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Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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***

The Ohio State University
1979

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Heather
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I wish to acknowledge the delicate and valuable assistance given to an old man by Dr. Richard Pratte and Dr. Gerald Reagan.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Ideological Arena

The battle for the control of the minds of men is ancient. In Genesis we find one suggested origin of the conflict. In it, God and Satan are pitted against each other in a marvelous struggle for Adam and Eve. And, although Satan was the victor in the initial battle, God refused to capitulate. His counterattack set in motion a war of minds which has yet to be concluded. In those original actions and throughout the ensuing ages, it has been the "quest for certainty"—the actual or created dependency of man upon some external source for explanatory beliefs— which has defined the parameters of the battleground.

John Dewey, Karl Popper, Erich Fromm, and Eric Hoffer are but a few writers who have offered philosophical, historical, psychological, and sociological accounts of how the battle has been progressing as well as suggested reasons for the directions it has taken and the impact of those directions upon man.¹

In discussing the options open to man as a means to the security he seems compelled to seek, Dewey claims that "people of old waivered

between thinking arts to be the gift of the gods and to be an invasion of their prerogatives." Such wavering is suggested by the story of the Fall. As Adam and Eve turned to the arts rather than supplication for control over their environment, an angered God cast them out of the Garden before the invasion of His prerogatives progressed too far.

This placing of limits on the source of knowledge and experience, which, in turn, establishes the boundries of thought and action, is the act of an ideologue seeking to gain control over the minds of others. Once the limits are established, the dogmatist can claim that "the ultimate and absolute truth is already embodied in [his]... doctrine and that there is no truth nor certitude outside it. The facts on which the true believer bases his conclusions must not be derived from his experience or observations but from Holy Writ." Thus, the ideological arena is the locus of the war for the minds of men, and the limiting of experience and knowledge became ideology's ultimate weapon.

History provides numerous examples of the use of the weapon. Successful despots, dictators, and benevolent keepers of the faith have recognized that the key to controlling the mind lay in the restriction on experiences and knowledge and the resultant limiting of thought and action. Politicians, religious hierarchies, and educationists also have sought to limit and manipulate the experiences of those they wished to control. The political, religious, and educational history of man

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2Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p. 3.

3Hoffer, The True Believer, p. 78.
provides a vast battle map of ideological warfare.

Humankind may have been a willing victim at times because of "a tendency to locate the shaping forces of our existence outside ourselves," and individuals may turn over freedom to those external forces because they believe that "unless a man has talents to make something of himself, freedom is an irksome burden," which leads to loneliness and a lack of security and identity. Still, we try the apple.

For example, Erich Fromm tells us that although "freedom to" has not yet been achieved, it has been an "ideal to which mankind has stuck even if it was often expressed in abstruse and irrational forms." For Fromm, the future of democracy itself "depends on the realization of the individualism that has been the ideological aim of modern thought since the Renaissance." Further, "the only criterion for the realization of freedom is whether or not the individual actively participates in determining his life . . . and this not only by the formal act of voting but in his daily activity, in his work, and in his relations to others."

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4Ibid., p. 6.

5Ibid., p. 30.

6Fromm, Escape from Freedom, p. 269. For Fromm, "freedom from" is of negative value in human individualism as it is an initial break from "passive adaptation" to external ties and definitions of self, e.g., God, the group, and the like. "Freedom to" is the result of a dialectic process leading to realization of the individual as an active, "self-determining, productive individual." See pp. 24-39.

7Ibid., p. 270.

8Ibid., p. 273.
As societies have become more culturally diverse and the foundation of knowledge and understanding has become broader, individuals, groups, and nations have increased the intensity of the battle to take part in controlling their destinies. These conditions can work against the attempts to control thought and action; but, because of the complexity which the changes have brought in their wake, the necessity to develop a clear conception of ideology as a weapon also has intensified. The necessity results from the fact that ideologies, and ideological discourse, the latter being the focus of this work, are mechanisms for providing "simplified meaning" in a world of complexity and diversity.9

In the relatively recent past, the weapon has been tagged and numerous attempts have been made to come to a better understanding of its nature and use. In the process, the notion of ideology has undergone a strange metamorphasis from being an aid to man to being the weapon itself and back to being an asset.

Recently, a modified position has emerged. Within it, "ideology submits to the grammar of modern rationality,\\^10 and by doing so, it offers a means for man's individualized participation in his destiny through "rational discourse in the public sphere."11 This perspective offers a means for man to gain not only "freedom from" the control of others but also a way to gain "freedom to" determine the course of his

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9 The idea that ideologies and ideological discourse function to provide meaning is discussed at greater length in chap. 6.


11 Ibid., p. 30.
fate and his society.

That rationality is a prime candidate for liberator of minds is not new. However, this perspective does bring about a subtle shift in viewing ideology. Rather than 'ideology' being an "object" to be examined, "ideological discourse" offers data to be utilized. This perspective forms the foundation of the effort in this work. Prior to an expansion of the purpose and method of this effort, it is necessary to indicate the relationship of the topic to my field of endeavor.

Ideology and Education

As a philosopher of education, I believe that theorizing is one of man's most rewarding and important activities. That is, along with the ideologues, I am interested in the functional role of ideas and the practical payoff of theorizing about them for the institution of schooling. I am, however, not concerned in this study with the content of particular ideologies or the impact of those ideologies upon past educational policies and decisions. Rather, my primary interest is the development of a linguistic framework (hereafter referred to as the Ideological Discourse Model, IDM) which will assist in achieving clarity about the structure and function of ideological discourse. Since language is a primary tool of educators, such knowledge may lead to new concepts and hypotheses regarding the role of the schools and the relationship of ideological discourse to that role.

Such efforts are especially crucial when the role and character of ideological discourse regarding the structure and function of the public schools is viewed from the perspective of recent criticism by Revisionists. Ideology and its relationship to education constitute
"a classical problem dating, one may suppose, from the earliest efforts of the Sophists to reconstruct the curriculum of Periclean Athens."\textsuperscript{12} Historians, educational philosophers, and analysts have expended great efforts in getting at the relationship between ideology ideas of the broader social, political, and economic scene and schooling which has been "notoriously difficult to characterize."\textsuperscript{13}

Recently, however, the Revisionists, operating from a simplistic view, have expressed concern over the utilization of the schools by dominant "ideologues." They claim that the role and character of the schools, with few exceptions, are a result of ideological manipulation. The Revisionist's claim is that the dominant descriptions and prescriptions regarding the role of schools were ideologically inspired because the individuals defining those roles had consciously or unconsciously accepted an ideological stance.

In some instances, the Revisionist critics of the institution of schooling suggest that decisions and arguments were conducted with the express purpose of justifying and inculcating the particular ideology in


vogue at the time. A prime example of this position can be found in *Roots of Crisis*. In this work, the authors support the collusion theory. They suggest that the structure and the ideological stance of schools is the result of conspiracy. Whether the charge is well-founded or not remains to be seen, but irrespective of the credibility of their position, the Revisionists have provided a new critique of education in which the concept of ideology is central; consequently, an understanding of the concept of ideology is crucial if we are to deal rationally and productively with the claims made.

Another arena in which the concept has been introduced is in the public discussion regarding the schools and the policies which control them. Charges have originated from many points on the political spectrum that certain individuals or groups are employing the public schools for their own ideological purposes. At one end, it is claimed that the elimination of school prayers and pledges to the flag are communist plots to undermine the moral fibre of our youth. At the other end of the spectrum, it is claimed that the public schools are the agents of capitalists who, consciously or unconsciously, wish to dehumanize and indoctrinate children in order to create willing workers for the technological/corporate machine.

Moreover, ideological issues have been manifested through public discussion over questions such as bussing, religious activities, cultural diversity, students' rights, school finance and the expanded role

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of the courts and legislatures. Interested citizens are increasingly concerned with how answers to the above problems interact with the larger real or imagined ideological battles in the society.

Charging these discussions with an ideological foundation opens the door to simplification of the issues and the answers. It provides a scapegoat. Samuel Bowles, in his "Unequal Education and the Reproduction of the Social Division of Labor," makes essentially this claim. He argues "the ideological defense of modern capitalism rests heavily on the assertion that the equalizing effects of education can counter the disequalizing forces inherent in the free-market system." He further claims that in contradiction to the above, "unequal education has its roots in the very class structure which it serves to legitimatize and reproduce."

For Bowles, the practices of the public schools are in a one-to-one correspondence with the ideology and characteristics of the capitalist society. Elements of that ideology such as efficiency and alienation, class stratification and organization, are transferred from the ideology and are manifested in the policies and practices of the schools. They are transferred from the ideology via the structure of the labor divisions and political power which create different values and goals for different sub-groups. He goes on to claim that "educational reform movements failed because they sought to eliminate

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16 Ibid., p. 37.
educational inequalities without challenging the basic institutions of capitalism."\textsuperscript{17} His concern is with reform at the level of the public schools; however, given his position, change in the schools must be accompanied by a change in the relationship of the society and the schools or by a change in the societal ideology.

Ivan Illich, in his \textit{Deschooling Society}, deals with this problem in a different manner. He moves the argument to a concern with the institutionalization of values in general. His emphasis is not upon schools specifically. Rather, it is with the question of whether or not values are institutionalized. He accepts the latter and uses the former heuristically. His tactic is to look to the schools because they are common institutions and they are vulnerable. He says that he wants to "raise the general question of the mutual definition of man's nature and the nature of modern institutions which characterizes our world view and language."\textsuperscript{18} To do so, he uses the schools as his "paradigm" institution.

Illich's claim is that institutions, including the schools, are such that "non-material needs are transformed into demands for commodities . . . our basic needs have been translated by society into demands for scientifically produced commodities."\textsuperscript{19} For Illich, this is dangerous in a number of ways. And, the way to change to nonthreatening institutional framework is to eliminate the present institution of

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 64.


\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., p. 2, 4.
schooling and redefine the nature of institutions in general, to employ a new ideology, based upon a "new understanding of the educational style of the emerging counterculture," and its values and beliefs.

As a prime example of the danger of present institutions and the manner in which they serve the damaging ideology, Illich claims that the hidden curriculum of the schools serves "as a ritual of initiation into a growth oriented consumer society." He lays the blame for this state of affairs at the feet of the capitalist/corporate society and its ideology by claiming that "from the beginning of this century, the schools have been protagonists of social control on the one hand and free cooperation on the other, both placed at the service of the 'good society' conceived of as a highly organized and smoothly working corporate structure."

Although Illich's claims assume that the schools support and are supported by an external ideology, he moves ultimately to exclude questions of ideological origin by claiming that "in a basic sense, schools have ceased to be dependent on the ideology professed by any government or market organization." The school system not only "shapes the consumer who values institutional commodities above the nonprofessional ministration of a neighbor," they also are forming their own ideology.

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21 Ibid., p. 48.
22 Ibid., p. 95.
23 Ibid., p. 105.
24 Ibid., p. 106.
Illich believes that the way to counter the trend toward institutionalization of destructive values is to recognize that this institutionalization does occur and to define new institutional patterns which will support the right values. He attempts to lay the foundation for this effort in his work.

Bowles and Illich are quite representative of a current widespread critique of the public schools. Asking certain questions about their critiques leads to a set of problems which they have not dealt with in their discussions.

One could begin by questioning whether the Revisionist's descriptions of the current institution of schooling are accurate and what the viability and ramifications of the resultant prescriptions might be. At another level, one could ask whether the present structure of the schools is the result of a particular ideological stance which has provided the institution with certain characteristics; that is, is the current ideological stance of the schools oriented toward labor/power/consumer values, and is this problematic in the sense defined? Finally, one could ask how the particular ideological stance is functionally related to the making of policy in the schools.

The purpose of this work is to argue that asking these questions leads to a concern with ideological discourse and that it assumes something which might not be valid to assume; namely, that we possess some degree of clarity regarding ideological discourse. Discussion of the above questions prior to some clear understanding of ideological discourse would be fruitless and/or counterproductive in the sense that without clarity we talk past one another. The intent of this work is to
begin that search for clarity by examining 'ideology' as discourse.

The Scope of this Work

In his *Toward an Effective Critique of American Education*, James E. McClellan says that "psychologically we, as a nation, are ready for an educational revolution. Politically we are unready. The issues are unarticulated, the forum not made ready."\(^{25}\) I am concerned here with an attempt to build an IDM within which articulation of ideological discourse and its relationship to description and prescription regarding educational theory and public schooling can begin.

In chapter 2, I will examine, in some detail, efforts in a variety of fields dealing with the concept of ideology. Hopefully, this will indicate where problems have arisen and confusion has been generated. It also will point up inadequacies in certain discussions.

Chapter 2 will provide an analysis of the history of ideology only to the extent that I discuss commonalities which exist in the various approaches and how those commonalities contribute to the justification for the approach I have chosen to take in this work.

In chapter 3, I will draw upon the historical survey of chapter 2 and the work of Richard Pratte and Alvin Gouldner as a means for justifying dealing with ideological discourse as slogan systems and as a means for justifying dealing with slogan systems as collections of

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\(^{25}\) James E. McClellan, *Toward an Effective Critique of American Education* (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1968), p. 16. In this work, McClellan, through an analysis of the notion of polity, draws attention to the fact that the forum for policy decision making assumes the importance of discourse and the clarity of the language utilized in that discourse.
Chapter 4 will provide a discussion of the work of philosophic analysts who have dealt with the nature of slogans and slogan systems. This will provide a vehicle for further expansion of the IDM. This expansion will necessitate a discussion to the relationship of slogans and sub-slogans within the system as well as an initial discussion of the relationship of the system to beliefs.

Chapter 5 will provide a discussion of beliefs and their relationship to slogan systems. This discussion will be related to the notion of ideology, ideological discourse, and a paradigm slogan system as detailed in chapter 3.

In chapter 6, the IDM will be expanded to include the relationship of beliefs to experience. This effort will assume a particular stance regarding the concept of meaning in order to employ it as a heuristic device.

In the concluding chapter, I will try to draw the model together and make initial application. The contribution this work makes to past and current efforts is twofold. First, it is a synthesis of past efforts which leads to the development of a model which has a heuristic function. It provides a structural type analysis of ideological discourse which facilitates attempts to deal rationally and thoroughly with that discourse. This potential will be demonstrated in chapter 7.

Second, in the development of the model, it will be necessary to provide an explication of the "mapping" or "interpretative" function of ideological discourse. This explication is unique in existing literature. And, the explication provides a clearer understanding of the
relationship of ideological discourse to the ideologue and the hearer.

The Limitations of this Work

It is beyond the scope of this work to provide a theory of meaning which will explicate the link between language and reality. I will only assume a position regarding meaning which will enable me to link the linguistic framework to experience in such a way as to offer a means for achieving some clarity about ideological discourse.

Nor it is my intent to provide a historical analysis of the development of humankind and society in relation to real or imagined ideologies. I am not examining "ideology" per se, nor am I examining particular ideologies.

The purpose of this work is to model a linguistic framework for heuristic purposes in order to clarify the function of ideological discourse, especially as employed in education. The model or linguistic apparatus thus developed is important as a process, but it also has significance as a kind of archetypal demonstration of how educational ideological discourse can be clarified.
CHAPTER II

THE LITERATURE AND THE TOPIC

Introduction

In looking to the history of ideology, we encounter a panoply of definitions which is made more complex by the idioms related to the concept. Writers refer to "ideology," "ideologists," "ideological thought," "ideological discourse," and "the function of ideology." These idioms have grown out of the concepts which have become attached to 'ideology' and, as such, are of little more use in this work than the definitions. This chapter is an attempt to sort out the definitions and the usages.

The End of Ideology

Debates over the use of ideology as a weapon has a temporally defined existence. Beginning with Raymond Aron's *The Opium of the Intellectuals*, obituaries for the debate began to appear. "It seems to me that the battle of ideologies belongs to the past,"¹ Aron claims at the outset.

Aron further claims that "the two great societies of our time have come to suppress the conditions of ideological debate, have integrated the workers, and imposed a unanimous adherence to the principles

of the regime,\textsuperscript{2} and those who still cling to ideologies now are the intellectuals who "try to discover the causes of the gap between the dreams of yesterday and the realities of today."\textsuperscript{3} Hence, the end of ideological discourse.

A few years later, Daniel Bell added a nail to the coffin with his \textit{The End of Ideology}. Viewing ideologies as a means for the "conversion of social ideas into social levers,"\textsuperscript{4} Bell claims that because of the complexity and variety of sociological change, of compromises among adherents to competing ideologies and the loss of belief that blueprints or social engineering are attainable or practical, "the old ideologies have lost their 'truth' and their power to persuade."\textsuperscript{5} Therefore, "the ideological age has ended."\textsuperscript{6}

But, apparently, 'ideology,' or at least "ideology" is not destined to die quietly.

In 1968, Chaim I. Waxman published \textit{The End of Ideology Debate}. The basic argument represented by a majority of the articles Waxman collected is indicated by his opening statements. He begins by citing C. Wright Mill's notion that "'abstracted empiricism,' that is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 314.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 100.
\item \textsuperscript{5}Ibid., p. 373.
\item \textsuperscript{6}Ibid., p. 373.
\end{itemize}
concentrating on the very minute particles within the total framework,"\(^7\) has brought an end to ideology. He then goes on to argue that what is needed is a "broad, plastic ideology . . . which will enable us to transcend our current stagnation."\(^8\)

Whether we are indeed witnessing the end of debates about ideologies or whether it will rise from its ashes transformed into something more glamorous is only incidental to this paper. It is incidental in that an end to the attempts at stipulative definitions of 'ideology' may be welcome indeed. However, that in itself does not make ideological debate disappear, even though it may reduce in number, debates over ideologies.

