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SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION, RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, AND
THE CREATION OF A SOCIAL PROBLEM: A CASE STUDY OF A
MOVEMENT FOR BATTERED WOMEN

The Ohio State University
Ph.D. 1979

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SOCIAL MOVEMENT, ORGANIZATION, RESOURCE MOBILIZATION, AND THE CREATION OF A SOCIAL PROBLEM: A CASE STUDY OF A MOVEMENT FOR BATTERED WOMEN

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
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* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1979

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Since two assumptions behind this study are that power, or the ability to get things done, resides in resources and that the success of an endeavor is in part a function of the quantity and quality of the resources mobilized to carry it out, it seems appropriate to acknowledge here the providers of the various types of resources I was able to marshal in initiating and carrying out this research.

First, I found a valuable intellectual resource in E.L. Quarantelli, who has been my advisor for the past six years. Besides helping me refine my critical abilities and providing much needed guidance in the difficult art of framing research questions, he has offered me the freedom to study intensively topics in which I am truly interested—all too often a scarce commodity. Additionally, working with Professor Quarantelli, Russell R. Dynes, and my other colleagues at the Disaster Research Center has afforded a range of research experience as well as a number of valued friendships. Many thanks to those at DRC who were with me over the long haul.

I also wish to acknowledge the support provided by other members of the Ohio State University faculty with whom I have worked closely: Roscoe C. Hinkle and Clyde W. Franklin, Il, who directed my doctoral studies in sociological theory and social psychology, respectively; John Seidler and Katherine Meyer, who made many valuable contributions to earlier versions of this manuscript; and Alfred C. Clarke and Timothy J. Curry, who
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Those cited above helped me forge the instruments and provided some of the tools for approaching my task. Another important resource—the raw materials which eventually became the finished product—was furnished by activists in the anti-wifebeating movement who, despite numerous, pressing obligations, took the time to share with me their knowledge of the wife abuse problem and the organized struggle against it. Because of the constraints of confidentiality, I cannot acknowledge each individual who provided data for the study here, but I do want them to know that my thanks and respect for their work go far beyond mere appreciation for their contributions to this study: that I am grateful for their help goes without saying; over and above that, however, I am in awe of what they have accomplished on behalf of women forced to live with the brutality of domestic violence. Their contribution to society is real; may it be lasting.

Even though the intellectual tools and the raw materials were present, I required another resource to insure that the latter would be turned into a finished product: manual dexterity. Jayme Littleton transformed my
jottings into a readable manuscript so swiftly and accurately that I sometimes suspected she maintained a secret team of typing elves, working around the clock to turn out flawless pages on demand. Shari Carres also made a major contribution to the manuscript by typing the bibliography.

That I am presently in a position to thank those listed above for the resources they provided is due in large measure to the generosity and understanding of my husband, Raymond Horner and my son, Justin Horner. No pro forma nods to "the family" here: Ray has sustained my efforts in ways too numerous to mention, and without his daily support, encouragement--and, yes, even his outright bulldozing--the other resources noted above may have never been utilized. Justin put up with my absences, fits of temper and spells of preoccupation with a sweet patience that is rare, even among grownups. I love them and thank them both with all my heart.

With resources like these at my disposal, can there by any doubt whose fault it is if the finished product doesn't manage to do the job?
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I. INTRODUCTION

Background and Objectives of this Study

In several Western countries, notably England (Pizzey, 1974) and the United States, the last five years have seen the beginning of organized efforts to seek social and political changes which would benefit victims of wife-abuse. A variety of remedies have been sought by movement partisans; these include: making both criminal and civil divisions of the legal system more responsive to the claims of battered women; passing legislation in the domestic violence area; diverting offenders from the legal system into counseling programs; educating particular groups, e.g., police and judges, as well as the general public about the incidence and dynamics of spouse abuse; and, perhaps most significant, establishing shelters or safe-houses for battered women. Efforts to improve the plight of abused women appear to be growing in numbers, spreading in terms of their geographic distribution, and drawing increasing attention from the media, opinion leaders, and established institutions. More than 170 shelter homes for battered wives have opened in the U.S. since 1975, according to one source (U.S. News and World Report, 1979). Special legislation aimed at the reduction of domestic violence has recently been put into effect in a number of states, and Congress considered, but did not pass, two domestic violence bills during the last Congressional session. Even in the absence of a legislative mandate, however, various federal agencies
have instituted programs aimed at ameliorating the hardships of abuse victims. A recent book on the wife abuse problem has termed these and similar efforts "the fastest growing social movement in America." (Davidson, 1978)

In the Midwestern community which is the setting for this research, the last three years have been marked by the active involvement of several groups concerned with the problems of battered women. Two recently-formed organizations currently offer shelter to women who must flee from violent homes; members of another group sheltered abuse victims for a period of time and attempted to form an ongoing shelter. Three other groups have had various types of action on behalf of battered women as either their sole reason for functioning or as an important organizational goal. These social movement organizations (SMO's) range from loosely organized networks and small groups meeting sporadically to corporate entities with charters, by-laws, and boards of directors. Budgets range from virtually nonexistent amounts to sums in excess of $100,000. The various SMO's differ in goals, ideology, and structure and have employed different strategies of resource mobilization, with different outcomes.

This dissertation reports the results of a comparative case study which takes as its subject matter the characteristics and social history of these organizations. Broadly stated, its objectives are:

--to describe the organizations and to chart their careers, with emphasis on the varying degrees of success enjoyed by the groups

--to gain insight into factors affecting the careers of these SMO's through an analysis of organizational attributes and interorganizational linkages; and
to make a contribution to the social movement literature by deriving from this data a set of general and abstract principles which may explain the differential success rates of SMO's concerned with the same social issues.

The second and third objectives will be accomplished through the use of principles and generalizations which are consistent both with the resource mobilization approach to social movements and with well-known scholarly works on interorganizational relations.

Potential Significance of this Research

Besides having value because it provides an in-depth socio-historical account of the emergence and careers of a group of SMO's concerned with an important social issue, this study is significant because it not only compensates for some of the one-sided treatments of social movements which appear in the literature, but also considers aspects of social movements the literature has tended to neglect. Specifically, the study makes a contribution by: focusing on organizational, rather than individual attributes in discussing social movements; treating the activities of social movement organizations as no less rational than those of other goal-oriented organizations; adopting a multi- and interorganizational focus; defining organizational success in concrete, relatively measurable, and theoretically justifiable terms; and considering failed social movement organizations along with those which survived. Each of these points will be elaborated upon below.

The Organization as a Focus for Analysis in the Study of Social Movements

Like their counterparts in the broader field of sociology, sociological studies of social movements undertaken in the United States have tended
to favor individualistic, voluntaristic/motivational, and social-psychological explanations for social movement emergence and maintenance. With a few exceptions (cf Zald and Ash, 1966; Zurcher and Curtis, 1973; Curtis and Zurcher, 1974; Gamson, 1975) theoretical and empirical approaches to social movement topics emphasize socio-psychological or socio-cultural factors, both in discussions of the antecedent conditions leading to movement emergence and in analyses of movement recruitment, growth, and dynamics. Factors such as frustration and relative deprivation—intrinsically psychological phenomena—have been posited as forerunners of social movement activity by popular and scholarly writers too numerous to cite (but cf Gurr, 1969; 1970; Davies, 1969; 1971; Morrison, 1973). Use of social psychological imagery is even more favored in explanations of movement recruitment and participation; such analyses range from the relatively vulgar (Hoffer, 1951) to the more sophisticated theories and are based both in Freudian (Freud, 1922; Fromm, 1941) and in Durkheimian theory. The latter category includes much of the relative deprivation and status inconsistency literature as well as writings stressing alienation, mass society, and social dislocation as factors producing various forms of psychic stress and impelling people to seek solutions to this stress through collective action (cf Cohn, 1957; Gusfield, 1962; Geschwender, 1964).

A substantial portion of the literature in the social movements area adheres to the tradition of voluntaristic nominalism by: viewing individuals rather than groups as primary social actors; emphasizing motives as the wellsprings of human behavior; and viewing social trends additively—as the result of the spreading of attitudes, beliefs, or practices through
a population. While many present day approaches constitute a distinct improvement over earlier approaches to social movement emergence and maintenance, which were based on notions such as convergence, imitation, suggestion, and contagion, they display the same biases evident in the field of sociology as a whole. As Hinkle and Hinkle note, in American sociology:

> the feeling, knowing and willing of individuals--though limited by cultural prescriptions and social controls--are taken to be the ultimate source of human interaction, social structure, and social change (1954: 1972).

Weller and Quarantelli (1973) point out that many of the writings on social movements and collective behavior stress psychological and socio-psychological aspects of these phenomena at the expense of the social organizational dimension. While social structure has of course not been totally ignored in present-day treatments of social movements, it has been seen largely as a context or backdrop explaining why individuals might be motivated to join movements. With certain exceptions (Gurian and Hine, 1970), analyses of the social structure of movements themselves tend to be limited to such topics as the leader/follower distinction and the division of labor within a movement (cf. J. Wilson, 1973; Howard, 1974). The status of theory and research in the field has been such that one writer argued as recently as 1974 that "Many scientists and laymen persist in believing that political protest movements...consist primarily of frustrated people who have nothing better to do with their time and no better device to relieve their discontent" (Orum, 1974: 182).

One consequence of this focus on individual-level phenomena such as motivations is that it has not only tended to ignore the important sociological question of the relationship of social movements to social structure
and social change but also tended to lead to efforts to explain social movement formation in terms of individual pathology. Another consequence of this downplaying of social organizational factors is that, due to the tremendous influence of social groupings—e.g., institutions, organizations, and groups—on behavior, social movement theories lack both explanatory and predictive power. In part to compensate for these kinds of biases, this analysis treats movement groups as organizations, rather than as collectivities composed of aggrieved individuals. Organizational attributes such as goals and domain, as well as relationships between movement organizations and other community organizations and sectors are emphasized, and relatively little attention is paid to the psychic qualities, dispositions, and motivations of members.

The Rationality/Irrationality Issue

Scholars interested in the study of non-traditional, noninstitutionalized social behavior have almost invariably found themselves confronting the question of whether this type of behavior is less rational and/or instrumental, and more impulsive, irrational, or non-rational than behavior which conforms more closely to societal practices. While the study of social movements has not been plagued by the rationality/irrationality dilemma to the same extent as the study of other forms of collective behavior such as the panic and the crowd, approaches viewing social movement phenomena as less than rational have not been entirely absent from the literature (cf. Lang and Lang, 1961; Smelser, 1963; Klapp, 1969). These kinds of views have been criticized extensively on two major grounds: that they make the assumption of homogeneity of mood among movement participants; and that they not only ignore the means-oriented components of
emergent social behavior, but also downplay the irrational aspects of institutionalized behavior. Turner (1964) and Turner and Killian (1972) for example criticize the "contagion" and "convergence" notions of collective behavior and social movements—the former for its assumption of homogeneity and loss of critical faculties among participants and the latter primarily for the homogeneity assumption. Other writers (Oberschall, Berk, 1974) point out that all forms of emergent social behavior are more complex than was once believed and that no single attribute, mood, or motive can be said to characterize an episode of collective behavior. At the same time, a related line of analysis (Weller and Quarantelli, 1973) stresses the fact that using the rational/irrational distinction when discussing collective behavior and social movements lacks utility; such terms are vacuous, as they neither differentiate collective behavior from other social behavior nor specify its essential characteristics. In short, as Marx and Wood (1975) note, recent collective behavior analyses have displayed a marked tendency to avoid emphasizing irrationality and/or non-rationality as a characteristic of social movements or collective behavior in general and to stress the continuity between emergent and institutionalized social behavior.

By focusing primarily on organizations, rather than individuals, this study approaches social movement phenomena in a fashion that renders the old rationality/irrationality issue moot and, at the same time, continues in the newer tradition which emphasizes the similarities in the various forms of social behavior. It concerns itself, not with the motives or behavior of individual social movement participants, but with the activities of social movement organizations, which are viewed as seeking to acquire
resources both for stated goals and for organizational maintenance. The research thus uses a model of group behavior which is relatively rationalistic; social movement organizations are seen as resembling established organizations in that they carry out their activities in ways that promote their own interests. In this analysis, then, social movement organizations act in ways that other "rational" organizations act: they elaborate structure, set goals, establish networks of linkages and exchanges with other organizations, and so on.

Movements as Networks of Organizations

In one way or another, most of the social movement literature acknowledges the significance of the social context for the emergence and the course of social movements. Particularly since the 1960's, the impact of social support and social control on movement dynamics has received a great deal of attention (See Zald and Ash, 1966; Turner, 1970). Yet too often, empirical studies of social movements fail to systematically take the interorganizational environment into account; one writer argues that students of social movements must be cautious lest they fall into what Whitehead terms the fallacy of simple location, or the view that entities may be studied in and of themselves without reference to either their relationship with other entities or the passage of time. (Lauer, 1976) Moreover, as McCarthy and Zald note, movements have frequently been depicted in a reactive, rather than an active, stance in relation to other organizations, and relatively little emphasis has been given to "ways in which such social movement organizations can utilize the environment for their own purposes" (1977: 1217). This study is somewhat unusual, then, in
that it focuses systematically on, and gives major emphasis to the relationships which developed among several social movement organizations in a community, as well as on the linkages movement groups were able to form with established community organizations. The discussion of patterns of interorganizational linkages and their consequences relies not only on the literature on social movements and voluntary organizations, but also on relevant writings on interorganizational relations. This emphasis follows logically from the choice of the resource mobilization framework as a guiding theoretical perspective, since this approach emphasizes the importance of extra-organizational sources of movement support for the careers of social movements. In keeping with this theoretical perspective, it will be argued that the establishment of beneficial interorganizational linkages is an important precondition for successful resource mobilization. Turner and Killian state that:

The rise and decline of a movement often depends more upon the coalitions formed with groups having established power at their disposal than upon the rise and decline of grass-roots discontent. (1972: 247)

Jenkins and Perrow (1977) also note that what may make a social movement organization successful at one time and unsuccessful at another is the presence or absence of support from powerful sectors in society. For this reason, considerable attention will be paid in this analysis to the linkages and exchanges which developed between the emergent groups studied and large, established organizations having significant resources at their disposal.
Criteria of Organizational Success

Assessing social movement success has proved problematic for students of social movements for a number of reasons. Institutionalization, or the acceptance of the movement as a legitimate actor in the community or society, is frequently mentioned as a criterion of movement success. However, as some discussions imply (Turner and Killian, 1972) this criterion is open to question because, since social movements typically do not survive institutionalization "intact", having relinquished aspects of their programs in order to obtain legitimacy, institutionalization is never total. Similarly, difficulties inhere in the use of goal realization as a criterion of success. Far from remaining constant, goals exist in a dynamic relationship with other aspects of movements; both the number and the nature of a movement's goals typically change in the course of its career (Levitas, 1977). Adopting goal realization as a yardstick for success also introduces an implicit bias which favors social movements which have limited, reformist objectives (Gamson, 1968). Analyses which treat societal impact as a standard for judging success can meet with difficulties in attempting to demonstrate that specific social changes occurred as a result of the movement, rather than due to other factors. Finally, as Turner and Killian (1972) indicate, both member increase and organizational survival prove largely unsuitable for judging the success of a movement. Not all movements need a mass base to achieve their goals, so an increase in membership does not necessarily signify an increase in movement viability. Some movements may survive largely because they "sell out" their original goals and substitute new ones; thus mere organizational survival lacks utility as a criterion for movement success.
Some of the theoretical and empirical problems with the concept of movement success may be traceable to the above-mentioned tendency to place undue emphasis on the "culture" of social movements and to neglect the social organizational dimension. For example, the accomplishments of the "Labor Movement", the "Black Movement" and the "Women's Movement" are often equated in the sociological literature—as they are in the popular press—with the successes of particular social movement organizations, such as the CIO, the NAACP and the National Organization for Women. The goals, strategies, successes, failures, and contributions of non-mainstream or extinct social movement organizations—the IWW, the communist and syndicalist labor organizations, the Garveyites, SNCC, WITCH, the Redstockings—are more or less ignored when movement success is discussed. By equating the broadest goals and values of some or many organizations with the goals and values of movements themselves, those attempting to gauge social movement success miss the point that, while some movement organizations become successful, others, concerned with the same broad and general goals, do not. This analysis brings a needed perspective by recognizing that the gains attributed to a social movement can probably more fruitfully be credited to specific social movement organizations. Using a framework that is consistent with the resource mobilization approach to social movements and the system-resource approach to organizational effectiveness (Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967; Molnar and Rogers, 1976), organizations are characterized as more or less successful by demonstrating their ability to mobilize resources. Using this approach not only gives the notion of success more solid empirical grounding but also begins to
shed light on the means by which particular movement organizations come to speak for and define a "movement" and to influence social policy.

Non-surviving Organizations as Important Elements in Analyses of Social Movements

Sociological accounts nearly always focus on successful social movements, or at the very least, on movements which have succeeded in surviving for a substantial period of time. Within the social movement literature, it has primarily been those writers concerned with comparing insurrections and revolutions (Hobsbawm, 1959; Oppenheimer, 1969; Russell, 1974; Greene, 1974; Tilly, 1978) that have attempted to come to terms with movement dissolution or failure in a systematic manner. This is unfortunate, since ephemeral movements and organizations or those which do not succeed in bringing about the adoption of their programs are, in some ways, as relevant for sociological analysis as those which do. As Killian (1964) notes, some movements which fail as organizational entities can nevertheless have an influence both on social structure and on the development of other movements. In discussing the natural history approach to social movements, which takes as its prototypical case the fully institutionalized movement, Lang and Lang state:

Actually, the study of abortive social movements may bolster our understanding of their mechanics considerably more than the concern with specific patterns. (1978: 96)

The point they are making is essentially that any analysis seeking to determine why social movements succeed can benefit from a consideration of why movements fail to accomplish their goals or go out of existence before they can. In attempting to establish the conditions which may have led to success for some local organizations involved in the movement for
battered women, this analysis will incorporate observations about the characteristics and activities of organizations which were not successful as well as from those which were.

Besides striving for greater clarity in the five general areas outlined above, the study should prove interesting for other reasons. As suggested above, it will employ a resource mobilization approach to social movements and therefore will emphasize the role played by professionals who "free-lance" or sometimes even make careers out of movement involvement. In line with this perspective, the study sees social movement growth less in terms of attitude change and growth in mass support and more as a type of interest group or pressure group politics. It attempts to describe in concrete terms how concerned groups "create" social problems by lobbying for a place for their cause on the community agenda. Finally, it demonstrates the tremendous variation which is present in the social movement phenomenon by giving examples of ways in which local organizations seeking to reverse society-wide inequities must adapt to local, social and political realities, as well as ways locally-based organizations may influence collective action and official policy at the national level.

Organization of Remaining Chapters

This chapter consists of a general discussion of the subject matter of the study and the contributions it can make to knowledge in the area of social movements by focusing on topics which have been neglected. Several points introduced in this discussion will be elaborated upon in other sections.
Chapter II contains a lengthy discussion of the theoretical model, analytic strategy, concepts, and methodology employed in the study. Two contrasting models of social movement emergence are discussed and a rationale is provided for the specific methods employed in this research. Chapter III provides background for the discussion of the local movement by describing the dimensions of the wife-abuse problem, discussing the recent increase in publicity surrounding the problem, and presenting a chronology of anti-wife-abuse activities which had a nationwide impact. Chapter IV is a descriptive account of the formation, characteristics, and activities of local groups concerned with the wife-beating problem, placed in the community context. Chapter V compares and contrasts the various groups in terms of key analytic dimensions seen as affecting their ability to mobilize resources. Chapter VI contains an abstract model and set of propositions about relationships among these factors which constitute a middle-range theory of SMO success. Chapter VII reiterates the objectives of the study; discusses the extent to which the objectives were met; and comments upon the implications of the study for the study of social movements and for understanding social change.
II.
THEORETICAL BASIS AND METHODOLOGY OF THIS STUDY

This chapter contains a discussion of the guiding theoretical framework for the study, the analytic approach chosen for viewing the social movement for battered women, and the methodology which directed the conduct of the study. The discussion begins with a brief history and general outline of each of two opposing approaches to social movement phenomena, the traditional grass-roots or grievance model and the newer resource mobilization model. These two types of perspectives will be contrasted in terms of the assumptions they make about conditions for the emergence of, and participation in, social movements as well as in terms of the dimensions of social movement phenomena they select for analysis and measurement. It will be suggested that, of the two views, the resource mobilization perspective contains assumptions and imagery which can more fruitfully be employed in an analysis of the movement for battered women.

Following the theoretical discussion, the major concepts to be employed in analyzing the activities of the organizations working on behalf of battered women will be introduced. An effort will be made to point out links which exist between these concepts and both the resource mobilization approach to social movements and the resource model of organizational effectiveness, which is prominent in interorganizational theory and research.
Finally, the basic research foci, the outlines of the analytic strategy and the details of the methodology employed in the study will be discussed. It will be noted that this research is primarily inductive; that is, its object is the development of an empirically-based model accounting for the growth of movement organizations, not the testing of a model. The sources of data, the choice of informants, the data-gathering methods, and the areas focused upon in interviews and in the analysis of documents will also be discussed.

Grass Roots and Resource Mobilization: Contrasting Approaches to Social Movements

The "grass roots" or "grievance-level" perspective on social movements and the resource-mobilization approach are two ideal-typical explanations of social movements. Neither constitutes a "theory" in the strict sense, and both are relatively heterogeneous; yet each is without question an identifiable school of thought. Because resource mobilization is the newer of the two perspectives—at least insofar as American sociology is concerned—and because what resource mobilization is not is currently somewhat more clear than what it is, the "grievance" perspective will be discussed briefly, and resource mobilization will then be contrasted with it. This treatment should help shed light, not only on the differences in concepts and theoretical assumptions between the two models, but also on the implications of these differences for which aspects of social movements are singled out for study.

It is not possible to discuss, summarize, and distinguish the many theoretical approaches falling under the grievance/deprivation rubric here. However, an attempt will be made to summarize the approach in
general terms, to point out essential concepts, and to suggest the kinds of phenomena the perspective tends to focus upon. The grass roots approach will then be contrasted with the concepts and assumptions of the resource mobilization school.

Classical Social Movement Theories

Grass roots, or traditional theories of social movements are as old as sociology itself. The roots of the contemporary relative deprivation/rising expectations perspective can be found in Marx's (1964) thesis that revolutions come about in part as a result of the increased poverty of the working class, relative to the bourgeoisie and in de Tocqueville's (1971) observation that the strongest support for the French Revolution came from those parts of the country that had experienced the greatest improvement in the standard of living. Widely used and made prominent by the work of individuals such as James C. Davies (1969; 1971), James Geschwender (1964; 1968), and Geschwender and Singer (1970), this perspective has greatly influenced much of the present-day social movement literature. The equally influential frustration-aggression approach to social movements owes its prominence in part to the hegemony of Freudian psychology earlier in this century, to the rise of experimental social psychology, which pioneered research on aggression, and to the writings of theorists such as Gurr (1969; 1970), who applied propositions concerned with individual aggression to the societal level.

Turner and Killian convey the spirit of the grass roots approach in this passage:
According to this view, frustration that affects increasing numbers of people, more and more intensely, leads to mushrooming discontent. Identifying this common frustration and agreeing upon a plan to reform the offensive conditions, the discontented band together to promote their objectives. (1972: 247)

While many approaches (cf. Gurr, 1969; 1970) are much more elaborate and sophisticated than the Turner and Killian passage suggests, most are reducable to the same sort of reasoning. Grass roots perspectives take the position that social movements "are the products of problem situations, discontent, deprivation, frustration, anomie, isolation, hopelessness, or status reassertion." (Rush and Denisoff, 1971: 160)

The line or argument pursued by adherents of traditional theories is straightforward and plausible: in essence, it combines the old, tried and true notion that tensions, disorganization, or rapid change in the social system produce increased psychological stress in individual members of society with the notion that, if allowed to grow and spread, and provided other necessary factors are present, this inner tension could lead to social movements seeking changes in societal conditions which would benefit those experiencing pressure. Davies (1971) explained three episodes of intense societal strife--Dorr's Rebellion, the Russian Revolution, and the 1952 Egyptian Revolution--by tracing the outbreaks of unrest to the societal instability that preceeded them, for example.

A frequent theme in traditional approaches to social movements stresses the importance of relative, as opposed to absolute, hardship as well as the significance of the perceptual dimension, for the formation of grievances. Thus, social categories are considered deprived if they come to define themselves as deprived, and this defining process always requires
the presence of a visible comparison or reference group. Thus, Geschwender (1964) attributes the rise in black militancy in the 1960's to the growing status discrepancy between blacks and whites. While blacks in the 60's had advanced, relative to their 1940's status, so had whites, and at a more rapid rate. Although better off in absolute terms, blacks in the 1960's had actually lost status, compared with whites, and were beginning to behave accordingly. Similarly, Morrison and Steeves (1967) in a survey or research on participation in the National Farmer's Organization, a social movement seeking better pricing arrangements for farmers, find that most studies show NF0 participants are generally better-off economically than non participants but also hold higher aspirations and display a greater propensity to see social structural arrangements as the source of their less privileged status. In other studies (cf. Searles and Williams, 1962; Crawford and Naditch, 1968) use of relative deprivation and frustration/aggression principles has meant at least a theoretical—if not an empirical—focus on individual perceptual states, feelings, and related psychological processes.

Another element in many traditional social movement formulations is an explicit or implicit notion of additivity or proportionality of grievances. Gurr (1970) in particular argues that more intense deprivation results in more sustained and/or fervent anti-regime activity, other things being equal. Similar arguments can be noted in writings which suggest that the more widespread a particular type of deprivation becomes in a society, the more likely, or the more intense, the organized opposition to it.
McCarthy and Zald (1973) note other assumptions which are often implicit in traditional social movement analyses. One concerns the importance of the membership or mass base of a movement for providing funds and human resources to the organization as well as a sense of direction to the movement leadership. According to this view, the membership provides a great deal of what is needed for movement programs; one consequence of this state of affairs is that leaders must be aware of and attempt to conform to its preferences. Leites and Wolf (1970) make a similar point concerning traditional perspectives, or what they term the "hearts and minds" approach. They state that this perspective assumes, among other things, that revolutions need popular support to begin and be maintained; that revolutions become stronger when poverty and inequality, their sources, increase; and that intra-movement processes are more important than exogenous factors in accounting for the growth of revolution.

Criticisms of the Grass Roots Approach

The major grass-roots or traditional perspectives on social movements are variants on Marxian and Durkheimian sociological theories; their socio-psychological elements have been widely researched; they are consistent with the individualist assumptions of the dominant strain of American sociology; and they have achieved prominence through the efforts of energetic researchers. Nevertheless, theory and research based on classical social movement imagery have been criticized on both theoretical and methodological grounds. The former include criticisms citing conceptual vagueness and lack of explanatory power. Marx and Holzner (1977), for example, take issue with strain/grievance models of social movement
emergence and development for: assuming, rather than specifying and empirically examining, links between social structure and personality; failing to distinguish between the causes, dimensions, and consequences of S-M phenomena; and assuming not only that most individuals are similar in the amounts of stress they can tolerate, but also that S-M participants possess higher stress levels than non-participants. Other writers argue that, since strain, deprivation, lack of integration, and the like are always present in any society to some degree, these kinds of concepts are trivial when it comes to explaining social movements. As Oberschall states:

The conclusion that several diverse patterns of economic change must bear some direct and indirect links to social disturbances, and that this link of mediated by some intervening social psychological processes, is inescapable, but not very helpful. (1973: 37-38)

Turner and Killian make the same point when they argue that, while deprivational theories almost certainly contain a grain of truth, it should be remembered that:

The emotion arising from deprivation is seldom as important as effective organization in sustaining a movement; and ...The rise and decline of a movement often depends more upon the coalitions formed with groups having established power at their disposal than upon the rise and decline of grassroots discontent. (1972: 247)

Orum, another critic, states bluntly that such theories "try to explain too much with too little." (1974: 192)

Methodological criticisms of different empirical studies are too numerous to discuss thoroughly. Major problems with empirical applications of traditional social movement imagery seem to center on the tendency for researchers to fail to obtain measures of frustration or
discontent that are independent of movement participation (Hyman, 1972) and on the related failure to determine whether perceptions and expressions of discontent precede or follow movement emergence. As Portes notes:

Successful revolutions have sought historical legitimacy through imputation to the previous regime of qualities which made it unbearable for the vast majority of the people. Thus, revolutionary historiography has depicted the origins of the movement as arising from the spontaneous reaction of the masses to intolerable deprivation. (1971: 42)

Thus, this literature is open to criticism from those who argue that it confuses the ideology of revolutions and other social movements with the conditions which gave rise to them. (See Gurney and Tierney, 1979, for a lengthy and detailed analysis of the theoretical and empirical adequacy of the relative deprivation theory of social movements.)

Finally, a growing body of research exists which qualifies or contradicts several assumptions made by scholars in the grass roots tradition. Many of these studies are related to the emerging resource-mobilization perspective, to which the discussion will now turn.

The Resource Mobilization Approach to Social Movements

The resource mobilization perspective has become increasingly prominent in social movement theory and research in recent years (Marx and Wood, 1975). This theoretical shift is attributable to forces both in society and in social science. There is, for example, a growing awareness that it is often social movement groups which make the community or society aware that problems exist which require socially devised solutions. A common sense view of social problems seems to suggest that "society" moves more or less automatically to correct extreme injustices; moreover, as
indicated above, traditional views of social movements suggest that corrective movements arise when inequities become sufficiently widespread and severe. Social scientists, on the other hand, are increasingly taking the position that many social changes occur because groups organize to make the public aware that a problem exists and to pressure, persuade, bargain, or coerce concessions from those possessing power and influence. Stated succinctly, for these scholars, public discontent is the consequence, not the cause, of movement agitation. According to this view, the "creation" of social problems is the task of organizations formed for that purpose. Additionally, as is the case with any manufacturing concern, these organizations must gather resources to "market" the "product." Conceptualizing social problems as the product of social movements is a potentially fruitful approach, as demonstrated in studies on drug abuse (Duster, 1970) juvenile delinquency (Platt, 1969) mental illness (Connery, 1968) the problems of the city (Banfield, 1970) and rape (Rose, 1977) as well as in general approaches to the study of social movement phenomena (Blumer, 1971; Mauss, 1975).

The increasing use of the resource mobilization perspective may also be due to a growing appreciation of the role "professionalized" core or leadership groups in social movement activities in American life (McCarthy and Zald, 1973). Examples of heavily professionalized movements are Common Cause, various Welfare Rights groups and movement organizations in the pro- and anti-abortion and pro- and anti-ERA camps. Many movement organizations are directed by professional staffs, function by means of contributions from concerned citizens who are otherwise uninvolved in movement programs, and seek to benefit either society in general or some
special group—which may or may not even have knowledge of the movement. Scholars and the general public, then, are becoming aware that social movement phenomena can be very complex; the growth of professionalized movements has demonstrated that movements do not necessarily consist of aggrieved individuals seeking change for themselves and that those on whose behalf a movement works may not be members themselves and in fact may contribute little.

New ways of thinking about social movements—such as those which focus on social problems as the product of movement activity and as enterprises directed by professionals—are of course part of the legacy of the 1960's. In fact, at least one writer (Gamson, 1975) credits the involvement of social scientists in the movements of the 1960's with hastening the apparent demise of theories which stress participants' psychological attributes and the rise of resource-oriented perspectives. According to Gamson, scholarly debunking of popular theories of black and student activism led logically to a questioning by students of social movements of all approaches emphasizing dispositional, attitudinal, and social disorganization explanations of social movements.

Adding to the social conditions facilitating the shift to resource-oriented analyses of social movements is a body of theory and research in economics, political science, and sociology that is rich both quantitatively and qualitatively. Much of this work merely called into question either common-sense or traditional notions about social movements. For example, Olson argued in The Logic of Collective Action (1965) that there are no grounds for assuming that people automatically organize to pursue
collective goods and that rationally-based economic theories suggest the obverse should occur, i.e., that because of the costs involved, individuals will not unite to seek collectively values they would realize if they did not seek them actively. By reminding social scientists that organizations do not simply emerge but rather must be brought into being through struggles which have to overcome the human tendency to go on with daily life and not "get involved," Olson's work pointed to a need to understand the means by which groups attempting to obtain benefits are organized and maintained.

At almost the same time, an impressive body of studies began to question research on the contribution of conditions such as alienation, relative deprivation, and societal disorganization to the emergence of social movements. Pinard questioned mass society approaches to social movements, which focus on the individual's atomization or lack of imbeddedness in social networks as a factor facilitating their recruitment into social movements. Pinard argued that, contrary to this view, membership in primary and secondary social networks renders an individual more likely to participate in social movement activity, and that "integrated individuals and pluralistic societies will be more prone to social and political movements than atomized people and mass societies." (1967: 689) The late 1960's and early 1970's saw a minor flood of research on the relationship between social participation and involvement in political movements. Marx (1967) and Orum (1972) both argued that the most significant common characteristic of movement members is not relative deprivation, but prior organizational membership and involvement in
political activity. In the same vein, Portes (1971) demonstrated that social integration, rather than isolation, was a predictor of political radicalism among the Chilean population he studied.

Accompanying the line of research which challenged sociological assumptions about movement genesis and maintenance was a felicitous cross-pollination by ideas from political science, particularly those dealing with interest groups, pressure groups, and publics. Lowi (1971) considered several social movements in his analysis of interest group functioning and is credited by McCarthy and Zald (1973) with attempting to synthesize "interest group" and "social movement" analyses, carried out in political science and sociology, respectively. Wilson's *Political Organizations* (1973), which borrowed a great deal from Olson's economic theory and drew extensively upon earlier research on social participation and movement membership, was influential in several respects: it conceptualized participation in social movements as a rational endeavor for the individual and treated social movements themselves as rational enterprises; it explored the makeup and operation of various incentives for "holding" movement members; it emphasized the dynamics of the competition for resources among voluntary associations; and it explored not only the influence of policy on the functioning of voluntary associations, but also the impact of the latter on the former.

If political scientists are increasingly coming to view the formulation of policy as a result of political activity by unconventional as well as conventional interest groups, sociologists are becoming increasingly aware of the political nature of social movements. They are focusing to a greater degree on such phenomena as: the struggle for power and
resources against resistance by the dominant group (Snyder and Tilly, 1972); movements as actors challenging the political status quo (Gamson, 1975); and movements as parties in social conflict (Oberschall, 1973). Accompanying this change in focus is a declining emphasis on the expressive aspects of movement activity and on the "culture" of social movements—beliefs, values, and ideology—except insofar as these either facilitate or hamper the struggle for political leverage.

