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PRESIDENTIAL–CONGRESSIONAL RELATIONS: PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON CONGRESSIONAL VOTING BEHAVIOR

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * *

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The legislative and executive branches of government are functionally interdependent; each needs the other in order to perform its role. Since these two branches share power in the policy-making process, their interaction influences the course of both domestic and foreign policy. Such an important relationship has generated a great deal of attention. Despite this attention, the relationship between the president and Congress remains one of the abiding mysteries of American government.

The Constitution says little directly about the relationship between the president and Congress. It states that the president "shall, from time to time, give to the Congress information on the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration, such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." Further, "he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses," and "he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper." The president requires the consent of two-thirds of the Senate to make treaties and a majority for senior appointments. The president has the power to veto legislation which Congress can override by a two-thirds vote, and he can be removed from office by the Congress. After establishing these principles, the Founding Fathers left the relationship largely undefined.
In the absence of constitutional or legal specifications, there has been an ongoing debate regarding the proper relationship between the president and the Congress. Much of the discussion has centered on how much power should reside in the presidency. This disagreement began in the Constitutional Convention, and the argument about the proper balance of power between the president and the Congress has swayed back and forth ever since. Viewpoints on the proper balance of power have been influenced by ideology and circumstance. For example, during the Constitutional Convention many delegates viewed a strong presidency as a threat to individual liberties; in more recent times, a strong president at the head of a powerful Federal government has been seen as the protector of individual rights. As Schlesinger argues "views on the proper distribution of power balance between the Congress and the president depended a good deal less on considerations of high principles than on preferences about the uses to which the power was put."¹ Not only have attitudes regarding presidential-congressional relations undergone change, but the relationship itself has changed. Historians can identify periods of congressional dominance and times when the presidency has been strong.

Not surprisingly, the attitudes of presidential scholars have also been influenced by the times in which they lived. The scholars who studied the presidency following Franklin Roosevelt's Administration tended, in the words of one critic, "to glorify the presidency." This group has been referred to as the "1960 writers."² In a recent critique of this school, William Andrews summarized their attitudes toward the presidency.³ These men tended to view the presidency as
best suited to lead the nation. They agreed on the existence of "great" and "substantial" power in the presidency and felt that the presidency's power, however great, was not adequate and should be increased.

A different image of the presidency emerges from the literature of the late 1960's and early '70's. Following the Vietnam War and Watergate, many scholars had doubts about the value of the strong presidency. They observed that the powers of a strong presidency could be used for both beneficial and destructive purposes. Many of the new critics of presidential power believe that the solution to the problem lay in strengthening congressional control, especially in foreign and defense affairs.

While modern presidential scholars have disagreed on the normative question regarding how much power should reside in the presidency, they have tended to agree that the office is indeed powerful. Even while proclaiming these powers, however, they have noted that Congress is an independent force. Many of the "1960 writers" recognized that there was a gap between expectations regarding presidential leadership and presidential power. Rossiter noted that the "President's leadership of Congress is spotty and discontinuous....There is a widening gap between what people expect and what he can produce. He must have a program and push for its enactment, but he has no way to force a decision upon a reluctant Congress." Neustadt has referred to presidents as "clerks" and "clerkship is no guarantee of leadership....Presidential power is the power to persuade." McConnell notes that "If the president sets much of the agenda of Congress, what follows is very much in the hands
of Congress. Each Senator and each Congressman is a power in his own right.⁷ Recent scholars have often urged that Congress assert itself, especially in foreign and defense affairs, but they agree that Congress is independent from the president.

Generally speaking, however, the recognition of congressional independence has not been integrated into a conceptualization of the balance of power between the president and Congress; instead congressional independence has been a footnote to the general theme of presidential power. Yet, as presidential scholars recognize, congressional cooperation is necessary if presidential programs are to become law. Much of the presidential literature, therefore, contains a paradox; the presidency is viewed as a powerful office even though it is recognized that the president cannot dominate Congress.

An exception to this generalization is Richard Neustadt's conceptualization of presidential-congressional relations. Neustadt argues that the Constitutional Convention did not create a government of separated powers, but "a government of separated institutions sharing powers."⁸ As will be elaborated in the following discussion, this conceptualization appears to be appropriate for most of the policy formulation process. The exception, according to the literature on the topic, is congressional voting behavior.

There is ample evidence to support the thesis that both the president and Congress share in the policy-making process. The president does have unique abilities to place items on the policy agenda. In part, this power derives from his ability to publicize policy issues. Also, there is a great deal of expertise in the
executive branch which the president can mobilize for policy formulation. In much of the literature on presidential-congressional relations, it has become almost conventional wisdom that the president initiates major innovations in legislative public policy and sets the congressional agenda—"the president proposes, and Congress disposes."

It is not clear, however, that the executive branch is the only source of innovation and creativity. The means by which an issue area matures and is put on the national agenda is a mysterious process, but there is good reason to believe that Congress participates through such means as holding hearings and publicizing issues. The same point can be made regarding innovations in public policy; Congress plays a role by holding hearings and participating in the formulation of new policy. Often a new public proposal will be the result of input from a number of sources; as a consequence, it is difficult to give credit to any one participant.

There are policy areas which require presidential initiative such as foreign affairs and certain emergencies. Because these situations tend to receive public attention, the appearance of presidential dominance is enhanced. However, there are policy areas which Congress virtually dominates, often referred to as "subgovernments," such as agriculture and water resources. Because of the lack of public interest, congressional strength in the "subgovernments" is generally not recognized. In short, despite the general impression of presidential dominance, each branch of government has its areas of strength, and, as a consequence, power is shared in both domestic and foreign policy.
When congressional voting behavior is considered, however, the empirical studies of congressional decision-making indicate that the executive and legislative branches do not share power; Congress appears to be dominant. Two recent, major studies of congressional voting behavior found little evidence of presidential influence on congressional decision-making. Using roll call analysis in a longitudinal study which covered the time period from 1953-1970, Clausen found evidence of presidential influence on voting on foreign affairs bills but none in the domestic policy areas. After studying the 91st Congress, Kingdon concluded that "By any measure, the administration and executive branch do not appear to be particularly important in congressmen's voting decisions. Congressmen of the president's party pay greater attention to the administration than do those of the opposition party...but this advantage is not always translated into votes." 

The major source of congressional decision-making powers is the Constitution which gives Congress the authority to pass judgment on all legislation and appropriations. The Constitution is explicit in this matter, but the delegation of authority for other aspects of the policy process is not as clearly defined. It is the lack of explicitness which has allowed a more flexible arrangement of sharing powers between the two branches of government. Congress may, if it chooses to do so, maintain the decision-making powers granted to it by the Constitution. The president may veto legislation, a tool which can be used to force compromise or prevent the passage of legislation which the president adamantly opposes. In practice, presidents have usually
preferred to use the veto sparingly, so it cannot be considered a dependable means for influencing legislation.

The Constitution also gives congressmen a power base that is independent of the president. Each congressman is elected by and represents his own district, and in the absence of disciplined political parties, there is little a president can do to influence the selection process. Because of the independent power base, congressional cooperation with presidents must be viewed as largely voluntary; presidents do not have the power to threaten a congressman's position.

If, as the preponderance of empirical evidence indicates, congressmen do not respond to presidential wishes when making voting decisions, congressional voting can be viewed as a "bottleneck" in which the give-and-take between the two branches of government breaks down; at this point power is no longer shared. Such a situation has implications for the remainder of the policy formulation process. If Congress has veto power at a crucial point, the ability of the president to propose and publicize legislation is diminished in importance; there is less value in proposing legislation if an independent source can reject it. Further, presidents are likely to modify their legislation proposals until they are acceptable to a majority of congressmen which further dilutes presidential powers. It does not matter how much presidents use powers such as the ability to command media attention; the final decision will still be made by a source with an independent power base.

Following this line of reasoning, it is clearly important to know whether congressional decision-making is impervious to presidential
influence. Therefore, this study will evaluate congressional response to presidential wishes; i.e., are presidents able to influence the voting decisions of congressmen? Answers to this question will enhance understanding of interbranch relations during the congressional decision-making process and contribute to a conceptualization of presidential-congressional relations in general.

A realistic picture of the power balance between the presidency and the Congress is of more than academic interest. The presidential literature has tended to stress the theme of presidential power, and this representation of the presidency has apparently been widely accepted by the press and the public, and, as a consequence, public expectations of presidential performance are quite high. The emphasis upon presidential powers has led to the tendency to hold presidents responsible for the development and passage of a legislative program, a role referred to by Rossiter as Chief Legislator. Presidents are expected to succeed as Chief Legislators by getting their legislation program through Congress in the desired form. Such an expectation is unrealistic and can create unfavorable attitudes toward both branches. Congress may be censured for performing its constitutional role while presidents are criticized for failing to dominate totally the legislative process, a performance that the Constitution does not allow.

The expectation that the president dominate the policy process has been partially responsible for the image of the two branches as adversaries rather than coparticipants in the policy process. In particular, the image of a recalcitrant Congress resisting the wishes of a popularly-elected president has been dominant. This image has
reflected the time when, in the thirty years following the beginning of the New Deal, conservative elements in Congress, ensconced in the committee and seniority system, were able to thwart the popular measures proposed by presidents. This image also reflects the tendency of the press to view the policy formulation process as a zero-sum game in which presidents are labeled as winners and losers. The practice of keeping box scores on how much presidential legislation has passed Congress also contributes to the image of conflict between the president and Congress.

In general, unrealistic images of presidential power and presidential-congressional relations have contributed to both high expectations and cynicism because neither branch is considered to be performing adequately. As stressed earlier, the greatest difference of opinion regarding presidential-congressional relations concerns congressional decision-making. It is difficult to reconcile the image of a powerful presidency with the empirical evidence of independent congressional decision-making. This study, therefore, has the potential to contribute to a more realistic image. Evidence of congressional response to presidential influence would support Neustadt's thesis that Congress and the president share power in the policy-making process. Such a conceptualization does not support the present practice of fixing responsibility for both foreign and domestic affairs on the president.