It is by beginning at the end of debates about ideology and looking back at its historical development that I propose to offer an analysis of a different sort. By categorizing and examining the types of definitions, a list of the concepts which are the historical nexus associated with 'ideology' can be described. And, from this, commonalities can be "unpacked" as an initial step in the analysis.

At first glance, this would appear to be an enormous task. In his introduction, Waxman lists eight of many definitions which have been offered. They range from the claim that ideology is "nothing but political discourse"\(^9\) to the claim that "ideology is an intellectual

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\(^8\) Ibid., p. 7.

production describing society."¹⁰

Still, within these discussions regarding the questionable na­
ture and demise of the concept there is a common thread. Haber, in his
"The End of Ideology as Ideology" claims that:

For an ideology to be linked to a political movement and
for the movement to develop a mass following certain
requisites must be met: 1) the ideas must be easily com­
municated, which usually involves their simplification
and sloganization, 2) they must establish a claim to
truth, and 3) they must demand a commitment to action.¹¹

Bell claims that "a social movement can rouse people when it can
do three things: simplify ideas, establish a claim to truth, and, in the
union of the two, demand a commitment to action."¹²

Lewis Feuer, in his "Beyond Ideology" claims that "ideology is
the instrument whereby men repress their human responses, and shape their
behavior to political mandates."¹³ In his Ideology and the Ideologists,
Feuer says that "an ideology is an ism, that is, a philosophical tenent
which has been disassociated from the process of investigation and search,

¹⁰ Robert Haber, "The End of Ideology and Ideology," reprinted
from Frank V. Lindenfeld, Reader in Political Sociology (Funk and
Wagnalls, 1968), and cited in Chaim I. Waxman, ed., The End of Ideology

¹¹ Robert Haber, "The End of Ideology as Ideology," in The End of

¹² Bell, The End of Ideology, p. 372.

¹³ Lewis S. Feuer, "Beyond Ideology," (reprinted from Psychoanaly­
sis and Ethics, pp. 126-130), in Chaim I. Waxman, ed., The End of
p. 66.
and has been affirmed as the axiom for a political group."\textsuperscript{14} As such, "the ideology claims answers that are certainties."\textsuperscript{15}

On a different tack, Max Mark says that an ideology contains two elements: "a particular value and the assertion that social or psychological reality calls for the implementation of this and no other value."\textsuperscript{16} He also says that "the elements of reality are so complex and contradictory that objective proof of what is and what is not becomes rather difficult."\textsuperscript{17}

There are common threads in these discussions. The general notion is that (1) an ideology is a set of supposedly true ideas about what social realities are and should be; (2) these views of society and societal action are translated into a political agenda through a process of linguistic simplification, which is designed primarily to gain adherents who will commit to action in line with the views and the plans; (3) there is the notion that ideologies have outlived their usefulness because of the current status of the world and the empirical nature of both our approach to and the type of data about the social structure.

However, as argued in chapter 1, this position results primarily from viewing ideologies as "objects," from reifying the concept.


\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., p. 188.


\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 3.
Reification of ideology as an object can lead to the claim that ideologies are no longer descriptive of the world because, as ideologies involve simplification and the current world is complex, they simply do not apply. However, if one views ideology in the sense of ideological discourse, it can then be viewed as means, as data to be employed in the attempts of individuals to come to grips with their experience. In this sense, C. Wright Mills is right when he argues that "the end-of-ideology stands, negatively, for the attempt to withdraw oneself and one's work from political relevance; positively, it is an ideology of political complacency which seems the only way now open for many writers to acquiese in or to justify the status quo." Apparently, some persons have abandoned the quest for explanation.

Involved in this general set of ideas are other, crucial elements. Eschewing more explicit evaluation of their own definitions and the implications inherent in those definitions, theorists such as David Apter express concern that ideologies have a capacity to be "manipulative." In Ideology and Discontent, he follows Erik H. Ericson's notion that ideology is an unconscious tendency to manipulate facts and ideas. This leads to an analysis of the role of ideology in establishing identity and coherence in a society which in turn leads to discussions about the roles ideologies such as "nationalism" and "scientism" and the like have played in history. Reification of the concept, then, fosters

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efforts to discover the causes of adherence to ideologies, e.g., social class X leads to adherence to ideology I_1. As Clifford Geertz says, the clumsiness of this approach "manifests itself mainly in the handling of ideology as an entity in itself." 20

Geertz, in this same article, offers a means of escape when he suggests that the way out of the troubles of reification is through the "perfection of a conceptual apparatus capable of dealing more adroitly with meaning." 21 This is a statement of the purpose of this work. It will later be expanded. 22 First, it is necessary to determine why discussions of 'ideology' have taken the road they have, and why there are commonalities. A brief look at the history of the concept will be helpful.

The History of the Concept

It is not necessary to provide detailed documentation of the history of the concept. Rather the goal here is to examine major trends which have contributed both to the embroilment of the concept in the current difficulties and to the directions taken in the traditional attempts to deal with 'ideology'.

In "The Age of Ideology," Reinhard Bendix claims that "social thought, since the enlightenment, has developed an image of man as a


21 Ibid., p. 49.

22 The basic purpose of this work was discussed in chap. 1. The importance of building an IDM meets Geertz's request for an apparatus. The method for development of the IDM will be discussed in chap. 3.
creature of his drives, habits and social roles, in whose behavior, pru-
dence and choice play no part." As employed in this framework, "knowl-
edge conceived solely as a product of social life can hold no promise
for the improvement of the human condition." There is no paucity of
works which take this position regarding man. And, utilizing 'ideology'
as an object, these works are a search for the conditions which give
rise to certain ideologies and the consequences which derive from those
ideologies.  

In his forward to Truth and Ideology, Bendix provides a summary
view of how this situation arose.

Bacon had offered an inventory of the ways in which human
thought goes astray. His approach concerned the human
condition, and under God the prospect of human reason was
bright. The French philosophers offered a diagnosis of
their time, maintaining that vested interests prompted
man's thought to go astray.  

Ideology and Discontent (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-

24 Ibid., p. 303.

25 Roland Barthes, Mythologies, trans. by Annette Lauers (New
York: Hill & Wang, 1957); Maurice Cranston, ed., The New Left (New
York: The Library Press, 1971); Clarence J. Karier, Paul Violas, Joel
Spring, The Roots of Crisis (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing
Company, 1973); Francis X. Sutton, Seymour E. Harris, Carl Kaysen,
James Tobin, The American Business Creed (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1956).

26 This author's understanding of the history of the concept
'ideology' is dependent primarily upon Hans Barth, Truth and Ideology,
trans. by Frederic Lilge (Berkeley, California: University of Cali-
ifornia Press, 1976); John Plamenatz, Ideology (New York: Praeger
Bendix extends this summary to include the fact that the French sought to protect against this interference with man's rational thought. It is this attempt to work against the distortion which is later expanded upon by Marx. And, it is the combination of these views which has lent suspicion to man's thought in general.

The transformation, then, began in recent times with Bacon who, concerned that man discover the true laws of nature in order that he might order his life in accord with those laws, sought to protect the attempts of man to get at nature and her laws from the distorting effect of religion and superstition. 27

To work against this interference, Bacon developed his "theory of idols." One of these, his Idol of the Marketplace, is an attempt to deal with the fact that "men associate with each other by means of speech; but words are imposed according to the apprehension of the crowd. And therefore the ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully obstructs the understanding. . . .Words do violence to it and spoil everything." 28

With these notions, Bacon sets the stage for looking at public views of society as being rooted in those aspects of man's nature which work against rationality. 29 It is with Bacon that subjectivity and


28 Ibid., p. 23.

29 Ibid., p. 27.
'distortion' enter the nexus of concepts surrounding 'ideology'. It is one short step from this, through the French "ideologues" and the science of ideas they sought to create, to Marx's view that 'ideology' is related to a class oriented attempt to distort reality and foster its own views, to maintain the status quo.

With the French "ideologues," the term "ideologie" is officially coined, and with it the notions of prejudice and distortion loom larger. Their "science of ideas defined" "the sources of human knowledge, its limitations and the degree of its certainty" as the foundations for working against interference. But, Napoleon saw this as a threat, and his attack on the ideologues connected ideology and politics. Ideologie was assigned pejorative connotations.

DeStutt de Tracy and the French ideologues attempted to develop the science of ideas so that it might be used as a foundation for the activities of the schools in battling the prejudices of the ruling class. It was this which raised questions about the manipulative nature of ideologies and the method for determining truth and falsity. Marx followed this lead.

Marx and the Causes and Truth of Ideologies. It would be presumptuous to attempt anything close to an exhaustive analysis of Marx's ideas. Rather than this, it is only necessary to look at the key concepts which Marx either added to the nexus or highlighted. Bendix claims that for Marx, ideas "are weapons wielded by contending social classes to attack their enemies and defend their friends." This view

30Ibid., p. 2.

and Marx's idea that history is a succession of class struggles and his claim that consciousness—the intellectual superstructure—is determined by the material base, gave rise to a real concern with the truth and falsity of ideologies and the objective basis for determining that truth and falsity. This analysis set the tenor for investigations to come. It is at this point that the concept is reified. And, as mentioned previously, dealing with 'ideology' as an object leads to examination of causes and effects. In his *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim claims that "it can be shown that behavior of the past, when analyzed, can be reduced to relationships of cause and effect." Hence, sociology was set against ideology.

It is here also that the relationship of 'ideology' to 'distortion' and 'political' gains great credence. Mannheim claims that there "is implicit in the word 'ideology' the insight that in certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real condition of society both to itself and to the others and thereby stabilizes it," Marx's false consciousness.

Mannheim reduces ideology to total relativism—although he terms it relationism—by concluding that "mental structures are inevitably differently formed in different social and historical settings." He notes

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34 Ibid., p. 265.
only eliminates the need for determining truth and falsity; he also drops "ideology." He says that "in the realm of the sociology of knowledge, we shall then, as far as possible, avoid the term 'ideology' because of its moral connotation, and shall instead speak of the 'perspective' of the thinker." In a sense, then, by 1936, the concept had come and gone. But, in the process, the acquisition of the conceptual encumbrances had led to a number of models which were used in the investigations.

General Methods for Dealing with 'Ideology'

The nexus of concepts surrounding 'ideology' include 'subjectivity', 'distortion', 'true/false', 'cause/effect', and the like. These concepts, when coupled with the process for dissemination and acquisition of ideological thought, allow for a basic typology of models in relation to traditional investigations.

When looking to the process by which an ideological system, whatever it may be, is disseminated and acquired, three broad cause-effect relationships serve as the basis for the models.

The Indoctrination Model. First, there is the idea that an ideology is a set of beliefs, attitudes and ideas which are generally distortions of reality and are propogated through the process of indoctrination. Mannheim, for example, drops the use of "ideology" because he is committed to the notion that the particular concept of ideology "refers only to specific assertions which may be regarded as

\[35\text{Ibid., p. 266.}\]
concealments, falsification, or lies.  

Because of this, "politics can be studied only from the party viewpoint and taught only in the party school."  

This viewpoint involves the idea that there is an effort, conscious or unconscious, to instill a set of interpretations, beliefs, ideas, and attitudes which are determined not by the "real" environment, but rather by the values and goals of the group.

Willard Mullins expands this idea when he says that, in terms of the simplifying function of ideologies, "the significance for mobilization is not that it causes one to do but that it gives one cause for doing. It provides grounds or warrants for the political activity engaged in."  

Within the indoctrination model, ideologies, propogated as true interpretations of reality, function to permit only those viewpoints which are consistent with that interpretation. Further, by providing a comprehensive, consistent view, they function to limit the evidence which will be counted for or against the perceptions offered. Evidence which runs counter to the interpretation can be simply discounted or reinterpreted. The fact that some Blacks worked themselves to death in the summer heat in the cotton fields of the South does not falsify the core beliefs of Blacks as subhuman. Rather, it can be interpreted as

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36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., p. 147.

proof of the low intelligence and the lack of initiative one would expect. Similarly, the fact that a "poor" person has achieved some economic success in a free-enterprise system need not be interpreted as proof of the value of the system but as an indication of its insidiousness when viewed from the perspective of values it involves.

That is, the statements, "If X is Black, then X is subhuman" and "If X is a free-enterprise system, then X is inherently evil," appear initially to be saying something about Blacks and free enterprise—something which would be open to verification or falsification by appeal to evidence from the experiences of men. However, when such evidence is presented as an attempt to falsify the statements, the evidence is either ignored or is reinterpreted to support the statements. The statements are true by definition. There is no evidence which will count against them.

The indoctrination model, then, assumes that "ideology is a mask, a weapon," used by groups or persons who seek power over others, perhaps as a means to maintaining their position. Such assumptions lead to questions about true and false "consciousness," the origin and consequences of such consciousness and a means for battling it. Hence, the arrival of slogans such as "Down with bourgeois ideology" and attempts to "raise consciousness."

The Conditioning Model. A second method for dealing with ideologies involves conditioning as the process of ideological thought. When discussing the "strain theory," Geertz says that it is based upon the

39Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," p. 52.
idea that "ideology is a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of a social role."\textsuperscript{40}

This model generates a need for examining personality structures, including attitude formation, in relation to social class, social position, and the like. As a result, there are attempts to explain the adoption of ideological positions on the basis of broad social characteristics related to the psychological structures of men. And there are attempts to explain actions on the basis of psychological entities such as attitudes and beliefs.

In his \textit{Ideology}, L. B. Brown offers that "the response to ideologies is therefore personal although their basis is social."\textsuperscript{41} He claims further that the "psychological study of ideology rests on individual response, acceptance or adherence to ideas or beliefs about social issues."\textsuperscript{42} Given the position of the individual as a kind of reactive mediator, the analysis becomes psychological.

This approach fosters examination of the "content" of "belief systems" or "ideological positions" such as "authoritarianism," or "liberalism" as a means for getting at the conditions which might lead to their acceptance, the intensity of such a commitment and the relationship of the beliefs and attitudes they involve to the person's political/social behavior. Such an approach assumes a definition of

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., p. 54.
  \item\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 170.
\end{itemize}
'ideology'. And, the method involves looking at a belief system and
drawing general conclusions about ideological content and predicting
what conditions will lead to what ideological positions.

The Paradigm Model. The final model is much broader in scope
than the preceding two. Mannheim, it will be recalled, argues for look­
ing to "perspective" rather than "ideology" because such action involves
the "subject's whole mode of conceiving things as determined by his his­torical and social setting." For want of a better term, this can be
called the "paradigm model."

The paradigm model assumes that the total collection of goals,
attitudes, social conditions, historical positions, and the like estab­lish the world view and control the actions of individuals. One of the
broader statements of this thesis comes from R. E. Lane. He claims that
"for any society: an existential base creating certain common experi­ences interpreted through certain cultural premises by men with cer­tain personal qualities in the light of certain social conflicts pro­vides certain political ideologies." A

\[43\] Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, p. 266.

\[44\] In his *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, vol. 2, no. 2
out his notion of a paradigm. A scientific paradigm is that set of per­ceptions about efforts, the data to be dealt with, the methods for
achieving solutions and the range of solutions which are acceptable
which is shared by a group of scientists engaged in what Kuhn calls
"normal science." The paradigm itself arose as a result of success in
the past. As such, it establishes the rules of the game. Mannheim's
notion of "perspective" is analogous to this model. Society establishes
the paradigm and the members of that society are engaged in "normal
social science." That is, they accept certain views of what is and how
it is to be dealt with.

\[45\] R. E. Lane, *Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man
Within this model, concerns with truth become confused. According to the view, every era, every group, even every individual can have its own version of the truth; hence, its own ideology. Given this, universal claims regarding ideologies or 'ideology' are limited to the claim that everybody "does his own thing." One is driven to dropping out subjectivity, distortion, and even cause/effect as they relate to the formula "Conditions $C_1$ imply Ideology $I_1$.”

One is left with attempts to generate empirical descriptions of what occurred, what ideologies were espoused at what points and with attempts to analyze the points at which social action was "influenced by" and "influenced" thought. However, there is a paradox. Explanations themselves will arise from the social/historical paradigm of the individual doing the analysis. How, then does one ever decide that what he has concluded is, indeed, an accurate description?

The "paradigm model," although it is sufficiently broad to allow consideration of many elements involved in ideological generation, seems to be so broad as to have questionable value as an analytic tool.

The Problems. Each of these models, then, makes certain assumptions which contribute to the difficulty of determining the nature of 'ideology'. They lead to a concentration on the relationship between man's actions and 'ideology'—the latter being vaguely defined.

The indoctrination model, with its notions of truth, falsity, and distortion, which are derived from the reification of the concept, has the potential of reducing ideological conflict to nothing more than a battle for supremacy. Further, it entraps one in the paradox where truth and falsity are nothing more than pejorative terms. Relativity
reigns supreme.

The conditioning model leads to questions about humankind's psychological construction, the mechanism by which he achieves psychological commitment and the manner in which that psychological structure is affected by and affects one's social situation.

The paradigm model places one in the position of attempting to make empirical claims about the nature and the role of a world view at some point in historical/social time while simultaneously trapping one concerning the extent to which his own paradigm has colored those claims.

