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PRELUDE TO THE TOTAL FORCE: THE ORIGINS AND
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1943-1969.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, PH.D., 1979

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PRELUDE TO THE TOTAL FORCE: THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD, 1943-1969

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Charles Joseph Gross, B.A., B.S., M.S.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1979

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I dedicate this work to my wife Barbara. Her moral support and prolonged efforts on the typewriter were essential to the completion of this undertaking.
VITA

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PUBLICATIONS


FIELDS OF STUDY

American Military History. Professor Allan R. Millett

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INTRODUCTION

The shadow of the Minuteman statue falls across the bustling village green in Lexington, Massachusetts. The statue is symbolic of America's oldest and most celebrated military legacy, the citizen-soldier. In colonial times, minutemen were members of small elite companies within the organized militia. They agreed to turn out for immediate service in defense of their communities while the more cumbersome ordinary militia units were being assembled. Today their historic legacy is most clearly expressed by the Air National Guard, an elite volunteer force of citizen airmen maintained in a high state of operational readiness as a reserve component of the U.S. Air Force.

Although it can trace its heritage to the colonial minutemen, the Air Guard is a relatively young and comparatively unknown military organization. It was not established as a separate reserve component until 1946. However, the National Guard's aviation program was well established long before then. The program originated even before the Wright brothers were able to convince the U.S. Army that the airplane had definite military possibilities. On May 30, 1908, the First Aero Company, Signal Corps, New York National Guard was formed at the Park Avenue Armory on 34th Street in New York City. It consisted of approximately twenty-five aviation enthusiasts who had volunteered to learn ballooning. Two years later, the unit financed and built
its first aircraft at a cost of $500.00. The investment depreciated when the do-it-yourself aircraft crashed on takeoff at maneuvers that summer. In 1911, the First Aero Company made its first successful entry into heavier-than-air flight when the Curtiss Airplane Company loaned it an airplane and a pilot. The pilot, Beckwith Havens, later joined the unit as a private and is recognized as the National Guard's first military aviator. When he flew the unit's airplane at joint Army-National Guard maneuvers in 1912, the regular Army's aircraft inventory consisted of a grand total of two flying machines.\(^1\)

The development of National Guard aviation remained limited through World War I. An aeronautical detachment was established in the California National Guard's Seventh Coast Artillery Company in February 1911. The Missouri National Guard organized a Signal Corps air section the following month. New York's National Guard organized its Second Aero Company at Buffalo in 1916. These small units were largely the product of the initiatives of local aviation enthusiasts. State or federal financial support for their programs was minimal. Their aircraft and balloons were purchased almost entirely through private contributions. For example, in 1915, the Aero Club of America equipped New York's First Aero Company with five airplanes costing approximately $29,500.00. When New York's two National Guard aviation companies were mobilized during 1916—the first such organizations ever called into federal service—several members took their own personal aircraft with them as unit property.\(^2\)

In April 1917, the War Department decided that no National Guard aviation units would be mobilized during World War I. These
units were disbanded and most of their personnel tendered their services as individuals. For example, Major Raynauld C. Bolling, an attorney for U.S. Steel and former commander of the First Aero Company, volunteered for active duty as an army aviator. He was killed in action while serving with the AEF's air service in France. Bolling AFB in Washington, D.C. commemorates his service and sacrifice.³

During the 1920-1921 reorganization of the National Guard, aviation units achieved a permanent place in its organization. In 1920, the War Department, at the urging of Guard aviation enthusiasts and a few regular Army air officers including Brigadier General Billy Mitchell, announced plans to include "aero units" in the postwar organization of National Guard infantry divisions.⁴ Between 1921 and 1930, all nineteen National Guard divisions organized air observation squadrons. Whether or not such squadrons should have actually been organized or merely carried on paper had been the subject of much General Staff debate in 1919 and 1920. Eventually the availability of some 8,500 surplus World War I military aircraft and associated supplies tipped the scales in favor of the former option. By 1930, the War Department was looking to the National Guard for more than divisional observation squadrons. Faced with smaller budgets and pressured by Army fliers for increased emphasis on aviation, it allowed the Guard to organize ten additional observation squadrons. These air units were not attached to divisional units. Most of them appeared on National Guard troop lists as "Corps Aviation Troops."⁵
The National Guard was ordered into federal service beginning in September 1940. Its aviation units furnished twenty-nine observation squadrons manned by some eight hundred officers and four thousand enlisted men. Although some units retained their numerical designations, all were ordered to duty as non-divisional formations. Most of their personnel were eventually scattered across the rapidly-expanding Army Air Corps as individuals rather than members of organized National Guard units. Their skills and enthusiasm were a valuable addition to the Air Corps whose total active duty strength had only risen to 51,185 by the end of 1940.

The Air National Guard first emerged as a separate reserve component of the armed forces after World War II. Significant wartime contributions of individual National Guard aviation personnel notwithstanding, the Air Guard was primarily a product of the politics of postwar defense planning. This study will examine the origins of the Air Guard during World War II and then trace its gradual evolution from a glorified postwar flying club into an outstanding first-line reserve component of the U.S. Air Force during the 1943-1969 period.

The Air Guard has played an increasingly important role in the total Air Force structure since World War II. Portions of the Air Guard were mobilized for service during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Air Guard units also reinforced America's active duty military strength during the 1961-1962 Berlin Crisis. Its fighter-interceptor squadrons have participated continuously in the Air Force's air defense runway alert program since 1954. As of June 1977,
60 percent of the Air Force's fighter interceptor squadrons are Air Guard units. Their performance has consistently equalled or surpassed that of their active duty counterparts. Since the early 1960's, Air Guardsmen have been increasingly integrated into the daily Air Force operations in a broad variety of mission areas ranging from military airlift to the installation of ground-based communications equipment.

By the late 1970's, the Air Guard accounted for a substantial portion of the Air Force's post-Vietnam flying unit strength. During fiscal year (FY) 1977, it contributed 40 percent of Tactical Air Command's (TAC's) fighter squadrons, 50 percent of its reconnaissance squadrons, and over 60 percent of its tactical air support units. Approximately one-third of the Military Airlift Command's (MAC's) airlift units were Guard outfits. Although their aircraft were not the most advanced types available, these units substantially augmented the active Air Force. Through realistic training, Air Force management policies that demanded virtually the same standards of operational performance as their active duty counterparts, and the skilled services of a large cadre of full-time technicians, Air Guard units were maintained in advanced states of readiness. Despite these impressive figures, the Air Guard is still a relatively small force of some ninety-one thousand personnel. Its annual budget of just over $1.20 billion represented less than 3 percent of the total Air Force budget.7

Judged by its performance during the last two decades, especially the outstanding contributions of Air Guard fighter units deployed to South Vietnam following the Pueblo Crisis in 1968, the
Air Guard may well be the most successful military reserve program operated by the armed forces of the U.S. Nevertheless, relatively little scholarly attention has been devoted to it. Professional military men have also largely ignored the topic in their broad analyses of America's long-term national security requirements. More glamorous topics like nuclear strategy, weapons' research and procurement, and the military's role in National security affairs have dominated their attention since 1945. Reserve programs have not received much serious attention. The few studies available on these programs have generally concentrated on the problems of the Army's reserve components, especially the National Guard. Scholars analyzing the National Guard have tended to emphasize its role as an organized political pressure group rather than its military functions. The Air Guard has been virtually ignored except for passing references to it as an exception to the general pattern of reserve program difficulties. These omissions have created a significant void in our understanding of reserve programs and those factors which could contribute to their success as military organizations. Hopefully, this study of the origins and evolution of the Air Guard will begin to fill that void.
FOOTNOTES

INTRODUCTION


4 NGB, Fact Sheet No. 302-76, p. 2.

5 Hill, Minute Man, pp. 526-528.

6 Ibid., pp. 534-535. NGB, Fact Sheet No. 302-76, p. 2.


Guard. Martin Binkin's policy-oriented U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warrior (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974) provides a more substantial introduction to the issues generated by the costs, roles and mobilization performance of America's military reserve forces. Unpublished scholarly research on the Air Guard is difficult to identify. One example of this rare genre is Frank L. Howe's M.A. thesis, "A Bombsight for a Freight Train: The Air National Guard, Air Defense, and Federalization, 1946-1950" (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University, 1972). Howe's work is supplemented by a series of studies completed by Guardsmen who were students at the Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.
The modern Air National Guard was established after World War II. Its first unit, Denver's 120th fighter squadron, was activated in April 1946. Unlike its prewar cousin, a collection of twenty-nine National Guard divisional aviation observation squadrons manned by some 4,800 personnel, the Air Guard was an expression of the drive for an independent Air Force that had animated early American military pioneers like Billy Mitchell. According to War Department plans developed during World War II, the Air Guard would be a highly-trained combat reserve force capable of rapidly augmenting an independent Air Force. It would consist of some 58,000 men organized in 514 units. The heart of the program would be eighty-four tactical flying units including seventy-two fighter and twelve light bomber squadrons. On paper, the Air Guard was a formidable military organization. It appeared happily to marry the independent air power assumptions of the Army Air Forces, presumably vindicated during World War II, and the historic citizen-soldier traditions represented by the National Guard.

However, appearances were deceiving in this particular case. The postwar Air Guard program was neither a happy marriage nor a
rational expression of the air power lessons of the Second World War. Until the Korean War, the Air Guard more closely resembled a government sponsored flying club than a formidable first line reserve component of the Air Force. In reality, the program was an outgrowth of the exigencies of the politics of World War II planning for the postwar American military establishment. It reflected the determination of General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, to obtain support from the National Guard Association of the United States for wartime enactment of a postwar system of universal military training in return for assurance that the National Guard would continue to occupy its position as the Army's first line reserve force.

General Marshall dominated the War Department during World War II. His ideas heavily influenced wartime planning for the postwar Army. Marshall firmly believed that the political, economic, and technological uncertainties of the twentieth century required the United States to maintain a formidable military establishment. If America wished to avert or minimize a repetition of disasters like both World Wars, she could no longer afford to be virtually disarmed in peacetime. Marshall, in common with other American professional military officers, believed that the fundamental answer to the uncertainties of the age was increased peacetime military preparedness. Marshall, however, faced a dilemma. He realized that national security policy was not created in a domestic political vacuum. Despite the need for a large postwar military establishment, Marshall's reading of American history taught him that his fellow citizens would rapidly dismantle the nation's military machine and never tolerate a large
standing Army once victory over the Axis had been achieved. Furthermore, his experience with the AEF in France during World War I had convinced him of the merits of a citizen army that could be trained in peacetime by professional soldiers to shoulder the bulk of America's wartime combat burdens.  

The answer to Marshall's dilemma had been suggested by his old friend and mentor, Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer. Palmer had been recalled from retirement to active duty by Marshall in November 1941. Marshall, according to Palmer, had asked him to help "... develop a post-war military system that would be consistent with our traditions, and one which might therefore expect favorable consideration by the American people and Congress." Palmer was a long-time advocate of the "citizen Army" concept. He was convinced that American citizens could become excellent part-time soldiers if given proper professional training and isolated from the state politics surrounding the National Guard. The vehicle to achieve this would be a system of universal military training (UMT) conducted by the regular Army for all able-bodied males. The large pool of trainees would be organized into a strictly federal reserve force. Palmer had publicly advocated this approach in his capacity as General Pershing's personal representative to Congress when it considered postwar military policy after World War I.

General Marshall was sympathetic to Palmer's ideas. By the summer of 1943, Marshall had accepted Palmer's UMT proposal as the basis for the War Department's postwar plans. It would substitute a massive citizen reserve force for a large peacetime professional
army. UMT would minimize the financial burdens of national defense. Organization and training of the UMT force would be strictly a federal affair. The National Guard, with its divided state-federal loyalties, would be dissolved as a federal reserve force. UMT would give America the peacetime military power that an increasingly uncertain world required while avoiding the historic American distrust of a large and expensive standing army.5

A Special Plans Division (SPD) had been established on July 22, 1943 to coordinate detailed War Department planning for demobilization and the postwar Army. Palmer served SPD in an advisory capacity. Meanwhile, the Army Air Forces (AAF) had also established its own postwar planning agencies. Bitter wartime interservice rivalries and the desire to achieve an independent postwar Air Force had helped push the AAF into this activity. The separate War Department and AAF postwar planning staffs worked largely in isolation from each other. They lacked adequate guidance from either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or civilian officials within the executive branch of government and operated without a formal joint planning mechanism. Predictably these two staffs, along with their equally isolated Navy counterparts, developed quite different versions of America's postwar national security requirements.6

The AAF, although part of the Army, had evolved into a virtually autonomous military service by the time it commenced its own postwar planning in 1943. The political motivations and military assumptions behind the AAF's postwar plans were quite different from those which animated Marshall, Palmer, and the SPD staff. Fundamentally, AAF
planning was driven by one overriding goal, the need to build the best possible case for an independent postwar Air Force. The doctrine of strategic bombardment was the heart of the AAF's case for independence from the Army. The wartime AAF headquarters was dominated by officers who were zealous advocates of strategic bombardment. They firmly believed that future wars would be brief and highly destructive affairs that would be quickly decided by the superior application of air power against an opponent's homeland. The mixed and highly controversial results of strategic bombing campaign's during World War II had little impact on their thinking. High ranking tactical aviation exponents like Lieutenants Elwood Quesada and George Kenny, who might have questioned strategic bombing's effectiveness, were not included in the planning process. Consequently, strategic air power doctrine hardened into dogma for AAF officers in the Special Projects Office (SPD) and the Post War Division (PWD) of the Air Staff Plans Directorate, the two offices charged with developing the AAF's postwar plans.7

The basic lack of competition of ideas within Headquarters AAF as well as the absence of effective outside guidance resulted in some very unrealistic plans for the postwar Air Force. The "Initial Plan for the Post War Air Force" was completed in February 1944.8 It contemplated a huge peacetime active duty Air Force of approximately one million. The cutting edge of this force would be 105 combat air groups. This force structure was designed to carry the burden of postwar American security with little Army or Navy support. There was no room in this plan for UMT, an organized federal reserve
force, or the state-controlled National Guard. Subsequent AAF post-war plans were directed by the War Department to include provisions for a smaller active duty force, UMT, an Air Force Reserve and even a National Guard air component. However, AAF leaders and planners never abandoned their quest for a huge active duty Air Force built around the strategic bombardment mission. They remained cool toward UMT and stressed that forces-in-being, not reserves, were the key to modern defense. They were confident that the public and Congress would eventually accept their vision of America's postwar national security requirements. Adoption of the massive retaliation doctrine by the Eisenhower administration in the early 1950's vindicated their optimism if not their strategic insights.

The initial postwar plans of both SPD and the AAF had neglected the National Guard. Guard officers, operating through their potent political lobby, the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), had become alarmed by the treatment they had received at the hands of the War Department early in the war. Army public relations coverage of the mobilization, reorganization, and training performance of National Guard divisions had been extremely poor. Numerous stories had appeared in the public press concerning the problems experienced by National Guard units after they had been called into federal service in 1940. Basically, Guard officers believed that their organization had been made a scapegoat for the inadequacies of pre-war Army plans, organization, facilities and equipment. Terrific pressure had been placed on Guard units for men to fill the Army's rapidly expanding officer candidate schools. Another controversial
issue was the War Department's pre-Pearl Harbor decision to create a relatively youthful officer corps by limiting eligibility for active duty in each rank to certain prescribed age brackets. Through this policy, the Army sought to create a more energetic and aggressive field leadership. However laudable its intent, this policy had disqualified numerous Guard officers, as well as their regular and organized reserve corps counterparts, from active duty assignments. Many Guardsmen believed that its real purpose was to eliminate the leadership of the Guard in order to create vacancies for the young officers of the regular Army.^

Compounding the anxieties of the National Guard, its formal participation in the War Department's planning process appeared to have disappeared by mid-1943. Section 5 of the National Defense Act of 1920 required the War Department to consider the views of National Guard and Reserve officers when formulating plans and policies pertinent to their components of the Army. The prescribed mechanisms for this advice were War Department committees on National Guard and Reserve policy. On May 2, 1942, the Secretary of War had suspended their operation for the war's duration. Another development that had troubled guardsmen was the removal of the National Guard Bureau (NGB) from the War Department's Special Staff in April 1941. The Bureau was then placed in an obscure and powerless position under the Commanding General, Army Service Forces. There, it was relegated to a largely record keeping function. Consequently, the Bureau was no longer able to defend the interests of the Guard within the innermost councils of the War Department. The suspicions of guardsmen were
increased by rumors that the War Department's secret plans for the
postwar Army excluded the National Guard altogether. The absence of
Guard participation in the planning process, General Palmer's previous
public advocacy of an entirely federal military reserve system, and,
what leading Guard officers felt was the shabby treatment of the
National Guard during the current war, gave apparent substance to the
fear that the Army was determined to destroy the Guard. ¹¹

Major General Ellard A. Walsh of Minnesota was president of
both the National Guard Association and its companion organization,
the Adjutant Generals' Association. Walsh, as the result of a
meeting of Guard leaders convened by Governor Edward Martin of
Pennsylvania on April 1, 1943, had agreed once again to become presi­
dent of NGAUS. He was given "a blank check on the small funds
available and general mandates to proceed in behalf of the Guard." ¹²
Walsh established a Washington headquarters for the association with
a permanent office where he prepared to defend the Guard's interests
against the regular Army. The postwar military planning process,
already complicated by interservice rivalry and parochialism, was
about to be introduced to the pressures of American domestic
politics. ¹³

Walsh was determined to save the National Guard by insuring
the preservation of its position as the Army's first line civilian
reserve force after World War II. On January 2, 1944 he held a pre­
liminary meeting with Palmer to discuss SPD's postwar military plans.
Next, a conference was arranged between the SPD staff and representa­
tives of the National Guard Association concerning the Guard's place
in the postwar military establishment. Four sessions were held during February 1944 in the offices of the National Guard Bureau. National Guard representatives made their position clear to Major General William F. Tomkins, head of SPD, and his staff. They argued that "the National Guard would be a first line reserve thereof (i.e., of the Army of the United States) . . . organized under the militia clauses of the Constitution with the control of the states unimpaired . . . " and that "we would view with suspicion and distrust any action of the Special Plans Division so long as the National Guard had no representation thereon." They also made it clear that provisions of Section 5 of the National Defense Act of 1920 requiring National Guard participation in the formulation of all War Department policies and regulations affecting the organization, distribution, and training of the Guard must be complied with. In sum, they would accept nothing less than a guarantee that the National Guard would participate in the postwar planning process, maintain its position as the Army's first line civilian reserve component, and retain its dual state-federal status.

Palmer, reversing his previous position, sided with the arguments of the guardsmen. He convinced Tomkins and then Marshall that the National Guard's prewar status must be retained in the postwar Army. However, the reasons advanced for this recommendation were primarily political rather than military. It had become quite evident to both Palmer and Tomkins that any effort to eliminate the Guard's state status by merging into a purely federal reserve would result in a tremendous political battle in Congress. They feared that such
a fight would weaken and perhaps fatally delay Congressional enactment of a system of UMT prior to the war's end. The price of National Guard support for UMT was assurance that it would remain a major element in the postwar Army. Marshall, who believed that an adequate system for postwar UMT had to be enacted before wartime enthusiasm for military service waned, accepted these essentially political arguments.17

At a special joint meeting of the National Guard and Adjutant Generals' Association held in Baltimore, Maryland in early May 1944, Walsh publicly attacked the Army. His annual report opened with the declaration that the convention would determine whether or not the National Guard would continue to occupy its primary position in the nation's peacetime military reserve system. Walsh followed with an exhaustive and one-sided history of American military policy from the perspective of the militia and the National Guard. He portrayed their relationship with the regular Army in the blackest of terms. Walsh denounced the "Regular Army Samurai" as a greedy, caste-conscious, and self-serving elite bent upon destruction of the National Guard in order to aggrandize their own careers. The National Guard Association, he declared, must be prepared to represent its views on postwar military policy before Congress.18

Walsh, in the meantime, had mounted pressure on the War Department by publicly threatening to stall postwar military legislation in Congress. In a bitter letter to the House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy during the spring of 1944, he blasted the Army's treatment of the National Guard. He charged that "the National
Guard never has and is not now receiving the wholehearted support from the regular Army that it should, or which is contemplated in law." Rejecting the argument that legislation molding the postwar military establishment would be enacted quickly to avoid any postwar backlash, Walsh argued that such a procedure would guarantee the loss of public support. NGAUS was willing to support UMT only if trainees were given the option of joining the National Guard afterwards. However, final determination of these matters should be deferred until after the war was over. At that point, America's citizen soldiers will have returned home and their opinions could be heard according to Walsh.

The National Guard Association's political pressure eventually had its intended effect. Upon the recommendation of General Tomkins, the Secretary of War approved formation of a General Staff Committee on the postwar National Guard composed of Army and Guard officers. The committee was appointed August 1, 1944 with all members assigned to Tomkins' SPD. Policies affecting the postwar National Guard were actively considered by this committee from August 1944 to September 1945. On May 17, 1945, the National Guard Bureau was removed from its position under the Commanding General, Army Service Forces and reestablished within the War Department. The Bureau had been conducting a study on the Guard's postwar position. Responsibility for the study had been temporarily assigned to its Requirements Division. The division's chief was designated as the Bureau's liaison with SPD and the General Staff Committee on National Guard policy. The Bureau was not satisfied to insure the mere survival of the National
Guard at its prewar troop level of approximately 242,000 men. Rather, after polling Guard commanders on active duty with the Army, it pushed vigorously for a substantial increase in the postwar troop allotment.  

Planning for the future of the National Guard took place within the War Department as part of a continuing struggle between aviators and ground force officers over the size and composition of the postwar Army. On May 31, 1944, General Tomkins solicited recommendations on the postwar Army from various General Staff divisions and major commands including the AAF. The only real guidance that accompanied this request was an arbitrary troop level ceiling of 1.5 million men for Army developed in 1943. Even before Tomkins' request, the AAF and the Army ground forces had staked rival claims to postwar strengths that threatened this troop ceiling. The AAF's 105 group plan had required a million man Air Force while the Army ground forces were asking for 780,000 men including 400,000 trainees provided by a UMT system. A compromise plan was developed in August 1944 calling for a total Army strength of 1,093,050 professionals and 630,217 trainees annually. This plan would have designated the AAF as the primary M-Day force with 75 air groups and a strength of 430,000 professionals. Seventy-five groups did not satisfy the aviators. They still insisted on 105 groups.  

On November 11, 1944, General Marshall shattered the postwar planners' design for a 1.1 million man Army. Castigating their schemes as grandiose and politically unacceptable, he ordered papers describing it destroyed. Marshall demanded a reexamination of postwar
military strengths by SPD. He wanted a small professional force backed by UMT. Under pressure from Marshall to develop a less expensive military force, a new plan was formulated. Total Army strength was projected at 1,015,000 men. The Army Ground Forces were to consist of only 100,000 regulars and 320,000 trainees. The projected total size of the AAF was even smaller. It was to be limited to 120,000 regulars and 200,000 trainees. Under this new plan, the AAF, which had been insisting that 105 air groups were needed to insure national security, got only sixteen groups. The Air Staff moved to defeat the plan. They argued that domestic politics and budgetary considerations should not be elevated above national defense needs. AAF protests failed to budge either Marshall or Tomkins. The Army's postwar planning machinery, plagued by conflicting demands and interests, stalled and practically ground to a halt during the spring of 1945.23

The AAF had first begun seriously considering the prospect of postwar National Guard air units at the request of General Tomkins in the late summer of 1944. The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff had approved a "Study of the Air Component of the Post-War National Guard" on October 21, 1944. The study assumed that state armed forces with federal status would continue to exist. It concluded that these state forces would include an autonomous air component corresponding to the projected postwar regular Air Force. Reflecting the AAF's lack of enthusiasm and its reluctance to assign important missions to the Guard, the study recommended that approximately 90 percent of the projected air component should consist of anti-aircraft
artillery (AAA) troops. The balance would be allotted to flying and possibly aircraft control and warning (AC&W) units. Thus, at the very outset of AAF planning for the air component of the National Guard, a negative pattern of regular force expectations was established. This pattern, which relegated National Guard air units to distinctly secondary roles and provided them with inadequate resources, continued to plague the program through much of its history. It reflected the generally negative attitude toward the postwar establishment of the Air Guard that permeated Air Staff thinking in 1944-1945.

Despite the reservations of the Air Staff and stalemated post-war planning within the War Department General Staff in the early summer of 1945, the National Guard, including its air component, had assured its postwar existence as a first line military reserve force. General Tomkins, testifying before the House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy on June 15, 1945, affirmed this. He noted that the War Department "contemplates retention of our two reserve components of the Army . . . the National Guard and the Organized Reserves . . . " and that the former "is our first line of reserve in an emergency and it has again demonstrated its worth in the present war." The Guard, he noted, should continue to perform its dual function as an instrument of internal security for the individual states in peace and an instrument of national security in war.

Tomkins, referring to the work of the Committee on Postwar National Guard Policy, indicated that as a result of its recommendations, the War Department had approved a mission statement for the Congress to
consider. The basic War Department recommendation was "to strengthen and improve the National Guard so as to make it capable of immediate expansion to war strength fully able to furnish units trained and equipped, fit for service anywhere in the world. In time of war, when called into national service, the National Guard should be able to defend the critical areas of the United States from land, sea, or air attacks and assist in covering the mobilization and concentration of other reserve forces." 27

The National Guard, which had feared extinction as a wartime reserve force in 1943, had forced the War Department to accept it in the postwar Army. Not only had the Guard's survival been guaranteed, but, as Tomkins' testimony confirmed, it had been given a clear M-Day mission that implied an expanded troop strength. The political price for the Guard's inclusion had been made obvious by earlier testimony before the same committee by General Walsh. On June 5, 1945, he had declared that the National Guard would support UMT if the National Guard was assured of the continuation of its present status as a component of the Army and its first line reserve. In his testimony before the committee, Tomkins noted that the National Guard would be able to recruit volunteers from the UMT system proposed by the War Department.

The struggle within the War Department over the size and composition of the postwar Army continued through 1945. General Marshall insisted on a small, balanced professional force backed by a huge citizen reserve system. The Air Staff, firmly wedded to the forces-in-being concept, argued that only a large, active duty Air
Force could adequately fulfill America's postwar national security requirements. Arguing that politics and budgetary considerations should not be elevated above defense needs, they moved to defeat SPD's plans. Their alternative to UMT was the seventy group Air Force. This proposal emerged in 1945. It called for an all-volunteer Air Force of 400,000 men backed by a massive reserve system of some 1,100,000 men who would be fully prepared for combat operations within one year of mobilization. The seventy group plan was not based upon a particularly sophisticated analysis of America's probable postwar national security requirements. Rather, it was offered as a glamorous technological and less expensive alternative to what the Air Staff believed would be a politically unpopular system of peacetime UMT. In short, the AAF asked for what it thought Congress and the public would eventually give it.  

Effective War Department planning for the postwar Army remained stalled during the summer of 1945. The ground forces and the aviators had conflicting versions of postwar requirements and the best interests of their respective branches. They both opposed Marshall and Palmer's version of the regular Army as essentially a small training and organizational cadre for hordes of UMT trainees. To complicate matters further, the Navy loomed as an even more formidable challenger for what appeared quite likely to be extremely limited postwar military budgets. In this rather fluid context, planners continued to struggle with questions relevant to postwar policies for the National Guard.
SPD's committee on National Guard policy was augmented on July 28, 1945 by four additional Guard and Regular Army officers. The most politically prominent of the newcomers was Major General Milton J. Reckord of Maryland. Reckord was a former president of the National Guard Association and current chairman of its legislative committee. He had been recalled by General Marshall from his active duty assignment as the European theater's provost marshal.

In Washington, Reckord chaired both the revised National Guard policy committee and an overall "Joint Staff Committee on Postwar Planning for the National Guard and Reserve." Marshall, faced with growing opposition to his postwar plans within the War Department, had evidently sought to strengthen the hand of the reserve component planners. The politically influential Reckord favored UMT and expected to see a small postwar regular Army backed by a substantial National Guard. The organized reserve would then fill the remaining requirements for a balanced Army. General Reckord's joint committee made some changes in the recommendations previously approved by Secretary of War Stimson and General Marshall. The most important of these provided that "the federal government will contribute its equitable share of the expenses of constructing and maintaining the required facilities . . . when the requirements for a balanced force in the Army of the United States necessitate the allocation to a state of troops or equipment, the housing of which would impose an inequitable burden on the state." They also prepared, in conjunction with civilian officials in the War Department, a troop basis plan for the
Army's organized reserve units. Their proposal anticipated "a National Guard of . . . perhaps 500,000." ³³

The joint committee's policy proposals were approved by the Secretary of War on October 13, 1945. Officially entitled Approved War Department Policies Relating to the Post War National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps, 13 October 1945, these proposals clearly committed the War Department to the creation of dual component reserve systems for both the Army and the AAF. The National Guard retained its prewar position as the Army's first line combat reserve force composed entirely of organized units. Individuals needed to bring organized units up to full authorized strength and to replace combat losses, as well as those units which neither the active Army nor the National Guard could provide, would be supplied by the U.S. Army Reserve. The War Department's proposals also added a new reserve organization to augment the postwar AAF, the Air National Guard. The Air Guard, like the National Guard, was clearly intended to be the primary source of organized combat ready units for strengthening the active duty establishment in a crisis. All Guard units, whether Army or Air, were envisaged as M-Day (i.e., Mobilization Day) organizations capable of rapid expansion to wartime manning levels and full operational readiness. Despite the lack of a clear state mission, the Air Guard would also enjoy a dual state-federal status. Individual reservists and air units that neither the AAF nor the Air Guard could supply would be provided by a strictly federal AAF reserve program paralleling the Army's. ³⁴
Approved Policies 1945, as these plans were commonly known, established the official basis for AAF planning of its postwar reserve programs. The AAF implemented them through separate plans for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. The original AAF reserve components plan implementing Approved Policies 1945 was prepared by the Assistant Chief of the Air Staff for Operations (AC/AS-3) and presented to the Air Staff on October 9, 1945. At that time, certain revisions were directed. An ad hoc committee within the Air Staff then drew up a revised plan. The revised plan, dated November 1, 1945, clearly implied an air defense orientation for the Air Guard. It called for twelve wing headquarters commanding a unit structure consisting of twenty-four fighter groups, twelve AC&W organizations, fourteen AAA brigades, and three light bomb groups.35

Air Staff officers remained skeptical about the Air Guard's ability to fulfill an M-Day role. They were especially critical of the Guard's ability to operate and maintain highly technical equipment such as that associated with AC&W organizations. The general Air Staff attitude about the Guard remained skeptical, although some officers realized the wisdom of any plan that would increase public support for the AAF.36

Regardless of these negative assessments, the Commanding General of the AAF approved the revised plan on November 26, 1945. He forwarded it to the Army Chief of Staff the same day with the recommendation that it be approved for initial implementation and further planning. The plan was returned without action on December 4, 1945 pending decision on the organization, strength, and composition
of the postwar regular Army. The AAF was instructed to keep the plan current with timely revisions. Finally, on January 30, 1946, the Army Chief of Staff directed the "piecemeal" activation of National Guard Air units under the revised AAF plan.37

On February 9, 1946, the Guard Bureau officially announced the Air Guard plan to the states and territories. Formal unit allotments were made to those states which had already approved their proposed units. Based upon the response of the states and further study of the plan, minor changes were made in it. Augmentations of the strength of the Air Guard were recommended by the National Guard Bureau. The final Air Guard Plan, calling for 514 units, was agreed to by General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General AAF, and Major General Butler Miltonberger, NGB Chief, that spring. Spaatz forwarded it to the Army Chief of Staff who approved it on April 25, 1946.38

The final plan targeted June 30, 1947 as the completion date for postwar organization of the Air Guard. It retained the twelve wing headquarters envisaged in the preceding plan. Tactical flying units would consist of seventy-two fighter squadrons and twelve light bomber squadrons with the former capable of air interception and other missions. The fighter squadrons were to have twenty-five aircraft each, either P-47's or P-51's. The federal government agreed to furnish aircraft, supplies, instructors, and pay. The states were to furnish men, bases, and storage facilities. Projected strength was set at 57,000 to 58,000 men with the states allocated quotas based on their male population between eighteen and thirty-five. Each
state would receive at least one tactical flying unit. Air bases
were to be located near large population centers to make recruiting
easier. 39

The revised AAF plan assumed that the Air Guard would be
primarily an air defense force composed primarily of tactical flying
units equipped with fighters. The fighters were seen as eminently
suitable for the Guard due to their size and relatively low main-
tenance costs. They were viewed as general purpose air weapons sys-
tems which could be used in a variety of roles including air defense
and ground attack. The air defense mission was seen as especially
suitable to the Air Guard because it would be relatively easy to sell
to the states as an extension of the traditional militia idea. Light
bomber aircraft were found suitable because of their size, flexibility,
and economy. Other types of aircraft for the Air Guard such as
transports and heavy bombers were given short shrift by the AAF.

Perhaps more significantly, AAF planners were faced with the problem
of disposing of large numbers of surplus yet still useful fighter
aircraft no longer needed by the rapidly-shrinking postwar active
duty establishment. It is quite likely that the initial allocation
of the Air Guard's missions and aircraft was heavily influenced by
this fact. This was quite significant. Beginning in 1920 with the
first permanent program of National Guard aviation and extending
throughout its history, the Air Guard's tactical organization and
missions have apparently been more heavily influenced by the avail-
ability of surplus military aircraft than any other single factor. 40
The Air Guard plan, which had emerged in 1945-1946, was an outgrowth of the politics of national security planning for the postwar military establishment. It was foisted upon an unenthusiastic AAF because of General Marshall's desire to minimize postwar defense spending and create popular support for a viable peacetime military system based on UMT. Marshall wanted this before America's historical distaste for compulsory peacetime military service and expansive standing armies could reassert itself. To avoid a time-consuming and politically damaging fight with the National Guard Association, he had reluctantly agreed to preserve the Guard's established position as the Army's first line reserve force in the War Department's postwar plans.

Headquarters AAF took a different view of America's postwar national security requirements. Lacking meaningful experience with a reserve system of its own and determined to build the best possible case for an independent Air Force, AAF's postwar planners had stressed the necessity for a large Air Force-in-being built around the strategic bombardment mission. Their reading of the military lessons of World War II had convinced them that an active duty Air Force, held in instant readiness for combat, was the only type of military organization that would be decisive in future wars. These wars, they argued, would be short and horribly destructive affairs decided by the superior application of strategic air power. Within this context of AAF organizational self interest, strategic doctrine turned dogma, and historical interpretation, little attention had been devoted to the necessity for reserve forces, especially state-controlled
organizations like the Air National Guard. Air Staff officers were extremely skeptical of the ability of any amateur force of citizen airmen to master adequately the sophisticated technology of modern aerial warfare. Nevertheless, General Marshall, determined to maintain National Guard Association support for its postwar plans and stretch austere postwar military budgets as far as possible, directed the AAF to create the Air Guard as part of a dual component air reserve system. It acquiesced to Marshall's pressure because it wanted to minimize the political problems it faced in achieving its long-cherished goal of independence from the Army. Many of the difficulties that plagued the Air Force-Air Guard relationship until the Korean War can be traced to the strained circumstances surrounding the latter's creation in 1945-1946.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER ONE


8. Ibid., p. 2.

9. Ibid., pp. 56-61, 64, 71, 73. Sherry, Next War, p. 41.


15. AGAUS, 1944 Conference, p. 36.

16. Hill, Minute Man, pp. 311, 499.

17. Ibid., p. 495. Sherry, Next War, p. 58 (notes).

18. NGAUS, 1944 Proceedings, pp. 25-140.


20. Ibid., pp. 292-293.


22. Sherry, Next War, pp. 95-96.

23. Ibid., pp. 102-114.

24. Director, Special Planning Division, War Department Special Staff, Memo for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces (AAF), 30 August 1944, Subj: "Post-war Air Force National Guard"; and, DC/AS, Hqs. AAF, "Study of the Air Component for the Post-War National Guard," 21 October 1944, Army Adjutant General Central File 381, Box 189, File Postwar Vol. 2, Record Group (RG) 18, National Archives and Records Service (NARS).


27. Ibid., pp. 52, 501.


29. Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1962, 1966). Hereafter cited as Postwar Policy and the Navy. This is an excellent treatment of the role of Secretary of the Navy Forrestal and senior Naval officers in U.S. national security policy making during the 1943-1946 postwar planning, like that of the Army and AAF, was largely a parochial matter conducted without benefit of JDC or other nationally-oriented guidance. It called for a large peacetime fleet dominated by carrier task forces. The author concludes that the Navy's postwar planning was stimulated more by a fear of inadequate budgets and Army domination under military unification schemes than by any potential enemy including the Russians. An independent Air Force, allied with the Army, was seen as even greater threat to postwar Naval budgets and continued Navy control of carrier aviation.


32. NGB, Report for FY '46, p. 64.


37 NGB, Report for FY '46, p. 80.


39 Ray, ADC Study No. 23, pp. 7-11.

CHAPTER TWO
THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL: BUILDING THE
AIR NATIONAL GUARD, 1946-1950

On June 30, 1946, Denver's 120th Fighter Squadron became the first unit of the postwar National Guard's new aviation component to receive formal federal recognition. Nearly three years later, on May 26, 1949, the last of the Air Guard's projected 514 units had been organized. On paper, the Air Guard had become a formidable military organization. Its officer corps had largely escaped the taint of state political patronage which had harmed the image of the prewar National Guard. Air Force officers considered its pilots, virtually all World War II combat veterans, to be well-qualified for their assignments. Celebrated combat pilots like Joe Foss and Tom Lanphier, both serving as Air Guard squadron commanders, gave some of its units an especially glamorous aura. Air Guard tactical units consisted of seventy-two fighter and twelve light bomber squadrons. Its non-tactical units included thirty-six AC&W units, three tow target squadrons, three air service group detachments, and three weather stations. These primary organizations were supplemented by numerous Air Guard support units. By February 1950, the Air Guard's aircraft inventory consisted of 2,401 planes, including 211 jet fighters. Its fighter aircraft strength represented nearly 70 percent of the Air Force's total fighter strength in the continental United States.
United States. By June 30, 1950, its personnel strength was 44,728, including approximately 3,600 pilots. This unusual dual state-federal military force, built from nothing in a little less than three years, was a considerable accomplishment. To National Guardsmen, it vindicated their faith that the American militia tradition could be successfully adapted to the demanding requirements of modern aerial warfare.¹

The Air Guard, however, was far from ready to play its intended role as the Air Force's primary mobilization day reserve force in 1950. In fact, some Air Guardsmen privately considered its tactical units to be nothing better than glorified flying clubs formed into forty-eight little state Air Forces. Regular Air Force officers could see no compelling military justification for these state-controlled organizations whose missions were entirely national. Moreover, they could point to the fact that, although Washington paid 97 percent of the Air Guard's bills, it could not presume to tell it how or when to train. Most of these officers were convinced that the Air Guard's anomalous state-federal status precluded its immediate use in a national emergency. Operational readiness tests conducted by the Air Force during 1949 tended to confirm these pessimistic assessments. The inspectors concluded that, on the average, it would take Air Guard fighter units 86.6 days after mobilization to become fully prepared to carry out their primary operational mission.² This mission, the air defense of the United States, appeared to be especially untenable after the Soviet Union had tested its first atomic bomb in 1949. Lieutenant General
Ennis C. Whitehead, writing in November 1949, noted that "... at best the Air National Guard represents aircraft in flyable storage." Whitehead was commander of Continental Air Command (CONAC), the Air Force command responsible for inspecting and supervising the training of the Air National Guard. Professional Air Force officers widely shared his extreme skepticism about the military utility of the Air Guard. Reflecting its growing skepticism and frustration with the Air Guard, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, in concert with CONAC, suggested in January 1950 that the Air Guard be written off as its primary combat reserve force. The Air Force wanted to give the Air Guard less demanding missions than air defense. These missions included troop transport, direct air support of ground troops, and civil defense. They, in effect, rejected the Air Guard's image of itself as twentieth century aerial minutemen. Moreover, they implied greatly reduced levels of federal support for the organization.

The troubled partnership between the Air Force and the Air Guard reflected the traditional hostility that has often characterized relationships between the militia and the professional military in American history. The Air Force-Air Guard partnership, an unhappy marriage of political necessity in the aftermath of World War II, had sunk to a new low on the eve of the Korean War. At the base of the partnership's difficulties lay continuing Air Force skepticism about the wisdom of having an Air Guard and unresolved fundamental questions about the ability of the active duty establishment to direct the training of its principal combat reserve force. Hoping to resolve these problems, the Air Force struggled with the National
Guard Bureau and the states for four years to gain greater operational control of Air Guard units. This struggle, including an abortive drive to convert the Air Guard to a strictly federal reserve force incorporated in the Air Force Reserve (AFRes), was ultimately futile and counterproductive. More significantly, it diverted the Air Force and Air Guard from the necessity of establishing a harmonious working partnership that would have enabled them to constructively address the host of problems which delayed the latter's emergence as a viable combat reserve force until the Korean War. The Truman administration's austere postwar defense budgets also significantly slowed the pace of the Air Guard's initial development thereby further exacerbating its serious problems with the Air Force. Finally, poor planning and neglect by the Air Force slowed the Air Guard's development.

The most basic problem troubling Air Force-Air Guard relations during the 1946-50 period was the question of command authority. The Air Force and its predecessor, the AAF, had insisted from the inception of planning for the postwar military establishment that there was no military justification for a dual component air reserve system composed of both the Air Guard and the Air Force Reserve (AFRes). The Air Guard, it had argued, would have an entirely federal mission, the air defense of the continental United States. Such a force would lack viable state missions like the traditional disaster relief and internal security functions of the National Guard. This professional military logic was rejected because of the exigencies of wartime American politics. Consequently, the Air Force had found itself
saddled with the practical necessity of building a proper working relationship with a reserve component which it did not want and could not adequately control. Its basic dilemma lay in the fact that while stringent postwar defense budgets and official policies mandated a heavy reliance on the Air Guard to help fill the Air Force's operational commitments, it could only suggest where Air Guard units could be located and how they should be trained.

Air Force authority over the Air Guard was marginal at best. Although it supplied aircraft, equipment, and operating funds to the Air Guard, the exigencies of domestic politics made it virtually impossible to use this support as an effective lever to force strict compliance with Air Force policies and procedures. Once federal recognition had been granted to a unit, the Air Force's authority was essentially limited to conducting annual inspections and supervising training. Air Force advisors could only suggest, not command, the units they were assigned to. Command remained firmly lodged with the various states until Air Guard units were called to active duty. The Air Guard was fiercely protective of its state militia status. Moreover, many state authorities were determined to treat their Air National Guard contingents as if they were nothing more than miniature Air Forces that had to be operated strictly within their own state boundaries when not in active federal service.

Considerable tension developed between the Air Force and the Air Guard because of their anomalous relationship. Initially, this tension focused upon General George Stratemeyer. Stratemeyer was the first commander of the Air Defense Command (ADC). ADC was
created by Headquarters AAF on May 27, 1946. In addition to the air defense of the United States, ADC was burdened with a variety of miscellaneous and distinctly second-rate missions. These included administration of ROTC, Air Scouts, and the Civil Air Patrol. Finally, his command was responsible for running the Air Force Reserve and discharging the AAF's inspection and training supervision responsibilities relative to the Air National Guard.  

Stratemeyer was apprehensive from the beginning about the ability of the Air Guard to successfully participate in the air defense of the United States. However, he had to rely on the Air Guard to provide the bulk of ADC's fighters. The AAF's air defense fighter force in the spring of 1946 consisted primarily of two night fighter squadrons. They, like their Air Guard counterparts, existed only on paper.  