A comprehensive theory of resource mobilization has not yet been developed. However, McCarthy and Zald have cited five assumptions (actually, assumptions and related methodological implications) which they argue are "central to the perspective" (1977: 1216). Paraphased, these principles are: 1) movement activity entails conflict and/or preparation for conflict; conflict necessitates the aggregation of resources; therefore, "study of the aggregation of resources (money and labor) is crucial to an understanding of movement activity;" 2) organization is necessary for resource aggregation; hence, the study of social movement organizations is essential for the understanding of movement activities; 3) knowledge about the involvement in social movements of groups other than movement beneficiaries is important for understanding the fate of movements; 4) the flow of resources to and away from specific movements can be conceptualized in terms of principles of supply and demand; and 5) a consideration of attendant costs and rewards is important for understanding the participation of individuals and groups in social movements.

Other works which might be grouped under the rubric "studies in resource mobilization" have tended to focus more or less on the kinds of issues outlined by McCarthy and Zald. Zurcher and Curtis (1973) and
Curtis and Zurcher (1974), for example, treated social movement groups as complex organizations characterized by varying combinations of goals, membership requirements, types of member incentives, contact with the environment, styles of leadership, and membership composition. They continued the line of argument begun by Zald and Ash (1966), and saw the fate of a movement as a partial consequence of variation in these structural components. Salisbury (1969) explored the types of incentives which operate between the organizers or leaders of social movements—the entrepreneurs—and those who join movements—the customers or clients—from the perspective of exchange theory. Walsh (1976) assessed the adequacy of the resource mobilization approach in accounting for the patterns of activity and changes in the United Farm Workers' Union. Reasoning that relations between a movement organization and its environment are the means by which resource aggregation is made possible, Aveni (1978) presented data on the linkages that existed between the NAACP and other organizations over a decade in an effort to account for the strength of its influence. Tilly et al (1975) have continued with historical inquiries into the relationship between macro-societal characteristics and trends and the incidence of collective violence; these studies see collective violence as the result of the political struggle between those in authority and solidary groups mobilized to obtain or defend their rights and interests. Jenkins and Perrow (1977) found that a major factor accounting for the successes of the United Farm Workers' movement in the 1960's was not changes either in the movement organization or in its support base, but was rather an increase in support given to the movement by established institutions, including government.
In a recent article (1978), Oberschall contrasts the traditional and the resource mobilization approaches to social conflict by suggesting that the most basic difference between the two views is that the former emphasizes disruptions or the "breakdown" of the social order as antecedent conditions to movement activity, while the latter emphasizes social solidarity. Each theoretical stance has further implications for how related processes are conceptualized. Selected portions of Oberschall's argument suggest the following relevant contrasts between the two perspectives:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Breakdown theories</th>
<th>Solidarity theories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social changes produce societal imbalances, leading to accumulated individual frustrations, which mount and are discharged in conflict and which are later dissipated through institutional channels.</td>
<td>Social changes affect the emergence and activity of conflict groups mainly indirectly, by facilitating or inhibiting group potential for mobilization and through their effect on the power of social control agents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent collective outbursts originate from sources similar to those which give rise to &quot;pathological&quot; behavior--mental illness, suicide, and the like.</td>
<td>Collective outbursts arise from the same circumstances which produce other forms of collective action, including conventional political behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective violence is the product of an irrational seeking after the release of tension.</td>
<td>Collective violence is merely one form of collective action, directed towards the acquisition of or the maintenance of group interests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These contrasting observations, combined with elements of the preceding discussion of the resource mobilization perspective and related research, suggest several essential properties of the resource mobilization approach which can be said to distinguish it from earlier perspectives on social movements. They are as follows:
1. Stress is a ubiquitous condition in society; moreover, social movements themselves can either result from, exacerbate, or produce feelings of stress in individuals. Thus, the relationship between stress and social movement emergence is a matter for empirical investigation.

2. Social movement activity is purposive activity aimed at the attainment of collective goals; it is no less and no more rational than other forms of social behavior.

3. The emergence and course of social movements is affected by social structural factors which render collective action either more or less costly. Among the kinds of factors that could affect the careers of social movement organizations through altering cost/benefit ratios are: the policies of social control agents; the supply of discretionary time and money in the population; rewards available for participation in and support of movement groups; and the incentives offered by organizations and institutions competing for the energies of potential members and supporters.

4. The beneficiaries of a social movement (those the movement seeks to aid), its adherents (those who believe in its goals) and the constituents (supporters) of social movement organizations may be identical, similar, or different groups; this is a matter for empirical study and cannot be assumed a priori.

5. In most cases, the social movement organization is the smallest appropriate unit of analysis in the study of social movements.
6. Social movement organizations display a range of strategies in their relationships with one another and with established organizations. Co-operation, competition, coalition formation and related processes are important elements in the repertoire of movement organizations.

7. In studying social movement organizations, particular attention should be paid to external sources of movement support. The influx of various kinds of resources plays a major role in the career of movement organizations.

The foregoing analysis suggests that the recent history of sociological inquiries into social movements has been marked by: a decline in trust in psychological and socio-psychological explanations of social movements and an increase in the use of the language and concepts of economics, political science, and the sociology of organizations; a decrease in interest in the attributes of members and an increase in interest in the structural attributes of movement organizations; and a lessening of stress placed on the formation and function of movement ideology and a strengthening of the tendency to emphasize the acquisition of money and personnel, as in conventional politics. While the resource mobilization perspective is currently less a theory than a set of assumptions about collective action and imagery and sensitizing concepts adapted from the three fields mentioned above, it is sufficiently coherent as a perspective to be used fruitfully in empirical research.
Resource Mobilization as an Appropriate Perspective for Describing and Analyzing the Social Movement for Battered Women

Traditional "grievance" and "breakdown" theories of social movements would not serve well to explain the emergence and dynamics of the movement that is the focus of this study. An analytic strategy derived from concepts and assumptions in the resource mobilization tradition seems much more appropriate for understanding the movement for battered women, for several reasons. First, contrary to what might be expected based upon classical theories of social movements, this movement appears to be characterized by an extremely low degree of overlap between the active membership and the beneficiaries. Abused women, one of the most frustrated, aggrieved, and isolated categories of people in our society, have not been represented to any significant degree in either the leadership or the membership of the movement, no doubt because their energies are concentrated on sheer survival and avoidance of further trouble.

Second, contrary to what would be predicted according to views which focus on "generalized excitement" and "collective unrest" (Park, 1924; Blumer, 1951)—in short, on increased societal concern—as antecedents to movement formation, the general populace has shown considerable indifference to this form of violence against women. Indeed, it has been argued that husband-wide violence is normative in our society (Gelles, 1974; Straus, 1974; 1977). Major societal institutions and community organizations have been more or less silent on the problem. Prior to the last two or three years, mass media treatments of wife abuse as a problem have been virtually nonexistent. Scholarly research on domestic violence has literally just begun in this decade. Agencies which have jurisdiction in
spouse abuse cases—e.g., the police, the courts, and mental health and social service organizations—are only now beginning to identify wife abuse as a problem *sui generis*. Previously, professionals viewed this kind of violence mainly as a symptom of some underlying problem or as a part of a constellation of difficulties created by some other pathological situation, such as alcoholism, but not as the primary focus for intervention. A recent essay book review of literature on the problems of women of relevance to the social work profession (Johnson, 1976) mentions wife-beating once, in its closing paragraph. The bulk of the three-page article discusses rape and the victimization of women by the psychotherapeutic community as major concerns for the profession. Until recently, even feminist organizations have placed help for battered women low on their list of priorities, behind issues such as ERA passage, equal employment opportunity, abortion, better pay, and more day care facilities. A demand for aid for battered women was incorporated into the platform of the International Women's Year meeting in Houston, but even this required a struggle. Thus, far from taking advantage of a groundswell of public opinion demanding change, movement organizers have had to overcome societal difference and even opposition in launching their activities.

Third, the movement is characterized by considerable involvement by persons whose services are "donated," that is, taken away from their regular jobs. This form of movement "free labor" is discussed by McCarthy and Zald (1973) as common within newer social movements. While no systematic evidence is available on this point, there is some evidence that the leadership of groups working for battered women is largely middle-class, female, and professional, with approximately equal representation
from feminist, mental health, and social service organizations. While organized efforts for battered women are just beginning to take hold in many communities, links between this movement and both established organizations and "older," more structured movement organizations can be seen. The borrowing of time from other organizations to do movement work and the links with other organizations are both aspects of the movement which are considered by the resource mobilization perspective and which should be studied for a better understanding of the dynamics of movement organizations.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the acquisition of resources is both essential for and central to the functioning of many organizations in this movement. Those groups which form the core of the movement attempt to shelter women and keep them safe from their assailants. Since women who flee from violent homes usually take with them mainly their children and the clothes on their backs, providing shelter for numbers of women can be a very costly business. Divorces are often sought and charges are often filed in the domestic violence area; legal services are also costly. Female domestic violence victims often have profound difficulties in the areas of health, housing, education, and mental health. Those seeking to aid them must necessarily have resources to offer. The story of efforts on behalf of battered women is, in short, a story of a constant and unremitting scramble for dollars, space, and helping personnel. While not attempting to gainsay the argument that all social movements must aggregate resources in order to function, clearly, some movements need resources more than others, and need more of them. Moreover, the movement organizations in question have had to seek resources
from those other than their beneficiaries. Both the "outward" focus of movement groups and the necessary preoccupation with various kinds of resources seem to make this movement an ideal candidate for analysis by means of a resource-oriented perspective.

Major Concepts Employed in this Analysis

The resource mobilization perspective subsumes a variety of implicit and explicit assumptions, propositions, and concepts. These include propositions about phenomena ranging from macro-societal trends and processes to individual behavior. Obviously, no single study could utilize all these ideas and concepts. This analysis uses a relatively small number of basic concepts which are consistent both with the resource mobilization perspective and with the organizational and interorganizational foci of the study. In the section which follows, the most general and significant concepts used in the analysis are defined and discussed.¹

For analytic purposes, it is important to distinguish and discuss the implications of the terms social movement, social movement organization, and social movement industry. Writers tend to use the term social movement in a variety of ways, to refer to a social change issue or set of issues supported attitudinally by members of society; an issue or issues combined with some social organizational component; a collection of organizations working towards some common set of goals, e.g., the Black movement; and broad social trends, such as the Counterculture. Most writers would agree with Wilkinson (1971) that social movements always contain an element of preference—the goals or objectives the movement is seeking to promote—and an element of organization. In this analysis,
however, following writings in the resource mobilization tradition, preference and organization will be distinguished analytically from one another. A social movement (SM) will be defined as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution in society." (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1217-1218) A social movement organization (SMO) will be defined as "any discrete organization which identifies itself with the preferences of a social movement and attempts to implement its goals." (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1218) To be considered a SMO for this study, a group must have engaged in activities as an organization for a period of time; that is, it must have 1) possessed a name, title, or organizational charter; 2) had a definable membership; 3) had identifiable leaders or officers; 4) articulated goals and objectives identifying it as seeking increased aid for abused women; and 5) interacted with other organizations and the community at large as an organization.

SMO's can be distinguished from other groups they resemble. Wilkinson (1971) for example, distinguishes them from pressure groups by noting that the latter are more integrated into central political processes and into a relatively more restricted role than are the former. Some SMO's also superficially resemble voluntary associations, yet these kinds of organizations, unlike SMO's, need not necessarily be concerned with social change issues.

Because it does not assume that social movements necessarily attract aggrieved individuals working to improve their own position, the resource mobilization perspective distinguishes between beneficiaries, adherents, and constituents of various SMO's. Beneficiaries are those the movement
and its organizations seek to aid through their efforts. Adherents include all those persons who believe in the preferences of the movement. Constituents are those who support SMO's by giving time, money, or other resources. SMO's gain resources by transforming adherents into constituents.

The SM/SMO distinction is useful in that it recognizes that two or more organizational entities may express the same or similar preferences for social change, but may differ in structure, ideology, strategy, and even goals. As the later discussions comparing the six local SMO's will indicate, these differences can have profound implications for organizational survival and growth. It is important to distinguish SMO's from the more general concept of SM in this study because its focus is on the impact of organizational differences on the careers of groups interested in bringing about reforms in the same general area.

A social movement industry (SMI) is the organizational counterpart of a social movement; it is defined as the set of "all social movement organizations that have as their goal the attainment of the preferences of a social movement." (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1219) On the societal level, for example, it is presumably possible to identify the set of organizations which comprise the Labor Movement, the Environmental Movement, or the Women's Movement. This study treats the local community as the unit of analysis and focuses on the major actors in the SMI functioning on behalf of battered women--that is, on a set of organizations which emerged specifically around the issue of obtaining rights for abuse victims. Besides being consistent with the notion that grievances are sometimes "manufactured" by social movement entrepreneurs, the SMI concept
suggests that there is an element of competition in the functioning of SMO's; not only do different SMO's compete with one another for adherents and constituents, but SMI's themselves can be viewed as competing with one another for the loyalty of potential adherents and supports. The SMI concept aids in the understanding of the kinds of conflicts and "turf" battles sometimes observed among SMO's; these can be seen as efforts by SMO's to specialize, diversify, or monopolize the market in a particular social issue, so as to obtain a sufficient and reliable resource flow.

Although references will be made to a number of organizational characteristics in the descriptive and historical accounts of the SMO's three organizational attributes--goals, domain, and ideology--will be focused upon in the analysis. Target goals of SMO's are conceptualized as those specific changes in social structure towards which groups claim to be working. Examples of the kinds of goals toward which the SMO's working for abused wives direct their efforts include the establishment of shelters for battered women, changes in the policies of various legal, social service and medical organizations, and the initiation of research on the problem. McCarthy and Zald note that "the amount of activity directed toward goal accomplishment is crudely a function of the resources controlled by an organization," (1977: 1221); therefore, it will be argued that the number and the specificity of goals adhered to by an organization can influence the course it takes. Goals will be viewed not only as preferred end states, but, equally important, as devices used by organizations for differentiating themselves from one another.
The concept of organizational domain will be used in the analysis both as a key concept for understanding the nature of the interactions which occurred among the social movement organizations and as a device which provides a partial explanation for the types of incentives for establishing linkages and exchanges which existed for other community organizations. Following Levine and White (1961) and Thompson (1967), domain is conceptualized as the specific area of competence claimed, the services rendered, and the tasks performed by an organization. Domain differs from goals in that the latter refers to some relatively abstract future state, while the former refers to more concrete and current organizational tasks. Organizational theorists frequently allude to the "sounding out" and mutual adjustment that occurs between organizations on issues of domain; they argue that this is done in part because it is necessary for an organization to establish a discrete, well understood, and uncontested domain if it is to function effectively. Thompson notes, for example, that:

The attainment of a viable domain is in essence a political problem. It requires finding and holding a position which can be recognized by all of the necessary 'sovereign' organizations as more worthwhile than available alternatives. (1967: 36)

Turner and Killian (1972), following Raymond Aron, characterize social movement ideologies as unfalsifiable, future oriented perspectives having both an empirical and an evaluative dimension. Oberschall quotes McClosky's excellent definition, which identifies ideology as:

a system of belief that is elaborate, integrated, more or less coherent, which justifies the exercise of power, explains and judges historical events, identifies political right and wrong, and furnishes guides for action. (1972: 178)

For purposes of this analysis, the term ideology will be used to denote
a general philosophical orientation which provides an overarching rationale or justification for the goals and activities of a SMO. Movement organizations will be classified in terms of their ideologies, with an eye towards noting which were "mainstream" and which were "extreme" for the time and place and indicating the consequences of these ideological stances for resource mobilization.

Besides these three structural characteristics, other concepts will be employed to describe the relationships which developed between SMO's and other organizations in the environment. A linkage between a SMO and other community organizations or sectors is "any recurrent pattern of behavior which exists between two systems and is supported by both." (Aveni, 1978: 185) Linkages are considered necessary conditions for resource mobilization. Two dimensions of linkages will be distinguished: strength, or the degree of relatedness which exists between organizations; and breadth, or the extensiveness or multiplicity of connections between one organization and others in the environment. Linkages will be measured by noting patterns of overlapping membership and sponsorship. Strength, breadth and subsequent productivity of linkages--the extent to which they result in an influx of resources into the organization--can vary independently of one another.

According to the perspective employed in this analysis, resources are transferred from one organization to another because this transfer is viewed as beneficial in some manner to both organizations. In addition to linkages, then, the concept of incentives will be used to describe possible reasons why organizations in the environment may have chosen to invest resources in SMO's working on behalf of battered women. Discovering
indicators of incentives will involve seeking to determine what benefits
established organizations may have wished to derive from affiliating with
SMO's.

The concept of resource is, of course, central to the analysis. Rogers
defines a resource as "any attribute, circumstance, or possession that
increases the ability of its holder to influence a person or group." (1974: 1425) Yuchtman and Seashore define resources as "more or less
generalized means or facilities that are potentially controllable by
social organizations and that are potentially usable--however indirectly--
in relationships between the organization and its environment." (1967:
900) Resources and power are closely interrelated. Gamson (1968), for
example, calls resources "influence in repose." Rogers calls power "a
system-based holding of resources." (1974: 1431) and makes the point
that only those organizations which are relatively high in resources
are capable of exercising influence; those with fewer resources have
more unmet needs and must permit other organizations to influence them.

The concept of resource presents the researcher with formidable mea­
measurement difficulties, due to the fact that literally almost anything
can be considered a resource. The literature abounds with different
treatments of the concept and its dimensions. Gamson (1968) for example,
mentions several types and forms of resources and notes the significance
of both material and non-material attributes and both positive and nega­
tive sanctioning ability. Rogers (1974) distinguishes between instru­
mental resources--the means of influence in a given situation--and infra­
resources--those elements which, when present in a situation, permit the
application of instrumental resources. Using Rogers's framework, money
could be an example of an instrumental resource, and information about where to best apply the money in an attempt to exert influence would be an infra-resource. In his discussion of resources, Oberschall states they can be:

anything from material resources—jobs, income, savings, and the right to material goods and services—to nonmaterial resources—authority, moral commitment, trust, friendship, skills, habits of industry, and so on. (1973: 28)

No attempt will be made in this study to distinguish, identify, catalogue, and measure each and every potential and actual resource which operated in the social situation in question. Instead, the focus will be on comparing the various SMO's in terms of their ability to gain access to or control over members, facilities, legitimacy, and money. These forms of resources have been singled out as the most significant ones for three reasons:

1. they are among the most significant resources for any organization, established or emergent;

2. singly and in combination, they are of critical importance for the survival of emergent organizations; such organizations begin with few resources and must amass as many as possible for desperately needed exchanges with the environment. If this is not done, no momentum exists which can keep the organization functioning, and

3. consistent with the organizational and interorganizational perspective of the study, the resources mentioned above are the kinds of resources which are most often employed in interorganizational (as opposed to interpersonal or organizational/individual) exchanges.

Regardless of their specific goals, social movements are concerned with achieving power—either over individuals or over the environment. Resources are crucial to an SMO, then, because they are the basis of its power. For this reason, the analysis will view the organizational
"success" of SMO's, not in terms of goal attainment, but in terms of
1) whether the various SMO's were able to continue to function; and
2) if they continued, whether they experienced an increase, a state of
stability, or a decline in resources. This approach is consistent with
the perspective in interorganizational analysis which conceptualizes
organizational effectiveness as an organization's ability to obtain in­
puts of resources from its environment, rather than as the achievement
of goals. Yuchtman and Seashore express the reasoning behind this ap­
proach as follows:

We propose, accordingly, to define the effectiveness of an or­
ganization in terms of its bargaining position, as reflected
in the ability of the organization, in either absolute or re­lative terms, to exploit its environment in the acquisition of
scarce and valued resources.

The concept of bargaining position implies the exclusion of any
specific goal (or function) as the ultimate criterion of organi­
zational effectiveness. Instead it points to the more general
capability of the organization as a resource-getting system.
(1967: 898)

Research Questions and Analytic Strategy

The goal of the study is to describe and compare selected aspects of
the structure and activities of organizations comprising the anti-wife­
abuse SMI in one community. The analysis will be undertaken through the
use of concepts from the literature on interorganizational relations
and on social movement resource mobilization, in an effort to account
for differences in organizational success, defined as the ability to
obtain resources.

The following questions are addressed in the study:

1. What were the origins and significant occurrences in the
   histories of the various movement organizations?
2. What goals and ideologies were adopted by the SMO's?

3. What were the domains of the different organizations?

4. What linkages were established between each SMO and other community organizations, institutions, or sectors? What linkages existed among the movement organizations themselves?

5. What benefits did other community organizations derive from their association with the SMO's?

6. To what extent were the careers of each SMO—i.e., survival, accumulation of resources—attributable to the attributes, relationships, and incentives outlined in the preceding items?

7. What can this case study offer to scholarship in the general area of social movements? To what extent are the phenomena discussed in this study generalizable to other social movements?

The study is comparative, inductive, and largely post hoc. The value of building in comparisons in exploratory research has been pointed out by many writers (Barton and Lazarsfeld, 1955; Lofland, 1971); interorganizational comparison has a central role in this study because it is the means by which conclusions concerning the antecedents of organizational success are reached. All the movement groups functioned in the same community at approximately the same time, and therefore they shared a common organizational environment. Since they experienced differential success rates, presumably this was due to organizational differences along particular dimensions, interorganizational comparisons are made to discover which dimensions were significant for success.

The study has as one of its objectives the formulation of general propositions about social movements, rather than the verification of hypotheses. Adoption of an inductive and qualitative approach to data is frequently justified by claims that the use of deduction and more
rigorous quantitative methods is not possible, given the state of current research. According to one line of reasoning (cf. Barton and Lazarsfeld, 1969) qualitative, inductive studies are appropriate for laying the groundwork for future quantitative, verification studies. This is not the position taken here. It is indeed the case that no systematically derived set of interrelated propositions concerning resource mobilization and social movements exists from which hypotheses about the activities of movement organizations could be derived. Resource mobilization formulations currently contain, at best, sensitizing concepts, nominal definitions, and empirical generalizations. It is also the case that studies using empirical data have mainly used it to either illustrate a general perspective or to test the applicability of specific elements of the approach, rather than to test hypotheses. However, these kinds of weaknesses are not unsurmountable barriers to the development of deductive arguments and hypothesis-testing; they certainly have not prevented investigators from doing verificational research on other sociological topics. It is both logically and practically possible to construct a deductive argument based on the research mobilization perspective; it is also both possible and desirable to test hypotheses derived from the argument. However, using data to formulate, build upon, and link generalizations about resource mobilization and social movements is an equally valid approach. Use of the inductive or the deductive approach to ordering data is a choice which is dictated by many factors, including the scholarly style, training, and experience of the investigator; the resources available to conduct the research; and the possibilities inherent in the research setting. Both strategies are justifiable and potentially fruitful; both can be done
extremely well, or badly. For some of the reasons just mentioned—style, training, resources, and the nature of the setting—an inductive strategy has been selected as the best way to proceed in this study. Of course, there is no such thing as pure induction. The study is inductive in the sense that it does not use the logico-deductive framework for explanation and in that it seeks to establish regular patterns in events through analysis of data and with the aid of concepts, types, and typologies. Indeed, the approach taken in this study corresponds very closely to that which is described by Glaser and Strauss as the "discovery of substantive theory," or "the formulation of concepts and their interrelation into a set of hypotheses for a given substantive area...based on research in the area." (1965: 5) This study resembles the kind of research described by these authors in that: groups were compared to highlight factors which may have significantly influenced their careers; a range of data-gathering were employed and were intermingled in analysis; and data collection and analysis were closely related.

Regardless of which theoretical strategy is used, the need for further verificational research is not obviated. Both inductive and deductive approaches can yield findings which can be challenged on the basis of studies which replicate, refine, or expand upon the original research. This study will generate propositions which can be applied to other social movements.

The study is historical—a circumstance which has both advantages and drawbacks, but which, on balance, is probably positive. People forget about, distort, and retrospectively interpret their own and other's actions. Key actors depart from settings. Records get lost and changed;
their validity and meaning are often difficult to discern in any case. For all these reasons, it is desirable for an investigator to "be there" if a grasp of events and sequences is being sought. As Zelditch (1962) has argued, participant observation is the optimal method for studying "incidents and histories" and for obtaining "analytic descriptions of complex social organizations." However, it is difficult to see how, from a practical standpoint, it would have been possible for a single individual to study this movement, for several reasons. First, some movement activity was carried out by individuals as part of their jobs--as "unofficial business." Second, attendance at all, or even a sample of meetings, would have been enormously time-consuming. Even more importantly, there was a tendency for certain groups to be rather "closed" to outsiders for various reasons and at different times. The mutual suspicion some groups had for one another was at some points quite strong. It is possible that influential members of groups which were parties to conflict would not have been open and frank with an individual who was in contact with their organizational adversaries. Participation in some groups, then, would have closed off entre to others. Finally, the course of the careers of the groups themselves virtually dictated an historical approach. Since the study focuses not only on the origins, goal-setting, ideologies and interorganizational con-acts of the various SMO's, but also on the outcome of group activity--i.e., on resource acquisition--it was necessary to 'work backwards' to the beginnings of each group and to focus on a relatively long time-span. By the same token, the group which "failed" performed functions for battered women for a relatively short time, compared to the others and went out of existence prior to
the formation of some of the SMO's. Essentially, unless an investigator is fortunate enough to be involved with the group at precisely the right time, an historical approach is the only possible way of gathering data on an organization which fails.

The ex post facto nature of the study does not detract from its overall quality significantly. The events under study are in the relatively recent past. As nearly as can be determined, the overwhelming majority of key actors in SMO's have been contacted. Many official and unofficial records of the various SMO's were obtained. Through ongoing participation in one of the organizations for battered women, the author was able to glean a large amount of information on different individuals, organizations, and events which otherwise might have escaped notice and which contributed a great deal to the analysis. Of equal significance is the fact that the intra- and intergroup struggles that marked the early days of SMO activity have decreased in intensity. While two organizational entities in particular still avoid contact with one another due to earlier clashes, the struggle for legitimacy and resources is not as intense as it once was. This is of course due in part to the fact that, at the time the data was gathered for this study, competition for resources had largely been settled in favor of one organization. Individuals were thus more willing to discuss objectively such topics as ideological splits and differences within the movement and also to venture their own hypotheses about what strategies 'worked' and why.
Sources of Data for the Study

Data were obtained from the following four types of sources:

1. Interviews with key movement participants. Semi-structured, tape recorded interviews were conducted with twenty-five persons who were active in the movement for battered women in the community between the summer of 1976 and the summer of 1978. Interviewees were contacted based on information given by informants in a major organization working for battered women and on records indicating their involvement with the problem. This set of informants and respondents by no means represents all individuals who had an interest in or worked on the wife-abuse issue in the community; rather, it is a group comprised of leaders, key decision-makers, and active participants. Interviewees belong to one or more of the following categories:

1. original organizers of groups working on behalf of battered women;

2. current or past chairs of organizations or groups and executive members of boards of directors of organizations set up to aid battered women;

3. persons named as influential by interviewees;

4. persons who, based on reports and meeting minutes, appeared to have been involved in performing important tasks for SMO's; and

5. persons who, although involved primarily with non-movement organizations, provided support and assistance to SMO's, e.g., in seeking funding.

In no case were interviews conducted with less than two key organizational members. (And this only occurred in one instance--that of the religiously-oriented shelter, a comparatively small and homogeneous group.) An average of four individuals were interviewed on the history and
activities of each organization; however, this figure is somewhat de-
ceiving, since several interviewees were members of more than one or-
ganization, and could therefore offer some information on both.

Just as the choice of key SMO activists as the best sources of in-
formation followed from the focus on goals, ideologies, and interorganiza-
tional relationships developed by SMO's, so too did the decision to treat
interview subjects as elite interviewees, rather than as respondents.

As Dexter (1970) indicates, the elite interview/survey interview dis-
tinction recognizes that, in researching certain types of questions, all
interviewees are not created equal. In certain types of elite inter-
viewing, elite subjects are typically given more opportunity to structure
their replies to questions. Even more importantly, substantive conclu-
sions about the data gathered in interviews are reached, not by adding
or averaging the responses of interviewees, but rather by establishing
which responses are most credible and consistent with other data. As
noted by Dexter

In the standardized interview...a deviation is ordinarily
handled statistically; but in an elite interview, an exception,
a deviation, an unusual interpretation may suggest a revision,
a reinterpretation, an extension, a new approach. In an elite
interview it cannot at all be assumed--as it is in the typical
survey--that persons or categories of persons are equally im-
portant. ...It may well be that only a few interviewees give
the insightful answers because they are the ones who both know
and can articulate how things are actually done. (1970: 6-7)

A standard method was used for contacting prospective interviewees.
Although the writer made a presentation explaining the research to the
board of directors of one organization whose cooperation was thought to
be essential for the conduct of the research, and thus was known to these
individuals, most interviews were initially requested by telephone. The
following information was given: that the researcher was a doctoral
candidate in sociology with an interest in social movements; that the
prospective interviewee had been mentioned as someone who had played a
role in the social movement for battered women, on which this disserta-
tion research was focused; and that the researcher wished to arrange a
time for an interview concerning the individual's activities on behalf
of battered women. Typically, questions were then asked by the recipient
of the request concerning the specific focus of the research. These
questions were answered in general terms, as follows:

Some people believe that attention gets paid to problems
in the community simply because they have become more serious
or otherwise merit this attention. On the other hand, there
are people who say that issues get attention because groups
get together to call them to the attention of the general pub-
lic. I'm interested on how this has been done recently in----
for the battered women problem. I'd like to talk to you about
your involvement with----(organization) and the kinds of things
that were done to focus attention on the problem. (or words
to that effect)

This elaboration on the request for an interview performed what Johnson
(1975) terms a "defocusing" function: it conveyed information about the
substantive focus of the research and at the same time told very little
about specific hypotheses, areas of interest, or other research concerns.
Virtually all interviewees were satisfied with this explanation; with
the exception of one non-essential interview, all interviews sought were
obtained.

Interviews were conducted at either the homes or the offices of inter-
view subjects. Most were quite lengthy; none lasted less than one and
one-half hours. The interview format was relatively open-ended; inter-
viewees were left to decide how much emphasis to devote to various
questions. A chronological order was followed in the interview, as indicated by the standard introduction:

I have about twenty questions that concern the work you have done and the organizations you have worked with in the area of domestic violence. The questions start by finding out a little about how you first came to be involved with the problems of battered women. Then the questions go through time, more or less up to the present, getting some idea of the history of your activities with (organization). Since I am more interested in getting your ideas on things that happened than in answering the questions in any set order, please feel free to structure your answers your own way.

Interviewees were also given assurances of confidentiality and anonymity prior to the beginning of the interview. Questions and associated probes focused upon the various conceptual areas outlined above, e.g., target goals, domain, and the other key topics. Topics given particular focus included: origins of personal involvement with the problem; development of and changes in organizational goals; the frequency and nature of contacts with other groups working on the problem; representation by established organizations in the membership of the SMO; the use of power and influence; and the interviewee's evaluation of the success and prospects of the organization. Responses to interview questions were used to supplement written records of events and to provide information beyond public and official organizational versions of movement activities.

2. Records of local movement organizations. Various pamphlets, brochures, statements of purpose, funding proposals, budgets, meeting minutes, and organizational membership rosters were obtained for the six organizations that are the major focus of the study. This material served a variety of functions, including: helping establish organizational goals and ideology; indicating conflicts over strategy and attempts to delimit the
domain of the organization; providing evidence of interorganizational
linkages showing patterns of involvement in SMO's by established organi-
zations; and indicating persons to contact for interviews.

3. Participation in current group activities. Since November 1977, the writer has worked as a volunteer in a shelter for battered women; additionally, the writer serves as a member of the board of directors of the same shelter. Besides allowing access to past records, budgets, and information about movement activities, these positions have led to consi-
iderable face-to-face contact and familiarity with many key individuals in various SMO's. Close involvement with one of the SMO's and continued contact with others are means of obtaining knowledge of the movement which partially offsets the problem of not having been present to observe activ-
ities during the period that is the focus of the study. Informal contacts with organizational members provides considerable information on certain aspects of events and activities which might not have been reported other-
wise. Examples of this kind of information are things members take for granted about the community, past SMO activities that may not have been strictly in keeping with societal or group norms, and facts it may not have occured to the writer to inquire about.

4. Newspaper, magazine, and other media accounts of activities related to the problems of battered women. Issues of the Reader's Guide and the New York Times Index for the past ten years were searched for references to the wife-beating phenomenon. Two community newspapers were scanned to provide background information on news media treatment of the activ-
ities of local organizations. Information was also obtained concerning major television news coverage of either the wife abuse problem or the
activities of local organizations during the period focused upon in the study. Because so few references were made to the problem, even in the recent past, this data was insufficient for systematic and quantitative analysis. However, newspaper and periodical reports were a valuable source of information about the increase in attention to the problem on the national level and also provided information on the activities of SMO's on the local community level.

Quality, Quantity, Reliability, and Validity of Data

Weaknesses in the data are evident. Both the quantity and the quality of the data obtained for the various SMO's are uneven. This is of course directly related to the specific characteristics and histories of the groups themselves. For example, while some SMO's kept extensive records, and while the more prominent shelter organization generated a great deal of written material, one group was small, informal, and short-lived and consequently contained fewer potential interviewees and produced scanty written records. Reflecting the rather high degree of turnover in two of the SMO's, written accounts such as meeting minutes varied in organization, comprehensiveness, and clarity. Obtaining interviews with representatives of the religious organization formed to aid battered women was also somewhat difficult, due to its relatively exclusive membership philosophy and its tendency to question the motives of the writer.

Despite these shortcomings, the data are sufficient to permit the kinds of generalizations set forth in the study, for three reasons. First, the goals of the study are relatively modest. The study seeks to use an analytic approach which stresses organizational attributes and
interorganizational linkages to generate hypotheses about factors leading to organizational success. It is concerned with discovering general patterns, rather than with testing specific hypotheses—a process which may call for more rigorous, refined, and selective data-gathering methods. At present, there is little reason to believe that any data which were inadvertently not gathered and analyzed would change the conclusions of the study.