This is not to argue that the models have no value or are destructive. Obviously, each of these approaches leads to an expansion of our understanding. That they do, however, does not preclude the possibility that other approaches might be more effective. The purpose of this work is to propose another model, the IDM, following Geertz's claims that a most important task lies in the "perfection of a conceptual apparatus capable of dealing more adroitly with meaning."\(^{46}\)

As discussed previously, the models of the past have focused on ideology as an object. However, with the directions provided primarily by Pratte, Gouldner, and Geertz, it is possible to deal with ideology as ideological discourse, as data, a process, a means. Therefore, rather than seeking to define and classify the object or to determine its cause and effect/source and consequences, we can examine ideological discourse as a means for building Geertz's conceptual apparatus which, in turn,

\(^{46}\)Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," p. 49.
will help provide some clarity about the nature, function, and role of ideological discourse. Or, as Dewey says, "The subject matter which has been taken as satisfying the demands of knowledge, as the material with which to frame solutions, becomes something which sets the problems."47

Beginnings of the IDM

Although it is obvious that all of the above models assume communication as a crucial aspect—primarily verbal communication—a model which provides the kind of clarity Geertz seeks is lacking at the moment. Richard Pratte, in his *Ideology and Education*, has begun the building process by pulling together the above models and the techniques of critical evaluation to look at 'ideology' as it relates to 'schooling'. His approach differs from efforts such as the above. Prior to beginning an analysis of the impact of ideologies on schooling, he outlines the structure of the components traditionally assigned to an ideology. On the basis of this framework, he then lays out "competing beliefs in schooling ideologies" and "the supporting arguments."48 The primary use for his framework is in judging "an ideology by determining if it is rationally defensible."49 However, he admits that one can never "drown the charge of misinterpretation,"50 and, misinterpretation is usually a


49 Ibid., p. 283.

50 Ibid.
result of not dealing adroitly with meaning.

In a similar vein, the interests of this author are to relate ideological discourse and education. The attempt to build an IDM is linked to analysis of the role of 'ideology' and ideologies at two levels. First, if, indeed, it is beneficial to detail the impact of certain ideologies upon the institution of schooling and the process of education, then as philosopher of education, it is crucial that I not only be aware of those points of impact, but also that I be aware of the relation of ideological discourse and schooling. Doing so necessitates that I come to an understanding of the nature and function of ideological discourse itself.

Second, given my role as a teacher and the extent to which certain authors claim ideologies affect the process of education, it is incumbent upon me to provide students with as many tools as possible to deal with ideological discourse.

A recent work by Jack E. Williams and Normand R. Bernier indicates the extent of the suggested relationships and the difficulties encountered in dealing with them. The authors begin by claiming that ideologies are "products of collective life . . . [which] serve, in part, as a language system . . . [and which] provides us with organization for social experience."^51 They go on to argue that ideologies are learned. Further, they claim "institutions which control the formal education and training of children and youth in a nation will profoundly

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influence the selection of ideological content" contained in that process.

There is a problem here because this is ideological discourse about the relationship of ideologies and schooling. That is, ideologically, it is claimed that schools are what they are because of ideologies such as "puritanism," "scientism," and the like. And, it is claimed that these ideologies have had the impact because of the nature of ideology and its relationship to schooling.

Therefore, Williams and Bernier claim, schools must change rather than remaining "ideologically static," or reluctant to discard the ideological roots of the past." Schools must "operate according to ideological realities." Moreover, the individuals within the institutions "must cautiously select terms used to describe individuals or events [because of] . . . variety of meanings which a term or phrase may take on as a result of cultural or ideological forces."55

There is great confusion here about what is being claimed. One can applaud attempts to look closely and critically at ideologies which provide the "woofer and tweeter"56 of Americanism. However, how does one decide that the analyses presented are not themselves distortions or

52 Ibid., p. 32.
53 Ibid., p. 33.
54 Ibid., p. 34.
55 Ibid., p. 45.
56 Ibid., p. 59.
static? Or, more importantly, is this an appropriate activity as a starter? Is the question significant? If ideologies are so pervasive, and if the concept is so broad and subjective, and if ideologies are couched in distorted terms, then how is one to decide when schooling is ideologically static or truly reflective; and how is one to decide among the terms, all of which—by definition—will be ideologically bound?

Hence, the purpose of this work is to contribute in a small way to answering these questions, not by adding one more analysis of an ideology and its impact to the enormous store which already exists, but by attempting to expand upon the efforts of Pratte and others. The goal here is to develop a heuristic device, an IDM, which can be used not to determine the truth or falsity of an ideology, but, which can be used to foster critical examination of ideological discourse, particularly in education.

If schooling is both affected by and affects the growth and development of ideologies, then such critical examination, on as clear a basis as possible, is necessary. It is necessary for both those who make the policies and control the activities of schooling and for those who are immersed in schooling for a large part of their lives, the students. It is necessary if they wish to predicate their actions on rational grounds and attempt to justify their actions in the public arena. For direction in this effort, I take the concerns of Clifford Geertz. And, for a foundation, I take the work of Pratte and Gouldner.
CHAPTER III

IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE AND SLOGAN SYSTEMS

Introduction

It will be argued that the basic approach to building an IDM is to utilize slogan systems rather than ideology or ideological discourse. Hence, we will begin this chapter by drawing a connection between a particular type of slogan system and ideological discourse. To do so, it will be necessary to pull the main characteristics historically assigned to ideology from the discussion in chapter 2. I will then provide an initial explication of my understanding of "slogan systems" as discussed by Richard Pratte. In doing so, I will begin to draw the comparisons. Finally, I will describe my understanding of Alvin Gouldner's views of ideological discourse as a means of drawing the final connection. The ultimate goal, of course, is to produce an IDM which will assist in further examination of ideological discourse.

Ideology

Initially, I will broadly characterize ideology as it has emerged historically. I make no claims that this represents a conditions type analysis of 'ideology' or that it "defines" ideology. It is simply a characterizing of those elements which have come to be associated with the concept. Moreover, only those characteristics which appear most consistently will be listed.
As Ideas. As encountered during the reign of the French "ideologues," ideology was associated with the "science of the mind." They sought to discover those "ideas" which were thought somehow to stand between man and his perceptions of the world. This effort could be construed as an attempt to move from what Gouldner terms "authority referenced" assertions to "world referenced" assertions. In the former case, assertions about the world are supported by the extant political or religious doctrines. In the latter, they are supported by man's use of his rational faculties to decipher and understand the world.

As Beliefs. The notion that ideas stand between man and his perceptions was later refined into the notion that ideology was a set of beliefs which were "determined" by man's social existence and which caused him to interpret that existence in particular ways. This view led to attempts to discover a means for ascertaining the truth or falsity of particular ideologies, the conditions for the acceptance of particular ideologies, and the consequences of such acceptance. This concern also led to attempts to explain the function of particular ideologies in terms of the establishment of identity, the staying power of societies, the history of societies, and the like. It was on the basis of beliefs as ideology that the nature and policies of social politics were interpreted.

Arising from Interest Groups. It was also held that ideologies defined social existence and policies, and that particular ideologies were foisted upon society by special interest groups who subscribed to

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certain basic beliefs and values. By a variety of methods, interest
groups proselytized a particular ideology designed to further the con­
ditions on which the group's power rested. Events within society were
interpreted in such a way as to support the desired ideology.

As Directives. Ideologies were defined as belief systems which
contained directives for action and provided a way in which one should
view the world and events. These directives, based upon the beliefs
and interests of certain groups, were designed to achieve the results
they agreed were desirable, be it to maintain or revise the status quo.

As Slogans. A primary vehicle of an ideologue for gaining com­
mitment from others was the slogan. This linguistic entity is basic to
ideological discourse because it functions to simplify the goal(s) of an
ideology and to arouse emotional levels to the point necessary to gain
the action typically indicated by the slogan. (We can recall the state­
ments by Naber and Bell quoted on pp. 18-19.)

In general, the composite, historical description of what counts
as an ideology is that (1) ideologies are ideas, more specifically, sets
of beliefs which (2) interpret the world and (3) are proselytized by
individuals or groups in order to (4) provide a set of directives for
what people should do to maintain or change the status of society and
(5) these ideas and directives are simplified and generalized in order
to broaden the appeal.

To establish an understanding of how the method employed in this
work "links up with" and expands upon the traditionally assigned charac­
teristics of 'ideology', let us examine what Richard Pratte has to say
about "slogan systems." His work will enable us to look more closely at
the characteristics and the manner in which ideologies are manifested.

**Slogan Systems**

SSI. Looking at Pratte's notion of a slogan system in order to draw some comparisons between it and the historical notion of ideology, we see that he lays out three uses of "slogan system."

The first, which will hereafter be referred to as SSI, is his notion of a paradigm slogan system containing the following structural components:

- **M.** Metaphysical beliefs
- **K.** Epistemological beliefs
- **V.** Value beliefs
- **I.** Interpretation
- **C.** Limiting class of situations
- **E.** Empirical observations and claims to be accounted for by "I"
- **R.** Results intended

We see that there are some obvious parallels between Pratte's SSI and the historical notion of ideology. For example, the theoretical-normative base in his model can be equated to the set of beliefs in ideology. The empirical data base can be equated to the societal situation which is interpreted or accounted for on the basis of the beliefs, and the results intended are the maintenance of the status quo or the dramatic, utopian change which ideologies are said to be about achieving.

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In fact, with the addition of the interpretative component, it could be argued that there is no significant distinction between the structural components of Pratte's SS1 and ideology as historically defined.

It is, however, the addition of the interpretative component which is crucial for this work. And, it is the interpretative component which is the second reference for "slogan system," hereafter referred to as SS2.

SS2. Pratte tells us that the elements of SS2 are "slogans, subslogans, hyperbole, analogy, metaphor, etc." which are the result of an interest group's attempt to create "an emotionally charged interpretative component . . . and other highly persuasive language 'moves'" to be "employed by the interest group to rally support for or opposition to results intended or actual." Further, he claims that "such language employments construct immense edifices of symbolic representation that help overshadow the reality of disagreement" encountered at the level of the theoretical-normative base. This overshadowing is accepted, he claims, because of the group's need for cohesiveness.

The interpretative component also functions to "map" the theoretical-normative base onto the empirical data base and, by doing so, links beliefs to actions by specifying "the rules of the game." For Pratte, the rules of the game are the general imperatives which specify the acceptable "forms of behavior."

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4Ibid., p. 123.

5Ibid., p. 126.
That is, SS2 may contain a slogan such as "We teach children, not subjects." As a slogan, it symbolizes the theoretical-normative base. As a slogan, it is designed to arouse the emotions of potential converts. And, as a slogan, it provides an initial stipulation of "the rules of the game." The imperative is: "Teach children, not subjects!" The agreed-upon intended results may be a shifting of emphasis from subject matter and formality to children and flexibility as Scheffler argues. The limiting class of situations are teaching situations. What the slogan does is interpret the underlying theoretical-normative base—beliefs about good and evil, knowledge and the universe—in relation to empirical observations and claims within that class of situations in a way seen to be consistent by the group so that it allows the accomplishment of the intended result. The "T-N" is applied to teaching, so that doing X will achieve R₁.

Further, the imperative provides an initial stipulation of the behaviors deemed acceptable. If the stipulations are unclear, the sloganeer must be willing to further refine the imperative. Refinement of the imperative becomes important when discussing the relationship of slogans and subslogans in chapter 4. The general notion of defense and/or refinement of the imperative is important to the linking up of slogan systems and ideological discourse being attempted in this chapter.

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6 This idea that the SS2 symbolizes the theoretical-normative basis will be developed in chaps. 4 and 5.

The "mapping" metaphor involved in Pratte's linking of beliefs to action is critical and will be expanded in chapter 3. For now, suffice it to say that with the addition of the interpretative component, we can complete the comparison between SSI and ideology. That is, ideologies are seen as arising from the conflict of interest groups, which have in mind certain results which they intend to achieve and which they wish others to "buy into." And, in some complex sense, the underlying belief/theoretical-normative base is "mapped" onto the empirical base, social realities, in such a way that the beliefs are linked to action and the acceptable behaviors are specified in a way which will assist in the accomplishment of the results.

With this understanding, it is now possible to link ideological discourse with SSI on the basis of a description of ideological discourse as explicated in Gouldner.

**Ideological Discourse**

In many instances, ideology has been viewed as doctrine, as an "authority referenced" system which has been used to control others. Hoffer claims that doctrine makes simple words "pregnant with meaning" and makes them appear as "symbols in a secret message." Gouldner's work is an attempt to "inhibit sociology's view of ideology as primarily 'dogmatic'." To this end, he tells us that the opposite is true. He claims that:

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8 Hoffer, *The True Believer*, p. 80.

Ideologies, then, are belief systems distinguished by the centrality of their concern for What Is and by their world referencing 'reports.' Ideologies are essentially public doctrines offering publicly scrutable evidence and reasoning on their behalf; they are never offered as secret doctrines.\(^\text{10}\)

He then proceeds to discuss the essential characteristics of this publicly offered discourse. For the ideologue, he claims the task "of spreading the word; to tell and convince others, to help them see something of the extraordinary thing he sees."\(^\text{11}\) "Ideology is thus a call to action--a 'command' grounded in social theory--in a world referencing discourse that presumably justifies that call."\(^\text{12}\)

However, even though ideological discourse originates from a belief system and is an attempt to move others to action, it does something more, and it does it in a manner similar to Pratte's SS2.

Gouldner says that "in short, each ideology presents a map of 'what is' in society; a 'report' of how it is working, how it is failing and also of how it could be changed."\(^\text{13}\) Just as Pratte claims that the interpretative component, the SS2, must account for the empirical data base by mapping the theoretical-normative base onto the empirical in a manner which is sufficiently consistent to justify and achieve the intended results by engaging in the appropriate action "or rules of the

\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 33.

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p. 47.

\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 30.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., p. 30.
game," Gouldner claims that "in ideological symbol systems, . . . the report side is taken, under certain conditions, to institute a secured justification for the command, practical or policy implications of the symbol system."\footnote{Ibid., p. 55.}

In other words, the symbol system employed in ideological discourse performs the same functions as the SS2 in Pratte's model. They both function to interpret the empirical observations and claims, the "What Is," in terms of the underlying theoretical-normative base, the belief system, in such a way that it indicates what one should do and justifies the imperative in terms of the above relation.

For example, if we encounter the statement "We seek to raise the consciousness of women in America," we encounter a slogan. Basic to the IDM being developed in this work is the notion that the distinction between a slogan and an ideological slogan is made on the basis of function. If the above slogan is intended to perform the following five functions, then it is an ideological slogan.

1. It functions to convince us of something, to arouse our emotions.
2. It functions to "command" us to act by providing an imperative.
3. It functions to indicate what someone sees as the state of society, "What Is." (world-referenced)
4. It functions to indicate what the state of society should be.
5. It functions to map a theoretical-normative base onto the world, the empirical base.

These functions characterize an ideological slogan and therefore will provide the structure of this work. Functions 1 and 2 will be
dealt with in chapter 4, and functions 3, 4, and 5 will be dealt with in chapters 5 and 6.

Given what has been offered, what can be concluded thus far? There is no way to say that the above statement is ideological discourse but not SS2, nor is there a way to say that it is SS2 but not ideological discourse. Further, given Gouldner's notion that ideological discourse is *world-referenced* rather than *authority-referenced*, it is always legitimate to ask the ideologue to justify his command by expanding upon the description of *what is* that is contained in the slogan. And it would not be unreasonable to ask for a bit more detail about what counts as "raising consciousness," that is, asking for further clarification of the "rules of the game." What asking these questions will lead us into will be discussed momentarily. First, a word about SS2 and ideological discourse.

**Ideological Discourse as Slogan Systems (SS2)**

It would appear, then, that on the basis of the characteristics and functions Pratte and Gouldner assign to SS2 and ideological discourse, they are one and the same. At least they appear to be sufficiently close to justify this author's method of dealing with SS2 as a means for building an IDM which can then be applied to the interrelationships of meaning. The reason for beginning with SS2 is that it provides us with a rather well-defined set of statements, whereas, although Gouldner lays out the basic characteristics of ideological discourse and other authors have mentioned the value of slogans in ideological discourse, it still remains a rather nebulous object with which
to deal. Ideological discourse has not been delineated to a point where the one can use the discussions for a jumping-off point to the building of Geertz's framework. As stated initially, that is the purpose of this work.

Redefinition of the Problem

Historically, ideology has been viewed as an object or a weapon. When ideology is viewed as a weapon, as something which is used to limit the experiences and knowledge of persons, a reasonable approach has been to view ideology as an object and then further define the nature of the object, the conditions which give rise to it, and the consequences of its existence. Given that it has been viewed as a weapon, it is reasonable, as with other weapons, to want to understand its objective characteristics so that one is better able to combat, defend against, or use it.

However, as discussed in chapter 2, even though models which grew out of that approach to ideology have led in fruitful directions, they have not proven adequate for dealing with one of the primary characteristics of ideology, its manifestation as discourse. The emphasis on the weapon/object has resulted in the exclusion of man as something other than a vehicle which has little or no part to play. Dealing with ideological discourse is a means for re-introducing man as an active participant in the "battle."

Therefore, the basic thesis in this work is not in concert with the historical approach which has been described. Rather, the concentration is on the linguistic manifestation of ideology—ideological
discourse. This new concentration began with the argument that ideologi­
cal discourse involved the utilization of slogan systems comprised of
slogans, subslogans, metaphor, and the like, Pratte's SS2. It was fur­
ther argued that in order to begin the process of clarification of the
linguistic "rules of the game," it was necessary to regard slogan sys­
tems as collections of statements. This means simply that one begins by
looking at Pratte's "edifices of symbolic representation" which arti­
culate and codify the underlying theoretical-normative base as a means
of "bridging the gap."

Such a shift in emphasis is not whimsical. Haber, in his "The
End of Ideology and Ideology," claims that "one of the major problems
in the sociology of knowledge" relates to the "linkage between mental
productions and the existant base."  

Moreover, in his "Ideology as A Cultural System," Geertz claims
that

the link between the causes of ideology and its effects
seem adventitious because the connecting element—the
autonomous process of symbolic formulation—is passed
over in virtual silence. Both interest theory and
strain theory go directly from source analysis to con­
sequence analysis without ever seriously examining
ideologies as systems of interacting symbols, as
patterns of interworking meanings.  