Stratemeyer was forced to exercise his limited authority over the Air Guard within a complex and cumbersome system of command growing from the latter's anomalous state status. Lines of authority and communication between Headquarters AAF, ADC, the NGB, the states, and individual Air Guard units were confusing, time-consuming, and often ineffective. Headquarters AAF had delegated its responsibilities to inspect and supervise the training of the Air Guard to ADC. Stratemeyer, in turn, sought to exercise these responsibilities through the commanders of ADC's four numbered air forces. Regular AAF instructors, assigned to specific Air Guard units, and command level inspection teams actually implemented these AAF functions. Command jurisdiction remained with the states. Unless authorized
by prior voluntary agreements between ADC and the governors concerned, Stratemeyer could not command Air Guard units during sudden national emergencies. Rather, these units would remain under state command until a Congressional declaration of war or emergency allowed them to be mobilized for federal service. A separate channel of communication for administrative and logistical matters ran from the Commanding General, AAF to the Chief of the NGB, and then to the states. War Department General Staff Circular No. 5-14, dated June 3, 1946, had given the NGB responsibility for all Air Guard functions except the supervision of training. As late as June 1949, no Air Force directive could be made applicable to the Air Guard without the specific concurrence of the NGB. Within the states, administrative control was exercised through the adjutant generals, representing their respective governors, and on to the various Air Guard unit commanders. These unit commanders could not, while their units remained in their state status, exercise command jurisdiction over any of their sub-units which were located in other states. This complicated arrangement was inconsistent with the accepted professional principles of military organization which sought to combine authority and responsibility within a single, easily-understood chain of command.\(^7\)

Stratemeyer recognized the shortcomings of his authority and organizational relationships with the Air Guard. He quickly antagonized the NGB by trying to strengthen his control of Air Guard units. In March 1946, Stratemeyer had been charged by Headquarters AAF with the responsibility for maintaining the Air Guard and the Air Force Reserve "in a highly-trained condition of readiness."\(^8\) The importance
of this mission statement was underscored by the fact that the Air Guard's seventy-two fighter squadrons, when organized, would constitute virtually the entire air defense interceptor force available to ADC for several years. Likewise, its projected AC&W units would provide the bulk of America's air defense radar capability. Determined to gain more authority over the Air Guard, Stratemeyer wrote Major General Butler B. Miltonberger, Chief of the NGB. He emphasized that "the mission of the air national security [of the United States]... has been assigned in large measure to the Air National Guard." 9 Since ADC "was originated to place under one commander the primary responsibility for the efficiency and effectiveness of the Air National Guard... I feel I must be responsible for organizing and administering the Air National Guard in its federally recognized status." 10 Stratemeyer also proposed that NGB functions relevant to the Air Guard (i.e., the actual allocation of federally-owned aircraft and equipment, which by law was vested in the NGB) be transferred to ADC. 11

This request received a chilly reception at the Guard Bureau. On May 10, 1946, General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of the AAF, informed Stratemeyer that federal statutes limited ADC's control of the Air Guard while it remained in its state status. Apparently Miltonberger had lectured Spaatz on the meaning of those statutes. After what Guard spokesmen later described as "a knock-down drag-out fight" in the spring of 1946, Spaatz had agreed that the AAF, including ADC, would go through the NGB on Air Guard matters. 12 Spaatz noted that ADC's authority was essentially restricted to
prescribing organization and training standards, furnishing equipment, and conducting inspections. In all other respects, the Air Guard was under the complete control of the state authorities. Stratemeyer, henceforth, would work closely with the Guard Bureau and the state adjutants general. However, he would make no agreements binding the AAF. Spaatz would do that.\textsuperscript{13}

Another touchy issue was the selection of Air Guard bases. This was usually done by state adjutants general in conjunction with state and local politicians. In states that had operated aviation units of National Guard infantry divisions prior to World War II, they attempted to have Air Guard units established in the same local areas. However, in situations where entirely new units were being created, the choice was largely political, although consideration was given to the availability of personnel to man the units. The Air Force could only advise the states on the selection of the Air Guard airfields. The latter jealously guarded their prerogatives in this area.\textsuperscript{14}

Many problems were encountered by the states in acquiring suitable facilities for their proposed Air Guard units. Because of dramatic wartime advances in military aviation technology, most of the prewar facilities were entirely inadequate for the new types of aircraft which Air Guard flying units were scheduled to receive. During the war, National Guard aviation facilities had been used by the AAF. The airfields had been greatly expanded, runways lengthened, fueling facilities improved, additional operational and maintenance buildings constructed, vast parking areas and numerous
dispersed hardstands provided, and extensive taxiways established connecting these facilities. When the war ended, most of these facilities became surplus to the needs of the federal government and were turned over to the War Assets Administration for disposal. This was done without any consideration of the possible requirements of the Air Guard or Air Force Reserve. If detailed facilities requirements for the Air Guard had been established prior to the war's end, the Air Guard would have had its pick of whatever it needed.\footnote{15}

Unfortunately, the War Department did not have a detailed plan for the Air Guard for some time after V-J Day. Once airfields had been turned over to the War Assets Administration, and the military had indicated no need for them, local communities were given the opportunity to acquire them. These communities had quickly taken advantage of this opportunity to gain control of valuable aviation facilities which, in many cases, had been their municipal airports prior to the war. They had then signed leases on these facilities with commercial aviation or other interests. Frequently, these leases excluded or greatly restricted future Air Guard use of the airfields.\footnote{16}

In some instances the AAF received considerable political flak from congressmen and local officials for pressing the states to speed the acquisition of local airfields to house their Air Guard units.\footnote{17} Stratemeyer had written Spaatz outlining ADC's problems in helping to obtain airfields for both of the AAF's reserve components. The ADC commander had lamented the: \footnote{18}
... lack of a policy with reference to which activity, ANG or Air Reserve, has priority in acquiring of airfields and facilities thereon. In numerous instances, facilities are being held for Air Reserve activities which ... will be requested in the very near future by the various states for their ANG programs. ... Hq AAF is presently declaring excess to the War Assets Administration all facilities other than those required by the interim and postwar Air Force and Air Reserve activities. ... In this way, many facilities which this headquarters (ADC) feels will be requested [by the states] for use in the ANG program at some later date are being lost. ... This command is placed in the position of competing through the War Assets Administration with civilian agencies for the use of airfields and facilities which are essential to the mission of this Command ... the air security of the United States.

Some states, according to Stratemeyer, were slow in requesting airfields for their planned Air Guard units. They were reluctant to commit themselves to a program that might involve a considerable expenditure of their own funds for maintenance of these facilities. He criticized the War Department for failing to inform the governors of an AAF recommendation that expenses relative to the operation of these ANG airfields should be borne 75 percent by the federal government and the remainder by the states. Stratemeyer also asked, in effect, that ADC be given final responsibility for the selection of Air Guard bases. \(^{19}\) Reflecting his own frustrations in dealing with the Air Guard and a deep-seated anti-militia bias, Stratemeyer concluded that he found it hard to consider Air Guardsmen as part of America's first line of defense no matter how well organized and trained. For him, the Air Guard was of necessity an augmentation force to supplement the regulars. It could never be part of the first team. \(^{20}\)
Spaatz, in his reply, noted that Stratemeyer was to restrict himself to advising on the selection of Air Guard bases. The politically sensitive states would retain absolute authority over the selection of bases regardless of ADC's requirements. State reluctance to acquire airfields was overcome when the War Department agreed to the AAF proposal to defray three quarters of the annual operating expenses. This was accomplished through the mechanism of service contracts between the states and the federal government. These contracts obligated the states to operate or share in the operation of Air Guard flying fields. These contracts were promulgated for individual airfields and assured that the states paid their agreed upon share of the operating expenses.

The AAF quickly scaled down its ambitious and unrealistic initial goals for the Air Guard. On June 5, 1946 it changed ADC's mission statement with respect to the Air Guard. Henceforward, ADC would simply discharge the responsibilities of the AAF regarding the organization, training, and maintenance of the Air Guard, subject to policies established by AAF. No mention was made of maintaining the Air Guard in a "highly-trained state of readiness" as had been the case in the original mission statement two months earlier. In short, Stratemeyer's responsibility for the Air Guard, his primary source of air defense units, now covered only training and inspection. Resentment on the part of the Guard Bureau and the independent-minded states had evidently caused this change in ADC's original sweeping assignment with respect to the Air Guard. Stratemeyer's first attempt
to gain greater control of the Air Guard had been totally ineffective. It had only heightened long-standing National Guard suspicions of the regular military establishment.

Stratemeyer, who had been skeptical of the Air Guard's utility as an active air defense force from the very beginning, grew increasingly disillusioned with its slow development. On September 25, 1946 he felt impelled to write Spaatz once more concerning the Air Guard's problems. The ADC commander was prepared to recommend abandoning the Air Guard's air defense role altogether. He wrote Spaatz:

Our present national security and particularly our security five to ten years hence, depends to a large extent on states accepting their responsibility for creating ANG units which can immediately be called into federal service for effective use on the outbreak or threat of hostilities. If, as happens to be the case at present, they are not disposed to accept this responsibility, I believe the War Department should recommend another system for providing national defense in the air.

Air Guard political independence and the problems it posed were illustrated again late that same year. A bitter conflict between the Air Guard and Air Reserve for priority access to scarce funds, equipment, aircraft, and airfield sites had generated a great deal of ill-will for the publicity conscious AAF. Guardsmen had been especially vociferous in their criticism of the AAF. Responding to this pressure, the War Department issued a "Clarification of War Department policies Pertaining to the National Guard and Organized Reserve Corps" in December 1946. The statement emphasized that:

- War Department mobilization plans depended upon the enactment of a system of universal military training.
- All M-Day forces must be capable of promptly performing their military missions.
The only M-Day forces which the Organized Reserve Corps would provide would be those which the Regular Army and National Guard [including Air Guard] could not supply.

Priority in facilities, funds, and equipment would be given M-Day units.

The Guard had clearly staked its superior claim to priority over any strictly federal reserve force in the postwar struggle for missions and resources. Once again its superior organization and political influence had been successfully exercised to advance its own organizational interests.

Despite its official priority over the Air Force Reserve, the early progress of the Air Guard program was slower than ADC had expected. Recruiting, lacking the expected stimulus of Universal Military Training (UMT), was far behind schedule early in 1947. By the end of February, only 1,746 officers and 3,562 enlisted men were on board. Only thirty flying squadrons had been federally recognized.

To receive federal recognition, a unit needed to have 25 percent of its authorized officers and 10 percent of its authorized enlisted men present for duty.25

Stratemeyer believed that ADC's inadequate command authority over the Air Guard was the principal cause of this unsatisfactory progress. However, another vital factor which he ignored was the absence of adequate and predictable levels of federal funding. Air Guard funds were severely curtailed in fiscal year 1947 (FY '47). Congress had appropriated $110 million for the entire National Guard for that period. Faced with a budget shortfall for the active duty Army, Congress allowed the War Department to divert $60 million of
the National Guard's appropriation to it. After a fight in Congress, the Guard managed to have $12 million restored to its budget. Total Guard obligation for FY '47 amounted to approximately $27 million. The National Guard Bureau had anticipated spending some $33 million on the Air Guard that year under the original $110 million appropriation. Major General Reckord of the NGAUS told Congress that the original War Department plan for the postwar National Guard, including its air component, had called for expenditures of $200 million in 1947 and $300 million in 1948. He claimed that the severe cuts in the FY '47 budget had "ham-strung" efforts to develop a strong National Guard in accordance with the War Department's original plans.26

Headquarters AAF reacted to the FY '47 National Guard budget cuts by temporarily suspending the organization of additional Air Guard squadrons. The original plan had called for 514 units including eighty-four tactical squadrons. This was cut almost in half. On March 14, 1947, the AAF's Commanding General announced an "interim-ceiling" of 272 Air Guard units.27 The Fiscal Year 1948 National Guard appropriation permitted this to be raised to 308 units, still far short of the final goal. More significantly, the AAF believed that the 308 unit program, unlike the 514 unit program, would make the Air Guard an unbalanced force. Its tactical flying squadrons would be inadequately supported by service, engineer, and communications units. However, the Chief of the NGB was determined to emphasize the development of tactical units. Support and technical units
could await the restoration of adequate budgets. He felt that this policy would save potential airfields and equipment for Air Guard use. Furthermore, it would aid recruiting.\(^{28}\)

Although the Air Guard's personnel strength had risen to 10,341 and 257 units had been federally recognized by June 30, 1947, the program still was unready to contribute operationally ready flying organizations to ADC.\(^{29}\) The cumulative impact of severe funding cuts, recruiting problems, inadequate command arrangements, and a host of other difficulties was best reflected in the AAF's June 1947 plan for the Air Guard. It stated that "... the role of the Air National Guard in air defense was not firmly enough established [by June 1947] to enter into specific [AAF and ADC] air defense plans."\(^{30}\)

The overriding concern of Headquarters AAF in 1947 was the long-sought goal of complete independence from the Army. This objective became a reality in September when the AAF became the U.S. Air Force under the terms of the National Security Act of that year. The newly-created Air Force, like the old AAF, was hardly an effective fighting force itself in 1947. Postwar demobilization had reduced personnel strength from 2.25 million on VJ Day to 303,000 in May 1947. Its combat effective air groups had plummeted from 218 on VJ Day to two in December 1946. By June 1947, it had only eleven combat ready groups. The Air Staff's long-term goal of building an active duty establishment of seventy combat air groups remained frustrated by the small postwar defense budgets of the Truman administration and its habit of dividing them evenly between the armed services.\(^{31}\)
Faced with inadequate budgets and a critical shortage of combat ready active duty air units, the Air Force was not inclined to devote a substantial portion of its slender resources to building a viable reserve components program. Only direct Presidential intervention in late 1948 eventually began to reverse this tide of reserve component neglect by the active duty establishment.

Given these circumstances, it was not surprising that the Air Guard's development lagged behind the War Department's original postwar estimates. Reacting to the slow pace of the Air Guard's development, Air Force headquarters provided ADC with another revised mission statement on December 17, 1947. In recognition of the "... patently unready state of the Air National Guard ..." it directed ADC to plan for the use of the Guard whenever its units were operationally ready to perform their air defense mission. The Air Force was reluctant to devote a substantial share of its slim resources to air defense. It still intended that the Air Guard would eventually provide the bulk of its interceptor force. Even if Congress authorized the long-sought active duty force of seventy combat air groups, only twelve regular fighter interceptor squadrons would be allotted to ADC. With a fifty-five group Air Force, only nine regular flying squadrons would be given an air defense mission. At the close of 1947, ADC's interceptor force consisted of only seven regular Air Force squadrons. This slim force had no operationally ready Air Guard fighter units to augment it.

By the end of 1948, the Air Guard still lacked a fighter force that the Air Force could draw on immediately in a national emergency.
A number of severe difficulties had continued to slow the organization of its individual units since the end of World War II. It had been exceptionally difficult, especially in some smaller rural communities, to find qualified officers who could devote the time and effort necessary to organize and command flying squadrons. In several instances, state authorities had asked the Air Force to loan them regular officers on a temporary basis to actually command Air Guard units during their initial organizational phases. Although enormous numbers of pilots had flown combat missions during the Second World War, some Air Guard units still found it difficult to recruit adequate numbers of trained pilots. Rank limitations in Air Guard units were also part of the problem. Many higher ranking Air Force reservists were unwilling to vacate their grades to accept lower ranking Air Guard positions. Furthermore, unnecessary delays had been experienced by Navy and Marine reserve fliers wishing to join the Guard. No adequate program had been developed to train young pilots to replace the Guard's aging force of veteran fliers. The Chief of the NGB forecast a shortage of six hundred lieutenant pilots by 1950 unless the situation was rectified. Qualified non-flying officers for various support specialties required were more difficult to obtain than officers. This problem was partially solved by the selective service act of 1948 which virtually brought the Air Guard up to its phased program strength but, at the expense of filling its ranks with hordes of untrained youths seeking to avoid the draft. Further military service remained unattractive for most enlisted veterans of World War II.
Command relationships still had not been resolved in a manner consistent with professional requirements for adequate military functioning by the end of 1948. Air Guard unit commanders still were not compelled or disposed to accept Air Force direction. Air Force instructors could only advise them on training and operational matters. The training programs of air units in the various states had not been adequately coordinated. Air Guard unit commanders were not able to exercise effective control of subunits located in other states unless informal agreements had been reached between the political authorities of those states. In effect, each state was operating its own little Air Force.\(^{35}\)

Another crucial shortcoming involved the inadequate size of the authorized caretaker detachments for Air Guard units. These personnel, later to be known as technicians, were full time state employees responsible for maintaining the equipment, aircraft, and administrative records of Air Guard units. They were required to be National Guard members of those same units. In years to come, they would be recognized as a key factor in the Air Guard program because of the extraordinary continuity and expertise they provided their units. However, in early 1948 the Air Guard faced a critical shortage of these vital personnel. Headquarters U.S. Air Force recognized that "unless additional fulltime personnel [i.e., caretakers] are provided the Air National Guard program is in danger of collapsing."\(^{36}\)

Early in 1948, General Stratemeyer made a second major attempt to establish a better relationship between the Air Force and the Air National Guard's tactical units. At a unit
commanders' conference held during February 1948 at Brooks AFB near San Antonio, Texas, Stratemeyer advanced a proposal to strengthen his operational control of Air Guard units. His "Channels for Control of Operations for Training of Air National Guard units in Preparation for Readiness for their Federal Mission" envisioned a purely military chain of command. The commanders of ADC's numbered air forces would, under the Stratemeyer proposal, deal directly with their subordinate Air Guard wing commanders. The wing commanders, in turn, would be able to deal directly with the air group commanders below them regardless of whether or not they were both located in the same state. Neither governors nor adjutant generals would intervene in this proposed operational chain of command.\(^{37}\)

Stratemeyer's proposal had been foreshadowed in November 1947 when he had urged his Air Force commanders to make voluntary agreements with state governors, where possible, to place Air Guard units under ADC in peacetime. He had cautioned that ADC's short term plan did not contemplate the employment of any Air Guard units "primarily due to their universal lack of unit proficiency at the present time."\(^{38}\) However, once they had reached a "usable state of proficiency," he wanted his Air Force commanders to prepare to employ them immediately upon their federalization. This, of course, would require prior agreement with the state governors on a voluntary basis. Several of these agreements were apparently in effect when Stratemeyer called his San Antonio unit commanders conference.\(^{39}\)

Guardsmen present at the February 1948 conference included the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Major General Kenneth Cramer, and
the President of the Adjutants' General Association, Major General Raymond H. Fleming, as well as many state Adjutants General and air unit commanders. They were receptive to Stratemeyer's proposal, viewing it as a means of increasing the military effectiveness of Air Guard units through closer supervision by the regular Air Force. The adjutants general present at San Antonio approved it. For some, it only represented a formalization of existing informal agreements between some states and the Air Force to expedite the latter's assumption of command during annual training and national emergencies. By July 1948, the proposal's final version had been sent to all the states and the District of Columbia. Thirty-five of forty-nine adjutants general accepted it.40

Unfortunately for Stratemeyer, two of the most politically influential guardsmen were not present at San Antonio. Major General Ellard A. Walsh, present of the National Guard Association, and Major General Milton A. Reckord, chairman of the association's Standing Committee on Legislation, were extremely influential in shaping opinion within the Guard establishment. Both were old-line Army Guard officers and fierce partisans of its interests. Both interpreted Stratemeyer's directive as a threat to the National Guard's distinctive character as a state militia force.41 Walsh was especially vehement in condemning Stratemeyer's proposal as just one more example of a long series of attempts to replace the Guard with an entirely federal reserve force. Speaking to the 1948 annual conference of the National Guard Association at St. Louis, Missouri, Walsh denounced Stratemeyer's initiative:42
The step taken . . . in my opinion, it is destructive and illegal, for there is no authority vested in the Chief of Staff of the Air Force or the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to determine policy. This can only be done as provided by . . . the National Defense Act. This, and other laws, were enacted by Congress for the protection of the National Guard. The continued attempts of the Department of Defense and the Regular Army to destroy the National Guard as it exists today, is eloquent testimony as to the needs of . . . protective measures.

The biggest target of Walsh's wrath was the Secretary of Defense's Committee on Civilian Components, popularly known as the Gray Board. The board, chaired by Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon B. Gray had been appointed to study America's military reserve programs. It had called for an end to the dual component Army and Air Force Reserve systems sanctioned by Approved Policies '45. The board's Report to the Secretary of Defense by the Committee on Civilian Components had noted that using the National Guard "with its present powerful armament is not generally suitable in the execution of state missions in case of riots or other civil uprisings." The report concluded that "national security requires all services have one federal reserve force." These federal reserve forces, unlike the National Guard, would be established under the army clauses of the Constitution rather than its militia clauses.

Headquarters U.S. Air Force supported the Gray Board's basic conclusions. It had never been happy with the dual component air reserve system established by the War Department in 1945. ADC subsequent inability to assert command authority over Air Guard units reinforced this initial skepticism. Colonel Bruce K. Holloway, an Air Staff officer later to become Air Force Chief of Staff, reflected
this skepticism in a memo to General Stratemeyer. Holloway claimed that the Air Guard's lack of operational efficiency were rooted in its peacetime control by state authorities. He asserted that as long as "command jurisdiction remains with the states it precludes appreciable worth in an emergency unless federal control can be gained three to six months prior to an expected attack." General Spaatz had outlined the Air Staff's basic position on the reserve unification issue in a January 1948 memo to Secretary of the Air Force Symington. He noted that several studies by the Air Staff "indicate that the best interests of the Air Force and of national security would be best served by consolidation, under federal control, of the existing Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve." Sensitive to the political controversy bound to be generated by such proposals, Spaatz suggested that the Air Force should defer its public position on the issue until after the Gray Board had made its report. He informed Symington that, due to the controversy, the Air Staff had developed plans for either unification of its reserve components or retention of the status quo.

There was some dissatisfaction within the Air Guard's ranks concerning its anomalous status as a dual state-federal force. Lieutenant Colonel Tom Lanphier, Jr., publicly voided it. Lanphier was the commander of Idaho's 190th Fighter Squadron and a member of the Air Staff Committee on Air National Guard Policy. He had compiled a distinguished combat record during World War II as a fighter pilot in the South Pacific. In April 1943, he had intercepted and shot down the Japanese aircraft carrying Admiral Yamamoto. In 1948,
Lanphier was elected president of the Air Force Association (AFA), a
civilian lobbying organization devoted primarily to furthering the
interests of the active duty Air Force.49

Writing for the January 1949 issue of Air Force, the AFA's monthly magazine, Lanphier made his case for the Air Guard's federalization and consolidation with the Air Force Reserve. He argued that his Idaho Air Guard squadron was nothing more than an independent little Air Force. Although the federal government paid 97 percent of its expenses and supplied it with combat aircraft, it "does not presume to tell us specifically how, when or where to fly, and has no authoritative way of checking or insuring the quality of our training."50 Only a handful of Air Guard units could and actually had fired live ammunition at targets up to standards that the Air Force might approve according to Lanphier. Lacking specific instruction and invigorating inspection from the Air Force, the Air Guard in any given state was no better than the individual civilian who acted as its senior Air Guard officer. Consequently, the states operated forty-eight varied training programs. The problems generated by this lack of standardization were compounded by the wasteful duplication inherent in maintaining two reserve programs—the Air Guard and the Air Force Reserve—that competed for men, equipment and the taxpayer's dollar. Lanphier dismissed the argument that the Air Guard had a state mission with the caustic comment that "an air arm is about as useful to the governor of the sovereign state of Idaho as a bombsight to a freight train."51
Lanphier concluded that, as presently constituted, the Air Guard was nothing more than a luxurious flying club for those few pilots fortunate enough to be able to join its tactical squadrons. As long as their training was not standardized and strictly supervised by the Air Force, this situation would prevail. He urged that, in the name of both operational readiness and economy, that the Air Guard be federalized and merged with the Air Force Reserve.\textsuperscript{52}

James Forrestal, first Secretary of Defense, also strongly supported the creation of a single, entirely federal reserve system for the Air Force. His initial annual report to the President put the issue in clear perspective:\textsuperscript{53}

National preparedness is a national rather than a state responsibility. Retention by the states of control over military forces with a solely national mission violates the sound principle of delegation of authority with responsibility.

Forrestal strongly recommended that President Truman initiate measures to consolidate the Air Guard with the Air Force Reserve under federal direction. He wrote:\textsuperscript{54}

The most careful review of the Gray Board Report and our experience with the implementation of Executive Order No. 10,007 have led to the conclusion that an effective civilian air component requires the unification of the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve in a single, wholly federal, Air Force reserve. This conclusion . . . has the unanimous concurrence and full support of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and of the JCS.

The Secretary of Defense re-emphasized the purely national mission of the Air Guard. The Air Guard was intended to be an M-Day air defense force. It was inconceivable that its tactical flying units would be
ever used to preserve domestic law and order. Forrestal then went to
the heart of the Air Guard's problems, as seen from the Pentagon.

His memo to the President continued:55

Retention by the states of control over military forces with
a national mission violates the sound principle of delega-
tion of authority with responsibility. Under present circum-
stances those federal agencies responsible for national
preparedness exercise only a negative type of supervision
over the Air National Guard. . . . The situation is further
complicated by the impracticability of attempting to organize,
operate and train effective combat forces when the components
are under the control of forty-eight different 'commanders-in-
chief.' The present nature of Air Force activity is such that
artificial geographical restrictions seriously handicap the
preparation of the Air National Guard for its national mission.

Forrestal closed his memo to the President by "strongly recommend[ing]
your approval for immediate initiation of measures to effect the
consolidation under federal direction of these civilian air compo-
nents." He noted that both he and Secretary Symington wanted to meet
with Truman at an early opportunity to discuss the matter.56

President Truman had grown increasingly impatient with the
slow progress of the reserve component programs of the Army and Air
Force. Although faced with the growing intransigence of the Soviet
Union, and the continuing failure of Congress to enact universal
military training (UMT), the President had been reluctant to ask for
a major expansion of the active duty military establishment. Rather,
he had been forced to settle for a reintroduction of the draft in
June 1948 and an increased emphasis upon the reserves to strengthen
America's military power. His Executive Order 10,007, dated
October 15, 1948, had grown out of his determination to improve the
military readiness of the reserves. The President had specifically
focused his order on the sagging reserve programs of the Army and Air Force. He pointedly contrasted their civilian components with the reserve programs of the Navy and Marine Corps. They were asked to follow the Navy's example by appointing high ranking officers to head their reserve programs. The President directed that all "General Staff" divisions give increased attention to reserve programs and that young, vigorous regular officer instructors be assigned to train reservists. Furthermore, adequate training facilities were to be provided for the reserve components.  

The Air Force, responding both to the President's order to strengthen its reserve programs and the requirement to strengthen America's weak air defenses in the face of rapidly deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union, established the Continental Air Command (CONAC) on December 1, 1948. CONAC absorbed both the Tactical Air Command (TAC) and ADC, the major command previously responsible for administering both of the Air Force's reserve programs. It also obtained nine fighter squadrons from the Strategic Air Command (SAC). General Stratemeyer, ADC's commander, became CONAC's first commander. The paramount influence in CONAC was ADC. The latter's old headquarters and most of its staff were simply redesignated headquarters CONAC. Old ADC regulations were retitled CONAC regulations. All four of ADC's numbered air forces as well as two of TAC's came under CONAC's jurisdiction. TAC and ADC were reduced to minor operational command headquarters within the new CONAC organization.

The basic operational concepts behind the creation of CONAC were the release of additional Air Force resources for reserve
programs and the development of a flexible pool of tactical fighter
airpower within the continental United States. This meant that all
of the Air Force's fighter resources in the United States, including
the Air Guard, were supposed to be trained in both tactical offensive
and air defense operations. In reality, it meant that air defense
had been firmly established as the second highest priority within the
Air Force behind SAC's strategic nuclear offensive mission. Con­
sequently, all of CONAC's fighter units began to emphasize air inter­
cept training. Within the context of this increased concern over
the nation's air defenses, Air Guard units still constituted the
majority of the Air Force's stateside fighter strength. They accounted
for some 63 percent of its potential fighter strength including 28
percent of its jets. Sixty-nine of the 109 fighter squadrons poten­
tially available to the Air Force in 1949 were Air Guard units.59

Unfortunately, neither the creation of CONAC nor the increased
emphasis on air defense addressed the core problems that inhibited
the development of the Air Guard prior to the Korean War. Although
the federal funds available to the Air Guard increased from $45 million
in FY '48 to $78 million in FY '49, this was far short of the $161
million requested by the Guard Bureau for the latter period. Adequate
operational funding simply was not available. Moreover, CONAC was no
more able than its predecessor, ADC, to establish firmer operational
control of Air Guard. This point was illustrated at the second annual
Air Guard unit commanders conference at Orlando, Florida during
April 1949. The conference was sponsored by Stratemeyer's successor
as CONAC commander, Lieutenant General Ennis C. Whitehead. Although
the assembled Air Guard officers were conciliatory toward the Air
Force, the best Whitehead could gain from them was a reaffirmation
of CONAC's existing weak training supervision of their units. Command
jurisdiction of non-mobilized Air Guard units was rejected. The
prevailing opinion within CONAC was that the continued lack of ade-
quate Air Force operational control of Air Guard units was the major
factor accounting for their inadequate operational capabilities. A
complete federal takeover of the program was the implied corrective
to the situation. 60

Although President Truman wanted to reinvigorate the reserve
programs of the Air Force, he was reluctant to risk his personal
political prestige in the drive to federalize the Air Guard and merge
it with the Air Force Reserve. He recognized the "political dynamite"
inherent in any such proposal. 61 Consequently, the burden of obtaining
the necessary legislative action fell entirely upon the Department
of Defense and the Air Force. On December 15, 1948, the Secretary of
Defense had directed the Air Force to prepare legislative proposals
for consolidation of the Air National Guard with the Air Force Reserve.
Lieutenant General Elwood R. Quesada was directed by General Hoyt S.
Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, to chair an ad hoc Air Force
committee that would study factors relating to the intent and effect
of this proposed legislation. 62

Quesada, a champion of tactical air power, was the Special
Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces. His position on
the Air Staff was a relatively new one. It had been created late in
1948 in response to President Truman's order to upgrade reserve
programs. Quesada's job was to formulate plans and programs for both of the Air Force's civilian components. However, he had to rely upon other air staff agencies to actually implement them. Quesada also served as the liaison between the Chief of Staff, the Air Staff, and Air Force major air commands on reserve matters. His appointment was tacit recognition of the inadequate Air Staff attention to reserve matters since the end of World War II. Prior to the creation of his new post, all reserve matters, including the Air Guard, had been the responsibility of a small Civilian Components Group buried deep within the Directorate of Operations. It had consisted of only four officers and five civilians headed by Brigadier General John P. McConnell, another future Air Force Chief of Staff. Although the Air Staff was organized on a functional basis with each of its directorates responsible for all regular and reserve forces planning within their own particular specialties, they had largely devoted inadequate attention to reserve matters. Consequently, the burden of reserve forces' planning had fallen primarily upon General McConnell's small and politically impotent Civilian Components Group. Quesada's appointment represented a dramatic upgrading of the reserve forces planning function on the Air Staff. Underscoring this change was the substantial increase in the strength of the staff directly responsible for coordinating reserve forces planning. It went from nine persons under McConnell to forty-four under the much more influential Quesada. 63

General Quesada's top priority was to rebuild the floundering Air Force Reserve. In an interview published in Air Force magazine,
he criticized the Air Force Reserve program declaring "the past program has been pretty poorly conceived and poorly executed."

Quesada noted that the original plan after World War II sought to train as many reservists as possible. The Air Force finally decided that this was impossible and would start all over again. It only had sufficient funds, equipment, and facilities to adequately train some 65,000 air reservists, approximately 15 percent of the total program. Quesada emphasized that the Air Force intended to provide the Reserve with a substantial number of tactical aircraft in the future. These would replace the trainers and cargo aircraft that all of its organized flying units were then operating regardless of their assignments under existing mobilization plans. Quesada emphasized that the Air Guard would continue to enjoy priority over the Air Force reserve because it was still considered an M-Day force. Air Staff planners did not anticipate having Reserve units fully operationally ready until an unspecified period following M-Day.

General Quesada had neglected to mention that one of the major problems that had retarded the Air Force Reserve's development had been the priority given to the Air Guard after World War II. The Air Guard, despite its problems, had found it much easier to attract veteran combat pilots than the Reserve. Air Guard units were flying relatively high performance P-47 and P-51 fighter aircraft. Air Reservists, meanwhile, had to settle for AT-6 trainers and C-46 and C-47 transports if they had any aircraft at all. Budget requests for the Air Guard were usually greater than those for the far larger Air Force Reserve. For example, the Air Force budget for FY '49 requested
$52 million for the planned 1.5 million man Reserve while $56 million was requested for the 57,000 man Guard. The Air Guard also had priority in the acquisition of airfield sites. In sum, many of the Air Force Reserve's problems had been due to the fact that it had been unable to compete with the better organized, politically influential, and officially-favored Air National Guard.  

While General Quesada was emphasizing plans to revitalize the Air Force Reserve, the long-festering struggle for control of the Air Guard reached a critical point in February 1949. Secretary of the Air Force Symington, with the approval and encouragement of the Secretary of Defense, was determined "to push for the federalization of the Air National Guard." Quesada's ad hoc committee had been directed to study the policies and procedures upon which to base legislative proposals which could create a single reserve component for the Air Force. Never happy with the creation of a reserve component outside its complete control and twice rebuffed in its postwar efforts to gain command jurisdiction over the Air Guard through administrative agreements, the Air Force now turned to Congress. Encouraged by the Gray Board's report and the support of the Secretary of Defense, it sought a legislative remedy for the problems generated by its anomalous and often-strained relationship with the Air Guard. From its perspective, the elimination of the Air Guard's dual state-federal status was consistent with sound principles of military command. It would give the active duty establishment the full authority that it felt it needed to adequately prepare the Air Guard for its air defense mission. Air Force officials believed that this mission
was a strictly federal affair and that it made little sense to have a state-controlled force training to fulfill it. Problems that had inhibited the scheduled development of the Air Guard program and that would also slow the immediate availability of its units in the event of an emergency would, according to the regular establishment's view, be greatly reduced or eliminated by federalization.

The federalization issue was resolved in February 1949 during hearings before the House Armed Services Committee on H.R. 1437, a bill to authorize the legal composition of the Army and the Air Force. Representatives of the National Guard Association attacked the proposed language of Title II of the bill. Major General Walsh charged that Title II would permit federalization of the Air Guard. Noting the pro-federalization conclusions of the Gray Board and its endorsement by the Secretary of Defense, Walsh disputed the Air Force contention that H.R. 1437 would preserve the existing status of the Air Guard. He then cited language in the bill which called for sixty-one Air Force Reserve groups but made no specific mention of the Air National Guard. Major General Reckord continued to develop the same theme. He charged that the Secretary of the Air Force could gradually kill the Air Guard because of Title II's vague language. He urged the Armed Services Committee to rewrite the bill to ensure the separate existence of the Air Guard. He then savagely attacked the Air Force's handling of its own wholly federal civilian component, the Air Force Reserve. Reckord charged that the regular Air Force had done almost nothing with the Air Force Reserve for three years despite spending nearly as much money as had been spent on the Air Guard. He called
the Air Force Reserve a strictly paper organization. The Air Force, he alleged, had failed in its duty to the Air Force Reserve over which it had complete control. Reckord claimed that the Air Guard was a far more advanced reserve component and implied that it owed its superiority to its relative independence from the Air Force.  

Reckord also called for a major increase in the authorized size of both air reserve components. He argued that Congress should mandate that the Air Guard and the Air Force Reserve would each consist of thirty-five air groups manned by 100,000 personnel apiece. At that time, the Air Guard was limited to twenty-seven groups with an authorized personnel goal of approximately 57,000. The actual strength of the Air Guard at the end of FY '48 was only 29,000.

The National Guard Association's attack on the Air Force brought a vigorous response from Secretary Symington. Testifying before the same committee on February 3, 1949, Symington emphasized that "when I came into the Air Force three years ago ... it became obvious that one of the most serious problems the Air Force would have would be the so-called civilian components: the Air Reserve and the Air National Guard." He stressed that the amount of money available for the civilian components of the Air Force had been very limited and their problems great. Getting to the heart of the issue, Symington asserted that "one of the things the Air Force looked forward to [after World War II] ... was the possibility of controlling their own civilian components comparable to the ... Navy." Nevertheless, in the final days before enactment of the National Security Act, that had created a separate Air Force, frequent compromises were
being made in order to insure passage of that bill. During that period, according to Symington, "National Guard interests wedged into the act the fact that the National Guard Bureau would continue to handle the Air National Guard along with the National Guard."74 This meant the Air Force's principal first line reserve component would continue to be administered by Army officers, a particularly galling circumstance for a military service which had struggled for years to free itself from the Army. Symington, seeking to rebut Reckord's charge that any federal Air Force reserve component would be allowed to languish by the regulars, noted that the Air Guard had been given priority over the Air Force Reserve as a matter of policy.75 "We have concentrated on the National Guard [as opposed to the Reserve]. . . . We gave the Guard every favored position we could plus modern airplanes as against old trainers we gave the Reserve."76 Symington then criticized the dual component air reserve system created in World War II. That system, he charged, "has made it impossible to administer [civilian components] efficiently in the past."77 Symington denied that the Air Force was trying to destroy the Air Guard through the proposal language of H.R. 1437.78

Representative Carl Vinson, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was frustrated by the bitter impasse which had developed between the Air Force and the National Guard during hearings on H.R. 1437. On February 3, he directed representatives of the committee's staff, the Air Force, and the National Guard to sit down together and draw up an amendment to the bill. The amendment would specify that the Air Force of the United States would consist of three components:
the regular U.S. Air Force, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve. He told them to prepare a mutually agreeable amendment over the weekend and submit it to the committee the following Monday. On February 8, 1948, the proposed amendment was read and unanimously accepted by the committee. It firmly established the Air Guard as a legal component of the Air Force of the United States and increased its authorized personnel ceiling to 100,000. 79

The National Guard had won everything that it wanted from Congress. The continued existence of the Air Guard had been written into law. Federalization was a dead issue in Congress. Henceforward, the Air Force would have to work with the state-controlled Air National Guard whether it wanted to or not. On February 18, the Air Force publicly acknowledged its defeat. A press release noted that General Vandenberg had directed General Quesada's committee to broaden its study of reserve affairs by studying methods of improving the Air Guard's readiness and ways to facilitate rapid federal control of Air Guard units in a national emergency. Other matters to be studied included the effectiveness of the Air Force Reserve and ways of improving it. Members of the committee, in addition to Quesada, included Air Staff officers, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of the NGB and the Chief of its Air Force Division, Air Force Reserve officers called to duty, and representatives from Quesada's office. 80

The February 1949 issue of the National Guardsman, official magazine of the National Guard Association, announced a new training agreement between the Air Force and the Air Guard. 81 In an effort to
insure closer Air Force supervision over the training of Air Guard units for their M-Day mission, all states and the District of Columbia had agreed to permit the Air Force to direct training through its normal tactical command channels. The plan was similar to the one offered by General Stratemeyer over a year earlier. The new agreement provided that:

On all matters pertaining to operations for training purposes in the preparation of Air National Guard units for their federal mission, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, through his designated commanders may exercise training supervision—differentiated from command jurisdiction—over Air National Guard units by means of normal military channels.

It also provided that Air Guard commanders could exercise training supervision over their subordinate units when those units were training for their federal mission regardless of whether or not they were located within the same states. The Air Force, which had been determined to achieve total control of the Air Guard via federalization, had been compelled to settle for closer training supervision.

Despite these developments, the struggle for control of the Air Guard had not been resolved by early 1949. The central focus of the battle now shifted to the role of the National Guard Bureau. The Bureau was part of a complicated system of administrating the Air Guard. It had evolved from two preceding organizations. The first of these, the Division of Militia Affairs, had been made part of the War Department in 1908. The National Defense Act of 1916 had renamed it the Militia Bureau. It was called by the latter name until 1933 when it was given its present name, the National Guard Bureau.
The Air Force and Bureau saw the latter’s functions quite differently. To the Air Force, the Bureau was a channel of communication between the Chief of Staff and the state military authorities. Its proper function was to carry out the directives of the Air Force concerning the administration, supply, and equipping of Air Guard units in preparation for their federal mission. However, the Bureau interpreted its mission in broader and more activist terms. It did not wish to confine itself to the passive administrative role envisaged by the Air Force. Rather, in accordance with its interpretation of the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1933, it saw itself actively participating in the formulation of all plans and policies relevant to the administration of the Air National Guard. This interpretation was reinforced by language inserted in the National Security Act of 1947 that required the Air Force to go through the Bureau on matters relevant to the Air Guard. The Bureau, in effect, actively represented the Air Guard’s interests within the Air Force and the Department of Defense. General Reckord, reflecting this view, referred to the Bureau as “our salvation.”

The postwar relationship between the Bureau and the Air Force had been less than harmonious from the very beginning. The tone had been set in 1946 when, according to National Guard spokesmen, the AAF had not only tried to seize command and control of the Air Guard but also “went into the National Guard Bureau and demanded that the Bureau turn our money over to them....” General Spaatz had been forced to go through the National Guard Bureau on Air Guard matters after what was described as “a knock-down drag-out fight”
over control of the Air Guard's share of the FY '47 National Guard appropriation.\textsuperscript{87} The Bureau had won that fight and had also rebuffed General Stratemeyer's efforts to gain greater command jurisdiction over the Air Guard in the spring of 1946. Guard spokesmen were determined to preserve the Bureau's prerogatives. Testifying before the Armed Services committee of the U.S. Senate during its 1947 hearings on unification of the armed forces, General Reckord had made a strong and successful argument to prevent division of the Bureau into separate ground and air components housed respectively in the Departments of the Army and the Air Force. His argument was directed specifically against Air Force attempts to circumvent the Bureau.\textsuperscript{88}

He told the Senators:

\begin{quote}
We [the National Guard] do not care what language you give us (in the unification bill), so long as you give us the Bureau with language that will be sufficient so that everybody concerned will understand they must deal on National Guard matters through the Bureau. . . . All the time, notwithstanding the corrective action taken a year ago (i.e., General Spaatz agreed to go through the Bureau on AAF matters), there is not a week passes but what we run into trouble, . . . where the Air Corps ignores the Bureau, ignores the governors of the states, and the adjutant general, and issues orders to the air unit in the state. That is what we must overcome.
\end{quote}

The National Security Act of 1947 had established the NGB as a joint bureau of the Departments of the Army and Air Force.\textsuperscript{89} Its chief, usually an Army Guardsman on active duty with the rank of Major General, reported directly to the civilian secretaries of both departments. Within the Bureau, a separate Air Force Division was established on October 1948 to replace the Aviation Group that had previously handled Air Guard-AAF matters. The Air Force Division's
chief and his Army counterpart both reported to the Chief of the Bureau. The Bureau's Chief, Major General Kenneth Cramer, was determined to run the Air Guard according to his own standards, not those of the Air Force.90

A vital function of the Guard Bureau was to prepare and defend National Guard budget requests before Congress. Air Guard budget requests had to be coordinated first with Air Force headquarters.91 The Bureau and its National Guard allies had consistently fought for higher Air Guard budgets than either the Truman administration or the Congress had been willing to authorize prior to the Korean War. For example, from FY '47 through FY '49, the Bureau had requested approximately $536 million for the Air Guard. Only $154 million had actually been made available. This reduction dramatically slowed the Air Guard's pace of development. It made it impossible to complete the organization of all 514 units by July 1, 1947 as originally projected.92

In 1947, the War Department still had controlled the Air Guard's budget through the Guard Bureau. It had diverted $48 million from the National Guard's total $110 million appropriation to help meet the expenses of the active duty Army. This action, reflecting the frantic postwar competition of all military components for extremely scarce resources, virtually "brought the organization of the Air National Guard to a halt" according to General Cramer.93 For Cramer, this action had underscored the recurrent failure of the federal government to provide adequate financial support to the greatly expanded postwar National Guard program that the War Department
had promised in Approved Policies, 1945. The detrimental effect of inadequate funding of the Air Guard was one of the few issues that the Bureau and the Air Force agreed upon.\footnote{94}

The Air Force, however, was dissatisfied with its inadequate control of Air Guard funds. This was particularly galling because these funds, prior to FY '50, were administered by the Department of the Army through the Guard Bureau. The Air Force, which had spent many years struggling to free itself from the grip of the Army's ground-oriented hierarchy, felt that Army policies and budget priorities were not especially sensitive to its own requirements. The situation was complicated by the reluctance of the Chief of the NGB to predicate Air Guard budget requests upon programming data established by the Air Staff. In a memo to the Chief of the NGB, written in late 1949, the Special Assistant to the Air Force Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces made this point. He emphasized that procedures for preparing the Air Guard budget were the prerogative of the Air Force Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff, he claimed, had merely delegated responsibility for preparing this budget request to the Guard Bureau. This Air Force claim to ultimate authority over the Air Guard's budget had been rejected by the Bureau ever since General Spaatz's abortive attempt to gain control of the Air Guard's appropriation in 1946.\footnote{95}

The Air Force was also frustrated by the NGB's determination to function as an operating agency with an active policymaking role. For example, the Bureau had directed that Air Guard units would only comply with Air Force manuals and regulations that had been first coordinated with it. Consequently, Air Guard units often disregarded
Air Force directives. In some instances, according to an official
Air Force history, these units even actively circumvented such direc-
tives "by securing authority from the National Guard Bureau to use
any system best suited to their desires and fantasies." As late as
the end of 1949, no Air Force directive could be made applicable to
the Air Guard without the express concurrence of the NGB's Chief.
This situation further encouraged the existing lack of standardization
in Air Guard training and procedures.