However, if congressional decision-making does prove to be impervious to presidential influence, it is Neustadt's thesis which should be modified to include a recognition that at an important point
in the policy process, power is not shared. Further, the expectations which have been created by the emphasis on presidential power would have to be lowered considerably to include a recognition of congressional responsibility in the policy process.

Avenues for Presidential Influence

The empirical studies of congressional voting behavior have found little evidence of presidential influence on decision-making for domestic issues. Despite these findings, a detailed study of this topic is easily justified. The major studies of congressional voting behavior were designed to enhance understanding of a wide range of influences on voting behavior. Therefore, a more detailed, specifically designed project is necessary before the possibility of presidential influence is dismissed. Furthermore, the study of congressional voting behavior has now advanced to a state which permits presidential influence to be thoroughly examined. The new theoretical work and empirical studies can be used to guide an examination of a small portion of the decision-making process.

From the theoretical work in this field, only two recent theories, policy dimension and consensus mode, will be utilized since they incorporated much of the earlier work. In brief summary, policy dimension theory states that:

legislators reduce the time and energy requirements of policy decision making by 1) sorting specific policy proposals into a limited number of general policy content categories and by 2) establishing a policy position for each general category of policy content, one that can be used to make decisions on each of the specific proposals assigned to that category.12
The theory holds further that the policy position taken by the individual, when acting as a congressman, consists of more than his personal attitudes. It is based also on his view of his policy-making responsibilities vis-a-vis his constituency, his party, the president and cherished interests.13

This theory was supported by empirical analysis which found that most congressional legislation falls into one of the five major policy dimensions— civil liberties, international involvement, agricultural assistance, social welfare and government management. The policy positions of congressmen, with the exception of international involvement, were stable on each of the dimensions for quite a long period of time, 1953-70. Further, the sources of the policy positions tended to vary by policy dimension. The four domestic policy dimensions were heavily influenced by major political variables such as party, region, and state. The fifth dimension, international involvement, proved to be susceptible to presidential influence.

In the second major study of congressional decision making, Kingdon developed the consensus mode theory of decision making which states that congressmen will vote with a consensus in the field of forces or actors in his decision-making environment. The field of forces is defined as having seven possible actors: his own specific policy attitude towards the issue under consideration; his constituency; fellow congressmen to whom he pays attention; interest groups; his staff; his party leaders; and the administration. If a few actors are not in agreement, the congressman is likely to vote with the majority.
Kingdon found that there is a high degree of consensus in the congressman's immediate decision-making environment. When examining how congressmen made decisions, Kingdon found that congressmen rely most heavily on colleagues within the House and on constituents for guidance as they vote; other actors in the system such as lobbyists and administration policy-makers tend to work through these two gatekeeper sources.  

These two works provide an overview of the barriers which a president must overcome if he is to influence congressional decision-making. Although the theories concentrate on explaining different aspects of the decision-making process, they are complementary and can be used to develop a model of the entire decision-making process and environment. This model illustrates the potential avenues for presidential influence as well as the obstacles. (Figure 1)  

To borrow terminology from voting behavior literature, policy dimension theory explains the effects of long-term forces on congressional decision-making. The long-term forces, such as political party and constituency, have been a part of a congressman's decision-making environment for all of his political career, if not most of his life. An analogy in voting behavior literature would be the influence of party identification. Together with a congressman's personal policy attitudes, the long-term forces influence the policy position taken by congressmen. These long-term forces tend to be stable which helps explain the stability in congressional policy positions.  

The consensus mode theory, on the other hand, explains the effects of short-term forces on congressional decision-making. Short-term
forces—e.g., fellow congressmen, interest groups, party leaders—are present in the immediate environment when congressmen are making decisions. In contrast to long-term forces, the short-term forces are variable and have not influenced the establishment of policy positions. The equivalent in voting behavior studies would be variables such as issues and the personality of candidates.

The links between the long-term and short-term forces are the congressional policy positions. These policy positions help to structure the short-term decision-making environment. As Kingdon argues, a congressman has some control over the structure of the field of forces which influence him. Through the preconsensus process "A congressman structures his environment according to his general policy attitudes, through selection of cues to which he pays attention, and through selective perception of information which comes to him."15 A congressman's voting history plays a similar role in structuring consensus in his field; once a congressman has established a pattern of behavior, this pattern may structure current decisions.

The completed model of congressional decision-making illustrates how it is possible to examine the influence of a short-term force such as the president. Because the policy positions are stable, they provide a measurement of "normal" congressional behavior. As short-term forces enter the decision-making environment, it is therefore possible to measure whether congressmen alter their "normal" voting patterns in response to the short-term forces. The background of stability permits the study of temporary fluctuations in voting behavior; without the stability, it would not be possible to evaluate
and interpret change in policy positions.

This discussion of the complete decision-making process has described powerful mechanisms for maintaining stability in congressional policy positions. The stable decision-making environment provides a major obstacle for presidential attempts to influence congressional voting behavior. A president must penetrate this environment and either reinforce congressmen's pre-existing tendencies to support him or persuade congressmen to change their policy position to positions closer to the president's preference. Although this would appear to be a formidable task, the president is not without resources.

Short-term Forces

The comprehensive model of decision-making (Figure 1) indicates that a short-term force such as the president would have difficulty breaking through the barriers established by the policy positions. That is, unless a congressman is predisposed to listen to a president, the influence of policy positions on the decision-making environment will prevent the president's viewpoints from being considered. While this would appear to limit severely a president's potential for influence, he does have advantages that can be used to alter this pattern.

First, the president has access to legislators and is generally able to communicate his viewpoints if he chooses to do so. Interest groups are known to be particularly interested in maintaining access to legislators so they can present their viewpoints. In this regard, the congressional liaison agents for the president appear to have the
clear advantage; as representatives of the president, they can gain
access quite easily. The executive departments also have access to
the committees considering relevant legislation. The most direct and
immediate form of communication is, of course, from the president
himself. Presidents can and have used the personal approach for
establishing good relations with Congress by inviting congressmen to
the White House to socialize or by making telephone calls. This
appears to be an approach which should be used sparingly. Legislative
liaison agents for the president have noted that "if he (the president)
started using the phone for votes, all the members would expect to be
asked by the president personally."¹⁶ The president can communicate
with Congress through the party leaders; he can also communicate
publicly because of his ability to command the attention of the media.
In general, the president does not appear to have to be concerned
about lack of access to congressmen.

Since congressmen must deal with large quantities of complex,
technical legislation, the opportunity to communicate and discuss the
merits of legislation is no small advantage. Holzman reports that
"Departmental liaison officers, with two exceptions, were adamant in
their conviction that the merit of their legislative proposals was
their most effective asset for obtaining votes from congressman."¹⁷
In Milbraith's study of Washington lobbyists, eighty percent of his
respondents preferred the direct personal approach and noted it to be
the most effective; despite this they relied increasingly upon
intermediaries who were presumed to have better access to decision-
makers. This shift away from the direct approach had occurred despite
its being considered less complicated, less risky, and less expensive than the indirect method. These findings reinforce the observation that access to direct communication is an important asset for the president.

The president has advantages which are not available to other short-term forces. The White House and executive departments can capitalize upon the needs of legislators for special favors affecting their constituents. An executive bureau can provide routine services by meeting the political needs of the congressman who are attempting to provide services for their constituents. Departments also have scarcer resources to dispense such as grants, loans and patronage. It is difficult to gauge the effectiveness of these measures, but at least one active participant found them to be useful. "During his three years in the White House," reported O'Brien in 1963, "he and his staff developed a tremendous service operation. 'We could never have survived unless we had had and had used patronage. We got the vote not just by appeal on the basis of merit or substantive discussion with members.'"

And finally, the president has a unique position as the only nationally elected leader capable of providing unified leadership. Using this position and the resources of the Executive Branch, the president can, in certain circumstances, define a legislative program which will meet the needs he perceives and receive support from a majority of congressmen. It is the ability to define legislation, especially legislation concerning new policy, and to play an important role in establishing the congressional agenda which has helped create
the impression of a dominant presidency.

**Long-term Forces**

The president may also be assisted by the long-term forces which influence the personal policy positions assumed by congressmen. The president himself is influenced by long-term forces, such as political party and personal ideology, which will be congruent with many congressmen. The president may also have a common constituency with some congressmen, but the president's will be larger and more diverse. Obviously, to the extent that the long-term influences of a president and congressmen coincide, the president is more likely to be able to influence the congressmen's voting behavior.

A long-term force which is expected to play a particularly important role is political party. While American political parties are not able to control the nominations of those who run under the party label, they can be influential in a number of other ways. First, a common political party membership will enhance communication between the president and congressmen. Second, because of the importance of party label in most voters' minds, it is in the congressman's self-interest that the administration of the president of his party be well regarded or at least not a disaster. If an administration is unpopular, usually due to economic problems, there may be a backlash against the party in either the midterm or general elections. Even if a congressman is in a fairly secure position, he benefits from a large party majority since chairmanships and party balance on committees are determined by the party balance in the larger body. The problem, of
course, is that there may be disagreement on the measures that will lead to a popular, successful administration. Nevertheless, congres­sional self-interest should coincide with presidential interests at least some of the time.

Presidents also can claim a loyalty which is due to membership in the same political party. Kingdon reported that Republican congressmen often referred to their stake in the administration's success, their unwillingness to embarrass the administration, and their personal loyalty to the president. Some quotations as examples:

This is something the Nixon Administration wanted, and I'm a Republican. I support this Administration, and I'll go along with them when I can.20

I'm a party man. I worked hard for Nixon, and I want to see him succeed.21

Similar types of reactions were reported by President Kennedy's chief liaison officer with Congress, Lawrence O'Brien. O'Brien suggested that by involving the name of the president in a direct appeal ('The President wants you and this is the key to his program.'), he made it difficult for a congressman to beg off. Common party ties helped, he contended, since in most cases Democratic congressmen started with a basic loyalty to their party and to the President as party leader. Unless special problems arose for them in their districts, appeals in the name of party loyalty and to support their party's leader tended to evoke cooperative responses from such congressmen.22

Conflict with Pre-Existing Policy Positions

To summarize the previous discussion, when a president is attempting to influence congressional voting behavior, he is able to circumvent many of the obstacles which other short-term forces
encounter. Further, a president may receive a valuable assist from long-term forces, especially political party. Despite these advantages, a president must still deal with the pre-existing policy positions of congressmen. Because empirical studies have demonstrated a high degree of stability in these policy positions, presidential influence would be enhanced if he could appeal to the pre-existing positions rather than attempting to change them. If a president pursued such a course, however, he might have little impact on domestic policy.