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15 Robert Haber, "The End of Ideology as Ideology," reprinted
from Frank V. Lindenfeld, Reader in Political Sociology (Funk and
Wagnalls, 1968), and cited in Chaim I. Waxman, ed., The End of Ideology

16 Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David E.
Apter, ed., Ideology and Discontent (London: The Free Press of Glencoe,
And, in *Ideology*, Plamenatz, when discussing the distinction between explicit and implicit ideology says that we have access to popular beliefs of the past ages "only if they are recorded."¹⁷

These are crucial notions. They address the common thread or difficulty in ideology of trying to link the mental productions to their base. Obviously, we cannot enter the minds of Marx or Dewey or the middle class and extract their ideologies however we have defined them. We must patiently examine their oral and written statements, since, not being privy to the internal mental process, we must be content with the culminating symbolic manifestation of "mental processes."

However, to assume, as has been done in the past, that the body of statements is a mirror reflection and the sum total of someone's mental content raises numerous problems. To accept this is to accept a constantly shifting numerical definition. "Ideology" comes to mean the volume of statements provided. As an operative definition, it works against the explanatory usefulness of the concept because any number of statements would count. We would not know where to stop or, indeed, we could stop anywhere.

The argument could be made and, indeed has been, that the body of statements only "represent" the mental content in the sense that one typically finds some set of overt statements X consistently and accurately linked to M₁, a particular mental content. These mentalistic approaches to dealing with statements in ideological discourse and their link to what Pratte has called the theoretical-normative base are

fraught with difficulties, the most obvious being: how does one ever know that the statements are linked to some "mental concepts?"

The position adopted in the next and succeeding chapters is that by beginning with the statements in slogan systems, one can indeed trace back to the theoretical-normative base, not in the sense of finding some mental storehouse of beliefs, but in the sense of discovering more statements at another level which perform a different function in the symbolic framework than do the slogans. In this way, then, we will be able to ascertain the content of the beliefs which are "represented" by the "symbolic edifice" without worrying about whether those beliefs represent some mental storehouse.

To the extent that this attempt is successful, I will be able to develop an IDM which can assist us in the process.

The foregoing will be the primary method in this work. To put the matter in other terms, I will attempt to delimit the types of statements one would expect to find as one moves from the interpretative component, the SS2 or ideological discourse, back to the underlying base, the theoretical-normative or belief base. In doing so, I hope to undertake the process of explicating the symbolic interactions of which Geertz speaks and of ultimately linking those beliefs to the existant base of which Haber speaks—experience. On this foundation of the IDM, I will then attach criteria which will help us apply the model to ideological discourse and, at the same time, provide some basic tools for evaluating that discourse.

The latter is necessary because ideological discourse is public and world-referencing rather than secret and authority-referencing.
Hence, we will have all the information needed, and then the problem is to "unpack" what is already known rather than to "discover" what is secret and "unknown."
CHAPTER IV

SLOGANS AND SLOGAN SYSTEMS

The Nature of Slogans

Richard Pratte, in *Ideology and Education*, claims that the usefulness of slogans in relation to ideologies is that slogans "are extremely powerful and seductive because belief is coupled with a practical awareness and action." He claims that this is so because when used in the ceremonial sense, "the slogan expresses an emotive force as well as an attitude toward an object or state of affairs." "If, in addition, the slogan functions to prescribe what is to be done, then it functions non-ceremonially"; it provides general directives for action.

Pratte has begun the unpacking of what Feuer calls an entangling of "emotions, actions, and ideas into one amalgam, so that one does not know where the emotion ends and the idea begins."

Pratte's remarks about slogan and ideologies, as represented here and in chapter 3, point to some interesting possibilities for

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2 Ibid., p. 46.

3 Ibid., p. 47.

examining the way in which slogans, as linguistic entities or statements, function in relation to ideological discourse. Prior to pursuing those possibilities, it would be useful to look to what B. Paul Komisar and James McClellan, one of the foundations of Pratte's position, have to say.

Ceremonial and Nonceremonial Slogans. In "The Logic of Slogans," Komisar and McClellan draw a distinction between ceremonial and nonceremonial slogans. Ceremonial slogans, they say, "are chosen to appeal to the feelings of the listener or reader." Nonceremonial slogans "convey, in a distinctive sort of way, information and directions." When judging the ceremonial use of slogans, Komisar and McClellan claim that the only important consideration is whether or not the slogan brings about the desired emotions and commitments. However, they tell us that we can ask what a nonceremonial slogan means. The answer to the latter is that the meaning of a nonceremonial slogan is the assertions it summarizes.

Slogans as Summarizers. From the above distinctions and definitions, Komisar and McClellan begin a discussion of the summarizing function of nonceremonial slogans by comparing them to generalizations. A

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6 Ibid., p. 196.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.
generalization is a "general statement that is itself a descriptive assertion and summarizes more particular descriptive assertions," as, for example, in scientific generalizations. Educational slogans, "however, always contain a prescriptive element," because they not only describe educational practice, they also "advise, exhort, hint, or suggest that certain educational practices should be followed and others avoided." \(^9\)

Even though Komisar and McClellan are discussing educational slogans, the discussion of slogan systems and ideological discourse in chapter 3 would lead us to the conclusion that all slogans may contain a prescriptive element. Particularly, an ideological slogan such as "We seek to raise the consciousness of women in America" "advises" or "suggests" the practices one should follow.

The idea that slogans may always contain a prescriptive element is important in two senses. First, it is important for drawing a connection between slogans and subslogans. Second, it is negatively important in that it can be misleading about the full function of SS2 within Pratte's SS1. For example, when discussing the slogan "Good teaching is meaningful teaching," Komisar and McClellan, while claiming that it may summarize descriptive assertions, also claim that the descriptive assertions, e.g., descriptive statements and definitions, receive their relevance from their relation to the proposals contained in the slogans. \(^11\) The authors' use of "relevance" and "meaning" is

\(^{9}\) Ibid., p. 198.

\(^{10}\) Ibid., p. 198.

\(^{11}\) Ibid.
confusing. One wonders what the distinction between them might be. It would seem that anything would achieve relevance from that with which it is related. The fact that this is an analytic claim is less important than the fact that it suggests that the relationship between the assertions summarized and the slogan is equivalent to the relevance the former receives from the latter.

This point is crucial because acting on that suggestion places a limitation on expanding the function of slogans both when they are placed within Pratte's SS2 and when they are viewed as functioning as ideological slogans. It reduces the importance of examining whether and how slogans function as other than summarizers of prescriptive assertions. By this I mean that, if one assigns to the prescriptive element the level of importance suggested by Komisar and McClellan, the need, when attempting to describe the function of a slogan in discourse, to go beyond the level of admitting that the slogan may do something else is minimized. As will be argued later in this chapter, there is a link of a different sort between SS2 and SS1. And it is just that link which enables us to move to another level of statements in the process of building the IDM.

To return to the prescriptive component, once they have established the function of nonceremonial slogans, Komisar and McClellan point out that the slogans are "systematically ambiguous."\(^\text{12}\) That is, for any given slogan such as "Good teaching is meaningful teaching," "there is no limit to the variety of conceivable practices" the slogan

\(^{12}\)Ibid., p. 200.
summarizes. Given this, in order to determine what the slogan means, it must be interpreted by "deliberately restricting or delimiting its application to some limited set of proposals." This is essentially what Pratte is talking about when he says that the attempt to follow the imperative contained in the slogan, i.e., "Engage in meaningful teaching!" may necessitate a further stipulation of the "rules of the game." One may need a further description of what activities count as "meaningful teaching."

For Komisar and McClellan, such an activity is made easier, perhaps, by the fact that "it is not the individual slogan that is of most significance; it is the slogan which, in context with other slogans, serves to unify a range of different proposals." That is, what one typically encounters is a slogan system. Further, the authors claim that one customarily finds a "Grand Slogan" which serves to summarize the subslogans which provide a more specific indication of the accepted areas of activity. For Komisar and McClellan's "slogan system," the relationship between the slogans and subslogans is such that the subslogans provide the "Grand Slogan's" creator a means for insuring that "systematic ambiguity is reduced to a minimum."

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 201.
15 Ibid., p. 206.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
At this point, Komisar and McClellan have established something similar to Pratte's third sense of "slogan system" (hereafter referred to as SS3). Pratte defines SS3 as "the interpretative component plus the limiting conditions to which the rules of the game apply along with empirical claims and observations and results intended."\(^\text{18}\) But, Komisar and McClellan expand their model one more step. They claim that the slogan system enables one to relate prescriptions to the "basic moral commitments and spiritual aspirations" of society.\(^\text{19}\) That is, in a vague sense, they have introduced Pratte's notion that a theoretical-normative base—ideologies/beliefs—is the foundation for the prescriptions offered. They have, in a less clear manner, defined the components of Pratte's SS1 with their final component.

Both the account provided by Komisar and McClellan and the accounts provided by Pratte head initially toward clarification of the relationship between the theoretical-normative base and SS2. However, both pass by an expansion of the interpretative function entailed in this relationship.\(^\text{20}\)

Interpretation is important for the hearer in two senses. First, the sense of interpretation described by Pratte's "rules of the game" and Komisar and McClellan's relationship of "Grand Slogans" and subslogans provides a vehicle for greater specificity of the actions

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\(^{19}\) Komisar and McClellan, "The Logic of Slogans," p. 207.

\(^{20}\) "Interpretation" can be used to designate both the prescriptive act of moving from the underlying base to the conditions and the linguistic act of moving from those underlying beliefs to the slogans. It is the latter I intend to emphasize.
which will count as acceptable action. If one does not understand what will count as acceptable action, then more specificity must be provided by the sloganeer if he wishes the hearer to work toward achieving the intended results. However, if, to reintroduce Gouldner, such discourse is to be publicly argued and, if, as Pratte, Komisar and McClellan say, the prescriptions derive from an interpretation of the empirical which is based upon a theoretical-normative base—a set of moral commitments or, in Gouldner's terms, beliefs—then it is incumbent upon the hearer to gain as full an understanding as possible about that base. It is incumbent if the hearer is to accept the interpretation rationally. This idea will be expanded later in this chapter when "mapping" and ideological discourse as elaborate rational discourse are discussed.

For now, suffice it to say that neither Pratte nor Komisar and McClellan expand upon this function of slogans and slogan systems. But then, that was not their intent. Komisar and McClellan aimed at explicating the logic of slogans as they function in a system which relays directives for action. This explication is tied to their discussion of systematic ambiguity and the fact that the sloganeer must be ready, if asked, to eliminate this ambiguity by further specification of the programs he has in mind. Given their previous statements regarding the "relevance" of other than prescriptive assertions, i.e., the descriptive assertions which appear to be something like Pratte's empirical claims and observations which are summarized by the slogans, there is no need for them to go beyond the point they do in explication of the interpretative function.
However, slogans, even educational ones, play a more expanded role. And, the other logical types of assertions or statements which are summarized may not be dependent upon the prescriptions for their relevance. It does not seem legitimate to suggest that it is not important to look beyond programs, even if one admits that directives for action may be the primary goal of slogan use and that partial relevance of nonprescriptive assertions is determined by those programs. This is especially true when slogans are viewed as symbolic representations of the underlying beliefs, theoretical-normative base, the moral commitments. This aspect of slogan use will be discussed momentarily.

Pratte's discussions are more useful in the sense that his SS2 incorporates this symbolic function. His "mapping" brings us one step closer to Geertz's system of interacting symbols. Still, primary in Pratte's article was the attempt to delimit the structural components of a paradigm slogan system. This did not necessitate an expansion of the interpretative component. And, in his book, the primary goal was to show the connection between ideologies and the nature of public schooling. Therefore, he did not follow his interpretative link beyond the adequacy and confirmation criteria. Both of these criteria are used mainly to evaluate the success of the slogans, SS2, in relating to an audience and bringing about commitment to action. This success is based upon whether the SS2 adequately and relatively consistently and accurately explains the empirical and works to bring about the intended results.

Neither the summarizing nor the ceremonial function of slogans leads immediately to an understanding of the linguistic relationships
involved in the process of interpretative formulation. Both must be expanded. Israel Scheffler, in *The Language of Education*, provides a key for doing so.

Slogans and Meaning

Israel Scheffler, in *The Language of Education*, recognizes that educational slogans "provide rallying symbols of the key ideas and attitudes" and, therefore, are "analogous to religious and political slogans." He goes on to claim that "slogans make no claim to facilitate communication or to reflect meanings," that a slogan is never defended as "an accurate reflection of the meanings of its key constituent terms." The latter statements are interesting and, as will be demonstrated, are open to challenge. Taken together, the two claims seem, at least on the surface, to be somewhat contradictory. To open the possibility of less than accurate reflection suggests at least some reflection.

Scheffler follows these claims with the statement that, under certain circumstances, slogans can come to be taken as having a literal purport. That is, over time, slogans may come to be "taken more and more as literal doctrines or arguments, rather than merely as rallying symbols." He then employs analytic techniques to show that those who ascribe this literal meaning are likely to be confused or misinterpreting

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22 Ibid., p. 36.

23 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
the slogan. In either event, the slogan has become a doctrine in its own right and must be dealt with literally. But, the fact that one can show the literal purport to be meaningless or confused does not exclude the possibility that the slogan may have a symbolic relationship to the underlying theoretical-normative base.

Slogans, as interpretative symbols in Pratte's SS2, do facilitate communication in a unique way. And, when analyzed from the perspective of their being a symbolic "mapping" link between a theoretical-normative base and empirical observations and actions, they can be shown to reflect more than practical meanings, i.e., more than Pratte's "rules of the game" or Komisar and McClellan's prescriptive meaning.

Scheffler himself demonstrates this possibility when he places the slogan "We teach children, not subjects" in a particular context in order to determine the slogans "practical purport." He relates the slogan to the "parent doctrine" which fostered its rise. This parent doctrine is bound to a particular social milieu. This milieu has been described in a particular way and the descriptions have been subscribed to by the group or person using the slogan in that milieu. As a result, the "practical purport," the emphasis it was intended to have, can be related to the aims and goals of the parent doctrine within that particular setting.

It would seem, then, that the slogan does reflect at least "practical meaning" when placed in the context of the parent doctrine

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24 For Scheffler, the "parent doctrine" is the aims symbolized by the slogan and the educational tendencies of the group offering the slogan initially. See pp. 37, 39-41 in his The Language of Education.
to the extent that one can determine the "practical purport" it was meant to have. And, under certain conditions, i.e., when speaking to an audience familiar with both the parent doctrine and the social milieu surrounding it, the slogan facilitates communication at least in the sense that it eliminates the necessity for full explication of the practical purport. The slogan acts as a shorthand.

But, even if, as Scheffler claims, the relevance of the practical message can be known only when the slogan is placed in the context of its origin, there are questions which can be asked beyond those related to the practical purport and the conditions which somehow gave rise to it.

One may ask whether the descriptions or interpretations of the social milieu were accurate. And, even if they were accurate, one could ask how those descriptions led to the program for action which was represented by the slogan. That is, the context of the slogan brings about a need for more than analysis of the practical emphasis intended by the sloganeer. The conditions surrounding the generation of the slogan were interpreted by the sloganeer. That interpretative act suggests that something was employed in the act of interpretation. Further, once the interpretation of the conditions was completed, judgments about acceptability of the conditions were made in order to determine the directions actions should take or the emphasis which those actions should enjoy. To deal only with the practical purport and the conditions which gave rise to it is to deal only with Pratte's SS3—the accounting for of empirical claims and observations in a limited set of conditions in order to achieve certain results intended.
The additional concerns, when related to the past, may be interesting and challenging, especially if one is seeking an explanation for the actions of certain groups or persons. However, when one encounters slogans in discourse designed to arouse emotions and commitment, the questions become more than interesting. If one is being asked to commit to a plan of action, then, unless one chooses to act on the basis of emotions or the authority of the speaker, the questions must be asked. And it is the asking of the questions which leads to another conception of the role of slogans and the need for some framework which will enable one to deal efficiently and rationally with such discourse. In order to clarify this additional conception of the role of slogans, it will be helpful to look more closely at what Pratte and Gouldner say.

Mapping

Pratte assigns a number of functions to his SS2. For our purposes, it is necessary to look only at three of those functions. First, he tells us that slogans are "language employments" which "construct immense edifices of symbolic representation that help to overshadow the reality of disagreement." What these employments represent are the underlying metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological beliefs about which the members of a group generating a slogan may not agree.

Second, "the theoretical-normative base is 'mapped' onto the data base by the interpretative component"—the SS2. That is, the

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26 Ibid., p. 125.
underlying set of beliefs about the nature of reality, knowledge and values account, vis à vis SS2, for the empirical observations and claims made in regard to a particular set of conditions.

Third, it is on the basis of the first two actions that the SS2 "bridges the gap" between the beliefs and the recommended actions which are designed to achieve the intended results.

As I understand Pratte, a slogan such as "We teach children, not subjects" (1) provides the imperative "Teach children, not subjects!" so that certain results may be achieved; (2) this imperative represents the interpretation or accounting for of a set of empirical observations and claims within a limited set of conditions, i.e., observations and empirical claims about how children learn best, what is needed for them to learn, etc., (3) this interpretation is consistent with a set of underlying beliefs about reality, knowledge and good/evil, which has been agreed to broadly by the group generating the slogan.

It is the first function, the role of slogans as statements which are "symbolic edifices" representing underlying beliefs, which I intend to expand upon in building the IDM. Doing so necessitates dealing with how the symbolic edifice represents and how the symbolic edifice functions in discourse. The latter will be dealt with when SS2 as ideological discourse is discussed more completely. That discussion will lead to a second link in the IDM.

We can begin dealing with the former by looking at the fact that the imperative contained in the slogan would seem to assume agreement, if not about what is currently being done, at least about what should be done and what counts as doing it. The former would entail agreement
on descriptions of current teaching/learning situations. (A fuller ex­
plication of this notion will take place in chapter 6.) For the moment, 
it is important to look to the former, agreement upon what should be 
done as indicated to some degree by the imperative.