The tensions between the Guard Bureau and the Air Force culmi-
nated in an open confrontation late in 1949. The Chief of the
National Guard Bureau, General Cramer, precipitated the crisis when
he unilaterally relieved the head of the Bureau's Air Force Division,
Major General George Finch. Cramer's action was partially the result
of a personality conflict with Finch. Each man disliked the other
from the start of their relationship. Both were intensely ambitious.
However, its fundamental roots lay in the continuing struggle between
the Air Force and the Bureau for control of the Air National Guard.
Cramer was an Army Guard officer. Finch was an Air Guardsman. The
Air Force felt that Cramer was basically insensitive to its require-
ments for the Air Guard and had no right to take exception, on his
own authority, to certain policies which the Air Force had established
for its state-controlled reserve component.

The Air Force charged that Cramer had, on many occasions, when
directed by the Department of the Air Force to promulgate lawful poli-
cies and regulations, "delayed implementation so as to affect adversely
the training of the Air National Guard." Examples of Cramer's
obstructionism cited by the Air Force included a delay of over eleven
months in implementing a decision to establish an Air Staff in the
headquarters of all state and territorial National Guard organiza-
tions, an eight month delay in implementing an air staff decision to
prohibit split training assemblies for pay purposes, and a three month
delay in a Headquarters USAF decision to increase the combat crew
strength of tactical units. The real issue, however, was the failure
of the Bureau's Chief to allow his Air Force Division to administer
the Air Guard program. As a consequence, according to General Hoyt
Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff:

> Important policies involving the Air National Guard have been
> handled by officers inexperienced and uninformed in Air Force
> policies and procedures. This situation deteriorated to the
> point where the Chief of the National Guard Bureau issued
> instructions that no one in the Air Force Division . . . would
> prepare any correspondence on any subject . . . without his
> personal approval.

On August 10, 1949, Vandenberg's headquarters directed Cramer
to use the Air Force Division of his organization for the purposes for
which it had been created. Cramer replied that he could not comply
with the directive. On September 26, 1949, Cramer issued a memo
relieving the Chief of the Bureau's Air Force Division from his
duties. General Vandenberg noted in a memo to the Secretary of the
Air Force that this action "was taken without any prior consultation
with any representative of the Department of the Air Force. Also,
... [it] was taken without any reference to the Army." Despite
a personal conference with Cramer concerning the problems between the
Bureau and Headquarters USAF, Vandenberg remained convinced that their
relationship was unsatisfactory. Although the Bureau was technically
complying with Air Force requests and directives, its compliance
had not been accompanied by a desire to cooperate in spirit as well
as with the letter of instructions. Although General Finch had been
reinstated, the Air Force Division of the Bureau was still, in effect,
being bypassed. This situation led to a joint inquiry by the
Inspectors General of the Army and Air Force at the direction of their
respective service secretaries. The Inspectors General recommended
that General Finch should be relieved from further duty with the NGB.
Further, they advised that a joint board of officers should be
appointed by both Secretaries to recommend changes in the Bureau's
organizational structure and internal operating procedures. The Chief
of the NGB, they argued, would be directed to comply fully with provi-
sions of any Air Force directive relating to staff procedures on mat-
ters pertaining to the Air Guard. In a separate recommendation, the
Air Inspector General called for the relief of General Cramer as
head of the Bureau. Inspector General declared that General Cramer:

was reluctant to do anything which the Air Force requested
him to do if it were not in accord with his personal
views . . . [Cramer] so hamstrung the Air Force Division
of his office with restricted memoranda that they could
not possibly have the independence of action that he him-
self (i.e., Cramer) admitted was maintained by agreements
entered into . . . with the Air Force Division when his
office was created . . . [the Air Inspector General
personally had] grave doubts that it will be possible in
the future to work any more harmoniously and effectively
with . . . General Cramer than in the past because of his
inflexible and contentious attitude about detail and his
insistence of following the same pattern of conduct with
respect to the Air Force that he has with the Army.

Upon receipt of the report of the Inspectors General, the Secre-
taries implemented some of its recommendations. A joint board of
inquiry was appointed to investigate the situation within the Guard Bureau. The board, commonly referred to as the "Miltonberger Board," was headed by a former chief of the National Guard Bureau, Major General Butler Miltonberger. The Department of the Air Force implemented another recommendation of the Inspectors General. It rewrote several National Guard Bureau regulations pertaining to the organization of the Bureau as it affected the Air Guard and submitted them to the Miltonberger Board. ¹⁰⁵

The Miltonberger Board reported its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of the Army on March 31, 1950. It rejected the creation of separate National Guard Bureaus for the Army and Air Force as unnecessary and undesirable. It found that any action consistent with the law taken by the Air Force regarding the organization and function of the Bureau insofar as the Air Guard was concerned was a matter of primary concern to the Air Force. In matters of joint interest to the Army and Air Force, the Bureau's structure and operating procedures must conform to the joint operating policies of both services. The Board concluded that the existing organizational structure and current operating procedures of the NGB were inconsistent with sound staff principles. On this premise, the Board reviewed and rewrote a proposed Department of the Army Regulation No. 10-230-1, entitled "Organization and Functions of the National Guard Bureau." ¹⁰⁶ It also rewrote the proposed Air Force regulations for the Air Guard. The Board stated that "if faithfully implemented, the proposed regulations and related allocations of functions should result in sound internal and administrative operating procedures" and would "eliminate
the top-heavy overhead of the National Guard Bureau by removing ... functions and duties which could be more properly and effectively performed by the Army and Air Force Divisions [i.e., of the Bureau]. 107

General Cramer's defense of his actions clearly revealed that they were part of his effort to assert the Bureau's independent role in the policy process. Addressing the annual meeting of the Adjutant Generals' Association in February 1950, Cramer focused on this issue. He asserted that: 108

One of the greatest difficulties which confronts the Bureau is the fact that planning [for the National Guard] whether policy is involved or procedures or programs, that all too often difficulty arises because we (i.e., the Bureau) have not given an opportunity to participate... We believe that the Bureau was created for the purpose of giving advice and assistance to the Army and Air Force in the preparation of all plans and procedures.

The Bureau's policy role, in Cramer's view, should be exercised by its Chief. However, the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force ignored Cramer's assertion of authority. They concurred with most of the recommendations of their Inspectors General and the Miltonberger Board. Administrative action was taken, at their direction, to revamp the internal organization and operating procedures of the National Guard Bureau in the spring of 1950. Fundamentally, these changes strengthened the authority of the Bureau's division chiefs to administer the Army and Air National Guard in accordance with the directives of their respective active duty military services. The power of the Bureau's Chief to interfere with the operations of the Army and Air Force Divisions was greatly reduced. 109

The one remaining issue in May 1950 was the future of Cramer and Finch. Finch had been reinstated as head of the Bureau's Air
Force Division in 1949 at the insistence of the Air Force Chief of Staff. The Secretary of the Army wanted to remove Finch. The Secretary of the Air Force was opposed to this unless Cramer, who had precipitated the crisis, was removed at the same time. The Korean War finally resolved this interservice impasse. Cramer was called to duty with the 28th infantry division. Major General Raymond Fleming was appointed acting head of the Bureau. Meanwhile the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff agreed to reassign General Finch from the Bureau.

Despite its limited victory over General Cramer in early 1950, the Air Force remained disenchanted with the slow progress of the Air Guard. CONAC's authority over it was still essentially restricted to training supervision and annual inspections. Although all 514 units envisaged in the original plans for the postwar Air Guard had been initially formed by mid 1949, their ability to perform operational missions was another matter. CONAC inspectors had conducted operational readiness tests (ORT's) of many Air Guard units during their annual summer encampments in 1949. This had been the first year that large numbers of these units had trained together in their wing organizations. The results of the ORT's were not encouraging. National Guard officials complained that "the inspections which have been made by officers of the Air Force . . . [who] are finding that a number of our units are unsatisfactory because of the fact that adequate facilities have not been provided." They argued, with justification, that providing funds for the purchase or improvement of these facilities was the responsibility of the federal government, not the individual
units. Adequate funding for this purpose had not been forthcoming.

Consequently, the Air Force had been forced to readjust some of these unsatisfactory ratings. However, inadequate facilities were evidently only part of a larger problem. Based upon the 1949 inspections, CONAC had estimated that, on the average, it would take Air Guard fighter units nearly three months of intensive post-mobilization training to attain full operational readiness. Paradoxically, the Air Guard's future potential as an M-Day air defense force was further endangered by its planned conversion to more modern aircraft. The Air Force intended to equip all Air Guard fighter units with jets. It assumed that only younger pilots could successfully fly jets in combat. However, the Air Guard's pilot force was almost entirely composed of World War II combat veterans. According to the Guard Bureau's own estimates in 1950, it needed six hundred to eight hundred new pilots annually to meet future Air Force requirements. Yet, on the eve of the Korean War, it was getting practically none at all.

The financially strapped Air Force was unable to provide the Air Guard with adequate spaces in its pilot training programs. The situation in the Guard's AC&W squadrons was even worse. The Air Force recognized that those units had mostly obsolete equipment and inadequate training aids. Only a few of the units had been able to obtain long range radar sets. The remainder had to settle with lightweight, portable Army and Navy hand-me-downs probably only suitable for local ground control intercept operations. It was even more difficult to obtain adequate numbers of skilled personnel to man these unglamorous radar
units. Consequently the states were showing some reluctance to participate in the AC&W unit program.\textsuperscript{112}

The Soviet Union's explosion of an atomic bomb in 1949 radically changed Air Force thinking about air defense.\textsuperscript{113} The Air Staff argued that the United States faced a potential disaster if it continued to rely on Air Guard fighter units for 70 percent of its interceptor resources. Previous air defense plans had assumed that Air Guard units would have several months of post mobilization training to bring themselves up to full operational capability in the event of a national emergency. This assumption was no longer valid now that the United States faced the catastrophic possibility of a surprise Soviet atomic attack. Lieutenant General Ennis C. Whitehead, CONAC's commander, supported this Air Staff assessment in February 1950. He believed "that the atomic explosion in Russia ... altered the problem [i.e., air defense] from an M-Day [one] to one of H-Hour D-Day."\textsuperscript{114}

The Air Force recognized that active air defense of the United States was far from a reality in early 1950. Top ranking officers, including Generals Vandenberg and Whitehead, had no confidence in the Air Guard's ability to perform its assigned air defense mission. Studies at CONAC and Air Force headquarters had concluded that the Air Guard's system of dual state-federal control was ineffective. Air Force officers were defensive about Air Guard charges that many of the Guard's problems were an outgrowth of the active duty establishment's shortcomings in handling reserve programs. Some feared that
Air Force rebuts "would merely add fuel to the contentious spirit already rife between the Guard people and ourselves."115

Early in January 1950, a meeting was held in the offices of General Muir S. Fairchild, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, to discuss this situation. Representatives were present from CONAC and the Air Staff. Air Guard officials were excluded. The participants agreed that the United States could no longer jeopardize the nation's safety by continuing to rely on the Air Guard as its primary air defense force. The Guard's archaic command arrangements, obsolete aircraft, aging pilots, and low operational readiness ratings indicated to the conferees that it was ill-suited to achieve the high degree of readiness planned for it. They suggested switching the Air Guard to less critical missions. Alternate possibilities discussed for the Air Guard included ground support, troop carrier, transport and liaison.116

General Vandenberg approved these suggestions and forwarded them to Secretary of the Air Force Symington on February 13, 1950. His memo emphasized that:117

the Air National Guard cannot perform a D-Day air defense mission because its personnel cannot leave their civilian jobs for a sufficient number of days to prepare themselves and their units to go instantly into combat. In addition the Air National Guard is not deployed and because of dependence of its personnel upon civilian jobs in specific localities cannot be employed at all times in those positions best suited to meet the potential attack.

Consequently, Vandenberg suggested that Symington should discuss with the Secretary of Defense the necessity of switching the Air Guard to a less critical mission. Recognizing the dangerous political ramifications of this idea, Vandenberg noted that Congress and the public
were then "under the erroneous impression that our National Guard units are a potent force . . . and would be capable of employment to defend the nation against a sudden atomic attack." He implied that this false picture of the Air Guard's operational capabilities could be a formidable barrier to Air Force intentions to switch it to a less demanding role.

Although Secretary Symington concurred with Vandenberg's assessment of the Air Guard, he was evidently unable to gain the approval of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to change its mission. Johnson had been instructed to hold down the defense budget by President Truman. In those pre-Korean War circumstances, it was unlikely that he would have approved a major policy innovation that could have vastly increased spending for continental air defense. Modifying the Air Guard's formal M-Day mission assignment as a fighter-interceptor force meant that the Defense Department would have had to either channel vast new resources into the creation of a viable regular Air Force interceptor force or publicly downgrade the Soviet atomic threat. Given the military assessments prevalent at that time and the growing American public preoccupation with the communist threat, the latter policy option must have been politically unpalatable. Moreover, the National Guard was certain to vigorously resist any effort to reduce its air component to the status of a lower priority Air Force auxilliary. The Air Guard was led by officers who were, for the most part, combat veterans of World War II. They had little enthusiasm for non-combat roles and aircraft. The more politically astute among them must have recognized that the Air Guard's claim to
Air Force resources would certainly decrease with any significant reduction in the importance of its assigned missions. Maintenance of the Air Guard's position as the Air Force's first line combat reserve force meant that it would continue to enjoy priority over the Air Force Reserve. Any diminution of this status would probably have been seen by Air Guardsmen as the beginning of another Air Force attempt to eliminate the Guard. Finally, the Korean War must have killed the proposal altogether. The Air Force was compelled to rely upon its reserve components to provide the bulk of the trained manpower needed to rapidly expand it from a prewar strength of 411,277 to 788,881 within a year of the war's outbreak. Some 45,000 of those personnel would be Air Guardsmen. 120

The proposal to strip the Air Guard of its M-Day mission climax ed the troubled postwar phase of its relationship with the Air Force. The effort to build the Air Guard into a credible first line reserve component of the Air Force had floundered badly. Although considerable progress had been made in creating an organization where none had existed before, the Air Guard was still little more than a glorified flying club in 1950. It lacked any significant, immediate combat capability and was still seen as an organizational anomaly by the active duty establishment. The confusion and delay encountered by the Air Force in preparing the Air Guard for active service during the Korean War confirmed the impression of its operational capabilities which had been noted by CONAC during the 1949 ORT's.

A variety of circumstances had contributed to the Air Guard's poor initial showing. The most obvious problem confronting it had
been the lack of adequate resources. The austere postwar defense budgets of the Truman administration were considered woefully inadequate to fill even the requirements of the active duty military services. Despite its announced determination to rely heavily on the reserve programs of the military services, the administration did not provide either the budgets or the sources of trained military manpower that would have given substance to that particular policy objective. Surplus equipment, supplies, and aircraft also failed to bridge the gap between inadequate budgets and the Air Guard's operational requirements. Much of the surplus it acquired had required extensive reconditioning. Its propeller-driven tactical aircraft were rapidly approaching obsolescence in the jet age and its airfields required extensive construction to make their facilities suitable for military operations. The shortage of resources drastically slowed the pace of the Air Guard's initial development and was at least partially responsible for its lack of a significant operational capability prior to the Korean War.

Inadequate resources, however, were not the most significant factors contributing to the initial failure of the Air Guard to develop into an effective combat reserve force. Rather, the inability of the parties involved to overcome the host of problems associated with the Air Guard's anomalous position as a state-controlled military force with an almost entirely federal mission lay at the heart of its difficulties. The AAF had been opposed to the creation of a dual component reserve system featuring the Air Guard. Although forced to accept it due to political considerations, the AAF, and later the
Air Force, had struggled fruitlessly during the 1946-50 period to
gain command of Air Guard units. The logic and experience of pro-
fessional Air Force officers convinced them that this was necessary
because the requirements of modern aerial warfare would no longer
safely permit an extensive period of post mobilization training to
bring reserve combat units up to full operational readiness. None-
theless, domestic political considerations and austere postwar
defense budgets compelled the Air Force to rely upon the Air Guard,
a military reserve component it could not completely control in peace-
time, to provide the bulk of its tactical fighter capability. Almost
every effort of the Air Force to obtain greater authority over the
Air Guard had been frustrated by the National Guard's politically
potent allies in Congress, the states, and the National Guard Associ-
ation. The resulting confrontations had created a climate of ani-
mosity which further delayed resolution of the problems that plagued
the Air Force-Air Guard relationship.

Rather than direct command of its primary combat reserve force
to properly prepare it for its wartime role, the Air Force had been
compelled to settle for a complex, inefficient, and confusing set of
administrative arrangements. Logistical and administrative matters
were handled through the Guard Bureau. Training supervision and annual
inspections were conducted first by ADC and then CONAC, acting through
their numbered Air Forces and air instructors assigned to individual
Air Guard units. Command authority remained firmly lodged with the
state governors and their military representatives, the adjutants
general. Air Guard training was not standardized across the various
states according to rigorous Air Force standards. Ineffective commanders could not be removed by the Air Force. Yet, in a national emergency, the Air Force would suddenly find itself responsible for the operational performance of these units. Air Force officers had experienced continual frustration in dealing with this basically archaic military command system. Their prevailing negative opinion of the Air Guard reflected the historic anti-militia bias of American professional soldiers. They argued that it must be divorced from the "weed roots" of local politics and made a purely federal reserve organization before it could become a viable military program.

However, the Air Force itself had to shoulder a considerable portion of the blame for the Air Guard's inadequate development prior to the Korean War. Neither of its two reserve programs had received the attention and support they required. The prevailing attitude toward the reserves was at best apathetic and indifferent. General Whitehead put the matter in sharp focus in a memo to General Vandenberg on December 13, 1950. Faced with an impending reorganization to CONAC which would have a significant impact on the air reserve forces, Whitehead wanted to bring certain problems effecting those programs to Vandenberg's attention. Based upon his eighteen months of service as CONAC's commander, he wrote:

Basically, the weaknesses of our Reserve Forces programs stem from a planning deficiency which still has not been corrected. We do not have a proper Reserve Forces Troop Basis. We do not have a USAF mobilization plan... We do not know our requirements... This deficiency is, in my best judgement, the one factor which has contributed most to the creation of Reserve Forces problems and difficulties.
Whitehead noted that Air Force supervision of existing reserve programs had been inadequate. Neither proper organizational structures nor adequate resources had been devoted to that complex task. Turning specifically to the Air Guard, Whitehead contended that "we have permitted our lack of direct control to act as an excuse for insufficient effort." He recognized that "acceptance of the present organizational status of the ANG [i.e., its status as a state-commanded reserve of the Air Force] appears inescapable." Interjecting a note of pragmatism and political realism that had seldom characterized confidential Air Force appraisals of the Air Guard, Whitehead noted that this fact of life must be recognized and accepted. The Air Force had to get the job done within the existing framework of the Air Guard's anomalous status. He also charged that the Air Staff's major divisions were inadequately aware of reserve problems and inclined to shrug off their responsibilities in that area. The resultant neglect and poor planning had harmed the development of viable reserve programs prior to the Korean War. He urged Vandenberg not to overlook the political significance of well managed reserve programs. "The Reserve Forces," Whitehead urged, "can and should be the best public relations medium available to the Air Force. . . . To date we have not taken advantage of this fact and our program has been such as to hurt the Air Force." Whitehead argued that the best interests of the Air Force could no longer permit this situation to continue. Instead, it must develop realistic and properly administered reserve programs based upon sound military requirements. The Air Force must spend the money
necessary and revise its organizational structure to do this. Furthermore, every member of the regular establishment had to be made aware of the importance of the reserves and the necessity to create a team which included them. Reservists must also be made to understand this. Whitehead concluded his memo on a note of deep personal concern for the future of the Air Force if the problems he had presented were not constructively addressed.\(^{127}\)

Whitehead's analysis of the situation was sound. His suggestions were prophetic. The Air Force, although professional military logic was on its side, had achieved very little success in its efforts to assert command authority over the peacetime Air Guard. Concentration on the federalization issue had generated enormous hostility and political opposition. Consequently this had obscured the need to recognize the realities of American politics and proceed with pragmatic solutions to problems facing the Air Guard. Some of the more astute regular officers had recognized this fact. They also knew that the Air Force had used the Air Guard's problems and anomalous status as an excuse for inattention and poor planning.

Because of inadequate funding, poor planning and the inconclusive federalization struggle, the Air Guard was little better than a collection of glamorous private flying clubs on the eve of the Korean War. Its tactical units, although filled with veteran combat fliers and experienced NCO's, were not prepared to function on short notice as cohesive fighting teams. It would take an enormous amount of post-mobilization work to prepare them for combat operations. Nevertheless Air Guardsmen were justifiably proud of their
accomplishment in creating an organization from scratch since the end of World War II. Only a few of them were willing to concede that the Air Guard was in no condition to play its intended M-Day role. Most professional Air Force officers, hostile to the concept of a separate Air Guard from the beginning, were prepared to downgrade the entire organization. Their unsuccessful struggle to attain command authority over the Air Guard and its law operational capabilities seemed to confirm their skepticism. Yet, the interests of the Air Force and national security required strong air reserve programs. The Air Guard was too powerful politically to be eliminated. The Air Force, because of the debacle associated with the haphazard partial mobilization of its reserves during the Korean conflict, would be forced to recognize these realities in the early fifties and proceed with the task of building an effective Air Guard program. This pragmatism would be largely forced on the regular establishment by civilian defense officials as well as Air Guardsmen and their political allies.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER TWO


Howe, "Bombsight," p. 22.


Ibid., pp. 1-5.

Ibid., pp. 1-5.


Letter, Col. Gerald C. Ward, USAF (Ret.) to author, 17 March 1978, pp. 1-2. Col. Ward, a regular Air Force officer, was assigned to the National Guard Bureau during the 1945-1948 period. His job was to help Air Guard units obtain flying facilities in each of the states. Hereafter cited as Ward, Letter to author.


Memo, Assistant Secretary of War for Air To the Secretary of War, 15 June 1946, Subj: "National Guard Airport Facilities," Spaatz Papers, File Asst. Sec. of War for Air, Box 256, LOC.

Ibid.

McMullen, ADC Study No. 38, p. 17.


McMullen, ADC Study No. 38, pp. 1-5.


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On June 25, 1950, heavily armed North Korean troops invaded South Korea and quickly overwhelmed its poorly prepared armed forces. The North Korean attack caught the United States government by surprise. Assuming that the invasion was Soviet-inspired and convinced that a failure to respond militarily would encourage future communist aggression, President Truman ordered intervention by American air, naval and land forces in the Far East. He rejected atomic retaliation because of the risk of inciting nuclear war with the Soviet Union and the danger of using up America’s small store of such weapons against a minor power. However, the limited U.S. conventional response to North Korean aggression proved hazardous because of the weakened condition of its armed forces. Moreover, it proved extremely frustrating to U.S. military commanders in the field and deeply disturbing to the nation itself since it was so at variance with the familiar total war strategy that had characterized American participation in both of the twentieth century’s world conflicts.¹

The outbreak of armed hostilities on the Korean peninsula in June 1950 found America’s armed forces poorly prepared for combat. U.S. ground troops in nearby Japan proved to be neither physically
nor psychologically prepared for the rigors of field service. Like nearly all U.S. Army formations in mid 1950, their units were under-strength. Infantry regiments consisted of only two rather than the standard three battalions. Their combat skills and even some of their equipment was inferior to that of the North Koreans. American 75-MM bazooka rockets bounced harmlessly off the sides of Soviet-made T-34 tanks manned by the North Koreans. American heavy tanks had to be brought from the continental U.S. because General MacArthur's occupation force in Japan had been restricted to light tanks. Poor field communications and inadequate lower level leadership forced senior officers to play the roles of lieutenants and sergeants. Major General William F. Dean, commander of the 24th Division, was captured by the enemy while trying to make his way back into his own lines. Only overwhelming American air and naval power prevented its ground troops from being completely ejected from the Korean peninsula in the summer of 1950.²

With its Army hard pressed to prevent the North Koreans from driving it into the sea, the U.S. was forced to resort to a partial reserve mobilization. Ultimately, the Army mobilized 2,834,000 men and 20 divisions. Of those mobilized, National Guardsmen numbered 138,600 while some 244,300 were Army Reservists. The rest were volunteers and draftees.³ The Air Force also found itself desperately short of trained manpower and organized units in mid 1950. Budget restrictions mandated by the Truman administration had limited its active duty strength to just over 400,000. This only allowed it to man forty-eight combat air groups, well below its post World War II minimum
goal of seventy groups. The Korean War shattered the curb on Air Force expansion. Within a year after the North Korean attack, Air Force strength had soared from 411,277 to 788,381. It reached a wartime peak of approximately 977,500 by June 30, 1953. Initially, the vast majority of this increased strength was provided by members of its air reserve components who either volunteered or were recalled to active duty. For example, in April 1951, 72 percent of the officers in the Far East Air Force (FEAF), the major air command directly responsible for prosecuting the war, were reservists. In Korea itself, a Fifth Air Force study during the war revealed that approximately 80 percent of its personnel were recalled Air Guardsmen and Air Force Reservists. After the regulars had helped to stymie the initial North Korean thrust, the major burden of the Air Force's global expansion and combat in the Far East fell upon its poorly prepared reserve components.4

Korea was the Air Guard's first war. Sixty-six of its ninety-two tactical flying squadrons were called to active duty. Numerous ground support and technical units were also mobilized. Some 45,000 Air Guardsmen, approximately 80 percent of its total strength, saw active duty from 1950 through 1953. Air Guard units and individuals performed a variety of crucial missions for the Air Force. Two fighter-wings were sent to the Far East and compiled excellent combat records there. Three other fighter wings were assigned to strengthen NATO air power in Europe against the threat of a Soviet attack. One fighter wing trained jet air crews for the Air Force's rapidly-expanding tactical flying unit inventory. The sixteen remaining
activated wings augmented Tactical Air Command (TAC), Strategic Air Command (SAC), and the Air Defense Command (ADC) in the continental United States. Air Guardmen and their supporters were convinced that their performance during the Korean War vindicated their organization's existence. They argued that it won the respect of the active duty establishment and resulted, for the first time, in the creation of a viable working relationship between the Air Force and Air Guard. According to this interpretation, Korea set the stage for the Air Guard's subsequent development as a true first line combat reserve component of the Air Force.5

Korea, without a doubt, marked a crucial turning point in the Air Guard's short history. Its authorized troop strength, limited by prewar budgets to 44,728, was increased to a postwar goal of approximately 67,000. Air Guard appropriations grew dramatically after the war, climbing from $106 million in FY '53 to $223.44 million in FY '60. High level Air Force attention to the Air Guard, as well as the Air Force Reserve, was dramatically increased. Strenuous efforts were made to insure that the composition and strength of both air reserve programs were tied directly to the actual requirements of Air Force war plans. Reservists and Air Guardmen were given greater opportunity to effectively influence the planning process. Aircraft and equipment were upgraded. Air Guard units began to participate in exercises with the active duty armed services. In 1954, Air Guard flying units began to actively augment the regular Air Force's air defense alert program on a continuing basis. A number of selected ANG fighter-interceptor squadrons provided aircraft and aircrews on air defense
runway alert. The Korean War era precipitated a reversal of the neglect and hostility that had marred Air Force-Air Guard relations during the 1946-1950 period. 6

Despite the rejuvenation of the Air Guard program associated with the Korean War, there was little direct contemporary evidence to suggest that its active duty performance during the Korean War actually had any significant impact upon the willingness of the professional Air Force establishment to allocate it additional missions and resources. Most Air Force officers, including members of the Air Staff remained, at best, indifferent to the Air Guard. Contrary to interpretations popular with Guardmen, the most crucial factors contributing to the post-Korean War emergence of the ANG as a viable reserve component appear to have been domestic politics and defense budget constraints rather than proven military performance. 7 Civilian officials within the executive branch of the federal government as well as Congressmen, representatives of the reserve associations and individual reservists were far more important initially than professional Air Force officers in redirecting the course of the Air Guard. These groups were impressed by the enormous problems, confusion, and inequities surrounding the haphazard mobilization of reserve forces during the Korean War. The glaring deficiencies revealed by that mobilization compelled Congress, DOD, and the individual military departments to institute a series of reforms intended to reinvigorate America's entire military reserve system. These reforms, taken in conjunction with the Eisenhower administration's determination to hold down the cost of conventional military capabilities through a heavy
reliance on reserve forces, were crucial to the Air Guard's post-Korean War emergence as an increasingly viable reserve program. The professional Air Force, to its credit, responded constructively during and after the Korean War to these pressures for better reserve programs. Nevertheless, it was compelled to do this against some of its own most deeply-held biases and professional judgements.

Mobilizations in 1950 and 1951 revealed a host of problems in the existing air reserve structure. Perhaps the most basic of these was the unrealistic nature of the concepts and assumptions underpinning existing reserve programs. They had been designed for another protracted World War II-style mobilization. The Air Guard was intended to be an M-Day force of tactical flying units able to augment the active duty establishment after a relatively short period of post-mobilization training. The Air Force and the Air Guard, according to this scenario, would, if given sufficient strategic warning, absorb the initial shock of an air attack. Meanwhile, the Air Force Reserve and the rest of the nation would mobilize for total war. Of course, neither of the air reserve components had been capable of playing these unrealistic roles. Neither had ever received the funding, planning, and equipment support necessary to make those grandiose roles a reality during the immediate years following V-J Day. Soviet explosion of an atomic device in 1949 had seriously challenged the assumptions behind the Air Guard's M-Day air defense role within the continental United States. Moreover, the limited war faced by American defense planners in June 1950 was far different than anything they had anticipated. Further complicating matters, they feared that the
North Korean attack might actually be feint designed to draw our attention and strength away from a military conflict with the Soviet Union in Europe. The actual war that reservists were called upon to fight was a so-called "police action" in an obscure corner of Asia. It involved a partial, rather than the expected total mobilization. Consequently, the call-ups of the air reserve components were hastily conceived and poorly executed. The Air Force was compelled to draw upon its reservists because they were the only readily available source of trained or, at least, partially trained manpower. Reservists were used, in effect, as a temporary solution to the Air Force's urgent requirements for a rapidly-expanded active duty force. They fought much of the war in Korea and met other vital operational commitments while the bulk of the career establishment devoted itself to an enormous expansion.8

The Air Force was clearly unprepared for a large mobilization in 1950. It lacked the facilities needed to train large numbers of additional personnel. Headquarters USAF had not completed work on its first detailed mobilization plan. The Air Staff was in the process of developing this document, AF MOP 2-51, when the Korean War began. Work on it was temporarily suspended and the plan was not actually completed until the following April. Complicating matters even further, the fluid military situation in the Far East and continued uncertainty about Soviet intentions periodically reshaped top national security policy directives concerning the authorized manpower and unit ceilings of the active duty armed forces. Consequently, the Air Force undertook
a series of hastily improvised expedients intended to meet its dramatically growing manpower requirements.9

Shortly after the war began, President Truman authorized the Air Force to augment its FY '51 manpower ceiling of 416,000 by an additional 50,000 personnel. On July 7, it launched a voluntary recall of individual reservists. This was designed to meet the immediate need of FEAF for individual replacement "fillers" and to augment those organizations in the U.S. supporting the war in Korea. Top Air Force officials had yet to identify a requirement to mobilize ANG units. They, as well as their Army counterparts, reportedly spurned an urgent request from National Guard officials shortly after the outbreak of hostilities for total mobilization of the Guard. Guardsmen were told at that time that Korea was going to be strictly a regular service show. However, by July 19, it had become apparent that the Air Force would have to involuntarily recall reservists to attain rapidly its initial augmentation goal.10

The first major permanent Air Force expansion was not authorized by Congress and the President until September 1950. At that time, the Air Force was given authority to expand its flying organization from forty-eight to fifty-eight wings. Because of this expansion, the Air Force finally called upon the Air Guard. Five Air Guard wings were alerted in early September for mobilization the following month. On October 10, these five wings plus fifteen of their fighter squadrons and assorted support units were ordered to active-duty with TAC. This limited mobilization was viewed as only a temporary expedient. General Nathan Twining, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, emphasized
this point in a memo to the Secretary of the Air Force late in October. He wrote that "present planning indicates that we can phase out the first of our Air National Guard units by next April [i.e., 1951]." Further underscoring this point, involuntary recalls of reserve airmen were stopped by October 24 because of better than expected recruiting for the active duty establishment. The Air Force was apparently satisfied that it could meet its manpower requirements without a long-term mobilization of the Air Guard or the rest of the voluntary (i.e., non-pay) air reserve.

Events in the Far East soon shattered these assumptions. Massive Chinese communist forces entered the Korean War, quickly reversing the apparent tide of early allied victory. President Truman responded with a declaration of national emergency on December 16, 1950. He authorized expansion of the total U.S. military strength to 3.5 million by June 30, 1951. The Air Force, which had already been given authority to proceed with a second major expansion to sixty-eight flying wings and 651,000 personnel, now geared itself to a ninety-five wing program. This dramatic buildup was scheduled to raise its active duty manpower from approximately 539,000 in mid-December 1950 to a planned ceiling of 1,061,000 no later than June 30, 1952.

At this point, CONAC was finally permitted to use Air Guard units to strengthen U.S. air defenses. Responsible for this mission until ADC was re-established as a separate major air command on January 1, 1951, CONAC possessed only twenty-three regular Air Force fighter-interceptor squadrons in June 1950. Sensitive to the weakness of America's air defenses, CONAC had, on July 20, 1950, requested
mobilization of twenty Air Guard fighter squadrons to strengthen its air defense resources. However, Headquarters USAF rejected CONAC's proposal at that time because it wanted to assign newly-formed regular Air Force fighter squadrons to the air defense mission as soon as they became available. In September, CONAC proposed that it be given authority to federalize Air Guard units in the event of an emergency. USAF again refused. The Secretary of the Air Force wanted to retain that authority in his own hands. In November and early December, CONAC reiterated its request that certain Air Guard units be mobilized for air defense duty. Its repeated requests were not approved until the President's declaration of a national emergency.

On December 15, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approved a request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to augment U.S. air defense forces by calling certain Air Guard units into federal service. Consequently, one AC&W group, three AC&W squadrons, and a radar calibration detachment were mobilized on January 8, 1951. They were joined the following month by five more Air Guard wings including eighteen fighter squadrons and attached support units. All of these units, with the exception of one wing and three fighter squadrons which were assigned to train Air Force jet aircrews, joined ADC.14 Their mobilization was still apparently seen as only a temporary expedient.

According to one official ADC history, the federalized Air Guard units would "buy time" until additional regular Air Force squadrons could take their places.15

However, ad hoc, short-term mobilizations of Air Guard units were finally abandoned by the Air Force because of President Truman's
declaration of national emergency. Between December 16, 1950 and January 11, 1951, the Air Staff developed a manning policy and general reserve call-up procedures. Following Department of Defense approval of its proposed mobilization plan, the Secretary of the Air Force approved its implementation in mid January 1951. Air Guardsmen and Air Force Reservists totalling 150,000 were to be ordered to active duty beginning on March 1. Involuntary recalls of reserve airmen were resumed. Recruiting was intensified. The governors of the affected states were notified that twelve more Air Guard wings, thirty-three flying squadrons as well as a number of support and technical service units were to be ordered to active duty in March and April. The bulk of these were distributed to major air commands within the continental United States. SAC initially received six Air Guard wings and seventeen flying squadrons. Four of these wings and their flying squadrons—all tactical fighter units—were eventually reassigned to TAC. Three wings and six flying squadrons went to ADC. Three wings and ten flying squadrons were allocated directly to TAC. Five wings and eighteen fighter squadrons remained under the control of the states. The Air Force anticipated that they all would eventually be mobilized and assigned to ADC. However, they were never called to active duty.16

Air Guard unit mobilizations for the Korean War were completed during FY '52 when an additional eight AC&W squadrons and five tow target flights were called to active duty. The first ANG units called into federal service had been liable for twenty-one months of service under the provisions of PL 599 enacted by the 61st Congress on
June 30, 1950. This period of service was later extended to twenty-four months by PL 51 enacted by the 82nd Congress. According to the NGB, 45,594 Air Guardsmen entered federal service during the Korean War. This represented approximately 80 percent of the Air Guard's total strength.17

Mobilization of military reserve forces during the Korean War dramatized the crucial deficiencies that had plagued these programs since the end of World War II and created an enormous political controversy within the United States. The air reserve programs, including the Air Guard, were deeply involved in the resulting uproar. Air Guard tactical units required from three to six months of intensive post-mobilization reorganization, re-equipment, and retraining before the Air Force considered them ready to assume operational commitments. The exact length of time varied with an individual unit's initial personnel and training status upon mobilization as well as whether it had to convert to new aircraft. Many Air Guardsmen and Air Force Reservists had assumed that they would never be called into active military service again in any contingency short of a massive national mobilization similar to World War II. Korea did not fit that assumption. The Air Force intensified reservists' anxieties with its continually shifting recall quotas and policies. These policies seemed to change on a day-to-day basis. One Air Staff officer, dismayed at the apparently haphazard order in which Air Guard flying units had been mobilized, characterized the entire process as "rather mystifying."18
Organized reserve units were frequently broken up to fill the regular establishment's expanding manpower requirements. Although ANG flying units technically escaped this fate, they frequently found their ranks depleted by transfers of pilots and other key personnel to regular Air Force units. To cite an extreme example, the 137th Fighter Bomber Wing had experienced a 90 percent personnel turnover when it departed for Europe in May 1952 following eighteen months of active duty training in the United States. One hundred thirteen Air Guard support units were inactivated after their entry into federal service. Unmobilized Air Guardsmen and reservists, facing possible recall to active duty, were often denied civilian employment or promotion opportunities. Some even lost their jobs because of their uncertain military status.19

Major General Winston P. Wilson, then a colonel, represented the NGB's Air Force Division at Air Staff meetings where Air Guard units were allotted to the various major air commands during the Korean War. Wilson, a career Air Guardsman whose active affiliation with National Guard aviation had begun in 1929, castigated the whole process of dividing up the Air Guard as the "great cutting up of the pie as the Air Force called it."20 Like other Air Guardsmen, he could see no rationality to the process whereby existing organizations above the squadron level were split apart and distributed to TAC, SAC, and ADC. NGAUS officials, worried by Air Force efforts to recruit individual Guardsmen and its reluctance to mobilize any Air Guard units during the war's early months, were even harsher in their criticisms. They bitterly denounced what they saw as another attempt by
the regulars to destroy their organization. Some charged publicly that the Air Force, as well as the other military services, were cannibalizing reserve and National Guard units of key personnel to speed the promotions of regular officers.²¹

DOD and the individual armed services denied these charges. Their basic position was that mobilization policies were based upon the need to provide trained individual replacements for hard-pressed American forces in the Far East. Retention of unit integrity and equity for World War II combat veterans were not pressing considerations in that desperate context. Brigadier General Harlan C. Parks, Director of Personnel and Planning at Headquarters USAF, emphasized another reason for the reluctance of the active duty establishment to mobilize its organized reserve units during the early stages of the Korean conflict. Trying to counter public criticism of the Air Force's mobilization policies, he told the 1951 conference of the National Guard Association:²²

We did not know whether we were facing the so-called police action in Korea or whether we were on the brink of the big adventure [i.e., war with the Soviet Union].

Regardless of the respective merits of these positions, the controversies and problems associated with reserve mobilizations early in the Korean War helped create a domestic political climate receptive to fundamental changes in America's military reserve policies.

Official Air Force histories extensively documented the numerous problems encountered by newly mobilized Air Guard units in 1950-1951. Integration of these units into the active establishment was a difficult and time-consuming process. The basic organizational structure
of Air Guard wings was different from their active duty Air Force counterparts. The latter were organized in what was known as a combat-wing structure. It featured a highly-centralized support unit operation at the wing headquarters level. Because most Air Guard flying units had operated from municipal airports far removed from their parent wings, they had been organized in a structure that featured tactical and support groups at each operational location. Although the Secretary of the Air Force had approved a suggestion in 1948 that the Air Guard should adopt the standard Air Force combat-wing structure to speed their mobilization in the event of an emergency, financial and operational constraints had delayed implementation of his directive. The NGB and some adjutant generals had been opposed to the reorganization. They felt that the combat-wing plan did not take into account the realities of their widely dispersed state air units. The Korean War quickly removed these constraints on Air Guard reorganization.23

All Air Guard tactical wings were converted to a modified combat-wing structure by November 1, 1950. This modified structure took into account the decentralized operating locations of most Air Guard flying units under state control. Conversion to the new organizational structure increased the total authorized Air Guard strength from approximately 49,500 to a wartime goal of approximately 78,000. All units were permitted to recruit to full strength under this new table of organization and equipment (TO&E). Authorized air technician spaces were increased. Finally, authorized flying training
was increased from 110 to 125 hours per year for all tactical pilots under the conversion plan approved by the Air Staff in September 1950.²⁴

A host of other problems, the legacy of postwar neglect and poor planning, plagued the mobilization of Air Guard units. Hard pressed to provide air support for allied troops in Korea, the Air Force had stripped ANG units of 296 propeller-driven F-51 fighters in the summer of 1950. Consequently some units reported for active duty with severe shortages of tactical aircraft. Others lost their aircraft during their initial active duty training cycles when they transitioned to jet fighters. Many of the Air Guard's twelve light bomb squadrons were switched to other aircraft types and missions. Extensive quantities of equipment and supplies were taken from Air Guard inventories to meet the requirements of the active duty Air Force early in the year. Uniforms were in critically short supply. The Air Guard's internal system of unit supply accounting differed from the Air Force's and had to be changed upon mobilization.²⁵

Air Guard units also suffered from serious personnel problems. Budget restrictions had limited their actual manning to approximately 80 percent of full TO+E authorizations. Large numbers of personnel were eligible for active duty deferments. Some units lost up to 10 percent of their people because of family hardship, medical, or other deferments. The gaps caused by these conditions had to be filled by recruiting non-prior service youths and assigning individual fillers from the Air Force Reserve. The Air Guard's system for classifying the job specialties and skill levels of its personnel did not coincide
with the Air Force's and had to be changed. The actual job skills and proficiency ratings of many Air Guardsmen and Reservists frequently failed to correspond to those shown in their records. Many of those ratings had either been simply carried over from World War II or arbitrarily awarded by individual Air Guard units. Consequently, reclassification boards had to be established to award skill ratings on the basis of actual ability. Extensive reassignment and retraining was necessary within individual units because of these deficiencies in the personnel classification system as well as the changes in the TO+E associated with adoption of the combat-wing structure. Most of this retraining was accomplished within individual units. These problems were exacerbated by frequent transfers of key Air Guard unit personnel to assignments in higher Air Force headquarters or other tactical units.