At this point in the study of congressional voting behavior, the possibility of some flexibility in congressional policy positions should not be dismissed. The reported stability in policy positions is an empirical finding and is not a premise in the theories of congressional decision-making; that is, the theories do not preclude flexibility and instability in policy positions. Further, the major studies of congressional voting behavior were not designed to examine congressional voting responses to changes in the decision-making environment. Therefore, the extent of flexibility in congressional policy positions has not been fully explored. As Clausen notes, "The expectation is that the individual congressman will hold the same policy position across numerous times of office because there is little change in the determinants of the policy position."23

Because of the great number of voting decisions which must be made by congressmen, they need a method for simplifying the decision-making process. One means for doing so is to establish a position on a policy dimension and maintain that position in future decision-making. Despite the need to economize the decision-making process, a persuasive
argument can also be made for expecting some flexibility in policy positions in response to changes in short-term forces such as the president. The desire to simplify decision-making does not mean that congressmen are going to neglect their responsibilities as policy-makers and ignore new stimuli in the decision-making environment. In many cases, congressmen may be maintaining a policy position without feeling strongly about the issue; therefore, they may be willing to consider new information and perhaps make temporary alterations in their policy positions, if they do not create severe conflicts with other forces in the decision-making environment. The president, in particular, stands to benefit from potential flexibility in policy positions because congressmen are on record as wanting to support "the president whenever they can."

In summary, the empirical finding of stability in congressional policy positions does not preclude the possibility of congressional response to presidential influence. The extent to which it may happen is the testable proposition of this study. The results will enhance understanding of presidential-congressional relations and provide new data on flexibility in congressional policy positions.
FIGURE 1

COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF CONGRESSIONAL DECISION-MAKING


15. Ibid., p. 259.


17. Ibid., p. 201.

18. Ibid., p. 211.


CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH FOR STUDYING PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCES

The theoretical developments and empirical studies on congressional decision-making provide the basis for studying congressional response to presidential influence. Since a major assumption of this study is that the basic principles of congressional decision-making will not differ significantly when presidents are active in the decision-making environment, the premises and assumptions of policy dimension theory will provide the theoretical basis for this study.

An assumption of policy dimension theory is that decision-making by congressmen involves two separate but related decisions: 1) the congressmen must determine the policy content on which the decision is to be made; and 2) he must determine the rule for making the decision. It is assumed that the decision rule is chosen after the policy content has been determined.\(^1\) The theory based on these assumptions states that congressmen will sort specific policy proposals into a limited number of general content categories and will establish a policy position for each general category of policy content.\(^2\)

When policy dimension theory was applied to congressional voting behavior for the years 1953-70, certain characteristics emerged. First, it was found that the majority of congressional voting decisions fit onto five policy dimensions—civil liberties, international involvement,
agricultural assistance, social welfare, and government management—and these dimensions were continuous during the years of 1953-70.

Second, the policy positions held by individual congressmen were stable during the time period of the study. Further, the policy positions taken by congressmen varied by policy dimension with each dimension reflecting different patterns of influence ranging from party influence on government management to constituency influence on civil liberties.

These empirical findings perform two important functions for the study of presidential influence. First, and very important, the verification of continuity in policy dimensions and stability in policy positions provides a stable measuring instrument which can be used to examine the influence of a short-term force. Without an established pattern of "normal" behavior, it is not possible to study temporary changes and fluctuations.

Second, when the empirical findings are combined with the theoretical assumptions, expectations can be developed for congressional voting behavior when presidential influence is present:

1. It is assumed that policy dimension theory will explain congressional voting behavior.

2. Therefore, congressmen will sort policy proposals into general policy categories before deciding whether to include presidential wishes in the decision calculus.

3. Presidential influence will vary by policy dimension with congressmen deciding to accommodate presidential wishes in some areas and ignore them in others. Since the long-term influences on congressional policy positions vary by policy area, it will be possible
to identify the conditions which enhance presidential influences as well as those which provide barriers.

While the theoretical and empirical work on congressional decision-making provide the necessary background for the study of presidential influence, this research project will also contribute information and insights to the rapidly developing body of literature on congressional decision-making. In addition to providing information of presidential-congressional relations, this study will be examining congressional voting behavior in a previously untested situation, a change in a short-term force in the decision-making environment.

Definition of "Influence"

The concept "influence" and its close ally "power" have been widely discussed and analyzed in political science literature. In an analysis of Congress and foreign policy-making, Robinson asserts that "The analysis of power or influence in decision-making is really a search for explanation for why decisions turn out the way they do." This definition corresponds with the usage of "influence" in major studies of congressional decision-making. When Clausen and Kingdon discuss the "influence of constituency" or "the influence of party," they are attempting to evaluate whether congressmen's voting decisions reflect the wishes of these groups.

In this paper "influence" will mean that A persuades B to do something that A wants him to do. Applying this concept to presidential influence on congressional voting behavior, the president would persuade congressmen to vote in a particular manner. Therefore, an assessment of
presidential influence would need the following information:
1) evidence that the president was attempting to influence the outcome of a roll call vote; 2) the outcome which the president prefers; 3) a measurement of congressional reaction to presidential efforts to influence the outcome.

This definition of "influence" is more rigorous than is normally used in congressional decision-making studies. Most studies of legislative voting behavior analyze voting patterns and draw conclusions regarding the forces which influenced the outcome. Therefore, their definition of "influence" does not meet the three requirements of the definition used in this study. For example, a voting behavior study may analyze a set of voting outcomes and use multiple regression to ascertain the comparative impact of a variety of potential influences such as constituency and political party. Such an approach does not require evidence that the forces were trying to influence the voting behavior, the response they preferred, or whether the voting outcome was in response to the forces. While Kingdon used a different approach, interviewing congressmen regarding their decision-making environment, he relied on the congressman's perception of that environment. Also, he did not have a measurement of a congressman's reaction to any specific force.

The more precise definition enhances the possibility of finding presidential influence, if any exists, and increases confidence in the findings. The definition serves another important purpose; it measures the president's greatest source of strength in the policy-making process, the ability to define policy and have it considered with the
congressional source of power, voting decisions. The major studies of congressional voting behavior have not studied this link because they were pursuing broader topics. It is this omission, however, which may explain why presidential influence has not been found in congressional decision-making.

The examination of presidential influence will proceed on two levels, the macro or "group" level and "micro" or individual level. Congressional behavior at the macro level will provide information on how the members of the president's party, as a group, responded to presidential influence. However, since a measurement of group behavior can conceal movement at the individual level, congressional reaction at the micro level will also be studied in order to identify the individual congressmen or subgroups of congressmen who respond to presidential wishes.

Measurement of "Influence"

The measurement of "influence" must, of course, meet the requirements specified in the definition. Fortunately, data are readily available which will meet the first two criteria: 1) evidence that the president was attempting to influence the outcome of a roll call vote; 2) the outcome which the president preferred. The Congressional Quarterly has recorded the roll call votes on which the president took a public position and the outcome which he preferred. Before a presidential stand is noted for a roll call, Congressional Quarterly requires that the president must have indicated clearly in public whether he supports or opposes a particular bill,
The third criterion, congressional reaction to presidential influence, is more difficult to obtain. The definition requires that a link be established between presidential wishes and congressional response. As evidence that the link does exist, this study will require that congressmen change their policy positions to a position which corresponds more closely with presidential wishes. In other words, this measurement requires a change in congressional voting behavior because the president is attempting to influence the outcome of the voting. Such a reaction would establish a link between presidential wishes and congressional response. This measurement is a stricter requirement than is usually found in congressional voting behavior studies; other studies have usually not required that a measurable change occur in voting records before a force is regarded as influential. Given the well-established stability in congressional voting behavior, this requirement is not likely to be easily met.

While this method of measuring "influence" increases confidence in the results, it presents very difficult problems also. The first difficulty is a consequence of working with change in voting records. When the patterns of stability in congressional records are examined, it is sufficient to identify the stability and search for explanations among variables which are also stable. However, when change is being studied, the change must be identified and an explanation for the change found among a number of changing conditions in the environment. This task is difficult to accomplish because when working with change, other factors are less likely to be constant.
Secondly, there is the difficulty of establishing whether congressional voting behavior is due to presidential influence or to the character of the subset of roll calls on which the president has taken a position. To alleviate this problem, political party will be used as a control. The congressional members of the president's party will be assumed to be the principal recipients of presidential influence. If the congressional members of the president's party alter their voting patterns in the direction of presidential wishes while members of the opposition party remain stable or change in a contrary fashion, it will be an indication that members of the president's party are responding to the president. However, if congressional members of both parties react similarly to a subset of votes, it can be assumed that either the subset is responsible or that changing conditions in the environment have influenced all congressmen.

Methodology

The principal methodology will be roll call analysis, a methodology usually employed to measure long-term influences. Long-term influences, such as political party and constituency, are stable and consistent so they can be measured by roll call analysis which does not require on-the-scene observations. However, it is difficult to evaluate the impact of short-term influences without personal observation because they tend to be variable. Unless observed, it is difficult to know whether congressmen interact with short-term forces such as fellow congressmen or lobbyists before making a voting decision.
Even though this study is examining a short-term influence, roll call analysis is appropriate for a number of reasons. First, while it has an intermittent quality, presidential influence, unlike most short-term forces, occurs in an identifiable pattern, i.e., with changes in administration. Second, it is possible to make assumptions about the congressmen who will be exposed to presidential influence, the congressional members of his party, and to assume that they will be aware of the president's wishes. And finally, it is possible to identify the roll call votes which interest the president because of the record kept by Congressional Quarterly. These unique qualities allow presidential influence to be analyzed as though it were a long-term influence.

