NATIONAL SECURITY ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURAL VARIABLE IN DECISION-MAKING.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, PH.D., 1979

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NATIONAL SECURITY ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT:
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURAL
VARIABLE IN DECISION-MAKING

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
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by

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* * * * *

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To Kathie
I would like to acknowledge the assistance of my committee members, Professors Donald Sylvan and Cynthia Cannizzo. Their helpful comments, especially during the formulation stage of this research, are most appreciated.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The Importance of the Substantive Problem

This dissertation explores the relationship between the structures upon which the President relies for national security advice and the quality of advice that he receives. Its central concern is with national security decisions in which the President is the primary decision-maker. The central question which this dissertation seeks to address is whether all organizational arrangements are equally useful in promoting and encouraging good advice, that is, inputs that aid effective decision-making, to the President.

Conventional wisdom provides no clear consensus on what the preferred structure for national security advice should be (see, e.g., Jackson, 1965; Clark and Legere, 1969; Johnson, 1974; Destler, 1977). The recognition is made by some that while different arrangements may have their distinctive assets and liabilities, on the whole, whatever support system best satisfies a President's style is probably best for him (see, e.g., Falk, 1964; Hess 1976). It is the convention of this dissertation that this conventional wisdom
is essentially incorrect; that the structure of the advisory system makes a significant difference in the quality of advice a President receives and that the structure of the advisory system impacts on a whole range or organizational process variables that are critical components of Presidential advice.

The general structure and process of national security decision-making has long been of interest to political scientists (see, e.g., Huntington, 1961; Hammond, 1961; Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder, 1962; Halperin, 1975). The structure of advisory systems supporting Presidential decision-making has also been of continuing interest in the discipline. Paige (1968), George (1972), Hess (1976), and Destler (1977), among others, have examined the structures of various advisory systems for national security matters, and for the most part have offered suggestions on how the quality of advice given the President might be improved. None, however, have identified in a comparative way which organizational structures of various advisory systems have given the President the best quality advice. This, in essence, is what this dissertation seeks to do.

The structures through which the President receives advice on national security matters are varied and changeable. Writing on the national security decision-making process over twenty years ago, Robert Cutler (1956) noted
that the peculiar virtue of the National Security Act is its flexibility which enables a President to use certain national security resources (such as the National Security Council) "as he finds most suitable at a given time" (p. 442). Here again, we find a reflection of the conventional viewpoint that the best organizational arrangement for national security advisors is simply that which the President prefers. The assumption implicit in this notion is that the President works best with the structural arrangements with which he is most comfortable. Presidents have frequently taken advantage of the great flexibility of the national security advisory apparatus to reorganize its structure to suit their preferences. It is important to note as well, however, that Presidents have demonstrated the ability to utilize other than the formal channels set up to funnel advice to the President on national security matters. At times, each President has bypassed the formal elements of his advisory system to seek advice elsewhere. It is important to note that whether the President receives his advice from a legally constituted group of advisors (such as the National Security Council), or from some ad hoc group (such as Johnson's Tuesday Lunch), or from individuals, that the advice is the product of certain organizational structures, whether formal or informal, and that changes in the structure are likely to have important consequences for the quality of advice that he receives.
If changes in structure do make an important difference in the quality of advice, as we have argued, does this explain why Presidents utilize different advisory structures? In most instances the answer would be negative. In fact, many researchers resort to idiosyncratic factors to explain the changes in the formal structure between administrations (e.g., Hess, 1976). Johnson (1974) has gone so far as to suggest that Eisenhower's highly structured and very formal National Security Council-centered system was devised because Eisenhower had a high tolerance for and long experience with formal staff meetings from his army career. Kennedy, on the other hand, had little patience with formally structured meetings and purposely did away with them in order to avoid the unpleasant experience of having to attend them.

We see then that the organizational structure of the Presidential advisory system for national security matters has been recognized as an important but little-understood factor in Presidential decision-making. This research seeks to provide an answer to a critical question which has been raised but never answered in a systematic way: Do different advisory structures have different effects on the quality of advice the President receives? It is easily demonstrated that the President has a large part in determining the structure of his advisory system. It is accepted that he
has great latitude in choosing who will give him advice and how his advisory system will be structured. If it can be demonstrated that certain structural arrangements have provided a number of Presidents with consistently better advice than other structural arrangements, then Presidents will have the opportunity to make a more reasoned choice when determining the structure through which they will receive advice. If a President is interested in organizing his advisory system so as to give him the best possible advice, the findings of this dissertation could be of real value to him.

Even though our focus is on the structural variable, we remain cognizant of the importance of the interactions of the organizational structure with leader personalities. The work of Barber (1972) and others demonstrate the importance of being aware of personality factors. We recognize, for instance, that certain personality types could generate conditions under which good advice could be generated even though one might expect the organizational structure in and of itself to yield less satisfactory results. Conversely, one might expect that leader personality could offset the benefits of certain structural arrangements which might have otherwise been expected to produce good advice.

Individual personality factors, therefore, might from time to time make invalid generalized statements about the
relationship between structure and advice. This must be recognized. Nonetheless, this research seeks to uncover whether consistent patterns of interrelationships exist between advisory structures on the one hand and the quality of advice on the other.

Finally, one must recognize the probability of trade-offs, such that one type of structural arrangement might promote certain values at the expense of others. Thus, there may be no single "best" structure for all Presidents at all times. In spite of these potential limitations, it is important for scholars and policy-makers alike to understand more fully the effects of how changes in the structure of the advisory system affect the ability of national security advisors to provide the President with good advice.

Overview of the Dissertation

Chapters II and III set out the components of the theoretical framework. Chapter II is divided into three main sections. In the first section, the notion of the relationship between organizational structure and the processes which yield advice is introduced. Following that, a discussion of how one might evaluate advice is presented. In the second section, seven "criteria for good advice" (that is, seven processes which are important to be present in the advisory system) are presented. Justifications from
the literature on Presidential decision-making form the basis for each assertion. Finally, in the third section, a discussion on how we operationalize these criteria is found.

Chapter III is also divided into three section. First we discuss the structural characteristics which we think have an effect on whether the criteria mentioned above will be present. Second, there follows a section on operationalizing the structural characteristics. Specific operationalization is necessary if the case survey method is to be reliable. In the final section we will advance the linkages which we would expect to find between these structural characteristics and the process criteria. These expectations were developed before the research was begun.

Chapter IV discusses the methodology of the case survey method used in this dissertation, as well as various methodological considerations about which the reader should be aware concerning the analysis of the data.

Chapters V through IX present the cases studies on an administration by administration basis. Perhaps the best reason for organizing cases by Presidents is that it provides for a type of control on Presidential personality. Assuming the relative consistency of an individual's personality over a short period of time, it is possible to attributed any differences in the fulfillment of the criteria for good advice to changes in the advisory structure rather
than personality. The use of Presidential administrations as an organizing device should not be misinterpreted. It is seen as useful in that it provides a historical perspective. It is not meant to imply that major changes in structure are to be found only between administrations and not within them. Analysis between administrations will be undertaken in Chapter X which provides a summary and conclusion.

The case studies will be presented in narrative form, focusing of course on the structural characteristics of the decision-making process and those actions within the process which confirm or deny the presence of the criteria for good advice. Each case will be followed by a brief summary of the structure and process, and an evaluation of the process criteria. Each chapter concludes with a summary of the decisions evaluated for that administration.

The final chapter analyses the relationships uncovered between the presence of certain structural characteristics and the presence of process criteria needed for the generation of good advice.
CHAPTER II

EVALUATING THE ADVISORY PROCESS

The Concept of Evaluating Advice

Advice is commonly recognized as a specific policy recommendation or prescription. National security advice often takes the form of a recommendation or prescription to the President by his advisors to take a certain policy action, or perhaps to refrain from taking action. Thus, recommendations to send troops to Vietnam, or to provide U.S. transports to carry French troops to Africa, are both considered to be national security advice. Advice of course is the result of a process that often involves such elements as gathering information, analyzing alternative courses of action in light of the information, and finally, selecting between alternative courses of action. This process is played out within certain structural and organizational boundaries. A simple diagram of the advisory process which posits that the structure of the advisory system affects the advisory process which, in turn, affects the quality of advice would look like the following:

Advisory Structure ➔ Advisory Process ➔ Advice Quality
Let us put aside the elements of structure and process for the moment and focus on the evaluation of the advice itself. Commentators on national security policy often make assessments on whether a particular action which the President undertook was "good policy." Similarly, observers of the advisory process make evaluations on whether advice which the President received was "good advice." Although some might object to values implicit in the work "good," we constantly make such assessments about the value of such Presidential advice. That "the President received good advice," or that "the President was ill-advised," are commonly offered in evaluative pieces on foreign policy actions. The problem, we contend, lies not in the values implicit in the word "good" but rather in the failure to make specific the criteria upon which one makes such an assessment. When, then might it be said that the President receives "good" advice? There are, we believe, three ways to approach this question.

First, one might evaluate advice by examining the substantive content of the advice itself. One might look at the substantive content along any number of dimensions, for example, whether it was consistent with the interests or objectives of a country, whether it was consistent over time or perhaps whether it was innovative and responsive to a changing environment. A difficulty with this approach is that any discussion of content requires a more extensive knowledge of the larger international context than is readily
mastered in a longitudinal study of the kind we are doing here. Otherwise, it is impossible to distinguish between conflicting content properties. For example, continuity is sometimes good, but flexibility and innovation may be desirable at other times. Consistency with goals is laudable unless circumstances require a reevaluation of out-moded goals, etc.

Second, the most common (and we believe least valid) method of evaluating national security advice is based on the evaluation of the results of the advice; that is, how successful the policy action was that was taken as a result of the advice. Thus, if we want to assess whether the President received "good advice" on the question of whether to drop an atomic bomb on Japan, we normally make some assessment of the efficacy of the actions taken as a result of that advice. If the policy outcome is judged satisfactory, that is, that it satisfied certain policy objectives, that action, as well as the advice upon which it was based, is said to be "good."

There are, it seems, several problems with this approach. One problem stems from the difficulty in determining just when the effects of a given policy action end. How can one be sure that the long-term repercussions of an action might not turn what appears to be a successful action at time t, to an unsuccessful one at time t₁? We often see
this type of reassessment in revisionist treatments of history. What might have been defended as good policy thirty years ago (perhaps in reference to the U.S. policy of containment during the Cold War) is now seen by some to have been flawed (in this case, that containment was a major cause of the Cold War and not a response to it). Another variant of this problem is seen in the case where additional effects appear with the passage of time, as opposed to a reassessment of previously noted effects as in the example above. This problem is illustrated by the U.S. Soviet grain deal. At time $t_1$, selling wheat to the Soviets seemed beneficial in that it reduced the American surplus and increased the value of trade exports. At $t_2$, however, other effects such as higher domestic prices for bread contributed to a growing inflation problem which proved to be an unintended negative result of the initial policy.

A second problem with evaluating the affects of policy results from the difficulties in determining causal relationships. Can we really be certain that the effects of a given policy caused the response taken by the target country? Other variables, unknown at the time of the evaluation of advice, might have had a significant impact on the decisions made. Even though one country might perceive the actions of another country to be the result of a certain policy decision, one cannot be sure of this. One example of this problem is
cases involving simultaneous decisions, or decisions taken by a target country before they were aware of actions taken by the initiator.

A third problem results from the different perceptions of success. One analyst might consider a certain policy action to be successful, while another operating under different assumptions deems it a failure. Often, the assumptions are not made explicit. Some, such as Sorenson (1965), hailed the resolution of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as a U.S. policy victory. Others citing Kennedy's promise not to invade Cuba, or the risks of nuclear war encountered (e.g., Nathan, 1975), made the opposite claim. In short, the evaluation of policy outcomes is often ambiguous.

In the final analysis, perhaps the most compelling argument against the position that one should judge advice on the merits of its results is a very practical one. Quite simply, that position leaves the decision-maker without any effective way of evaluating the advice he receives in advance of his decision. Obviously, a policy-maker cannot afford the luxury of putting three courses of action into effect and then choose the one that worked out best. No, he must make a choice based on the advice itself. If he would want to evaluate the advice and the process out of which it was produced in advance of his decision, he must make that evaluation based on some other criteria.
In view of these difficulties, we suggest that a third method of evaluating the "goodness" of advice be utilized. This method does not evaluate the advice itself, that is, the actual policy recommendation, nor does it evaluate the real-world consequences of the policy adopted as a result of some particular advice. Instead, this method evaluates the process out of which the advice is generated. It posits that there are certain processes that are necessary for the production of advice that will be of use to the policy-maker, and that the absence of these processes, by definition, increases the likelihood of poor advice. These required processes are culled from the literature on national security policy-making and are asserted as necessary for the production of good advice. The position taken is that good process increases the chances of good advice. And when we attempt to evaluate whether advice is good, we will be looking not at the substantive advice itself or the results of that advice, but at the process that produced the advice. The following illustrative story tries to make clear the distinctions that have been made in this section.

Let us consider the example of two men, both of whom decide to wager all their money at the race track. Neither knows much about racing, but each is willing to wager his life's savings for the chance of winning big. The first man, while entering the racegrounds, is stopped by a panhandler looking for a handout. The panhandler offers the
promise of a sure winner if only the man would give him $5.00. The man agrees, gives the panhandler the $5.00, and the panhandler turns to walk away. The man calls him back, insisting on the promised winning pick. The panhandler, also ignorant of racing, looks down at the bottle of liquor he is carrying. The label reads, "Vat 69." The panhandler looks up and tells the man to bet all his money on horse number 6 in the 9th race. The man follows this advice, much to his fortune. Number 6 wins the 9th race and pays 100 to 1. This man goes home rich.

What about our second bettor? He too, realizing that he knows little of racing, decides to get advice. He calls a group of trainers around him and offers them $50.00 each plus a percentage of the winnings if they would spend some time discussing with him what they know about the horses in that day's races. The trainers agree and a discussion ensues during which information about the horses is made available and shared among the members of the group. Evaluations are made on the basis of that information, and different options are advanced concerning how the man might maximize his chances of winning. Other factors surface; someone, for example, asks the man whether he has considered the effects that such a large sum of money would have on the odds. After carefully listening to the discussion, our second man decides that his best chance of winning a large
sum of money is to bet it all on horse number 1 in the 9th race. Unfortunately for man and beast, horse number 1 breaks his leg coming out of the starting gate. As we already know, horse number 6, the long-shot, wins.

How are we to judge which man got the best advice? If we were to use the criteria that the results of the advice are the judge of their soundness, then we would have to conclude that our first man had the best advice. That conclusion, we believe, would be somewhat unsettling to most of us. Who, for instance, would be willing to follow that type of advice consistently, especially in the national security arena? To what extent would most reasoned thinkers conclude that the first man was merely lucky, and that the unexpected complication of horse number 1 breaking a leg might have altered the outcome of the betting?

What we argue here is that in fact the second man, although he lost his money, really had the best advice, and that over time (assuming that knowledge and expertise relate in any way to an ability to pick winning horses) the second man would have fared better because the process which he chose to advise him was in fact capable of giving him consistently better advice.

What we are contending is that in national security matters there are certain processes which if present will produce, more often than not, good advice. We will evaluate
the process by means of certain criteria for good advice that are discussed immediately below. When the advisory process satisfies these criteria, then we say that it produces good advice. So saying, we have shifted the evaluation away from the actual advice (that is, the stated policy recommendation) and moved it to the process out of which the advice is generated.

Process Criteria Necessary for Good Advice

Assessment involves the choosing of some standard of desirability against which actual events can be evaluated. Initially, then, a number of criteria must be developed against which the various advisory structures can be evaluated. These criteria are admittedly subjective, and as we discussed in the previous section, conceptions about what constitutes "good advice" may vary. Nonetheless, good advice is defined here in terms of seven explicit, observable, process criteria. The fulfillment of these criteria will be considered as necessary if the structure is to give consistently high-quality inputs to the President. The less these criteria remain fulfilled, then the less adequate the system will be for Presidential needs. Over the long-run, such a deficient system will not be able to provide the President with adequate advice in a consistent fashion. The following criteria relating to the advisory process
are offered as a basis with which to measure whether a given structure provides the President with the best possible advice.

1. Information - attention to quality
2. Multiple options - presented to the President
3. Dissent - transmitted to the President
4. Concern for implementation
5. Consideration of uncertainty
6. Use of experts
7. Explication of goals

We now turn to a full elaboration of each of the criterion and provide a justification why its presence is seen as promoting and encouraging good advice. At the conclusion of the discussion of each criterion we address the question of when the presence of the criterion (normally held to be necessary for good advice) might be considered undesirable to the production of good advice. We include this comment because it is recognized that there may indeed be exceptions to the general principal, that is, times when the presence of the criteria may be counterproductive.

At this point, we would do well to ask in advance whether the criteria for good advice which we are discussing are ever justifiably ignored. It may well be argued that inflexible application of specified criteria to all cases could in specific instances be inappropriate. We should ask
then, as we discuss each criterion, whether circumstances can be anticipated in which the criterion might prove to be a liability rather than a benefit to the President as decision-maker. It should be clear, however, that these circumstances are to be considered exceptions to the general utility of the criterion, and that the policy-maker who consistently ignored the general applicability of the criterion would be sacrificing the quality of advice he received. The burden of responsibility for ignoring the criterion to satisfy some other objective rests with the decision-maker. In other words, we feel that there must be compelling, not merely convenient, reasons for a President to ignore the general criteria.

1. **Information - attention to quality**

An advisory system is better able to provide good advice where accurate information about the problem is available to all the advisors involved in the decision process. The question of accuracy is readily determined in a *post hoc* fashion. Nonetheless, an advisory unit should be cognizant of the problem of information and make some attempt to evaluate the information available to them. By "attention to quality" we simply mean that there is a conscious evaluation of the information upon which the advisors will base their advice.

Government consists of many organizations which, for various reasons, collect and evaluate information on world
events. It is widely accepted that accurate information about the policy problem is the sine qua non for those who would offer advice on national security matters (e.g., George, 1972, p. 759). Finite resources, together with many other factors, limit the amount and type of information which any one organization can collect. What is collected is often governed by the organization's perspective of what is important, frequently defined in terms of contributing towards the fulfillment of an organization's mission (see, e.g., Hilsman, 1967; Halperin and Kanter, 1973; Allison, 1971). The information that is collected is often evaluated within an organizational framework which is likely to bias the analysis for similar reasons. Thus, at least two factors - limited resources and organizational bias -- combine to shape the amount and kind of information collected and the subsequent analysis of the information. Any organization, therefore, frequently has only part of the information obtainable on a given subject, and almost always possesses a limited range of interpretation. Given the assumption that the best advice is the product of the most complete information available, a system in which information is readily shared is likely to provide better quality advice than a system in which information is more fragmented.

The inherent data acquisition limitations of individual organizations are often recognized within government. The creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency to coordinate
the gathering and analysis of intelligence of the individual service organizations is but one example. However, not all advisory structures are designed to facilitate the transfer of information between organizations or individuals. This criteria, then, evaluates whether information on a policy problem is made available to organizations or individuals whose mission or position would qualify them to make inputs of advice to the President, and whether that information itself is evaluated by the advisors.

This information criterion also considers whether the information which the advisors utilize is available and accurate. The system could produce accurate information which for one reason or another never reached any decision-maker. On the other hand, information which might reach decision-makers could well be inaccurate. Thus there are two distinct aspects to the first criterion. However, if either are absent, the advisory process is jeopardized. If the information which reaches the advisors is inaccurate, the validity of their analysis of the situation is suspect. If there is accurate information in the system that never reaches the advisors, they are being denied the very basis for making their advice. (Note: The operationalization of the criteria, that is, just what a researcher would have to see in a given case to say that information was accurate, etc., is provided in the final section of this chapter.)
Are there any times then when our first criterion might be a negative factor in the attempt to provide good advice? In the abstract, it is difficult to conceive of a situation when attention to the quality of information would prove a liability. Could the attempt to get even more accurate information and to have that information disseminated to all participants ever prove a liability? Certain such conditions are conceivable; for instance, the cost of additional information might be prohibitive. One might justifiably argue that the sharing of information could have negative consequences—the possibility of leaks, loss of secrecy, overload of the decision-maker with amount of information to digest, and delay are but a few. Of course, no one should participate in the decision-making without information on the topic. If secrecy or time are overriding factors in a given situation it might be reasonable to relax this criterion. However, only in those cases when the need for secrecy is extraordinarily great, or the time for decision is exceedingly short would a relaxation of this criterion be justified.

2. Multiple options - presented to the President

A system that provides the President with multiple options is more likely to provide him with better advice than one in which only limited options are offered. A system geared to providing multiple options will be less likely to offer advice based on (1) incomplete analysis,
(2) hasty conclusions, (3) the suppression of unpopular viewpoints, and (4) perhaps fragmentary information, assuming that the search for alternative options results in a concomitant search for more information and a more careful examination of the pros and cons of each (the point being that one might need more information to assess the viability of the increased number of options). The more options required of an advisory system, the more likely that it will be forced to cover a fuller range of relevant hypotheses and alternatives. One of the prime recommendations of the Jackson Committee was that the President be provided with alternative courses of action and that he not be spared the necessity of choice (Falk, 1964, p. 428). Janus (1972) and George (1972) also consider the presence of multiple options highly desirable in an advisory system. Among George's reasons is the observation that it is "extremely difficult for a President to act contrary to the unanimous advice of all his national security advisors" (p. 775).

The second criterion is satisfied then when the advisory system presents multiple options for Presidential consideration. The decision to blockade Cuba during the missile crisis came out of a multiple option situation as told by Allison (1971). On the other hand, the account of the development of the Marshall Plan by Jones (1955) would
seem to indicate that this criterion was not fulfilled in that case.

There are at least two potential liabilities or times when this criterion might not lead to good advice. The first is when false options are generated merely for appearance. This is the case when advisors might agree on a particular course of action as being best and then generating other options which are more clearly undesirable and thus by contrast make their desired option look even better than if it had been presented alone. Another liability would surface if agencies or individuals used this criterion to aid them in avoiding the acceptance of responsibility by forwarding everything without making any firm commitment. This situation could readily overload the President. Additionally, what the President would be getting could not be considered advice if he merely received lists of every possible alternative devoid of any analysis or recommendations.

3. Dissent - transmitted to the President

A system which allows unpopular or dissenting options to be expressed is more likely to provide good advice than one in which dissent is viewed as undesirable and disloyal. George (1972) views the presence of an advocate for unpopular policy options as important for the correct functioning of a policy-making system.
This criterion proceeds partly from the premise that complete information and analysis provide the best advice. A dissenter is in a position to further the consideration of all relevant information in at least one of two ways. First, he might persuade others that he has additional information on the problem which was either unavailable or simply not considered in their analysis. Second, he might be able to show that an alternative analysis of existing information could lead to different conclusions. Both these processes could prompt the President, if not other advisers themselves, to examine more closely the arguments being advocated by the majority. One need only look at the accounts of the thinking that governed decision-making during much of the Vietnam War (see, e.g., Janus, 1972) to realize the importance of an advisory system which allows for the consideration of dissenting opinions.

Janus (1972) considers the elimination of dissent in small groups fatal and considers it a major symptom of "groupthink." The groupthink process involves loyalty as one's highest morality. A groupthinker, then, tends to avoid raising issues that might upset the cohesiveness of the group. Critical thinking is deferred for the sake of consensus. Dissent is suppressed for the sake of unanimity.

The second criterion is fulfilled when a system allows positions which are not in harmony with the prevailing
opinion to be (1) raised in the first place, (2) considered as a legitimate position, and (3) passed on to the President.

Dissent can be present in at least two ways. The first is seen operating out of an environment which values free expression of ideas uncensored by restraints of expected outcomes. The second occurs within the framework of what might be called the "hired critic," or "devil's advocate," who is expected to be at odds with the prevailing opinion. George Ball, it has been argued (George, 1972), played such a role in the Johnson administration with regard to Vietnam policy. The potential danger with this second type is that the dissent tends to become discounted and in the end is not true dissent at all. Dissent is not always manifested in the generation of multiple options and hence it is considered a separate criterion. It has been demonstrated that the presence of multiple options does not in itself guarantee the presence of dissent. Such might be the case when all advisors agree to the superiority of one course of action and even if they present multiple options there may be no support for them. In another case, the range of options presented might be so small that there is in reality no substantive differences between them, or one or more option my be regarded by a dissenter as misrepresented.

Are there potential liabilities in a system which encourages an atmosphere conducive to dissent? Dissent could create divisions which might precipitate bargaining and
trade-offs, or delays or indecision, where the policy-maker may not make a clear choice but rather create an option based partly on one group's perception of what should be done and partly on another group's perception of what should be done. Such hybrid decisions, if not based on logic but on the need to build consensus and maintain harmony, either for political or personality reasons, probably reduce the quality of decision. In this case, however, we are evaluating the capabilities of a particular individual in the office of the President rather than the advisory system.

4. Concern for implementation

A system which anticipates the requirements for the implementation of a potential policy recommendation and the fits with existing resources and the will to commit them is likely to give better advice than one in which implementation is not considered. An advisory system which fails to consider the problems of implementing its advised policy fails to give the President complete advice. In any complex political system intra-branch and inter-branch conflicts are often present. At times, these can seriously affect the quality of implementation of a given policy. The failure to anticipate such problems in advance results in rendering the President deficient advice. This has been recognized, for instance, in the Jackson Committee recommendation that "ways and means should be found of better integrating NSC recommendations with budgetary decisions made outside the Council"
The consideration of fiscal capabilities is but one aspect of the question of implementation. Other aspects would include consultation and coordination with the potential implementors within the Executive Branch, consultation with important Congressional leaders whose support may be beneficial, and, when the occasion warrants, consultation with appropriate leaders of foreign governments whose concurrence may be needed for successful implementation.

Advice may be of limited value if there is little chance for it resulting in policy. Recognizing the necessity of implementation, a President will often take care to pay more attention to the advice of a man who must carry out the policy (Sorenson, 1965, p. 79).

This criterion, then, considers whether an attempt is made to assess how implementable a policy option is should the decision to pursue it be made. The criterion is satisfied if, in the deliberation stage, attention is paid to feasibility. Coordination with those whose responsibility it would be to carry out the policy as well as consideration of such matters as budgetary feasibility would be indicative of such consideration.

Assuming that the President had not been advised of possible implementation problems, President Kennedy's decision to remove the Jupiter missile from Turkey would not seem to fulfill this criterion. However, Truman's
consideration of the implementation of the Marshall Plan is a good example of the fulfillment of this criterion.

The potential liability of this criterion would be the possibility of leaks and delay in decision-making. More importantly, it could cause advisors to seek the line of least resistance in providing advice to the President. Policy which, in the formulation stage appeared to be difficult to implement, might be dropped prematurely in favor of an option which seemed to have a better chance of being implemented. This would be detrimental if it drew the advisors into a satisficing situation where implementation considerations drove the advisory system rather than policy objectives.

5. Consideration of uncertainty

A system which recognizes the uncertainty of the consequences of its advice will provide the President with more complete advice than a system which does not. It is important to consider how a system deals with uncertainty. It is important to know whether advisors consider the probability of an advised course of action working as planned, and whether an assessment is made of the consequences of the policy's adoption on an external environment. One of the hallmarks of national security decisions is the uncertainty
that surrounds them. In a policy area where, as Kennedy said, "mistakes can kill," it is important to know how adequately uncertainty is treated.

An initial question is whether uncertainty is recognized at all in the advice offered to the President. At the very least, one should expect that an assessment of all possible outcomes, both desirable and undesirable, be made for each option that is advanced. A President should be made aware that if option A is selected over other options, there is a certain probability that outcomes X, Y, and Z will occur. If outcome Y, for example, is undesirable, the President should be made aware of the possibility of its occurrence. If uncertainty about the outcomes of recommended policies are either suppressed or ignored, then the advice to the President will necessarily be incomplete.

Oran Young (1975) suggests that there are three common types of responses to uncertainty. These are avoidance behavior (in which the decision-maker ignores or evades the impact of uncertainty on his choice), search and information-gathering (in which new or improved information is sought in an attempt to reduce the level of uncertainty), and use of decision rules (in which rules of thumb are employed to make ultimately arbitrary decisions). It would be interesting to see whether structural arrangements impact on differing responses to conditions of uncertainty.
It should be noted that this criterion differs from the fourth criterion in the following way. The fourth criterion asks whether an option which appears desirable can be implemented if it is chosen. The criterion concerned with uncertainty asks whether attention is paid to the effects of the policy if it is implemented.

Are there any potentially negative aspects of treating uncertainty? It would seem that an undue amount of attention to the inherent uncertainty of any human action could be detrimental to the decision process. Without doubt, uncertainty could breed excessive caution by advisors and decision-makers leading to excessive delays or even inaction. In making this judgement, we are speculating on the interactive effects of uncertainty on other variables such as personality. In and of itself, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where the failure to consider uncertainty would provide better advice than instances where the recognition of uncertainty is present.

6. Use of experts

An expert may be considered as one who possesses detailed knowledge of a problem usually acquired from direct experience over a period of time, and/or through formal learning processes concerned with a particular domain. Advisory systems which include the use of experts in the
decision process are more likely to provide better advice than those in which experts are excluded from the decision process. It is often argued that a generalist perspective is most useful for Presidential advisors to have. Presidents, we are told, often prefer them to experts. Sorenson (1965) relates one such example in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs invasion by quoting Kennedy: "All my life I've known better than to depend on experts. How could I have been so stupid, to let them go ahead." Cronin (1975, p. 62) quotes a senior White House aide: "The more specialized in a single area you are, the less likely you are to be effective ... those who stay generalists are likely to be turned to by a President."

Regardless of the nature of the immediate advisors to the President, it seems prudent that experts be consulted in decision-making. Contrary to Kennedy's view of the role of the expert in the ultimate failure of the Bay of Pigs, Janis (1972) considers that the lack of expert input was partly responsible for its adoption and failure. He reveals, for instance, that key State Department experts on the Cuban desk were not asked to comment on key CIA assumptions such as those relating to the probabilities of an indigenous Cuban uprising. The exclusion of experts in Kennedy's immediate circle tended to render them helpless in any critical evaluation of the CIA plan. Their failure to ask
the right question that might have shown flaws in the CIA's contingency plans (for example, the assumption that the force could move into the mountains to wage guerrilla warfare if things went badly) demonstrates the value of experts being included in the decision process.

Within the realm of experts, we would include both those within the government as well as outside experts. Thus, both the academic or other nongovernmental expert on China, as well as the State Department official from the China desk, would qualify.

A possible danger with experts or specialists is that they may evaluate problems too narrowly with reference only to countries or regions or substantive areas in which they are specialists without the broader ramifications being taken into consideration. This is a frequent charge leveled against military experts, for example. It is sometimes charged that their very expertise (normally achieved as a result of long association with the profession) biases them toward the use of the military instrument of foreign policy. Another danger would occur in the extreme case where only experts are consulted. This would be expected to result in advice that was narrow and "technical" in nature.

Finally, one realizes that expert involvement does not in itself guarantee the right answers to tough policy questions. Experts often disagree about the reasons for why
things are the way they are, and on solutions to the problems with which reality confronts us. One need only look at economic experts who are notorious for disagreeing with each other on solutions to economic ills. What expert inclusion does do, is to introduce into the discussion advice by people who have thought about a substantive area previously, in non-crisis situations, and who might lend a note of detachment from immediate political and bureaucratic pressures.

7. **Explication of goals**

Another criterion for good advice is the presence of a clear explication of the national interest and the goals which the decision is designed to serve. One also would expect a specification of the objectives that the policy action seeks to achieve. Together with these, one would expect to see a recognition of certain trade-offs inherent in policy action--more of "this" at the expense of less of "that."

One of the hallmarks of any definition of national security policy is the notion of a national interest, of goals being served and of specified results expected. What we will be looking for is whether these concepts are articulated in the decision process and whether they are articulated only in the most general terms (motherhood and apple pie) or whether they are linked logically to a
specific set of objectives that need to be achieved in a particular instance.

George (1971) argues that one of the problems the Johnson administration faced in the early (1964-65) air war against North Vietnam was precisely that it lacked this criterion. There was no clear explication of the American objectives nor was there a clear conception of what actions the North Vietnamese would have had to take in order to cause a cessation of the bombing. (For example, did Johnson want the North to stop invading the South? Did he want the North merely to give up all support to the Viet Cong? Did he want the South to "win"? Etc.)

On the other hand, it can be argued that during the Cuban missile crisis there was a conscious search made for the adequate response to the introduction of offensive missiles to Cuba which included a conscious explication of the national interest (threatened by nuclear weapons from within the Western Hemisphere) as well as the consideration of the whole range of specific policy objectives from the removal of the missiles to the removal of the Castro and Communism from the hemisphere. In this decision there was a conscious attempt to fit the objective to possible options. Blockade was finally considered sufficient for the voluntary removal of the missiles, overt force would have been required to topple Castro.
The benefit of such a determination of national interests and specific objectives is that it forces advisors to consider what values are being threatened or affected and then choose a response proportional to the magnitude of the threat. It also forces them to clarify the objectives of the response and provides some standard for policy evaluation.

A danger of including national objectives and goals in the advisory process might present itself if the advisors were so locked into a certain goal that it would later cause problems if circumstances changed. To begin a war with the objective of "unconditional surrender" is one thing, but the circumstances might change as time passes and the original objective might profitably be modified to adapt to changing circumstances.

Operationalization of the Criteria for Good Advice

It is important to specify the conditions that should be present in a case in order that a criterion discussed in the above section can be assessed as being present. Yin and Heald (1975) stress the importance of replicability in the case survey method of analysis. If the case survey method is to produce reliable results (that is, multiple researchers would make the same assessments as to the presence or absence of the criteria) then there must be objective standards.
against which the researcher can base his evaluation. What follows, then, is a presentation of each of the criteria with the stress being on their operationalization.

1. Information – attention to quality

   Few, if any, decisions are based on the absence of any information. What we wish to ascertain is whether there was any critical information that was either not available to advisors, or if available, was accepted without a judgement being made about its quality. In the first instance, it would appear that only a direct assertion by the author of the case study would provide justification for asserting that this criterion was absent. What we are looking for here is whether there is direct evidence in the case that the information channels either denied information being forwarded, or, if forwarded, was inaccurate. We will define critical information as that information which, either in the opinion of the author of the case study, or of one of the actual participants in the decision, would have made a difference either in the advice given the President or in the actual decision made by the President. Given these guidelines, the researcher must answer the following closed-end questions as they relate to the case.

   a. Is there conscious consideration of the general problem of information in the case?
b. Do the participants make any attempt to evaluate the information presented to them?

c. Does the author discuss the presence of critical information which is in the system, but not available to the advisors?

d. Does a reading of the case study indicate that information available to some advisors was not available to all of them (or to the President)?

If the answer to questions a and b are positive, and c and d are negative, then the criterion will be considered as being present in the advisory process. If all are negative, the criterion will be considered absent from the advisory process.

2. Multiple options - presented to the President

We are interested in whether more than one option is generated by the advisory group. An option will be considered to be a policy recommendation or choice of action. Multiple options, therefore, indicate the presence of more than one policy recommendation for the President to consider. It is important to know when options are generated, but options which are considered at an early stage in the advisory process but which never reach the President (because, perhaps, they are rejected by the advisors in favor of a single policy recommendation) would not be considered as fulfilling this criterion. Also, we would demand that there is some genuine support for the options presented. One
advisor, at least, should be prepared to argue its merits. Thus, if the advisors present the President with five possible choices, but they speak unanimously in favor of one, we would not consider that as fulfilling this criterion. Here again, we are reminded of George's (1972) contention that it is difficult for a President to go against unanimous advice.

The question might arise as how one would differentiate between "false" options and real options. For our purpose, a "false" option will be considered as any option that has no support within the advisory group. A false option would also be considered as such if labeled in that manner by the author of the case study. To determine whether this criterion is present in the advisory process we will ask:

a. Is more than one option generated?

b. What are the options presented to the President?

c. Do the options appear to have support from one or more advisors?

Question c arises out of concern about whether each option has some support. It is extremely unlikely that most case studies would be so detailed as to mention the supporters of each option transmitted to the President. There is obviously a fine line between the generation of options which are viewed in a negative manner and the generation of options which, while having no firm support, are deemed
plausible enough to be called to the President's attention. While we would ideally want to see the author address the information asked in question c, we may have to rely on the author's implication that the options were genuine and not merely cosmetic.

The question of advisor support presents some problems. In most instances, it is felt that we will be relying on the analysis of the author of the case study. Without doubt, occasions arise in which options are presented to the President with apparent support, but in no way are they real options. One example that comes to mind was the recommendations of the "never again" school during the Laotian Crisis of 1961-62. This school was a continuance of the belief that we could not meet the Asian Communists on the Asian continent with force, unless it was a total commitment. The options supported by this group (that is, use all force possible or do nothing), was clearly an unacceptable response. It was considered by many merely to be advice that the group knew would not be seriously considered and thus not offered in good faith. Without the commentary by the case study author on such points, one would be forced to code that advice as the example of a multiple option. We are reminded again that we are completely dependent upon the case studies for the accuracy of our data.
3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President**

Dissent is used here in the sense of a strongly articulated opposition to a particular course of action. Ultimately, we are concerned with dissent which reaches the President, who in all our cases is the principal decision-maker.

Dissent is seen as operating on two levels. The first level is between the advisors themselves. If dissent occurs early at this level one might expect its chief effect would be on the fulfillment of other criteria. For example, early dissent might broaden the search for new information, or for a new conceptualization of the problem, or for new options to be generated, etc. Whereas dissent at this level is important for these reasons, and therefore will be looked for in the cases, we are more immediately interested in dissent at a second level. This is the level of Presidential involvement. If dissent exists at lower levels but never reaches the President it might be said to be non-existent for his purposes; that is, by presenting a different perspective in the decision stage itself.

Dissent differs from the offering of an alternative; that is, another option. Dissent implies a strong and direct dissatisfaction with a particular possible policy option. It is in this sense that dissent differs from the multiple option criterion. One can offer an alternative
option yet not dissent to the option that is chosen; similarly, one can be a dissenter against a particular option while offering no counter proposal.

The following questions are applicable for evaluating the presence of this criterion:

a. Does the author of the case study assert that there is dissent in the system?

b. Did the dissent reach the President?

In absence of a discussion of dissent by the author, the criterion will be considered in the analysis as missing data.

4. **Concern for implementation**

Implementation here refers to paying attention to the factors which ought to be considered if a proposed policy is to be put into action. Thus, concern for implementation might include such things as consideration of the role of the Congress, the support of various other groups, the consultation with other governments, etc. Fulfillment of this criterion could be asserted when either (a) the author asserts its presence, or (b) a demonstration in the text that some discussion or communication with those whose assistance might be required to carry out the policy. For instance, if a military action is considered, it would have to be demonstrated in the account that some military experts
were consulted to evaluate whether we have the capability, from a military standpoint, to carry out the action. Similarly, if the approval or support of Congress were needed, it should be demonstrated that this be reflected at an appropriate stage in the advisory process. At a minimum, one would expect that there be some conscious assessment of potential policy support in Congress. These considerations would extend to foreign leaders in instances where there consultation is important.

The following questions are applicable for evaluating the presence of this criterion:

a. Was the feasibility of the proposed action considered by the advisors?

b. Were those groups or individuals whose support might be needed in putting the policy into action consulted during the decision process?

5. Considerations of uncertainty

We want to determine if there was some recognition of the indeterminacy of human action on the part of the advisors—whether it was present, and how it was treated. Uncertainty is demonstrated by the awareness that a policy option might not produce the desired result. This information is critical for the President. It is an input which might make a critical difference in the choice he makes.
Thus, one would demand that uncertainty about policy options be transmitted to the President.

The following questions are applicable for evaluating the presence of this criterion:

a. Is there specific evidence that the advisory group recognized the possibility that the proposed policy might not produce the results desired?

b. Is this uncertainty passed on to the President along with the policy recommendation?

6. Use of experts

This criterion asks whether there is broader participation other than those who have only a general knowledge of the issue.

The author's assertion that a certain participant is an expert would merit a positive response. Similarly, his assertion that experts were left out of the process would be grounds for a negative response.

We will assume that certain positions confer a high probability of expertise in an individual holding the position. This may be true even if the author does not explicitly ascribe expertise to an individual. For example, an ambassador of several years to a country would be considered an expert on that country. A high-level, but sub-Cabinet career civil servant who heads the State Department's
desk for Far Eastern Affairs would similarly qualify. For our purpose then, Assistant Secretaries would be considered experts. On the other hand, the Chief of Staff cannot automatically be assumed to be an expert on the uses of tactical air power in a nuclear environment. In this case, qualifications other than position in government must be presented, and a heavy reliance on the author of the case study would be expected.