Flying proficiency and aircraft maintenance were below Air Force standards. Flying safety, inadequate gunnery and low bombing proficiency were the most significant initial problems delaying full operational readiness of Air Guard aircrews. The Air Guard's extremely limited access to bombing and gunnery ranges prior to mobilization accounted for many of the problems in the latter areas. Maintenance was another problem. Spare parts for the Air Guard's P-51's and P-47's were in extremely short supply. Moreover, premobilization Air Force inspections within at least one of CONAC's numberers air forces had revealed that most Air Guard aircraft maintenance at the unit level was of an unknown standard. The resulting low aircraft in-commission rates slowed badly needed flying training programs.
Air Guard tactical flying units mobilized during the Korean War fell far short of the combat-ready M-Day force goal originally established for them in 1945. Units mobilized in October 1950 underwent an initial ninety-day period of intensive reorganization, re-equipping, personnel augmentation and training with TAC at regular Air Force bases prior to becoming eligible for transfer to actual operational assignments. Some fighter units, prior to the completion of this initial training period, were re-equipped with jet aircraft and placed upon a second ninety-day training cycle. Some others simply had not progressed far enough in their training to be reassigned. Not surprisingly, TAC's overall impression of its first batch of mobilized ANG units was extremely poor. They were demeaningly characterized as "Sunday Soldiers" by personnel at TAC Headquarters, who had little faith in their ability to develop into effective combat organizations. 28

The first Air Guard unit assigned to the Far East, the 136th Fighter Bomber Wing, did not begin arriving in Japan until May 18, 1951. After an intensive period of advanced training with pilots from the regular Air Force's 27th Fighter Escort Wing, the 136th's pilots saw their first combat action on May 24. This was over seven months after the wing had been called to active duty. The only other Air Guard organization to see combat in Korea as a unit, the 116th Fighter Bomber Wing, arrived in the Far East in July 1951. Like the 136th, the 116th had been mobilized the previous October. Both wings had originally been alerted for transfer to Europe only to have their assignments changed to FEAF at the last moment. 29
Contrary to Air Force expectations, experience, not youth, proved to be the decisive factor determining the effectiveness of jet fighter pilots in Korea. Older pilots, drawing on their World War II combat experience, scored a disproportionate number of Mig kills. Air Guard pilots, almost all of them World War II combat veterans, performed extremely well in Korea. Years later, Brigadier General Paul E. Hoover, Ohio Assistant Adjutant General for Air, discussed the importance of this experience and maturity. Reflecting on his own combat service in Korea as an Air Guardsman assigned to the regular Air Force's 49th Fighter-Bomber Squadron, he emphasized that:

When we first got to Korea, we had a lot of youngsters, Air Force types that had been put through [pilot] training rather rapidly and they were losing quite a few. Then, as the reservists and the Air Guard got there, the average age climbed quite a bit. With the experience of these individuals, our loss rate decreased rapidly. We didn't make silly mistakes like making three or four passes on the same target and we plotted our entries into target areas more efficiently than they did in the early days. They were young and not aware of what could happen. Many of us that got over there came from that World War II experience and we applied some of that experience in Korea. It reduced our losses considerably.

Despite their initial mobilization problems, FFEF's two Air Guard fighter wings compiled fine combat records in Korea. Although primarily based at Misawa to strengthen the air defense of northern Japan, the 116th maintained one of its three jet fighter squadrons in South Korea on a rotational basis to gain combat experience for its pilots. The 136th completed movement of its entire organization to Korea in September 1951. Although its three jet fighter squadrons participated in a variety of air operations over the entire peninsula, interdiction and close air support were their primary missions.
Both wings were relieved from federal service on July 10, 1952 following completion of their legally mandated twenty-one months of active duty. Members of the two organizations plus individual Air Guardsmen serving with other Air Force units flew some 39,530 combat sorties in Korea. They destroyed thirty-nine enemy aircraft and damaged another 149. They dropped 44,000 bombs, launched 31,000 rockets and fired over 16,000,000 rounds of .50-caliber ammunition. Attesting to their versatility, they flew virtually every type of tactical aircraft in the Air Force inventory from jet interceptors to conventionally powered medium bombers. Four Guardsmen became aerial aces. The Air Force reported 101 Air Guardsmen either killed or missing in action. They were awarded over 1,300 medals and citations. A spokesman for Headquarters USAF reported that the two operational ANG wings in FEAF had been assigned "very high combat efficiency indices and actual operations have demonstrated that they can effectively meet combat circumstances."^31

Like TAC, other major air commands in the continental U.S. had not been initially impressed with the Air Guard units assigned to them. For example, Air Guard units assigned directly to ADC in the 1951 mobilizations "didn't immediately assume an air defense capability commensurate with that of the regular Air Force squadrons [of the command]" according to one official ADC history.\(^32\) Rather, they required an intensive four-month organizational and training period after mobilization to achieve acceptable levels of operational efficiency. Only four of the fourteen squadrons mobilized to augment ADC in 1951 were initially jet equipped. Consequently, relatively few
of their pilots were checked out in these high performance aircraft. Most of their pilots were not well versed in ground control intercept procedures. Lieutenant General Ennis C. Whitehead, ADC's commander, was quite blunt about the limited capabilities of the Air Guard fighter units assigned to him. In May 1951, he asserted that:

We have found that most of the Air Guard units are not in a position to do what is expected, and the units above the squadron level [i.e., the wing headquarters] are not capable of doing their jobs.

The Air Force and the Air Guard had clearly failed to build a viable air defense augmentation force since the creation of the Air Guard in 1946.

Air Guard units assigned to SAC experienced especially difficult transitions to active duty. Four of the six Air Guard wings assigned to SAC in the spring of 1951 were fighter units. After brief service as escorts for the command's bombers, they were reassigned to TAC that summer so that their experience and training could more readily fill immediate operational requirements. Two other units, the 106th and the 111th Light Bomb Wings, remained with SAC until they returned to state control in December 1952 and January 1953 respectively. Neither wing was at all prepared for the command's extremely demanding requirements. Their aircrews had flown short range and tactically-oriented B-26's prior to entry on active duty. They had virtually no experience with either B-29's or B-36's, the aircraft they eventually received after entering federal service. The technical qualifications and general experience level of all personnel was poorly suited to the strategic bombing and reconnaissance
missions they were asked to prepare for. An official 15th Air Force History summed up the situation by noting that "by and large, the qualifications of individuals coming to duty in these two [Air Guard] units were very low."[^34]

Neither wing ever achieved fully combat-ready status prior to their return to state control. However, they did serve, in essence, as organizational cadres around which SAC built two of its permanent active duty bombardment wings. The 106th was equipped with B-29's and became a medium bomb wing. The 111th was first equipped with RB-29's and later RB-36's. It was reorganized as a strategic reconnaissance wing. Training of inexperienced Air Guard and other personnel in these SAC missions was extremely slow. It was significantly inhibited by early shortages of aircraft, spare parts, tools, and supplies. Excessive personnel turnover exacerbated the situation. Many individuals were lost either to Air Force quotas for overseas units or technical schools. Many of the aircrews as well as technical specialists were transferred into these two units from elsewhere in the Air Force. The 106th Bomb Wing, for example, experienced a personnel turnover rate of 183 percent from July through December 1951. Initial unit cohesion and the distinctive Air Guard character of these organizations were obliterated. The end result of these problems was a pronounced shortfall in operational readiness as well as official hints that Air Guardsmen and Air Force Reservists were very dissatisfied with their circumstances in these units. Many problems associated with the low morale of Guardsmen and Reservists were solved either by reassignment or other administrative action including early releases.
from active duty. Very few chose to remain in the Air Force once these units, minus aircraft, supplies, equipment and non-Guardsmen were returned to state control.35

Despite these severe problems and the questions they suggest about the Air Force's use of Air Guard resources in SAC, the Guardsmen of the 106th and 111th wings made a significant contribution to national defense during the Korean War. They helped to build functioning military organizations for SAC. When they returned to their civilian pursuits after nineteen months of federal service, these military organizations remained as integral parts of the active duty Air Force. This pattern was typical, in many respects, of that experienced by other Air Guard units. Upon their return to state control, all Air Guard units left their aircraft, equipment, and supplies with the active Air Force. In many instances, they also left behind functioning military organizations that simply acquired new unit designations and remained as part of the greatly expanded permanent active duty establishment.

The pattern of Air Guard tactical unit experiences during the Korean War had been fairly consistent. Upon mobilization, these units underwent an extensive period of reorganization, retraining, reequipment, and personnel augmentation. Some transitioned to entirely new aircraft and missions during this phase of their federal service. The duration of this initial training cycle varied from three to six months depending upon the gaining air command, the status of the Air Guard unit upon mobilization, and whether or not they had to adapt to new aircraft after they were called to active duty. Units were trained
by their gaining major air commands including TAC, ADC, and SAC after an extremely short transition to active duty under CONAC. The initial impression made by these Air Guard units upon the active duty Air Force establishment was almost uniformly poor. Air Force personnel, however, had little appreciation of the history of neglect, poor planning, and political controversy that contributed to the Air Guard's poor initial showing.

Faced with the pragmatic necessity to expand American air power rapidly in the face of shooting war in Korea and fearing the threat of a larger military conflict with the Soviets, the Air Force did a good job in preparing most ANG units to eventually take their places beside their active duty counterparts. Consequently, Air Guard units and individuals were able to make a substantial contribution to a variety of crucial operational commitments during the Korean War. These ranged from combat in the Far East to strengthening NATO air power in Europe. Stateside, Air Guard flying units augmented both SAC and ADC. Its support and technical resources augmented the Air Force's AC&W, meteorological, construction, communications, and a host of other functions. Over 80 percent of the Air Guard, totalling over 45,000 individuals, was called to duty during the war. In addition, it contributed equipment worth an estimated $500 million to the Air Force. This represented a major augmentation of the active duty establishment. The air reserve forces, including the Air Guard, bore the main initial burdens of combat and expanding Air Force operational commitments during the Korean War while the active duty establishment devoted the bulk of its energies to an enormous permanent growth in
its authorized strength. Moreover, in many instances, Guard and Reserve units formed the basic cadre around which permanent regular Air Force units were built. Their ability to augment American air power was almost entirely the result of the fortunate circumstance that the U.S. possessed a vast reservoir of trained or partially-trained individual World War II veterans. It did not reflect the inadequate efforts of the Air Force and the Truman administration to build postwar reserve programs.

The Korean War reversed the pattern of hostility and neglect that had marred the Air Guard—Air Force relationship from 1946 to 1950. Following the war, the Air Guard began to evolve into a genuine reserve component of the U.S. Air Force, leaving behind its flying club era. Its budgets, manpower and operational capabilities grew steadily throughout the remainder of the 1950's. This transformation was not a product of its military performance during the Korean War as many Air Guardsmen and their supporters believed. Rather, it was a consequence of both domestic politics and budgetary considerations. The Air Guard flourished after the Korean War because the political uproar generated by the improvised 1950-1951 mobilizations compelled DOD and the armed services to give serious attention to revitalizing their reserve programs. This external pressure found a receptive audience in a small but influential group of Air Force officers, including General Nathan F. Twining, Vice Chief of Staff, who realized that the Air Force could no longer afford to pay the political, budgetary and military costs of neglecting its air reserve
programs. Growing Air Force budgets during the 1950's and the availability of surplus aircraft provided the means to implement official policies emphasizing more effective reserve programs.

Hastily improvised partial mobilizations during the first year of the Korean War had publicly exposed the severe inadequacies of America's military reserve programs. More significantly, the individual hardships and inequities caused by these recalls had created enormous political pressures on Congress and the Truman administration. The burden of recalls to active military duty had fallen most heavily upon World War II veterans. Many of these men had not been members of organized reserve programs. They were paper reservists only. Their records reflected information which frequently had not been updated since 1945. The vast majority of these individuals never expected to see military duty again in any situation short of a total mobilization for another global war. Naturally, they bitterly resented being recalled to active duty for a limited war in an obscure corner of Asia. Their anger was intensified when they realized that, while their lives were being placed in jeopardy for a second time, draft-eligible youths who had never worn a uniform and other reservists, who had drawn drill pay for participating in organized units, remained at home. Organized reserve units were mobilized piecemeal and then frequently cannibalized to fill the manpower and equipment needs of the rapidly expanding regular military services. Virtually all of them required extensive post mobilization training and re-equipping. It was quite evident by early 1951 that America's military reserve
programs and the governmental policies which directed them were in need of a major overhaul.\textsuperscript{36}

Congress and DOD bore the brunt of public criticism generated by the badly managed reserve recalls early in the Korean War. DOD was inundated with complaints from Congressmen, reserve organizations, and thousands of individual reservists concerning the inequities and uncertainties of the recall programs. Reacting to the resulting political heat, President Truman directed Secretary of Defense Marshall to remedy these problems. On October 27, 1950, Marshall announced that a special subcommittee of his Committee on Civilian Components (CCFB) would study the whole problem of mobilizing reservists. Its objective was to work out equitable policies for a strong, long-range reserve program. The committee consisted of eight members, seven of whom were either regular or reserve officers from the various military services. It was headed by Edwin H. Burgess, Vice President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Secretary Marshall instructed the committee to study all the problems involved in using reserves to carry out the long range buildup of the armed forces even after the Korean War. He emphasized the need for policies that would also be fair to both reservists and their employers. In the meantime, Marshall had already ordered the armed forces to release all reservists and National Guardsmen who were on active duty involuntarily as soon as they could be replaced by draftees and volunteers.\textsuperscript{37}

In January 1951, Secretary Marshall announced a new series of long range reserve policies. These policies were largely the result of recommendations made by the special CCFB subcommittee. The
subcommittee had conferred with various veterans and reserve organizations as well as with the individual military department and DOD while developing its recommendations. Their primary objective was to establish a vigorous set of reserve programs which could assist the regular armed services to expand easily and quickly in the event of either a partial or total mobilization. They also sought to minimize inequities and uncertainties that had plagued reserve mobilizations since the start of the Korean War. The burden of future involuntary recalls would be shifted from the shoulders of men who had already fought in two wars. Finally, they sought to help generate broad public and political support for reserve programs. Addressing himself to the reservists and the American people, Marshall noted that:

The establishment and maintenance of an effective and dynamic reserve force will be accomplished only by the full acceptance of responsibilities by all concerned. The Military Department must provide appropriate plans and programs. The Reservist must exercise his right and meet his obligation to participate actively in those programs. Necessary support must be made available by the Congress, and the interest, approval, and cooperation of the public is a prime prerequisite to success.

Thirty-nine general policies were set forth in Marshall's announcement. According to the January 1951 Air Reserve Forces Review, their highlights included:

Each military department would have an Assistant Secretary who would have the primary responsibility for reserve component matters.

Each military department would have a military office that would serve as a focal point for supervising reserve programs and as an expeditor of staff action relative to reserve problems.
Advisory committees would be established in all military departments similar to the separate Air Staff Committees on Reserve and Air Guard policy.

The organization, administration, training, and supply of the reserve forces of the three Military Departments, except as otherwise provided by law, would be completely integrated with the similar functions for the regular services.

The strength and organization of the National Guard, both ground and air, would be assured. Whenever Congress determined that military units were needed for the national security in excess of the regular components, the National Guard would be ordered to active duty.

An assured flow of trained manpower would be supplied to the active and reserve forces through the proposed system of Universal Military Training and Service if Congress approved.

To eliminate the confusion and uncertainty that had marked the reserve mobilizations early in the Korean War, the priority and vulnerability of reservists to future recalls was specified. Each military department was directed to establish three categories of reserve programs, Ready, Standby, and Retired. The top priority for recall would go, so far as possible, to units and individuals in the Ready Reserve. They could be involuntarily recalled to active duty by either the President or the Congress in the event of war, national emergency, or as otherwise provided by law. Second priority for recall would go to units and individuals in the Standby Reserve. The third category of reservists, the Retired Reserve, wasn't expected to see further service short of an extreme national emergency.

To provide incentives for active reserve participation, individuals who had either satisfactorily completed thirty-six months of training with the Ready Reserve or four years or more of active duty with the regular military services would be transferred to the Standby Reserve for the remainder of their eight-year military obligation. Those who had fulfilled their entire eight-year obligation could be discharged from the reserve forces if they desired.

All reserve forces personnel would receive a medical examination at least every four years, or more often if their military department head deemed it necessary. Those unable to pass the examination would be dropped from the program.
Promotions for reservists were to be based upon opportunities and procedures similar to those in the regular establishment.

Policies affecting the reserve forces had to be widely publicized.

The Air Force, responding to these broad DOD directives and the political pressure of a House subcommittee hearing on military reserve programs, began developing its own "Long Range Plan for Reserve Forces" early in 1951. This plan was basically the work of a board of officers convened in the Pentagon by the Secretary of the Air Force. The board included Air Staff members, Air Force Reservists, and Air Guardsmen. It was chaired by Brigadier General Robert J. Smith, an Air Force Reservist. The "Smith Committee," as the board was commonly known, was charged with:

conducting a comprehensive and objective study to determine the type and character of Air Reserve forces that should be maintained; the missions which should be prescribed for such [forces]; . . . the optimum size composition, organization, administration and training of these [forces]; . . . the proper relation of such [forces] . . . to the Active Air Force in being; and the ways in which objectives desired may be attained with a maximum of harmony, efficiency, and economy.

The Smith Committee held preliminary meetings with the Air Staff, CONAC, as well as the Air Staff committees or Air Guard and Air Force Reserve policy. The views of the major air commands were solicited in April once the committee had drawn up its preliminary plan. On August 9, the final plan was approved by Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter. Twelve days later, Eugene M. Zuckert, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, publicly unveiled it at the fifth annual national convention of the Air Force Association.
Basically, the "Long Range Plan for Reserve Forces" followed the general outline of those promulgated in January 1951 by the Secretary of Defense. It also reiterated what the Air Force had pledged itself to in both Approved Policies, 1945 and President Truman's Executive Order 10,007 in 1946. The plan was designed to provide a dependable supply of trained units and individuals who would be immediately available in either a partial or a total mobilization. Mr. Zuckert was designated as the Assistant Secretary who would have primary responsibility for reserve matters within the Department of the Air Force. The Air Force would continue to maintain the Office of the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces as the agency within the Air Staff responsible for coordinating and expediting reserve matters. Committees on the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard, authorized under the National Defense Act of 1916 as amended, would continue to operate. Each staff office within Headquarters USAF was once more charged with exercising the same planning responsibilities for the air reserve forces as it did for their active duty counterparts. CONAC's responsibility to train the air reserve forces was reemphasized. On the sensitive issue of the Air Guard and its relation to the Air Force, the legal status quo remained unchanged. The Air Guard was still an autonomous military force controlled by the states and territories when not called into federal service. Its organization, administration, and composition would continue to be managed through the NGB. The Bureau would continue to function as an administrative and reporting channel between the Adjutants General and the Air Force Chief of Staff. Many of these
commitments had been made before the Korean War. It remained to be seen whether or not they would actually be implemented now that sustained political pressure was being applied to the armed forces to revitalize their reserve programs.43

There were, however, a number of significant innovations within the Air Force's 1951 plan for its reserve components which suggested that they might be placed on a more realistic footing. Reserve missions and personnel strengths were tied to the Air Force's master war plan for the first time. All organized flying units were to be given definite missions by wing and earmarked for specific major air commands in the event of mobilization. Each wing would, unlike the situation which prevailed in June 1950, be given one standard aircraft type. All units would maintain up-to-date organizational structures in accordance with major air command requirements. The programmed post war Air Guard troop strength would be approximately 67,000, up 7,500 from the prewar ceiling. The size of the air technician program would be substantially increased to support this larger organization. The Air Guard's tactical structure would be maintained at twenty-seven wings with eighty-four combat flying squadrons. All Air Guard units would be included in DOD's proposed Ready Reserve category. The Air Force Reserve was to have fourteen flying wings, all of which would fall in the Ready Reserve category. Responding to one of the bitterest complaints of reservists, the Air Force promised, insofar as possible, to maintain the initial unit integrity of all organized reserve units in future mobilizations. Reservists and Air Guardsmen on extended active duty would, to the greatest extent...
possible, be used in carrying out the "Long Range Plan for Reserve Forces." The Air Force committed itself to providing its reserve units with a full supply of the best first-line equipment. The plan was to be implemented over a six year period extending through 1958.  

Improved public relations were a vital aspect of these reserve policies. Assistant Secretary Zuckert put the political essence of the matter in clear perspective in a December 21, 1951 memo. Arguing for the necessity of maintaining requested levels of air reserve program funds, Zuckert noted that:

> We [i.e., the Air Force] are very much on trial ... with Congress, with the public, and with the reservists themselves, this being our last chance to show them we are going to have a Reserve program and will support it.

Zuckert, as well as a number of other key civilian officials and a few military officers within the upper reaches of the defense establishment, had been clearly troubled by the negative political and military consequences of the failure to build viable reserve programs prior to the Korean War. The inequities and uncertainties experienced by reservists during the war's first year had created a serious public relations problem for the armed forces. This situation had generated demands for a complete overhaul of the nation's military reserve programs. These demands would, after an extensive series of Congressional hearings, result in the Reserve Forces Act of 1952. In the meantime, the Air Force had been compelled to establish a positive working relationship with its reservists.
Eugene Zuckert's predecessor, Harold Stuart, had recognized the negative implications of the Air Force's troubled relationship with the Air Guard since his appointment in 1948. Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington had given him the principal civilian responsibility for reserve affairs within the Department of the Air Force. In April 1950, Stuart had attempted to launch a new era of harmony and cooperation with the Air Guard via a conciliatory speech at the annual meeting of the Adjutants General Association. He had announced that the Air Force was dropping its demands for a number of things which had agitated the Air Guard. These included the establishment of separate Air Guard staffs in the states to parallel the existing ground force-oriented organizations under the adjutants general. The Air Force would develop new tests to evaluate the combat efficiency of Air Guard units and these tests would no longer be conducted away from the home stations of those units. There were other, lesser points of friction, which the Air Force was considering in an equally conciliatory manner. However, absent among them at that time was the biggest issue of all, federalization of the Air Guard. Nonetheless Stuart's speech reflected an early appreciation of a vital problem that was not widely shared then within the upper echelons of the Air Force, especially its uniformed military components.

Mr. Stuart continued his campaign to improve relations with the Air Guard until the end of his tenure as Assistant Secretary in the spring of 1951. He had held a number of meetings with various representatives from NGAUS and NGB. Largely at his insistence, as well as that of General J. P. McConnell, Brigadier General Earl T. Ricks,
Adjutant General of Arkansas, was brought to Washington to take over the troubled Air Force Division of the NGB. Ricks brought Major Winston P. Wilson and Lieutenant Colonel I. C. Brown with him. These three members of the "Arkansas Connection" ran the Air National Guard for the next twenty-three years. During this period, it emerged as a formidable reserve component of the Air Force.47

During Stuart's tenure, the separate Air Staff Committees on Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard policy were merged and their membership was upgraded. These committees, authorized under the provisions of the National Defense Act of 1916 as amended, were composed of equal numbers of reserve components and regular Air Force officers. Separate committees on the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve had been established in 1946. They were charged with advising the Air Force Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force on all proposed plans and policies which might affect their respective reserve components. These committees were frequently ignored and their regular Air Force membership seldom contained the most influential professional talent available. However, the rapid expansion of the active duty establishment associated with the Korean situation caused the Secretary of the Air Force to direct a joint meeting of the Air Staff committees on Air Guard and Air Force Reserve policy in August 1950. These joint meetings were designed to provide the Air Force with an improved mechanism for obtaining advice concerning the most effective ways of using the air reserve forces during the Korean emergency. The meetings were quite popular with committee members and were continued throughout the war. Evidence of a growing Air Force
commitment to strengthen this advisory mechanism was provided in November 1950 when four regular Air Force general officers were added to the committee's membership.48

DOD and the Air Force made a determined effort to enhance their standing with both reservists and the general public. In large measure, the reserve policies they promulgated in 1951 were aimed at this objective. Top Air Force military and civilian officials within the defense establishment publicly lauded the performance of mobilized reservists and Air Guardsmen at annual meetings of various influential groups such as the National Guard Association, Reserve Officers Association, and the Air Force Association. The remarks of General Nathan Twining to the Adjutant Generals Association at its annual meeting in February 1952 reflected both the Air Force's determination to cultivate better relations with the Guard and a growing, albeit limited, appreciation of its contributions as a military organization. According to NCAUS observers, Twining's remarks demonstrated a genuine acceptance of the Air Guard's role as integral and vital part of the Air Force. The Vice Chief of Staff said, in part, that:49

The contribution of the Air National Guard to the Air Force since Korea has been essential to the degree of success the Air Force has met in its global commitments . . . [and] handicaps and difficulties experienced in the past have been overcome and need not arise again because the efforts of your governors and yourselves [i.e., the adjutants general] have proven the feasibility of making your air units available to the Air Force in a timely and effective manner.

General Twining's speech and changes in the handling of air reserve programs were part of a much improved atmosphere for reserve forces planning within the upper levels of the Air Force. Following
a conference luncheon in the offices of Assistant Secretary Stuart on May 9, 1951, that year, General Reckord, Maryland's venerable and influential Adjutant General, cautiously remarked that the relationship between the Air Force and the National Guard "now excelled that which could be expected and that the Air National Guard wanted to be most cooperative with the desires of the Air Force." He contrasted the current atmosphere with that which had existed during efforts to federalize the Air Guard under General Quesada's regime, warning that relations would continue to improve up to the point of any future effort to modify the basic state character of the organization. A three-day conference at the Pentagon in October 1952 involving the state adjutants general and their air staff chiefs, representatives from Headquarters USAF, and NG officials further underscored the improving relationship between the Air Force and the Air Guard. Air Guard spokesmen commented that the central message of the conference was that the Air Guard had demonstrated its value as a first line reserve and stood high in the Air Force's esteem. On a more substantive note, the National Guardsman announced after the conference that the Air Guard had finally been included in all Air Force planning and programming documents.

Inadequate planning and administration of air reserve programs had been a continuing problem for the Air Force during its brief history. Theoretically, these responsibilities had been distributed throughout the directorates of the Air Staff at Headquarters USAF since the Air Force had emerged as a separate service in 1947. However, that had seldom actually been the case in practice. Reserve
matters were frequently neglected or relegated to a very low priority because of the press of other business or the widespread attitude among professional Air Force officers that the air reserve programs were not especially important. The office of the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces (SARF), created by Presidential Executive Order in 1948 to help coordinate and expedite reserve matters in the Air Staff, had consequently been forced to attempt to carry the burden of these neglected planning and administrative functions. This improvised effort to function as an "operating" or "action" agency had not been especially successful.

Assistant Secretary Stuart and General Twining became convinced in the spring of 1951 of the necessity to take firm action to insure that all sections within the Air Staff would begin to exercise their full range of responsibilities for air reserve programs. General Twining, in a memo to the Air Staff on March 13, 1951, harshly criticized them for failing to discharge their responsibilities for reserve programs adequately in the past. He directed them to rectify that situation immediately. The following September, he re-emphasized the necessity for all Air Staff offices to integrate reserve programs, plans, and policies with similar activities for the regular military establishment. To underscore his determination to achieve these objectives, Twining also announced that SARF would be reorganized and function under a new charter in the fall of 1951. This new charter emphasized SARF's advisory functions and forcefully restated the Vice Chief's intent that Air Staff agencies would assume all "operating"
and "action" responsibilities for reserve programs within Headquarters USAF. These changes were to be completed by October 1, 1951.  

Air Force actions in 1951 to upgrade its reserve programs evidently fell well short of its ambitious objectives. In July 1953, General Twining, after his elevation to Air Force Chief of Staff, was compelled to establish yet another top level board of regular and reserve officers to investigate continuing problems with the air reserve programs, especially the Air Force Reserve. Not coincidentally, his appointment of a Reserve Program Review Board corresponded with increased concern about the health of reserve programs by reserve components' associations, the press, Congress, high officials of the Eisenhower administration, and the President himself.  

The Eisenhower administration clearly viewed an increased reliance on reserve programs as a method of holding down defense expenditures. Initially this was part of a planned reduction of the active duty Air Force from 120 to 137 wings. On June 8, 1953, Secretary of the Air Force Harold Talbott told a Senate subcommittee that:

Reduction in programmed [active duty Air Force] wing strength [would] be substantially offset by continuing fighter aircraft production as scheduled to the requirements of the 143 wing program, and [by] making modern fighter aircraft available to the Air National Guard and [Air Force] Reserve to the extent that regular tactical wings [were] not added. [This would] result in greatly increased strength and readiness of the Guard and Reserve.  

Although this planned reduction of the active duty Air Force was subsequently abandoned when the "New Look" was announced in the autumn of 1953, the Eisenhower administration remained determined to strengthen military reserve programs as a hedge against contingencies requiring
the extensive use of conventional military forces. Major studies conducted by the Senate Armed Services Committee, the President's National Security Training Commission, and the Office of Defense Mobilization during 1953-1954 period underscored the serious weakness of these programs. These studies set in motion a chain of events which culminated in Congressional passage of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955.55

The Reserve Program Review Board was headed by CONAC's commander, Lieutenant General Leon W. Johnson. The board's seven members included two representatives from the regular Air Force, three from the Air Force Reserve, and two from the Air National Guard. All except two of these officers were generals. The "Johnson Board" was told that the revitalization of reserve programs was General Twining's first planned project during his tenure as Air Force Chief of Staff. General Thomas White, the new Vice Chief of Staff, told the board members that the Air Force had lost ground with Congress and the public because of an ineffective reserve program. He indicated that the "board should write their own ticket" with respect to its findings and recommendations on strengthening the air reserve programs.56

Subsequent proceedings of the Johnson Board highlighted both the enormous improvement in Air Force-Air Guard relationships that had taken place since 1950 and the relatively serious problems of the Air Force Reserve. Air Guard representatives, testifying before the board, emphasized progress in rebuilding the Air Guard after its demobilization as well as the cooperative spirit which now prevailed between the Air Staff and the Air Force Division of the National
Guard Bureau (AF/NGB). Colonel Mark H. Calusha, AFAUS legislative liaison officer, gave the Air Force high praise for its cooperation in helping to rebuild Air Guard units as they returned to the control of the states following the periods of active federal service. An outstanding example of this cooperation was the speedy Air Force approval of an AF/NGB proposal to create air base squadrons at flying facilities vacated by federalized Air Guard units during the Korean War. These squadrons would serve as holding cadres to form the basis for reconstituting Air Guard units once they were released from active duty. The Air Staff had approved this and associated AF/NGB ideas for returning Air Guard units to state control. By way of contrast, discussions of the Air Force Reserve emphasized problems that had plagued the program since its formation after World War II. These included difficulties in obtaining satisfactory levels of participation by qualified personnel, inadequate facilities and equipment, and unrealistic training programs.57

The Johnson Board heard testimony from many sources, including the Air Staff, representatives of reserve components' associations, and the Army and Navy. On August 24, 1953, after approximately six weeks of work, it forwarded its final report to General Twining. The report concluded that the existing Air Force plan for its reserve forces, developed by the Smith Committee in 1951, was basically sound but was not being effectively implemented by the Air Force. It charged that, during the board's deliberations:58

It repeatedly became evident that in general the active establishment has not, and does not now, understand or appreciate the Reserve Program. . . . [It] does need
understanding, appreciation, and implementation at all levels in the Air Force. In this connection, it [the board] believes that emphasis must be placed more exactly on quality rather than quantity, and it must realistically approach the Air Force's present ability to equip, recruit, and train its Reserves.

The board had placed the onus for failing to implement sound reserve programs squarely on the shoulders of the active duty establishment. This finding articulated a central and continuing problem impeding complete development of the total capabilities of the air reserve programs including the Air Guard.

The board's other significant general finding was essentially political. Assessing the impact of inadequate reserve programs it noted:

Weakness of a Reserve Forces plan and program is more serious to the entire [active duty Air Force] establishment than just the loss of trained individuals and units. Such weakness can result in a lack of influence and support for the entire Air Force by the public and the Congress.

The serious non-military consequences of the bungled 1950-1951 reserve mobilizations had not gone unnoticed within the Air Force's higher echelons. The growing appreciation of these negative political consequences plus the emphasis placed upon improved reserve programs by the Eisenhower administration were crucial factors in the Air Guard's subsequent development as an increasingly viable reserve component during the remainder of the 1950's. Generals Twining and White strongly supported better reserve programs. They knew what Congress was saying even if many of their subordinates did not.

The Johnson Board concluded that, of the Air Force's two civilian components, the Air Guard "is working to greater effectiveness
than the [Air Force] Reserve. It's report emphasized that.

No fundamental facts were established to show that the comparable parts of the Air National Guard and the Reserve (i.e., organized units) could not be trained and developed on an equally effective basis, provided that each had the same or comparable facilities and equipment.

The board recommended continuation of the Air Force's existing reserve program for the next five years. It strongly endorsed continued reliance upon voluntary participation in training programs. Compulsory participation through proposed system of national service (i.e., UMT) was specifically rejected. However, the board did recommend certain modifications of the air reserve programs to cope with deficiencies it had noted. To increase emphasis upon reserve programs within the Air Staff, it suggested creation of an Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, Reserve Forces (AFCRF) with an authorized rank of Lieutenant General and membership on the Air Force Council, Air Force Budget Advisory Committee, and the Air Force Installations Board. This office would replace the SARF. The board also recommended continuation of the concept of integrated regular and reserve forces action within Headquarters USAF. It called for the simplification of the existing organizational structure for administering Air Force Reserve training programs and suggested that the Air Force Reserve adopt the Air Guard's practice of hiring civilian technicians to supervise its flying organizations. Furthermore, it recommended expansion of the Air Guard's tactical squadron structure within existing air reserve program objectives. Individuals leaving the active duty establishment should benefit from a more affirmative and conscientious program of information concerning opportunities for them
in the reserve forces. It urged quick review and approval of the existing construction program for the Air Force reserve. CNAC, suggested the report, would be the only field agency responsible for discharging the Air Force's responsibilities toward its reserve components. Since July 1952, the major air commands had been responsible for conducting the annual field training of reserve units having M-Day assignments with those commands. The Johnson Board urged that the contents of its final report be made known to the civilian reserve associations prior to its release. 63

Written responses of the various Air Staff offices to the Johnson Board's recommendations were generally favorable. Many of its recommendations were subsequently approved and implemented. The most significant of these changes were those upgrading the emphasis on reserve matters within the Air Staff, simplifying the administration of Air Force Reserve training programs, retaining the principal of integrated staff planning for active duty and reserve forces' matters, and adopting of a technician program for Air Force Reserve flying units. 64

The enduring significance of the Johnson Board did not involve the specific administrative or policy changes that evolved from its recommendations. Rather, it was related to the growing awareness by top officials that the Air Force would pay an unacceptable price, both military and political, for its continued failure to develop effective reserve programs. The basic problem in this regard appeared to be inadequate support and appreciation of the reserve programs by the active duty establishment itself. These perceptions,
emerging from the Korean War experience, represented an enormously significant shift in top level attitudes since 1950. The Air Force was beginning to learn the necessity of giving real substance to its repeated pledges to improve reserve programs. The most important lessons of Korea for the air reserve programs had been political and budgetary. If the Air Force was going to maintain the positive relations with Congress and the public which adequate support of its active force programs required, then it would have to develop and implement more effective reserve programs. Furthermore, these reserve programs, as the Korean emergency had demonstrated, could also help to bridge the gap between military requirements and active force capabilities.

The political ramifications of reserve programs were illustrated by growing congressional involvement with reserve components' policy during the Korean War. Despite the changes which DOD and the individual armed services had made in their reserve programs in 1951, Congress and the reserve components' associations pressed for new legislation in this area. Reserve components hearings had been initiated by a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in early January 1951. These hearings, chaired by Representative Overton Brooks of Louisiana, were largely the result of the tremendous political pressures placed upon Congress because of the poorly handled Korean War mobilizations. Individual reservists and their organized lobbies including the National Guard Association and the Reserve Officers Association were appalled by the inequities and
confusion associated with the mobilizations of reservists in 1950 and 1951. They demanded legislation to correct this situation and establish reserve programs on a sounder basis.\textsuperscript{65}

Basically, the reserve associations asked Congress to rejuvenate reserve programs through a system of universal military training and service. They also wanted Congress to protect and strengthen their position within the national security establishment by enacting a legislative charter for the reserve components. In essence, they wanted Congress to mandate the size, strength, and composition of the civilian components of the armed forces. The attitudes underlying these demands were reflected in the "Annual Report of the Special Air Advisory Committee of the National Guard Association."\textsuperscript{66} In his speech to the 1951 NGAUS conference, Brigadier General Errol H. Zistel of the Ohio Air Guard reported that his committee was:\textsuperscript{67}

firmly convinced that a charter or constitution in the form of a legislative enactment should be provided to control the Department of the Air Force in its relation to the Air National Guard and civilian components. ... [We are] unalterably opposed to a condition permitting ... the Air National Guard to be controlled by the varying policies of the Department of the Air Force or the regulations thereof.

Brigadier General Melvin Maas, a former congressman, Marine Corps reservist, member of the Secretary of Defense's CCFB, and chairman of ROA's legislative committee, articulated similar attitudes in his testimony before the Brooks subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. Maas advocated Congressional enactment of a charter for reservists which would ensure equal treatment for
them regardless of their reserve component. When asked by the
subcommittee why DOD was mobilizing individual reservists instead of
units, he responded that:

there is a general feeling in the Army and pretty much in
the Air Force Reserve [and the Air Guard] that the reason
that they want to strip units is to get junior officers and
enlisted men and not have to call field grade officers
thereby saving for themselves an opportunity for an accel-
erated promotion by regulars into those field grades.

Early in 1951, Congress and the reserve components' associa-
tions had pressured DOD to submit legislative proposals designed to
build an effective military reserve system and remedy inequities
in the existing one. They were unsatisfied with largely administra-
tive remedies which DOD had already promulgated. These, they argued,
could be altered or neglected at the whim of civilian and military
officials. The eventual product of their pressures were two major
pieces of legislation enacted by the 82nd Congress, the Universal
Military Training and Service Act (UMT+S) of June 19, 1951 and the
Armed Forces Reserve Act (RFA) of July 9, 1952.

The purpose of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act was:

first to raise immediately the manpower necessary to build
and maintain an armed force of the size determined by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to be our minimum security require-
ment, and, secondly, to provide for the maintenance of an
adequate force of trained Reserves for the future security
of the United States.

The permanent active duty personnel strength of the armed forces was
set at 2,005,882. However, this limit was suspended so that they
could build toward a wartime force of some five million. Their
actual peak military strength of 3,685,054 during the Korean War
was reached on April 30, 1952. The act provided that every young man between eighteen and twenty-six years of age should register for military service. Each man inducted after June 21, 1951 was required to serve two years in the armed forces and serve for six years in a reserve component after his discharge. The Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were authorized to provide that any person who entered organized units of the National Guard, Air National Guard, and other reserve components could be released from service in the regular armed services. The act also provided that if the proposed system of universal military training (i.e., the National Security Training Corps) were started, trainees who served for six months would be obligated for an additional seven and one half years of service in a reserve component. However, Congress never authorized the controversial universal military training system.72

The Armed Force Reserve Act of 1952, the so-called "Magna Carta" of the Reserve components, was based upon the proposals initially developed by DOD's CCPB. These proposals and the resulting legislation were designed to rejuvenate the armed forces' reserve components and eliminate the inequities associated with mobilizations during the Korean War. The act sought, as had the War Department's Approved Policies 1945, to create trained units and qualified individuals readily available to augment the regular armed forces when additional military manpower was needed. It codified many existing statutes relating to the reserve components and provided various benefits and equalization measures for individual reservists.
regardless of the component in which they served. DOD's new system of reserve categories was written into law. Henceforward each of the armed forces would be required to maintain a Ready, Standby, and Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve force was authorized a strength of 1.5 million. The act also placed limitations upon the vulnerability of Korean veterans to future recalls. The legal status of the National Guard and the Air National Guard as reserve components of the Army and Air Force respectively was reaffirmed. 73

The Reserve Forces Act of 1952 also strengthened the reserve forces planning structure. Each service was required to maintain a top level military office within its military staff structure in Washington, D.C. These offices would be responsible for expediting and coordinating reserve components' planning and administration within each service. Furthermore, each of the armed forces was required to have reserve components officers on active duty in the nation's capital to participate in the preparation and administration of all policies and regulations affecting their respective reserve forces. Consequently, Air Guard and Air Force Reserve officers were assigned to active duty with the major divisions of the Air Staff at Headquarters USAF. The act also required top level civilian administration of reserve components' programs within DOD and the individual military departments by Assistant Secretaries whose principal duties would include reserve matters. These provisions of the law strengthened reserve forces administration by granting statutory authority to several existing administrative arrangements. 74
Beyond permitting the President to mobilize it for service outside the country in the event of a declaration of a national emergency and strengthening its inputs into the formal decision-making machinery within the defense establishment, legislation enacted by Congress during the Korean War had a limited immediate impact upon the Air Guard. All Air Guard units were still included in the nation's highest priority military reserve category, the Ready Reserve. They had actually enjoyed this priority, under other designations, since the War Department's 1946 clarification of Approved Policies 1945.75

The Korean War was a crucial watershed in the history of the Air Guard. Korea marked the reversal of the downward slide of Air Force-Air Guard relationships. It signaled the beginning of the Air Guard's development as a viable reserve component of the Air Force. This transformation from a glorified flying club to an integral portion of the nation's military aviation resources was initially the product of political expediency and budgetary limitations rather than military performance or changing national security requirements. Although Air Guard units and individuals had made substantial contributions to the expansion of the Air Force and its global missions during the Korean War, available evidence strongly suggests that this military performance had virtually no impact on the organization's postwar rejuvenation. Rather, inequities in military service obligations and severe weaknesses in existing reserve programs dramatized by the poorly handled American reserve mobilizations during the Korean War unleashed a flood of public
indignation and Congressional criticism. DOD and the armed forces, fearing the political consequences of this indignation and recognizing the serious military shortcomings of their existing reserve programs, took internal administrative steps to strengthen those programs. They also launched a vigorous public relations campaign designed to placate reservists and the public by informing them about those changes. Top Air Force officials, especially some civilian policy-makers, were clearly convinced that, unless effective reserve programs were developed, the active duty establishment could lose the public and political support it needed to maintain its own programs at levels consistent with America's national security requirements. Furthermore, they believed that properly handled reserve programs could significantly enhance the nation's air strength at a fraction of the cost of comparable active duty forces. They were joined in this growing appreciation of the political, military, and budgetary significance of reserve forces by a small but influential number of professional Air Force officers. The work of the Smith Committee in 1951 and the Johnson Board in 1953 reflected this growing determination to develop effective reserve programs.

Congress encouraged these initiatives by holding extensive hearings on the problems as military reserve programs and enacting controversial legislation designed to strengthen them. This legislation, principally the Reserve Forces Act of 1952, had little immediate impact upon the Air Guard. However, it did signify the political dangers to the armed services of neglecting their reserve programs. Moreover, it had a significant long range impact on these
programs by strengthening the input of reserve officers, including Air Guardsmen, into the top level planning processes of the armed services. The legislation also resulted in the designation of Assistant Secretaries within each military department as well as in DOD, who would be legally responsible for administering reserve matters within their respective organizations.

The Korean War compelled the Air Force to overcome its own deeply ingrained professional prejudice against the Air Guard's citizen-airmen. Guardsmen were one of the few available sources of trained manpower desperately needed by the active duty establishment during its rapid wartime expansion. Political necessity and budget restraints forced top civilian officials to ignore the Air Guard's anomalous state-federal status and concentrate upon developing a productive working relationship. Although they were joined in this effort by a small number of top Air Force officers, the initial impetus for the changed attitude toward the Air Guard clearly came from outside the uniformed military establishment.