Policy Dimensional Analysis

As discussed earlier, this search for presidential influence is based on the assumptions of policy dimension theory. Therefore, the methodology of policy dimensional analysis will also be used. First, the roll call votes on which the president took a stand were sorted into five domains of policy: social welfare, economic, foreign and defense, civil rights and liberties, and agriculture. This process was followed for each Congress. Following this assignment, gamma correlations were used to find the roll calls which fit together, i.e., the dimensions. In order to be included in the dimension, a roll call had a correlation of at least 0.6 with every other vote in the dimension. In addition, the average correlation between the roll calls in the dimension was required to be 0.7 or greater. Each subset was
required to have at least three votes, but in practice the number was much greater.

Following the delineation of the policy dimensions, each congressman was given a policy score for each dimension, provided that he had cast a vote on at least half of the votes in the dimension. The procedure used to obtain the policy scores was as follows. The member was given a score of 1.00 on each roll call on which he was more supportive of the relevant policy concept, 3.00 on roll calls on which he took a less supportive position, and 2.00 on each roll call on which he failed to indicate a position either by a pair or a response to a Congressional Quarterly poll. Following this procedure, a mean score, or policy position, was calculated for each congressman on each policy dimension. A policy position of 1.00 reflects the highest support position and a score of 3.00 reflects the lowest level of support for the policy concept. The same procedure was followed for scoring the presidents; they therefore have a policy position for each dimension.

Data Base

The Congresses selected for study were the 90th through the 93rd; the last Congress of the Johnson Administration and three Congresses of the Nixon Administration. These Congresses were selected for a number of reasons. First, the more recent Congresses will provide findings which will be as relevant to the present time period as possible. Also, the recent Congresses have larger numbers of roll calls which increases the validity of the data. Second, since the intent of this
study is to measure the impact of an independent variable, the president, it is desirable to have the values of that variable vary. Preliminary analysis of the data confirms that Presidents Nixon and Johnson differed in their policy positions on most of the policy dimensions. Also, in an evaluation of presidential influence it is necessary to consider the president's position relative to the policy positions of the congressional members of his party. If, for example, a president assumes a position similar to that held by the majority of congressional members of his party, there would be little reason to expect a change in voting behavior. Again, preliminary analysis reveals that Johnson held policy positions considerably to the left of the mean support score of his party in Congress while Nixon was to the right of Republican congressmen. Third, both presidents can be classified as activists who wished to use the presidency to accomplish certain goals. Clearly, there would be little purpose in attempting to measure the influence of a president who made few attempts to lead.

On the negative side, the analysis included the 93rd Congress which may create problems. During the first session of this Congress, the Watergate scandal began to break. It is difficult to estimate the impact of this scandal upon congressional attitudes, but it can be assumed that the effectiveness of the Nixon Administration was undermined somewhat. In any case, the potential impact of the Watergate scandal should be kept in mind when analyzing the voting records of the 93rd Congress.

A final qualifier should be noted. This analysis will include only a partisan changeover from a Democratic to a Republican
Administration. Therefore, any generalizations which are reached will be somewhat more limited than if a changeover from a Republican to a Democratic Administration had also been included.

Measurement of Presidential Effectiveness

As discussed earlier, our measurement of "influence" requires that congressmen change their policy positions to a position which corresponds more closely with presidential wishes. At this point, the type of congressional response which will provide evidence of presidential effectiveness will be discussed in greater detail. Essentially, two techniques will be involved: 1) the measurement of change in policy scores and 2) the comparison of congressional response on policy dimensions in different circumstances.

In order to facilitate comparison, two types of policy dimension were used. The first type was generated by analyses of the full set of roll call votes in each policy domain, hereafter referred to as "general dimensions." The second type was generated from the subset of votes which received presidential attention; these dimensions will be referred to as "presidential dimensions" and the issues receiving presidential attention as "presidential issues." (This terminology does not mean that the issues were necessarily sponsored or defined by the president.)

Using these dimensions, two measurements of presidential effectiveness were available. For the first measurement, a congressman's score on a presidential dimension was compared with his score on the corresponding general dimension. For example, a congressman's score
on the general social welfare dimension for the 91st Congress was compared with his score on the presidential social welfare dimension for the 91st Congress. Such a comparison avoids the difficulties involved in comparing across time. It also means that all congressmen for each Congress can be included in the analysis. When a preponderance of the roll calls are the same on both the presidential and general dimensions, this comparison will be less useful than when the presidential position roll calls are a small subset of the general dimension and/or involve different roll calls.

In the second measurement of presidential effectiveness, congressional policy scores on the presidential dimensions were compared across partisan turnover at the White House. For example, a congressman's policy score on the presidential social welfare dimension in the 90th Congress (under a Democratic Administration) was compared with his policy score on the presidential social welfare dimension in the 91st Congress (under a Republican Administration). The same comparison was made for the 90th relative to the 92nd and 93rd Congresses. In these comparisons, there is no overlap in roll call votes. However, there are the usual difficulties of comparing across time, and the analysis is necessarily limited to congressmen who were in attendance in the 90th Congress and at least one Congress during the Nixon Administration.

The results of the two types of comparisons are referred to as change scores. For the first comparison, between the general and presidential dimensions, the congressman's score on the presidential dimension was subtracted from his score on the general dimension. For
the second comparison, a congressman's policy score in the Congresses which met during the Nixon Administration were subtracted from his score in the 90th Congress. Therefore, if a congressman attended the 90th and 91st Congresses, he would have one change score; if present for all four Congresses, he would have three change scores; 90th-91st, 90th-92nd, 90th-93rd.

To briefly review, a policy score of 1.00 represents the highest possible support for a policy concept while 3.00 represents the lowest possible support. However, change scores refer to the difference between two scores and no reference is made to the level of support. Thus, if a congressman had a score of 1.50 on the presidential civil liberties dimension for the 90th Congress and a policy score of 2.50 on the presidential civil liberties dimension for the 91st Congress, he would have a change score of -1.00 which would mean that he had assumed a lower support position on civil liberties in the 91st Congress. This methodology, therefore, creates an impartial change score which measures congressional response to different circumstances.

To facilitate analysis, the change scores were categorized as follows:

-3 Policy score was lower by 1.26 to 1.75
-2 Policy score was lower by .76 to 1.25
-1 Policy score was lower by .26 to .75
  0 No change defined as a difference less than .25
+1 Policy score was higher by .26 to .75
+2 Policy score was higher by .76 to 1.25
+3 Policy score was higher by 1.26 to 1.75

The data created by this methodology permit a number of evaluations at both the group and individual levels. Regardless of the evaluation which is used, however, two analyses will be made. First, congressional positional change will be assessed relative to presidential policy
scores. The change needs to be to a policy position nearer to the president's position before it can be attributed to presidential influence. Second, the evaluations are made by political party. As indicated earlier, it will be assumed that congressional members of the president's party will be the source of presidential support; this assumption allows political party to be used as a control. If members of both parties have a similar voting pattern, it can be assumed that presidential influence is not responsible.

The two types of dimensions and the change scores permit presidential effectiveness to be measured by different techniques. First, a mean support score and variance will be calculated for both parties on the general and presidential dimensions. The mean score obviously presents the average policy position for each party while the variance measures the cohesiveness. These calculations permit a number of comparisons between and among both general and presidential dimensions; e.g., for the Republican party, the mean and variance on the presidential social welfare dimension in the 91st Congress can be compared with the social welfare general dimension for the 91st Congress and the presidential social welfare dimension for the 90th Congress. These analytic techniques measure congressional reaction at the "group" or macro level and can be used to explore such motivations as congressional reaction to presidential definition of issues.

It is relatively easy to sketch the type of response by the Republican congressmen which would indicate presidential influence. If Republican congressmen, individually or as a group, assume a policy position closer to that of President Nixon while the Democratic
congressmen remain stable or change in the opposite direction, their response could with some confidence be attributed to presidential influence.

Since Democratic congressmen will not be the objects of presidential attention for most of the Congresses in the study, it is more difficult to evaluate their response. Democratic congressmen will no longer be receiving attention from President Johnson who assumed a high support position on most policy dimensions. There may, therefore, be a tendency for some Democrats to assume slightly lower policy positions. In such a situation, it would be difficult to evaluate whether the lower scores were in response to President Nixon, who tended to assume low policy positions, or a reaction to the absence of President Johnson, but the response would still be evidence of presidential influence. In part, an evaluation can be made by determining whether the Democrats as a group or only a portion assumed lower policy positions. Given the demonstrated tendency of northern Democratic congressmen to consistently assume high support positions on most policy issues, it is extremely unlikely that large numbers of Democratic congressmen would assume lower policy positions because of the absence of President Johnson's influence. Therefore, if the Democrats, as a group, assume lower policy positions, the voting pattern can reasonably be assumed to be due to the characteristics of the subset of votes on which the president took a position, but if an identifiable group of Democratic congressmen assume lower scores, the reaction may be due to presidential influence. However, if Democratic congressmen assume higher policy scores during the Nixon Administration,
the reaction can be interpreted as a response to the subset of presidential issues under President Nixon.

The change scores for individual members can also provide information on congressional reaction at the macro level by showing the pattern as well as the extent of change in congressional policy positions. For example, the party mean scores may show that the Republicans assumed a lower support position on a social welfare dimension, but the mean scores do not tell us if the lower score is due to most Republicans assuming slightly lower scores or a smaller number of Republican congressmen assuming considerably lower scores. These patterns would indicate two quite different types of congressional response. In the first, the Republicans as a group found the presidential issues to be acceptable, in the second, the president was able to influence smaller numbers of congressmen.