A second and related point is that interview, documentary, and participant-observation data have been used to complement, supplement, and cross-check one another. No single source of data has been relied upon totally in reaching conclusions about the various organizations. For example, in attempting to establish SMO ideological orientations and overall goals, reference was made, not only to the remarks of interviewees, but also to written materials, such as statements of philosophy contained in grant proposals and statements of goals and objectives. Similarly, in addition to obtaining information from interviewees on SMO activities, it was possible to refer to committee and task force reports to determine what was being done by an SMO, and when.

Finally, attempting to overcome the limitations of the data and to include as much information as possible on the different SMO's serves scholarly objectives. Recent comparative organizational studies have shed considerable light on important features of social movements (Rudwick and Meier, 1970; Zurcher and Curtis, 1973). Thus, it can be argued that organizations which can be compared for the purpose of arriving at generalizations about SMO's should be compared, regardless of whether identical quantities and types of information are available about
all such groups. Moreover, research which focuses on unsuccessful attempts at bringing about social change is scarce and needed. As indicated above, one organization attempting to serve battered women was so unsuccessful in obtaining member commitment and the support of other organizations that it went out of existence, leaving few records that could be systematically analyzed. Nevertheless, this organization warrants inclusion in the study not only because it had an impact on other groups but also because knowing why this organization failed has obvious implications for understanding why others succeeded. Thus, even a group which produced relatively little evidence of its activities can serve an important function as a "negative case" demonstrating an absence of the properties needed for survival.

What degree of confidence can be placed in the results of the study, given the quantity and types of data obtained? Questions of reliability are typically addressed in quantitative research through assessing the consistency or coherence of the data, e.g., over repeated applications, between items, or among raters. Establishing whether the data obtained through qualitative methods accurately reflects the phenomena studied also entails making judgements about consistency, although these judgements often involve more subtle operations. Dean and Whyte (in Dexter, 1970) suggest the following standards for ascertaining the accuracy of interviewee reports of "objective" data, i.e., information on events and situations, rather than on the individual's own feelings, attitudes, or beliefs:

1. the plausibility of the interviewee's statements; some descriptions of events or explanations of motives, for example, simply may be too far-fetched to be accorded credence, in the absence of supporting evidence;
2. the interviewee's credibility or reputation for accuracy;
3. knowledge of the interviewee's mental set with regard to the material;
4. comparisons between an individual's account and the accounts of others.

To the list can be added two criteria not mentioned by these authors:
5. agreement between statements made by interviewees and reported accounts of events; and
6. the "situation" of the interviewee vis a vis the events reported upon, i.e., the extent to which the events reported upon were known first-hand, or through the statements of others.

In general, statements made in interviews were taken as accurate reflections of events if they seemed plausible; if they agreed with other verbal or written reports; and if the interviewee was judged to be relatively free of distorting biases and was "in a position" to possess the information requested. On the other hand, remarks were viewed with more skepticism if they were markedly inaccurate in relation to the historical record or if they were based on statements of others rather than on personal acquaintance with an event.

Records generated for purposes other than a specific research project and "inherited" by the research typically present problems in the areas of reliability and validity. Among these difficulties are: the fact that data are not always kept in the most useful form; lack of knowledge of the universe of data and consequently the possibility that the data are incomplete; and the researcher's lack of knowledge about the sources and direction of possible biases. The written records used in this analysis are no exception. Fortunately, this study is concerned primarily with relatively formal and public matters, such as information on
membership, sponsorship, fundraising, and organizational objectives--in short, with the kinds of information that appear in documents such as minutes, quarterly reports, and grant proposals. Thus, while the documentary data would not have been useful for some purposes, e.g., for learning about the quality of interpersonal relationships in SMO's or for understanding the dynamics of meetings and gatherings, they can be considered reliable sources of information on the topics selected for study, especially when used in conjunction with interviews and participant observation. Indeed, because of the potential for cross-checking data, use of a combination of these three methods can be considered the optimal means of approaching the research topic discussed here.

To what extent can the products of this research be generalized to other cases? This issue is one which should be addressed at two levels: that of the most abstract propositions concerning the success of SMO's in general, and that consisting of generalizations about the six SMO's which have been studied. It is a major objective of the study, not to test hypotheses, but to generate propositions which might then be applied in other settings. As is the case with other studies, the results of which must be supported, refined, or rejected following further research, the empirical adequacy of the abstract propositions derived from this research can only be established through further study. Regarding the second level of abstraction--the generalizations concerning the careers of specific social movement organizations--while the community in which the research was conducted is in some respects a typical American community, the generalizations made on the basis of the data cannot automatically be accorded applicability beyond this case. In short, the
abstract propositions must be applied to other social movements before their usefulness can be assessed, and the empirical generalizations have value primarily for the insights they provide into a single case.

Summary

This study attempts to discover factors responsible for the differential success of various SMO's in a single social movement industry. This objective is accomplished, not through reference to factors such as the increase or decline of change-oriented sentiments in the population or to changes in public awareness of the problem, but rather through an examination of the properties of the SMO's themselves and an understanding of the relationships they developed with other established and emergent community organizations. The study relies on propositions, hypotheses, and concepts contained in resource mobilization theories of social movements and in forms of interorganizational analysis typically applied only to established organizations. Consistent with scholarship in both these areas, organizational success is defined in this study as the ability to accumulate resources.

The study is qualitative, inductive, and comparative. It aims at generating testable propositions concerning key factors accounting for why some segments of SMO's become prosperous, while others simultaneously decline. Interviews, documents, and participant observation are used as data sources. The data, while beset with all the failings which are typical of post hoc interviews and historical documents, are adequate because: all data forms supplement one another; general patterns, rather than rigorous specifications of relationships are sought; and the potential
benefits justify a strategy which includes for consideration as much data as possible.
III. THE BATTERED WOMEN MOVEMENT: A SOCIAL HISTORY

The Problem of Spouse Abuse in the U.S.

We can readily appreciate the fact that other societies appear to selectively perceive different aspects of culture and social life, emphasizing some behaviors and qualities and suppressing others. The negative attitudes held about sexual matters by Victorians and the Puritan emphasis on work and frugality are obvious examples. It is more difficult, on the other hand, to locate and discuss instances of tunnel vision in our own culture. For this reason, a sociological approach to the phenomenon of wife-beating and to the organized efforts to eliminate it must begin by noting the existence of the basic and unacknowledged paradox, summarized by Straus, that "the social group that the society most often looks to for warmth, intimacy, help, and love is also characterized by cruelty and violence." (1977: 59-60) Further, it should be emphasized that violence directed against women in the home, while denied or sanctioned in principle, is bolstered by both cultural and social structural factors.

Although it is probably not unfair to say that America as a culture is preoccupied by violence—that is, by either its expressions or its suppression—discussions and depictions of violent behavior tent to center on activities which take place in relatively public arenas and between strangers. War, demonstrations, riots, gang fights, police-criminal
conflict, barroom brawls, paid killers, extortion threats, snipers, robbers, rapists: these are some of the elements and actors commonly thought to feed the flood of violence that has concerned our society recently. In contrast, historically there has been little attention paid to the forms of violence which occur in the privacy of the home. Despite what Steinmetz describes as the mythological view of "the family as an institution surrounded by an atmosphere of love, affection, and gentleness" (1977: 3) aggressive behavior between adult partners in intimate relationships is both traditional and widespread in American society. For example, in one study, family members were found to be involved in nearly one-fourth of the criminal homicides committed in a sample of U.S. cities in a single year, with husband/wife homicides and homicides between lovers accounting for 19% of the total. The same study found that husbands or wives and lovers were involved in 12.3% of the aggravated assaults reported in the same year (Curtis, 1974). The largest category of homicide victims typically is "family members" (Wolfgang and Ferracuti, 1967).

Although reliable statistics on the incidence of wife abuse are not available existing records of serious crimes between spouses may represent only the tip of the iceberg. Evidence gleaned from other sources indicates that violence between mates is very widespread. For example, an organization established in Los Angeles to shelter the families of alcoholics found that 80% of the women sheltered had been battered (Langley and Levy, 1977). Levinger (1966) found that 36% of the women in the 600 divorce cases he studied gave physical abuse as the reason
for seeking to terminate the marriage. For working class women, abuse ranked third, after mental cruelty and neglect and was tied with financial problems as a reason for seeking to end the marriage. Mental health and rape crisis hotlines also receive large numbers of requests for assistance from women who are battered. Gelles (1974) notes that about 60% of the partners in 80 families he interviewed reported behaving in a physically aggressive manner in marital disputes. Straus (1973) found that 16% of a sample of university students questioned recalled that their parents had resorted to physical violence in their conflicts with one another in the preceding one-year period.

Societal Sources of the Problem

Powerful societal forces operate to maintain patterns of aggression between men and women involved in primary relationships. On the one hand, the twin images of society as a harmonious array of complementary interests and the home as a place of sweetness and light are emphasized. On the other, attitudes, beliefs and values of members of society condone, or at least excuse, the entire spectrum of violent interpersonal activity. Among the evidence cited by Straus (1974) to support his argument that violence-approval is a cultural element are the following: surveys conducted in 1968 and 1969, indicating that 72% of the respondents agreed with the notion that killing civilians in war is regrettable but unavoidable; a 1969 study finding that 60% of interviewees said the police were "almost always" or "sometimes" justified in shooting at rioters; and various studies indicating that at least 84% of parents (and probably more) physically punish their children at one time or another; and
Steinmetz (1977) notes that physical punishment of children is not confined to the early years and is widespread, even into the last year of high school. Finally, a survey conducted for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Stark and McEvoy, 1970) found that approximately 25% of the men questioned, and one woman in six, believe it is appropriate for a man to slap his wife under certain circumstances.

The pattern is clear: aggression is viewed as an appropriate means by which the will of the stronger party in a dispute is carried out. Whether the opponent in conflict is another nation, a faction within society, or the child as a junior member of the household, the pattern holds. Similarly, aggressive behavior towards the wife or female lover, the subordinate and physically weaker party in a domestic dispute, is also seen as permissible. Davidson (1978) gives an excellent account of the historical bases of violence against women, citing Biblical passages, church teachings, and both British Common Law and early colonial and state laws, which, taken together, constitute a framework for viewing the woman as, at worst, a fount of infamy, and at best, a potentially errant subject in need of constant supervision and occasional correction.

"Spare the rod and spoil the child." The contemporary debate on "permissive" child-rearing practices is evidence that many adult Americans believe in using physical force to induce compliance on the part of children. Indeed, stern correction of children is widely believed to be a sign of love. If the following newspaper item containing a quote from an article by the wife of the current Canadian prime minister is
any indication, so is the physical chastisement of adult women, at least in the minds of some:

Mrs. Trudeau says she got a black eye from her husband when she left him—and liked it. "It showed me he really loved me," she said. "Actually, I was quite pleased. It was the first time in a very long while that I'd been able to really get a response from Pierre." (Columbus Dispatch, 1979)

It is not uncommon to hear it stated that women who endure abuse ask for it, need it, or "like it." Perhaps this kind of thinking stems from a lack of understanding of the circumstances surrounding wife abuse. It seems more likely, however, that members of society believe that a man has a right to hit his wife, and that outsiders have no right to intervene when he does. Straus cites several studies, including laboratory and field experiments, which he concludes are indicative of "the norm permitting assaults between spouses." (1977: 67)

Recently, the writer was told by a battered wife that, once, after having beaten her, her husband waved a copy of their marriage license in her face, stating that he could do anything he wanted with her—even beat her—because she belonged to him, and the marriage license was the "title" that proved it. This statement is of course atypical and extreme; however, it is also, for all practical purposes, true, insofar as the courts and the police are concerned. While wife-beating is in theory actionable under both civil and criminal statutes, it is practically a policy of police and members of the legal profession (whether working for the prosecution or for the defense) to dissuade women from pressing charges against their mates. Law enforcement and court officials have wide latitude in processing cases, e.g., in decisions to arrest or to
file charges. Discretion is almost always exercised to discourage the 
abused woman from seeking legal redress. Often, this is done on the 
grounds that it is inappropriate for the legal system to become involved 
in domestic disputes, which are essentially private. Eisenberg and 
Micklow describe the plight of the battered woman in this manner:

The assaulted wife who seeks legal help finds herself in a 
Catch-22 situation: a circular shuffle between criminal and 
civil courts. If she seeks a criminal remedy, the police may 
or may not respond. Even if her call is answered, she probably 
will receive no protection. If she requests a warrant, she 
will have to survive the scrutiny of the prosecuting attorney 
and prove she is a worthy victim... If she tries the alternate 
course, divorce, she is handed what is characterized by judges 
and police alike as a worthless piece of paper: the prelimi-
nary injunctive order. She most probably will not be protected 
by it... In criminal court, she is told wife assault is not a 
crime but a family matter; in civil court, she is told it is 
a crime which must be enforced by police officials. And society 
tells her it is her fault; she provokes it, she tolerates it, 
she may even like it. (1977: 159)

Social Scientific Approaches to Domestic Violence

Morroring society, social science has until recently tended to ignore 
the phenomenon of wife abuse. O'Brien (1971) notes that, for all issues 
of the Journal of Marriage and the Family from its beginning in 1939 to 
1969, there is not one article in the Index which has the word "violence" 
in its title, although "conflict" is mentioned frequently. Steinmetz 
and Straus (1974) also remark on the dearth of scholarly writing on the 
problem of wife abuse.

Much of the social scientific writing which has been done presents 
a one-sided picture. Komarovsky (1964) discussed wifebeating briefly 
in her excellent book, Blue Collar Marriage. One effect of the book was 
to contribute to the impression that wife abuse is a practice limited
primarily to the working and lower classes. Pre-1970's work discussing violence against wives tends to give the impression that it is either linked with the subculture of violence or engaged in by individuals who are disturbed.

Insight can be gained into social scientific research on wifebeating by comparing this research with some of the work on child abuse, a phenomenon which until recently had also been ignored in the literature. Gelles (1973) has criticized early work in the child abuse area for what he terms its support of a "psychopathological" interpretation of child-beating. Briefly stated, this view, adopted by early writers who were primarily clinicians, argues that people who severely beat their children are mentally "sick." The source of the violent behavior is sought in the internal psychological dynamics or the socialization of the individual, rather than in social structure or the characteristics of the family setting. Gelles argues, on the other hand, that violence occurs among essentially "normal" individuals who are exposed to societally-induced pressures with which they cannot cope without resorting to force. He advocates a more sociological approach to the problem of child abuse, one which emphasizes such factors as socioeconomic status and family resources. Newer theories and treatment strategies in the child abuse area do seem to place more emphasis on structural factors in both the etiology and the prevention of the problem.

Social scientific accounts of wife abuse parallel those of child abuse to a degree—except that in the case of wife abuse, the victim may be seen as having pathological inner needs, such as "masochistic" tendencies or the desire to dominate her husband. (For a good discussion
of the treatment of feminine masochism in the literature, see Waites, 1977.) More frequently, however, it is the psychological makeup and the motivations of the abuser that are explored (cf. Elbow, 1977). Finally, several studies have viewed the wifebeating phenomenon in more sociopsychological or sociological terms (O'Brien, 1971; Field and Field, 1973; Nichols, 1976; Eisenberg and Micklow, 1977). Only a handful of scholarly works (Gelles, 1974; Steinmetz, 1977; Straus, 1977) address the pervasiveness and normative nature of intrafamilial violence. The majority of writers treat wifebeating as a symptom or consequence of deterioration in individual or primary group functioning. As Steinmetz comments:

Evidence suggests that lawmakers, historians, and social scientists as well as the general population, tend to deny the existence of family violence or to assume violence occurs in sick families, families living in inner-city ghettos, or families characterized by some other pathology such as drugs, alcohol, gambling, or mental aberrations. (1977: 5)

Such scholarly works as exist on the topic seem capable of being divided into the following categories: writings which stress the socio-behavioral dynamics of wifebeating and which suggest intervention in the couple or family relationship; those which discuss the failures of the criminal justice system and which speak to the need for changes in police procedure, the law and the courts; and those which take a "systems" approach, discussing the role of societal values and norms and the contribution of the entire range of societal institutions, as well as the role of the socialization process in generating and maintaining abuse patterns.

The Social Movement Against Wife Abuse

The practice of wife abuse has flourished in a social climate which tends either to deny the existence of intense conflict between intimates
or to shield it behind the right of the family to privacy and which legitimizes the use of force by those capable of exercising it successfully. Although it is not known how widespread the phenomenon of spouse abuse actually is, it is now believed to affect a significant minority in society. As indicated earlier, the public, community caregivers, and social scientists have only very recently begun to view wife abuse as a problem in its own right. Prior to consciousness raising efforts by concerned groups, wifebeating was viewed in several ways: as a common element in the life of poor families or the families of alcoholics; as a relatively rare phenomenon in "better" segments of society; or as a practice desired or instigated by women themselves. Anti-abuse activists have had to attempt to overcome these kinds of myths. Members of the public, instead of forming a definition of the problem and uniting to press for reforms in the domestic violence area have themselves been the targets of influence attempts by organized groups seeking to educate them to the needs of battered women. Additionally, as the discussions which follow will suggest, it is fair to argue that efforts at public education followed, rather than preceded, successful efforts at resource allocation by movement groups. That is, groups seeking to aid battered women did not ride a wave of public sentiment demanding solutions and gather resources from this constituency--they amassed resources and then set about attempting to change public opinion.

The first widely publicized shelter for female abuse victims was Chiswick Women's Aid, established in London, England in 1971 by Erin Pizzey. Since its founding, Chiswick Women's Aid has sheltered thousands of primarily poor and working-class women and their children. Poorly
funded, filled beyond capacity, and lacking adequate facilities from the start, the London shelter survived conflicts with the London Borough Councils, which took Pizzey to court for maintaining an overcrowded facility. Shelter facilities, many under the sponsorship of the National Federation of Women's Aid, have expanded considerably in England in recent years. Due to agitation by Pizzey, her supporters, and sympathetic politicians, two Parliamentary committees were set up to investigate family violence in England, and a law giving broader protection to female abuse victims was passed in 1976.

In the U.S., organized efforts to combat wife abuse have advocated a variety of approaches and have been accompanied by increased mass media attention as well as by responsiveness on the part of established societal institutions. As was the case in England, the provision of shelters and related crisis services has been an important part of the organized response to the problem. Rainbow Retreat, which opened in 1973 in Phoenix, Arizona, is believed to be the first U.S. shelter for battered women. Probably due to requirements from its funding source, this shelter originally specified that, in order to be admitted, an abused woman must be a victim of a husband with a drinking problem. Operating currently on a moderately large budget (over $100,000 per year--substantial for a shelter operation) Rainbow Retreat is set up to shelter thirteen to fifteen women at a time. Like Rainbow Retreat, Haven House in Los Angeles, which has been in operation since 1964, was established to shelter women abused by alcoholic husbands. In the mid-1970's, Haven House began to focus increasingly on the phenomenon of abuse itself and to focus less on the involvement of drinking in the abuse situation.
As early as 1972, Women's Advocates, Inc. in St. Paul, Minnesota had set up a hotline for providing telephone crisis counseling to victims of abuse. This led to informal sheltering of victims and their children in the homes of members of the organization. In late 1974, Women's Advocates opened a shelter in St. Paul. One of the original members of this group is currently the director of Harriet Tubman Women's Shelter in Minneapolis; this facility is funded in part by city community development funds.

Early in 1975, Maria Roy, a New York City social worker, began a hotline service for battered women called Abused Women's Aid in Crisis (AWAIC). Roy went on to act as a catalyst in several New York groups working on behalf of battered women and to write a book on the subject. (Roy, 1977) In 1976, AWAIC opened a shelter in Manhattan. Another local organization which has had a national impact is the Ann Arbor (Michigan) Wife Assault Task Force. This organization, begun in 1975 by NOW, and currently funded heavily by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and ACTION, sponsors a shelter in Ypsilanti and has written a training manual for police intervening in domestic violence situations.

In October, 1975, at its Eighth Annual Conference, the National Organization for Women (NOW) formed a Battered Women Task Force, which was charged with raising consciousness about the problem, supporting research, and exerting pressure for the establishment of shelters for female abuse victims. A co-ordinator of the NOW National Task Force on Battered Women/Household Violence was Del Martin, who also wrote an influential book on the topic. (Martin, 1976) Later, towards the end of 1977, the National Women's Year Conference in Houston also passed a resolution urging action
on the local, state, and federal level on behalf of programs to benefit abuse victims.

Following the NOW resolution, efforts to work on behalf of abused women gained momentum. New York formed its own task force in early 1976. Many more shelters and other crisis services were instituted in the next few years. An August, 1976, Ms. magazine article listed twenty different sources of assistance for abuse victims. Twelve of these were shelter facilities; six were described as offering primarily counseling and legal assistance; two were primarily resource/clearinghouse operations. A recent book on the spouse abuse problem (Davidson, 1978) lists and describes sixty-five shelters for abused wives, located in twenty-six states and the District of Columbia. The shelters included in this list exhibit great variety, both in sponsorship and philosophical orientation and in patterns of funding. While many shelters are operated by feminist groups and have names suggesting feminist themes (Shelter Our Sisters, Women's Survival Space, Women Together), a large proportion state that mental health and other human services are a part of their programs. Funding sources include churches and traditional service organizations such as the YMCA; the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration; state governments; city governments; the United Way; and individual fundraising projects. Many shelters operate through the use of volunteers. Most barely survive financially and serve relatively few clients.

The number of shelters for battered women has increased markedly even since the publication of the Davidson book. A recent article on the domestic violence problem (U.S. News and World Report, 1979) indicates that over one hundred seventy shelters have opened in the U.S. since 1975.
Besides increasing in numbers, shelter services for battered women seem to have become more distinct from other similar kinds of services. Previously, services for battered women had a tendency to be combined in one organization with services for alcoholics, rape victims, and even, in one case (House of Ruth in Washington, D.C.), homeless and vagrant women; recently, the trend has been toward viewing battered women as a population requiring distinct and separate support services.

The geometric increase in services for battered women has been closely related to increased mass media attention to the problem. Early groups working on behalf of battered women apparently did so with relatively little assistance from the national print media. An analysis of entries in the New York Times Index shows little media attention to the problem until the last four years. To document changes in media attention, the following topics were systematically searched for references to wife-beating between 1970 and 1978:

- Assults
- Battered Wives
- Divorce
- Domestic Relations
- Families and Family Life
- Marriages
- Violence
- Women

The analysis suggests media attention to the problem began in the second half of this decade, and may already have "peaked." For the years 1970-1972, there was not a single reference to wife-beating as a societal or community issue. Indeed, the only reference to domestic violence was found, not under topics such as "violence" or "divorce," but as part of news reports of assaults and murders, where the victim was incidentally mentioned as married to or living with the assailant. In 1973, an FBI statistic linking policy fatalities to domestic disturbance calls was
reported. In 1974, again one article was printed; this one noted that New York City police and courts tend to discourage beaten spouses from pressing charges. In 1975, five articles appeared. Three of these dealt with the lack of police and legal co-operation in abuse cases; one reported on a conference held on the problem of abuse. Additionally, in a less clearly related article, a NOW march protesting violence against women was noted.

The next year, 1976, marked the beginning of a phase of more intense news coverage of domestic violence. Although seven articles appear in the Index for that year, the articles began discussing innovative approaches to the problem, e.g., the development of shelters and a Hammond, Indiana program which experimented with naming battered women as probation officers for their assailants, thereby somewhat equalizing the woman's power in the relationship. Additionally, late in 1976, the Times began covering a New York City class action suit by a group of battered women against the Police Department and the Family Court of the city, which were charged with failing to provide protection for abuse victims. This case understandably resulted in fairly extensive media coverage in the coming months.

If the Index is any indication, 1977 marked the high point in news coverage of the problem. Forty-four separate entries referring to various aspects of the battered women problem appeared. The articles discussed such topics as: the setting up of hotlines to provide services to victims in crisis; the initiation and passage of legislation to alleviate the problems of abused women; the funding and opening of shelters; public hearings and conferences on the problem; and the trials of female
abuse victims who killed their alleged assailants. "Battered Wives" first appeared as a separate topic in the Index in 1978. In all, nineteen references to the plight of female abuse victims appeared during that year.

Similar patterns and trends can be seen in popular magazine coverage of the problem. Generally speaking, until the mid-1970's, "domestic violence" meant riots and terrorism, so far as the popular press was concerned. News magazines began sketchy coverage around 1973, with Newsweek reporting once on the London shelter and Society devoting some space to the problem. Ms. ran an article on Chiswick Women's Aid in June, 1974—the same month Ladies Home Journal ran a story on wifebeating. By January, 1978, articles had appeared in such varied publications as Science Digest, Good Housekeeping, America, Vogue, and Mademoiselle.

Wifebeating also travelled the route from obscurity to prominence in the mid-1970's world of television. CBS-TV aired a series on its morning news in 1975. NBC's "Weekend" followed with a segment in Spring, 1976. Probably due to extensive news coverage of alleged self-defense killings of husbands by wives during the last two years, art has imitated life, and there has recently been a raft of television dramas about wifebeating. Indeed, wife abuse seems to be superseding child abuse and rape as a favored topic for television writers. This is of course understandable, in view of the fact that the wife abuse situation contains many elements insuring strong audience appeal: violence, sex, love, a helpless victim, and sometimes courtroom drama.

Increased media attention to the wife abuse problem has been accompanied by changes in other institutions as well. In the legislative
area, for example, criminal charges by wives against husbands, e.g., for assault, while possible in theory, have been virtually impossible to pursue in all but the most brutal and flagrant cases, (see Field and Field, 1973, for a comparison of the disposition of assaults between strangers and spouses); civil protective orders, moreover, have been meaningless. In an attempt to remedy this situation, more than a dozen states, including New York, Connecticut, California, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Ohio have passed various laws which offer protection to victims in spouse abuse cases. Legislative interest in this area is continuing; a Senate bill currently pending in the Ohio General Assembly, for example, would place a tax on marriage licenses and distribute the proceeds to shelters for battered women.

Two domestic violence bills were sponsored in Congress in 1977. One bill, "The Domestic Violence Prevention and Treatment Act of 1977," would give the Department of Health, Education and Welfare responsibility for funding and evaluating programs in the domestic violence area and would authorize the National Institute of Mental Health to study state and local laws in the area. The other, "The Family Violence and Treatment Act of 1977," would locate responsibility for funding programs in ACTION and would train and reimburse volunteers for working in the domestic violence area.

At the same time, many government agencies have recently either established new programs in the domestic violence area or extended already existing programs to cover wife abuse situations. The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) has stopped investing heavily in the drug abuse area and has begun putting dollars into wife abuse and other
forms of domestic violence. Early LEAA assistance was channelled to victims through its Victim Witness Assistance (VWA) Program. Other LEAA projects, such as the widely respected Columbus (0) Night Prosecutor's Program, a diversion program set up to settle various kinds of disputes, also aided abuse victims. In 1977, however, LEAA tripled its allocation for domestic violence programs specifically, and administration officials began making public statements about the recent alarming increase in the incidence of wife abuse. (New York Times, 1977) The LEAA Family Violence Program currently operates in a number of U.S. cities, with local projects taking a variety of forms.

In 1978, having anticipated passage of the federal legislation, ACTION, the "domestic peace corps", also expanded funding in the domestic violence area. ACTION currently funds technical assistance centers in each of the HEW regions to which requests for information on the various aspects of combating domestic violence can be directed. Besides LEAA and ACTION, other federal agencies and programs which fund services for spouse abuse victims include the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect, within the HEW Administration on Children and Youth, which funds research/demonstration projects targeting battered women and the Community Services Administration, through its Community Action Agencies, which sponsored Family Crisis Centers in five cities in 1978. At least two other federally sponsored programs provide funds that can be used to defray the costs of delivering services to victims of abuse. They are: the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) administered by the Department of Labor, which can pay staff salaries at organizations sheltering or otherwise serving victims; and Title XX of the Social Security
Act, which grants funds for adult protective services given in conjunction with other social services.

Research on domestic violence is also receiving more attention in federal funding circles. The National Institute of Mental Health has been the earliest and most active funder of sociological research on domestic violence, having begun funding projects early in this decade. Several departments of the NIMH Special Mental Health Programs Division, including the National Center for the Control and Prevention of Rape, fund research and research/demonstration projects which focus on wife abuse. In the last three years, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Women's Rights Division has sponsored research on wife abuse and presented a national conference on policy issues in the domestic violence area.

Characteristics of and Trends in the Movement Against Wife Abuse

Commenting on the growth in attention to the phenomenon of wife abuse, Terry Davidson, a journalist and author of a book on the topic, notes that, in 1975, she began approaching editors of "women's" magazines with manuscripts on the wifebeating problem. She was told at that time that the problem was not widespread enough to appeal to a mass audience and that abusers and their victims, being basically lower-class and problem-ridden, were of no interest to typical middle-class magazine readers. Beliefs about the problem were soon to change considerably. Today, Davidson writes:

There has been so much progress since I began research on this subject that I feel very encouraged. When I began, no librarian had knowledge of the subject. Most magazines were certain the subject was too ugly and irrelevant for their middle-class readership...There were only a handful of shelters in America, none of them publicized outside their own locality--
if there...Today, it seems that most educated, concerned persons are at least aware of the problem, although there is some resistance to believing it happens in the best of families. The media report on it with increasing frequency. It is a 'hot' topic. There is a Library of Congress catalogue listing: Under Conjugal Violence, 'Wifebeating' was recently given its own number. (Davidson, 1978: 208)

Even if Davidson's claim that organized efforts on behalf of abused wives constitute "the fastest growing social movement in America" is exaggerated, that they are a social movement--and an influential one--cannot be disputed. Moreover, these collective efforts possess many of the characteristics of what have been termed "professionalized" social movements. (McCarthy and Zald, 1973)

The set of organizations which comprises the social movement against wife-abuse exhibits the organizational features described by Gerlach and Hine (1970) as characteristic of social movements. That is, to the extent that any coherent movement organization is present nationally, that organization is decentralized, segmented, and reticulate. There is no central entity which speaks for concerned organizations, and authority and decision-making are markedly decentralized. While great strides have been made in the areas of information transfer and technical assistance e.g., through publications such as the newsletter RESPONSE to Violence and Sexual Abuse in the Family, begun by the Center for Women Policy Studies in 1976, movement adherents frequently carry on activities in their own communities with little awareness of what is occurring elsewhere. Many distinct organizational entities can be identified within the movement. These vary from groups which are national in scope and focus, such as NOW, to local and state organizations which have statewide, regional, or national influence, e.g., the Ann Arbor organization;
and to organizations which operate primarily on the local community level.
Organizations in the battered women movement are linked to one another,
to other feminist organizations, and to established organizations in a
complex and reticulate structure. Linkages occur via overlapping memberships as well as through formal and informal sponsorship.

In general, three broad but identifiable philosophical orientations
are present: feminism and civil rights, legal advocacy, and social service/community mental health. Similarly, it is possible to identify
major structural antecedents for movement activity, particularly in on­
going women's movement organizations such as the National Organization
for Women and in the legal and social work professions. Intermingled
with these analytically distinguishable philosophical orientations and
identifiable organizational and professional bases are several widely
advocated strategies for the prevention and amelioration of abuse. These
include efforts to make the laws, the police, and the courts more responsive to the needs of the victim of domestic violence; strategies which
focus on equalizing power in the violent relationship through therapeutic
and counseling interventions; and, perhaps most important, efforts to
provide crisis shelters in which women who are abuse victims can hide from their assailants.

Another way of characterizing the set of organizations concerned
with the wife abuse problem is to use the term social movement industry
(SMI), introduced in the preceding chapter. The SMI concept, articulated
by McCarthy and Zald (1977) aptly captures the essential quality of the
phenomenon: the battered women movement is a number of movement organiza­
tions, which are concerned to a greater or lesser degree with different
aspects of the plight of female abuse victims and which at a given time are more or less mobilized and more or less co-ordinated. This concept has utility in that it introduces the imagery of the "market," which is in turn useful because it reminds us that group activities are marked not only by co-operation but also by competition. The battered women SMi competes with other movement organizations and industries for a share of the attention of legislators, policy-makers, and the general public; moreover, movement organizations which share the same "turf" or organizational domains--one or more national information centers; and one or more local battered women shelters, for example--can also be seen as engaging either in competition with one another or in efforts to accommodate one another. Finally, the concepts of "industry" and "market" imply the existence of "processors" and "consumers" of social problems and suggest ways of interpreting the ebb and flow of support for the movement.

The growth in media attention to the plight of abused wives is interesting both in terms of the information conveyed in published discussions of the problem and as a phenomenon in its own right—that is, as an example of the marketing of a social problem. The rise of interest seen in the New York Times coverage of wife abuse illustrates strikingly what Downs (1972) calls the "issue attention cycle." Downs points out that "American public attention rarely remains sharply focused upon any one dominant issue for very long—even if it involves a continuing problem of crucial importance to society." (1972: 38) He notes further that:

Public perception of most 'crises' in American domestic life does not reflect changes in real conditions as much as it reflects the operation of a systematic cycle of heightening
public interest and the increasing boredom with major issues. (1972: 38)

The wifebeating phenomenon possesses all the attributes Downs argues are necessary for candidates for the attention cycle: it is not a problem which directly affects the majority in society; the same social arrangements which oppress its victims also benefit powerful interests in society; the public probably would not pay attention to it were it not for dramatic media treatment. He uses his framework to discuss the environmental quality movement and suggests the concept has wide applicability. While his notions about how and why issues go through the cycle can be criticized along certain lines, Down does make several additional points which, if extended can be applied to this analysis: a) that the mass media assist in the "production" of social problems for consumption by the public; b) that organizations interested in resource allocation need mass media marketing to highlight the fact that they are doing worthwhile things, as well as to encourage other individuals and organizations to support them; and c) that issues which go through the attention cycle receive more public effort and concern than those which do not.

Viewing the movement against wife abuse in this light presents a novel picture of social movement phenomena: a "top-down" rather than a "bottom-up" view. Rather than seeing the growth in organizations and the establishment of new laws and programs for battered women as a reflection of increased awareness and demands for change among members of society, these changes can be viewed as the consequence of agitation which resulted in increased media coverage and a concomitant rise in incentives to established organizations to demonstrate their responsiveness and their relevance.
Although movement organizations have always been characterized by a high degree of participation by professionals "borrowing" time from their jobs for movement work, it appears that full-time "careers" for movement cadres (McCarthy and Zald, 1973) are beginning to emerge on the national and, in some cases, on the local level. This trend is significant because it could have several consequences, both for movement members and for movement organizations:

1. members receive incentives to pursue work in the area; their efforts are "going somewhere," there is a chance to aspire to leadership and influence, not in a volunteer organization or in a sideline occupation, but in a position which can financially support the individual;

2. the organization has some continuity from day to day, month to month; the organization does not need to rely solely on the support of movement constituents who might at any time decide to give their time, effort, and money to some other cause;

3. the organization has the possibility of obtaining more resources to direct towards its goals because personnel exist to direct their efforts to resource-allocation through activities such as public speaking, proposal writing and other forms of fundraising, lobbying, and exchanging information with other movement and established organizations.

