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POINT OF VIEW IN LITERATURE AND FILM

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INTRODUCTION

Point of view is a phenomenon common to all representational art forms: literature, painting, theater, and film. The phenomenon, of course, manifests itself differently in the various art forms. In this dissertation, we shall be examining its manifestations in literature and film. To be more precise, we shall be seeking to describe the possible modes of relationship between the narrator(s) and the narration in literature and representational film. We can describe our focus more clearly in terms of the following diagram:

\[\begin{array}{c}
\text{the writer} \\
\uparrow \\
\downarrow \\
\text{guiding intelligence} \\
\uparrow 2 \\
\downarrow \\
narrator(s) \left\langle \quad --- 1 \quad \rightarrow \text{narrative} \right.
\end{array}\]

a. unspecified
b. specified

Figure 1: Diagrammatic Representation of the Relationships to be Considered in Point of View Studies.

It is the relationships represented by the double-arrows numbered one, two, and three which will concern us in this
dissertation. There are already attempts to describe these relationships, of course. In general, however, these accounts neither make nor maintain the distinctions represented in our diagram. For example, one handbook of literature tells us that "point of view" is a term "... used in the analysis and criticism of fiction to describe the way in which the reader is presented with the materials of the story, or, viewed from another angle, the vantage point from which the author presents the action of the story."¹ The reader can see from our diagram that we are not using the term "point of view" in either of these senses. First of all, the relationship of the reader to the narration is a complex matter that lies beyond the scope of this dissertation. Secondly, and even more importantly, we regard it as a misrepresentation to say that point of view is a matter of the way the author (writer) presents the narrative. Rather, point of view is primarily a matter of the way a narrator(s), acknowledged or unacknowledged, presents the narrative. To describe how a narrator performs this task does not require that we discuss the relations of the writer to the work. Accounting for the modes of relationship between the narrator and the narrative does, however, require that we examine the relationship between the "guiding intelligence" and the narrator. The guiding intelligence is that author who is "implied" by the work. We
should have liked to use Wayne Booth's term "implied author" to describe this guiding intelligence; however, Booth's term carries with it confusion which we wish to avoid. Describing the modes of relationship between the narrator(s) and the narrative also requires that we study the relationship between the world represented by the narrative and the narrative itself. It does not, however, require that we examine the relationship between the world represented by the narrative and the "real" world.

In the following pages, we hope to make clear why it is necessary to assume the focus described above in point of view studies. At this point, it is only necessary to make clear how we intend to describe the manifestations of point of view in literature and film. Besides the focus that we will adopt here, we need to make clear that our concern is to describe the modes of relationship possible between the narrator and the narrative. In other words, we shall describe what points of view are possible, what kinds of relationships may exist among these points of view, and what their functions may be. We are not concerned to determine what modes should appear in the relationship between the narrator and the narrative. We might point out in this context that before we can evaluate a work we need to be able to describe it adequately; thus our work here does have implications for criticism.
Developing the implications of our work here for literary and film criticism is an area for further research.

The relationship of the narrator to the narrative in literature has received extensive treatment in this century, while this relationship has only begun to be studied in film. It is our goal here to provide an account of this relationship in film. We intend to do so by adapting to film a revised version of Boris Uspensky's theory of point of view in literature. We have been guided in our choice of Uspensky's theory by the fact that it allows us to describe more of the possible modes of the relationship between the narrator and the narrative than any other theory.

So that we may appreciate Uspensky's theory, in chapters one and two, we shall study how point of view is approached by the New Critics and the Russian Formalists, respectively. We consider work from these two schools only because we regard these two schools to be the source of the thinking done about point of view in literature in this century. Narrowing our field even more, we shall consider only the work of those New Critics and Formalists whom we believe to have made significant contributions to an understanding of point of view in fictional prose. We have eliminated other writers who concern themselves with point of view for two reasons. The first is that they
work solely within the conceptual framework that the men we study provide. Thus, they tell us nothing new. Second, we want to devote our time to rigorous analyses of the work we see making significant contributions to Uspensky's conception of point of view. We will discover that the Americans and the Russians concentrate upon different modes of the relationship between the narrator and the narrative. The New Critics devote most of their energies to examining how the narrator controls the amount and kind of information that we receive about the action. The Formalists, on the other hand, devote their time to exploring the relationships possible between the narrator's discourse and the discourse of the characters. Uspensky's theory appears in the best light when we recognize that it allows us to deal with both modes of the relationship of the narrator and narrative. In chapter four, we will discover that Uspensky does more than combine and systematize the work of his predecessors, however.

His most significant contribution to our understanding of point of view is his recognition that a single scene, even a single sentence, may be constructed from more than one point of view. It is his account of multiple viewpoints that allows us to bring the necessary refinement to our descriptions of the relationship of the narrator to the narrative. In chapter three, we will discuss Lubomir
Dolozel's theory of narrative modes. Dolozel's theory is included here because we believe that identifying the shortcomings of his theory is instructive in two ways. First, it allows us to see the problems inherent in current approaches to literature which attempt to describe the narrative modes solely in terms of linguistic features. Second, studying Dolozel's confusion about consistent narration prepares the way for appreciating Uspensky's theory of multiple modes.

In chapter five, we will examine what little writing has appeared on point of view in film. Unfortunately, writers on point of view in film are to be distinguished for their failure to define or apply terminology consistently. They rely heavily for their terminology on the French Structuralist School of literary criticism. We may point out in this context that French Structuralism receives only marginal treatment here. We believe that upon the subject of point of view, it has nothing new to offer. More particularly, we find the French Structuralists repeating New Critical prejudices in the jargon peculiar to their school. Their reliance on the confused conceptions offered by French Structuralism is one reason why many writers on film fail to explore their subjects successfully, we might add. At any rate, although we cannot look to extant writing for a systematic or comprehensive approach to point of view in
film, we can discover several uses for it. It does, first of all, suggest those aspects of point of view which are peculiar to its manifestation in film. Secondly, it supports our conviction that point of view in literature and point of view in film are amenable to approaches which are common in many respects.

Finally, in chapter six, we will present a theory of point of view in film which, hopefully, will recommend itself to the reader because it allows us to describe a greater number of possible modes of the relationship between the film narrator and the film narrative than any account to date. The theory offered here also allows us to distinguish between the guiding intelligence in film and the film-maker and to distinguish between the film narrative and the world represented by the film. It will become clear to the reader during the course of our investigations how important it is to make each of these distinctions.
CHAPTER I

THE NEW CRITICAL APPROACH TO POINT OF VIEW

In the Republic, Plato identifies three styles of narration which he says comprehend every form of expression in words. They are "simple narration," "imitation," and a mixture of the two preceding pure styles. Simple narration results when the poet or storyteller speaks in his own person. Imitation, or what we would call dialogue, occurs when the poet or storyteller speaks in the voice of another. For example, Plato points to tragedy and comedy as wholly imitative and the lyric as wholly simple narration. The epic he sees as a combination of the two pure styles: the poet speaks in his own voice in some instances and, in others, does everything he can to convince his audience that the characters themselves are speaking.

Once Plato has identified the three styles, he moves to the crux of his argument. His concern is whether all three styles should be permitted in the ideal State. After considering what harm might result from poets being allowed to imitate at will, Plato decides that only those poets who imitate the virtuous can be allowed to enter the state. His reasoning is that imitation is by its nature the most entertaining and, therefore, influential. He recognizes it as the most popular style with the world. Plato seems
to fear a chain reaction; the audience will itself imitate what it sees or hears; thus only the virtuous must be imitated by the storyteller or poet. The philosopher is not without admiration, however, for what he calls "pantomimic gentlemen" and their art.

And therefore when any of one of these pantomimic gentlemen, who are so clever that they can imitate anything, comes to us, and makes a proposal to exhibit himself and his poetry, we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland of wool upon his head, we will send him away to another city. For we mean to employ for our soul's health the rougher and severer poet or storyteller, who will imitate the style of the virtuous only . . .¹

Obviously, for Plato, moral seriousness wins out over felicity of technique as a standard of judgment.

We open with this brief account of Plato's analysis of style for two reasons. The primary is that in his analysis what Plato calls "style" we here are calling "point of view"; thus what he has to say is important to the concept's development. Secondly, Plato's work provides us with a model for the process of criticism. We may distinguish in his work three steps. The first is to label certain verbal phenomena which appear in literary works as instances of a single device or technique. The second step is to determine the effect upon the audience which this device most
consistently produces. The third and final step is to judge the desirability of the effect and therefore the literary worth of the device in accordance with some standard. We cannot argue that actual critical practice is bound to these three steps in just this order, of course. What we do argue is that it is nearly always possible to distinguish these three steps and that to do so allows us to clarify what are the key points in writing about point of view. Not only does this model help us to clarify the issues in a single critic's writing, it helps us to see more clearly where and how individuals and/or schools differ. For example, we can discover differences in the devices identified, in the type of effects associated with a particular device, or in the standards of judgment used, etc. These differences gain significance for us because we are able to place them within a single frame of reference, i.e., our model.

In this chapter, we will trace in terms of our model the development that point of view receives in the writings of members of the American New Critical School. We are beginning with the New Critics because their work should be most familiar to the reader. In the next section we will discuss how point of view is treated by the Russian Formalist School of literary criticism. To be sure, other critical schools have studied the relation of the teller
to the tale, but their understanding of the concept of point of view rests upon notions developed by members of these two schools. Moreover, it seems when contemporary critics deal with point of view, they more often than not present in new vocabulary what their predecessors who were members of these two schools had to say on the subject. There are exceptions of course, and we treat them later.

The reader may remember that for Plato what we are calling point of view was a rather simple matter. A narration was either simple or imitative or a combination of the two pure styles. The author either spoke in his own voice or that of a character as he told his tale. For the New Critics, the mechanics of storytelling are not so simple a matter. They study the relation of the teller to the tale in an attempt to explain more about the form of the story than the distinction between commentary and dialogue.

The first critic in America to devote an entire book to the subject of storytelling is Percy Lubbock, the critical champion of Henry James. Although his book, *The Craft of Fiction*, appeared in 1921 and thus predates the arrival of New Criticism, New Critics accept his work without reservation. Although they do not realize it, all of the New Critical writing about point of view stems directly from Lubbock's book. For Lubbock, point of view or what he calls narrative technique, involves far more than the
question of who is speaking, author or disguised author. Point of view, as he conceives it, is the method by which the author selects the information he offers. (p. 63) It is not primarily a matter of voice, but rather the case is that certain methods produce certain results no matter what voice the author uses. Clarifying Lubbock's definition of point of view is not enough to render his work understandable, however. If we are to appreciate the significance of the visual and spatial metaphors that pervade his writing, we must understand how he conceives the processes of writing and reading fiction.

According to Lubbock, when the author writes, "he is making a reproduction of something that is in his own mind." (p. 68) The something of which the story is a reproduction Lubbock calls the "subject." (p. 69) Apparently this subject is rather like a color sound film of the events upon which the narrative is based. As Lubbock has it, when the author writes, he records particular aspects of this subject depending upon the point of view he takes. He assumes different viewpoints depending upon the theme he wishes to extract from the events (subject). So the case is actually that the story is not an identical reproduction of the subject, but one possible reflection of it. The reader as he reads creates a "structure of impressions" which must be, if Lubbock's work is to make sense, a series of sights and
sounds in the mind's eye and ear which are accompanied by emotional and intellectual reactions. Lubbock does not make clear what relation the reader's structure of impressions bears to the author's subject. But his comment that "the reader must follow the writer, always looking back to the subject itself in order to understand the course of the logic he pursues" (p. 63) suggests that the reader reproduces the author's initial subject. His comment also suggests that the reader produces structure which is that subject seen, heard, and reacted to from various viewpoints. Lubbock's idea is that particular subjects and themes receive their "truest" expression if particular methods of presentation are used. Thus, for him, the critic's job is to determine if the proper narrative technique has been employed. We cannot fail to notice here that for Lubbock what appears on the page is important only as a stimulus for impressions. The key elements are the author's subject and the reader's structure of impressions, neither of which are available for direct scrutiny. Lubbock's description of both elements tells us, however, that they are like mental movies. His terminology bears out this reading of his work.

Lubbock identifies two antithetical techniques which an author may use to present his subject: the panoramic and the scenic. If the author decides to create a pano-
ramic narrative, Lubbock says that he will relate the story from a position "above" the action. From this position, the author "sweeps the character's history with a wide range of vision and absorbs a general effect." (p. 66) In a panoramic narrative, the author may also exercise his superior knowledge and intervene with information the reader could not have discerned "simply by looking and listening." For example, he may "descend" to enter his character's thoughts if he wishes the reader to know what they are thinking and/or feeling. On the other hand, if the author chooses to create a scenic narrative, he assumes a position "straight in front of the action." (p. 67) From this position, the author presents only action of "certain selected hours" and suppresses any comment of his own. Beyond these two techniques, Lubbock identifies the "dramatic" and the "pictorial" methods for presenting events. With the pictorial method, the author presents events as they are reflected in the "mirror of somebody's consciousness." Lubbock says that it is the case with this method that the reader is not so much looking at the events as he is watching somebody's response to them. If he treats a scene dramatically, the author places the reader "in front of the visible and audible facts of the case, and leaves it to these to tell the story." (p. 71)
It is these four techniques which are for Lubbock "the elements of the novelist's method—essentially few and simple, but infinite in their possibilities for fusion and combination." (p. 76) He comments that "in a well-fashioned work, it is always interesting to discover how method tends to lay on method, so we get, as it were, layers and stratifications in the treatment of a story." (p. 76) With these two statements, Lubbock makes it clear that the critic will rarely run into a strictly scenic or panoramic work. However, it is the case that individual works are labeled scenic or panoramic according to which narrative method tends to predominate. Actually it would be more informative to speak of scenic or panoramic structures of impressions as Lubbock does not think of or write about narratives as if they were verbal items.

Like Plato, Lubbock discovers that each of the four methods which he identifies produces a particular effect upon the audience. Lubbock describes what he thinks these effects are in simple terms. If the author uses the panoramic method, he "tells" his story. If he adopts the scenic method, he "shows" his story. For example, when an author uses the panoramic method, Lubbock says the reader will be unable to pay full attention to the events of the story. Rather, he or she will be aware of the author's presence as guide, and this awareness will break the story illusion.
Here it seems as if Lubbock has what is called voice-over narration in film in mind; i.e., a narrator comments on what the audience watches happening on the screen as it happens. The story illusion remains intact in scenic narratives. Lubbock points out that although the author's judgment is equally present in the scenic narrative, what the author tells is "so immediate, so perceptible, that the machinery of his telling by which [the story] reaches us, goes unnoticed; the story appears to tell itself."
(p. 112) Once Lubbock makes clear what effects he thinks are associated with either method it is easier to understand why he distinguishes still further a pictorial method for presenting action. He sees the need to distinguish between those instances where the narrator descends to tell his readers what his characters think and feel and those where he simply presents their thoughts and feelings as they occur. The pictorial method then is that where thoughts and feelings are represented without authorial comment in narratives where the author always remains at the level of the action. Remember that the author may descend to enter his character's thoughts in a panoramic narrative, but not without some signal to the reader. Apparently, Lubbock includes the term dramatic to emphasize that there are two ways to treat action scenically, with or without entering the characters' consciousnesses. His second set
of distinctions then serves to preserve the integrity of his first set. He is able to account for why inside views do not break the story illusion in scenic narratives.

Once he points out what effects are produced, Lubbock makes clear which effects and, hence, which techniques are to be preferred. Ironically, Lubbock celebrates those very effects which Plato fears. He finds most admirable those narratives where the author disguises his presence throughout. He wants the reader to be completely mesmerized by the story illusion. Thus he finds that the scenic, pictorial, and dramatic methods are superior. Intense story illusion is not his only criterion of judgment, however. He charges that the author should shift his point of view no more often than necessary because shifts serve "only to confuse the effect, changing the focus without compensating gain." (p. 74) In other words, shifting point of view defeats the requirements of artistic economy. It also, in Lubbock's opinion, presents an obstacle to the story illusion since shifts draw attention to the source of the information. However offensive shifts are to Lubbock, the intrusions of an all knowing author are even more so. These intrusions, particularly if they occur after a scenic passage, force the reader to ask who is speaking. Lubbock argues that if this question must be asked, the narrative is not really self-contained because
it raises issues that it does not answer. In other words, he objects to authorial intrusions not only because they break the story illusion but also because they deny autonomy to the narrative. To his criteria of verisimilitude, economy, and autonomy, Lubbock adds that of technical sophistication. He closes his book with a discussion of how the panoramic technique is the more primitive and easier to use because it places no limitations on the artist's freedom. It is his feeling that "it is not at all presumptuous of a critic to declare that a story will never yield its best to a writer who takes the easiest way with it." (p. 294) Despite his conviction that showing is better than telling, Lubbock does not fail to find merit in those narratives which have been told. His idea though seems to be that authors know how to and should write better than that now.

We stated earlier that New Critics accepted Lubbock's work without reservation. This statement holds true despite their occasional criticisms of it. For example, Mark Schorer, in his 1957 Preface to an edition of The Craft of Fiction, complains that Lubbock's abstractions from James' technical concerns do not allow him to tell why War and Peace is a great work of art "still within the terms of craftsmanship." Like criticism of Lubbock's work appears fairly frequently, yet the New Critics actually
do nothing to alter Lubbock's views. For example, the
New Critic, Allen Tate, writes in 1941 that:

The limited and thus credible authority for the action, which is gained by putting the knower of the action inside its frame, is perhaps the distinctive feature of the modern novels; and it is, in all the infinite shifts of focus of which it is capable, the specific feature which more than any other has made it possible for the novelist to achieve an objective structure. 3

Here Tate reiterates the claim made by Lubbock twenty years earlier. Remember that Lubbock objects to the intrusions of an omniscient author since they "flourish" the fact that the point of view is the author's own and not to be confused with anybody's in the book, and keep the book from being "complete in itself." What Tate has done is to repeat the same idea in vocabulary designed to appeal to his contemporaries, e.g., "objective structure." Another New Critic, Mark Schorer, builds further on this idea of limitation lending credibility and objectivity. In a 1948 essay, he discusses the uses of point of view not only as a mode of "dramatic limitation" but even more importantly as a mode of "thematic definition." As Schorer has it, the novel reveals a created world of values and attitudes, and the author is aided in his search for artistic definition of these values and attitudes by the devices of point of view. In other words, the devices of point of view help him to separate his own prejudices and predispositions from those of his characters and thus to evaluate his characters
in relation to one another within their own frame. Apparently, Schorer's idea is that if the author does not allow himself the freedom to comment directly on the action, then he must manipulate the action so the reader will evaluate it as the author wishes. Here Schorer has tied the notions of narrative credibility and objectivity with the notion of the author's need for aesthetic distance. While Lubbock himself does not introduce the notion of aesthetic distance, we can easily see him accepting it.

The critic who makes most clear how little American thinking about point of view changes is Norman Friedman, in his essay, "Point of View in Fiction: The Development of a Critical Concept." Friedman opens his paper by describing what he sees as the aesthetic background for the concept. He identifies the two opposite points in time which the history of the concept can be plotted, i.e., from Plato's distinction between simple narration and imitation to Joyce's description of the evolution of the personality of the fictional artist. As Joyce has it, "the personality of the artist, at first a cry or a cadence or a mood (lyric) and then a fluid and lambent narrative (epic), finally refines itself out of existence (drama) impersonalizes itself, so to speak." (p. 1163) At the same time that Friedman is presenting the history of point of view as a concept, he is building the case for its im-
importance to literary criticism. He chooses his poles in history carefully to support his point that "it has all along been a commonplace of aesthetic theory that effective presentation and impersonality go hand in hand." According to Friedman, another commonplace is that effective presentation means the creation of "as complete a story illusion as possible." Thus, he understands the evolution of fiction as a steady progress toward the ideal of totally impersonal narratives which provoke strong illusions of verisimilitude; "... the prime end of fiction is to produce as complete a story illusion as possible." (p. 1180) On this basis, point of view becomes invaluable as a critical tool, "for point of view provides a modus operandi for distinguishing the possible degrees of authorial extinction in the narrative art." (p. 1163)

Once Friedman has outlined the emergence of point of view as a critical tool, he presents his classification of the types of narration. His typology is based on the notions of authorial extinction and historical evolution plus the answers to four questions. The questions are:

1. Who talks to the reader (author in third or first person, character in first, or ostensibly no one)?
2. From what position (angle) regarding the story does he tell it (above, periphery, center, front, or shifting narrator)?
3. What channels of information does the narrator use to convey the story to the reader (author's words, thoughts, perceptions, feelings; or character's thoughts, perceptions, and feelings; through which of these or combination of these three possible media does information regarding mental states, setting, situation, and character come)?

4. At what distance does he place the reader from the story (near, far, or shifting)? (p. 1168-9)

These four questions are drawn with what Friedman calls the basic distinction between "telling" and "showing" in mind. What Friedman does is to simply repeat Lubbock's distinction, but using the words "summary narrative" and "immediate scene." He defines narrative as "a generalized account or report of a series of events covering some extended period and a variety of locales." (p. 1169) When "specific, continuous, and successive details of time, place, action, character appear," he says we have scene. (p. 1169) Thus, the answers to the questions result in a typology which "proceeds by degrees from one extreme to the other; from statement to inference, from exposition to presentation, from narrative to drama, from explicit to implicit, from idea to image." (p. 1169) Friedman's typology of narrative modes includes eight distinct modes:
"editorial omniscience," "neutral omniscience," "I as witness," "I as protagonist," "multiple selective omniscience," "selective omniscience," "the dramatic mode," and "the camera." A new mode is created according to this typology whenever the author relinquishes yet another channel of information. For example, in the editorial omniscient mode, the author shifts position at will and uses any channel of information he wishes, including his own thoughts, feelings and perceptions. The "next step toward objectification," the neutral omniscient mode, differs from the editorial only in the absence of direct authorial commentary. In this mode, the author speaks impersonally in third person. In the I as witness mode, the next step, the author hands his job completely over to a narrator observer who is a character more or less involved in the story itself, and who speaks to the reader in the first person. In this mode, the author reveals to his readers only what the I as witness may legitimately discover. When the author shifts the burden of telling the story from a witness to one of the main characters who tells the story in the first person, more channels of information are sacrificed and, hence, another mode, the "I as Protagonist," is created. According to Friedman, the witness because of his subordinate role in the story has greater mobility and consequently a greater range and variety of sources of information than a character who is centrally involved in the action. The protago-
nist narrator can reveal little beyond his own thoughts, feelings and perceptions. The most dramatic step toward objectification occurs with the elimination of any narrator whatsoever.

In the multiple selective omniscient mode, the reader "ostensibly listens to no one; the story comes directly from the minds of the characters as it leaves its mark there." (p. 1176) Narrative summary, if it appears at all in this mode, occurs in the form of stage direction or emerges from the thoughts and/or words of the characters. Friedman charges that this mode of omniscience differs from neutral omniscience because here the thoughts of the characters are rendered consecutively and in detail as they pass through their minds. In neutral and editorial omniscience, the author or a third person narrator summarizes and explains the characters' thoughts and feelings after they have occurred. To demonstrate what he discovers as the difference between telling and showing a character's thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, Friedman "translates" a passage from Virginia Woolf's *To the Lighthouse* written in the mode of Multiple Selective Omniscience to normal omniscience. The original passage as is:

For what happened to her, especially when staying with the Ramsays, was to be made to feel violently two opposite things at the same time; that's what you feel, was one; that's what I feel, was the other, and then they fought together in her mind, as now. It is so beautiful, so exciting, this love, that I tremble on the verge of it. (p. 1176)
Friedman's translation to normal omniscience reads:

It seemed to Lilly "that" things were quite complex. Staying with the Ramsays, especially, made her feel "that she was being pulled in two opposite directions at the same time." On the one hand, "there were" the feelings of others; and, on the other, "there were one's own" feelings. Sometimes love appeared so beautiful and exciting "that she" trembled on the verge of it. (p. 1177)

He claims to have effected the translation by changing direct discourse to indirect discourse, standardizing the personal pronouns to the third person, and normalizing the syntax. It is clear upon observation that he has changed to third person what were with two exceptions first person pronouns referring to Lilly Briscoe. The two third person pronouns (her) that appear in the original passage he explains away by saying that one often thinks of oneself in the second or third person. It is not clear, however, that the original passage is direct discourse. Traditionally, direct discourse is defined as the speech of another reproduced verbatim. Such discourse traditionally is surrounded by quotation marks. There are no quotation marks in the original passage. Friedman seems unconcerned by the lack of traditional punctuation. He also seems unaware that the verbs in the first sentence of the original passage are with two exceptions in the past tense. It seems that in terms of Friedman's own typology that this sentence could be that of a third person impersonal narrator summarizing Lilly's past feelings so as to compare them with her feelings in the present. However, this explanation does not
account for the presence in this sentence of the two clauses which contain verbs in the present tense, clauses which do despite their lack of traditional punctuation seem to be direct discourse. What we are forced to conclude is that while Friedman's translation is clearly indirect discourse, the original is not clearly and, therefore, we cannot understand his claim. We can understand that Friedman means by "normalizing syntax" that he has rewritten the passage in syntax found in normal discourse. His idea is that when writers dramatize mental states, as he sees Woolf doing here, the logic and syntax of normal daytime public discourse begins to disappear.

The next step toward objectification that Friedman identifies is selective omniscience. This mode differs from multiple selective omniscience in that the mind of only one character is open to the reader. The dramatic mode is the next step. In it author, narrator, and mental states are eliminated. The information available to the reader in this mode is limited almost wholly to what the characters do and say. Friedman says that what we have with this mode is "in effect, a stage play cast into the typographical mold of fiction." (p. 1178) Friedman concludes his account of the kinds of point of view with what he terms the ultimate in authorial exclusion, "the camera." Here he says the aim is to transmit without any apparent
selection or arrangement a "slice of life." Friedman comments at this point that the final extinction of the author may mean the extinction of fiction as an art. It seems to him that fictional works, while requiring some degree of objective vividness, require structure (as well). According to Friedman this structure is

the product of a guiding intelligence which is implicit in the narrative and which shapes the material so as to arouse the reader's expectations with regard to the probable course of events, to cross those expectations with an equally contrary course, and then to allay these expectations so that the resultant outcome seems after all the necessary one. (p. 179)

Friedman closes his paper with recommendations for how we are to evaluate a writer's handling of point of view. His conclusion is that successful handling of point of view is more a matter of consistency than this or that degree of impersonality. The suitability of a given technique for the achievement of certain kinds of effects is for him the real issue. He is even willing to allow the author to comment directly if he adequately establishes and consistently maintains his point of view. About great novelists who shift point of view, Friedman comments "the overall consistency of a great but clumsy novelist may emerge in spite of his technical inadequacies, while the consistency of a lesser talent will not in itself produce masterpieces ... Sometimes a noble failure is more exciting than a petty victory." (p. 1182) We may remember,
at this point, that Lubbock arrives at this very conclu-
sion. Lubbock, however, is not willing, as is Friedman, to praise authorial commentary, no matter how consistent.

We mentioned earlier that New Critical thinking about point of view is essentially Percy Lubbock's. We have now another chance to demonstrate our assertion. Norman Friedman presents the typology of narrators we just examined in 1955. In 1974, Barbara McKenzie presents us with yet another typology of the narrator in prose fiction. We include McKenzie's typology on the next page because we think that in it McKenzie manages to include in one schematization nearly all of the information used to classify narrators by her colleagues. More importantly, she does so while systematizing their often confusing terminology. It seems to us that McKenzie's major improvement over Friedman's typology of point of view is her rejection of the term "omniscient." She also does not refer to the author in her typology. It makes more sense in terms of our diagram to discuss narrators in terms of their degree of knowledge than it does to try to identify the author's knowledge. Thus, while we can compliment McKenzie on these two improvements, we cannot show that she adds anything else to the conception of point of view in literature.

In the text which accompanies her typology, McKenzie discusses the advantages and disadvantages of using par-
## Table 1

**McKenzie's Classification of Narrators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Objective Narrators</th>
<th>Skewed Narrators</th>
<th>Personal Narrators</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identity</strong></td>
<td>Proximal</td>
<td>Distal</td>
<td>Proximal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Character</strong></td>
<td>Not a character</td>
<td>Not a character</td>
<td>A character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Voice</strong></td>
<td>Third-person pronouns (he, she, they, etc.), may occasionally use first-person pronouns</td>
<td>Third-person pronouns</td>
<td>First-person pronouns, I, we, you, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Access to characters' consciousness</strong></td>
<td>Limited access to consciousness of all the characters</td>
<td>No access, does not enter consciousness of characters, reveals their thoughts and feelings through dialogue and action</td>
<td>Access to consciousness of one character, may skew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Presence</strong></td>
<td>Calls attention to himself as narrator through descriptions centered on his own voice and reflecting his position outside the events of the story; may narrate only in the third person, using direct speech and dialogue</td>
<td>Conveys almost no sense of his presence, more he narrates events long after they occur or narrates as an observer who does not always report</td>
<td>Presence strong, other characters experience his presence as, sometimes, an omniscient character whose perspective serves as narrative focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reliability</strong></td>
<td>Generally reliable because the narrator stands clearly outside the reported action</td>
<td>Reliably in that he is present</td>
<td>Reliably in that he is present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Speaks in his own voice but is object of the narrator's observations, often used to convey implicit attitudes and values.*
ticular narrators. Although she is writing in 1974, her thinking on this subject is Percy Lubbock's. She argues that her chart works only for traditional fiction. Asserting that "consistency of viewpoint is basic in fiction in which mimesis is accorded a high value," she sees contemporary "experimental fiction distinguishing itself by the ambiguous perspectives" that inconsistent narration creates. (p. 58) She explains that experimental writers are likely to "deny convention" to create a narrator who is both conspicuous and inconsistent because they want to draw attention to their fiction as a "made object." At the same time, however, she remarks that "to many writers, the modern world—with its tremendous movements and forces—seems beyond human control and understanding," and she sees them adopting a point of view that "collapses the perspective of a 'know-it-all' narrator." (p. 20) It seems that if she were to extend her argument here she could support the notion that inconsistent narration is mimetic. Beyond her demand for consistent narration in mimetic fiction, there is yet another and equally important way that McKenzie's thinking about point of view mirrors Lubbock's. Her classification of narrators indicates that it is possible to describe the manifestations of point of view in traditional fiction in terms of only four categories.

Despite Friedman's conclusion that consistency of viewpoint is actually more important than impersonality
in the fictional work and McKenzie's account of ambiguous perspectives in contemporary experimental prose, we must conclude at this point that the notion that rhetoric is incompatible with the art of fiction is fundamental to the work on point of view that we have considered so far. In 1961, however, the most influential book written on point of view since Lubbock's appears, and its author, Wayne Booth, rejects this very notion. Beginning with the premise that fictional art is an act of communication, Booth treats what his predecessors call narrative technique or the devices of point of view as a collection of rhetorical controls and appeals. Thus, he attacks the assumptions upon which previous writing about point of view is based. The first assumption that he critiques is that there is at the core of fiction a dialectical opposition between showing and telling. This assumption is, of course, central to all writing we have considered so far. In Booth's opinion the telling/showing distinction is radically inadequate both for describing and evaluating works of fiction. He points out that to expunge the author's voice from fiction would be to eliminate not only all direct address and explicit judgments but also shifts from inside to outside character's minds, all inside views, reliable statements of any dramatic character, distinctive literary illusions, metaphor, patterns of myth and symbol
as implicit evaluations, durational interference, etc. Booth's conclusion is that "though the author can to some extent choose his disguises, he can never choose to disappear." (p. 20)

The next two assumptions that he tackles are that all novels must be realistic and that their story illusion must be intense. According to Booth, everyone prefers his or her own brand of reality, and consequently, those critics who demand reality in fiction have a specific reality in mind. Moreover, they differ as to how they think realism is achieved in fiction. Some regard it as a matter of certain techniques; others think it requires specific subject matter. Booth like Friedman, argues that what is really at the heart of the writing situation is the writer's need to elicit certain responses from his readers at certain times. Therefore, he concludes that what the writer must do is to determine which response he wishes to engender and then choose the technique which will allow him to do so.