Experts outside government are perhaps more readily identified. Academic degrees, previous consultations in the substantive area, and peer respect in his substantive area make non-governmental experts more readily identifiable.

The control on falsely ascribing expertise where none exists will be the requirement that the expert be identified, as well as that the justification for the label be provided. The following questions then should be answered with the above discussion in mind:

a. Is there evidence that experts are consulted during the advisory process (either formally or informally)?

b. Are the experts available to the President?

7. Explication of goals

In his essay On War, Clausewitz writes that if nations acted wisely, they wouldn't go to war until they asked what was to be attained by the war. War, a policy tool, is undertaken by Clausewitz's "wise nation" in order to achieve some goal which is ascertained in advance. We ask the same thing
of policy advisors. Here we ask if a policy is taken in response to a clearly perceived national interest and with clearly specified objectives for the action. It is impossible to speculate with any confidence on what a person is thinking; thus, it would seem that only the direct assertion of the case study author, or by the participants themselves, would allow positive responses to the following questions which address this criterion.

a. Is there a conception of national interest specified in the advisory process?

b. If so, are the policy recommendations explicitly geared to the attainment of objectives which would satisfy the national interests expressed by the advisors?

c. Is there a recognition of possible trade-offs and goal conflicts in the advisory process?

Question c is included in recognition of the problem that broad interests and specific objectives are often put forth without a clear realization that certain other goals may have to be sacrificed for their attainment.

This concludes our discussion of the process criteria deemed necessary for the continued production of good advice. In the following chapter we will look at the various structural combinations of the advisory system and speculation on their relationship to promoting the presence of the seven process criteria.
CHAPTER III
EVALUATING THE ADVISORY STRUCTURE

This chapter will discuss the starting point of our model, that is, organizational structure. In Chapter II we introduced the simple diagram which posits that the organizational structure affects the advisory process which in turn affects the output—advice. Our premise is that different structural arrangements will provide different degrees of fulfillment of the seven criteria for good advice which are set forth in Chapter II. We will examine existing case studies of national security decisions as a basis for determining the structure of the advisory process involved, as well as a data source for assessing whether a given criterion was present.

We have already discussed some facets of the advisory structure in Chapter I. We indicated, for example, that structural changes in the President's national security advisory apparatus are frequent and easily accomplished. The formal changes are most notable between administrations. However, there are important differences within administrations as well. Presidents do not always rely on the formal structure which they instituted to handle national security
matters. Who sees the President, when he sees him, and in what setting he sees him, changes throughout a given administration. One of the important by-products of this dissertation is that it records the frequency with which Presidents use various advisory structures. In other words, it maps in a systematic way the structural configurations which have been used in national security decision-making.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section provides some general comments on the structure of the Presidential advisory system and provides a listing of those structural characteristics which will be examined in this dissertation. The second section presents a more detailed discussion of these characteristics and suggests how these structural characteristics can be operationalized. The final section attempts to make some assessments, in advance of the actual case study research, about the linkages between the structural characteristics presented in this chapter and the process criteria discussed in Chapter II.

Structure of the Presidential Advisory System

As stated earlier, the basic premise of this research is that structure has the potential for making important differences in the quality of advice which a President receives on national security matters. It is important
then, after having discussed in Chapter II the process variables which are believed necessary for good advice, to identify those structural characteristics within the organizational arrangements used by recent Presidents which are believed to be important in influencing the process variables.

Initially, an attempt was made to delineate several models of advisory systems which would be mutually exclusive. Upon observation, however, this route seemed undesirable from a research standpoint for two reasons. First, if the system as defined by a substantial number of variables was too specific, the advisory system models began to resemble the real world systems of specific Presidents. This would have prevented meaningful generalizations between Presidents because it would have been impossible to determine the idiosyncratic effects on the models. On the other hand, when the models were made more general, it was observed that a single case of decision-making would easily fit into more than one model. Again, little generalization would have been possible. Thus, rather than attempt to model entire structural systems, we chose to identify a series of structural characteristics, each of which could be analyzed separately in the initial analysis, and, if possible, combined later.
What then are the structural characteristics most noteworthy with respect to their effect on the process criteria in Presidential advisory systems for national security matters? Or stated another way—what are some of the more interesting arrangements that affect the process criteria for good advice that vary both within and between administrations? Many are straightforward and have already been suggested. For instance, the number of advisors that a President seeks advice from varies from one to many. This is one variable where effect should be observed, because one can speculate that certain criteria might more likely be fulfilled when there is more than one advisor. In addition to number, composition also varies. Presidents can rely on advisors either as individuals or as part of a group. These groups may be formally constituted as the National Security Council, or ad hoc, as Kennedy's EXCOM. Some Presidents have chosen to have strong intermediaries between themselves and formally constituted advisory systems. The question that will be asked concerning the advice in a national security decision is how well the process criteria for good advice discussed in Chapter II were satisfied in the presence or absence of such structural characteristics as these. What we want to uncover in each case are the structural characteristics which had an impact on the decision-making process and then evaluate how well the criteria for good
advice were fulfilled. Hopefully, a meaningful combination of cases will reveal patterns of performance for differing structural arrangements.

Below are listed the specific structural characteristics which will be examined in this dissertation. The question to be asked in each case is how differences in these structural characteristics affect the process criteria for good advice discussed in Chapter II.

1. The Composition of the Decision Unit
   a. Interagency participation vs single-agency participation
   b. Multiple-level participation vs single-level participation
   c. Involvement of outside participants

2. Interaction Patterns
   a. Face-to-face group interaction
   b. Mediated interaction
   c. One-on-one interaction

3. Frequency of Meetings
   a. One meeting vs multiple meetings

4. Number of Advisory Units
   a. Single advisory unit vs multiple advisory units
Discussion and Operationalization of Selected Structural Characteristics of National Security Systems

This section will discuss how the various structural characteristics are operationalized. Some illustrations are provided linking them with the criteria for illustrative purposes. A fuller treatment of these linkages is presented in the final section of this chapter.

1. The Composition of the Decision Unit

This structural characteristic seeks to uncover who the decision advisors are, and where they are spatially located either within or without the government. Differences in composition is expected to have impact on the fulfillment of the process criteria discussed in Chapter II.

a. Interagency participation vs single-agency participation. Are participants in the advisory process members of the same agency, or are multiple governmental (or nongovernmental) agencies involved? The identification of a single-agency advisory unit is rather straightforward. If all members of the advisory unit are also members of a single governmental agency (such as State, Defense, CIA) then the unit can confidently be placed in the single-agency category. Interagency advice is conceived as advice generated as a result of two or more agencies providing advice jointly after interaction (verbal, face-to-face, written
position papers) with each other. The distinction is one based on the interaction of the agencies. If there is interaction between the agencies before offering the President advice, then the participation is classified as "inter-agency." Thus, if more than one agency gives advice to the President, but they fail to interact with each other in advance, the advice would not be considered a product of interagency participation.

Specifically, a situation would clearly be labeled "single-agency participation" if policy options were worked out by a State Department working group without interaction with other Cabinet departments, and then the Secretary of State discussed these options with the President without consultation with other advisors. If several agencies act in a similar fashion (that is, no interaction between them), that structural characteristic would likewise be labeled "single-agency participation." If, however, several agencies pool their personnel and, as a result of a collaborative effort, offer advice to the President, the result would be labeled "interagency participation."

The following questions address the nature of agency participation.

(1) Is the advice offered the product of one or more than one agency's involvement?
(2) If the advice is the product of more than one agency, is it possible to detect undue influence of a single agency?

Question 2 is included to take into account the possibility that the interagency participation is of grossly unequal weight, either in the information and option development stage, or in the presentation of the advice.

While a full treatment of the linkages between the structural characteristics and criteria are discussed in the last part of this chapter, the following are illustrative of the differences structure is expected to make. When compared with singel-agency participation, multiple-agency inputs would lead to increased sharing of information; differing perspectives would increase the likelihood that experts would be used.

b. **Multiple-level participation vs single-level participation.** Is more than one level (in a hierarchical sense) of government used in the advisory process, or are all the participants on the same level? Multiple-level participation is recognizable either by the actors involved or by the organizations involved. An actor whose job is primarily that of a desk officer in the State Department or that of Army commander in the U.S. Army is clearly below Cabinet level in the governmental hierarchy. These lower-level actors, if included in the advisory process along with
Cabinet-level actors, would be evidence indicating multiple-level participation. Specifically, two career officers from the State Department—Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, and John Hickerson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, were intimately involved along with Cabinet-level actors from the very beginning on the question of aid to Greece and Turkey. Another example from the Truman administration would be the inclusion of a Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) in the deliberations during the first crucial week of the Korean War.

We will seek to uncover the level of participation by addressing the following:

(1) Are the participants in the advisory process from the same level of government, or are the participants from more than one level?

(2) If the participants are from multiple levels, does their participation include contact with the President (either in person, or in a position paper, for example)?

One expectation stemming from the use of multiple levels of participation would be the increased likelihood of experts being included since it is often the case that the highest levels of government are staffed by generalists. Availability of information should also be positively affected since information normally flows up from lower
levels of government. Multiple-level participation in the decision process should also facilitate implementation if it is to be carried out by subordinates.

c. Involvement of outside participants. We want to know whether the advisory unit is composed strictly of government personnel, or whether outsiders are included in the process. An outsider will be defined as one who has no formal position in the government. He may be an important former member of the government, however. What is important is his status at the time he is involved in the advisory process. An example of this type of outsider would be Acheson during the Cuban missile crisis. At the time of the crisis he had no official position in government and was included in the early stages of deliberations. We would not consider government members whose position is unrelated to the issue (Bobby Kennedy, Cuban crisis) as outsiders. In this case, we assume that all insiders, regardless of position, would be under the same pressure to conform or examine the problem in a similar light.

While examining each case then, we will ask:

(1) Are any nongovernment personnel included in the advisory process?

In general, we would feel that groups consisting of insiders alone would be more likely to exhibit what Janus
(1972) calls "groupthink"—suppressing dissent, limiting options, and ignoring uncertainty. Outsiders might be in a position to mitigate some of these problems because it is likely that the outside perspective will be somewhat different than that of the insiders.

2. Interaction Patterns

The various ways in which advisors and the President interact during the advisory process is the focus of this set of structural characteristics. Under this heading we will consider face-to-face group interaction, mediated interaction, and one-on-one interaction, as different characteristics with potentially different degrees of success in fulfilling the process criteria for good advice.

a. Face-to-face group interaction. This characteristic describes the President and his advisors interacting in person in a group setting. The group may be formally constituted (such as an NSC meeting) or ad hoc (such as Johnson's Tuesday Lunch). A group will be defined as three advisors in addition to the President. An example would be Truman's meeting with his advisors in several early Korean War decisions. This pattern holds the potential for the particular personality traits of the President to assume great importance. As in any situation which involves the President directly, one would expect the influences of his
personality to be felt most strongly. A President who in meeting with his advisors allows his views to color the advice he gets (see, e.g., Janus, 1972) could adversely affect the fulfillment of the criteria. His personality might so overpower his advisors that they might offer advice different from that which they might give under different circumstances. However, a President who consciously avoided such actions might expect to gain several beneficial effects from face-to-face encounters. A face-to-face discussion might be able to provide the President with the clearest and most accurate information available. It would provide the President with instantaneous feedback on information availability. Group discussions of this type might be more prone to consider implementation and consequences of actions. Dissent would be highly visible. Although such a pattern might not necessarily be expected to foster dissent, that which might surface would be sure to reach the President. Dissemination of information would be broadest in such a setting and information gaps would be most noticeable.

For each case study then, we will ask:

(1) Does the President meet with three or more advisors in a group setting?

b. Mediated interaction. Mediated interaction describes the situation wherein the President receives his
advice after it is channeled through a single individual. The mediator performs the function of a gate-keeper. He stands between the advisory group and the President and funnels their advice to the President. A mediator is said to be present in the process if the President uses a single individual as his representative to meet with others, receive their reports, etc. The President confines his interaction with the mediator or those who the mediator recommends he should see.

One of the things one would want to look at here is how faithfully the mediator transmits the positions of the Presidential advisors. Lack of fidelity could have adverse impact on fulfilling the criteria even if they seem satisfied below the Presidential level. The mediator can do no better than transmit the information exactly. So, whereas information, options, and dissent may be considered by those "below" him, the mediator has the ability in fact not to relay this situation, or he may be incapable of relaying these things faithfully. Depending on the unique circumstances, a mediator may provide expertise, configure alternative options, or offer dissent, but these linkages, we believe, are highly dependent on the personality of the mediator and the perception he has of his role.

For each case study then, we will ask:
(1) Does the President employ a mediator in the advisory process?

c. One-on-one interaction. This describes the interaction pattern in which the President meets with advisors singly. The meeting is face-to-face between the President and a single advisor, or the President and fewer than three advisors. The general pattern may be analogous to a wheel; the President is the hub, and his advisors (representing the spokes) report directly to him.

For each case study then, we will ask:

(1) Does the President meet singly with his advisors, as opposed to a group meeting?

We would expect information to be more fragmented in such an arrangement. There would be no compelling reason for the various participants to share information with one another.

3. Frequency of Meetings

This is rather easy to operationalize. The number of times the President and advisory group meet on the issue governs whether we code it as one or multiple meetings. Generally, case study authors will indicate the number of times a President will meet with his advisors in an explicit manner. Whereas the characteristic is simply a function of number, its effects on the criteria are predominantly
functions of time. These effects will be discussed in the following section.

For each case study then, we will ask:

(1) How many meetings were held to discuss the policy issue?

4. Number of Advisory Units

We are interested in recording the number of advisory units. It is important to note the distinction between this structural characteristic and those outline in paragraph 1.b. (multiple levels). This characteristic is concerned with the number of units, regardless of the level of government at which the units operate.

a. Single advisory units vs multiple advisory units.

There might be only a single unit (one advisor, or one group) to whom the President turns for advice. The composition of this group can be interagency or intra-agency. The number of advisors can range from one to a group. The distinguishing characteristic is whether there is only one unit for the production and dissemination of advice. Even if multiple groups are involved in a bureaucratic fashion (e.g., Interagency Group, Under Secretary's Committee, the NSC) it would still be counted as a single advisory unit because the President only acts with one of them.
On the other hand, the President may decide that he wants several "independent" units to report to him directly. Their advice could be competing or supportive, but the important characteristic is the number of units involved in producing advice independent of each other. The President may stipulate that the "independent" units cooperate with one another in sharing information; what should be unique is the analysis of the information. An example of multiple units would be if the President asked the CIA, State, and Defense to prepare independent analysis and advice on a particular policy problem. The advice, however, is clearly the product of multiple units. This is distinctive from the situation where the President asks the same units to provide a joint policy recommendation(s) on the problem.

For each case study then, we will ask:

1. How many advisory units were involved with the President in the decision process?

Expected Effects of Structural Characteristics on Criteria

This section attempts to make an evaluation (in advance of the research) on how the use of a structural characteristic described above might affect the fulfillment of the process criteria discussed in Chapter II. Table 1 presents this information in abbreviated format.
Table 1
INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS AND THE
SEVEN PROCESS CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>Composition</th>
<th>Interaction</th>
<th>Freq.</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interagency</td>
<td>Single agency</td>
<td>Outsiders</td>
<td>Multiple levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Information</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Options</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dissent</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Implementation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Uncertainty</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Experts</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Goals</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: + = positive effect  
- = negative effect  
0 = neutral effect
1. Composition of the Decision Unit

a. Interagency participation

(1) Information - attention to quality. One would expect that an advisory unit composed of interagency participants would increase the likelihood of information being evaluated. Since information flows to many points in the government the more agencies that are involved in the advisory process, the better the chance will be that one of the units would have some needed information. Also, since there is a greater likelihood of multiple information sources, there is a better chance that one information source could confirm another which would tend to increase the reliability of the information or, in the case where the information was contradictory, would provide the basis for some evaluation of sources. The fact that the information was contradictory would be a flag for the advisory group to make conscious assessments about the quality of the information, and, if necessary, seek alternative information sources to confirm one position or the other. Finally, different agencies with various points of view might serve as a corrective on the biases of any single agency.

(2) Multiple options - presented to the President. It is not unreasonable to expect that different agencies will bring somewhat different perspectives to the advisory process. These different perspectives might result in the
generation of different solutions to the problem and thus one would expect that the probability of multiple options being advanced would be higher for this structural characteristic.

(3) **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** For many of the same reasons presented above, one would expect that multiple agency participation would increase the likelihood of dissent. Different agencies with different views of the world would be likely to disagree with each other on possible solutions to a given problem. A State Department solution (diplomatic) would probably differ from a Defense Department solution (military) and one might even expect different solutions from within the three branches of the Defense Department. Dissent is more likely to surface in a situation where heterogeneous experiences, perceptions, and goals are present.

(4) **Concern for implementation.** It is felt that the effect of this structural characteristic would be essentially positive. As the number of agencies included is expanded, those likely to get charged with implementation would more likely be represented and, therefore, concerned with discussing it.

(5) **Consideration of uncertainty.** Different perspectives brought together by multiple agency participation might be expected to result in an increased questioning of the ability to carry out a particular recommendation. One would expect to find a greater vocalization of uncertainty
in such groups. There is less likelihood that solutions would be approved on the basis of a single agency's perception of the probable consequences of a given source of action.

(6) **Use of experts.** It would be expected that broadened participation resulting from multiple-agency participation would increase the likelihood of expert advice being introduced. Competing solutions offered by agencies would have to be defended from attack. It is not difficult to envision that an appeal to experts would be part of the resolution of differences.

(7) **Explication of goals.** Though we think this to be a weak linkage, one might expect the attempt to specify goals of the various policy options to come out of a multiple-agency composition if only as a basis for making some choices on the offered options. It would provide one basis for deciding which options the group most wants to pass to the President, and would enable those options which clearly served the accomplishment of some other goal to be dropped from consideration. The linkage is deemed weak, because the possibility exists of just the reverse happening. Inter-agency groups might try to suppress differences in goals in order to reach agreement.

b. **Single-agency participation**

(1) **Information - attention to quality.** It is not likely that a single-agency advisory unit would increase the
likelihood of making conscious assessments of information. Single-agency units would probably rely on information readily available to them and not seek out information on the problem from other agencies. It is likely that they would be less critical of information coming from their own channels of information. These factors would tend to have a negative effect on fulfilling this criterion.

(2) Multiple options – presented to the President. It is less likely that multiple options would be generated by a single-agency advisory unit. It is more likely that false options would be generated to serve to satisfy Presidential desires (that options be generated) or to make a preferred course of action look more desirable by contrast. A single-agency group is less likely to have the differing perspectives which are conducive to the production of true multiple options.

(3) Dissent – transmitted to the President. There is a greater likelihood for dissent to be suppressed in a single-agency unit. Violation of agency norms or positions is more likely to be dealt with in a negative manner. Dissent might be viewed as criticism of the agency itself rather than of a proposed course of action. Unity of belief might be perceived as necessary to convince the President of the agency's preferred course of action. Dissent is easily suppressed when there is but one channel to the President.
(4) **Concern for implementation.** If the agency responsible for implementing the policy is also the same agency responsible for making the policy recommendations, then one would expect some concern for the details of implementation. It would be unusual for an agency to make recommendations which they themselves would be unable to carry out. On the other hand, an agency may make recommendations that another agency would have to carry out. In that case, it is not at all clear that special attention would be made to the questions about implementation. On this basis, one would expect a positive relationship, but a weak one, and one highly dependent on the situation.

(5) **Consideration of uncertainty.** Whereas there would seem to be no reason why a single-agency group would ignore uncertainty, there also seem to be no reason why they would pay special attention to this criterion. It is unclear what effect this structural characteristic would have on this criterion.

(6) **Use of experts.** One would expect fewer cases of involvement by experts in the advisory process in single-agency advisory units when compared to multiple-agency units. There are no compelling reasons why single-unit groups would either seek to include or exclude experts.

(7) **Explication of goals.** A single agency is likely to have a relatively well-defined view of the world
and its place in it. Therefore, one would expect that it would offer advice to satisfy what it perceives is in keeping with its world view and goals that should be sought, probably defined in terms of its world view. Thus, one would expect some sort of explication of goals in a single advisory unit.

c. Involvement of outside participants

(1) **Information - attention to quality.** Outsiders would be expected to increase the information available in much the same way as interagency groups do. They might be more prone to question government information sources and make some assessment about the quality of that information. To this extent, we would expect the relationship to be positive but perhaps weak.

(2) **Multiple options - presented to the President.** It is conceivable that outsiders, bringing with them somewhat different perspectives, might offer new solutions to problems. Thus options might be generated which an inside group, by itself, would have overlooked or dismissed. Outsiders might cause the group to look into areas which they would have not thought of by themselves. This search for alternative ways to approach the problem might result in alternative solutions and options (see, e.g., George, 1972, p. 778).
(3) **Dissent - transmitted to the President.**

While there is no reason to believe that outsiders by their very nature would be dissenters, the fact that they are not part of an inside group with the attendant likelihood of internalized norms could serve to place them in positions where assumptions about the problem and its possible solution are not automatically accepted. The presence of the outsider then might cause further evaluation by the group of previously unquestioned assumptions. The product of this evaluation might serve to engender dissent by some within the group. The outsider himself, if he perceives that the rest of the group is approaching the problem from too narrow a perspective, might initiate the dissent. The proposition here is that by broadening the number of perceptions brought to bear on a given problem, one increases the likelihood of some dissenting opinion being surfaced. From an organizational point of view, an outsider might feel less inhibited to offer dissent than a member of the government.

(4) **Concern for implementation.** It is felt that the presence of an outsider would have a neutral effect on this criterion. The possible exception might be if the outsider were closely associated with a group whose assistance might be needed to implement the policy. An ex-Congressional leader might be in position to call attention to the
role of the Congress in implementing the policy. An ex-
Ambassador might realize the importance of foreign consul-
tations when needed.

(5) **Consideration of uncertainty.** An outsider, all things being equal, is likely to be less pressured for immediate solutions and thus might be in a position to offer cautionary statements on the uncertainty which might surround that policy decision. Outsiders might feel more cautious and less pressured to produce results and thus more analytical regarding the feasibility of policy proposals. The injection of the uncertainty of consequences thus seems more likely to occur when outsiders are included in the advisory process.

(6) **Use of experts.** It is felt that outsider participation would increase the likelihood of experts being drawn to the advisory group. Outsiders are less likely to feel that they have a monopoly of expertise on a given subject. Having less ego involvement with a given group, they would probably be more likely to seek a broadening of the information base to include expert advice.

(7) **Explication of goals.** It is felt that outsiders would likely increase the probability that policy goals be stated in the search for recommendations. Outsiders would less likely be adherents of the norms and
assumptions of those inside government. An outsider would probably seek to have policy goals clearly explicated—what problem the advisors were seeking a solution to and what the object of the policy recommendation was to be. This exercise would help those in the advisory group think more precisely on the goals which they sought to attain and the various options open to satisfy these goals.

d. Multiple-level participation

(1) Information - attention to quality. It is felt that multiple-level participation would increase the likelihood that information would be available and accurate and that it be evaluated in a conscious way. Since much information traditionally comes "up" from lower levels of organizations, the very participation of those not in the top level of government would serve to pull that information with them. Also, lower levels might be able to make a more accurate assessment of the quality and accuracy of information. For example, they might be more familiar with the source of the information and be able to comment on its reliability. Also, lower levels might be familiar with information sources that the top-level advisors, who are removed from day-to-day operations, would be less familiar with.

There is one caveat, that being that even lower-level participation might not alleviate the possibility of them acting as "gatekeepers" and not passing up information.
(2) **Multiple options presented to the President.**

A relationship might be posited between the presence of multiple levels and creation of multiple options. It might be true that the presence of people with somewhat different perspectives (based on their positions within the bureaucracy) would result in somewhat different ways of looking at a problem and perhaps different views on how one might go about solving the problem. The result might be the generation of a greater number of options than would be the case if multiple levels were not utilized.

(3) **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** It is felt that multiple-level participation would have essentially a neutral effect on the generation of dissent.

(4) **Concern for implementation.** The burden of actually carrying out policy often falls to those in government who are not ranked at the highest level. The inclusion of multiple levels in an advisory group could possibly tap some of the people whose job it would be to carry out the President's decision. It might be hypothesized that these people would be somewhat more aware of the problems of implementation and let this attitude surface during the advisory process. Concern for implementation might increase when multiple levels are included in the advisory unit.
(5) Consideration of uncertainty. The argument here is parallel to that for implementation. It is felt that different perspectives may enhance the appreciation of uncertainty and particularly at the lower levels where personnel might feel they are closer to "reality," or to the specifics of the policy problem being addressed.

(6) Use of experts. One feels that it is likely that there would be some positive relationship between the inclusion of multiple levels and the presence of experts. The chief reason for this belief is that the lower one goes in bureaucratic ranking, the more likely one will come upon the level of expertise. Most departments staff secondary levels with career employees rather than political appointees. These people are more likely to be experts in their fields and also be in communication with their counterparts outside government. In sum, these people would seem to be more receptive to the inclusion of experts than perhaps an advisory group composed only of those at the highest level.

(7) Explication of goals. It is believed that the inclusion of multiple levels would have an essentially neutral affect.

2. Interaction Patterns

a. Face-to-face group interaction. One must recognize that this interaction pattern increases the chances of Presidential personality changing the results one would expect
from the interplay of structure alone. Thus the following expectations are based on the premise of noninterference by the President.

(1) **Information – attention to quality.** Group interactions would increase the chances of this criterion being fulfilled. The group setting would allow for the immediate assessment of information which may be available and the recognition that other information which might be useful was not present. The group setting would provide the President with an instant reading on what was known, and what was not known, about the policy problem. (We know in advance that this will not always be true. The classic example is the Bay of Pigs. Of course Janis (1972) has identified this as an example of decision-making gone awry. It remains to be seen if groups typically act in the Bay-of-Pigs fashion.)

Groups provide arenas for the exchange of information. In fact, if an advisor wishes to convey some information to the President and the President makes it clear that all sessions will be with the advisory group, that information will by necessity come before the group and thus be known to all advisors. It would seem that this structural characteristic would be the most likely to result in the sharing of information.

(2) **Multiple options – presented to the President.** One would expect a number of options to emerge from face-to-face group advisory units. Group discussions should lead to
the surfacing of alternative ways of looking at a given problem and also different solutions to the problems. Options would be expected to be the product of such interaction. One case where this would not be expected would be when the group and the President were of considerable like-mindedness concerning the nature of the problem. In this case one would expect very similar types of analysis of the problem from the participants and thus a limited number of options, most of which would be minor variants of the same policy.

(3) Dissent - transmitted to the President. Groups, in themselves, would not seem to engender dissent. The same caveat which appears above should be remembered. Groups that are too like-minded might be expected to resist and suppress dissent. On the other hand, one might expect to find more dissent in groups than in interaction patterns which feature one-on-one situations. We think these things tend to cancel each other out to produce a lineage that is highly dependent on the situation. One thing that is a positive factor: if dissent does occur in a face-to-face interaction pattern, the President (being by definition present) will certainly be aware of it.

(4) Concern for implementation. The larger number of participants in a group (as opposed to one-on-one situations) would increase the likelihood that included in the group would be persons whose ultimate responsibility it would be to oversee the carrying-out of the President's
policy decision. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to assume that group advisory bodies would be more concerned with the problems of implementation.

(5) Consideration of uncertainty. This is probably more a function of the type of group than of groups in themselves. Close-thinking groups would probably be expected not to be concerned with uncertainty; more diverse-thinking groups might be—but it does not seem like there is any compelling reason to think that they would. We would think the effect of groups on uncertainty to be rather neutral.

(6) Use of experts. While groups, because of the broader base of participation, might be somewhat more inclined to seek expert advice than, say individuals, the relationship is probably rather weak—though positive.

(7) Explication of goals. Face-to-face group interaction by the President with his advisors is likely to have a positive effect on this criterion. Groups at the Presidential level are likely to have internalized certain attitudes and beliefs about the national interest and how it is best served. It is not unreasonable to assume that goals stated to satisfy national interest be clearly enunciated at such advisory meetings.

b. Mediated interaction

(1) Information—attention to quality. A mediator should have little effect on the attention paid to the quality of information by advisors "below" him. In fact,
the gate-keeper function which a mediator could perform could keep from the President any assessments which had been made about information. It is also difficult to perceive how a mediator would contribute to the availability and sharing of information. Indeed, a mediator would be in an excellent position to limit the amount of information available to any one individual since the influence of a mediator might rest precisely on the point that he alone possesses the sum of all information on the problem. On the other hand, the mediator could insist on quality control by refusing to transmit information to the President until subordinates had double-checked its quality.

(2) **Multiple options—presented to the President.** A mediator's effect on option generation is seen as essentially neutral and perhaps highly dependent on personality factors. There is nothing in the presence of a mediator in itself that would tend to limit or encourage the production of options. However, a mediator would be in position to encourage such activity if he so desired. Similarly, a mediator could keep from the President options that were generated at lower levels of the advisory process.

(3) **Dissent transmitted to the President.** It is felt that dissent would not be encouraged within a structure which includes a mediator. There is nothing inherent in the presence of a mediator which would tend to encourage dissent.
In this regard, perhaps it might be useful to view the mediator as a sort of surrogate President. Since he is the focal point for the advisory system, it may be his own personality traits and the structures which he employs to receive advice which later he will pass on to the President. If he were to have a personality which would encourage dissent among the advisors that he consults, then he may be likely to get it. If he doesn't want dissent, he may or may not get it, and even if he did, he might not pass it to the President.

On balance, however, one would expect a mediator to mute dissent, perhaps to soften it between the advisory body and the President. For this reason, the linkage is seen to be essentially negative.

(4) **Concern for implementation.** There appears to be no compelling arguments either way. Thus, we will regard the linkage as neutral.

(5) **Consideration of uncertainty.** There are no compelling arguments either way. Thus, we will regard the linkage as neutral.

(6) **Use of experts.** There are no reasons to expect that experts would be included in advisory systems which feature a mediator. In fact, it may be less likely insofar as the mediator acts as a filter. We would regard the linkage as essentially negative. If the President were
denied the opportunity to see the experts, their effectiveness would be reduced.

(7) **Explanation of goals.** It is believed that the effects of a mediator in the advisory process would have a neutral effect on this criterion.

c. **One-on-one interaction**

(1) **Information - attention to quality.** It seems that a one-on-one interaction between an advisor and the President would provide less likelihood of the presence of accurate and complete information. In and of itself, this interaction pattern contains no inherent means of evaluating information or insuring its completeness. Without additional inputs, it is conceivable that omission of information could occur. In addition, this structure has no inherent advantages for facilitating the exchange of information between multiple advisors. What information is exchanged would be done so on some basis other than structure. One would expect to find an essentially negative relationship in fulfilling the criterion. One positive side of this structural characteristic might be that it would foster candor that could be inhibited by the presence of others.

(2) **Multiple options - presented to the President.** Although this structure allows for the possibility of the President's personality to dominate the structural considerations (and so a President who demanded options would
probably get them more frequently than one who did not, there still seems somewhat less probability of this struc-
ture providing genuinely different policy options. Although
the President might extract options from face-to-face ad-
visory sessions, the options are likely not to be as rich as
those coming from a group environment. It would thus seem
that this structural characteristic would have a somewhat
negative influence in satisfying this criterion.

(3) Dissent - transmitted to the President.
There is no reason to assume that face-to-face interaction
between the President and advisors would be conducive to
dissent. Indeed, in this configuration, the advisor is at
his weakest. His legitimacy is confirmed by the same person
to whom he is giving advice. This is not a situation con-
ducive to dissent. Even if the President gets different
recommendations from the result of several such meetings
with different advisors, the result would probably not be as
beneficial as having the two "opponents" confront each
other's position in person. We do not think that dissent
would be an inherent feature of face-to-face advisory ses-
sions. One exception would be in the situation where a
group would be so dominated by a single advisor that this
advisor himself might be able to suppress any dissent in the
group. In this situation an advisor might be more willing
to express his dissent in the privacy of face-to-face meetings
with the President. More generally, the absence of colleagues might reduce group pressures and increase candor.

(4) **Concern for implementation.** One-on-one situations, insofar as there would be no opposition from other advisors, would appear to encourage advocacy. To this extent advocacy would be seen to reduce the concern for implementation. It would seem that there would be an essentially negative linkage between the presence of one-on-one structures and the fulfillment of this criterion.

(5) **Consideration of uncertainty.** To the extent that one-on-one situations encourage advocacy, we would consider the relationship here to be essentially negative.

(6) **Use of experts.** It would seem like there would be less opportunity for the President to call in experts. Our sense is that when Presidents do use this form of interaction, they do so only with the highest levels of governmental officials. People at these levels are more likely to be generalists than specialists.

(7) **Explication of goals.** There does not appear to be any apparent reasons why one-on-one situations would be conducive to the explication of policy goals. It is felt that this characteristic would have an essentially neutral effect of fulfilling this criterion.

3. Frequency of Meetings

a. **One meeting vs multiple meetings.** It seems to be reasonable to discuss this structural characteristic and the
relationship to the criteria in more general terms rather than on a criterion-by-criterion basis. In general, the differing factor between the two is time. While there may be some other specific effects due to the number of meetings, generally the benefits of one over the other are time-related. It seems fair to say that the increased time for consideration of the problem which multiple meetings allow will generally have a positive effect on the fulfillment of all the criteria. Similarly, when compared to multiple meetings, a single meeting on a policy problem would tend to have a negative, or at best, a neutral effect on criteria fulfillment. The most compelling reason for this assessment is simply the consideration that time limits our abilities in many ways. For instance, we can digest only a certain amount of information in a given time, and are able to consult with only a certain number of people in a given amount of time. The greater the time available, the greater the ability to do additional things, conceive additional thoughts, consider alternative solutions, etc.

It might be the case that within the single-meeting category there exist different degrees of criteria fulfillment based on the length of the meeting. Therefore, the length of time of single meetings would be useful information to record when available.

There may, for instance, be a point of diminishing returns if there are too many meetings. One may see a shift
from attention to the policy task to group maintenance concerns. The belief may arise that difficulties can be postponed, etc.

It seems that only one criterion can be usefully discussed outside the general "time" variable: **Information - attention to quality**. Multiple meetings would tend to increase the fulfillment of this criterion. Multiple meetings would allow for several assessments about the information, quality, and reliability; and questions about such matters could be delayed until further investigations could be made. Also, multiple meetings would allow for the consideration of what information the advisors would like to have in order to make better recommendations. This process would in turn spur the collection of additional information when required. In this case then, not only time, but also the requirements of the advisors themselves, would tend to increase the type and accuracy of the information available.

The general belief, then, with regard to this set of structural characteristics is that when compared to each other:

(1) A single meeting tends to lessen the chances for fulfillment of the criteria, and hence is seen as having a negative linkage with the criteria.

(2) Multiple meetings tends to increase the chances for fulfillment of the criteria, and hence are seen as having a positive linkage with the criteria.
4. Number of Advisory Units - Single vs Multiple Units

a. **Single advisory units.** We can think of no reasons why one would expect that a single advisory unit would in and of itself increase the likelihood that any of the criteria would be satisfied. It is not clear that such a structure would hinder the fulfillment of the criteria either. When compared to multiple units, it might be expected that it would be less likely that single advisory units would fulfill any of the criteria. The presence of this structure would be viewed as having a negative effect on the presence of all the criteria. The single advantage of single advisory units is coordination.

b. **Multiple advisory units.** Multiple advisory units would tend to produce the following results with respect to the criteria.

(1) **Information - attention to quality.** It is felt that multiple advisory units would tend to increase the likelihood that this criterion be satisfied. Multiple units would be expected to tap more sources of information and check between the units with regard to what the information says would serve to indicate something of its reliability and accuracy.

(2) **Multiple options - presented to the President.** The increased resources and presumably different perspectives which multiple units would be expected to bring to
bear on the analysis would lead one to believe that options would be increased in a multiple-unit environment. Multiple units would be a check against a groupthink type of interaction which in itself might tend to broaden the types of solutions which are considered acceptable.

(3) Dissent - transmitted to the President. The presence of multiple advisory units would likely serve to broaden the participation based on differing perspectives and experiences. This factor in itself would tend to increase the probability of dissent surfacing during the advisory process. The more diverging viewpoints that one brings to bear on the advisory process, the more likelihood there would be of individual advisors or groups of advisors looking at a given policy problem differently and offering differing solutions. Dissent would be an expected feature of such a structural characteristic.

(4) Concern for implementation. Expanding the advisory base expands the likelihood that advisors would either have some responsibility in carrying out a proposed policy or that they had such experiences in the past. One would expect this to bring about an increased concern for implementation questions during the advisory process.

(5) Consideration of uncertainty. Again, the broadened base for advice would increase the likelihood that one of the advisory elements would have a special reason to
consider this criterion. This would be especially true if there were any attempts to reconcile various policy recommendations coming from the various units. The uncertainty of accomplishing the recommendations of one unit might be questioned by another unit in the advisory structure.

(6) **Use of experts.** One would expect that the chances of experts becoming involved in the advisory process would be increased in a structure which included multiple advisory units. Perceived competition between units might induce groups that might otherwise not call for expert advice to do so out of a feeling that their advice will be compared with that from other units. This might increase the perception that expert inclusion would lend some additional support to a particular unit's advice.

(7) **Explication of goals.** The attempt to reconcile advice that different units would offer the President might be expected to lead to the resolution of differences based on specific goals that a policy sought to satisfy. On this basis one might reasonably expect that more attention would be paid to the elucidation of goals in a multiple advisory unit structure.
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY

The Case Survey Method

This research employs the secondary analysis of case studies to obtain data on how well certain structural characteristics of Presidential advisory systems for national security matters (discussed fully in Chapter III) fulfill certain criteria which we maintain are required for the production of good advice (discussed in Chapter II). It examines cases in five recent administrations: Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. The Ford and Carter administrations are excluded because of an insufficient number of available case studies.

At this point, we think it important to comment on case studies in general, as a technique for systematic examination of policy issues, and more specifically on how they relate to this study. During the behavioral trend of the 1960s, the case study came under increasing criticism as being essentially unscientific and noncumulative. Rosenau (1968), in particular, took the case study to task on these grounds. In his article on scientific consciousness in foreign policy
research, Rosenau makes the following observations about case studies and their place in the study of foreign policy.

For all their systematic reconstruction of decision and action through time, most case histories neither test nor yield propositions that are applicable beyond the specific situation considered. When the events subjected to systematic examination run their course, the case is treated as complete, and even if the analyst draws "some lessons for the future" from it, these are virtually never cast in the form of hypothesis that are testable when comparable problems subsequently arise.

Several consequences follow from the disjunction of systematic analysis and scientific consciousness in the study of foreign policy. The most crucial of these is that knowledge about foreign policy behavior does not cumulate. Since the case histories and broad assessments neither yield nor test hypotheses their conclusions cannot be placed in a larger context. . . . At any moment in time there is considerable knowledge available about the prevailing international scene, but virtually all of it becomes obsolete when conditions change. (Rosenau, 1968, pp. 199-200)

Rosenau's criticisms notwithstanding, case studies continue to constitute a large portion of dissertations in international relations in general, and are even more prevalent in the subfield of decision-making. A look through any catalog of recent dissertations confirms this impression. In a few instances, some attempt is made to compare several cases under a common theoretical umbrella, but these attempts are few when compared with the number of dissertations which focus on a single case study.

Some attempt has been made in published material to integrate case studies (e.g., Berkowitz, Bock, and Fuccillo,
1977). Even so, we would assess the results as being generally unsatisfactory, lacking in a satisfactory theoretical perspective which severely limits the utility of the information which can be extracted from the case studies. Generalization of results is on such a low level as to be virtually useless to the scholar who wants to understand not the unique aspects of a particular decision, but rather those instances where patterns of behavior reoccur under certain conditions and which might help him understand processes applicable to entire classes of decision-making.

This dissertation seeks to alleviate this deficiency in the study of national security advice, advice which is critical in the decision-making process. In short, it tries to provide an answer to Rosenau's objections about the utility of case studies by demonstrating that case studies, if used properly, can provide useful insights in the search for cumulative knowledge. It does this mainly by providing a theoretical framework with which case studies written by different authors can be reexamined. The result, we believe, is a new insight into the advisory process which would not have been apparent had not the theoretical framework been brought to bear on the existing case studies. The information of course was always in the case study, it was just not extractable without an integrative theoretical framework. It is suggested then that Rosenau's concerns
about the utility of the case study expressed a decade ago might no longer be valid. I would argue that the case survey method discussed below does provide a method of using case studies to provide cumulative knowledge on the one hand, and maintaining a "lifespan" which extends beyond the immediate period when they are topical.