Summary

While the actual incidence of wife abuse in American society is not known, gleanings from statistical and archival records and the existence of cultural themes and social arrangements condoning abuse indicate that it is a widespread and traditional practice. Wifebeating has probably not increased in recent years, but it has been the target of increased agitation and media attention. Attempts to change societal attitudes about wifebeating or to introduce social structural changes were almost non-existent prior to the present decade. In the early 1970's, groups
began organizing in local communities around the U.S., with the expressed goal of meeting various needs of battered women, including: emergency shelters, legal advocacy and reform, access to community services, and crisis counseling and long-term psychological support. Movement activists have primarily been non-battered women working in professions which have occasion to encounter abuse victims. That is, movement adherents and movement beneficiaries have, for the most part, been separate.

Organizations assisting abuse victims have responded primarily to local conditions, have displayed great variety and have developed through support from one another, from other organizations concerned with women's issues, and from established public and private organizations. At present, movement organizations appear to be mainly adapted to and integrated with other organizations on the local community level. However, funds from federal government sources are increasingly being brought to bear on the problem of abuse, and a loosely organized and reticular national organizational structure, linking some movement organizations—a small fraction of the total, however—is beginning to be visible.

This discussion of the emergence of the movement for battered women in communities around the U.S. has not focused on changes in public awareness of or attitudes towards the problem of wife abuse. Instead, it has highlighted the establishment and spread of organizations devoted to the problem, with particular emphasis on the variations which exist, both in organizational purposes and in linkages with supporting local and national groups. The concept of social movement industry was employed and the notion of issue attention cycle was introduced to suggest that the movement can be viewed as having grown, at least in part, due
to processes of social exchange. Beaten women, at home or fleeing from home, need much and can give little; movement organizations formed to aid battered women typically can expect little support from movement beneficiaries and must rely either on members of outside groups and organizations for sustaining resources. At the very least, in order to function, such groups need legitimacy, and this necessitates "getting known" in the community. "Getting known" involves establishing ties with other organizations and especially with the mass media, which can publicize the wife abuse problem and the need for reforms in the domestic violence area. The media, in turn, stand to gain in audience attention and public recognition for reporting on a significant social problem, or can at minimum expect to be a source of excitement and controversy. Media attention, exerts a "draw" on other organizations which identify with movement goals, have an interest in the beneficiaries, or believe establishing linkages with movement groups may be beneficial. Thus exchange relationships develop among social movement organizations seeking publicity in order to obtain resources; the mass media, which function by reporting what is novel, i.e., "news;" and organizations, which respond to media and interest group pressure, seek to support movement programs, and often contain individuals sympathetic to the goals of the movement organization.
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This chapter discusses the formation and careers of six local community organizations which attempt to call the attention of the public to the problem of wife abuse. It begins with a brief description of the community, assigned the fictitious name "Central City." The community sketch is included in part to demonstrate that Central City was probably not characterized by a higher incidence of wife-battering than other similar cities--i.e., a high need or demand for ameliorative programs--but rather possessed a relatively high supply of people and organizations with a potential interest in the problem and with discretionary time to spend combatting it. Next, existing services for abuse victims are discussed briefly.

Following the section on the community, the chapter contains a lengthy account of the emergence and activities of the six social movement organizations (SMO's). The six organizations are discussed individually and in chronological order, according to the time each emerged; the time period covered is the two years between early 1976 and early 1978. Although at the end of the account there is some attempt to view interaction among the SMO's in relatively abstract terms, referring to basic social processes such as competition and conflict, the chapter should be read as primarily a descriptive account, set forth to make the
reader aware of important similarities and differences among the SMO's. In the chapter which follows, the careers of the groups will be discussed in a more analytic fashion, using the basic concepts set forth in Chapter II.

The Community Setting

Central City is a state capital and the hub of an affluent, large, and growing metropolitan area. In terms of population, it is the second largest city in the state. In 1976, the estimated population of the county and the city were 860,871 and 533,075, respectively. Unlike several other metropolitan areas in the state and metropolitan areas in general, both the SMSA and the county population are increasing, although at a relatively low rate. The 1970 Census indicates that 19% of the population of the city is non-white, while 81% is white. Aside from a relatively cohesive population of Appalachian migrants, there are no noticeable ethnic enclaves in the city. Foreign-born citizens of Central City are most likely to be professional people, affiliated with one of the local universities, medical facilities, or research centers.

Where most economic indicators are concerned Central City appears somewhat better off than its urban counterparts, both in the state and nationwide. Personal income in the SMSA rose 65.1% between 1969 and 1975, a rate of increase greater than that recorded in the other seven SMSA's in the state as well as in the state as a whole. The estimated per capita income in 1975 was $4,589 in the city and $5,045 in the county; the former was below the average for the state, and the latter was above. The county average is raised considerably by several large, prosperous
suburbs, including a community abutting Central City's northwestern edge, which has a population of over 38,000 and a per capita income (est., 1975) of over $9,000.

Central City thinks of itself as inflation-proof. That conception has received support in recent years for, at the same time other communities in the state have suffered the various traumas that accompany inflation, recession, and a decaying inner-city economic base--unemployment, population loss, service cutbacks--the economy of Central City has been booming. The major reason for its economic resiliency is the domination of the labor force by government, trade, and service occupations. Nearly 20% of the labor force are government employees; state government, the state university, and the federal government are the three largest employees in the community. Retail trade and service occupations account for another 24% and 19.2% of the labor force, respectively. Manufacturing concerns employ only 20.48% of those working, and of the top ten employers in the community, only one is a manufacturing firm--and it is the smallest of the ten in terms of numbers employed.

Fifty-two insurance companies have home offices in Central City; the insurance industry is, of course, a sector which tends to do well, even in times of inflation. Research is also a big business in Central City. The community possesses the third largest repository of scientific and technical data in the world--a surprising distinction for a middle-sized Midwestern community. Finally, eight colleges and universities with a combined enrollment of over 60,000 students have both a cultural and an economic impact on the city. One of these institutions is one of the largest universities in the United States. With an enrollment
of over 50,000 and more than 16,000 employees, the university dominates an entire section of the city.

All these features have combined to make Central City the fastest growing labor market of the state's major metropolitan areas each year since 1966. Unemployment is low in Central City; the yearly rate has run about 1.5% below the rate for the state throughout this decade. In the years 1973-1976, the community was either the lowest or the next-lowest of the eleven major labor markets in the state in total unemployment rates. The overall unemployment rate in the county for the years 1970-1975 was 4.48, as compared with a state rate of just over 5.9% and a national rate of 5.9%. The strong local economy appears to cushion the effects of larger economic downswings; the highest unemployment rate for the SMSA in the current decade was 7.4 in 1975, which was considerably below the 8.9 rate experienced that year by the other metropolitan areas in the state. As has been the case in other areas around the U.S., unemployment in the Central City area has decreased considerably in the last half of this decade.

Other indicators also suggest that Central City in the mid-1970's was not a community characterized by a high incidence the kinds of social problems which might be related to high rates of marital violence. People were leaving the city to reside in other areas of the county, but at rates far below those for comparable metropolitan areas in the state. Overall crime rates and assault rates for the city have not been dramatically different from those of similar communities. The Central City is atypical on only one possibly relevant "social problem" indicator: the divorce rate, which in 1975 was the highest in the state. While it can possibly
be argued that a high divorce rate signals the presence of significant amounts of marital strife, many other factors might explain this high rate. Additionally, it can be argued that divorce may itself be a major solution to the problem of wife abuse—perhaps the one most frequently sought by those affluent enough to afford it.

The community contains a wide array of government facilities and public and private health and human service organizations. There are eleven general hospitals, one psychiatric hospital, nearly 2,000 physicians and 54 psychiatrists. Over two hundred federal, state, county, and city agencies have offices in the area. Of particular note for this study is the mental health/social service sector, which is quite elaborate and differentiated. Community human service agencies, organizations, and associations range from the most broad, typical and traditional (e.g., the Public Welfare Department, the Community Action Program) to the most specialized and innovative (e.g., Gambler's Anonymous, Action for Newborns).

The services of a number of major mental health and mental retardation agencies are co-ordinated through a central county board created by state law in 1967 and authorized to oversee comprehensive community mental health service delivery. This highly elaborate arrangement for mental health service delivery is currently the only system of its kind in the United States which is accredited by the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH). The major functions of the central mental health/mental retardation staff and board are to: plan for service delivery; receive and allocate funds from federal, state, and local sources; insure the delivery of services through contracts with agencies which provide direct services; and provide fiscal management and guarantee accountability.
for contracting agencies. The overall objective of this system-like mode of organization is to provide the broadest range of needed services to citizens in the county, by the most competent personnel, and to eliminate both duplication and gaps in services.

In 1977, the total income to the system--derived from county taxes, state allocations, federal and other grants, and agency fees--was more than $15.5 million. That year, there were twenty-nine "contract" agencies in the mental health/mental retardation system. County mental health/mental retardation agencies also enter into contractual relationships of their own with over one hundred area social and human service agencies, creating a large and extremely complex network.

Prior to the formation of anti-abuse groups in Central City, with one exception, the kinds of services available for battered women in Central City were more or less typical of those available in other cities around the United States. Hospitals and physicians were presumably treating abuse victims, but were keeping no records specifically on the problem. The city police were of course involved in dealing with domestic disputes on a daily basis, but were receiving no special training beyond what is typical for metropolitan police departments. Community mental health centers and other social service agencies were undoubtedly delivering services to victims of abuse; however, several mental health professionals interviewed for this study have indicated that, as the literature suggests, until recently professionals tended to view physical abuse of women as part of a constellation of symptoms having their source in some larger problem such as alcoholism or unemployment. Finally, several religious and charitable organizations were offering crisis lodging and meals to
persons unable to find or afford a place to stay. While it can be assumed that some of the persons using such facilities were women fleeing from assaultive husbands, battered women were not a target group for such services, and no data exist on how many women using emergency lodges were doing so because they had been battered.

A Central City legal project was perhaps the only program which dealt directly with large numbers of abuse cases prior to the founding of shelters for battered women. Instituted in late 1971, funded for a time by a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) grant for Neighborhood Justice Centers, and later financed by city funds, this program uses a mediation process to obtain solutions to neighborhood nuisance situations and citizen disputes. The objectives of the program are to administer justice in cases of minor legal infractions involving primarily individuals who know one another; to reduce the caseload on the court docket; and to attempt to quickly restore good will between contending parties without applying criminal sanctions.

The program operates out of the city prosecutor's office and functions as follows: citizen complaints are screened and, if appropriate, are referred to a hearing officer; an appointment is arranged, at which both parties can discuss their disputes in the presence of a trained mediator, usually a law student; a solution to the dispute is agreed upon in the hearing by the two parties; and a follow-up contact is made thirty days after the hearing to determine whether the agreed-upon solution is working. Although relatively few formal charges are ever filed, the threat of charges is used as a means for assuring compliance on the part of the offending party.
The kinds of cases typically processed in this diversion program include city ordinance violations, the passing of bad checks, some consumer complaints, and interpersonal disputes, including domestic violence cases. The program began in 1972 with a caseload of approximately 2,000, and the number of cases processed has risen annually to a high in 1978 of about 18,000. Approximately one-half of the cases mediated involved bad checks; the other half are interpersonal disputes, of which approximately 60% are instances of violence between husbands and wives. Many cases of extreme abuse between married partners have been brought before hearing officers in this program. Operating on the basis of experience with legal charges and the assumption that complainants typically wish neither to charge their spouses formally nor to obtain a divorce, but wish instead merely to prevent the abusive behavior from recurring, mediators attempt to work towards an agreement between the parties themselves that the behavior will not occur again. Although it is technically possible for hearing officers to file charges formally, and although a fraction of the cases brought into this process do eventually result in formal legal proceedings, it is primarily through the exercise of their moral authority that hearing officers attempt to assure compliance with the law. After the advent of anti-abuse groups in Central City, this program became not only a contact point for referrals but also a source of controversy, based on the belief held by some movement activists that hearing officers cared nothing for the well-being of female abuse victims and were seeking reconciliation at any cost.

Traditional views of social movement development and recruitment typically focus on the grievances expressed by members of a population
as an explanation for why movements come about; that is, they rely heavily on the assumption that need or demand stimulates movement emergence and/or growth. Although what is known in general about the incidence of violence in the home and what can be inferred from the size of the caseload at the prosecutor's program discussed above both suggest that a need existed for programs aiding battered women in Central City, the demand for such services—either by victims, the general public, or interested professionals—was virtually nonexistent prior to the formation of social movement organizations. For example, a household survey conducted by trained interviewers on a random sample of 2401 Central City residents in 1974 indicated that domestic violence was not a major concern for those questioned. Instead, respondents were concerned primarily with problems such as drug use and juvenile delinquency, and the majority of respondents believed the most needed social service programs were in the drug abuse and job-training area. Regarding the allocation of police time to domestic fights, while 18% of the respondents stated the police spend too little time on these kinds of case, 16% believed they spend too much time. On the whole, respondents tended to believe police should spend more time on crime prevention, recovering stolen property, and apprehending criminals. There was no mention at all in any section of the report of a concern with providing services in the domestic violence area. Of course, it should also be noted that this and similar surveys did not attempt to probe the domestic violence issue—again, an indication of the invisibility of the problem.

Other data suggest that, for the most part, community members are not yet accustomed to viewing wifebeating as a problem in its own right. As
recently as 1977, a report on a survey conducted to determine the needs of women in the Central City area discussed a number of concerns, including the need for food, counseling, financial assistance, housing, clothing, and medical care. Specific problem areas noted in the report include: the financial problems of low income female "pink collar" employees; the need for more educational experiences; the need for a women's center; concern about discrimination on the job; and the needs of women who are coping with life "on their own."

Clearly, the needs of abused women for various kinds of aid have not been given a high priority in Central City, either by those answering community surveys or by those conducting them. The findings of community needs-assessment surveys are noted, not as a way of denying that the problem exists, but rather to indicate that the formation of anti-abuse groups cannot be seen as a response to an increase in the problem or in general awareness of it and that attempts at understanding the careers of these groups must consider factors other than the demand for services. As McCarthy and Zald (1973) note, social movements are established and supported, not in areas of the greatest need, but where there exists a supply of people who have both the interest and the opportunity to participate in them. They argue that higher education, the professions, and other fields allowing similar amounts of freedom to individuals frequently contribute disproportionately to social movements. Similarly, greater affluence can mean that adherents have an increased ability to funnel money into "causes," and thus social movements may be among the beneficiaries of a higher standard of living.
It should be pointed out, however, that indicating that ample raw materials for building a social movement exist in a particular setting says nothing about the number of organizations that will eventually form around a given issue or how well different organizations will exploit their environment. Given a constant demand and a constant supply of personnel and other resources, any number of organizations might emerge.

While not attempting to account for movement emergence, the treatment of the history of Central City anti-abuse groups, which comprises the remainder of this chapter, as well as later analyses, make the assumption that the differential success rates of the six social movement organizations are due, not to factors such as an increase in the phenomenon of wife abuse, or even the ebb and flow of popular sentiments favoring ameliorative programs, but rather to attributes of the organizations themselves or of the environment in which they functioned.

Formation and Activities of Anti-Abuse Organizations

The history of organized efforts to combat the wife abuse problem can be roughly periodicized into three phases. The first phase, between late 1975 and fall, 1976, was marked primarily by actions taken on the initiative of individuals and small groups and by the first attempts to form groups to deal with the problem. The second phase, which began in fall, 1976, was characterized by the active participation of several groups and fledgling organizations and also by rather intense intergroup competition. By the third phase, which came approximately one year later, the groups had differentiated themselves from one another and routinized their
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**1975**
- Informal Sheltering by Shelter 1
- Meetings of Fore-runner of Advocacy II

**1976**
- Negotiations for First Shelter
- Shelter I Dissolves
- Formation of Advocacy II
- News Series on Battering
- Incorporation of Shelter II

**1977**
- Public Hearing
- Incorporation of Shelter III
- Shelter III Opens
contacts with other organizations, and they were either in control of considerable resources, stable, or in decline.

The sections which follow discuss individually six different anti-abuse organizations. Their actual names do not appear in the narrative. Since three groups were primarily concerned with providing shelter to victims, they are named accordingly; three other groups, denoted by the term "Advocacy," worked on a broad range of supportive tasks, e.g., education of social service providers and requesting consideration of abuse victims from the courts. Listed in the chronological order by time of formation, the groups are:

- **Shelter I**, a grass-roots feminist support group for single mothers which sheltered battered women and attempted to open a shelter house;

- **Advocacy I**, which operated under the auspices of the local chapter of a major national feminist organization;

- **Shelter II**, a Christian refuge for battered women, founded by individuals with a strong religious commitment to working on a long-term basis with abuse victims;

- **Advocacy II**, a group sponsored by a conference representing local chapters of a women's public service voluntary association;

- **Advocacy III**, formed by mental health professionals to conduct anti-abuse education, research, and prevention in the community; and

- **Shelter III**, a group seeking to establish a relatively large, short-term crisis shelter.

The narrative is organized chronologically, and the time line accompanying this chapter notes significant dates and times of operation.

The sections which follow attempt to provide the reader with a sense of how each organization was formed; the type of philosophy each espoused; what goals were formulated and what activities were undertaken in pursuit
of these goals; interactions which occurred among movement organizations and between movement and established organizations; and the relative success each group had in obtaining resources. These discussions are not intended to be complete histories or case studies of each organization. Rather, they are selective accounts written so as to permit interorganizational comparisons and aid in the formulation of hypotheses.

Early Efforts to Combat the Spouse Abuse Problem

Without suggesting that collective action is reducable to the actions of individuals, it seems accurate to state that the earliest attempts to redress the social inequities suffered by battered women arose out of the efforts of individuals and small groups confronted with either personal or work-related challenges. The first stirrings of activity in what was later to become a well-organized pressure group consisted of scattered and sporadic attempts at initiating change by individuals and groups which were, at least at first, unaware of one another.

In July of 1974, the executive committee of a state-level council made up of representatives from local affiliates of a major national voluntary association for women passed a resolution to begin developing a project to study the needs of young women in the state. Specific target groups cited were teenage women, single women, and young wives and mothers. In the fall of 1975, a small ad hoc committee began meeting and holding informal discussions on this topic. At the first meeting of the group, an older woman with over 25 years of experience with the sponsoring women's organization in several Midwestern communities spoke at length on the wife abuse problem. Those attending began discussing the possibility
of setting up a "retreat" for battered women which would provide shelter, counseling, and job training. A possible site for a state-wide shelter, an abandoned seminary in a rural area, was mentioned at that time. It was decided that the group should begin working with other organizations and through local affiliates of the sponsoring association to generate interest in the project.

At the second meeting of this committee, a number of topics were discussed, including:

--a Lansing, Michigan women's residence funded by an affiliate of their own organization which became known informally as a weekend retreat for "escapees" from abusive husbands;

--Haven House, the Los Angeles area shelter and the crisis shelters in England established by Erin Pizzey;

--the notion of a multi-agency approach to the problem and the idea that short-term crisis intervention techniques would probably be most appropriate for dealing with victims;

--the notion that court action should not be advocated for victims.

The committee invited representatives from several other organizations--other affiliated women's organizations, the courts, children's services--to attend its next day-long meeting. At this session, the parameters of the problem were outlined in discussions with agency representatives, and members met together in the afternoon to discuss the particulars of setting up a shelter, including the criteria for a site, the kinds of services that might be offered, and possible sources for referrals. At the next meeting, a formal recommendation was drafted, to be sent to the state council, requesting that the council establish a haven for battered women and further that a committee be appointed to implement this recommendation. This was followed by a final report of the committee's work.
in May, 1976. This report placed the housing of battered women within the traditional mission of the sponsoring organization, the "long and continuing concern that life shall be better for all people" and emphasized the need for a second committee that would "coalesce with other concerned groups." The group was able to form its own organization for battered women, Advocacy II, later that same year.

Advocacy I.

Moving parallel with and later intersecting with this effort were other activities, either spawned by or related to feminist and mental health organizations. One influential line of feminist-sponsored activity had its origins in approximately 1973, with the numerous roadblocks encountered by a fortyish, middle-class woman who had tried repeatedly to obtain legal protection and redress in the face of her husband's attacks. In that year, she had filed abuse charges against her husband, and had taken him to court, only to find herself the object of the judge's lecture. She was told in court that her home life would improve if she would read her Bible, go to church regularly and in general be a better wife. It did not, and she was forced to continue her efforts to obtain a conviction for her husband and a divorce. Some time later, however, she began attending meetings of the local chapter of a national feminist organization. The organization was then working through several task forces. Two of these--concerned with displaced homemakers and divorced women--occasionally touched upon the abuse problem. On the basis of her continued work in the area, discussions with activists in other communities, and contacts with abuse victims, it seemed appropriate to this individual to form a task force devoted specifically to the problems of battered women. A
notice was placed in the chapter newsletter in summer, 1976, announcing the formation of the task force and including information for interested persons and for victims on where to call to join the task force or receive assistance. At about the same time, a questionnaire was distributed through the chapter and various community agencies requesting information from abuse victims for use by the task force. Twenty-five items were included, and the end of the questionnaire listed six telephone numbers individuals could call to join a self-help group or to obtain crisis housing. There was considerable response to the notice and the questionnaire, with approximately twenty persons expressing interest in some aspect of the task force's work. The early membership was reportedly made up of approximately 60% abuse victims and 40% concerned mental health professionals and feminists.

The group met weekly, every two weeks, and then monthly, beginning in the summer of 1976. Its philosophy stressed the value of self-sufficiency and the use of legal sanctions against abusers. Economic independence was stressed as a way women could escape from abusive spouses. Particularly in the early days, self-defense was emphasized as well; even the use of lethal force was not ruled out. Indeed, many members saw the solution to the abuse problem as achievable through a dual strategy involving the use of physical counterforce and the threat of prosecution:

If someone hits me...they belong in jail...I want their ass in jail...if they live long enough.

There was a strong conviction among group members that women can prevent abuse by stepping out of their passive role and actively resisting male aggression.
Activities engaged in by task force members included: consciousnessraising and complaint sessions; public speaking; court-watching; work on behalf of members who were involved in legal cases; advocacy with the police department for better treatment of victims in domestic quarrels; lobbying for pending legislation; referrals of members and callers to community resources; and the provision of crisis shelter.

The task force exchanged referrals with concerned professionals at local community mental health centers, but its major focus was on the law and the courts. Members accompanied women to give advice and support when they were filing charges and at subsequent stages of litigation.

The group was sometimes publicly critical of the prosecutor's program because it diverts offenders out of the court system and because of the belief that the program counsels couples to stay together. A member of the task force reportedly received sustained applause for calling into question the philosophy of this program at the 1976 state conference on the International Women's Year. Others also saw the mental health sector as potentially contributing to the problem by "blaming" the woman for her own victimization. As an early leader stated:

They [battered women] are not mental patients, they're victims. What I want to see is a support system. If you're in a suitable environment, your mental health will take care of itself...Most of us had been to a psychologist or a psychiatrist, and it was always the same story--what could we do to change ourselves so he wouldn't lose his temper and hit us. So I hit out pretty hard at the professional people. I think they're one of the first offenders.

During its first year, the task force spent considerable time providing services to victims, especially emergency shelter, informal counseling, and court advocacy. When requested, shelter was provided primarily
in the homes of members. Although no records were kept, the current task force chair estimates that approximately 100 women were given aid by the organization, most of them in the early days. As will be discussed in more detail below, the activities of this group were to change after fall of 1976, and again when a local shelter for battered women opened in fall of 1977.

Shelter I.

A third center of activity in the early period was a grass-roots feminist group made up of women living on their own with their children. Formed in 1974, the group had about fifteen members at its peak, most of them Welfare mothers. The members were, by and large, young and not highly educated; however, many were either university students or were interested in becoming students. The original purposes of the group were quite broad and centered on the provision of social and material support for members and women in the same general situation, and for their children. To this end, the group agitated for reforms at the Welfare Department, attempted to influence employers to be responsive to the child care needs of workers, and organized baby-sitting, clothing, and toy exchanges for members. Additionally, from the time of its formation, the group offered emergency housing to other mothers without financial means who were separating from their husbands. Housing was offered out of the knowledge that some women who leave their husbands are virtually penniless and need a place to stay and basic information about how to go about obtaining an income. The idea was that members would take newly separated women into their homes, give them emotional support and companionship, and assist them in finding housing and in applying for Welfare or a job.
The group did not view emergency housing as a form of assistance specifically for battered wives. However, due both to the fact that two original members had been abused by their husbands and to the fact that the majority of women requesting emergency shelter mentioned that their husbands had beaten or threatened them, women who sheltered others in their homes began to be increasingly aware of violence as a factor in the break-up of marriages. Some members then began focusing on battering as a problem in its own right, discussing the abuse situation with the women they housed and making them aware of options they could pursue, e.g., the program at the prosecutor's office, filing charges, and applying for Welfare assistance.

Although committed to the notion that women must make decisions for themselves, the group tended to be rather prescriptive with the women it housed. Members believed strongly that emotional and financial independence were a woman's best defense against violence in marriage. Self-sufficiency and lack of dependence on a man were viewed as the best way to prevent abuse. Members were opposed to the notion that intervention should focus on maintaining or improving the marriage, as suggested in traditional "marriage counseling" approaches. Instead, they tended to favor physical and emotional separation as a first--and perhaps a final--step in solving the abuse problem.

In order to make known the kinds of support they were offering, the group began gradually to co-ordinate with other community organizations and services. It was already carrying out its various other programs under the auspices of a university-area feminist collective. The umbrella organization housed several other projects, including: a feminist bookstore
and newspaper; a peer counseling program for lesbians; assorted projects including an auto mechanics workshop and a musicians union; and a large and well-funded anti-rape organization which sponsored a number of projects and staffed a 24-hour rape crisis line. The rape crisis line had been receiving calls from abused women as well as rape victims, and arrangements were made for these calls to be referred to members of the mothers' group. The same arrangement was made with a large, community-wide information and referral hotline. A small number of mental health professionals at one of the community mental health centers who were beginning to conceive of physical abuse as a problem distinct from other family difficulties also got involved in exchanging referrals. Abused women who telephoned the mothers' group were given an opportunity to discuss their problems over the phone and the option of emergency shelter. Although no records were kept of this informal housing effort, estimates place the number of women sheltered at about 30, prior to the summer of 1976.

By early 1976, leaders of the group had begun obtaining such scanty printed materials as existed on wife abuse. On the basis of their reading, and because their meager resources were being taxed considerably by the at-home sheltering effort, members became increasingly convinced that a shelter-house should be established. The leader of the group was acquainted with a woman counselor at the community mental health center in the area who had also expressed interest in the idea of a shelter. In early March, 1976, this counselor called the group's leader to request emergency shelter for a client who had been abused. The request was granted, but at that time, the leader stated the current sheltering
arrangement would not be sufficient for the long-run and that it was
time for them to begin work on a permanent shelter. It was agreed they
would begin a joint attempt to establish a shelter in the very near
future. This decision was reinforced a day later when NBC's "Weekend"
aired its documentary on battered women.

At the outset, it was understood that Shelter I would be a collabora­
tive effort between the single women's group and interested professionals
from the nearest local community mental health center. The attempts at
negotiation on the overall orientation and structure of the shelter are
worth recounting in some detail first because they show clearly the po­
tential for ideological conflict that is inherent in the wife-abuse issue,
and second, because their outcome foreshadowed the direction movement
activities were to take in the months to come.

A three-person committee consisting of one member of the single
mothers' group and two representatives of the community mental health
center began work on the shelter concept in spring, 1976. A speak-out
on wife-beating was organized during the first week in May as part of
Women's Week activities at the state university campus. Committee members
spoke to about thirty people and were well-received. The next week,
the committee met to exchange information and to request support from
representatives of ten local organizations and social service agencies,
including two mental health centers and the county Children's Services
agency. Members also met with representatives from the women's social
service organization and from Advocacy I, both discussed above. The
emergency shelter effort was thus becoming more widely known and was
presumably gaining both increased legitimacy and increased access to potential victim/residents.

In June, 1976, the committee drafted a thirteen-page proposal containing the name of the proposed shelter and the type of site being sought; a history of the mothers' group; arguments about the need for a crisis shelter for abuse victims in the community; and statements concerning the high degree of support for the concept demonstrated by other established community organizations. Although a rough organizational chart was attached to the document, what the proposal did not contain were statements concerning the guiding philosophy of the organization and how it would be structured. It appears these basic issues were the source of the conflicts which soon developed.

That same month, the mental health counselor who had been working on the shelter idea was given some time off from her other duties, accounted for by the mental health center as "consultation and education" time, to volunteer in the effort to establish a shelter. As her involvement in the project began to increase, members of the mothers' group began to get the impression that their idea was being co-opted. A meeting was called in the early summer to discuss the proposal and to make decisions on what actions should be taken next. Members of the mothers' group and the sponsoring feminist collective, persons from the more traditional women's voluntary association, and several mental health professionals attended. At that meeting, there was a growing awareness that the two sides had radically different views on the kinds of services that would be offered; who should staff the shelter; what funding levels should be sought; and what methods should be employed in going about obtaining funds.
To the single women's group, it seemed appropriate that the shelter be explicitly feminist in orientation; employ former abuse victims or individuals like its own members to engage in peer counseling; and be run on a democratic, collective basis. Mental health professionals, on the other hand, wanted to pursue the classic agency-building course, choosing a board of directors with community visibility; applying for substantial sums of money from state, federal, and local agencies; and hiring a professional staff. Representatives of the two sides could agree on virtually nothing, save one thing—the need for a shelter. Beyond that, their paths diverged. As the leader of the mothers' group views the conflict,

It became clear early on that there was a fight brewing between the traditionalists and the radicals, whether we would have a big-name board with a hierarchical structure, and rules and regs, and a social work approach to the problem, and also get government funding, or that we would try not to get government funds to have a non-hierarchical structure, and to have it run much more co-operatively, and not have the social work philosophy.

Asked about the position of her group on funding and organization, this individual replied:

The ideal situation would be money from the women's community. It [the shelter] would have been a low cost operation—get the women on Welfare immediately and get emergency food so they could supply their own food. Get the house from a church for one dollar a year. Do our own repair work and remodeling work and basically operate on a shoestring and not be government funded. To have it run by the women who created it.

The community mental health personnel did not agree with the philosophy of the single women's group. They opposed the position that the proposed shelter should advocate separation or divorce as possible solutions to the problem. They believed this would not only interfere with the woman's right to choose, but also present barriers to certain kinds of financial support, e.g., funding from churches. Additionally, they believed very
few women from working and lower-class backgrounds would wish to utilize a facility which presented an overt feminist image and few funders would be attracted to such a project. Regarding the position taken by the feminists at the summer meeting, a mental health professional stated simply, "in the long run, it looked like we were defeating a proposal."

Almost from the beginning, then, it appears that those working in the mental health sector believed the proposed shelter would be more widely accepted by both funders and users if characterized primarily as an "agency," serving "clients" and receiving funding from established and recognized sources, rather than as an association of feminists organized for self-help purposes and operating "on a shoestring."

Negotiations between the two groups broken down in midsummer, 1976. The mothers' group began co-ordinating loosely with Advocacy I, which had just recently formed, and continued its sheltering efforts; however, the group went out of existence less than six months later. A leader in the feminist collective which sponsored the group attributes its failure to the departure in summer, 1976, of a leader who had given it a sense of direction; to the shifting nature of its objectives; and to its general lack of responsible participation in the collective. Clearly, loss of leadership and the wide variety of goals encompassed by the program of the group were handicaps. However, a former member of the group who was active in the sheltering effort in the summer and fall of 1976 suggested another factor which may also help explain its demise. She attributes its dissolution to the increasing burden of aiding and housing abused women. Having made its support services known, the group was receiving more requests for assistance, and other group priorities were set aside
so that members could concentrate on that task. However, the group was utilizing a dwindling resource pool—the time, money, and energy of members—that was not being replenished. Asked what the group could have done differently that might have contributed to its survival, this interviewee stated:

I would have looked more for people with resources to help ... than people that needed help. In anything we did, we were looking for battered women that want a way out and have no way out... and I would do it the other way-- be able to take care of the problem before you solicit people with the problem to take care of.

Others were later successful in establishing a shelter locally, she believes, because they concentrated on obtaining funds before attempting to provide services and because they had "better ways of obtaining traditional funding."

**Increased Activity and the Formation of Other Anti-Battering Groups**

The fall of 1976 was a transition period between an early stage of grass-roots activity in which different segments of the emerging movement were beginning to become conscious of one another and a later period, marked by considerably more interorganizational awareness and contact and by sustained efforts to link with established community organizations. In the late summer, the mental health counselor who was interested in the problem but who had withdrawn temporarily from efforts to establish a shelter had begun working with other professionals who were holding support groups for abuse victims at the community mental health center branch. Because sessions were conducted as consultation and education groups, client records were not kept, thus protecting the women who came for discussions. The groups were well-attended, as a rule, but since
victims were either still living with their husbands or under their control, attendance by individuals tended to be sporadic. Advocacy I and the mothers' group--now beginning to dissolve--were also working with abuse victims at this time.

In September, 1976, collective efforts against wife-abuse were given reinforcement when the problem was given extensive coverage on local television. A prominent news personality had become interested in doing a story on battering during the past summer after talking with a local mental health professional who had conducted interviews with battered women and produced a video tape on the dynamics of abuse. She had spent the summer preparing the story, and in October, a five-part series, "Battered Women: The Silent Sufferers," was aired on the local CBS-affiliated station. Early segments in the series included personal accounts by battered women; an interview with an imprisoned man who had killed his wife; portions of interviews with mental health personnel and victims concerning sources of the problem; portions of interviews with police officers and people in the prosecutor's office; and a discussion of the courts, accompanied by an account of a recent shocking local case in which the bungling of a case by a judge may have cost a woman her life. The last segment of the series was devoted to documenting the need for a local shelter and giving information on local resources. The single mothers' group was mentioned as an "informal" provider of emergency shelter. The community mental health center support groups and the activities of the Advocacy I task force were also noted. It was suggested that victims needing assistance get in touch with one of these groups or with one of the local information and referral hotlines.
Besides making the general public and the victims of abuse themselves aware of the magnitude of the problem on the local level, this television series was a catalyst for activity in other ways. It stimulated interest in the issue on the part of other local mass media; the two other network affiliates later began running stories on the problem and paying attention to local anti-abuse activities. It naturally provided encouragement to those who were already working in the area. It also led to an increase in mutual awareness on the part of activists involved with movement groups as well as to later attempts to "use" the media in efforts to publicize the problem.