Booth rejects any notion of a particular technique guaranteeing realism. In this same context, he reminds his readers of the writer's need to order intensities according to context requirements. His idea is that what will work in one place will not work in another.

In Booth's opinion, as much confusion surrounds the notion that the author must remain neutral as does the
notion that all novels must be realistic. He argues that complete authorial neutrality or objectivity is impossible for the very reason that it is the author who decides what the characters say and do. He concludes that critics have confused the concepts of aesthetic distance and impersonality. In other words he thinks that on the basis of the fact that a writer cannot pour untransformed prejudices into his work, critics have mistakenly concluded that he must have no opinion whatsoever. For Booth, it is transformed prejudices, so to speak, that are fundamental to fiction. To explain what role the opinions and values of the writer play in fiction, Booth develops the concept of the "implied author." The implied author is very similar to what Friedman calls the guiding intelligence which shapes the material to arouse the reader's expectations. Yet Booth is more interested in explaining how this intelligence creates the value system of the work. Booth, however, is as careful in the beginning as Friedman to make clear that he is not advocating that the actual historical personage be introduced as the focus of critical endeavor. The implied author is, according to Booth, "an ideal, literary, created version of the real man . . . ." (p. 75) Booth believes that distinguishing between the author and that image of him implied by his book will help prevent both irrelevant talk about an author's
objectivity and the error of pretending that an author can allow direct intrusions of his own immediate problems.

Booth means this concept to make up for most of the inadequacies of traditional criticism, so it is indeed a complex concept. How much in traditional criticism this concept is meant to replace will become clear when we consider the list of terms that Booth says its use will render unnecessary. He proposes it first as a replacement for the traditional terms, "style," "tone," and "technique." He rejects these three terms because they suggest that the author's presence in a book is limited to something purely verbal. He argues that while some aspects of the implied author may be deduced from tonal variations, many of his major qualities will also depend on the "hard facts of character and action." (p. 74) Actually, as we mentioned earlier, the implied author's presence is for Booth most closely associated with the "norms" by which the action of the book is to be judged. The implied author creates these norms and, in one sense, is these norms. The term "norm" is Booth's own. He introduces it to stand for that complex of phenomena referred to in past criticism as "theme," "symbolic significance," "meaning," "theology," and/or "ontology."

Booth's elaboration of his own concept leaves us in doubt about what relationship the implied author bears to
the real author. In the course of his work, he suggests what seem to be three equally possible alternatives. First of all, the implied author could be a creation of the author, something on the order of another character in the work. Booth does describe the implied author as a "created" version. Or the implied author could be the real author at the time he wrote the particular book in question, the Joyce of *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, for example. Booth's own writing suggests both interpretations. He also writes oftentimes as if there is no distinction between the implied author and the real author, particularly when he discusses the "morality of narration." For example, Booth argues that "the reader uninstructed in Celine must be lost" when he tries to assess what is intended by Bardamu's judgments of character in Celine's *Journey to the End of Night*. (p. 381) Booth also comments in reference to the narrator of the same novel that "even assuming that the reader knows nothing of Celine's personal life, he must find it hard to believe, after a hundred or so pages of the following kind of thing, that Celine is merely dramatizing a narrator who is completely dissociated from him." (p. 380) Further, Booth wonders if the character Bardamu's "repetitious sewage metaphors are intended to be signs of his--and thus of Celine's--poetic insight, or of poetic
insight gone to seed in a way that will characterize the narrator in contrast to Celine?" (p. 381-2) Finally, Booth charges that

though Celine has attempted the traditional excuse—remember, it is my character speaking and not I—we cannot excuse him for writing a book which, if taken seriously by the reader, must corrupt him. The better it is understood, the more immoral it looks. It is immoral not only in the sense that Celine cheats, though that is important: the world he portrays as reality contains no conceivable explanation of how anyone in that world could bring himself to write a book—even this book. (p. 383-4)

It seems finally that Booth has placed himself in an awkward position. In his attempt to reintroduce social conscience into literary criticism, he turns the implied author first into a scapegoat and then dispenses with the concept altogether. In the passages we quote above, it is clear that Booth is no longer distinguishing the actual author from the implied author. Even though we cannot unravel the problems surrounding Booth's concept of the "implied author," we can recognize now that the manner in which Booth conceives of the process of writing and reading fiction is similar in some respects to that of Lubbock. In other words, Booth has the writer choose what to write according to a particular system of norms. It is the reader's job to divine this system from certain features of the narrative. Lubbock has the writer presenting his "subject" from certain points of view depending on the theme he wishes to extract from the events. It is the
reader's job, according to Lubbock, to return to the subject to see if the right technique has been employed. The reading process for both critics is one where the reader must be able to understand the moral basis for what appears in the narrative. Yet the two critics disagree on other issues. For instance, Lubbock is as much concerned with the verisimilitude of the narrative and the techniques used in it as he is with thematic development. For Booth, realism and technical virtuosity are of secondary importance after thematic development. Booth's position will become more clear when we consider his description of the types of narrative.

Booth is embarrassed by the traditional classification of points of view which throws all works of fiction into three or four heaps, depending on the person of the narrator and the degree of his omniscience. He points out that while it is possible to name three or four famous narrators all of whom can be described as first person and omniscient, very little if anything is said about their contributions to their respective books by doing so. Such classification also does not explain why they succeed while other narrators who can be described with the same terms fail. Booth attempts with his own classification of the types of narration to present a richer tabulation of the forms the author's voice can take. Rather than
present a list of the types of narrators which can appear in fiction, Booth lists a set of features and functions which may or may not be necessary to describe the performance of any one narrator.

At the outset, two major departures from tradition which Booth makes in his classification can be noted. First, he labels the distinction between first and third person narrators as relatively unimportant. He justifies this claim by pointing out that every other functional distinction that he makes applies both to first and third person narrators alike. Second, Booth replaces the term "omniscience" with the term "privilege" to avoid what he thinks is the "curious ambiguity" raised by the former term. (p. 161) As he sees it, the presence of any statement from a character which the reader accepts as reliable implies the presence of an author who is as "unnaturally knowing" as any author ever was. In Booth's opinion, reading cannot take place unless the reader tacitly grants the writer the right to know about what he writes. To speak of types of privilege granted to and varieties of limitations imposed upon the narrator makes the most sense to Booth. He also recognizes that the degree of privilege allowed the narrator may vary from point to point throughout the course of the narrative. This recognition makes him avoid presenting a finite list of terms to cover the various dispositions toward events that a narrator may assume.
Unlike his predecessors, Booth finds that the most important differences in narrative effect depend on whether the narrator is dramatized in his own right and on whether his beliefs and characteristics are shared by the implied author. In those cases where the novel does not refer directly to the implied author, Booth says there will be no distinction between him and the implied undramatized narrator. While the implied undramatized narrators are currently the most popular, Booth points out how many different types of dramatized narrators there can be, and he sees as particularly important the distinction between those who are observers and those who are agents. He regrets that in traditional talk about point of view it has not been made clear that the same rules will not apply to both. Cutting across the distinction between observers and narrator agents of all kinds, he discovers a distinction between self-conscious narrators, aware of themselves as writers, and narrators who rarely if ever discuss their writing task. It should be clear by now how Booth's notion of rhetorical control and appeal allows him to include in his classification as legitimate narrative techniques that his predecessors had to explain away as untutored.

His approach also allows him to distinguish differences in what his predecessors label simply as authorial intru-
sions. For example, he points out that to label commentary as a single device is to ignore important differences between commentary that is integral to the dramatic structure, that which is purely ornamental, and that which serves a rhetorical purpose but which is not integral to the dramatic structure. In this vein, he points out that the distinction between scene and summary tells little about literary effect unless the type of narrator who is providing either is specified.

When Booth turns his attention to the relationship between the implied author and the narrator, he immediately introduces other elements into the situation and speaks of "variations in distance." According to Booth, observers, agents, and third person reflectors differ markedly according to the degree and kind of distance that separates them from the implied author, the reader, and the other characters.

"In any reading experience there is an implied dialogue among author, narrator, the other characters, and the reader. Each of the four can range, in relation to the others, from identification to complete opposition, on any axis of value, moral, intellectual, aesthetic, and even physical." (p. 155)

At this point, Booth makes clear that he is not only referring to those factors normally considered under the rubric of "aesthetic distance," e.g., spatial or temporal distance, difference in social class, etc. He argues that we must not
consider these distancing factors to the exclusion of others equally important, such as differences in beliefs and qualities in author, reader and characters. In this context, Booth draws a distinction at which he has hinted several times earlier. He discusses the difference between reliable and unreliable narrators. Reliable narrators are those who speak for or act in accordance with the implied author's norms. Unreliable narrators are those who depart from the implied author's norms. He makes further distinctions depending on how far and in what direction unreliable narrators depart from these norms. Again, Booth's approach allows him to credit as legitimate distinctions which his predecessors' approach does not allow them to recognize. For example, if the author could have no opinions, his narrator could neither differ nor coincide. Booth closes his discussion of narrative types with an analysis of inside views. Here he points out that any sustained inside view of whatever depth temporarily turns the character whose mind is shown into a narrator. The situation that he is describing here seems to be that which Lubbock explained by saying that the author remained at the character's shoulder.

As should be obvious to the reader by now, Booth's description of narrative types differs greatly from Friedman's. He makes no attempt to identify types that fall into any logical or evolutionary series. What he
does provide is a number of distinctions which may or may not apply to the narrative in question. Booth has purposely avoided developing a classification like Friedman's because he believes that:

In dealing with the types of narration the critic must always limp behind, referring constantly to the varied practice which alone can correct his temptations to overgeneralize. In place of our modern "fourth unity," in place of abstract rules about consistency and objectivity in the use of point of view, we need more painstaking, specific accounts of how great tales are told. (p. 165)

It remains for us to discover how according to Booth we may determine which are the "great tales." Booth makes clear that he feels that we "cannot judge by appeal to rules about point of view." (p. 203) He explains why he rejects judgment by rules in the context of a discussion of the merits of two pieces of mood building commentary where both authors address the reader directly, rhetorically.

In Booth's opinion one is far more successful than the other. Yet, he says that an appeal to rules will fail to explain the difference because the successful one breaks some technical rules that the unsuccessful one does not. Booth believes that if we must turn to rules in instances like these, the only one which can serve us at all will be something to the effect that if one does such and such badly, it will be bad. For Booth, quality is not primarily a matter of technique. At one point he asks his fellow
critics, "Is there no limit to what we'll praise provided that it is done well?" In Booth's opinion, bad books are those, no matter how well written, where the implied author asks his readers to judge by norms they cannot or should not accept or where the implied author applies norms inconsistently. Booth charges that the author has an "obligation to be as clear about his moral position as he possibly can." (p. 389) He demands that the author . . . plumb to universal values about which his readers can really care . . . [and] . . . [be] sufficiently humble to seek for ways to help the reader accept his view . . ." (p. 395 Throughout his book, Booth emphasizes the notion that the author creates his own readers through rhetorical control and appeal. It is Booth's desire ultimately that the author create an improved reader.
CONCLUSION

The writing of Wayne Booth offers us a convenient stopping place for our discussion of the New Critical approach to point of view for several reasons. First, Booth's work stands as a comment on the whole body of thinking about point of view that originates with Percy Lubbock. Booth is the only writer who questions this tradition. Secondly, from our beginning with Plato, we have with Booth, in a sense, come full circle. Both the philosopher and the critic regard point of view as a means to appeal to and control the audience. Both men recognize that style and/or point of view shifts within the work create, to use Plato's words, "... all sorts of harmonies and all sorts of rhythms." (p. 22) More importantly, neither man objects to shifting point of view. They do not argue that consistent viewpoint is necessary for realistic fiction. Finally, for Booth, as for Plato, moral seriousness is the standard by which fiction must be judged. The key difference in the thinking of these two men is that Booth, unlike Plato, believes that those not virtuous may be imitated and then judged for the benefit of the reader.

We can see at this point that wherever Booth aligns himself with Plato, he departs from the tradition of which
he is a product. In his work, Booth rejects the very premise upon which Lubbockian thinking about the relationship of the narrator to the narrative is based. In other words, his most important contribution to New Critical thinking about point of view is his rejection of the notion that consistency of viewpoint is merely one technique among many, he is able to recognize that the relationship between the narrator and the narrative can be far more complex than his predecessors realize. In an attempt to account for this complexity, he presents us with a list of functional distinctions rather than a set of abstract categories to describe the modes of the relationship of the narrator to the narrative. Unfortunately, this most important aspect of Booth's work is ignored by his colleagues. Witness that McKenzie persists in the belief that consistency of viewpoint is basic to mimetic fiction. Her belief allows her to present us with a typology of the modes of relationship of the narrator to the narrative that allows for only four different options. McKenzie, like her predecessors, seems to believe that realistic fiction must mesmerize its readers with a "story illusion." It is as if these New Critics object to "authorial intrusions" for the same reason that some film critics object to voice-over narration, i.e., they believe it detracts
from the image. Lubbock and his followers want to be placed directly "in front of the action"; they want the story "to tell itself," to present itself to their consciousnesses as a "mental movie." Thus they demand that the author not draw attention to the fact that his work is a written artifact, a "made object." They justify their prejudice by arguing that there is a "prime end" for all fiction which subsequent generations of writers have been working to achieve. The "prime end" is, of course, an "intense story illusion." Actually, these critics discover that consistent narration alone is not sufficient to guarantee aesthetic success. Tate tells us that putting the "knower of the action" inside its frame makes it possible for the novelist to achieve an "objective structure." We are reminded by Schorer that limiting the narrator's knowledge lends credibility to the narrative. Of course, Booth points out that we may have an "unreliable narrator" within the frame of the action. Booth is not careful, however, to make clear that the narrative represents a "fictional world." Only Lubbock, interestingly enough, does make the distinction between the "real world" and that world represented by the narrative. He calls this represented world the writer's "subject." (We do not use Lubbock's term because we do not want to link this represented world with the writer as Lubbock does.) Despite this oversight, it is Booth
who finally exposes the idea that "impersonality" is essential to realistic fiction as a mere prejudice.

He points out that the author, while he may to some extent choose his disguises, cannot choose to disappear. He argues convincingly that "impersonal narration" is every bit as rhetorical as "authorial commentary." Booth does well to make this fact clear, but he fails to account satisfactorily for the relation of the writer to his work as we have pointed out. When he first defines the concept of the "implied author," we are led to believe that he does so to avoid problems raised by collective authorship. We see later that such is not his goal. Booth is searching for someone to praise or blame. He is unwilling in theory to hold the writer responsible because he is afraid of being charged with falling prey to the intentional fallacy. It is because of Booth's confusion that we cannot use his term "implied author." We need to discuss the relationship of the narrator to the "guiding intelligence" so that we may describe certain modes of the relationship of the narrator to the narrative, but we are concerned neither with praising nor blaming the author. Thus, we have chosen to use the term "guiding intelligence" despite the fact that it appears in Friedman's work. Since the term is not a familiar one, we may, we hope, use it without calling into play Friedman's definition. We are not defining the "guiding intelligence" as Friedman does. We do not identify the
guiding intelligence with the task of raising the reader's expectations, crossing them with a contrary set, then al­laying the second set to make the outcome of the action seem necessary. Friedman makes the role of the guiding intelligence implicit in the narrative too limited. We need the notion of a guiding intelligence to account for more modes of the relationship of the narrator to the narrative than those connected with the action. We shall see how this guiding intelligence figures into another mode of this relationship in the following chapter.
NOTES


3 Quoted by Norman Friedman, "Point of View in Fiction: The Development of a Critical Concept," PMLA, 70 (1955), p. 1165. Hereafter, quotations from this article will be documented by page numbers in parentheses.


5 Wayne Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. Hereafter, all quotations from this volume will be documented by page numbers in parentheses.
CHAPTER II

THE RUSSIAN FORMALIST APPROACH TO POINT OF VIEW:
A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS APPROACH

When we turn to the Russian Formalist account of the relationship of the narrator to the narrative, we discover that they do not examine the same mode as the New Critics. However, it is equally as easy to discover the origins of their approach in the writing of Plato. We may remember that for Plato a narrative is "simple," "imitative," or a combination of the two, depending whether or not the author speaks in his own voice. In simple narratives, the author speaks in his own voice. He imitates the voice or voices of others in imitative narratives. We may also remember that for the New Critics, point of view is not so much a matter of whose voice we hear as it is a matter of which of several identifiable techniques the writer uses to present information about his subject. These techniques are described, for the most part, as ways of presenting action; thus we find spatial metaphors pervading New Critical talk about point of view. While Plato's theory of art is certainly concerned with the representation of reality, his notion of style seems to be based on his understanding of storytelling as an initially oral art form. The Russian Formalists share Plato's concern with "voice" in artistic fiction. In the work of the two
writers that we discuss in this chapter the reader will find neither spatial metaphors nor reference to scene and/or drama. The reader will discover extensive analyses of voice in artistic prose.

We can, as we did for the New Critics, describe the work of the Formalists in terms of the model that we developed in the last chapter. However, whereas the New Critics identify distinct narrative modes in step one, the Formalists identify distinct types of discourse. In step two, the Formalists determine what effects these types of discourse produce just as the New Critics specify the effects of the various techniques for presenting information. What is perhaps the major difference between the two schools occurs in the third step, i.e., that where the desirability of the effects is judged. The New Critics see all techniques in fiction operating toward one end, the creation of the story illusion. They judge the desirability of a particular technique depending on whether or not they find it contributing to or breaking the story illusion. Those techniques which create the most intense story illusion are the most valuable. The situation is, as the Formalists see it, one where a writer has available to him at any one time a number of discourse types. He chooses among these types depending upon his skill and his artistic intention. They are concerned to draw connections between literary
language use and language use in general. They do not concern themselves with notions of story illusion, etc.

We will be discussing the work of two Russian writers in this chapter, that of Mixail Baxtin and that of V. N. Voloshinov. We have already described their approach to point of view as a "discourse analysis" approach. Before we can proceed, we need to clear up the confusion which surrounds their use of the term "discourse." Both men use the term in a general sense to refer to the communication of the narrative by words: the words of the author, the words of the narrator, and the words of the characters. However, they both present us with more specialized uses of the term. Voloshinov sticks with the traditional terminology of "direct discourse" and "indirect discourse." Direct discourse he defines in the usual manner, i.e., as dialogue. For example, in the statement, "I will go to the store," said John, the words inside quotation marks are direct discourse. Indirect discourse occurs when only the "content" of the speaker's message is reported, as for example, in the statement, John said that he would go to the store. Voloshinov only uses the traditional distinction as his starting place, however. In his work, he identifies and describes the variants of these two "patterns" which have come into existence over time. For each of these variants, he gives us a separate label. Baxtin, on the
other hand, ignores the traditional distinction altogether. He presents us with an entirely new discourse typology in which there are three basic forms of discourse: 1. the author's own direct discourse, 2. "objectified" discourse (that of the represented characters), and 3. "double-voiced" discourse. He distinguishes discourse types two and three according to the ways that the author manipulates the speech of another addressee, that of his narrator and/or that of his characters.

We must make clear at this point that although we label Baxtin and Voloshinov as Formalists, two interrelated features of their work set them apart from other Formalists. First of all, they take what they call a "dialogical" approach to the language of literary works. By "dialogical," they mean that they study those aspects of utterances which arise because they enter into relationships with other utterances. Secondly, they do not maintain the practical/poetic language distinction which lies at the heart of Formalist thinking about language. Thus we find them talking about the same mechanisms in what the Formalists call "everyday," "communicative," and/or "referential" language and the language of literary texts, "poetic language."

METALINGUISTICS AND A NEW STYLISTICS

Baxtin is the one who develops the concept of a
"dialogic approach" to language. Basic to his thinking about language is not the poetic/practical distinction, but the Sausseurian distinction between langue and parole. Baxtin distinguishes between what he calls "the language system" and what he calls "the concrete utterance." He sees linguistics and traditional stylistics studying the language of artistic texts in terms of the language system (langue) rather than in terms of the concrete utterance (parole). He rejects this approach because it assumes that the "viability and function of words in the style of a concrete utterance" is the "face value of their viability and function in the language system." Baxtin wants us to regard the literary work as "a structure of elements that are whole utterances, though these utterances are not fully authoritative and are subordinated to the monologic unity." (p. 196) (He means here that the narrator's and characters' utterances in the work are subordinated to the author's intention.) Because he wants to study prose style in terms of the concrete utterance, he sees himself engaging in something beyond linguistic analyses. He calls his approach "metalinguistics." In metalinguistics, we study "dialogical relationships." Baxtin's account of "dialogical relationships" is so confused as to be inpenetrable. However, we will present what Baxtin has to say about them. First of all, he distinguishes between "log-
"ical" and "concrete semantic" relationships which obtain between statements and "dialogical" relationships which obtain between utterances:

'Life is good.' 'Life is not good.' We have before us two judgments which have a specific logical form and a specific concrete semantic content (philosophical judgments on the value of life.) There exists between these two judgments a specific logical relationship: the one is negation of the other. But there is and can be no dialogical relationship between them, they do not dispute with one another (although they can supply the subject matter and logical basis for disputation). Both of these judgments must be embodied in order for a dialogical relationship between them to arise. Thus, as thesis and antithesis, these two judgments can be united in a single utterance of a single subject's unified dialectical position on a given question. In that case, no dialogical relationship arise. But if the two judgments are divided between two different utterances of two different subjects, then dialogical relationships arise between them. . . Dialogical relationships are totally impossible without logical and concrete semantic relationships, but they are not reducible to them.3

We have here the conditions of the dialogical relationship, but not its definition. For examples of dialogical relationships Baxtin gives us the binary relations: agreement vs. disagreement, assertion vs. supplementation, and question vs. answer.

Dialogical relationships are possible not only between entire utterances; the dialogical approach can be applied to any "meaningful part of an utterance," even to the individual word, if that word is perceived not as an impersonal word of the language, but as the "sign of another's
semantic position, as the representative of another person's utterance, i.e., if we hear in that word another person's voice." (p. 152) Baxtin also argues that dialogical relationships are possible "among linguistic styles, social dialects, etc., if those phenomena are perceived as semantic positions, as a sort of linguistic Weltanschauung, i.e., if they are perceived outside the realm of linguistic investigation." (p. 152) Finally, he points out that it is possible to have dialogical relationships to one of our own utterances, to its individual parts, and to an individual word within it, "if we in some way separate ourselves from them, if we speak with an inner reservation, if we maintain distance from them, as if limiting or dividing our authorship in two." (p. 153)

Baxtin is calling for a new stylistics that will take into account the dialogical nature of language use in the artistic work. As we stated earlier, he rejects traditional stylistics because it only analyzes the stylistic relationship of elements within a closed message, against a background of abstract linguistic categories. For it, discourse belongs to the level of language; words are common property, objects which go to make up the lexicon, and any item taken from the lexicon goes directly into the context of the work. Baxtin sees it failing because it ignores those changes which come about during the process of shifting words from
one concrete utterance to another and during the process of "mutual orientation." It seems then, if we keep a traditional notion of stylistics in mind, that Baxtin will give us a way of approaching the author's diction and syntax which takes into account how he incorporates the utterances of his narrator and characters into his own discourse. Baxtin does not give us this new stylistics. Rather, he studies artistic prose in general to discern the types of discourse we may find there when discourse is classified according to the mutual relationships of voices.

AUTHORSHIP

The notion of authorship receives special treatment from Baxtin. We have already learned that for an utterance to become dialogical it must be "embodied," i.e., it must have an author whose position it expresses. It is important for us to recognize here that in the sense he defines, "every utterance has its author, who is heard in the utterance as its creator." (p. 152) He remarks that we need to know absolutely nothing about the author as he exists outside the utterance. Baxtin recognizes the forms of actual authorship are very diverse. A work can be the product of collective effort, or it can be the product of the efforts of successive generations, but, in any case, "we hear in it a unified creative will, a specific position to which
we can react dialogically." (p. 152) Here Baxtin sounds very much like Booth in that he is describing what could be called an author "implied" by the utterance. He does, however, talk about actual authors. He says that for the writer the world is full of other people's speech acts. According to Baxtin, the writer orients himself among these speech acts, concentrating upon their peculiarities. He has to incorporate these speech acts "on the plane of his own speech, but in such a way that that plane will not be destroyed." (p. 194) Baxtin argues that when we read, we, too, must orient ourselves with the sensitivity that will allow us to hear all "the different shades" in the author's and the characters' speech. He reminds us that in everyday life we are quick to hear the slightest changes in intention and "the faintest counterpoint of voices" in whatever of interest is said to us. We have pointed out that Baxtin talks as if what we listen for is the "voice" of an implied author. In some cases, however, he talks about the voice of the writer himself, making no distinction between the author implied by the utterance and the real author.

DISCOURSE OF THE FIRST TYPE: THE AUTHOR'S

For example, Baxtin tells us that the first type of discourse to be discovered in artistic prose is the author's "direct unmediated discourse, which is focused solely on its referential object, as expression of the speaker's ultimate
conceptual authority." (p. 191) This discourse "knows only itself and its referential object." (p. 178) If in the course of carrying out its directly referential mission, it shows that it has imitated or learned something from someone, "that does not in the least change things—all that is merely scaffolding which the builder could hardly do without but which does not become part of the architectural structure. The fact of imitation itself and the evidence of all sorts of influences (easily detected by the literary historian or by any competent reader) do not enter into the mission the discourse carries out." (p. 178)

(Baxtin comments that if the discourse has clearly marked its reference to another speech act, it would be discourse of the third type.) This discourse expresses the ultimate conceptual authority in the work. By "ultimate conceptual authority," Baxtin means the actual author's intentions. He argues that this authority occurs as a matter of course in any literary work, but that it is not always presented in the author's direct speech. He comments that the author's direct speech may be altogether absent. In this case, "the ultimate conceptual authority (the author's intention) is brought out, not in the author's direct speech, but by manipulating the utterances of another addressee, utterances intentionally created and deployed as belonging to someone other than the author." (p. 179)

DISCOURSE OF THE SECOND TYPE: OBJECTIFIED DISCOURSE

Discourse of the second type Baxtin calls "objecti-
fied discourse." It is the direct speech of the characters represented in the work. This speech has its own referential object as does the author's; however, it does not occupy a position on the same plane with the direct speech of the author. "It stands at a certain remove from the author's speech, as if in perspective. It is meant not only to be understood in terms of its referential object, but, by virtue of its character defining capacity, or its typicality, or its colorfulness." (p. 177) In other words, these utterances appear in the work as the objects of the author's intentions, hence the term "objectified."

Baxtin comments that whenever we confront the direct speech of a character within the context of the author's direct speech, we find within that one context two speech centers and two speech complexes, albeit that one is subordinated to the other. This situation is reflected stylistically. The author handles the speech of the character stylistically as speech belonging to another addressee, a person of a certain specific individuality or type. Meanwhile, he must make certain that he handles his own speech stylistically as speech aimed at its direct referential denotation: "it must be adequate to its object (of whatever nature, discursive, poetic, or other); it must be expressive, forceful, pithy, elegant, and so on, from the point of view of its direct referential mission. (p. 178)
Baxtin points out that the degree to which the characters' utterances are objectified may vary considerably. The words of Tolstoy's Prince Andrey are less objectified than those of Gogol's Akaky Akakijevic, for example. He comments that as the degree of objectification in a character's speech decreases and as correspondingly the degree of direct referentiality increases, the relationship between the author's speech and that of the character approaches that between two sides in a dialogue. Their relationship is, however, never actually that found between two sides in a dialogue. We can have dialogic relationships only between directly intentional utterances. We find this situation, says Baxtin, in the typical scholarly article where statements by various writers are cited, some for the purpose of refutation, others for the purpose of corroboration or supplementation. In dramatic dialogue, or in dramatized dialogue presented within the author's context, these dialogic relations coordinate represented, objectified utterances, and therefore they are themselves objectified. "What occurs here is not the confrontation of two ultimate conceptual authorities but the objectified (plotted) confrontation of two represented positions—a confrontation wholly subordinated to the supreme, ultimate authority of the author." (p. 180)

DISCOURSE OF THE THIRD TYPE: DOUBLE-VOICED DISCOURSE

Utterances of the third type of discourse, while they
must still be recognized as originating from another addres­
sso they are what Baxtin calls "double-voiced." When the
author objectifies another's utterance, he incorporates
it into the context of his own speech without altering
its meaning or tone. Baxtin comments that an objectified
utterance sounds "just as if it were a direct, intentional
utterance." (p. 180) Objectified utterances and the author's
direct utterances "have each one intention, each one voice:
they are single voiced utterances." (p. 180) In double-
voiced discourse, however, the author uses the speech act
of another so as to impose upon it a new intention while
allowing it to retain its original referential aims. Thus
discourse of the third type is made up of utterances with
two voices, two intentions: the speaker's and the author's.

UNI-DIRECTIONAL VARIANTS OF DOUBLE-VOICED DISCOURSE

There are three different varieties of double-voiced
discourse. The first is "unidirectional double-voiced dis-
course." In this variety, the author makes use of another's
speech in the direction of that speaker's intentions. In
other words, the author does not impose a contradictory
intention on the speech act of another addressee. Baxtin
discusses the variants of uni-directional discourse in
terms of what he calls "compositional forms." He makes
clear, however, that there is no necessary connection
between any compositional form and a particular type of discourse.

1. Stylization

Stylization results when the author creates a narrator who commands a specific literary style, which the author reproduces in the narrator's name. Stylization presupposes that the set of devices it reproduces had at one time a "direct and immediate intentionality and expressed the ultimate conceptual authority." (p. 181) What distinguishes style from imitation is that imitation directly appropriates the other speech act and makes it its own. The voices merge completely. If we hear another voice, then we hear something that did not figure into the imitator's plan. The stylizer, on the other hand, adopts another's set of stylistic devices precisely as an expression of a special point of view. He forces this set of devices to serve his own, new intentions. Baxtin comments that "a certain tint of objectification does fall on that point of view, on that other intention, and as a consequence, it becomes conventional." (p. 181) Conventional utterances are different from objectified utterances, however. Objectified utterances are "seriously spoken"; the author's intention never penetrates the character's speech "but observes it from without." (p. 181) Con-
ventionalized utterances are always double-voiced. Baxtin comments that stylization can become imitation if the stylizer's fascination with his model destroys the distance between them and undermines the deliberate marking of the reproduced style as belonging to another writer. He concludes that "what, after all, creates conventionality is, in fact, distance." (p. 161)

2. **Narrator's Narration**

Narrator's narration which compositionally replaces the author's discourse is analogous to stylization. This narration may take the form of standard written language (Dostoevsky's narrator-chroniclers) or the form of oral speech (*skaz* in the direct sense of the word). "Here, too, the verbal manner of another addresser is utilized by the author as a point of view, a position, essential to the way the author wants to conduct the story." (p. 182) Here, however, the tint of objectification in the narrator's speech is much heavier, and the conventionality much weaker, than in stylization. Baxtin cautions us, however, that the narrator's discourse can never become purely objectified discourse, even when the narrator is one of the cast of characters and assumes responsibility for only part of the narration. "The author does not exhibit the narrator's speech to us (as he does exhibit the
objectified utterances of the characters) but manipulates it from within for his own purposes, forcing us to be keenly aware of the distance between himself and this other speech act." (p. 182) Baxtin points out that the narrator's importance to the author is not only a matter of his typical manner of thinking and feeling, but also a manner of his way of seeing and depicting. With this comment, Baxtin tells us that he is not unaware of those modes of the relationship of narrator to narrative upon which the New Critics concentrate when they discuss point of view.