The nature of the agreement about what should be done can be 
made clearer by looking to the terms employed in the slogan. That is, 
the obvious emphasis intended by the imperative is an emphasis on the 
children involved in the teaching/learning situation. However, one 
would assume that agreement upon that emphasis would be based upon 
agreement on what counts as 'subject matter', 'teaching', and the nature 
of the relationships between a child, a teacher, and subject matter, and 
which of those relationships is good and therefore desirable. It may be 
that the group or persons offering the slogan has achieved only a loose, 
broad articulation of those agreements. And, as Pratte says, such loose 
agreement may be sufficient for "group unity--functional coordination, 
harmony, stability, and meaningful identity." 27

However, as the slogan is intended to represent a moderately 
codified and articulated position to individuals outside the group, 
those outsiders could legitimately expect that the sloganeer would, upon 
questioning, be able to provide greater refinement of the position (both 
prescriptive and conceptual) which is represented by the slogan. This 
is not to claim that slogans should be viewed as literal doctrines in 
their own right. It is to argue that in discourse about appropriate 
actions or emphases for actions, it is reasonable to expect that the in­
dividual or group presenting such statements would be able to provide

27Ibid., p. 123.
greater specificity of both the prescriptive "rules of the game," and, for want of a better term, "the conceptual rules of the game," i.e., what counts as an instantiation of the concepts.

There is a sense in which the specification of the prescriptive "rules of the game" will simultaneously offer some clarification of the "conceptual rules of the game." For example, as the sloganeer refines the actions which will count as meeting the imperative "Teach children, not subjects!" we, as hearers, will gain some notion of what he counts as 'subject matter', 'teaching', and the like. We may, to some degree, come to understand the operational rules governing the use of the concepts. We might come to understand that some X, a particular set of behaviors and criteria, are sufficient for us to agree that X counts as an example of 'teaching', therefore meeting the imperative. On this basis, we could then conclude that if we do X, we are meeting the imperative.

However, there is a point at which we may decide that there are more basic questions to ask, even though we have experienced agreement thus far. We might, for example, wish to ask the sloganeer for an explication of the foundation supporting the refinement of the operational rules he has provided. That is, we may ask for an explication of his theoretical-normative base. Justification for asking these questions derives for the "symbolic" role of SS2 within Pratte's SS1 and from the role of SS2 when viewed as ideological discourse. Even if we were to achieve clarification of the prescriptive rules of the game and, to some degree, clarification of the conceptual rules of the game, we have dealt with only one half of Pratte's "bridge." We have only Pratte's SS3
which is comprised of ICER. That it is necessary for the hearer to get at the M, K, V as symbolized by SS2 can be demonstrated by looking to Gouldner's analysis of ideological discourse which we have seen to be equivalent to Pratte's SS2 in characteristics and functions. It is time to examine how SS2 functions in discourse. This requires expanded explication of what is being agreed to by the group propagating the slogan.

**Ideological Discourse**

Gouldner begins his analysis of ideological discourse by telling us that ideologies are

> belief-systems distinguished by the centrality of their concern for What Is and by their world-referencing 'reports.'

Ideologies are essentially public doctrines offering publicly scrutable evidence and reasoning on their behalf; they are never offered as secret doctrines.

From this, he argues that ideological discourse is rational discourse because it

(1) is concerned to justify its assertions, but (2) whose mode of justifying claims and assertions does not proceed by invoking authorities, and (3) prefers to evoke the voluntary consent of those addressed solely on the basis of the arguments adduced.

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28 Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology*, p. 33. What Gouldner tells us is that the development of mass communications and technology have both increased the amount of information available to the public and the complexity of problems and solutions. Hence, it is more difficult for one to justify his interpretations of the world and his calls for action by appeal to his position or some authority. His offerings into the public arena must be defended publicly by public discourse and public verification.

29 Ibid., p. 39.
Further, he tells us that ideologues seek to tell and convince others, to help them see something of the extraordinary thing he sees.  

However, as a speech system, ideological discourse commonly contains imperatives for actions which are based upon descriptions of the world and call the hearer to action.  

The commands, however, are not supported by appeal to authority. Rather, the calls to action are supported by the descriptions offered. That is, the hearer is asked not to act upon the position of power held by the speaker or the program. Rather, he is asked to act when he sees the program supported by the descriptions of "What Is" offered. 

Finally, ideological discourse not only rejects the "personal" as represented by appeal to a speakers position, it offers something new. Ideological discourse entails new meanings. Gouldner argues that the increase in communications technology and the complexity brought about by technology in general, when placed in older value systems, have brought about the new for new, "secularized" meanings. According to Gouldner, the "old regime" is dying.

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30 Ibid., p. 47.  
31 Ibid., p. 34.  
32 Ibid., p. 55.  
33 Ibid., p. 64.  
34 Ibid., p. 61.  
35 Ibid., p. 93.  
36 Ibid., p. 93.
The crucial point in this illuminating, albeit truncated, description is that we see a paralleling between Pratte and Gouldner. Ideological discourse represents a set of beliefs about "What Is" and "What Should Be" which are offered for public defense through rational discourse. As a form of public discourse, ideological discourse is an attempt to provide others with a view of society which transcends cultural and authority referenced meanings. It is, as described by Gouldner, an attempt to assign meaning to the experiences of the individuals to whom the discourse is offered. However, it does more. According to Gouldner, the discourse is an attempt to ground the requests for action leading to "What Should Be" in the descriptions of "What Is." But, the "What Is" is an attempt to assign new meanings to experiences. The question, then, becomes not whether the "What Should Be" can in some sense be justified by the "What Is." Rather, the question is "Whence the What Is?"

At the moment, a viable candidate for the origin of "What Is" seems to be something akin to Pratte's theoretical-normative base.

Given these characteristics and concerns, one could, then, take issue with both the descriptions of "What Is" and with the "What Should Be." As to the latter, we would be concerned with issues such as whether or not "What Should Be" is sufficiently justified, whatever that means for Gouldner, by "What Is." Also, we would be concerned that the "What Should Be" is sufficiently clear to enable us to determine what we should do. As to the former, if "What Is" is an attempt to provide meaning to experience, then we would be concerned whether the meanings are viable, whether the descriptions are accurate, and, most importantly,
from what foundation are the meanings "derived."

Given the earlier linking of SS2 and ideological discourse, Gouldner's "What Is" seems to fall under Pratte's "accounting for" of the empirical claims and observations. Although it is not necessary that we have a clear conception of "What Is" initially, it would be legitimate in public discourse to ask for clarification of the issues listed above. It would be especially crucial because of Gouldner's linking of "What Is" to "What Should Be." Following this line of questions will lead us to another level of statements in the IDM. Therefore, prior to doing so, it might be useful to summarize what has been discussed thus far.

Summary

Thus far, we have seen that those authors writing about slogans agree that slogans function to rally others to commitment and action. There is also agreement that, as statements, slogans provide a prescription for action and/or indicate the emphases of those actions. There is also agreement that slogans or slogan systems do not stand alone—in some sense they are based upon something else, be it moral commitment, a broadly articulated theoretical-normative base, a parent doctrine or a set of perceived conditions.

There is also agreement that the sloganeer must be willing and able to make more specific his prescriptions, "rules of the game" or "practical purport."

Pratte expanded upon these notions with his distinctions between SS1 (MKV plus ICER₁), SS2 (I), and SS3 (ICER₁). SS2 functions to "map" the MKV onto CE in a consistent manner which justifies the imperative
designed to achieve the intended results.

SS2 has been equated with Gouldner's description of ideological discourse. And, Gouldner's ideology has been tentatively equated with Pratte's SS1. Gouldner adds the dimension that assertions about "What Should Be" (Pratte's imperative and R_i) are grounded in assertions about "What Is" (Pratte's CE which are accounted for by I) and both are offered for publicly scrutinized defense.

We should, then, when encountering slogans, SS2 or ideological discourse, be justified in questioning the descriptions of or "accounting for" which occurs, and the prescriptions which are offered. Each of these activities involves a different set of questions; however, both activities lead in the same direction—back to the MKV.

**From Slogans to Beliefs.** For example, if we encounter a slogan such as "We teach children, not subjects" one of two assumptions is possible. Either the sloganeer has found things are not being done as he likes and the slogan is designed to shift emphasis, or things are being done as he likes and he wishes to maintain and increase that emphasis. In the event that one of these two situations holds, there are some assumptions which commitment to his plans might involve. Prior to commitment, it would seem rational for us to want to know whether our description of the situation is akin to his. Given that this was our desire, we would need to determine whether what he counts as things such as 'teaching' and 'subjects' is the same as what we would count. However, discussions regarding this level of agreement would quickly lead us into discussions of such things as our beliefs about the nature of knowledge, what can be taught, what can be learned, and the like.
That is, if we begin by attempting to find out about the extent of agreement concerning "What Is," we are led ultimately to Pratte's theoretical-normative base. We are led to a concern with beliefs. This is not to argue that we are necessarily led to beliefs or that, once we are, we will find any. It is only to argue that, given the assumption that ideological discourse is rational discourse, such a course of action would be fruitful and justified.

And, even if we are able to determine a moderate level of agreement on "What Is," the question of agreement on "What Should Be" remains to be dealt with. In deciding on whether to follow the imperative, we should decide whether the results such action is designed to achieve is achievable. And, we must decide whether such action will result in Good. In doing so, we may be inclined to ask the sloganeer to justify his recommendation. We may, that is, ask him to articulate his beliefs regarding the nature of "good" and how it relates to his proposed plan of action.

It is in this sense, then, that Pratte's SS2 functions in ideological discourse. By "mapping" the theoretical-normative base onto the empirical observations and claims related to a limited class of conditions, it also provides a map for finding our way back to that base. It does so because the terms employed in the slogans not only indicate the limiting conditions and directives for action, they also indicate the types of beliefs which have been mapped and the range of content those beliefs encompass. In this sense, SS2 functions as a "symbolic edifice" representing more than specific prescriptive "rules of the game."

In rational discourse, it is imperative that such "tracing back"
occurs. In the event that the hearer does not do so, he is in danger of committing to actions on the basis of emotions or appeal of the personality of the speaker or vague understanding of what he is committing to or authority.

At this point, the IDM appears as follows.

When viewed as ideological discourse, SS2, by virtue of its functions, can be examined as a set of statements which offer an initial set of assertions about "What Is" and "What Should Be" into the public
arena. As statements, they employ terms which both indicate the limiting class of situations to which the assertions apply and provide initial directions for the asking of questions designed to elicit greater specificity regarding the prescriptive and conceptual "rules of the game."

As symbol systems which "map," they provide direction for questions designed to elicit more explicit information regarding the theoretical-normative foundation. Regardless of whether, under the dictates of rational discourse, we begin by seeking clarification of "What Should Be" or "What Is," we are led back to concerns with the underlying beliefs. In order to expand the IDM, it is necessary to look to those beliefs.

Prior to beginning that examination, it might be useful to trace through a Slogan System--SS2.

For example, upon encountering the Grand Slogan "We teach children, not subjects" the author, if asked to, might provide any number of subslogans to explicate its meaning. Candidates might be subslogans such as "Schools must bring about a sense of social responsibility," "Society needs norm creators, not norm obeyers," "Learning is more than pouring wine into vessels," and so on. Beginning, then, with the "Grand Slogan," the fundamental over-arching program, one usually discovers that there is an interrelated system of slogans. The subslogans help provide explication of the one "Grand Slogan." And, as links in the symbolic system, the subslogans take us a step closer to the underlying beliefs.
This last point may be seen as follows. If we requested expli-
cation of "Society needs norm creators, not norm obeyers," we would ex-
pect to hear a set of beliefs related to a view of the structure of
society and the relationships of the individual in that structure. That
is, we would reasonably expect that the author of the "Grand Slogan"
could provide a set of beliefs related to schooling and its place in the
view of society.

Subslogans, then, not only relate to the "Grand Slogan" in terms
of prescriptions, they also provide a clue to the types of beliefs the
hearer should seek. This is not to imply that beliefs can be deduced
from a Slogan System. It is only to claim that from examination of the
total Slogan System and the terms employed, we might expect to gain a
notion of the types and general content of the beliefs we should seek.

As such, subslogans provide another "link" in the IDM.
CHAPTER V

BELIEF STATEMENTS AND IDEOLOGICAL DISCOURSE

Introduction

Israel Scheffler, in concluding his discussion of beliefs, claims that "it will, in any case, never be reasonable to take belief simply as a matter of verbal response: belief is rather a 'theoretical' state characterizing, in subtle ways, the orientation of the person in the world."¹

This definition fits well with the notions offered in this work. It has been shown that a view of society and societal action are necessary conditions of an ideology. Also, it has been argued that these views are "represented" by and "contained" in SS2 because SS2 "maps" a theoretical-normative base—orientation—onto the empirical. This, then, facilitates attempts to determine, on the basis of the terms employed in the statements in SS2, which aspects of the "orientation" might be fruitful avenues of investigation.

Prior to an expanded discussion of the "mapping" function of SS2 and how it can assist in getting at the beliefs involved in the orientation, it would be useful to look to the nature of Scheffler's discussion which preceded his claim.

Beliefs as What?

Before offering his final claim, Scheffler discusses a number of theories proffered as an explanation of "what we are attributing to X in describing him as actually believing that Q."  

As Mental Entities. The first position is the notion that believing is a mental act, that it is something one performs. Scheffler draws upon Gilbert Ryle's *The Concept of Mind* to show that "the category of performance or activity indeed seems inappropriate for belief." That is, it does not seem that we can say of someone that he is now engaged in something called believing or that he spent some time yesterday believing before he went to dinner. The category of performing just does not fit.

The idea that believing is a performance is especially difficult when we are examining ideologies and ideological discourse. As discussed, the assumption that beliefs and believing are mental entities can lead to almost mechanical concerns with the "causes" and "effects" of those beliefs—Gertz's "source and consequences analysis." This, in turn, can lead to a minimizing of the role of the individual in subscribing to or rejecting a particular ideology.

Ideological discourse, as explicated by Gouldner, place the individual "center stage." Ideologies are accepted on the basis of

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2Ibid., p. 75.


4Scheffler, *Conditions of Knowledge*, pp. 75-76.
rational discourse and defense, not on the "cause" basis. Within ideological discourse, it is the statements of beliefs which are important to the hearer because, as the theoretical base, they are the first level of defense for the prescriptions and descriptions "imbedded" in the slogans. However, there are a number of problems with the idea that we can get at beliefs by dealing with verbal responses.

As Verbal Responses. In analyzing "X believes that Q," Scheffler goes through a number of formulations which arise from particular theories which regard beliefs as verbal responses. He finally arrives at one which seems to be reasonable and inclusive. It is:

if X decides to respond to questions truthfully, he has a propensity to respond by affirming some sentence which is a close translation of Q.\(^5\)

To use Scheffler's example, this means that to say that "X believes that Algebra is difficult" means that if X decides to respond truthfully to the question "Do you believe Algebra to be difficult?" he will have a propensity to respond with some sentence which is a close approximation of the sentence "Algebra is difficult." However, as Scheffler points out, this does not allow the hearer to draw any solid conclusions about the beliefs of the individual.

A person may not understand fully his own beliefs or he may be "weak willed." In either case, even though he is striving to be sincere, he may be incapable of accurately expressing his beliefs. Or, he may have convinced himself that he believes "that Q" when "deep down" he

\(^5\)This is not the actual phrasing Scheffler's formulation presented. I have substituted "X" and "Q" for names and sentences. Please refer to pp. 76-83 for Scheffler's full treatment which is only capsulized here.
does not. In any event, there are some difficulties with assuming belief on the basis of what someone says. This is especially true when one places such statements in the context of ideological discourse which functions partly as an attempt to convince others of the validity of the programs and views of society being offered. In the extreme case, it may be that the person offering the statements is not sincere, even though he may be attempting to convince his audience that he is responding truthfully.

However, as will be discussed later, it may be that whether the person is responding truthfully or not is not the crucial concern initially. That is, one of the main concerns of the hearer would be whether the beliefs do indeed provide a reasonable "grounding" for the claims about "What Should Be." Do the statements in SS2 "map" the theoretical-normative base onto the empirical in a manner consistent with that base and the prescriptions designed to achieve the intended results? Is the mapping logically and psychologically satisfying. More will be said about this throughout the paper, particularly in chapter 7. Answers to these questions will add to the hearer's understanding of the speakers's supposed position.

If, indeed, these concerns are important, then the initial questions will not be whether the sloganeer is responding truthfully about his beliefs but whether the beliefs he does offer are consistent with--provide a reasonable grounding--for his proposals. For example, if an individual offered the belief that government should take a laissez faire attitude regarding economic policy as part of his theoretical-normative base upon which he places the slogan "We stand for no taxation of
business," we would question the consistency of those statements.

Holding off the question of sincerity, however, does not eliminate it. If we were to ascertain that there was indeed some consistency between the statements in SS2 and the statements of beliefs, we might still wish to determine whether the speaker "really" believed what he was saying, and whether he acted upon those beliefs. Such concerns would seem important if we are considering following the sloganeer "to the barricades." From the perspective of the hearer, belief statements are taken to be notifications that "we should, upon occasions, act in regard to such things as we believe."\(^6\) As has been argued, however, one cannot, simply on the basis of belief statements, draw any solid conclusions about what is "really" believed. Nor can we draw any valid conclusions, simply on the basis of belief statements, about how someone will act. Scheffler speaks to this concern also.\(^7\)

As Behavior. There are difficulties both in attempting to predict behavior on the basis of belief statements and in attempting to deduce beliefs from actions. For example, to observe that someone regularly attends church, displays a St. Christopher medal on his dashboard and regularly contributes to church funds does not allow the "inference" that "he believes in God." It simply may be that he is a salesman of church paraphernalia and, although he is an atheist, he maintains contact with the church community and engages in religious

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\(^7\) See Scheffler, *Conditions of Knowledge*, pp. 78-83.
activities to spur sales. To say, then, that we can determine an individual's beliefs by watching what he does is to have rather weak grounds.