The Air Guard itself had gotten off to a poor start during the early stages of the Korean mobilization. Although its units contained a reservoir of talented World War II veterans, they had not been welded into effective combat teams since V-J Day. The glorified flying clubs of that postwar era had operated, in effect, as forty-eight separate little state Air Forces without benefit of strong and standardized supervision from the active duty establishment. Mobilized Air Guard units had required extensive personnel augmentation as well as reorganization, retraining and resupply.
A variety of factors including the extreme sensitivity of the states to federal encroachment on their military prerogatives, the general disinterest and even hostility of the active duty establishment, and the clearly inadequate military budgets of the immediate post World War II era had accounted for their lack of readiness. However, Air Guardsmen had overcome their initial mobilization deficiencies and had demonstrated that they could effectively augment the active Air Force in a broad range of important missions once properly trained and equipped. More significantly, their leadership recognized that in the post Korean War era only realistic training for legitimate military missions effectively supervised by the active duty establishment, could guarantee the Air Guard's future as a viable reserve program. They were willing to permit increased Air Force control of the Air Guard and to shoulder a portion of the active duty establishment's mission responsibilities in exchange for increased federal support. The post Korean War modus vivendi between the Air Guard and the Air Force reflected a mutual appreciation of these political, budgetary, and military facts of life.
CHAPTER THREE


7Hill, Minute Man, p. 535. Hoover, Interview, May 1978. Brig. Gen. Hoover is a career Air Guardsman who entered the program in 1946. He was mobilized during the Korean War and saw combat in that conflict. Both Hill and Hoover argue that the Air Guard's fine performance during the Korean War led to a better relationship with
the active duty Air Force following the war. This argument is quite common among veteran Air Guardsmen and their supporters.

8 Goldberg, History of USAF Through 1957, pp. 164-166. House, Reserve Hearings 1951. These hearings were an outgrowth of DOD's lack of preparedness to handle the limited war mobilization that the U.S. faced in 1950-1951.


11 Memo, Harold Stuart, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for General Earl S. Hoag, SARP, 11 July 1950, Subj: "Harmony with ANG," Records of the SAP, Correspondence, Decimal File (Nos. 325 to 326), Box 543, RG 340, NARS.


20Wilson, Interview, December 1978.


22NGAUS, 1951 Proceedings, pp. 117-118.


30 Hoover, Interview, May 1978.


Air Reserve Forces Review, Ibid., pp. 2-5.


Memo, Mr. Zuckert, Assistant SAF, to Mr. George Moore, 21 December 1951, Subj: "Need to Prevent Reductions in Air Reserve Forces' Programs," p. 1, Records of SAF, Correspondence, Decimal File, 1951, (Nos. 326-330.13), Box 885, RG 340, NARS.


Wilson, Interview, December 1978.


Ibid., p. 1.


Ibid., p. 297.

House, Reserve Hearings 1951, p. 112.

Ibid., p. 127.


Ibid., p. 473.

Senate, Reserve Hearings 1952, pp. 106-121, NGAUS representatives, Generals Walsh and Record. They reviewed postwar reserve policy and quoted extensively from the draft act of 1948 concerning Congressional intent that the National Guard and organized reserve should be called upon first if the armed services had to be augmented. William F. Levantrosser, Congress and the Citizen Soldier, Legislative Policy-Making for the Federal Armed Forces Reserve (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1967), pp. 54-60. Hereafter cited as Levantrosser, Congress and the Citizen Soldier.
CHAPTER FOUR


The Eisenhower administration marked a significant new era in the short history of the Air Guard. From 1953 through 1960, the Air Guard experienced dramatic growth and modernization accompanied by an increasingly closer integration with the active duty Air Force. Buoyed by official praise of their military service during the Korean War and aggressive new leadership in the National Guard Bureau, veteran Air Guardsmen shed the negative image associated with their flying club and "forty-eight little state Air Forces" reputation of the late 1940's. Major Generals Earl T. Ricks and Winston P. Wilson, both chiefs of the NGB's Air Force Division, were confident that Air Guard units could develop the high operational readiness standards demanded by the Air Force. Moreover, they firmly believed that those same units could perform competitively against their active duty counterparts in a variety of missions. They eagerly sought opportunities to expand the Air Guard's missions and demonstrate its operational competence in competition with regular Air Force units. During the Eisenhower administration, the Air Guard made noticeable progress toward becoming the well prepared
first line combat reserve force originally envisaged in the War Department's Approved Policies 1945. ¹

The confidence of veteran Air Guardsmen was well-founded. By 1960, the Air Guard's actual personnel strength had reached 71,000, an increase of 26,272 over its pre-Korean War level. Its technician complement, reflecting this growth and the increasing technological complexity of the Air Guard's equipment, had expanded from 5,814 to 13,200. Air Guard appropriations had more than doubled, growing from $114.69 million in FY '50 to $233.44 million in FY '60. The number of Air Guard flying squadrons had been expanded from 84 to 92. Their federal missions, almost exclusively concerned with air defense in the early 1950's, had been enormously diversified. By 1960, these missions included tactical fighter and reconnaissance, troop carrier and heavy airlift, and aeromedical evacuation. Although still largely dependent upon the transfers of excess or obsolescent aircraft from the active duty Air Force, the Air Guard's flying inventory was significantly upgraded during this period. All of its tactical aircraft were jet-powered by 1960.

Some units had been equipped with century series fighters including the F-100 and the F-104. Others were flying the all-weather, nuclear-capable F-89J fighter interceptor. Air Guard flying units augmented the Air Force with a real, albeit limited operational capability, which had been conspicuously absent in 1950. ²

More significantly, Air Guardsmen were regularly involved in the everyday business of running the Air Force. Air Guard officers,
assigned to the Air Staff and the major air commands on extended active duty tours, participated in the formulation of policies, plans, and programs that affected their reserve component. Chiefs of the Air Force Division of the National Guard Bureau had assumed the added role within the air staff of Deputy for ANG affairs under the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces. They were functioning effectively to promote the interests and military capabilities of the Air Guard in that capacity. Air Guard aircrews were beginning to participate in Air Force exercises and gunnery meets on an extremely limited basis. Its AC&W squadrons and other technical units provided some technical support to the active duty establishment. Finally, Air Guard fighter interceptor squadrons were actively augmenting the Continental Air Defense Command's runway alert force around the clock on a year-round basis. By 1960, twenty-two Air Guard fighter interceptor squadrons were participating in this highly successful program that had been initiated as a limited experiment with only two squadrons in 1953. Air Guardsmen were convinced that the growing operational capabilities demonstrated by their successful augmentation of the air defense program and participation in other peacetime missions had created an environment within the Air Force amenable to an even more significant allocation of resources and responsibilities in the future.3

The Air Force, for its part, abandoned any serious effort to eliminate the state character of the Air Guard. Federalization was a dead issue because of the political damage it would do to the
active duty establishment. Moreover, the Air Force had discovered that the Air Guard was increasingly responsive to its organizational, training, and operational readiness requirements. New leadership in the NGB had convinced the states of the long term advantages of permitting their Air Guard units to function as reserves of the U.S. Air Force rather than as forty-eight separate little state air forces. They were willing to exchange a measure of state autonomy for increased levels of federal support and supervision. They were convinced that this would enhance the Air Guard's operational performance, thereby buttressing the argument for its continued existence as an air reserve force with a distinctive state character. In this context, the issue of the Air Force's command jurisdiction looked less crucial than it had in the late 1940's. Top Air Force leadership grudgingly accepted the pragmatic necessity to develop the Air Guard into a viable reserve program despite its anomalous state-federal status. Chagrined by the political and military costs of the Korean War mobilization fiascos, nourished by abundant defense appropriations under the nuclear-oriented "New Look," and sensitive to the Eisenhower administration's initial enthusiasm for strong military reserve programs, the Air Force sought to implement the recommendations advanced by the Smith Committee in 1951 and reaffirmed by the Johnson Board two years later. Furthermore, the Air Force's commitment to the Air Guard, as well as the Air Force Reserve, was also encouraged by its growing, although limited, appreciation that the reserves could assist in bridging the ever-present gap between operational commitments and available resources.
Unlike the situation which had prevailed through the Korean War, the most significant innovations in the management and utilization of air reserve programs originated within the Air Force itself during the 1953-1960 period. These innovations included the Air Guard's participation in the air defense runway alert program in 1953, upgrading reserve forces representation within the Air Staff in accordance with the Johnson Board's recommendations that same year, and adoption of the gaining command concept of reserve forces management in 1960. They reflected the determination of top Air Force leadership to develop and maintain viable reserve programs. Adoption of the gaining command concept was particularly significant in this regard. It transferred responsibility for supervising the training and inspection of reserve programs, including the Air Guard, from CONAC to the major air commands that would actually employ specific reserve units and individuals in the event of a war or another emergency. This was a functional rather than a geographic approach to the management of air reserve forces. It provided a major incentive for Air Force commanders to train and equip reserve forces up to operational standards that would make them much more readily available for use in contingencies and peacetime support roles. Through these management innovations, as well as the related emphasis upon force modernization and the peacetime support roles of the Air Guard, the Air Force, in effect, evolved what later became known as DOD's total force policy.  

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Rebuilding demobilized units was the most pressing task confronting Air Guard leaders during the closing stages of the Korean War. This task was an enormous undertaking, comparable in some respects to the challenges associated with the initial development of the Air Guard after World War II. Air Guard units returning to state control in 1952 and 1953 were frequently little more than skeleton organizations possessing only small cadres of veteran Guardsmen. They had been stripped of their aircraft and equipment prior to leaving active federal service. By June 30, 1953, the Air Guard's eighty-two authorized flying squadrons possessed only 250 tactical aircraft. Many of these were obsolete World War II vintage, propeller-driven fighters. Many Guardsmen, especially younger enlisted men, had terminated their military affiliations entirely when their units were demobilized or were planning to do so as soon as they were eligible to transfer to standby reserve status under the provisions of the Reserve Forces Act of 1952. Some officers had elected to remain on active duty with the still-expanding regular Air Force. By the end of FY '53, the Air Guard's total personnel strength had shrunk to 35,556, well below its programmed ceiling of 52,500. Within these figures, the most critical shortage continued to be found in the cockpit. Qualified fighter pilots were in short supply. Their annual rate of attrition from the Air Guard was 20 percent. Since the Air Force still had not set aside adequate flight training positions to compensate for these annual losses, the shrinking Air Guard pilot force continued to rely
heavily on World War II veterans. Certain technical specialties such as weatherman and air controller were also difficult to man with fully qualified personnel. Consequently, many personnel in these jobs were inexperienced youths recruited directly from civilian life and trained on the job while in Guard status. A shortage of suitable airfields was another major problem facing the Air Guard in 1953. With a few exceptions, all Air Guard flying units were scheduled to be returned to the airfields they had occupied prior to mobilization. All of these flying units were programmed to be eventually equipped with jet fighters. However, many of their airfields could not handle jet operations. Some lacked adequate facilities, especially runways. Some had encountered strong local community opposition to the prospect of noisy and dangerous jet flight operations. An extensive and costly construction program had been initiated during the Korean War to expedite this conversion to an all jet fighter force. Eight pre-Korean War Air Guard airfields could not be modified for jet fighter operations. Consequently, units at those airfields were converted to airlift missions. Displaced fighter squadrons were relocated at bases which could handle jets in accordance with ADC recommendations. Despite these formidable challenges, Air Guardsmen approached the task of rebuilding their demobilized units with enormous self-confidence and enthusiasm gained during the Korean War. Reflecting this optimism and the Air Guard's growing integration with the active duty Air Force, a veteran Guard officer later commented:
It [Korea] gave us extreme confidence in our ability to train up to a level where we would be ready to go at any time. . . . After we got into Korea and came back, we developed our capability by an increase in technicians. . . . We finally realized that we could react with a minimum of notice and that was because we began to work more closely with Air Force units. . . . We were tested more and actually became competitive with the Air Force.

This confidence was also reflected in growing enthusiasm among state officials for the Air Guard program. By the end of the Korean War, thirty-eight states had requested that the Air Force authorize them to organize an additional sixty-six flying units beyond those already programmed. Although these requests were consistent with the Johnson Board's recommendation that the Air Force would take early advantage of the Air Guard's ability to expand its tactical unit structure, they were never implemented.11

The Air Force's failure to approve an expansion of the Air Guard's tactical flying unit structure in 1953 was a minor disappointment. It failed to dampen the optimism of the Air Guard's leadership. Their flourishing relationship with the Air Force was a major factor sustaining this mood. Unlike the situation before the Korean War, the Air Guard had been included in the Air Force's war plans. Each flying unit had been given a definite mobilization assignment. Air Guard officers, serving on extended active duty with the Air Staff and major air commands, were participating in the planning process as it affected their reserve component. General Earl T. Ricks, Chief of the NGB's Air Force Division, had been extremely effective in building an atmosphere of cooperation and harmony between the Air Force, the states, and Air Guard leaders. His human and political
skills were complemented by an excellent grasp of Air Guard matters that made him a valued and effective advisor to the Air Force Chief of Staff. Because of Ricks, the NGB appeared to get what it had futilely demanded in the past, an effective voice in the policy process at the highest professional military levels of the Air Force.  

Under General Rick's leadership, the foundations were established for a realistic post Korean War Air Guard training program. Each wing organization was programmed to receive a standard type aircraft, assigned a definite mission, and allocated to a major air command for mobilization purposes. Training programs were keyed to the mission assignments. To save money, units were provided with the minimum level of supplies and equipment needed to sustain monthly training programs. In the event of an emergency, they would be brought up to full operational readiness after mobilization. Compensating for the chronic shortage of training funds, material and locations, nine permanent Air Guard field training sites were selected. Each site included a full complement of the facilities, supplies, and equipment Air Guard units needed to conduct their field training programs. Units, minus their own supplies and equipment, were to be rotated through these sites for two weeks of training each year. Anticipating conversion to an all jet force by the mid-fifties, the Bureau initiated a program during the war to lengthen runways at civil airports housing Air Guard tactical squadrons. Conversion to jets had significantly raised the accident rate of some Air Guard units in the early fifties. A more intense and
controlled flying training program was needed to compensate for the increased difficulty of flying these high performance aircraft. Consequently, the Bureau proposed an additional thirty-six annual flying training periods for all Air Guard jet pilots. DOD eventually authorized implementation of this proposal in the late 1950's.

Finally, the Air Guard adopted the so-called Texas plan of concentrated weekend training for all of its units. Prior to the Korean War, most units had met two hours each week for training and pilots would fly when they were available on an individual basis. This approach had drastically limited the development of unit teamwork. To overcome this problem, the Air Guard adopted the practice of concentrating all of its training during one weekend each month.\(^\text{13}\)

The Air Force continued to work during the latter stages of the Truman administration to implement its commitment to build stronger air reserve programs. General Twining, upon becoming Chief of Staff in June 1953, emphasized that one of his first planned projects was the revitalization of those programs. Reserve forces planning was elevated to a higher level within the Air Staff in October 1953. Consistent with a recommendation of the Johnson Board, Twining dissolved the Office of the Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces and replaced it with the more powerful Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces (ACSRF). The ACSRFF was directly responsible to the Chief of Staff for coordinating and expediting reserve forces matters in the Air Staff. He was also given a seat on the Air Force Council, the Air Staff's top collective policymaking body. Furthermore, he was
represented on the Budget Advisory Committee and the Air Installa-
tions Board. This reorganization reflected the Air Force's increased
emphasis on reserve programs at its highest decision-making levels.14

A far more important Air Force initiative in upgrading its
reserve programs was launched on an experimental basis in the spring
of 1953. At the suggestion of the NGB and General George C. Finch,
CONAC's Deputy for ANG matters, the Air Force began to use Air
Guardsmen to augment the Air Defense Command's (ADC) runway alert
program. Concerned by the absence of realistic training programs
for the Air Guard units under state control, Finch had suggested in
May 1952 that better use might be made of them if a "... small
number of pilot officers at each strategically placed ANG unit
[were placed] on active duty with the unit for the purpose of per-
forming . . . air intercept missions."15

Lieutenant General Leon W. Johnson was Finch's superior as
CONAC's commander. He liked the proposal and approved it. General
Johnson had taken over CONAC in February 1952. At that time,
General Vandenberg, then Air Force Chief of Staff, had told him to
"get up there [to CONAC] and straighten out that god-damn can of
worms."16 The "can of worms" referred to by Vandenberg was the
enormous public dissatisfaction of Reservists and Guardsmen as well
as Congress with the continuing absence of effective and meaningful
reserve training programs. Recognizing that the Air Guard was too
firmly entrenched to ever be eliminated, Johnson felt that CONAC's
job was to make the program work despite its shortcomings rather
than to waste its energy in a counterproductive effort to assert
command jurisdiction. He needed to find realistic missions and establish effective training programs for the politically-potent but still militarily-underdeveloped Air Guard. Its active participation in the air defense runway alert program promised to help accomplish these objectives.17

At first the Air Force did not embrace the proposal. Its Judge Advocate General ruled that the proposal was illegal under existing statutes. The Air Staff was convinced that the idea was impractical. ADC's commander, Lieutenant General Benny Chidlaw, initially rejected the proposal in a long letter to Johnson. Chidlaw later changed his position. Faced with the inability of the Air Force to retain adequate numbers of experienced fighter pilots on active duty and insufficient funding, ADC could not adequately perform its air intercept mission. Moreover, it was unable to provide adequate simulated fighter interceptor attacks for SAC to train its bomber crews against. The serious gap between its assigned missions and its actual capabilities could be partially closed if the veteran pilots that the Air Force was unable to retain on active duty could be induced to participate, on a part-time basis, in the proposed Air Guard runway alert program.18

ADC submitted a plan to Headquarters USAF to implement the Air Guard runway alert concept. The Air Staff remained unconvinced of the plan's feasibility. However, faced with continuing political pressure to revitalize reserve programs and unwilling to allocate appreciably greater resources to air defense at the expense of SAC,
the Air Staff agreed to give the plan a trial run. In December 1952, the NGB and Headquarters USAF approved a final plan for the experiment.19

The experiment commenced on March 1, 1953. Two air Guard squadrons—the 138th Fighter Interceptor Squadron (FIS) at Syracuse, New York and the 194th FIS at Hayward, California—were selected to augment ADC's runway alert program. Each squadron maintained two aircraft and five aircrews on alert status from one hour before sunrise to one hour after sunset seven days a week. They were to be scrambled within five minutes of notification. Pilots participating in the alert force served short tours of active duty while ground crews remained in their civilian status.20

The experiment was an outstanding success. ADC was very enthusiastic about the results. It reported that the performance of Air Guard aircrews was very close to that of their regular Air Force counterparts. ADC asked to expand the program and retain it on a permanent basis. It wanted thirteen more Air Guard squadrons to participate. The request was approved, but the NGB had to postpone its implementation because of a shortage of aircraft and equipment. The Air Guard's eighty-two tactical flying squadrons possessed a grand total of only 250 combat aircraft at the end of FY '53. The NGB insisted upon distributing these thin fighter resources as widely as possible to maintain at least a minimal flight training capability in all of its tactical units. Air Guard fighter units possessed, on the average, only five or six tactical aircraft each as late as March 1954. Many of them were still World War II vintage
propeller-driven P-51's wholly inadequate for air defense operations in the mid 1950's. Another problem was the Air Force's inability or unwillingness to provide the additional manpower spaces needed to expand the experiment into a full-fledged operational program.21

Developments outside the Air Force soon overcame these barriers. The newly installed Eisenhower administration was committed to a fundamental reassessment of American national security policies. The President was an economic conservative who believed that deficit spending by the federal government posed a serious threat to the nation's economic health. Maintenance of this economic health was vital to the global struggle against Soviet-style communism. The President believed that the struggle against communism would be a protracted one. Success in this contest would depend as much upon economic as military strength. He believed that, if the Communists were unable to best the U.S. militarily, they would goad her into excessive defense spending over an indefinite period that could eventually bankrupt her. Eisenhower was alarmed by the serious inflation that had accompanied the huge increase in U.S. military spending during the Korean War. It seemed to confirm his fears about the dangers of oversize defense budgets.22

Eisenhower took office with his own set of guidelines for revamping American strategy. These guidelines were shaped by his conservative economic views. Basically, the President was determined to hold down the defense budget while maintaining U.S. military superiority over the U.S.S.R. through a greater reliance on atomic air power at the expense of large American ground forces. This was
also coupled with an emphasis upon developing new military technology and building strong allied ground forces around the Soviet Union's periphery. Although conservative advisors like Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles were influential with the President, Eisenhower clearly dominated the political bargaining process whereby strategic policy was established and defended during his eight years in the White House.  

To implement his ideas, the President installed a new set of Joint Chiefs who would presumably be more amenable to defense budget reductions than the holdovers from the Truman era. They began developing a national security strategy that incorporated Eisenhower's basic assumptions about the global struggle with communism. NSC-162, issued in May 1953, helped to establish the broad parameters of the new strategy for them by endorsing a continuation of the Truman administration's containment policy. However, unlike the Truman administration's policy of developing balanced land, air, and naval forces, NSC-162 stressed an increased reliance upon nuclear-armed strategic air power. The preliminary strategic plan of the Joint Chiefs, offered in August 1953, proposed a further buildup of the strategic air forces as well as a stronger air defense. Defense budgets would be reduced by scaling down the size of overseas garrisons and creating a mobile strategic reserve in the United States. This would be coupled with an increased reliance on our allies.  

President Eisenhower approved this new strategic planning when he endorsed NSC-162/2 in October 1953. In December, the Joint Chiefs gained approval of their proposal to implement NSC-162/2.
American military expenditures were to be reduced to between $33 and $34 billion by FY 1957. U.S. military personnel strength would drop from 3,403,000 in December 1953 to 2,815,000 by June 1957. The Army was scheduled to carry the brunt of this reduction. It would fall from 1,481,000 men to 1,000,000 men. The number of divisions would be reduced from twenty to fourteen. The Navy would be cut from 765,000 men and 1,126 combat vessels to 650,000 men and 1,030 combat vessels. The Marine Corps would go from 244,000 men in three divisions to 190,000 men in three reduced strength divisions.25

The Air Force was the big winner in this new strategic plan. It would expand to 137 wings from its earlier interim goal of 120 wings. The former goal was to be achieved by the end of fiscal year 1957 with a projected Air Force personnel strength of 975,000. The planned 137-wing Air Force was to be heavily oriented toward the strategic deterrence mission. Its projected strength included fifty-four SAC wings. To further strengthen deterrence, the number of air defense wings was set at thirty-four, an increase of five above the Truman administration's plans. The principal reduction from the Truman administration's 143-wing Air Force goal was in air transport units. Despite the theoretical emphasis on building a mobile strategic reserve force in the United States, the Eisenhower administration planned to reduce the number of air transport wings from seventeen to eleven. This defense strategy, with its growing reliance upon the Air Force's nuclear deterrent, became known as the "New Look."26
One element of the "New Look" that has often been overlooked was its emphasis upon strengthened reserve forces. Early in the Eisenhower administration, Secretary of Defense Wilson indicated that he intended to reduce defense costs and maintain the nation's military strength through a revitalization of the reserve forces while reducing the size of the active duty establishment. Wilson signaled this intention when he submitted the new administration's first defense budget to Congress. A revision of the Truman administration's FY 1954 proposals, the Eisenhower budget called for a $5 billion cut in the requested Air Force appropriation for the coming fiscal year. It sliced the Air Force flying unit program goals from 143 to 120 wings. Wilson stressed in his testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee that increased Air Guard and Air Force Reserve combat strengths would counter the projected reductions in the active duty Air Force. Secretary of the Air Force Harold Talbott confirmed Wilson's intention of placing more reliance upon the air reserve forces. On June 8, he told the same Senate subcommittee that:

reduction in programmed [Air Force] wing strength [would] be substantially offset by continuing fighter aircraft production as scheduled to meet the requirements of the 143 wing program, and [by] making modern fighter aircraft available to the Air National Guard and [Air Force] Reserve to the extent that regular tactical wings [were] not added. [This would] result in greatly increased strength and readiness of the Guard and Reserve.

This proposal contemplated shifting 1,200 more aircraft into the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve than they would have had under the Truman administration's budget for FY 1954. Beset by complaints from
reservists about continuing weaknesses and inequities in the reserve forces programs, Congress was sympathetic to the administration's announced intent to strengthen them.\textsuperscript{28}

Despite reforms within the defense establishment and significant legislative action by Congress during the Korean War, it had become evident by 1953 that serious flaws remained in America's military reserve system. Although these flaws pertained primarily to the Army's reserve components, they also affected those of other armed services. The situation was quite similar to the one that had prevailed in 1950. Many reserve units were little more than paper organizations, ill-prepared for immediate use in combat or other contingencies. Reserve programs were shot through with inequities. The burden of reserve service still largely fell upon World War II and Korean War veterans. Young pilots and other skilled technicians were also in short supply. Age and rank structures were out of balance. Unit cohesion and proficiency was seriously undermined by tremendous annual personnel turnover. According to DOD, the most glaring deficiency of the reserve system was the reluctance of enlisted reservists, except National Guardsmen, to participate in training programs. Only 28 percent of those enrolled in the reserve components were receiving drill pay by the end of FY 1954. These problems were highlighted in a series of studies conducted during 1953 and 1954 by the Senate Armed Services Committee, the President's National Security Training Commission (NSTC), and the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM).\textsuperscript{29}
President Eisenhower was determined to present a program for reconstructing and revitalizing the reserve forces to Congress as a top priority legislative item in 1954. Following extensive studies of the problem by the NSTC and the ODM, DOD, and the individual armed services were asked to make their own comments. The resulting recommendations were presented to the National Security Council (NSC) in June 1954. Evidently this was the first time in NSC's seven-year history that a meeting had been convened specifically to deal with reserve programs. Recommendations were revised during the summer of 1954 after consultations within the executive branch. Following briefings with the various reserve components' associations, a final presentation was made to the NSC in November. It was approved and presented to the Congress as the National Reserve Plan (NRP). 30

The NRP was introduced into Congress as HR 5297. It sought direct recruitment and training of youths for the reserve components via a system of UMT while, at the same time, retaining the draft to help the regular armed forces fulfill their manpower needs. Other significant features of the plan included: improvements in the reserve forces structure; provisions for transfer of trained personnel into the National Guard if voluntary recruitment failed; and measures to insure participation in reserve training activities once basic training had been completed. HR 5297 had serious shortcomings and stirred enormous political controversy on Capitol Hill. UMT had never been particularly popular with the American people. Congress had shied away from several UMT proposals since the end of World
War II. Its prospects for implementation were dim in 1955. Despite its objective of evenly distributing the burden of military service, the bill was inherently inequitable. It would permit youths to either serve two years of extended active duty with the regulars under the draft or six months of UMT followed by seven and one-half years of service in the reserves. Cost was another problem. The administration estimated that the program would cost $2 billion a year by 1959. Although this estimate was probably far too conservative, it did emphasize the squeeze such a grandiose program would make on the funds available for the regulars. Finally, the bill failed to address adequately the fact that each of the armed services had separate reserve problems to contend with. The Air Force, for example, had grave misgivings about the NRP. Like the Navy, the Air Force relied on the recruitment of long-term volunteers. It feared that the NRP's UMT and reserve service alternatives could have a ruinous effect on Air Force enlistments. Furthermore, it felt that a more basic failing of the NRP was its lack of recognition of the degree to which effective reserve programs must rely on the participation of prior-service individuals. The NRP envisaged reserve forces primarily composed of non prior-service individuals. The Army, unlike the Air Force, stood to benefit from the NRP by gaining an assured flow of trained non-prior service youths into its reserve components, particularly their combat units.31

The National Guard Association was another major source of difficulty for HR 5297. NGAUS was opposed to mandatory basic training for the National Guard's non-prior service recruits and rejected the
idea of involuntary assignment of trainees to its all-volunteer ranks. With respect to the Air Guard, General Ellard Walsh, NGAUS president, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Air Force had already solved the basic training problem. It permitted non-prior service Air Guard recruits to attend eleven weeks of training conducted by the active duty establishment. An amendment to HR 5297 offered by Representative Adam Clayton Powell barring racial segregation in the National Guard killed the bill. An alternative proposal, HR 7000, was then introduced in the House. At the insistence of NGAUS and its political allies, the new proposal omitted the provisions set forth originally for the National Guard.32

The 84th Congress eventually enacted two significant pieces of legislation designed to address the weaknesses in military reserve programs highlighted by the NRP and subsequent legislative proceedings. First, the 1955 Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act extended authority to induct men into the armed forces until July 1, 1959. Second, the Reserve Forces Act (RFA) of 1955 amended the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 in order to strengthen reserve programs. The RFA of 1955 increased the size of the Ready Reserve from 1.5 million to 2.9 million men; authorized the President to mobilize up to one million Ready Reservists in an emergency declared by him; reduced the total obligation for active and reserve military duty from eight to six years; required all those who entered the armed forces after August 9, 1955 to participate in reserve training following completion of their active
service and authorized specific sanctions for those who failed to participate; provided for direct enlistments in the reserve forces of non-prior service youths; and established a system of continuous screening for members of the Ready Reserve to ensure their availability for active duty. The act did not include provisions authorizing UMT, mandatory basic training for National Guard recruits, and authority to induct men into the reserves if sufficient numbers could not be obtained voluntarily. Although gravely concerned by these omissions, President Eisenhower, at the strong urging of the Secretary of Defense, signed the bill into law on August 9, 1955. 33

Although the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 had a minimal direct impact on the legal status, size, and composition of the Air Guard, it was significant because it reflected the general political climate of continuing concern about the health of reserve programs during the early years of the Eisenhower administration. Sensitive to this political climate and the concomitant desire of the Eisenhower administration to hold down defense budgets by emphasizing stronger reserve programs, the Air Force had taken significant steps to strengthen its reserve programs. For example, in January 1955, General Twining had established a requirement that air reserve forces' tactical flying units be trained and equipped to achieve an immediate combat capability upon mobilization. This goal, subject to budget and other limitations, applied to fifty-one Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve combat flying wings. It marked a significant departure from earlier policies that had emphasized the necessity for substantial post-mobilization refitting of air reserve units. 34
The Air Force's ambitious objectives for its reserve forces were partially thwarted by the Eisenhower administration's changing budget priorities. When the administration reversed its early 1953 decision to cut the active Air Force flying program to 120 and authorized 137 wings instead, the pace of the Air Guard's aircraft modernization program was drastically curtailed. The projected conversion of the Air Guard to an all jet force fully equipped with modern jets by 1956 was slipped backward several years. By June 30, 1955, the Air Guard had received 2,054 aircraft from the Air Force. Although this represented 70 percent of the aircraft to be assigned under the twenty-seven wing Air Guard program, most of them were not modern, first line fighter aircraft. Only 1,097 were jets. These included F-80's, F-84 D/E/F's, F-86 A/E's, F-89 B/C's and F-94 A/B's. The remaining fighters were prop-driven F-51's. The last F-51 was not eliminated from the Air Guard flying inventory until December 1957. Shortages of equipment, supplies, and qualified airmen had further limited the Air Guard's development. Poor ammunition storage facilities and the lack of suitable ground gunnery ranges were also problems. However, inadequate airfields posed an even more fundamental barrier to the Air Guard's transformation into a modern combat reserve force. The Air Force estimated early in 1954 that twenty-three of the Air Guard's eighty-one flying locations would not be able to handle jets by the end of FY 1955. These factors seriously inhibited the pace of the Air Guard's development. They precluded its evolution into a combat-ready force capable of immediate deployment in a crisis situation.35
Nevertheless, the Air Force had been moving to transform ADC's runway alert experiment into a permanent feature of the Air Guard's force structure and training programs. Encouraged by the outstanding success of the 1953 experiment and the resulting clamor of the Air Guard for its expansion as well as its own inadequate air defense resources in the face of the ephemeral Soviet bomber gap of the mid 1950's, the Air Force prepared to place a limited number of Air Guard squadrons on permanent alert duty at crucial locations around the country. This use of Air Guardsmen to augment the active Air Force in performing its peacetime missions was a revolutionary innovation in air reserve programs. Representing a sharp break with the tone and substance of pre-Korean War Air Force-Air Guard relations, the runway alert program dominated the evolution of the Air Guard throughout the remainder of the decade. It established a precedent for the increasing participation of air reserve forces in a slowly-widening circle of Air Force missions. Although it was implemented on an extremely limited basis prior to the 1960's, this growing integration of reserve forces with the active duty establishment established the foundations of what later came to be known as DOD's total force policy.

In 1953, the Air Force had taken concrete steps to convert ADC's runway alert experiment with the Air Guard into a permanent program. It had scheduled seven Air Guard fighter squadrons to receive F-94 A/B all-weather interceptor aircraft by the end of FY 1954. These were the first specific air defense aircraft ever assigned to the Air Guard. The Air Force also increased the
authorization of active duty personnel for the Air Guard from seventy-five to ninety for that same fiscal year. In November 1953, the primary mobilization assignments for all Air Guard fighter squadrons were shifted from TAC to ADC. This increased the number of Air Guard fighter units potentially available for air defense in an emergency from fifty-two to seventy squadrons. However, only seventeen of these squadrons were scheduled to participate in the runway alert program on a continuing basis. Furthermore, only nineteen Air Guard squadrons were actually equipped as interceptor units. The remaining fifty-one squadrons were equipped with fighter-bombers. They still carried totally unrealistic requirements to train for both the interceptor and fighter-bombers roles. In reality, only the seventeen Air Guard FIS's scheduled to participate in the runway alert program on a daily basis had a significant air defense capability. The other fifty-three squadrons, designated to augment ADC in the event of an emergency, added relatively little to the nation's actual air defense capabilities. Extensive re-equipment and post mobilization training would have been required to make them a viable air defense force. This was slow in coming due to the demands of the active duty establishment under the 137 wing program.36

Eight Air Guard FIS's took their places beside their regular Air Force counterparts in the first permanent augmentation of ADC's runway alert program on August 15, 1954. Each squadron furnished two jet fighter aircraft and five aircrews to man them fourteen hours per day on a year round basis. Pilots were voluntarily
recalled to active duty for short periods to participate in the program. Participating squadrons rotated this duty among all their pilots. The initial eight units were joined by nine more on October 1, 1954. Headquarters USAF and the NGB approved an ADC plan in 1955 to place nineteen Air Guard FIS's on permanent alert and augment them with forty-eight additional squadrons on rotating alert in groups of sixteen. Actual implementation of the plan, scheduled for July 1, 1956, floundered because of inadequate funding and the difficulty in obtaining skilled personnel at some Air Guard locations. 37

By mid 1957, ADC's Air Guard fighter interceptor force had grown to seventy-six squadrons. Twenty of these squadrons actually participated in the runway alert program. Although the total Air Guard interceptor force was quite large, it was generally poorly-equipped by modern air defense standards. Ten of its squadrons flew modern first-line jet interceptors including the F-94C, F-86 D, and F-89 D. Forty-two squadrons flew day fighters. The remaining twenty squadrons operated second-line interceptors including the F-89 B/C and the F-94 A/B. Unit and individual training levels frequently left much to be desired. CONAC complained that Air Guard FIS's were not receiving the advisory service and close liaison with ADC that their mission required. This complaint arose because, although these Air Guard units participated in ADC's alert program and would augment her forces in an emergency, CONAC was still responsible for supervising their training. 38
Despite the successful integration of a limited number of Air Guard aircraft and aircrews into ADC's air defense network, the program had generated a predictable share of tensions between the regulars and the Guardsmen. Many professional Air Force officers, including some in ADC, considered Air Guard participation in the air defense alert program to be strictly an augmentation of the active force. In their view, the Air Guard was still strictly a "second team" outfit that participated in air defense primarily for training purposes. More significantly, some regulars feared that the politically-powerful Air Guard would try to run off with the lion's share of the increasingly significant air defense mission and its considerable resources. As early as December 1954, a top ADC staff officer assured his counterpart at Headquarters USAF that any further expansion of the Air Guard alert program would be carefully considered from this perspective. Nevertheless, ADC continued to press for an expansion of the Air Guard's role in air defense until 1956 when Congress reduced the funds available for that increasingly expensive mission. ADC, which had previously recommended that all Air Guard FIS's be equipped with all-weather jet interceptors, reversed its position. In November 1956, it recommended that no more than 30 percent of the Air Guard's flying squadrons would be equipped with all-weather fighters while another 30 percent should be equipped with modern day fighters like the F-100. The remaining Air Guard flying units, according to this particular ADC recommendation, should be re-equipped for air rescue and transport missions. Responding to an ADC request to reduce the
size of the Air Guard's interceptor force and reductions in its projected budget for FY 1958, the Air Force reduced the Air Guard interceptor force from seventy-six to fifty-five squadrons by the end of 1957. This force shrank to forty squadrons by June 1960.39

Vigorously defending its own prerogatives and resources, ADC had strongly opposed the Air Guard's pressure to be included in the DOMARC missile program in 1958 and 1959. This pressure evidently provoked its commander, Lieutenant General Joseph H. Atkinson, to make a bitterly hostile attack on the Air Guard that threatened to puncture the still fragile framework of official Air Force-Air Guard harmony that had prevailed since the Korean War. Atkinson, in a letter to General Thomas White, Air Force Chief of Staff, clearly expressed some of the underlying tensions that have strained relations between professional officers and their citizen-soldier counterparts through much of American history. He asserted that:40

Reserve Forces should have no role in the air defense fighting forces. . . . I vigorously oppose equipping them with first line weapons. . . . This demands immediate response to command . . . 'command' by negotiation, persuasion and state politics will not do the job. I put little dependence on the Air National Guard as an emergency interceptor augmentation. Reserve forces belong in minimum cost, minimum support missions which do not materially compete for us for resources. I recommend a concerted effort to so employ them.

General White, in his reply, patiently explained the political and military facts of life to ADC's commander. He wrote:41

I must also consider that the administration and the Congress expect our reserve forces to perform active functions in U.S. defense. Any action to completely deny Air National Guard participation in air defense with newer weapon systems would meet with considerable opposition.
The exigencies of domestic politics clearly required the regulars to moderate or at least mask their fears about the challenge that reserve programs posed to their control of military missions and resources.

General Atkinson was not alone among the Air Force's top uniformed leadership in harboring serious reservations about the Air Guard. General Curtis LeMay, the outspoken Vice Chief of Staff, caused a minor political uproar in October 1959 when he indicated publicly that he was unhappy with existing air reserve programs. LeMay's concerns, however, were quite different from Atkinson's. LeMay feared the military weaknesses of those programs rather than their political strengths. Speaking at a reserve forces seminar in Washington, D.C., he asserted that he did not think that the present Air Guard and Air Force Reserve would make much of a contribution if war came. He opposed separate organizations with the same general aims. Reminding his audience that his remarks represented only personal views, General LeMay called for an amalgamation of the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve. The Vice Chief of Staff also forecast a decreasing tactical role for "weekend warriors" in the future. Arguing that modern weapons were becoming too technical to be adequately mastered by amateur military men, LeMay noted that:

One element of the overall Air Force program which we are looking at is the present and future roles of the air reserve forces. As weapons complexities continue to increase, the possibility of their being maintained and operated with a high degree of efficiency by other than members of the active establishment will decrease. I can see the tactical role for our reserve forces diminishing. . . . Looking ahead, I can see the need for only one air reserve component.
The National Guard Association, meeting at its annual conference, immediately passed a resolution demanding reevaluation of LeMay's qualifications and usefulness in light of his remarks about the air reserve components. The Secretary of the Air Force, James H. Douglass, moved quickly to calm this political storm. He telegraphed NGAUS President, Major General William H. Harrison (U.S.A.F., ret.), at the association's annual conference in San Antonio, Texas. Douglass sought to "clarify" LeMay's remarks by asserting that they had been made to stimulate "dynamic thinking."

He noted that LeMay had:

... recently approved the appointment of fourteen highly qualified officers to conduct a study of long range missions and requirements for the reserve forces. . . . Its members will consider future roles for the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard in the light of revisions in military equipment, methods, and techniques.

Douglass assured Harrison that Air Force policy was that both the Air Force Reserve and Air Guard were valuable to the overall program of aerospace power. He emphasized that, as Secretary of the Air Force, he supported this policy.

Air Force speakers at the NGAUS conference reiterated the secretary's position. Lieutenant General William E. Hall, CONAC's commander, praised the "... truly astonishing combat readiness of the Air National Guard." Dudley C. Sharp, Undersecretary of the Air Force, noted the future missions of the air reserve forces were under review by the Air Staff and special board of officers. Addressing the anxieties of the assembled Guardsmen, he assured them that:
... there is no second team in the Air Force. Active units, [Air National] Guards, and [Air] Reservists jointly form one first string deterrent force now. ... [The Air Guard] is an integral part of the entire defense team.

Public praise notwithstanding, the skepticism about reserve programs voiced by Atkinson and LeMay in 1959 may very well have been widespread within the Air Force's top professional military leadership. Their enthusiasm for these programs was often grudging. General White had commented in October 1958 to his Deputy Chiefs of Staff that "... the reserve forces were here to stay and that it was our job [i.e., the Air Staff's] to find ways for them to best serve and take some of the load off the regular establishment."47 However widespread such private skepticism about the air reserve programs may have been, it was impolitic to voice it publicly.

General LeMay's critical comments about the air reserve forces and the political furor they generated represented something more substantial than lingering professional military skepticism about amateur airmen. The political mini-tsunami LeMay precipitated in 1959 was also an outgrowth of a series of Air Force reassessments of the size and missions of its reserve programs. The first of these formal reviews was initiated in November 1956 under the chairmanship of Lieutenant General Charles B. Stone III, CONAC's commander. General Stone had written General Nathan Twining, Air Force Chief of Staff, that August, suggesting the need for such a review. Stone, concerned by impending cuts in the Air Force budget, believed that air reserve forces could be better employed to augment the active Air Force than current concepts and policies permitted.
He suggested that a reappraisal of their composition and missions "... would result in a realignment of functions which would make it possible for the regular Air Force to concentrate on the performance of these tasks not at all practical for the reserve." A little more than a month later, General Thomas White, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, replied for General Twining. White approved Stone's suggestion noting that budgetary and manpower limitations demanded the maximum utilization of every available resource. White approved Stone's suggestion noting that budgetary and manpower limitations demanded the maximum utilization of every available resource. White appointed Stone chairman of the Air Reserve Forces Review Committee. Besides Stone, the committee's membership included Major General William E. Hall, Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, Major General Winston P. Wilson, Chief of the NGB's Air Force Division, five representatives of Headquarters USAF, as well as representatives from SAC, TAC, ADC, Military Air Transportation Service (MATS), and the Air Material Command (AMC). Supporting research for the study was done by CONAC, Headquarters USAF and the Air University. The Stone Board submitted its final report to the Chief of Staff on February 12, 1957.

The Stone Board's principal recommendation was expanded utilization of the air reserve forces through their active participation in a number of peacetime support functions. The board's final report analyzed twenty-three Air Force peacetime support functions, grouping them in accordance with their perceived suitability for reserve forces participation. It concluded that five
of the twenty-three functions could be handled as well by reserve forces as by the active duty establishment and at appreciably lower costs. These five included: AC&W, air evacuation, tow target, certain logistical functions, and certain unspecified defense missions. The reserves could be of substantial assistance in nine other functions: ADC manned fighters, troop carrier and airlift, air rescue, fighter-bomber and tactical reconnaissance, tactical control, radio relay, communications construction and communications maintenance. In six areas, peacetime reserve participation did not appear to be practical. These were: aerial resupply, weather service, airways and air communications, air terminal augmentation, personnel processing, and medical services. No committee position could be established on strategic missiles. Base support functions could be augmented by individual reservists but not units and the ground observer function could be performed by reservists but no real savings were anticipated. The report also recommended "... that the Air Staff review the validity of the wartime requirements of all Reserve Forces units" and that existing reserve units with no substantial peacetime utility be "... evaluated for program retention."  