3. Skaz

Baxtin does not make clear what beyond an increased orientation toward oral speech distinguishes skaz from narrator's narration. Traditionally, skaz had been defined as narration distinguished by the special intonation, syntax, and lexicon of oral speech. It seems that Baxtin includes a discussion of it primarily to show that the orientation toward oral speech occurs in skaz more often than not as a consequence of its primary orientation which is to the speech act of another addressee. In other words, Baxtin wants to distinguish between skaz which is unequivocally referential and skaz which is double-voiced. For example, Baxtin argues that in Turgenev's works, skaz is merely
a compositional device. Turgenev only introduces oral forms to enliven what is his essentially literary style. He does not introduce a narrator with a separate voice, who is a socially distinct person, "with a spiritual diapason and an approach to the world appropriate to him. . ." (p. 183) Turgenev "himself would have spoken thus about matters of the greatest seriousness in his own life . . . Turgenev's skaz . . . contains only one voice, directly expressing the author's intentions." (p. 183) Leskov, on the other hand, resorts to a narrator primarily for the sake of another voice, for the sake of socially different speech and world outlook, and "only secondarily for the sake of the oral quality in skaz. . ." (p. 184) Baxtin argues that it is necessary to distinguish between single and double-voiced skaz because a large number of linguistic phenomena which occur only in double-voiced skaz are to be explained precisely because of its double-voiced quality.

4. **Ich-Erzahlung**

Ich-Erzahlung is the fourth compositional form which Baxtin discusses. Discourse in this form seems to differ from the others in that the narrator is the main character and assumes responsibility for the whole narration. Baxtin characterizes it as "analogous to narrator's narration: sometimes it is marked by ori-
ation toward another speech act, and sometimes . . . it will approach and finally merge with the author's direct speech, that is, operate with the single-voiced discourse of the first type." (p. 184) We must wonder at this point if it is possible to distinguish single from double-voiced narration on the basis of the work alone. Baxtin makes it seem that to do so is possible. But he gives us no clues as to what we can look for in the text itself to tell if what we are reading is single-voiced or double-voiced narration. We get the idea that, in any case, we will "hear" the difference whether or not we know anything about the actual circumstances of the author himself.

**VARI-DIRECTIONAL VARIANTS OF DOUBLE-VOICED DISCOURSE**

Parodic discourse makes up the second variety of doubled-voiced discourse. In parody, as in the uni-directional variants of double-voiced discourse, the author uses the speech of another, but in contradistinction to uni-directional double-voiced discourse, he introduces a new intention which is opposed to the original one. Baxtin describes parodic speech as "a battleground for opposing intentions." The other addressee's speech act in parody must be more clearly marked and the author's intentions more individualized than in the uni-directional variants of double-voiced discourse. Baxtin illustrates the situation in parodic disc-
course by calling our attention to parodic word usage in everyday speech. He reminds us of how often one speaker will repeat literally an assertion made by another, investing it with a new intention and enunciating it in his own way, e.g., with an expression of doubt, indignation, irony, mockery, or derision, etc. Since parodic speech is "essentially reported speech with an altered accent," it too exists in no obligatory bond with specific compositional forms. Thus we may find parodic narrator's narration, parodic Ich-Erzählung, etc.

ACTIVE TYPE OF DOUBLE-VOICED DISCOURSE

In the first two varieties of double-voiced discourse, we see the author using what are distinctly other people's speech acts for the expression of his own particular intentions. In the active variety of double-voiced discourse, the other speech act remains outside the bounds of the author's speech. Baxtin calls this the "active variety" because in it the other speech "actively influences the author's speech and forces it to change shape in whatever ways its influence and initiative dictate." (p. 190) In the first two varieties, on the other hand, the author takes someone else's speech act which is "defenseless and submissive" and forces it to follow his own aims.

1. Hidden Polemic

Hidden polemic is the first of the two varieties of
the active type of double-voiced discourse which Baxtin describes. "In hidden polemic the author's discourse is oriented toward its referential object, as in any other discourse, but at the same time each assertion is constructed in such a way that, besides its referential meaning, the author's discourse brings a polemical attack to bear against another speech act, another assertion on the same topic." (p. 187) Here the other speech act is not reproduced; it is understood only in its import. But Baxtin argues if it were not for the reaction to another's unexpressed speech act, the author's speech would be entirely different. He comments that to distinguish between actual cases of overt and hidden polemic is sometimes difficult. There remains, however, an important conceptual difference. Hidden polemic is double-voiced while overt polemic is not. "... The relation of the two voices in hidden polemic is special. The other intention does not enter explicitly into the discourse but is only reflected in it, determining its tone and meaning." (p. 188) Baxtin tells us that internally polemical speech is as widespread in everyday speech as it is in literary speech. His point is that it has an "enormous significance in the formation of style" in both everyday and literary speech. (p. 188) "Barbed words" and words used as "brickbats" are instances of hidden polemic in everyday speech. Hidden polemic in everyday
speech also includes "any speech that is servile or overblown, any speech that has determined beforehand not to be itself, any speech replete with reservations, concessions, loopholes, and so on." (p. 188) Baxtin concludes on a general note by stating that any individual's manner of speech construction in determined to a considerable degree by the way he feels about the speech of other people and his means of reacting to this speech.

In literary speech, the significance of hidden polemic is equally great.

In every style, properly speaking, there is an element of internal polemic, the difference being only in its degree and character. Any literary discourse more or less keenly senses its listener, reader or critic, and reflects anticipated objections, evaluations, points of view. Moreover, literary discourse senses other literary discourse, other style, alongside it. An element of the so-called reaction against a previous literary style which is present in every new style is just such an internal polemic; it is a hidden anti-stylization, so to speak, of another style, which often unites with an outright parody of that style. The significance of the internal polemic for the formation of style is especially great in autobiographies and in forms of Ich-Erzahlung of the confessional sort. Rousseau's Confession is a sufficient example. (p. 189)


The special relationship between the two voices that we find in hidden polemic also obtains in the single line of dialogue. In the single line of dialogue, one speech
act "acutely senses another speech act close by," and this recognition influences its internal structure. The line of dialogue either replies to or anticipates another speech act. Baxtin points out that the semantics of dialogic discourse must be of a very special kind. He argues that all those subtle changes of meaning "which occur in the heat of dialogic exchange" remain unstudied.

Hidden dialogue differs from the single line of dialogue in that the statements of the other speaker are deleted, "but in such a way that the general sense is not disrupted." (p. 189) "The second speaker's presence is not shown; his actual words are not given, but the deep impression of these words has a determining effect on all the utterances made by the only one who does speak." (p. 189) Baxtin comments that in Dostoevsky's works hidden dialogue occupies a very important place and "is profoundly elaborated." (p. 190)

INNER-DIALOGICATION

Throughout his classification of the types (and their variants) of discourse to be found in artistic prose, Baxtin has emphasized the fluidity, shall we say, of discourse in artistic prose. For example, a specific utterance can belong to more than one type simultaneously. Also, relation-
ships with another speech act in a concrete, continuing context do not have a static, but rather, a dynamic character. While utterances can belong to more than one variant and/or type of discourse simultaneously, there is yet another reason for the fluidity of discourse in artistic prose. Baxtin speaks of the "process of inner-dialogization." When discourse becomes "inner-dialogicized," the intentions of the other addresser's speech act take a more active role. " . . . The author's intention no longer retains its dominant hold over the other's intention; [the author's discourse] loses its composure and assuredness, becomes perturbed, internally decisive and ambiguous."

(p. 191) Baxtin calls such speech "not only double-voiced but double accented." (p. 191) This tendency is inherent in all vari-directional discourse. At its upper limit, it leads to the splitting of double-voiced discourse into two speech acts, autonomous and entirely separate. Conversely to the tendency toward inner-dialogization in the vari-directional modes of double-voiced discourse exists the tendency toward decreased objectification in the uni-directional variants of double-voiced discourse. Decreased objectification, at its upper limit, leads to a fusion of the author's and the other addressee's voices in the uni-directional variants and, consequently, to discourse of the first type. Thus we have in discourse two conflicting...
tendencies in operation at all times: one toward fusion and one toward separation. Baxtin reminds us that "the relationship of voices in discourse may change sharply: uni-directional utterances may turn vari-directional; inner-dialogization may become stronger or weaker; a passive type may undergo activization, and so on." (p. 191)

Baxtin presents us with the following chart which we will use as summary, but, as he does so, he emphasizes its abstract, conceptual nature. He wants us to recognize the fluidity of concrete discourse at all times.

Table 2

Baxtin's Discourse Typology

1 Direct unmediated discourse, focused solely on its referential object, as expression of the speaker's ultimate conceptual authority.

2 Objectified discourse (the speech of a person represented).

1. With a predominance of Various degrees of object-sociotypical determinations. ification.
2. With a predominance of individually characteristics determinations.

3 Discourse with emphasis on another speech act (double-voiced discourse).

1. Uni-directional variants. With reduced objectification, these variants approach a fusion of voices, i.e., approach the first type of discourse.
   a. Stylization.
   b. Narrator's narration.
   c. Unobjectified speech of a character who carries out the author's intentions (in part).
   d. Ich-Erzahlung.
2. Vari-directional variants.  
   a. Parody with all its shadings.  
   b. Parodic narration.  
   c. Parodic Ich-Erzählung.  
   d. Speech of a character who is parodically represented.  
   e. Any reportage of someone else's speech with an altered accent.

3. Active type (another speech act reflected).  
   a. Hidden, internal polemic.  
   b. Polemically colored autobiography and confession.  
   c. Any speech with an awareness of another's speech.  
   d. The single line of dialogue.  
   e. Hidden dialogue.

As we stated at the chapter's beginning, Baxtin really does not present us with the tools for stylistic analysis. We might do well to consider his discourse typology as a base for a future stylistics. Although what he has to say about prose discourse has great intuitive appeal, he leaves us with the idea that the critic needs only a good ear.

V. N. Voloshinov, writing one year after Baxtin, proceeds somewhat further in the direction of providing us with the tools for stylistic analysis. As we mentioned earlier, Voloshinov builds upon Baxtin's insights into the dialogic nature of the concrete utterance. Voloshinov introduces the terms, "reporting speech" and "reported speech," to describe the author's speech and the speech of the other addressee. He tells us that the reporting (authorial) speech and the reported speech are but terms of a dynamic
relationship. He asserts that the true object of linguistic inquiry "ought to be the dynamic inter-relationship of these factors, since after all, the two do in actual fact exist, function, and take shape only in their inter-relation, not on their own apart from one another." (p. 153)

We may remember that Baxtin does not regard this relationship as the object of linguistic inquiry, but rather, as the object of "metalinguistic" inquiry. We might consider Voloshinov's desire to move the study of dialogic relationships into the realm of linguistic inquiry the result of his desire to formalize Baxtin's insights into the nature of language. Rather than talk solely about the relationship of voices and/or intentions in discourse, Voloshinov talks about how the author's message, when it incorporates the reported speech, brings into play syntactic, stylistic, and compositional norms for its partial assimilation. He offers the same complaint against traditional syntactics that Baxtin does against traditional stylistics, i.e., it does not take the dialogical nature of discourse into account.

Voloshinov is concerned to emphasize the syntactic aspect of the relationship between the reporting and reported speech because he has definite ideas about what these syntactic relationships reflect. Although we will not spend the time here to describe what Voloshinov argues happens in active speech reception, we must make clear
that he believes that active speech reception is conditioned by socio-economic milieu. More importantly, he regards syntactic and stylistic forms as objective documents of this active speech reception in so far as it is conditioned by the socio-economic milieu. As proof for this notion, he points to the fact that speech transmission occurs in a bound context, a fact that entails the existence of a third person. He argues that if the third person can be expected to understand what is being communicated, the syntactic and stylistic forms must reflect stable relationships. For him, the existence of this third person adds great strength to his arguments about the impact of social forces upon speech reception.

Once Voloshinov has established the connection between syntactic, compositional, and stylistic norms of speech reporting and active speech reception and the modes of social interorientation, he turns his attention to the relationship between reporting and reported speech in general. We have already studied Baxtin's characterization of the relationships which may exist between the author's and another addresser's utterances. Voloshinov presents us with yet another characterization of these relationships. He talks of the "dynamic relationship" that exists between reporting and reported speech, a dynamism which reflects
the dynamism of the social interorientation in verbal-ideological communication between people. This dynamism moves between two poles, according to Voloshinov. He borrows terms from the art historian, Heinrich Wolfflin, to describe these poles. At the same time, he borrows Wolfflin's goal; i.e., he presents these polarities as the analytical tools with which the critic can grasp and articulate the fundamental stylistic distinctions between different periods.

**LINEAR SPEECH REPORTING**

In "linear speech reporting," the basic tendency in reacting to the reported speech is "to forge hard and fast boundaries for it." (p. 153) Here the direct and indirect discourse patterns and their modifications "serve to demarcate the reported speech as clearly as possible, to screen it from penetration by the author's intonations, to condense and enhance its individual linguistic characteristics." (p. 153) Voloshinov seems to contradict himself when he describes this style of speech reporting because in another spot he talks about how the linear style "minimizes the internal individuality of the reported speech." (p. 154) We must conclude from most of what he says that this style minimizes rather than enhances the individuality (linguistic) of the reported utterance. When an author engages in linear reporting, his work will
display a complete stylistic homogeneity; i.e., the author and his characters will speak the same language. According to Voloshinov, there are two different reasons why linear reporting will take place in a given speech community. The first is that another's speech is received as one whole block of social behavior, as the speaker's indivisible conceptual position. In this case, only the "what" is taken in, and the "how" is left outside. Here, of course, Voloshinov is assuming that we can distinguish between the "theme" (subject matter) of an utterance and its "verbal implementation" (its syntactic, compositional, and stylistic makeup). He finds that a "content conceptualizing and, in a linguistic sense, depersonalizing type of receiving and reporting speech" predominates in Old and Middle French and Old Russian prose writing. (p. 154) The second reason that linear reporting will appear is if, in a given language community, all social value judgments are divided into wholesale alternatives. Voloshinov comments that in this situation, "we simply have no room for a positive and observant attitude toward all those factors which give to another speaker's utterance its individual character." (p. 154) He concludes that this attitude toward another's speech is the result of either authoritarian dogmatism or rationalistic dogmatism. He discovers authoritarian dogmatism operating in Middle French and Old
Russian prose writing. Rationalistic dogmatism operates in 17th century French and 18th century Russian prose writing. He comments that in the sphere of rationalistic dogmatism, "the explicitness and inviolability of the boundaries between auctorial and reported speech reach the utmost limits." (p. 154)

PICTORIAL SPEECH REPORTING

In "pictorial speech reporting," the reporting context works to break down "the self contained compactness of the reported speech, to resolve it, to obliterate its boundaries." (p. 155) At the same time, in this style of reporting, there is a tendency to individualize the reported speech to a much greater degree. All of the linguistic peculiarities of its verbal implementation may be included. Voloshinov discovers a great number of diverse types of speech reporting within the scope of pictorial reporting. No matter the type, however, the weakening of the boundaries between the reporting and reported speech goes one of two ways.

1. Author's Speech Permeates the Reported Speech

The author's speech may permeate the reported speech with its own intonations, e.g., humor, scorn, irony, etc. This tendency operates in periods where social judgments are ruled by relativism, e.g., in the Renaissance, at the end of the 18th century, and
during the entire 19th. Social relativism supplies such favorable grounds for the positive and sensitive reception of "all individualized verbal nuances of thought, feeling, and belief" that a decorative trend in speech reporting is encouraged. Sometimes the meaning of an utterance is neglected in favor of its "color." Voloshinov comments that in the Russian Natural School, characters' speech sometimes loses all its referential meaning to become "decor" on a par with clothing, appearance, etc.

2. **Verbal Dominant Shifts to Reported Speech**

The verbal dominant may shift to the reported speech; i.e., the reported speech may penetrate the authorial context and "dissolve" it. This tendency testifies to a relativistic individualism in speech reception. Here the "authorial context loses the greater objectivity it normally commands in comparison with the reported speech. It begins to be perceived and even recognizes itself as if it were subjective, 'other person's' speech." (p. 156) In works of fiction, this phenomenon is often expressed by the appearance of a narrator who replaces the author, according to Voloshinov. This narrator's speech is just as individualized and colorful as the characters' speech; moreover, it is no more authoritative. Accord-
ing to Voloshinov, such a narrator cannot bring to bear against the characters' subjective positions a more authoritative and objective world view. We must point out here that Voloshinov does not take into consideration that the author might manipulate this narrator's voice from within. Baxtin would tell us that in this case the narrator would carry the ultimate conceptual authority, no matter how individualized his speech.

Voloshinov comments that inquiries into all of the tendencies shown in the active reception of speech must take into account "every peculiarity of the linguistic phenomenon under scrutiny." (p. 156) He points out that the teleology of the authorial context is an especially important factor to take into account. For example, verbal art "most keenly implements all of the permutations in socio-lingual interorientation." (p. 156) Rhetoric, on the other hand, simply owing to its teleology, is less free in its handling of other speakers' utterances. "Rhetoric requires a distinct cognizance of the boundaries of reported speech. It is marked by an acute awareness of property rights to words and by a fastidiousness in manners of authenticity." (p. 156) Judicial language, for example, assumes a clearcut distinction between the "verbal subjectivism"
of the parties to a case and the objectivity of the court." Beyond the teleology of the context, the position that a specimen of speech to be reported holds on the social hierarchy of values must also be taken into account, according to Voloshinov. He tells us that the stronger the feeling of eminence in another's utterance, the more sharply its boundaries will be defined in the authorial context. He credits this phenomenon for allowing low genres to display striking departures from linear speech reporting even in those times when rationalistic and/or authoritarian dogmatism hold sway.

It is important for us to note here that Voloshinov does not restrict his analyses to artistic prose. He makes no poetic/practical language distinction. Witness that he explains language use in artistic prose in terms of teleology. His approach then allows him to draw connections between artistic style and prose style in general and, more importantly, between artistic and the socio-economic milieu. On the basis of the polarities in speech reporting that he discovers, he presents us with the following chronological sequence of periods of style:

1. authoritarian dogmatism, characterized by the linear, impersonal, monumental style of reported speech transmission in the Middle Ages;
2. rationalistic dogmatism with its even more pronounced linear style in the 17th and 18th centuries;

3. realistic and critical individualism with its pictorial style and its tendency to permeate reported speech with auctorial retort and commentary (end of 18th century, early 19th century); and finally

4. relativistic individualism with its decomposition of the auctorial context (the present period). (p. 157)

THE INDIRECT AND DIRECT DISCOURSE PATTERNS

Voloshinov has described to us how the dynamism between the reporting and reported speech moves between the two poles in general terms. Now he presents us with descriptions of how this dynamism "finds its concrete linguistic expression in the patterns of reported speech and in the variants of those patterns..." (p. 158) We already know that the patterns are direct and indirect discourse; New Critics use these terms to describe discourse. Voloshinov departs from the approach we are used to, however, because he tells us that these patterns are implemented only in the form of their variants. Voloshinov describes the relationship between the patterns and their specific variants as "analogous to the relation of the actuality of rhythm to the abstraction of meter." (p. 158) We are used to identifying discourse in terms of what Voloshinov calls abstract patterns. Voloshinov would have us describe in terms of the variants of these patterns. He tells us that
while the patterns remain the same, changes in their variants take place over periods of time, either centuries or decades, and new habits of active orientation toward the speech to be reported take hold. These new habits then crystallize as regular linguistic formations in syntactic patterns. Debates over whether a particular form of speech reporting is a legitimate grammatical pattern or a stylistic variant is unproductive, according to Voloshinov. He argues that the borderline between the two is fluid because of the nature of language; some forms are undergoing grammatization at the same time as others are undergoing degrammatization.

Voloshinov confines his characterization of the variants of the direct and indirect discourse patterns to "the standard Russian literary language." He comments that it is well known that in Russian the syntactic patterns for reporting speech are very poorly developed. There are in Russian only the direct and indirect discourse patterns. Quasi-direct discourse in Russian lacks clear-cut syntactic markers. Not only does Russian have only two real patterns, they are not so clearly delimited from one another as they are in other languages. It is the lack of a consecutic temporum and the subjunctive mood that deprive indirect discourse in Russian of any distinctive character. Voloshinov comments that "on the whole, one must acknowledge the unqualified primacy of direct discourse in Russian." (p. 159) All of
the peculiarities of the Russian language create an extremely favorable situation for the pictorial style of speech reporting. "An extraordinary ease of interaction and interpenetration between reporting and reported speech is the rule." (p. 159) He comments that in Russian we do not get the sense of boundaries forced and resistance overcome that one feels in other languages. We might point out here that it seems English is a language in which the indirect discourse pattern is carefully worked out. We do get the sense which Voloshinov describes when we read the Woolf passage.

**INDIRECT DISCOURSE**

"Analytic transmission" is the essence of the indirect discourse pattern. "The emotive-affective feature expressed in the form of someone else's message do not pass intact into indirect discourse, . . . they are translated from form into content." (p. 161) For example, the direct utterance, "Well done! What an achievement!" cannot be registered in direct discourse as, "He said that well done and what an achievement." Rather, we expect:

He said that that had been done well and was a real achievement.

or:

He said delightedly that that had been done well and was a real achievement.

Voloshinov points out that all the various ellipses,
omissions, etc., possible in direct discourse on emotive-affective grounds, are not tolerated by the analyzing tendencies of indirect discourse and can enter indirect discourse only if developed and filled out. Thus a purely grammatical translation of direct into indirect discourse is impossible. There must be an appropriate stylistic reshaping.

1. REFERENT-ANALYZING INDIRECT DISCOURSE

There are two basic varieties of indirect discourse, according to Voloshinov. The "referent-analyzing variety" receives a message on the purely thematic level and does not take in whatever there is in the message that is without thematic significance. Meaning is dissected by this variety into its "constituent ideational, referential units." (p. 163) Referent-analyzing indirect discourse provides an excellent means for linear reporting since it has a built-in tendency to "thematicize" another's utterance and thus to preserve the autonomy of the other's speech in terms of meaning. Voloshinov finds this variety only weakly developed in Russian, primarily in discursive and rhetorical contexts. In these contexts, "the author must deal with the problem of explaining, comparing, and putting into perspective the opinions of other people on the topic being discussed." (p. 164)
In Russian verbal art, this variety of indirect discourse takes a certain stature only in the works of those writers not loathe to have their own say with its special ideational aim and weight. Voloshinov points to Turgenev and Tolstoy as two such writers.

2. **Texture-Analyzing Indirect Discourse**

The "texture-analyzing variety" of indirect discourse "incorporates into indirect discourse words and locutions that characterize the subjective and stylistic physignomy of the message viewed as expression." (p. 164) These words, more often than not enclosed in quotation marks, are introduced so that their specificity, their subjectivity, and their typicality are felt. Voloshinov presents the following examples: (pp. 164-5)

1. About the deceased, Grigorij remarked, making the sign of the cross, that he was a good hand at a thing or two, but was thickheaded and scourged by his sickness, and a disbeliever to boot, and that it was Fedor Pavlovic and the oldest son who had taught him his disbelief. (Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov).

2. The same thing happened with the Poles: they appeared with a show of pride and independence. They loudly testified that, in the first place, they were both "in the service of the Crown" and that "Pan Mitya" had offered to buy their honor for 3,000, and that they themselves had seen large sums of money in his hands. (ibid.)

3. Krasotkin proudly parried the accusation, giving to understand that it would indeed have been shameful "in our day and age" to play make-believe with his contemporaries, other thirteen-year olds, but --- that he did it for the "chubbies" because he was fond of them, and no one had any business calling him to account for his feelings. (ibid.)
4. He found Nastas'ja Filippovna in a state similar to utter derangement: she continually cried out, trembled, shouted that Rogozin was hidden in the garden. In their very house, that she had just seen him, that he would murder her . . . cut her throat! (Dostoevsky, The Idiot. Here the indirect discourse construction retains the expressive intonation of the original message.)

Voloshinov tells us that the words he has italicized in these passages and which are incorporated with "their own specificity detectable (especially when they are enclosed in quotation marks) "are being "made strange." He means that their individuality, their particularity is being heightened. He comments that at the same time, however, they are being made to accommodate shadings of the author's (Dostoevsky's) attitude--his irony and humor. His examples raise some problems for us. Voloshinov apparently has no trouble identifying the words in these passages which originate from the other addresser rather than from the narrator. Of course, we have no problem knowing that the words enclosed in quotation marks originate from the character. But can we say the same for the other words that he italicizes? For example, in the first passage, how are we to know that "scourged by his sickness" and "a disbeliever to boot" are Grigorij's words while "a good hand at a thing or two" are the narrator's? We could be running into problems here because we are reading these passages in translation. Perhaps the cues that let us distinguish the narrator's characteristic way of speaking from Grigorij's do not pass into the
translation. At any rate, it would seem that the phenomenon that Voloshinov is describing here would depend upon the differences in the narrator's and the character's dialect for its effects. If we look again at sample three, we as English speakers it seems cannot identify "murder her . . . cut her throat!" as originating from Nastas'ja any more than from the narrator. Rather what calls our attention to these words is the ellipsis involved in their presentation. The narrator suggests her agitated state by stringing together in rapid succession a series of prepositional phrases and dependent clauses, concluding with ellipsis. Perhaps we do identify these words as Nastas'ja's, but it seems we do so because of the syntax more than anything about the words themselves. Voloshinov's examples here help us to see that identifying "other people's" words in someone's discourse is a complicated matter, unless these words are enclosed in quotation marks.

Unfortunately, neither Voloshinov nor Baxtin gives us any idea about how we are to identify these words. Still they are convinced that to do so is important to the understanding of prose style. Their notions have great intuitive appeal as we said before. We are aware, for example, of at least three distinct situations in spoken discourse where we hear a speaker incorporate the words of another speaker into his own utterances:
1. We can hear a speaker repeat the words of another speaker who has just spoken. In this case, we are sure that the second speaker is using the words of the first. We also, when we understand the second speaker's utterance, understand the role that these words play in it. The way that the second speaker "intones" the words of the first lets us know how he is reacting to the first speaker's utterance.

2. We can hear the words of another addressee in a speaker's utterance even though we have not heard the utterance of that other addressee. In this case, the second speaker marks these words by the way he intones them. The marking here may be even stronger than in the first instance. (We are assuming here that the second speaker does not explicitly say whose words he is using.)

3. We can hear the words of another addressee in someone's speech although he does not call attention to them in any way. In this case, the speaker has appropriated these words for his own use; their appearance in someone else's utterance is unimportant to his intentions.

When we attempt to describe how a speaker marks someone else's words in his spoken discourse, we begin to have more sympathy for Voloshinov's and Baxtin's plight. We lack the vocabulary necessary to identify the ways in which we mark another person's speech in our own spoken discourse. At this point, we can only speak of elements such as change in pitch, change in stress, change in volume, change in accent, etc. We might add that non-verbal behavior also participates in marking another's words in our utterances.

What Baxtin and Voloshinov would have us believe is that we will meet all three situations which we have just described in prose discourse. For example, Baxtin argues that situations one and two give rise to "double-voiced
discourse." He characterizes the situation in three as "imitation." Voloshinov promises to show us how "syntactic, compositional, and stylistic norms" reflect stable relationships in the modes of verbal-ideological communication. This promise leads us to believe that he will show us how certain syntactical, compositional, and stylistic patterns correlate with specific reactions toward the words of another addressee. He does present us with a means for distinguishing periods of style in speech reporting. But to know that speech reporting in the Middle Ages is characterized by authoritarian dogmatism, etc., does not help us to understand how Voloshinov knows that certain words in the sample passages he presents are being infused with the author's irony. We can only speculate at this point that identifying another addressee's words in someone's speech in artistic prose requires in many cases that the reader bring to the utterance information he has learned elsewhere, either from the work itself or from his general experience.

Let us return now to Voloshinov's summary characterizations of referent-analyzing and texture-analyzing indirect discourse. He tells us that these two variants, despite their common analytical tendency, express "profoundly different linguistic conceptions of the reported addressee's words and the speaker's individuality." (p. 166) In the referent-analyzing variant, the speaker's individuality is a factor only in so far as it occupies some specific
ideational position. There "is no wherewithal here for the speaker's individuality to congeal into an image." (p. 166)

Exactly the opposite is true for the texture-analyzing variant. In it, the speaker's individuality is presented as a subjective matter (individual or typological), as a manner of thinking and speaking, involving the author's evaluation as well.

3. IMPRESSIONISTIC INDIRECT DISCOURSE

Voloshinov identifies a third variant of indirect discourse in Russian which he calls the "impressionistic variant." He sees it lying midway between the first two variants; i.e., in it, a referential analysis takes place while some words and locutions originate in the mind of the second addressee. "Mind" is the key word here. This variant has developed primarily for reporting the internal speech, thoughts, and experiences of a character. He calls this variant "impressionistic" because it treats the reported speech very freely, abbreviating it, often only "highlighting its themes and dominants." (p. 166) He presents the following passage as an example of this variant:

What were the thoughts he pondered then? That he was poor; that he perforce must labor to achieve respect, security; that God just might have granted him more brains and money. That goodness knows, there are those idle lucky dogs with little brains, those loungers, for whom life is just a lark! That he had been in service all two years; his thoughts remarked as well that the weather wasn't calming down; that the river kept on rising;
that all the bridges over the Neva were most likely up and that he would be two cut off from his Parasa. Thus went his pondering. (Pushkin, Bronze Horseman)

He comments that here a referential analysis has clearly taken place and that certain words and locutions are included which clearly originate in the mind of the hero. He adjudges that no emphasis is put on these words' specificity. We must wonder here what makes him say this. This passage seems to us very like those we read earlier in its treatment of other's words, particularly examples one and three. The difference here seems to us only to be that these words are presented as internal speech.

**DIRECT DISCOURSE**

Voloshinov presents us with only three variants of indirect discourse in Russian. When we get to the modifications of direct discourse in Russian, we must deal with a far greater number, and even then, Voloshtinov tells us that he concerns himself with only those variants characterized by an exchange of intonations. He comments that it is often difficult to tell the difference between those instances where the author's intonations permeate the reported speech and those where elements of the reported message creep into the authorial context, "making it fluid and ambiguous." (p. 167) He says that often we must speak of a "reciprocity of effects."
sions, etc., possible in direct discourse on emotive-affective grounds, are not tolerated by the analyzing tendencies of indirect discourse and can enter indirect discourse only if developed and filled out. Thus a purely grammatical translation of direct into indirect discourse is impossible. There must be an appropriate stylistic re-shaping.

1. REFERENT-ANALYZING INDIRECT DISCOURSE

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1. PICTORIAL VARIANTS OF DIRECT DISCOURSE

Voloshinov speaks of three variants of direct discourse which are pictorial in style. Beyond this, all three are characterized by the imposition of the author's intonations upon the reported speech.

a. Pre-set Discourse

In this type of direct discourse, the basic themes of the impending direct discourse are anticipated by the authorial context and colored by the author's intonations. In this category, Voloshinov places direct discourse that emerges directly out of indirect discourse, e.g.,

Though filled with the profoundest respect for the memory of his ex-master, he nevertheless, among other things, declared that he had been negligent toward Mitya and had "brought the children up wrong. The little child without me would have been eaten alive by lice," he added, recounting episodes from Mitya's earliest years. (Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov)

We also includes in this category direct discourse emerging from quasi-direct discourse. Quasi-direct discourse he tells us in this context is half-narration and half reported speech. He points to the entire fifth chapter of The Idiot as an example of this type. This is the chapter in which Dostoevsky describes Myshkin's state of mind before an epileptic fit.

b. Particularized Direct Discourse

In this type of direct discourse, the authorial context is constructed so that the traits that the author uses to
define a character "cast heavy shadows" on his directly reported speech. In other words, the value judgments and attitudes in which the character's portrayal is steeped carry over into the words that he utters. The referential weight of the reported utterances in this type declines, but at the same time, their "characterological significance" increases. Voloshinov mentions how, once we recognize a comic character on the stage by his dress, makeup, and general bearing, we are prepared to laugh even before we catch the meanings of his words.

c. Anticipated and Disseminated Reported Speech Concealed in the Auctorial Context

In this type, the narrator conducts the narrative entirely within the purview of the hero himself, not only within his dimensions of space and time but also in its system of values and intonations. This creates an extremely original background for reported messages; the auctorial context begins to sound like "reported speech." What he means becomes more clear when he presents what for him is a classic example of this variant, Dostoevsky's "Nasty Story."