As to attempting to predict behavior on the basis of belief statements, Scheffler points out that "relative to overt circumstances alone, therefore, we typically need to consider attributing a complex of beliefs and goals to the person." However, doing so leads to the conclusion that it is best not to view beliefs as leading necessarily to particular actions, but, rather, it is best to view beliefs as "broadly dispositional." That is, beliefs may be manifested in a variety of ways, verbally and behaviorally. And, it is on the basis of "word and deed" that we judge beliefs.

To accept that beliefs are best viewed as "broadly dispositional" does not work against the idea that in rational discourse we should seek to ascertain the beliefs which underlie the statements in SS2 by seeking statements of those beliefs. Prior to commitment to the sloganeer's demands for action, one would be well-advised both to acquire statements of the beliefs and to determine whether the sloganeer acts in accordance with those beliefs. But, for initial evaluation of whether the sloganeer "possesses" beliefs which undergird his proposals, i.e., does he "possess" a fully developed ideology--SS1--, belief statements appear to be the most immediately available evidence. Further, it always will be on the basis of those statements that the hearer will make an initial evaluation of the credibility of the prescriptions he is being asked to

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8 Ibid., p. 86.
9 Ibid., p. 87.
10 Ibid., p. 89.
adopt. It is for this reason that belief statements are offered as the second element in the IDM.

Still, there are other concerns with beliefs which will add clarity to the attempt to deal with belief statements and which will point us in the direction of another set of statements in the IDM. These concerns have been expressed by Thomas F. Green in his *The Activities of Teaching*. Prior to a discussion of these concerns, it would be useful to take some time to deal more clearly with the "mapping" metaphor which has been employed to this point. Doing so will allow for a clearer conception of the role which has been assigned to the terms in the slogan system.

The "Mapping" Metaphor

Perhaps the best way to explicate the "mapping" function of SS2 might be to follow an example through the proposed IDM.

The basic claim made by Pratte is that SS2 "maps" the theoretical-normative base onto the empirical data base. The data base consists of limiting conditions, empirical claims and observations. By doing so, it is a "formulation of M, K, V, as interpreted in C which is assumed to be consistent with E in order to achieve R_i." A schematic of this would look something like the following:

\[ MKV \rightleftharpoons SS2 \rightarrow CE \]

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The arrows indicate that the relationships move not only from MKV through SS2 to CE, but that they move also from SS2 to MKV.

To employ an example. The Grand Slogan "We teach children, not subjects" provides the imperative "Teach children, not subjects!" By virtue of the term "teach," we are made aware of the limiting conditions to which the slogan applies, i.e., the teaching/learning situation. More specifically, the conditions are limited to the teaching/learning situation as it applies to children, as opposed, say, to adults. This is indicated by the term "children." By examining all of the slogans one encounters in SS2, a good notion of the full range of application can be derived.

However, the terms do more than provide indications of the limiting conditions. Given Pratte's notion that statements in SS2 function as "symbolic edifices" representing broad areas of agreement about such things as the beliefs in the theoretical-normative base, the terms can serve also as "pointers" to the types and general content of beliefs we might normally accept as providing initial "grounding" for the prescriptions.

"To teach," for example, would normally be associated with epistemological beliefs regarding the nature of knowledge, the way in which knowledge is transmitted, and the like. It would, then, in rational discourse presuming a fully developed SSI, not be unreasonable for the hearer to request an articulation of those beliefs. From the term "children," and its juxtaposition in the slogan, the hearer would be led to concerns with metaphysical beliefs regarding the nature of children and their relationship to the world, etc.
As with a road map, the "mapping" function of SS2 not only tells us how to get from X to Y, i.e., from "What Is" to "What Should Be," it also provides us with an initial indication of the "tools" employed by the "map maker," the sloganeer.

The value of viewing terms in slogans as "pointers" to the type and content of beliefs is augmented by Gouldner's notion that, in rational discourse, it is assumed that "commands," or statements of "What Should Be," are "grounded" in "What Is." Obviously, this assumes a "What Is" which partially comprises Pratte's theoretical-normative base. This point will be argued momentarily. It appears to be reasonable to assume that SS2, in conjunction with the theoretical-normative base, "reflects" the sloganeer's perception of "What Is." (This idea will be expanded in chapter 6 when the relationship of belief statements to evidence statements and experience is explicated.) It is now necessary to look to Green's discussion of beliefs as a means of moving from slogan statements and belief statements to another level of importance.

"Belief Systems"

Thus far, I have attempted to argue that when engaged in rational discussions, it behooves us to regard slogans as statements which provide not only imperatives for action and "map" underlying beliefs onto an empirical base, but that they should also be viewed as "pointers." This is accomplished by looking to the terms in the slogans and asking for articulation of the beliefs the terms seem to indicate.

It may be that such activity results in the discovery that there are no beliefs or that the sloganeer is incapable of articulating them.
Or, the slogans may turn out to be what Scheffler calls "popularized versions" of what were once carefully articulated educational positions. They could, that is, be Pratte's SS3. However, given the fact that they are offered in the public arena, we would have the right to pursue them to the greatest degree of clarity possible.

However, in the event that we did manage to ascertain the beliefs which the sloganeer claimed were the foundation of his prescriptions, there is an additional problem to be dealt with. That problem relates to the verification of the belief statements. Once we have decided that the belief statements provide a reasonable "grounding" for the prescriptions, it behooves us to determine whether there are propositions in the statements and whether they are true. That is, it is possible that a false statement may serve as reasonable "grounding" for a prescription. For example, while it is not true that "The moon is made of green cheese," that belief could provide a reasonable "grounding" for the prescription contained in the slogan "Cheese makers must take advantage of the moon." In the event that we did not know that the belief was false, we would be reasonable in subscribing to the slogan, but foolish.

It is at this point that Green's analysis becomes helpful because his application of the "system" metaphor to beliefs points up a crucial distinction between how we believe and what we believe.\(^{14}\)

\(^{13}\)Scheffler, The Language of Education, p. 37.

\(^{14}\)Green, The Activities of Teaching, p. 43.
His analysis will aid us in looking clearly at questions regarding the truth of belief statements. That, in turn, will enable us to move to another level in the IDM.

The "Quasi-Logical." Consider the following: In answer to our request for 'support' for the truth of the proposition in his belief, the sloganeer provided us with his reasons for holding the belief rather than with evidence. That is, we ask the sloganeer to support the belief statement that "God 'personally' intervenes in human activity." In response he tells us that "God is omnipotent, omnipresent and nice."

What he has done is not give us evidence for the first belief. Rather he has given us another belief from which he sees the first as being derived. He has given us his reason for holding the first belief.

Green points out that a person, in response to being questioned why he believes X, may provide another belief Y which he sees as supporting belief X. Green terms this the "quasi-logical" relationship between beliefs. That is, belief X is seen as a derivative of belief Y. It is "quasi-logical," Green says, because the order has "little to do with the objective logical relationship between beliefs."\(^{15}\)

Within ideological discourse as discussed in this work, the reason for the person's holding a belief is not what is crucial. Although from the perspective of the person holding the belief, it may not be separable from the evidence which supports the truth of the proposition, it is just that evidence which we should seek in our attempt to

\(^{15}\text{Ibid., p. 44.}\)

\(^{16}\text{Ibid.}\)
evaluate the belief being offered as the foundation for the prescriptions. The person's reasons for holding a belief is not evidence for the truth of the proposition contained in the belief unless they happen to be one and the same. Unless, that is, the belief is what Green calls an "evidential belief."\(^{17}\)

By offering another, "primary"\(^{18}\) belief as his reason for holding a belief, the sloganeer has moved the question back one step. Hence, we can still ask him for the evidence of the truth of the proposition in the "primary" belief.

What does this show us? It shows us that in attempting to determine the extent of the evidence which supports the belief statements which are offered as the theoretical-normative base, the hearer must be careful not to be trapped into accepting reasons. If, as has been argued, it is that base of beliefs which is the foundation for the prescriptions which are offered in SS2, then it behooves the hearer to be as clear as possible about the viability and accuracy/truth of that foundation. To that end, a second set of distinctions drawn by Green will be useful.

**Evidential and Non-Evidential Beliefs.** Green draws a useful distinction between knowing and believing. He tells us that "though it is not possible to know what is false, it may be reasonable, nonetheless, to believe what is false."\(^{19}\) This is so because the truth condition

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 49.

\(^{18}\)Ibid., p. 44.

\(^{19}\)Ibid., p. 99.
applies to knowledge claims, i.e., "I know that X" implies "X is true," "I believe X," and "I have evidence for X." This is not the case for a belief statement. This is not to imply that belief statements which have been discussed as the theoretical-normative base are exclusive of knowledge. One can know X and still say only that he believes X. As Scheffler says, "though the uttering of 'I believe' would tend to convey the speaker's lack of knowledge, his actual belief is perfectly compatible with his knowledge." When, in Pratte's theoretical-normative base, we speak of belief statements, there is nothing in that locution to preclude there being knowledge claims, which the belief statements subsume.

In order to get at the difficulty presented by his claim, Green distinguishes between what counts as a "reasonable belief" and what counts as a "reasonable believer." The reasonableness of the belief, i.e., its truth, is a function of logical matters—the evidence which humankind in general has available. Does it support the proposition? The reasonableness of the believer is a function of the relationship between the evidence and the believer. That is, is he reasonable in believing X on the basis of the evidence available to him?

Given this, it is possible, then, for a person to believe that which is false (in terms of the evidence available to humankind or in terms of the actual truth of the proposition) and still be a reasonable believer. This is so because the truth condition is not involved in

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20 Scheffler, *Conditions of Knowledge*, p. 75.

21 Ibid., p. 99-102.
believing. However, our concern is not with believing; it is with the reasonableness of the belief, i.e., with the truth of the belief, the what. Clearly, we must seek evidence to determine the truth of a belief statement. However, even here we must be careful. As Green points out with his distinction between "evidential" and "non-evidential" beliefs, "a person may hold a belief because it is supported by the evidence, or he may accept the evidence because it happens to support a belief he already holds." The former is an "evidential belief." The latter is a "non-evidential belief."

This is the point at which things may get quite complicated. Even if one avoids being trapped into accepting reasons for holding beliefs and acquires instead evidence for the truth of the propositional content, there is still a problem. First, although it may appear, on the basis of the evidence mustered by the sloganeer, that he "possesses" a "well-reasoned" belief, it may be that the hearer is encountering a "non-evidential" belief. And since, as discussed in the next chapter, the interpretation of evidence is to some degree potentially colored by the very beliefs we seek to support, it may be, in some instances, an easy thing to begin with a belief and interpret experience in such a way that it provide evidence for the truth of that belief. One person may look at the sunset and see evidence for the belief that the laws of nature are immutable. Another person may look at the sunset and see evidence for the existence of God.

Moreover, in the cases where what we are given is an "evidential belief," the problem remains. We must discover something other than

\[22\] Ibid., p. 49.
evidence statements as a means for evaluating both those statements and the propositional content of belief statements.

The means for doing so, I will argue in the next chapter, is by closer examination of the relationship of beliefs and experience. Support for this position will be drawn from a closer examination of "statements" and "verification."

Statements and Verification

John Wilson, in his *Language and the Pursuit of Truth*, lays out five categories of statements. They are applicable for categorization of the belief statements we have been discussing. They are applicable also for categorization of evidence statements.

Prior to dealing with statements, however, Wilson discusses the notion of verification. Verification, he tells us, "means finding out whether something is true." Further, "verification is a guide to meaning" because "the meaning of a statement depends largely on its method of verification." Finally, he finds it to be important to determine whether "we do actually share experiences of a kind which would make it useful for us to agree upon an established meaning and verification." This last quotation is out of context to the extent that he

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24 Ibid., p. 51.

25 Ibid., p. 52.

26 Ibid., pp. 94-97 (italics mine).
is discussing verification in relation to "value" and "metaphysical" claims. However, the crucial nature of experience is evidenced by the fact that Wilson ultimately concludes that although there are some statements in the class of metaphysical statements which may be verifiable because we might gain some agreement as to the "special experiences" of some persons, there are others for which such agreement is not possible.

Wilson's discussion of "verification" introduces an element which has not yet been discussed in this work--that the meaning of a statement is to some extent determined by the method of verification. This enables us to begin to tie together what was said earlier about the relationship of beliefs and evidence. We must seek some way to make sense of meaning, beliefs, and experience as they relate to evidence. That is the task of the next chapter. We will begin with a look at statements.

**Statements**

Wilson distinguishes five types of statements.²⁷

**Imperative and Attitudes.** Statements of this type are not verifiable because they offer no facts. For example, "Down with tyranny" does not provide a proposition which is open to verification. However, given the discussions in this work, it would appear that the statement could be treated as a slogan because it could easily function as a rallying symbol proposing a political agenda.

²⁷Ibid., p. 47-74 and pp. 88-97.
Wilson argues that imperatives such as "Down with tyranny" are "disguised" attitude statements. As such, they do no more than provide information about an individual's feelings about some thing. They have only a "yea" or "nay" value. However, the example is different from a more obvious attitude statement such as "I don't know anything about Art, but I don't like this picture." In this latter example, there is no imperative and the sentence obviously relates no information beyond an indication of the person's feelings. Hence, there are no shared experiences to use as verification. Neither are such obvious attitude statements of any logical value in dealing with a slogan system.

**Empirical.** Statements of this type state some fact(s) about the world of experience. They are verified by appeal to experience through tests designed to determine the truth of the propositions. Into this class would also fall predictive empirical statements, i.e., "If I do X, then, Y will occur." The concern here is to decide what experiences will count as verification.

**Value.** Statements of this type express our judgment regarding the value of some thing. The judgment is based, or at least one would hope so, upon a set of criteria which defines what counts as good for that thing. The criteria, and our agreement to them, enable the first level of verification to occur. A second level is the evaluation of the criteria themselves. That is, we may agree that if the characteristics a,b,c are sufficient for calling some thing "good," then if X has a,b,c, it is "good." However, we do not always share a commitment to a,b,c being the definition of a good thing. This can present a problem at the second level until such time as we can come to agreement upon the
criteria for deciding between say a, b, c and d, e, f. Until then, we have
no shared experiences and we cannot achieve verification at that level.

**Analytic.** Statements of this type are true by definition or by
the laws of logic. For example, "2+2=4" is true by definition within
the base 10 number system. The statement "All unmarried males are
bachelors" is true by definition within the language system. There is
no need for experience to enter into consideration when verifying
analytic claims. But, then, neither would they serve any purpose in
the theoretical-normative base as part of the foundation of prescrip-
tions.

**Metaphysical.** Statements such as "Good comes from God" are,
perhaps, verifiable to those persons who share rather special experi-
ences. However, such experiences are not shared by all. Hence, there
is no agreement as to what counts as verification. There may be eventu-
ally, but, in such instances as above, there is none at present.

The point in introducing these categories is that any one of
the types may appear as beliefs in the theoretical-normative base if
that base is expanded beyond what Pratte seems to mean. (That expan-
sion will be argued for momentarily.) And, even though some of them are
not verifiable because they contain no propositional content, they all
require shared experience in some sense if those who use them are to be
understood even minimally. And, although that experience may not permit
verification, it is that experience which provides partial meaning for
the statements.

Prior to moving to those concerns, it is necessary to look again
at Pratte's theoretical-normative base.
The Theoretical-Normative Base

It has been argued that the key terms in the SS2 serve a two-way function. First, they indicate the limiting conditions to which the slogans apply. Second, it was argued that the terms act as "pointers" to the type and the content of the beliefs we might expect to find as the components of the theoretical-normative base of a full-blown ideology. That is, it is the addition of the theoretical-normative base which completes SS1.

Gouldner offered that ideological discourse is public discourse which seeks to provide "world-referencing claims, a "What Is," which serves as the "grounding" for "What Should Be." Given this, and Pratte's theoretical-normative base, it was argued that the hearer should attempt to elicit statements of those beliefs which we would assume serve as the foundation for the descriptions of "What Is." It is time to question that assumption in order to gain clarity about Pratte and Gouldner's theoretical-normative base/beliefs and their relationships to empirical claims and observations and "What Is." Neither of them clearly explicate these notions.

Pratte speaks of SS2 "mapping" an underlying base onto the empirical data base. This process involves "accounting for" that base. Gouldner also speaks of mapping when he tells us that "each ideology presents a map of 'what is' in a society." The primary questions with


which we must deal are: "What is being mapped?" "On what basis is something being mapped?" Dealing with these will lead us to the conclusions that Pratte's "mapping" function involves a "process" and a "product" sense, that his MKV is both too broad and too narrow, and it will help make clear Gouldner's "What Is" and "world-referencing."

Let us begin by imagining the following conversation.

Mr. X: "Hello! What are you doing?"
Mr. Y: "I am drawing a map."
Mr. X: "Of what?"
Mr. Y: "The world."
Mr. X: "Of all the world?"
Mr. Y: "Eventually. But for now I am just mapping Pittsburgh."
Mr. X: "What kind of a map will it be?"
Mr. Y: "What do you mean?"
Mr. X: "Will it be a population map, a road map, a map of industries, of climate patterns or what?"
Mr. Y: "Oh, it is a map of what I think is important in Pittsburgh, roads, places of interest, and the like."

Let us leave the conversation at this point and ask what we can learn from it.