The literature does provide support for aggregating case studies. Bruce Russett (1970) writes supportingly of the utility of aggregating case studies for research purposes. Russett argues that while the single case may have great utility for the policy-maker it normally has little value for the scientist. However, Russett continues, this does not mean that a single case study has no value when combined with other case studies. On the contrary, Russett suggests at least four uses to which case studies can be put in building cumulative knowledge (pp. 428-429):

1. Case studies can stimulate the production of hypothesis about possible regularities.

2. Case studies can be used to test inferences made from suggestive correlational analysis.

3. Case studies provide a means of examining the causal relationships between two variables.

4. Case studies can provide, through deviant case analysis, an understanding of those instances that do not fit a general pattern of association.
Throughout, Russett stresses the point that case studies, and what he calls correlational analysis, are both critical to the development of scientific knowledge, and that "a recognition of the basic symbiosis between the two is essential to the long-run health of the research process" (p. 431).

In a more policy-relevant vein, others, such as Robinson (1967), George, Hall, and Simmons (1971), and George and Smoke (1974) have used multiple case studies as a basis for investigating various aspects of foreign policy. Robinson briefly examined twenty-two cases to analyse the role of Congress in foreign policy-making. George used three more detailed case studies in an attempt "to formulate a theory regarding the uses and limitations of coercive diplomacy" (1971, p. xi). Finally, George and Smoke used eleven case studies to provide an empirical base for theoretical analysis of deterrence efforts in American foreign policy.

William Lucas (1974) assesses the utility of aggregating case studies in RAND Corporation research projects. He calls the aggregation of case studies the "case survey method," a term we shall adopt, and claims that the case survey method was developed by RAND "as a means of bringing diverse case studies together under a common conceptual framework so that the findings will be cumulative" (p. 1). At RAND, the case survey method was initially used to assess various impacts
on student achievement and since has expanded its scope to include other areas of social research.

More recently, Yin and Held (1975) discuss the uses of the case survey method in analyzing policy studies. More generally, they provide an interesting discussion on the various ways one might go about doing secondary analysis of studies focusing on public organizations and organizational behavior.

In general, three approaches may be used to review this research and evaluate the more significant findings. The first is a propositional method, which works best when previous studies have been organized along a similar experimental paradigm, so that the reviewers main task is to compare the investigators' final propositions and conclusions. The second is a cluster method, which is most effective when previous studies have produced large amounts of original quantitative data that can be aggregated and reanalyzed. The third is the case survey method. This works best when the studies consist of a heterogeneous collection of case studies. The reviewer's main task then is to aggregate characteristics, but not necessarily the conclusions, of these case. (p. 371)

Without doubt, the case survey method is most appropriate for the analysis of case studies of the national security decision-making process. In this substantive policy area, studies are predominantly of the single-case type. Any aggregation can come only by the application of a procedure such as the case survey method. Yin and Held continue their discussion of the case survey method by noting that:
The case survey method is mainly concerned with the analysis of qualitative evidence in a reliable manner. The method enables the reviewer to note the various experiences found in each policy study and then to aggregate the frequency of occurrence of these experiences. The frequencies form the basis for simple statements of association and nonassociation of different types of experiences. In this manner, the case survey method gives the reviewer a chance to survey different case studies. Until recently, the main shortcoming of case studies was that the insights from the studies could not be aggregated in any sense. The case survey method thus carries the classic case study method one major step forward; it enables aggregate reviews of individual case studies to be undertaken with scientific rigor. (p. 372)

The case survey method flows from a rather simple idea. It simply demands that as each case study is analyzed, it is done so within a common framework which is developed by asking a set of close-ended questions to determine the presence or absence of some quality which the researcher wishes to discover. In this dissertation, we want to investigate two basic phenomena: first, what structural features are present in a given advisory process; and second, whether that process results in the satisfaction of certain criteria which are considered important to the production of good advice. These concepts were developed in Chapters II and III. The case survey method thus demands that a certain level of reliability be established so that one researcher's conclusions would match those of another. One must first operationalize the concepts which one will deal with and develop
specific criteria which must be met in order for some quality to be judged either present or absent in the case. These then provide the guidelines in determining what must be read in the case study in order to affirm that a certain structural characteristic was present, or that certain processes were present which are judged to be necessary for good advice to be present.

Some Methodological Considerations
Selection of Case Studies -- Implications

The national security decisions selected for inclusion in this dissertation were not scientifically selected. Some criteria for inclusion are, first, that the decision be made by the President; second, that that subject deals with national security matters; and third, that at least four of the seven process criteria be discussed in the case study. Additionally, we attempted to vary the type of decision (for example, crisis vs. non-crisis) and the subject matter (decisions to commit troops, enter into negotiating positions, extend foreign aid, etc.), as well as to cover as wide a time span within a given administration as possible.

Given the criteria stated above, there may be questions concerning the extent to which the conclusions drawn from our cases can be generalized. Without a doubt, to be truly representative of the universe of national security decisions,
the cases chosen would have to be drawn from a random sample of all case studies written on national security decisions. In turn, all the case studies written would have to reflect an accurate sample of all national security decisions made. Clearly, one can never be sure whether the cases discussed in this research meet these two criteria. First of all, there is simply no way of accurately determining whether or not the universe of case studies accurately reflects all of the national security decisions made by the Presidents. We cannot know whether the cases which are committed to print are biased in one way or another. Most written commentaries are concerned with the "major" events of the day. It is probably fair to say that this reflects both author interest and information availability. These important decisions are most likely to be discussed in Presidential memoirs, etc., thus making information about the decisions more widely available. Without doubt, many decisions which American Presidents make and which concern national security matters are never written about, either because of lack of interest, lack of knowledge about a particular decision being made, or lack of information on the decision. Whether the sum total of all decisions would look very different from the ones which are contained in case studies is a question which is not answerable.
The second point raised above is to what extent the cases selected here are representative of all the case studies which have been written. Certainly, the decisions included here do not represent a scientific sample of all national security decisions. It was never our intent to gather all available case studies of national security decisions; rather, it was felt that by selecting a number of cases (three to six) from each administration, differing where possible both the type of decision made and the time when it was made, a sample of national security decisions would be acquired which, while not scientific, would be vastly superior (in terms of our ability to generalize) to the single-case method or to studies which use only a few cases. We realize the limitations of this method when making generalizations and conclusions, but maintain that in spite of the limitations imposed by the nature of the subject matter itself it remains a useful methodological technique.

The Problem of Single Sources and the Biases of Case Study Authors

The noted historian, A. J. P. Taylor, has written that "all sources are suspect" (1954, p. 569). It is recognized that some authors may not treat their subject matter in a completely objective manner, or might not be able to do so because of the nature of their source material. Conscious biases may develop both in the attempt to make a given
decision look "good" or "bad." Sometimes insiders may consciously give only the favorable side to a decision process. One might attempt to remedy these problems by relying on as many sources as possible. This had been done here at times, but not in all cases. However, one cannot have one's cake and eat it too. If the case survey method is to be useful at all, we must assume a certain level of confidence in the cases used. If not, logic would indicate that we must, in every case, go back to the original source. For research such as attempted here, this would be a lifelong project. While multiple confirmations of the presence or absence of a certain criteria is desirable, we are often limited by the fact that even though we may find two case studies of a given decision, in many instances these will not address the same facets of the decision, and so, two case studies do not automatically mean the probability of confirmation for a given piece of information. Even when cases confirm one another, we are limited in our confidence by the fact that they often use similar or the same source material. (If we are concerned about the reliability of insiders, for example, are we any more confident of the reliability of two different case studies, one of which quotes Eisenhower and the other which quotes Acheson?)

While the problem of bias is one which can be minimized, ultimately, in the approach we use here, it must be
accepted to a certain extent. One might, for instance, submit the proposed case studies to a panel of experts who would rate them according to how biased they might be; but even this technique has its drawbacks. Who can be sure if the panel itself is biased, or that it might make honest assessments based on what is in vogue in terms of historical insights at a given moment in time. Certainly the proliferation of revisionist histories suggests that even the experts are subject to very different interpretations about the "facts of history."

We must recognize the possibility of bias both in terms of available source material and in the author himself. One of the features of this study which may minimize this problem is that we are dealing with the "nonglamorous" side of decision-making. It would seem that if an author wanted to bias his study in favor of a given President he would stress the fact that the outcome was "good." We feel that he would be less likely to bias his consideration of the structural characteristics or the presence or absence of our seven process criteria. We are, in a sense, evaluating the presence or absence of what may be termed neutral concepts. Though subject to biases of the type mentioned above, we believe them to be less likely the subject of overt bias than if we were evaluating the outcome of the decision.
Data Analysis and Missing Data

We code each of the structural characteristics and seven process criteria as either present, absent, or, if those are not determinable, missing data. In our analysis, which looks mostly at the percentage of criteria present for a given structural configuration, we eliminate the missing data from the computation of the percentage of criteria present. In doing this, we are assuming that there is a 50/50 split for the missing data. What are the implications of this?

Essentially, we are asking here whether there is any systematic bias in the missing data? Is it missing because the case study author either could find out nothing about it, or was simply not interested in a given facet of the decision? Or does the fact that it is missing data mean that, in fact, it was absent from the decision process?

The recognition of the problems associated with missing data is important. Yet, within the context of this dissertation, it is essentially unsolvable. As suggested above, the missing data might be perceived as missing because it was in fact absent from the decision process. While possible, we believe this to be highly unlikely in most of the decisions we looked at. In instances where more than one author was consulted, it was indeed the case that some authors did not include comments on certain aspects of the
decision structure or process, while others included them. The reason for this difference is that the focus of different authors is varied. It was true in many case studies that the fact that a certain piece of information was missing reflected, not its absence from the structure or process, but rather the lack of interest of the case study author. It should be remembered that the cases examined where not written with the type of analysis we are doing here in mind, and it would be unlikely that each case study would consider all of our structural variables or all of our process criteria.

One of the reasons that missing data was present was the decision rule that the process criteria would have to be directly evident to the President. There are a number of cases where we know a certain criterion was present in lower levels but which was simply not discussed in terms of Presidential familiarity. These were coded as missing data even though it is very possible that in fact they were present.

Thus, we believe that our treatment of missing data is as valid as any other. First, precisely because the missing data is missing in the case study discussion, there is no way of knowing whether it was present or not in the actual decision process. We think it wrong to assume that the missing data represents the absence of the criteria from the decision process for we know that there were times when it was possibly present but coded as missing data because of a
degree of uncertainty involved. Finally, we know that for any given case the lack of discussion did not mean that the quality was not present because different case study authors focus on different aspects of the case.

In sum, then, when interpreting the data, it is important to realize how missing data is treated and to recognize that the results may have been different if all of the desired information was retrieved.
CHAPTER V
THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION

With this chapter we begin our analysis of the advisory process which supported national security decisions in the Truman through Nixon administrations. Each chapter will consider a number of decisions for a given Presidency. Each decision will be examined to determine the structure of the advisory process itself, as well as the degree to which the seven process criteria were fulfilled. For each decision, we will first provide a brief historical background which sets the international context leading up to the occasion for the decision. This will be followed by a narrative of the decision process itself, a brief summary of the process, and, finally, an evaluation of the presence or absence of the seven process criteria. At the conclusion of each chapter we will provide a brief summary and analysis of the decisions evaluated for that administration. In Chapter X, the final chapter, we will present a cross-Presidential analysis of all the decisions evaluated in this dissertation.

For the Truman Presidency, we will examine six decisions. The first, from 1947, concerns the decision to give
aid to Greece and Turkey. The next five, from 1950, concern decisions made during the first week of the Korean War.

1. The Decision to Assist Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine - 1947

The International Context

In the first years after World War II, a series of crises emerged between the Western World and the Soviet Union. One area which was ripe for confrontation was the Iran-Turkey-Greece region which proved a barrier to Soviet expansion to warm-water ports it so long coveted. None of these countries was capable, on its own, to resist a serious Soviet effort. By February 1947, Greece, considered to be the weakest of the three, was, in some estimates, within weeks of economic and military collapse (Jones, 1955, p. 11). If Greece fell, it was felt that it would only be a matter of time before other nations fell to Communist control.

By mutual agreement between the United States and Great Britain, it was decided that Great Britain would be responsible for military assistance to Greece, and the United States for economic assistance. The two powers had a similar agreement with respect to Turkey. On February 21, 1947, the First Secretary of the British Embassy, H. M. Sichel,

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\[1\] The narrative of this decision follows closely the extensive study of this case by Jones (1955).
dropped a diplomatic bombshell on the U.S. State Department. After April 1st, the British notes read, the British government would no longer be able to furnish financial assistance.

For the British, this was but one in a series of moves withdrawing itself from the burden of defending the vestiges of a once mighty empire. For the United States, it posed a serious policy problem, the result of which would have far-ranging consequences for American foreign policy in the post-war area.

Narrative of the Decision

After Sichel left the State Department, the Director of the Office of New Eastern and African Affairs, Loy Henderson; the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, John Hickerson; and Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson met and briefly discussed the message. All perceived the importance of the British notes and the necessity for a rapid American response. Acheson suggested that a State Department staff meeting be held to draft a summary paper to be presented to Secretary of State Marshall prior to his meeting with the British Ambassador on Monday, three days hence. The staff meeting was chaired by George F. Kennan who was lecturing at the War College at the time. Henderson, Hickerson, and members of their offices were present. "There is apparently nothing that is recorded and little
that is remembered about the meeting except that all present agreed that the United States would have to give extraordinary economic and military aid to Greece" (Jones, 1955, p. 133).

On the following day, Saturday, February 22, Henderson and Hickerson held a meeting with Admiral Sherman and General Norstad, representatives of the Navy and War Departments, "in which all aspects of the Greece-Turkey problem were considered" (Jones, 1955, p. 134). Meanwhile, the staff of the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs section was revising the draft from the Friday night meeting and the completed version was delivered to Acheson late Sunday. On Monday morning Secretary of State Marshall, who was already familiar with the British notes as well as the weekend work by the State Department, met with the British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel. Several hours later Marshall met with Truman prior to the regular weekly luncheon of the Cabinet. Apparently Marshall related only the outline of the situation and the "steps that were being taken to bring about a coordinated recommendation by State, War, and Navy for the President's early decision" (Jones, 1955, p. 134).

That afternoon Acheson presided over a meeting which included Henderson, Hickerson, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, Admiral Sherman, Secretary of War Patterson, and General Norstad. At the conclusion of the meeting Acheson
found that they were all "in agreement that it was vital to the security of the United States that Greece and Turkey be strengthened; that only the United States was in a position to do this; and that the President should therefore ask Congress for the necessary funds and authority" (Jones, 1955, p. 135). At the conclusion of the meeting Acheson promised that a State Department position paper would be available for review by the Navy and War Departments on Wednesday.

Acheson and the State Department staff spent Tuesday preparing that document. In an afternoon meeting with State Department political, economic, legal, and information officers, Acheson presented the "problem posed by the withdrawal of the British from Greece and Turkey and outlined alternative courses of action the United States might follow" (Jones, 1955, p. 135). Acheson solicited the comments and questions of the participants and refrained from expressing conclusions until the end of the meeting.

Following the meeting Acheson, Henderson, and the Far Eastern Affairs staff worked on the final version of the State Department position paper on the subject. Not unexpectedly, the paper supported the political and territorial integrity of Greece and Turkey. Specifically, the paper spelled out various short- and long-term recommendations for Congressional approval concerning economic,
military, and administrative assistance to Greece and Turkey.

On Wednesday the Secretaries of War and Navy approved the State Department position paper. Later that day Marshall and Acheson met with President Truman, presenting the recommendations of the three Departments. "Truman required no convincing. He had already discussed the matter in a preliminary way with Marshall, and several times with Acheson over the telephone . . . and knew the problems of the Middle East intimately" (Jones, 1955, p. 138). Truman thus approved the joint Department recommendations and decided to invite Congressional leaders to the White House on the following day to hear the case for aid to Greece and Turkey and to get their reactions to the proposal.

The meeting with Congressional leaders took place at the White House on Thursday, February 27. After a lengthy analysis of the global situation by Acheson, Truman invited comment by everyone present. "Not one registered opposition. Not one asked trivial questions or raised side issues. All had apparently been deeply impressed" (Jones, 1955, p. 142).

Although there were many additional details to fill in before the Truman Doctrine would be translated into action, it was clear that with the conclusion of this meeting the
advisory process supporting the President with respect to his decision to fill the vacuum created by the British withdrawal was concluded.

Structure and Process Summary

The decision was made in a single meeting which included Truman, Marshall, and Acheson. Although multiple agencies (State, War, and Navy) had input into the recommendation, the actual recommendation paper was a product of the State Department, and only the State Department was represented at the time the decision was actually made. Thus, we consider this to be single-agency, mediated advice. It is mediated because all recommendations flowed through the State Department and Marshall and Acheson. Only one advisory unit was used; only a single level was used; and no outsiders were present.

Evaluation of Process Criteria

1. Information - attention to quality. The only direct information source referenced in Jones' account (1955) of the Truman Doctrine decision was a "series of alarming cables from Athens" (p. 131) sent by Ambassador MacVeagh and others which related that "Greece was on the point of panic, in danger of complete collapse, economically, psychologically, and militarily, within a matter of weeks, and if it collapsed the armed Communist bands would
take over (p. 131). No further assessment is made by the participants concerning information. Jones relates that Acheson, from the very beginning, was quite concerned with coordinating with War and Navy, "giving them full information on the situation and the new problem that had arisen" (p. 132). Nonetheless, it appears that there is insufficient evidence to make a judgment about this criteria; hence, it will be considered as missing data (m/d).

2. Multiple options - presented to the President. The President was given only one option, presented in the State Department's paper and titled, "Position and Recommendations of the Department of State Regarding Immediate Aid to Greece and Turkey" (Jones, 1955, p. 138). Even at lower levels there are no reported indications that any approach other than that of the final position paper was seriously considered (Jones, 1955, pp. 133-135). There appears to be no evidence to indicate any other option or response to the British initiative was ever raised.

3. Dissent - transmitted to the President. Jones seems to imply that one of the hallmarks of this decision was a lack of dissent. At the highest level (Truman, Marshall, and Acheson) there certainly was none. Even at lower levels during the preliminary staff work Jones (1955) goes out of his way to convey a unanimity of thought. Some examples:
a. In general: "Without any exception known to [Jones] everyone in the Executive Branch recognized what this meant . . . the United States must move into the defaulted position" (p. 133); there was a "virtual unanimity of view . . . singleness of action" (p. 133).

b. At the first meeting, chaired by Kennan, on Friday night, February 21: "All present agreed that the United States would have to give extraordinary economic and military aid to Greece" (p. 133).

c. At the meeting on Monday afternoon, February 24, chaired by Acheson: "all found themselves in agreement that it was vital to the security of the United States that Greece and Turkey be strengthened" (p. 135).

d. At the meeting on Tuesday afternoon, February 25: "Chief and staff were as one. There was only one point of view" (p. 136).

4. Concern for implementation. There was a conscious awareness of the requirement that any policy initiative such as that embodied by the Truman Doctrine would require public and Congressional support. The drafters of the State Department's position paper were well-aware of Congressional role in any enabling legislation (Jones, 1955, pp. 136-137).

Truman himself, when he made his decision, simultaneously decided that a meeting of Congressional leaders would be convened on the following day. In that meeting, Truman,
Marshall, and Acheson were careful to outline the problems which would result from British withdrawal, outline their response, and solicit Congressional opinion (Jones, 1955, pp. 138-143). A follow-up meeting was proposed by Truman at which time a more detailed proposal could be presented. Public support would be curried in the interim.

5. Consideration of uncertainty. Jones seems aware of the general area of uncertainty for he mentions that in the meeting of State Department staffers cleared by Acheson that "some were concerned over the responsibility involved in challenging the Soviet Union at a time when our military strength was at a low ebb and no one knew what the Soviet reaction would be" (Jones, 1955, p. 135). In spite of this brief allusion to the question of uncertainty, nowhere else is it mentioned in any discussion of the decision process. Because it is difficult to conclude from this single reference that uncertainty of consequences was not considered by major participants, we will consider it missing data (m/d).

6. Use of experts. Henderson and Hickerson invited George F. Kennan to chair the very first State Department meeting on the Greek and Turkish situation on Friday evening. Kennan was at the time between State Department jobs and lecturing at the War College. Jones (1955) considered Kennan to be an expert in Soviet policy (p. 132-133), and his status at the time would indicate he was an "outside"
expert. Henderson and Hickerson are also attributed expert status by Jones (p. 131).

7. Explication of goals. There was an active consideration of goals throughout the process (Jones, 1955, p. 135). In general, the question became one of whether U.S. interests in the Eastern Mediterranean would be furthered by aid to Greece and Turkey. The specter of Communists taking advantage of the weaknesses in the military and economic situation in those countries proved to be decisive.

2. The Decision to Utilize the United Nations in Defense of South Korea - June 1950

The International Context

As the decade of the 1950s began, the international system was laden with the tensions built up over the previous five years. In 1947, following the issuance of the Truman Doctrine and the moves toward European economic recovery embodied in the Marshall Plan, an anonymous article by George F. Kennan heralded in the era of "containment." Hopes for some collaboration with the Communist nations gave way to the new perception that the West must prohibit any further territorial gains by Communist nations. Kennan's article provided the intellectual justification for the

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2All of the Korean War decisions closely follow the account of Paige, The Korean Decision (1968).
growing uneasiness about Soviet expansion which was summed up by Truman several years earlier who wrote about the Soviets: "Only one language do they understand--'how many divisions have you'" (quoted in Paige, 1968, p. 54).

Korea had been divided following World War II at the 38th Parallel into Soviet and American occupation zones. The partition became formalized in 1948 when unsuccessful attempts to arrange nation-wide elections under United Nations supervision led to elections in the South only. Here the government of the Republic of Korea was established under the Presidency of Syngman Rhee. In the North, Kim Il Sung became premier of the newly established Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Relations between the two governments were hostile from the beginning.

Yet, even in this increasingly hostile environment, Korea remained comparatively in the background of U.S. foreign and strategic policy concerns. A speech by Acheson in January 1949 omitted South Korea from the U.S. defense perimeter, even though Japan and the Philippines were included. In May, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee allowed that the Communists could take South Korea at any time, given its proximity to the Communist powers.

Korea, being contiguous to a Communist nation was given some attention, of course, but perhaps no more than other
areas similarly situated and potentially troublesome—Berlin, Finland, Yugoslavia, Iran. Intelligence studies undertaken to support NSC-68 (undertaken to reassess national security policy) did not envision an attack on South Korea in the immediate future. Yet, "there was a sense of growing tension in the international environment, and even a "hunch" that something important was about to happen somewhere along the Soviet periphery" (Paige, 1968, p. 75). It did, in Korea, on June 24, 1950.

Narrative of the Decision

On Saturday morning, June 24, 1950, President Truman left Washington for a weekend in Independence, Missouri. Having stopped first in Baltimore to dedicate Friendship International Airport, the President was still airborne at 3:00 PM (all times are EDT) as the first waves of the People's Army of North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel into South Korea. It took seven hours for news of the invasion to reach Washington via a United Press dispatch. It was not until about 9:30 PM that the Department of State was officially notified of the attack in a cable sent from Seoul by Ambassador John J. Muccio. One hour later Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Rusk telephoned Secretary of State Acheson and read him the text of the cable. Fifteen minutes later Rusk, Secretary of the Army Pace, and
Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs John D. Hickerson met to discuss the cable. A short while later Hickerson spoke to Acheson by telephone (as Acheson was at his farm in Maryland) and advised him that both he and Rusk thought that the United States should react to the attacks through the United Nations. Recommending that the U.S. attempt to convene an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council, they reminded Acheson that because it was a weekend there might be some problems in notifying parties concerned. Therefore they suggested that the Secretary-General be notified at once that the United States might call for such a meeting.

Acheson favored these moves and approved them. Finally, at 11:20 PM, Acheson telephoned President Truman in Independence. Acheson convinced the President that there was little point in coming back to Washington that night since information about the invasion was still fragmentary.

Mr. Acheson then suggested the possibility of calling for an emergency meeting of the Security Council and said he had already authorized some preliminary moves in that direction which could be cancelled, however, if the President so desired. Mr. Truman was in complete agreement with the recommendation to bring the invasion before the United Nations. It was understood that the Secretary should call again to submit the details of that action to him for final approval. (Paige, 1968, p. 93)
At the State Department, the American response to the North Korean invasion was being put together. These officials were convinced that the North Koreans were engaging in a military operation which had been calculated and which was of great magnitude.

The officials also shared a strong sense of the emergency of the situation— the need to do something and do it without delay. The North Korean invasion had caught them by surprise. There was no "position paper" that dealt with the present crisis and that could be employed as a basis for policy determination. (Paige, 1968, p. 98)

Secretary Acheson placed a second call to President Truman at 2:00 AM Sunday. Acheson informed the President that the fighting still seemed serious and that the State Department had drafted a resolution to place before the Security Council which charged the North Koreans with a "breach of peace" and an "act of aggression." The President had only to give the go-ahead and the State Department would formally request the Council meeting. Truman approved the plan.

Structure and Process Summary

The President spoke only to Acheson, and Truman's two telephone conversations with Acheson was his only involvement in the process. Below the Presidential level, the advisory structure consisted mainly of State Department members who convened as an ad hoc group during the night of the
24th and the morning of the 25th. Although there was some limited Defense participation, the State Department played the predominant role.

Evaluation of the Process Criteria

1. **Information - attention to quality.** All the information which was available to the advisors at the time was carefully evaluated. The initial report of fighting was via United Press dispatch. Almost immediately Dean Rusk had inquiries sent to the U.S. Ambassador Muccio for confirmation and additional information. Muccio's reply, confirming an attack on South Korea, was carefully evaluated. Paige notes that:

   The Ambassador had the reputation of being a cautious and careful observer; since he had concluded that apparently an "all-out offensive" was in progress, the very least that one could say was that a "considerable fracas" was taking place in Korea--not just another minor border clash. Thus [Rusk and Acheson] agreed that an attack had apparently come in force and that the situation was "serious." (pp. 91-92)

Unfortunately it is unknown whether or not Truman and Acheson considered this criterion. It will be considered as missing data (m/d).

2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.** No alternative options were generated by the advisory process. In fact, Paige relates that:

   The officials at the State Department, the President, and the Secretary of State had
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all agreed immediately that the correct initial response to the North Korean invasion should be to bring it to the attention of the United Nations.... There is no evidence that they considered any other alternative for meeting the crisis facing them, including doing nothing. (pp. 98-99)

3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** Just as no alternative options were forthcoming, neither was dissent. It is interesting to note, however, that Counselor George Kennan, who was at his farm which had no telephone and who did not return to Washington until after the decision had been made, later admitted that he did not agree with the decision. Other than this reference, Paige, who shows himself to be conscious of this criterion, mentions nothing of dissent in this decision. On this basis we conclude that it was not present.

4. **Concern for implementation.** A great deal of attention was paid to implementation at lower levels. Just a few minutes after Acheson's initial telephone call to Truman, Assistant Secretary Hickerson called the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie. Hickerson informed Lie of the reports from Korea and indicated that the United States would probably ask for an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Hickerson then called the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Ernest Gross, to alert him to the situation. Later that morning, Ambassador Gross conferred with the Secretary-General and the General Counsel of the United
Nations. Procedural matters, including the possibility of a veto by the Soviet Union, were discussed. Gross indicated that, in the case of a veto by the Soviets, a move would be made to call the General Assembly into emergency session. Throughout the morning, the State Department's Office of United Nations Affairs and Ambassador Gross conferred via secured telephone circuits concerning the U.S. action and such specifics as the language which would be used in the resolution which we would propose. None of these considerations were present in the Truman-Acheson conversations and so are considered missing at the Presidential level.

5. Consideration of uncertainty. There is no evidence that uncertainty was considered by the participants. No where in his detailed presentation of the unfolding of events does Paige hint that the participants were aware of any uncertainty in their actions. There was no discussion about how others might react. Since Paige is clearly aware of this criterion, his failure to mention it is considered to indicate that it was not present.

6. Use of experts. Experts were brought into consultation at lower levels. State Department officials, as well as officials associated with the UN mission were consulted. Truman himself consulted no experts.

7. Explication of goals. There was discussion of goals. Although Korea had not been considered to be of
major strategic importance in the event of an all-out war, it was considered to be an important indicator of the effectiveness of UN collective security. South Korea had come into being under UN supervision, and hence it provided an opportunity to test the collective security features of that body, its peace-keeping ability being in our national interest. Unfortunately there is no evidence to suggest that Truman was exposed to this criterion. We will consider it missing data (m/d).

3. Decisions at the First Blair House Conference

Narrative of the Decision

Throughout Sunday officials from State and Defense met to assess the unfolding situation in Korea. At about 12:30 PM they learned that President Rhee had decided to move the government from Seoul to Suwon, about twenty miles to the south. The situation appeared to be worsening with each cable. Secretary of State Acheson telephoned President Truman at 2:45 PM and, as a result of their conversation, Truman decided to return to Washington. He charged Acheson with the task of collaborating with the appropriate parties to draw up a list of recommendations for his arrival. While enroute, Truman cabled Acheson and instructed him to arrange
for a meeting that evening. He provided a list of advisors and told Acheson that he could include others in the meeting.

The meeting was held at the Blair House. There were thirteen present in addition to the President. They were all high-ranking members of the State and Defense Departments. After dinner the President opened the meeting with the statement that he had an open mind and that he didn't plan to make any important decisions as a result of the meeting. He asked Acheson to begin by presenting an overview of the situation as it was unfolding in Korea. As he concluded this overview, Acheson offered five specific recommendations for consideration:

(1) That General MacArthur be authorized to furnish the South Koreans with military equipment over and above that already authorized under the Military Defense Program, (2) that American airplanes be authorized to cover the evacuation of American women and children..., (3) that the Air Force be authorized to destroy North Korean tanks interfering with the evacuation, (4) that consideration be given to what further assistance might be given to South Korea pursuant to the Security Council Resolution..., and (5) that the Seventh Fleet be ordered to prevent a Chinese Communist invasion of Formosa as well as to prevent operations by the Chinese Nationalists against the mainland. (Paige, 1968, p. 127)

When Acheson concluded his briefing, Truman asked each of those present what they thought of the recommendations advanced by Acheson. Calling on Secretary of Defense Johnson for a Department of Defense viewpoint, Johnson
replied that the Department did not have a viewpoint as such and was attending the meeting with an open mind. The discussion turned to a wide range of issues. What was the Soviet involvement in the invasion? Was the invasion a prelude to a more global move? Would China move against Taiwan? Would the Huks move in the Philippines? Would Russia move against the Japanese islands which were not protected by a peace treaty? As a result of these questions, it was decided that cables be sent to State and Defense officials throughout the world to be on the lookout for and report on any incidents that might shed light on these larger questions.

Truman then moved to a discussion of U.S. and Soviet capabilities in the Far East. How long would it take to move the Seventh Fleet? How long would it take to resupply our air forces in the area? What type of assistance would be required if ROK forces were routed?

The group discussed the information that was available and concluded that it was limited in nature but agreed that the "situation was serious in the extreme" (Paige, 1968, p. 129). The lack of information about conditions in Korea prompted the conferees to agree that General MacArthur should send a party to Korea to report from the battle area.

It was clear that the participants held a common conviction: whatever needed to be done, would be done to repel
the invasion. "This was the test of all the talk of the last five years of collective security" (Paige, 1968, p. 137).

Following the discussion, Truman, in spite of his opening statement to the contrary, announced his decisions:

1. General MacArthur would be authorized to supply the South Koreans with arms and equipment over and above that which was authorized in the Mutual Defense Assistance Program.

2. Naval and Air Forces would be used to help evacuate American civilians.

3. The necessary orders to enable American forces to be made available to the UN, should that organization request them, would be prepared.

4. The Seventh Fleet would be moved to Japan where it would be closer to both Taiwan and Korea than its recent position in the Philippines. Truman deferred for the moment the question of placing the ships in the Straits of Formosa.

Structure and Process Summary

The decisions were made in a single face-to-face group setting. Multiple agencies were represented; however, the recommendations presented were Acheson's. Outsiders were not included, and there was but one advisory unit. There was some multiple-level participation, but it was minor.
Evaluation of Process Criteria

1. **Information - attention to quality.** There was a conscious attention paid to the information which was available. The participants realized they were acting only on meager information from the battlefront and "the conferees did not feel confident that the information they had garnered from piecemeal reports added up to a clear understanding of military development" (Paige, 1968, pp. 128-129). Recognition of the need for additional information was exhibited in their decision to direct General MacArthur to send a reconnaissance party to Korea for a first-hand report.

2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.** In the strictest sense, no alternative options were developed. Acheson presented a list of recommended actions, but they were all variants of the general principal that the U.S. should furnish additional weapons to the South Koreans and assist in the evacuation of Americans. Only one general policy was advanced, and no additional ones were generated from the group discussion.

3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** There is no record of dissent being presented at the first Blair House conference. Paige characterizes the discussion in terms of "consensus" and sharing "common conviction." There emerged, Paige (1968, p. 137) maintains, "the complete, and
almost unspoken acceptance on the part of everyone that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done."

4. **Concern for implementation.** The problems of implementation were considered. Truman asked lengthy questions about the status of American forces in the area. A good example of the concern for implementation was the order by Truman to prepare, in advance, the orders which would be necessary if we were to supply forces for a UN command.

5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** There was limited conversation within the group concerning Soviet forces and intentions, but Paige makes it clear that any uncertainty that might have been in the minds of the advisors was greatly out-weighed by their commitment to action (Paige, 1968, p. 137).

6. **Use of experts.** One must conclude from Paige's description of the careers of the military members who were present that they were experts in the types of actions discussed. Most had combat experience in the Second World War which was only five years prior to the Korean invasion.

7. **Explication of Goals.** Though it might be agreed that Korea was still considered not critical to the achievement of U.S. national goals, the situation which faced the decision group was somewhat different. Now they were weighing the national interest in terms of allowing the
Communists to commit aggression and get away with it (Paige, 1966, p. 137). Allusion to historical similarities which were present in the minds of the advisors surfaced. Some drew parallels to pre-World War II aggression. Before the meeting, Truman remarked to Acheson: "We can't let the UN down!" (Paige, 1968, p. 125). The possibility of collective security, to which we as members were pledged, failing in its first crucial test was unthinkable.

4. Decisions at the Second Blair House Conference

Narrative of the Decision

President Truman began a busy day of conferences early on Monday, June 26. First, two National Security Council staff members, James Lay and Sidney Souers, met with the President. There is no record of the particulars of this discussion. Later Senator Connally, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met with the President. Paige relates that it was Connally's impression that Truman was in a determined mood, but that he had not yet decided on what further action to take; and that Truman "wanted to review every possible alternative before he took any steps that might involve the nation in war" (1968, p. 149). Truman asked Connally during the course of the conversation whether he had authority to use U.S. troops without prior Congressional approval. Connally replied, "If a burglar
breaks into your house you can shoot him without going down to the police station and getting permission" (Paige, 1968, p. 149).

While Truman was conferring with these officials, Secretaries Acheson and Johnson testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee asking for more assistance for Korea and the Philippines in the form of a $16 million amendment to the Mutual Defense Assistance Program Act of 1949 which was before the Committee. Following their testimony, both returned to their offices to confer with members of their Departments. At the State Department Acheson met with Soviet expert George Kennan and the two concluded that the action in Korea was not part of a wider scheme by the Soviets to precipitate a world war. Acheson was able to assess the feeling of UN delegates through conversations with Ambassador Gross who had flown into Washington that morning. Ambassador Gross reported that there was strong support for the U.S. position that strong action needed to be taken to enforce the Security Council resolution.

About 4:00 PM Truman met with Ambassador John Chang of South Korea and Secretary of State Acheson. Chang related a personal message from South Korean President Rhee which he himself had received by telephone only two hours earlier. Rhee informed Chang that "complete disaster seemed near" (Paige, 1968, p. 157) and that the Korean government was
being moved to Suwon, twenty miles south of Seoul. Truman did not promise that U.S. troops would be used to defend South Korea, but did inform Chang that military supplies were being sent.

After this meeting Acheson returned to his office. By 6:30 PM he had completed a list of recommendations for meeting the crisis. He and his advisors worked on the draft for about half an hour when they adjourned for dinner. An unexpected report concerning the role of U.S. planes in the evacuation (specifically that they were not destroying North Korean tanks) prompted Acheson to call Truman. The President instructed Acheson to call his advisors to a meeting that night in the Blair House.

The group which met at the Blair House was substantially the same as was present on the previous night. Eleven were present in addition to the President. From State: Acheson, Rusk, Hickerson, and Jessup; from Defense: Johnson, Pace, Finletter, Bradly, Collins, Vandenberg, and Sherman.

The meeting opened with a military assessment of the situation in Korea. General Bradly "presented General MacArthur's most recent assessment of the battle" (Paige, 1968, p. 162).

MacArthur's assessment was grim. President Truman later wrote, "There was now no doubt! The Republic of Korea needed help at once if it was not to be overrun" (Paige,
1968, p. 162). For a summary of what form that help might take, Truman asked Acheson to present his recommendations. Acheson read from the draft he had prepared earlier. Five recommendations were made:

1. That the Navy and Air Force be instructed to give the fullest possible support to South Korean forces and that such support be limited to the area south of the Thirty-eighth Parallel;
2. that orders be issued to the Seventh Fleet to prevent an attack upon Formosa, that the Chinese Nationalist Government be told to desist from operations against the mainland, and that the Fleet be ordered to secure compliance of the latter;
3. that American forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that increased military assistance be rendered to the Philippine Government;
4. that military assistance to Indochina be accelerated and that a military mission be sent there; and
5. that Ambassador Austin be instructed to report any action taken under the above recommendations to the United Nations. (Paige, 1968, p. 164)

Truman asked for the opinions of those present, beginning with Secretary of Defense Johnson. Johnson, consistent with his position the night before, stated that the Defense Department had no formal position or specific recommendations. As the discussions widened to include others, it was agreed that American air power could probably repel the invaders, as well as providing a source of morale for the South Korean troops on the ground. Paige relates that although Generals Bradley and Collins still might have had reservations about the effectiveness of air power, neither they nor anyone else recommended that U.S. ground troops be committed (1968, p. 165).
The participants discussed the mobilization requirements should the U.S. commit ground forces. Difficulties, such as a 5,000-mile supply line which would be required to support ground troops, were recognized.

The advisors agreed with Acheson's desire to restrict air and naval forces south of the 38th Parallel. Paige indicates two reasons for this agreement. One concerned the desire not to enlarge the conflict and thereby minimize the probability of Chinese or Soviet intervention. The second reason was more tactical in nature, for it was not felt that the repulsion of the invaders would require action in North Korean territory. "There was a general understanding that the United States should act in a way as to assure the Soviet Union that it was 'not looking for trouble!'" (Paige, 1968, p. 167).

No opposition was forthcoming on Acheson's proposal to move the Seventh Fleet to Formosa. There was no disagreement on his proposal to increase the military presence in the Philippines. Likewise, the advisors "expressed unanimous approval" (Paige, 1968, p. 168) of the increased aid to Indochina. Finally, "there was full agreement" (Paige, 1968, p. 169) that actions should be taken within the framework of the United Nations.

Discussion turned to the question of Soviet intentions and their probable reactions to U.S. actions. Using a
detailed analysis provided by "one of the President's chief advisors in the State Department" (Paige, 1968, p. 169), and "other results of the world-wide intelligence recheck of Soviet intentions which the President had ordered on Sunday night" (Paige, 1968, p. 170), Truman and his advisors concluded that it was unlikely that the Soviets were attempting to provoke a world war. Turning to the question of what the Soviets might do if the United States used its air and naval forces, the advisors were in agreement that they would probably not intervene. Acheson provided some intelligence estimates to back up this conclusion. A parallel question on the possibility of Chinese Communist intervention was similarly discussed and dismissed as unlikely. The risks were not dismissed lightly, however, and Paige (1978) reports that:

Despite the conclusions that the Soviet Union was not prepared to fight a general war and that neither it nor Communist China would intervene directly in Korea, the Blair House conferees knew that the risk of war would be involved in a decision to repel the North Korean aggressors with American men and arms. (p. 173)

Paige makes special comment on the fact that none of the participants thought we should not use military force to stop the invasion. "'No appeasement' was the dominant theme of the conference" (Paige, 168, p. 174). Historical allusions to Hitler, Mussolini, and the failures of the League of Nations to stop the aggression of the 1930s all were brought forth to support the position that the U.N. faced a
grave threat to its ideals. More pragmatic reasons were offered for preventing the North Korean success—the most serious were the effects on Japanese security.