He says of this short story that the whole of it could be enclosed in quotation marks as narration by a narrator although none is indicated by the text. At the same time, however, the situation in the story is such that almost every epithet, definition, and value judgment offered in the story could be enclosed in quotation marks as originating in the
mind of one or another character in the story. To demonstrate his point, he presents the following passage:

Once in winter, on a cold and frosty evening—very late evening, rather, it being already the twelfth hour—three extremely distinguished gentlemen were sitting in a comfortable, even sumptuously appointed, room inside a handsome two-story house on Petersburg Island and were occupied in weighty and superlative talk on an extremely remarkable topic. All three gentlemen were officials of the rank of general. They were seated around a small table, each in a handsome upholstered chair, and during pauses in the conversation they comfortably sipped champagne. (Italics are V.'s)

Voloshinov argues that if we were to read this description as coming from the author, we would have to declare it "stylistically wretched and banal." (p. 169) But he points out that it is impossible to take it this way. In his opinion, each italicized epithet although "colorless, insipid, and dull" is an arena "in which two intonations, two points of view, two speech acts converge and clash." (p. 169) Voloshinov produces further examples to show how these dull and colorless epithets are purposefully sustained throughout the narrative. His argument is that when we actually hear the speech of the characters we realize that these epithets are the sort which they would use to describe themselves. Thus we realize that these epithets originate not in the author's mind but in the characters to then be adopted for use by a narrator who "would seem to be in solidarity with the generals, who fawns upon them, adopts their attitude in all things, speaks their language, but nonetheless provocatively
overdoes and thus thoroughly exposes all their real and potential utterances to the author's irony and mockery." (p. 170) Voloshinov reiterates at this point that almost every word in the story figures simultaneously in two speech acts, in the ironic, mocking speech of the narrator and in the speech of the hero who is far removed from the irony. This simultaneous participation of two speech acts, each differently oriented in expressivity, also explains the curious syntax and highly original style of the story. He calls the phenomenon of two speech acts merging and clashing, "speech interference." In his opinion, we will find speech interference producing durable and distinctive styles in indirect discourse only. He admits that it can occur, however, in the texture-analyzing variants of indirect discourse.

2. **LINEAR VARIANTS OF DIRECT DISCOURSE**

a. **Rhetorical Question and Rhetorical Exclamation**

Voloshinov finds certain instances of the rhetorical question and the rhetorical exclamation very interesting because of the problem of their localization in context. He tells us that "they would seem to be situated on the very boundary between auctorial and reported speech (usually, internal speech) and often they slide directly into one or the other." (p. 172) He mentions the particularly frequent occurrence in prose where some such question as "What is to be done now?" introduces the hero's inner deliberations or
the recounting of his actions. In these cases, Voloshinov argues that the question may be read equally as the author's and as one that the hero poses to himself in his internal speech. He admits that in such cases, it can be claimed that the author's intonations take the upper hand since the rhetorical questions and exclamations do not appear enclosed in quotation marks.

b. **Substituted Direct Discourse**

In this type of direct discourse, the author steps in for his hero and says what he might or should have said. We meet with a parallelism of intonations here:

> The Cossacks, leaning on their pikes, gaze over the rushing water of the river, and unnoticed by them, blurred by the fog, a villain and his weapon float past. . . . What are you thinking, Cossack? Are you recalling the battles of bygone years? . . . Farewell, free frontier villages, paternal home, the quiet Don, and war, and pretty girls. The unseen enemy has reached the bank, an arrow leaves the quiver—takes flight—and down the Cossack falls from the bloodied rampart. (Pushkin, *The Captive of the Caucasus*)

There can be an even more complete merging of the author's and the hero's voices. We can get long passages that belong simultaneously to the author's narrative and to the hero's internal (sometimes also external) speech:

> There, mountain peaks, each one alike, stretch out in a line; a lonely track among them winds and fades in the gloom. . . . Oppressive thoughts beset the captive youth's tormented breast. . . . The distant path leads back to Russia where his ardent youth began, so proud, so free of care: where he knew early joy, where he found so much love, where he embraced dire suffering, where he destroyed delight, desire,
and hope in stormy life. . . . The world and its ways he fathomed, and he knew the price of a faithless life. In people's hearts he found betrayal, in dreams of love, a mad illusion. . . . Freedom! For you alone he kept the quest in this sublunar world. . . . It came to pass. . . . Now he sees nothing in the world upon which to set his hopes, and even you, his last fond dream, you, too, are gone from him. He is a slave. (Pushkin, The Captive of the Caucasus)

Here Voloshinov tells us that it is the captive's own "oppressive thoughts" that are being transmitted. "It is his speech but is being formally delivered by the author." (p. 173) He argues that if the personal pronoun "he" were changed to "I," and if the verb forms were adjusted accordingly, no dissonance or incongruity would result. He also thinks that the apostrophes in the third person all the more underscore the author's identification with his hero.

c. Quasi-direct Discourse

The example we receive above lacks the speech interference which Voloshinov says must be present in quasi-direct discourse. Because it lacks speech interference, it also lacks the grammatical and stylistic features which characterize quasi-direct discourse, differentiating it from the surrounding context. Voloshinov presents the following as an example of true quasi-direct discourse:

But his rage for action Kocubej hid deep within his heart. "His thoughts had now, all woebegone, addressed themselves to death. No ill-will did he bear Mazeppa—his daughter alone was to blame. But he forgave his daughter, too: to God let her give answer, now that she had already plunged her family into shame and Heaven and the laws of man
CONCLUSION:

It seems that the most productive way to end this chapter is to ascertain whether or not we can apply the insights which Baxtin and Voloshinov present to us. The reader may remember that in the last chapter we studied Norman Friedman's "translation" of a passage in Woolf's To the Lighthouse from direct into indirect discourse. We raised certain objections to Friedman's description of the process at that time. It remains for us to see whether or not the typology of discourse that Voloshinov gives us will work any better for accounting for what we find in the Woolf passage. The original passage is:

For what happened to her, especially when staying with the Ramsays, was to be made to feel violently two opposite things at the same time; that's what you feel, was one; that's what I feel, was the other, and then they fought together in her mind, as now. It is so beautiful, so exciting, this love, that I tremble on the verge of it.

It seems that if we are to use Voloshinov's typology as our guide that we must identify this passage as an example of direct discourse emerging from quasi-direct discourse. Remember that Voloshinov classifies direct discourse emerging from quasi-direct discourse as a type of "pre-set direct discourse." When he is describing quasi-direct discourse in this context, he mentions that it is half narration and half
reported speech. It certainly appears as if that is what we are confronted with in the first sentence of the Woolf passage. Also, the Woolf passage bears the closest resemblance to the passage of quasi-direct discourse that Voloshinov gives us. (Check the preceding page.)

Voloshinov describes substituted direct discourse as follows:

when a complete solidarity in values and intonations exists between the author and his hero within the framework of a rhetorically constructed context, the author's voice and that of his hero begin to overlap: their voices merge; and we get long passages which belong simultaneously to the author's narrative and to the hero's internal (though sometimes also external) speech. (p. 173)

According to Voloshinov, only one step is needed to turn substituted direct discourse into quasi-direct discourse. The author must succeed in standing apart from his heroes and bring to bear the contrast of a more objective authorial context with its own values and intonations. In other words, speech interference must be introduced: almost every word in the narrative, as far as its expressivity, its emotional coloring, and its accentual position in the phrase, must figure simultaneously in two intersecting speech acts, the hero's and the narrator's. The key to identifying quasi-direct discourse is the "peculiar disfigurement" in "syntactic physiognomy" that speech interference generates.

We want to argue that the first sentence of the Woolf passage is quasi-direct discourse. We have in this sentence the intersection of two different speech acts: the
narrator's and Lilly's internal speech act. In one sense we have the narrator identifying with Lilly, conducting the narration from within her purview. In yet another and equal sense, we have the narrator exposing Lilly's speech to the author's irony. That we have an utterance "serving two masters" accounts for what Friedman describes as the "abnormal syntax" in this passage. The second sentence is, of course, direct discourse emerging from the quasi-direct discourse. Voloshinov calls this phenomenon "pre-set direct discourse" and tells us that in this case the basic themes of the impending direct discourse are anticipated by the context and are colored by the author's intonations. It seems to us that Lilly's direct discourse is anticipated by and colored by the preceding context. The naivete of Lilly's outlook is heightened by the narrator's irony.

According to Baxtin's discourse typology, the Woolf passage is an example of "parodic narration," an instance of the second variety of "double-voiced discourse," i.e., "vari-directional double-voiced discourse." Baxtin tells us that parody allows considerable variety. He points out that it is possible for the narrator to parody another's style as a style or to parody another's socially typical or individually characteristic manner of thinking, observing, and speaking. In the Woolf passage Lilly's individually characteristic way of thinking, observing, and speaking seems to be parodied by the author. The reader may have noticed that we referred to
the given artistic norms for representing reality. He argues that the deformation of the former artistic code is then perceived as a more accurate rendition of reality. At the same time, there is a conservative tendency exhibited by some to view the deformation of the old artistic code as a distortion of reality. Whether or not a person sees a code rendering or distorting reality depends upon to which code he or she subscribes.

Obviously, we get from the Formalists a picture of fictional evolution far different from that which the New Critic Norman Freidman gives us. The reader may remember that Freidman sees all fiction moving toward "impersonality." He tells us that "it has been all along a commonplace of aesthetic theory that effective presentation and impersonality go hand in hand." To his thinking, artists have been striving toward increased "authorial extinction" since the dawn of fictional art. They do so in service of the "prime end of all fiction" which is "to produce as complete a story illusion as possible." (p. 1180) Freidman's classification of points of view is meant to capture this evolution toward the prime end. Freidman's notions raise another relevant issue. There is the suggestion in what he has to say that good fiction draws the reader in, so to speak, and makes him forget that he is reading a story. Again, we have the Formalists disagreeing about the nature of art. They would argue that the goal of art is to break down automatism in
the narrator rather than the author in the preceding para-
graph when we were discussing the origins of the first utter-
ance in the passage. Baxtin and Voloshinov would, in this
instance, speak of an author rather than a narrator. Baxtin
and Voloshinov confuse matters when they talk about the
"author's direct discourse" in the work. Admittedly, Baxtin
makes clear that we need to know nothing about the actual
author of the work to hear in it "a unified creative will,
a specific position to which we can react dialogically."
(p. 152) Still, he tells us that the author's direct dis-
course occurs as a matter of course in every work. We avoid
Baxtin's confusion by talking about the position of the guid-
ing intelligence in the work. Actually, our notion of guid-
ing intelligence seems to cover what Baxtin calls the "ul-
timate conceptual authority." However, it is more accurate
to say that sometimes the authority of the guiding intelli-
gence seems to be directly expressed in the narrator's
discourse and that sometimes we only sense the authority of
the guiding intelligence from what we recognize to be manipu-
lations of the narrator's discourse.

Once we have made this revision in Baxtin's and Volosh-
ino"v's thinking, we are free it seems to use the insights
into fictional discourse which they provide us. Their dis-
course typologies are certainly useful in that they allow
us to speak of yet another mode of the relationship between
the narrator and the narrative without the problems that
accompany Friedman's attempt. They have shown us that the distinction between direct and indirect discourse alone is insufficient to describe the relationship between reported and reporting speech. Their work also demonstrates what we have been arguing all along, i.e., that narration need not be consistent in realistic fiction. Baxtin and Voloshinov emphasize that the narrator's relationship to the narrative may change throughout the course of the narrative. We might add here that the relationship of the narrator to the guiding intelligence may also change during the course of the narrative. Most importantly, they have shown us that upon occasion we must speak of more than one point of view at the same time, i.e., double-voiced discourse.

Baxtin's and Voloshinov's refusal to connect any particular technique with realism is indicative of the Formalist approach to literary art in general. The Formalists do not share the New Critic's notion that fictional art has a specific goal which successive generations of writers are working to reach. The Formalists' concept of literary evolution is divorced from ideas of progress and ordered succession. Part of their goal as a school of criticism was to redefine the notions of tradition and succession. Jurij Tynjanov comments:

When people talk about "literary tradition" or "succession" . . . they usually imagine a kind of straight line joining a younger representative of a given literary branch with an older one. It is not a matter of continuing on a
straight line, but rather one of setting out and
pushing out from a single point—a struggle. . . .
Each instance of literary succession is first and
foremost a struggle involving a destruction of the
old unity and a new construction out of the old
elements.6

Victor Schlovsky writes:

Not one but sever al literary schools exist during
each literary epoch. They exist in literature
simultaneously, but one of them forms the canon-
ized crest.7 The others exist without being canon-
ized. . . .

Once the older art has been canonized, new forms are created
in the lower stratum which force their way into the position
occupied by the older one.

Each new school of literature is a revolution—
something like the emergence of a new class.
But, of course, that is only an analogy. The
defeated line is not annihilated; it does not
cease to exist. It only topples from the crest,
drops below for a time of lying fallow, and may
again rise as an ever present pretender to the
throne. Moreover, in practice, things are compli-
cated by the fact that the new hegemony is usual-
ly not a pure instance of a restoration of earlier
form, but one involving the presence of features
from other junior schools, even features (but now
in a subordinate role) inherited from its predeces-
sor on the throne. (ibid.)

Neither Tynjanov nor Schlovsky allows that the new forms can
manifest entirely new idiosyncratic features along with
features from earlier schools. Their position was later
amended to take this phenomenon into account. The Formalist
notion of realism, too, is influenced by the notion of
dialectal change of forms. Roman Jakobson describes the
process by which there is in every new school (which has as
its intent to render life as it is) the tendency to deform
perception. They see artists purposefully prolonging the reader's, in this case, perception by making things "strange."

What are we ourselves to conclude about the issue of judgment? First of all, it seems that we should conclude that generalizations about all fictional art do not hold true. We want to say that sometimes art functions to prolong perception and at other times art works for just the opposite effect. The real question here is "are judgments about the value of particular techniques necessary or even desirable in a theory of point of view?" The answer is quite clearly no. Booth has shown us that a given technique will serve an author well in one spot and not in another. We do not want to concern ourselves with the problem of judgment; that is a subject for another study. Here we must agree with Wayne Booth when he argues:

In dealing with the types of narration the critic must always limp behind, referring constantly to the varied practice which alone can correct his temptations to overgeneralize. In place of our modern 'fourth unity,' in place of abstract rules about consistency and objectivity in the use of point of view, we need more painstaking, specific accounts of how great tales are told.10

By the same token, we can agree with the Formalist Boris Ejxenbaum when he proclaims:

In our scholarship we value theory only as a working hypothesis with the help of which facts are disclosed and take on meaning, that is, they are apprehended as immanent properties and become material for investigation. . . . We establish concrete principles and adhere to them to the extent that they are proven tenable by the material. If the material requires their further elaboration or alteration, we go ahead and elaborate or alter them.11
NOTES


4. For one Formalist's discussion of the relationship of the "implied" author and the historical author, read Boris Tomashevsky's "Literature and Biography," in Matejka and Pomorska, Readings in Russian Poetics: Formalist and Structuralist Views, 1971, pp. 47-55. Tomashevsky develops in this essay the concept of the writer's "legendary biography." He explains why only the legendary biography should figure into literary studies. In certain respects, his arguments are similar to those given by Wayne Booth in defense of his concept of the "implied author."


Wayne Booth, *The Rhetoric of Fiction*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1061, p. 75. Hereafter, quotations from this work will be documented by page numbers in parentheses.

CHAPTER III

DOLOŽEL'S THEORY OF NARRATIVE MODES

In this chapter, we will be examining Lubomir Doložel's theory of narrative modes. We have included his work here because, like Uspensky, Doložel attempts to account for more than one mode of the narrator's relationship to the narrative. Doložel seeks to do so, however, almost solely in terms of linguistic features. Doložel does not succeed in providing us with adequate means for describing the possible modes of the relationship of the narrator to the narrative for this reason, among others. Yet, studying Doložel's errors at once provides evidence for the superiority of our own approach and gives us insight into much that is wrong with the currently popular "linguistic" criticism. Thus, we will examine his work carefully.

Doložel opens his work by crediting first Plato and then the Russians for pointing out that every narrative text is "a plurality of discourses whose mutual relationships, contrasts, and harmonies constitute the basis of verbal structure of the narrative text."¹ He particularly lauds the Russians for revealing that the narrative text is a field of confrontation for numerous "voices" which "engage in polemics, attempt to dominate one another,
produce echoes or join in harmony to pass on the narrative message." (p. 1) He thinks that modern trends in poetics of the narrative text reveal the "invalidity of a normative poetics which required that the narrative text possess a unity and harmony of style, or tone, or 'mode' . . . ." (p. 2) Here he suggests that he does not share the New Critical preoccupation with consistency of viewpoint. He also hesitates to draw any connection between the style of realism and the mode of the objective narrator. He does comment, however, that nevertheless, "it can be expected that the aesthetic ideals of realism will lead to attempts at implementing the norms of the objective narrator in a rather systematic and consistent way." (p. 79) With this comment, he shows us what he has come to expect despite his theories to the contrary.

Dolozel does want to divorce his work from mimetic theory, however. He comments that traditionally the narrator and narrative modes have been treated within the framework of the mimetic theory of fiction. He points to anthropomorphic concepts and personifying terms (such as "omniscient" narrator, narrator with "limited omniscience") as characteristic of this approach. In his opinion, the "textual base" for the narrator has been more or less overlooked. He tells us that while he is not ready to do away with the traditional anthropomorphic terminology altogether, he does want us to realize that "the
inconsistencies and shortcomings of the extant typologies of narrator are due primarily to the neglect of the textual base." (p. 6) His "structural theory of narrator" is based on two assumptions:

1. In the process of reading a narrative text, referential totalities (such as 'narrator,' 'character,' etc.) are generated for the reader through the process of semantic accumulation. However, these referential totalities are secondary with respect to the textual base. Nothing is in the referent that has not been 'expressed'--explicitly or implicitly--in the text.

2. Referential totalities—as components of the overall text sign—are semiotic in nature; the referent (or any of its components) is a dimension of the text sign. The epistemological nature of narrator, character, etc., is fundamentally different from that of 'real' people. (pp. 5-6)

What Dolozel is saying here he later makes more clear. His point is that the particular forms of the narrator's discourse (modes) which he defines only by functional and verbal features provide the explanation for the semiotic "effects," which have been traditionally identified with the narrator, i.e., with what he calls the "image of the narrator." He argues that the "gamut of 'images' follows the gamut of narrative modes. . . ." (p. 12) He means by "images" such descriptions of the narrator as "anonymous and impartial" and "narrator with a limited point of view." We think we may put the point Dolozel is trying to make here in more simple terms. He is simply arguing that his theory will be able to account for everything past approaches covered
while doing so in terms of function and linguistic features. He obviously considers this sort of explanation an improvement over that offered by past approaches.

While the image of the narrator can be directly related to the narrative mode as its referent, the relationship between the narrator and author is "indirect and exterior," he argues. "The history of fiction amply shows that there is no pre-determined connection between the author of a narrative text and its narrator." (p. 12) Dolozel does admit that the strict theoretical distinction of narrator and author does not preclude discovering affinities (ideological, biographical, etc.) between the author and his narrator. He comments that the "rhetorical Ich-form" sometimes reveals an ideological affinity between the narrator and author. His conclusion is that "these affinities can assume a substantial importance for the structural interpretation of a narrative work." (p. 13) Dolozel never makes clear what a "structural interpretation" of a work involves. Nor does he explain why in only the rhetorical Ich-form can we find this ideological affinity between author and narrator. But, at any rate, his comment about affinities suggests that we may speak of the work's author when we talk about point of view. It seems that we may not, however, for later he tells us that "... the basic assumption of the structural theory of narrative modes must be spelled out with special emphasis: the narrator is
no 'deputy' of the author in the narrative text; rather it is a narrative technique created and applied by the author more or less consciously and consistently." (p. 78) When Voloshinov declares that the narrator is not the author's deputy, he seems to be telling us that it is altogether inadmissible to speak of the author's intentions when we speak of point of view in a work. His approach runs counter then to both the New Critical and the Formalist practice. Critics from both schools discuss the author's intentions, even though they differ as to how we may speak of the author "in" the work, i.e., our guiding intelligence.

Doložel differs from the Russian approach in yet another area. He makes the distinction between practical, "everyday" language and poetic language that Baxtin and Voloshinov refrain from making. Doložel tells us that:

... the use of several different devices of characters' speech in one dialogue (or even within one speech of a dialogue), testifies to the fact that modern fictional dialogue has acquired features which make it a specific form, distinct from everyday (communicative) and dramatic dialogue. Modern fictional dialogue developed its specific forms and functions which cannot be explained by referring to other, nonfictional types of dialogue. The theory of dialogue in fiction is to be embodied primarily in the framework of a general theory of narrative structure, describing forms and functions of dialogue with reference to other basic components of the structure, namely narrative and interior monologue. This general observation is also true of modern interior monologue which has become the most prominent specific component of fictional structure; drama and 'everyday' speech have nothing to compare with modern interior monologue, either in variety or complexity of forms, styles, and effects. (p. 47)
Just how differently Dolozel views literary language will become clear when we discuss how he distinguishes the narrator's discourse from the characters' discourse in what he calls the "traditional text." For the present, let us just say that his refusal to acknowledge artistic intention is linked with his notions about literary language. We will return to this problem later.

Baxtin and Voloshinov both have given us discourse typologies for prose. Neither did so with the specific goal of identifying the features of the narrator's discourse as distinct from the features of characters' discourse. Such is Dolozel's goal. He presents us first with a model for the "deep structure" of the narrative text. He admits that the variability of narrative discourse has many sources and forms, yet he believes that the fundamental forms of narrative discourse can be described according to the dichotomy of the narrator's and the characters' discourse. Thus he describes the deep structure of the text as a "concatenation and alternation of" DN (narrator's discourse) and DC (characters' discourse):

\[ T \rightarrow DN + DC \]

Figure 2: The Deep Structure Model

The dichotomy of DN and DC is much more complicated in the "surface structure" because both DN and DC can be found to be expressed in a variety of forms and because DC and DN
are not separated and isolated discourses. Doložel repeats the point made by Baxtin and Voloshinov when he tells us that DN and DC are "characterized by a dynamic correlation, ranging from absolute dichotomy to complete assimilation." (p. 4) The surface structure model is:

\[
\text{T} \rightarrow \text{DN} \rightarrow n_1, n_2, \ldots, n_k \rightarrow \text{DC} \rightarrow c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_k
\]

Figure 3: The Surface Structure Model.

As we already mentioned Doložel defines the modes of the narrator's discourse and, thus, the narrator by functional and verbal features alone. It follows from what he sees as the basic dichotomy of the narrative structure that the "features of the narrator can be specified only in opposition to those of the characters." (p. 6)

I. **THE FUNCTIONAL MODEL**

He identifies first those functions of the narrator and the characters that are necessary to generate the deep structure of the text: the "obligatory functions." The "representation" and "control" functions define the narrator. Doložel sees the narrator as the "medium of the narrated events," hence, "representation," and as "dominating the narrative text structure," hence, "control." By "control" he does not mean to suggest control of the characters' behavior, but, rather, control over
incorporating DC into DN. Here while he is concentrating on his functional, but primarily verbal, definition of narrator, he leaves us with this limited definition of control, one which is like that which Baxtin and Voloshinov suggest. Later, however, in his analysis of the narrator's control in a specific work, he gives us a far more developed notion of narratorial control. For example, he tells us that the objective ("voiceless") narrator in realistic fiction controls the "story-structuring" by:

1. exclusive control of the representation of nature.
2. exclusive control over the external characterization of characters.
3. control over the revelation of the interior makeup and psychological motivations of the main character.
4. "negative control" of the representation of the action, i.e., the narrator performs certain manipulations which eliminate certain motifs (or certain groups of motifs) from the chronological sequence completely, or temporarily (device of postponement).

Characters are defined by the "action and interpretation" functions, i.e., by their participation in the narrative's events and their expression of attitudes toward them respectively. The surface structure model is generated by indicating that the narrator can take up the action function or the interpretive function or both. If the narrator assumes both of the characters' functions, the opposition of character and narrator is "neutralized": "one and the same component of the narrative structure is assigned both sets of obligatory functions." (p. 7) By introducing what
he calls "the well-known distinction" between the Er-form (third person narrative) and the Ich-form (first person narrative), he completes the second step in his classification procedure (Figure 4 below). He tells us that in his effort to pick as simple terminology as possible and for the sake of continuity, he has preserved the traditional terms, "objective," "rhetorical," and "subjective," to describe the modes according to function. Once he has determined the functions and introduced traditional terminology, the functional typology of the narrator becomes Figure 5.

II. **THE VERBAL MODEL**

Doložel informs us that he wants the base for the typology of narrative modes to be sought in the verbal structure of DN. Once he has constructed his functional model for the narrator, he points to shifts in the narrator's functions as the source of the shifts in the verbal structure of DN. Therefore, he tells us that the typology resulting from the verbal model will be identical to that suggested in Figure 4, except that it will suggest the dynamic character of the transition from mode to mode more clearly. He presents the di-hotomy of verbal features in
Figure 4: The Functional Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative Mode</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>representation</th>
<th>interpretation</th>
<th>action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>objective</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rhetorical</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subjective</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: The Functional Typology

Narrative Mode

Er-form

- objective
- rhetorical
- subjective

Ich-form

- objective = observer's
- rhetorical
- subjective = personal
DN and DC by means of a set of binary text features (Figure 5). We will discuss his specification of discourse by text features in great detail later. But, for the moment, we want to show how Dolozel combines his functional model (Figure 4) and his binary verbal model (Figure 6) to produce the typology of narrative modes. The circular representation presented below is what results from the cooperation of Dolozel's functional and verbal models and is, finally, his structural typology of narrative modes. He sees it as a representation of the narrative modes and modes of characters' speech which he introduces in abstract terms in his "surface model" of the narrative text (Figure 2). He uses a circle to suggest the continuity of the transition from pole n₁ — specified as the objective Er-form — to the pole c₁ — specified as direct discourse. According to Dolozel, "... the 'deep' structure dichotomy of DN and DC is represented — on the 'surface' level — by the opposition of objective Er-form and direct discourse; the other modes are formed by the 'neutralization' of this opposition." (p. 9)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative Mode</th>
<th>Text Features</th>
<th>system of persons</th>
<th>system of tenses</th>
<th>deixis</th>
<th>allocation</th>
<th>emotive function</th>
<th>subjective semantics</th>
<th>specified speech level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>personal ich-form</td>
<td>1(\alpha)</td>
<td>1(\alpha)</td>
<td>1(\alpha)</td>
<td>1(\alpha)</td>
<td>1(\alpha)</td>
<td>1(\alpha)</td>
<td>1(\alpha)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subjective Er-form</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1(\alpha)/0</td>
<td>1(\alpha)/0</td>
<td>1(\alpha)/0</td>
<td>1(\alpha)/0</td>
<td>1(\alpha)/0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>objective Er-form</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rhetorical Er-form</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>observer's ich-form</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rhetorical ich-form</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: The Verbal Model
Figure 7: The Structural Typology of Narrative Modes
Doložel comments on what he calls several "critical points" in his structural typology of the narrator (Figure 7). The first is that the distinction between direct discourse and the personal Ich-form is purely functional. He tells us that in their verbal structure both modes are identical. The Ich-form is the direct discourse of a character carrying out the representation function. His second point is that the distinction between the personal and rhetorical Ich-forms must also be made on purely functional grounds. We have the presence of the action function in the personal form and its absence in the rhetorical form. His third and final point is that the distinction between represented discourse and the subjective Er-form is defined solely by the verbal model (Figure 6, p. 122). "Only a consistent or inconsistent occurrence of pertinent positive text features gives us the criterion for deciding whether we have to characterize a discourse as represented 'reproduction' of a character's speech or as a portion of subjective Er-narrative."

For the reader's convenience at this point, we may point out that what Doložel calls "represented discourse" is a more global term for what Voloshinov calls the variants of the direct and indirect discourse patterns.

**SPEAKERLESS DISCOURSE**

We mentioned earlier that Doložel makes the poetic/practical language distinction that Baxtin and Voloshinov do not make. We said at that time that we would return to
the problem of how Dolozel's view of literary language differs from Baxtin's and Voloshinov's. It is now when we begin to discuss how he specifies the dichotomy of DN and DC that the difference becomes obvious. The first indication of it occurs when Dolozel introduces the notion of a "referent-oriented text" and a "speaker-oriented text." To arrive at these abstractions, he uses Karl Buhler's model of speech which assumes that the text T is characterized by three function-relations: the expressive function—the relationship to speaker S; the allocutional function—the relationship to hearer H; and the referential function—the relationship to referent R (the subject of the text). The referent-oriented text, we find the relationship to the referent only; it lacks the relations to both the speaker and hearer. Dolozel defines this text so that the controlling function of the speaker is void and its verbal structure is determined by the referent only. In the speaker-oriented text, the speaker's control is explicit. He tell us that "under the speaker's control, certain verbal means of the text acquire additional qualities which are absent when the speaker's control is void." (p. 16) It is these qualities acquired through the speaker's control, that Dolozel calls "discriminative text features." He tells us that they are binary in nature; they assume a positive value in the speaker-oriented text and a negative value in the referent-oriented text. He reassures us that the linguistic means
that he will identify as discriminative features acquire the quality of discriminative features within the framework of the text only. By "text" here, he means the literary text because his next move is to tell us that DN is equivalent to the referent-oriented text and that DC is equivalent to the speaker-oriented text in the "traditional literary text."

Doložel introduces the notion of a "traditional text" to help himself circumvent the problem caused by the "flexible character of literary norms." He tells us that literary texts can be described either on the level of the abstract type or on the level of concrete manifestations. The structure of the abstract type can be expressed in terms of norms which are assumed to be reflected in the particular manifestations. However, because of the flexible character of literary norms, structures of particular manifestations cannot be expected to reflect the type structure perfectly. He tells us that "occasional violations of, or deviations from, the norm(s) cannot affect our attribution of a certain concrete narrative text to a specific text type."

(p. 17)

What Doložel is telling us is that we can find in certain literary texts discourse without speaker. "Objective narrative" involves this type of narrator's discourse, according to Doložel, and it is objective narrative which is the base of the theory and classification of narrative modes. He argues that "elementary misrepresentations" of
this mode's nature probably result "from the fact that it is
difficult for a literary critic to accept the idea that a
personal, partial, and idiosyncratic author can incorporate
in his text a 'discourse without speaker.'" (p. 78) The
notion of discourse without speaker is not new with Dolo-
zel's work. Other critics have toyed with this account for
narration in certain works. It is difficult, however, to
see what, if any, explanatory power such a notion gives them.

The first problem that these critics run into is
deciding which discourse is the discourse with no speaker.
Definitions of speakerless discourse vary from critic to
critic. Jonathan Culler presents an analysis of these at-
ttempts to identify speakerless discourse in his book,
Structuralist Poetics. Culler's analysis, while helpful
in pointing out the contradictions involved in these at-
ttempts, is vitiated by his own rather contradictory conclu-
sions about the issue. Culler tells us that the linguist
Emile Benveniste distinguishes, according to the system of
verb tenses, "two distinct and complementary systems . . .
that of story (l'histoire) and that of discourse (dis-
cours)." In discourse (the narration), we find the present
tense and the perfect. In both tenses, the temporal refer-
ence is to the moment of speech. (The perfect tense estab-
ishes a link between the past event and the present in
which one speaks of the event, e.g., John has bought a car.)
The reference in the aorist tense is to the moment of the
event only. The aorist then occurs in the story. Benveniste presents a passage where, apart from one verb in the present tense, there are no longer, in his opinion, any of the linguistic signs of discourse. "In truth, there is no longer even a narrator. No one speaks here; the events seem to tell themselves." (p. 198) Culler points out that this may be true from a linguistic point of view, "but the reader of literature will have recognized a narrative voice." (p. 198) He comments in this context that if we were to separate the story from all marks of a personal narrator, "we would have to exclude even the slightest general observation or evaluative adjective, the most discrete comparison, the most modest 'perhaps,' the most inoffensive logical connection, all of which partake of discours rather than l’histoire." (p. 198) It seems that while Culler buys the notion that the narration may be separated from the story, he is telling us that we will always have narration and, hence, a voice.