The Stone Board’s recommendations challenged the prevailing logic behind the Air Force’s reserve programs. That logic assumed that since preparation for D-Day missions was expensive and the active force was unlikely to ever get all the resources it wanted, the reserves must be relied upon to bridge part of the resulting gap. The Stone Board recommended that the conception of reserve
forces' roles be broadened whenever possible to support the active force in its peacetime functions as well as to augment its preparations for D-Day. The board's recommendations were approved in part by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces and then by the Chief of Staff. However, their implementation was sidetracked, at least for several years, by a substantial DOD budget and manpower retrenchment ordered by President Eisenhower in 1957. Nevertheless, the board's recommendations were extremely significant. They represented the first official Air Force recognition that growing pressures on its budget might necessitate the adoption of a much broader conception of the use of reserve forces and a closer integration of these forces with the everyday activities of the active duty Air Force.  

President Eisenhower ordered a major retrenchment in the defense budget in 1957. This retrenchment, dictated by his fiscal conservatism and the budgetary exigencies of the emerging missile age, struck the Air Force hard. In July, the President approved a 100,000 man reduction in active duty military strength to be completed before January 1, 1958. The Air Force's share of this reduction was 25,000 of its approximately 919,000 personnel. Additional manpower reductions were planned. These would reduce the Air Force's active duty strength to 850,000. These planned manpower reductions were to be accompanied by substantial budget cuts. In August, the Air Force was directed to limit its FY 1958 expenditures to $17.9 billion, almost $1 billion below its estimated requirements. The Air Staff decided that those portions of the Air
Force with missions directly related to air defense and retaliatory capabilities or missile development projects would sustain the minimum budget reductions under this revised program.\textsuperscript{53}

The 1957 budget retrenchment was also shared by the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve. All further expansion of these components was ordered halted by the Chief of Staff in August 1957 pending yet another study of reserve programs. The Secretary of Defense had directed the Air Force on March 1, 1957 to reduce the size of its ready reserve and place more emphasis upon their wartime roles. Consequently, headquarters USAF directed its reviewers to assume that the Air Force would only program those reserve units needed from D-Day to D plus thirty days in a general war and, as practical, those units having local war utility. On August 16, the Chief of Staff approved a proposal to reduce the air reserve forces' flying programs. Twelve of their fifty-one wing headquarters were scheduled for elimination, three from the Air Guard, and nine from the Air Force Reserve. Three Air Guard and ten Air Force Reserve flying squadrons were also scheduled to be cut. Furthermore, the entire air reserve fighter program was to be given to the Air Guard. The Air Force Reserve was to specialize in the unglamorous and less costly troop carrier mission. These cuts also reduced the Air Guard's total personnel authorization from 92,797 to 81,000. Actual Air Guard strength by June 30, 1957 had reached 67,950. The entire Air Force retrenchment project was dubbed "Streamline-3."\textsuperscript{54}

General Winston P. Wilson, chief of the NGB's Air Force Division, painted a grim picture of the future for Air Guardsmen
assembled at the annual NGAUS conference in October 1957. The Air Guard's appropriation had been reduced by $20 million for FY 1958. It would have to deactivate three wing headquarters and three flying squadrons. The money squeeze, he implied, was hurting the availability of flying hours. The annual Air Guard quota in the Air Force's pilot training programs had been reduced from 500 to approximately 155. The Air Guard had been a growing organization prior to 1957. Now it faced a situation where its strength was rapidly approaching its shrinking personnel ceiling. There was, however, a bright spot in this picture. Wilson noted that a number of Air Guard squadrons had been converted to certain unspecified new missions that the regular Air Force could no longer perform because of reductions in its strength. Furthermore, the Air Guard would be receiving newer and more modern aircraft twelve to eighteen months earlier than expected due to reductions in the active Air Force's flying inventory.55

Largely because of Streamline 3, there were some striking improvements in the Air Guard by the end of FY 1958. Its total jet inventory increased by 362 aircraft during that period. By June 30, 1958, it included 792 all-weather fighter-interceptors, approximately 1,000 day fighters, and 140 reconnaissance aircraft. The F-100 and the RB-57 had begun to enter its flying inventory. All sixty-nine Air Guard fighter squadrons had air defense designated as their primary mission. However, eleven of those squadrons, equipped with F-84F's, were instructed to practice a secondary mission, the delivery of tactical nuclear weapons. The public
announcement of this new mission emphasized that none of these squadrons would actually train with nuclear weapons nor would they be stored at Air Guard bases. Addressing other positive aspects of the Air Guard program, Wilson noted that aircrew readiness had increased from 27 to 33 percent while aircraft operational readiness had grown to 63 percent during the first six months of 1958. Finally, he emphasized that, although the Air Guard had lost three wing headquarters as scheduled, only one fighter squadron had actually been eliminated.  

David S. Smith, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, emphasized the Air Force's need for increased reliance upon its reserve components as a result of reductions in the Air Force budget. He explained to the Guardsmen:  

Clearly, with the requirements on one hand, and with the urgent need to control and reduce expenditures on the other, the Air Force cannot afford a full-time force to handle every risk ahead of it. We must place a large share of our defense burden on you and your fellow guardsmen throughout the nation. . . . In the past, our reserve forces concept included a large training mission but today our concept requires that the unit program constitute a force in being with very high standards of readiness. . . . [Our new reserve structure] will constitute, in a very real sense, an extension of our active force ready for mobilization in any future conflict. . . . You are nearer to being an integral component of the active Air Force than at any time in the past.  

Smith emphasized that the Air Guard would be concentrating upon the following operational tasks: air defense runway alerts, early warning, airborne sampling of nuclear clouds, as well as tactical fighter and reconnaissance operations in local wars. Clearly, the official emphasis was shifting from growth and training to increased
operational readiness and closer integration with the active duty force. Paradoxically, this shift was supposed to be accomplished while the Air Guard sustained a substantial budget cut.  

The Eisenhower administration's budgetary retrenchment received a rude jolt from the Russians in October 1957. Sputnik, the earth's first artificial satellite, shattered some comfortable national assumptions about American military, technological, and educational superiority. DOD responded with $1.5 billion in added budget estimates for FY 1959. These included funds for accelerated missile development and a reduction in planned cuts in the Army budget. The previously announced Air Force budget cuts were also reversed. Total Air Force obligations for FY 1958 actually were over $23.8 billion, a rise of $5.9 billion beyond its projected spending ceiling under the administration's discarded austerity budget. This also represented a growth of $5.3 billion over the Air Force's total obligations for FY 1957. The Air Guard budget profited modestly from Sputnik. Its total obligations for FY 1958 were some $257.5 million. This was a growth of approximately $8.2 million above its FY 1957 obligations.

In late 1959, new budget constraints forced another formal review of the air reserve programs. The Under Secretary of the Air Force had rejected in June a request from the Chief of Staff for an increase of 10,000 paid drill spaces for the Air Force Reserve. He also directed that "a complete and searching review be made of the entire program with the objective in mind of fully justifying a realistic existence of the reserve program and active establishment
support thereto.\textsuperscript{60} Air Force budget estimates for FY 1961 had also entered the picture that summer. DOD had directed the Air Force to submit estimates of $18.8 billion and $18.3 billion. These estimates were well below the $19.3 billion the Air Force considered essential. Following its Sputnik-induced $23.89 billion peak in FY 1958, total Air Force obligations had shrunk to $20.28 billion in FY 1959 and would shrink an additional $1.93 billion in FY 1960. Active Air Force bases were being closed and tactical units were being eliminated. These shrinking budgets had led to the Under Secretary's request that USAF undertake yet another formal reassessment of the organization and missions of its reserve forces. General LeMay's public criticisms of the air reserve forces in September 1959 alluded to this forthcoming Air Force review.\textsuperscript{61} In response to these pressures, a Reserve Forces Review Group convened in the Pentagon on October 19, 1959. It was chaired by Major General Sory Smith, commander of CONAC's 4th Air Force. The membership also included representatives from the Air Guard, Air Force Reserve, Air Staff, CONAC, Continental Air Defense Command (CONAC), AMG, MATS, SAC, and TAC. They assessed the Air Force's needs throughout the upcoming decade of the 1960's and how the reserve forces should be configured to support those needs. After thirty days of deliberations, the review group produced an important report titled "The Air Reserve Forces. New Roles in a New Era."\textsuperscript{62}

Generally, the report strongly endorsed the continuing need for existing air reserve forces. It was satisfied that they were capable of meeting the same high standards as regular Air Force
units. However, it was extremely critical of the obsolescent aircraft given the Air Guard. The release of aircraft to the Air Guard had been forecast at such a limited rate that the Guard had been forced to carry fighters such as the F-89 D/H and the F-86 D/C well beyond their anticipated obsolescence. These aircraft, the report concluded, would be hopelessly mismatched with the most probable threat. It emphasized that budget restraints had forced the Air Force to rely upon equipping its reserve forces with aircraft dropped from the active force's inventory. Since there would not be enough high performance aircraft available to equip most Air Guard units outside ADC, the report recommended that they be converted to other missions like troop carrier. It recommended the concentration of aircraft in the Air Guard that would have assured roles in both peacetime and war. The report also recommended reserve forces participation in new mission areas. These included nuclear attack survival and recovery; operation of alternate bases for SAC and ADC; and off-base storage of war readiness materials. The report recommended that the Air Force should defer reserve force participation in the operation of defensive missiles until regular units had obtained considerable experience with them. It also suggested that the reserves might operate one of the Air Force's basic flying schools. The Air Guard was already operating its own jet instrument school. 63

The most significant recommendation of the Reserve Forces Review Group's report called for a substantial restructuring of the Air Force's system of reserve forces management which later became
known as the gaining command concept. In order to save administrative overhead "... the group recommend(ed) that CONAC Headquarters, its immediate supporting structure and its subordinate numbered Air Forces be disestablished." It proposed that CONAC's responsibilities for all reserve units and individual mobilization augmentees be shifted to the major air commands which would gain them in the event of a war or other emergency necessitating the mobilization of reserves. The office of the ACSRF would be given responsibility for the budget allocations, coordination and supervision of all reserve forces. The report carefully added that no changes should be made in the internal Air Guard administration structure except that inspection and supervision of its training would be shifted from CONAC to the gaining major air commands. The board cautioned that:

... these proposals can succeed only if the highest Air Force officials insist that the Air Staff and the major air commands conscientiously and understandingly accept their responsibility for imaginative, objective, and enlightened guidance of the reserve forces.

The review group had good reason to insert this caveat. The NGF had urged adoption of a similar approach to reserve forces management beginning in 1954 but ADC and headquarters USAF had strongly resisted the proposal. An Air Staff proposal along those lines had gotten nowhere in 1957. In that instance, the proposal was quietly shelved when the major air commands failed to concur with it. For the most part, the major air commands had not been eager during the 1950's to take full responsibility for training and inspecting the air reserve forces.
Some of the review group's proposals were quite controversial. CONAC, naturally enough, was opposed to being eliminated. It had a powerful ally in the Reserve Officers Association (ROA). ROA, which had played a pivotal role in sponsoring the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, had emerged as an effective champion of the federal components of the reserve forces during the 1950's. ROA publicly opposed the Air Force's gaining command concept of reserve forces management, erroneously citing the 1945-1950 period as an experiment of that sort which had failed. ROA believed that the interests and preparedness of reserve components would continue to be best served by continuation of CONAC, a major air command primarily concerned with their training. However, the Air Force Association and the NGAUS endorsed the proposal. The Air Staff, which had conducted its own study of the air reserve components concurrently with that of General Smith's review group, continued to mull over various proposals through January 1960. A special meeting of the Air Staff's Reserve Forces Policy Committee was called in late January to advise on the merits of the review group's report, primarily its suggested changes in reserve forces management. However, the policy committee could not agree on the merits of the proposed new concept of reserve forces management and recommended return of the review group's report to the Air Staff for further study. The Secretary of the Air Force disregarded this advice and approved the gaining command concept and a proposed reserve force structure on February 2, 1960. Two days later, General White, the Chief of Staff, added his formal approval.
The plan, originally announced to the press on February 6, differed significantly from the original recommendations of the Reserve Forces Review Group. CONAC was not eliminated. It would continue to be responsible for the logistic, administrative and budgetary support of the Air Force Reserve. CONAC would also continue to administer training programs for individual Air Force Reservists who served as individual mobilization augmentees rather than members of organized units. Minor modifications of the plan were made in light of comments received by Headquarters USAF. The Chief of Staff approved the plan in its final form on May 17, 1960. The essential feature of the gaining command concept remained intact. The major air commands would assume, effective July 1, 1960, responsibility for inspecting and supervising the training of all Air Guard units assigned to them in contingency plans. They would also exercise the same functions with respect to Air Force Reserve units. Henceforth, the commanders of the major air commands would be directly accountable for the training and operational performance of those reserve units assigned to them. The training and management of reserve units would now be organized on a functional basis similar to that long enjoyed by active Air Force units.

The Air Guard retained its basic twenty-four wing flying unit structure. However, there were some significant changes in its aircraft inventory and missions. Six wings, three each from the air defense and tactical fighter forces, were converted to the long range transport mission. They were re-equipped with C-97 aircraft and assigned to support MATS. The C-97 was the first four engined
prop-driven aircraft operated by the air reserve forces. Further aircraft modernization was also scheduled. Both Congress and the Reserve Program Review Group had been highly critical of the obsolescence of the Air Guard's aircraft. Century series fighters had only been introduced in three squadrons by May 1960 but the NGB had plans to convert additional fighter units to F-100's, F-104's, and F-102's during fiscal year 1961. The pace of conversions to more modern aircraft accelerated considerably due primarily to the deactivation of ten of TAC's forty-five tactical flying wings in FY 1959. Fifty-five Air Guard flying squadrons underwent these conversions between July 1, 1959 and June 30, 1961. By the latter date, the Air Guard possessed 2,000 aircraft, all of them jets except for a limited number of support aircraft and transports flown by the twenty-six squadrons participating in non-tactical missions.

The Air Guard's entry into the long range air transport field illustrated some of the most significant factors that have shaped its force structure and missions. According to General Winston P. Wilson:

"We had six air defense units that we didn't have any missions for. . . . And, all at once, I saw where they were disbanding or modernizing the active Air Force. They were putting forty-eight C-97's into the boneyard. Well, I started a paper to convert six fighter-interceptor squadrons to transports. . . . The Air Force turned it down. . . . Mendell Rivers found out about it . . . and directed that the Air Force keep the C-97's in the inventory. . . . I put in my paper through the Air Staff and it got a non concurrence.

General Wilson explained that the Air Staff had argued that Air Guardsmen, drawn from various occupations and training only one weekend
each month, could not be formed into effective teams to maintain
and fly complex, multi-engined aircraft like the C-97's. Secretary
of the Air Force James Douglass overruled the Air Staff and authorized transfer of the transports to the Air Guard after reading
Wilson's paper and discussing the issue with him personally. 71

Clearly, the Air Guard still had to overcome ingrained profes-
sional skepticism in the late fifties. This skepticism largely
ignored the enormous skill and experience of the cadre of ex-Air
Force flyers and maintenance personnel who constituted the heart of
the Air Guard program. Many professional officers overlooked the
fact that this Air Guard cadre was composed of Air Force veterans
who could maintain advanced levels of military proficiency on a
part-time basis. More significantly, the C-97 episode illustrated
the fact that the Air Guard continued to rely upon its political
influence and the availability of surplus or obsolescent Air Force
aircraft to modernize its flying inventory. These factors, more
than any other, molded the Air Guard's force structure and missions
through the fifties. In one form or another, they had dominated the
shape of National Guard aviation since 1920. Although legitimate
military uses could almost always be found for aircraft made available
by this process, it imposed substantial limitations upon the mission
assignments and operational potential of Air Guard flying units.

Adoption of the gaining command concept in 1960 marked the
beginning of the Air Guard's integration into the Air Force's
operational structure on an across-the-board basis. It also signaled
the beginning of broad-gauged Air Guard support of the Air Force's
peacetime functions which the air defense alert program had foreshadowed and the Stone Board had explicitly recommended. These developments contributed significantly to upgrading the operational readiness of Air Guard units by providing Air Force commanders with a direct personal incentive to enhance their performance. Air Guard leaders, anticipating diminished future requirements for manned fighter aircraft, had encouraged these developments throughout the late 1950's by pushing for a diversification of the Air Guard's missions, greater peacetime support of the Air Force, and elimination of its ties with CONAC. They correctly foresaw that diversification would make the Air Guard far less vulnerable to future program changes. 72

Significant changes in the Air Guard—Air Force relationship were soon evident with the adoption of the gaining command concept. Closer ties between TAC and the thirty-six Air Guard flying squadrons assigned to it in 1960 led to their frequent use in firepower demonstrations and reconnaissance missions. They also began actively participating in joint Army—Air Force exercises. Although the Air Guard's air defense mission was downgraded in terms of total numbers, the quality of its participation improved. By June 1960, its fighter interceptor force had shrunk to forty squadrons, down considerably from the unwieldy force of sixty-nine squadrons assigned to ADC in 1958. This slimmed down force had, on the whole much better equipment than its larger predecessor. Prompted by reduced estimates of the Soviet bomber threat and the increased availability of all-weather interceptors, six Air Guard FIS's had expanded their
alert program participation from fourteen to twenty-four hours a day in mid 1959. Two years later, twenty-five Air Guard fighter-interceptor squadrons were participating in the alert program on this around-the-clock basis. Nine of these squadrons, flying F-89 J interceptors, were equipped with nuclear rockets in 1961 and 1962. Three of those actually stood alert with these rockets by late 1962. General Atkinson, ADC's commander, was much happier with the closer supervision of ANG FIS's his command had acquired in July 1960 because of the gaining command concept. He emphasized that Air Guard squadrons should, so far as possible, be trained to the same level of proficiency as their regular Air Force counterparts.\(^{73}\)

The Air Guard had enjoyed a period of enormous growth, modernization, and increasing integration with the active duty Air Force establishment from 1953 through 1960. By the latter date, its personnel strength had reached 71,000, well above the 35,556 reported in June 1953 as the Air Guard began to rebuild following its participation in the Korean War. Its technician complement had been expanded to 13,200 to handle the increasingly sophisticated technology its units were called upon to operate. The Air Guard budget had more than doubled since FY 1953. Total obligations during FY 1960 stood at some $232.61 million. This represented only 1.3 percent of the total Air Force budget for that year. The Air Guard's share of the total Air Force budget had remained fairly constant during this period, ranging from 1.1 to 1.4 percent of the total obligations each fiscal year.
The total number of Air Guard flying squadrons had been expanded to ninety-two by 1960, an increase of eight over its pre-Korean War level. The missions of these squadrons, although predominantly oriented toward air defense during much of the 1950's, had been enormously diversified. By 1960, Air Guardsmen were participating in tactical fighter and reconnaissance, air transport and aeromedical evacuation as well as air defense missions. Their aircraft inventory, although still dependent on the fallout of excess or obsolescent aircraft from the active Air Force's inventory, had been substantially improved. Their F-51's and B-26's had been replaced by F-84's, F-89's, F-100's, F-104's, and C-97's. Although still manned and equipped on a training basis, they possessed limited operational capabilities that had been conspicuously absent in 1950. The air defense alert program had demonstrated this. Adoption of the gaining command concept in 1960 had been a significant step in integrating the Air Guard's training with the daily operations of the Air Force. In effect, this integration and the concomitant emphasis upon air reserve forces' peacetime support of a broad range of active force missions promised marked the beginning of what later became known as the total force policy.

The Air Guard and the Air Force had gradually evolved a productive working relationship during the Korean War and carried this forward during the Eisenhower administration. For political and budgetary as well as military reasons, the Air Force had tacitly agreed to ignore the Air Guard's anomalous state status. Federalization was no longer a live issue. The contentious bickering over
command authority that had troubled Air Guard–Air Force relations prior to the Korean War was almost entirely absent. Top Air Force leaders, encouraged by the Eisenhower administration's initial enthusiasm for stronger reserve forces and comforted by the lion's share of defense budgets under the "New Look," grudgingly accepted the pragmatic necessity to build a viable Air Guard program.

The Air Guard, led by officers who recognized that their organization's future ultimately depended upon its development of high level operational capabilities, proved to be extremely responsive to Air Force direction. Organizational, training, and operational readiness requirements were standardized in accordance with the directives of Air Force commanders. Air Guardsmen achieved an effective voice in the development of policies, plans, and programs as they related to their particular reserve component at the Air Staff and major air command levels. In this context, arguments over formal command jurisdiction were far less compelling than they had been in the late 1940's. The Air Force achieved the objectives of command authority because of the willingness of top Air Guard leadership to accept increased federal control and supervision of training. Guardsmen had done this to achieve the improved operational performance that would, in their view, help guarantee the Air Guard's future as an Air Force reserve component with a distinctive state character. In effect, they had exchanged a measure of state autonomy for higher levels of federal support and closer integration with the active Air Force to insure their own survival. The growing mutual accommodation
between the Air Force and the Air Guard transformed the latter from a glorified flying club into a viable reserve component of the active duty establishment during the 1953-1960 period.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER FOUR


5 NGAUS, 1953 Proceedings, pp. 88, 298-299.

6 Ibid., p. 87.


10 Hoover, Interview, May 1978.


16 Johnson, Interview, June 1978.

17 Ibid.

18 Letter, Col. Clayton E. Hughes (USAF, ret.) to author, 20 March 1978. Col. Hughes was Chief of the Operations Division, Air Force Division of the NGB from December 1952 until July 1956. During this period, the Air Guard's participation in the air defense alert program was planned and implemented. McMullen, ADC Study No. 38, p. 24. Johnson, Interview, June 1978. Headquarters ADC,


20 McMullen, ADC Study No. 38, pp. 25-27.


23 Kinnard, Eisenhower and Strategy, pp. 10, 18, 19, 23, 136.


26 Weigley, Way of War, pp. 402-403.


29 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, DOD Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1954, Hearings, before a subcommittee, 83rd Cong., 1st sess., 1953, p. 177.


U.S. Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee, Hearings on a National Reserve Plan, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955, p. 81. Hereafter cited as U.S. Senate, Hearings on NRP.


4 AFCRF, "Semi Annual Report. The Air Reserve Forces Plans and Programs. 1 January to 30 June 1955," pp. 1, 29, Records of the AFCRF, Office of the AFCRF, Liaison Division, Subject Correspondence File, 1955, Box 40, RG 341, NARS.


44. SecAF, Telegram to NGAUS Pres., Oct. 1959.


46. NGAUS, 1959 Proceedings, pp. 96, 98.

47. Memo for the Record, General White, 21 October 1958, Subj: "Chief of Staff Meeting with the Deputies, 21 October 1958," p. 2. Papers of General Thomas D. White, Box 15, Chief of Staff Meetings, LOC.


50. CONAC, History, Jan.-June 1957, pp. 113-115.
51 Ibid., p. 115.


53 CONAC, History, July-Dec. 1957, pp. 30-34.


57 NGAUS, 1957 Proceedings, pp. 132-133.

58 Ibid., pp. 132-133.


63 Ibid.


65 Ibid., pp. 22-23.


70 Wilson, Interview, Dec. 1978.

71 Ibid.


CHAPTER FIVE


John F. Kennedy's inauguration as President in January 1961 signaled the beginning of a fundamental shift in U.S. national security policies. The new President was committed to an activist foreign policy backed by usable conventional military power. He considered the Eisenhower administration's reliance on nuclear forces dangerous and ineffective. Kennedy's emphasis upon non-nuclear military forces, taken in conjunction with the increasingly close integration of the active Air Force and its reserve components under the gaining command concept, eventually transformed the Air Guard into a highly proficient element of the total force. Before these programs could be fully implemented, however, the Air Guard was tested in a role for which it had never been prepared. Between October 1961 and August 1962, nearly 33 percent of its strength was mobilized to help serve as a diplomatic counterweight to Soviet efforts to eject the western powers from Berlin. The Air Guard was a success in this unanticipated role as an instrument of Cold War diplomacy. Nearly 300 of its aircraft were deployed to Europe in the autumn of 1961. However, this success was limited and the product of brilliant improvisation rather than sound reserve forces.
policy and planning. The Berlin mobilization revealed a host of shortcomings in the Air Force's reserve programs. Air Guard tactical units deployed to Europe displayed very limited operational capabilities and required extensive active force support. Their shortcomings were a product of DOD-imposed manpower and equipment limitations as well as faulty Air Force planning. Although the Air Guard was able to perform far more impressively in 1961 than it had done ten years earlier during the initial Korean War mobilizations, the Berlin Crisis showed that its tactical units were still not M-Day forces. Clearly, they had been manned, organized, and equipped for training rather than immediate operational roles. Moreover, the Air Force lacked concepts and well-developed plans for using reserve units in situations short of a general war. Problems associated with the Air Guard's performance during the Berlin mobilization resulted in changes that rectified many of the planning and management deficiencies revealed in 1961-1962. However, resource deficiencies continued to be a major barrier until Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara moved to create a selected strategic reserve force in 1965.

President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara were concerned by America's heavy reliance on nuclear weapons. This legacy of the Eisenhower administration's massive retaliation doctrine had long been under attack by certain Army officers and influential civilian intellectuals who specialized in national security issues. Essentially these critics, including General Maxwell Taylor and Henry Kissinger, argued that massive retaliation was a dangerous doctrine that stripped the U.S. of usable military power in most
of the potential conflict situations it was likely to face. During the Eisenhower administration, the nation's conventional ground, naval, and air forces had been allowed to atrophy. The lion's share of its defense budgets had gone to the strategic retaliatory and continental air defense forces. However, several international crises, including Suez, Taiwan Straits and Berlin, had demonstrated that the U.S. could not use its nuclear-armed, strategic retaliatory forces to meet low level challenges to its security interests. Furthermore, America's allies lacked both the will and the ability to fill the gap in conventional military forces that Eisenhower's emphasis on massive retaliation had created. The Soviets were beginning to develop a formidable strategic nuclear force of their own. Consequently, when President Kennedy took office in 1961, he faced an increasingly unpalatable choice between nuclear war or inactivity in future international crises.¹

The Kennedy administration moved rapidly to rectify the dangerous shortcomings it perceived in its predecessor's security policies. Defense spending grew significantly. Total DOD obligations under Kennedy's FY 1962 budget were $51.5 billion, an increase of over $9.1 billion above the Eisenhower administration's FY 1960 defense obligations.² Although existing strategic weapons programs such as Polaris and Minutemen were accelerated, much of this increase was devoted to upgrading the strength and readiness of America's conventional military forces.³ The President signaled his determination to rejuvenate the nation's conventional military forces in
his first special defense message to Congress. In the message, delivered on March 28, 1961, he declared:

Our defense posture must be both flexible and determined. Any potential aggressor contemplating an attack on any part of the free world with any kind of weapons, conventional or nuclear, must know that our response will be suitable, selective, swift, and effective.

Kennedy was calling for creation of a broad spectrum of military power that could be used in situations short of a nuclear confrontation. His statement represented a fundamental departure from the Eisenhower administration’s nuclear-oriented national security policies.

The Kennedy administration's new basic approach to national security came to be known as the doctrine of flexible response. It sought to reduce the threshold of nuclear war and restore the link between diplomacy and military power. Individual situations could be met with a combination of diplomacy and military force specifically tailored to them rather than dangerous threats of massive retaliation with nuclear weapons. The President intended to reinvigorate American foreign policy. Conventional military power would be one of his prime instruments for achieving this objective. Underscoring this emphasis upon the creation of strong non nuclear forces, the President brought General Maxwell Taylor, a retired Army Chief of Staff and critic of the Eisenhower administration's security policies, back into the government as his military advisor.

The Kennedy administration also launched a crash study of the armed forces' reserve components. Assistant Secretary of Defense Carlisle P. Runge was placed in charge of the Reserve Forces Task
Force that had been directed to complete this study by April 1, 1961. The Runge group had inherited a DOD/JCS study of the reserves launched during the last year of the Eisenhower administration. By 1961, that administration's initial enthusiasm for the reserves had cooled considerably. The President's budget request for FY 1961 had called for a 10 percent reduction in the Army's reserve components. NCAUS and ROA officials were alarmed by a published report that Runge's group was considering a more extensive role for the reserves in civil defense while downgrading their combat functions. They also feared that it might be sympathetic to the Eisenhower budget proposals. The House Appropriations committee began questioning DOD and reserve association officials in executive session about the Kennedy administration's plans for the reserve forces. In late March 1961, NCAUS and ROA publicly called upon Congress to block the proposed cuts in the Army's reserve components carried over from the Eisenhower administration. This pressure achieved its objectives. The Eisenhower proposals were quietly shelved. Although the Runge report was never released to the public, the Pentagon announced in June 1961 that the Army's reserve components were to be bolstered as part of the Kennedy administration's highly touted efforts to strengthen America's limited war capabilities. Earlier, DOD had revealed that all reserve forces would be maintained at levels previously established by Congress for FY 1961.

With its mix of fighters and transports, the Air Guard was potentially well suited to the new emphasis upon conventional military forces. When President Kennedy took office in 1961, the Air
Guard's personnel strength was just under 72,000. Its flying
organizations included thirty-two interceptor, twenty-two tactical
fighter, twelve tactical reconnaissance, sixteen transport and ten
aeromedical evacuation squadrons. These units were supplemented by
various technical and support organizations. Twenty-one Air Guard
interceptor squadrons continued to participate successfully in the
air defense runway alert program. Other units supported TAC and the
Army in various exercises. Although still seriously handicapped
by obsolescent aircraft, shortages of spare parts, and DOD-imposed
personnel ceilings, Air Guard units had benefited from closer ties
with the active Air Force with the implementation of the gaining
command concept of air reserve forces management in July 1960.

TAC's official history for January-June 1961 reported that "... in
general it may be said that their [i.e., the Air Guard's] readiness
was high—of thirty-eight ANG units [reported in a May 1961 summary]
thirty-five had maintained C-1 or C-2 ratings [i.e., fully or
nearly fully combat ready]." DOD's annual report for FY 1961 noted
that approximately 66 percent of all the Air Guard's flying units
were rated combat-ready. Although these estimates of the Air Guard's
operational capabilities in mid 1961 were greatly exaggerated, they
suggested that the Air Guard could play a valuable role in the
Kennedy administration's flexible response doctrine.9

Before the Kennedy administration could implement its buildup
of conventional active-duty and reserve forces, the Soviet Union
mounted a major diplomatic challenge in Europe. Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev renewed his campaign to force the western powers
out of Berlin. At a June 1961 summit meeting with President Kennedy in Vienna, Khrushchev presented a fresh statement of Soviet proposals on Germany and Berlin. He demanded the speedy conclusion of a German peace treaty and conversion of West Berlin into a so-called "free city" with the termination of western access rights. If the western powers failed to comply, Khrushchev threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic that would cancel all existing western rights in Berlin. He raised the terrible spectre of possible war if the western powers sought to interfere with any unilateral Soviet settlement of the German question. Shortly after the Vienna summit the Soviet Premier set a year-end deadline for compliance with those demands.10

The Kennedy administration had begun to consider its Berlin policy shortly after taking office. In March, the President had asked Dean Acheson to examine the problems of NATO and Germany. Secretary of Defense McNamara had reviewed existing Berlin contingency plans. Early in May, McNamara informed the White House that those plans assumed an almost immediate resort to nuclear war. The President expressed dissatisfaction with the state of planning at a July 8 meeting with his top aides. He directed Secretary McNamara to produce a plan that would permit conventional military resistance strong enough to convey American determination to stay in Berlin while encouraging the Soviets to negotiate. On the diplomatic side, he asked Acheson, who was advocating a military confrontation with the Soviet Union, to develop a political program for Berlin. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was instructed to develop a negotiating prospectus.
The DOD and State Department papers outlining these options were due at the White House within ten days. Meanwhile, a fierce debate between hardliners and moderates on the Berlin issue raged within the Kennedy administration.  

The President spent most of July struggling through the debate to reach his own conclusions. On the evening of July 25, he presented his Berlin plan to the American people in a televised speech. "We cannot and will not permit the communists," Kennedy said, "to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force." Rejecting the idea of an immediate military confrontation with its high probability of nuclear war, he announced an American military buildup coupled with a renewed offer to negotiate the larger German question. The military buildup included a request for an additional $3.25 billion for the defense budget and enlargement of the civil defense program. Approximately $1.8 billion of the requested defense budget increase was to be allocated to the procurement of conventional weapons and equipment. Draft calls were to be doubled and tripled. The Air Force delayed deactivation of B-47 bombers. Furthermore, the President requested authority to mobilize certain reserve and National Guard units. He and McNamara had decided at least as early as July 19 to mobilize twenty-nine Air National Guard flying squadrons. This military program supplemented the $3.4 billion increase in U.S. defense expenditures requested on May 25. These moves gave substance to Kennedy's firm stand on Berlin and his determination to strengthen America's conventional military capabilities.
The administration moved quickly to implement its announced conventional military buildup. On the day following the President's speech, Secretary McNamara asked the Senate Appropriations committee for Presidential authority to order up to 250,000 ready reservists to active duty for no more than one year without a declaration of national emergency. Congress obliged the administration by enacting public law 87-117 six days later and approving its request to expand the defense budget.16

On August 1, the NGB implemented procedures to mobilize National Guardsmen. It notified governors that certain units in their states had been designated priority units and could be subject to recall to active duty on October 1. All discharges from the National Guard were frozen and units were urged to recruit to full manning. General Winston P. Wilson, Deputy Chief of the NGB, advised the governors that virtually all of the Air Guard's tactical fighter units and two of its tactical reconnaissance wings could be mobilized. He authorized designated priority units to increase their monthly flying hours by twenty-five hours per aircrew during the first quarter of FY 1962. Priority units were also authorized to hire additional fulltime aircraft maintenance and administrative technicians on a temporary basis.17

An increased sense of urgency was imparted to these preparations when the Soviets escalated the Berlin Crisis on August 13. A few minutes after midnight on that date, the East Germans occupied most of the crossing points into East Berlin. They installed road-blocks and barbed-wire barricades between the two halves of the
city. Four days later, they began construction of a concrete wall to seal off the mounting torrent of refugees from the German Democratic Republic. The implications of these actions were not clear at the time. Some American officials feared that the wall might be part of a Soviet master plan to drive the Western powers out of Berlin. Remarking that there was now one chance in five of a nuclear war, Kennedy mobilized the decision-making resources of his administration. The special Berlin Task Force went into continuous session. It concluded that an accelerated American military buildup would be the most effective response to the latest Soviet challenge. The task force also drafted a formal diplomatic protest to Moscow. Increasingly sensitive to the need for more concrete American actions, the President decided to send Vice President Lyndon Johnson to West Berlin. He also ordered a battle group of 1,500 U.S. Army troops to move from West Germany via autobahn to Berlin. On August 30, the President appointed General Lucius Clay as his personal representative to the city. Clay was still remembered from the early days of the Cold War as the great symbol of western determination to stay in Berlin. The President also ordered some 148,000 reservists to active duty under Public Law 87-117. The Army mobilized 113,000 while the Air Force mobilized 27,000 and the Navy mobilized 8,000.

The Air Guard's performance during the 1961-62 Berlin Crisis was justifiably hailed as a success. The number of Air Guardsmen mobilized was 21,067. DOD's annual screening of ready reservists, instituted during the mid 1950's, evidently had worked well. Less than 1 percent of the mobilized Guardsmen were lost for personal
hardship or other reasons. During the Korean War, some Air Guard units had lost up to 10 percent of their personnel when they were called to active duty. The bulk of the individuals, mobilized during the Berlin Crisis, reported for active duty with their units on October 1. Units mobilized that date included eighteen tactical fighter squadrons, four tactical reconnaissance squadrons, six air transport squadrons, and one tactical control group. On November 1, three more fighter squadrons were mobilized. Selected units were notified on October 9 to prepare for overseas movement about November 1. In late October and early November, eight of these fighter squadrons deployed overseas. They flew 216 aircraft to various bases in Europe without a single accident. Additional units, including three squadrons of F-104's and their sixty aircraft, were airlifted to Europe in late November. All of these units were in place overseas within one month of their respective mobilization days. Mobilization and overseas deployment had taken at least seven months during the Korean War. Air Guard fighter squadrons retained in the U.S. on active duty were prepared to deploy to Europe in a second wave when needed. 19

The Air Guard's deployment to Europe, entitled "Operation Stair Step" by the Air Force, was publicly praised as a great success. 20 The U.S. commander in Europe, General Lauris Norstad, lauded the "... outstanding performance of the Air National Guard squadrons in crossing the Atlantic and taking over their bases in Germany and France and then participating almost immediately in defense tasks. ..." General Curtis E. LeMay praised "... the
magnificent showing of the [Air] Reserve Forces in the face of the current threat. . . . These units [i.e., federalized ANG squadrons] are generally ready. They can fight. They can be depended upon."

Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert declared that "the response to Berlin reemphasized the importance of our Reserve Forces. It put new factual evidence behind our belief in the need for and the effectiveness of our Air Reserve Forces Program." Secretary of Defense McNamara, emphasizing the fundamental significance of the Berlin recall, told Congress that "I don't believe there is any action that has been taken that more clearly demonstrated the strength, the will, and the firmness of purpose than the call-up of those [reserve] units." Public praise aside, the Berlin mobilization revealed a host of problems within the Air Force and its reserve programs. Many of these problems stemmed from the fact that the U.S. was not prepared to fight a conventional war in Europe. Secretary McNamara's review of Berlin contingency plans in May 1961 had revealed that they were virtually all predicated on the early use of nuclear weapons. The Air Force lacked an adequate supply of consumable items that could sustain conventional combat operations for any length of time. The gaining command concept of reserve forces management notwithstanding, the Air Guard was still a doctrinal orphan in the nuclear and space-oriented Air Force. DOD and the active duty establishment had, in effect, permitted the Air Guard to be organized, equipped, and operated on essentially a training basis. It lacked the concepts, plans, and spare parts to rapidly integrate Air Guard units into
its daily operations in a situation short of general war. Consequently, an enormous amount of post mobilization planning, reorganization, retraining, and resupply was required before Air Guard units could fully participate in European operations.25

The shortcomings of the Air Guard program had become evident in August after the state governors were notified that some of their units might be mobilized. Air Guard squadrons had been limited to 83 percent of their full authorized organizational strength by DOD in 1957. The resulting manpower shortages were overcome by mobilizing approximately 3,000 individual Air Force reservists and assigning them to Air Guard units. However, many of these individual fillers provided little help. Either they lacked the skills attributed to them in Air Force personnel records or they arrived too late to fulfill the requirements established by continually changing Air Force personnel Manning documents. These Manning documents were a major source of difficulty. In an effort to adjust Air Guard unit structures to European theater requirements, no fewer than six different Manning documents were presented by the Air Force after the Air Guard units had received their tentative mobilization alert notification on August 1. Consequently extensive post-mobilization training of personnel was required. One official Air Force history estimated that these extensive reorganizations placed almost 30 percent of the airmen in some "Stair Step" units in positions for which they had never been trained. The last change in unit Manning documents was imposed less than two weeks prior to overseas deployment. Complicating matters further, the headquarters of all but one of the Air
Guard Wings deployed overseas were split between the U.S. and Europe. This ad hoc split wing organization was adopted so that the units sent overseas could function independently while awaiting the planned follow-on deployment of the remainder of their respective wing organizations. However well intentioned, the split wing organizational format diluted the experienced leadership of individual Air Guard units by dividing them between the U.S. and Europe.  

Air Guard mobilization planning had envisaged moving mobilized units to the Air Force's main operating bases where extensive active force support would be available. However, they actually were deployed to inactive dispersed operating bases in France that were far from ready to receive them. Upon arrival at these bases, Air Force and Air Guard personnel had to devote considerable time and energy to make them barely livable. Also, considerable construction and repair activity was required to adapt their facilities, which had been constructed to support World War II aircraft, to jet fighter operations. The pressure of extensive base renovations and intensive preparations to assume European alert commitments initially caused serious morale problems for deployed units.

It soon became evident that Air Guard units had not been adequately equipped for sustained combat operations prior to mobilization. Unit equipment authorizations did not meet TAC's requirements. Air Guard units had only been authorized 70 percent of the equipment needed for full time operations. Aircraft had to be modified to carry TACAN, the Air Force tactical control system, and racks for 750 pound bombs. Tactical flying squadrons lacked
adequate flyaway kits, portable collections of the spare parts and tools needed to keep their aircraft operational for thirty days without outside support. Air Guard fighter squadrons only had rudimentary kits for its aging F-84F's and F-86F's. The Air Force in Europe was not flying these aircraft and did not maintain stockpiles of spare parts for them. Consequently, spare parts shortages became a crucial problem for Air Guard units in Europe once they began flying their aircraft on a sustained basis. Due to these shortages, units were sometimes unable to maintain a high percentage of their aircraft in an operationally-ready status. For example, the Air Guard's 102nd Tactical Fighter wing noted in a news release that "as a direct result of this situation [i.e., the spare parts shortage], the wing found itself unable to maintain its operational readiness [i.e., 70 percent in-commission rate required] during several of the most important days of the Berlin Crisis." The most serious problems in this regard were encountered by the three F-104 squadrons which were airlifted to Europe in November. Their aircraft were repeatedly grounded for maintenance or air safety reasons during the first six months of 1962.

Although Air Guard pilots were generally rated as excellent individual aviators, their flying training programs had not prepared them for a trans-Atlantic deployment. Most had only been trained for short overland flights and had never practiced aerial refueling. Many of their aircraft were not even equipped for aerial refueling. Few had ever flown in survival suits. Consequently, the Air Force instituted a crash program of intensive advanced flight training.
Air Guard pilots flew long range missions and practiced crash landing procedures for ice caps, fjords, and the sea. They also began to acquire the rudiments of aerial refueling skills. This advanced training was supervised by regular Air Force instructors. More significantly, a substantial amount of retraining for conventional weapons delivery was required once Air Guard units arrived in Europe. The Air Force had planned to send the Air Guardsmen overseas as a conventional weapons augmentation force that would free regular Air Force tactical fighter squadrons for nuclear strike roles. Yet, according to an official 17th Air Force history, "all of the Stair Step units had been trained for a nuclear mission; therefore, considerable training was necessary to prepare them for a conventional role."

The initial "Stair Step" concept called for mobilizing six tactical fighter wings and one tactical reconnaissance wing on October 1. All of these units, including their twenty-eight tactical flying squadrons, were originally scheduled to be deployed to Europe on December 1. However, Headquarters USAF set the launch date ahead to November 1. The deployment force itself was changed to include five tactical fighter wing headquarters with seven fighter squadrons, one tactical reconnaissance wing headquarters with one reconnaissance squadrons, one tactical control group with two AC&W squadrons, and three fighter interceptor squadrons. A follow-on force of one tactical fighter wing and fourteen tactical squadrons was retained in the U.S. While all of these Air Guard units were being prepared, TAC augmented USAFE (United States Air Forces in
Europe) with eight regular Air Force fighter squadrons possessing 144 aircraft. These squadrons were dispatched to Europe in mid September ostensibly to participate in NATO Exercise "Check Mate."