Following the news story, three new groups formed which were to have an impact on the movement in Central City and one other group, which had been operating more or less in isolation, became more widely known. Individuals from the committee of the state council of women's service organizations, which in the past spring had recommended steps be taken to aid battered women, received approval from the state council to organize a meeting in November, 1976. Potential supporters from various mental health and human service organizations, as well as from local chapters of the association, were invited to the day-long conference. The outcome of the meeting was a decision by participants to pursue various strategies designed to bring about change on the local, state, and national levels. Groups which were formed that day or shortly thereafter and which are relevant to this discussion are Advocacy II, a carryover from the original state council committee; Advocacy III, consisting primarily of representatives of the mental health sector; and Shelter III, which eventually went on to become the most viable of the anti-abuse
organizations. Shelter II, primarily a religious organization, had been in the early stages of development earlier in the fall of 1976, but became more widely known and somewhat more integrated into the network of concerned organizations beginning at the time of the fall meeting.

Advocacy II. Although its original vice-president was the same mental health counselor who had begun negotiations with the grass-roots feminist organization to set up a community shelter, this group was made up primarily of women from different parts of the state who were active in the sponsoring women's group, a traditional, "establishment," service-oriented voluntary association. For the first year of its existence, the group had a leadership core of older women with extensive experience in community work and a long history of involvement in association-sponsored causes. Several early members who worked were employed by local association programs; others were social and human service workers. Many members worked only in volunteer activities. The membership had sufficient discretionary time and release time from jobs that, except for times when there were organizational difficulties, the group was able to meet for one day each month, with members commuting to Central City from communities around the state.

The group developed several general goals at the time of its formation which were: to provide technical assistance to local communities wishing to establish programs for battered women; to establish a statewide crisis hotline and eventually a centralized shelter for battered women; to conduct research on the problem of wife abuse; to increase public awareness about the issue; and to establish a clearinghouse for information on
abuse. A wide variety of public education activities were engaged in by the organization; moreover, as time went on, additional priorities were introduced almost on an adhoc basis. For example, during its first year, several members became increasingly interested in taking the lead in a national coalition against wife-abuse and sponsoring a national conference. Lobbying for both national and state legislation also became a big concern.

Advocacy III. Another group which was formed as a result of the November, 1976 meeting was made up almost totally of individuals working in community mental health centers and other mental health organizations in Central City, with some representation from the Advocacy I and II organizations. Members had heard that groups in other communities had been successful in generating community interest in the abuse issue by holding public hearings, and the group originally formed around the idea of organizing a hearing of this type in Central City. The rationale for a public hearing was that it is a means to inform the public about a problem and at the same time pressure public figures to take steps to remedy it. Preparations for the hearing involved sending invitations to key individuals in selected government offices and community agencies to serve as panelists; arranging for individuals--including abuse victims--to testify about the problem; and inviting a roster of special guests, the general public, and the mass media to attend. Several meetings were held in November and December to plan the panel, testimony, agenda, and public relations for the hearing.

The hearing was held on January 27, 1977, with several community mental health centers, an association of church women, and the sponsors of the Advocacy II and III groups listed as co-sponsors. Although a
number of persons who had been invited to serve as panelists had declined or sent substitutes, the fourteen people who did serve as panelists represented a wide range of community organizations, including churches, legal organizations, the county commissioners, the police, the mental health/mental retardation system, the Welfare Dept., the city council, and the courts. Testimony on the psychological, legal, and law enforcement aspects of the problem was given by a group of community "helpers," and abuse victims also presented first-hand accounts of their experiences. The economic dependency of victims, the lack of responsiveness of the police and the courts, and the need for a crisis shelter were stressed.

Facilities and most of the publicity material for the hearing had been donated by several different organizations whose members had joined the group. A small amount of money—less than $100—was collected at the hearing; however, since the group had incurred no significant expenses to date, it had succeeded in raising funds, however minimal. Although attendance by the public had been poor due to the weather, news coverage of the hearing was extensive.

In the weeks following the hearing, members made attempts to follow-up contacts with panelists to determine their own reactions and to find out the extent to which the questions and issues raised at the hearing, e.g., on the conduct of the police in domestic disputes, could be addressed. Having held the hearing, Advocacy III was then faced with a decision about what projects to pursue next. Within a short time, new goals were developed, centering primarily on three functions: 1) advocacy to enhance the effectiveness of existing community services, to be accomplished by increasing the membership of the organization and by developing a means for communication
among organizations serving abuse victims; 2) research on the problem in the Central City area and evaluation of existing resources; and 3) public education, to be carried out through a speakers' bureau, quarterly forums, and a specialized library.

The group continued meeting every two weeks and spent a large amount of time clarifying goals and objectives, specifying activities relating to these objectives, and setting deadlines for particular tasks. During spring and summer, 1977, a great deal of member energy was expended in contacting personnel in organizations such as the Police Dept., hospitals, legal aid organizations and the Night Prosecutors Program in order to interview them, obtain from them data on their contacts with battered women, and provide them with lists of community agencies and groups concerned with the problem. Several other public relations, community education, and advocacy programs were either planned or begun. Two approaches to fundraising were discussed during this time, but were not pursued. Members were aware that the organization had not filed for tax-exempt status, and thus would have had difficulties in acquiring funds.

Shelter II. This organized effort at sheltering abuse victims is, in many ways, the most controversial of the new anti-abuse organizations operating in Central City. Formed in 1976 and incorporated as a private, non-profit organization in October of that year, Shelter II receives both direction and sponsorship primarily from the religious sector of the community. The idea for a shelter originally came about through the work of a Baptist minister, his wife, and another married couple. The ministerial couple attributes their interest in the problem of domestic violence to their
adoption of children who had lost their parents as a result of a double murder/suicide in the community, which had followed a long period of marital violence. A group consisting primarily of married couples from the same church formed the board of directors of the organization. The original intention of the group had been to establish a foster home for children from violent homes; negotiations were begun on the purchase of a large house for this purpose, but the group had met with little success in this area. The viewing of the local television series on wife abuse and a subsequent conversation with the television reporter who had presented it revealed to the group the lack of facilities for women abuse victims as well as for children. The group decided to change their original focus and begin working to obtain a site which would house battered women and their children.

The founders of Shelter II were strongly religious in their orientation to both the problem and its solution. In formulating organizational policy, the theological literature on family violence and on the obligations that marital partners have to one another was referred to as frequently as were social scientific writings and accounts of successful shelter operations. For example, the so-called "cycle of violence," a term used to convey the notion that persons who have been abused grow up to become abusers, is explained in Shelter II literature by the passage in Exodus which refers to the passing down of the sins from one generation to the next. Those who established the shelter believed the effects of abuse can only be overcome through a long-term physical, emotional, and spiritual "healing" process in which the shelterers work intensively with a few women "who really want to change." The group
sees this healing as facilitated by God's help and by the formation of a close, supportive friendship bond between adult volunteers and individual shelter residents. Because of the belief that recovery from spouse abuse takes a relatively long time, the directors of Shelter II envisioned a program of residency for each woman and her children which would last up to six months.

Shelter II anticipated referring residents to other community agencies for needed services such as Welfare benefits, mental health counseling, and job training. The board therefore began to make an effort to make the organization known in the community. One of the founders attended the November, 1976 anti-abuse organizational meeting and began making regular contact with Advocacy II and III, both of which she eventually joined.

Fund raising was also a major concern for the board. Although Shelter II states in the by-laws accompanying its articles of incorporation that "Jesus Christ is our motivation, however, religion is not our mode of treatment," the religious fervor conveyed by persons speaking on behalf of the shelter made both community social service agencies and potential funders wary. Shelter II personnel have indicated that several public agencies and non-profit foundations approached for funds turned down requests and formal proposals upon reading that the by-laws specify members of the board must be "men and women who profess a personal faith in Jesus Christ as their savior and Lord." As will be discussed below, this and other features of the organization were the source of conflicts with other anti-abuse groups, which adhered more closely to either the community mental health or the feminist ideology. However, the philosophy of Shelter II did not present barriers to funding from religious organizations;
indeed, Shelter II received fairly substantial amounts of money, primarily in the form of one-time contributions from various churches, a conference of churches, and a bible college, as well as from private donations collected through churches. Shelter II opened its doors in fall, 1977, offering separate, individual apartments in the same building to up to five abused women and their children. By that time, however, another shelter house, with a substantially larger budget and staff as well as much more community visibility, was already in operation.

Shelter III. Although Shelter II was the last anti-abuse organization to form in Central City, it was to accumulate support at a very swift rate and establish itself as a virtual dominant force in the anti-battering "industry." This position was achieved through a strategy which involved linking with other organizations; using the media, word-of-mouth publicity and testimonials; and resisting attempts at co-optation. The history of this organization warrants close scrutiny here, in part because its efforts at resource mobilization were so successful.

Following the demise of the Shelter I concept in summer, 1976, the mental health counselor who had been working with the single mothers' group turned her attention to working directly with abuse victims at a community mental health center at which she was employed. However, as a result of the failure of the women's group to continue its sheltering efforts; the media publicity given the problem in the fall; the enthusiasm expressed at the November meeting; and the rumors that another group (Shelter II) was beginning to work on establishing a shelter, this individual began to hold organizational meetings for Shelter III in early
January, 1977. At one of the first meetings, a VISTA volunteer from another community in the same state, who had been instrumental in establishing a shelter there, came at the request of a member of the founding group to share information on strategies for shelter organization and fund raising. The group decided immediately to file articles of incorporation, apply for tax exempt status and appoint both a board of directors and an advisory board, each with twenty members. It also composed a hand-out describing the services it planned to offer for distribution at the January 27 public hearing on wife-battering.

As envisioned at the time of its founding, the new shelter, although not explicitly feminist in orientation, would be operated 24 hours a day, seven days a week, by women—primarily volunteers—for abuse victims and their children. It would focus mainly on providing a secret place of refuge for women in life-threatening situations. Programs planned at that time included: short-term housing (up to 30 days) for approximately twelve women and twenty children; legal advocacy; assistance with obtaining jobs or Welfare; child care; a 24-hour crisis telephone line; some in-house counseling; and referral of residents and crisis-line callers to other community services. Later, the board organized a speaker's bureau which worked to make the community aware of the wife abuse problem and the services Shelter III was planning to provide. To dispel any impression that the organization favored divorce as a solution to wife-beating, and thus neutralize anticipated accusations that the shelter was "anti-family", those who presented descriptions of the program stressed that its objective was to encourage free choice and self-determination for women and to support whatever life decisions they themselves made.
A group of five to seven individuals, affiliated with various community mental health and social service programs, formed the working nucleus of the organization. The sole immediate goal of the group was to be able to open the shelter house. No attempt was made to do outreach to abuse victims during the early months; instead, all efforts were concentrated on obtaining facilities and funds which could eventually be used in service delivery. In order to accomplish this objective, the Shelter II group pursued a dual strategy of attempting to influence potential providers of money and other resources and attempting to gain support from other community organizations. The advisory board concept is an example of the latter strategy, adopted specifically to involve representatives of organizations which were considered crucial to Shelter III's objectives in its development. Shortly after its formation, the organization raised its social capital in Central City by recruiting the television news personality, by now considered an expert on domestic violence, to serve as president of the board of directors. Highly respected, well-connected, and always in demand as a speaker, this individual was also credited with being able to "plant" television and newspaper stories at crucial times, e.g., just prior to meetings held by potential funders to consider grant proposals.

With regard to obtaining funds and facilities, the founders of Shelter III approached a range of potential constituents in spring and summer, 1977, using each promise of resources as a rationale to justify requests for further support. For example, the founders made early decisions to attempt to obtain staff salaries by means of a Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) grant and to begin negotiating with a church to use
one of its properties as the shelter site. Working with these two organizations, they then used the promise of a rent-free facility to justify the salary grant request and used the promise of salaries in discussions with the church about the facility. At the same time, the leadership group was "covering its bets" by engaging in discussions with the local women's service organization which operated a residence for women and was considering donating space for abuse victims.

Summer, 1977, was a critical time for the organization in its attempts to obtain funding and legitimacy. At the beginning of the summer, as one informant stated, "Everything was contingent on everything else," as the group waited to transform resources sought into resources obtained. While awaiting decisions on staff salaries and the shelter building, the group was also seeking other "start-up" monies to pay for expenses such as utilities, funds to pay a shelter director, and other income. A proposal was submitted to a large private foundation in Central City, and at the same time, attempts were made to affiliate with the county mental health/mental retardation system.

The foundation proposal generated a crisis for Shelter III's supporters, in the form of a merger request on which foundation funds were made to appear contingent. Shelter III representatives were invited in late June to a meeting at foundation offices. The meeting was also attended by: representatives of the major private social service umbrella organization; the foundation project proposal reviewer; a member of the central mental health/mental retardation office staff; and a representative of the community service/residential facility for women. At this time, according to a Shelter III board member who was present:
They told us they would feel much more confident about our grant if we had more representation from the business community on our board and/or if we affiliated with another group that was recognized in the community. Well, it became apparent that the women's service organization had put in a grant for funding for a shelter for battered women to operate out of the building. The foundation asked us to meet with and consider merging the two groups.

Representatives of the groups met, but by then a degree of bad feelings existed between them:

Those of us from felt we had been somewhat deceived, that we had tried to include them all along and they had pulled out and not kept us informed and that they had a grant in to the agency we were seeking funds from. They had put it in after we had put ours in--and they were aware we had.

Other movement activists viewed 's submission of an alternative proposal as an act of deception; however, there were those in the movement who believed the story had two sides and saw Shelter III partisans as acting in bad faith. On the other hand, several well-informed interviewees saw the incident differently and suggested that the pressure placed on the two groups to merge was possibly part of a quid pro quo between the foundation and other large-scale community funders. In their view, the foundation was attempting to "bail out" the financially-troubled and under-occupied women's residence, which was receiving funding from other concerned community sources as well, and at the same time pressure the association to provide desperately needed services it was reluctant to provide on other grounds. This explanation for the merger request seems plausible, since the board of the women's association was widely reputed to be conservative, was not enthusiastic about the idea of a shelter, and in fact had not agreed to shelter battered women, even at the time of the foundation meeting.
At subsequent meetings between the two groups, the conditions discussed for the merger appeared so disadvantageous to the interests of Shelter III that it saw no reason to co-operate with \__\__\__\__. Noting that the proposed merger would permit Shelter III little policy-making power in the larger association, granting it only token representation on a large board of directors and, beyond that, merely allowing the Shelter III group the freedom to run a program for battered women in the organization's facility, Shelter III believed it had little to gain by merging. The organizers already had some chance of obtaining their own facility and of receiving funds to hire staff. All they would lose by refusing to affiliate with \__\__\__\__ was a claim to legitimacy in the community—and that they could obtain elsewhere. Withdrawing from merger negotiations with the association and sending a letter to this effect to the foundation, Shelter III leaders began a concerted effort to win acceptance and support from the publicly-funded mental health/mental retardation system in time to give evidence of the shelter's community support and potential for fiscal stability to the foundation. Letters of endorsement to the central mental health/mental retardation staff and board were obtained from the three comprehensive community mental health centers then operating. Mental health/mental retardation staff were lobbied both by Shelter III partisans and by influential members of the community who were interested in the project.

By virtue of having sent a representative to the foundation meeting at which the merger idea was advanced, the mental health/mental retardation staff was aware that in contracting with Shelter III, it would be providing evidence of a link between the shelter and "established" community human
service organizations which would encourage other funders. By this time, the staff was convinced both of the need for crisis services for battered women and of the competence of the women who had developed the idea for Shelter III. Both the display of support from affiliated community mental health centers and the fact that several Shelter III board members were human service professionals—women with master's degrees in social work who had been employed in various Central City human service organizations—strengthened the confidence the staff had in Shelter III.

Project review personnel in major public and private organizations engaging in large-scale funding of human service projects in Central City have substantial mutual knowledge about projects seeking funding in the community from various sources. They also contact one another from time to time to obtain information on specific organizations requesting funding. The same network which was to work against Shelter II's claims to legitimacy and funding operated in a positive fashion for Shelter III in late summer, 1977. An individual who was close to the negotiations on the mental health/mental retardation system level indicated the personnel reviewing Shelter III's proposal for mental health funding were anxious to approve some sort of support for the organization as quickly as possible, so as to endorse the program. Funding was recommended by the staff to its own board at a late summer meeting which, significantly, was also attended by the foundation's project officer. A relatively small amount of money—just over $6,000—was granted at that time, along with approval for Shelter III to receive adult protective service (Title XX) reimbursements of up to $10,000 for its first year. One week later, the foundation,
having seen evidence of "establishment" sponsorship of Shelter III, awarded it a substantial grant.

Other negotiations conducted during summer, 1977 also had positive outcomes. In a highly unusual action, Shelter III was told informally it could revise its original proposal for staffing monies upward in order to request support for more positions. The church provided a seven-bedroom, three-story house, and the council of churches supplied several hundred dollars for telephones. Fund raising from individuals and groups and requests for material donations from the community yielded a considerable amount of money, as well as many other needed items. When the shelter opened in fall, 1977, it had secured a first-year operating budget of just under $100,000; acquired a facility, furniture, and appliances; begun hiring staff; and recruited approximately 50 volunteers to insure round-the-clock staff coverage. And to the surprise of no one, Shelter III was filled from the day it opened.

The Third Stage of Anti-Battering Activism

This study focuses on the activities of anti-battering groups over a relatively short period of time--roughly the two-year period beginning in 1976 and ending in early 1978. Thus, it cannot claim to speak definitively to questions of ultimate organizational success or impact. However, even within that brief time period, it is possible to discern definite trends in organizational activity and marked changes and differences in the productivity of different groups.

Both shelters were in operation by fall, 1977. Shelter II consisted of five rented apartment units and facilities for its two-person staff.
Shelter III was a house with separate sleeping quarters, and common living area and housed twelve women and twenty children. Each organization had succeeded in generating sufficient community interest and financial support to be able to serve victims, although Shelter III's budget, staff, and residence facilities were considerably larger than those of the other organization.

By virtue of the fact that they were dealing with residents who needed various forms of assistance, both shelters had regular contact with other community sectors having responsibility for abuse victims, e.g., the police and the courts. This circumstance, together with the fact that Shelter III was receiving large sums of money from other public and private sources and the fact that both organizations were pursuing active public awareness campaigns, meant that Shelter III and, to a lesser extent, Shelter II, came to be defined as organizations possessing expertise in the wife abuse area. Particularly because of Shelter III's 24-hour crisis line and round-the-clock staffing, this organization was more likely than any other to receive inquiries, referrals, and offers of assistance from the community.

With the advent of two organizations specializing in services for battered women, the role of other anti-abuse organizations in the community shifted. The three advocacy groups continued to function beyond fall, 1977; however, their goals underwent revision. Moreover, the groups either stayed about the same or declined in terms of funds and membership.

Advocacy I, which had worked more closely with abuse victims than had the other two non-shelter organizations, appeared to experience the greatest decline following the establishment of the shelters. When Shelter III opened, it became clear to members that the need for emergency shelter
was being met elsewhere. Thus, in its second year, the group focused
more on tasks such as lobbying for legislation and influencing the city
police departments to hand out cards containing information on local
services for abused women to victims in domestic violence calls.

Regarding its relationship with the local chapter of the sponsoring
feminist organization, informants felt the group received very little sup­
port. Reasons suggested for this lack of attention include the preoccupa­
tion of the chapter with working for the passage of the Equal Rights Amend­
ment, lack of funds, and lack of chapter commitment to the issue. Lack
of rapport between this group and its official sponsor was at times so
great that, following the fund raising concert in June, 1977, the group
set up its own checking account, so as to avoid putting its funds into
the general organizational treasury. Nevertheless, the group never con­
sidered branching out on its own, since the chapter provided a measure of
legitimacy in the eyes of the community, meeting facilities, and a com­
munications outlet, via its newsletter.

As time went on, Advocacy I continued to function, but its membership
diminished considerably. Abused women who had joined the group improved
their circumstances and moved on; other women in crisis had other services
to turn to; and individuals interested in working on behalf of battered
women also had other organizations they could join. The group had ap­
parently failed to capture a loyal constituency and to differentiate itself
from other similar organizations.

Advocacy II evolved into a routine of meeting monthly to discuss develop­
ments around the state and to share information, particularly on legal
issues. Although the good intentions of its members are widely praised,
this group is generally regarded as ineffective and unable to "get things done." Several early members have departed to work with other groups, and attendance levels at meetings tend to fluctuate.

It may be that the diversity of the goals and strategic foci of this organization are in part due to its relationship to the sponsoring organization. On the one hand, as will be discussed later, the links between the two groups benefited them both. Some local associations operating residences had an interest in adding programs for battered women to existing programs. Additionally, many people felt focusing on a dramatic and relevant problem such as wife abuse would revitalize the image of the association. Working with the association aided the subgroup by giving it legitimacy and access to personnel on the local level. On the other hand, however, the state council was only willing to give token financial support to Advocacy II—$500 per year, granted on a year-by-year basis. This money barely covered the cost of preparing and mailing meeting minutes to the two hundred persons on the mailing list. At the same time, sponsorship by the state council prevented the group from engaging in fund raising because of agreements between the council and the United Way, which restricted independent fund raising by affiliated organizations. It can be argued that, having set large-scale, long-range goals, but having no access to the kinds of funds needed to reach them, the group set about working on such tasks as seemed to appeal to individual members, so as to maintain their interest. Of the many plans and ideas originally advanced by the group, the only one on which the organization has made appreciable progress is the information transfer concept.
Members are aware that sponsorship by the state council is, in some ways, a liability. For this reason, the group established a "committee to explore independent status," which began making plans for the achievement of autonomous status and independent fund raising.

Advocacy III had been holding meetings every two weeks throughout 1977, but later began meeting monthly. The group continued to pursue the goals which had been formulated after the public hearing—institutional advocacy, research, and community education. Many diverse activities relating to these objectives were carried out or initiated in late 1977, including: the production of anti-abuse flyers for distribution in the community; interviews with personnel in various local agencies and continued efforts to gather data on the incidence of abuse; attempts to have questions on wife-abuse added to community needs-assessment surveys; and plans for informal educational luncheons with persons who by virtue of their professions, have contact with abuse victims, e.g., judges and legislators. Additionally, in fall, 1977, the group became involved in renewed efforts to open the local women's residence facility for abuse victims. A few individuals apparently believed the unused space could be turned into a shelter, and for a time Advocacy III members discussed developing funding proposals to make this idea more feasible.

In spring, 1977, Advocacy III had made one of its objectives to increase membership as a means of insuring that more personnel in key community human service agencies would learn the facts about wife abuse in Central City. However, throughout this period, Advocacy III was experiencing a decline in working membership, with an average of ten individuals...
attending each meeting. Because so many projects were initiated and because member attendance was so sporadic, few tasks were completed. Moreover, new goals were created, old ones disappeared, and much effort was expended in prioritizing both the overall goals and the tasks subsumed under them. In a statement on the formation and activities of Advocacy III, prepared for a national anti-abuse group by a three person committee, several organizational difficulties were noted, including: the difficulty of making progress towards group goals in the face of both the lack of member commitment and the apparent lack of community response; "not enough person-power to carry out the work;" and low member morale, the result of high expectations which were not being met. Advocacy III was, by early 1978, a "becalmed" organization: still in existence, still presumably pursuing its goals, but not increasing its resources and in danger of losing the interest of its members to other anti-abuse groups or to newer causes.

Interorganizational Co-Ordination, Competition, and Conflict in the Most Active Phases of Movement Activity

The publicity provided by the public hearing and the advent of groups actively seeking to establish safe houses for abuse victims in Central City created an atmosphere of intense activity around the issue of wife-beating. By early 1977, five groups with contacts in different community sectors were working behind the scenes and speaking out in favor of various social changes which would benefit battered women. This proliferation of organizations meant a substantial increase in community awareness of the problem. At the same time, it also created a potential for coalitions, conflicts,
Coalitions, Competition, and Conflict. Once there were two groups actively seeking resources to provide shelter to abuse victims, other established and movement organizations in the community became a potential constituency for them, and by early 1977, both Shelter II and Shelter III were actively seeking support for their programs from concerned organizations. Shelter III supporters were already familiar to others in the movement, and Shelter II founders took steps to insure wider organizational recognition, e.g., by public speaking and by seeing to it that the organization was represented on two of the advocacy committees. As both groups began writing and submitting funding proposals, they sought written endorsements and other kinds of support, not only from movement organizations but also from community human service agencies. Advocacy I and II were asked for formal endorsements by each shelter organization to support requests for funding. Although Shelter III had not yet been formed at the time Advocacy I was asked to endorse the other shelter, Advocacy I was not willing to endorse the religious group, and both groups eventually endorsed Shelter III. Advocacy I also held a fund raising concert in June, 1977, and donated the proceeds to Shelter III. Neither advocacy group ever officially endorsed Shelter II; indeed, there was almost universal suspicion of this organization, largely stemming from the concern that future shelter residents might be proselytized in addition to being kept safe from their husbands.
As noted above, Shelter II refused to merge its efforts in a co-operative program with the local women's residence facility. Some organizations wanted the merger. It would have relieved the foundation staff, not only because it would have placed foundation funds in the hands of a "proven" organization, but also because the residence, which was also receiving foundation and private social service money, would have been made more solvent. The merger would also have pleased influential members of Advocacy II, who had close ties with this organization and who believed the residential unit was a logical place for a battered women's facility. Indeed, some Advocacy II members came to evaluate Shelter III negatively as a result of the merger negotiations. Despite this attitude of suspicion, however, Advocacy II did not endorse or support Shelter II, citing its board composition as a major stumbling block. As a member of the steering committee noted:

It didn't seem to me that we [Advocacy II] can support an organization that will select people on the basis of religious convictions.

Competition and conflict were, understandably, more probable between organizations which were similar in their goals; which required relatively large pools of resources to carry out their main objectives; and which were considering seeking resources from the same target groups--namely, the two shelter organizations. Both groups soon became aware they were seeking endorsements and financial aid from similar sources, and, while they initially began contact with one another in a spirit of co-operation, the two groups grew to distrust one another and subsequently were almost totally unable to work together. Indeed, at least one meeting, mediated by a member of the central mental health/mental retardation staff, was
held shortly after both shelters opened, for the purpose of establishing "ground rules" for interaction between the two shelters and placing limits on the public statements each could make about the other.

Not unexpectedly, disputes erupted between movement organizations and other community organizations because, in arguing that special services for abuse victims were badly needed, anti-battering groups sometimes appeared to be pointing the finger of accusation at organizations already working with domestic violence cases, e.g., the police, the courts, and the diversionary program mentioned earlier. Both Advocacy I and Shelter III, for example, had to spend time "mending fences"—winning the support of community sectors they had previously criticized or failed to work well with—in order to obtain consideration for their beneficiaries.

Also inevitably, the anti-abuse groups themselves became critical of one another, often because of basic philosophical issues. Shelter III, for example, was heavily criticized by feminist elements in the movement, both for affiliating with the mental health/mental retardation system and for giving staff positions to men—the latter action having been virtually mandated by the equal employment opportunity requirements of funding agencies. Shelter II was criticized for its religious emphasis, which was seen by some other groups as substituting one form of dependency—subjection to a man—with another—reliance on God. Additionally, there was a great deal of concern expressed that one or the other of the shelter organizations would not emphasize the anti-abuse measures believed by different groups to be the most effective, e.g., prosecuting abusers, self-defense, separation, or divorce.
Domain Adjustments. As more anti-abuse organizations became active in
the Central City area, it appears that some groups attempted to become
more specialized, probably as a way of minimizing conflict with other
groups while maintaining a distinct organizational identity. Even prior
to opening, the two shelter organizations worked to clarify the ways in
which they were different. Shelter II portrayed itself as committed
to long-term work with relatively few women who would be housed in private
quarters so as to enhance the autonomy of the mother-child unit. The shel­
ter did not wish to offer over-the-telephone counseling directly to vic­
tims, choosing instead to obtain clients only through other agencies
or the central community information and referral number. Shelter III
saw itself as operating more as a crisis intervention facility and publi­
cized itself widely as such, emphasizing the idea that crisis telephone
and shelter services would be available at all times. A relatively high
resident turnover rate was anticipated, and it was planned that residents
would be a "community of women," living and eating together and assuming
joint responsibility for cooking, cleaning, and other household chores.
Although several interviewees noted that, in its public statements,
Shelter II sometimes conveyed the impression that it was affiliated closely
with Shelter III, as time went on, each organization tended increasingly
to emphasize what was distinctive about its own program, and the dif­
ferences between the two organizations were thus highlighted.

By mid-1977, two shelters for battered women had incorporated and were
actively seeking to obtain their funds and to make their services known
in the community. The three advocacy groups could have responded to this
situation in any one of several ways. First, one or more of the groups
could have dissolved, on the rationale that the need for services for battered women was now being met in the community. Second, the groups might have merged, coalesced, or co-ordinated with one another in a joint advocacy effort. Third, members could have worked with one of the shelters in a volunteer capacity, on the staff, or on the board of directors. Finally, the groups could have gone on functioning as separate entities. While Shelter III in particular tended to involve members of other organizations in its activities, the last-mentioned course was in general the one the three advocacy groups followed. This is not to say the groups did not have contact with one another; they were frequently aware of one another's activities, and members of different groups sometimes found themselves engaged in similar tasks, e.g., giving testimony for proposed legislation. However, for the most part, each group continued to function as an independent organization with specific goals, objectives, and activities.

With the passage of time, each of the three groups struggled to define its role in the movement. All three groups had to resolve the issue of whether they should give aid directly to abuse victims; function as advocates in or liaisons with community organizations; educate the public; or create relatively few group "outputs" and concentrate on obtaining funds to carry on larger projects later. The groups tended to vacillate among these positions. Advocacy II began its career with direct service, advocacy, and educational goals and gradually withdrew from its commitment to dealing directly with abuse victims. Some interviewees indicated this group had too many goals to pursue any objective effectively. Advocacy I and III had a great deal in common with one another in terms of membership
characteristics and goals; however, Advocacy I was more committed to working with victims and to influencing the police and the court system, while Advocacy III tended to focus on the health service delivery system as the target for persuasion. Additionally, Advocacy I members appeared to believe it was appropriate that the pressure group acting on behalf of battered women be affiliated with a major feminist organization; many members of Advocacy III, on the other hand, belonged to the group primarily in their capacity as employees of mental health and social service organizations, rather than as feminists. Thus, two groups which might logically have been expected to merge maintained separate organizational identities and independent task domains.

Summary and Observations

Focusing on a period of just over two years, this chapter has traced the formation and careers of six local anti-abuse organizations. As Chapter III, on the development of society-wide interest in the wife abuse problem suggests, the groups comprising the local social movement industry have diverse organizational antecedents and different philosophical orientations. Two groups might be classified primarily as feminist in both organizational ties and philosophy; of these, one group, which failed, was a relatively radical, grass-roots organization; the other is affiliated with a powerful and well-known national women's movement organization. A third SMO is aligned with a more established, traditional women's voluntary association and espouses a community service philosophy. Two groups can probably best be described as adhering to the community mental health ideology. Finally, one organization, founded by persons of deep religious
faith, attempts to follow Christian principles in its work with abuse victims.

Predictably, these SMO's also differed in the goals they espoused, in the means they saw as important for reaching them, and in the programs they developed for bringing about social change. The descriptive account above contains many references to the range of strategies engaged in as part of the overall effort to improve the position of battered women in society. It also gives examples of both competitive and co-operative activities engaged in by the various groups and notes shifts which occurred in organizational agendas over time. Dilemmas faced by organizations seeking to realize dual or multiple goals are also focused upon.

Where mobilizing resources is concerned, the SMO's had very different success rates. One group so depleted its financial stores and member commitment that it ceased to function as an organization. One shelter group has amassed considerable resources and has become a large-scale provider of services to abuse victims, and another shelter had been able to build sufficient support to deliver services on an ongoing basis. The three advocacy groups have been somewhat less successful in obtaining resources with which to carry out their original goals. Particularly after the advent of shelter organizations, these groups have been less able to count on member and community support and have tended to function on an ad hoc basis. However, this is not to say that these groups are not significant elements in the anti-abuse movement--that they do not, for example, influence the climate of public opinion and the conduct of decision-makers on the issue, make their own members more aware of what they can do to help abuse victims, or provide needed support to Central
City shelters. It is merely to suggest that, other things being equal, these groups command fewer resources, and hence less potential power, than other SMO's in the same local industry.

Finally, before the discussion proceeds to a consideration of the factors which may have led to these differential success rates, it is perhaps appropriate to make several general observations on the attributes of and changes in this set of social movement organizations, which seem to support the notion that this is a highly 'professionalized' movement:

-- Although some individuals were involved because they themselves had been battered, the leadership and most of the active participants in SMO's tended to be well-educated professional women whose knowledge of abuse was derived primarily from exposure to the problems of other women, not from direct experience. Moreover, it appears that participation in different SMO's by battered women was more extensive in the early stages of movement activity than at later times. As time went on, SMO membership also changed due to the entry of men into the various groups.

-- The movement received a great deal of both official and unofficial support from a wide range of established community organizations. Gestures of support included: sponsorship and permission to use the name of another organization; the granting of release time for work on the problem; the giving of advice informally; formal letters and statements of endorsement; the lending of facilities; the provision of mailing, copying, and secretarial services; the giving of publicity; and many similar activities.

-- Concern with feminist issues is marked among movement participants; however, with the entrance into the movement of trained professionals and also with the advent of certain types of funds, SMO's have shown an increased tendency to apply the terminology and tools of the community mental health approach to the problem. In line with this trend, the victimization of women is coming to be seen as part of the more general problem of domestic violence (wife/husband/child abuse) and concern is being expressed about extending treatment to abusers as well as abuse victims. At the same time, the mental health providers in Central City are becoming more concerned with the issue of violence against women.
These trends are an interesting example of the kinds of interchanges which can occur between social movement organizations and other groups with which they affiliate and of the diffusion of ideas among organizations aligned for a common purpose.