He holds on to this opinion for awhile when he discusses how Roland Barthes misapplies Benveniste's categories in his account of the difference between personal and "a-personal" narration. Barthes asserts that narration in which no first person pronouns appear and to which they cannot be added without destroying the sense is "a-personal." "Personal narration," on the other hand, is narration in which first person pronouns do appear or to which they can
be introduced with no loss of sense. Culler points out that by identifying personal narration in this manner, Barthes is calling "personal" what Benveniste tells us is "impersonal" discourse. For example, "he entered the tobacco shop" is an example of impersonal discourse for Benveniste because it contains the aorist. For Barthes, the same sentence is personal because we can easily say, "I entered the tobacco shop." Culler points out that for Barthes what really prevents a sentence from being rewritten in first person is the presence of elements which implicitly identify the narrator as someone other than the character which is mentioned in the sentence. Thus, paradoxically, for Barthes, the marking of a narrator becomes the criterion for "a-personal" narration. Culler tells us that Barthes's discussion does point out for us the importance of distinguishing those cases where no point of view beyond the character's is indicated and those where a narrator is indicated. Culler decides, however, that Benveniste's linguistic distinction can hardly serve as justification for making this distinction. We might point out here that the distinction to which Culler refers is made in all traditional typologies of point of view. Barthes's discussion hardly raises its significance as an issue. It is difficult to see what, if anything, Barthes's talk about narration does add to our knowledge if we deny him the definition of "a-personal" which he intends, i.e., no speaker. Even then his
analysis does not eliminate the possibility of a speaker, i.e., an authorial position, in narration with no first person pronouns.

Culler goes on to provide his own non-linguistic definition of speakerless narration. He is able to provide us with this definition for two reasons. The first is that he makes identifying a narrator in a work equivalent to figuring out how the text relates to the world. The second is that he does not allow for inconsistent narration. For example, he tells us that while some avant-garde fiction can be made intelligible by identifying a narrator for it, "the most radical works set out to make this kind of recuperation an arbitrary imposition of sense and to show the reader how dependent his reading is on models of intelligibility." (p. 200) He tells us that such novels act by becoming thoroughly banal when "naturalized" (made to be about the world by being the product of a narrator). That they become banal is supposed to show the reader "at what cost he has purchased intelligibility." (p. 200) He cites as another case of speakerless discourse those novels with "limited point of view." He tells us that "if we cannot compose the text by attributing everything to one narrator, we . . . break it down into scenes or episodes and give meaning to details by treating them as what was noticed by a character who was present at the time." (p. 201) According to Culler, this convention "may be seen as a last-
ditch strategy for humanizing writing and making personality the focal point of the text. . . ." (p. 201) Finally, Culler agrees with Barthes when Barthes distinguishes between those works where a narrator makes the text into a "communication about a world situated with respect to narrator and reader" and those which are "writing." "Writing becomes truly writing only when it prevents one from answering the question 'who is speaking?'" (p. 200)

Our question becomes can we conclude from Culler's analyses that there is such a thing as speakerless discourse? The answer is no, if we are to depend on what Culler tells us. He points out how Benveniste and Barthes fail to identify it. And about Culler's own account of it, we can say that inconsistent narration becomes a problem only for those who operate with the particular canon of fictional realism that counts consistent narration as a criterion for realism. Culler is actually demanding that the narrator's relation to the events he tells remain the same throughout the work. He is at the same time demanding that the narrator adopt a conventional stance toward what he relates. The facts of inconsistent narration and unconventional stances do not support the conclusion that there is "speakerless" discourse. We can conclude, however, why such a notion has been conceived. First of all, the idea of speakerless discourse seems to be yet another attempt to discover
differences between "poetic" and "practical" language or "communication" and "writing," as the case may be. Second, it seems to have been concocted by Culler, in particular, to solve what are problems only for a particular approach to point of view.

Doložel anticipates in his account of speakerless discourse two of the objections that Culler sees fit to raise to Benveniste's account. We may remember that Culler tells us what all we would have to exclude if we were to separate the story from all marks of a personal observer. (p. 24) Doložel with his notion of the traditional text can explain away references to the personality of the narrator by writing them off as deviations from the norms of the traditional text. Doložel also tells us that any statement about the "death of the narrator" is "a misleading figure of speech." (p. 79) The objective narrator still maintains the control and representation functions. "In other words, a piece of fiction employing the technique of the objective narrator is not prose without a narrator, but only prose without the interpreting and acting narrator." (p. 79) We can only point out that Doložel has a narrow idea of interpretation. We also wonder how many deviations from the norm are allowed before we may start talking of a speaker. For example, he presents the following description of a landscape as that coming from an objective, "voiceless" narrator:
The masses of snow clouds dispersed and the blue sky arched over the earth. The sun quivered in the bright azure, but the hilly landscape was all in the whiteness of snow which the earth, once again frozen to the bone, still huddled under. (Rais, Kaliba's Crime) (p. 81)

Here is another passage of description from the same so-called objective narrator which Dolozel presents to us:

She was pretty, only her eyes occasionally flashed in a strange manner, her eyelashes frowning and her look acquiring a strange, wild, almost ugly expression, reminiscent of her mother. (p. 83)

It is obvious that the examples which Dolozel himself provides make it impossible for us to grant any credence to his notion of speakerless discourse. We have in these two passages a speaker whose discourse possesses the emotive and semantic functions. We do have the point of view of a narrator expressed here. In this context, Dolozel lets slip what we must assume is his working definition for the "objective narrator." He tells us that "this mode can be materialized only within the framework of the traditional narrative text. Only in a structure of this type (recognized by strict boundaries between narrative and character's speech) can the objective narrative preserve its 'purity,' protected from any influence coming from the speech of the characters." (p. 88) This definition, of course, entails none of the other information that he provides about the mode. We may wonder if Dolozel himself has a clear idea of to what he wants "objective narration" to refer.
THE SET OF SEVEN DISCRIMINATIVE FEATURES

When Dolozel presents his account of the discriminative features, he actually does so with two goals in mind. One, of course, is to give us the verbal means for distinguishing the different narrative modes. The second is to account for "represented discourse" in terms of verbal features of the text. "Represented discourse," as we have already mentioned is Dolozel's global term for the variants of direct and indirect discourse. He hails represented discourse as the truly "international, universal device," the existence of which "clearly demonstrates that the idea of 'world literature' is highly meaningful with respect to literary forms and structures." (p. 19) He considers represented discourse to be a "transitional narrative device" created through the neutralization of the opposition of DN and DC.

1. SYSTEM OF GRAMMATICAL PERSONS

The fundamental formal discriminative feature of DC and DN is the system and use of grammatical persons. His account refers both to the persons of the verb and to personal pronouns. DC is characterized by a three person system. The persons of the verb acquire the value of "shifters" in DC. The use of persons follows the shifts in functions of speaker, hearer, and referent which can be assigned to the participants in the speech act. In contrast,
in DN, where the relations to both speaker and hearer are void, verbal action can be assigned only to the referent (the object of utterance). This situation results in DN having only a one form system of grammatical persons, equivalent to the third person formation. Dolozel presents the following examples of discourse. The first is pure DC form. The second is represented discourse.

a. A: "Where is your workman?"
   B: "At home, in Rybary."
   A: "How do you know that?"
   B: "Well - I only think - "
   A: "I'm not asking you what you think. How do you know that he's in Rybary?"
   B: "--I don't."

b. A: Mister's a stranger here?
   B: Yes, that's right, a stranger. He's moved in and doesn't know things here yet, and he's going to live here permanently.
   A: Then, of course, . . . he's going to need someone to do his laundry once in awhile. Has he found a woman in Dolina to do his laundry for him?
   B: Oh . . . he hadn't even given it a thought, and that's no small matter.

In the second example, speaker B is referring to himself in the third person. Dolozel tells us that in this example, the reduction of the grammatical persons to one, formally identical with the third person, gives the dialogue "a strange muted quality." In a detailed analysis, he shows us the following use of persons in Czech RD. The reference to the speaker is expressed by the third person:

c. Torgler: He thanks both gentlemen for their good will; but he knows that his case is in the best possible hands and he is asking Doctor Sack only to act for him as he sees fit.
The reference to the hearer, too, is expressed in the third person:

d. Policeman: "How are you, Erzika?" . . . No, she mustn't be afraid, he hasn't come on official business.

The grammatical person of the referent (object of the utterance) is the third person:

e. Standa: What will the party think?--they all did a hundred times more . . . even that beast Matula, and Pepek with his jawing.

We may remember that Doložel asserts that RD in fictional prose has developed forms which cannot be explained by reference to "everyday dialogue." The examples he presents here do not justify his claim. We are familiar with conversations in which, for various reasons, a speaker will refer to himself or herself in the third person. For example, a speaker might say:

This woman knows one thing for sure. She'd better hurry if she wants to make that deadline!

It seems we use constructions such as this when we want to draw attention to either the seriousness of or the humor involved in our situations. We also, at certain times, address our listener in the third person. What seems to distinguish the use of "RD" in prose from its use in everyday speech is that in everyday speech, we do not use it to report other people's interior monologues. We do use it to report our own upon occasion. This difference alone
cannot account for Doložel's claim that speech forms in fictional prose have developed independently from those in everyday speech. But even though we must reject his basic claim, his analysis of RD does draw our attention to some specific features of our language use which are important both in everyday dialogue and fictional prose. For example, Doložel concludes that the system of grammatical persons of RD is obtained when transforming the three person system in such a way as to arrive at a system formally identical with that of DN. This rule he offers as the basic statement of his theory of RD.

2. VERBAL TENSES

The problem of the difference between DC and DN in the system of verbal tenses is more complicated than that of grammatical persons. Doložel tells us that, generally, DN can be considered oriented toward "epic," i.e., past time; it renders past actions. He points out that the use of the historical present does not change matters since it is a stylistic device, the effect of which is based on the contrast between present form and past function (determined by context). Tense in DC expresses the reference to the individual and the shifting time position of the speaking character. The speaker's "now" represents the time center, in relation to which the use of verbal tenses is determined. Tenses in DC are "shifters" just as the grammatical
persons of the verb are. In English, Dolozel tells us, RD is characterized by the past tense. In Czech RD, tenses are used both absolutely (with no reference to the act of enunciation) and as shifters. For example:

f. Vlach: Of course Gamza is entitled to actual freedom in all his theatrical columns. Vlach is not intending to interfere with this right of his.

and

h. Stanislav: Ah, darkness was just right for what he wanted to ask yer.

Dolozel identifies the second example here as "internal monologue."

3. DEIXIS

Deixis is what Dolozel calls the function some demonstrative means (pronouns, adverbs) assume of pointing to the shifting time-space position of the speaker. Demonstrative means with deictic function behave as shifters as do verb tenses and grammatical persons in DC. In DN, demonstrative means do not behave as shifters; rather, they point to some spatial or temporal centers of the narrated action, fulfilling a function which can be called "elenxis."

Dolozel tells us that the function of elenxis is possible in DC, and, consequently, only deixis operates as a discriminative feature. Demonstrative means with deictic function are a marked feature of RD.
4. **ALLOCUTION**

"Allocution" is a signal to the listener intended to "govern his intrinsic or extrinsic behavior." (p. 30) Allocution presupposes a listener and is proper to dialogue and soliloquy. The allocutional function in Czech DC is expressed by the imperative mood, the interrogative sentence, and the vocative case as a means of address. In contrast, since DN by definition has no hearer, it has no allocutional function. Doložel comments that RD is closer to DN in this feature because RD utterances express allocutional function with the modification of form and frequency implied by RD's system of grammatical persons. For example, allocution is muted in RD because there is no second person in RD, and, therefore, there is a change in the imperative form. Also questions in RD rarely require answers; they have modal or emotive functions.

5. **EMOTIVE FUNCTION**

Doložel borrows Roman Jakobson's definition of the emotive function: "emotive function aims a direct expression of the speaker's attitude toward what he is speaking about. It tends to produce an impression of a certain emotion whether true or feigned." (p. 32) Since DN, by definition, does not express any reference to the speaker, it does not possess the emotive function. In contrast, DC commonly does express various subjective attitudes of the speaking
characters by a variety of emotive means. Dolozel labels interjections, the exclamatory sentence, the optative sentence, and the deliberative and rhetorical questions as emotive means. All of these means occur with great frequency in RD. Dolozel sees this frequency reflecting the generally emotive character of interior monologues which are usually expressed in RD.

6. SEMANTIC FEATURES

Dolozel remarks that while he does attempt to seek out verbal means which carry out the discriminative features of semantic distinction, isolating individual means is rather inefficient. The semantics of DN and DC is a "contextual semantics," i.e., those planes are semantically differentiated only as contextual wholes. Individual semantic means, words, for example, participate in the formation of that contextual semantics, and, at the same time, acquire specific semantic qualities from the impact of their context. Dolozel sounds very much like Baxtin when he tell us that "... we can say that an utterance (be it a monologue or part of a dialogue) represents an idiosyncratic subjective semantic context in the sense that--besides its referential semantics--it expresses attitudes, viewpoints, and evaluations of its speaker originator." (p. 34) The speaker is the primary factor organizing and controlling the contextual semantics of his utterance. Therefore, by
definition, only DC utterances possess idiosyncratic, subjective semantic qualities, reflecting the individual viewpoints and attitudes of the speaking characters. DN, assumed to reveal no reference to the speaker-narrator, expresses no individual attitudes, no point of view, no subjective semantics. We have already pointed out that no critic who posits the existence of this discourse without point of view is successful in identifying it for us. Absence of reference to the speaker obviously does not prevent an utterance from representing a particular position toward that being referred to. We might point out here, that Doložel's list of discriminative features seems too narrow to capture all those features of language which indicate the ideological position of the speaker. We could agree with Baxtin here and say that it is a fact that we naturally hear utterances as expressing the position of their originator. Despite our own convictions, we must point out Doložel's stand on this issue. He tells us that RD in its semantic aspect is identical with DC, i.e., its verbal means carry the contextual component of subjective semantics. He admits, however, that with regard to his present knowledge, he is unable to present us with any final classification of semantic means. He tells us about only two features which he is prepared to call semantic features of DC and RD.
The first he calls "attitudinal semantics." He defines attitudinal semantics as "the expression of individual attitudes and evaluations relating to the verbalized thoughts, depicted actions, characters, etc." (p. 37) Qualifying adjectives and adverbs which carry the speaker's evaluations are the primary means of attitudinal semantics. "Modality" is the second semantic feature. By "modality" Doložel means "that evaluation of the verbal action which attributes to it the quality of unreality, possibility, conditionality, or necessity." (p. 37) Modal means are neutral in terms of the opposition of DN and DC, so modality becomes a discriminative feature of RD only where we can determine from the context that modal evaluation originates from a character.

7. **SPEECH-LEVEL FEATURES**

DC utterances, controlled by an individualized speaker, make use of verbal means reflecting the speaker's idiolect; these means will be particularly conspicuous if the speaker's idiolect is based on a substandard speech level (on a regional or social dialect). On the other hand, DN is assumed to be based on a "neutral" speech level reflecting the standard language of the period. As far as speech-level features are concerned, RD is generally identical with DC.

Doložel closes his account of discriminative features with the table we have included on the next page. This
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Characters' Speech</th>
<th>Discriminative Features</th>
<th>system of persons</th>
<th>system of tenses</th>
<th>Coxis</th>
<th>allocution</th>
<th>emotive function</th>
<th>subjective semantics</th>
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(*with formal modifications)

Figure 8: Discriminative Features in DN, DC, and RD
table shows how positive and negative values of discriminative features participate in the verbal structure of RD. At the same time it reveals that RD has no discriminative features of its own. "RD. . . . is a certain concentration of some positive features of DC emerging on the unspecified ('zero') base of DN." (p. 40) Dolozel comments that there is a tradition which identifies RD with interior monologue. According to Dolozel, however, the identification of RD with interior monologue is based on limited evidence. He argues that only in its first stages of development was RD used exclusively for the expression of interior monologues. He points to his investigations which show that both basic forms of characters' speech, interior monologue and dialogue, can be found expressed in RD. Thus, he considers that, from the functional point of view, RD is a device synonymous with direct discourse and unmarked direct discourse. (Unmarked direct discourse is a variant of direct discourse which preserves all of its grammatical, semantic, and speech-level features, but lacks its conventional punctuation, i.e., quotation marks, etc.) Doložel sees these three devices competing in modern prose for the expression of dialogues and interior monologues.

Even though he characterizes these three devices as synonymous from the functional viewpoint, he asserts that they will produce different effects because they possess different formal features. Thus, we see those parts of
characters' speeches which are semantically less important being expressed in RD while those parts with more semantic importance are expressed in direct discourse. By the same token, speeches with an emotive nature are expressed in direct discourse while "emotionally muted" speeches are expressed in RD. Other factors play a role in which devices will appear. Doložel mentions that, in particular, the idiosyncratic preferences of the author figure in the selection of devices. When Doložel does discuss the preferences of an author, he does so in a matter that suggests the author is concerned only with developing new stylistic techniques. He never allows that concern with the construction of a particular narrative could determine the writer's choice of technique. He concludes that, in reality, the general functions of direct discourse, unmarked direct discourse, and RD can be formulated only in probabilistic terms. Thus he tells us that direct discourse is the usual, primary means of expressing dialogue in Czech fiction.

Unmarked direct discourse is used most often to express interior monologues. And RD is the most common, primary device for expressing interior monologue. At the same time, however, some specific types of dialogue can be found expressed in RD. Doložel tells us finally that "in harmony with its form, RD has developed a specific function of its own--expressing dialogues and monologues of a narrative character." (p. 43) More specifically that RD is used to
verbalize actions, episodes, and incidents which usually do not belong to the main action. He argues that this function for RD arises from its formal identity with DN, the basic form for introducing action motifs. When these are introduced into RD, they do not interrupt the "smooth flow of the narrative, but are normally assimilated into DN." (p. 45)

Doložel concludes by relating the developments in the function of RD to the structure of the modern novel. He defines the traditional text as alternating between strictly demarcated segments of DN and DC. In the modern text, these strict alternations no longer appear. He declares that what he calls "diffused RD" (DN penetrated and modified by a limited number of discriminative features which appear as signals coming from RD) changes the relationship of DN and DC dramatically. The relationship between DN and DC is now dynamic; a continuous field of transition exists between the pole of DN and the pole of DC. He even admits that there are "portions of the text where we cannot decide whether DC is penetrated by signals from DN, or DN tinged with signals from DC. These are simply mixed contexts where, as it were, both the narrator and the character speak at the same time." (p. 53) He labels diffused RD and "NC." In his typology of narrative modes, he calls NC the "subjective Er-form." Interestingly enough, he calls NC an example of what Baxtin would call "double-voiced" discourse. "The NC blend cannot be assigned to a homogeneous source; rather, a new totality of the two
combined sources of 'verbal behavior,' that of narrator and that of a character, is supposed to account for the verbal structure of discourse NC . . . the narrator's voice being inseparably fused with the voice of a character."

(p. 54) He presents us with two variants of the subjective narrative mode, i.e., RD used in narrative fashion. In the first, a character's participation in the narration is indicated by semantic, deictic, and other signals, but no speech-level shift from the norm can be observed:

Maybe they were still alive, those animals that Hausler and Ruza ate raw. Ondrej would not put any in his mouth for all the world. But Ruza who'd already then, on Christmas Eve in Nechleby, so bravely bitten into snails, encouraged by another old gentleman, Uncle Frantisek, was now gulping down oysters, that disgusting slime which Ondrej could not even look at, with the help of a drop of lemon, and wanted to flush it down with wine. (italics Doložel's)

Doložel tells us that here the viewpoint of Ondrej, the protagonist of Pujmanova's People on the Crossroads, is clearly expressed. He points out that the lexical variety and syntactic complexity which is generally characteristic of the narrative style in Pujmanova's novel is preserved. In the second variant, a character's participation is expressed by all the positive signals, including the signals of a specified speech level. This variant comes closest to first person narrative; it is distinguished from it almost by grammatical form alone:
Did not Dovbusa's cuirass emerge from the earth at Brazy? There, before his death, the famous robber of these mountains buried his flintlock rifle deep underground. And every year, the rifle moves a bit farther from the earth's darkness to the earth's surface; and when the whole of it will glitter in the sun, like avens or anemone in the meadows of the spring, the world will be given a new Oleska Dovbus, Dovbus who took away from the rich and gave to the poor, beat the masters and never killed a soul except in just revenge or self-defence.

Doložel tells us that here the stylistic features of folk myth are "conspicuously present." He comments that we find this "participation of a 'collective' character, the expression of the 'voice of the people' through typical idioms of its myths" throughout Olbracht's *Nikola Suhaj, Robber*.

Doložel describes the passages above as examples of RD used in a narrative fashion. These seem to us examples of what Voloshinov would call "substituted direct discourse" since there is no speech interference present. Finally, when we look at Doložel's examples, it does not appear that he presents us with anything very different from the phenomena that Baxtin and Voloshinov describe. The difference lies in his choice to define these phenomena solely in terms of linguistic features. (We might point out here that when he begins to discuss actual examples, the word "voice" creeps into his vocabulary; he even assigns the narrator in these passages a voice, an authorial position. What remains to be seen is if Doložel's typology improves upon our understanding of the problem of point of view in fiction.)
OUR CONCLUSIONS

It seems again that the best way for us to determine if we can apply Doložel's insights is to attempt to analyze the Woolf passage in terms of his theory. (The reader may remember that in the last chapter, when we analyzed the passage in Voloshinov's terms, we concluded that it is direct discourse emerging from quasi-direct discourse.) The passage is:

For what happened to her, especially when staying with the Ramsays, was to be made to feel violently two opposite things at the same time; that's what you feel, was one; that's what I feel, was the other, and then they fought together in her mind, as now. It is so beautiful, so exciting, this love, that I tremble on the verge of it.

It seems that Doložel might tell us that what we have here is an interior monologue expressed in RD and unmarked direct discourse. Or there is a possibility that he could tell us that this passage is an example of interior monologue expressed in unmarked direct discourse growing out of the narrative. It is difficult to tell because to distinguish between the two we have to count discriminative features. That in itself is taxing. But a problem arises when he tells us that there is no real need to distinguish between compact RD and diffused RD. "Compact RD" is RD that, "though grammatically identical with DN, can be clearly distinguished from sections of DN, representing a compact, delimited and well-defined portion of character's speech (dialogue or interior monologue)." (p. 50)
Doložel defines RD as a concentration of positive discriminative features (deictic, allocutional, semantic, speech-level) on the formal base of DN. Diffused RD then occurs "if the positive features are dispersed thinly, as sporadic signals on the DN base." (p. 51) He tells us that the result is "just a tinge of DN." Because compact RD and diffused RD represent two poles of the same phenomenon, Doložel concludes that there is no real need to decide explicitly what type of RD is present. So it seems that we may conclude that what we have is probably compact RD.

There is still the problem of deciding whether we have narration in the rhetorical or subjective Er-forms. We would like to say that we have the subjective Er-form here because we hear two voices merge. However, Doložel tells us that in the subjective Er-form we have a narrator who possesses the action function. The narrator here is not a participant in the action. Thus, it seems we must call the narration in this passage narration in the rhetorical Er-form. It seems, finally, that his theory does not allow us to say what we feel is necessary about this passage. Moreover, it does not allow us to approach the modes of relationship of the narrator to the narrative in any adequate fashion.

It is Doložel's preoccupation with linguistic features that seems to be the source of his problems. It seems obvious that a set of only seven discriminative features
is far too limited to account the functions and effects of language use in artistic prose. Moreover, the generation of a narrative involves conventions beyond the strictly linguistic. For example, the guiding intelligence and the represented world are not linguistic conventions. His attempt to account for the "objective narration" as "speakerless discourse" is only the most obvious error to which this preoccupation leads him. He is also unable to account for the relationship of the narrator to the guiding intelligence. After all is said and done, what Doložel gives us is a set of abstract categories in terms of which we are to attempt to describe all of the manifestations of point of view in literature. We have learned from our experience with the New Critics that such an approach will not work. Inherent in this notion that all fiction fits into one of several point of view categories is the idea that point of view must remain consistent throughout the narrative. Doložel's own account of "diffused RD" should have led him to see that his typology lacks the refinement necessary to describe the possible modes of the narrator's relationship to the narrative. His desire to talk of "double-voiced discourse" should have led him to see that we must not only talk about shifting point of view but also about multiple viewpoints. Yet, Doložel remains oblivious to the implications of his analyses. Finally, it seems as if Doložel's
promise to account for the forms of the narrator's discourse solely in terms of linguistic features and functions is an empty one. He fails because he attempts to avoid the problems which plague past accounts of the narrator by ignoring significant modes of the narrator's relationship to the narrative.
NOTES

1 Lubomir Dolozel, Narrative Modes in Czech Literature, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973, p. 2. Hereafter quotations from this work will be documented by page numbers in parentheses.


3 Quoted by Culler, Structuralist Poetics, p. 198.

4 The passage to which Benveniste refers is: After a turn in the Arcades, the young man looked at the sky and then at his watch, made an impatient gesture, entered a tobacco shop, lit a cigar, placed himself before a mirror, and glanced at his clothes, somewhat more elaborate than the laws of taste in France permit. He adjusted his collar, and his black velvet waistcoat, which was crisscrossed by one of those large golden chains made in Genoa; then, throwing his velvet-lined coat onto his left shoulder with a single movement and letting it hang there in elegant folds, he continued his walk, without allowing himself to be distracted by the leers of passers-by. When the lights in the shop began to go on and the night seemed sufficiently dark, he made his way towards the square of the Palais Royal like a man who was afraid of being recognized, for he kept to the side of the square until the fountain so as to enter the rue Froidmanteau screened from the hackney cabs.
Boris Uspensky, unlike any of the other writers we have studied, has in mind when he approaches point of view a general theory of composition which studies the laws which govern the structural organization of the artistic text. In other words, he thinks it is possible to describe the structure of a work by describing the various viewpoints from which the narration or description is conducted. By the word "text" here Uspensky means "any semantically organized sequence of signs."¹ When he defines "structure," he does so in opposition to another term, "montage." He tells us that "... montage ... may be conceived in terms of the generation of the artistic text (the synthesis): the structure of the artistic text should be regarded as the result of the reverse process, the analysis." (p. 5) He tells us further in a footnote that a direct analogy can be made here with generative models (of synthesis) and analytic models in contemporary linguistics. Uspensky allows that there may be many approaches to the articulation of structure of a work of art. Thus we get the idea that while he chooses to do so by specifying the
points of view from which the narration or description is conducted, he does not rule out other approaches. For example, he tells us that this approach will not work for abstract painting, nondescriptive music, architecture, and ornament. Point of view pertains to any art related to semantics, i.e., arts concerned with "the representation of some part of reality set out as the denotatum, although it may be differently manifested in the various arts (literature, painting, film, theater)." He sees it as "a problem directly related to those forms of art which by definition have two planes, a plane of expression and a plane of content (the representation and that which is represented)." His second statement is, of course, far more acceptable. What is represented by the narrative is not "some part of reality" but a fictional world, a "represented world" which may or may not correspond with the "real world." Although he does discuss the other art forms, he is concerned primarily with presenting us with "the typology of compositional options" in literature as they pertain to point of view. In other words, he is concerned to show us what types of point of view are possible, what kinds of relationships may occur among them, and what their functions are.

Uspensky chooses to describe the manifestations of point of view in the literary work in terms of "planes."
He designates these planes as the plane of ideology, the plane of phraseology, the spatial and temporal plane, and the psychological plane. He tells us that while the planes of analysis which he outlines generally respond to different possible manifestations of point of view, the possibility of discovering a new plane beyond his scheme is not excluded. He acknowledges that there is certain degree of arbitrariness in his enumeration of the planes. The possibility of other planes need not concern us here. The important thing at this point is to note the connection which Uspensky draws between the planes of investigation and the structure of the work. We must mention here that Uspensky also defines these planes as "levels of description." He concludes that "... different approaches to the articulation of points of view in an artistic work (that is, different planes of investigation of point of view) correspond to different levels of analysis of the structure of the work." (p. 7) He is telling us here that different approaches to the articulation of the points of view in a work correspond to different methods of describing the work's structure.

We have presented Uspensky's own description of his work here, but we do not think he describes it as clearly as he might. In his attempt to be "scientific," he makes things seem more complex than they are. Actually, Uspensky
is not introducing any new subject matter, so to speak, into point of view studies. The New Critics and the Formalists discuss the modes of relationship of the narrator to the narrative in terms of ideology, psychology, phraseology, and space and time. The situation is that the Formalists concentrate upon phraseology, while the New Critics concentrate upon psychology and space. What is new with Uspensky is the notion that we may investigate the modes of the relationship of the narrator to the narrative separately and then in terms of their interrelationships. He has reconceptualized point of view, in a sense. In the preceding chapters, we examined typologies of points of view. Implicit in these typologies is the assumption that point of view can be "inconsistent" in terms of the narrative but not in terms of a single scene. In other words, the narrator may "shift" his position from scene to scene, but he cannot construct a single scene from more than one position. We might describe what Uspensky gives us as a morphology of the modes of the relationship of the narrator to the narrative. It is his idea that point of view is a "migrating phenomenon and a unit of a multitude of realizations." (p. xv) (Actually, it is more accurate to say that Uspensky realizes that point of view can migrate on all planes. Baxtin and Voloshinov show us that it migrates on the phraseological plane.) In other words, he sees that
the narrator may move on each plane, adopting first one
character's point of view and then another's or maintaining
his own. The result is that we can find narratives, and
single scenes within narratives, constructed from several
nonconcurrent positions. Uspensky spends a great deal of
time showing us how the juxtaposition of viewpoints can
function in the narrative.

In these introductory remarks, we must also mention
that Uspensky, like his predecessors Baxtin and Voloshinov,
does not make a poetic/practical language distinction. He
is searching for universal laws of composition in his work.
Thus he draws parallels throughout his study with painting
and the other forms of representational art. He also draws
parallels between literature and the practice of everyday
speech, story-telling and conversation. His argument is
that "if the parallels between the arts bear witness to the
universality of the laws of composition, then the connec-
tion between literature and ordinary speech testifies to the
naturalness of those laws. . . ." (p. 7)

IDEOLOGICAL PLANE

Uspensky describes the ideological plane as the "most
basic" and as the "least accessible to formal analysis."
(p. 8) By "most basic," he seems to suggest that this plane
stands in what could be called a "deep to surface structure
relationship" with the other planes. He tells us that on
this plane we are interested in the problem: "whose point of view does the author assume when he evaluates and perceives ideologically the world he describes." (p. 8) This point of view may, he comments, belong to the author himself; or it may be the normative system of the narrator as distinct from the author's (perhaps in conflict with the author's); or it may belong to a character represented in the work. Uspensky tells us that, when he refers to the author's evaluative system here, he is referring only to the world view that he adopts for the construction of the narrative. To determine just what evaluative position the author has adopted, we must rely in large part on our intuitive understanding, according to Uspensky.

Uspensky only creates confusion by referring to the author here. We want to substitute for the term "author" in Uspensky's description of the ideological plane the term "guiding intelligence." In this way, we can speak of that world view implicit in the work without making any claims about the writer's motives or intentions. As we have already made clear, the problem of the writer's relation to his or her work is a problem which requires the use of extra-literary sources for its solution. When we are discussing the manifestations of point of view in a particular work, it is not necessary that we solve this problem.