They were scheduled to return to the U.S. once the Air Guard units had arrived in Europe. 32

Despite the tremendous difficulties encountered in preparing the mobilized Air Guard units for deployment to Europe, operation "Stair Step" was an outstanding success. Small advanced echelons of Air Guardsmen had deployed to USAFE bases in mid-October to gather food, supplies, and equipment for the units in Europe. Beginning on October 29, nearly 10,000 Air Guard ground support and administrative personnel as well as tons of supplies were airlifted to Europe by MATS. A steady stream of transports completed this operation within forty-eight hours. Air Guard combat aircrews and their aircraft departed their home bases on October 27. Eight squadrons with 216 jet fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and trainers assembled at McGuire AFB, New Jersey and Loring AFB, Maine. Their move across the North Atlantic would be the largest single jet fighter deployment in U.S. Air Force history. 33

F-86H fighters and T-33 trainers were assembled at Loring AFB, Maine. They would island-hop to Europe via Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland, and Scotland. Brigadier General Charles W. Sweeney of the Massachusetts Air Guard personally led them. The F-84's and RF-84's assembled at McGuire AFB, New Jersey. Brigadier General Donald J. Strait, New Jersey Air Guard, led them on a more southerly route to Europe. They stopped at Newfoundland, the Azores, and
Spain. Tactical fighter squadrons participating in the Operation "Stair Step" deployment included the 163rd (Ft. Wayne, Ind.), 101st (Boston, Mass.), 131st (Westfield, Mass.), 141st (McGuire AFB, N.J.), 138th (Syracuse, N.Y.), 166th (Columbus, Ohio), and 110th (St. Louis, Mo.). Elements of the 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (Birmingham, Ala.) also deployed to Europe in this operation.34

The ocean crossing was originally scheduled to begin November 1. However, because of good weather, the F-86H's at Loring AFB left two days early. The T-33's followed on November 1. The F-84F's and RF-84's left McGuire AFB on schedule. The deployment was conducted during daylight hours only. Each squadron flew in formations of four aircraft apiece with the formations launched at fifteen minute intervals. The pilots had overnight rest stops while their aircraft were repaired and refueled. "Stair Step" aircraft began arriving at their assigned bases in Europe on November 2. The entire deployment was completed by November 17 without an accident or the loss of a single aircraft two weeks ahead of the original schedule.35

There was considerable anxiety about the dangers associated with "Stair Step" within the Air Force's top military leadership. The North Atlantic crossing was considered extremely dangerous for the limited range day fighters the Air Guardsmen flew. To minimize some of the risks associated with the ocean crossing, an impressive array of units were deployed to support the Air Guard pilots. C-54 "Duckbut" aircraft with radar monitored their flight. SAC supplied KC-135 tankers. These aircraft were primarily used as communication
relay stations rather than as aerial refueling platforms. Coast Guard vessels and freighters were strung out beneath the flight routes to conduct rescue operations if needed. General Sweeney, TAC's commander, monitored the deployment from his flying command post over the North Atlantic. General LeMay, Air Force Chief of Staff, also personally monitored the operation. Piloting his own transport, LeMay visited every airfield used during the critical ocean crossing period. Afterwards he congratulated the Air Guard "... for the outstanding manner in which this difficult and important task was accomplished."

Following "Stair Step's" completion, Air Guard flying units were stationed at five dispersed operating bases and one main operating base in France. The dispersed bases had generally been in poor condition when advanced parties of Air Guardsmen began arriving in mid October. Guardsmen had to repair barracks as well as administrative and maintenance facilities. Electrical power systems, which had been installed to support the flight operations of propeller-driven aircraft, were inadequate to handle jets and had to be augmented. Munitions storage had to be constructed. It took an enormous amount of work to make the dispersed bases operational.

The 152nd Tactical Control Group (TCG) from New York also deployed to Europe as part of "Stair Step." Its primary mission was to provide radar control for USAFE aircraft on tactical offensive missions. The main body of the 152nd personnel were flown to Germany between November 7 and 12. The bulk of its equipment was
not airlifted to the continent until the beginning of December. Its units achieved limited success in their efforts to become operational by year's end. Four of its six AC&W squadrons were almost operational by December 31. Its other two squadrons were delayed in achieving that status.  

Stair Step forces were augmented by three more Air Guard fighter squadrons in November. Beginning on November 10, sixty Air Guard F-104's from three squadrons were airlifted to Ramstein Air Base, Germany and Moron Air Base, Spain by giant C-124's from MATS. The project was named Operation "Brass Ring." The F-104 squadrons had experienced a dramatic transition since their recall to active duty on November 1. Prior to that date, they had been fighter interceptor squadrons participating in ADC's runway alert program. However, they were mobilized as tactical fighter squadrons and had been assigned to TAC. This had required extensive realignments within the three units on a crash basis. Although their aircraft were repeatedly grounded for maintenance or safety reasons during the first six months of 1962, these units stood their European theater alert requirements successfully beginning on December 19, 1961.  

"Stair Step" forces were deployed to USAFE under unilateral U.S. and tripartite contingency plans rather than NATO plans. The U.S. wanted to avoid commitment of these forces to NATO so they could be withdrawn from Europe as the situation permitted with a minimum of political and military complications. USAFE mission concepts for Air Guard forces included conventional interdiction strikes, counter air operations, and on-call close air support for the Army in the
event of a general war. They were also assigned missions within
Berlin corridor access contingency plans. All tactical fighter
squadrons were standing alert by December 31. Some of them had
assumed alert status in November. 41

The Air Force found that the Air Guard units deployed to
Europe had extremely limited operational capabilities. The 17th
Air Force observed that "as the Stair Step units began to arrive,
it appeared that they were not manned, trained, or equipped to assume
full base operational and maintenance responsibilities." 42 Initial
tactical evaluations of the "Stair Step" fighter wings were begun
by USAFE prior to the end of 1961. Only the 7108th and 7122nd
wings were rated satisfactory. Tests indicated that the 102nd,
7121st, and 7131st wings could not carry out their missions under
wartime conditions. Their pilots were acceptable but wing combat
operations center, pre-mission briefings, ordinance handling, and
aircraft turn-around times showed serious weaknesses. F-84 spare
parts shortages were a severe problem. Lacking these aircraft in
its active force inventory, USAFE had not stockpiled spares for
them. This seriously complicated maintenance problems and opera­
tional readiness rates in F-84 units. The 102nd, 7121st, and 7131st
wings could not launch sequence rates called for in exercise plans.
After additional command guidance and assistance, USAFE tactical
evaluations rated the 102nd, 7121st, and 7131st wings satisfactory
early in 1962. Subsequent USAFE operational readiness inspections
(ORI's) concluded that all these units were in satisfactory condition
except the 7121st TFW and the 152nd TCG. A second tactical evaluation
rated the 152nd satisfactory in May 1962. The 7121 TFW's problems included poor weapons delivery skills and inadequate aircraft availability rates. The wing received an unsatisfactory rating in weapons delivery during a subsequent inspection. Air Guard F-104 units were not formally evaluated by USAFE.43

A large force of mobilized Air Guardsmen remained on active duty in the U.S. after "Stair Step" and "Brass Ring" were completed. Less than half of those called up had been sent to Europe. Two wings of C-97 transports joined MATS. Their Air Guard aircraft and crews flew airlift missions to Europe, the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, South America, and Alaska. They also participated in Airlift exercises within the U.S. and between the U.S. and exercise locations overseas. The "Stair Step" follow-on force of one tactical fighter wing and fourteen tactical flying squadrons worked closely with TAC to enhance their operational readiness. These units participated in TAC and joint service exercises. Fighter squadrons also conducted firepower demonstrations and flew thousands of close air support missions for the Army. Reconnaissance squadrons flew aerial photographic missions for TAC.44

In the summer of 1962, Air Guard units returned to the U.S. and demobilized along with their counterparts that had remained in the states on active duty. Air Guardsmen were highly praised for their military performance and patriotic sacrifice during ten months of service. Public praise notwithstanding, the Air Force was privately skeptical about the military value of the Air Guard deployment to Europe. USAFE concluded that it had required a major diversion of
effort and resources within the command. Air Guard units had needed extensive modification and training before they could attain a substantial operational capability in Europe. The command's operations staff did not consider them to be potentially effective in the opening stages of a general war; however, it still believed that they might be useful in limited Berlin air corridor actions. USAFE had opposed deploying the Air Guard follow-on force from the U.S. to its European bases. It had feared that the Air Guard's obsolescent aircraft would saturate the command's bases, thereby making it difficult to either disperse its own aircraft or receive superior additional regular Air Force squadrons from TAC. Consequently, it recommended "that TAC regular force squadrons be deployed in any future USAFE augmentation rather than reserve forces." Clearly, the Air Force in Europe had not been especially pleased with the Air Guard's performance during the Berlin Crisis, public comments notwithstanding.

General LeMay was even more skeptical than USAFE about the combat capabilities of the "Stair Step" units. Assessing the Air Guard's performance years after his retirement in 1965, the outspoken former Chief of Staff observed:

They flew their airplanes over there [i.e., to Europe in 1961] and they could get some airplanes up in the air. How well they could pilot them is something else again. There again [they were] better than nothing. . . . But, it wasn't the kind of outfit that we should have had in the Reserves at that point. They just weren't ready. They had equipment. It was old equipment but going downhill. . . . It would fly, but whether it would do its job in combat is something else again. If its bomb racks won't work or their guns won't shoot, why it's not good. . . . If you are not fully combat
equipped, and if your crews are not fully combat trained, you haven't got a combat tool. That's what I am talking about. And, they just weren't what I would call combat ready.

The Berlin mobilization demonstrated that the Air Guard's equipment and manning had been designed for training, not actual combat operations. Its organizational structure had not been compatible with USAFE's requirements. Frequent changes in manning documents prior to the European deployment had created an enormous burden and reduced the effectiveness of the units involved. Splitting veteran wing staffs between the U.S. and Europe had further complicated these problems. DOD's refusal to approve Air Force and NGB requests to lift the 80 percent drill pay ceiling on Air Guard units in the years prior to the 1961 mobilization also had significantly weakened the operational potential of Air Guard units. Obsolescent aircraft and inadequate supply inventories had further diminished the Air Guard's combat potential. Air Force planning clearly had not anticipated the use of Air Guard squadrons in situations short of general war. Furthermore, it appears that the Air Force had anticipated having an extensive post M-Day period to bring mobilized Air Guard units up to full operational readiness. Neither the Air Force nor the Air Guard were adequately prepared to cope with a Cold War crisis like Berlin that implied the use of conventional military forces on a limited scale.48

Air Guardsmen saw the lessons of the Berlin mobilization in a wholly different light than the regulars. For them, it had been a great success. Working closely with active duty Air Force
personnel, Air Guardsmen prepared their units quickly for a successful overseas deployment despite the fact that their units had not been manned, organized, trained, or equipped for immediate deployment prior to the summer of 1961. Despite the problems it encountered, the Air Guard's 1961 mobilization performance was far superior to the initial Korean War debacle. Air Guard units, which had taken seven months to deploy overseas in 1950-1951, were able to do it within six weeks in 1961. Of course, these units were not rated ready for combat until early 1962. For the most part, unit integrity had been retained. Units had lost less than 1 percent of their assigned personnel during the Berlin mobilization for personal hardship and other reasons. During the Korean War, approximately 10 percent of the Air Guard's personnel had been excused from active duty once their units were mobilized. Operation "Stair Step" itself was a brilliant testimony to the basic flying skills of Air Guard pilots. Although mobilized units had demonstrated limited operational capabilities in Europe, they did contribute to the American conventional military buildup during the Berlin Crisis. From a diplomatic perspective, their mere presence in Europe was an important display of American resolve. On the military side, their improvised deployment had demonstrated the Air Guard's potential to become a first rate combat reserve force. Furthermore, they had provided a badly-needed interim buildup of conventional military forces as they had during the Korean War. Their veteran pilots and full-time technicians were excellent. Due to the pressures of the
draft, they were backed by a highly educated body of enlisted men
who could provide excellent support if properly trained and utilized.

Major General John J. Pesch typified the positive attitude
of veteran Air Guardsmen about the lessons of the Berlin mobiliza-
tion. During 1961–1962, Pesch had been an Air Guard colonel
assigned to the Operations Directorate of Headquarters USAF. Fol-
lowing his retirement as Director of the Air Guard in February 1977,
Pesch commented: 49

We had F-86H units that went to Europe and we had F-104 units
that went to Europe. They performed well [in 1961–1962] . . .
We opened up some old bases in rather austere places in
France. And so here again we proved we had the ability to
man and operate and function from, if not a bare base,
almost a bare base. It proved again what many of us knew.
We could do a job and do it professionally. I think it
demonstrated to the Air Force too, to the Germans, to the
French, and to the Spanish that we had an augmentation
force that was truly a combat capable augmentation force . . .
The [Air Force] officers and airmen we came in contact with on
active duty, who later got into positions of influence, were
favorably impressed. You had people who saw firsthand the
professionalism of Air Guard officers and airmen.

Obviously, a vast gulf separated Air Guard and Air Force assessments
of the former's Berlin mobilization's lessons. The Air Guard believed
that Berlin had illustrated its emerging capabilities as a combat
reserve force. The regular Air Force, focusing upon the problems
encountered by "Stair Step" and "Brass Ring" units, questioned the
value of mobilizing the Air Guardsmen and deploying them to Europe.
Most high ranking regular officers still refused to recognize any
real improvement in the Air Guard program. To them, Air Guardsmen
were still second-rate amateurs with limited usefulness in an era
that demanded increasingly high standards of operational competence.
They failed to recognize the limitations which obsolescent aircraft, inadequate funding and manning levels as well as poor planning had placed on the Air Guard’s operational performance.

Despite its private reservations about the quality of the Air Guard’s military performance during the Berlin Crisis, the Air Force worked closely with the NGB to correct some of the problems revealed by the mobilization. In May 1962, General Sweeney directed the development of a comprehensive program to enhance the Air Guard’s operational capabilities. As early as December 1961, the NGB had asked the Air Force to require its major air commands to prepare mobilization manning documents for their assigned Air Guard units in the same manner as they did for their own regular units. Air Guard units were reorganized in 1962-1963 in a cellular structure that matched the manning requirements of their gaining commands. This change made it possible for the Air Force to mobilize only those portions of specific wings that would be needed in a given contingency situation. Air Guard units were also written into Air Force plans for limited wars and cold war contingencies like the Berlin Crisis. The Chief of the NGB concluded in his annual report for FY 1962 that the manpower and organizational problems revealed by the Berlin mobilization had brought about closer and more enlightened cooperation between the Air Guard and the Air Force’s gaining commands.

Some fundamental Air Guard problems remained unsolved, indeed were exacerbated, in the immediate aftermath of the Berlin mobilization. DOD failed to authorize full manning for Air Guard units. The Air Guard’s personnel situation deteriorated as 285 of its
officers, mostly pilots, volunteered to remain on active duty with the Air Force. A Headquarters U.S. Air Force operational survey of all Air Guard units released from active duty in August 1962 found that they had experienced an average 12.5 percent personnel loss since mobilization. Demobilized units had also experienced serious losses of aircraft to the active duty establishment. In 1961, Secretary McNamara had approved expansion of the regular Air Force's tactical fighter force from sixteen to twenty-one wings as part of the Kennedy administration's conventional military buildup. The five new wings were temporarily equipped with obsolescent F-84's from Air Guard squadrons demobilized in 1962. DOD was unable to immediately provide adequate replacement aircraft for those Air Guard units. As a consequence of these pilot and aircraft losses, the Air Force reported that "at the end of the year [1962] . . . Air Guard squadrons assigned to TAC for training and instruction purposes were low in capability."  

The Berlin mobilization was an important episode in the Air Guard's transition from a glorified flying club to a highly proficient component of the total force. Regular Air Force skepticism aside, it demonstrated that the Air Guard's tactical flying units had made enormous progress since the Korean War mobilization. Operation "Stair Step" had been a brilliant improvised success. Guard units had shown a substantial capacity to rapidly adapt to unforeseen circumstances. Its pilots had demonstrated excellent flying skills. They were backed by a highly skilled cadre of full-time technicians in the maintenance, flight supervision, and
administrative support areas. However, inadequate funding and obsolescent equipment had seriously limited the Air Guard's immediate operational capabilities. Clearly, it had not been organized, manned, equipped, or trained for immediate deployment overseas in a potential limited war situation. Air Force planning had not even envisaged the Air Guard's employment in situations short of general war. DOD budget limitations had insured that Air Guard units would require substantial post mobilization assistance before they could become proficient combat teams. Yet, by 1961-1962 the Air Force and the Air Guard had evolved management and training systems for the latter. Inadequate resources and planning, not the Air Guard's anomalous state-federal status, were clearly the major barriers to the Air Guard's evolution into a highly proficient component of the total force. Many of these barriers were removed when Secretary McNamara created a selective strategic reserve force in 1965. The Air Guard would then be in a position to actually demonstrate the operational capabilities that its ardent champions had long claimed.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER FIVE


3 Weigley, Way of War, pp. 443-444.


5 Ibid., p. 445.


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Ibid., p. 391.


29. Eckwright, ANG to USAFE, p. 58. 7121st TFW, History of the 7121st Tactical Wing, 1 October 1961-31 December 1961 (Etain Air Base, France: 7121st TFW, Undated), p. 4. Hereafter cited as 7121st TFW, History, Oct.-Dec. 1961. The prefix "7" was added to the elements of the Ohio ANG's 121st TFW that deployed to Europe in Operation Stair Step. The wing operated under an ad hoc split wing concept with the bulk of its units retained under the 121st TFW designation in Ohio.


37 Hoover, Interview, May 1978.

38 Eckwright, ANG to USAFE, pp. 60-63.


46 Eckwright, ANG to USAFE, pp. 91-92.

47 LeMay, Interview, Sept. 1978.


49 Pesch, Interview, June 1978.


51 NGAUS, 1962 Proceedings, p. 255. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Authorizing the President to Order Units and Members in the Ready Reserve to Active Duty for Not More Than Twelve Months and for Other Purposes, Hearings, before the committee, 87th Cong., 2nd sess., September 1962, p. 8.

Following the Berlin Mobilization, DOD and the Air Force made significant changes in the Air Guard. Its operational readiness was substantially enhanced, and its weapons systems were modernized. The trend toward an increased emphasis upon tactical aviation, evident in the late 1950's, was accelerated. Air defense was downgraded even further. The Air Guard was transformed from a force requiring considerable post mobilization preparation for combat to one containing units available for immediate employment in a crisis. DOD's emphasis upon stronger conventional military forces under the "Flexible Response" policy and Secretary Robert S. McNamara's determination to create a select force of immediately-deployable reserve units in support of that policy provided the impetus for this transformation of the Air Guard. The growing American involvement in Southeast Asia also had an extremely important impact on the Air Guard. With the active duty establishment increasingly tied down by the Vietnam War, Guardsmen and Air Force Reservists shouldered a growing share of the burden of routine Air Force operations. The Air Guard's total personnel strength continued to grow. By June 30, 1969, it had reached some 83,000, an increase of approximately 9,000.
above its June 1963 level. This growth reflected the increasing technological sophistication and maintenance requirements of Air Guard as well as its growing annual appropriations. Accelerated draft calls after 1965 made it relatively easy to fill the Air Guard's expanded personnel authorization.¹

In 1965, Secretary McNamara intensified DOD's emphasis upon reserve readiness. Frustrated by Congress in his attempts to reduce the size of the Army's reserve components and merge them into a single organization, McNamara directed the creation of a Selected Reserve Force within each of the armed forces. This force, including nine tactical fighter and four tactical reconnaissance groups from the Air Guard, would constitute America's strategic reserve while the bulk of the active duty establishment was tied down in Southeast Asia by the late 1960's. DOD authorized Selective Reserve Force units to draw equipment on a high priority basis, recruit to full wartime manpower levels, and perform additional paid training. The program proved its value in 1968. Following seizure of the USS Pueblo by the North Koreans in January of that year, a number of Selected Reserve Force units were mobilized and deployed to Asia. Among them were Air Guard tactical fighter and reconnaissance units that served with distinction in South Vietnam and South Korea. Their truly outstanding performance in 1968-1969 appeared to substantiate the claims of ardent Air Guardsmen. Mobilized units had demonstrated that, given adequate support by DOD and the active duty establishment, they could achieve the high standards of performance and readiness demanded by Air Force doctrine. Thus, by
1968, a portion of the Air Guard had finally demonstrated the operational capabilities originally envisaged in the War Department's Approved Policies 1945.²

There was a substantial buildup of American military strength during the early 1960's. In the three years prior to June 30, 1964, nuclear weapons available to U.S. strategic alert forces had been increased 150 percent and the strategic bomber alert force had been enlarged by 50 percent. During that same period, Army active duty strength had been increased from 859,000 to 973,000. The total number of combat-ready Army divisions had been raised from sixteen to twenty-one. Procurement of weapons and material for these conventional ground forces had grown from $1.5 billion to $2.9 billion. The total number of Air Force tactical fighter wings in June 1964 stood at twenty-one, an increase of five since June 1961. Three more tactical fighter wings were programmed. Force modernization had also been emphasized. During FY 1964, the F-105F and F-4C began entering the Air Force's tactical inventory for the first time. Improved air-ground cooperation under the newly-established Strike Command and more frequent joint service exercises further underscored the Air Force's growing conventional warfare role.³

The buildup of active duty military strength was accompanied by DOD efforts to enhance the readiness of the reserve components. The major initial focus of these efforts was on the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. Unlike their predecessors in the Eisenhower and Truman administrations, DOD officials in the 1960's recognized that a prolonged and massive World War II style mobilization was no
longer especially useful. The Berlin mobilization had underscored this point. For example, two so-called high priority Army Guard divisions, the 32nd Infantry and the 49th Armored, had been recalled to active duty in 1961. Although these units had responded swiftly to their initial mobilization notice, their active duty performance had been extremely disappointing. They were critically short of fully-trained personnel, supplies, equipment, and modern weapons. Low authorized manning rates and generally substandard personnel job proficiency levels had made it necessary to recall many veterans to serve as individual fillers in those units. Although mobilized for one year, the 32nd and 49th Divisions required up to nine months of intensive preparations to achieve combat ready status. This was six months longer than their pre-mobilization readiness schedules had anticipated. Given the speed with which the Berlin Crisis had unfolded in 1961, nine months was far too long to support U.S. diplomatic and military objectives.  

Secretary McNamara initially responded to this disappointing Army Reserve mobilization performance with a proposal for extensive reductions in the Army Guard. Congress, following an investigation by the House Armed Services Committee, blocked the proposed reductions in 1962. McNamara then shifted his approach. He clearly wanted a smaller reserve force tailored for a rapid response to a broad range of global contingency plan requirements. Congress had taught him that massive manpower reductions in the reserves were not politically feasible. Adequate funds were not available to bring the entire reserve force up to desired standards of readiness.
Consequently, in 1963, McNamara directed the Army to create a high priority force within its existing reserve system. The Army's high priority force would consist of six National Guard divisions, eleven separate brigades, as well as an unspecified number of air defense missile batteries and support units. Units in this force were reorganized, given priority access to material, and manned at 75 to 80 percent of their full wartime strength. Their readiness objective was eight weeks.\(^5\)

As the Vietnam War escalated, McNamara attempted to carry his program to enhance Army reserve components' readiness a step further. In December 1964, DOD announced a proposal to create a single-component Army reserve system. Mindful of the failure of previous attempts to federalize or eliminate the National Guard, DOD asked Congress to authorize the merger of the 300,000-man Army Reserve into the 400,000-man Army Guard. The end result would be a 550,000-man Army Guard. All units that could not be made ready for combat within twelve to eighteen months of mobilization were to be eliminated. Approximately 2,100 units, including fifteen National Guard and six Army Reserve headquarters, were earmarked for deactivation. All units in this proposed force structure were to be fully prepared for rapid overseas deployment. A less publicized proposal to merge the Air Force Reserve into the Air Guard was also quietly approved by the Air Force. Both proposals were extremely controversial. Although they were cautiously supported by the National Guard Association, intense lobbying by the Reserve Officers Association helped defeat them in Congress in 1965.\(^6\)
Following the defeat of his merger proposals, Secretary McNamara announced the creation of a Select Reserve Force in 1965. The goal of this program was to identify high priority units that could be prepared for rapid deployment overseas if needed. The Selected Reserve Force's Army component consisted of 150,000 men. It was organized in three infantry divisions, six separate brigades, and many smaller units. It was given first priority for training funds, modern equipment and manpower. Within a few months of the Selected Reserve Force's creation, its units were reportedly fully manned and equipped. They constituted the bulk of the Army's strategic reserve in the U.S. once most of the active duty establishment's strategic reserve units were sent to Vietnam in 1967 and 1968.7

The Air Guard's performance during the Berlin mobilization, its operational shortcomings notwithstanding, had been far superior to that of the Army's reserve components. Consequently, it had not been singled out for much special DOD attention early in Secretary McNamara's regime. The short term result of that mobilization had been a substantial decline in the Air Guard's operational readiness. Five Air Guard fighter wings had been stripped of their jets upon demobilization to temporarily fill the needs of the Air Force's expanding tactical aviation inventory. Demobilized Air Guard units had lost some 25 percent of their personnel once the Berlin recall was terminated. By the end of September 1963, Air Guard tactical unit manning had declined to only 70 percent of full authorized wartime strength. Prior to the Berlin recall, they had been manned
at approximately 80 percent of their full wartime strength. At least partially as a result of the rebuilding process necessitated by the Berlin mobilization, no Air Guard units were mobilized during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.8

Problems facing the Air Guard were highlighted by the report of a Reserve Forces Ad Hoc Study Group in December 1963. The group had been organized by General Curtis E. LeMay in response to a request from the Under Secretary of the Air Force for an analysis of the major problems that would face the air reserve forces during the next five to ten years. The study group, which included regular Air Force, Air Guard, and Air Force Reserve officers, concluded that the basic reserve system of the Air Force was sound. However, it argued that the regular establishment still lacked an adequate appreciation of the air reserve forces. The interest of the regulars in reserve matters was not constant. It only peaked in response to relatively infrequent stimuli like the Berlin Crisis. The major air commands could, according to the study group, make considerably better use of the reserve forces available to them to help satisfy the total range of Air Force requirements. Evidently the active duty establishment still had not fully implemented the gaining command concept. This was especially important given the increasingly tight resource situation confronting the regulars.9

Air Guard problems highlighted by the group included an aging pilot force as well as difficulties in recruiting and retaining younger enlisted personnel. The Air Guard was hampered by the limited transfer of young pilots from the active force and small
annual pilot training quotas in regular Air Force schools. During FY 1964, the Air Guard pilot training quota was only 114. This was clearly inadequate to sustain the total strength as well as a proper age/rank structure for an organization with a total authorized pilot strength of 4,592 as of June 30, 1963. According to the study group, enlisted retentions had also become a major problem in 1963 due to the losses of large numbers of non-veteran airmen as a consequence of their active duty during the Berlin mobilization.

Finally, the group concluded that the principal limitation on the capabilities of the air reserve forces still was the inferior quality of their equipment. Continued adherence to the policy of supplying reserve units with obsolescent equipment no longer needed by the active duty establishment limited the full operational potential of the reserve forces. The study group recommended that the Air Force purchase new equipment directly for the reserves to overcome this qualitative deficiency. Projecting Air Force requirements through the 1964-1973 period, the group correctly predicted that world conditions would confront the active duty establishment with responsibilities far in excess of its capabilities. If properly managed and equipped, the air reserve forces could help bridge that gap. 10

Although there is little direct evidence that the Ad Hoc Study Group's report significantly influenced Air Force policy and programming, its conclusions clearly reflected contemporary Air Force thinking about the importance of maintaining reserve units in high states of operational readiness. Following the Berlin and
Cuban Crises, the emphasis on reserve readiness and closer integration with the active duty force was intensified. *Air Force Regulation 45-60*, published in February 1963, reflected this development. According to the regulation, the objective of air reserve programs was no longer the creation of M-Day forces that required extensive post-mobilization preparation. Rather, "the objective of the Air Reserve Forces program is to provide operationally ready units and trained individuals that are immediately available to augment the active duty establishment. . . ."  

Although full implementation of the new policy objective was still constrained by shortages of equipment, operating funds, and qualified manpower, Air Guard training and organization were geared to achieving enhanced operational readiness. Air Guard unit structures had been reorganized in the wake of the Berlin mobilization to approximate more closely the requirements of the gaining commands. Air Guard aircraft made non-stop, air-refueled deployments to Alaska and Puerto Rico for training in 1963. In August of the following year, a composite force of thirty-one Air Guard tactical fighters and reconnaissance aircraft flew to Europe for their annual field training. This was the first time U.S. reserve units had been deployed to Europe for training purposes. Compared with the six-day island-hopping Operation "Stair Step" in 1961, the 1964 deployment was a model of speed and efficiency. With the aid of aerial refueling, the entire trans-Atlantic crossing was completed in a little over nine hours. Air Guardsmen were also becoming more actively involved in stateside joint service exercises. Three
provisional Air Guard units, formed from sixteen separate Air
Guard organizations, had participated in the JCS Exercise "Desert
Strike" in May 1964. Their performance was rated outstanding by
active Air Force observers. Members of the Air Guard's 146th
Fighter-Interceptor Group from Pittsburgh placed first in the F-102
category at the Air Force's global "William Tell" fighter weapons
meet in October 1963. Twenty-two Air Guard fighter-interceptor
squadrons continued to provide substantial support of the Air Defense
Command. In FY 1965, they flew approximately 30,000 hours and com-
pleted more than 38,500 intercept sorties as an integral part of
that command's operations.12

The Air Guard's non-tactical units were also heavily involved
in supporting the active duty establishment. In FY 1965, Air Guard
transports flew 1,469 missions overseas for MATS that involved
60,840 flying hours and moved 11,388 tons of military cargo. Their
destinations included South Vietnam, Japan, Germany, and Spain. In
addition to their MATS missions, these transport units also carried
more than 25,000 Army Guard troops to their annual training sites
while flying 12,160 hours. An Air Guard C-123 unit in Alaska flew
2,919 hours while carrying more than 3,600 passengers and 940 tons
of cargo in support of Air Force resupply missions in that state.
Air Guard Communications Maintenance and Ground Electronics
Engineering and Installations Agency (GEEIA) units continued to
train through "live scheme" projects, repairing communications and
electronic equipment at Air Force and Air Guard bases. Six Air
Guard fixed-site AC&W squadrons continued to conduct around-the-clock
operations as part of America's active air defense system. An Oklahoma-based Air Guard airborne communications center nicknamed "Talking Bird" was deployed to Puerto Rico in May 1965 to support U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic.\(^1\) NGB Chief, General Winston Wilson, testifying before a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, summarized these recent changes in the Air Guard's status. "Largely within the past three years," he indicated, "our units have been transformed from primarily a training status to that of a ready and global force fulfilling operational missions on an almost daily basis."\(^{14}\)

During 1964–1965, the process of modernizing the Air Guard's flying inventory with aircraft dropped by the Air Force and diversifying its mission responsibilities continued. Fighter-interceptor units phased out the last of their F-86L's and replaced them with supersonic F-102's. The remainder of the interceptor inventory consisted of F-100A's and F-86J's. One F-86L unit had converted to an aerial refueling mission flying KC-97's while another began operating RF-94F reconnaissance aircraft. Aerial refueling was a recent addition to the Air Guard's missions. Its first tanker units had been formed during FY 1962. Additional Air Guard aircraft modernization efforts in FY 1965 included F-100C's and a small number of F-105's. These two fighters were its most advanced aircraft. The bulk of its tactical fighters were still aging F-84F's and F-86F's. Tactical reconnaissance units were flying RF-57's and RF-84F's. Air commando units, first established during FY 1965, were flying a variety of light utility and transport aircraft
including U-10's, HU-16's, and C-119's. Air Guard transport units were primarily flying C-97's and C-121's. A small number of shorter range C-123's was also included in their transport inventory.\(^{15}\)

The Air Guard's Aircraft inventory by type and mission in 1965 consisted of: \(^{16}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Aircraft Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>F-102</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>F-100A</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>F-89J</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Fighter</td>
<td>F-105</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Fighter</td>
<td>F-100C</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Fighter</td>
<td>F-86H</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Fighter</td>
<td>F-84F</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Reconnaissance</td>
<td>RF-84F</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Reconnaissance</td>
<td>RB-57</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Refueling</td>
<td>KC-97</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Commando</td>
<td>U-10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Commando</td>
<td>HU-16</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Commando</td>
<td>C-119</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>C-97</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>C-121</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>C-123</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of aircraft in the Air Guard's inventory had shrunk from 2,269 in FY 1960 to 1,525 in FY 1965.\(^{17}\) Those aircraft were organized in a mission structure that had changed dramatically during that five year period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Fiscal Year 1960</th>
<th>Fiscal Year 1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Squadrans</td>
<td>Squadrans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Fighter</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Reconnaissance</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeromedical Evacuation</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Refueling</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Commando</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These figures illustrate the Air Guard's shift away from air defense and the diversification of its missions that took place during the early 1960's. The underlying themes of these developments were force modernization and increasing emphasis on conventional warfare options.\textsuperscript{18}

Escalating American involvement in the Vietnam War and defeat of the reserve merger proposal encouraged yet another DOD initiative to enhance reserve readiness. On July 28, 1965, President Johnson announced his decision not to mobilize reserve units to augment the initial American military buildup in Vietnam. Acting against professional military advice, he had decided to rely upon volunteers and draftees to fill the growing ranks of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{19} In August 1965, DOD announced the creation of the Selective Reserve Force program. Units in this program would be brought to high states of operational readiness and serve as part of the nation's strategic military reserve in the continental U.S. while the active duty establishment was increasingly tied down in Southeast Asia. The Air Guard component of this program included nine tactical fighter groups flying 225 F-100's, four tactical reconnaissance groups flying 72 RF-84's, and one tactical control group. Within the Air Force, this program was known as "Beef Broth" and, later, "Combat Beef." Its mobilization objective was the capability to deploy reserve units overseas within twenty-four hours of a recall to active duty. By August 1966, all of the Air Guard's "Beef Broth" units were rated either fully combat ready or combat ready with minor deficiencies. As the Vietnam War continued to escalate
in 1967-1968, Air Guard and Air Force Reserve units in the program comprised the bulk of the Air Force's strategic reserve in the continental U.S.\textsuperscript{20}

The escalating war in Southeast Asia compelled the Air Force to integrate Air Guardsmen more fully into its routine operations. By 1965, Air Guardsmen had become involved in a variety of global activities that directly or indirectly supported the War effort. Air Guardsmen were flying airlift missions for MAC in the Pacific area by August 1965. MAC's own aircraft had been unable to meet the rapidly growing demands caused by the escalating American military involvement in Vietnam. Stateside missions flown by Guardsmen had released some MAC aircrews for use in Southeast Asia. The initial sizable direct involvement of the Air Guard in Southeast Asia began in late 1965 with the airlift of Christmas gifts to U.S. military personnel in that theater. Beginning in January 1966, Air Guardsmen flew an average of 200 overseas flights per month supporting MAC's global airlift operations. Seventy-five of these went to Southeast Asia. The program was cancelled by DOD in July 1967. Because of a pilot shortage in the active Air Force due to Southeast Asia operations, a small number of Air Guard F-102 pilots were encouraged to volunteer for temporary active duty overseas. In July 1968, twenty-four of these pilots were on active duty at bases in Holland, Germany, Alaska, the Philippines, and Okinawa. Air Guard aeromedical evacuation aircrews regularly flew domestic and offshore missions beginning in August 1965. These missions, although not flown to Southeast Asia, freed Air Force aeromedical
units for employment there. Faced with the inability of SAC to provide enough tankers to keep the Air Force's European-based tactical fighter and reconnaissance aircrews proficient in aerial refueling techniques, the Air Force called upon Air Guardsmen to help fill the gap beginning in May 1967. Air Guardsmen, volunteering for short active duty tours in Germany, operated this highly successful project for the next ten years. Although Air Guard tactical fighter and reconnaissance units provided no direct support to Air Force operations in Southeast Asia prior to 1968, they indirectly contributed to the war effort by supporting TAC's training and contingency plan requirements in the continental U.S.\textsuperscript{21}

"Beef Broth" and support of the regulars notwithstanding, the Vietnam buildup damaged part of the Air Guard program. Non-"Beef Broth" units lost considerable equipment and spare parts to support escalating SEA operations. By October 1966, aircraft losses in that combat theater had pushed back the Air Guard's projected modernization schedule by some eighteen months. Obsolete F-84's and F-86's were retained in the Air Guard's aircraft inventory to offset this delay. The chronic shortage of junior Air Guard pilots had been exacerbated by the demands of the active force. Adequate quotas in the Air Force's undergraduate pilot training program were simply not available to the air reserve forces by 1966.\textsuperscript{22}

More significantly, the self image, military utility, and political acceptability of reserve programs, including the Air Guard, had come into question by 1967. President Johnson's decision to rely upon draftees rather than reservists raised questions about
the expense and military utility of reserve programs. Many Americans were incensed that their sons and husbands had been drafted to risk death in another obscure corner of Asia while men who had been drawing drill pay stayed at home. The draft-exempt status of Guardsmen was a related irritant. It was common knowledge that many young men joined the National Guard, as well as other reserve programs, to avoid being drafted into the Army. Although the vast majority of them proved to be skilled and conscientious, the public image of the National Guard as a draft haven was painful for its leaders who regarded their all-volunteer organization as a legitimate heir of the venerated minuteman tradition. Growing anti-war sentiment contributed to a decline in public esteem of all American military institutions including the Air Guard. Furthermore, the Air Guard's social composition began to draw criticism. In the late 1960's, its personnel were still overwhelmingly white, male, and middle class. Militant civil rights organizations lambasted it as a bastion of established privilege that systematically excluded minorities. Another source of contention was the Guard's performance in a series of race riots that swept through American cities in 1965-1967. Guardsmen mobilized to quell these severe disturbances were accused of being undisciplined, untrained, trigger-happy and ineffective. Although these criticisms were not directed specifically at the Air Guard, they threatened the broad public and political support that was the real foundation of its existence.

Public criticism and simultaneous developments within the defense establishment created considerable anxiety within the
Guard's top leadership. The defensive tone of remarks at the 1967 NGAUS Conference reflected this anxiety. Major General Winston P. Wilson, NGB Chief, lashed out at critics of the Guard. He told the assembled delegates:

We in the National Guard have nothing to be ashamed of. We've taken a beating in the press lately. . . . There have been suggestions that the National Guard has not lived up to either its responsibilities or to its obligations. . . . The major problem is that the National Guard has been tarnished by a few unfortunate incidents in the recent past. . . . Stature, image and credibility are matters of vital importance. All 500,000 of us . . . have been damned before the American public. . . . And many now believe that we are not even necessary.

The president of the NGAUS, Major General James P. Cantwell, castigated the Air Force for planning a substantial reduction of the Air Guard's flying units while, at the same time, publicly praising its performance. According to Cantwell, eight airlift squadrons had been originally scheduled for elimination by July 1, 1968. The July 1967 issue of the National Guardsman reported that the Air Guard's future role was under review and the subject of serious controversy within DOD and the Air Force. Although congressional intercession had blocked the proposed reduction of Air Guard airlift units through FY 1967, their long term future was in doubt. The National Guardsman complained that the failure to mobilize the reserve forces, constant efforts by the Secretary of Defense to reduce those forces, and unfounded public criticisms of the National Guard. These factors had created doubt and confusion about the future of America's military reserve programs. It noted that, in an effort to resolve these uncertainties, several different
separate studies of the future of the Air Force's reserve components had been launched. 26

One of these studies was conducted by the RAND Corporation, an Air Force-oriented think tank in Santa Monica, California. The RAND study revealed a good deal about the actual condition of the air reserve programs and the nature of the policy process as it affected those programs in the 1960's. The moving force behind the Air Force request for the study was Dr. Theodore Marrs, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Reserve Affairs. Dr. Marrs was a pediatrician and an avid Air Guardsman from Alabama. He had been deployed to France with his unit in 1961 during the Berlin Crisis. Upon returning to the United States, Dr. Marrs had obtained an active duty Air Guard position in the Pentagon with the assistance of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau. Later, he had been appointed to his civilian position within the Department of the Air Force. Dr. Marrs maintained a close liaison with the reserve components' associations as well as the National Guard Bureau. In effect, he championed their interests within the Department of the Air Force. That was a formidable task. According to Dr. Marrs, there was considerable anti-reserve feeling among both civilian and military officials in the Pentagon behind their public praise and support of air reserve programs. Nevertheless, he, like other influential reserve officers in the NGAUS and ROA, was determined to protect and expand the role of the reserve forces within the Air Force. By 1966, he had convinced General John P. McConnell, Air
Force Chief of Staff, to request a RAND study of future roles for the air reserve forces through the mid 1970's.\textsuperscript{27}

The massive ten-volume RAND study arrived at the Pentagon in late July 1967. Its overall objective was to analyze which roles and missions could best be performed by the air reserve forces to complement the active Air Force. At the request of General McConnell, political factors were regarded as secondary by RAND's researchers. Instead, the report focused on military considerations versus the capabilities of reserve forces to effectively perform in all Air Force mission areas. The report's third volume, describing the air reserve tactical fighter program, was especially relevant to the Air Guard. It noted that all twenty-three reserve tactical fighter groups were Air Guard units. They comprised approximately 25 percent of the Air Force's total tactical fighter inventory. However, their actual combat potential, as measured by their payload capabilities for ground attack missions and their air-to-air combat characteristics, was considerably less. Air Guard tactical fighter squadrons were authorized twenty-five aircraft per units while active Air Force squadrons were authorized eighteen. Most Air Guard squadrons were equipped at or near their authorized aircraft strength. Air Guard pilots were authorized 135 flying hours per year compared with 240 hours for their active force counterparts. During the last six months of 1966, Air Guard units had passed all but one of twenty-three Air Force operational readiness inspections. This trend had been constant since 1962.\textsuperscript{28} The Air Force's evaluation of the relative effectiveness of Air Guard and active force
aircrews was summed up in the following quote taken by the RAND researchers from official classified correspondence:  

Operations personnel of the Air Staff and NGB agreed that standardization/evaluation checks, operational readiness inspection results, and differences in training times and events should amount to a five percent degradation of ANG operational readiness aircrew (sic) capability to successfully perform conventional weapons delivery missions.

The researchers then addressed the crucial question of limitations upon the employment of reserve forces. They observed that there were strong management and political constraints against frequent mobilizations. The management constraint was the difficulty of retraining people in the reserves if they were called up often enough to handicap their civilian careers. The political constraint was that the general public and foreign nations saw mobilizations as signals of grave international emergencies insofar as the U.S. government was concerned. Such signals could not be used frequently or at inappropriate moments. These basic management and political factors limited the availability of reserve forces regardless of the quality of their military capabilities.

Assessing the future of the reserve forces in the tactical fighter role, the RAND researchers observed that "they possess a significant capability today, and ... it is feasible to consider them for an even stronger role in the mid 1970's." Assuming a continuation of the presently programmed force, the researchers recommended that the most suitable role for the reserve tactical fighter force appeared to be ground attack [i.e., close air support and battlefield area interdiction]. Responsibility for air superiority
and nuclear delivery missions should be concentrated in the active force. Moreover, they also recommended modernization of reserve tactical fighter forces with direct buys of A-7's for the Air Guard and retention of the current selective unit readiness policy.  

The RAND report suggested that some major shifts in the regular/reserve tactical fighter force might be contemplated on the basis of cost-effectiveness considerations alone. Reserve units could have nearly the same combat potential as active force units in some scenarios. However, tactical fighter forces with a heavy mix of reserve units ran considerable risk of non-availability for contingencies in the lower and intermediate portions of the warfare spectrum. Furthermore, they would also produce fewer sorties than their active force counterparts in the initial days of a war, especially if strategic warning was lacking. On the other hand, the larger total force that could be obtained from a larger reserve mix would allow a greater daily sortie rate later in a campaign. The report cautiously concluded that it would be in the national interest to increase the reserve mix in tactical fighter force but that this should not be done to an extreme degree.  

The report's overall summary neither recommended a specific force structure nor a particular regular/reserve unit mix. However, it concluded that reserve units could complement active ones in all but a few mission areas. The summary suggested:  

That part of the contingency spectrum which demands stringent mobility, frequency of use and rapid response time for deployment, these forces ... should be in the active establishment. However, those units needed for later
application to complete the force buildup and to serve as attrition fillers, can be maintained at a lower peacetime response level and are likely candidates for the reserve components. The result is attainment of the required total cost at a lower peacetime sustaining cost than if only the active force were used.