Since a change score is calculated for each congressman, they are obviously suitable for identifying individuals and subgroups who respond to presidential influence. Those scores will, therefore, be the major means of measuring congressional response from a variety of viewpoints at both the macro and micro level.

In summary, this discussion has briefly outlined the measurements of presidential influence which will permit the examination of congressional response from a variety of viewpoints at both the macro and micro level.
FOOTNOTES


5. The general dimensions are from Clausen's analysis of congressional decision making. Because general dimensions were not available for the 90th and 93rd Congresses, the general dimension for the 88th Congress was compared with the 90th presidential dimension and no comparison was made for the 93rd Congress.
Before an examination of presidential influence on congressional behavior can begin, two preliminary analyses should be made. First, it must be established that the presidential dimensions are similar to general dimensions in certain key characteristics. Secondly, this study has thus far assumed that there is variability in the presidential positions on presidential dimensions. Clearly, there is little value in exploring congressional response if the value of the independent variable does not vary. Therefore, the second task of this chapter will be to explore aspects of the independent variable, presidential actions on the presidential dimensions.

In this study of presidential influence, the definition and measurement of "influence" requires as evidence of presidential influence that congressmen change their voting behavior in response to presidential wishes. However, change in congressional voting behavior cannot be studied unless a general pattern of stability has been established. If the policy decisions of congressmen changed constantly, it would be impossible to evaluate the significance of change in congressional voting behavior on presidential issues. Fortunately, stability and constancy in congressional behavior have been well documented. In a study of congressional voting behavior during 1953-70,
Clausen observed two characteristics; the continuity of five policy dimensions through several terms of Congress and the stability of the policy positions held by individual congressmen over the same period of time.\textsuperscript{1}

However, these findings referred to the general dimensions. It remains to be established that the same phenomena occur on presidential dimensions. If congressional decision-making does not differ significantly on presidential issues, the following three propositions from policy dimension theory should apply:

1) The large number of specific policy questions associated with individual roll calls are referred to a limited number of general policy concepts by the individual legislators as they strive to reduce the complexity of their decision-making chores; each specific question is given meaning in terms of the policy concept which it activates in the mind of the individual. 2) The general policy concepts used by an individual member of Congress are stable components of his cognitive map, highly resistant to change even over fairly long periods of time. 3) The positions that congressmen hold with respect to the general policy concepts, from low to high support, are relatively stable over time.\textsuperscript{2}

Since the stability of congressional policy positions has been verified, it will be assumed that proposition three applies to the general dimensions included in this study. Therefore, change can be measured by comparing the voting records on the presidential dimensions with the stable measuring instrument, the general dimensions. Because the major measurement of presidential influence is change in congressional voting records, the validity of applying proposition three to the presidential dimensions will not be tested at this point; instead stability and change in congressional voting on the presidential
dimensions will be examined throughout the analysis. It should be noted, however, that the basic validity of proposition three is not being challenged. Specifically, this analysis is exploring the possibility that temporary fluctuations in policy positions may occur in response to a change in a short-term force in the decision-making environment.

The validity of applying propositions one and two to presidential issues will, therefore, be verified before proceeding. A finding of five dominant policy dimensions would be consistent with the first proposition: that congressmen refer a large number of specific policy questions to a very limited set of general policy concepts. The continuity of dimensions through the four Congresses would be consistent with the second proposition of policy dimension theory: that policy concepts are stable components of a congressman's cognitive mapping, highly resistant to change even over fairly long periods of time. Since continuity for the general dimensions has been established for three of the Congresses included in this study, this analysis will concentrate on verifying the continuity of presidential dimensions.

The existence and continuity of presidential policy dimensions will indicate that congressmen use the same policy concepts when presidents are attempting to influence their decision-making as they use in other circumstances. Such a finding will also imply a sharing of concepts between presidents and congressmen thereby forming a basis for communication. If, as such a finding would indicate, the process of congressional decision-making does not differ when presidential influence is present, the current knowledge about
congressional decision-making can be related to presidential influence. However, the implications would be quite different if neither the existence or continuity of presidential dimensions can be established. Such a finding would indicate that presidential issues and influence are unique in the congressional decision-making environment. The unusual voting behavior could occur for essentially two reasons. First, the voting pattern could mean that when presidents are attempting to influence the voting outcome, congressmen evaluate the issues on that basis. When deciding how to vote, congressmen would be debating whether to support the president, and the policy concept would be less important. Second, the voting could reflect presidential ability to structure the issues in terms of policy concepts other than the five used in this analysis. Regardless of the motivation, a lack of presidential dimensions would indicate a far more important presidential role in congressional decision-making than previous research has found.

Existence and Continuity of Presidential Dimensions

The presidential policy dimensions for the four Congresses were generated by the methodology discussed in Chapter Two. Four dominant policy dimensions that accounted for approximately three-quarters of all roll calls in the subset were found. This finding is consistent with the first proposition of policy dimension theory.

Policy dimensions were not found for the agriculture policy domain, but this does not mean that congressmen did not use the policy concept on presidential issues. Both Presidents Johnson and Nixon
exhibited such a low interest in this policy area that there were not a sufficient number of votes to generate a dimension. This presidential neglect occurred even though agriculture policy was being examined in Congress during the time frame of this study. Thus, the more comprehensive analysis of congressional roll call behavior in the 91st and 92nd Congresses found a new "general" farm policy dimension which was concerned with limiting the federal subsidization of large corporate farm enterprise.\footnote{4}

The Presidents may have shown little interest in agriculture policy because of the strength of the agricultural groups. Political scientists have found that this policy area has been dominated by a subgovernment consisting of the agriculture committees in Congress, farm interest groups, and the Agriculture Department. Faced with this concentration of power, both Presidents may have decided to expend their energy on policy areas where the potential for influence was greater. Also, there is little political reward for publicly intervening in agricultural policy; relatively few people benefit from farm policy, and the remainder may be indifferent or hostile toward the issues.

After establishing the existence of the presidential dimensions the next task is to demonstrate the continuity of these dimensions through the four Congresses. This procedure is necessary to insure that, e.g., the dimensions labeled as social welfare are measuring the same dimension in all four Congresses.

In order to assess the continuity of the presidential dimensions, Pearson r correlation will measure the similarity of member orderings
on the dimensions within each policy area. An important assumption of this method of measurement is that the policy positions of congressmen remain stable during the four Congresses. This presents a problem because the stability of congressional policy positions is a testable proposition in this study, therefore, the absence of continuity could also be interpreted as evidence of presidential influence. If congressmen respond to the president by changing policy positions, the instability could influence the measurements and indicate a lack of continuity in presidential dimensions. Because of this problem, the major test for continuity will be made during each administration. The argument is that congressmen will be much more likely to change positions during a partisan turnover at the White House than during an administration. Therefore, the tests for continuity will be primarily concerned with the 91st through the 93rd Congresses which met during the Nixon Administration.

The Case for Continuity

The test for continuity measured the similarity of member orderings on the dimensions within each policy area by means of the Pearson r correlation. As usual in such measurements, it is difficult to establish standards; how low can a correlation fall and still indicate measurement of a common dimension? The criterion used here is that the correlation within each policy dimension should be higher than the average correlation between policy areas.

Using these standards, it is easy to conclude that the government management dimension for the 92nd Congress should be eliminated.
(Table 1) Apparently, President Nixon publicly supported issues during this Congress which were quite different from those he usually supported.

The remainder of the dimensions demonstrate continuity with the possible exception of the civil liberties dimension for the 93rd Congress. The correlation between the 91st and 93rd civil liberties dimensions is the same as that between civil liberties and two other dimensions, social welfare and international involvement. However, the correlation between the 92nd and 93rd civil liberties dimensions is, by the standards of this policy area, high. Because it is not clear that the civil liberties dimension for the 93rd Congress should be included, this analysis will rely primarily upon the other three measures of the civil liberties dimensions.

Presidential Issues

While congressional stability on policy dimensions has been established, presidential actions on the presidential dimensions have not yet been explored. Therefore, it is not known whether there is a stable structure underlying the presidential issues. Presidents may find that outside forces largely determine both the issues they will support and their policy positions on the dimensions. Conversely, presidents may have a great deal of freedom in the selection of presidential issues. While it is necessary to have change in positions as presidents change if congressional response is to be established, a certain stability in presidential policy concerns will enhance the possibilities of establishing generalizations regarding presidential
behavior. That is, if it is found that patterns of behavior persist despite changes in presidential personality and ideology, generalizations regarding presidential behavior on presidential issues can be advanced with more confidence. This exploration of presidential stability and variability will concentrate upon three characteristics: 1) the variability in presidential policy positions on the presidential dimensions; 2) the structure underlying presidential selection of issues; and 3) the extent of presidential-congressional conflict on the presidential dimensions.

Variability in Presidential Policy Positions

As indicated earlier, there must be some variability in presidential positions before congressional response to those positions can be explored. Since there are party divisions on most of the general dimensions, presidential differences can also be expected. There are, however, different approaches which presidents can take in defining their policy stances. The emphasis upon political leaders as "brokers" among different groups in society suggests that presidents would assume policy stances somewhere between the left and right wings of their party members in Congress, thereby defining the policy issues which most of the congressional members could accept. By using this approach, the president would be attempting to lead by serving as a moderator between congressional factions.

However, the data clearly indicate that presidents do not use this approach to gain congressional support. (Table 2) Instead the presidents define the polarities for policy positions, with President
Johnson assuming high support positions and President Nixon, low positions. The exception is the international involvement presidential dimension on which both Presidents occupy high support positions. This pattern reflects presidential need to gain congressional support for such issues as foreign aid. It is important to note, however, that the Presidents do not occupy the most extreme policy position on each dimension, i.e., 1.0 or 3.0. If they did, there would be a suspicion that the positions were an artifact of the data.

The presidential policy positions suggest that presidents attempt to elicit congressional support by defining both the issues and the polarities for policy positions on those issues. Thus, a different conceptualization of presidential leadership is needed. Apparently, presidents attempt to influence congressmen by assuming a position at the forefront of issues rather than attempting to serve as a moderator between factions.