As he does for all of the other planes, Uspensky describes point of view on the ideological plane in terms
of compositional possibilities. The simplest case occurs when ideological evaluation is carried out from a single, dominating point of view. Baxtin describes this situation as "monologic," we may remember. Here the single viewpoint will subordinate all others in the work. If some other point of view should emerge, nonconcurrent with the dominant one (if, for example, some facts should be judged from the point of view of one of the characters), this judgment will, in turn, be reevaluated from the dominant position.

In some works, we may speak of multiple evaluative views. For example, we may consider the situation in Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury.* (Uspensky's example is Lermontov's *A Hero of Our Times.*) *The Sound and the Fury* is divided into sections, each narrated by one of the heroes. In each section we find the character Caddy and her behavior evaluated from yet another point of view: Benjy's, Quentin's, Jason's, and Dilsey's. Within the narrative, these different evaluative systems assume definite relationships to each other, forming what Uspensky describes as "a complex design of oppositions and identifications." (p. 10) It is this design that is the compositional structure of the work on the plane of ideology.

Uspensky believes that we can find works in which the multiple evaluative viewpoints are not subordinated to a dominant viewpoint. He tells us that if the viewpoints
are not subordinated, we have "polyphonic narration."
Uspensky borrows this concept from Baxtin, who develops it in his approach to the structure of Dostoevsky's novels. Uspensky redefines this concept for his theory of point of view in terms of three requirements:

1. Several independent points of view must be present in the work.
2. The points of view must belong directly to characters involved in the action. There can be no abstract ideological position outside the personalities of the characters.
3. In the study of polyphony, points of view on the ideological plane only are considered. They become manifest primarily in the manner in which characters evaluate the world around them.

Uspensky agrees with Baxtin that Dostoevsky's novels are polyphonic. Such is not the case, however. Uspensky tells us that we must have all viewpoints directly belonging to characters in a polyphonic work. To cite only one example, we find in *The Brother's Karamazov* all of Book Twelve: "A Miscarriage of Justice" conducted in ironic narration, "double-voiced discourse." The reader does not evaluate the action from the point of view of the narrator from whose position the narrative is constructed at this point. Rather, the narrator evaluates from the point of view of the guiding intelligence. In this section of the work, the evaluative points of view of the guiding intelligence and the narrator are in conflict. In *The Brother's Karamazov*,
the guiding intelligence sometimes adopts the evaluative position of a character and sometimes not. Perhaps it would be better to say that sometimes the guiding intelligence "shares" the evaluative system of a character, i.e., uses a specific character as the vehicle of the ideological viewpoint. We still, however, may speak of an evaluative system implicit in the work that is not to be identified as belonging to any of the characters despite this occasional sharing.

We do not accept Uspensky's notion of "polyphonic narration." We believe that we may always speak of the evaluative system of the guiding intelligence apart from the world views represented in the narrative. The case is that this evaluative system may be more or less close to the narrator's or to a character's in the work. Thus, to discuss point of view in the ideological mode is to discuss the relationship of the evaluative viewpoints represented in the work to each other and to examine their relationship to the evaluative system of the guiding intelligence. For example, when we study point of view in the ideological mode in *The Sound and the Fury*, we need to discuss the "design of oppositions and identifications" formed by the relationships of the characters' evaluative points of view and then the relationship of this design to the world view of the guiding intelligence.
We think that Wayne Booth could benefit from using our approach to ideology in the work. What Booth is really demanding from fictional works is that the point of view of the guiding intelligence be clearly deducible. His criticisms of Céline indicate that he cannot distinguish when the guiding intelligence has adopted a character's point of view.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE IDEOLOGICAL AND PHRASEOLOGICAL LEVELS

Although it is common for the ideological point of view to be expressed through the use of certain speech characteristics, i.e., by phraseological means, Uspensky warns that the ideological point of view cannot be reduced to characterizations of this kind. He points out that the diversity of ideological positions in Dostoevsky's works are almost never reflected in speech characteristics. Uspensky identifies only one such means of identifying the author's ideological point of view on the phraseological plane: the fixed epithets of folklore. He tells us when these appear in a character's speech, they do not belong to the speech characteristics of the character; rather, they manifest the evaluative position of the author.

Different phraseological features serve two functions. First, they may characterize the person to whom they belong; thus, the world view of a character (of the narrator) may be defined through a stylistic analysis of his speech.
Uspensky gives us no clue as to what sort of procedures would be involved in this stylistic analysis. Second, phraseological means may indicate concretely whose position the narrator has adopted for his narration. When we are talking about how linguistic means reflect ideological evaluation, we are still discussing the ideological plane. When we discuss how linguistic means indicate the position of the author during the narration, we are speaking strictly of the phraseological plane. Uspensky comments that the definition of a particular ideological point of view by means of phraseology may take place in any art form which uses language as its medium, e.g., literature, theater, and film. However, the position from which the author is conducting the narration may be determined by phraseological means only in literature. In other words, he thinks that the phraseological plane is limited to literature.

**THE PHRASEOLOGICAL PLANE**

Uspensky tells us that the differentiation of viewpoints is especially apparent on the phraseological plane when the author uses different diction to describe different characters and when he makes use of one or more forms of reported or substituted speech. In many cases, we may be able to detect changes in authorial position on this plane only. To explain to us in simple terms how we may think of changing position on this plane, Uspensky gives us
the "theoretical perspective" from which we must perceive the generation of the narrative. He tells us that an event occurs before a number of witnesses, among whom may be the author, the characters (the immediate participants in the event), and some other, detached observers. Each of the observers offers his own description of the event in direct discourse. Thus we have monologues which are distinct in their particular speech characteristics; however, the facts described by the various people—who may be in different relations to each other and may describe each other—coincide, intersect, and complement each other in specific ways. The author, while constructing his narrative, may use first one then another of the various narrations. These narrations, which were originally direct discourse, may merge with and be transposed into authorial speech. Within the authorial speech the shifting authorial point of view is expressed in different uses of forms of someone else's speech. Uspensky shows us here the debt he owes to Baxtin and Voloshinov. We have here, of course, what Baxtin is talking about when he speaks of the author incorporating the speech of other addressers on the plane of his own discourse without destroying that plane.

While Uspensky does have in mind something like Baxtin does as far as the generation of the narrative goes, he gives us an account of point of view that differs somewhat from Baxtin's. For example, he gives us the simplest
example of the possibilities in the choice of position, those possibilities present in a single simple sentence where we have only one voice. He presents us with three simple sentences, each of which indicates the author's adoption of yet another position toward the same event.

The sentences are:

1. Entered Natasha, his wife.
2. Entered Natasha.
3. Natasha entered.

Uspensky tells us that in sentence one we have the narration conducted from the position of an outside observer. In the second example, we have narrated monologue, according to Uspensky, i.e., the phraseological point of view of the husband. His point is that, as readers, we should not know who Natasha is; the author intends us to adopt an internal point of view belonging to the perceiving husband. He thinks that the syntactical organization of the third example suggests that Natasha's own point of view is being used. To arrive at these interpretations, Uspensky uses what he calls the "functional sentence perspective."

(p. 18) He defines the "functional sentence perspective" as "the correlation between what is 'given' and what is 'new' in each sentence." (p. 18) He tells us that in the sentence "Entered Natasha," "entered" functions as the given, taking on the role of the logical subject of the sentence, while the word "Natasha" functions as the new information, serving as the logical predicate. "The
functional construction, therefore, corresponds to the sequence of perceptions of an observer located in the room, who first perceives that someone has entered the room, and then sees that this someone is Natasha." (p. 18) On the other hand, in the sentence "Natasha entered," "Natasha" functions as the given, and the new information is expressed by the word "entered." "The sentence is constructed, therefore, from the point of view of a person for whom the given fact is that Natasha's behavior is being described, while the new information is that she did the entering, and not someone else. Such a structure appears when Natasha's own point of view is used to narrate the event." (p. 18)

This account of the relationship of syntax to point of view is something completely foreign to the analyses that Baxtin and Voloshinov present. For the remainder of his discussion, however, he confines his analyses to the approaches we are by now familiar with. His discussion of the author's point of view on the phraseological plane depends for the most part on Voloshinov's work. Uspensky tells us that the most elementary case of authorial speech is when only one point of view is used. This point of view may belong, phraseologically, to the author himself, Uspensky tells us. Here we have him agreeing with Baxtin by telling us that we can hear the author's own voice in the work. Or, of course, the author may conduct the
narrative in the voice of some narrator who can be defined by specific phraseological characteristics. Uspensky points out that in this case the author and the narrator do not coincide. He tells us that if this narrator with the specific speech characteristics does not participate in the action, we have "stylization" or "skaz." Uspensky does not make for us the distinction between stylization and skaz that we learned from Baxtin. The reader may remember that in stylization, the narrator appropriates another literary style. In skaz, he adopts an oral manner of story telling. Uspensky tells us that in yet other cases the author's phraseological point of view concurs with the point of view of one participant in the action. The narration here can be in either first person (Ich-Erzählung) or third.

Uspensky's use of the term "author" here is misleading. We have already made clear that we do not want to speak of the author himself or herself but, rather, the "guiding intelligence" in our account of the plane of ideology. In his account of the phraseological plane, Uspensky uses "author" to refer to both the writer and the originator of the utterance, whether it be narrator or character. We do not need to talk about the phraseology of the author himself. We do need to talk about the phraseology of the narrator who is either specified or unspecified. In those cases where Uspensky says we find the phraseological point of view of the author himself, we
actually have a narrator whose ideological point of view is nearly identical with that of the guiding intelligence. In the following discussion, the reader must understand "author" as referring merely to the originator of an utterance.

So far Uspensky has been describing cases where in the authorial speech only one point of view on the phraseological plane is used. There are, of course, cases where there are several points of view present on the phraseological plane. To introduce his readers to the idea of shifts on the phraseological plane, Uspensky discusses naming as a problem of point of view. His first examples come from everyday speech, magazine writing, and letters. We will not go into his accounts of naming in these sources, except to say that the same phenomena he discovers here occur in literature. Uspensky presents us with a passage from The Brothers Karamazov where different names are attributed to the same person:

His face (Fyodor Pavlovich Karamazov's) was covered with blood, but he was conscious and listened greedily to Dmitri's cries. He was still fancying that Grushenka was somewhere in the house. Dmitri Fyodorovich looked at him with hatred as he went out.

Uspensky enumerates then the different ways the different characters have of referring to D. F. Karamazov. In the narrative the author can use any one of these names. That he does so indicates that for the moment he has adopted
the point of view characteristic of whomever usually refers to the character by that name. In our passage, Uspensky suggests that the author (narrator) adopts first the point of view of the brothers and Grushenka ("Dmitri") and then an impersonal view because "Dmitri Fyodorovich" is not used by any one particular character. Uspensky tells us that in the beginning of the novel and often in the beginning of a chapter, the author will use "Dmitri Fyodorovich," adopting an impersonal viewpoint of an objective observer. He tells us that it is only after the reader has become more closely acquainted with him does the author refer to him as "Mitya." In like manner, Uspensky discusses the naming of Napoleon in War and Peace, both the author's use and the characters' use. He concludes:

In Parts I-III of War and Peace, in the majority of instances, the author calls Napoleon "Bonaparte;" in the authorial speech of Parts IV-VII, "Bonaparte" and "Napoleon" are used equally; in Parts IX-XI the name "Bonaparte" appears only in isolated instances, and in Parts XII-Epilogue it is never used. Thus, the author adopts attitudes which correspond to the attitudes of the society he describes. (p. 32)

We might point out that "Napoleon" suggests the more respectful attitude. In the opening chapters of War and Peace, we find characters referring to Napoleon pejoratively as "Buonaparte" (emphasizing the non-French origin) or even as "Bonaparty."
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE SPEECH OF THE AUTHOR AND THE SPEECH OF CHARACTERS IN THE TEXT

Uspensky tells us that the inclusion of elements of someone else's speech is a basic device for expressing changes of point of view on the phraseological plane and is by no means limited to naming alone. He discusses the various forms for reporting speech, following Voloshinov almost item for item. (When he departs from Voloshinov's characterizations, his account of reported speech suffers.)

INFLUENCE OF SOMEONE ELSE'S SPEECH ON AUTHORIAL SPEECH

The most clear-cut cases are those where the author italicizes the other person's words. Uspensky tells us that Tolstoy, when he uses someone else's speech sporadically, "seems to feel it necessary to emphasize that these words belong to another speaker, that they are borrowed for the moment from someone else's speech." (p. 34) Thus he italicizes borrowed words both in the authorial text and in the text which belongs to the characters. Other cases of the use of another's speech are more complex.

COMBINATION OF DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW IN A COMPLEX SENTENCE. QUASI-DIRECT DISCOURSE

Unlike Voloshinov, Uspensky does not emphasize "speech interference" in his definition of quasi-direct discourse. He defines "quasi-direct discourse" as a "synthesis" of indirect and direct discourse. Uspensky tells us, however,
that his discussion follows that of V. N. Voloshinov because he defines quasi-direct discourse as "... a phenomenon midway between direct speech and indirect speech, a phenomenon that permits transposition (by specific operations) into both direct and indirect speech." (p. 36) According to Uspensky, in order to transpose quasi-direct discourse into direct discourse, the appropriate material is enclosed within quotation marks and conjunctions are omitted. To transpose quasi-direct discourse into indirect discourse, we must coordinate all grammatical forms. Uspensky presents us with two examples of quasi-direct discourse:

1. The innkeeper said that I shall not give you anything to eat until you pay what you owe. (Gogol, The Inspector General)

2. 'His majesty drew his attention to the grenadier division and their parade march,' pursued the general; 'and it seems the ambassador took no notice and it seems he ventured to remark that we in France do not pay attention to such trivial matters.' (Tolstoy, War and Peace)

Uspensky comments that we have quotations in which there are two points of view and, hence, the texts of two different speakers united in a single complex sentence. He says that they relate to the clear-cut cases of borrowed speech in Tolstoy because the texts belonging to the other addresser are well-defined. In both cases, we could enclose the words of the other addresser in quotation marks and "consider them to be the product of accidental speech"
interference." (p. 36) The point is here, however, that these are not cases of accidental speech interference. Nowhere in his discussion does he make clear that speech-interference as Voloshinov defines it is necessary for quasi-direct discourse. If he were to allow this, he could not talk so easily of grammatical transposition. He does not seem to realize that he does not follow Voloshinov here, however. It seems that we should keep Voloshinov's notion of quasi-direct discourse as it allows us to discover manifestations of the ideological viewpoint on the phraseological plane.

THE COMBINATION OF POINTS OF VIEW IN SIMPLE SENTENCES.
THE INTEGRATION OF THE SPEAKER'S AND LISTENER'S POINTS OF VIEW

What distinguishes the cases of multiple viewpoints on the phraseological plane from Tolstoy's borrowed words is that in the former we find a "more organic fusion." The clearest case of this organic fusion Uspensky presents is in Russian:

In your place, I would definitely take an Englishman for a husband.

Ia by, na vashem meste, nepremenno vyshla zamuzh za anglichanina. (Dostoevsky, The Gambler)

In the Russian text, the speaker, a man, adopts the point of view of his woman listener grammatically, through the use of the feminine form of the verb. Uspensky tells us that his usage goes against all the rules of Russian
grammar. "He has 'put himself in her place' as he speaks to her, and this becomes manifest linguistically. If this phrase were taken out of its context, it could only be attributed to a woman speaker." (p. 37) In this passage the boundaries of the reported speech are not clear. Because it is completely impossible to transpose the sentence into indirect discourse by predetermined rules, Uspensky tells us that this sentence and others like it do not represent cases of quasi-direct discourse as he defines it. Uspensky's example raises an interesting question. If we were to describe this sentence using Voloshinov's schema, we would probably call it a case of substituted direct discourse. Here the author, in a sense, speaks for the other, saying what the other might have or should have said.

MAXIMUM CONCENTRATION OF DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW

Uspensky tells us that the combination of different points of view in a single word is a paradoxical occurrence which belongs to parole rather than to langue. He means to suggest here that it is usually connected with improvisation during the creation of a text rather than being the instance of a norm. He cites as an example of this combination of viewpoints manifested in a single word an instance in Dostoevsky's Notes from the House of the Dead. A criminal describes his crime; he murdered his
wife. His pronunciation of the verb to refer to the slitting of his wife's throat suggests his wife's reactions as her throat is being slit. In other words, pronouncing the word makes him grimace as if in pain and fear. Uspensky tells us that here the speaker assumes two points of view at once; that of both participants in the action. He comments that a similar conjunction of two points of view in the same element of speech is frequently encountered in mimicry, intonation, gesture, facial expression, and other paralinguistic phenomena that accompany speech. For example, when we pose a question, knowing that the answer will be in the affirmative, we often nod our heads signalling the listener's affirmation.

THE INFLUENCE OF AUTHORIAL SPEECH ON SOMEONE ELSE'S SPEECH

So far we have discussed instances where another's speech has influenced the speaker's. Of course, the situation may occur in reverse. Uspensky tells us how the author's speech may influence another speaker's discourse. He cites "narrated monologue" as the least obvious case of authorial influence. His description of narrated monologue follows Voloshinov's description of the "impressionistic variant" of indirect discourse. We may remember that Voloshinov tells us that this variant is used primarily for reporting the internal speech, thoughts and experiences of the character. "It treats the speech to be reported very
freely, it abbreviates it, often only highlighting its themes and dominants. . . . authorial intonation easily and freely ripples over its fluid structure." (p. 166) Uspensky, as has been his pr_ tice, presents us with a grammatical account of narrated monologue. He tells us oftentimes if we substitute first person pronouns for third in narrated monologue, we get direct discourse. He gives us the following example:

He had gained a seat on the cannon, from which he hoped to see the Tsar, who was to walk back. Petya thought no more of presenting his petition. If only he could see Him, he would think himself lucky. (Tolstoy, War and Peace)

Here we have what is clearly the speech of Petya Rostov, himself, formally presented in the voice of the author, according to Uspensky. He tells us that the syntax of the last sentence and the capitalization of the third person pronoun which refers to the Tsar stress the identification between the author and his character. Uspensky would have us translate this passage into direct discourse by substituting first person pronouns. He does stress that there are cases where the substitution of pronouns alone may not be sufficient to transpose the text from authorial speech to the direct discourse of the character.

Sometimes we find what we may call "potential internal monologue," i.e., the author makes reference to a conventional internal monologue which did not in fact happen but which might have taken place. Uspensky gives us the
following example:

However often she told herself that she must not let herself lose her temper, when teaching her nephew, almost every time she sat down with a pointer showing him the French alphabet, she so longed to hasten, to make easy the process of transferring her knowledge to the child, who was by now always afraid his auntie would be angry the next moment, that at the slightest inattention she was quivering in nervous haste and vexation, she sometimes raised her voice and pulled him by his little hand and stood him in the corner. (Tolstoy, War and Peace)

Here we find that in the first part of the passage the aunt's point of view is used, then the point of view of the boy, and finally that of an "abstract author-narrator." Uspensky comments that in cases like this, we attribute point of view to a character not so much because of the phraseological peculiarities of the expression as by the interpretation of the consciousnesses.

As a more obvious case of the author's influence on his characters' direct discourse Uspensky presents "substituted direct discourse." He borrows Voloshinov's term and his example here. We may remember that Voloshinov tells us that in substituted direct discourse the author steps in for his character and says what he might or should have said. The reader may wish to refer to Voloshinov's example in chapter two. (p. 49)

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POSITIONS

Uspensky provides an extended analysis of Tolstoy's reporting of direct speech in War and Peace. On the basis
of this analysis he generalizes about the narrator's position toward direct speech. Uspensky tells us that when the foreign and irregular speech is represented naturalistically, the narrator stresses the distance between the speaking character and the describing observer. It is as if by reproducing the speech the narrator emphasizes those features which would go unnoticed by someone at all close to or acquainted with the person. Uspensky describes the narrator as taking a "deliberately external view of the person being described." (p. 52) The same narrator takes an "internal view" when he translates the "idiosyncratic features of the speech into a neutral phraseology. . . ." (p. 52) In the second case, the phraseological points of view of the describer and the described begin to approach each other. Of course, the concentration upon "essence rather than form" reaches its ultimate point in narrated monologue "where the speech of the character interlocks with the speech of the author." (p. 52) Uspensky mentions in this context that the narrator's attitude may change during the course of the work. He may begin by reporting direct discourse naturalistically and then, after the reader has become acquainted with the character's linguistic style, switch to an internal view on the phraseological plane.
SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL PLANE

In some cases the point of view of the narrator may be more or less clearly defined in space and time. Uspensky tells us that we may be able to guess the position, defined in spatial and temporal coordinates, from which the narration is conducted as, for example, when the narrator seems to be carrying out the narration from the point where a character is standing. Thus, we can speak of the spatial or temporal "perspective" adopted for the construction of the narrative. Uspensky defines "perspective" as "a system for the representation of three- or four-dimensional space by means of artistic devices, specific to the particular art form." (p. 57) He tells us that the reference point in the system of linear perspective is the position of the person who does the describing. In visual art, where we speak of the transferral of multi-dimensional space onto the two-dimensional surface of the painting, the reference point is the position of the artist. In literature, the same effect is achieved by the "verbally-established spatial and temporal relations of the describing subject [the narrator] to the described event." (p. 57) When Uspensky discusses spatial and temporal points of view, he does so in terms of the narrator's concurrence or nonconcurrence with the spatial and/or temporal position of his characters.
Uspensky describes four different ways in which the narrator may assume a position concurrent with his characters. The narrator may "attach" himself to a character. If the character enters a room, the narrator describes the room; if the character goes out into the street, the narrator describes the street. For example, the narrator in *The Brothers Karamazov* is often the invisible companion of either Alyosha or Dmitri. He often "motivates" the description of an event by following them. He does not always describe the event from their point of view, however. If the narrator "merges" with a character, he may for the moment adopt not only his position on the spatial plane, but on the ideological, phraseological and psychological planes as well. Uspensky describes the case which we described first, i.e., that where the narrator does not "merge" with the character as the "suprapersonal" position.

In some cases, the spatial position of the narrator may be only relatively defined. For example, he may conduct the description from a point somewhere in the same room that we find the characters. In this case, he does not attach himself to one character in particular. His position remains "relatively defined," however, because, for instance, he will describe what the characters hear as coming from another room. The narrator assumes an
"undefined" spatial position if he tells us what is going on not only in one room, but throughout the house, and in other places as well.

NONCONCURRENCE OF NARRATOR AND CHARACTER ON SPATIAL PLANE

The narrator's position may be precisely defined yet not correspond to that of any participants in the action. Uspensky describes three different forms that a nonconcurrent position can produce. In the "sequential survey," the narrator's viewpoint moves sequentially from character to character and from one detail to another. The reader, then, is given the task of piecing together the separate descriptions into a coherent scene. In some cases, the narrator may follow the action from character to character within one space. In other cases, he may not follow the action, i.e., his movements will not be dependent on the characters' movements.

In the "bird's-eye view," the narrator takes a position far above the action so that he may present an all-embracing description of a particular scene. Here we are reminded of Lubbock's panoramic technique, of course. We can call the narrator's position in relation to the events "real" here, Uspensky tells us, because his position is indicated by the fact that there are some things he cannot see from his position. The "bird's-eye view" often appears at the beginning or ending of scenes or whole narratives to
serve "as a kind of frame" for the scene or the work as a whole. (p. 64) The "silent scene" is a special variation of this generalized description carried out from a relatively remote position. Here the narrator, who is located at some distance from the characters, can see the characters but not hear them. The result is that the reader receives a pantomimic description of the events. Uspensky comments that Tolstoy uses this device frequently.

**TIME**

In the same way that the narrator's spatial position may be defined in three-dimensional space, the narrator's temporal position may also be fixed. The author may borrow the time sense of his character, or he may use his own time schema. And, of course, he may switch back and forth between time schemas.

**MULTIPLE TEMPORAL POSITIONS: COMBINATIONS OF POINTS OF VIEW**

The narrator may change his temporal position sequentially, describing events first from one point of view and then another. Or he may "overlap" the descriptions of an event, i.e., describe that same event from several different points of view on the temporal plane. A more complicated form is one in which the same event is described from several temporal positions simultaneously. "The narrative which results is not a juxtaposition of
viewpoints, but a synthesis in which different temporal points of view are merged, so that the description appears, so to speak, as a kind of double exposure." (p. 67) Uspensky tells us that this combination of viewpoints may be manifested in the authorial commentary which accompanies or precedes the narration of a particular episode. In the commentary, the narrator adopts his own retrospective position. Thus, the commentary serves as a background against which the sequential account of the events is perceived. In keeping with his metaphor of the double-exposure, Uspensky tells us that we have a "double perspective" which derives from the double position of the narrator. On the one hand, the narrator assumes a position which is synchronous with that of a character; on the other, he adopts, within his own time frame, a retrospective point of view. When he knows what the characters cannot know because of his retrospective position, his position on the temporal plane is external. When the narrator assumes a synchronous position, his position on the temporal plane may be described as internal. Adopting a double position allows for some complicated effects. For example, we may as readers perceive the events as they occur, through the character's perceptions, and simultaneously, we may perceive the happenings differently from the way the character perceives them because we share the narrator's privileged knowledge. This phenomenon occurs several times in The
Brothers Karamazov. For example, we already know how Dmitri's trip to Lyagavy will turn out while we read the description of the event from his point of view.

Uspensky spends some time relating temporal position to the tense and aspect of the verb. He chooses to tell us how in "A Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District" the narrative past tense and the descriptive present tense are alternated throughout the story. In this story, every time the verbs are in the present tense, the author's temporal position is synchronic. The verbs in the past tense, then, provide a transition between the synchronous sections of narrative. Uspensky likens the situation here to a slide show. The synchronous passages are the slides which are connected by the narrative. When a slide is shown, narrative time stops. Between the slides narrative time is accelerated.

PSYCHOLOGICAL PLANE

On the psychological plane, the narrator can choose to describe a character from the position of an outside observer, or he may choose to structure the events through the viewpoint of an individual's consciousness. Different combinations of these techniques are, of course, possible.

EXTERNAL VIEW OF PERSON DESCRIBED

A person's behavior may be described externally in two different ways. In the first case, the observer's position
on the spatial and temporal plane is indeterminant, and his description is what Uspensky calls "transpersonal." For example, the description will take the form of a court recording in which the lack of involvement of the author and his objectivity are emphasized. In this case, only phrases like "he did," "he announced," "he said," will be used. We will not find "he thought," "he felt," "he was ashamed," etc. The second kind of external description refers to the opinion of the observer. We will find phrases like "it appeared that he thought," "he apparently knew," and "he seemed to be ashamed" in this kind of external description. Uspensky tells us that the modal expressions in these phrases "function as special operators to translate the description of an internal state into an objective description." (p. 85) The use of these operators is a device which justifies the application of verbs of feeling to a character who has been consistently described from an external point of view. He calls these modal operators "words of estrangement." (p. 85)

INTERNAL VIEW OF PERSON DESCRIBED

Uspensky points out that the verbs of feeling, verba sentiendi, function in the text as formal signs of description from an internal point of view. He tells us that in the analysis of a narrative, we may formally determine the particular aspect of its structure on the
psychological plane by the presence or absence of these words. There is the case, however, when we are attempting to distinguish internal from external views where we will encounter ellipsis. In other words, modal expressions such as "evidently" and "as if" will be left out for stylistic but not compositional reasons. For instance, in the following passage, Uspensky tells us that modal expressions are absent in the second sentence because they occur in the preceding sentence:

Fyodor Pavlovich . . . watched his neighbor Piotor Aleksandrovich with an ironical little smile, obviously enjoying his irritability. He had been waiting for some time to pay off old scores, and he could not let the opportunity slip. (Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov)

Uspensky points out in this context that words of estrangement indicate a synchronic narrator present at the action. These words then serve not only to fix the psychological viewpoint of the observer but also his spatial and temporal viewpoint.

A TYPOLOGY OF THE COMPOSITION USE OF DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PLANE

A. Unchanging Authorial Position in Narration

CASE ONE: CONSISTENTLY EXTERNAL

In terms of compositional complexity, the most simple case is that where the external view is used consistently. All events are described objectively, i.e., without any reference to the internal states of the characters. Verbs
of feeling are not present. Uspensky tells us this construction is characteristic of works of epic.

CASE TWO: CONSISTENTLY INTERNAL

In this case, all of the action is represented from one particular point of view, through the perception of one person. Thus the description of an internal state is justified only in reference to this character. The story in this instance may be presented from the point of view of a narrator in the first person (Ich-Erzählung) or from the point of view of a particular character. In the latter case the story is told in third person; we have a transformation of Ich-Erzählung because the first person pronoun is replaced by a personal name or descriptive designation.

The two cases of unchanging authorial position can be called "consistent narration," according to Uspensky. He tells us that here the position of the narrating observer is "essentially real: the author describes the behavior of characters in literature just as the ordinary person, in an ordinary narration, would describe the behavior of another person." (p. 89) In consistent narration, the author belongs to the same world as his characters, according to Uspensky.
B. The Plurality of Authorial Positions

CASE THREE: CHANGE OF AUTHORIAL POSITIONS IN SEQUENCE

In the sequential use of different points of view, each scene is described from one particular position, but the different scenes in the work are narrated from the position of different characters. Thus, the narrator seems to link his point of view with that of one of the characters, as if he were taking part in the action. His position changes in sequence, from one point of view to another, during the narration— from the point of view of one character to another, or from that of a character to his own. Each time a change occurs, verba sentiendi are used to refer to the character who is serving as the vehicle of the narrator's vision. It is important to note that in a work the number of characters who can serve as this vehicle is functionally limited. Some characters serve as the subject for the author's perceptions while others serve as its object. Uspensky comments that in many cases the main characters are described from an internal position on this plane. In other cases, the main character may be described from an external point of view so that he remains somewhat of an enigma. The reader is forced to reconstruct the character's motivations, e.g., Stavrogin in *The Possessed*. 
CASE FOUR: SIMULTANEOUS USE OF DIFFERENT POSITIONS

The narrator can assume several points of view not sequentially but simultaneously. We speak here of the copresence of internal views. The describer does not take part in the action, Uspensky tells us, but stands above it in a position that enables him to see not only all of the action, but all of the feelings and thoughts of the characters. Uspensky offers two possible interpretations for this narratorial position. On the one hand, we can say that the position of the narrator is unreal, for he takes the position of an all-seeing and all-knowing observer. Or we may say that his position is retrospective; the events occurred some time ago, and he has had time to puzzle things out after the fact. In this case, we would say that he presents us his imagined reconstructions of the characters' internal states.

What differentiates case four from the third is that here the change from one character's viewpoint to another's is so rapid that the "boundaries of the microdescriptions become blurred . . . and the separate descriptions merge in distinguishably." (p. 96) The compositional rhythm of the work is accelerated. In the case of The Brothers Karamazov, there is a correspondence between this rhythm and the internal states of the characters at the time. For instance, we see the acceleration in "An Onion" and "A Sudden Resolution."
TRANSFORMATIONAL CONCEPT

Uspensky points out that of the four different cases of narrative organization that he describes, the last three may be obtained by combining more and more complex transformations of Ich-Erzählung. The second case may be Ich-Erzählung or transformed into it by the substitution of first person pronouns. In the third case, each segment is constructed according to the same principles as the second. Meanwhile, in the fourth case, each fragment of the narrative is constructed from a single point of view and thus may be translated as in the second case.

THE PROBLEM OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW AS A PROBLEM OF AUTHORIAL KNOWLEDGE

The approach to the psychological point of view based on the presence or absence of verba sentiendi shows that formal analysis may be applied in this sphere, but it by no means exhausts the possible manifestations of point of view on this level. It is possible to make reference to a subjective state without the use of verba sentiendi. For example, Dostoevsky describes Rogožhin's attack on Myshkin in The Idiot first from Myshkin's individual, psychological point of view:

Rogožhin's eyes glittered and a frenzied smile contorted his face. He raised his right hand and something gleamed in it. The prince did not think of checking it.