As he had done the night before, Truman announced his decisions at the conclusion of the meeting. In sum, he approved all five of Acheson's recommendations.

Structure and Process Summary

The decisions were made in a single face-to-face meeting. (However, this meeting was preceded by conferences with individuals during the same day and, of course, a similar meeting which had met the previous night.) Multiple agencies were represented; however, once again, the formal recommendations were presented by Acheson who had been supported by State Department staff workers. Outsiders were not included in the formal Blair House meeting, but were included in the below-Presidential level (specifically, Kennan's input into Acheson's recommendations).

Evaluation of Process Criteria

1. **Information - attention to quality.** Paige makes numerous references to the information which the participants used in their assessments. Reports from MacArthur, special intelligence estimates, and diplomatic cables are but some examples (pp. 156, 162, 170). Although there is no specific commentary on the question of information quality,
some assumptions might be made about its implicit presence. First, the major background information on the current situation came from MacArthur's cable—he had been requested to furnish such information as a result of the previous night's meeting. One would therefore assume that he was considered a respected source by the conferees. Second, reports relating to a key discussion area—Soviet intentions—were also received as a result of a world-wide intelligence check ordered the previous night. Since none questioned the validity of the checks, we can assume, with a fair degree of confidence, that the notion of some quality of information was within the minds of the participants. Also, while Paige relates the substance of much of the information used by the group, he never mentions that it was lacking in basic accuracy. Neither does he indicate the presence of information which was unknown to the participants.

2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.**

Multiple options were not presented during the decision process. The only participant who came prepared to offer a set of recommendations was Acheson. He presented a single list of five recommendations (Paige, 1968, p. 164). Discussion centered around these recommendations and no counter recommendations were presented for consideration (Paige, 1968, pp. 166-169). It is important to realize that Acheson's recommendations were not offered in the manner of
"should we choose A or B," but rather, "does anyone have any objections to A, to B, etc.?"

3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** There was simply no dissent present at the Blair House conference. There was unanimity on the interpretation of events that were unfolding in Korea, on the potential reaction to American actions in Korea, and on the recommendations presented by Acheson. Paige reports Secretary Johnson as expressing the feeling of all the participants when he said: "If we want to oppose it, then use our time to oppose it. Not a single one of us did" (Paige, 1968, p. 179). Another participant described the meeting as "the finest spirit of harmony I have ever known" (p. 179).

4. **Concern for implementation.** Attention to possible problems of implementation was considered throughout the discussion. We know that the overall question of eventual Congressional involvement was on Truman's mind from his conversation with Senator Connally earlier in the day (Paige, 1968, p. 149). During the day Secretaries Johnson and Acheson testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee for more aid dollars for Korea and the Philippines. More specific questions of implementation were considered during the meeting. These concerned mostly tactical concerns such as mobilization in the face of current armed forces strength, the difficulties of a transoceanic supply line,
and the availability of sea and air forces in the area. Implementation of the U.N. resolution was discussed (Paige, 1968, p. 169) and the support for U.S. action in the U.N. played a part in the discussion and recommendations supported by the participants.

5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** The participants recognized the uncertainty of their actions. A major question which was considered both before (Paige, 1968, p. 147) and during (p. 169 ff) the meeting was that of how the Soviets might react to our proposed actions in South Korea. Similar questions were asked about the Chinese Communists. Though uncertainty about Soviet and Chinese intervention was discussed at length, it was brushed aside in the face of the larger problem, namely what we could do to stem the North Korean advance. Ambassador Jessup remarked in subsequent testimony, "The invasion had to be met even if it meant the beginning of World War III" (p. 173). Later General Bradley wrote that "if the defense of South Korea was risking an all-out war the choice was not ours, for the Communists had thrown down the gauntlet" (p. 179). While Paige indicates that other participants held more moderate views, we see some support for the view that while the risk of all-out war seemed low, the risk was created by the "other side" and should not deter the United States in its efforts to defend its attacked ally.
6. **Use of experts.** Experts were employed both before and during the meeting. Acheson conferred with Kennan, Acheson's "foremost advisor on Soviet affairs" (Paige, 1968, p. 147), on the question of Soviet intentions. Ambassador Gross certainly must be considered an expert on the reaction of the UN to proposed U.S. actions. He was specifically flown in to Washington from New York to discuss the situation with State Department officials. He was not present at the Blair House meeting, however. Paige provides short biographical sketches of the major participants in the decisions made during the first week of the invasion (pp. 367-375). In this context, several members of the military who were present could be considered as experts in the areas of air and sea power. Admiral Sherman was a "specialist in naval aviation" (p. 373). General Vandenberg had command experience in air operations as commander of the 9th Air Force during part of World War II (p. 374).

7. **Explication of goals.** It is clear that the advisors considered that vital American national security interests were put in jeopardy as a result of the North Korean invasion. Paige (1968) relates that "while the loss of Korea as a piece of real estate would not have meant a direct threat to American military security, the President and his advisors perceived a logical progression of consequences stemming from it which would inevitably menace the
safety of the United States" (p. 176). The argument was advanced by the advisors that if we failed to repel the North Koreans we would fail to uphold the principles of collective security which we had sought to build in the previous five years. In this context, "the North Korean invasion was perceived to threaten the security of the United States" (p. 176).

The limited goal of the responses considered was clearly the repulsion of the North Korean attack. An invasion of North Korea was not considered. The explicit goal was to repel the North Korean invasion of the South. American national interest would be served in the resulting affirmation of the United Nations collective security system.

5. The NSC Meeting of 29 June - The Decision to Extend Use of American Armed Forces in Korea

Narrative of the Decision

As the week wore on, political and military actions increased in intensity. On Tuesday, the day after the second Blair House meeting, Truman met with Congressional leaders to discuss the situation in Korea. "In an extended statement President Truman . . . dwelt with strong emphasis upon the important role of the United Nations in removing the threat to world peace that had been posed by the
arrogant invasion of South Korea" (Paige, 1968, p. 188). Truman then announced the decisions which he had reached the previous night.

That afternoon the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution which recommended:

that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area. (Paige, 1968, p. 205)

As the members voted their approval of this resolution, Seoul fell to the advancing North Korean army.

On the following day, Wednesday, General MacArthur made a personal tour of the battlefield. While enroute to Japan on his return flight, MacArthur drafted a report for his superiors in Washington which recommended that a U.S. regimental combat team would be required to stem the advance of the North Koreans. For unknown reasons, MacArthur delayed sending his recommendations until Friday morning.

Reports from General Headquarters in Tokyo received in Washington early Thursday morning indicated that South Korean casualties were far higher than previously thought. These reports prompted Secretary of Defense Johnson to recommend to President Truman that another meeting of his advisors was warranted. Truman agreed to a conference which was to begin at 5:00 PM.
The evening meeting, characterized by Truman as a National Security Council meeting, was attended by fourteen advisors in addition to the President. In addition to Truman and Johnson, the representatives of the Defense establishment included Secretaries Pace, Matthews, and Finletter; Generals Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg; and Admiral Sherman. The State Department was represented by Acheson, Rusk, and Ambassadors Harriman and Dulles (recently returned from Japan). Chairman Symington, from the National Security Resources Board, and Executive Secretary Lay of the NSC staff also attended (Paige, 1968, p. 244-245).

Secretary of Defense Johnson reviewed the major problems affecting military action in Korea and proposed that a directive be sent to General MacArthur with approved recommendations for remedying the situation.

According to Secretary Johnson, the principal impediments to the effective accomplishment of the military mission in Korea were: the restriction of air and naval activity to South Korea; the limited combat time for fighters over the battle area because of the necessity to fly from distant bases in Japan; poor air-ground liaison with the ROK Army; and, inadequate South Korean transportation facilities for delivering American munitions at the front. (Paige, 1968, p. 245).

Johnson recommended that the President approve a directive which had been agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs which authorized MacArthur to extend air and naval action into
North Korea; to utilize U.S. service forces (such as transportation) in South Korea; and, finally, to utilize a limited number of U.S. combat infantrymen to protect a port-airfield area of Pusan.

It is important to recognize that the introduction of American troops in the Pusan area was not intended by the advisors as a prelude to their eventual inclusion in offensive action. At the time, the front was 200 miles to the north of Pusan. Nor was this action taken in response to MacArthur's tour of the front, for MacArthur's recommendations had not yet been sent. "According to the public record of the proceedings of this NSC meeting, the President and his advisors apparently did not know that General MacArthur already had ordered the Air Force to attack targets in North Korea and had come to the conclusion at least seven and a half hours earlier that only the direct weight of American ground troops at the fighting front could stop the North Koreans" (Paige, 1968, p. 246).

Following the presentation of recommendations by Johnson, Truman asked those present to make their opinions known. Some were concerned that the language used might "lead to the unanticipated and undesirable consequence of a broadened conflict" (Paige, 1968, p. 246). Truman suggested that one paragraph, as presented by Johnson, could be interpreted that "the United States was planning to engage
the Soviet Union in combat. 'I stated categorically,' the President recalled, 'that I did not wish to see even the slightest implication of such a plan'" (Paige, 1968, p. 246).

Further suggestions were advanced about specifically limiting the bombing north of the 38th Parallel to military targets, the desirability of including a specific prohibition against violating Soviet or Chinese air space, and, finally, including a specific directive to MacArthur instructing him to hold his positions and report at once if the Soviets intervened (Paige, 1968, p. 247). The President approved all of these recommendations.

Another topic of conversation was the official Soviet reply to a United States request that they use whatever influence they might have to restrain the North Koreans. "Secretary Acheson reported that expert opinion in his department interpreted the response to be unprovocative and indicative of a desire on the part of the Soviet leadership to avoid formal responsibility for the North Korean invasion" (Paige, 1968, p. 248).

The meeting lasted only forty-five minutes, and by its conclusion Truman had approved all of Johnson's recommendations.
Structure and Process Summary

The decisions were made in a single face-to-face group meeting. Multiple agencies (State, Defense, NSC staff) were represented. Outsiders were not included in the deliberations. Only one advisory unit was involved. Multiple levels were not involved in the meeting itself.

Evaluation of Process Criteria

1. Information - attention to quality. Paige makes several references to the information available to the group. Reports from the battle area were via General Headquarters in Tokyo. The advisors apparently made no conscious assessment about the accuracy of this information, but consideration was given the source of the information insofar as it represented the most proximate source to the fighting. MacArthur's recommendations formed as a result of his first-hand inspection of the battle area had not yet been sent (Paige, 1968, p. 246). Since the group was very similar to those which had met in the preceding days, the background information on the invasion was still part of their recent experience. It should be remembered that the meeting was held in response to specific battle reports and, as such, perhaps it is not unreasonable to assume that at least two participants--Secretary Johnson and President Truman--felt that the information was of sufficient quality
and reliability as to warrant a full-scale advisory meeting.

One missing piece of information which Paige felt important enough to mention was the apparent lack of information about MacArthur's order for U.S. planes to attack North Korean targets (p. 246). Though the advisors were unaware of this order, Paige does not indicate that the possession of such information would have made any difference in the outcome of the meeting.

2. Multiple options - presented to the President. Multiple options were not provided to Truman. Johnson's recommendations (Paige, 1968, p. 245) were not "either/or" propositions. No alternative option was offered during the course of the meeting. There was no creative search for alternative methods to deal with the problem that could serve as a substitute for Johnson's recommendations (Paige, 1968, pp. 244-252).

3. Dissent - transmitted to the President. There was no dissent on the basic issues in question. The meeting turned out to be mainly a consideration of tactical actions that could be taken to shore up the badly routed South Korean forces. All participants were in basic agreement as to the proper nature of the response. Only the specific details of the response were discussed (Paige, 1968, p. 246).
4. **Concern for implementation.** The participants did not mention the specific problems of implementation, but there is strong circumstantial evidence which suggests that they would have felt that the limited actions taken as a result of the decisions would be implemented without problem.

First, there was a sense that actions would be taken under the recently passed U.N. resolution. In the directive which was to be sent to MacArthur, this feeling was conveyed in the opening words which read, "In support of resolution of the United Nations approved on the 25th of June and transmitted on the 28th of June" (Paige, 1968, p. 250). It was perceived that there was international support for the actions.

Domestically, support seemed to be building for Truman's actions (this, however, was not specifically discussed). While he was under fire for not including the Congress in a more direct way (Paige, 1968, pp. 216-218), most Congressmen appeared to be willing to support the type of decision which Truman made at the meeting. There were other signs of support, such as the Senate's approval of an extension of the draft by a 76-0 vote.

These events would lead one to assume that the advisors and President did not perceive the problem of implementation to be pressing enough to talk about in such a short meeting.
5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** Participants were well-aware that a potential danger existed in the possible misinterpretation of orders by field commanders which might result in Soviet misinterpretation of official policy. Their reaction was to carefully consider the language of the proposed recommendations and to alter it when it seemed ambiguous (Paige, 1968, pp. 246-247). Truman especially wanted to be sure that there be no room for Soviet misinterpretation of our intentions. The participants felt that the language changes reduced the possibility of this occurring and were more confident that the actions which they wanted to affect would result in the consequences intended.

6. **Use of experts.** Acheson specifically alluded to State Department experts (Paige, 1968, p. 248) being involved in the interpretation of the Soviet message. As in the previous case, the military representatives, because of their battlefield experiences, would qualify as expert participants in the military decisions.

7. **Explication of goals.** A clear conception of U.S. goals and objectives was present. It was quite clear to all present that the United States should be careful in its approach to the deteriorating situation lest it get out of hand. There was a realization that trade-offs occur in the real world. Of this consideration, Truman wrote,
I wanted to take every step necessary to push the North Koreans back of the 38th Parallel. But I wanted to be sure that we would not become so deeply committed in Korea that we could not take care of other situations as might develop. I [pointed out] that operations above the 38th Parallel should be designed only to destroy military supplies, for I wanted it clearly understood that our operations in Korea were designed to restore peace there and to restore the border. (Paige, 1968, pp. 246-247)

6. The Decision Concerning MacArthur's Request for Two Divisions

Narrative of the Decision

At about 3:00 AM on Friday morning, 30 June, a full seventeen hours after he completed his inspection tour of the battle area, a cable was received from General MacArthur urgently recommending that he be given the authority to use American combat troops in Korea. MacArthur elaborated on this request during a telecon conversation which Army Chief of Staff General Collins set up soon after he received MacArthur's message. Via the telecon link, MacArthur told Collins that two divisions might be required to stem the advancing North Korean attackers. General Collins immediately relayed MacArthur's assessment to President Truman through Secretary of the Army Pace. Truman immediately approved the authorization of a smaller number of men (one regimental combat team), and delayed a decision on the larger request until he had a chance to meet with his advisors.
This meeting took place at 9:30 AM in the White House Cabinet Room. In attendance were the President; Secretaries Acheson, Johnson, Pace, Fineletter, and Matthews; Deputy Secretary of Defense Early; Averall Harriman; Generals Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg; and Admiral Sherman (Paige, 1968, p. 257). Truman opened the meeting by informing those in attendance that he had authorized MacArthur "to commit a regiment to the fighting and asked for advice on the question of whether or not the General's further recommendation should be approved" (Paige, 1968, p. 258). In addition, two other questions of some importance were placed before the group by the President. The first was the question of whether we should accept the Nationalist Chinese offer to supply ground troops (two divisions of which could be ready within five days). The second question which Truman wanted to discuss concerned possible responses by the Soviets and Chinese to whatever actions would be decided upon.

As to the first question, the seemingly unanimous opinion was to decline the Nationalist Chinese offer. Acheson's position was that the employment of Nationalist troops "would increase the probability of Chinese Communist involvement in the Korean fighting" (Paige, 1968, p. 258). The Joint Chiefs also recommended rejection of the offer. Their reasoning was based on supply and transportation problems. Their feeling was that to be truly useful,
Chiang's army would have to be resupplied or suffer the same fate as the retreating South Koreans. Also, their employment to the battle area would require the diversion of transports which were needed to move American men and material. Truman, who had been "inclined to accept the offer" (Paige, 1968, p. 258) finally agreed with the nearly unanimous position taken by his advisors.

With regard to the second question, it was felt that "there was still no evidence that the Soviet Union intended to intervene in Korea . . . [and while] Chou En-lai's belligerent declaration had raised the possibility of Chinese intervention, it did not seem imminent" (Paige, 1968, p. 259).

The major reason for calling the meetings was of course to make a decision on whether to commit two American regiments to the fighting. Paige relates that it was the general feeling at the time of the meeting that the addition of these ground troops might "tip the balance of battle in favor of the Korean Republic" (Paige, 1968, p. 260). There appears to have been two reasons for this feeling. The first was born out of an error in judgment. Apparently none of the decision-makers had a true appreciation of the capabilities of the North Korean army. The second reason was based on the initial success of the American Air Force in the battle area. For instance, in the previous twenty-four
hours, twenty North Korean fighters had been shot down, and U.S. bombers had attacked North Korean troop concentrations. Thus, the addition of the requested ground troops to the present American commitment of air and naval forces was seen as most timely and perhaps decisive.

"Even though the proposed employment of the Army in Korea raised certain problems, apparently none of the President's advisors opposed it" (Paige, 1968, p. 260). The thirty-minute meeting ended with President Truman's decision to give MacArthur "full authority to use the troops under his command" (Paige, 1968, p. 260). This authorization then was not limited to the two divisions requested. His limitations were governed by the resources he could spare for his primary mission—the security of Japan.

Structure and Process Summary

The decision was made in a single face-to-face group meeting. Multiple agencies (State, Defense, White House) were represented. Outsiders were not included in the advisory unit. Only one advisory unit was involved in the decision. Multiple levels were not involved.

Evaluation of Process Criteria

1. Information - attention to quality. General MacArthur's urgent cable to the Defense Department was the primary information input. Since it was based on a first-hand
report by the General, there was no questioning of its reliability. Paige does not indicate that the advisors made a conscious assessment about the accuracy of the information. On the other hand, there was no information which might have served to induce the advisors to question its reliability. In fact there was some supporting evidence. In his cable, MacArthur mentioned the danger to the "Han River line." Unofficial United Press dispatches received in Tokyo midnight Thursday indicated that the defensive line had been penetrated by the North. It is not clear from Paige's account whether this information was known to the advisors. It is clear, however, that Paige considers information variables to be important to the decision process. The fact that his account does not indicate any questioning of the information upon which this decision was based would lead one to conclude that the participants believed that the information was of high quality.

2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.** Multiple options were not provided to Truman. No alternative option to the increased commitment of American ground troops was offered during the course of the meeting.

3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** There was no dissent on the basic issue in question. Paige (1968) indicates that no one opposed the decision (p. 260). In addition, there was "nearly unanimous" (p. 259) agreement on
the question of whether to accept the Nationalist offer to supply ground forces.

4. **Concern for implementation.** The question of implementation seems almost moot in this particular decision. Since Truman's final decision was simply to give MacArthur authority to commit his own troops, there was little need for consideration of implementation. Truman, as Commander-in-Chief, believed he had the authority to allow the use of the troops, and MacArthur, as Area Commander, had the authority to deploy them once given permission by the President. In the narrowest sense, there is some support for the position that implementation was considered. During the discussion of whether or not to accept the Nationalist Chinese offer to support, the Joint Chiefs rejected the offer partly on the basis of needing the transports which would be required to move the Nationalist troops for American men and material. It might be inferred that since the question of limited transport space was discussed in that connection it would have also been brought up if there had been a question of moving American troops from Japan to Korea. The question of feasibility was inherent in MacArthur's request and in Truman's response.

5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** One of the major questions which Truman wanted addressed at the meeting was the possible Soviet and Chinese responses to any American
action. Although Paige (1968) does not attribute a specific source to various estimates, he reports that "intelligence teams set up to study the problem of Soviet-Chinese intentions were in general agreement that the Soviet Union . . . would avoid a head-on military collision with American forces in Korea or elsewhere" (p. 259). The consensus on the possibility of Chinese intervention was that "it did not seem imminent" (p. 259). The brevity of the meeting (thirty minutes) precluded the possibility of an intensive examination of all alternatives, but at the very least, the question of Soviet and Chinese response was raised by the President himself.

6. **Use of experts.** Because this was primarily a military decision, the expertise previously attributed to the military representatives at former meetings applies to this advisory group as well.

7. **Explication of Goals.** There is no discussion of this criterion in the case study. It will be considered as missing data.

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**The Truman Decisions - A Summary**

In this section we will briefly summarize the advisory system which supported President Truman in the decisions examined in this chapter. We will also consider the extent to which the seven process criteria, the presence of which
we believe necessary in order for the President to have consistently good advice, were present under different structural configurations of the advisory system. In the final chapter we will look at these variables in a cross-Presidential analysis which will enable us to have a more generalizable picture of the relationship between advisory structure and the presence of the process criteria for good advice.

Table 2 displays the advisory structures utilized in the six Truman administration decisions covered in this chapter. It also indicates the degree to which the seven process criteria were present in each decision. Looking at Table 2, it is readily apparent that the structure of the advisory system which Truman turned to for advice varied among the six decisions. We find the greatest differences in overall structure between Decisions 1 and 2 on the one hand, and Decisions 3, 4, 5, and 6 on the other. Although even within these two groups the decision structures vary somewhat, we find that they share some common structural characteristics. Decisions 1 and 2 are similar to the extent that they both involve single-agency participation and mediated interaction patterns. On the other hand, Decisions 3, 4, 5, and 6 feature interagency participation and face-to-face group interaction patterns. It is import­
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**EVALUATION OF THE PRESENCE OF THE PROCESS CRITERIA**

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m/d = missing data
their similarity in part can be attributed to their close proximity in time, their common context, and their generally common actors.

If structure has an impact on process, we should be able to detect some differences in how these differing structures relate to the presence of the seven process criteria for good advice. [We realize that since the number of cases is small, and the fact that there still do remain some differences between these two groups, our observations will be only suggestive in nature. In the final chapter, when we examine all the decisions together (and have some control on Presidential personality), we will be able to have more confidence in our analysis.] Are there any differences in the presence of the process criteria between the two groups? Yes, it appears that there are. Since the number of cases is so small, let us look only at the presence of the criteria in the aggregate for the two structural configurations which we have isolated. That is, for the time being, we will not be interested in how the first group's structural configuration satisfies the criterion of, say, options being made available to the President. Instead, we will look only at how well the two advisory structures are associated with the criteria in the aggregate, without regard to any single criterion.

In the aggregate then, what can be said about the association between the presence of a certain structural
type and the presence of the process criteria? For the first group (Decisions 1 and 2) there are fourteen possible "yes" responses to the process criteria (that is, seven process criteria times two decisions). However, four criteria have been coded as missing data (m/d), leaving just ten possible positive responses. Of these ten, we find only three that have been coded as present, or thirty percent. For the second group (Decisions 3, 4, 5, and 6) there are twenty-eight possible "yes" responses. Two of these are missing data, however, which leaves twenty-six possible positive responses. Of these twenty-six, we find seventeen that are coded as present, or sixty-five percent.

Thus, while the number of cases for any given administration is too small to make any definitive statements about the relationship between the structural variable and the presence of certain process criteria, we do find the strong suggestion that decision units which include interagency participation and face-to-face group meetings have a greater chance of ensuring the presence of the process criteria. That is, there was a sixty percent fulfillment of the aggregated criteria in those cases where the decision structure included interagency and group characteristics, while only a thirty-percent fulfillment of the aggregated criteria in those cases where those structural characteristics were missing.
Another conclusion which is readily apparent from looking at Table 2 is that in neither of the groups (that is, in none of the decisions) were the criteria on options or dissent satisfied. This suggests that perhaps factors other than structure are more influential at times. We suggested this possibility very early in the dissertation when we recognized that certain personality traits might from time to time produce results that were not in keeping with those expected as a result of the structural configuration alone. Indeed, overall, structure might be a far less potent variable than personality. Nonetheless, because structure is much more manipulable, its relationship to national security advice is important to understand. Was Presidential personality the important difference with regard to the lack of options and dissent?

Perhaps, but there may be reasons other than Presidential personality for the lack of options and dissent in the Truman decisions. Throughout the accounts of the Truman decisions, one is struck by the unanimity of mind with which the major administration figures viewed the world. Perhaps, for such like-minded men, their own pre-conceptions of the world and the proper way in which it was to be perceived was so ingrained that any combination of structural characteristics would have failed to induce
them to change their views long enough for dissent or alternative ways of doing things (options) to surface.

When we link some aspects of Presidential style with the notion of group solidarity, we get even a clearer picture of why dissent and options were lacking. According to Janis (1972, p. 71), Truman "set the tone at all the meetings with his advisors, strongly shaping the group consensus as each successive step was taken to deepen America's involvement" in Korea. Further,

when Secretary Acheson had started to speak about some of the risks, stating that what had been done in the last three days might ultimately involve America in an all-out war, President Truman immediately replied that he thought that the danger involved was obvious but that we should not withdraw from Korea unless a military situation elsewhere required such action. With statements like that, it could hardly escape the attention of everyone in the advisory group that the name of the game, so far as the President was concerned, was commitment to United States military action in Korea. (Janis, 1972, p. 71)

We see then that the group of advisors were highly receptive to the influence of Truman, and the group setting facilitated the ability of Truman to get his views across. Given the cohesiveness of the advisory group and the common outlook, it is not difficult to understand why dissent and options were not forthcoming.

We will refrain from making any broad statements about the relationship between structure and process as a result
of the decisions of any single administration. That analysis will be undertaken in the final chapter. Nonetheless, we must conclude our summary of the Truman administration with the observation that for these six cases there was the suggestion that for those structural characteristics discussed above there does exist a relationship to the process criteria.

Finally, we note that without regard to structure, when we combine all six decisions together, the Truman decisions presented here had a fifty-six-percent (twenty out of thirty-six) fulfillment of the seven process criteria.
CHAPTER VI
THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

In this chapter we will discuss three national security decisions made during the Eisenhower administration. The first took place in 1954 and concerned the decision to resupply certain aircraft to pro-Western rebels in Guatemala. The next decision took place in 1956 and concerns the U.S. withdrawal of assistance to finance the building of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. Finally, we will examine the 1958 decision to intervene in Lebanon.

1. The Decision to Resupply Guatemala - 1954

The International Context

In the spring of 1954 the Cold War moved its focus for a time to the tiny Latin American republic of Guatemala. Relations between the United States and Guatemala had been deteriorating for some years. In the late 1940s, Juan Arevalo, who had been elected President after a junta overthrew Dictator General Ubico in 1944, took moves toward social reform which worked against the economic interests of the American-based United Fruit Company. His efforts

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1This summary follows the accounts of Barnet (1968), Eisenhower (1963), and Sanchez (1972).
brought some violent reactions and nearly two dozen attempts to overthrow him were undertaken in four years. "By 1950 the attempts to oust President Arevalo, who showed a willingness to use local Communists in the bureaucracy, were growing more serious. He asked Ambassador Richard C. Patterson to leave the country because he sympathized openly with the conspirators and publically attacked Arevalo for his "prosecution of American business!" (Barnet, 1968, p. 230) Under Arevalo, exports plummeted, World Bank loans were terminated, and U.S. military assistance ceased.

In 1951 Jacobo Arbenz was elected President and he immediately instituted a program of land reform in which the most immediate casualty was United Fruit. The Guatemalans offered $600,000 for some United Fruit land, but United Fruit demanded almost $16 million in compensation. The State Department, headed by John Foster Dulles, sided with United Fruit. "A mammoth public-relations campaign was launched by United Fruit . . . [and] the major thrust of the campaign was that Communism was taking over in the Western Hemisphere" (Barnet, 1968, p. 231).

Narrative of the Decision

Belief that Communism was gaining a foothold in Guatemala apparently spurred the Eisenhower administration to support an anti-Arbenz coup. The CIA found Guatemalan
Colonel Castillo Armas willing to become the U.S. candidate for president. U.S. Diplomat John Peurifoy was suggested by Allen Dulles as the man to lead the operation. The CIA used Honduras and Nicaragua as staging areas. Meanwhile, the arrival of a ship containing 2,000 tons of small arms for Arbenz provided yet another pretext for U.S. action and Dulles suggested that the arms might even "be used against the Panama Canal one thousand miles away" (Barnet, 1968, p. 233).

Colonel Armas led his forces into Guatemala on June 18, 1954, supported in part by several P-47 Thunderbolts allegedly flown by American pilots. Two of the planes were destroyed, and the question for the administration was whether or not to replace them.

Eisenhower's account of the preliminaries differs somewhat from the above. He does not, for instance, refer to the CIA's role, nor does he hint that the P-47s were American. He does however set the scene for the decision. Eisenhower reports that:

On [June 22] Allen Dulles reported to me that Castello had lost two of the three old bombers with which he was supporting his "invasion." A meeting was arranged that afternoon with Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, and Henry F. Holland, who had succeeded John Cabot as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. The point at issue was whether the United States should cooperate in replacing the bombers. (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 425)
Eisenhower recalled that the meeting did not produce unanimity. Holland argued that the U.S. should keep its hands off (it is not clear if he knew of the CIA involvement), and that he thought Latin America would view the replenishment of the planes as intervention in the internal affairs of Guatemala. The Dulles' apparently argued that we should supply the planes. Eisenhower asked what chance Castillo had if the planes were not sent. Allen Dulles answered, "about zero." Next Eisenhower asked what Castillo's chances would be with the planes. Dulles responded, "about twenty percent" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 425).

Eisenhower agreed to supply the planes. Within five days Arbenz resigned and fled to Czechoslovakia. Castillo Armas was eventually confirmed as President.

Structure and Process Summary

Two agencies—the CIA and the State Department—were involved in the advisory process. There were no outsiders involved in the single, face-to-face meeting which included three advisors and Eisenhower. There was but one advisory unit, and it was of a single level.

Evolution of the Process Criteria

1. **Information - attention to quality.** The decision to resupply the aircraft was inexorably linked to the question of Communism in Guatemala. Most accounts questioned
the validity of the administration's view. Sanchez (1972) maintains that the United States over-reacted to what he considers was a relatively small Communist presence. Part of the explanation for this view, Sanchez maintains, lay in the sources of information on which American intelligence relied. Barnet (1968, p. 232), while agreeing that the Communists held some key positions, argues that:

Guatemala was far from adopting a Communist economy or social system. She was receiving no aid from the Soviet Union or indeed had any relationship with the Communist bloc. Arbenz was actually using the Communists to help administer a continuation of the moderate reformist program of Arevalo, who was a rather strong anti-Communist. . . . The cry of Communism had been the traditional pretext for opposing reformers in Guatemala. Now that both the pace of reform and the participation of Communists had been stepped up, anti-Communism reached hysterical proportions.

There is no sense whatsoever of the attempt to see Guatemalan affairs as anything but an extension of the Cold War. Eisenhower's memoirs contain no hint that anything but a Communist take-over was in the works. There is no evidence whatsoever that information was carefully examined as to the bias that it might contain.

2. Multiple options - presented to the President.

There is no evidence that the President was presented with alternative solutions to the problem. The discussions
centered entirely on whether we should or should not supply Colonel Armas with aircraft.

3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** Clearly, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American Affairs Henry Holland took the position that we should not supply the Guatemalan rebels with additional planes.

4. **Concern for implementation.** There is no evidence with which to assess the presence or absence of this criterion. We will consider it to be missing data (m/d).

5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** Eisenhower specifically asked Allen Dulles about the chances of success (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 425). However, the treatment of uncertainty was to ignore it. In fact, the uncertainty seemed to be a factor in Eisenhower's decision to go ahead. As Eisenhower himself relates:

   I walked to the door with Allen Dulles and, smiling to break the tension, said "Allen, that figure of twenty percent was pervasive. It showed me that you had thought this matter through realistically. If you told me that the chances would be ninety percent, I would have had a much more difficult decision!" (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 426)

6. **Use of experts.** Although the decision unit was quite small, it seems as if expert status can be ascribed to one of them—Henry F. Holland. Holland, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, is characterized by Eisenhower (1963, p. 425) as "a real expert in Latin American affairs."
7. **Explication of goals.** A clear enumeration of goals and the possible trade-offs between potentially conflicting goals was present. On the one hand, the U.S. wanted to promote good relations with Latin America and knew that interference in the internal affairs of one of its own would carry with it bad publicity. On the other hand, the U.S. wanted to head off Communism in the Western Hemisphere and restore "freedom to Guatemala" (Eisenhower, 1963, p. 425). Eisenhower, using the Caracas resolution's condemnation of Communism as a basis, decided to intervene.

2. **The Decision to Cancel Funding of the Aswan Dam - 1956**

The International Context

At times the Cold War was seen as a benefit by leaders of the emerging Third World. Interested more in development at home than choosing sides, some countries perceived that they might play one side against the other. One such nation was Egypt, whose growing national and Moslem sentiments were being harnessed by a new leader of the emerging nations, Nasser. Both the Soviet Union and the United States were interested in courting favor with Egypt, and Nasser was willing to play both sides against each other.

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2This study follows the accounts of Finer (1964), and Berkowitz, et. al. (1977).
The idea of a large dam across the Nile was already decades old when the United States appropriated money in November 1954 for preliminary engineering surveys. The dam was to be a symbol of a new Egypt, a project equal in vision to the Pyramids themselves which would provide both irrigation for agriculture and electricity for industry. Events proved that nothing was quite so simple in the Cold War environment of the mid-1950s.

Narrative of the Decision

After an unsuccessful attempt to buy arms from the United States, Nasser concluded an arms deal with the Communists in September 1955. This liaison led to a fear of a future Soviet offer to finance the Aswan Dam itself, and "strengthened the hand of pro-Dam forces in Washington" (Berkowitz, 1977, p. 78). By late December, Secretary of State Dulles announced a plan whereby the U.S. would join with Great Britain, France, and the World Bank to finance the Aswan Dam. Nasser, who reportedly had received a better offer from the Soviets, stalled. It appeared that Nasser's lack of response allowed anti-Dam sentiment to build in the United States, and on July 16, Egypt, fearing that the deal might be in jeopardy, "announced with great fanfare that its Ambassador to the United States, Ahmed Hussein, would leave
for Washington immediately in order to accept the American offer" (Berkowitz, 1977, p. 81).

For some time though, Dulles had had misgivings about loaning the money to Egypt. Hassen's open courting of the Soviets, his insistence on neutrality, and his recognition of Red China all combined to induce Dulles to reevaluate his position. On July 16, 1956, Dulles met with Eisenhower to present him with his feelings on the subject.

The President did not, for his part, positively order the Secretary to withhold the loan. He was annoyed, he said, because, while he was working for peace in the Middle East, Nasser was acquiring arms that might be used against Israel. Where, then, was the point in finding money for the Dam? If the Secretary should come down on that side, then he would concur in the denial of the loan. (Finer, 1964, p. 46)

Two days later Sir Roger Makins, the British Ambassador, met with Dulles. Dulles informed him of the possibility of refusing to offer the loan to Egypt. The British cautioned Dulles about being precipitate, but left the decision up to him. According to Finer (1964, p. 47), several days earlier the French Ambassador, Couve de Murville, warned the State Department, "Beware how you handle the situation with the loan, because a most likely consequence of a refusal is the seizure of the Suez Canal!" Finer concludes, "The warning was laughed at by officials."
It is really unclear whether Dulles had made his decision by the time the Egyptian Ambassador arrived at his office.

On July 19, 1956, Dulles was in the office at work, as usual, shortly after 8:00 A.M. He repeated his consultation with the President, the issue not closed [emphasis added]. At about 11:00 his phone rang and he was told that Ambassador Hussein was on his way up to the office. . . . Then as Dulles appeared to be bringing the various reasons against the loan to a head, all in tones rather sad and firm, the Ambassador became excited." (Finer, 1969, p. 47)

The Egyptian Ambassador then mentioned the Russian offer to finance the Dam. Finer continues:

No nerve was so raw in all of Dulles' sensitive composition as Russia. He at once retorted, "Well, as you have the money already, you don't need any from us! My offer is withdrawn!" (Finer, 1964, p. 48)

Seven days later Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, precipitating another crisis.

Structure and Process Summary

Eisenhower left the final decision to Dulles though he concurred in advance with a possible negative response. There was but one meeting, consisting of one advisory unit, working at a single level of a single agency with no outsiders included. The interaction pattern was mediated.
Evaluation of Process Criteria

1. **Information - attention to quality.** If there was one area where information was weak, or ignored, it was in the possible reaction of Nasser. Finer (1964, p. 58) asserts that "No one had taken serious notice of the French Ambassador's warning" that Nasser would nationalize the Suez Canal if denied the loan. In fact, Finer concludes that in general, "the Secretary and the President were not realistically in touch with conditions in the Middle East" (p. 59).

2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.** There is no evidence that the question was ever broadened from the either/or question about whether to make the Aswan loan or not. There was never a mention of alternatives.

3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** The manner in which the decision was made hardly allowed for dissent. Clearly there was no difference in feeling between Eisenhower and Dulles. Actually, since there was no one actually involved in the final decision except these two, there was not opportunity for dissent to be raised.

4. **Concern for implementation.** There is no discussion of this criterion. No inferences can be drawn about its presence. We will consider it missing data (m/d).

5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** There is no record of uncertainty being a part of the decision process. Couve
de Murville's warning (Finer, 1964, p. 47) about the possible consequences went unheeded. Dulles' rapid decision hardly allowed for such considerations. Finer (p. 52) concludes that Dulles did not consider the consequences of his action by saying: "if, indeed, Dulles did foresee consequences, never was a man so blind to what they might be." Dulles' actions after the nationalization confirm that he did not consider the consequences of his action. Upon hearing that Nasser nationalized the Canal, Finer (1964, pp. 57-58) writes, "Dulles sustained the shock of his life, and it was clearly registered on his face."

6. **Use of experts.** There is no evidence of experts being a part of the decision. Again, the small size of the decision group hardly allowed for the presence of experts.

7. **Explication of goals.** Finer's entire account of the decision indicates that a conception of goals was never a part of the decision (1964). Rather, it came down to Eisenhower's willingness to back any Dulles' decision, which ultimately seemed based most solidly on Dulles' personal view of the situation: "Nasser had piqued him, he felt piqued toward Nasser" (p. 54).
3. The Decision to Land Marines in Lebanon - 1958

The International Context

One result of the 1956 Suez crisis was a growing perception by many Americans that the Arab world was drifting toward neutralism, or even worse, toward pro-Communism. But the events which culminated in the landing of U.S. Marines in Lebanon on July 15, 1958, were the result of perceptions and events far more complex than that. Rostow (1972, pp. 94-95) points out that at this time:

Moscow, Peking, and Washington were operating in a situation with its own churning dynamics that involved a number of elements: the Arab struggle with Israel; the rise of a new generation of Arab radical leaders; Nasser's efforts to encourage the rise of such leaders (notably, in Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan) and the nationalist resistance to Nasser's domination; the Bedouin-Palestine schism in Jordan; the Moslem-Christian schism in Lebanon; and the tensions between the Arabs and non-Arab Moslems in Turkey and Iran.

The American attempt to increase its influence in the Middle East in order to foster regional stability was embodied in the Eisenhower Doctrine and crystallized in a Presidential address to Congressional leaders on January 1, 1957: "The existing vacuum in the Middle East must be filled by the United States before it is filled by Russia" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 178). Included in the Doctrine was the proposal for increased economic and military aid. In

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3This summary follows the accounts of Barnet (1968), Eisenhower (1965), Rostow (1972), and Berkowitz, et. al. (1977).
addition, the Doctrine included justification for the President to use "the armed forces of the United States to serve and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism" (Barnet, 1968, p. 138).

The reaction of Arab governments to the Eisenhower Doctrine was less than overwhelming. Some saw it as an attempt by the United States to extend its sphere of influence over an area which saw itself as becoming increasingly neutral. Others saw a greater threat from Israel than from "international Communism." In fact, only President Chamoun of Lebanon welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine, and in 1957 a joint communique was issued which stated that the U.S. would grant economic and military aid to Lebanon and, in return, Lebanon would ask for military assistance in the event of Communist interference in its internal affairs. The communique was in some ways a self-fulfilling prophecy for "the dissension stirred up by the proposed ideological alliance led directly to the civil war and American intervention a year later" (Barnet, 1968, p. 140).

Almost immediately intense debate broke out within Lebanon on the merits of the Eisenhower Doctrine. A pro-Nasser group argued that the accord would only serve to
antagonize the Soviets. By the Spring of 1957 a formal opposition had coalesced around this issue but they were defeated in parliamentary elections in June. Nonetheless, opposition against Chamoun grew, crystalizing on the issue of a second term for the President. In May of 1958, the murder of the editor of an anti-government newspaper led to rioting and attacks of U.S. occupied buildings.