**Structure in Presidential Policy Issues**

Each president gives attention to a subset of congressional roll call votes; however, how much freedom does the president have in distributing his attention among the five policy areas? While presidents do undoubtedly have freedom in selecting which policies will receive priority in the foreign and domestic programs, they may find that outside pressures require that each policy domain receive a certain amount of attention. If so, a structure may underlie the presidential issues.
Apparently, presidents do have the option to decide how many roll call votes they will publicly support. (Table 3) The image of Johnson as an activist president and Nixon as less active is confirmed by the data. President Johnson took a public stand on 114 votes in the 90th Congress while Nixon took a public position on considerably fewer, 66 and 69 for the 91st and 92nd Congresses. The results for the 93rd Congress present a puzzle. The Watergate scandal broke shortly after this Congress convened, and President Nixon's potential for influence was presumably lessened. Despite this, President Nixon took a public stand on considerably more roll call votes than the previous Congresses. A plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that President Nixon was attempting to draw attention from the scandal by engaging in policy-making activities.

Despite this difference, the Presidents did distribute their attention among the policy domains in a similar manner. Social welfare issues received the most presidential attention followed by economic management for the 90th and 91st Congresses and international involvement for the 92nd and 93rd. The latter development is undoubtedly due to the conflicts which developed between Congress and the President regarding the war in Southeast Asia; repeated roll calls were taken on such issues as restricting bombing in Cambodia and Laos. This conflict provides a good example of how outside events can command presidential attention.

The two Presidents did not distribute their attention among the policy domains in an equal manner because of similar personalities and political philosophies. Apparently outside pressures influenced
the distribution. Congress may spend a greater proportion of its attention on, e.g., social welfare than civil liberties issues; therefore, there would be more issues compelling presidential attention in the social welfare policy domain. Further, the bureaucracy, public opinion, client groups may expect a certain amount of presidential attention, regardless of the political party or personal philosophy of the president.

Presidential–Congressional Conflict

A study dealing only with presidential issues allows the extent of presidential-conflict to be studied in a new light. The manner in which "influence" was defined means the presidential-congressional conflict will be examined only on those issues which have received presidential attention. This is only reasonable since the concept "conflict" requires two participants. In addition to studying the extent of conflict, this analysis will also be searching for patterns; specifically, we will be interested in the extent to which the personality, ideology, and party affiliation of the president influences their relationship with Congress.

The popular lore on presidential-congressional relations clearly suggests that the conflict between the president and Congress will be extensive. The extent to which the president and Congress are unable to agree on policy issues and in political literature is often discussed in the press and in political literature. In particular, Congress has been portrayed in the obstructionist role, blocking measures proposed by the president. Further, the literature and media have tended to
emphasize the importance of the personal characteristics of presidents in presidential-congressional relations. If a presidential program does not gain congressional approval, the failure is often attributed to the manner in which the president handled the program or the general quality of the president's relations with Congress.

The two Presidents which are a part of this study provide a good test for this image of presidential-congressional relations. They not only were members of different political parties, but they have been portrayed as having quite different relations with Congress. Johnson has been viewed as giving this relationship care and attention and, as a consequence, dealing skillfully and successfully with Congress. Nixon, on the other hand, was known for his indifferent and unsuccessful dealings with Congress. Therefore, these two Presidents with their different approaches to congressional relations provide a good testing laboratory for studying regularity in presidential-congressional cooperation.

The extent of presidential-congressional cooperation will be measured by the percentage of roll call votes on which the president and Congress agreed, e.g., the president supported the passage of a bill and Congress concurred and voted for passage. Using this measurement, it is clear that the extent of presidential-congressional conflict has been exaggerated. (Table 4) With the exception of the social welfare dimension during the Nixon Administration, the president and Congress agreed on well over half of the roll call votes, usually considerably more. These figures do not support the image of an obstructionist Congress blocking presidential programs. Instead the
extent of presidential-congressional cooperation is far greater than is usually recognized.

The patterns of presidential-congressional cooperation vary by policy area. The greatest degree of cooperation occurs on the civil liberties presidential dimension. Since this policy area is associated with strongly held opinions and attitudes, this is a surprising finding. Two possible explanations can be advanced for this relationship. First, because of the controversial nature of issues, the Presidents may have been careful to read congressional and public opinion before taking public stands. However, as will be argued in greater detail in Chapter 7, the Presidents may have taken advantage of the volatile nature of this issue area to skillfully define civil liberties issues which were supported by constituency attitudes to help gain congressional cooperation.

The degree of presidential-congressional cooperation is also high on the international involvement dimension, reflecting congressional willingness to provide the president with the tools, e.g., foreign aid authorizations, which he needs to carry out his responsibilities in foreign affairs. The government management dimension also has a distinct pattern of cooperation.

The cooperation between the president and Congress also refutes the argument that the personality and ideology of the president are responsible for the cooperation he will elicit from Congress. With the exception of the social welfare dimension, the extent of presidential-congressional cooperation is quite similar. The pattern for the social welfare presidential dimension undoubtedly reflects the
similar ideology on these issues held by President Johnson and the Democratic majority in Congress and the dissimilarity in ideology between President Nixon and the Democratic majority.

Because the two Presidents assumed such different policy positions while the membership in Congress remained stable, the similar patterns of cooperation between the President and Congress are surprising. They suggest that the Presidents must have given some consideration to their chances of success before they took a public stand. In other words, they may have chosen to expend their resources on policy issues which they felt they had some chance of influencing. Further, their efforts to influence the outcome may have influenced the high rate of cooperation.

The presidential social welfare dimension during the Nixon Administration, however, presents an example of the conflict which can occur between the president and Congress when the president assumes an ideological stance which is contrary to a majority in Congress. This dimension demonstrates that the general pattern of cooperation between the president and Congress is definitely not predetermined or unalterable.

Summary

The analysis performed on the presidential policy dimensions established the existence of four policy dimensions and their continuity through the four Congresses in the study. Therefore, it is appropriate to apply the propositions and premises from policy dimension theory to the presidential dimensions. Or, to phrase it differently, the process of congressional decision-making does not differ significantly when
presidential influence is present.

The study of presidential behavior on the presidential policy domains and dimensions established presidential variability in policy positions. This variability not only allows an examination of congressional response to the presidential policy stances, but it also provides a different conceptualization of presidential leadership than is often presented. Apparently, at least at the stage of congressional voting, presidents attempt to lead by defining the polarities rather than assuming a moderate position at the center of their party. It is certainly possible, of course, that presidents may use different styles of leadership at other stages in the policy process.

The similar patterns in presidential dimensions and issues which were found provide a stable basis for studying presidential relations with Congress. If the relationship between the president and Congress was highly influenced by the personality and ideology of the president, it would be difficult to establish generalizations regarding the relationship. This portion of the analysis suggests that the emphasis which has been placed on presidential personality may have obscured the stable patterns in the relationship.

Now that the dependent and independent variables have been explored, congressional response to presidential influence for each of the four dimensions can be studied. It is to this task that we now turn.
### TABLE 1

**CORRELATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSIONS BY POLICY AREA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Management Congress</th>
<th>Social Welfare Congress</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress 91st 92nd 93rd</td>
<td>Congress 91st 92nd 93rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th .75 .17 .77</td>
<td>90th .86 .83 .85</td>
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<td>91st .85 .86</td>
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<td>92nd .29</td>
<td>92nd .88</td>
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Average Correlation* - .75 
(w/o 92nd Congress) 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil Liberties Congress</th>
<th>International Involvement Congress</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Congress 91st 92nd 93rd</td>
<td>Congress 91st 92nd 93rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th .79 .68 .57</td>
<td>90th .83 .73 .64</td>
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<td>91st .83 .76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92nd .76</td>
<td>92nd .74</td>
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</table>

Average Correlation - .73 

**Average Correlations between Dimensions:**

- Government Management and Social Welfare: .73
- Government Management and Civil Liberties: .48
- Government Management and International Involvement: .46
- Social Welfare and Civil Liberties: .65
- Social Welfare and International Involvement: .65
- Civil Liberties and International Involvement: .67

*Average figures for Congresses which met during the Nixon Administration - 91st, 92nd and 93rd
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Position</th>
<th>Government Management</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Johnson - 90th Congress</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Nixon - 92nd Congress</td>
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<td>Nixon - 93rd Congress</td>
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<table>
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<td>Nixon - 93rd Congress</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th></th>
<th>International Involvement</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Johnson - 90th Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nixon - 91st Congress</td>
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<td>Nixon - 92nd Congress</td>
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<td>Nixon - 93rd Congress</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Civil Liberties</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Johnson - 90th Congress</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nixon - 91st Congress</td>
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<td>Nixon - 92nd Congress</td>
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<td>Nixon - 93rd Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congress and Policy Domain</td>
<td>Number of Roll Calls</td>
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<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
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<td><strong>90th Congress</strong></td>
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<td>Social Welfare</td>
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<td>International Involvement</td>
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<td>Total N =</td>
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<td><strong>92nd Congress</strong></td>
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<td>Economic Management</td>
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<td>Social Welfare</td>
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<td>Civil Liberties</td>
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<td>International Involvement</td>
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<td>Total N =</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>93rd Congress</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Economic Management</td>
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<td>Social Welfare</td>
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<td>Civil Liberties</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Involvement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total N =</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Dimension</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Johnson</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Nixon</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
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<td>President Johnson</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Nixon</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Johnson</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Nixon</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Involvement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>President Johnson</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Nixon</td>
<td>71%</td>
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</tbody>
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FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., pp. 52-53.


4. Ibid., p. 10

5. Ibid., pp. 61-67.
CHAPTER 4

PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON CONGRESSIONAL VOTING BEHAVIOR:
THE SOCIAL WELFARE DIMENSION

The concept of social welfare and federal responsibility for it has been defined as involving a "relatively direct intercession of the government on behalf of the individual, cushioning him against the jolts administered by the economy, assisting him in coping with more powerful economic elements, and aiding him in getting the equal chance that the ideal of equal opportunity demands." Included in this legislation are proposals dealing with public housing, urban renewal, labor regulations, education, urban affairs, employment opportunities and rewards.