Two paragraphs later, we receive an "objective" description
of the same event; facts are presented rather than impressions. (Uspensky tells us that here "the author relies on his own point of view and not the point of view of the prince; consequently, the description is carried out from a retrospective, rather than synchronic position.") (p. 82)

We know that the first passage is constructed from Myshkin's point of view not because of *verba sentiendi* but because the author limits his knowledge to what Myshkin knows.

Uspensky tells us that "if we want to generalize about all of the possible manifestations of point of view on the plane of psychology, we should perhaps give central place to the question of the [narrator's] knowledge and the sources of his knowledge." (p. 99) The key question becomes: if the guiding intelligence does place restrictions on the narrator's knowledge, what are the conditions that impose these limitations? The case will not always be that the limitations are connected with the adoption of a particular character's point of view. Uspensky points to those instances where a special narrator is created, e.g., in *stilization* and *skaz*. We might also mention that there are cases where a narrator will purposefully withhold information until a later point in the narrative so that the reader's response will be more complicated. There are several instances of this withholding in *The Brothers Karamazov*. For instance, though we are to privy to Dmitri's thoughts much of the time, we do not learn that
he keeps the remainder of Katerina's money in a bag tied around his neck until he tells his interrogators.

**THE INTERRELATIONS OF POINTS OF VIEW ON DIFFERENT LEVELS IN THE WORK**

We have learned that the concurrence of points of view on different levels of analysis in one person, although common, is not by any means obligatory. The manifestation of someone's point of view on one level of analysis does not entail that it be manifested as belonging to the same person on any other level. When, in a work, points of view concur on different levels, the compositional structures of the different levels also concur. This would be the case in *Ich-Erzählung*, for example, where the character-narrator carries out the narration from his own position, without ever adopting someone else's point of view in any of the aspects we have studied. Uspensky considers cases such as these "trivial in terms of the possibilities of compositional options." (p. 102) He tells us that, in a work, complex compositional designs are formed when structures articulated on each level of analysis are different. It is his idea that we should be able to discover the laws which govern the interrelationships of the various structures of the work, articulated on the different levels. But he admits that he is not prepared as of yet to tell us how one structure may determine another or to what extent the structures may differ. He limits himself to describing
and exemplifying possible types of nonconcurrency in viewpoint among different levels of analysis.

THE NONCONCURRENCE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW AND OTHER POINTS OF VIEW

A. Nonconcurrence of the Ideological and Phraseological Planes:

Nonconcurrence of the ideological and phraseological planes occurs when the narration in a work is conducted from the point of view of a particular character, while the compositional aim is to evaluate the character from some other point of view. "Thus, on the plane of phraseology, the character emerges as the vehicle for the [narrator's] point of view, while on the level of ideology he serves as its object." (p. 102) This situation is typical of stylization and skaz. It is also a typical device in the creation of irony. To illustrate this particular type of nonconcurrence, Uspensky uses two of Voloshinov's examples. The reader may refer to the third example of "texture-analyzing indirect discourse" presented in chapter two on page 87, and to the example of "anticipated and disseminated reported speech concealed in the authorial context" presented on page 97 of chapter two. Uspensky comments about the passage where Krasotkin's behavior is described that "in terms of phraseology, the author incorporates himself with his character, while in terms of evaluation he 'estranges' himself from the character." (p. 103) In
reference to Voloshinov's example from "A Nasty Story," Uspensky declares that "irony occurs when we speak from one point of view, but make an evaluation from another point of view; thus for irony the nonconcurrence of point of view on the different levels is a necessary requirement." (p.
)

His comment here indicates that the nonconcurrence can occur between other planes besides the ideological and phraseological.

B. Nonconcurrence of the Ideological and Psychological Planes:

Uspensky comments that in order to characterize a work, it is necessary to discover whether there is a relation between the fact that a character's mind is open or closed to us and the author's ideological attitudes toward that character. In other words, we must discover what relation obtains between outer and inner views and the distinction of characters as "sympathetic" or "unsympathetic."

If the narrator assumes the point of view of only those characters with whom, according to his intentions, the reader will identify (sympathetic characters), the psychological and ideological points of view concur. The narrator may, however, describe the inner states of unsympathetic characters. In this case, the narrator's and the reader's positions diverge. Also there is nonconcurrence of the psychological point of view and the ideological point of view.
NONCONCURRENCE OF SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL POINTS OF VIEW WITH OTHER POINTS OF VIEW

A. Nonconcurrence of the Spatial and Temporal and Psychological Points of View

Nonconcurrence of the spatial and temporal points of view and the psychological point of view occurs when the vehicle for the spatial and temporal point of view is not shown from within, but through the perceptions of some other observer. For example, we follow Stavrogin on his journeys but we are not privy to his thoughts. This device helps keep Stavrogin an enigma that we can begin to resolve only near the end of the narrative.

B. Nonconcurrence of the Spatial and Temporal Points of View and the Phraseological Point of View

Uspensky illustrates nonconcurrence of points of view on the spatial and temporal and phraseological planes with this example:

Marya Ivanova, who had taken a fancy to Rostov, seeing his attachment to her Fedya, often talked to him about her son. (War and Peace)

Uspensky comments that the scene from which this passage is taken is narrated from Nikolay's point of view. On the phraseological plane, however, at this particular moment, Nikolay's point of view is combined with Marya's. The use of the name "Fedya," the mother's affectionate name for her son indicates that in part the phraseological point of view belongs to her.
THE COMBINATION OF POINTS OF VIEW ON THE SAME LEVEL

In this instance, we are not talking about changes in the authorial point of view (shifts from one point of view to another during the narration), but about the combination of points of view, i.e., about the simultaneous use of more than one position. The use of simultaneous points of view results in "several superimposed, discrete compositional structures articulated on the same level of analysis." (p. 109) Uspensky comments that the most common occurrence of multiple positions is the case where one point of view is that of a special narrator, either openly present or concealed. This point of view may merge during the narration with the point of view of a character, and sometimes with that of another narrator. In an analysis of War and Peace, Uspensky points to the existence of two narrators. The first he describes as the "panchronic narrator." He is the "astute and intelligent observer" who is able to analyze the actions of the characters in light of their conscious and unconscious motives. He is also the narrator who provides us with his own conceptions about life and history. Uspensky tells us that "there is no real reason to differentiate this narrator from the author of the digressions in War and Peace." (p. 113) However, we find yet another narrator in the work. Uspensky calls him the "synchronic narrator." He adopts the "position of the immediate observer who is present (although he remains unseen) in the
scenes which he describes and who reports the action, synchronically, as it progresses." (p. 113) This narrator functions under the same restrictions which control the characters in the work, and his knowledge suffers the same constraints. Uspensky presents us with examples of where both of these positions are used in the same scene, e.g., in the first scene of the novel, Anna Pavlovna's soiree.

'SUBSTITUTED' POINT OF VIEW: AN INSTANCE OF A COMBINATION OF THE POINTS OF VIEW OF THE NARRATOR AND OF THE CHARACTER

Uspensky presents us with several examples where the psychological position of the characters merges with the narrator's psychological explanation and interpretation of their position. We have this example:

The presence of Natasha—a woman, a lady, on horseback—excited the curiosity of the uncle's house-serfs to such a pitch that many of them went up to her, stared her in the face, and unrestrained by her presence, made remarks about her, as though she were some prodigy on show, not a human being, and not capable of hearing and understanding what was said about her. (Tolstoy, War and Peace)

Uspensky tells us that we have two psychological positions here; one belongs to the house-serfs and the other belongs to the narrator who interprets their actions. This substitution process often takes place when the narrator describes the character's mental state from an "estranged" view, i.e., as much interpretation as reporting takes place.
THE INFLUENCE OF THE OBJECT OF DESCRIPTION ON POINT OF VIEW

Uspensky presents us with further complications of the compositional possibilities that we have discussed. So far, we have discussed compositional organization as if the choice of narrative position were dependent only upon the narrator in the narrative. There is, however, another possibility. The point of view may be determined not only by the describing subject (the author) but by the described object (which may be a particular character or a particular situation). Thus we have what we may refer to as the possibility of two "typologically distinct descriptive modes co-existing in the same work." (p. 120)

Uspensky comments that the dependence of the author's point of view on the object of description is best illustrated by examples on the phraseological level. Earlier we pointed out how particular phraseological points of view are most apparent when personal names and appellations are used, for the naming of a character in the authorial speech suggests the point of view the author has adopted toward the character at that particular moment. But different modes of description may be applied to different characters in the same work. For instance, in War and Peace, Natasha Rostov is always "Natasha," while Nikolay is called by various names to suggest the point of view of his family, his comrades, the servants, etc. Uspensky tells us that when the character is seen consistently from a single viewpoint, the
descriptive mode is dependent solely on the object of description.

A similar dependence upon the object of description may also be found on the ideological level. Uspensky points out that the situation in epic and oral poetry is such that if the writer describes the behavior of a prince, he subordinates it to the standards of princely behavior; if he writes about a saint, he follows church etiquette, etc. The described situation originates, therefore, in the object of the description and defines and determines the ideological point of view of the author." (p. 123)

THE SEMANTICS, SYNTACTICS, AND PRAGMATICS OF COMPOSITIONAL STRUCTURE

Uspensky tells us that we may discuss the semantic, the syntactic, and the pragmatic aspects of the composition of the work, i.e., we may discuss these aspects in terms of point of view. It is primarily the syntactic aspect of composition that he examines in his work; he has concerned himself with the internal structural laws and regularities which govern the construction of the text. He does give us some idea of what would be involved in the study of composition in its other aspects.

He tells us that to study the semantic aspect of composition is to examine the relationship of point of view to the described reality, "... and, in particular, that distortion of reality which is produced in its transmission
through a particular point of view." (p. 128) Here we would consider, too, the organization of multiple points of view in a work with respect to the problem of adequate representation of the referent. The case may or may not be that these views are mutually complementary and when brought together produce a more adequate image.

The pragmatics of the compositional construction studies the composition of the work in connection with the audience for whom the text is addressed. "The compositional structure of a literary work may specifically foresee some responses on the part of the reader, in such a way that the reader's reactions enter into the author's calculations, as if the author were programming those responses into the work." (p. 128) Usually, the point of view of the author, the one who is conducting the narration belongs simultaneously to the reader. In the pragmatics of composition, we would study those cases where the author has planned that his position will not concur with the reader's. We have already discussed instances of this planned nonconcurrency in our accounts of sympathetic and nonsympathetic characters. In our account of irony, we pointed out that nonconcurrency of viewpoints is a necessary requirement for its creation. In connection with his discussion of pragmatics, Uspensky tells us that "the intentional nonconcurrency of the reader's and the author's positions is the basic technique of irony." (p. 126) It is characteristic
of irony that the author speaks or acts through an assumed character, yet that character appears as the object of the author's evaluation.

The nonconcurrence of the reader and author may extend for the entire work, Uspensky comments. This is the case when the author creates a narrator who is distinct from himself and who becomes the object of evaluation. In the examples we have discussed so far, the author's position shifts with respect to the reader. The reverse may occur. Uspensky points out that "the shifting of the author's position is characteristic of irony; the shift of the reader's position, on the other hand, is typical of the grotesque." (p. 126) In Gogol's The Inspector General, the reader has just become adapted to the conventional reality presented to him when Khlestakov begins to tell lies that soon reach cosmic proportions. Thus the reader's norm of perceptions must shift. A similar shifting in the reader's position is common in fantastic literature and anecdotes. The reader must, to read fantastic literature, adapt the norm of his perceptions, his notions of probability and possibility, to a norm which is alien to him. In the anecdote, the reader first perceives the events from one point of view, and then unexpectedly discovers that he has adopted the wrong point of view; he discovers that the narrator actually spoke from a point of view different from the one he had suspected. Uspensky comments that the
shifting of the reader's position in respect to the author's is characteristic of comedy in general.

Of course, in general, various compositional relations between the author's and the reader's points of view occur first of all in terms of their relative horizons, i.e., how informed they are about the events. To study pragmatics in one sense is then to examine the shifting relationships between these horizons.

Conclusion

We are going to adopt Uspensky's theory of point of view in literature. While we cannot argue that it allows us to describe every possible manifestation of point of view in literature, we can argue that it allows us to describe more modes of the relationship of the narrator to the narrative than any other approach that we have examined. Moreover, with Uspensky's theory, we can describe both narratives where the narrator never adopts any one else's point of view and narratives where the narrator's point of view migrates in all of the modes. His theory possesses this greater descriptive power because he does not base it on any particular canon of fictional realism and because he does not attempt to account for the manifestations of point of view solely in terms of linguistic features.

We are adopting Uspensky's theory with certain revisions, however. We can, at this point, provide a summary
of these revisions. First, rather than speak of the author or the authorial position from which the narration is conducted, we will speak of the narrator and his or her position. It is the narrator who tells the story. This narrator may be "specified" in the text, i.e., identified, or the narrator may remain "unspecified," i.e., unidentified. In the Woolf passage, we have an unspecified narrator. It seems that when Uspensky talks about the author in a narrative, he is referring to those cases where the narrator is unspecified. That he does so is not surprising because unspecified narrators more often than not bear a closer relationship to the guiding intelligence than specified narrators. Baxtin, Voloshinov, and Uspensky all realize that the narrator's relationship with the guiding intelligence can be more or less close, they just fail to distinguish between the author and the guiding intelligence when they try to describe how this relationship may vary from work to work and within a single work. Thus we do not alter in any essential way what they have to say about the relationship of voices in the narrative. We merely want to identify that other "voice" that is only implicit in the narrative as the guiding intelligence's rather than the writer's.

Discussing the guiding intelligence bring us to the second revision we need to make in Uspensky's theory. It is because he fails to distinguish between the author and
the guiding intelligence that he is able to subscribe to a notion like "polyphonic narration." We reject this notion. The ideology of the guiding intelligence is always dominant in the work. Other ideological points of view may be represented in the work; however, they are always evaluated according to the norms established by the guiding intelligence. Such must be the case because it is the norms of the guiding intelligence which give substance to the represented world. When we read a narrative, we do so with the belief that it is presented to us by design as a more or less accurate representation of a fictional world. We might doubt the validity of the information given to us by the narrator(s) about this world, but we do not call into question the ontology of the represented world. This amounts to saying that while we may question the ability of a narrator(s) to know about and/or to judge events in the fictional world, we cannot doubt the guiding intelligence's ability to know about and to judge these events.

Percy Lubbock is the first to see that there is a relationship basic to the fiction beyond that of the narrator to the narrative. He directs our attention to a relationship between the author and the "subject" which is antecedent to the narrative. Wayne Booth also tries to describe this relationship when he identifies implicit norms (and an "implied author") by which we must, if we are to accept the fiction, judge events in the narrative. Baxtin,
too, seems to have something like this relationship in mind when he asserts that the writer's "ultimate conceptual authority" occurs as a matter of course in every work of fiction. Each of these men comes close to but fails at elaborating this primary relationship. We can do so in terms of the diagram we presented in the Introduction. If we draw a double-arrow between the guiding intelligence and the represented work, we have graphically represented the actual boundaries of the fictional world. Within these boundaries, we, as readers, must accept the conditions established by the guiding intelligence. Within these boundaries, the limits of what we can know and the standards by which we may judge are prescribed for us by the guiding intelligence. If we reject or ignore these limits and standards, we deny the work's ontology. Likewise, when we examine the relationships of the writer to the guiding intelligence and the relationship of the represented world to the "real world," we have left the boundaries of the fiction. These relationships are irrelevant to the ontology of the fictional world. In point of view studies, we are concerned only with the workings of the fictional world. In other words, we are concerned only with the relationships of the guiding intelligence to the represented world, the guiding intelligence to the narrator(s), the narrator(s) to the narrative, and the narrative to the represented world.
We have accounted for the first two of these relationships, and Uspensky's theory describes the second two. Thus we have, finally, a theory of point of view in literature. We can set about our task of adapting this theory to film.
NOTES

1Boris Uspensky (1970), A Poetics of Composition: The Structure of the Artistic Text and Typology of Compositional Form. Translated by Valentina Zavarin and Susan Wittig. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 5. Hereafter, quotations from this work will be documented by page numbers in parentheses.
CHAPTER V

APPROACHES TO POINT OF VIEW IN FILM

We commented in our Introduction that writers on point of view in film are to be distinguished by their failure to define or apply terminology consistently. We can point to another problem in this writing. Every approach that we will examine fails to account for many of the manifestations of point of view in film. These major problems notwithstanding, we can divide the writing we will examine here into two categories. In the first category, we find an emphasis on the film-maker and his role in creating the mood or tone of the film. In the second category, we find writers discussing point of view in terms of the generation of narrative space. From writers belonging to the second category we hear nothing about mood or tone.

Roy Huss and Norman Silverstein assert that the film-maker "as an artist, good or bad, tells us how he feels about the photographic reality he shows us by the way he manipulates it." What "photographic reality" is they do not make clear. Point of view, for them, is a matter of whether "the filmed material purports to be unmalleable reality (objective) or reality as seen by a character (subjective)." (p. 53) On the basis of the opposition of
subjective and objective reality, they introduce a distinction between "first person point of view" and "third person point of view." First person shots are those which reproduce what a character sees or feels. Third person shots are those where the director either "withdraws from the material by allowing it to occur as if he were not manipulating it" or where "he introduces himself by self-conscious techniques." (p. 60) The authors seem to have in mind a distinction between "rhetorical" and "objective" third person here. Huss and Silverstein present us with a simple enough typology of narrative modes. They give us only three alternatives to choose from. However, this schema raises a number of problems because the authors do not describe point of view in terms of structures beyond the individual shot. What are we to do with voice-over narration for example? They do tell us how we may determine if we have first or third person point of view, according to camera techniques present. Dollying, swish panning, and losing focus are subjective camera techniques. Masking, space play, and variable camera distance are self-conscious techniques. It seems that we need a more careful way of distinguishing between points of view than reference to a list of techniques. Conceivably a supposedly self-conscious technique could be used to represent a character's point of view and vice versa. Here we see Huss and Silverstein
repeating the New Critics error of identifying technique with effect despite context.

When they discuss the film-maker's tone, we see their typology raise yet another problem. Again they associate particular techniques with particular effects regardless of context. For example, they tell us that long shots predominate in comedy while close-ups appear with greater frequency in tragedy. Also when they discuss tone, they seem to forget the dichotomy between points of view which they present us. For example, when they tell us that "masses with a predominance of strong horizontal lines, especially shot from a low angle, establish a feeling of heaviness, quietness, and confinement," (p. 67) they imply that when we find this phenomenon we will know the film-maker's feeling. Huss and Silverstein do not make clear that the director may represent a character's point of view without necessarily subscribing to it himself. We encounter the same sort of confusion in John Harrington's account of point of view in film. We run into the reality problem again. Harrington tells us that

while each photographable scene has an independent existence, it assumes the quality of an abstraction in the hands of the film-maker. . . . It contains an idea apart from its concrete existence and that idea grows from the selection of the film-maker's controlling consciousness. . . . The film-maker manipulates reality, molding disparate material into a unified point of view."2
Harrington's talk about "concrete existence" and "molding reality" makes us wonder if he realizes that one possible interpretation for what he has to say is that point of view is a matter of the relation of the film to the actors on the set. In both Harrington's and Huss and Silverstein's thinking about film, there seems to be an element of "the camera never lies." What Harrington seems to want to say is that events have an existence in the narrative apart from their representation by the film. We have here the distinction between narrative and represented world however poorly made.

Harrington tells us that point of view in film has a dual nature. To describe this dual nature, he overwhelsms us with terminology. For example, he tells us that the controlling consciousness is "the mental framework determining the nature and direction of the work." (p. 52) "Voice" is "the outward manifestation of the ideas of the controlling consciousness." (p. 52) We may only wonder why Harrington wants to connect voice with the controlling consciousness because he talks of the "voices" of the characters. His account would be easier to follow if he maintained a distinction between the two, i.e., what he has to say would also make more sense if he were to use the term "controlling consciousness" consistently. Instead, he uses this term interchangeably with "dominant voice," "the film-maker," "the director," and "dominant tone."
At any rate, Harrington's key point about point of view in film is that it is the product of two phenomena. We might point out that he does not make clear how these phenomena interrelate. The first, and most important, phenomenon which works to produce point of view in film is the "emotional milieu" which the film-maker, director, controlling consciousness creates in the film. The second phenomenon is the way the director controls the interplay of the characters' voices or points of view in the film.

When Harrington discusses how the director creates the dominant voice in the film, he examines how the director exercises control over what his camera records. It is in this discussion that we get Harrington's discussion of "rhetorical devices and rhetorical properties." In Harrington's discussion, we might point out, everything becomes a rhetorical device or has rhetorical properties. For example, he tells us that "every filmstock has rhetorical properties peculiar to it, and it is these peculiarities and their rhetorical applications that interest the film-maker." (p. 72) In this context, he tells us that the viewer has unconscious associations about the ways various films should appear. Thus since "fast films" were first used for reporting situations requiring natural light, "the grainy and contrasty effect of fast film has come to connote on-the-spot recording of events." (p. 72) In this
case rhetorical properties "appear" because of the viewer's unconscious expectations. Generally, however, when Harrington discusses rhetorical devices and techniques, he does so in terms of norms. He has in mind what is conventional and then calls any departure from what he considers conventional "rhetorical." For example, he tells us that, by changing lenses, the film-maker can "move away from what is normal, rhetorically developing his ideas through a variety of image sizes and perspectives." (p. 55) In this context, he tells us that the wide-angle lens's ability to "exaggerate or emphasize actions or relationships between people provides the controlling consciousness with a ready tool for subjective treatment." (p. 66) In like manner, he tells us that camera angle can be used to "enhance various feelings" because any movement away from the norm for camera placement "which is slightly below the eye-level of a person" alters the perspective and has connotations which may be exploited by the film-maker. As another example of his analyses, consider Harrington's account of lighting. He tells us that "low key" lighting, i.e., lighting that puts most of the setting in shadow, "heightens suspense and creates feelings of gloom and mystery." (p. 83) He comments that horror movies and "most old" detective movies depend on low key lighting. As for angles of lighting, he comments that "back lighting idealizes a face . . ." while "... side lighting frequently makes a
face look mysterious." (p. 83) His conclusion is "each angle of lighting provides the film-maker with another rhetorical device to establish point of view." (p. 83) His general rule of thumb is "... the greater the degree of movement away from the norm, the greater the conveyance of individualized feeling and attitude." (p. 84) Several problems are raised by Harrington's analyses. First of all, he talks as if all rhetorical devices are employed to suggest the film-maker's point of view. Certainly all of what he labels "rhetorical properties" and "rhetorical devices" can be used to indicate the characters' points of view apart from the film-maker's. Secondly, his use of the term "norm" is problematic. He does not distinguish between the norms generated in the context of a particular film and norms common to all films. We might also distinguish between norms common to all film and norms developed in a particular genre. Third, it seems unwarranted to base an analysis on the opposition of subjective and objective when everything turns out to be subjective, either from the characters' or the film-maker's point of view. For example, Harrington tells us that the "illusion of objectivity" is another rhetorical device employed by the film-maker. Finally, if everything is rhetorical, the real issue becomes: whose viewpoint do these rhetorical devices represent? Harrington does not tell us how we may determine whose point of view we are dealing with, a
character's, a narrator's, or the film-maker's.

Once he has examined the rhetorical devices available to the film-maker, Harrington discusses how the film-maker, the director in this instance, controls all of the "contradictory voices in the film out of which the unified vision of the film grows." (p. 89) In this discussion, a typology of narrators turns up. Harrington does not make clear how the narrator figures in controlling contradictory voices. At any rate, Harrington tells us that the camera is always the narrator "in one way or another." Thus he describes four different ways the camera can be the narrator, although in two of them he does not make clear what the connection between the camera and the narrator is.

1. Camera-as-narrator or Camera-as-Witness

The camera is the only narrator when it just follows the events, or seemingly so. Harrington cautions that this "apparently objective point of view" is as subjective as all of the devices used by the film-maker. "Rather than being an objective, disinterested, or reliable narrator, the camera is the tool of the operative point of view of the film-maker. The camera-as-witness and the controlling consciousness are one." (p. 89)

2. Witness-as-narrator

Harrington tells us that when a witness as narrator appears, we sense that a point of view is shaping materials
according to preconceptions. Apparently we do not have this sense with camera-as-narrator, according to Harrington. Usually the audience sees and hears this narrator briefly before a dissolve leads the audience to a dramatization of what he begins to say. This narrator may return at the ending of the sequence.

3. **Protagonist-as-narrator**

Here, when the camera follows the main character, the audience is aware that the story comes from his point of view. This mode operates very much like the second; sometimes the main character speaks to the audience.

4. **Subjective-camera**

"Subjective camera" occurs when the camera directly enters the narrator's mind. The subjective camera becomes the eyes of the protagonist. Harrington cites as an example the sequence from *On the Waterfront* where the camera lurches up the gangplank, jerks around and attempts to focus, all as if it were the eyes of Terry Malloy. Subjective camera is, according to Harrington, the equivalent of "stream of consciousness" in writing. In this same context, Harrington describes subjective camera in yet another fashion. He tells us that subjective camera occurs when the character looks off screen and the next shot is of what he sees. "...he tells us the shift to subjective camera is unobtrusive; "...subjective camera has been used in a conventional, barely noticeable,
but effective way." (p. 92) We can only wonder why Harrington sees fit to lump under one heading two distinctly different points of view. It seems his second description of subjective camera belongs under the headings of protagonist-as-narrator.

We may conclude at this point that our first category of writing on point of view in film contains little that is helpful in accounting for the manifestations of point of view in particular films. These writers rely too heavily upon generalizations about devices and present us with typologies that are inadequate to describe even those manifestations that come immediately to mind. We turn now to the second category of writing about point of view in film. In this category, we discover what may be considered two opposing approaches to point of view in film. One approach involves defining point of view only in terms of the characters represented in the film. We present the work of Edward Branigan as representative of this approach. The other approach defines the narrator in terms of how "the text mediates the functions of narrator, character, and spectator." Nick Browne's work is offered here as representative of this opposing approach.

Writers in the first category spend a great deal of time telling us how the film-maker manipulates what he shows to establish his point of view. We find no mention of the film-maker's intentions or the narrator's, for that
matter, in Edward Branigan's account of point of view in film. He asserts that the real problem when dealing with point of view is not to probe the narrator's motives or to measure the effects the narration may have on the viewer; rather it is to "describe the code" by which the narrator's and the viewer's "presence" can be detected within the narrative. In Branigan's opinion,

one does not understand the film as the personal view of the film-maker (as a real life person) because there is no context within which to locate the film-maker. Even if the auteur appears within the film, we cannot recognize the 'auteur' who placed him or her within the narration. There is always some filmic voice beyond which it is impossible to go.  

When Branigan speaks of "filmic voice" here, he means the character's spatial position and nothing else. He tells us that "to identify filmic voice is to discover the origin of the narrative at any moment--to discover who is speaking and from what standpoint." (p. 62) Branigan uses "speaking" here quite unaccountably. For him, to identify "voice" is really to determine whose gaze we happen to be sharing; the origin of the narrative is the spatial position of the character whose gaze we share. He tells us that to define the point of view shot more rigorously will allow us to discriminate "a larger--and constantly shifting--narrative point of view or filmic voice." (p. 54) We might point out that his definition of the point of view shot does not allow us to do any such thing. Actually, Branigan regards
the "point of view structure" as only an "adjunct to" the system of character, "in effect, pointing to the presence--the existence--of character." (p. 64) The "larger filmic voice" he mentions as we can only understand as a sequence of spatial positions. This concept obviously is not the accepted one for voice.

To begin his more rigorous definition of the point of view structure and its variations, Branigan describes the composition of the basic point of view shot. The point of view shot, one where we experience contemporaneously with a character or characters, is composed of five elements usually distributed in two shots as follows: (p. 55)

SHOT A: POINT/GLANCE

1. Point: establishment of a point in space.

2. Glance: establishment of an off-camera object by glance from the point.

BETWEEN SHOTS A AND B:


SHOT B: POINT/OBJECT

4. From Point: the camera locates at the point, or very close to the point, in space defined by element one above.

5. Object: the object of element two above is revealed.

Figure 9: The Point of View Structure

Branigan illustrates the importance of element one ("point") by cases where no point is established or where
more than one point is established. For example, a glance may be established by dialogue ("Hey, look at this!") but no point established because the screen is black, or the camera is too far away or the character is off-screen. The establishment of too many points would be a shot of two heads turning in opposite directions. In either case, the point of view structure has been undermined.

Element two does not have to involve the actual glance of a character. Branigan lists as other clues: eye movement, head movement, body movement (e.g., walking to answer a knock prior to a shot of the door swinging open in front of the camera), a new, perhaps sudden camera distance or angle, camera movement, music, the length of a shot (the character becomes fixated by the object) and perhaps even larger narrative structures (has everyone who has entered the room confronted the object). Although the concept of glance implies a sentient observer, Branigan tells us that the observer does not have to be human or living. He mentions that in one film we get a snake's eye-view and that, in another, we get a ghost's eye-view. The important thing is that we as viewers be able to participate in the glance. Just how important "glance" is to Branigan becomes clear when he tells us that when we cannot ascribe a shot to somebody's view, the shot "becomes an ambiguous, unclaimed voice in the film." (p. 56)
The significance of elements one and two also becomes even clearer when Branigan describes what happens when they are eliminated. For example, he describes a point of view shot in *Floating Weeds* (Yasujiro, 1959) where a man looks at a flower. He tells us that later, in the same scene, this point of view structure is undermined because the point/object shot, the flower, is repeated without the point/glance shot, the man. He tells us that in the second shot the flower "seems to exist almost independently, in its own right." (p. 56) Branigan tells us here that we "were snared" in the point of view structure to be "set free" at a later time. "The filmic voice at this later time has evolved; it no longer has a specific origin (the man); rather, it has become larger, more general, more plural." (p. 56) It is impossible to see what Branigan gains here by talking about a "more plural voice." One may wonder if he means by this that all of the characters' glances participate in giving us this shot. Of course, then we would have to speak about "implied glances." Branigan seems driven to absurdity in his quest to locate point of view solely in terms of the spatial positions of represented characters.

Element three is any device that implies temporal continuity. Branigan tells us that there is no requirement of temporal continuity within shots A and B. Rather, the
last fragment of A must be temporally linked to the first fragment of shot B. Without temporal continuity, the structure will be deviant. The traditional subjective flash forward and flash back result when no temporal continuity exists between shots A and B. For example, a character will look at a party scene, but rather than having a shot of the party scene, we get a shot of an empty room, dirty glasses, etc.

Element four ("from point") establishes the spatial continuity of shots A and B. In this segment of the point of view structure, the camera moves to the point established by the glance. Branigan tells us that frequently spatial cues exist to reinforce our spatial orientation. He cites as one example a shot from Bambi (Walt Disney, 1942) where Bambi twists his head to look at some opossums hanging by their tails from a branch. The next shot is rotated 180 degrees so that we see the opossums from Bambi's inverted viewpoint.

Finally, element five reveals the object suggested by the glance. Branigan tells us that there is the possibility, though rare, that the object, or part of it, will be seen in Shot A. In this case, element five functions to reveal the object from a new distance or a new angle or both. At this stage in the point of view structure, we are seeing what the character sees. It is possible for a sixth element to
be "engrafted" on the point of view structure, according to Branigan. How the person sees the object may be characterized.