Up to this point, the discussion of the activities of the six SMO's has been primarily descriptive; no attempt to analyze their careers through the use of sociological principles has been made. The two chapters which follow are more abstract and analytic, seeking to discover explanations for the patterns described in this chapter.
V.
FACTORS AFFECTING RESOURCE MOBILIZATION IN SIX SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

Introduction

The descriptive narrative in Chapter IV concerned the formation and careers of six social movement organizations (SMO's) working to bring about social change that would ease the problems of battered women. That chapter showed that the six groups differed in their philosophical orientations as well as in their central goals and their activities. It also indicated that some organizations were more successful than others, both in the absolute sense--five survived, whereas one did not--and in the relative sense, i.e., in terms of net resources obtained. This chapter goes beyond Chapter IV, viewing the careers of these organizations in more abstract terms and discussing SMO attributes and the dimensions of relationships between SMO's and other organizations, so as to arrive at generalizations about why these SMO's--which functioned in the same community and were concerned with a common problem--experienced different success rates.

The discussion will proceed in the following manner: 1) the underlying rationale for the analysis will be outlined; 2) each organization will be discussed in terms of its success in acquiring each type of resources (legitimacy, funds, members, and facilities), and this will permit a rough categorization of organizations as more or less successful;
3) the SMO's will be discussed using three intra-organizational dimensions: ideology, goals, and domain; 4) two characteristics of SMO-environment ties, linkages and extra-organizational incentives, will be focused upon. As each element in the analysis is discussed, an effort will be made to establish its relevance through reference to the data, the literature on social movement resource mobilization, and the literature on organizations and their environments.

Rationale for this Approach

As noted earlier, in Chapter II, both on theoretical and empirical grounds, approaches to social movement analysis stressing collective grievance formation or societal breakdown appeared inappropriate for generating insights into why the six SMO's studied here acquired differential access to resources. Because of their underlying assumptions and the concepts they employ, studies in resource mobilization provide a more satisfactory framework for viewing and attempting to account for the different patterns of SMO development. Perhaps the most general of these assumptions, and one which is employed extensively in this analysis, is stated by McCarthy and Zald: "SMO's operate like any other organization...and consequently, once formed, they operate as though organizational survival were the only goal" (1977: 1226). Of course, this is scarcely a revolutionary idea in the sociological literature. Older studies (Selznick, 1949; Gusfield, 1963) discuss ways in which SMO's sought to maintain themselves and to adapt to a changing environment, e.g., through goal displacement. The advantage of treating SMO's as organizations for purposes of analysis is that it opens the way for the use of concepts and studies on organizational and
interorganizational activity, which may aid in explaining patterns of SMO development and decline. For example, James Q. Wilson uses an organizational and market framework to account for competition between voluntary associations, including SMO's:

In a sense, all voluntary associations, like all retail firms, compete with one another—they struggle to obtain scarce resources from a population of prospective contributors (or customers) who in a sense are allocating their money, time, and the value of their names between associational and non-associational uses and, within the former category, among a variety of alternative associations. (1973: 261)

In the subsequent discussion of factors which may account for differential SMO success, it will be assumed that the six organizations focused upon are similar to other organizations—but with one important qualification which stems from the fact that they are "new" organizations, rather than "old" ones, and small organizations, rather than large ones. As Starbuck (1965) notes, for reasons relating largely to resource capability and environmental support, large, older organizations can typically innovate more and afford to make more mistakes. Small and new organizations are more dependent on the environment, have fewer "slack" resources, and in general are more vulnerable. Moreover, because they resemble voluntary associations, rather than formal organizations or bureaucracies, SMO's are even more subject to environmental fluctuation.

Another important characteristic of the resource mobilization approach to social movements is that it considers both the cost and the benefit side of the calculus of mobilization. The position taken is that, at times, the risks and/or inconveniences of movement activity may render it costly for individuals, or internal SMO business may constitute a drain on member emergy; these costs should be taken into account in any attempt to explain
the development and course of SMO's. This is but another way of noting that SMO activity is like the activity of any other organization, which must be profitable in some fashion on both an individual and an organizational level: resources cannot accumulate and outputs cannot continue unless sufficient inputs, in the form of human efforts and material goods, are obtained and unless resources are conserved within the organization.

Finally, the resource mobilization perspective focuses on the environment of SM's, which consists of both isolated individuals and other organizations. The potential beneficiaries of the SM for battered women can contribute little to the support of the various SMO's, and thus the latter requires a high degree of environmental support.

In summary, the following are the most general guidelines followed in the analysis: 1) SMO's are viewed as organizations, and thus are analyzed in terms of organizational properties; 2) the costs as well as the benefits of movement activity are taken into consideration; and 3) SMO relationships with potential constituents are emphasized as the vehicle for resource mobilization.

The Success of Six SMO's, Indicated by Resources Obtained

As noted in Chapter I, SMO success is defined for purposes of this analysis as the ability to obtain resources, rather than as goal achievement, formalization, or mere growth in membership. This conceptualization is consistent not only with the guiding theoretical perspective on social movements, but also with recent efforts to gauge the effectiveness of established organizations (Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967). As Gamson notes, "Potential influence is synonymous with control of resources" (1968: 94).
Resources are an appropriate measure of the effectiveness of both traditional and SMO's because they offer a means of influencing events in a manner favorable to the organizations—something sought by all organizations, particularly SMO's. Resources are a source of power because they improve the bargaining position of the organization vis-à-vis other organizations; because they are often the basis for beneficial exchanges; and in general because they enhance the possibility of environmental control.

Measuring organizational success through reference to resources has its drawbacks, however. One of the difficulties with conceptualizing and measuring resources is that almost anything can be considered a resource. Gamson (1968), for example, mentions three types, each of which subsumes other specific resources; they are: constraint (e.g., violence), inducement (e.g., money) and persuasion (e.g., personal attraction) resources. Other writers (Clark, 1968; Oberschall, 1973; Rogers, 1974) typologize resources differently and devise their own inventories. Obviously, such broad, abstract, and divergent classifications present problems when attempts are made to use the concept in research. It was therefore necessary to establish categories of resources which would be both theoretically relevant and empirically applicable.

A second problem with attempting to use resources as an index of organizational success is that there is no way of assessing what "maximum" mobilization of a resource is. As Yuchtman and Seashore comment:

It is of course very difficult, if possible at all, to determine in absolute terms the organization's maximum bargaining position and the optimum point of resource procurement that is associated with that position. (1967: 902)
Moreover, while some resources—money, for example—are readily quantified, others, e.g., legitimacy, cannot be calculated so easily. Finally, since various kinds of resources are not interchangeable or substitutable for one another, it is not possible to score or scale organizations in terms of overall resources.

This analysis follows the advice of Yuchtman and Seashore, who argue

In practice, organizational effectiveness must be assessed in relative terms, by comparing organizations with one another. (1967: 902)

Thus, organizations are compared and gross differences between them are noted. The emphasis is not on measuring rigorously the resources amassed by each, but on noting which organizations were most able to obtain substantial amounts of all those resources considered important.

Four major forms of resources were considered: legitimacy, funds, members, and facilities. These resource forms were selected because of their significance for the function organizations of all types; because they are those most frequently singled out for consideration in other treatments of social movements; because they are the kinds of resources which typically are employed in interorganizational exchange; and because they are relatively easy to assess and compare.

Having limited the analysis to a few major forms of resources and having indicated that organizational resources will be considered in terms of "more" or "less", rather than in absolute or quantified terms, the discussion will now turn to the outcomes of SMO activity, the resources gathered by the six SMO's. Chapter IV has already discussed the survival and growth of these organizations in a general way, so this section merely attempts a more systematic comparison.
Legitimacy

Miller defines legitimacy as:

(1) the sanctioned rights of some persons to make decisions,
and (2) ...the approval rendered by certain groups in the community, by certain persons, and by all the people, (1968: 310).

In this analysis, legitimacy is conceptualized as actions by the public in general, and other community organizations in particular, that appear to indicate that a given organization is considered capable of acting in an informed and authoritative manner in issues concerning battered women. Since general public recognition is hard to gauge, public exposure will be considered as at least weak evidence of recognition. The attribution of legitimacy by both extra-movement organizations and other SMO's took a variety of forms, as the discussion will indicate.

The data suggest that each of the six SMO's achieved at least a minimal degree of legitimacy in the eyes of at least some potential supporters, although considerable organizational variation is evident. Shelter I experienced relatively little public exposure and only a few symbolic gestures of endorsement from other organizations. Early public speaking ventures and the fall, 1976 television coverage gave the sheltering activities of the group some exposure, and its membership in a loosely-knit collective of feminist organizations probably conferred some status upon the group in the eyes of local feminists. Moreover, Shelter I's services were needed enough at one time that other organizations had standing agreements to refer abuse victims to members for assistance. However, in contrast with some other groups, members of the Shelter I group participated primarily as individuals and were unemployed, and thus did not "import"
the prestige of any other organization to their work on behalf of abuse victims. Additionally, while the sponsoring organization attempted to see to it that the group was not overwhelmed in its summer, 1976 negotiations with mental health professionals, little symbolic support was actually given by that or any other established or SMO. Indeed, the schism over the Shelter I proposal was at least in part concerned with the group's legitimacy outside the feminist community.

The legitimacy of Advocacy I was based primarily in its ability to identify itself with the mainstream national feminist association with which it was affiliated and in its claim to be working directly with battered women. It gained exposure through the chapter newsletter, the television news story, and its joint sponsorship of the public hearing. The fact that other groups would refer victims to Advocacy I indicates they viewed the group as legitimate, and, like Advocacy II, the group sent a representative to testify before the task force on domestic violence set up in 1977 by the Attorney General's office. It can thus be concluded that the group achieved recognition in the community as a legitimate organization working on behalf of battered women.

Advocacy II, like Shelter I and Advocacy I was affiliated with another organization. Its public use of the name of a traditional women's service association with a long, distinguished history and an international reputation gave Advocacy II a "recognition factor" that some other anti-abuse organizations lacked. Advocacy II frequently received requests for speeches and additional information on the abuse problem, which indicates some recognition of the group's right to speak authoritatively on the subject of wifebeating. Members gave testimony at hearings on pending
state legislation and spoke before the Attorney General's task force. In 1978, the organization was mentioned as a resource on the wife abuse problem in a book and in the report of a Washington conference which had nationwide circulation. In general, this group, made up of concerned, community-oriented professional women, was seen as a legitimate organization by the community and relevant publics.

Advocacy III appears to be accorded legitimacy in the same degree as was Advocacy I. Since many of its members were mental health professionals, serving with the group as part of their "consultation and education" functions, the group had an aura of professional stature and commitment. Members were interviewed periodically in the mass media and gave speeches in the community, particularly as part of programs sponsored by mental health organizations.

Shelter II and Shelter III garnered a considerable amount of de facto legitimacy in 1977, simply by being able to open their doors to victims. Additionally, both shelters received news coverage when they opened, increasing community awareness of their services. Although some community members and organizations may have found fault with the way services were given, the fact that these groups were working with battered women bolstered their claims to authority in the area.

Despite the fact that both groups had some measure of legitimacy, it appears Shelter III was far ahead of Shelter II in the amount of public recognition and approval it could claim. Shelter III had been endorsed by other anti-abuse organizations in its efforts to obtain funding, and Shelter II had not. Shelter II, although unquestionably recognized by the religious sector of the community, was not considered "professional" by
representatives of the mental health/human service sector. Although Shelter II obtained some exposure via radio and television public interest spots and public speaking—primarily in churches—Shelter III was the only organization of the six whose activities were consistently regarded as news by the local media. Additionally, although Shelter II receives mention in the national publication on the Washington conference, so does Shelter III. Finally, while members of Advocacy I and II testified before the Attorney General's task force in 1977, a founding member of Shelter III was a member of the task force.

As the foregoing discussion shows, the six organizations differed in the claims they could make to legitimacy as groups opposing wife abuse. While they were all accorded legitimacy by some community sectors, they could not claim similar amounts of support from the range of Central City organizational sectors. On the basis of the data, the six organizations can be grouped as follows:

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<tr>
<td>Advocacy III</td>
<td>Shelter II</td>
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SMO Rankings: Legitimacy

**Funds**

Money is an extremely crucial resource for both established and emergent organizations. It is a generalized resource, and its liquidity means it can be readily exchanged for other kinds of resources, such as facilities. While it cannot buy legitimacy, it can be used to obtain some of its prerequisites, such as exposure. Since each of the six organizations had
objectives which clearly required money for their accomplishment, it comes as no surprise that in group meetings and strategy sessions, obtaining money was a major topic for discussion.

When "countable" resources are considered, it is relatively easy to gauge differences among the six groups. Briefly summarized, the financial stores of the six organizations, as of late 1977, were as follows:

Shelter I: Went out of existence in fall, 1976. Never acquired more than $150 to $200 for use in aiding victims. Raised funds primarily through activities such as bake sales and benefit concerts. Money was sometimes kept in the home of the Treasurer or other members, and at least once the group suffered a loss due to theft by an abuse victim or her husband.

Advocacy I: Did a fund raising concert in mid-1977, which grossed just over $200, but gave $150 of the proceeds to Shelter III. Runs on a budget of about $50 per year; funds are merged with those of the sponsoring organization. Generally does not seek contributions independent of general chapter fund raising.

Advocacy II: Receives $500 per year from the sponsoring organizations, allocated on a year-by-year basis. The organization's account tends to fluctuate around that figure. Some members can receive reimbursement through employers for expenses incurred in Advocacy II work. Although the organization receives small unsolicited donations from time to time, at the request of the sponsoring organization, it does not solicit funds from individual contributors or other groups.

Advocacy III: The public hearing, January, 1977 was the first fund raising attempt, and the organization netted less than $100. The amount in the organization's treasury remained at this level throughout the period focused upon. Several fund raising strategies were suggested, but not pursued.

Shelter II: By late fall, 1977, Shelter II had raised sufficient funds to begin renting a building which cost approximately $4,000 annually, to hire a three-quarter time Executive Director at about $12,000, and to meet other expenses involved in shelter operation, e.g., insurance, household expenses, and staff fringe benefits. Income to the shelter is actually higher than its approximately $20,000 budget indicates, since residents are eligible for Welfare benefits while living there. Fund raising was very costly in member time at first, since contributions were raised one-by-one from different area churches and church groups. Several attempts at
generating grants failed. At the time the shelter opened, operating monies were not all in hand and funds have tended to trickle into the organization on a month-by-month basis.

Shelter III: By the end of 1977, the shelter had secured approximately $88,000; most of these funds were lump-sum grants from various public and private funders, although some monies were gathered through fund raising from individual and group contributors. In addition to receiving "Title XX" reimbursement for providing protective services to those women sheltered, the organization attempted to charge--but seldom actually collected--a small fee from residents who could afford to pay.

In summary, the six organizations distribute themselves in the following manner where funds are concerned:

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<td>Advocacy I</td>
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SMO Rankings: Funds

Members and Workers

The human resources available to an SMO consist of all those persons who have an active commitment to working on its behalf. This analysis does not attempt systematically to measure the degree of commitment of individual members; instead, the number of persons who have made themselves available to the six SMO's in any one of a variety of capacities is taken as an indicator of membership support. Estimates of membership support have been taken from organizational records and rosters, meeting minutes, and information given by interviewees.
Shelter I: Although it had a name and designated leaders, the fact that this organization had as one of its goals the provision of support to members meant its activities were conducted in a relatively informal, unstructured manner. The group began small and remained small until its dissolution. The membership never totaled more than fifteen, and the active core may have been considerably less at any given time. However, since most members did not have jobs, they were available to work more or less when needed. Notwithstanding this apparent strength, when the group's leader left Central City, there was no one in the group who could assume a leadership function; this and other circumstances undoubtedly contributed to the dissolution of the group.

Advocacy I: This group began relatively large, with a membership roster of twenty and a mailing list of twenty non-members who indicated a willingness to assist with various projects. By late 1977, interest in participation had waned and the active membership had declined to approximately ten persons, the majority of whom were employed and thus had competing obligations.

Advocacy II: As is the case with Advocacy III, individuals tend to come and go in this group. Advocacy II can claim a roster of around thirty, a relatively large mailing list and a stable, active membership at any given time of around fifteen individuals.

Advocacy III: This organization lists about twenty-five persons on its membership roster. Members are theoretically involved in Advocacy III as representatives of other organizations, and thus substitutes and designates sometimes attend meetings. Since several members are able to count attendance at meetings as part of their jobs, this enhances participation in the activities of the organization.

Shelter II: This organization began small and increased in worker support, although not substantially. Among the persons working on behalf of or for the organizations at the end of 1977 were: a twelve-person board of directors, two staff members (one paid) and approximately one dozen volunteers, several of whom also serve as board members.

Shelter III: When established, the organization was no larger than many other anti-abuse SMO's, but it grew substantially during its first year. By that time, the organization consisted of: a board of directors, with about fifteen of twenty positions filled; a fifteen person advisory board; and a staff of over a dozen full- and part-time workers. Other persons working in or for the organization included two university graduate students in social work, who had field placements at the shelter, and a roster of over seventy volunteers, most of whom worked at the shelter, but some of whom
worked soliciting donations in the community. Although only about one-half of the volunteers were involved in an ongoing way with the organization, the volunteer group was a worker pool the organization could theoretically draw upon if the need arose. By the time it began serving victims, Shelter III was by far the most elaborate of the six organizations, with a clear board/staff differentiation and established lines of authority within staff.

The six organizations can be charted as follows in terms of working membership:

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<tr>
<td>Shelter I</td>
<td>Advocacy III</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advocacy I</td>
<td>Advocacy II</td>
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SMO Rankings: Members

Facilities

The fourth and final category of organizational resources is facilities, or supplies and services which, if not donated to the organization, would have to be purchased. Facilities are crucial for SMO's, because they can assist the organization in achieving its goals without a corresponding outlay of funds. The provision of facilities can also entail an implicit recognition of an organization's legitimacy and can pave the way for actual monetary support. For this reason, non-monetary support given to anti-abuse SMO's by other community groups are of particular interest in this discussion.

Shelter I: The facilities obtained by this group were relatively meager. The only regular source of support was the feminist collective, which provided meeting space and the printing of publicity materials. The rape crisis line, to which the organization had access, might also be termed a resource. Finally, members made their homes available for sheltering victims.
Advocacy I: This group, like Shelter I, could rely on its sponsoring organization for meeting space and publicity. Additionally, individual members sometimes arranged to have typing or copying done at their regular places of employment.

Advocacy III: The only major source of non-monetary support which this organization could claim was the typing and reproduction of its newsletters and flyers, which was typically done at work offices of members or at the sponsoring organization.

Advocacy III: Meeting space was donated by a community organization and expenses such as printing, reproduction, and mailing were assumed by members' places of employment. Correspondence was sometimes even sent on member's letterhead stationery.

Shelter II: Probably the most important non-monetary items received were clothing and toys, furniture and appliances, and other goods needed for arranging a long-term living situation for abuse victims. Donations of household goods came mostly from churches.

Shelter III: Like Shelter II, this organization prepared, equipped and furnished its residence largely through donations. Prior to the time the shelter opened, the organization also received the same kinds of support as other organizations mentioned above—reproduction, mailing, and printing costs—from various community organizations, including the news media. The latter also provided considerable free publicity through news coverage. Unlike Shelter II, the organization did not have to rent its facility; the building was given rent-free by a church, although utilities, insurance and other expenses were paid by the shelter.

It is very difficult to gauge the value of materials and services given gratis, but in general, based on the frequency of the support given and on impressions about the value of the goods provided, the organizations rank as follows:

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<tr>
<td>Shelter I</td>
<td>Advocacy II</td>
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<tr>
<td>Advocacy I</td>
<td>Advocacy III</td>
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SMO Rankings: Facilities
Ordering of the Six SMO's on Resources Obtained

With the exception of Shelter I, which had so few resources that it ceased to survive, all the SMO's mobilized some degree of support. When the four major forms of resources are consolidated, the six organizations group themselves in the following manner:

Shelter I: Lowest in legitimacy, funding, size of membership and facilities.

Advocacy I: Moderate legitimacy, low funding, low membership size and low facilities.

Advocacy II: Moderate to high legitimacy, low to moderate funding, low membership, low facilities.

Advocacy III: Moderate legitimacy, low funding, low membership and low facilities.

Shelter II: Low to moderate legitimacy, high funding, moderate membership, and moderate to high facilities.

Shelter III: Highest in legitimacy, funding, membership size, and facilities.

In an attempt to explain these differential rates of success, key dimensions along which the organizations differed will now be discussed.

Factors Contributing to Differential Organizational Success

Early in Chapter IV, it was suggested that the emergence of a social movement industry (SMI) concerned with improving the status of battered women is attributable, not to any exceptional need or demand in the Central City community, but rather to the supply of individuals capable and willing to organize others to achieve this end and to contextual factors such as organizational richness and the general climate of affluence. It was also noted that the fact that the raw materials are available for collective action does not mean all emergent organizations will be capable of utilizing them to the same degree.
As the foregoing discussions indicate, the six Central City SMO's all began with similar amounts of social capital but achieved success in different degrees. One group failed and another exploited its environment to a remarkable degree, a third achieved a moderate degree of success, and the other three remained more or less stable or experienced an absolute or net loss in support. The remainder of this chapter concerns five factors or analytic dimensions which both the data and the organizational and social movement literature suggest may have been responsible for the differential rates of organizational success. Three of these attributes--ideology, goals, and domain--are primarily organizational properties. The other two--linkages and incentives--are properties of SMO relationships with their environment.

**Ideology**

Marx and Wood (1975) note that, along with other ideational variables such as emergent norms, ideology is frequently used in classifying social movements and is cited as an important contributor to SMO fates. At the same time, they note that ideology is seldom a subject for study in its own right and that the newer trend in collective behavior/social movements is to move away from using variables such as ideology, which seem to imply homogeneity of belief among organizational members. Nevertheless, the literature continues to suggest that ideological compatibility with the dominant belief system in the society or community is at least a limiting factor affecting the course of social movements. Ash (1972), for example, notes that successful SMO's in twentieth century America are those whose ideologies do not challenge the values of the New Industrial State.
For purposes of this analysis, ideology is conceptualized as the most general philosophical orientation of a SMO, containing both an evaluative and an empirical dimension (Turner and Killian, 1972) as well as ethical constraints and guidelines for action (Oberschall, 1973). Ideology supports organizational goals and justifies the concrete actions engaged in by members. It is distinguishable from the goals of an SMO in that the later concern future objectives, while the former places the goals in a larger philosophical context and elaborates on why the goals should be sought and how the organization should go about obtaining them. The analysis makes the assumption that identifiable organizational ideological positions exist in their own right, but does not assume that individual ideological positions are identical within an SMO or that all members adopt the organizational ideology to the same degree. In attempting to determine the ideological stance of a SMO, attention was paid to statements of organizational purpose, official organization records, and public statements of individuals speaking on behalf of the different SMO's. Records of and observations about discussions of philosophy and strategy, which took place among SMO's and between movement and established organizations also provided information on ideological orientations.

The data suggests that ideology was a factor contributing to SMO success, at least insofar as it rendered certain groups less attractive than others to potential members, supporters, and contributors. On the whole, the community appeared to have been most comfortable with approaches to the wifebeating problem which avoided a militant or confrontive stance, either towards men as a category or towards particular social institutions. Moreover, the more successful organizations were those whose philosophies
appeared relatively non-committal and disinterested on the issue of which specific solution to the abuse problem women should seek. Shelter I and Advocacy I experienced difficulties in this regard, as both were seen as having taken extreme positions vis a vis "patriarchy" (Shelter I) and established community institutions such as the police and the courts (Advocacy I). Both organizations viewed wifebeating primarily as a feminist issue and were explicitly "for the woman" in any situation involving contact with the husband or the larger community.

The data also suggest potential supporters did not look favorably on groups which departed from the universalistic, secular world-view. Central City is a relatively cosmopolitan community in which even religious-sponsored social action groups articulate their objectives in terms of the broader values of community health and welfare, and thus Shelter II was an anomaly, both for potential movement constituents in the community and for other SMO's, which themselves claimed a fair number of civic-minded church women among their membership. Many interviewees expressed discomfort with and mistrust of the group because of its exclusive organizational charter and because of the perception that the program of the shelter would be religious in content.

Groups fared better by adopting a community service or professional stance on the wife-abuse problem. Advocacy II and III, with their espousal of the values of public service and community mental health, did not offend potential supporters—except possibly those who viewed their guiding principles as not radical enough. Even Shelter III, which as a refuge for beaten wives could naturally be seen as partisan, or "on the woman's side," was gradually able to stress its identity as a social service agency with
the goal of promoting, in the words of its original set of goals and objectives "functional home and family environments through the provision of services focused on the prevention and treatment of domestic violence."

Several points can be noted to aid in understanding why ideology may have been significant in the case of these SMO's. In her study of the environmental quality movement, Kronus (1977) finds that an overlap of general goals and concerns can be a factor explaining why some established organizations are mobilized into social movements, while others are not. This may explain in part why some SMO's in this study seemed to receive more support than others: Their stated reasons for existence were similar to those of major holders of facilities and funds as well as those of most private citizens. Besides being motivated by the benefits of supporting certain SMO's, outside organizations may also have been potential costs as salient. In showing why ideology may have presented barriers to support by community organizations, it is important to note that potential organizational supporters are themselves governed by formal and informal norms, which they are subject to sanction for violating. Moreover, such organizations are imbedded in networks of exchange with still other organizational entities. Seen in this light, an established organization needs to exercise caution in its choice of which organizations to support--whether symbolically, materially, or financially--because this could jeopardize its own resource flow. SMO's which, by their stance, seemed to ask funders to "gamble" their prestige, standards, and contacts may have inadvertently reduced their own chances for support. Indeed, it appears that at least one sheltering organization relied so heavily on its ideological roots that it failed to take steps to make itself appear a good
risk to potential community investors. To the major umbrella agency co-
ordinating non-public-sector funding in Central City, Shelter II was "un-
touchable," not because it was a religious organization, but because, per-
haps due to its strong fundamentalist stance, the organization had neglected
to assemble the kinds of documentation the co-ordinating agency had to re-
quire of all groups it was supporting, e.g., affirmative action and equal
employment opportunity policies. Other organizations voiced similar con-
cerns about Shelter II's lack of a professional image, and even other
battered women SMO's were unwilling to endorse the group. These constraints
presented a real dilemma for Shelter II, for the very ideological elements
which made it distinctive and worthy of support in the eyes of many local
religious organizations rendered other funders inaccessible. Shelter II
partisans are aware of the barriers to broader funding, but have chosen
not to downplay the organization's religious focus.

Shelter I was another organization which was unable to resolve favor-
ably a dilemma between primary ideological loyalties and the constraints
placed on service delivery by conventional funding sources. Several inter-
viewees hypothesized that the vision Shelter I founders had of an exclusively
female, peer-oriented home based on equalitarian principles would not have
been consistent with notions of organizational structure adhered to by
mental health/social service/foundation organizations which support most
human service agencies in Central City. In several telling statements,
one informant discussed the perceived incompatibility of the feminist
and the community mental health approaches to the battering problem in this
manner:
People in the mental health field have a vested interest in keeping patriarchy going. They get very real benefits from hierarchy /the hierarchy made up of "psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers at the bottom/!

The mental health ideology doesn't mesh with a radical feminist perspective.

You can't get funding if you're a feminist, and so you have to take it from a more socially acceptable position.

Because the values of Advocacy I and Shelter I and II were so distinctive a part of the structure of these organizations, the organizations probably appealed to a less broad pool of potential supporters than did the others. While only one of the organizations was exclusive with regard to membership status--and then only with regard to Board membership--all three seem to have required significant personal commitment over and above the desire to "help" battered women. Although members recruited to these groups may have had exceptionally strong allegiances, it appears that one result of the extra requirement that supporters adhere to feminist or religious values may have been a narrowing of the scope of potential constituents, rendering the mobilization of support more difficult.

In short, two major negative images plagued Shelter I and II and, to a degree, Advocacy I, in their search for support. Shelter II's fundamentalist image has already been discussed. Shelter I and Advocacy I, because of their explicit feminist orientation, ran the risk of appearing "anti-family" to other community groups. Asked why the Shelter I organization was not successful, a former leader of the group stated its problems stemmed from:

the way we would present it--the structure, the nature. We didn't want to say, 'we're going to help out a few unfortunate souls who have this problem.' It wasn't the social work point of view. Would we counsel women not to go back to their husbands?
Yes! Would we give them abortion information? Yes! Would we help them fight with the Welfare department? Yes! Would we suggest therapy? Well, if the women wanted it, that was their business, but we wouldn't encourage them to go back to their husbands while they were getting it. That was the crux of the issue: were we going to work to maintain the family, or not?

While Shelter II may have been too explicitly religious to appeal to funders valuing secularism in public life, the other two groups may have appeared to be a bad risk to potential organizational supporters involved in networks with churches, government funding sources, or family service organizations. Measures taken by all these organizations on the basis of ideological commitment could have brought them into conflict with the standards of such potential supporters. Most churches probably would not wish to be associated with organizations which would advocate divorce. Organizations receiving public funds could not transfer them to groups with exclusionary hiring practices, e.g., shelters which would not employ men. At the very least, then, by virtue of the "extreme" positions they held, the religious and feminist organizations were at a disadvantage in seeking support. Shelter III, while certainly not anti-divorce and while in principle open to the same criticisms as the strongly feminist organizations, was concerned enough with the prospect of being labelled "anti-family" to explicitly include the maintenance of the family life as an organizational goal.

Statements such as those alluded to and quoted above reflect beliefs about how decisions to support organizations are made, rather than concrete evidence about how major Central City funders have made decisions over time. Yet, based on the argument that the resources of many community organizations depend on the maintenance of certain standards and bureaucratic procedures
and the knowledge that major suppliers of resources are themselves answerable to other organizations, it seems reasonable to assume that organizational ideology presented a barrier to certain kinds of support for three of the SMO's studied. By comparison, the other three groups—Advocacy II and III and Shelter III—appeared more compatible ideologically with the larger community setting and thus were less risky to support.

Goals

In this discussion, the goals of a SMO are defined as "a set of preferred changes towards which it claims to be working" (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: 1220). Earlier, the six groups had been classified according to whether they are concerned primarily with shelter or with advocacy. However, besides these differences, SMO's showed variation in the number and types of institutional changes they sought. Among the specific target goals the six SMO's adopted were: the establishment of a permanent shelter house (Shelter I, Advocacy II, Shelter II, Shelter III); the development of a center for research on wife abuse (Advocacy II); changes in police and court procedures (Advocacy I); provision of peer counseling for battered women (Shelter I, Advocacy I); changes in the legal system (Advocacy I and II); public education (Advocacy II and III); and the training of those providing services to battered women (Advocacy III).

To the extent that social movements have been viewed as organizations, movement goals are an aspect of organizational structure that have received emphasis. Moreover, it is in this area that scholarship on social movements has converged with the study of organizations in general. Empirical studies incorporating the concept of organizational goals can be roughly divided into three areas:
1. Studies following in the tradition of Blau's work on formal organizations (1956) and the Lipset, Trow and Coleman (1956) union study, which focus on the relationship of goals to internal organizational structure (Simpson and Gulley, 1962; Zald and Ash, 1966; Curtis and Zurcher, 1974).

2. Studies resembling that of Thompson and McEwen in the organizational area (1958), which focus on changes in SMO goals as a result of contact with the environment (cf. Selznick, 1949) and


Various characteristics of SMO goals have been emphasized in social movement research. Much of the literature (cf. Turner and Killian, 1972; Zurcher and Curtis, 1973) incorporates some form of the inward/outward distinction, as articulated by Gordon and Babchuk (1959), who distinguish between instrumental (societally-oriented) and expressive (individually or inwardly oriented) organizational objectives. Equally numerous are studies which emphasize the relevance of the distinction between movements articulating single and multiple goals for understanding various SMO attributes (Zald and Ash, 1966; Ash, 1972; Zurcher and Curtis, 1973; Gamson, 1975). Finally, studies have inquired into the influence of the nature of the changes sought (radical vs. reformist objectives; mainstream vs. extreme demands) on SMO elements such as recruitment (Ash, 1972) and success (Gamson, 1975).

Since all the six SMO's focused on in this study had goals which were instrumental, the inward/outward goal distinction can probably reveal nothing about why some were more successful than others. Similarly, although the ideology of Shelter I verged on a revolutionary perspective, and Shelter I and Advocacy I members used relatively radical rhetoric in private, in-group discussions, none of the SMO's actually expressed a
programmatic interest in bringing about immediate and radical societal changes. Thus, the last-mentioned line of reasoning alluded to above did not appear potentially fruitful generating ideas about organizational success. The six SMO's did differ markedly, however, in the number and specificity of their goals, and thus it seems probable that this was an organizational characteristic which had consequences for resource mobilization.

Ash (1972) notes that every social movement must choose between focusing on single or multiple issue demands; this is a basic dilemma any social movement must face. The social movements literature does not show consensus on the question of whether it is best for an organization to have single or multiple goals. Turner and Killian (1972) argue that, to be viable, movements should have many goals, some of which are attainable in the near future and some of which are not. In general, scholarship employing traditional or classical images of social movement development tends to stress multiple issues as best because of their potential for incorporating a broader support base, i.e., greater numbers of people. Gamson (1975) also argues that, from the standpoint of mobilizing a broader support base, multi-issue movements should be more likely to achieve success. However, this was not what his research found; instead, single-issue movements had more societal impact. In her study of the Women's Liberation movement (1975), Freeman also notes that a narrowing of organizational goals contributed considerably to the success of the National Organization for Women.6

This analysis takes the position that, at least for the six organizations studied, fewer goals meant greater success, that is, the acquisition
of more substantial resources. This position can be justified on several grounds. First, promoting multiple goals simultaneously is costly for organizations. Following the logic of McCarthy and Zald, who state that "the amount of activity directed towards goal accomplishment is crudely a function of the resources controlled by an organization" (1977: 1221), it appears that few if any of the organizations could afford to have multiple goals, at least at the time of their formation. All the groups were far too poor in size and other resources to pursue a variety of goals. Several organizations began by espousing broad and multiple goals. Even though the majority of Shelter I's resources were being used to house abuse victims, the group still had a commitment to bringing about social changes which would benefit members, e.g., Welfare reform. Unlike Shelter I, Advocacy I and II at least had an exclusive focus on the battered women problem, but both were initially committed to both giving direct assistance to victims—a very difficult goal to meet—and performing a variety of institutional advocacy and public education functions. Although Advocacy II dropped its direct service goal for all practical purposes, the multiple goal orientation may have contributed to the inability of the group to mobilize substantial resources. Advocacy III, although relatively non-specific in regard to the tasks it envisioned, had focused on advocacy as a general goal at the time of its inception. However, as the chronology in Chapter IV indicated, in late 1977, even this group began to consider becoming involved in sheltering victims; indeed, it spent considerable time and member effort on this project, which was later thwarted.