Narrative of the Decision

As the violence grew in Lebanon, Secretary of State Dulles was busy explaining that the Eisenhower Doctrine could be applied to the current conditions in Lebanon under the provision "that the independence of these countries is vital to peace and the national interest of the United States. That is certainly a mandate to do something if we think that our peace and vital interests are endangered from any quarter" (Barnet, 1968, p. 143).

In Lebanon, the situation steadily deteriorated. The rebels, in what had become a civil war, held areas adjacent to Syria and began receiving men and arms across the border. In late May President Chamoun brought charges of intervention against the United Arab Republic before both the Arab League and the United Nations. A UN observation group sent to Lebanon in mid-June failed to substantiate his charges of active outside intervention. Under mounting
pressure and violence, Chamoun called for U.S. support on July 14, 1958 under the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine.

Washington had apparently anticipated this request. Barnet (1968, p. 147) maintains that Dulles favored a U.S. move in May "despite his great fears that this action would result in the retaliatory destruction of U.S. pipelines in Syria and the blockade of the Suez Canal." On the same day as the Lebanese request, word reached Washington of a coup in Iraq in which Western-leaning King Faisal and the Prime Minister were shot. This event was the final action which triggered an Eisenhower response.

Berkowitz (1977) states that Eisenhower met with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and CIA Director Allen Dulles. The meetings were perhaps only perfunctory, for Eisenhower notes:

That morning I gathered in my office a group of advisors to make sure that no facet of the situation was overlooked. Because of my long study of the problem, this was one meeting in which my mind was practically made up regarding the general line of action we should take, even before we met. (Eisenhower, 1965, pp. 269-270)

On July 15 the first of what ultimately numbered 14,000 Marines walked ashore in Lebanon without resistance.
Structure and Process Summary

There were three major meetings representing all three interaction patterns: one on May 13 between Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, and two on July 14. The first of the July 14 meetings was between Eisenhower and at least two others—Secretary of State Dulles and CIA Director Allen Dulles. The second was between Eisenhower, both Dulles, and twenty-two leaders of both Houses of Congress. Eisenhower reports that he had made up his mind on a general course of action **prior** to the meetings of July 14 (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 270) and it is questionable whether the other two had a major influence on his decision. Nonetheless, all three will be considered in the analysis since Eisenhower did not announce his decision until after the Congressional meeting.

1. **Information - attention to quality.** Although the information variable was not dealt with in detail in any of the accounts, the references to information were generally negative in nature. While Dulles and Eisenhower maintained that the rebellion was of Communist origin, others did not. The UN observation team, for instance, found no direct outside intervention. Barnet (1968, pp. 144-145) concludes that "Egyptian intervention was neither the stimulus nor the mainstay of the civil strife. Once again a government that had lost the power to rule effectively was blaming it
failure on foreign agents." Speaker Sam Rayburn termed the conflict a civil war. "Senator Fulbright seriously doubted 'that this crisis was Communist inspired,' not a startling conclusion since the President and his advisers had received no evidence of Communist involvement" (Barnet, 1968, p. 148). Rostow's account (1972, p. 95) also questions the informational base upon which the decision was based. "Eisenhower's decision to move on July 15, before the meaning of the Iraqi coup could be fully assessed, was based on an instinctive judgment that the Middle East was getting out of hand, rather than on precise evidence that 'armed aggression' from a nation 'controlled by international Communism' had occurred or was about to occur."

On the point of information, Berkowitz (1977, p. 107) goes so far as to state that the CIA "shaped the information it supplied in such a way that military intervention seemed the only solution."

2. Multiple options—presented to the President.

There is no indication whatsoever that Dulles or Eisenhower considered any alternative other than invasion. In light of the unanimous opinion that "he made this decision before his discussion with his principal advisors" (Berkowitz, 1977, p. 108), it is unlikely in any event that Eisenhower had developed a well-thought-out list of alternative actions—especially considering the speed of his decision. If
doing nothing was an alternative, one might infer that Ike did consider that possibility. In his memoirs (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 274) he states: "The question was whether it would be better to incur the deep resentment of nearly all the Arab world . . . or to do something worse--which was to do nothing." Nonetheless, it is clear that the advisory system failed to provide Eisenhower with alternative courses of action.

3. Dissent - transmitted to the President. There is no evidence of any dissent among the administration advisors. There was some question of interpretation of facts by some Congressional leaders in the July 14 meeting--notably by Rayburn and Fulbright--but Eisenhower seems to have made up his mind to move prior to this meeting anyway. Eisenhower, at any rate, did not perceive any dissent for he writes: "no direct objection was voiced" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 272).

4. Concern for implementation. It is clear that Eisenhower did consider the question of implementation. First, he recognized the fact that he could make such a decision. Reporting on the July 14 meeting with Congressional members, Eisenhower (1965, p. 272) maintained that with regard to an invasion of Lebanon, "authority for such an operation lay so clearly within the responsibility of the Executive. The question of the mechanics of the landing
itself was addressed along with such matters as reinforce­ments and the use of British forces as reserves (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 273).

5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** Eisenhower asked Secretary Dulles for a run-down on possible Soviet reaction (Eisenhower, 1965, pp. 170-171). Dulles reported that our superior power would temper any Soviet reaction. Dulles also commented on the possible adverse reaction by Arab states, including such possibilities as their destruction of an important oil pipeline across Syria and closing the Suez Canal to us.

Nonetheless, the uncertainty that was considered was largely ignored. While recognizing the threat, Eisenhower reports: "This point did not worry me excessively; I be­lieved the Soviets would not take action if the United States movement were decisive and strong, particularly if other parts of the Middle East were not involved in the operation" (Eisenhower, 1965, p. 266).

6. **Use of Experts.** There is no evidence that any outside experts were consulted, or that experts within the administration were drawn into the advisory process.

7. **Explication of goals.** Throughout the build-up of the crises going back to the formation of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the administration had several goals for the Middle East—stability, freedom from Soviet influence,
support of pro-American governments. It was these considerations which prompted the action of Eisenhower and his closest advisor, Secretary Dulles (Eisenhower, 1965, pp. 269-270).

**The Eisenhower Decisions - A Summary**

Table 3 displays the structural characteristics of the advisory systems used in the three decisions examined in this chapter. It also provides a summary of the presence or absence of the seven criteria for good advice for each decision. Like Truman, Eisenhower employed different advisory structures to obtain advice, and, in terms of interaction patterns, these were even more varied than were found in the Truman decisions.

Because the Truman decisions seemed to suggest that the number of agencies involved in the decision process was important to the presence of the process criteria, let us take an initial look at the Eisenhower administration's decisions based on differences in this structural characteristic. A look at Table 3 reveals that Decisions 1 and 3 both employed interagency participation, whereas Decision 2 was a product of single-agency advice. Ignoring the missing data, we find that for Decisions 1 and 3, for the thirteen criteria coded, seven were present. That is, in the
### Table 3

SUMMARY OF THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

ADVISORY STRUCTURES AND THE PRESENCE OF THE SEVEN PROCESS CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisory Structure</th>
<th>Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. COMPOSITION OF DECISION UNIT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Interagency vs single agency</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inter</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sngl</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Multiple level vs single level</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>sngl</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>sngl</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Outside participants</td>
<td>no</td>
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<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. INTERACTION PATTERNS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Face-to-face group</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Mediated</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>c. One-on-one</td>
<td>no</td>
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<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3. FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>sngl</td>
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<tr>
<td>sngl</td>
<td>multi</td>
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<tr>
<td>sngl</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4. NUMBER OF ADVISORY UNITS</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>sngl</td>
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<td>sngl</td>
<td>sngl</td>
</tr>
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<td>sngl</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

EVALUATION OF THE

PRESENCE OF THE PROCESS CRITERIA

|   | 1. Information               | no | no | no |
|   | 2. Options                  | no | no | no |
|   | 3. Dissent                  | yes| no | no |
|   | 4. Implementation           | m/d| m/d| yes|
|   | 5. Uncertainty              | yes| no | yes|
|   | 6. Experts                  | yes| no | no |
|   | 7. Goals                    | yes| no | yes|

m/d = missing data
aggregate, the criteria were present fifty-four percent of the time. For Decision 2, the single-agency advisory structure, none of the six criteria were found to be present in the advisory process. Again, while the number of decisions for the Eisenhower administration is small, the results with regard to structure are similar to those found for the Truman administration. That is, there is a greater percentage of the criteria present in advisory structures which feature interagency participation.

As in the Truman administration, we find that some of the criteria are never present regardless of the structure of the advisory system. For Truman these criteria were options and dissent—for Eisenhower they were information quality and options. What might account for this finding? One of the features of the Eisenhower administration was its reliance on John Foster Dulles' ideas and style regarding the conduct of foreign affairs. Indeed, Eisenhower delegated authority in other areas as well. Hess (1976, p. 65) discusses some of the consequences of this preference.

Eisenhower's doctrine of extreme delegation had a number of consequences. It may have helped to keep his appointees on the job for longer than they planned to stay in Washington. It contributed to their comfort (some say their complacency), for they knew the outer limits of their assignments and had no fear of poachers. . . . And according to the power equations by which Presidents are often measured, Eisenhower
gave himself considerable freedom of action by giving his subordinates considerable latitude to act.

We have seen the freedom of action which Dulles had in the Aswan Dam decision. Furthermore, even when there was a wider decision group, it might be hypothesized that the delegation of foreign affairs to Dulles resulted in a recognition of his primacy within groups as one who had the ear of the President. (As Hess says, above, he would have "no fear of poachers.") Given this delegation, it would seem that a natural deference to Dulles in areas of foreign policy would result. And the consequences of that might well be to limit the search for information and options, those areas being within the hunting domain of Dulles himself.

Given Eisenhower's style, one of the interesting things which the data on Table 3 indicates is the lack of more than one decision with interagency input. Eisenhower has always been noted for his organizational sense and indeed the transformation of the NSC system into an institution. Yet, our three decisions would tend to confirm the feeling of Hess (1976, p. 74) who contends that "the more urgent the stakes, the less likely is a decision to be the result of large, formal sessions."

How does Eisenhower compare with his predecessor in terms of aggregate presence of the process criteria?
Looking at all the decisions, regardless of the structure of the advisory system, we find that in the Truman administration fifty-five percent of the criteria were present in the advisory process, while thirty-five percent of the aggregate criteria were present in the decisions examined for the Eisenhower administration.

We find then, certain similarities between Eisenhower and Truman. First, both were found to rely on various advisory structures, and when these included interagency input, the criteria were more likely to be present. Second, for both administrations, we found that some criteria were never present regardless of structure. In the final chapter we will find whether these conditions are generalizable across Presidential administrations.
CHAPTER VII
THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

In this chapter we will examine four decisions made during the Kennedy administration. Three are from 1962—the decision to take action to support the neutralization of Laos; the decision to implement a naval blockade during the Cuban missile crisis; and the decision to cancel the Skybolt program. The fourth decision took place in 1963 and concerned the attempt to pressure Diem of South Vietnam to moderate his policies towards the Buddhists.

1. The Decision to Support the Neutralization of Laos - 1962

The International Context

During 1960 and 1961 Laos became a microcosm of the East-West ideological struggle. Pro-Western, pro-Communist, and neutral camps parried for supremacy, aided by their various supporters. Several internal crises were the result of this division and concern by both U.S. and Soviet officials was voiced that Laos might become a battleground—one ill-suited to the strategic and tactical inclinations

\footnote{This summary follows the account of Hilsman (1967) and Schlesinger (1965).}
of both sides. In June 1971, in Vienna, both Kennedy and Khrushchev agreed Laos should not become a divisive issue and settled on neutrality as the best solution. As is often the case, small powers have a way of subverting the intent of the large, and indigenous political struggles within Laos threatened the cease-fire established in May 1961.

The cease-fire was broken over several days in early May of 1962 and American fears of a broadening conflict resulted in high-level consultations within the American government to defuse the crisis before it had a chance to explode.

Narrative of the Decision

In the preceding year a relatively well-defined set of advisors took charge of Laos-related problems. Hilsman (1967) describes a multi-level, multi-organization advisory arrangement. Averell Harriman and William H. Sullivan, members of the State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, were "the central switchboard and conducted the whole operation" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 142). A group in the State Department's intelligence Bureau served intelligence and planning functions for Harriman. In the White House, Michael V. Forrestal (Special Assistant to Kennedy for Far Eastern matters on the NSC staff) "kept the President informed and ensured coordination with the Pentagon and other
agencies" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 142). Hilsman indicates that Kennedy himself both through Forrestal and by telephone "kept day-to-day control, feeding his own ideas into both planning and operations" (p. 142).

What came out of this process in early May 1962 was a paper which recommended a series of diplomatic moves designed to make it clear that the U.S. goal was to reestablish a cease-fire and create a neutral Laos through the mechanism of a government of national union and that the U.S. would not tolerate a Communist military take-over.

A meeting, described by Hilsman (1967), was held to discuss the issue.

The National Security Council (NSC) met in the Cabinet room of the White House on Thursday, May 10, to consider the recommendations, and we were all braced for a battle between the "Never Again" view that either all-out force should be used in Asia or none at all versus the politically tailored recommendations that had been laid before the President. (p. 143)

The never-again view was clearly dominant at the very top, but Kennedy was reluctant to make a decision because two important advisors—McNamara and Lemnitzer—were out of the country. They would soon return from Southeast Asia, however, and perhaps could share some first-hand observations with the group. As the meeting progressed, Harriman and Hilsman presented the case for the previously developed
position paper. Included in the paper were recommendations to move the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Siam, move 1,000 troops to Thailand, move a force already in Thailand to the Laos border, and improve communication capabilities in the area in case action became necessary.

The Pentagon was against any military action in excess of moving the Seventh Fleet, and preferred a series of diplomatic protests combined with military assistance to pro-Western troops. "What the counterproposal really said was—again—that the Pentagon's recommendation was to use military force all-out or not at all" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 144).

The split made it difficult for Kennedy to make a decision.

At the very least a politically wise president would not want to make so far-reaching a decision without considerable effort to bring us as many key constituencies along with him as he could, and certainly high members of the Executive Branch like the absent McNamara. (Hilsman, 1967, p. 144)

Kennedy approved moving the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Siam since both groups favored this move. Kennedy also sent two officials to Eisenhower for his view of the situation. Eisenhower responded with support for firm action, including, if necessary, the sending of troops to Laos itself. A second NSC meeting was scheduled for the following day immediately following the return of McNamara and
Lemnitzer. At this meeting, McNamara presented his appraisal of the situation and both he and Lemnitzer supported the initial troop movements and up-grading of communication and supply lines. The meeting soon broke up "to permit the State and Defense Departments to work out the details and meet again that afternoon, when the President approved both the decisions and a guidance paper to be used in briefing the press" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 146).

The decision having been made, the Communists in Laos seemed to defer for the time being to the show of American determination. Long-term, Vietnam was the primary battleground. The fate of Laos was viewed ultimately as dependent on the outcome of fighting in Vietnam, an outcome that few participants at the time could conceive as taking over a decade.

Structure and Process Summary

The decision was made following three face-to-face group meetings. The advisory process was multi-level and multi-organizational. An outsider—Eisenhower—was consulted.

Evaluation of Process Criteria

1. Information - attention to quality. There was a conscious attention to information about the situation. Aside from the desire to have a key advisor present during a
major decision, Kennedy postponed his decision until McNamara's return so that they would have the advantage of more first-hand information (Hilsman, 1967, p. 143). McNamara seemed to echo this sentiment when, upon his return, "he somewhat brusquely interrupted the CIA briefing at the beginning of the meeting to run-down the information he had brought back, which was only fifteen hours old and fresher than anything the CIA had on hand" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 143). In addition, Hilsman indicates a cooperative attitude on the part of national security advisors to keep "the President informed" (p. 142).

2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.** It is clear that the President was given a clear choice between those who advocated all-or-nothing and those who advocated a moderate action which included limited troop movement.

3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** Although Hilsman seems to indicate a relatively dissent-free atmosphere prior to the first meeting, it is apparent that the presentation of the State Department-supported paper at the first NSC meeting caused dissent to become manifest (Hilsman, 1967, p. 143).

4. **Concern for implementation.** The Hilsman account makes it very clear that there was an awareness about
implementation. Regarding the State proposal, Hilsman makes it clear that consideration was given the external participants:

The Soviet and British would be informed in their capacity as co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Agreements; India in its capacity as chairman of the ICC; and Souvanna in his capacity as premier designate. But the paper also proposed that our ambassador seek out Souphanouvong and make sure the Communist Pathet Lao understood our intentions too. (p. 142)

5. Consideration of uncertainty. Hilsman mentions uncertainty as being present in the formulation of the paper which was presented by Hilsman at the first NSC meeting. While uncertainty was a consideration, the recommendations were drawn to convince the Communists that the U.S. was willing to defend its interests, while avoiding actions that might encourage intervention by Communist China. "Our estimate," Hilsman (1967, p. 143) writes,

was that the Communists, including the Chinese, would prefer to continue negotiations toward a neutral Laos under a government of national union rather than run a high risk of American intervention. At the same time, we also calculated that the Communists, including the Chinese, would not be either provoked or frightened into further escalation by United States military moves that were clearly limited so as not to threaten their position in North Vietnam or Northern Laos but pointed only toward defending the portion of Laos still held by the Royal Lao Government.
6. **Use of experts.** Hilsman (1967) implies that experts were part of the process which resulted in the State Department-supported position paper. The group responsible for Laos "included specialists on Soviet and Asian Communism" (p. 142). In describing the overall process, Hilsman says that "there was more or less continuous interchange in which specialists at the planning and operating levels were kept informed of the President's strategic thinking, while their specialist knowledge and ideas at the same time flowed upward, informing and shaping that thinking" (p. 142).

7. **Explication of goals.** "From the viewpoint of Kennedy and his advisers, important national interests were endangered by the Communist thrust in Laos" (Hall, 1971, p. 45). These interests were mainly in relation to the dire consequence to Thailand, a keystone of SEATO, which was considered likely if Laos were to go Communist. Hall, (1971) maintained that:

> The crisis was perceived as a threat to American prestige and commitments in Southeast Asia and a menace to the existing balance of power in that region. To Kennedy this made abandonment of Laos impossible and the situation extremely dangerous. (p. 48)

It is clear from the Hilsman account that the advisors were aware of the need to address specific goals not only among themselves but also to transmit these goals to relevant foreign parties. Hilsman (1967, p. 142) relates that
it was necessary to "make it clear that our specific goal was to reestablish the cease-fire and create a neutral Laos."

2. The Decision to Implement a Naval Blockade of Cuba - 1962

Narrative of the Decision

On the morning of Tuesday, October 16, 1961, the first meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council met in the Cabinet Room to discuss the recently discovered evidence of a Soviet missile build-up in Cuba. Including President Kennedy, fourteen were present at the initial meeting.

Hilsman (1967) relates that at this initial meeting almost all of the issues which would evolve during the following two weeks were touched upon, however tentatively. What was the Soviet's intention? How would the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba affect the strategic balance? What response should the United States take?

Since information about the situation in Cuba was still fragmentary, and the American response unresolved, the decisions which came out of this meeting were informational.

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2This summary follows the accounts of Abel (1966), Hilsman (1967), and Allison (1971).
in nature. The first was geared to increase our knowledge and information of the situation by increasing drastically the number of reconnaissance flights over Cuba. The second tried to deny knowledge to the enemy as Kennedy invoked strict secrecy about the entire affair.

Just hours after the first ExCom meeting began, President Kennedy outlined for Adlai Stevenson, who was not present, the alternatives as he saw them. "We'll have to do something quickly," the President said. "I suppose the alternatives are to go in by air and wipe them out, or to take other steps to render the weapons inoperable" (Abel, 1966, p. 49).

"The ExCom met almost continuously Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, October 17, 18, and 19" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 103). Various participants came and went as their other responsibilities would allow. Robert Kennedy soon became the acknowledged leader, raising difficult questions, playing the devil's advocate, and forcing individuals to defend their positions. During the course of the meetings on Wednesday the 17th, six possible responses were discussed. These were (1) do nothing, (2) apply diplomatic pressures, (3) make a secret approach to Castro, (4) invade Cuba, (5) order a surgical air strike, and (6) blockade Cuba (Allison, 1971, pp. 58-60). The last two soon became leading contenders. A debate took place as George Ball and Robert
Kennedy attacked the air strike option on essentially moralistic grounds as evidenced by Kennedy's exclamation: "My brother is not going to be the Tojo of the 1960s" (Abel, 1966, p. 64). Acheson rejected the analogy, citing the Monroe Doctrine as well as recent statements by Congress and by the President himself warning against using Cuba as a base from which U.S. security could be threatened.

By Thursday more pragmatic considerations made the air strike option less palatable to the group. First, the plan which the military laid before the ExCom to carry out the air strike seemed too large. Even with a large number of sorties (500), the Air Force could not guarantee the complete destruction of the missiles. Also, the probability of Soviet casualties, which would be inherent in an air strike, would be difficult for the Soviet leadership to ignore. To more and more of those involved, the trouble with an air strike was not only that there was no guarantee that it would be completely successful, but also that it set in train a series of events that would be extraordinarily difficult to manage and control.

President Kennedy attended two meetings on Thursday. Abel characterizes the tone of the meeting as follows:

Each meeting opened with McCone's intelligence briefing. There was no agenda, only a checklist of topics which Bundy would have typed up a few minutes beforehand. The President would then call, in
turn, on Rusk and McNamara, leading to a general discussion. Kennedy did a lot of listening. He was careful to give each of the secondary figures--Gilpatric, Nitze or Ball--his opportunity to be heard. When the time came he would state his own conclusion, often understating it. There were no scenes of high drama. (Abel, 1966, p. 71)

At the Thursday morning meeting the Intelligence Board told Kennedy that the first MRBM in Cuba could be ready for launching in eighteen hours. Clearly events were pushing Kennedy for a decision. Acheson argued that an attack on Cuba would not invoke Soviet military response. George Ball argued for a naval blockade as a more legal response. Leonard C. Meeker, a Deputy to the Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State, argued that the blockade might better be called a defensive quarantine (Abel, 1966, pp. 72-73).

The meeting continued on Thursday afternoon. Kennedy was absent. Abel suggests that Robert Kennedy had asked his brother not to be present in order that a more uninhibited discussion might result.

By Thursday evening a consensus was developing against an air strike.

They had divided into two groups, George Ball heading the blockade team, and McGeorge Bundy the air strike team. They had been split almost evenly at the start: McCone, Dillon, Taylor, Acheson, Nitze, and eventually Bundy on the side of using American air power to "take out" the Russian missile sites; McNamara, Gilpatric, Robert Kennedy,
Thompson, Ball, and now also Lovett for naval blockade. (Adlai Stevenson had returned to New York for the conclusion of the general debate in the United Nations General Assembly.) (Abel, 1966, p. 79)

In the debate that ensued each side pressed for its desired option. At least one of the airstrikers defected to the blockade faction. McNamara argued persuasively that "the decision confronting the President was not of the either-or variety. Let blockade be his first option, the contraband list limited at the start to offensive weapons. If that failed, the President would then have a choice of responses" (Abel, 1966, p. 81). Dillon favored the blockade because it could be undertaken with the realization that an air strike or any other option could be considered at a later time.

The committee members met with the President from around 10:00 PM until after midnight. The majority favored a blockade and Kennedy moved in that direction by asking Sorensen to start drafting a speech in which he would reveal the presence of missiles in Cuba and the measures for their removal.

But the final decision had not been made. Before the President left Washington on Friday morning to campaign for the November election, the Joint Chiefs pleaded against the blockade. Robert Kennedy was left in charge of the meeting with the outcome still in doubt. The ExCom met all day,
rehashing the pros and cons of the various options. It was perceived that an OAS resolution endorsing the blockade would be taken seriously by the Soviets. As the day wore on those favoring an air strike were clearly in the minority. Acheson, feeling he should not participate in the planning of a blockade he opposed, left the group that night and spent the weekend at his farm. On Friday night the blockade option was clarified by linking it to further military action if it failed (Abel, 1966, p. 81).

On Saturday morning, October 20, the ExCom met and approved a blockade speech which Sorenson had written for the President. At a 2:30 PM meeting which the President attended, two options were placed before him. Abel (1966, p. 93) summarizes these recommendations: "begin with the naval blockade and, if need be, move up the ladder of military responses, rung by rung; or begin with an air strike, then move almost certainly to a full-scale invasion of Cuba."

Kennedy chose the blockade, subject to a review with the tactical bombing specialists, on the basis that it was the best way to start and left open alternative options, including an air strike, if it failed. On Sunday morning Kennedy met with several ExCom members and a number of Air Force officers. General Sweeney, commander of the Tactical Air Force, told the President that he could not guarantee a
"100% effective air strike." Also, since the plan called for strikes in or near populated areas, it was his opinion that Cuban civilians would certainly be killed. The air strike option was dead. At 7:00 PM on Monday, October 22, 1962, the President, in a nation-wide address announced he was implementing "a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 210).

Structure and Process Summary

The advice was the product of a multiple-level, multiple-agency effort which included outside participants. The primary interaction pattern was multiple face-to-face group meetings. There was but one advisory unit.

Evolution of the Process Criteria

1. Information - attention to quality. Though there might be some questions as to the timing of information availability (see, e.g., Allison, 1971), the information which ExCom members received was by and large "hard," i.e., photographic evidence of the Soviet missile build-up (Abel, 1966, p. 59) and there is every indication that it was considered of utmost reliability (Hilsman, 1967, p. 168). That the advisory group considered accurate information to be important is unquestioned (Abel, 1966, p. 59).
2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.** The President clearly was given a choice. Within the ExCom, the first meetings produced at least six options. This list was reduced to two--air strike or blockade--in the following days. Both options had support. Both were argued at the meeting with Kennedy on Thursday, October 18, at which time he himself came out as leaning toward the blockade option.

3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** There was a clearly differentiated viewpoint about what option the U.S. should pursue. Meetings were conducted so as to allow for dissenting opinions to surface. One tactic was for the President to remove himself from some of the meetings (Abel, 1966, p. 73). Also, even after the majority view had shifted to blockade, the pro-air-strike faction had an opportunity to present its case before the President at the evening meeting of Thursday, the 18th, and again prior to his departure on the 19th, and finally at the all but decisional meeting of Friday, the 20th.

4. **Concern for implementation.** There was constant discussion of how the various options might be implemented and what the result would be. The air strike option was, in large measure, eliminated because it was felt that proper implementation could not be achieved (Abel, 1966, pp. 100-101).
5. Consideration of uncertainty. There was a recognized degree of uncertainty in all courses of action. The uncertainty of the efficacy of the air strikes (Abel, 1966, pp. 100-101) and Soviet response to such an action (Hilsman, 1967, p. 204) effectively eliminated it as a first choice. Even the blockade was sheathed in uncertain outcomes. Sorensen pondered how the "naval blockade in the waters surrounding Cuba would come to grips with the real problem of missiles on the island" (Abel, 1966, p. 89) even as he prepared to write a pro-blockade speech. In the end, as a policy consideration, the uncertainty concerning the blockade was more acceptable than that surrounding the air strike because it was perceived as the least irreversible and least risky option (Abel, 1966, pp. 93-94).

6. Use of experts. Although it was by and large a generalist group which developed the list of tentative options, it was expert input which prompted the President to go with the blockade. His acceptance on Saturday, the 20th, of the blockade was conditional upon his meeting later with "tactical bombing specialists" (Abel, 1966, p. 94). On Sunday, Kennedy did meet with the "experts" (Abel, 1966, pp. 100-101) and their analysis convinced him to initiate a blockade instead.

7. Explication of goals. Hilsman relates that one of the major issues of the first meeting on Tuesday, October
16, was what the American objective should be. "Should our purpose be limited to getting the offensive weapons out? Or should we set a larger goal--removing the Soviet presence entirely eliminating Castro and his regime (Hilsman, 1967, p. 195)? Later, Hilsman reports, it was seen not in our interests to have a precipitous change in the balance of power; thus, "the American objective was to have the Soviet missiles removed from Cuba" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 202). Hilsman also relates that the discussion of goals and alternative actions to accomplish these goals went hand-in-hand throughout the advisory process.

3. The Decision to Cancel the Skybolt - 1962

The International Context

The development of a bomber-carried air-to-surface missile by the United States in the early 1960s seemed beneficial to several interests. First, it provided the U.S. Air Force with a defense suppression missile which was envisioned to extend the life of its strategic bomber force. Second, it satisfied a request by Prime Minister Macmillan to President Eisenhower to develop a missile in which the British could participate which would extend the usefulness of a British strategic deterrence. The British

\(^3\)This summary follows the accounts of Schlesinger (1965) and Neustadt (1970).
had seemingly rejected either a land- or sea-based nuclear deterrent force as too expensive, and an air-to-surface missile of the Skybolt type could be readily assimilated in the RAF Bomber Command. Macmillan pledged (he thought in return for Skybolt) Holy Loch in Scotland as a Polaris base for the American Navy. Thus Skybolt became a symbol both of British nuclear independence and of Anglo-American interdependence (Neustadt, 1970, p. 34).

Narrative of the Decision

The central figure in the Skybolt decision was Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. In the fall of 1961 he reinstituted the Skybolt program (which had been recommended to be killed by the out-going Secretary of Defense) and, thinking it a hedge against a possible "missile gap," as well as a possible alternative to the Air Force's B-70 program if he decided to cancel it, McNamara resisted Bureau of Budget and White House scientists who urged that the Skybolt be cancelled. President Kennedy agreed, and "McNamara made a 'treaty' with his Air Force Secretary that the cost of its development thereafter would not exceed a fixed dollar amount" (Neustadt, 1970, p. 37).

By July 1962 there was no doubt that the dollar ceiling agreed upon would be exceeded. The missile gap charge proved bogus, and the American land-based strategic arm was given
a boost as the Minuteman missile would soon go into production ahead of schedule. Further evidence built up against the wisdom of continuing the Skybolt program. Development was slow and costly, there were major problems in the guidance system, and other short- and long-term alternatives were becoming plausible. A shorter range air-to-ground missile, the Hound Dog, could be utilized in the defense suppression role, and over time Minuteman and Polaris would decrease the need for a manned bomber force (Neustadt, 1970, p. 40).

The British, of course, were concerned over the possibilities of cancellation, but apparently felt that the possibility was somewhat remote. In September 1962 the new British Secretary of Defence, Peter Thorneycroft, visited Washington, seeing both McNamara and Kennedy. Neustadt writes:

Thorneycroft had Skybolt on his mind . . . but heard nothing to alarm him on that score. McNamara did allude with feeling to uncertainties and cost in its development. But this was an old story for the former Minister of Aviation; such things always seemed to take longer and cost more than expected. . . . Thorneycroft took care to stress that British defense posture was dependent on the weapon, and let it go at that. By all accounts, he went home stimulated by his contacts and unruffled on the score of Skybolt. (Neustadt, 1970, pp. 41-42)

The Cuban missile crisis pushed all else into the background, but by early November McNamara, who was now
prepared to let the Skybolt die, was faced with a problem. On the one hand he wanted to inform the British so they could have ample time to assess the implication of the cancellation. On the other hand, he could not warn the British for the President had yet to decide the fate of Skybolt as he was still awaiting a formal reply from the JCS on their position. This process might take an additional three weeks, and even after a final decision "the President's decision would be sent down to the Services with strict injunctions against publication before January's Budget Message" (Neustadt, 1970, p. 43). Still, McNamara feared leaks and while he felt that the British must be warned, he did not want to make the "referral to the Chiefs appear a mockery" (Neustadt, 1970, p. 43).

On November 7, McNamara met with the President, Secretary of State Rusk, and Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy. At McNamara's urging, "they agreed that Skybolt ought to go, and also that the British must be warned without delay" (Neustadt, 1970, p. 42).

Structure and Process Summary

The actual decision was made at a single face-to-face non-group meeting. There was only a single level of an essentially single-agency advisory unit utilized. Only one advisory group was used. It is important to mention the
mediated advice which Kennedy received through McNamara. Also, because of the unanimous recognition of the over­riding primacy of McNamara's position vis-a-vis the Presi­dent and his impact on the final decision, we will consider the advice to be the product of a single agency.

Evaluation of Process Criteria

1. Information - attention to quality. There are two types of information which bear on this decision. The first is on the technical nature of Skybolt, its cost-effectiveness, alternatives, its defects, etc. The second type of knowledge is of a political nature—the understanding of the British position being most important. It is clear from the British reaction to the Skybolt cancellation that accurate information about the consequences that cancella­tion would have on the British was lacking. Schlesinger (1965) writes:

The President told me later (in January) that he was totally unable to understand London's reaction in the days and weeks after November 8 . . . they did nothing, even though the political life of their government was at stake. (p. 859)

The apparent lack of attention to the political inform­ation is seen in the choice of persons to inform the British. McNamara volunteered to tell British Ambassador Ormsby Gore and Thorneycroft. "Rusk, apparently regarding
Skybolt as a military rather than a political problem, made no objection" (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 859).

2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.** No discussion of options at the meeting is mentioned in the Neustadt account. Schlesinger mentions that "there was brief talk about other weapons systems which might be offered in place of Skybolt--possibly Polaris" (1965, p. 859), but neither account indicates that these were genuine options with any support. The Schlesinger account indicates that the McNamara recommendations concerned only the cancellation of the project, not a series of alternatives (1965, p. 859).

3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** Dissent is not mentioned in either account. In the early months of the administration there was differences between agencies concerning Skybolt. At the pivotal meeting, however, there was no dissent (Schlesinger, 1965, p. 859).

4. **Concern for implementation.** The implementation of the decision, in this case, how the decision would be transmitted to the British, received relatively little concern. The decision group agreed McNamara should relay the decision. As Neustadt writes, "As for the mechanics of a warning, McNamara volunteered to handle it. The others were content" (Neustadt, 1970, p. 43).
5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** None of the accounts convey any sense of uncertainty. None of the participants of the November 6th meeting are reported to have been particularly concerned with the uncertainty surrounding the decision. Kennedy was indeed so perplexed at the outcome that he commissioned Neustadt to study the miscalculation, the results of which appear in Neustadt's *Alliance Politics* which serves as a case study source for this decision.

6. **Use of experts.** There was no conscious effort to draw experts into the decision unit. None were present at the decisional meeting.

7. **Explication of goals.** On balance, the decision to cancel the Skybolt program was made on technical grounds. However, it seems as if an inadequate conception of how this might effect a more important longer-range goal of Anglo-American cooperation seemed ill served by the decision. In this context, consideration of goals was not an important part of the decision process.

4. **The Decision to Pressure Diem to Moderate His Repressive Policies - 1963**

The International Context

One of the problems facing the Kennedy administration in its support of South Vietnam against the Viet Cong in the

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This summary follows the account of Hilsman (1967) and Schlesinger (1965).
the early 1960s was the increasingly unpopular regime of Ngo Dinh Diem. Appointed Premier soon after the 1954 division of Vietnam, Diem's popularity waned as he became increasingly dictatorial. In late 1961 Diem was prompted by Viet Cong military successes to ask the United States for increased aid. President Kennedy responded by sending a team under General Maxwell Taylor to assess the situation.

In addition to increases in some specific military aid, the Taylor team recommended that reforms be undertaken by the Diem government. This recommendation was supported by Kennedy and was a concrete example of the feeling by some in Washington that Diem could never win without popular support. One of these was Roger Hilsman who was Kennedy's Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Hilsman (1967, p. 426) writes: "What was needed to meet the guerrilla threat successfully, we felt, were reformers to organize mass parties and social and political programs that could become the basis for modernization."

The reforms took backseat to the war effort, however, and in May 1963 an incident took place in Hué in which government troops opened fire on a group of Buddhists, killing nine of them. The incident served as a focus for growing Buddhist discontent and was followed by the presentation of five "aspirations" to the government. These demands were ignored, and sporadic rioting and other acts of
defiance broke out, culminating in the well-publicized self-immolation by Quang Duc in June. "In Washington, the frustration with Diem's reluctance and general ineptness in handling the Buddhist protest was shared in all agencies" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 475). America's support of Diem was viewed by the world press as support of anti-Buddhist policies. In the early fall of 1963, Diem broke a June agreement with the Buddhists to respect their religious freedom and jailed a thousand Buddhist priests. Civil unrest followed. Hilsman (1967, p. 495) writes:

To the Buddhist demonstrations were added those of the university students. Many of these had also been jailed, and the regime closed the universities at both Hue and Saigon. The secondary-school students then took up the torch of demonstrations, and they too were jailed. To the despair of the regime, the grade-school students then began to demonstrate. In its paranoia, the Diem regime had only one answer to any opposition—and they arrested the grade-school students, hauling them off by the hundreds in trucks.

The question for U.S. policy-makers in late August 1963 was how to induce Diem to change. American support could not be counted on forever in the face of growing disillusionment with Diem's practices.

Narrative of the Decision

An NSC meeting was held to discuss the Diem situation on August 31 at the State Department. President Kennedy, who was in Hyannis Port, was not present. At the meeting
discussion centered on whether the Diem policies concerning the Buddhists were seriously affecting the war effort. The debate pitted Averell Harriman, Roger Hilsman, George Ball, Michael Forrestal, and Secretary of State Rusk who felt that the war wasn't going well and that the repressive policies of Diem were only making it worse, against Robert McNamara, Maxwell Taylor, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff who thought Vietnam needed authoritarian rule if it were to beat the Viet Cong. Hilsman relates that Taylor and McNamara considered any statements that the war wasn't going as well as it might have been to be a criticism of their judgment and efforts. In Kennedy's absence, the Secretary of State chaired the meeting. Even Vice President Johnson was asked for his views, "the first time such an invitation had been issued in these meetings" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 497). His response indicated his support of the Pentagon group. The meeting ended without conclusive results.

Although Kennedy was not where the problem was being discussed, Walter Cronkite took the problem to him. In a television interview at Hyannis Port two days after the meeting (September 2), Cronkite asked Kennedy about U.S. policy in relation to the events unfolding in Vietnam. "The President had to answer, and whatever answer he gave would be a policy decision" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 497). In the interview, Kennedy referred to unspecified changes in policy and personnel. Hilsman indicates that through this reference:
The President had decided that the tension between the United States and the Diem regime would continue until the policy of repression against the Buddhists and the students had been abandoned and some arrangement made to lessen the dominant position in the government occupied by Ngo Dinh Nhu. (Hilsman, 1967, pp. 497-498)

The NSC met again on September 6. Hilsman reports that Kennedy phoned him prior to the meeting asking if there might be a way to make selective cuts in aid to Vietnam such that the war effort would not be adversely affected, but through which Diem and Nhu would get the message. At the meeting several topics were covered. First, an inconclusive discussion on whether Lodge should reopen "tough negotiations" with Diem and whether such meetings would be looked upon as surrendering to Diem while holding only a small hope for reforms.

Robert Kennedy asked if the U.S. really knew just what it was doing in Vietnam. If the war could not be won with any government, he argued, now was the time to get out. McNamara "leaped on the Attorney General's question as to whether anyone had enough information to answer the basic question and proposed still another mission to Vietnam 'to get the facts'" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 501).

The mission left on September 6, within hours of the meeting, and included General Krulak (representing Defense) and Mendenhall (representing State). They logged 24,000 miles and returned to report to another NSC meeting on
September 10. President Kennedy was present, and the meeting proved to be lively. General Krulak reported that his discussion with almost a hundred members of the American advisory system (though no Vietnamese) led him to believe that the war had not been greatly affected by the political crises. "The war was going well and would be won if current programs were pursued, irrespective of the defects of the regime" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 502). Mendenhall visited cities and towns talking mostly to Vietnamese. He reported that "the war against the Viet Cong had become secondary to the war against the regime. . . . Mendenhall concluded that the war could not be won unless, as a minimum, Nhu withdrew or was removed from the government" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 502).

Hilsman reports that "President Kennedy looked quizzi-cally from one to the other. 'You two did visit the same country, didn't you'?' (1967, p. 502). General Krulak then offered an explanation: He visited the countryside where the war was being fought; Mendenhall visited the cities. Nolting noted that Mendenhall's report might be biased as he had long held that the U.S. could not win with Diem. Nolting cited 1961 as an example where fear and paralysis in the civilian government was eventually overcome.

McGeorge Bundy came to Mendenhall's defense, saying 1961 was different, for now it was the Vietnamese government, not the Viet Cong, causing the fear and paralysis.
John Mecklin, head of USIS in Vietnam, who returned with the mission, reported that the government had alienated so many people that it could not win the war. It was time for decisive American action, he said, and recommended the introduction of U.S. ground forces to fight the Viet Cong.