In an analysis of the party realignment and the political agenda of the House of Representatives, 1928-1938, Barbara Deckard Sinclair found that under the stimulus of the economic emergency of the Great Depression, the social welfare dimension first appeared in the 71st Congress. It is, therefore, associated with the New Deal realignment of the 1930's and became one of the new policy items on the congressional agenda. In the beginning the social welfare dimension was partisan with the Democrats supporting government programs to alleviate the widespread misery caused by the Depression and President Hoover and the Republicans in opposition. Following the election of Roosevelt,
most Republicans ceased opposing all federal relief spending and simply objected to the amounts proposed. However, on the permanent programs which implied a continuing government role in protecting the individual, many Republicans and southern Democrats were in opposition. By the 75th Congress, many people had concluded that the worst of the Depression was over. It was then that the regional split in the Democratic Party between northerns and southerners began to appear with the "Conservative Coalition" forming between southern Democrats and Republicans.  

In its modern form, both constituency and party have been important sources of congressional policy positions on the general social welfare dimension.  

A multiple regression analysis performed on the social welfare dimensions for the period inclusive of the 83rd and 88th Congresses found that party explained about a third of the variation. However, constituency variables explained a large proportion of the remaining variation. Within the Democratic Party, urbanization and region accounted for most of the differences in policy positions, reflecting the North-South division on this dimension. There was a higher level of unity within the Republican Party (40% of the variation), leaving less variation to be explained. Nearly half of the remaining variation was explained by state party and region.  

Therefore, as presidents attempt to influence congressional voting on the social welfare dimension, they will be competing with two preexisting forces, constituency and political party. The influence of political party should enhance presidential influence, assuming that he does not attempt to steer a course outside the party consensus.
However, constituency influence is expected to lessen the chances of presidential influence, if the two do not correspond. Congressional concern for constituency interests and attitudes has been well-documented. This concern may spring from a number of sources such as a desire to represent constituents' attitudes or an interest in making reelection as routine as possible. Whatever the motivation, a president is likely to find it more difficult to persuade congressmen if the congressmen perceive the president's wishes to be different from their constituents.

**Congressional Reaction to Presidential Influence at the Macro Level**

Each president finds that a number of issues on the national policy agenda require his attention; therefore, a president does not have complete freedom in selecting the policy issues he wishes to influence. Despite these constraints, presidential ability to select issues is a potentially potent tool. By selecting issues which his fellow party members can support, a president may influence their voting behavior. However, if the president selects issues which correspond with the preexisting congressional policy positions, there will be little change, and the president will not be influential as defined in this study. Therefore, in order for measurable influence to appear, a president must select issues which appeal to congressmen but require them to assume different positions closer to the president's position on the policy dimension.

The congressional members of the president's party are undoubtedly the first group a president would turn to for support. In order to
examine congressional reaction by political party, two different tests were made. In the first, the mean or "average" policy position of party members on each dimension, general and presidential, was calculated. In order to measure party cohesion, the variance for each party on each dimension was also calculated. (Figure 2) These measurements permit a comparison of congressional response on the general and presidential dimensions. However, there is a great deal of duplication of roll call votes on the two dimensions. With one exception for each Congress, the roll call votes in the presidential dimensions are also on the general. The general dimensions, of course, contain a number of votes other than those on the presidential dimensions. The second test for partisan reaction examines the congressional change scores across partisan turnover at the White House. (Figure 3) Mean change scores were also calculated for each party. (Table 5)

The two tests clearly lead to one conclusion: the Republican congressmen, as a group, responded to President Nixon's efforts to influence their voting behavior during the 92nd Congress but were relatively unresponsive during the other three Congresses. During the 92nd Congress, the Republican congressional members assumed policy positions near President Nixon on the presidential dimension; not only is the mean score close to President Nixon's position, but the low variance indicates that the Republicans, as a group, found President Nixon's policy stance to be acceptable to them. (Figure 2) The different responses of Republican congressmen on the general and presidential dimensions provide further evidence of presidential influence. The Republicans did not change their voting behavior on the
general dimension for the 92nd Congress (the lower variance also occurred among Democrats); therefore, their response on the presidential dimension was unique. As defined earlier, it is the difference in congressional behavior which provides evidence of presidential influence. Because the Democrats did not respond in a unique manner on the presidential dimension for the 92nd Congress, it is more difficult to argue that the Republican response be attributed to the subset of votes.

The second test, congressional voting behavior on presidential dimensions across partisan turnover, also provides evidence of presidential influence. The mean score change for the Republicans between the 90th and 92nd Congress is -.465 while the remaining mean score changes reveal stability in voting behavior. (Table 5) The pattern of change in policy positions was one of large-scale movement to lower policy positions. (Figure 3) Only 30% of the Republican congressmen assumed similar positions on the presidential dimensions for the 90th and 92nd Congresses. However, 40% assumed lower positions by one change score and 28%, two change scores. By the standards of congressional voting behavior, the voting behavior of Republican congressmen on the 92nd presidential dimension underwent substantial change.

The question which needs to be considered is, of course, why did the Republican congressmen respond to President Nixon's efforts to influence their voting behavior in the 92nd Congress but ignore his wishes in the other Congresses? The answer seems to be that the Republican congressmen responded to their president when constituency attitudes and interests did not interfere. During the 92nd Congress, the issues in the presidential dimension apparently did not concern
their constituency, and Republican congressmen were free to respond to presidential wishes if they chose to do so.

In order to accept the validity of this argument, it is necessary to reexamine the nature of the social welfare dimension. The legislation on this dimension was defined earlier as involving a relatively direct intercession of the government on behalf of the individual, cushioning him from jolts administered by the economy and aiding him in getting an equal chance. It is the issue of federal aid for individuals together with attitudes toward federal intervention which help explain party differences in voting. The Democratic Party traditionally has shown a greater willingness to use the power and resources of the federal government to aid individuals.

If social welfare legislation was limited to providing benefits for the less-advantaged groups, there would be relatively little constituency pressure since these groups are typically less well-organized and have fewer political assets. However, another aspect of social welfare legislation has led to the creation of clientele groups and a larger, more affluent constituency which have considerably more political power. Many of the social welfare bills and much of the money are not necessarily directed toward, nor do they reach, only the "underprivileged or needy." Much of the money which is authorized under the "social welfare" label benefits a variety of economic classes and flows into a number of congressional districts. This is certainly true of the education legislation, particularly the programs and money for higher education which benefit the middle class, generally speaking. The same point can be made regarding many of the health programs, such
as medicare and hospital construction. In part, this disbursement of benefits has occurred because it is easier to get programs through Congress if they benefit a large number of congressional districts. Therefore, social welfare programs are often broadened to include groups and areas for which they were not originally intended. Obviously, the wider distribution of benefits creates a large constituency which will generally want the program continued. Even the programs which are more narrowly targeted to aid lower income groups often lead to the creation of powerful clientele groups. However, these groups do not usually form among the recipients of the programs. Since the programs and funds are administered by state and local governments, it is the officials in these governments which often form the clientele groups that are interested in the continuance and expansion of these programs. For example, programs such as Manpower and public service programs are often used to perform tasks for the local governments. Furthermore, local and state officials will tend to favor programs which enhance their domain.

Because of the wide disbursements of social welfare benefits, many congressmen will be under pressure to continue funding the programs. This is true even for the programs which are not popular with the constituency in general because the officials who administer them usually have greater access to congressmen. Therefore, once a social welfare program has been implemented, there are forces working to insure its continuance. The pressure is not as great as for military spending which benefits a larger number of congressional districts, but the forces and processes are similar.
Following this line of reasoning, the Republican congressional voting on the 91st and 92nd presidential dimensions can be explained. The roll call votes on which President Nixon took a stand during the 91st Congress were generally attempts to modify existing programs and appropriations which provided benefits for congressional districts. For example, the President vetoed appropriations for such programs as federal aid to education; the appropriations bills were then passed over the President's veto. However, the 92nd presidential dimension contained fewer such programs and also included a new issue, child care and development centers. Apparently, many Republican congressmen were unwilling to modify or eliminate programs providing benefits for their constituency, but when these concerns were absent, Republican congressmen were more likely to look to their president for leadership. Therefore, this portion of the analysis suggests that when constituency interests conflict with presidential wishes, the president is likely to be the loser.

In brief summary, the voting behavior of Republican congressmen on the social welfare dimension illustrates that presidents can define and select issues to elicit a desired congressional response. The reaction of Republican congressmen to the 92nd presidential dimension suggests that President Nixon appealed to common party attitudes on social welfare issues. However, the voting behavior of Republican congressmen also illustrates the constraints on presidential influence. Because President Nixon was unable to influence congressional decision-making on existing programs, his ability to influence Republican congressmen and legislation was limited to new policy. This is, however, the
situation encountered by any force attempting to bring about change; it is difficult to alter existing policies when benefits are accruing to constituencies which will fight to keep them.

Another striking partisan difference in voting behavior is the tendency for the Democrats to be more stable than the Republicans. However, as will be discussed in greater detail, this voting pattern appears to be due to the nature of the social welfare dimension rather than to presidential influence. The difference in mean scores between the general and presidential dimensions is greater for the Republican Party for all three Congresses. (Figure 2) Secondly, the percentage of continuing Republican congressmen who maintain stable scores across partisan turnover is lower than for the Democrats. (Figure 3) For the 90th and 91st Congresses the greater difference between means for the Republicans occurs because they assume higher positions on the presidential dimensions, nearer the Democrats and further from President Nixon, than the positions assumed on the general dimensions. That is, of course, contrary to the expected pattern of behavior if presidential influence were responsible. The greater instability among Republicans for the 90-92nd comparison is, as described earlier, due to presidential influence. However, for the remaining two comparisons, the Republican congressmen tended to change to both higher and lower policy positions, a response which does not reflect any particular influence.