Primarily it shows us that an attempt to "map" some X involves a decision about what characteristics of X we will represent on the map. This decision implies that we (1) already possess some broad notions about X which enable us to isolate it from the rest of our experience; (2) we have refined those broad notions to the point where we are able to isolate certain characteristics of X such as a, b, c which will be represented on the map, and (3) that we have refined the characteristics
of $a, b, c$ to the point that we know what will count as $a, b, c$. These assumptions hold whether we are mapping a "mythical" or a "real" $X$.

To translate this into the terms of our discussion, if we are "mapping" a theoretical-normative base onto empirical data, then, it would seem that (1) we "possess" some broad beliefs about that data which enable us to isolate it from the rest of our experiences, i.e., we have some broad beliefs about the nature of knowledge; (2) we have refined those beliefs into more particular beliefs which enable us to isolate certain characteristics of that one aspect of our experience, i.e., knowledge possessing characteristics $a, b, c$ is of the greatest good, and (3) we have refined $a, b, c$ to the point where we know what counts as $a, b, c$.

This, it would seem, is a close approximation of what Pratte means when he talks of the theoretical-normative base. But what then does it mean to say that these are "mapped onto" an empirical data base within a limiting set of conditions? To begin with the first part of the question, it would seem that it means that the empirical data base is "interpreted" vis à vis those beliefs. That is $M$, $K$, and $V$ beliefs are used to interpret empirical observations. This interpretation of empirical observations results in empirical claims. This I would argue, is the only way we can make sense of Pratte's notion that the empirical data base is "accounted for."

But, if this is the case, then when that process is completed, the product will be an expanded MKV. We will now, as a result of the beliefs represented by the empirical claims, have in our base $M_{1-n}$, $K_{1-n}$, and $V_{1-n}$. However, we do not stop here. Pratte claims that MKV
is mapped onto an empirical data base of limited range, i.e., the limiting conditions. But, again, as a result of that process, the product will be a further expanded base in that now it will include MKVs related to a specific set of conditions, say, education. We then have a base consisting of $\text{ME}_{1-n}$, $\text{KE}_{1-n}$, and $\text{VE}_{1-n}$.

The process/product notion is crucial when we return to the question of what it means to say that SS2 "maps" the theoretical-normative base onto the empirical data base. Does this mean that the sloganeer, by uttering the slogans in SS2, is at the moment of utterance "mapping" his beliefs onto the empirical base for himself? I would not discount that possibility entirely in that each utterance may indeed lead to a "new insight." However, there is a temporal, cumulative effect, and, we would assume that prior to the first utterance, the sloganeer has already engaged in "mapping"/interpreting vis à vis his beliefs, thereby increasing the set of beliefs he has to work with. Ultimately, the question is whether that is the intent of the sloganeer. That is, does he utter slogans in order to engage in the interpretive process or is his primary concern to provide a "map" of his interpretations so that the hearers will employ the concepts resulting from his interpretive process in their interpretive process?

The latter seems reasonable. Slogans, we have said, act as simplifiers and "symbolic edifices" for underlying beliefs. Gouldner has said that ideological discourse serves to "define and interpret social situations explicitly." Slogans serve as a primary vehicle

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$log$.

Ibid., p. 68.
for public offering of those definitions and interpretations because they can act both as general maps of the underlying beliefs for the sloganeer and they are useful rallying devices.

What conclusions can we draw from this discussion. First, SS2 is a map in the product sense when viewed from the perspective of the sloganeer. Second, SS2, as a map designed to ascribe meaning to, to "account for" empirical observations will, if accepted by the hearer, provide direction for that hearer in his attempts to interpret empirical observations. This, then, describes the "mapping" function of SS2.

Third, it seems that if by "theoretical-normative base" Pratte means only MKV and not ME, then his notion is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad in that the beliefs he includes are too broad by themselves, i.e., the content of the beliefs does not range beyond very general concerns. It is too narrow in that it does not permit the inclusion of more than a very few basic beliefs. Finally, it seems that to say that SS2 "maps" MKV onto a data base is to say that SS2 provides a map (product) of that data base which has been generated by the sloganeer so that it can now be used by the hearer to map (process) the data base he experiences.

How, then, does this discussion relate to Gouldner's notions of "What Is" and "world-referencing" claims? While, on the one hand, Gouldner claims that ideological discourse is "world-referencing," on the other hand, he claims that "language limits what [we] . . . may say and know about the world." Thus, even though ideological discourse is

\[31\text{Ibid., p. 54.}\]
supposed to transcend ordinary language which is culturally rooted by providing new meanings and descriptions which are world-referenced in a more secularized, broader sense, he does not come clean on how this works. It would seem that if language limits what we can say and know, then introducing a new language does not seem to help us out of the problem of relativity which the limits of language would impose on "world-referencing" claims. If the new language assigns meaning to the world which, in turn, is to serve as the verifying reference for those claims, then we must find some way to break out of the "map." That is the task of the next chapter.

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32Ibid., p. 60.
CHAPTER VI

BELIEFS, EVIDENCE, EXPERIENCE

Introduction

In The Meaning of Meaning, Ogden and Richards tell us that a language transaction or a communication may be defined as a use of symbols in such a way that acts of reference occur in a hearer which are similar in all relevant respects to those which are symbolized by them in the speaker.¹

The purpose in this chapter is to look at this act of symbolizing as an act of assigning meaning, particularly as it relates to beliefs, evidence and experience.

It was argued in the last chapter that even when we are able to elicit evidence in our attempt to verify the propositional content—the what of belief statements—we must be careful because the experience to which we appeal in order to verify the propositions is, to some degree ordered by the beliefs in our "system." This claim regarding the interrelationship of the assignment of meaning to statements and experience was augmented by Wilson's remarks about verification and shared experience.

Meaning, Experience, and Statements

Concepts or interpretations, the assigning of meaning to the world, play a large role in the "mapping" of one's experience. Hence, ²

it is reasonable to claim that the statements uttered in ideological discourse will need to be related ultimately to one's own experience and to the experiences of the ideologue if they are to be even partially understood and grasped. Such relating will enable the speaker and hearer to come to some conclusions about the extent to which they share meanings and the extent to which they share experiences necessary for verification. In other words, the ideologue is placing his experiences and interpretations in the form of a map. Therefore, the hearer must first determine whether he has the same experiences and interpretations. And, second, he must determine whether the map works. To do so, he must get at the experiences of the ideologue. He can do that only to the extent that he can deal with the evidence and concepts presented. It is this route which allows the hearer to determine the extent to which he shares experiences similar to the ideologue. And, it is this shared experience which allows them to determine the method for verifying the truth of the propositional content of belief statements.

This is to say it is not reasonable to claim that a given set of experiences $E_1$ will necessarily evoke a given set of statements $S_1$. Nor is it reasonable to claim that because some one utters a set of statements $S_1$ that he has undergone a particular set of experiences $E_1$. To do either of these is to ignore the "symbolic interrelationships" of which Geertz speaks.²

However, it is reasonable to claim that ultimately the belief statements and the key terms employed will be supported by appeals to experience. "Experience" encompasses more than direct interactions of individuals with physical events in their environments. It incorporates also the individual's own conceptual framework, thought processes, and experiences and interpretations of others as presented in written or oral form.

When asked to provide evidence for a particular belief, an individual may say that he believes there are tides because his mother told him there are tides or because he had undergone a personal experience at the beach which had led him to that conclusion. Or he may claim that he believes China to exist because he has been there or because he had seen a map and read an account of China in the papers. Some are representations of the experiences of others and the maps they have generated.

Statements such as these are offered as reasons/evidence for statements of beliefs. As such, they are the last form of statement in the IDM. However, these are not the last element. Experience is. Evidence statements are a means of communicating the interpretations/meanings discovered in a variety of experiences and they provide as well, \textit{vis à vis} the key terms, an indication of the cognitive ordering of an individual's world. Just as the process of coupling events and meanings cannot be separated from the individual and his experiences, the deciphering of the meanings represented by the key terms cannot occur by examining them in limbo.

The key terms are representatives of the concepts and interpretations which in turn represent meanings assigned to experience.
Therefore, they must be placed within the context of a network of experiences to which they interrelate.

If we assume that the previous analysis relates to one half of Ogden and Richards' symbolizing process— the relation of ideas to things—and that communication also involves the relation of words to ideas, then, to complete the process of communication, it seems reasonable to move from words to concepts to the events to which they ascribe meaning. This is especially crucial if we are to determine the extent of shared experiences in order to determine the method of verification for statements about "What Is."

Secondly, as Reddiford claims, the meaning of a concept within a system of concepts is determined in part by locating its relationship to the other concepts in the system. The order of the individual's conceptual system is determined by examining the relationship of concepts. Given this, statements offered as reasons or evidence for belief statements would be a description of that ordering.

However, as one moves from the particular experiences upward in the linguistic chain, the statements become more general, thereby becoming more vague. That is, they have packed into them more and more meaning. The original concept is represented by the key term, the

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4 In his "Conceptual Analysis and Education," in *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), Vol. VI, no. 2, July 1972, 99. 9-199, G. Reddiford says that "there . . . are not intrinsic meaning elements lodged in concepts; if, then, we wish to discover what someone means, it is necessary to trace the conceptual nexus within which they are located."
concept, in turn, being a representation of the concepts. As one moves to
the level of beliefs, one can find packed into that key term the meaning
of other concepts within the conceptual nexus. From the statement, "I
learned much from a teacher, although he did not concentrate on subject
matter"--and other statements related to similar experiences--to the
statement, "I believe that the value of an educational experience is
determined by the transactions taking place" is a huge jump. Although
"educational experience" "carries," or could "carry," the meaning first
associated with "learning," it "carries" more. That is, it summarizes
more than just those experiences first mentioned. And, by the time we
reach the slogan "Learning is more than pouring wine into vessels,"
'learning' is far broader than it began. At this point, it represents
not only the original statement related to experience but a host of con­
cepts, interpretations, statements of beliefs, and other subslogans.

By "packed into," then, is meant nothing more than "represents"
or summarizes. The terms employed in statements, as linguistic symbols,
become a shorthand which represent other terms, statements, concepts,
and experiences. To paraphrase Ogden and Richards, the terms represent
the concepts of the speaker, which, in turn, represent the meanings
assigned to the experiences of the speaker.5

But, as was indicated earlier, individuals undergo experiencing
of other than experiences in what is commonly called the "physical en­
vironment." They also experience their own cognitive processes. Logic
is an example of the results of those experiences. It is a result of

5See C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning
new concepts and interpretations being created out of the nexus of concepts the individual possesses. Although Green may have experienced some events in his "physical environment" such as the actions of men, it is the experiencing of his store of concepts and their relationships, e.g., 'norms', 'commitment', 'creates', and 'obey' that enables him to create the new concepts 'norm obeying' and 'norm creating'. And, the deciphering of those concepts leads to the examination both of the former concepts and the experiences related to them and to the latter. This process begins by looking to the key terms employed in the statements. In general, then, "all roads" lead to experience and meaning and they pass through statements and key terms. Let us look, then, at the thread of meaning as it relates to the role of slogans.

Meaning and the Role of Slogans

Discussion of the relationship of experience, meaning, and the terms used to represent them has been undertaken. It has been argued that 'meaning' is the thread which "knits together" statements as we move from the level of experience to the slogans in ideological discourse. However, we have dealt primarily with the nonceremonial use or summarizing use of slogans, from the perspective of the utterer of the slogans. That is only one perspective in the communication process. What of the hearer, the person on whom the slogan is used?

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Given that the ideologue attempts to persuade others to act in accord with his views of society and societal action, the slogan is an effective linguistic shorthand for him. The slogan acts for the sloganeer as a symbolic representative for what may be an enormous amount of experiences and statements. "Packed" into the slogan are the experiences, the experiencing, the concepts, interpretations, and the prescriptions of the sloganeer. He, we assume, knows what he means. Thus, the slogan is a subtle vehicle for discourse. Realizing that when trying to move masses, the recitation of a litany of experiences and statements underlying the slogans might be dysfunctional, the ideologue tends to seek a more efficient means for communicating. It may be that with certain audiences, who are quite demanding, the litany would be useful. Or, at some point where persons have exhibited the emotional commitment sought by the utterer, the litany can be offered as further explication.

However, the desire to move others to action and the recognition of the power that words can enjoy leads to an overemphasis on the ceremonial use of slogans as the primary weapon in ideological discourse.

It is partially because of the ambiguity and vagueness of the key terms that slogans which, from the ideologue's point of view, can be seen mainly as nonceremonial, take on their importance as rallying symbols, function ceremonially for the hearer. That is, given the discussion of 'meaning', a term such as "teaching" can mean "teaching to," "teaching that" or "teaching how to." However, even if one were to

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7 In his *The Activities of Teaching*, pp. 1-19, Green provides an interesting discussion of the ways in which a term such as "teaching" can be ambiguous and vague.
look only at one of the possible meanings to remove a degree of the ambiguity, it can still be vague. There are a wide range of activities which could count as an example of "teaching that." Thus, the key constituent terms can "represent" a potentially enormous number of concepts, interpretations, and experiences. Just as the slogan can "represent" a large number of "rules of the game." This vagueness and ambiguity is important when the slogan is functioning ceremonially because that vagueness and ambiguity typically is not removed in initial discussions. Thus, the slogan can enjoy broad application and appeal.

Beyond the fact, then, that some words possess a kind of magical efficacy, they can also possess an enormous ambiguity and vagueness which leaves them open for application to a variety of concepts, interpretations, and experiences. Both of these aspects contribute to the "rallying" function of ceremonial slogans. Although the utterer of the slogan "We teach children, not subjects" may have in mind a particular notion of "teaching" and the range of experiences to which it applied, the hearer, unless he is aware of that explicit meaning, can interpret the term according to his own concepts and experiences. To recoin an old phrase, "one man's concepts are another man's map." It is just this which can foster the appeal of slogans to peoples with differing, perhaps even contradictory, notions.

Cromwell's call for "discipline" in England could appeal to the English maid who had just been raped on the way home from the pub. When she encounters what is for Cromwell a concept, she, on the basis of her experience and her concepts, interprets her experience with that concept to mean more soldiers on the streets to protect her. She assigns her
own meaning. Although this might be accepted by Cromwell as a reason­
able social policy, it is at least somewhat different from the role "discipline" played in his religious framework.

Similarly, a slogan such as "Back to basics" can, because of the term "basics," gain adherents who understand that to mean reinsti­
tuting "discipline" as well as those who subscribe to Green's notions of norm-creators. Or, a slogan such as "Learning is more than pouring wine into vessels" can attract those who are for more discipline in the class­
room and those who think that traditional discipline methods are useless or destructive.

Thus, in a sense, a successful ideologue uses terms in slogans which have the widest possible number of meanings and the widest range of application, yet still are able to function symbolically within his conceptual framework in a specific way, provided he does indeed "possess" such a framework.

However, if one couples Pratte's notion that slogans "map" a theoretical base onto a set of empirical data, thereby expressing a pro­
gram for action, with the potential ambiguity and vagueness this can entail, one can make an initial step in reducing the danger inherent in slogans. Prior to commitment to "What Should Be" offered by the slogan, it behooves us to look to that theoretical base and the experience, con­
cepts, and interpretations from which it is derived.

It is this base which is the meaning Gouldner says is being assigned to experience as a description of "What Is" upon which "What Should Be" is grounded. The danger is that we might stop at the level of appeal or at the level of the theoretical-normative base. It is
crucial that we continue to the level of experience for the theoretical-normative base, i.e., our beliefs, not only are used to interpret experience, they are the result of our experiencings.

If we look at the slogan as a statement related to other statements as detailed previously, then, by tracing the key terms back through those statements, we can begin the process of deciphering the concepts, interpretations, and experiences they symbolize. We can derive a clearer view of the utterer's "orientation" to the world, his view of society and societal actions, and the experiences and objects which are its foundation.

Finally, although this method may enable us to deal rationally with ideological discourse by aiding us in determining the descriptions and the accuracy of the descriptions of "What Is" so that we can rationally decide on committing to "What Should Be," it is experience, the "things," that are the ultimate test. One cannot stop when concepts and interpretations have been generated. We must be taken back to experience in order to see if they "work." Theory must interact with practice, else neither is rational.

It seems, then, that even though one may begin with examining how slogans function ceremonially, how they appeal, one is drawn back to examining how they function nonceremonially.

For each of the linguistic elements in the IDM related to the nonceremonial function, there are criteria or techniques which can be employed to foster that examination. This application of the IDM is discussed in the concluding chapter.
A Summary of the Model

Ideology, it has been shown, indicates a view of society and societal action which is based upon an "orientation" to the world. As such, it includes a political agenda--prescriptions--for action which are proffered to others in an attempt to gain their commitment to action in accord with those views. The proffering takes place in ideological discourse, the defense of which is always a public matter. Taken together, these are the bases for the sense of 'ideology' employed in this work.

Ideological discourse involves the use of certain linguistic elements, statements, as a vehicle for communicating those views. The primary statements are nonceremonial slogans/slogan systems. Slogans, as statements, perform two functions: ceremonially slogans are used to rally others to act. The ceremonial function is facilitated by the "magical efficacy" which words possess and their inherent vagueness and ambiguity. The constituent key terms used in the slogans symbolize or represent and gain their meaning from concepts/interpretations. And the concepts and interpretations represent the meaning assigned to the experiences from which concepts and interpretations are derived. These characteristics of slogans allow for the opportunity for interpretation vis à vis the hearer's own concepts and experiences; therefore, creating more rallying power for the slogan. But, the interpretation of the hearer may or may not be similar to those of the utterer.

Viewing slogans as only one element in a linguistic chain enables us to develop an IDM which aids in "tracing" the slogan and its terms back to their source. The IDM provides a means for dealing with
"What Is" in Limiting Conditions

Key Terms

Concepts Hypotheses

Belief Statements

Evidence Statements

Meanings Experiencing

Experience

Ambiguity Vagueness

Prescriptions
the process of symbolic formulation and, as such, it momentarily holds off what Geertz has called the leap from source to consequences. That this leap predominates in traditional attempts to deal with 'ideology' was seen in the review of those attempts in chapter 2.