Branigan tells us that the five elements of the point of view structure require a transition device since the camera must physically shift between element one (point) and element four (from point). For some reason, Branigan describes this shift in the camera position as the "physical correlate for a shift in narrative perception from, for instance, objective and omniscient to subjective and personal." (p. 59) At no other time does he mention the possibility of an "objective and omniscient" narrative perception. We may wonder how we are to reconcile this comment with his others about "unclaimed voices" and "larger, more plural voices." The transition device may take the form of a simple cut, an optical printer effect (dissolves, fades, wipes, etc.) or camera movement, in which case we watch as the camera repositions. Sometimes, when the camera begins close to the point, a fast pan, rack focus, zoom, etc., may be sufficient to indicate a transition from elements one to four. In any case, the device used must imply temporal continuity. Branigan chooses shot B as the reference and takes a line running from the subject's eyes to the object as the reference line. He then classifies point of view structures according to the placement of shot B according to this line. He shows us the alternate
Set-up 1 is the classic point of view shot. Set-up 2 is a reverse angle from behind the subject. Set-up 3 is a deviant point of view where the object revealed is what we believe the subject to be looking at, but which he is not. Set-up 4 is the typical eye-line match. Set-up 5 is the mirror image of set up four. Set-up 6 represents the point of view of the object, usually a person. Set-up 7 is a reverse angle of the object. Set-up 8 and 9 are destabilizing shots since in their resemblance to 1 they imply a false space for the subject. Set-up 10 is also destabilizing since it represents a jump into a new space or scene.

Branigan identifies two major variants of the point of view structure and a number of what he calls "simple structures." The first major variant is that which he describes when he identifies the five elements. The other major variant is the "discovered or retrospective point of view" where shot A follows shot B. In other words, we see the object of someone's gaze first and then discover it to be that object later.

The "closed point of view" is the first simple structure that Branigan describes. It takes the form A, B, A, i.e., the point/glance shot is repeated. He tells us that this
structure has a high degree of "narrative stability" since the repetition of shot A serves to reestablish time and place and what we have seen. The repetition also signals the end of a "subjective view." "The audience is fully prepared for the camera to establish a new relation (the next voice) vis-a-vis the characters." (p. 60) Time is suspended during the closed point of view. We do not expect events to be happening while we are looking at the object or until we fully recognize the closure. If events do happen, then we are confronted with the tension between on-screen and off-screen space. The camera seems unable to keep up with the events. The formal variants of the closed point of view are A', B, A" and A, B; B". In the A',B,A" form, A" is a minor variant of A' such as a new angle or new distance in which the subject is seen, at least momentarily, still frozen in his glance before the narrative action continues. In the A, B', B" form, instead of the camera shifting back to A, we see, after an interval, the subject step into shot B.

The second simple structure is the "delayed or suspended point of view." It occurs when a character has obviously seen something, yet the point object shot is withheld from the audience for a number of shots. The inverse of this structure occurs when the point/object shot and the glance are given but not the subject. We then wonder who is watching. A related structure is the "open point of
view." Here we are never allowed to see the object.

The third simple structure is the "continuing point of view." Here the character looks at a series of objects or one object a series of times. The objects are typically rendered by cutting from object to object or by a subjective travelling shot. On the other hand, the "multiple point of view" is a structure whereby several characters see the same object. It takes the form A, (B), C, (B), D, E, (B) where B is the object and the other shots are of persons. Branigan mentions that when two people appear together in a single shot, the structure is less subjective than when offered as the view of only one person.

An "embedded point of view" results when a point of view structure of one character is contained within the larger point of view structure of another character. Branigan gives us an example from Psycho: Marian looks up at a policeman outside her car window who then glances at her license plate. Marian is still watching the policeman (repetition of shot A) as he looks up (repetition of shot B). In this sequence we have seen something from Marian's viewpoint, and we have also seen something she cannot see. Here, too, the first appearance of B functions both as the point/object shot of A and the point/glance shot for shot C. We learn from this sequence that the given elements of the point of view structure need not be distributed in a fixed pattern of two elements per shot.
The "reflexive point of view" occurs when the object of the glance is also a person. If such is the case, it is possible to alternate point of view structures—as in a conversation—centered about two or more points. Strictly speaking, the reflexive point of view takes the form (A, B), (closer B, A), (closer A, B), representing three point of view structures. Branigan tells us that in the traditional Hollywood film, the complete model for the reflexive point of view shot is often abridged so that the point/object shot functions also as the point/glance shot for the next series. Hence the above, complete model is rendered in four shots instead of six.

Branigan would have us believe that his definition of the point of view shot and his enumeration of its variants and the simple structures exhausts the possible manifestations of point of view in film. While his elaborate account of the point of view shot is helpful in that it explains one way that the auteur may assume a character's point of view, his account hardly exhausts the possible manifestations of point of view in film. What Branigan has done is to present us with the notion that there can be the equivalent of "speakerless discourse" in film. He is operating under the same misapprehensions as Doložel, Benveniste, and Barthes. Not surprisingly, he acknowledges his debt to Roland Barthes in several footnotes. We may conclude at this point that the notion of shots which show themselves
makes no more sense than stories that tell themselves. What these writers fail to see is that their notion of "speakerlessness" is the last gasp of the New Critical notion of "authorial extinction."

Before Nick Browne presents his own approach to point of view in film, he examines the shortcomings of approaches like Harrington's that take the point of view shot as the paradigm for the construction of narrative space. He argues:

... an explanation or theory whose principal logic is ascription—referring an account of a shot to the authority, to the glance of a depicted character—can neither explain third-person shots adequately, nor assimilate them to first-person shots, nor provide a basis for a coherent account of the logic of shots of either kind.4

He points to his essay "The Spectator in the Text: The Rhetoric of Stagecoach"5 as presenting a more satisfying account of the structure of filmic narration. Here the construction and significance of narrative space is accounted for by the "mutually implicating positions of camera, character, and spectator." (p. 19) This analysis proves that the contention that the spectator's position is dictated by the camera is untrue.6 In Stagecoach, we discover that the spectator's "emotional and fictional positions" do not necessarily coincide with the literal optical one, even when the camera occupies the geographical place of a character who is used as the central point of reference for the depiction of space. For example, in this film, Lucy, as beholder, is
the central support for the camera's representation of the scene. Yet, Lucy is being criticized by the film. Thus the spectator's position, as far as his commitments are concerned, is identified neither with the vantage point of the camera, nor with the point of view of the central character. Browne tells us that Lucy is "inscribed in a larger meaningful structure . . . that has the power to assess and to place those characters who seem to authorize the shots that 'belong' to them." (p. 20) According to Browne, the articulation of critical judgment by control of what he calls "narrative point of view" marks the power specific to a narrator.

Browne is the first writer on point of view in film that we consider to speak of a narrator in film when no narrator is specified in the film. He introduces the notion of "one who presents the discourse" to account for the "linkages between the different orders of seeing integrated within a film: 'shot,' 'point of view shot,' 'character's point of view,' and 'narrative point of view.'" (p. 21) "Narrative point of view" here refers to the narrator's point of view. He gives us a careful description of the film narrator's function:

The narrator exhibits the images of the film and by control of camera position, mise-en-scene, editing, and sound, positions the spectator in a certain relation to the depicted world. He creates a fictional position we have called 'spectator in the text.' He constructs too, through the use of the character as a medium of communication, views on the
world of the story. While the characters' views have their own integrity, it is the place of the narrator to exhibit them as views, and to make us see them as part of a larger picture through the power of his commentary. That is, the narrator is related to the characters by both structures of analogy (he can appropriate their gaze) and independence (he can show their views as views). (p. 20)

Browne tells us further that it is the narrator's freedom to either adopt a character's view or to show it as a view that serves as the basis for a distinction between "representation" and "story." "Representation" is the "set of rhetorical mechanisms" by which the narrator presents the story to the spectator. "Story" is the actions, speech, and perceptions of the characters. In Browne's approach, finally, the character's gaze becomes like his other actions: an "object" to be depicted. Such is not the case in the film Au Hasard, Balthasar, according to Browne.

While we are quite ready to accept Browne's argument that the structure of filmic narration cannot be explained by reference to characters' views alone, we are not prepared to accept his analysis of the function of the narrator in Au Hasard, Balthasar. It is surprising that after presenting so careful a description of the function of the narrator in film, Browne gives such a confusing, contradictory account of the narration in this film. Browne tells us what we should look for, so to speak, but his own work does not indicate how we find it.
Browne's major problem seems to be that he bases his analysis on his interpretation of the film. He tells us that "the film in its most general significance undertakes to testify to a religious truth: there is dignity behind the chance events of life and the suffering of man. The problem of the construction of the film is to authenticate this claim." (p. 21) Actually, the problem is that Browne must describe the "rhetoric" of this film in a way which makes it authenticate his claim. From Browne's analyses it is difficult to get a clear idea of what "rhetoric" means, first of all. He does tell us that "formal rhetoric" is the shot/reverse shot sequence, i.e., the point of view shot. This rhetoric is the "conventional rhetoric" that allows us to infer characters' views from the shot. He tells us that in a conventional narrative, i.e., one with formal rhetoric, we will find that "a central character whose 'consciousness' is constructed and appropriated by the film generally functions to mediate the world of the film to the spectator." (p. 21) In Au Hasard, Balthasar, we do not find this formal rhetoric; rather, we find that this formal rhetoric is undermined. We are not encouraged to adopt the characters' points of view. Browne tells us that Bresson proposes a rhetoric not of identification but of attention to the image." (p. 25) Because of the nature of the representation in this film, the images
acquire a presence not fully located within, or explained by, the story. Thus the spectator is constantly reminded that the characters are not producing the shots. What the spectator realizes according to Browne, is that the film is an allegory. This is all well and good, but he does not make it clear how the narrator figures into the creation of this allegory. He only asserts that the existence of the allegory points to the existence of the narrator. When we say here that Browne does not make clear how the narrator functions in the creation of the allegory, we are referring to the fact that he gives us two contradictory accounts of the narrator in this film. On the one hand, he tells us that the rhetoric we find in the film "encourages the question who is showing these images, and as such works to expose the limits and conditions of the narrator's power. It acknowledges an account of production: it is one outside the fiction, and just not off screen, that organizes it." (p. 26) On the other hand, he tells us that "... the narrator locates himself in the film... In his identification with Balthasar, the narrator allegorically represents himself as existing in the world of the film and at the same time identifies himself as the one who whose point of view makes the meaning of the story." (p. 30) To give Browne credit, he does say that the narrator represents himself allegorically as Balthasar. We have only now to wonder what "allegorical representation" entails.
Conclusion

We may conclude that Browne could have made his point that the narrator does not adopt a character's point of view in the film without dragging in the "allegorical" identification of the narrator with Balthasar, who is, by the way, a donkey. Browne actually seems hesitant to come right out and say that in film we have one who creates the narrative just as we do in literature.

Throughout our examination of the writing on point of view in film, we have run into the problem of describing the role of the narrator in film. In the first category of writing, the authors were not hesitant to speak of a narrator, but neither were they hesitant to attribute everything in the film to the feelings of the film-maker. In the second category, we find one writer telling us that there can be no such thing as a narrator in film, in the sense of an 'auteur.' Browne comes closest to solving the problem when he describes the function of the narrator, but one step remains to be taken. We must distinguish between the "auteur" and the "narrator." We need this distinction if we are to account for certain effects in film. At this point we might also add that we need a more careful account of how the sound track works to create point of view in film. Browne does discuss the contribution of the music to point of view in Au Hasard, Balthasar, but we need a more systematic account. And, of course, finally we need an account of point of view in film which allows us to describe
how a single shot or an entire scene, or an entire film narrative can be constructed from multiple and/or nonconcurrent points of view. We have then our task for the final chapter
NOTES

1 Roy Huss and Norman Silverstein, "Tone and Point of View," Film and Literature: Contrasts in Media, ed., Fred H. Marcus, (Scranton: Chandler, 1971) p. 70. Hereafter, quotations from this essay will be documented by page numbers in parentheses.


3 Edward Branigan, "Formal Permutations of the Point of View Shot," Screen, 16 (1975), p. 54. Hereafter quotations from this essay will be documented by page numbers in parentheses.


6 For other accounts of point of view in film that rely solely on the characters' spatial positions, read Stephen Heath's "Narrative Space," Screen, Autumn 1976.
CHAPTER VI

A THEORY OF POINT OF VIEW IN FILM

The writing about point of view in film that we examined in the preceding chapter indicates that it is standard procedure to attempt to adapt to film an approach to point of view in literature. This is not surprising since the same relationships which are necessary to the ontology of the fictional world of the literary work are necessary to the ontology of the fictional world of the film work. If we are to level a general criticism at the work done so far on point of view in film, it must be that it tries to account for the relationship of the narrator(s) to the narrative in film without examining it in the larger context of the relationships forming the fictional world. In the theory offered here, the relationship of the narrator(s) to the narrative in film is accounted for within this larger context. In other words, the primary relationship between the guiding intelligence and the represented world is recognized and the relationship of the guiding intelligence to the narrator(s), both specified and unspecified, is studied. The relationship of the guiding intelligence to the filmmaker(s) and the relationship of the represented world to the "real world" are not examined. In film, as in literature,
when we examine these relationships, we have left the boundaries of the fictional world, i.e., these relationships are irrelevant to the ontology of this world.

In the Introduction we made clear that it is Uspensky's theory of point of view that must be adapted to film. We can, at this point, make clear why Uspensky's conception of point of view as a migrating phenomenon and a unit of a multitude of realizations is as appropriate for film as it is for literature. In other words, we can explain why a morphology of the modes of the relationship of the narrator to the narrative in film is what we need. Nick Browne helps us identify the reason. He mentions at one point in his analyses the problems with accounting for camera position by reference to an "ideal spectator's" natural movement of attention to the dramatically significant action. He argues that such an account "... defines the role of the camera in the filmic representation entirely on the model of the spectator in drama, leaving no scope for the filmic properties of narration at all." Browne does not identify for us the filmic properties of narration, but we think he has in mind the factor we want to consider here. We are not arguing that this factor is the only filmic property of narration, but we do argue that we are identifying a major one. This factor becomes apparent if we compare, as Browne would have us do, the position of the spectator in drama and the position of the spectator in film. The spectator in drama
sits in a fixed relationship to the action on the stage. (We speak here of traditional drama, of course.) He does not view the action from a variety of perspectives: long-shots, medium shots, and close-ups, for example. Nor does the spectator in the drama see and hear first from one character's point of view and then another's. The spectator in film is privileged to watch the narrative from a far greater number of spatial, temporal, and psychological perspectives. Of course, the narrator need not alternate perspectives. We may remember the first films which were essentially "filmed theater"; the action was performed before a stationary camera. The introduction of the moving camera (and sound) allows point of view to migrate in film narratives as it does in literary narratives. Thus, film narratives, as they appear now, are more similar to literary narratives than they are to drama. This is the reason that a morphology of modes of the narrator's relationship to the narrative is needed.

There are, of course, differences between film narratives and literary narratives. Uspensky identifies a major difference when he discusses the degree of spatial and temporal concreteness in the different arts. For Uspensky's term "concreteness," we are going to substitute the term "repleteness." Film narratives are presented in images and sound. Thus, spatial representation in film is characterized by repleteness. On the other hand, spatial
representation in literature can remain indefinite. Uspensky demonstrates this difference with an example. He points to the difficulty that would be involved in filming Gogol's "The Nose." The nose has a face; it walks; it wears a dress coat, etc. Filming this work would require the "actualization" of spatial features which are irrelevant in the literary text. In this context, it seems that we are called upon to distinguish on the basis of our experience those literary works that encourage visualization from those which do not. We are aware that we have read works in which physical appearance assumes a negligible importance and works where appearance is all important. In film narratives, appearance never assumes a negligible role.) We as spectators may be asked to question what we see, but except for extremely rare instances, we are always seeing something. This factor of spatial repleteness assumes importance in our discussion of point of view in film. Spatial repleteness may be exploited or overcome in the creation of viewpoints in film. Because of this spatial repleteness, we very often see from one position and hear from another in film.

POINT OF VIEW ON THE IDEOLOGICAL PLANE

As in the case in literature, when we discuss the ideological plane in film we are discussing the various ideological points of view that may be involved in the construction of the narrative. We are interested in the problem: whose point of view does the narrator adopt when he evaluates and perceives ideologically the world he
describes. When we speak of the system of ideas that shape the narrative, we are speaking of what Uspensky tells us is the "deep compositional structure of the work." It is the "surface compositional structure" that we trace on the other planes. In film, as in literature, this level is the least accessible to formalization. We rely for its analysis on our intuitive understanding for the most part. We discover that in its compositional aspect on this level point of view manifests itself in the film narrative as it does in the literary narrative. We find narratives in which the ideological evaluation is carried out from a single point of view and narratives where the narrator's position on the ideological plane changes. Multiple viewpoints on the ideological plane are involved in the composition of Citizen Kane, for example. In the recent film, Days of Rain, the action is evaluated from the point of view of the narrator, a young girl. In this film, the narrator's ideological evaluations are explicitly presented. In many films, we do not find a narrator's evaluation explicitly presented, of course. Whether or not evaluation is explicitly represented, we still must distinguish between ideological points of view represented in the film and the ideological point of view of the guiding intelligence. We, as viewers, must evaluate according to the standards established by the guiding intelligence.
Uspensky discusses the epithets of folklore as a special means of expression of the ideological point of view. We think that cinematic metaphor may serve as a specific means of expression for the ideological point of view in film. For example consider the juxtaposition of the image of Kerensky with the image of the peacock in *October* and the juxtaposition of the image of the workers leaving the factory with that of sheep herding down a stockyard runway in *Modern times*. In these two cases, the juxtaposition of the images is not motivated on the level of the action but on the ideological plane. These two instances are the exception to the rule. More frequently we must determine the ideological position on the basis of more subtle cues.

**PHRASEOLOGICAL PLANE**

Uspensky tells us that the phraseological plane is limited to literature. In other words, while the definition of a particular ideological point of view may take place in film by means of phraseology, phraseological means cannot in film indicate whose point of view the auteur has adopted for his narration. Uspensky is wrong. We can point to instances in film where we have only voice over narration to suggest that we are seeing and hearing what a narrator remembers to have happened. In these cases, it would seem that phraseological means do indicate whose position the narrator has adopted for the narration. We may point out
here that not all of the scenes within the film may be conducted from this character's point of view on the spatial and temporal plane. For example, in the film Days of Rain, not every shot is constructed from the little girl's point of view. This fact points to the presence of two narrators in the film: the little girl and an unspecified narrator who shows us what she could not have seen. Writers on point of view in film fail to recognize the importance of the sound track in the manifestations of point of view. Besides voice-over narration, dialogue is often used to link shots.

POINT OF VIEW ON THE SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL PLANES

As Branigan and Browne point out it is the auteur's position defined in spatial coordinates that creates the space of the film. We do not want to say that his spatial position creates the space of the narrative, since there are cases where the space of the narrative and the space of the film are not identical. We will return to this problem, later. As is the case in literature, the author may conduct the narrative from a character's point of view on this plane or from his own position. Thus we may speak of concurrence and nonconcurrence of narrator and character on this plane.

CONCURRENCE OF THE SPATIAL POSITION OF THE NARRATOR AND A CHARACTER

We have the same possibilities here as we do in the
lity narrative. The narrator may attach himself to a character and hold the same spatial position as the character temporarily or throughout the narrative. In this instance, the narratorial camera follows the character and shares his field of vision. We have here the situation that Branigan describes as the "point of view structure." We may also speak of the narrator merging with the character when he adopts the character's perceptual system, i.e., when the sixth element is engrafted onto the "point of view structure."

NONCONCURRENCE OF THE SPATIAL POSITION OF NARRATOR AND CHARACTER

Now we want to discuss those scenes in which the movement of the narratorial camera is not motivated by the movement of the character. In these cases, the narrator maintains his own point of view on the spatial plane. We find here the devices for generalized description that Uspensky describes in his analyses of literature (the sequential survey, the bird's-eye view, and the silent scene), and we discover some other devices, too. In film, we may describe the sequential survey as the result of narratorial camera movement and montage. The scene is presented in a series of separate images which we must piece together to form a coherent picture. For instance, battle scenes are very often filmed in this manner. The narratorial camera follows the action by focusing first on a single pair of warriors
and then another. In this case, the narrator's spatial attachment to the characters is preserved in a sense, since his spatial position is limited by the location of a character. In other instances, the narrator's movement is not related to a character's movement in any way. For example, the narratorial camera may move around a table, focusing first on one character and then another. The separate scenes then combine into a composite scene which is the dinner party. We may also talk of a sequential survey when the characters observed are not located in a space which can be observed from one viewpoint. For example, the narrator may choose to show us what is happening in two different places at once. We may watch the Indians approach the stranded band of settlers from one side in one shot and the cavalry approaching from the other side in the next shot. In this context, we also want to point out the possibility of the silent scene in film. The auteur may choose to present us with the action from a distance where we are unable to hear the characters. Our descriptions of the possibilities for generalized description are elementary. Nevertheless, no other writer on point of view we have considered has examined the possibilities for generalized description offered when the narrator assumes a spatial position nonconcurrent with that of the characters.
Other possibilities for description arise when the narrator assumes a position nonconcurrent with the characters. The narrator can by his spatial position and movement indicate his position on the ideological plane. For example, we realize the narrator's evaluation of Charles Foster Kane's second wife Susan when we are presented with a shot of her name on a sign atop a night club then a zoom downwards through a skylight to a shot of her sitting slumped over at a table. Here visual cues are used to suggest her downfall. In this sequence, we might say of the narrator's position on the spatial plane that it is unreal in the sense that it would be impossible for a character to provide us with this view. We can point to other instances where the narrator adopts a position on the spatial plane that we might call unreal. There is a single shot in *Annie Hall* constructed from two different positions on the spatial plane. On one half of the screen we see Alvie in his psychiatrist's office; on the other half of the screen, we see Annie in her psychiatrist's office. Alternately we hear Alvie and Annie describe the same aspects of their relationship; here the narrator has chosen to represent the juxtaposition of two points of view spatially. We have a case of a shot constructed from multiple positions on the spatial plane.

So far we have been talking of spatial positions as unreal if it would be impossible for a character to assume
them. There is another sense in which we can speak of a film narrative being constructed from unreal spatial positions. Sometimes we cannot be sure if what we see really exists despite the spatial repleteness of its representation. We are referring here to those instances where what a character remembers or imagines is depicted. In this case, we may say that the narrator has adopted the character's position on the psychological plane, but we cannot say that he has adopted the character's position on the spatial plane. Here the scenes are constructed from what must be considered an unreal spatial position. Unless we are given cues that what we are seeing is imagined or remembered, we will be unable to tell, however. The imaginings and remembrances assume an equal degree of spatial repleteness. We may point to Last Year at Marienbad to prove our point. In this film, we are not sure what we are seeing is or has ever taken place. We do not know whether the narrator has assumed a position in "real" or imagined space. We will return to this point when we examine the manifestations of point of view on the psychological plane. Now we want to discuss point of view on the temporal plane.

We can define the narrator's temporal position in film just as we can define his spatial position. He may count time and order the events from the position of one of the characters in the film or he may use his own time schema. And, of course, he may change his position, borrowing the
time sense of first one character, then another, and/or use his own time schema along with that of a character. When the narrator chooses to construct the narrative from multiple temporal positions, the descriptions from different temporal positions may be joined end to end or they may overlap. In Citizen Kane, we are presented with the events of Charles Foster Kane's life in almost strict sequential order, but to describe the different segments of his life the narrator adopts the time sense of first one character, then another. In the film Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge, we are presented with the same event from two different (temporal) points of view. We are presented with the seconds before the hanging first in the time sense of the man about to be hanged and then in the time sense of the narrator.

We meet in film, as we do in literature, a more complicated form. We find narratives which result not from a juxtaposition of points of view, but a synthesis in which different temporal points of view are merged. In film as in literature, this combination of viewpoints may be manifested in narration which precedes or accompanies the action. In the film Days of Rain, the film narrative is accompanied by the voice over narration of a young girl. Thus, the narrative we realize is conducted from her retrospective viewpoint. Yet, individual scenes in the narrative are conducted from the point of view of an unspecified narrator or another character. We can describe the narrative
structure here as one in which on the temporal plane individual scenes are joined from the narrator's retrospective point of view while the scenes themselves are constructed from a synchronic perspective.

It seems that often time is defined within film narratives in the form of separate and discrete scenes, each of which is presented from the point of view of a synchronic observer and is characterized by what Uspensky would call its own "microtime." These scenes, however, are joined in a temporal framework which the narrator provides which is not related to any individual character's time sense. We might when we characterize the temporal perspective from which an entire narration is conducted ask ourselves from whose point of view are the individual scenes connected. If it is the time sense of a character, then his movement will often motivate the cuts from scene to scene. When the dissolves, fades and cuts are not motivated by the character's movement, imaginings, or memories, we have a narrative constructed from a narrator's own time schema.

**POINT OF VIEW ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PLANE**

In those cases where we talk about changes of scene being motivated by a character's memories or imaginings, we are speaking of the psychological plane in film. When we describe those cases where the narrator has adopted the perceptual system of a character, the character's
consciousness, we are speaking of the manifestations of point of view on the psychological plane. It seems that at the outset we need to distinguish cases where the narrator simply shares the visual field of the character and those where he adopts the character's perceptual system. On the basis of the individual shot or even, in some cases, a series of shots, it is sometimes difficult to tell whether or not the narrator is simply sharing a character's visual field or reproducing his manner of experiencing. We might point out that the cases in film where the narration is carried out totally according to the données of a character's consciousness on the spatial and temporal plane are extremely rare. We can think of only two clear examples. The first is the 1946 film Lady in the Lake where every shot is constructed from the spatial and temporal point of view of the protagonist; the viewer does not see him (except in a mirror). The second is one episode in the M.A.S.H. television series where we find an identical situation. Every shot is constructed from the spatial and temporal point of view of the protagonist whom we never see, in this case, a wounded soldier. Usually the narrator will choose to "subjectively structure" only certain segments of the narrative.

It seems that we want to distinguish two types of subjectively structured narrative: the type in which the narrator adopts the perceptual system of the character without leaving the space and time of the narrative and the
type where the narrator allows us to "see into" the character's consciousness, and thus where he introduces us into a different space and time. The film **Lady in the Lake** presents us with an example of the first type of subjective structuring. In other films, we will find only certain scenes structured in this fashion. The reader may remember Branigan's description of the scene in *On the Waterfront* where we share Terry Malloy's perceptual system as he proceeds up the gangplank. We might mention as another example the sequence where the camera loses focus and spins in *The Last Laugh*. Here the auteur has adopted the perceptual system of the drunken doorman. In the case of the examples we have just described, we do not leave the narrative space and time.

It is possible for us to point to other instances of subjective structuring where we do leave the space and time of the narrative to be introduced into what we might call the character's internal space and time. We are thinking here of instances of subjective structuring like we find in the films **Hiroshima Mon Amour** and **Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge**. In *Hiroshima Mon Amour*, the narrative is intercut with memory sequences of the heroine. We recognize them as such because we see the heroine herself represented within them. We are seeing her as she remembers herself to have been. In *Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge*, we have a different situation; we see the character's image of
himself as he imagines it to be. Here the space and time of the narrative action are suspended and an imaginary narrative space and time are constructed. In each of these cases the boundaries between the different time/space entities are clearly marked by the narrator. We can point to Last Year at Marienbad as an example of a film narrative where the boundaries between what we might call in this context "objective structuring" and the subjective structuring are not clearly marked. In this film we cannot be sure when we are seeing into the protagonist's mind, so to speak, and when we are not. Thus the narrator's and our own position in time and space is never definitely defined. Returning to our first two examples, we might want to distinguish further between them. We have said that in both cases that narrative time is suspended and the narrative space abandoned for an "internal space and time." We might say that in Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge that a few moments of narrative time "expand" in the subjective structuring and we have the same instant described from two different points of view. At any rate, we have distinguished here between two different ways that the narrator can assume a character's point of view on the psychological plane: he may adopt the character's perceptual system within the narrative space and time or he may suspend narrative time and remove us from the narrative space to allow us to "see into" the character's mind.
We may point to yet another way that the narrator may adopt the character's position on the psychological plane. In this case, he allows us to hear what the character is thinking. We are not referring to a filmed soliloquy here. In other words, we do not see the character verbalize his thoughts; rather we watch him or her as we hear his or her thoughts represented by voice-over-narration. We find the character's thoughts revealed in this manner quite often in soap operas. In this case we can speak of an obvious non-concurrence between the auteur's positions on the psychological and spatial planes. We have here an internal view on the psychological plane juxtaposed with an external view on the spatial plane. This observation brings us to the subject of the interrelationships of points of view in film.

THE INTERRELATIONS OF POINTS OF VIEW ON DIFFERENT LEVELS IN THE FILM

We have come to realize that those instances where someone's point of view manifests itself simultaneously on all planes in the film are extremely rare. Indeed, we can think of only the two instances we discussed when we talked of the auteur adopting a character's perceptual system: Lady in the Lake and the episode of the M.A.S.H. series. In film it is the case in almost every instance that we are required to speak of migrating point of view: multiple viewpoints and nonconcurrence between viewpoints manifested on different levels of analysis. We want to explore at this
point some standard types of nonconcurrence.

NONCONCURRENCE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL AND SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL POINTS OF VIEW

We mentioned in our discussion of point of view on the ideological plane that the narrative in *Days of Rain* is constructed from the ideological point of view of the young girl who is the narrator. It is she who tells us in reference to her brother's and his lover's behavior that "people are part devil and part angel." While the narrative is constructed from her point of view on the ideological plane, and specified narrator alternates his position on the spatial and temporal plane. In many of the scenes in the film, neither the young girl nor her voice appear. These scenes are constructed from the viewpoints of the other characters in the action or the narrator's own on the spatial and temporal plane.

NONCONCURRENCE OF THE SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL POINTS OF VIEW AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

When we described what we called a third method of representing a character's consciousness, we gave the most obvious example of nonconcurrence between the spatial and temporal and the psychological points of view. In this instance we see the character from the point of view of the narrator but hear the character's internal speech on the sound track. The case we describe here indicates that we cannot always determine the narrator's position on the basis of visual cues alone. In other words, point of view in film is more than a matter of just seeing. In this context
we can point to another instance of nonconcurrence of point of view on these two planes. Remember our account of subjective structuring in the film *Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge*. In this firm, we are presented with a relatively long sequence of imaginary narrative, i.e., the auteur assumes the protagonist's point of view on the psychological plane for nearly three quarters of the movie. We as viewers do not know that this is the case until the conclusion of the film, however. The auteur constructs much of this sequence from his own viewpoint on the spatial plane; therefore, we as viewers are led to believe that the narrator is following the protagonist in narrative time and space rather than representing his consciousness. In this same film, we have another instance where the narrator assumes the protagonist's point of view on the psychological plane but not on the spatial and temporal planes. We are watching from the narrator's point of view the protagonist's face while we hear a magnified ticking sound. In the next shot we see the officer who is supervising the protagonist's hanging remove the protagonist's watch from his pocket. It is to instances such as this we were referring when we commented earlier in this chapter that the narrator could have us see and hear from different positions. We are, of course, seeing and hearing from different positions in many of the other examples we have described.
SUMMARY

That we may see and hear from different positions in film is precisely the reason why we need a morphology of the modes of the relationship of the narrator to the narrative in film. Point of view in film is a migrating phenomenon and a unit of a multitude of realizations, just as it is in literature. Previous accounts of film have, to be sure, discussed the different modes of the narrator's relationship to the narrative, but they failed to explain the manifestations of point of view that arise from the interrelationships of these modes. Ours is the only account to do so. It is also the only account of point of view in film that places the relationship of the narrator to the narrative within its proper context, i.e., within the context of the relationships which form the fictional world. Thus, our account alone explains why we may adapt a theory of point of view in literature to film. We have also shown how a theory of point of view in film differs from a theory of point of view in literature. The concrete manifestations of the modes of relationship of the narrator to the narrative differ. Thus, in film theory, we must account for point of view as it manifests itself in images and sound.
There exists in film, even more so than in literature, the phenomenon of collective authorship. In many instances, it seems that if we were to discuss the relation of the actual creator to the film, we would need to discuss the contributions of a scriptwriter, a director, and an editor at the very minimum.

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