Rufus Phillips, who headed the American aid mission supporting the strategic hamlet program, spoke next. He too returned with the mission and argued that the government had lost the support of the important military and civil service sections of Vietnamese society. Phillips took General Krulak to task on his assessment of the war. While the war had been going well in the I, II, and III Corps areas, it was not going well in IV Corps, the important delta region. "The strategic hamlets there were being chewed to pieces by the Viet Cong. Fifty hamlets had been overrun in the last few weeks" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 504). Phillips concluded by saying that this war was a war for men's minds, and it was being lost. The meeting ended without deciding on a course of action.

In the weeks that followed, the State Department drafted a paper which focused on two alternative courses of action. One course considered reconciliation with Diem; the other applying pressure (such as cuts in aid) and persuasion.

Hilsman reports that the next meeting of the NSC resulted only in another McNamara proposal for a visit to Vietnam which would include himself.
Upon their return, McNamara and Taylor reported their observations to an NSC meeting on October 2, the fifth NSC meeting which Hilsman cites as addressing the Diem question. While steadfastly clinging to the belief that the war was going well and "the major part of the United States military task can be completed by the end of 1965" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 510), they did seem willing to alter their position on pressing Diem. Acknowledging that "further repressive actions by Diem and Nhu would change the 'present favorable military trends!'" (p. 510), they concluded that "unless the United States did exert ... pressures Diem and Nhu were almost certain to continue their past patterns of repressive behavior." Hilsman reports that the upshot was that:

McNamara and the Joint Chiefs would agree to a policy of "pressure and persuasion" on the Diem regime, which they now thought was necessary, but they would agree only if the White House and the State Department would in turn agree to a public announcement that the Pentagon was right about how the "shooting war" had been going. (Hilsman, 1967, p. 510)

The discussion was two-fold. Militarily, Harkins would discuss with the Vietnamese requirements for military campaigns in the north and central portions of Vietnam by the end of 1964 and in the delta by 1965. Also, training programs would be instituted to insure that the Vietnamese would be able to replace the American military by 1965. Politically, pressure would be applied by withholding funds for a commodity import program, holding up selected
Vietnamese aid requests, and withholding U.S. payments to certain Vietnamese Special Forces troops being used to enforce repressive measures rather than fight the Viet Cong. Ambassador Lodge was instructed to follow a policy of "cool correctness" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 511) until Diem came around. Diem was to be given a face-saving out in the decision not to make public the formal decision to apply pressure.

Structure and Process Summary

This decision was the product of an advisory process which included several face-to-face group meetings. The single, interagency advisory unit was single level in composition and included outsiders.

Evaluation of the Process Criteria

1. Information - attention to quality. During the advisory process, information was perceived to be crucial and was openly evaluated. For instance, Nolting (Hilsman, 1967, p. 503) criticized Mendenhall on his possible bias in reporting the serious consequences to continued political instability of the Diem regime.

McNamara pressed for two fact-finding missions during one month. The problem here was not a lack of information, but how to evaluate what they had. The information presented was often contradictory, leading to the President's questioning whether some of his advisors had visited the same country (Hilsman, 1967, p. 502). The resolution to
this problem came only after most participants agreed on the harmful effects which Diem's repressions were having on the war effort.

There did not appear to be any information which was withheld from any of the participants. Virtually all of the information available was presented at the NSC meetings. Reports by those who participated in the fact-finding missions were presented at the advisory group (Hilsman, 1967, pp. 502-504, 510-511). Once again we find that it was not the case that information was withheld; on the contrary, each "side" bombarded the other with information favorable to its cause. This process resulted in all available information being shared.

2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.** Essentially Kennedy was presented with two options (Hilsman, 1967, p. 506): either to adopt a policy of reconciliation with Diem, or pursue a policy of pressure and persuasion. In general, the military-associated advisors supported the reconciliation policy on the theory that the war was going well and political changes might prove detrimental to that effort. The diplomats favored pressure and persuasion on the grounds that the war wasn't going well, and the only way it could turn favorable would be changes in domestic policy by Diem.

3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** The options presented were the product of real and differing
policy perspectives. Hilsman's accounts of debate within NSC meetings (see, e.g., pp. 502-504) indicate that a real debate was being conducted in which the participants were given free reign to express their views. There is nothing in the accounts to indicate that Kennedy did anything to suppress dissent in the meetings which he attended. In the final policy decision the dissent was removed when McNamara and the Joint Chiefs agreed to support the pressure and persuasion policy in return for a White House statement acknowledging their view that the war was being won.

4. **Concern for implementation.** Kennedy was certainly aware of implementation. Hilsman relates a personal call from Kennedy (1967, p. 500) in which the President wanted Hilsman to explore just how a policy of pressure might be implemented—that is, what specific policies might be chosen "that would not hurt the war effort but still make Diem and Nhu understand that we mean business" (p. 500).

5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** The decision group was aware of the uncertainty of the consequences of their decision. Two examples are specifically given in Hilsman's account. First, McNamara himself, who had originally opposed putting pressure on Diem, returned from his mission to report to the NSC that he had changed his mind and that the continued repression by Diem against the Buddhists would adversely affect the war effort. Nonetheless, McNamara reported that:
It was not clear that pressure would move Diem and Nhu toward mediation—it might, indeed, increase their obduracy. But the judgment in McNamara's report was that unless the United States did exert such pressures Diem and Nhu were almost certain to continue their past patterns of repressive behavior. (Hilsman, 1967, p. 510)

Hilsman gives an indication of his own uncertainty after the decision was made.

Forrestal asked me how I would bet on the outcome. My feeling was that there was about a forty percent chance that Diem would come around, a forty percent chance that he wouldn't and the generals would move to take over, and a twenty percent chance that nothing would happen at all. (Hilsman, 1967, p. 512)

We see then that uncertainty was recognized but that uncertainty was preferred to no action at all which was seen as the path to defeat. Hilsman sums up this fear by stating:

If nothing at all happened, it seemed clear that within six months to a year the Viet Cong would control the country—or we would have to take over the war with American ground forces, which President Kennedy was convinced would be a tragic error. (Hilsman, 1967, p. 512)

In short, uncertainty of the consequences of the decision was acknowledged, but all alternatives seemed preferable to the current state of affairs.

6. Use of experts. Experts were drawn into the decision process. First, Hilsman sent Mendenhall to Vietnam. Hilsman describes Mendenhall as "a senior foreign service officer with long experience in Vietnam who was then
head of the planning office in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 501). He brought back two field workers—Mecklin, the head of USIS in Vietnam, and Phillips who headed the support mission for the strategic hamlet program. All three of these individuals reported to the NSC (pp. 502, 505).

7. Explication of goals. Robert Kennedy explicitly injected the question of goals and objectives during the September 6th meeting. Robert Kennedy raised the fundamental question of what the U.S. was doing in Vietnam, what its objectives were, and what the chances of success were. A debate ensued, but at its conclusion, "the basic question of whether a Communist take-over could be successfully resisted with any government had not been answered, and [Kennedy] was not sure that anyone had enough information to answer it" (Hilsman, 1967, p. 501).

President Kennedy framed the national objective in somewhat narrower terms. In his September 12 news conference he said:

What helps to win the war, we support; what interferes with the war effort, we oppose. I have already made it clear that any action by either government which may handicap the winning of the war is inconsistent with our policy or our objectives. (Hilsman, 1967, p. 505)

Thus the NSC debate centered on Diem's policies as they affected the war effort. The decision was consistent with this framework.
The Kennedy Decisions - A Summary

As we can see in Table 4, the patterns which began to emerge in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations with respect to the relationship between structure and process continue for the Kennedy administration decisions. Once again we note that a variety of structural patterns were used by Kennedy in the advisory effort, and once again we can see that the composition of the decision unit in terms of the number of agencies represented appears to related to the presence or absence of the process criteria for good advice.

Without a doubt, the Kennedy administration compares very favorably with the Truman and Eisenhower administrations in terms of aggregate criteria present in its decisions. Fully seventy-five percent of the aggregated criteria are present when all cases are combined. This compares to fifty-five percent for the Truman decisions and thirty-five percent for the Eisenhower decisions. It is also obvious that one case (Skybolt) accounted for all the instances where the criteria were found to be absent from the advisory process.

What about the "deviant" decision? First, we note that there is a great structural similarity between Decision 3 in the Kennedy administration (cancellation of
Table 4

SUMMARY OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
ADVISORY STRUCTURES AND THE PRESENCE OF THE SEVEN PROCESS CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisory Structure</th>
<th>Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. COMPOSITION OF DECISION UNIT</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Interagency vs single agency</td>
<td>inter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Multiple level vs single level</td>
<td>multi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Outside participants</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. INTERACTION PATTERNS</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Face-to-face group</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mediated</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. One-on-one</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>multi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. NUMBER OF ADVISORY UNITS</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sngl</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EVALUATION OF THE PRESENCE OF THE PROCESS CRITERIA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Information</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Options</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dissent</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Implementation</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Uncertainty</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Experts</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Goals</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Skybolt) and Decision 3 in the Eisenhower administration (cancellation of Aswan Dam loan). In both cases, the "decision" was made by a cabinet officer, the President serving more as an approving authority than actual decision-maker. The example is more extreme in the Eisenhower-Dulles case, but the results in terms of the presence of the process criteria are the same for both administrations. In both cases none of the process criteria were fulfilled. If we are allowed to suspend on our own rule not to evaluate outcomes, we would point out that both decisions were considered by most observers as examples of poor decision-making. It is almost universally held that the proximate result of the cancellation of the Aswan Dam loan was the closing of Suez Canal by Nasser and the subsequent Suez crisis. Kennedy was so concerned with the apparently unforeseen British reaction to the Skybolt cancellation that he commissioned Richard Neustadt to do a case study on the decision so he could see where the process went wrong.

Why was the Skybolt decision so structurally different than the other Kennedy decisions? One explanation might be that since it was being decided almost simultaneously with the Cuban missile crisis it was considered to be relatively unimportant. The fact that it remained so even after the crises was passed is somewhat puzzling. Nonetheless, it provides a glaring example of the departure from
an interagency mode of decision-making which Kennedy adapted following the fiasco of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Unlike the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, we do not find any criteria which are never present in any of the decisions. Just as the delegation of authority might have contributed to the lack of criteria being present in the Eisenhower decisions, we feel that the structural changes in decision-making which Kennedy instituted following the Bay of Pigs contributed to insuring that most of the criteria were present most of the time. In the Kennedy case, the advisors' knowledge that the President wanted dissent and options to be a part of the advisory process probably contributed to their presence regardless of structure (Skybolt excluded, of course). Here we speculate that the Presidential style had a positive effect on criteria fulfillment and the one instance where the process criteria were not present was the one time when Kennedy allowed McNamara to go it relatively alone.
CHAPTER VIII
THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

In this chapter we will consider four national security decisions made during the Johnson administration. The first is from 1965 and concerns the question of bombing North Vietnam. The next, from 1965 also, involves the Dominican crisis. The third decision concerning deployment of an ABM is from 1967. Finally, we will look at the attempt to develop a SALT negotiating position in 1968.

1. The Decision to Bomb North Vietnam - 1965

The International Context

In the eleven years between the decision by President Eisenhower not to intervene in Indochina and the decision by President Johnson to initiate systematic bombing of North Vietnam by launching operation ROLLING THUNDER, our policy toward Southeast Asia took a 180-degree turn. Yet, as Geyelin (1966, pp. 213-214) states,

It was almost imperceptible, the way we got in. There was no one move that you could call decisive, or irreversible, not even very many actions that you could argue

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1This summary is based on the accounts of Geyelin (1966), Hilsman (1967), Gallucci (1975), and Schandler (1977).

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against in isolation. Yet when you put it all together, there we were in a war on the Asian mainland.

By 1964, however, not only did the U.S. realize it was in a war, but realized that it was going badly.

From the time of the overthrow of the Diem government in November 1963, to the end of the winter in February and March of 1964, it became increasingly clear to the American leadership, as it had not been clear before, that the situation in Vietnam was deteriorating so badly that the kind of American effort invested thus far could not reverse the trend. . . . As the realization grew that an ally on whose behalf the United States had steadily increased its commitment was in a state of political and military collapse, the president undertook a determined policy reassessment of the future American role of the war. (Schandler, 1977, pp. 3-4)

Narrative of the Decision

In January 1964 the chairman of the JCS, Maxwell Taylor, argued in a memorandum to McNamara that the war effort be expanded to include the bombing of North Vietnam. Similarly, an interagency report "further structured thinking in the direction of the north in order to solve the problem of insurgency in the south" (Gallucci, 1975, p. 37).

In early March, President Johnson sent Taylor and McNamara to Vietnam for a first-hand assessment of the situation. Their report, which became National Security Action Memorandum 288, while rejecting for the time taking direct military action against North Vietnam did reject "accepting a neutralized South Vietnam" (Schandler, 1977, p. 4).
Gallucci (1965, p. 37) contends that "NSAM 288 would serve not only to set the tone of policy but also to limit the scope of debate." Furthermore, Gallucci continues, in setting forth the extent of American interest in Vietnam, it "seemed to preclude reconsideration of that basic issue in further policy reviews."

NSAM 288 was not without its critics. The military found its unwillingness to act against North Vietnam unpalatable, while others, such as Roger Hilsman, thought more emphasis should be placed against insurgency in South Vietnam.

In the months that followed, policy drifted in the direction of the JCS position with the ISA and the Far Eastern Bureau of the State Department acting to temper, slow, and lay the political groundwork for the military moves against the north. Hilsman left the administration. (Gallucci, 1975, p. 38)

The Tonkin Gulf incident in early August resulted in retaliatory raids and set a precedent for U.S. military action against the North itself. The election campaign and Johnson's desire to be perceived as a peace-maker terminated any movement toward continued action against the North. Nonetheless, pressure by the military to continue the strikes against the North remained. By September, as a result of intelligence reports indicating continued deterioration of conditions in South Vietnam, even a study conducted by the State Department:
tentatively recommended that escalating military activity begin immediately with such actions as harassment of North Vietnam's coast and borders by South Vietnamese . . . , United States destroyer cruises along the North Vietnamese coast . . . , and tit-for-tat reactions to any special Viet Cong 'dirty tricks.'" (Gallucci, 1975, p. 40)

A September policy review by the JCS concluded that we should begin to implement a bombing campaign against a list developed earlier of nearly 100 targets in North Vietnam.

Gallucci contends that during the close of 1964 and beginning of 1965 these types of recommendations began to close out the possibility that other options would be generated when and if the situation warranted further U.S. action. One attack on Bien Hoa Air Base by the Viet Cong in November resulted in the death of several Americans and the destruction of several B-57s. The incident prompted the JCS and Maxwell Taylor (no longer Chairman of the JCS, but Ambassador to South Vietnam) to recommend immediate retaliatory action against North Vietnam, but coming on the eve of the elections, this advice was rejected. Nonetheless, the attack prompted the formation of an NSC working group whose task it was to study alternative courses of action for the United States. In spite of its mandate, the group "began from exceedingly questionable assumptions, proceeded to narrow to three only marginally distinguishable options, and finally resulted in a policy best described as a blend of
those options that could be supported by none of the individual rationales" (Gallucci, 1975, p. 41).

On December 1, Johnson met with his advisors on the results of the study group's work. Gallucci contends that three alternatives were presented (albeit "marginally distinguishable" ones), while Schandler contends there were but two. Regardless, the alternatives presented were nothing new and could be divided into two phases. First, an effort would be made to strengthen the South Vietnamese government and return in a tit-for-tat arrangement actions against the U.S. by the North Vietnamese. Second, at a later time the plan called for increasing military action against the North Vietnamese to convince them to decrease support for the Viet Cong (Schandler, 1977, p. 8). Apparently, the President accepted the recommendation in principle but approved only the first phase specifically. While apparently no other alternatives were presented to the President, Schandler makes an interesting contribution by pointing out that the policy review did briefly consider the alternative of withdrawing American support for a government so incapable of supporting itself. However, the Joint Staff representatives objected forcefully to this alternative, and their objections were effective in downgrading it, so that it was not presented to the President" (Schandler, 1977, p. 8). This is particularly interesting in light of the
conclusion that "the decision to use military power against the North, in the end, seems to have resulted as much from a lack of alternative proposals as from any compelling logic advanced in its favor" (Schandler, 1977, p. 10).

Conditions in Vietnam continued to deteriorate in the early months of 1965. The Viet Cong virtually destroyed two South Vietnamese battalions at Binh Ghia. Then on February 7, 1965, the Viet Cong attacked the American advisor's position at Pleiku inflicting heavy losses of material, and the death of eight Americans. McGeorge Bundy, a Presidential Assistant, was in Vietnam at the time. He advised Johnson, through State Department channels, that retaliatory strikes against the North and Phase Two be initiated.

The decision to retaliate against North Vietnam was reached in a seventy-five-minute meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House on the evening of February 6... , with Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield and House Speaker John McCormick present. George Ball, the senior State Department representative present, indicated to the president that all were in accord that action must be taken. (Schandler, 1977, p. 12)

Within fourteen hours retaliatory strikes were made against North Vietnamese barracks and staging areas just north of the demilitarized zone. With the strike and those which followed, the United States entered a new phase in its involvement in Southeast Asia.
Structure and Process Summary

The proximate decision was reached at a single meeting with multiple agency participation. Multiple meetings (at least one additional with Johnson present) had been held on the general question of responses to increasingly hostile actions against American forces in South Vietnam and neighboring waters. The process was one of consensus-building and elimination of alternatives as they became undesirable to Johnson or the majority of the advisory unit. Reviews were done by the people responsible for the prior policy.

Evaluation of Process Criteria

1. **Information - attention to quality.** The whole question of information and the Vietnam War is a highly charged issue. Nonetheless, in its narrowest sense, information does not seem to have been lacking. Information about some of the key variables affecting the decision was available and accurate. The declining state of the political and military situation in the South was known. The attacks on American positions in South Vietnam were also widely known. The salient problem was not lack of information, but the interpretation of the facts at hand.

2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.** Accounts by both Gallucci and Schandler indicate that genuine option formulation was narrowed at each step of the advisory process. Throughout, the alternatives suggested
by the participants differed mostly in degree, not in kind. The options that were offered were in Gallucci's conception only "marginally distinguishable" in that they all accepted without question the fundamental principle of support for the South Vietnamese and left unquestioned the legitimacy or desirability of U.S. involvement. The result was that "President Johnson gradually put himself in the position of a leader without significant options" (p. 57).

What options were lacking from the process which might have legitimately been expected? For one, "the options did not include seeking a political settlement without further military involvement" (Gallucci, 1975, p. 42). Why were the alternatives proposed to Johnson so limited in perspective? Gallucci (1975, pp. 42-43) suggests at least three reasons. First, was that Johnson may have signaled his advisors that he did not want options which might result in "losing" South Vietnam, as reflected in Johnson's admonition to Lodge, "I am not going to be the President who saw Southeast Asia go the way China went" (Gallucci, 1975, p. 43). Next, there were certain shared images which served to limit option formation by both the President and his advisors, among them being the Cold War image of the world and a domestic concern which viewed the people as thinking Democrats in general as soft on Communism. Finally, the policy reviews of 1964-65 were undertaken by those same people responsible for the
policy to that date, a situation hardly conducive to the spawning of radical alternatives.

3. Dissent transmitted to the President. The same factors which are mentioned above which limited option formulation also served to limit dissent. In fact, taken in its entirety, the process was free from meaningful dissent. What dissent that was present was often outside the formal structure and process. For instance, George Ball did recommend, in a lengthy memorandum in October 1964, that the U.S. seek a political settlement, but it did not get before the President until January [1975] after the course of action had been set by the November review" (Gallucci, 1975, p. 42). Some dissent which was present in early 1964 surrounding NSAM 288 was eliminated when Hilsman resigned. Reflecting on this decision Hilsman (1967, p. 535) contrasts the style and resulting process of Presidents.

The style of Roosevelt and Kennedy was to build into the situation around them conflicting advice, to have men around them who had opinions of their own, and to encourage them to articulate their positions vigorously. . . . President Johnson seemed to prefer a more hierarchical way of handling the job . . . I could stay on and fight. But I would not only lose, but would be so cut up in the process that anything I said thereafter would be regarded as sour grapes.

4. Concern for implementation. The question of implementation, that is, exactly how the bombing of the North would be worked out was of key importance in Johnson's
attempt to build consensus. To that end, and in order to incorporate as broad a spectrum of opinion behind the policy, the nature of implementing the policy was left deliberately vague. Gallucci (1975) maintains that:

although it is roughly true that the policy consensus was really an alliance over means rather than ends, bombing was an acceptable means to all so long as the specifics of the action were not spelled out. [emphasis added] The specifics were not, in fact, spelled out in advance and one of the reasons they were not was to avoid eroding the base of support for the policy. (p. 47)

Specificity in implementation then was deliberately avoided for the sake of consensus-building. Each group could see in the decision the policy as they would see it implemented.

5. Consideration of uncertainty. No mention of uncertainty was discernable. We will consider this missing data (m/d).

6. Use of experts. Certainly there were policy review groups, etc., but it is difficult to make an accurate assessment of this criterion based on available information. We will consider this missing data (m/d).

7. Explication of goals. There was no agreement over one clear-cut conception of goals which the bombing policy was to satisfy. Rather, a multiplicity of goals advanced by various actors clouded the enterprise. Gallucci indicates that these goals were not necessarily the result of clear-cut
national objectives, but rather the result of organizational and individual perspectives.

The decision makers who endorsed the policy of bombing North Viet-Nam did so . . . for different reasons. They differed over what, specifically, they hoped the policy would accomplish. . . . Because of these differences it is not surprising that they also had individual perspectives on how the bombing should be conducted to achieve their separate goals. (Gallucci, 1975, p. 47)

2. The Decision to Intervene in the Dominican Republic - 1965

The International Context

In December 1962, Juan Bosch became President of the Dominican Republic in the first democratic election in that country in forty years. Eight months later a military coup overthrew Bosch and installed a three-man civilian junta in his place. This junta was recognized by President Johnson on December 14, 1963. Donald J. Reid Cabral eventually became President of the junta, which soon ran into severe popularity problems with both the civilian populace and segments of the armed forces. Reid Cabral became aware of a possible coup against him over his refusal to move up the date for free elections. Rather than risk a coup, Reid directed that certain suspected officers be arrested on

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This summary is based on the accounts of Draper (1965), Roberts (1965), Halper (1971), Sanchez (1972), and Berko-witz, et. al. (1977).
Saturday, April 24, 1965, but the tactic failed and the coup was on.

The original impetus for the revolution had come from junior army officers, but now there were clear signs of widespread popular support for the Boschist cause. By mid-afternoon, the rebels in charge of the radio station were demanding Bosch's return. (Sanchez, 1972, p. 225)

Although initially the government of Reid Cabral seemed to be in control of the situation, during the early morning hours of Sunday, April 25, 1965, the rebels gained control of Santo Domingo. "The constitutionalists (demanding a return of the 1963 constitution under Bosch) were soon back at the controls of the radio stations calling for popular support in the streets" (Sanchez, 1972, p. 228). The army did not move against the rebels and Reid abdicated to the constitutionalist delegation. Soon a split developed. The army which had not taken up arms to support Reid, could not tolerate a return of Bosch. "General Wessin issued an ultimatum at 3:00 PM presenting his terms for a settlement: a military junta would rule until elections were held—if that was not satisfactory, civil war would follow" (Sanchez, 1972, p. 231). That afternoon air force planes strafed the constitutionalist position in the National Palace. Meanwhile the constitutionalists set up an interim government and sent a delegation to the American Embassy to seek its assistance in arranging a cease-fire. This approach was
without result however, and the fighting continued. By Sunday evening events were somewhat clarified. Militarily, a civil war was taking place between the so-called constitutionalists who favored the return of Bosch, and those senior army officers led by General Wessin who opposed his return. Diplomatically, "the position of the embassy had also solidified on Sunday. The initial American contacts with the rebels proved unsatisfactory for both parties—especially for U.S. officials who continued to perceive a disturbing Communist presence among the constitutionalists" (Sanchez, 1972, pp. 234-35).

Narrative of the Decision

During the course of Monday, April 26, the tide seemed to be going against the rebels (constitutionalists). Charge d'Affaires William Connett (Ambassador Bennett was in Washington, D.C.) sent back to Washington conflicting reports indicating first that the rebels were about to achieve victory, then that the situation was not so grim.

Ambassador Bennett returned to Santo Domingo at mid-day on Tuesday, April 27. Several hours later General Wessin launched a major offensive against the rebels who again sought American mediation. A rebel delegation was sent to Ambassador Bennett who refused their requests, believing the rebels to be on the verge of defeat (Sanchez, 1972, pp. 239-42).
But the rebels were not to be defeated. By late Tuesday they had regained control of Santo Domingo, and on Wednesday the loyalists requested that the U.S. Embassy supply them with fifty walkie-talkie radio sets. Ambassador Bennett relayed the request to the State Department despite the fact that this would render its policy of neutrality moot. State approved the request. During the day the military situation turned steadily against Wessin and the loyalists. The loyalists announced the formation of a three-man junta led by Colonel Benoit. Benoit immediately requested U.S. military assistance. Ambassador Bennett relayed the request, but recommended the U.S. not send troops. Later that day, however, as the rebels were on the verge of victory, Benoit repeated his request and Ambassador Bennett dispatched a cable which was received by the White House at 5:16 PM that Marines be landed.

This message was received by President Johnson, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, and Bill Moyers. Very little discussion of the issue followed and within a few minutes the President had made the decision to intervene. "I told my advisors that I was not going to sit by and see American lives lost in this situation. If local authorities could not provide protection, we had no choice but to provide the necessary protection ourselves. They all agreed that we had to act." (Sanchez, 1972, p. 248)
About one and a half hours after Bennett's message was received, orders were issued authorizing the landing of U.S. Marines in Santo Domingo.

Structure and Process Summary

The decision itself was reached at a single face-to-face group meeting with representatives of several agencies present. Clearly, the dominance of the State Department in its role as the primary information source was felt. There were no outsiders present in the single-unit, single-level advisory structure.

1. Information - attention to quality. The question of information and its role in Johnson's decision is surrounded by controversy. Roberts (1965, pp. 198-199) maintains that Johnson did receive good information and that he consulted his advisors about it. Others suggest that Johnson did not pay attention to the quality of the information he received. Draper (1965, p. 34) notes that Johnson "was stampeded into unfortunate decisions by a panicky, ill-informed embassy." Berkowitz, et. al. (1977, p. 183) contends that:

At no point during the crisis did Johnson choose to challenge the intelligence reports, either on the grounds of incompleteness or because of insufficient substantiation. On the contrary, he endorsed many of their recommendations despite what we now know to be their obvious shortcomings and inadequacies.
The consensus view is that Johnson paid little attention to the quality of information. This is especially interesting in light of the fact that much of the early information was sent by a relative newcomer to Santo Domingo. "The Chief official in the embassy," (Sanchez (1972, p. 226) writes, "was William B. Connett, Jr., charge d'affaires who had been in the country for less than six months. It would be Connett's responsibility to make a series of critical evaluations and decisions which would set the tone for the basic American policy through the crisis."

2. Multiple options - presented to the President.
Here again we find controversy. Berkowitz, et. al. (1977, p. 190) contends that Johnson and his advisors felt that they had three options which were (1) do nothing, (2) proceed through the OAS, and (3) act themselves to shape the situation. These do not appear to be options in the strictest sense; for example, the "actions" in (3), above, are unspecified. Most analysts agree with Halper (1971) who contends that the President had already made up his mind, and that the final Bennett cable "apparently triggered a preexisting presidential decision" (p. 55).

3. Dissent - transmitted to the President. Halper (1971) discusses the lack of dissent at the meeting between Johnson and his advisors which was taking place as Johnson received Ambassador Bennett's cable. Halper contends that
the group, similar to the one which managed the Cuban missile crisis, felt that the crisis could be managed if Johnson took the initiative.

Certainly, Raborn with his "damn the torpedoes" reputation was unlikely to advocate timidity and there was no evidence to suggest that Moyers dissented. Johnson thus surpassed even Kennedy at the Bay of Pigs in his refusal to solicit hostile or differing opinions. (p. 55)

4. **Concern for implementation.** There is no evidence to suggest that implementation was considered in any detail. In fact, there was no prior consultation of some whose support would be needed to sustain any intervention--the Congress and Latin American governments. Only after his order to send Marines ashore did Johnson inform "Congressmen, Latin American leaders, and ambassadors, and organization of American States officials--each was informed and none were consulted.

Apparently there was even a lack of consultation within the U.S. government with regard to implementation. "This was true particularly during the implementation of the policy. Confusion became so abundant that Martin Arnold of the New York Times finally exclaimed at one point, 'You know, I think all this is just one great insane asylum and all of us are the inmates here'" (Berkowtiz, et. al., 1977, p. 196).
5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** Given the serious question about the quality of information upon which he acted, there is no evidence that Johnson was aware of uncertainty. Halper's account (1971, pp. 54-55) indicates that Johnson was convinced of his position to the point that he viewed "additional affirmation or opposition as superfluous." Halper characterizes the advisory group as one which felt "that the crises could be managed boldly and successfully" (1971, p. 55). There is no hint of uncertainty in any of the accounts.

6. **Use of experts.** It is impossible to make an accurate assessment about this criterion given the information available. We will consider it missing data (m/d).

7. **Explication of goals.** It does seem as though there was a clear conception of U.S. goals advanced by the decision group. Halper (1971, p. 51) indicates that everyone agreed that "there must be no Communist take-over in the Dominican Republic." Roberts (1965, p. 198) contends that there was consensus on two overriding objectives—"to protect American lives and prevent a Communist take-over."
3. The Decision to Deploy an ABM System - 1967

The International Context

Technological innovation, perceived Soviet threat, the requirement to make budgetary decisions, and the support of certain organizational interests within the U.S. government pushed the question of whether to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system before President Johnson in 1967.

Johnson's decision seemed to be shaped mainly by the debate which surrounded him as he himself did not have any strong feelings on the subject (Halperin, 1975, p. 121). Halperin identifies those forces which influenced Johnson's decision both in a general way as background factors and in a more specific way within specific decision settings. First, as background factors (with which the President was usually aware but which did not always make themselves felt in specific decision settings) were the positions of the agencies and individual actors who had an interest in the substantive problem.

Outside the Executive Branch, Halperin (1975) mentions only those in favor of an ABM system who used their forums to support the military's position. "For congressional leaders like Russell, Stennis, Jackson, and Thurmond,

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3 This summary is based on the account of Halperin (1975).
the stakes were the national interest as defined by the military" (p. 121).

Within the Executive Branch, only the Defense Department seems to have played a major role, but there was a rift within it. For its part, the military branches lined up in favor of the deployment of an ABM system. "Although each of the three Services saw a different face of the ABM issue, in the end they were all prepared to support it" (Halperin, 1975, p. 117).

Three offices within the Office of the Secretary of Defense provided McNamara with advice. The principal scientific and technical advisor to the Defense Secretary was the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). This office, taking the position that what was technically feasible should be implemented supported the deployment of the ABM. The Systems Analysis Office (SA) also favored deployment of an ABM defense for Minuteman silos, albeit, it viewed the choice as a marginal one. The position of International Security Affairs (ISA) was dominated by the commitment to arms control of John McNaughton and Paul Warnke. As such, it opposed deployment.

The chief Defense actor was the Secretary of Defense himself, Robert McNamara. McNamara opposed ABM deployment. McNamara appears to have viewed the ABM as in some sense a symbol of the arms race. If the United States could take the decision not to
deploy the ABM, then it might be possible to negotiate an agreement with the Russians or to reach a tacit understanding with them which would permit a leveling off of the strategic expenditures on both sides and, ultimately, their reduction." (Halperin, 1975, p. 119)

Viewing the issue on national security grounds, McNamara concluded that the U.S. would be better off without the ABM.

Narrative of the Decision

Halperin characterizes President Johnson as perceiving the issue primarily in terms of his:
relations with the Secretary of Defense, with the military, and with the senior members of the Congress concerned with defense, especially inasmuch as implications for the 1968 election were involved. As the President saw it, McNamara was strongly against deployment (as was Secretary of State Dean Rusk), while congressional leaders and the military were strongly in favor. All claimed to be reasoning from the point of view of national security. Johnson's own instincts would have led him to search for a compromise which would minimize the danger to his relations with his advisors." (Halperin, 1975, pp. 122, 123)

Throughout all, McNamara retained one structural relationship with the President which affected the final ABM decision. "McNamara tended to deal privately with the President on issues of major concern to him" (Halperin, 1975, p. 123). Halperin indicates that the President's meetings with other concerned parties were "routine and formalistic" (p. 123).
This meant that there was no open debate within the administration. Because of the private nature of McNamara's relation with the President, other agencies such as the State Department, ACDA, and the President's Science Advisor were not able to make inputs to the decision in an orderly way before McNamara and the President had reached tentative agreement. (Halperin, 1975, pp. 123-124)

The President seemed to have only two choices (Halperin, 1975, p. 129). Either he could support McNamara and choose not to deploy, and go against the Joint Chiefs and certain Congressional leaders, or he could support the deployment of an ABM system.

McNamara met with the President twice at Johnson's ranch in Texas on November 3rd and 10th. The key meeting appears to have taken place on December 6th. Present were President Johnson, McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance, all members of the Joint Chiefs, and Special Assistant Walt Rostow. The Chiefs argued that the initial deployment should be designed to defend against a Soviet as well as Chinese threat and should ultimately be expanded to counter a large Soviet attack. McNamara argued against the Soviet-directed ABM system. He offered two compromise options. The first would be to delay a decision on what system should be deployed while procuring those items requiring a long lead time, and simultaneously try to begin arms limitation talks with the Soviets. The second option
was to begin deployment of the smaller, anti-Chinese-only system.

The meeting ended without a decision on the ABM, but McNamara continued his attack on the Soviet-directed ABM system. In a memorandum he suggested that perhaps an ABM system against possible Chinese attack was useful. McNamara also arranged a January 1967 meeting between the President, the Joint Chiefs, and past and present Special Assistants to the President for Science and Technology, and Directors of Defense Research and Engineering. All agreed that an ABM defense from Soviet attack was not feasible (Halperin, 1975, p. 130). While a majority opposed a Chinese-directed system, some supported it.

In the following months, McNamara increasingly tied the ABM to the arms limitation talks. Congress and the military could be quelled by steps taken toward purchasing certain items for an as yet unspecified system, while negotiations on arms control could be pursued unhampered by charges that the U.S. was continuing the arms race by building an ABM system to which the Soviets would logically respond by increasing their offensive capabilities.

While the exact time of Johnson's decision is unknown, by mid-September 1967 it became clear what it would be. On September 18, 1967, McNamara, in a speech outlining the impossibility of an effective Soviet-directed ABM system,
announced that the government had decided to go forward with the "Chinese-oriented ABM deployment, and [would] begin actual production of such a system at the end of the year" (Halperin, 1975, p. 112).

Structure and Process Summary

The locus of the decision is uncertain. Certain key influences on the President were identifiable. At least four meetings were held (two with McNamara, alone, one with all concerned, one with outside experts). Multiple agencies were involved, including Defense and Congress, and splits were evident in Defense. However, McNamara's relationship with Johnson seemed to give him the edge in agenda-setting and prearranged agreements.

Evaluation of Process Criteria

1. **Information - attention to quality.** It is impossible to make a judgment about this criterion based on the information available.

2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.** The President had a clear choice presented to him by the competing factions--either accept or reject ABM deployment. As time passed, McNamara came up with two additional options: (a) a limited Chinese-oriented system, or (b) initial procurement for an unspecified system plus overtures to the Soviets for arms reduction talks (Halperin, 1975, p. 130).
3. Dissent - transmitted to the President. Although the President was aware of competing factions, McNamara's relationship with Johnson often made dissent meaningless since others "were not able to make inputs to the decision in an orderly way before McNamara and the President had reached tentative agreement" (Halperin, 1975, p. 122). Halperin reports that there was "no open debate within the administration" (p. 124).

4. Concern for implementation. McNamara wasn't concerned with implementation because he really wanted to delay the ABM project altogether (Halperin, 1975, p. 131).

Actually, this lack of concern came back to haunt McNamara for he found he had not the time nor resources to control implementation and the Army, charged with implementation, "was able to tell the Congress that actual deployment was not different in any significant way from the projected first stages of an anti-Russian system, and that the system being deployed was expected to grow" (Halperin, 1975, p. 134). McNamara's lack of attention to implementation led to consequences which he originally argued against.

5. Consideration of uncertainty. There was an effort by McNamara to convince the decision unit that the ABM was not workable. A meeting was held with certain experts who offered their opinion that the ABM was not workable.
6. **Use of experts.** McNamara arranged for a meeting of experts with President Johnson and the Joint Chiefs. In short, McNamara used an appeal to expert authority to persuade President Johnson about the validity of his point of view.

7. **Explication of goals.** Goals were made, but each camp perceived the national interest in different terms. The Joint Chiefs and certain Congressional leaders saw the national interest best served by the defense of the U.S. against Soviet missile attack. McNamara saw our national interest best served by a reduction in the arms race which he saw as being intensified by an ABM program.

4. **The Decision to Develop a SALT Negotiating Position - 1968**

The International Context

Time ran out for the Johnson administration before a final Presidential decision was made on a U.S. negotiating position on certain important issues which were thought to be crucial in any SALT environment. Even though a decision as such was not made, advice on the issues was asked for by President Johnson and since it is the quality of advice which we are focusing on, we have chosen to include this case for analysis.

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4 This summary is based mainly on the account of Rosenthal (1975).
In his study of the attempt by the Johnson administration to arrive at a Strategic Arms Limitation Talk (SALT) position, Rosenthal (1975) cites the controversy surrounding the development of two weapons systems, the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) and the Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), as important to an understanding of the SALT issue. The ABM, which was being developed by the Army, had support in Congress but was looked upon suspicously by most of the Executive Branch. The MIRV, on the other hand, was widely supported by most of the defense establishment including the appropriate Congressional committees. Secretary of Defense McNamara, reflecting the view that ABMs would destabilize the nuclear balance, tried to persuade the Soviets to agree to bilateral ABM controls at the Glassboro Summit in June 1967. The Soviets, however, were not receptive, which gave new impetus for the U.S. development of some kind of ABM system and resulted in the September 1967 ABM speech of McNamara—a case covered earlier in this chapter.

Narrative of the Decision

The announcement by President Johnson in March 1968 that he would not run for reelection and his desire to establish a "peace legacy" prior to his departure gave new impetus to arms control issues. Time was a diminishing
resource and constrained organization of the arrangements for preparing a U.S. negotiating position. Since Johnson wanted to begin talks before the November election he "did not want extended internal debate over the provisions of a U.S. negotiating position. . . . A negotiating package would have to be prepared on which all the major foreign policy agencies--especially the Joint Chiefs--would sign off" (Rosenthal, 1975, p. 328).

In order to lessen the time required to get a consensus, the normal interagency channels were by-passed. In more normal circumstances, arms control matters in the Johnson administration would have been overseen by a high-level interagency group--the Committee of Principals, with staff input from a Committee of Deputies chaired by the Deputy Director of ACDA. Since the Joint Chiefs were suspicious of virtually anything coming out of ACDA, a new mechanism had to be devised lest the proposals be forever delayed by ACDA-Defense quarrels.

In July a substitute mechanism was devised. "It was centered in the Pentagon, and relied on informal bargaining between middle-level civilian and military representatives to produce negotiating positions that could pass muster at higher levels" (Rosenthal, 1975, p. 328).

The process began with the drafting of positions in the ISA Group (ISA, State, ACDA) headed by Morton Halperin, then
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning and Arms Control in ISA. These proposed drafts—called the ACDA-State Proposal, would be forwarded to the official working group, the "SALT Committee," chaired by Halperin, with representatives of the JCS, Offices of Systems Analysis, DDR&E, and civilian and military service representatives. The next step up was JCS Review, then the Committee of Principals (State, Defense, ACDA, CIA, JCS, White House, NSA), and finally, President Johnson (Rosenthal, 1975, pp. 328-329). It is clear that Joint Chiefs had a key role in the process. In addition to the review of drafts before submission to the Committee of Principals, the JCS was allowed a special representative to the ISA Group which allowed the JCS to inject its ideas at the lowest level.

As stated above, the ABM and MIRV were the two issues most difficult to deal with. There was conflict between agencies on the relative merits of desirability of each system. The Army wanted a full area defense system built, which would entail the building of enough sites to cover the entire country. On the other hand, some officials in ISA, ACDA, and Defense wanted to see the ABM banned altogether. Similar controversies surrounded the MIRV whose supporters wanted the go-ahead on testing, while some arms control specialists hoped that MIRV technology might be controlled if testing were delayed.
The special position of the JCS in the policy process and the desire to avoid controversy in order to preserve precious time affected the positions of those involved in the advisory structure.