RAND urged expansion of air reserve forces' participation in all major mission areas except strategic nuclear delivery. It recommended expansion of reserve participation in air defense, tactical fighter, tactical airlift, and tactical reconnaissance missions. This expansion should be accompanied by the earliest possible modernization of aircraft. Strategic airlift was another potential candidate for expanded reserve participation. However, RAND found the future of the strategic airlift mission clouded by major uncertainties and consequently difficult to analyze. It estimated that reserve flying units in general would cost about one half as much as active force units if similarly manned and equipped. The RAND summary concluded that Air Force planners should consider placing a larger portion of the total force mix from most mission areas into the air reserve forces. 35

The RAND report received favorable reviews from the Air Staff, NGB, and the reserve components' associations. However, its actual impact upon subsequent policy and programming appeared to be negligible. DOD continued to press for smaller reserve forces held in higher states of readiness. Congress reacted to this pressure with the Reserve Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act of 1967. Among other provisions, the act gave statutory sanction to Secretary McNamara's Selected Reserve Force but required Congress to approve
its authorized strength annually. It also specifically precluded an Air Guard–Air Force Reserve merger. Moreover, it gave statutory protection to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The level of top policy attention devoted to the Air Force Reserve was finally put on a par with that given the Air Guard. An Office of Air Force Reserve was created to work directly with the Air Staff on policy roles and missions for the Air Force Reserve. It replaced the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces that had been concerned with both Air reserve components. Through this legislation, Congress had clearly expressed its intent to retain the basic structure of the existing reserve system and strengthen reserve policy making machinery. However, the Air Force itself remained reluctant to allocate additional missions and resources to its air reserve programs in the late 1960's. The Vietnam War precluded dramatic across-the-board improvements in these programs. Modern equipment, especially aircraft, simply was not available for the reserves. However, more fundamental problems precluded full implementation of RAND's recommendations. Direct purchases of modern aircraft for the reserves have been extremely limited. Top Air Force officers were reluctant to initiate plans that would reduce the size and budget of the active force. Furthermore, they remained skeptical about the ability of reservists to satisfactorily perform ever more demanding missions involving the operation of increasingly sophisticated equipment. Air Guard and Air Force Reserve officials still had a difficult time convincing top Air Force leadership that their units could shoulder
expanded responsibilities. At best, the RAND study was another
selling point that these officials could use to support their drive
for broadened reserve participation in the total range of Air
Force missions. The history of the RAND study demonstrated that,
despite increased active force reliance on the air reserve programs
due to the demands of the Vietnam War, active efforts of the
reserve forces to expand their own roles within the Air Force still
met with considerable resistance. 36

A stronger selling point for the Air Guard emerged in 1968.
On January 23, the North Koreans seized the U.S.S. Pueblo, an
electronics surveillance vessel that had been collecting intelli-
genence data while cruising along the Korean coast. The vessel's
seizure was a painful setback for the U.S. Already struggling to
balance military commitments against inadequate resources and to
hold together declining public support for the Vietnam War,
President Lyndon Johnson did not want to be drawn into another
inconclusive war for murky purposes in Asia. American military
commanders in the region had advised Washington that they could not
recapture the Pueblo's crew from the North Koreans. Low-keyed
public statements by the President and other administration officials
soon made it clear that the U.S. would not go beyond diplomatic
means to redress this painful humiliation. However, the South
Korean government had to be reassured by some overt display of
American resolve. Fearing that the Pueblo's seizure might be a
prelude to a North Korean invasion, the South Koreans were threatening
to withdraw their troops from South Vietnam. To display American
resolve while minimizing the chances of an armed conflict with the North Koreans, President Johnson dispatched some 350 Air Force tactical aircraft to South Korea and mobilized approximately 14,000 naval and air reservists. The reservists, in effect, replaced regular units from the depleted strategic reserve in the continental U.S. Although no war erupted on the Korean peninsula, the communists' Tet offensive in South Vietnam soon placed additional pressures on U.S. military resources. In March, the President decided to mobilize an additional 22,200 reservists, effective May 13.\(^37\)

The Pueblo crisis confronted the Air Guard with its third partial mobilization since the end of World War II. Its 1968 mobilization performance was demonstrably superior to its showing during the Berlin crisis seven years earlier. The Pueblo call-up came without warning on January 25 when President Johnson issued Executive Order No. 11392 mobilizing 9,343 Air Guardsmen. Within thirty-six hours approximately 95 percent of them had reported to their units. Eight tactical fighter groups (TFG's) and three tactical reconnaissance groups (TRG's) as well as three wing headquarters were activated. These units and their aircraft types were:\(^38\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit/Location</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>113th TFW+TFG/Andrews AFB, Maryland</td>
<td>F-100C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177th TFG/Atlantic City, New Jersey</td>
<td>F-100C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107th TFG/Niagara Falls, New York</td>
<td>F-100C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121st TFG/Lockbourne AFB, Ohio</td>
<td>F-100C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140th TFW+TFG/Denver, Colorado</td>
<td>F-100C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184th TFG/Wichita, Kansas</td>
<td>F-100C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>185th TFG/Sioux City, Iowa</td>
<td>F-100C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150th TFG/Albuquerque, New Mexico</td>
<td>F-100C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The eight tactical fighter units were participants in the "Combat Beef" program. They were rated combat ready by the Air Force at the time of activation and could have deployed overseas within a few days. At least one fighter unit, the 140th TFW, was alerted to prepare for overseas movement within seventy-two hours of its mobilization. The three tactical reconnaissance units were not rated combat ready when activated due primarily to equipment shortages. However, within one month they could have been deployed into combat.

For nearly three months, the fate of the mobilized Air Guardsmen remained uncertain. The Pueblo crisis failed to develop into a war. In South Vietnam, the Tet offensive was a devastating military defeat for the Communists. However, despite losing on the battlefront, they won a stunning psychological victory with American public opinion. Tet caused a palpable shift of American popular sentiment against the war. This encouraged a furious debate and policy reappraisal within the Johnson administration. Meanwhile, military planners had to find new uses for the mobilized Air Guardsmen.

While policymakers debated America's future in Vietnam and planners scrambled to define new contingency plan requirements, mobilized Air Guardsmen remained in limbo at their home stations. The speed of their activation and uncertainty about their future caused serious morale problems. Most of them had been unable to place their personal affairs in order due to the lack of warning prior to
the call-up. Unit commanders, acting under instructions to be prepared for immediate overseas movement, were reluctant to release their personnel to settle such matters. The fluid international situation and the ongoing Vietnam policy debate in Washington effectively blocked Air Force guidance concerning the future employment of activated reserve units. In the meantime, politically embarrassing questions were being raised about the necessity for the mobilization while Air Guardsmen remained at their home bases through March. 41

Two additional factors contributed to the delay in speedily integrating the mobilized Air Guardsmen into active Air Force operations. Although Air Guard units were organized on a cellular basis that permitted selective recalls of portions of each unit, DOD mobilized entire units when, in fact, it only needed Air Guard flying squadrons. Many maintenance and support personnel were not really needed to augment the active duty establishment. Consequently, they were eventually split from their units and individually reassigned throughout the Air Force. This was a time-consuming process that contributed to morale problems and deprived the Air Force of many smoothly-functioning maintenance and support organizations. Further complicating the situation, Air Guard units were structured in a different organizational format than their active Air Force counterparts. As a result of problems encountered during the Berlin mobilization, they had been reorganized by TAC under a wing-group-squadron concept. The group was the key organization in this format. It consisted of maintenance and support elements
collocated with a tactical flying squadron. This permitted the flying squadron to operate autonomously from its home base. In many cases these bases were located at remote airports far removed from a squadron's parent wing. Beyond reflecting the realities of non-mobilized Air Guard operations, this organizational format would also permit Air Guard units to deploy intact to bare bases in future emergencies similar to the Berlin crisis. TAC subsequently abandoned this organizational structure for its active force units. It substituted a wing-integrated squadron concept that provided centralized support services at the base level while decentralizing field maintenance at the squadron level. Hurried mobilization planning in January 1968 did not take into account either these organizational incompatibilities or the possibility of a selective recall of needed portions of Air Guard units. Rather, to show American resolve, entire Air Guard wings and groups were hastily recalled to active duty.\(^42\)

The experience of Ohio's 121st TFG illustrates the problems associated with the poorly-handled January 1968 mobilization. The 121st remained at its home station, Lockbourne AF, Ohio, for nearly four months before the Air Force announced that it would be deployed to South Korea in mid-June. During this interim period, the unit engaged in normal training and was rated fully combat ready by a TAC operational readiness inspection team. Just two weeks before the unit was scheduled to deploy to Korea, TAC reorganized the 121st into its wing-augmented squadron concept. The original 900-man
140th TFG was reduced to the 410-man 166th TFS. Surplus personnel were reassigned throughout the Air Force. Personnel reassignments were made on the basis of the TAC's recommendations rather than those of the Air Guard commander or his staff. Consequently, some valuable personnel did not deploy to South Korea with the 166th. Other Air Guard tactical units mobilized in January experienced a similar process. It delayed their integration into the Air Force, hurt morale and damaged, at least temporarily, their operational effectiveness. Ironically, units like the 166th that were deployed to South Korea found themselves operating on bare bases temporarily without support and maintenance personnel. These were the very same types of personnel that had been stripped from their units in the U.S. when they converted to the wing-augmented squadron organization.

Fortunately, DOD and the Air Force were able to deal with these problems constructively prior to a second mobilization announced by the Secretary of Defense on April 11. On that date, he ordered an additional 22,200 reservists, including 1,333 Air Guardsmen, to active duty effective May 13. Unneeded maintenance and support personnel were not mobilized this time. Because of the advance notification, individual Guardsmen were given the opportunity to place their personal affairs in order before reporting for active duty. Units were able to reorganize before being mobilized. It was a much smoother operation than the January call-up.
Air Guard units mobilized in May included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit/Location</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>174th TFG/Syracuse, New York</td>
<td>F-86H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175th TFG/Baltimore, Maryland</td>
<td>F-86H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171st Aeromedical Airlift Wing and Group/</td>
<td>C-121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The two F-86H units deployed augmented squadrons to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico to provide forward air controller and combat crew training for active Air Force pilots. The 171st Aeromedical/Airlift Group moved patients from casualty staging bases and military installations to treatment hospitals. It operated primarily in the eastern U.S., Texas, and the Caribbean area. All three Air Guard units mobilized in May were demobilized the following December.

Four of the Air Guard F-100 units that had been mobilized in January were alerted in late April for deployment to South Vietnam. The first stage of the deployment ended on May 3 when twenty F-100's from Denver's 120th TFS landed at Phan Rang Air Base. The remainder of the squadron's support personnel and material followed close behind. Its pilots began flying operational missions with other Air Force squadrons on May 8. By June 1, all pilots had been checked out in the theater's requirements and were flying combat missions. Meanwhile, three other Air Guard TFS's—the 174th from Sioux City, Iowa, the 188th from Albuquerque, New Mexico, and the 136th from Niagara Falls, New York—also went to South Vietnam. In addition, the 355th TFS, an active Air Force unit, was 85 percent manned by Air Guardsmen, primarily volunteers.
Air Guardsmen were quickly and effectively integrated into Air Force operations in South Vietnam. Each of their four F-100 squadrons had deployed into the combat theater with twenty to twenty-one aircraft and 350 men. They were assigned to regular Air Force wings at their new home bases. Approximately 200 personnel from each deployed squadron were then assimilated into the Air Force wing and support organizations at these bases. Many of these Air Guardsmen assumed top management positions in the maintenance, ordinance, supply, and service fields.48

Air Guard tactical fighter units saw combat in South Vietnam from June 1968 through April 1969. Pilots from the 120th, 174th, 136th, and 188th TFS's flew 24,124 sorties and 38,614 combat hours. If the preponderantly Air Guard 355th TFS is included, these totals rise to approximately 30,000 sorties and 50,000 combat hours. Air Guardsmen flew a variety of scheduled missions including close air support, aircraft escort, and landing zone construction (i.e., bombing landing zone sites so that helicopters would have space to land). They also maintained aircraft on fifteen minute alert status to respond to emergency requests for aerial firepower. Combat losses suffered by the Air Guard included seven pilots, one intelligence officer serving as an observer, and fourteen aircraft. Each of the five Guard-manned squadrons completed its full eleven month combat tour without a reportable accident due to pilot, material, or maintenance failure.49

The combat performance of the Air Guardsmen in South Vietnam was truly impressive. The Air Reservist reported that the Air
Guardsmen were:  

Flying more combat missions than other [i.e., regular Air Force] squadrons at their bases, and in-commission rates, bomb damage assessment, and other criteria by which tactical fighter units are judged, rate higher than other F-100 squadrons in the zone.

Air Force personnel in Vietnam were similarly impressed. The 35th TFW's official unit history reported:

Almost no problems were encountered when the 120th TFW became part of the 35th TFW. Personnel deploying with the 120th TFS were skilled and experienced enough to perform their duties in a highly professional manner.

General George S. Brown was the Air Force commander in South Vietnam when Air Guard units joined the 7th Air Force. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee during his confirmation hearing as Air Force Chief of Staff in 1973, General Brown gave his assessment of those units:

I had . . . five F-100 Air National Guard squadrons. . . . Those were the five best F-100 squadrons in the field. The aircrews were a little older, but they were more experienced, and the maintenance people were also more experienced than the regular units. They had done the same work on the same weapon system for years, and they had [personnel] stability that a regular unit doesn't have.

The combat performance of Air Guard flying units in South Vietnam was at least the equal of and possibly superior to that of their active Air Force counterparts. For Air Guardsmen, this fact vindicated their program and seemed to promise a secure future role for them within the Air Force. They could claim, with justification, that the Air Guard had finally demonstrated the combat ready status originally envisaged for it in the War Department's Approved Policies 1945.
Approximately 3,000 Air Guardsmen were also deployed to South Korea in the summer of 1968. Two Air Guard tactical fighter squadrons—the 166th from Columbus, Ohio and the 127th from Wichita, Kansas, arrived at Kunsan Air Base with fifty F-100C's between June 29 and July 8, 1968. These two squadrons, as well as Air Force Reservists and individual Guardsmen who had been split from their own units after mobilization, formed a whole new Air Force unit, the 354th TFW. The 354th was commanded by an Iowa Air Guardsman, Colonel Donald W. Forney. His wing replaced three other Air Force tactical fighter squadrons equipped with seventy-two F-4D fighters. The F-4D's were withdrawn as the Pueblo crisis cooled.**4**

In some respects, Air Guardsmen assigned to South Korea had much more difficult assignments than those in South Vietnam. With the exception of personnel in the two TFS's, most Air Guardsmen in South Korea were individuals who had been transferred from their original units after mobilization and reassigned to entirely new organizations. For example, personnel from tactical groups in New York, New Mexico, and Nevada were used to form new combat support squadrons at air bases throughout South Korea. This wholesale violation of unit integrity, not only hurt morale, but necessitated time-consuming reorganizations and personnel transfers. Furthermore, many enlisted Air Guardsmen found themselves without jobs due to frequent changes in manning documents while others had to put in extra hours due to personnel shortages in their particular job specialties even after they arrived in South Korea. This situation generated many complaints by disgruntled Air Guardsmen to Congress
and stateside newspapers. Although these personnel problems were gradually resolved and the 354th TFW eventually began to function smoothly, many Air Guardsmen believed that they could have deployed overseas and operated effectively much sooner if unit integrity had been maintained.55

Aircraft maintenance and operations in South Korea also posed major challenges. Maintenance for F-100C's was a major headache because 5th Air Force had not included those aircraft in its inventory for several years. It no longer stocked spare parts for them. Consequently, F-100 parts had to be obtained from Japan and, frequently, the continental U.S. Although the 354th TFW was able to keep 84.4 percent of its possessed aircraft operational in July, spare parts and the strain of continual aircraft use made it impossible to sustain this rate. By December 1968, the wing's readiness rate fell below the Air Force 71 percent minimum. Due to an afterburner maintenance problem, all of the 354th's F-100C were grounded for a short time that month. Meanwhile, the wing had been forced to drop its original primary operational mission in South Korea. The Air Force rediscovered that its F-100C's were not good air defense alert aircraft. They were slow attaining altitude and lacked an effective all-weather air-to-air capability. Consequently, the 354th's F-100C's were redesignated as fighter-bombers to support ground force training in Korea.56

Maintenance and operational problems continued to plague the 354th during the first three months of 1969. Spare parts shortages persisted. From January through March, four F-100C's crashed and
one pilot was killed. Furthermore, the wing failed an operational readiness inspection. Although extremely cold weather and spare parts shortages contributed to the failure, the inspection report highlighted some operational problems that implied lax training. For example, aircrews were criticized for flying nonstandard formations and achieving poor bombing scores. Ground crews failed to load aircraft munitions within prescribed time criteria. For these and other reasons, Air Force inspectors recommended downgrading the combat readiness ratings of the 354th's two tactical fighter squadrons to marginal.  

With the return of the U.S.S. Pueblo's crew, Air Guardsmen in South Korea were scheduled for release from active duty in June. Their last few months overseas concluded on a positive note. The 354th TFW passed a second ORI. Both of its fighter squadrons regained the fully combat ready ratings they had brought with them to South Korea the previous summer. In late May, the Air Guardsmen began returning home. By mid-June, this process was completed and Air Guard operations in South Korea ceased. The two Air Guard TFS's were returned to their home bases with their aircraft and deactivated on June 18. Individual Air Guardsmen from other units who had comprised the bulk of the 354th TFW's non-flying personnel were released from service and returned to their homes that same month. Although they had not enjoyed unalloyed success as their counterparts in South Vietnam, nevertheless they had performed a valuable military service for the United States at a time when her military and political resources had been stretched thin. The deficiencies
revealed by their service in South Korea could have been minimized by better Air Force planning. Adequate stocks of F-100 spares should have been obtained by 5th Air Force when it became evident that those aircraft were going to be assigned to it. More significantly, deployment of cohesive Air Guard units, including maintenance and other support functions, would have minimized many of the morale and operational problems that plagued the Air Guardsmen in South Korea. 58

The active duty performance of the Air Guard's 123rd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) was also mixed. The wing and four of its units—Louisville's 123rd Tactical Reconnaissance Group (TRG), Little Rock's 189th TRG and 123rd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron (RTS), and Reno's 152nd TRG—were mobilized on January 26, 1968. These units were not included in the "Combat Beef" program. They were not rated combat ready when activated primarily due to a shortage of avionics equipment. Additional problems were created after mobilization when the Air Force directed the 123rd to move to Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base, Missouri and reorganize under TAC's wing-augmented squadron structure. This reorganization substantially reduced the wing's unit manning document. Surplus personnel from the 123rd were individually reassigned throughout the Air Force. Most of them went to units in South Korea. The lingering effects of these personnel changes contributed to the wing's unsatisfactory showing during the ORI in October. At that point it was awarded a marginal combat readiness rating by TAC inspectors. The 123rd finally passed an ORI and received an acceptable combat readiness
rating in January 1969. However, the 123rd received an overall marginal rating during a no-notice inspection conducted by the 12th Air Force inspector General at the end of February. Thus, one year after mobilization, it really had not fully measured up to Air Force standards. 59

Despite its difficulties, the 123rd made substantial contributions to the Air Force during its active duty service in 1968-1969. Shortly after its mobilization, it became the primary working TRW in the continental U.S. Its three TRS's, flying RF-101's, were utilized in photo missions throughout the country. The 192nd TRS and the 165th TRS also flew special missions in Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone for which they were highly commended by the commanders of those two areas. The 123rd TRS remained at Little Rock where its personnel processed film for Air Force, Army, and Navy reconnaissance units as well as other federal agencies. In July, each of the wing's three TRS's began rotating responsibility for temporary duty tours at Itazuke Air Base, Japan. They also operated a forward element at Osan Air Base, Korea. These units provided photo reconnaissance support for U.S. forces in Korea and Japan between July 1968 and April 1969. 60

The 123rd TFW's active duty experience in 1968-1969 fell short of the rapid response capability claimed for the Air Guard. Much of this was due to the fact that it had not benefited from the Manning, training, and equipment priorities established for "Beef Broth" units in 1965. Sweeping post-mobilization reorganization had further delayed the 123rd's achievement of operational readiness.
Nevertheless, its units flew a total of 19,715 tactical hours, launched 11,561 sorties, and processed 841,601 feet of aerial film. The 192nd and the 165th TRS’s were each honored by 5th Air Force for their service in South Korea with its Outstanding Unit Plaque. Underscoring this positive recognition, Lieutenant General Thomas K. McGehee, 5th Air Force Commander, strongly commended members of the 154th TRS for their performance. His letter of appreciation said, in part:

I wish to take this opportunity to commend your entire squadron for its outstanding professional performance. . . . Your rapid deployment and immediate operational readiness aided immeasurably in providing a more effective combat posture. . . . Please convey to all of your people my most sincere appreciation for a job well done.

Guardsmen from Arkansas’s 189th TRG and 123rd TRS were demobilized in December 1968. The remainder of the 123rd TRW was demobilized in June 1969.

The seven years following the Berlin mobilization witnessed significant improvements in the Air Guard. Its combat readiness was substantially enhanced, its weapons systems were modernized, and its operations were closely integrated with those of the active Air Force. These trends had been dramatically illustrated in Southeast Asia during 1968 and 1969. Following the Pueblo crisis, four Air Guard tactical fighter squadrons were deployed to South Vietnam and rapidly integrated into combat operations. The performance of those squadrons demonstrated that, when properly supported by the regular establishment, Air Guard units could quickly and effectively assume the first line combat reserve force role. Air Guardsmen believed
that their genuinely impressive performance had earned them a place on the Air Force's first team. Public praise of their combat contributions by top Air Force leaders seemed to substantiate this view.

Several factors had contributed to the Air Guard's emergence as a first line combat reserve force during the 1960's. Implementation of the Air Force's gaining command concept of reserve forces' management had gradually improved readiness through standardized operational procedures, improved training, and tougher inspection standards. The major air commands had begun to require Air Guard units to perform according to the same standards as active force units. Air Guard leaders, recognizing that much of their program's long-term viability depended upon its ability to measure up to those standards, were extremely responsive to training supervision by their respective gaining commands. DOD's increased emphasis upon conventional military forces and its determination to create a select force of immediately-deployable reserve units to support that policy provided some of the wherewithal for the Air Guard's growing proficiency. Finally, the Vietnam War had an enormous impact on the Air Guard. By stretching the active duty establishment's resources thin, it forced the Air Force to rely increasingly on its reserve components to help fulfill a variety of peacetime responsibilities ranging from aerial tanker operations in Europe to the installation of communications facilities in the U.S. This practice of relying on Air Guardsmen to perform real operational functions substantially enhanced their military capabilities. The fate
of the RAND report and numerous air reserve forces' studies conducted within the Air Force itself illustrate the continuing reluctance of the professional establishment to devote the substantial additional resources needed to maintain reserve flying units in advanced states of readiness. The Selected Reserve Force program instituted by Secretary McNamara illustrated what was needed. The success of these units in the 1968 mobilizations notwithstanding, the program was subsequently dropped. It is clear that, despite its growing dependence on the Air Guard and the outstanding combat performance of Guardsmen in South Vietnam, the Air Force remained reluctant to devote resources to the Air Guard that might threaten its own position.  

During the 1960's, the Air Guard had clearly emerged as a first line combat reserve force with units capable of rapid global deployment. Its aircraft were still capable of effective employment in a broad range of contingencies. Reflecting the growing U.S. concern with conventional warfare and the availability of surplus aircraft, its force structure had been reoriented from its concentration on air defense in the 1950's to a variety of tactical aviation missions by 1969. Air Guard technical units continued to support active force operations with weather, communications, aircraft control and warning and construction services. By the end of the decade, the Air Guard had evolved into a valuable reserve component of the Air Force that could serve as a flexible instrument of national policy.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER SIX


15 DOD, Report for FY '65, pp. 79-80.

16 DOD, Report for FY '65, pp. 79-80.


18 Wilson, Interview, Dec. 1978.


25. Ibid., pp. 36-37.


31. Ibid., V.

32. Ibid., VI.

33. Ibid., VII-VIII.


Memo, Assistant SAF (Manpower and Reserve) to Assistant Sec. Def. (Manpower and Reserve), 10 January 1969, Subj: "Lessons Learned from Limited Mobilizations." Memo provided to author by HQ USAF, Directorate of Plans, DCS/OP+R. Hereafter cited as USAF, "1968 Mobilization Lessons."


48. NGB, Report for FY '69, p. 11.


50. Untitled News item, Air Reservist, August/September 1968, p. 5.


52. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Nominations of John L. McLucas to be Secretary of the Air Force and General George S. Brown to be Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, Hearings, before the committee, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 13 June 1973, p. 18.


In addition to the active duty assignments discussed in the narrative, two ANG F-100 units activated in January 1968—Washington, D.C.'s 113th TFG and Atlantic City's 117th TFG—were transferred to Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina. They formed a training unit to prepare Air Force pilots to fly F-100's in SEA. Furthermore, numerous ANG technical organizations including Communications, weather, and Ground Electronics Engineering and Installation Agency (GEEIA) units were mobilized along with their parent tactical organizations. Air Guardsmen in these technical units were reassigned on an individual basis throughout the Air Force. See NGB, Report for FY '68, pp. 7-10. NGB, Report for FY '69, p. 12. Benton, Air Weather Flights, pp. 61-62, 72.

CHAPTER SEVEN

EPILOGUE: THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND THE TOTAL FORCE

Current DoD policy emphasizes the necessity for maintaining strong reserve forces including the Air Guard. Officially, this is known as the "Total Force" policy. Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird promulgated this policy in 1970. His objective was to save money by reducing the size of the active duty establishment while strengthening the reserve components of the armed forces. The policy itself was an outgrowth of American disenchantment with the stalemated Vietnam War. That disenchantment had helped to elect Richard M. Nixon President in 1968. After taking office, Nixon had ordered a gradual de-escalation of the direct American involvement in that unpopular conflict. His "Vietnamization" policy returned the main burden of the fighting, especially ground combat, to the South Vietnamese themselves. While the U.S. continued to provide heavy aerial and logistical support, American ground combat troops were gradually withdrawn.¹

In a broader context, Nixon had sought to reshape U.S. national security policies in directions reminiscent of President Eisenhower's initiatives following the Korea War. The defense budget was dramatically reduced. Defense obligations for FY 1971 amounted to $78 billion, a reduction of $18.1 billion below the FY 1968
Vietnam era peak in U.S. military spending. American ground forces suffered substantial reductions as a result of these budget cuts. Nuclear deterrent forces were maintained at approximately their current levels. Conventional air and naval forces were de-emphasized. America's allies were told that, henceforward, they would be expected to shoulder the main burden of countering communist-inspired subversion and conventional aggression. With the exception of the NATO countries and South Korea, they could no longer automatically expect assistance from American ground forces to help counter such threats to their security. These policies were labeled the "Nixon Doctrine." Conspicuously absent from this reformulation of national security policy was any overt reference or implication that the U.S. would immediately resort to nuclear weapons to counter communist pressure on its allies.2

The "Total Force" policy was a corollary of the "Nixon Doctrine." Spending on reserve forces was dramatically increased. For example, the FY 1972 budget for the reserves was set at $3.1 billion, an increase of nearly 50 percent above the $2.1 billion spent on them during FY 1969. The weapons and equipment of reserve units were modernized. Some reserve air units began to be partially-equipped with aircraft purchased directly from factory production lines. Moreover, the "Total Force" approach sought to insure that all policymaking, programming, and budgetary activities within DOD considered active duty and reserve forces on a concurrent basis. Its ambitious objective was to determine the most advantageous mix of those forces in terms of their contribution to national security
versus the cost to equip and maintain them. Finally, the "Total Force" policy committed DOD to using reservists as the initial and primary source of manpower to augment the active duty forces in the event of a future war or other national emergency. This provision was clearly a response to public and congressional dissatisfaction with the Johnson administration's decision to rely upon the draft rather than a massive reserve mobilization during the Vietnam era buildup of U.S. military forces.  

Concepts behind the "Total Force" policy itself were a direct outgrowth of the Air Force's experience with its reserve programs, especially the Air Guard. The "Total Force" idea was the brainchild of Dr. Theodore Marrs, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. He was dedicated to advancing the roles of the reserve components within the defense establishment. In 1966, he had sponsored the RAND study which had suggested, primarily on cost-effectiveness grounds, that the Air Force expand reserve participation in most of its major mission areas. That type of argument for stronger reserve forces participation in national defense was increasingly attractive to many civilian officials and congressmen given the relatively austere defense budgets of the Nixon administration. Dr. Marrs promoted it with great vigor and effect from his position within DOD.

In a larger sense, the Air Guard and the Air Force had pioneered a "Total Force" approach to reserve programs since the Korean War. Air National Guard augmentation of the Air Force's air defense runway alert program, implemented on a continuing basis in
1954, had marked the first significant attempt to fully integrate reserve units into the peacetime functions of the active duty military establishment. This use of reserve training time and resources to augment the active Air Force was extremely limited prior to the 1960's. However, there was a vast expansion of this practice in the early 1960's due to the escalating American military involvement in the Vietnam War. Air Guardsmen and Air Force Reservists became directly involved in a variety of active force support missions ranging from overseas airlift to installation of ground-based electronics gear. By 1967-1968, air units of the Selected Reserve Force constituted the bulk of the Air Force's strategic reserve forces in the continental U.S. Four of these units, Air Guard fighter squadrons, compiled outstanding combat records in Vietnam following their mobilization during the Pueblo crisis. As early as October 1963, Major General Curtis R. Low, Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Forces, labelled this approach to utilizing the Air Force's reserve components as the "Total Force concept" in an address to the 85th General Conference of the NGAUS. Although the label did not become official until 1970, it did reflect the fact that the Air Force was beginning to use the full range of resources available to it for accomplishing its various mission responsibilities. These resources included the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve.

The "Total Force" approach also extended to Air Force policy-making, planning, programming, and budgeting activities for its reserve components. Theoretically these responsibilities had been
integrated with their active duty counterparts on a functional basis when the Air Force was established as an independent military department in September 1947. However, as the Air Guard's experience illustrated, the actual practice had been quite different until after the Korean War. Reserve forces had received scant attention at headquarters USAF and the major air commands except CONAC. CONAC itself was delegated the major responsibility for planning and supervising reserve forces programs. This management system was clearly inadequate because it lacked effective guidance from the Air Staff and failed to effectively involve the major air commands in reserve training. Those air commands would be forced to rely in wartime or other national emergencies on the reservists they had neglected in peacetime. The Air Guard's mobilization debacle during the Korean War partially reflected the inadequacies of this Air Force system of reserve forces management and planning.

The Korean War forced the Air Force to improve its reserve programs. Reserve components' policymaking, planning, programming, and budgeting functions began to be integrated with their active force counterparts on a limited basis. Increasing numbers of individual Air Guardsmen and Reservists were recalled to active duty to advise the Air Staff and the major air commands on reserve forces matters. Reserve forces planning machinery was upgraded on the Air Staff by General Twining during his tenure as Chief of Staff. Congressional legislation confirmed the Air Guard's legal status as a separate reserve component and strengthened reserve forces policy-making machinery within DOD and the Department of the Air Force.
Yet, these improvements during the 1950's were only marginal. The Air Guard was still treated as primarily a training outfit. It was equipped and manned well short of full wartime levels. Many of its aircraft were obsolescent. War plans assumed a substantial period of post-mobilization training and refitting. The Berlin crisis mobilization in 1961 exposed extreme deficiencies in the Air Guard's operational capabilities. These deficiencies were an outgrowth of inadequate Air Force and DOD planning, programming, and budgeting for reserve forces.

Adequate Air Force implementation of a "Total Force" approach to utilizing its reserve components did not come until after the Berlin mobilization. The keys to this were the Air Force's gaining command concept of reserve forces management and DOD's Selected Reserve Force. Under the gaining command concept, responsibility for the peacetime training and inspection of the air reserve forces was transferred to the major air commands that they would actually be assigned to during a mobilization. This was probably the single most important Air Force innovation in the management of the Air Guard and Air Force Reserve. It forced them to organize and train according to the same standards as their active force counterparts. The gaining command concept truly integrated the Air Guard and the Air Force Reserve into the "Total (Air) Force" at the operational level well before it became official DOD policy in 1970. The Selected Reserve Force, created by Secretary of Defense McNamara in 1965, provided the wherewithal needed by an elite group
of these reserve units to achieve the high levels of operational readiness that made them immediately available to the Air Force for global deployment.

Following a rough beginning during the immediate post World War II period, the Air Guard has gradually evolved into an outstanding reserve program. Despite its anomalous state-federal status, its units have achieved high degrees of operational readiness and have made substantial contributions during three partial mobilizations from 1950 through 1969. They provide a significant percentage of the tactical fighter, reconnaissance, and transport aircraft available to the Air Force today. Sixty percent of the nation's manned interceptor force is flown by Air Guardsmen. Air Guard support units augment the active Air Force with a host of technical services including aircraft surveillance and warning, civil engineering, weather forecasting, and communications-electronic support.

Despite its historic record of accomplishments, there are serious limitations on the Air Guard's military utility. Advanced operational readiness is very expensive. As its tactical squadrons approach the Air Force requirement to be prepared for immediate global deployment while flying increasingly sophisticated aircraft like the F-4 and the A-7, the gap between Air Guard and regular force operating costs has narrowed significantly. In 1967, RAND estimated that gap to be 50 percent. Recent studies have estimated that such units cost 70 percent as much as their active force counterparts to operate. Direct buys of aircraft for reserve units further narrow
the cost differential. If Air Guard unit operating costs continue to approach that of their active force counterparts, they may become increasingly less attractive options to national security policymakers and planners.

There are also serious political and managerial constraints on the use of the Air Guard. Regardless of their operational readiness, Air Guard units cannot be mobilized frequently for international contingencies. Such mobilizations send strong political signals to foreign governments and American public opinion. In many circumstances, those signals would be inappropriate and misleading. Furthermore, a force structure overly reliance on reserve units might also be construed as a sign of weakness or passivity by foreign governments. From a management perspective, there are several drawbacks to a heavy reliance on reserve forces. Frequent mobilizations could so disrupt the lives of Guardsmen and reservists that most of them would be unlikely to maintain their military affiliation. This would rob the Air Guard of two of its most precious assets, unit cohesion and the relatively high experience levels of its personnel. In today's no draft environment, frequent mobilizations could rapidly decimate the Air Guard's ranks.

Finally, there appear to be significant limitations on the roles and missions which the Air Guard can play. It cannot effectively operate the command and control, basic and advanced technical training, logistics, and technological research and development programs that constitute the foundations of modern air power. Furthermore,
certain missions like strategic deterrence or tactical air superiority, that require constant states of extremely high readiness and frequent deployments, are poorly suited to reserve programs. Rather, they must depend upon a strong active duty establishment to provide the basic infrastructure of air power and the exclusive responsibility for certain missions. However, as the history of the Air Guard illustrates, reserve units can perform extremely well when they share missions and aircraft types with their counterparts in a healthy active duty establishment. Their optimal role lies in augmenting, not replacing, a strong regular Air Force.

Its limitations notwithstanding, the Air Guard has gradually developed into an excellent military reserve program. Several factors have accounted for its success. Most significantly, the Air Guard has become closely integrated into the policymaking, planning, programming, budgetary, operational processes of the active Air Force. Since the Korean War, the Air Guard's leadership has been willing to exchange a good deal of the effective control of their organization in return for increased Air Force supervision and support. They recognized that only through this exchange could the Air Guard attain the operational effectiveness that would guarantee its long-term survival as a reserve component with a distinctive state character. The Air Force was compelled to accept this arrangement because political and budgetary realities dictated that the Air Guard could not be forced to surrender its state affiliation at an acceptable cost. Consequently, the Air
Guard has gradually evolved from "little Air Forces" to a reserve program operated according to the same organizational, training, and inspection standards of the active Air Force.

The political strength of the National Guard has been another key factor shaping the Air Guard's history. The Air Guard would have never been established if it had not been for the determined efforts of the NGAUS to insure that the National Guard was included in the War Department's post World War II plans. The wartime Army Air Force (AAF) was forced by General Marshall, against its better judgement, to accept the idea of a dual component air reserve system including the Air Guard. Marshall was determined to remove potential political opposition to wartime action by Congress on postwar national defense policies that he felt were vital to American security. The AAF was willing to go along with this to insure that it achieved its long-sought goal of independence from the Army. However, after 1947, the Air Force began to press for total federalization of the Air Guard. Only the strength of the NGAUS in Congress and statehouses across the country prevented the Air Force from accomplishing this goal.

The Guard's political strength has played a significant role in legislative initiatives by the Congress designed to strengthen reserve programs and insure their separate legal identity. The National Security Act of 1947, the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, and the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 all reflected the National Guard's political influence. Furthermore, the Guard has intervened in the administrative processes of DOD and the Air Force
to protect its interests. Its political muscle has insured that the Air Guard received priority over the strictly federal Air Force Reserve in the distribution of aircraft and equipment. Consequently, Air Guard flying units have usually been equipped with more advanced and more glamorous tactical aircraft than the Air Force Reserve. This has made it easier for the Air Guard to attract the cadre of skilled personnel that it needed for its flying units. Finally, the Guard's political strength has enabled it to defend its annual budget requests with reasonable success against crippling cuts by either DOD or the Air Force.

The Air Guard has relied upon the Air Force to provide it with a large pool of experienced officers and NCO's since the end of World War II. The willingness of these trained veterans to maintain at least a part-time military affiliation once they leave active duty has been another key to the Air Guard's performance. Given adequate Air Force support and supervision, these individuals have been able to retain advanced levels of military proficiency while serving as Guardsmen. For many of them, the old "weekend warrior" stereotype no longer adequately reflects the time and effort they now devote to their part-time military duties. Especially for pilots, one weekend each month and two weeks of annual training are no longer adequate to maintain proficiency in modern military aircraft. Subject to the availability of operating funds, they put in a good many extra flying and other training hours. This, plus the fact that many of them are either professional
civilian pilots or operate their own private aircraft, provides a high general level of flight experience not often found in regular Air Force units.

Air technicians have been another key factor in the Air Guard's success. These full-time quasi-military employees are responsible for the daily operations of their units. They account for some 20 percent of the Air Guard's total manpower, but the bulk of them are concentrated in the aircraft maintenance area. All technicians must be military members of their respective units. Like the Air Guard's pilots, most of them are Air Force veterans.

The maintenance technicians, as a group, have a level of experience and continuity of unit service unmatched in the active Air Force. They constitute the heart of the Air Guard's impressive capability to maintain their aircraft in an operationally-ready status and provide on-the-job training to less experienced "weekenders."

Because of their extensive experience, the technicians can provide high levels of maintenance services that are frequently the envy of regular Air Force units. Moreover, the technicians, whether they be in maintenance, supply, administration, or flight supervision, provide the continuity and unit cohesion that are seldom found in regular units.

The legal and administrative arrangements governing the Air Guard's technician force are complicated. They have existed in their present form since January 1, 1969, the effective date of PL90-476, The National Guard Technician Act. Prior to that date, technicians had been considered state employees although paid by the federal
government. Furthermore, they did not enjoy a retirement program and lacked protection under federal civil service laws. Finally, they had been described as caretakers and clerks with very limited legal responsibilities for the operation of their Air Guard units before the enactment of PL90-486. The new bill significantly changed their official status. It specifically provided for their employment to administer and train Guardsmen as well as to maintain and repair equipment and supplies. Although they were now hired under a noncompetitive federal civil service status, they were still actually employed and their program was administered by the state adjutant generals. Regardless of these complicated arrangements, the technicians are absolutely vital to the operation of their units. Without them, the Air Guard simply could not function.9

Finally, the availability of surplus military aircraft has been a crucial factor shaping the Air Guard's organization and missions. Indeed, since the establishment of aviation as an integral and permanent element of the National Guard in 1920, this factor has largely determined what kind of flying organization it was going to be. Insofar as the NGB could demonstrate that the Air Guard could effectively operate a particular type of aircraft while fulfilling a legitimate military requirement, this situation has served U.S. national security interests well. Moreover, to the extent that these aircraft were still maintained in the active force's inventory flying the same missions as their Air Guard counterparts, this provided an extensive pool of expertise and spare parts that strengthened the Guard's own operational performance.
The Air Guard's reliance on the availability of surplus aircraft has been a mixed blessing. Although it made possible an extensive and increasingly diverse flying program, it has also imposed substantial limitations on the operational potentials of Air Guard units. Frequently, these units have been equipped with aircraft approaching obsolescence. Several times it appeared that the Air Guard was equipped with aircraft simply because they were surplus to the active force's needs even though no compelling military case was evident for their continued use. This raises the issue of whether prudent reserve force planning and programming should be so heavily influenced by the availability of surplus hardware rather than carefully developed military requirements. Although limited numbers of aircraft have been purchased for the Air Guard directly from factory production lines in recent years, it is evident that continued reliance on surplus and often obsolescent aircraft remains the most crucial factor inhibiting the full development of the Air Guard's operational capabilities.

Despite its success, the "lessons learned" from the Air Guard's historic development cannot be mechanically applied to other reserve programs. Certain elements of the Air Guard's experience, including the technician program and the "Total Force" approach, obviously have had legitimate applications to other reserve programs. But, the character of the operational and training tasks facing each of the armed services is dissimilar. The Army, for example, needs large numbers of men and a great deal of empty territory to conduct realistic combat exercises. The Navy prefers to use
individual reservists to augment its ships and shore installations. Consequently, the organization of reserve programs of these two services is heavily influenced by geographic considerations. The Air Force, on the other hand, has adopted a largely functional approach to reserve training. Training supervision under the gaining command concept is exercised by a functional Air Force command such as TAC rather than a geographic entity like an Army Corps area. The nature of air operations lends itself to this approach. Air Guard units, scattered across the country at various municipal airports and Air Force bases, can fly and maintain their aircraft on a daily basis. Most of the tactical units have ready access to gunnery ranges and the transport outfits are usually engaged in supporting MAC airlift operations. They can conduct realistic training programs at their home stations. Most Army and Navy reserve units or individuals cannot do this.

Furthermore, the Air Guard has found it much easier to attract personnel than most other reserve programs. From the inception of National Guard aviation before World War I, flying has had a glamorous appeal that service in conventional ground or naval forces lacks. This factor, plus the relatively small size and technological orientation of the Air Guard, has enabled it to recruit the high caliber people it has needed. Many of the skills that they have developed as Guardsmen are transferable to civilian life. The pressures of the draft have also helped. The Air Force itself has benefited from these same circumstances while the other armed
services and their reserve components have been placed at a dis-
advantage by them.

The nature of institutional preferences has also played a
role in the history of American military reserve programs since
World War II. By and large, the Air Force appears to have been much
more willing than its older sister services to develop the organi-
zational arrangements and to devote the resources necessary to build
strong reserve programs. Despite the efforts of virtually every
President from Truman to Nixon to limit defense spending by
strengthening reserve programs, only the Air Force has managed to
demonstrate a steady growth in the capabilities of its civilian
components. Innovations like Air Guard participation in the air
defense runway alert program and the gaining command concept attest
to the Air Force's institutional commitment to building viable
reserve programs. To be sure, external political and budgetary
pressures have encouraged the Air Force to strengthen these programs.
However, its sister services have faced these same pressures with
frequently less satisfactory results. Perhaps the fact that it
has been less burdened than the Army and Navy by a long history of
regular—reserve animosity has made the Air Force more willing to
take a pragmatic approach on this matter. Whatever the reasons, the
Air Force has overcome much of its own institutional skepticism to
fashion a set of reserve programs that effectively complement the
active duty establishment.

Since 1950, the Air Guard has gradually evolved into a valu-
able reserve component of the U.S. Air Force. The evolving pattern
of Air Guard–Air Force relationships established the precedents for what became known in 1970 as DOD's "Total Force" policy. The integrated policymaking, planning and operational functions pioneered by the Air Guard–Air Force relationship provided the conceptual basis for the "Total Force." Despite its nominal state-federal status, the Air National Guard continues to set the pace for U.S. military reserve programs in the late 1970's. It is a highly successful contemporary expression of the venerated Minuteman tradition in American military history.
FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER SEVEN


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