The example of the two shelter organizations indicates that organizational success may have little to do with the ease of goal accomplishment
and a great deal to do with the ability to focus on a concrete, specific organizational goal. Gaining support for and setting up a residence facility is no easy task; such operations can be very costly, and great attention must be paid to details such as zoning, building, and rooming-house codes. Thus, it might appear at first glance that these organizations were likely candidates for failure. However, as the data indicate, the two shelter organizations were much more successful in mobilizing resources, perhaps because they were more capable of focusing on targets for action and adhering to them. Although initially unclear about who it would be aiding--children only or women and children--Shelter II was able to adopt the establishment of a residence for victims of battering as its only major goal. Similarly, regardless of member activities at any given time, Shelter III partisans always focused their energies on obtaining funding for a shelter. Later, after support was obtained, the organization began to emphasize other goals, such as advocacy and prevention, but always incorporated these as elements in shelter programming.

Goal specificity may have contributed to SMO success through its effect on the motivation of SMO workers. As noted above, espousing multiple goals can be costly for new SMO's which are relatively poor in resources, because this means large amounts of resources cannot be applied in any one direction. This in turn can mean slow progress towards all goals, a resulting reduction in incentives for member participation, and a subsequent loss of human resources. As James Q. Wilson (1973) notes, people devote their energies to voluntary associations because they identify with their goals (purposive incentives), or hope to gain materially from participation (instrumental incentives), or because joining with
others is rewarding in itself (solidaristic incentives). Organizations which cannot show concrete progress toward goals must devise ways of keeping members interested. Regarding the relationship between goals and incentives, Freeman notes that for a social movement, "The more remote are its goals, the greater the role of solidary incentives and the more consummatory its actions" (1975: 102). In a similar vein, Turner and Killian note

When a movement does not offer proximal goals to its members, they are likely to create such goals on the spot, often undermining the long-range goals in process (1972: 274).

These kinds of adjustments can be seen in the activities of some of the multi-goal SMO's. Because progress towards the goals was necessarily slow, goal achievement must have appeared remote, and pressure must have existed to motivate members and forestall their leaving to work with some other group. It appears that Advocacy II attempted to solve the problem of maintaining member interest by allowing members to introduce new objectives, such as leadership in a nationwide anti-abuse coalition. The continual introduction of new concerns into the agenda of advocacy III can also be interpreted in this light. This type of goal fluctuation may significantly impede organizational progress, as it creates a spiraling tendency to organizational entropy, in which new goals are added to satisfy some members, causing the overall organizational direction to be fragmented, resulting in the availability of fewer resources for any one goal, and producing a renewed need to furnish incentives to members to offset the impression that "nothing is being done." Just as multiple goals are costly to SMO's which are just beginning their careers, the addition of new goals, without a concomitant addition of resources, can prove costly in the long run.
All SMO's operate via some mixture of inducements; none contains purely purposive or solidaristic incentives, and certainly none operate via instrumental inducements. Interestingly, solidaristic incentives may have worked in different ways in the six SMO's. Two of the organizations--Shelter I and Shelter II--approached the solidaristic end of a continuum of member incentives. However, because Shelter II had a single goal to focus upon, the social benefits of working together may have enhanced collective goal-relevant efforts; in the single mothers' group, which manifested goal fragmentation, solidaristic incentives may have substituted for purposive inducements, in effect working against efforts to mobilize outside resources. The data suggest the same may have been true for Advocacy I, also a close-knit group. While several Shelter III activists knew one another prior to their involvement with that project, and while several persons stated that loyalty towards one another kept the group going, most also said cohesiveness was related to the anticipation of goal achievement: they fully expected to receive support for a shelter "any day." This is another illustration of the way in which solidaristic incentives can reinforce group effort when there is a single goal which seems attainable. Relating these notions to what was said earlier about ideology, it appears that strong commitment and in-group feeling can keep people involved in a group, but whether the group is successful in acquiring resources depends upon other factors, which are primarily organizational in nature.

Other reasons why multiple goals may have worked against resource acquisition for many of the anti-abuse organizations are suggested in the next section, which discusses the domains of SMO's.
Domain

The concept of domain is frequently employed in analyses of ongoing organizations, but with a notable exception (Wilson, 1973), it is not used explicitly in the literature on social movements. In the section which follows, it will be argued that domain clarity is in some ways even more important to SMO's than to established organizations, for the following reasons: a) SMO's typically possess fewer "slack" resources than other organizations; b) for SMO's, as for any other organizations, establishing relationships with the organizational environment is a prerequisite for obtaining resources; and c) domain clarity is a prerequisite to both interorganizational relationships and interorganizational exchange.

J.Q. Wilson uses the term autonomy in the same manner sociologists and organizational behaviorists use the term domain. He defines it as a distinctive area of competence, a clearly demarcated and exclusively served clientele or membership, and undisputed jurisdiction over a function, service, goal, or cause. (1973: 263)

Stated simply, the domain is the functions an organization performs in seeking to achieve its goals.

The literature (cf. Levine and White, 1961; Benson, 1975; Cook, 1977) accords the concept of domain a position of significance in the study of organizations for the following reasons: First, if all organizations controlled all the resources they needed, each would be self-sufficient and autonomous. However, since virtually every organization requires some funds, goods, or services from other organizations, it is typical for an organization to seek to enter into exchanges with one or more other organizations. Finally, contacts and the exchanges they may
later yield are based on a mutual understanding of organizational purposes, functions, and activities—in short, on domain consensus.

While control of a domain is something organizations must constantly assert themselves to maintain, and while some organizations may question the domain of another at any time, established community organizations have fought the battle of establishing a domain. (In fact, Thompson and McEwen [1958] argue that communication about the purpose and functions of organizations is the raison d'être for much of the contact among groups). In contrast, SMO's which are seeking to have an eventual impact upon the functioning of community organizations and which need support to realize their goals can be seen as having an "uphill fight" to become known and motivate other organizations to work with them. Domain clarity, or the ability to convey a message to other groups that "We are Organization A, we do X—and we're the only group around here that does" can help an emergent organization advance one more step towards gaining needed support.

Along the same lines, Curtis and Zurcher in the study of anti-pornography SMO's in two communities, found that the group which had clearer goals and single-mindedly engaged in a specific activity manifested better integration with its organizational environment than the organization which was dedicated to the rather amorphous value of "decency." Concerning supporting organizations, they concluded "aligned organizations had to decide to align, and thus needed to know the risks and benefits of alignment." (1973: 58)

Just as domain duplication must frequently result in competition among established organizations (Starbuck, 1965; Guetzkow, 1966) the same thing may occur among SMO's. J.Q. Wilson (1973) suggests that organizations can show variation along the dimensions of domain exclusivity
and resources: they may be high along both dimensions; high in one and low in the other; or low in both. Noting that new SMO's are likely to fall into the last category, he uses the need for resources and the resulting domain disputes to explain interorganizational conflicts in the early U.S. Labor Movement, the Civil Right Movement in the 1960's, and the Feminist Movement in this decade.

Along similar lines, to understand the importance of domain clarity for the six anti-wifebeating SMO's, it is important to reiterate a point made earlier: that, although sufficient resources may exist in a community to offer adequate support to a social movement, this does not necessarily mean that all SMO's will share in these resources equally. Thus, from the standpoint of any single SMO, there is a need to be concerned with obtaining members, funds, and other important resources. As McCarthy and Zald note, "As the competition within any SMI [social movement industry] increases, the pressure to specialize intensifies." (1977: 1234) SMO's which cannot claim to be performing a unique function, either with reference to established organizations, or in relation to other SMO's, and which wish to obtain a share of available resources must either attempt to adjust their activities so as to become more specialized or risk loss of support to some other SMO. Either course is costly. Thus, other things being equal, it might be expected that SMO's which have clear-cut domains, i.e., functions which do not overlap with other SMO's or with established organizations, would be at a competitive advantage.

The data suggest that this was the case for the organizations studied. In the previous section, the various target goals of the six groups were listed, and it was suggested that organizations with fewer goals seem to
have had more success in mobilizing resources. Seen from a slightly different perspective, the data indicate that several multi-goal organizations were also handicapped by a degree of unresolved domain overlap with other organizations. Shelter I had already dissolved by the time the other five organizations were most active, and thus was not a party to much of the ensuing competition, but some of the remaining organizations appear to have spent a good deal of time and effort dealing with domain issues.

Difficulties developed early between Shelter II and Shelter III, despite the fact that their intended functions were merely similar, rather than identical. As both groups conducted public relations activities to obtain funding, they were frequently faced with questions concerning their relationship to one another and the ways in which the programs differed. After a series of awkward occurrences, there were negotiations, and each group agreed to refrain from commenting on the other and to make public statements only about its own program. The groups took pains to distinguish themselves from one another in other ways. Shelter II, for example, obtained an unlisted telephone number, a move which may be interpreted as ceding to Shelter III the right to function as the crisis agency for battered women. Shelter III's steady and conscious avoidance of co-ordinating with or publicly mentioning Shelter II can also be seen as an effort to maintain an independent organizational domain.  

Possibly because the two shelter organizations were consciously competing for financial support and material donations, they were more or less forced to confront and resolve the issue of overlapping domains. Additionally, because both were at the same time attempting to perform a function no other established group could claim to be capable of
performing—housing abused women—they could make an additional claim to distinction. (Indeed, the one case in which another established organization—the women's residence—showed an interest in providing this service very nearly prevented Shelter III from obtaining support from a major funder. If this SMO had not been able to show extensive backing for its own program, it would not have succeeded in tapping this source.)

The three advocacy organizations, on the other hand, were relatively weak in both areas. Advocacy II was somewhat more fortunate than the other two groups, since it could claim the entire state, rather than only the Central City community, as its focus of operation. The three groups also differed along another dimension, i.e., the relative emphasis given to direct services in addition to institutional advocacy. These dissimilarities notwithstanding, however, the three groups all appear to have had difficulty establishing their uniqueness, both in relation to one another and in regard to other established and movement organizations. They all worked on many of the same projects, sometimes in coalition, sometimes independently. They engaged in similar activities in the community, e.g., public speaking, lobbying, and community needs assessment. Besides being an inefficient way to organize interest group activities, this strategy in effect diluted the potential support base of each group. Interviews and other data contain no evidence of attempts to reduce domain overlap through specialization or the specification of a division of labor—or, conversely, to eliminate it through permanent merger—although a few interviewees expressed concern at the fact that duplication was occurring.

The situation becomes more complicated when the impact of the establishment of shelter organizations is taken into account. An Advocacy III
interviewee noted that when the opening of Shelter III seemed immanent, there was concern within her organization about the duplication of function, and the question arose whether a separate community advocacy group would be needed now that an organization would be working on behalf of battered women on a daily basis. The lack of growth in Advocacy III and other advocacy groups can in part be seen as a result of their inability to offer a unique agenda for combatting abuse.

Since an interest in concerns articulated by the women's movement has become an element in American institutional life, many community sectors can be expected to become involved in seeking solutions to the problems of women. Unlike the two shelters, the advocacy groups appear to have run a greater risk of having their functions taken over by existing Central City organizations. This form of co-optation may have hurt, rather than helped, these SMO's. Stimulated by the availability of federal funds for providing counseling for rape victims (now an "essential service" mandated by the National Institute of Mental Health for community mental health centers receiving federal funds) the largest Central City community mental health center instituted a "women's issues" position in 1976. Besides providing support for the anti-abuse movement, holders of this position have incorporated many of the concerns of the movement into ongoing mental health programming. Besides practically eliminating the distinction between institutional and social movement advocacy activity, this practice may have obviated the need for special advocacy groups in the wife-abuse area. In a related example, as a state capital, Central City is a focal point for political activity, and legislative staffs gravitate to new issues. Like the community mental health centers, state government offices
have created staff positions responsible for producing and supporting legislation in the women's rights area. Although the existence of such offices offers SM0's the prospect of forming symbiotic relationships, at the same time, it reduces the claims of some SM0's to uniqueness. After all, why should the public (individuals and community organizations) support a voluntary association to do what government is already doing, unless the former can clearly do it better? The entry onto the scene of government officials seeking to "do something" for battered women, e.g., the Attorney General, with his special task force, effectively cut into potential support for new organizations with similar agendas. Thus, the advocacy groups confronted a paradox: even though the changes they were seeking appeared to be beginning to take place, they could neither claim special credit nor gain increased support for their own organizations as a result of their efforts.

The discussion above indicates that, just as the probability of success is increased for SM0's which formulate relatively few goals towards which maximum collective effort can be directed, those groups which establish distinctive domains enhance their chances of obtaining resources. Both points are based on the same general principle noted above: that, other things being equal, support is extended to those SM0's whose programs are clearly understood by potential constituents, and thus SM0's which appear distinctive in relation to one another and in relation to existing organizations are at a competitive advantage.

The foregoing discussions have concerned intra-organizational attributes which seem to encourage resource mobilization. To complete the analysis, attention now turns to relations between SM0's and the
interorganizational field or environment. Because the environment is the primary source of needed resources, SMO's need to discover ways to exploit the environment; thus, SMO ties with other community sectors are an extremely important element in this analysis.

Community Linkages

Although the majority of studies on organizations focus on behavior within organizations, there is a growing tendency for social scientific theory and research to be concerned with interorganizational relations (Evan, 1966; Warren, 1967; Turk, 1970; Marrett, 1971; Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and Marsden, 1978), particularly patterns of linkage among organizations. A linkage between two organizations is "any recurrent pattern of behavior which exists between two systems and is supported by both" (Aveni, 1978: 185). Despite the wide range of topics covered in the literature on patterns of interorganizational contact, there is a clear consensus that such relationships are relevant because they are a precondition for resource exchange (Levine and White, 1961; Benson, 1975; Cook, 1977). This partially explains the scholarly interest in such topics as interlocking directorates (Mills, 1957) and the composition of boards of directors (Zald, 1967; 1969; Pfeffer, 1972; 1973).

Since linkages are emphasized in the literature on organizations and exchange, they seemed an appropriate area to examine in this study. Overlapping membership was focused on as the most potentially fruitful way of viewing linkages between SMO's and other community organizations. This was done because common membership in the linkage dimension used most often in interorganizational research and also to maintain the conceptual
distinction between linkages and resources; to use the granting of funds as evidence of linkages, as do some researchers (Benson, 1975) would have verged on circular reasoning, since the flow of funds to SMO's is in part what the study is seeking to explain.

One difficulty with attempting to determine the number and types of linkages between the six SMO's and other community organizations—a problem that is probably inherent in the study of all incipient SMO's—is that membership in most of the SMO's was relatively fluid and casual, particularly in the early days. It appears many members did not maintain an interest in the movement for a sufficient length of time that their participation could be termed a "linkage." Nevertheless, it was possible to obtain a general idea of patterns of common membership, based on the information gathered from meeting minutes, organizational membership rosters, and interviewee observations. This data suggests that certain aspects of linkages may be related to the subsequent success the SMO's had in acquiring resources and also indicates that this relationship may be a rather complex one.

The approach to the data on extra-organizational linkages was heavily influenced by the work of Aveni (1978), whose excellent study of the NAACP constitutes the only systematic attempt to document SMO linkages and relate them to resource mobilization. Following Aveni, the interpretation of the data distinguishes two independent dimensions of linkages: breadth and strength. Strength refers to the degree of involvement a member of an outside organization has with an SMO. "Weakest" linkages are those in which the person participates in SMO activities purely as an individual, rather than as a representative of their organization; moderately strong
linkages exist if an individual belongs to an SMO as a formal representative of the outside organization; maximum linkage strength obtains when the individual participates in an SMO at the leadership or policy level, with the consent of the other organization. Stronger linkages between an SMO and an established organization indicate a greater likelihood of both resource exchange across organizational boundaries and mutual influence between the SMO and the outside organization.

Studies of interorganizational linkages are often criticized because they tend to depict interorganizational exchange in dyadic or bilateral terms (Laumann, Galaskiewicz, and Marsden, 1978). The dimension of linkage breadth compensates for this weakness by taking into consideration the extensiveness or multiplicity of linkages between SMO's and their environment. Breadth refers to the number of "inroads" SMO's make into different organizations or organizational sectors. Breadth indicates organizational flexibility in resource acquisition: a SMO with broad representation has alternatives to exploit if particular linkages cease to be productive. According to Aveni, linkages which are both broad and strong tend to bring high amounts of resources to an SMO.

Applying these conceptual dimensions to the six Central City anti-abuse SMO's reveals that only one organization—Shelter III—systematically established linkages which were both relatively strong and relatively broad. Early attempts at organizing were directed by individuals whose most significant memberships were in mental health, social service, religious, legal, and mass media organizations, with individuals from the first two groups participating more or less in a professional capacity, with the consent of their organizations. Within a short time after it incorporated, Shelter
Ill formed an advisory board, composed of representatives from community organizations whose activities were considered relevant to Shelter III's objectives. This was done explicitly for the purpose of broadening community support for the organization. A partial list of organizations represented on the executive committee of the board of directors and on the advisory board includes: several community mental health centers; the LEAA-sponsored diversion program mentioned in Chapter IV; the Women's Political Caucus, the YWCA; a national women's association sponsored by a number of Protestant churches, the AFL-CIO; and the Junior League. It appears that Shelter III was successful at mobilizing resources of various kinds in part because it was able to develop a strategy for using the energies of highly committed professionals for bread-and-butter tasks such as proposal writing, while enhancing legitimacy by encouraging established organizations to at least lend their names to organizing and fund raising efforts.

When compared to Shelter III, the strong linkages of the other six organizations are relatively narrow, a factor which may have contributed to their comparatively low success rates. Members of Shelter II's original board of directors all belong to the same church and interact with the public on the basis of that affiliation. The organization also stresses its Christian auspices in public relations material. As a result, the recognition Shelter II has received has been relatively low outside church circles, and the organization has had to depend on a slow input of funds from religious organizations. To reduce the costs of having to engage in continuous fund raising, leaders have sought inclusion for the shelter in various church "missions" check-offs, while continuing to seek non-church
funding. For the time being, however, Shelter II resources, while substantial compared with those of some other SMO's, appear to rest on relatively narrow social ties.

The strongest extra-organizational ties forged by the three advocacy groups are also relatively narrow. Advocacy III, which encouraged organizational, rather than individual, representation in its membership, has always had a leadership core composed of mental health professionals and is generally viewed as a mental health oriented organization. Other groups which had early, but less intense, organizational membership on Advocacy III were: social service organizations, legal organizations, the League of Women Voters, and the other two advocacy groups.

The extra-organizational ties of Advocacy II were even more narrow than those of Advocacy III. During the first year of its existence, the leaders of the organization, as well as most of the membership, were active primarily as representatives of the sponsoring organization. While persons employed by or volunteering for other organizations did join Advocacy II, they did so primarily as individuals, and even this occurred relatively infrequently.

A similar pattern was evident in relations between Advocacy I and other community organizations. Members joined primarily as individuals, and the sponsoring feminist group was the only community organization which provided a significant number of persons acting as organizational representatives. For both Advocacy I and Advocacy II, the strong linkage with organizations whose names evoked instant recognition was primarily a source of legitimacy. Indeed, if there is any difference between the two organizations, it is in the wealth and prestige of the sponsoring organization.
The sponsor of Advocacy I is more controversial, poorer, and less widely known than that of the other group.

Shelter I, the organization which failed, worked in a loose coalition with a group of other relatively autonomous feminist organizations. Although some members took part in the activities of affiliated feminist groups, there is no indication that most members considered themselves to be participating in Shelter I as active members of groups either within or outside the collective. It appears that members, who tended to be either unemployed or students with part-time jobs, had no extensive shared membership in community organizations other than the university and other feminist and anti-abuse groups, notably Advocacy I. Thus, from the standpoint of extra-organizational ties, Shelter I had the fewest contacts to draw upon of the six organizations.

The data reveal other significant aspects of SMO-environment relationships. Aveni (1978) notes, for example, that the strength and breadth of linkages vary independently of the productivity of those linkages; strong ties with organizations or sectors which have few resources will not generate significant amounts of support for SMO's. Shelter I and Advocacy I and II illustrate this point well. Even if the ties were very strong between the single mothers' group and the sponsoring organization, the latter did not possess sufficient free monies and facilities to support organizational sheltering efforts. (Indeed, the only time the collective showed an interest in Shelter I was when the group began to seek outside funding for itself. Then, the collective wanted a hand in administering the funds.) The same is true of Advocacy I and II; the sponsoring organizations were willing to support them to a degree, but were themselves too low
in funds to be of great assistance. The paradox of this kind of bonding is that, lacking broad linkages and hence the appearance of wider support, an SMO closely tied to a sponsor may have difficulty obtaining resources from other organizations. Advocacy III, with its relatively close ties to the mental health sector, at least had a potential for tapping larger resources. However, the potential was never realized, perhaps because of the lack of clarity in the areas of goals and domain, and also because Shelter III offered more bonding incentives to this community sector (see discussion below).

Shelter II's ties to the religious sector of the community were relatively productive. Churches are typically a source of support for many kinds of social programs, and the battered women issue is one which undoubtedly offers incentives for organizations interested in "relevant" projects. (It is interesting to note that among the largest institutional contributors to Shelter II is a large congregation in a very affluent area of the community.) However, until the organization can establish an ongoing relationship with one or more institutions, the battered women program runs the risk of being supplanted by some other issue.11

As indicated earlier, Shelter III's original funding/facilities "package" was quite diverse. This was no doubt due in part to the extensiveness of its linkages, which made the organization seem attractive to a range of potential constituents, permitting flexibility in support-seeking. Potential funders could look down the list of directors and advisory board members attached to a grant proposal and see names of individuals and organizations they recognized. Later, once financial support began to come
to the organization, potential contributors of time, effort, money, and material goods could be even more confident that this was the organization to support.

Besides leading to a consideration of the strength/breadth and the productivity of linkages, the data suggest that linkages which place restrictions on the ability of an SMO to seek resources from other sources—i.e., linkages which restrict autonomy in resource mobilization—can be very detrimental. This situation obtained for Advocacy II, whose relationship with the sponsor not only yielded relatively few funds but also effectively ruled out alternative fund raising efforts. In a less clear-cut case, it can be noted that Advocacy III was probably prevented from taking further steps to build a resource-base because of disincentives placed on the leadership by virtue of their strong connections with other organizations. If this organization had incorporated and sought status as a non-profit organization, its leadership group, primarily mental health professionals, could have placed their regular jobs in jeopardy due to conflict of interest rules. (A precedent had been set for use of conflict of interest regulations with anti-abuse organizations. When Shelter III incorporated and began serious fund raising efforts, at least two of the founders were asked by employers to choose between board membership and their positions at a community mental health center; one resigned from her job, and one resigned from the board.) These examples simply illustrate the fact that, for SMO's as well as for established organizations, a delicate balance exists between environmental linkages and organizational autonomy (Gouldner, 1959): organizations are in the best bargaining position vis a vis the environment if they can maintain the kinds of ties
which lead to organizational enrichment without sacrificing control to another entity. This is undoubtedly the kind of reasoning which led Shelter III to resist the pressure to merge with an established organization in summer, 1977, on the grounds that to do so would dilute its own organizational decision-making capability.

Data on the six SMO's indicate the quality and quantity of regularized contacts between an SMO and its potential organizational allies can have important consequences for resource mobilization. Linkages which are both broad and strong appear to have the highest potential for yielding a pay-off in resources. Strong and narrow linkages, while they contribute to organizational survival and can bestow legitimacy and other resources on an SMO (providing the sponsoring organization is viewed favorably in the larger social setting and has many resources to give) can work to the detriment of an SMO in the long run, as they may be expected to restrict SMO autonomy and flexibility.

Thus far, the discussion has proceeded as if the organization-set of emerging SMO's were merely a passive recipient of SMO resource-seeking activities. This is of course not the case, as the discussion of incentives, the final factor influencing SMO support, will demonstrate.

Incentives

SMO's, like other organizations, interact with their environments in order to obtain needed support. However, if it is to continue, interaction cannot be beneficial only to the SMO. Enduring interorganizational ties are based upon an exchange of benefits. Contrary to surface impressions, SMO's can offer established organization resources they need for
their own functioning. Freeman (1975), for example, attributes the impact of the Women's Liberation Movement on national policy in part to the symbiotic relationship that developed between women's liberation organizations and personnel in branches of government charged with providing information on women's issues (e.g., the Women's Bureau) and with making (Congress) or enforcing (the EEOC) legislation. The movement was able to provide badly needed information, volunteers, clientele, and political "clout" to those in government who were willing to become actively involved in movement programs; out of this situation of mutual need, a mutually beneficial partnership between government and a social movement was formed.

The Central City anti-abuse SMO's also took part in these kinds of exchanges, although not all organizations had the same appeal as "investments." At the very least, of course, all the SMO's offered potential sponsors an opportunity to support action on a new and possibly highly relevant social issue. Moreover, as Kronus (1977) notes, goal similarity is a key factor explaining mobilization of organizational support for social movements. As might be expected, organizations concerned with the status of women aided in the formation of, established linkages with, and contributed to the support of anti-abuse organizations. Goal congruence also helps explain why other organizations whose traditional missions involve social welfare objectives, e.g., mental health organizations, social service organizations, some voluntary associations, and churches, supported these organizations. Involvement with anti-battering groups can be seen as related to goal attainment for these community sectors.

Other things being equal, however, it appears that potential supporters may have had more incentive to work with organizations having
direct contact with abuse victims. Levine and White (1961) have noted that, in the health field, "treatment" organizations—those which give services directly to clients—receive more resources than other types of organizations, e.g., education or prevention bodies, presumably because the former have something to exchange, i.e., referrals. Applied to this case, this principle may explain in part why the shelter organizations tended to obtain more support. Combined with other factors rendering it attractive, the fact that Shelter III would be working with battered women and their children—both definite candidates for referral—may have made this organization a logical choice for support by funders such as the mental health system. In principle, the same incentives existed for Shelter I and Advocacy I, since both these organizations also had contact with battered women at different times. However, it may have been the case that weaknesses along other dimensions, e.g., goal clarity, ideological compatibility, and linkages, may have prevented these organizations from utilizing this situation to their own advantage.

Along other lines, funding a program for battered women may have had considerable appeal for some funders. Keeping in mind the notion that health and welfare organizations are frequently considered as either enhanced in status or stigmatized by the types of clients they serve (Elling and Halebsky, 1961), providing support for an organization for battered women, particularly a shelter facility, may have been seen by potential supporters as a way of improving their image in the community. Asked why the mental health system moved so quickly to fund Shelter III, a member of the group which made the decision explained:
Shelter I gives us publicity... It is the kind of program that captures the imagination of the community, based on honest to God, real need. It's a little harder when the client you're dealing with has been in the state hospital for twenty years, is bizarre in appearance and dress, trying to find a place to live in the community. Because of the kind of visibility and acceptability Shelter I gives us, we can in turn pay off for those clients, who are not as acceptable. So there is mutual payoff... It helps if mental health clients are seen as people who look alright, who might have the same problems.

Similar incentives for support certainly existed for Shelter II: the idea of aiding a battered woman in building a new life through long term support is one which can certainly "capture the imagination" of potential constituents, and this shelter was also a likely source of referrals for other service delivery systems. However, while perhaps enhancing its appeal to progressive religious organizations, the standing of this organization along the ideology and linkage dimensions probably rendered it less attractive to public sector funders than its more secular, professionalized, and integrated competitor.

Compared with the shelter organizations, advocacy groups offered few incentives to established organizations to mobilize support. Such groups could give evidence of the concern of sponsoring organizations with women's issues--reflecting favorably upon the sponsors--and could provide some information on the incidence of abuse, needs of victims, status of legislation, and the adequacy of institutional remedies, but beyond these informational resources, advocacy organizations could exchange few benefits with other organizational entities. Once in operation, shelter organizations, with paid staffs, recognized expertise, and access to information on victims, were in a position to provide even more of these kinds of resources to interested organizations, and thus advocacy organizations had no items to exchange that were uniquely their own.
The data indicate that the incentive dimension is a good predictor of the flow of resources where two competing SMO's differ along this dimension and are similar along others. In situations of this nature, knowledge that support could result in an influx of cases to the supporting organization might "tip the scales" in favor of a particular SMO. It appears that incentives alone cannot motivate extra-movement organizations to invest resources in SMO's which are not seen as good risks on other relevant criteria; given the option, community organizations are likely to rally behind those SMO's which, besides offering incentives, are ideologically acceptable, clear in their objectives and functions, and well integrated with other community organizations.

Summary and Additional Observations

This analysis has treated SMO's as similar to other organizations, stressing the notion that they operate to maintain themselves by acquiring needed resources from their environments. SMO success has been defined as the ability to accumulate resources which can be utilized to achieve organizational objectives.

Of the six SMO's that constitute the anti-battering social movement industry (SMI) in one community, one organization was unable to obtain sufficient resources (legitimacy, funds, members, facilities) to be able to continue functioning. Three organizations can be considered only marginally successful, having gained few resources beyond a moderate degree of legitimacy and a minimal level of funding and membership interest. The two surviving shelter organizations were the most successful of the five existing groups, with one shelter gaining a considerable share of the total resources mobilized by the movement.
Relationships between SMO's and various sources of community support were viewed as a special case of organization/environment dependency and interorganizational exchange. It was hypothesized that differential success rates of these SMO's were attributable to the following factors:

1. ideological differences between SMO's and dominant community sectors, which rendered three organizations (Shelter I and II and Advocacy I) problematic candidates for support;

2. multiple SMO goals, which prevented four organizations (Shelter I, Advocacy I, II and III) from directing member energy towards specific organizational objectives;

3. domain overlap, which caused three organizations (Advocacy I, II, and III) to be indistinguishable from one another and subject to the co-optation by established organizations;

4. the breadth and strength of linkages with other community organizations, which operated in various ways to limit the options of all but one organization (Shelter III); and

5. incentives offered to outside organizations, which were present in the case of four organizations (Shelter I, II and III, and Advocacy I).

When the six anti-abuse SMO's are compared along the five analytic dimensions discussed in this chapter, the following patterns can be observed:

Factors Affecting Success

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<th>SMO's</th>
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<th>Goal Specificity</th>
<th>Domain Clarity</th>
<th>Linkage Strength/Breadth</th>
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PATTERNS OF VARIATION AMONG SIX ANTI-ABUSE SMO's
The data indicate that the organization whose resource mobilization attempts were most efficacious was the only one which combined the attributes of ideological compatibility, goal specificity, domain clarity, linkage breadth and strength, and extra-organizational incentives. Other SMO's, which were handicapped along one or more dimensions, did not achieve a comparable degree of success; indeed, organizations which rated low on most dimensions either went out of existence or experienced a marked decline in support.

The analysis suggests that, within a given SMI, only those SMO's which satisfactorily resolve basic dilemmas related to each of the five factors are likely candidates for success. The knowledge that even the short-term success of a SMO requires a fortuitous combination of several important factors helps explain the high mortality rate among newly-formed SMO's.

Two closing points should be raised. First, for purposes of clarity, this analysis has treated each of the five contributing dimensions as discrete and equal in weight. No attempt has been made to comment upon the influence different factors may exert upon one another or on the probability of acquiring different forms of resources. Although this study contains no systematic data on which to base conclusions about the inter-relationships among various dimensions and the differential impact of some factors upon organizational success, it seems likely that both interactive and indirect effects exist among some factors. These kinds of relationships will be considered in the next chapter, which contains a theoretical model and a set of testable propositions about SMO success.
Second, by focusing exclusively on the relationship between organizational characteristics and resource mobilization, this analysis has avoided commenting upon the implications of these patterns for social problem definition and social change. This and related topics will be considered in the final chapter.
VI.
A MODEL AND SET OF PROPOSITIONS

The foregoing discussions have treated the growth of support for new SMO's from a system resource and organizational exchange perspective. The flow of resources from the environment has been focused upon as the major source of SMO success. SMO's have been viewed as having a necessary interest in acquiring money, legitimacy, members, and facilities because SMO power is a function of the market share of these four kinds of resources a SMO is able to control. Consistent with the exchange perspective, the costs and benefits for both parties--SMO's and their potential supporters--have been considered.

This chapter contains an abstract model relating the factors discussed in the previous chapter to one another and to the probability of SMO success. Following the presentation and discussion of the model, propositions concerning predicted relationships between SMO characteristics and SMO success will be listed, and some strategies for testing hypotheses derived from these propositions will be suggested.

Domain of the Propositions

Since the six elements in the model are relatively easy to operationalize, any or all of the propositions can be tested empirically. Other communities in which battered women movements are or have been active are obvious candidates for empirical studies involving the model. Both informal conversations and interviews with individuals who are familiar
with movements for battered women in other communities suggest that the characteristics of SMO's and the dynamics of their activities in many ways parallel those of the six organizations discussed here. Thus, the model might be applied in another community to determine whether it can predict which anti-battering SMO's will mobilize the greatest degree of support for their programs.

Beyond these kinds of cases, the model is formulated so as to be applicable in any social setting containing two or more SMO's seeking to bring about social change in a given issue area. Although based on data gathered at the community level, the propositions can probably be applied to other social units. Examples of the types of organizations currently active in this society on which the propositions might be tested are: environmental quality groups; student political organizations; antibusing groups; and pressure groups seeking legal reforms. Later in this chapter, a design for applying the model to the case of two farm workers unions will be presented. While the study concerns SMO's operating in the same place and time, the model might possibly be useful in studies of social movements active at different times in history, but which have the same general aims, e.g., early and contemporary Women's Rights organizations, or the original and present-day labor organizations.

This set of propositions is a middle-range theory of social movements, rather than a general theory, and there are limits to its applicability. It probably has relatively little utility for explaining the mobilization of support for social movements which primarily seek to bring about inward changes in participants, rather than societal reform. It offers little insight into the ways isolated individuals are mobilized into social
movements, and focuses instead on linkages between organizations as the most important means by which support—including membership support—is channelled into a movement. The model concentrates on the dynamics of social movement careers and on factors which contribute to the success of SMO's, and does not attempt to account for why SMO's emerge or why some SMO's receive more societal support at a given time than others. However, some of the assumptions underlying the model, e.g., the notion that supply is just as important a factor as demand in social movement emergence, contain implications for these two topics.