A whirlwind of SALT policy studies by the ISA Group and the SALT Committee were underway in the Pentagon where Halperin and his collaborators from ACDA and State made two decisions about AMB-MIRV which carried through the entire decision process. On ABM, the ISA Group agreed that any proposal for specified, even moderate limits would bring a split with the military. Instead, the draft proposal would ask for unspecified, symmetric limits on ABM. On MIRV, similarly, the Group felt certain that a recommendation for controls of any sort would result in a military veto of the ACDA-State proposal. The Chiefs were solidly behind MIRV development, and a fight over controls would risk other prospects for ABM limits, for limits in other areas such as ICBM and SLBM launchers, and for an overall U.S. commitment to arms talks with the Soviets. Halperin and his reluctant colleagues in ACDA and State agreed that no MIRV limitations would appear in the ACDA-State proposal. (Rosenthal, 1975, p. 330)

Most of the bargaining among agencies took place before the interagency Committee of Principals received the package. Virtually all the suggestions by the JCS or their representative at the ISA Group level were accepted. For example, an attempt by ACDA and State representatives for a delay in MIRV flight testing was turned down by the JCS on the grounds that possible delays in SALT itself might postpone such tests indefinitely. The initial proposal for a
The limit of ABMs from zero to 1,000 was changed by the JCS to between 100 and 1,000. An attempt to place controls on the number of ABM radar installations was likewise dropped.

Only a minor role remained to be played by the interagency Committee of Principals. Notably, the Chiefs stipulated in their JCSM that they were approving the package "as an entity." That signaled clearly that any change in this package of compromises would reopen the whole can of worms—either during final preparations, or even during the SALT negotiations themselves. So any dissatisfaction with the draft proposal was unlikely to generate serious debate when the SALT package was reviewed for final delivery to the White House. Secretary Rusk, for example, shared ACDA's concern over the absence of MIRV provisions, but he was unwilling to make any challenge. (Rosenthal, 1975, p. 331)

In essence, then, the proposal which the Committee of Principals sent along to the White House was a watershed in U.S. arms control thinking. On the plus side, it put forth the notion that arms control proposals could enhance the security of the U.S., it set for the acceptance of a limited number of ABMs which would preclude wholesale deployment of the system, it gave tentative recognition of the principle of strategic parity in its agreement to negotiate a freeze on ICBM construction, and, finally, dropped U.S. insistence on territorial inspections, substituting the notion of "national technical means" of verification. These were the major negotiating positions approved by the Committee of Principals. They were never placed on the negotiating
table, however, as another event—the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia—ended any hopes for SALT negotiations during the Johnson administration.

Structure and Process Summary

This is the only case where there is any significant missing data with regard to the advisory structure, and is true, in part, because there never was any formal interaction pattern between the President and his advisors since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the closing months of the Johnson administration which made any serious consideration of arms limitation talks with the Soviets impossible. Therefore, Johnson never considered the advice which he had requested earlier in the year.

We can say that the advisory structure was single in number and interagency in composition, and that it employed multiple levels.

Evaluation of the Process Criteria

1. Information - attention to quality. Although the Rosenthal text of the case study does not mention any details of information, in his summation he briefly evaluates the availability of relevant information. Though he maintains that information on Soviet intentions was problematical, Rosenthal cites the use of sophisticated U.S.
intelligence gathering to provide the actors with accurate information on Soviet capabilities.

2. Multiple options - presented to the President. The package which was finally approved by the Committee of Principals was the only one submitted to President Johnson (Rosenthal, 1975, p. 342). In fact, it was the only one submitted to the Committee itself, indicating that multiple options were not even available at the Committee level. In addition, the JCS insistence that the package not be changed reduced whatever flexibility and options which might have been available and any modification of that package.

3. Dissent - transmitted to the President. While dissent was observed at the lower levels, it was all in the hands of the JCS and their representatives. Dissenting views from those espoused by the JCS did not reach the President since they were excised by the JCS before they even reached the Committee of Principals. Of course, dissent was not one of the features which Johnson wanted (Rosenthal, 1975, p. 328) and the process was specifically designed to eliminate it. Even a person as high as Rusk did not feel the benefits of dissent outweighed the drawbacks (Rosenthal, 1975, p. 331).

4. Concern for implementation. In the attempt not to alienate the military, there was "little consideration of the effectiveness of costly weapons systems (N.B., Sentinel,
ABM), nor of Soviet intentions and the negotiability of various provisions in Vienna as opposed to Washington, D.C." (Rosenthal, 1975, p. 342). The process as described by Rosenthal seemed geared more to accommodating the limited perspectives of various agencies (particularly the JCS) than consideration of whether the positions being taken were truly negotiable in the larger context of U.S.-Soviet relationships.

5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** This criterion was not discussed in the case.

6. **Use of experts.** While the role of specific experts is unknowable by reading the Rosenthal case, he is clearly critical of the proper use of "appropriate participants," which seems to parallel our conception of expert involvement. Rosenthal maintains (1975, p. 342) that "the participation of several agencies was excessively limited. DDR&E people, familiar with and sensitive to the radar issue, were hardly consulted. Similarly, ACDA was effectively excluded from any MIRV flight-testing decision." While this is a difficult assessment to make, it is clear from this quotation that Rosenthal is sensitive to the concept of the inclusion of experts. There is no mention of outside expertise in the case text and this, in conjunction with the above quotation, warrants us to view this criterion as absent or seriously degraded in this case.
7. **Explication of goals.** Rosenthal, 1975, p. 342) maintains that one could only rate as "fair" that a reasoned conception of U.S. objectives was present in the process. "In 1968," he maintains, "the most common objective was initiating negotiations with the Soviets." However, he continues:

> On strategic issues, there were at least two divergent views of U.S. objectives: parity and "assured destruction capability," or superiority and "damage limitation." The political leadership was not willing to settle the issue.

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**The Johnson Decisions - A Summary**

Table 5 displays the structural characteristics of the advisory system which supported President Johnson in the decisions which we examined in this chapter. Like the structures examined in previous chapters, they are varied. It is apparent from looking at Table 5 that the percentage of aggregated criteria which are fulfilled in the Johnson decisions is low—regardless of the advisory structure utilized. Overall, regardless of structure, the Johnson decisions resulted in a thirty-percent fulfillment of the aggregated process criteria. This compares to a seventy-five-percent fulfillment for Kennedy, fifty-five percent for Truman, and thirty-five percent for Eisenhower. This low percentage is surprising from a structural consideration,
Table 5
SUMMARY OF THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
ADVISORY STRUCTURES AND THE PRESENCE OF THE SEVEN PROCESS CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisory Structure</th>
<th>Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. COMPOSITION OF DECISION UNIT</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Interagency vs single agency</td>
<td>inter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Multiple level vs single level</td>
<td>multi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Outside participants</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. INTERACTION PATTERNS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Face-to-face group</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mediated</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. One-on-one</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS</strong></td>
<td>multi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. NUMBER OF ADVISORY UNITS</strong></td>
<td>sngl</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EVALUATION OF THE
PRESENCE OF THE PROCESS CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Information</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>m/d</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Options</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dissent</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Implementation</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Uncertainty</td>
<td>m/d</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>m/d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Experts</td>
<td>m/d</td>
<td>m/d</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Goals</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

m/d = missing data
because, while both Johnson and Eisenhower are in the low range of process criteria fulfillment, the structures which Eisenhower relied upon were those which we have linked to poor criteria fulfillment, while Johnson did use structures which would be expected to be associated with the presence of the process criteria.

To what can we attribute this result? Personality and style factors are often mentioned in any evaluation of the Johnson Presidency. Stephen Hess concludes that "Johnson's methods of organizing the Presidency suggest that Presidents can be too idiosyncratic" (1976, i. 109). How, specifically, did Johnson's idiosyncracies affect the conduct of national security affairs? Kearns (1976), in her biography of Johnson provides one answer. Focusing on the Tuesday Lunch, Kearns relates that:

Johnson was ravenous for information when things were going well. Under siege, however, his operational style closed in and insulated him within the White House, where discussion was confined to those who offered no disagreement. . . . As suspicious of disloyalty and conspiracy began to dominate his thought, Johnson narrowed his circle of advisors to the trusted Tuesday lunch group. . . . Soon, all who did not share Johnson's convictions ceased to attend the Tuesday lunches. Johnson protected himself from contrary arguments and discussions by dismissing the doubters from his staff. (pp. 334-335)

Kearns concludes that Johnson simply did not want to hear doubting opinions. "He needed [emphasis added] loyalty
and support" (1976, p. 335). One aspect of loyalty and support, of course, was not leaking the nature of Johnson's deliberations to the public. Concerned with secrecy and fearing leaks, Johnson did not allow systematic agendas or written reports of the deliberations to be drawn up.

As a result, decisions were often reached on matters that had not been discussed in advance. . . . Under Johnson's surveillance, the participants in the Tuesday lunch group were afraid to discuss the content of the meetings even with their senior subordinates. Eventually a serious communication gap developed between the men at the top and the assistants who were supposed to serve them but found it increasingly difficult to translate a policy they did not understand into daily action. (Kearns, 1976, p. 337)

The result of Johnson's personal involvement in policy matters was that "over time, Johnson tacitly developed an anticipatory feedback system that discouraged views that the President would not receive favorably from being communicated to him" (Kearns, 1976, p. 338)

It is not surprising then, in light of the above discussion, that in none of the four decisions examined in this chapter, did Johnson receive either dissent or concern for implementation. With regard to implementation, the increasing isolation of lower level groups could not help but take attention away from this aspect of policy. When those who would implement the program were removed from the advisory process, who would speak on this issue? With regard to dissent, it is clear that Johnson wanted consent,
not dissent. Barber (1972) relates two examples of the dilemma with which Johnson's advisors were often faced. Both involve a look at Johnson's consensus-building in action through the polling technique. In one meeting where McNamara had doubted the value of providing more troops to General Westmoreland, he faced the following exchange:

"The troops that General Westmoreland needs and requests, as we feel it necessary, will be supplied," Johnson said, then asked, "Is that not true, General Westmoreland?"

"I agree, Mr. President."

"General Wheeler?"

"That is correct, Mr. President."

"Secretary McNamara?"

"Yes, sir," came the helpless reply.

(Barber, 1972, p. 82)

Barber relates a second incident from a National Security Council meeting as related in Chester Cooper's The Lost Crusade.

During the process I would frequently fall into a Walter Mitty-like fantasy: When my turn came I would rise to my feet slowly, look around the room and then directly at the President, and say very quietly and emphatically, "Mr. President, gentlemen, I most definitely do not agree." But I was removed from my trance when I heard the President's voice saying, "Mr. Cooper, do you agree?" And out would come a "Yes, Mr. President, I agree." (quoted in Barber, 1972, p. 82)
The extent to which the entire administration can be considered a deviant case cannot be determined until a cross-Presidential analysis is performed in the concluding chapter. Nonetheless, for the Johnson administration, it does appear as though personality and style were more potent in determining the presence or absence of the process criteria than structural considerations.
CHAPTER IX
THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION

In this chapter we will consider five decisions of the Nixon administration. The first two, from 1969, concerned the downing of an EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft by the North Koreans, and the use of chemical and biological warfare agents. The third, from 1970, concerns the decision to undertake a rescue attempt of American POWs from a North Vietnamese prison camp. The fourth and fifth actually involve one case—our response to the threatened unilateral Soviet intervention in the October 1973 war.

1. The Decision Concerning the EC-121 Downing - 1969

The International Context

On April 15, 1969, the North Koreans shot down a Navy EC-121 with thirty-one men aboard which was performing reconnaissance duty ninety miles off the coast of North Korea. This incident precipitated, in Nixon's own words his "first international crisis" (1978, p. 383).

\footnote{This summary is based mainly on the accounts of Kalb and Kalb (1975), and Nixon (1978).}
Narrative of the Decision

Henry Kissinger learned of the downing shortly after 1:00 AM, but decided to wait until more information was available before awakening the President. By 4:00 AM the Pentagon had confirmed that the EC-121 had been shot down by the North Koreans, and Kissinger informed the President of the incident.

At 8:00 AM Nixon and Kissinger met in the White House (Kalb & Kalb, 1975, p. 113), at which time Kissinger briefed the President on the situation as it was known. Nixon asked that a full report on military and political responses be prepared. "From six o'clock Tuesday evening [April 15] until three o'clock Wednesday morning, Kissinger chaired an NSC review group and prepared a full report on alternative courses of action" (Kalb & Kalb, 1975, p. 114).

At 10:00 AM on April 16, Nixon met with the NSC in the Cabinet Room. A second meeting was held later that afternoon. At the morning meeting, Nixon reports (1978, p. 383) that two serious options emerged. Option One considered military retaliation against a North Korean airfield. Option Two involved sending an armed escort on future EC-121 flights. The Joint Chiefs, supported by Kissinger, urged retaliation (Kalb & Kalb, 1975, p. 114), while Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird favored restraint (Nixon, 1978, p. 383).
Nixon apparently felt neither option ideal. He thought that retaliatory strikes against the well-armed North Koreans would result in further American casualties and perhaps provoke an attack on the South. Option Two, Nixon felt, would serve notice that we intended to protect our right to flights over international waters, but was, at best, a "weak response to what appeared to be the murder of thirty-one men and a deliberate affront to American honor" (Nixon, 1978, p. 383).

By the time of the afternoon meeting, several bodies and some debris from the plane had been recovered from the water. Nixon was inclined to view the intelligence reports as indicating that the attack was an isolated incident, not unlike the Pueblo seizure during Johnson's administration. Also, an urgent cable was received from Ambassador William Porter in Seoul urging restraint lest our actions play "into the hands of North Korea's extremist leadership" (Nixon, 1978, p. 383).

On Thursday, Kissinger and an NSC study group prepared "two highly detailed scenarios of what might happen if the United States bombed North Korea and what might happen if it did not" (Kalb & Kalb, 1975, p. 114)²

²Kalb & Kalb, p. 114, report that Laird recommended that these ad hoc NSC groups which represented State, Defense, and the CIA be made a permanent body "to inject some order into crisis management." This was the beginning of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG).
The President studied these options again and decided to announce the adoption of Option Two, the continuance of reconnaissance flights accompanied by armed fighters, at a news conference on Friday, the 18th. Nixon felt that the selection of Option Two did not preclude the use of Option One at a later date. Nixon also secretly decided to respond to the Communist challenge by renewing the bombing of North Vietnamese sanctuaries in Cambodia, a project which was called Operation Lunch (Nixon, 1978, p. 384).

After the news conference, Nixon met with Kissinger and asked him to poll the members of the NSC for their opinions on possible bombing of North Korea. Kissinger, after an hour, reported that most advisors were against that option. Nixon reports that Kissinger still felt that our credibility was at stake. Nixon (1978, p. 384) recalled:

I still agreed that we had to act boldly; I was just not convinced that this was the time to do it... As long as we were involved in Vietnam, we simply did not have the resources or public support for another war in another place.

I also had to consider the fact that except for Agnew and Mitchell, most of my top national security advisors, particularly Rogers and Laird, were strongly opposed to Option One. Kissinger agreed that we could ill-afford a Cabinet insurrection at such an early date in the administration.

Over the next few days the issue seemed to die. "Before long," Nixon wrote (1978, p. 385), "other issues absorbed us and the EC-121 incident was largely forgotten. Yet I
remained troubled by the response we had made—or, as I saw it, that we had failed to make. I told Kissinger, 'they got away with it this time, but they'll never get away with it again.'"

There is one interesting footnote to the EC-121 incident that reflects on the implementation of Presidential decisions. Nixon recalled that it took three weeks for the Pentagon to implement the President's April 18 directive. Additionally, the Pentagon had suspended reconnaissance flights in the Mediterranean from April 14 to May 8 without informing him. Nixon reports his anger at this situation, which he felt would make the North Vietnamese think that they had succeeded in making us suspend our reconnaissance flights. Nixon concludes (1978, p. 383) that, "Thanks to this incident, I learned early in my administration that a President must keep a constant check, not just on the way his orders are being followed, but on whether they are being followed at all."

Structure and Process Summary

The decision was arrived at after several NSC meetings with multiple-agency participation. The primary interaction

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3It should be mentioned that Kalb & Kalb (1975, p. 113) maintain that Nixon did indeed order that similar reconnaissance flights "be stopped pending the outcome of his deliberations."
pattern appears to have been face-to-face group. No outsiders were involved. There was but one advisory unit.

1. **Information - attention to quality.** There was a sensitivity to insuring the accuracy of information. Kissinger waited until sufficient information was in before he called Nixon. Even though possible responses were considered, nothing was decided until after positive confirmation of the downing was made, and an analysis of whether the incident was isolated or part of a larger campaign (Nixon, 178, p. 383).

2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.** At least two options were advanced which were significantly different in scope to give the President a real choice. The options had genuine support from competing groups. Nixon specifically detailed the options and the supporters of each in his account (Nixon, 1978, p. 383).

3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** Although Nixon, Agnew, Mitchell, and Kissinger supported the retaliation option, most of the NSC members did not and they made their views known both at the formal meetings with Nixon and through the informal polls which Kissinger took. It was, in fact, these dissenting views which in the end prevailed against the original Nixon and Kissinger stance.

4. **Concern for implementation.** Nixon had Kissinger do feasibility studies of both options, and, although the
outcome of these studies are not specifically given, it was clear that Nixon was concerned over our ability to back up any action given the constraints which an involvement in Southeast Asia placed on our ability to support military action in other areas.

5. Consideration of uncertainty. Uncertainty was considered in terms of the effects which certain actions would have on the North Koreans and how our response would affect the Soviets, the North Vietnamese, and the Chinese (Nixon, 1978, p. 384).

6. Use of experts. While it appears as though all relevant parties were consulted, it is unclear whether experts were included because the membership of the NSC ad hoc deliberations was not reported. It was noted by Nixon that our Ambassador to South Korea, William Porter, sent a cable, which urged restraint and which Nixon thought "strongly supported" the case against retaliation (1978, p. 383). Porter was the closest thing to an expert directly mentioned in the accounts of the EC-121 decision. We will consider this missing data (m/d).

7. Explication of goals. This element seemed to be absent from the deliberations. No where is it mentioned exactly what goal would be served by the options which were considered.
2. The Decision on the Use of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents - 1969

The International Context

Although the United States had used chemical agents in Vietnam, it had no overall policy on the use and production of chemical or biological weapons (CBS). A 1925 Geneva Protocol had banned the production and use of chemical and biological weapons. By the late 1960s over sixty nations had signed the Protocol and the United States stood alone among the major powers as a non-signatory of the Protocol. A request by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense for a national policy on CBW resulted in the issuance by the White House of NSSM 59 which requested "a thorough study of the issue, a map of the options, and a statement of the pros and cons of each alternative" (Frank, 1975, p. 306).

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4This summary is based on the account of Frank (1975).
5National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs) were commissioned by the President through Henry Kissinger, Assistant for National Security Affairs. NSSMs called for a statement of all available options on a given issue with the attendant pros and cons of each. These lengthy interdepartmental studies were specifically designed to permit statements of exception or differences of interpretation of agreed evidence so that the President and his staff could make choices with greater understanding of internal U.S. Government differences of opinion. Decisions reached by the President were communicated to the agency responsible for implementing them via National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs)." (Frank, 1975, p. 306)
Narrative of the Decision

According to Frank (1975), NSSM 59 was issued in response to a wide variety of pressures. An accident in 1968 at the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah resulted in the death of over 6,000 sheep. When finally given broad media coverage in an NBC television special, the accident evoked public and Congressional outcry. As Congress prepared to investigate CBW policy, Secretary of Defense Laird requested that Kissinger's NSC do the same. One of the biggest pressures on Laird was the JCS desire for a definitive policy on the use of such agents. "The installation of Laird in the Pentagon and Nixon in the White House suggested to the Chiefs that their views on increased flexibility in the use of chemical and biological weapons might get a favorable hearing" (Frank, 1975, p. 312).

Three separate interdepartmental groups worked on the study in mid-1969. One group was assigned the task of evaluating foreign CBW capabilities and was composed mainly of intelligence community members. A second group looked into the military utility of using CBW weapons. Diplomatic representatives formed a third group which explored various diplomatic options open to Nixon. In addition to the studies conducted by the interdepartmental groups, the White House Office of Science and Technology was contacted to arrange for a panel to prepare a report on technical aspects
of CBW. This report was undertaken by members of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

By early August the Advisory Committee's report was completed. Basically, the report was unfavorable toward biological agents, but suggested a continuance of chemical programs. The group also favored ratification of the 1925 General Protocol. A second report by the Office of Systems Analysis concurred with the Advisory Committee's report and commented unfavorably on the safety and utility of biological weapons research and development. A third report, a draft from the inter-departmental group dealing with military options, was much more favorably disposed toward viewing biological weapons as reliable and controllable.

Secretary of Defense Laird, upon seeing the discrepancy, transferred responsibility for DoD's contribution from the JCS-dominated interdepartmental group to the Office of International Security Affairs. The report which this group forwarded was similar to the President's Scientific Advisory Committee report. "Thus the military's preference for a permissive CBW policy was largely shut out of the NSSM study process, forcing the Joint Chiefs to stake their hopes on a 'last stand' at the November NSC meeting which would consider the issue" (Frank, 1975, p. 314).

On November 18, 1969, President Nixon chaired a meeting of the NSC which included the statuatory members and General
Wheeler, Chairman of the JCS, the CIA and ACDA Directors, and the Under Secretary of State. "A list of five options was presented to the President, ranging from a vigorous development of all aspects of chemical and biological weapons to a total unilateral renunciation of both chemical and biological weapons" (Frank, 1975, p. 314). The meeting was used to discuss the whole range of CBW-related issues. On the question of retaining biological weapons, General Wheeler argued that the only limitation we should place on ourselves would be a renunciation of first use. All of the other agencies represented were "against the retention of an offensive biological warfare capability as being redundant, unreliable, and uncontrollable, especially in comparison with nuclear weapons. A consensus quickly developed in favor of eliminating U.S. biological weapons" (Frank, 1975, p. 314-315). Other related issues were also discussed with similar results. The JCS spoke in opposition on limitations to chemical weapons' use and the ratification of the General Protocol. The civilians urged the opposite course of action.

General Wheeler's only success at the meeting was the preservation of the option of first use of riot control agents and herbicides in future conflicts, as well as their continuing use in Vietnam. But the Joint Chiefs were on the short side of the argument in three major policy areas—the renunciation of biological weapons, the renunciation of the first use of lethal and

A week later Nixon announced his decision.

Biological weapons were renounced, as well as the first use of lethal and incapacitating chemicals; the 1925 General Protocol was to be resubmitted to the Senate; U.S. biological warfare agents and munitions were to be destroyed and production facilities converted to peaceful purposes; and the U.S. would support efforts to negotiate a biological weapons convention. (Frank, 1975, p. 315)

Structure and Process Summary

The decision followed a single face-to-face group meeting at which multiple agencies were represented. Of course, considerable effort over a period of several months preceded this meeting. These efforts were multi-level and outsiders were included.

Evaluation of the Process Criteria

1. **Information – attention to quality.** The lengthy and thorough process allowed a great amount of information to be evaluated before being incorporated in the various position papers. Frank (1975, p. 320) notes that the process allowed the infusion of civilian positions which might normally be muted by a strong JCS position at NSC meetings. When strong differences developed over certain positions within inter-departmental review groups, the
requirement that supporting evidence be incorporated in the paper often required additional inquiries to be undertaken. One such example was provided by a State Department objection to a report on foreign CBW capabilities. Reanalysis suggested that there was indeed no hard evidence to support the long-held beliefs concerning Soviet biological weapons capability.

2. Multiple options - presented to the President. The President was provided with a number of options to consider. Frank (1975, p. 321) considers the process to be influential in option generation.

Since agencies were instructed to give the President every conceivable option and not simply those which were strongly recommended by the senior officials, junior officials could get any option included in the package simply by pointing out that it was a possible alternative. When the Joint Chiefs, for example, objected to the inclusion of the option of a total renunciation of chemical and biological weapons, they were told that they would be free to see to it that the objections to such a policy would be clearly stated but that the members of the working group were under orders from the President to present him with all conceivable options and alternatives.

3. Dissent - transmitted to the President. It is clear from the case that dissent was present both in the information-gathering stage and the decision stage. The example of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence strong objection to a draft on foreign CBW capabilities discussed earlier which resulted in further analysis is one
example in the information stage. In the decision stage, dissent is evident in General Wheeler's ability to convey his dissenting views directly to the President at the November 18 NSC meeting.

4. **Concern for implementation.** There is very little discussion about concern for implementation in the case. Frank (1975, p. 321) states, "It is unclear whether the NSSM process had generated sufficient information on Congressional opinion on the issue for Nixon and his aides to anticipate what the Senate's probable reaction to the resubmission would be." We will consider this criterion unevaluable due to lack of information.

5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** There is not sufficient information to evaluate this criterion.

6. **Use of experts.** Although not discussed in depth, it is clear that experts had an impact on the CBW policy question. The President's Science Advisory Committee was one source of expertise. Outside experts could occasionally "plead their cause directly to members of the staffs of the various interdepartment groups studying the issue" (Frank, 1975, p. 322).

7. **Explication of Goals.** The process allowed for a full review of military, "technical, diplomatic, political, and arms control considerations in a general conception of
U.S. objectives" (Frank, 1975, p. 322); therefore this criterion was fulfilled.

3. The Decision to Attempt a Prisoner-of-War Rescue at Son Tay - 1970

The International Context

One of the few concerns common to most Americans during the Nixon administration was the plight of the prisoners of war. Reports of brutal treatment, lack of adequate medical care, and even the death of American prisoners caused concern within the administration and among the general public. Negotiations aimed at freeing the prisoners of war were ineffective and it became apparent that the North Vietnamese would keep the American POWs in captivity, hoping that they would help to hasten American withdrawal.

Withdrawal was a long way off in 1970. There were almost 500 Americans held as prisoners of war in mid-1970 and over 425,000 American soldiers in Southeast Asia. If, indeed, the POWs were being held as hostages, they would remain in captivity a long time unless they could be rescued.

Information about POWs was sought after and held in high priority. There were two main reasons for seeking

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6This summary follows the account of Schemmer (1976).
good intelligence about American POWs. First, a humanitarian purpose would be served if families of those who had been declared missing could be sure that they were really alive, and second, information about POW whereabouts could be used to place those areas where POWs were known to exist off limits to U.S. bombing campaigns. This second reason was especially important beginning in the fall of 1966 when ROLLING THUNDER missions were being planned and executed against North Vietnam. This more than casual interest in the location of POWs led to an unusual discovery in May 1970 which would culminate in the Son Tay Raid six months later.

Narrative of the Decision

On May 9, 1970 members of the Defense Intelligence Agency who worked with photographic and other intelligence sources concluded that there were about fifty-five POWs at a compound near Son Tay, North Vietnam, and further, that they seemed to have indicated via "messages" left in the dirt that they were in need of rescue. The information was taken to Army Brigadier General, Donald D. Blackburn, who was the "Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities" (SACSA) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By late May, Blackburn had gotten permission from JCS Chairman General Wheeler (who was soon to
be replaced by Admiral Moorer) to go ahead with a feasibility study for a rescue mission. To insure the widest possible amount of intelligence resources would be brought to bear on the study the DIA, headed by Lt General Bennett, was put in charge of intelligence operations. By early June, "new high-altitude SR-71 photographs . . . confirmed beyond a doubt" (Schemmer, 1976, p. 53) the existence of a POW camp at Son Tay.

On June 5, a meeting of the JCS gave Blackburn additional support for his study, and several days later the CIA Director's Special Assistant for Southeast Asia Matters, George Carver, agreed to support the study (Schemmer, 1976, p. 56). By June 10 DIA's Blackburn had begun the feasibility study, and a plan to rescue the Son Tay prisoners was presented to a July 10 meeting of the Joint Chiefs presided over by its new Chairman, Admiral Moorer. "By this time DIA's 'make' on Son Tay was so detailed that sixty-one prisoners had been identified in the camp, by name and service" (Schemmer, 1976, p. 67). The plan called for a night raid by about fifty men who would fly 100 miles into North Vietnam in helicopters, assault the compound, rescue the POWs, and return. It was calculated that the attackers would have less then thirty minutes to accomplish their mission before North Vietnamese reinforcements would arrive. Meteorological conditions favored a late October
or November launch. "The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Blackburn's final recommendations. More detailed planning would be needed; then a joint task force would be trained to execute the raid on Son Tay" (Schemmer, 1976, p. 71).

Within a few days, Blackburn had asked Army Colonel Simons to lead the mission, and Air Force Brigadier General Manor was designated overall commander. Unknown to the growing team of planners, violent monsoon rains caused a nearby river to flood which resulted in the removal of all POWs from Son Tay to a compound fifteen miles away.

Over the next weeks and months a raiding force was assembled and trained, using as realistic conditions as were possible. This was coupled with the highest degree of security. One example which illustrates both realism and sincerity was the full-scale mock-up of Son Tay which the planners wanted to construct at Eglin Air Force Base.

Counterintelligence personnel cautioned against building the complete realistic replica that Blackburn and Simons had in mind. Too much detail would prematurely reveal the nature of the target to the raiders and the new construction would be difficult to explain to casual observers. More important, the 'spooks' pointed out, Russian photographic satellites passed over Eglin Air Force Base regularly. . . . Moreover, a Soviet trawler was operating in the Gulf of Mexico, clearly on an electronic intelligence-gathering mission. [The extra supply flights and increased radio activity which the training would require] might give the trawler enough of an 'indicator'
to warrant Cosmos 355, or a specially launched satellite, to take a closer look at Eglin Auxiliary Field Number 3. (Schemmer, 1976, p. 92)

Instead of a permanent mock-up, Blackburn built a portable one which could be dismantled during daylight hours, thus evading Soviet reconnaissance satellites. In addition, not even the men who were training for the mission knew that the mock-up was of a POW camp, let alone one in North Vietnam.

A steady stream of intelligence was funnelled through the Son Tay raid planners. Although the monsoons provided effective cover, SR-71 and drone coverage were flown over Son Tay regularly. Some of the information troubled the planners; for example, "photos taken since June 6 showed Son Tay Prison to be 'less active' than usual" (Schemmer, 1976, p. 93).

As training wore on, more high-level interest surfaced. Manor and Simons briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 16. They reported that their force could be deployed by October 8. On September 24 Manor discussed the raid with Secretary of Defense Laird in the presence of CIA Director Helms. Laird, who was aware of some last-minute diplomatic efforts to affect the release of the POWs, said he would have to coordinate with higher authority (Schemmer, 1976, p. 131).
The diplomatic approach proved fruitless. Kissinger's secret negotiations with Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam's Chief Negotiator in Paris, provided no cause for optimism. On September 27 Secretary of Defense Laird and Admiral Moorer first told President Nixon about the rescue proposal. Nixon approved the proposal in principle, but events in the Middle East had first priority at the time. Also, he wanted Kissinger to be briefed before a decision about the date of the raid was made.

On October 7 a full dress rehearsal was held by the rescue team. On the next day, two important meetings were held. First, the raid's planners met with representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Latest intelligence photographs failed to reveal any people in the Son Tay Prison. This lack of activity;

would be "attributed to the probability that the U.S. POWs were being kept in their cells for extended period of time." Don Blackburn would remember "sitting around [with some DIA interpreters], talking and looking at photographs, and someone said, I vaguely recall, 'It looks like they haven't been using this.'" Simons had a similar reaction. "The photographs brought me showed a difference in vegetation," he later remarked. Weeds were growing in the compound, and "I said to myself, 'Well, it's possible that they have restricted their movements. It's possible that they have locked them up.'" But he also thought, "It's possible they have moved them." (Schmmer, 1976, p. 137)
The second meeting that day was with Henry Kissinger. Kissinger seemed pleased with the plan. His main concern was avoiding putting any more Americans in POW camps should the raid fail. Blackburn assured him of a ninety-five to ninety-seven percent assurance of success. "During the drive back to the Pentagon, one participant thought to himself that there had been something odd about the meeting. Henry Kissinger had not even asked how sure they were that there were any prisoners at Son Tay" (Schemmer, 1976, p. 140). One can conclude from that remark that none of the briefers brought the subject up either.

The planners were informed that the November launch window would be used. The latest SR-71 photographs showed increased activity at Son Tay in early November. The mission took on greater urgency in mid-November when the North Vietnamese released the names of six dead POWs.

The final hurdle to be passed was a meeting with the President. On November 18 Admiral Moorer briefed Nixon on the raid. Also present were Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Laird, CIA Director Helms, Secretary of State Rogers, and Kissinger's deputy, Major General Haige. The meeting consisted mainly of the briefing by Moorer. He went through all the details of the raid from beginning to end.

Lastly, Moorer spoke of the objective of the mission--the POWs at Son Tay. "This is the only confirmed active POW camp outside
Hanoi, Mr. President. The Son Tay camp has a prisoner population of 70 Americans. Of these, 61 have been tentatively identified by name and service: 43 Air Force, 14 Navy, 4 Marines." (Schemmer, 1976, p. 161)

No one spoke in opposition to the mission. Kissinger spoke favorably of his meeting with the mission commanders, Colonel Simons and General Manor. Nixon asked only three questions: How soon must he decide, what cover stories would be used in case of failure, and how soon after launch would he know of the mission's fate?

Late that afternoon, Nixon gave the go-ahead for the raid. New information was still being received, however, and on November 19, only one day after Nixon's meeting, General Bennett of DIA told Admiral Moorer that he had learned from Maguyen Van Hoong, a senior North Vietnamese official who worked in the administration of POW camps, that the Son Tay prisoners had been moved to a new camp named Dong Hoi. DIA photo interpreters confirmed increased activity at Dong Hoi, yet Son Tay also looked active again. The following morning Moorer and Bennett had breakfast with Secretary of Defense Laird.

There, over breakfast, they told the Secretary of Defense that Leroy Manor had already issued the launch order to rescue POWs from a camp which they now knew, but Manor didn't, might be empty. Bennett told Laird the prisoners were "gone," but that it was his opinion they "might have been reintroduced" into Son Tay. (Schemmer, 1976, p. 178)
Laird decided to let the mission proceed. After Moorer and Bennett left, he phoned President Nixon to tell him the latest news and his decision. Nixon concurred with his order to let the mission proceed.

On November 21 the Son Tay mission was launched. No Americans were lost in the raid, but no POWs were found. As expected by some, they had been removed from Son Tay months before.

Structure and Process Summary

At the Presidential level, the decision was made after a single face-to-face group meeting which involved multiple agencies at a single level. Of course, there had been multiple meetings within DoD, but they did not involve Nixon. Outsiders were not a part of the deliberations. A single advisory unit provided all of the advice.

Evaluation of the Process Summary

1. Information - attention to quality. This is a most difficult assessment to make. The Son Tay raid planners were meticulous in their planning and they sought as much

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7Nixon, in his memoirs, gives a different version, indicating that he was unaware of the last-minute intelligence. "Apparently all the intelligence reports used for the planning of the operation had been several weeks old. Even if I had known when the operation was being planned that the reports were out of date, I believe I would still have given my approval." (Nixon, 1978, p. 860)
information as they felt was possible. Yet they had one bias which seems to have affected their analysis—they wanted to go. To what extent this great desire caused them to minimize unwanted information is unclear. What is clear, however, is that neither Kissinger nor the President asked the crucial question which might be what caused those subordinate to them to be more objective: What proof do we have that POWs are at Son Tay? Moorer asserted flatly at the November 18 meeting with Nixon that they were present, even going as far as breaking down the captives by service. Yet none questioned the accuracy of his statement. Once the mission had been given the go ahead, even the news from the North Vietnamese informant wasn't enough to prevent its launch. Overall, we will consider attention to quality of information to be present.

2. Multiple options - presented to the President. At the Presidential level there certainly was no mention of other options. Nor did the advisory system offer any alternative way of getting the POWs released.

3. Dissent - transmitted to the President. There was essentially no dissent present in the advisory process. The only recorded dissent at all came from an early meeting of the Joint Chiefs on July 10. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt, questioned whether all alternative sources might have been attempted.
None of his questiones focused on the raid, but on whether it was necessary. Was Blackburn sure that every possible avenue had been explored in the Paris peace talks to get the prisoners released? Was there anything else the United States could do to negotiate with Hanoi on the treatment of the POWs? (Schemmer, 1976, p. 71)

This is the only case of dissent in the behavior which Schemmer reports took place throughout the process. Was it effective? Schemmer continues:

One of those present . . . later remarked "You can describe Zumwalt's questions this way: they would have been great at the White House or over dinner with Henry Kissinger, but at the meeting, they were just irrelevant. He acted like a drone."

It was as if the planners left to the final decision-makers the "big questions" such as whether the operation should take place in light of some conflicting information on the status of Son Tay, but those questions never were raised.

4. Concern for implementation. Yes, this was clearly present. Most of the planning went into this very area, and most of the high-level briefings were on the feasibility of inserting the raiders at Son Tay Prison and removing the POWs to safety. The success of this aspect of the mission testifies in large measure to the concern shown for implementation.

5. Consideration of uncertainty. This aspect came up at both Kissinger's meeting and the final Nixon meeting.
The ninety-five to ninety-seven percent probability of success was cited at both meetings (Schemmer, 1976, pp. 139, 160). Although considered, the acceptance of success was uncritical. One very important aspect of uncertainty, that is, whether the prisoners were actually there, was not a topic at the decision-making level. This major flaw must weigh heavily in deciding that this criterion was not satisfied by the advisory process.

6. **Use of experts.** Yes, experts were used at every phase of the mission planning. Interestingly, none of the experts were available at Nixon's meeting, although the mission leaders had met with many of his advisors such as Kissinger, Haige, Laird, and, of course, Admiral Moorer.

7. **Explication of goals.** There were two goals which were clearly elucidated. First, of course, was the goal of rescuing some POWs for humanitarian reasons. A second goal which seemed to underlie thinking at the Nixon meeting (Schemmer, 1976, p. 164) was the uncovering of the North Vietnamese as inhumane wardens—not as the humanitarians which they had led anti-war activists to believe.
4. The Decision to Alert U.S. Military Forces During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War

Kissinger as Decision-Maker

The International Context

Henry Kissinger had been Secretary of State for only two weeks when the Egyptians and Syrians launched their October 6, 1973, attack on Israel. Although the Israelis were aware of the impending attack, they resisted internal pressure for a preemptive attack and by doing so sacrificed military advantage to political reality. Kissinger had often warned the Israelis about the political risks inherent in any Israeli preemptive strike, and since the United States was their only source of support, the Israelis had little recourse but to accept the first blow. Kissinger, too, had been aware of intelligence reports signaling an impending Arab attack. Still, he was convinced that the political move was to convince the Israelis that they must await the attack. In any event, Kissinger felt the Israelis would win any war in a few days. Golda Meir shared this view and prevailed over the attempts of Israeli Chief of Staff Elazar to strike first. Even if attacked, Meir was sure the Israelis could repulse the invaders in short order. Both Kissinger and Meir were wrong. Backed by large

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8This summary follows the accounts of Kalb and Kalb (1975), Binder (1975), and Nixon (1978).
quantities of advanced Soviet material, including a new mobile SAM-6 missile, the Arabs were proving to be an effective fighting force.

Narrative of the Decision

After several days of heavy Israeli losses, the announcement by the U.S. that it would provide additional military aid enabled the Israelis to launch a counteroffensive which resulted in Israeli troops crossing the Canal to the west bank by October 16. The Soviets were beginning to reevaluate their position vis-à-vis the Arab offensive. Premier Kosygin visited Egypt on the 16th and "discovered that the Egyptian Army, in contrast with President Sadat's boasts, was near a state of collapse" (Binder, 1975, p. 335). Kosygin wanted Sadat to accept, among other things, a cease fire in place to be guaranteed by the Soviet Union and the United States. Sadat was worried about the consequences of agreeing to a cease fire which might then be violated by the Israelis. Kosygin "told Sadat that the Soviet Union stood ready to help enforce the cease fire—all alone, if necessary" (Kalb & Kalb, 1975, p. 543).

Upon Kosygin's return to Moscow, Brezhnev invited Nixon to send Kissinger to Moscow to discuss the entire situation. Kissinger met with Brezhnev on October 20 and 21. The Soviet call for an early cease fire was agreed upon, as well
as the American desire to link any cease fire to the principle of direct talks between the Arabs and Israelis, a position previously unacceptable to Sadat.