The IDM is "knit together" by the notion that slogans "map" the theoretical base from which plans of action are generated. They summarize underlying beliefs, experiences, and experiencings through key constituent terms which symbolize/represent those things. They symbolize because meaning is carried "upwards" from experiences through concepts and interpretations to slogans.

Beginning with the first linguistic element or slogans, we find that, generally, ideological discourse designed to move others employs a system of slogans which may be "pulled together" by one "Grand Slogan." By examining those statements and the key constituent terms within them, one gains some indication of the types and content of beliefs which have been "mapped" by the slogans.

The logical step, then, is to request statements of beliefs from the relevant areas. This leads to a narrowing of the meaning of the slogans. And, by looking to the types of statements offered, e.g., value, metaphysical, empirical, and the like, some notion is derived of the types of statements of evidence which might be offered as support.

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9 The notion of "knitting together" is obviously metaphorical. However, it functions well in the sense that it is useful to view meaning as the thread "holding together" or "running through" the IDM.
for the belief statements. It is these statements which enable us to get a handle on the "meaning" which was packed into the slogans with which we began. This is so because the key terms employed in the evidence statements will be symbolic representations of the results of that processing and the concepts derived.

Further, some of those concepts will be the result of the individual's experiencing of his own concepts rather than simply being a result of examining "physical" experiences. In a sense, prediction is an example of this type of process. By examining the store of concepts he has created to explain the "physical" experiences, man extrapolates to new concepts to predict probable interactions and interpretations not yet experienced. Further, within a theory, man generates new concepts and interpretations in an attempt to relate and unify that which he has already discovered. Hence, the necessity claimed by Reddiford\textsuperscript{10} for examination of the interrelationships of concepts as a means for determining their meaning.

Obviously, the IDM by itself is not sufficient. It must be coupled with criteria or techniques for the hearer's use in evaluating the statements and the meanings they represent. This evaluation is crucial both for understanding of the "orientation" of the world being presented by the discourse and for rational acceptance of the ideology and the recommended actions derived from it. The criteria and techniques proposed in the next chapter deal not with whether the statements

are elegant or appealing since that would be to deal with the ceremonial use only. Rather, they relate to the nonceremonial, summarizing, symbolizing function of slogans.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

William Barrett, in a recent review of Barbarism With A Human Face, a book by a former French socialist Bernard-Henri Levy, says that he "wishes Mr. Levy had traced the links here more thoroughly," as he attempted to detail the failure of Marxist ideology to hold his commitment.\(^1\) Apparently, Mr. Levy's thinking had been "turned around" by reading Solzhenitsyn. Barrett introduces the idea that Solzhenitsyn had added a new dimension to discussions of Marxism. Namely, "The concreteness of art, which is always more powerful than the abstractions of ideology."\(^2\)

The purpose of this work has been to develop a heuristic model—the IDM—which would aid in reducing the abstractions of ideology. In this chapter, the IDM will be applied to the ideological discourse which has been offered by proponents of Competency-Based Education. The proponents have claimed that Competency-Based Education (hereafter referred to as CBE) is a viable curriculum model for all levels of educational activities; therefore, they have entered into discourse in many public forums in an attempt to convince nonbelievers. In doing so, they have


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 3.
IDM

EVALUATION CRITERIA/TECHNIQUES

"Mapping" in Limiting Conditions

Key Terms

Concepts Hypotheses

Meanings Experiencing

Experience

Ambiguity Vagueness

Reasonableness of:
Believer (how-psycho-
logical)
Belief (what-logical)
presented analyses of the goals of education and how the goals are to be achieved (What Should Be) as well as an analysis of the current "state of the art" (What Is).

Obviously, we will not be dealing with discourse in the sense that we are involved in a "give-and-take" with an ideologue. However, by examining what has been offered in the past, we can indicate the usefulness of the IDM in isolating statements and generating appropriate questions. And, even in the absence of the speaker, we can begin the application of the criteria at various points.

Discourse about CBE is ideological discourse in that it arises from an interest group; it is an attempt to convince others to act in a particular way; attempts to describe the current state of affairs are couched in "world-referencing" statements; it includes statements about "What Should Be" and how to get there, and, given the content of the discourse and that to which it applies, we can assume that it is an attempt to map a theoretical-normative base onto empirical observations. Given this, we can begin.

The above provides a schematic view of the IDM, the relationships of the elements and the initial concerns related to evaluation. For convenience of discussion, the points at which a particular evaluation may occur are numbered. In a sense, the numbers represent a hierarchy of approach to the process. As examination of the schematic will show, we might begin at any point depending upon the type of statement encountered.

Step 1--Grand Slogan and Subslogans. At this level, beyond attempts to isolate the key conceptual terms which "carry" meaning, there
is a concern with consistency and relevancy. *Consistency* relates to both the key terms and the interpretative relationships of the slogans. As to the first, the best that can be demanded is that the slogans not be contradictory.

*Relevancy* relates to the connection between the Grand Slogan, its key constituent terms, and the areas circumscribed by the subslogans. If those areas represented by the subslogans do not appear relevant to the Grand Slogan, then either the system is flawed or the understanding of the hearer is not complete.

Perhaps the best candidate for the Grand Slogan of the system would be "The goal of education is to develop competence." This slogan offers the vague imperative "Develop competence!" to all persons involved in "educating" others. One interesting point about this slogan is that it can be put forth in many arenas ranging from public "schooling" through post-secondary education to training activities in business, the armed forces, and government. As a result, the limiting conditions are quite broad and this range of application has led to confusion about both the notion of education CBE involves and the actions which will count as meeting the imperative.

In attempts to delineate more clearly the conceptual and practical applications of the slogan, proponents of the model have offered the following subslogans:

1. Concentrate on the outcomes of the educational process.
2. Specify publicly the skills and "bits of knowledge" the learner is to acquire.
3. Offer a variety of "learning routes" for the learner.
4. Indicate publicly the levels of performance expected of the learner.
5. Specify the levels of performance in objectively measurable ways.
6. Offer the learner more than one try at demonstrating competence.

As we would wish, the subslogans do provide further explication of what we should do in order to meet the imperative in the Grand Slogan. Second, there is consistency between the imperatives of the Grand Slogan and subslogans and between the subslogans. They all function to emphasize "outcomes" of the learning process. Little is said regarding the relationship of 'education' and 'society' or 'education' and the learner, except as they relate to each other through "outcomes."

That is, each of the concepts in the slogan-system appears to derive meaning from the notion of the demonstrable, measurable outcomes of the learning process. Hence, there appears to be acceptable consistency and relevancy between the Grand Slogan and the subslogans.

Given this, the next step in applying the IDM is to elicit statements of beliefs regarding the areas indicated by the "key terms" employed in the slogan system.

Step 2—Slogans and Statements of Beliefs. Given the idea that the subslogans point to broad areas of beliefs which we would expect to be articulated, the relevancy criterion can again be applied. That is, it would seem rational that the statements of beliefs offered as further explication of the subslogans would represent broad areas of beliefs which, on the basis of the terms, appear to be conceptually related.

The adequacy criterion at this level is both psychological and logical. Psychologically, the hearer must be satisfied that the meaning
relationship between the subslogan and the statements of beliefs has been established. This psychological inadequacy may exist even when the sloganeer has provided a sufficiently logical explication of how the belief statements are related to the slogan; that is, when he has shown that there is some reasonable connection between the key terms in the slogans and the content of the beliefs. However, for the hearer, it may be that even when a degree of logical adequacy has been established, the relationship may not be psychologically adequate because the hearer simply does not have sufficient knowledge to understand. Particularly, the hearer may be unfamiliar with the terms employed in the belief statements.  

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Those areas of beliefs to which the key terms "point" are primarily concerned with the "K's" of the theoretical-normative base. In defense of the slogan-system, proponents of CBE have offered the following statements:

1. All skill and knowledge acquisition that a learner can justifiably be asked to submit to examination can be stated in observable, objectively measurable terms.

2. The primary purpose of an educational process is to develop individuals who are competent.

3. Competence in an area is defined primarily by the ability of an individual to demonstrate knowledge and skill to a level determined

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3In his An Introduction to the Analysis of Educational Concepts (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 56-62, Jonas Soltis discusses the notion that a satisfying explanation must be psychologically adequate. To be psychologically adequate, the information already available to the individual being given the explanation must be sufficient for him to understand the explanation. That is, the explanation may have no logical gape, yet the person, because, say, of the lack of familiarity with the terms, may not be able to understand. Hence, the explanation is psychologically inadequate for him. A similar notion is being applied here.
by the practicing professionals in that particular field.

4. There is a causal relationship between the actions of a teacher and the learning outcomes of a student.

5. Everyone learns at their own rate and in their own way.

The beliefs which have been presented by CBE proponents are relevant. They deal with those areas of belief that one would logically expect to be the foundation of the prescriptions and they provide further explication of the key concepts 'education', 'competence', 'learning'.

However, there are some problems with the adequacy criterion. First, it is not clear that the belief statements provide any rational support for the move from "is" to "ought." That is, even if beliefs 3, 4, and 5 can be shown to be true beliefs, they do not justify beliefs 1 and 2 nor do they justify the imperatives of the slogan-system. The sloganeer must be willing to provide a clearer notion of the nature of society, educational efforts and their relationships. It is the beliefs related to these two concerns which appear to be primary in the CBE proponent's conception of "What Is."

In relation to these areas, the following statements have been offered:

6. Current educational efforts emphasize the role of the teacher, not the learner.

7. Much that is unnecessary is taught and examined.

8. Current educational efforts of the schools are "failures" because students are not leaving the educational system as competent persons.

These belief statements which provide a broad representation or "accounting for" of "What Is" seem, on the surface, to be reasonably
adequate. That is taken as true, one can justify the "What Should Be's" offered in the slogan-system.

However, although there appears to be a quasi-logical adequacy, there are serious problems with conceptual adequacy. Namely, 'teaching', 'learning', and 'competence' must be explicated more fully. To gain a clearer understanding of these notions, we can begin by asking for evidence for the propositions contained in the belief statements.

The reasonableness of the believer is determined by looking at relationship of the believer to the evidence. As Green says, "a person may hold a belief because it is supported by the evidence, or he may accept the evidence because it happens to support a belief he already holds." And, it may be that even though he holds the belief because of the evidence, his evidence is scant when compared to what is known to humankind in general.

In dealing with the reasonableness of the belief statement as a means for determining the adequacy of the evidence, we look not to how the evidence is used but to what the evidence is. As mentioned above, a person may be a reasonable believer because he holds the belief on the basis of evidence. But, if the evidence is scant in relation to the total amount of evidence available, then the belief is unreasonable.

This process draws us to the relationship between concepts and experience vis à vis the concern to establish a method of verification. The clarification of that method, to some degree, leads to a concern

with meaning. That is, to determine the extent to which there is evidence to support the propositional content of a belief, the sloganeer and the hearer must agree upon the method of verification. However, to do so involves questions of meaning.

For the adequacy criterion to be met, then, both the how and the what must be examined. And, the most viable means for doing so is to examine the concepts in order to determine the extent of agreement on meaning-verification.

The crucial belief statement is statement number 4. It is crucial because it provides a foundation for the model. That is, if there is no causal relationship between 'teaching' and 'learning', then emphasis upon outcomes is no more valuable to the educational process than the appearances of buildings or the attitudes of teachers. If the proposition in belief statement number 4 cannot be verified, the attempts to propaggate the model become more political than educational, and the prescriptions, the "What Should Be's," are not justified by the "What Is's," unless one accepts desire and politics as justification.

There is no evidence which verifies the proposition in belief statement number 4.

However, this typically does not dissuade or deter the CBE proponent. His first reaction is to claim that we all assume such a relationship and that his desire to get others to implement CBE is based upon the other belief statements.

As pointed out earlier, statements 1 and 2 are supported mainly by the supposed truth of statements 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8. Therefore, we must attempt to determine the evidence for their truth.
As it stands, belief statement number 3 cannot be verified. On the surface, it appears to be a stipulative and programmatic definition. It is simply that the ideologue wants us to employ "competent" as he does because it lends support to his programs. However, prior to acceptance, we might wish to get clearer about the concept 'competence'.

Statement number 5 is nonsensical. Obviously, everyone learns at his own rate and in his own way. It is hard to imagine someone learning at some other person's rate. The primary problem here is the unclear conception of 'learning' and the possessive use of "rate" and "method."

Statements 6, 7, and 8 represent great conceptual confusion. There is much lack of clarity regarding the role of 'teacher', 'unnecessary', 'taught', 'failure', and 'competence'.

Therefore, if we are to verify or falsify the propositions in these beliefs, we must get clear about the concepts.

Steps 5-6-Experience, Concepts, and Meaning. As mentioned above, attempts to determine whether the individual is a reasonable believer holding a reasonable belief draws the evaluation downward toward experience. Thus, the evaluation leads immediately to the relationship of experience, meaning, and concepts, as . is the concepts and the hypotheses which are the meaning of experience and therefore underlie the evidence statements.

Recognition of this is quite important, for, as Reddiford claims, we must examine the nexus of concepts as an initial step and examine the way in which the concepts are employed to explain experience. As discussed in relation to the ceremonial use of slogans, failure to do
so broadens the appeal of the network of statements in that they may be interpreted in a contradictory or dissimilar manner.

Failure to remove this ambiguity and vagueness can lead to subscription to an ideology which the hearer perceives as congruent with his beliefs when, in actuality, it is at cross-purposes. Commitment to an ideology on these grounds may be of value to the ideologue, but it is hardly valuable for the hearer. It is akin to signing a contract prior to reading it and understanding what it entails.

In the past, attempts to gain clarity about concepts employed in CBE discourse have been fruitless. They have been fruitless in the sense that they have either been ignored or the propositions have been taken as true and have been defined circularly. Within the nexus of concepts employed by the CBE proponent, 'learning' is the acquisition of 'competence' defined as observable, objectively measurable skill and knowledge which is the goal of teaching. Those "bits" of skill and knowledge are defined by practicing professionals, and, professionals say that most students coming into those professions do not "possess" them. Therefore, schools have failed.

Obviously, the notion of competence is crucial at this level. The problem is that it has not been related to either the attendant concepts, 'knowledge', 'skill', and 'practice' nor to experience in such a way as to gain clarity regarding its meaning. Until that is done, the CBE model should not be adopted, unless the prospective adherent is willing to side-step rationality.

Even when the above steps have been successfully completed, it still remains to determine whether the total network of statements and
the meaning they place on experience provide a reasonable, adequate ex-
planation of the phenomena. This is crucial. The meanings assigned to
experience must always be returned to experience. Such a process re-
duces the possibility that systems of meaning will be built and sup-
ported on authority rather than on world-referencing claims. Gouldner's
notions of "world-referencing" are important in two aspects of the IDM.

First, the taking back to experience occurs within the frame-
work of statements themselves. That has been the basic purpose of this
paper, i.e., to show how and why that should occur. However, to return
to Pratte's "mapping" notion, SS2 maps the theoretical-normative base
(belief statements, evidence statements, and meanings) onto the empiri-
cal—onto experiences in a limiting set of conditions. There are, then,
three final questions.

For CBE, the proponents have offered a map, a conceptual/belief
framework employed to describe the educational world and what roads we
should travel. However, the road is not clear, if examined carefully.
But, then, perhaps that is not important to the proponent. His concern
is to rally us—to gain subscribers. As long as those subscribers look
only at the map and do not try to understand the tools used in creating
it, the proponent is assured some success.

Typically, however, when the map is actually employed, people
get lost. Many persons, groups, and agencies have attempted to use the
map and have discarded it when they discovered that it was not as clear
as it initially appeared.
First, after evaluation of the meanings of those statements in SS2 and the theoretical-normative base has been completed, can the hearer accept the meaning which is being assigned to the limiting class of conditions—the experiences being accounted for?

Second, if those meanings are acceptable, do they indeed "justify" the imperative and the specific "rules of the game" which have been offered? Does the "What Is" "justify" the "What Should Be?"

Third, if so, then, the final interrelated questions are, whether the results intended are attainable and are they judged as "good" from the perspective of the hearer?

Together, the IDM and the evaluation criteria/techniques provide a means for dealing with the symbolic formulation, the patterns of interworking meanings which are manifestations of ideologies. It is hoped that they provide also a means for slowing the leap from source to consequence which excludes the individual as an active participant in ideological discourse.

Limits of the Model

The foregoing does not contain a "full-blown" analysis of meaning or the communicative act. That task must be left to others. However, there is at least a doubt that such efforts would negate the value of the IDM, even though it might necessitate further refinements. The primary function of IDM is locate linguistic elements and propose elements for dealing with them.

The value of the model in determining the nature of beliefs, the role of society in the formulation of views which are represented
by those beliefs and the determination of the truth or falsity of standard "ideologies" is not immediately evident. But, then, such a function has not been claimed. If the model does nothing more than stimulate rational discourse about ideological discourse, that is sufficient to the stated goals in this work.

I would offer one final comment regarding the representational dialogue examined in this chapter. The volume of literature related to Competency-Based Education is quite large. And, discussions of the model have occurred over the last ten years at least.

The statements of slogans, beliefs, and evidence offered in this chapter are based on this author's readings over the past four years of involvement with the model and on recollections of conversions which took place at various state and local meetings and conferences. Therefore, although I would not claim unerring accuracy, I would claim that they are a fair enough representation for the discussion not to be viewed as a "straw man." The intent here was to indicate how the model may be utilized, not to suppor or defeat CBE.  

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5Persons interested in looking at some of the literature might begin with a series of monographs published by the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education and ERIC Clearinghouse on Teacher Education titled PBTE Series.
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