The Explanatory Model

Based upon the data used in this study, the theoretical model below has been developed:

**FACTORs PREDICTING SMO SUCCESS**

Terms and Relationships

The propositions comprising this model are applicable for different organizations in a SMO. They attempt to predict organizational success from five antecedent conditions, three of which are qualities of SMO's and two of which are properties of relations between SMO's and the environment. The terms and relationships posited in the model are discussed below.
Ideological compatibility/divergence. This term refers to the consistency, coherence, or "fit" between the general philosophical orientation of a SMO and that of the surrounding environment, i.e., organizations and significant publics in the larger social setting. Compatible ideologies are those which do not challenge the traditional practices, the vested interests, or the basic philosophical positions of organizations or groups in the social setting which control large quantities of the kinds of resources needed by the movement. Divergent ideologies are those which evaluate these traditional institutions negatively or which seem to require potential supporters to engage in costly change, adjust or relax their standards, or risk their legitimacy. In the case of the movement studied here, the most compatible SMO ideologies were those which: were couched in secular, community service terms; "blamed" neither males nor prominent community institutions for the practice of battering; upheld the importance of the family; and which allowed for internal SMO structuring and procedures that were consistent with those of established community organizations.

Compatibility between the ideology of a SMO and the larger social setting is seen as raising the probability that an SMO will forge both broad and strong linkages, as having a direct effect on resources--i.e., legitimacy--and as creating extra-organizational linking incentives, or at least removing disincentives.

Goal specificity/diffusion. Goal specificity refers to the number of target objectives an SMO is working towards. The smaller the number of goals, the greater the goal specificity; conversely, the larger the number of goals, the greater the goal diffusion. Based on the notion that
multiple goals lower the quantity of resources available for reaching any one goal, SMO's with fewer goals are seen as more likely to obtain resources. Multiple goals are seen as costly for two reasons. First, while goal specificity has no effect on the clarity of an organization's domain, multiple goals raise the probability SMO task domains will overlap with those of other movement and established organizations, necessitating competition within the SMO, domain adjustments, or the sacrifice of potential support. Second, goal diffusion can result in slower organizational progress, necessitating the introduction of new concerns (increased focus on organizational maintenance and solidaristic benefits; additional goals) to stimulate support. The multi-goal SMO's in this study expended considerable energy prioritizing goals and changing strategic emphases--efforts which produced no immediate gains. Goal specificity is seen as leading to a net gain in SMO resources, primarily because it reduces organizational costs.

Domain clarity/overlap. This term refers to the extent to which the activities performed by an SMO in pursuit of its objectives are distinctive and particular to the SMO, or whether, conversely, they are shared by some other movement or established organization. Domain overlap with other SMO's is costly because the affected organization must either direct efforts towards competing with other SMO's and towards further specialization or accept the prospect of losing support to a competitor. Domain overlap with established organizations in the larger setting sets the stage for competition, co-optation and subsequent loss of SMO identity.

Although goal specificity does not in itself assure domain clarity, goal diffuseness is conducive to domain overlap. Specificity is also depicted
in the model as positively related to extra-organizational incentives; 
like the two shelter organizations focused on in this account, SMO's 
which can make an undisputed claim to a specific function or clientele 
have more to offer other organizations in exchange for support.

**Linkage breadth, strength/narrowness, weakness.** Linkages are 
recurrent patterns of contact between SMO's and the environment. This 
study used common membership as an indicator of interorganizational link­
age. Strong links are obtained when individuals representing one sector 
in the larger setting assume leadership positions in an SMO broad linkages 
are a result of participation in SMO programs by many organizations or in­
stitutional sectors, rather than a few.

Ideological compatibility between an SMO and its organizational field 
is seen as leading to the formation of both broad and strong linkages; 
additionally, linkage breadth and strength are more probable where incen­
tives exist for potential sponsors and where the functions of the SMO are 
not duplicated by some other organizations. Because they indicate wide 
acceptance of the SMO, broad and strong linkages can themselves raise 
linking incentives for other organizations. Linkages are seen as necessary 
conditions for resources.

**Extra-Organizational Incentives/Disincentives.** Incentives are the 
resources SMO's can offer to other organization in exchange for support. 
Among the benefits the SMO's, including those studied here, can offer to 
other organizations are information, legitimacy, personnel (clients), and 
programs compatible with the goals of the outside organizations. In this 
study, those SMO's which could offer all these types of inducements were 
most successful than those which could offer only one or two.
Inducements are weakly influenced by ideological compatibility (in the sense that ideological diversity is a disincentive to link) and strongly influenced by domain clarity and linkages. Because organizations typically do not support SMO's unless they can gain something from doing so, incentives are also depicted as necessary conditions for resource growth.

Resources: Net Gain/Net Loss. Within a given set of SMO's concerned with a common issue, those organizations which are high in terms of the five antecedent conditions should experience the largest net gain in resources (legitimacy, funds, etc.). That other organizations do not achieve comparable success levels, i.e., go out of existence or decline, may be attributed to: failure to manifest the properties which encourage the development of networks of support (narrow, weak linkages); an inability to offer resources to other organizations in exchange for their support (lack of incentives); or an expenditure of resources, e.g., member time and energy, within the SMO itself, in competitive and/or accommodative activity.

It should be noted that, when acquired, surplus resources can themselves function as incentives, raising the probability that outside organizations will wish to work with, and provide resources to, a "successful" organization. Thus, an SMO which possesses a significant quantity of any one type of resource is in a better position than others to obtain additional forms of support.
Relative Strength of Effects

The data from this study offer no clear indication of the degree to which different factors contribute to or inhibit resource mobilization. Further research is needed to clarify the conditions under which the relationships hold, as well as the relative weights of the antecedent conditions. However, the model does suggest that ideological compatibility, linkage breadth/strength and incentives may be the most important factors contributing to SMO success. All three should be thought of as necessary conditions for resource exchange between an SMO and its environment. In the model, these are the only factors seen as having direct consequences for resource acquisition. Goal specificity and domain clarity are considered important primarily because of their relationship to one another and to incentives.

Propositions Contained In Or Implied By The Model

Based on the model, a number of assertions can be made about the direction and strength of relationships among the terms. They are listed in the order the terms appear in the model and should be interpreted as holding between organizations ceteris paribus; that is, other things being equal. The following are the most general of these statements:

Pr 1: The greater the compatibility between the ideology of a SMO and those of major holders of resources in the larger social setting, the greater the perceived legitimacy of the SMO.

Pr 2: The greater the compatibility between the ideology of a SMO and those of major holders of resources in the larger social setting, the greater the probability of linkages between the SMO and outside organizations.
Pr 3: The greater the compatibility between the ideology of a SMO and those of major holders of resources in the larger social setting, the greater the extra-organizational linkage incentives.

Pr 4: The higher the degree of SMO goal specificity, the lower the probability of domain overlap.

Pr 5: The greater the SMO domain clarity, the greater the degree of extra-organizational linkage incentives.

Pr 6: The greater the extra-organizational linkage incentives, the greater the probability of linkages between a SMO and outside organizations.

Pr 7: The greater the extra-organizational linkage incentives, the greater the net gains in resources to a SMO.

Pr 8: The greater the number and strength of interorganizational linkages formed by a SMO, the greater the net gain in resources to an SMO.

Pr 9: The larger the net gain in SMO resources, the greater the extra-organizational linkage incentives.

Pr 10: The higher the standing of a SMO on some resource, the greater the probability of a net gain on other resources.

In addition to the ten general relational statements listed above, other testable propositions about the characteristics, dynamics, and outcomes of SMO activities can be extrapolated from the model, the theoretical assumptions of this study, and related literature. The following are some of the more significant propositions suggested by this research:

I ideology:

Pr 11: The greater the divergence of the ideology of a SMO from those of major resource holders in the larger social setting, the lower its perceived legitimacy.

Pr 12: The greater the divergence of the ideology of a SMO from that of the population in the larger social setting, the greater the difficulty of recruiting members and the smaller the membership.
Pr 13: The greater the divergence of the ideology of a SMO from those of major resource holders in the larger social setting, the lower the probability that the SMO will form broad linkages with outside organizations.

Pr 14: Organizations will be mobilized to support those SMO's in a given SMI whose ideological positions are closest to their own.

Pr 15: Organizations will be mobilized to support those SMO's in a given SMI whose ideological positions do not conflict with the interests of other members of their organization-set.

Pr 16: The greater the ideological similarity between a SMO and some other organization in the same SMI, the greater the probability they will establish linkages.

Pr 17: The greater the ideological compatibility between a SMO and some outside organization, and the greater the linkage incentives for the outside organizations, the greater the probability that strong linkages will be formed between the SMO and that organization.

Pr 18: The greater the divergence of the ideology of a SMO from the ideology of major resource holders in the larger social setting, the greater the reliance on solidaristic incentives among the membership.

Goals:

Pr 19: The greater the number of goals established by SMO's in a given SMI, the greater the probability of domain overlap within the SMI.

Pr 20: The greater the number of goals established by SMO's in a given SMI, the greater the probability of domain overlap with organizations outside the SMI.

Pr 21: In the absence of new resource inputs, the addition of new goals by a SMO will slow progress towards resource acquisition.

Pr 22: The greater the number of goals in a SMO, and the slower the progress towards resource acquisition, the greater the reliance upon solidaristic incentives among the membership.

Pr 23: Solidaristic incentives hasten acquisition in goal-specific SMO's and slow resource acquisition in goal-diffuse SMO's.
Domain:

Pr 24: The larger the number of SMO's in a SMI, the greater the probability of domain overlap within the SMI.

Pr 25: The higher the degree of domain overlap within a SMI, the greater the competition among SMO's.

Pr 26: The greater the competition among SMO's in a SMI, the higher the degree of non-goal-related activity.

Pr 27: The greater the competition among SMO's in a SMI, the greater the tendency to specialize.

Pr 28: The higher the degree of unresolved domain overlap among SMO's in a SMI, the lower the amount of resources mobilized by SMO's sharing a common domain.

Pr 29: The higher the degree of domain overlap between a SMO and an established organization outside the SMI, the higher the probability of strong linkages with that organization.

Pr 30: The greater the degree of domain overlap between a SMO and an established organization outside the SMI, the higher the probability of co-optation by that organization.

Pr 31: The higher the degree of domain overlap between a SMO and an established organization and the stronger the linkage with that organization, the lower the autonomy of the SMO.

Linkages:

Pr 32: The legitimacy of the SMO's linked strongly to a specific organization will be no greater in the larger community than the legitimacy of that organization.

Pr 33: The greater the quantity of resources controlled by organizations linked to SMO's, the larger the quantity of resources subsequently mobilized by the SMO.

Pr 34: The stronger the linkages between an outside organization and an SMO, the greater the degree of control by that organization over the SMO and, conversely, the lower the autonomy of the SMO.

Pr 35: The more narrow the linkages between an SMO and an outside organization, the greater the degree of control by that organization, and the lower the autonomy of the SMO.
Pr 36: The broader the linkages between a SMO and outside organizations, the greater the probability of resource mobilization.

Pr 37: The broader the linkages between a SMO and outside organizations, the greater the degree of SMO change.

**Incentives:**

Pr 38: The greater the similarity between SMO goals and the goals of other organizations, the greater the probability of establishing linkages between the SMO and those organizations.

Pr 39: The higher the probability that SMO's will provide resources to other organizations, the higher the probability of linkages between those organizations and SMO's.

Pr 40: The greater the scarcity of resources controlled by SMO's, the greater the probability that organizations will establish linkages with those SMO's.

Pr 41: Within an SMI, SMO's which offer the most resources to other organizations are those with which the most linkages are established.

**Resources:**

Pr 42: The greater the legitimacy of an organization in the larger community, the higher the probability of obtaining members, funds, and facilities.

Pr 43: The greater the resources controlled by an SMO, the higher the incentives to other organizations to establish linkages.

**Applying the Model**

Both the overall explanatory framework and specific propositions can be tested empirically. Several SMI's which might serve as topics for study have already been mentioned. Additional examples can be offered to demonstrate the potential utility of the model.
A Test of the Overall Model on Other SMO's

The model could be applied to explain differential support for SMO's concerned with social issues other than the one focused upon in this study. SMO's in the farm workers' movement appear to be good candidates for empirical study; indeed, such organizations have already received attention from sociologists interested in resource mobilization. Jenkins and Perrow (1977), for example, attempt to discover why, of two farm workers' SMO's espousing similar goals and employing similar strategies—the National Farm Labor Union and the United Farm Workers Union—the latter mobilized a great deal of societal support, while the former did not. These authors attribute the greater success of the UFW to government actions which were favorable to, or at least not overtly hostile to, that union organization. In a case study of resource mobilization by the UFW, Walsh (1976) argues that one factor contributing to the success of the UFW was its ideology, which meshed well with that of dominant social institutions. Research on the same topic, guided by this model, would consider both these factors—societal support and ideological compatibility—as well as others, in arriving at an explanation of why one group was more successful. The study would focus on the early history of each group, and could be conducted in the following manner:

1. Through reference to SMO slogans, official writings, speeches, leaders and newspaper reports (an indicator of public perceptions) major themes in the ideology of both SMO's could be identified. An effort would be made to determine which elements of SMO ideology, if any, were incompatible with the belief systems of the majority of potential constituents at the time both SMO's were active.
2. Using organizational records of reports of union activities, the degree to which the union organizations attempted to work towards either single or multiple goals would be determined.

3. Because these two organizations functioned at different times, they did not compete directly; nevertheless, domain clarity/overlap may have affected mobilization efforts. (At least one union—the UFW—had other competition which had to be overcome.) Research on SMO domains would systematically take into account the extent to which each SMO had developed a distinct area of competence which was not duplicated either by other SMO's or by other government or public interest organizations.

4. The strength and extensiveness of linkages between each SMO and powerful outside interests would be noted. Following Aveni (1978), common membership could be used as an indicator of linkages. The following might be suitable sources of information on linkage breadth and strength: information on the number and nature of additional organizations in which the leadership of each SMO were active participants; data on organizations to which the unions sent official representatives; lists of organizations which provided volunteer organizing cadre to the unions; and information on organizations which lent their name to union programs.

5. Social, political, and legal changes which occurred between the times the two groups were active may have had an effect on incentives to establish relationships with farm worker union organizations. Based on knowledge of the prevalent social climate and the pressures on established organizations to respond to the problems of farm workers, a measure comparing linkage incentives could be developed.

6. It would be hypothesized that differences between the two organizations along the five key dimensions and in the directions predicted by the model account for differences in perceived organizational legitimacy, funding levels, member and volunteer support, and the goods and services made available to each union organization.

A Test of Some Propositions on SMO's Working on Behalf of Battered Women

The research design outlined above applies all the variables in the explanatory model to SMO's which are part of a social movement different from the one on which the model is based. Research strategies could be
devised for testing specific propositions on other SMO's in the battered women movement.

Proposition 8 states:

The greater the number and strength of interorganizational linkages formed by a SMO, the greater the net gain in resources to a SMO;

Proposition 13 states:

The greater the divergence of the ideology of an SMO from those of major resource holders in the larger social setting, the lower the probability that the SMO will form broad linkages with outside organizations.

These two propositions could be tested on anti-abuse organizations in this fashion:

1. A complete and up-to-date list of shelters for battered women around the U.S. would be compiled. The list would include newly established shelter facilities and would exclude those set up as program elements or satellites to already existing organizations in the religious, health, welfare, or other sectors.

2. Each of these shelters would be contacted by mail or telephone and asked for information on:

   a. Guiding philosophy and objectives; these would be categorized in some meaningful way, e.g., as feminist, religious, mental health, social service; or as concerned primarily with women; with the maintenance of the family; or neutral.

   b. Organizational structure; for shelters with a corporate structure and a board of directors or advisors, the other organizational affiliation(s) of board members would be determined. Otherwise, information on organizational representation on the staff or steering committee would be noted.

   c. Staff size, including full- and part-time employees and volunteers.

   d. Size of budget.
On the basis of the two propositions stated above, it would be hypothe­
sized that, with appropriate controls (e.g., for community size) those
or­ganizations with larger budgets and larger number of staff would be
those which compared with their less "successful" counterparts,

a. do not depict themselves as having either a woman's libera­
tion or religious mission and/or take either a family-main­
tenance or neutral stance towards the solution of the problem; and

b. manifest comparatively more involvement by individuals re­
presenting a wider range of community and other outside or­
ganizations. Conversely, those shelters with smaller staffs
and budgets might be expected to be those espousing less
"mainstream" philosophies and having relatively weak and
narrow linkages to outside organizations.

Because the propositions contain terms which are relatively easily
distinguished and measured, they offer a range of opportunities for empiri­
cal application. Among the other research topics that might be pursued
by means of this model and set of concepts is the question advanced by
Aveni (1978), whether linkages with particular kinds of organizational
sectors yield particular kinds of resources for SMO's. For example,
it can be asked whether linkages with religious institutions result in en­
hanced legitimacy for anti-abuse organizations, and whether linkages with
social service networks yield funds and facilities. Aveni argues the
patterns are not straightforward, and that various linkage combinations
can bring about similar quantities and kinds of resources. This subject
seems very relevant to social movement research and should be pursued
further.

Finally, research is needed to further specify the relationships set
forth in the model. Each of the terms can be seen as having various di­
dimensions; the dimensions linkage breadth and strength have already been
discussed, as have different component elements of the general concept of resources. There is a need to clarify the extent to which these and other conceptual elements affect and interact with one another, and this can only be accomplished through extensive research and conceptual reformulation.

Summary

Some of the outcomes of social movement activity—the quantity of resources obtained by different SM0's—have been related to five antecedent factors: compatibility of SM0 ideology with the philosophical orientation of the larger organizational field; SM0 goal specificity; SM0 control of an undisputed domain; the strength and extensiveness of SM0 connections with outside organizations; and the potential for productive exchange between the SM0 and major resource-holders. These six variables were incorporated into an explanatory model, from which over forty general and specific propositions were derived.

Suggestions for possible empirical application of this middle-range theory of SM0 success were then presented. In one case, it was suggested measures on the six variables of the model might explain the high degree of support given to one union working on behalf of farm workers, as compared to another. In a related discussion, possible applications of specific propositions to explain differential resource acquisition by battered women shelters in the U.S. were presented. While these two proposed research strategies certainly do not exhaust the potential for research inherent in the model, they are sufficient to demonstrate both
he testability and the wider applicability of this empirically derived formulation.

In the next and final chapter, several of the more important implications of this research for the study of social movements and the field of sociology in general will be discussed.
Review of the Purposes and Findings of the Study

As Outlined in Chapter I, the objectives of this study were:

1. to describe the formation and careers of six SMO's which emerged in a single community and had as their common objective action on behalf of battered women;

2. to account for variations in the ability of these SMO's to obtain support for their activities through reference to organizational characteristics and relationships; and

3. to add to the theoretical literature on social movements by developing an abstract model to explain differential SMO success levels.

The first objective was met. A lengthy discussion of the establishment, careers, and fates of each of the six organizations indicated this locally-based SMI was relatively heterogenous, consisting of groups and individuals from a variety of community sectors: religious institutions; mental health and social service organizations; establishment-oriented voluntary associations; and feminist organizations. It was noted that one group, failing to obtain even minimal support, dissolved; three SMO's were "becalmed," i.e., continued to exist but experienced either stability or a slow decline in support; one organization experienced a moderate degree of success; and one SMO was able to virtually, "corner the market" on the abuse problem.

To achieve the second objective, the organizations were systematically compared along analytic dimensions which the literature on organizations
as well as writings on social movement resource mobilization indicate
may affect the ability of an SMO to obtain support. The ways in which
the SMO's resolved several basic organizational dilemmas were seen as
more or less costly and more or less likely to yield payoffs. It was
argued that the most successful organizations was the one which achieved
the optimal "mix" of factors needed for success and that the other or­
ganizations were handicapped in varying degrees by virtue of their organi­
zational attributes and interorganizational contacts.

In their survey of the field of collective behavior, Marx and Wood
speak of the need for "testable, middle range propositions that the field
of collective behavior has generally lacked" (1975: 397). The third
major goal of the study was to address the need for empirically applicable
formulations; this goal was also met. An explanatory model containing
six operationalizable variables and statements of relationships, accom­
panied by a set of over forty propositions, was set forth in Chapter VI.

Additional Accomplishments and Implications of the Study

Besides containing important socio-historical material on a new and
growing social movement, this study makes theoretical, methodological,
and substantive contributions to the social movements area. From the
standpoint of social movement theory, the study has shown that it is both
meaningful and useful to study movements from an organizational per­
pective. A major contribution of this research has been to give support
to the notion that SMO's can not only be described in structural terms,
but also be analyzed by means of many of the same concepts used in studying
ongoing or established organizations. This kind of approach to
non-conventional social behavior, which subsumes emergent phenomena under the same kinds of principles thought to be applicable to social behavior in general, is not only theoretically parsimonious, but appropriate at the current time, given the tendency in our society for social movements to be spearheaded by entities which, although challenging existing social arrangements, resemble formal organizations more than anything else. With paid staffs, direct-mail requests for support, a complex division of labor and skillful use of the media, these SMO's require the same kinds of inputs from their environments as do other, conventional organizations—and often go about obtaining them in similar ways. Moreover, this study suggests that even in the case of SMO's which do not approach this upper level of complexity, variations in careers and success rates can be traced to differences at the organizational level. Only a handful of studies (Zald and Ash, 1966; Zurcher and Curtis, 1973; McCarthy and Zald, 1977) have presented sets of propositions concerning SMO's using organizational imagery and concepts, and none of these contain an overall model for explaining social movement phenomena using organizational-level variables. Earlier discussions (see Chapters I and II) have suggested that social scientists have in the past tended to view social movements and other forms of collective behavior as having their origins in societal breakdown; as containing a large amount of behavior which is less than rational in character; and as being maintained in large measure because of their tendency to attract problem-ridden individuals. One consequence of applying an organizational perspective to social movement phenomena is that the distinction between conventional and emergent social behavior is made less sharp; there is thus no need to seek for
special theories or concepts to explain why individuals should engage in "odd" or "deviant" behavior. Focusing on the ways in which social movements resemble other organizations in their formation, functioning, and relationships with the environment provides dual benefits; it corrects for biases in the literature and at the same time shows a potential for unifying seemingly disparate phenomena under a common theoretical framework.

The most important methodological implication of this position is that it calls for research on SMO's utilizing the same kinds of strategies and concepts as are used in studying ongoing organizations. In the case presented here, the adoption of an organizational perspective meant using the data as indicators of organizational and relational concepts such as domain and linkage. It also meant treating statements of SMO leaders as data on organizational activities. The social science literature on organizations is extremely complex and rich, offering innumerable opportunities to introduce new concepts and methods to the study of emergent organizations. New organizational studies on SMO's would contrast markedly with past inquiries, which have tended to gather data at the individual level and to focus on such topics as member attitudes and dispositions and the background factors explaining movement participation. Future organizational studies of social movements could draw an extensive theoretical and empirical base and might use data-gathering methods similar to those used here to apply concepts not used previously in the social movement literature, e.g., SMO growth rates and SMI diversification and specialization. In sum, just as conceptualizing social movements primarily as collections of individuals had implications for what was
studied empirically—and how it was studied—so too does defining them in organizational terms, and this way of viewing the phenomenon makes available a range of new theories, concepts, and methods.

This research also has substantive implications for the study of specific aspects of social movements, as well as for understanding larger sociological issues. One specific area in which the study points out the need for further research is that of the relationship between the size of a social movement, the resources it controls, and its eventual societal impact. In general, both common sense and traditional scholarly views on social movements suggest that a movement gains in influence and has an impact when more people hear about it and agree with its aims and when its following subsequently increases. The common image of movement growth is that movements start small, grow larger, and subsequently obtain other resources, such as money and material goods, largely as a consequence of this growth in membership. The argument presented here, however, suggests that for some movements, resource allocation and even social impact may proceed, not follow, membership growth. Based on this study, it can be hypothesized that some SMO's start small, link with larger, established providers of resources, develop staff positions, begin advancing towards their objectives, and then begin attracting more members. Moreover, this approach even allows for the possibility that a SMO may have considerable societal impact without attracting large numbers of adherents, primarily through the exploitation of contacts within established organizations and through the use of money and influence. According to the position taken in this study, then, the empirical relationship
between resources, membership size, and societal impact should be treated as variable, rather than constant.

This study also has implications for research on the relationship between goal specificity and SMO survival. The model derived from the data on the anti-abuse SMI asserts that specific goals help SMO's mobilize resources, presumably by using member energy efficiently and facilitating the development of domain consensus. However, other studies (Zald and Ash, 1966) also suggest that, upon the achievement of their objectives, social movements with specific goals are likely candidates for dissolution. Viewed in light of the literature on organizations, these two notions seem somewhat at odds with one another and suggest the following questions about movement dynamics: Does goal specificity indeed encourage the acquisition of resources? And, if so, once the original SMO goal has been reached, could not a surplus of resources lead to a desire for organizational maintenance and the formation of new goals, rather than to SMO decline?

While the research reported here focuses on the effect of organizational characteristics on SMO resource mobilization—that is, on the consequences of one set of SMO attributes for another SMO characteristic—it can be argued that this line of inquiry has implications beyond the study of movements themselves, for the study of social stability and change.

One such application involves the well-documented tendency for social movements to become conservatized. To the disappointment of some and the delight of others, large-scale change in this society is extremely gradual; moreover, very few truly innovative social movements survive their
encounter with an indifferent or hostile society, and leaders of many movements show a tendency—even an eagerness—to establish partnerships with the powers that be. Studies such as the one reported here may lead to a fuller understanding of why these patterns prevail. Zald and Ash (1966), for example, attribute conservatizing trends in social movement organizations primarily to changes in the sentiments and commitment of members and leaders and secondarily to co-optation and subsequent goal transformation. This study, on the other hand, suggests that the greater emphasis should be placed on co-optation and resultant SMO dependency on the environment. It has been argued that SMO's which acquire large pools of resources gain in power and influence, and also that, to be successful in mobilizing support, such groups have had to establish prior connections with a considerable number of rich and prestigious outside groups. However, the organizational literature also indicates that, the greater the integration of an organization with its environment, and the greater the degree of dependency on the environment, the greater the influence of the environment over the organization. This analysis implies, then, that the growing conservatism and the retreat from original goals seen in some SMO's is neither part of an inevitable progression nor due to intra-organizational factors, but rather is a consequence of environmental pressure experienced by the most "successful" movements. Aveni (1978) makes a similar point about the controls placed upon SMO's by outside sources of needed support, noting that those organizations which are involved in extensive networks of support tend to become dependent on those networks and to have relatively little freedom to change direction and initiate new programs or strategies.
If this analysis suggests reasons why some of the most successful social movements seem the most willing to renege on their earlier visions, it also provides hints about why the pace of social change is sometimes nearly imperceptible. The findings indicate that, while it can in principle be argued that SMO's seeking radical change are just as likely as other groups to develop broad links with outside organizations interested in the same kinds of objectives, and hence to acquire resources, the current reality is that, for movement organizations, obtaining resources with which to carry on programs usually involves establishing productive linkages with "establishment" sectors in the community or society. And it is the "ideologically compatible" SMO's which are at an advantage in seeking this type of support. By electing to channel support to organizations which do not violate their basic philosophical premises, contributors of large amounts of resources to change-oriented groups also contribute to the slow pace of social change. Because social movements receive extensive support from established organizations in their environment, and because more organizational support is typically mobilized by "moderate" SMO's, there is a virtual guarantee that both newly discovered social problems and their solutions will be viewed in much the same way as the "old" ones have: as the occasion for the reform of some part of society, but not for a restructuring of the whole.

In the case of the social movement focused upon in this account, structural remedies to the wife abuse problem, brought about as the result of the activities of a set of SMO's, focus on providing shelter and related services to individual victims of battering. For the time being, providing solutions to the problem of abuse has been defined as within
the purview primarily of the mental health and social service sectors of the community and secondarily of the police and the courts. Very little has been done to expose or challenge the structural bases of male domination. The community remains more or less closed to the issue and may remain as indifferent as ever to the fate of the abuse victim. Battered women, once given crisis shelter, have approximately the same options they had before. Many people term the provision of shelter a "band-aid" approach to the problem; many others are delighted with the progress the movement has made. Most would agree that the establishment of shelter houses, while undeniably a remarkable victory for the anti-abuse movement, can certainly not be equated with major change in social structure or culture.

Concluding Note

In the West today—and probably in all societies throughout history—collective efforts to bring about or impede new lines of social action have been viewed with alarm by those who would prefer not to see established social patterns interrupted. Often, the critique of emergent social forms has centered on attributions of weakness, malice, and abnormality to their proponents. Moreover, social scientists themselves have sometimes tended to adopt this position. This analysis provides a limited but valid illustration of the alternative argument that collective behavior and social movement phenomena, while occasionally disruptive and troublesome, are first and foremost social, and as such are explainable through reference to the same generic principles as apply to other social phenomena. In doing so, it aligns itself with an emerging perspective in the field
(Turner and Killian, 1972; Weller and Quarantelli, 1973; Marx and Wood, 1975) which argues that non-conventional social activities need not be explained through reference to special theories and concepts, separate from those explaining social behavior in general. It is hoped that subsuming theory and research on social movements under more general principles of the field of sociology will result in increased progress for both parties to the merger.
FOOTNOTES

1. Although the concepts to be used in the analysis are introduced here and related to the literature on social movements, they are discussed again at some length in Chapter V. At this time, additional literature, primarily on the sociology of organizations, is cited to show why specific dimensions of the concepts were singled out in the interpretation of the data.

2. As is the case with other situations before they have been identified as social problems by society at large, systematic data on the incidence of wife abuse or its prevalence in various social classes or other groupings does not exist. To a great degree, our ignorance about the extent of the wifebeating phenomenon is due to its relatively private, secret nature; it is also a consequence of the fact that methods of reporting the phenomenon have not been developed. Police reports and nationwide crime statistics do not recognize abuse as a separate category of criminal behavior, although it is probably the case that a large proportion of "domestic" calls involve wifebeating. Hospital records are of virtually no help in determining the incidence of abuse, since this is an area in which a good deal of concealment can be expected. Additionally, since they tap more cases of severe abuse, as well as more disputes between lower- and working-class couples, police and hospital records would probably not be suitable sources of data from which to generalize about the practice of wifebeating. In the child abuse area, authorities have in the last few years begun to urge citizens to report suspected episodes, but this type of program is highly unlikely to be instituted in the case of wife abuse and might also be expected to yield biased data. It appears that the highest potential for gaining quality information on the incidence of wife abuse exists in programs such as the NIMH-sponsored Family Violence Research Program, under the direction of Murry A. Straus, Department of Sociology, University of New Hampshire. Straus and his colleagues Richard Gelles and Suzanne Steinmetz have over the past few years gathered an impressive amount of data on wife abuse, including survey data. Publication of the results of a large-scale population survey on family violence is anticipated in the near future.

3. Unlike murder, assault is a crime that frequently goes unreported, particularly where the assailant and the victim know one another. The widespread knowledge that filing charges will not remedy the abuse problem may cut down on reports of assaults by husbands. Thus, it can be assumed that the proportion of couples involved in unreported assaults is considerably higher than the aggravated assault statistics would indicate. Moreover, this figure undoubtedly contains the same kinds of biases as other "police blotter" statistics. In short, while this and other statistics are cited to indicate that wife-beating
is a societal problem of considerable magnitude, no attempt is made to generalize from cases currently reported to the phenomenon in general.

4. There is a want of coherence in Downs's otherwise penetrating and insightful approach to the process by which social problems are manufactured. On the one hand, he seems to depict the issue-attention process from a purely socio-psychological point of view, almost in stimulus-response terms: he assumes media reporting of exciting events "captures the public mind" and has an impact on attitudes, which then lead to a period of public pressure for change. The fact that social problems never really get resolved seems to be attributed to the "fickle" nature of public opinion. On the other hand, however, the importance of social structural factors--e.g., the creation of vested interests, generational succession--in maintaining interest in an issue is also given emphasis. The reader is left confused about Downs's position on which of these two factors has more weight. The real crux of the matter--the nature and extent of the relationship between the structural factors and the attitudes of the general public--is not dealt with in his analysis.

5. The decision to mask the identity of the community in which the research was conducted precludes citing by name this and another survey which is discussed in this section. The needs assessment survey was conducted by the Academy for Contemporary Problems, Columbus, Ohio as part of its Benchmark Program and was published in 1975.

6. It should be noted, however, that both authors describe social movement success in a different way than does this analysis. Rather than focusing on the consequences of SMO activity for social change, as have Gamson and Freeman, this study defines success as the ability to obtain resources. One of the reasons this account has avoided using societal impact as a measure of SMO success is that, as Levitas notes (1977), it is always questionable whether the institution of a reform is attributable to the action of a specific social movement. SMO's which can obtain significant amounts of resources of course stand a better chance for having their demands met; however, acceptance of the program of a SMO is a consequence of many facilitating factors.

7. Additionally, it can be seen as an effort on the part of a more successful organization not to jeopardize its own claims to legitimacy by confusing the distinction between its own brand of services and those of a less successful group. Shelter III supporters believed they had more to gain by not co-ordinating with Shelter II than by doing so; however, the data suggest that along some lines, Shelter II would have liked to be able to present itself as working with Shelter III.
8. One consequence of specialization by shelter organizations is that, at a later time, when yet another funder urged a merger of Shelter II and III, the latter was able to point to programmatic differences between the two organizations that precluded a merger.

9. There are interesting parallels here between rape and the wife abuse problem. When first instituted, crisis counseling programs for rape victims were primarily "alternative" services conducted by feminist organizations. Within a period of years, such programs were co-opted into established organizations such as hospitals and community mental health centers; indeed, by the mid-1970's, the provision of crisis services for rape victims by federally funded community mental health centers was mandated by the National Institute of Mental Health.

10. The analysis treated individuals as linked to SMO's if they sustained an interest in SMO programs beyond attendance at one or two meetings or participation in a single project. However, where a series of individuals came and went, all acting as representatives of a particular outside organization, this was taken as evidence of a linkage.

11. Later in its career, Shelter II was able to obtain a degree of ongoing support from several religious organizations, including a Bible college which made a commitment to donate funds regularly. However, no specific level of support or funding period was agreed upon by the organizations.
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