On October 22 an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the wording of the Soviet-American call for a cease fire in place. On his return, Kissinger stopped in Israel to explain the terms of the cease fire. Back in Washington, on the morning of October 23, Kissinger received a call from the Soviets complaining of massive Israeli violations. Kissinger, who had communicated Meir's word that the Israelis would observe the cease fire, was furious. He called Israeli Ambassador Dimitz, who contended that the Egyptians had been the first to violate the agreement. Kissinger's own sources indicated that, while the Egyptian Third Corps, which was trapped on the east bank of the Canal, did violate the cease fire in a break-out attempt, the Israelis, after turning back the Egyptian assault, continued to fight toward the capture of the key city of Suez. If that objective were obtained, the Egyptian Third Corps of 100,000 men would surely be destroyed (Kalb & Kalb, 1975, pp. 549-550).

After some effort, a second cease fire was arranged for October 24, but moments before it went into effect, the Israeli army had reached Suez and had surrounded the Egyptian Third Corps. Sadat, worried about Israeli violations
against his precarious position, called for a joint Soviet-American peace-keeping force. Nixon and Kissinger were opposed to this move. At the same time, intelligence reports indicated that 50,000 Soviet airborne troops had been put on alert, an unprecedented eighty-five Russian ships were patrolling the Mediterranean, a dozen huge transport planes were flying toward Cairo, and "special military orders had been intercepted, suggesting the Russians might be preparing to intervene in the Middle East" (Kalb & Kalb, 1975, p. 552).

Early on the evening of October 24, Kissinger called Ambassador Dobrynin to relay Nixon's opposition to a Soviet-American peace-keeping force. At 9:25 PM (10:40 PM by some accounts), Dobrynin called Kissinger to read a message from Brezhnev to Nixon. Brezhnev urged the dispatching of a joint peace-keeping force, or, failing that, threatened to consider sending Soviet troops unilaterally. Brezhnev, one should recall, had promised Sadat that if need be the Soviets would guarantee the cease fire by themselves.

Events now moved rapidly, as Kissinger saw the need for some immediate action. First, he called Nixon who was in his living quarters at the White House where he would remain throughout the decision-process.

The Secretary gave him a complete fill-in and suggested recommendation that the United States might have to alert its
military forces as one way of deterring any unilateral Soviet move. The President concurred and empowered Kissinger to take charge of the American response. He added that if there were any problems, he would be available immediately. (Kalb & Kalb, 1975, p. 554)

Kissinger used three groups of experts to provide an analysis of Brezhnev's note and Soviet intentions in general. "Sonnenfeldt met with a small group of Soviet experts at the White House; Sisco, with a group of Middle East specialists at the State Department; and David Popper, then Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations, with a group of UN experts."

Kissinger called a meeting of what Schlesinger termed the abbreviated National Security Council. It was abbreviated because the chairman, President Nixon, was upstairs, while Kissinger represented himself as both Secretary of State and Assistant for National Security Affairs. Agnew, the Vice President, had resigned and there had been no director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness for fourteen months. A council aide made the comment that "officially the meeting consisted of Kissinger, Kissinger and Schlesinger" (Binder, 1975, p. 336). Also present were William Colby, the CIA Director; Admiral Moorer, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Brent Scowcroft; and Alexander Haig, Chief of the White House Staff.

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Binder (1975, p. 336) notes that Haig functioned more as a go-between than as a member of the decision-making group.
By the time the meeting convened at 11:00 PM, Kissinger's groups of experts had concluded that there was a high probability of unilateral Soviet moves. Kissinger:

informed the President's top advisors about the experts' opinion. Then he distributed copies of all recent Brezhnev communications, plus the latest note, and asked everyone present to study the package. Without exception, they concluded that the tone of the note received that night was "totally different" from the earlier communications—"harsh," "blunt," "leaving nothing to the imagination." (Kalb & Kalb, 1975, p. 554)

The American response to the Soviet note was two-fold. First, at the abbreviated National Security meeting, "Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger swiftly agreed on a modified alert as the United States meeting response designed to persuade the Soviet Union against acting alone" (Binder, 1975, p. 336). Secondly, Kissinger embarked on a number of diplomatic moves, including the notification of some allies, contact with UN Ambassador Scali to begin negotiations for a new Security Council resolution, and, lastly, the drafting of a reply to the Brezhnev note which precipitated that night's activity. Kissinger wrote that the United States would not tolerate unilateral military action by the Soviet Union and called for a joint proposal in the UN. "That done, according to an aide, a weary Mr. Kissinger walked upstairs and reported to President Nixon and obtained his

---

10There is some question as to whether Nixon and Kissinger ever met face-to-face that night. Kalbe & Kalb (1975,
'ratification' of the moves, including the second note to Mr. Brezhnev" (Binder, 1975, p. 337). All these events transpired over the course of less than six hours from the time the Brezhnev note was received.

Structure and Process Summary

The President made his "decision" consulting only with Kissinger (although messages were relayed through General Haig). Since Nixon agreed with Kissinger prior to the meetings held that night that the response should be military as well as political (Binder, 1975, p. 336), it must be concluded that he did give consent to the general response leaving the specifics to Kissinger which he approved later. In this context, we can properly view this decision in two contexts. First, in the context of Nixon-as-President-decision-maker and second, of Kissinger-as-surrogate President.11

p. 356) note: "It is curious that, considering the seriousness Kissinger ascribed to the crisis, the Secretary never saw the President that night. Nixon, who struck a number of his close advisors as 'remote' remained in his living quarters, upstairs, while his advisors conferred downstairs. Kissinger talked with the Chief Executive only once—on the phone. All other messages were relayed through Haig. Nixon's own memoirs do not mention any meeting or direct contact with Kissinger that night. (Nixon, 1978, pp. 938-939) 11Woll and Binstock (1975), in their introduction to the Binder article, suggest that Kissinger could be considered a surrogate President on this occasion.
Since we are primarily concerned with the President as decision-maker, we must consider the applicability of the criteria to the events surrounding his decision. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to see how well the structure performed if Kissinger is considered the decision-maker and surrogate President. Let us look at that structure and process first and the degree to which our criteria for good advice was met. Later we will consider Nixon as decision-maker.

Evaluation of Process Criteria

Kissinger utilized multiple agencies at a single level with no outside participants included at the single meeting. The interaction was face-to-face group, and while he used only one advisory unit, he did employ three independent groups of "experts."

1. **Information - attention to quality.** Kissinger attempted to utilize several sources. In addition to the Brezhnev note, Kissinger and his group used intelligence sources (which were evaluated by his expert group) to fill in information on Soviet actions. The Director of the CIA was present. Kissinger made sure each of the members had recent Soviet messages. It seems that prior to the meeting CIA Director Colby was unaware of the most recent Soviet note (Binder, 1975, p. 336).
2. **Multiple options - presented to the President.** It is impossible to tell with certainty whether multiple options were considered. It seems unlikely that there were many options considered and the evidence, although circumstantial, is presented below.

   a. While the possibility of other options exist, it is important to note that they are not mentioned in any account.

   b. The record indicates that Nixon and Kissinger conferred before the meeting and at that time Kissinger had "recommended that the U.S. might have to alert its military forces as one way of deterring any unilateral Soviet move" (Kalb & Kalb, 1975, p. 554).

   c. While references to the meeting are spotty, they do indicate a swiftness that belies much discussion, let alone opposition. For instance, Binder (1975, p. 336) says, "the abbreviated National Security Council met at about 11:00 PM, and Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger swiftly agreed on a modified alert as the United States military response."

   d. With regard to Kissinger's reply to Brezhnev, it was apparently written after the meeting, by Kissinger alone, who then obtained Nixon's ratification.

3. **Dissent - transmitted to the President.** Dissent, too, seems to be missing, for many of the same reasons as
above. With regard to the analysis of the Brezhnev note, Kissinger's assembled band of advisors agreed on its intent "without exception" (Kalb & Kalb, 1975, p. 354). When noting that Kissinger "quickly decided that the United States had to alert its military forces," (Kalb & Kalb, 1975, p. 555) encapsulate the unanimity with two words—"Schlesinger agreed." Finally, in his memoirs, Nixon (1978, p. 939) claims that the advisors provided him with a "unanimous recommendation "to put U.S. forces on military alert.

4. **Concern for implementation.** It is impossible to evaluate this criterion from the information available.

5. **Consideration of uncertainty.** It is impossible to evaluate this criterion from the information available.

6. **Use of experts.** Kissinger assembled three groups of experts on Soviet, Middle East, and UN affairs. In addition, the opinion of the experts was distributed at the NSC meeting. It is important to note that the experts were used primarily in evaluating information, not in the decision-making itself.

7. **Explication of goals.** Kissinger's stated goal was the prevention of either unilateral Soviet intervention or a joint Soviet-American peace-keeping force. Kissinger repeatedly warned of the possibility of big power involvement leading to increased instability in the area. His goal was
always, as it was that night, the establishment of a Security Council sponsored cease fire peace-keeping force.

5. The Decision to Alert U.S. Military Forces During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War

Nixon as Decision-Maker

Decisions 4 and 5 can be considered as two case studies, having the same international context and narrative of decision. If we look at Nixon as the decision-maker, the structure and process summary changes. Now we have only a single-agency input (State) from a single level. Outsiders were not a part of the process. The interaction is mediated in a single meeting (or phone call, depending on the source). Only one advisory unit is used.

Evaluation of the Process Criteria

1. Information - attention to quality. It is impossible to evaluate this criterion, given the available information.

2. Multiple options - presented to the President. It is clear that the President was presented with only one option, that being the course of action presented to him by Kissinger.

3. Dissent - transmitted to the President. There was no dissent. Nixon and Kissinger were in full accord as to what the American response to the Russian note should be.
4, 5, & 6. **Concern for implementation, consideration of uncertainty, and use of experts.** There is no evidence which suggests that these criteria were present. Indeed, given the fact that the "decision" was made several hours after the alert had been ordered by Kissinger, it seems impossible that they could have been considered.

7. **Explication of goals.** Kalb and Kalb (1975, p. 554) indicate that Kissinger and Nixon were in agreement before any decision was made that our response should be one which would be interpreted by the Soviets as achieving our goal of deterring them from any unilateral action.

### The Nixon Decisions - A Summary

The data displayed in Table 6 shows that Nixon, like all of his predecessors studied in this dissertation, used various advisory structures. In the aggregate, the presence of the process criteria was quite high: sixty-two percent for Nixon, compared to thirty percent for Johnson, seventy-five percent for Kennedy, thirty-five percent for Eisenhower, and fifty-five percent for Truman.

For all except the Johnson administration, analysis of the data suggested that there was a difference in criteria fulfillment between decision units which contained interagency vs. single-agency input. Does this relationship hold for Nixon? Decisions 1, 2, 3 and 4 are products
Table 6

SUMMARY OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
ADVISORY STRUCTURES AND THE PRESENCE OF THE SEVEN PROCESS CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advisory Structure</th>
<th>Decisions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. COMPOSITION OF DECISION UNIT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Interagency vs single agency</td>
<td>inter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Multiple level vs single level</td>
<td>m/d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Outside participants</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. INTERACTION PATTERNS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Face-to-face group</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mediated</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. One-on-one</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS</td>
<td>multi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. NUMBER OF ADVISORY UNITS</td>
<td>sngl</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EVALUATION OF THE PRESENCE OF THE PROCESS CRITERIA

| 1. Information | yes | yes | yes | yes | m/d |
| 2. Options | yes | yes | no | no | no |
| 3. Dissent | yes | yes | no | no | no |
| 4. Implementation | yes | m/d | yes | m/d | no |
| 5. Uncertainty | yes | m/d | no | m/d | no |
| m/d = missing data | m/d | yes | yes | yes | no |
| 6. Experts | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| 7. Goals | no | yes | yes | yes | yes |
of interagency input. For these, seventeen of the twenty-three aggregated criteria were present—or seventy-four percent. For Decision 5, a product of single-agency advice, we find only one of the six criteria present—or sixteen percent.

The difference between Decisions 4 and 5 are instructive, both in the structural characteristics utilized, and in the criteria present. You may recall that Decisions 4 and 5 relate to the same event (the U.S. military alert during the October 1973 War) looked at from two different perspectives. Decision 4 looks at Kissinger acting as decision-maker and surrogate President; Decision 5 looks at Nixon as decision-maker. As we can see from a look at Table 6, there are two rather different advisory structures. Decision 4 utilized interagency participation and face-to-face group interaction. Decision 5 utilized single agency input and mediated advice. Are there any differences in the fulfillment of the seven process criteria for good advice? Yes, in Decision 4, three of the five criteria coded were present—or sixty percent. For Decision 5, only one of the six—or seventeen percent—were present. While one cannot make generalizations from two cases, this relationship is supportive of the general relationships we found in the previous chapters.
In general, there doesn't seem to be anything unique about the structures which Nixon relied upon for advice. His reliance primarily on interagency composition of advisory groups and face-to-face group advice would suggest a relatively high percentage of the process criteria being fulfilled. This is borne out by the sixty-two-percent fulfillment as indicated above.

We have now completed our examination of national security decisions in five administrations. We have suggested in these administration-by-administration summaries that there are certain relationships which seem to exist between certain types of structural combinations and the associated presence of the process criteria which we feel important for the generation of good advice. In the final chapter we will continue the analysis in a cross-administration manner.
CHAPTER X
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Commentators have been giving advice to decision-makers for centuries. Some of this advice has been on the nature of advice itself. Consider the following:

A prudent prince must [choose] for his council wise men, and giving these alone full liberty to speak the truth to him . . . he must ask them about everything and hear their opinion . . . and in these councils and with each of these men comport himself so that everyone may see that the more freely he speaks, the more he will be acceptable. (Machiavelli, p. 87)

What Machiavelli perceived nearly five centuries ago was that there is a link between the decision-maker and the advice which he receives, and that he must insure the presence of certain processes if he is to receive good advice. In the following sections, we will explore the relationship between the structure of the national security advisory system and the presence of certain criteria which we feel necessary for the production of quality advice.

The General Relationship Between Structure and Process

We began this dissertation by suggesting that a highly manipulable variable—the structure of the advisory system which supports Presidential decision-making for national
security matters—might have important consequences for the quality of advice which a President receives. We defined quality advice as the advice that is generated in the presence of seven process criteria, the fulfillment of which is required for the President to get consistently good advice. Although we realize that other variables (such as Presidential personality and the nature of the situation itself) are of considerable importance in the decision process, we felt that the structural variable was one which deserved greater study. One prime reason for this belief is that the structural variable is manipulable; that is, the organization for national security advisory functions is such that the President is able to change it at will. Being so readily changed, an evaluation of the relative performance of various types of advisory structures would be a valuable addition to information on decision-making.

What can we conclude about the relationship between the various advisory structures and the presence of the seven process criteria in the decision setting? Although each of the chapters dealing with the Presidential decision-making concluded with a brief summary of these relationships as they appeared for that given administration, it remains to be seen whether more generalizable and systematic conclusions can be inferred from the data.
Let us look first at the aggregate fulfillment of the seven process criteria across the five administrations covered in this dissertation. Table 7 displays this data. Down the left hand side of the table we note the various structural characteristics which were involved in the advisory process. Down the right hand side of Table 7 are percentages which indicate the percentage of the total number of criteria which were present when the corresponding structural characteristic was present in the advisory process. Thus, we note that when there was an "interagency" composition of the advisory structure \(N = 16\), sixty-five percent of the criteria aggregated for all decisions were present. On the other hand, when we look at all the cases where single-agency advice was a part of the advisory structure \(N = 6\), we find that only twenty-three percent of the aggregated criteria were present. Although the total number equals twenty-two \(N = 22\) (that is, twenty-two decisions were examined across five administrations), the number for any structural characteristic could be smaller than twenty-two because of missing data. The sum of the "interaction patterns" is greater than twenty-two because the characteristics are not mutually exclusive.

A careful examination of Table 7 highlights the following results. When interagency advisory units \(N = 16\) are employed, we find that a greater percentage of the process
Table 7

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY SYSTEMS AND THE PRESENCE OF THE SEVEN PROCESS CRITERIA FOR GOOD ADVICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>Aggregate % of Criteria Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. COMPOSITION OF THE ADVISORY UNIT</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Interagency (N = 16)</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single agency (N = 6)</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Multiple level (N = 8)</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single level (N = 13)</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Outsiders included (N = 5)</td>
<td>94%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No outsiders (N = 17)</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. INTERACTION PATTERNS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Face-to-face group (N = 16)</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mediated (N = 7)</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. One-on-one (N = 2)</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. FREQUENCY OF MEETINGS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. One meeting (N = 13)</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple meetings (N = 8)</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
criteria are fulfilled than when single agency units (N = 6) are employed (sixty-five to twenty-three percent). Similarly, when multiple-level advisory structures (N = 8) are employed, we find a greater percentage of process criteria being present than when single-level units (N = 13) are employed (sixty-eight to forty-three percent). Although the inclusion of outsiders was found in only five decisions, the presence of outsiders insured a higher percentage of criteria present than in cases where outsiders were not involved (ninety-four to forty-seven percent).

With regard to the second cluster of structural characteristics, interaction patterns between the President and his advisors, we find that in cases where face-to-face group interaction patterns (N = 16) were used, a greater percentage of criteria were present than in cases where either mediated (N = 7) or one-on-one (N = 2) interaction patterns were used (sixty-eight to twenty-six percent and twenty-one percent, respectively).

We also note the difference that frequency of meetings makes. In cases of single meetings (N = 13), the aggregate percentage of criteria present was forty-four percent compared to seventy-four percent in cases of multiple meetings (N = 8).
The number of decision units was one in all cases examined so no analysis based on this structural characteristic can be made.

What implications do the above findings have? First, they would seem to indicate that the "best" decision structure, that is, the structure with which one would find the greatest chance of criteria being present in the process, would be one which included interagency participation with multiple levels and outsiders included, coupled with multiple, face-to-face group meetings. The least desirable combination would include single level, single agency, single meeting with no outsiders included who interact with the President in either a mediated or one-on-one fashion. Are there any real world decisions which fit these profiles? Yes, and these are displayed in Table 8. As we can see, there are only two decisions which fit the "most desirable" profile, but four which fit the least desirable profile. These four are spread throughout the administrations covered. The decisions with the best profiles came in the Kennedy administration and concerned the neutralization of Laos and the Cuban missile crisis. The worst profile decisions were spread among four administrations: Truman (use of the UN in Korea); Eisenhower (cancellation of the Aswan Dam loan); Kennedy (cancellation of Skybolt), and Nixon (military forces alert, October 1973).
Table 8

COMPARISON OF THE "BEST" AND "WORST" STRUCTURAL COMBINATIONS IN ACTUAL DECISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BEST STRUCTURAL COMBINATION</th>
<th>WORST STRUCTURAL COMBINATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interagency</td>
<td>Single agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple level</td>
<td>Single level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsiders consulted</td>
<td>No outsiders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Face-to-face group</td>
<td>Mediated or one-on-one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple meetings</td>
<td>Single meeting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECISIONS</th>
<th>DECISIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Laos (Kennedy, No. 1)</td>
<td>1. UN/Korea (Truman, No. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cuba (Kennedy, No. 2)</td>
<td>2. Aswan Dam (Eisenhower, No. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Skybolt (Kennedy, No. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Military Alert (Nixon, No. 5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PERCENT OF CRITERIA PRESENT: **100%**  
PERCENT OF CRITERIA PRESENT: **04%**
How did the suggested best and worst structural combinations work in reality? The best structure fulfilled all fourteen (100 percent) of the criteria in the two cases where it was present. In the decisions which employed the least effective structure, only one of the twenty-four recorded criteria was present (four percent). While the number of decisions is far too small to be significant in a statistical way, they do suggest that structure does make a difference regarding the presence of the seven process criteria.

Do we ever find all the criteria present in cases where the structural characteristics do not match the best profile? Yes, but only twice. And in each of these decisions the structural characteristics differ from the best profile by only one structural characteristic. For example, Kennedy's decision to pressure Diem to liberalize his domestic policies used only a single level, while Nixon's decision on the use of CBW agents was the product of a single meeting. Aside from these deviations, all the components of the best structure were present.

Table 9 indicates the relationship between the presence of the seven process criteria and the degree to which the decision structure resembles the best profile presented above. For the four cases where all the criteria were present (missing data is excluded) only two of the possible
Table 9

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEVIANCE FROM THE "BEST STRUCTURAL PROFILE" AND MISSING PROCESS CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nr. of Missing Criteria</th>
<th>Nr. of Cases</th>
<th>Nr. of Structural Characteristics Different from &quot;Best&quot;</th>
<th>Per Case Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more than 3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

twenty-eight structural characteristics differed from the best profile, for an average per decision difference of one-half. (There are seven structural characteristics which are looked at for each decision, excluding the number of advisory units which was single in all cases.) For the one case where one criterion was absent, the per-decision difference was one. For the seven cases where two process criteria were different, there was an average of three structural characteristics per decision which differed from the best profile. For the nine cases where more than three process criterion were absent, there was a four and two-tenths structural characteristic difference.

We conclude from the data presented in Table 9 that as an advisory structure departed from the best profile, the
average number of criteria which were absent increased. So, while it was possible to get perfect fulfillment with other than the best profile, it is clear that to depart significantly from this standard greatly increased the chance that a larger number of process criteria would not be present.

Structure and the Presence of Specific Criteria

In the above section we have looked for relationships between the structure of the advisory system and the presence of the aggregated process criteria. While this is useful in identifying the utility of certain structural characteristics as a whole, it does not address the question of whether some criteria are more frequently associated with the presence of specific advisory structures. Let us begin an exploration of this subject by looking at aggregated data once more. This time we will look at the extent to which specific criteria are associated with the presence of specific structural characteristics. As a starting point, it is useful to know how well the process criteria were fulfilled, regardless of structure. We can use this information as a benchmark. Table 10 displays this information.

Looking at Table 10 we see that five of the criteria (information, implementation, uncertainty, experts, and goals) were present in more than half the decisions. Their presence ranged from 56% for implementation to 76% for
goals. Two of the process criteria (options and dissent) were present in only about one-quarter of the decisions.

We can see then that there is a wide latitude in the presence of the process criteria. Do certain structures promote the presence of individual process criteria in the same way they did the aggregated criteria? Let us look at Table 11 which displays the relationship between the various structural components and the presence of specific process criteria. Table 11 can be compared to Table 1 (page 63) which displayed our initial assessment of how each structural characteristic would either promote or discourage the presence of the process criteria. In general, our initial assessments were proven to be quite accurate.
Table 11

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESENCE OF VARIOUS STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS AND THE AGGREGATED PERCENTAGE OF SPECIFIC PROCESS CRITERIA PRESENT FOR ALL DECISIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF ADVISORY SYSTEMS</th>
<th>PERCENT PROCESS CRITERIA WERE PRESENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. COMPOSITION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Interagency (N=16)</td>
<td>81% Info 31% Optn 37% Dsnt 75% Impl 75% Unct 85% Expt 80% Goal 80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Multiple level (N=8)</td>
<td>100% Info 50% Optn 38% Dsnt 57% Impl 80% Unct 86% Expt 75% Goal 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Outsiders (N=5)</td>
<td>100% Info 100% Optn 80% Dsnt 66% Impl 100% Unct 100% Expt 100% Goal 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No outsiders (N=17)</td>
<td>64% Info 12% Optn 18% Dsnt 62% Impl 50% Unct 64% Expt 73% Goal 73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. INTERACTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Face-to-face gp (N=16)</td>
<td>86% Info 40% Optn 33% Dsnt 75% Impl 75% Unct 92% Expt 86% Goal 86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mediated (N=7)</td>
<td>0% Info 13% Optn 13% Dsnt 33% Impl 43% Unct 38% Expt 71% Goal 71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. One-on-one (N=2)</td>
<td>0% Info 0% Optn 25% Dsnt 50% Impl 50% Unct 25% Expt 50% Goal 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. MEETINGS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Multiple mtgs (N=13)</td>
<td>100% Info 63% Optn 50% Dsnt 75% Impl 100% Unct 83% Expt 75% Goal 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single mtg (N=8)</td>
<td>64% Info 8% Optn 15% Dsnt 50% Impl 36% Unct 67% Expt 80% Goal 80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With regard to the composition of the decision group, we find that for all criteria interagency out-performs single agency, multiple-level out-performs single-level (with the exception of goals), and the presence of outsiders out-performs situations where outsiders are not present. Considering interaction patterns, we find the face-to-face group interaction is associated with the presence of all criteria to a greater degree than either one-on-one or mediated configurations. And, finally, with regard to the frequency of meetings, multiple meetings are associated with a greater percentage of each criterion (except goals) than single meetings.

There are then, we see, only several relationships which we did not anticipate in our discussions in Chapter III. While this is gratifying, we would be remiss if we did not give some consideration to those unexpected results.

In only two instances the percentages of criteria fulfillment (Table 11) did not live up to the expectations summarized in Table 1 (page 63). Both of these related to the criteria of "goals." We anticipated that multiple-level advisory systems would be more likely to consider the relationship between advice and goals than single-level advisory units. Actually, the reverse was true by a small margin (82% to 75%). Also, multiple meetings were expected to contribute to goal consideration more than single-meeting
advisory situations. Again, the reverse was true (80% to 75%). It is difficult to see reasons for this from the cases studied. Indeed, a conception of goals was present most of the time and structure seems to have little impact on its presence. Perhaps it is the case that most advisors realize that a President is likely to ask how a given recommendation is related to broader policy objectives and how it might affect other on-going policies. Thus, perhaps it is the case that the conception of goals and tradeoffs is considered to be a necessary component of advice at the Presidential level.

We also find a somewhat unexpected result under the implementation criteria. Twice (outsiders/no outsiders, and multiple-level/single-level), while the percentage fulfillment is in the direction hypothesized, the difference is so small as to be identical. It is apparent that those structural characteristics have a smaller effect than anticipated and we must admit that the reason for this is not understood.

Structure and the Presence of Specific Criteria within Administrations

We have examined several things in this chapter. First, we looked at the relationship between structural characteristics and the presence of aggregated criteria. We found that certain structural characteristics promoted the
presence of the process criteria more than others. Next, we examined the relationship between specific structural characteristics and the presence of specific criteria. In general, the relationships at the aggregate level held for specific criteria. In this section we will look at how the relationships uncovered above hold for specific administrations. Table 12 presents this information and displays the structural characteristics and the associated percentage of aggregated criteria which were present in each administration. We find that there is a great consistency between this information and the results previously discussed. For all the Presidents except Johnson, the results are consistent with what would be expected from looking at the results in the first section of this chapter. That is, the relationships between each structural characteristic and the process criteria for specific Presidents is consistent with those found in the aggregate analysis. The only exceptions occur in the Johnson administration. While the data previously examined would have suggested that Johnson would have had greater fulfillment of the criteria using multiple-group rather than single advisory units, and using face-to-face group interaction rather than mediated or one-on-one, we find that the opposite is true.

In the concluding section of the Johnson administration we had speculated that perhaps Johnson's style and personality was such that the influence of structure was diminished.
Table 12

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESENCE OF VARIOUS STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS AND THE AGGREGATED PERCENTAGE OF PROCESS CRITERIA PRESENT IN SPECIFIC ADMINISTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS</th>
<th>PERCENT OF PROCESS CRITERIA PRESENT FOR EACH ADMINISTRATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. COMPOSITION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Interagency ..............</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single agency ..............</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Multiple level ...........</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single level ...............</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Outsiders included .......</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No outsiders ...............</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. INTERACTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Face-to-face group ......</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Mediated ..................</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. One-on-one ...............</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. MEETINGS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Multiple meetings .......</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single meeting .............</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Certainly, Johnson is atypical for the five administrations which we examined. It is difficult to make a definitive analysis other than to suggest that perhaps Johnson's personality was such that he was more able to manipulate structures with group settings and interagency compositions than others. Of course, when we examine the structure and its relationship to the process criteria for any given administration, the number of cases is too small to make definitive generalizations. One problem is that a different selection of decisions might have led to different results. This subject is pursued in the following section.

Some Caveats

We realize that the results of the above analysis are highly dependent on the cases which were chosen for the study. One should recall the methodological considerations dealt with in Chapter IV. For example, the number of case studies which discuss the type of information in which we were interested is limited. Many case studies focus on the effects of decisions (what happened) rather than aspects of the processes which led to the decisions (how and why things happened). For many, it is the results of the decisions, rather than the decision-making itself which is most worthy of recounting. Many otherwise insightful and detailed case studies are not usable because they are not attentive to the decision process itself. Fewer still are attentive to the
advisory process. When we did have a choice of decisions which might be included, we attempted to include decisions which differed both in subject and time. Thus we attempted to choose decisions which were made at different times in a given administration and which focused on different aspects of the national security spectrum—crises, negotiating positions, arms development, foreign assistance, war, etc.

We see then that the decisions examined in this dissertation represent neither the universe of Presidential decision-making on national security matters, nor a scientific sample of that universe. Another problem which should be considered is that none of the case studies chosen were written specifically for the purpose to which they were put here. We are forced to recognize that the case study authors might have omitted information which could have modified some of the assessments which we have made. When possible, we tried to incorporate multiple sources for a single decision. However, even this tactic is no guarantee since many case study authors use the same or similar primary sources.

These caveats notwithstanding, we believe that the results of this research are valid and that they provide a springboard from which additional research on the relationship between structure and process might be based. There are several ways this research might be expanded. First,
one could increase the number of cases examined. This would serve to increase our confidence in the general applicability of the findings. A second avenue would be to ask the authors of the case studies used in this research to evaluate the decisions using the framework provided in this dissertation. This might lessen the problems of misinterpretation, and of data which might not have appeared in the published case study. A third, and perhaps best method of extending this research, would be to have various experts write new case studies using the framework developed here. Multiple case studies all written under a common framework would have advantages of comparability which are simply not possible using case studies not written under a common conceptual framework.

Some Implications for Policy-Makers

1. While the President may not be able to constitute advisory groups according to the "best" structure presented above, he can increase the likelihood of having the process criteria present by at least insuring that his advisory unit is of interagency composition. In the decisions studied, interagency composition of the advisory unit seemed to be the key variable in determining the presence of the criteria. Whether this variable was associated with multiple or single levels in the advisory structure, it was associated with a consistently high percentage of criteria present.
For example (leaving out the Johnson administration which we have seen is different than the others), in only one instance out of eleven cases did the fulfillment of the criteria fall below 50 percent when the advisory group was of interagency composition. On the other hand, in only two out of six cases did the fulfillment of the criteria exceed fifty percent for decisions involving single-agency advice. Another problem with single-agency advice was its strong association with single-level advice (in five out of six decisions). This combination produced an aggregate fourteen percent fulfillment of the criteria. It is interesting to note that sixteen of twenty-two decisions studied did involve an interagency advisory structure.

2. Following the above, if the President must rely on a single agency, he should seek to broaden participation by attempting to involve multiple levels of that organization. While we have only one instance of a single-agency/multiple-level advisory unit, we do find that it fulfilled sixty-seven percent of the criteria, opposed to fourteen percent for single-agency/single-level advisory units. The decisions involving single-level/single-agency advice include, for example, the decision to cancel Aswan Dam funding (Eisenhower), the decision to cancel Skybolt (Kennedy), and the military forces alert (Nixon). In each of these cases the consensus of commentators is that the Cabinet officer
involved for all practical purposes made the decision with the President serving as the ultimate approving authority. In each of these cases, it appears that the Presidents had somewhat different reasons for putting themselves in such a position. For Eisenhower, it was his operating style vis-a-vis his Secretary of State; for Kennedy, other more important matters intruded (Cuban missile crisis); and Nixon was beset with growing domestic problems stemming from Watergate. Whatever the reason for its appeal, if the stakes are perceived to be high enough, a President would do well to avoid single-agency advisory structures.

3. Outsiders, despite the impressive association with the presence of the process criteria are seldom used at the Presidential level of decision-making. In the twenty-two cases examined, outsiders were available to the President on only five occasions. While the sample is small, it indicates that Presidents are not prone to including outsiders in an advisory capacity. Nonetheless, when included, advisors were associated with a ninety-four percent fulfillment of the process criteria. This compares very favorably with a forty-seven percent fulfillment rate for those cases not involving outsiders. Outsiders were included at the Presidential level in three out of four of the Kennedy decisions looked at in this study (neutralization of Loas, Cuban crisis, pressure Diem). Other than these instances, experts
were available at the Presidential level only for two decisions with a high technological component—Johnson's ABM, and Nixon's chemical and biological warfare decision.

4. The presence of multiple options is lacking most of the time at the Presidential level. However, outsiders, multiple levels, and multiple meetings are factors which are associated with an increase in its presence. Overall, multiple options were present in only twenty-seven percent of the decisions. More seriously, they were present in only eight percent of cases involving a single advisory level; in only twelve percent of cases where outsiders were not present; and in only eight percent of the cases when single meetings were part of the decision structure. On the other hand, in cases where outsiders were present, there was one-hundred percent multiple option fulfillment; a sixty-four percent fulfillment in cases where multiple meetings were made; and a fifty percent fulfillment when multiple levels were employed.

The presence of multiple options is one of the key process criteria if one looks at the literature. Few commentators would argue that a single option is to be preferred over multiple options. Of course, some Presidents are characterized as preferring this kind of relationship between them and their advisors. Eisenhower, for example, is often characterized as wanting a single option for a decision.
Johnson, too, would fit into this pattern, although he is characterized as wanting his advisors to support the option which he himself had desired.

This lack of multiple options may suggest that bureaucratic politics is not of key importance at the Presidential level, but rather that bargaining between actors takes place before a Presidential confrontation. On the other hand, it may also speak something of the likemindedness of advisors upon which Presidents rely.

Whatever the reason, the research suggests that there may be some structural remedies if Presidents want to have more than a single option to consider. First, in every case, outsiders were associated with multiple options. Multiple meetings were eight times more successful in being associated with multiple options than were single meetings (sixty-three percent to eight percent). Multiple levels were far more successful in being associated with the presence of multiple options than were single levels (fifty percent to eight percent). Each of these structural characteristics broadens participation either in the number of people involved or in the frequency of problem consideration.

5. The presence of dissent is lacking most of the time at the Presidential level. While the structural remedies presented above also work with dissent, they are somewhat less effective. Overall, dissent was present in only
twenty-seven percent of the decisions. As was the case with multiple options, dissent was least present in decision structures which were of a single level (fifteen percent), or had but a single meeting (fifteen percent), or where outsiders were not present (eighteen percent). Multiple-level participation increased the presence of dissent to thirty-eight percent, multiple meetings to fifty percent, and outsider participation to eighty percent.

The presence of dissent is another of the process criteria which is widely considered beneficial to good decision-makers. The general lack of its presence is somewhat surprising. The explanation for its absence is uncertain, and we can merely suggest two possibilities. First, perhaps the lack of dissent suggests that bureaucratic politics is less prevalent at the highest levels than at lower levels. That is, with most national security issues, a consensus is arrived at below Presidential level and differences do not surface in front of the President. On the other hand, the explanation could be personality-related. For example, the Presidential team, in spite of differences, is generally reluctant to present serious objections to what they believe the President desires. Individuals sometimes find it hard to take independent stands. Sorensen (1963, p. 62) reminds us that:
Even the most distinguished and forthright advisor is reluctant to stand alone. If he fears his persistence in a meeting will earn him the disapprobation of his colleagues, a rebuff by the President, or (in the case of a "leak") the outrage of the Congress, press, or public, he may quickly seek the safety of greater numbers.

Conclusion

It is apparent that structure is a variable which deserves more consideration from policy-makers who would want to have the process criteria which we believe are necessary for good decisions present in their advisory systems. It appears doubtful that structure in and of itself leads invariably to the presence of the process criteria. As we have seen in the Johnson decisions, this was not the case. Nonetheless, it does appear as though certain structures do promote the presence of the process criteria given the fact that the advisory system is not unduly influenced by any of the following.

1. Presidential style or personality. We have seen that personality and style influence the degree to which any advisory structure can produce the presence of the seven process criteria. The strong influence of personality pervades the advisory structure of all administrations. Sometimes it influences advisors toward advice which is the product of the process criteria. At other times it inhibits the presence of these criteria. But it is always there and
underlies even the decision as to what type of advisory structure a President will establish. Sorenson (1963, p. 58) observes that "each President must determine for himself how best to elicit and assess the advice of his advisors." He then goes on to enumerate certain personality and style issues which shape these decisions and cites Kennedy's aversion to meetings as one of these.

Who the President will listen to is also influenced by his personality and the personalities of his advisors. In assessing the merits of advisors and their advice, the President "need not weigh them equally. For toward some he will have more respect. With some he will communicate easier. For some he will have more affection." (Sorensen, 1963, p. 76).

The result of Johnson's overriding influence on his advisory system and the knowledge that he wanted consensus and reinforcing opinions was that even when he used structures which would usually be associated with the presence of certain process criteria, he failed to get them. It is not enough then to merely set up an advisory structure and hope that it produces certain qualities which are deemed useful for national security decision-making. In the presence of counterproductive Presidential interference, even the best advisory structure is sure to break down.
2. **The nature of the decision.** There are times, of course, when it is impossible to achieve the ideal advisory structure. Short decision time might prevent the formation of interagency groups, might preclude multiple meetings or multiple levels from being employed, or prevent the inclusion of outsiders. Nonetheless, if an advisory system is sensitive to the results that such combinations often engender, the attempt might be made to include at least one of these structures in the advisory process. Presidents could anticipate such requirements in advance of crises and establish mechanisms to deal with such situations. Nixon's Washington Special Actions Group which attempted to anticipate the requirements of crises decision-making in advance is an example of this procedure. These preparations notwithstanding, the probability of unexpected events occurring are almost certain. For these, perhaps there is no adequate preparation, and the risk of poor advice remains high. The importance of time, for instance, is highlighted by President Kennedy's remark on the Cuban missile crisis which is quoted in Sorensen (1963, p. 30): "If we had had to act in the first twenty-four hours, I don't think ... we would have chosen as prudently as we finally did."

There are times also, when the advisory system is constrained by the past, by decisions made prior in times which have perhaps already set the limits of permissible action in the present.
3. The nature of bureaucratic and organizational politics. Given the reward structures which influence the behavior of organizations and their leaders, it is not surprising that they often seek to exclude rather than include other organizations in what they perceive as their domain. This runs counter to the formation of structural characteristics which involve multiple-agency input and which are associated with the presence of the seven process criteria. Thus, as we saw in the Eisenhower administration, when any one individual or agency is given sole responsibility for advice in a specific area, we are not likely to find (in the absence of any other stimulus) that they will broaden the search for information and input from others. Thus we see that it is largely the responsibility of the President himself to insure that he encourages the formation of mechanisms which will promote the presence of the process criteria.

4. Fortuity. There is also the element of chance to be considered; that is, occurrences that cannot or are not planned. Deutsch (1968, p. 78-79) likens the making of foreign policy to a pinball machine. If we may borrow this analogy and extend it to the advisory process, we note that some actors or groups, represented by pins, are more strategically placed and, over the long run, have greater influence in the decision or outcome of the game. The
interplay is important in the long run, but for any single game or decision, the structure of the game (distribution of pins or actors) may have little impact. "Outcomes," says Deutsch," can be predicted with fair confidence for a large number of runs, but for the single run—as for the single decision—even at best only some probability can be stated." (1968, p. 78).

We note in our own analysis that certain structural characteristics are associated with the presence of certain process criteria. Yet, for some individual decisions, the general relationship did not hold. Our explanations for these cases are not wholly adequate and the true explanation may be found in some variable not considered in this research or by the element of chance.

We conclude with the observation that structure cannot by itself account for the presence or absence of the process criteria. Yet the associations uncovered in this research between certain structural configurations and the presence of the seven process criteria seem too regular to be accounted for by chance. Perhaps the most general conclusion is that while good structure in itself is not sufficient to promote the presence of the process criteria, it may, in most instances, be necessary. The data suggests that certain advisory structures almost always promote the absence of the
criteria, and, while good structure might not guarantee the presence of the criteria, bad structure almost guarantees their absence.

President Eisenhower wrote:

Organization cannot make a genius out of an incompetent; even less can it, of itself, make the decisions which are required to trigger necessary action. On the other hand, disorganization can scarcely fail to result in inefficiency and can easily lead to disaster. (1963, p. 114).

In conclusion, we wish to extend that observation by suggesting that, while certain structural characteristics of the advisory process cannot by themselves guarantee good advice, the lack of these structures in the advisory process will almost invariably promote advice that is incomplete and based on only a portion of the expertise available to the President. Such advice can readily lead to undesirable consequences.
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