As already suggested, the greater instability in policy positions among Republican congressmen appears to be due to the nature of the social welfare dimension. The explanation is as follows: the social welfare dimension is the turf of the Democratic Party. Beginning with
the New Deal to the Great Society programs, the Democratic Party has provided the impetus for new programs and supported existing policies. Because they have, with a few exceptions, had a majority in Congress since 1932 and controlled the White House for much of that time, they have been able to define the policy area to meet their preferences. It is, therefore, not surprising that they maintain stable positions and display little difference in their reaction to both general and presidential dimensions.

The situation for the Republicans is quite different. They have had little opportunity since 1932 to define this policy area although they do have the ability, as the minority party, to alter and modify the Democratic legislation to a certain extent. Much of the social welfare legislation would undoubtedly have been different if the Republicans had been the majority party for the last 40 years. It is this inability to define social welfare issues which may be responsible for the greater voting instability by Republican congressmen. Such instability does not indicate party support for social welfare issues as presently defined. Instead, the voting patterns suggest that Republicans often find themselves in the position of selecting the lesser of two evils, as they view social welfare issues. This explanation reinforces the discussion on Republican voting behavior during the 92nd Congress. The dramatic change in policy positions may have occurred because the Republicans found the Nixon presidential issues to be considerably more acceptable than those sponsored by Democrats. In short, there is a pattern underlying partisan response on the general and presidential dimensions which is compatible with the
apparent presidential influence.

**Congressional Reaction to Presidential Influence at the Micro Level**

The exploration of congressional behavior at the micro level began with the expectation that information on congressional voting behavior on the social welfare general dimensions could be used to predict individual behavior on the presidential dimensions. This expectation proved to be incorrect; as will be discussed in greater detail, for both parties the variables which influence congressional voting behavior on the general social welfare dimension do not necessarily influence congressional response to presidential influence on the presidential dimensions.

Based on the discussion and analysis in this chapter, it is reasonable to expect constituency to be influential on congressional decision-making at the micro level. This possibility will be explored by means of a widely-used measurement for constituency influence, geographic region. It is fairly easy to develop expectations regarding the response of Democratic congressmen. Because the "conservative coalition" has appeared on voting for the social welfare dimension, southern Democrats can be expected to support a Republican president on social welfare issues while their northern brethren remain stable. That is, if voting patterns on the general dimension can be used as a guide for predicting congressional response to presidential issues at the micro level, the southern Democrats and Republicans should have similar voting patterns.
Despite these expectations, the analysis clearly shows that the "conservative coalition" did not respond to President Nixon on the presidential social welfare dimension. In fact, the southern and border state Democrats responded to partisan turnover in a manner contrary to Republican congressmen. (Figure 4) For the 90-91 comparison, 60% of the southern Democrats and 32% of the border state Democrats were in the positive change categories while the Republicans tended to maintain stable policy positions. The same voting patterns occurred for the 90th and 93rd Congresses. For the 90-92 comparison when the Republicans in large numbers shifted to lower policy positions, the southern (68%) and border state (80%) Democrats maintained relatively stable policy positions.

Another way of studying the reaction of southern and border state Democrats is to examine the characteristics of Democratic congressmen who shifted to lower policy positions during the Nixon Administration. None of the Democratic congressmen shifted to lower positions between the 90th and 91st Congresses. For the 90th-92nd comparison, 50% of the 16 who shifted to lower positions were from the southern and border states and for the 90th-93rd, 100% (N=7). These are such small numbers that they do not detract from the generalization that President Nixon was not able to mobilize the conservative coalition. However, it appears that the limited support a Republican president can expect from Democrats on the social welfare dimension will be from southern and border state Democrats.

The question then is: why does the "conservative coalition" which appears on the general social welfare dimension split and react
dissimilarly on the presidential dimensions? There are basically two answers to this question. According to the first explanation, the coalition may come together only on the more liberal issues. Following this line of reasoning, the southern and border state Democrats are generally more supportive of social welfare issues than Republicans but vote with the Republicans against the more liberal programs. Therefore, if Nixon was assuming a position on more conservative issues, the southern Democrats might find that they could not support President Nixon while the Republicans would feel comfortable with the presidential policy stance. This explanation contains two assumptions: that there is a policy split in the "conservative coalition" and that President Nixon assumed a public position on the more conservative issues. Presidential influence plays a bigger role in the second explanation. According to this explanation, the different voting patterns in the "conservative coalition" occur because Republicans are responding to President Nixon's policy stands while southern and border state Democrats are not.

While the Republican Party does not have the obvious regional split found in the Democratic Party, it has been established that constituency, as measured by state party and—to a lesser extent—region, urbanization and blue collar populations, does influence Republican congressional policy positions. However, when an analysis was made of the change scores of Republican congressmen, none of these variables identified subgroups who reacted in a distinctive manner to presidential influence. This analysis, therefore, did not find any identifiable characteristics at the micro level among Republicans who responded to
President Nixon. Again, the variables which explain stable congressional voting behavior on the general dimension are not useful for explaining change in behavior.

Summary

Contrary to previous empirical findings, congressmen do, on occasion, respond to presidential influence on domestic issues. The Republican congressmen reacted as a group to President Nixon suggesting that the President was able to influence congressional voting by defining issues which Republican congressmen could support. However, Republican congressmen were also frequently indifferent to presidential wishes which allowed an identification of the circumstances which enhance or decrease presidential influence. Apparently, the presence of constituency influence decreases the chances for a president to influence voting decisions. Given the documented congressional concern with constituency interests, this is not a surprising finding. The nature of the social welfare dimension also seemed to influence Republican congressional reaction. As members of the minority party, Republicans often find themselves voting for social welfare issues which they did not define. This may explain their greater instability on this dimension, relative to the Democrats, and the agreement between a Republican president and Republican congressmen when circumstances permitted.

The analysis of congressional behavior at the micro level did not identify individuals or subgroups who responded to the president. The surprising finding was that congressional behavior on the general
dimensions could not be used to predict congressional response at the micro level on the presidential dimensions. However, the implications of this finding cannot be fully assessed before it has been determined whether this pattern of behavior is unique to the social welfare dimension.
### Table 5

**Mean Party Changes in Support Scores for Continuing Members on the Social Welfare Presidential Dimension**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90–91 Change Scores</td>
<td>+.1604</td>
<td>+.0457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90–92 Change Scores</td>
<td>+.0413</td>
<td>-.4652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90–93 Change Scores</td>
<td>+.0767</td>
<td>+.0432</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 2

SOCIAL WELFARE DIMENSION: PARTY MEAN AND PARTY VARIANCE FOR ALL CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS

GD and GR represent the general dimensions; PD and PR, the presidential.
FIGURE 3
SOCIAL WELFARE DIMENSION: PERCENTAGE CONGRESSMEN IN SCORE CHANGE CATEGORIES BY POLITICAL PARTY ON PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSIONS
FIGURE 3
FIGURE 4

SOCIAL WELFARE DIMENSION: PERCENTAGE CONGRESSMEN IN SCORE CHANGE CATEGORIES; DEMOCRATS BY REGION ON PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSIONS ACROSS PARTisan TURNOVER
Figure 4
FOOTNOTES


4. Ibid.

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Therefore, this is not a dimension primarily concerned with the extent of United States' participation in a world community. Thus the ordering of congressmen on the international involvement dimension does not go from the "isolationist, fortress-America-firsters" to the "antinationalist, one-world-internationalists." Rather it is an ordering that goes from those who seriously question the value of assisting others as a means toward helping ourselves and who prefer military strength over strong allies to those who feel that an active involvement in international affairs is an investment that serves the national interest.\textsuperscript{4}

A new dimension, national security commitment, appeared among both the general and presidential dimensions in the 92nd and 93rd Congresses. This dimension reflects the concerns which developed during the war in Southeast Asia and includes the question of the United States' role abroad in defending and protecting allies and the size and purposes of the defense budget.\textsuperscript{5} Unfortunately, this policy dimension appeared only during the Nixon Administration precluding a comparison of congressional reaction to partisan turnover in administrations. This dimension, therefore, is not included in this study.

Congressional response to presidential influence on international involvement issues was established by Clausen in his study of congressional voting behavior for 1953-1970. He found evidence that members of "both the House and Senate respond to a president of their own party by either retaining a constant position or moving towards a position of greater support for international involvement."\textsuperscript{6} The response to the president was not consistent, however; distinct regional variations
After examining the patterns of influence on congressional decision-making, Clausen concluded that in addition to presidential influence, there are two other influences. First, party is indirectly influential through the loyalty of a congressman to a president of his party; except for the loyalty, however, party influence was considered to be weak. A second and far stronger influence on the international involvement dimension is constituency. This conclusion was based on the link between congressional behavior and the properties of electoral constituencies, the regional variations and a rural-urban influence.

The problem, however, is that a major requirement for constituency influence is apparently lacking; the constituency in general does not have a set of reasonably firmly held policy positions to be represented. For example, a number of surveys of mass attitudes indicate that foreign policy matters are the concerns of a fairly specialized public; consequently, any measurement of constituency attitudes based on a cross section of the voting population is unlikely to have much relevance to the behavior of congressmen. "The search for constituency influence must be focused upon the limited number of constituents who maintain a steady interest in foreign affairs and form a specialized public on foreign policy questions." 7

Because of the information available regarding presidential influence on the international involvement dimension, the analysis of congressional response on the presidential dimension can begin with quite clear expectations. The task of this chapter is, therefore, to establish whether presidential influence on the international
involvement dimension is unique when presidential issues and congressional change scores are considered.

**Congressional Reaction to Presidential Influence at the Macro Level**

The first notable characteristic of the international involvement dimension is that the presidents from both parties assume the highest possible support position, a presidential reaction unique to this dimension. This pattern of presidential behavior reflects the issues in the international involvement dimension. Since foreign policy is a presidential area of responsibility, it is in a president's interests to support legislation and appropriations which he can use to exert influence at the international level. The international involvement issues, therefore, transcend partisan or constituency differences as far as presidents are concerned. As will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, presidential need for tools to assist him in conducting his foreign affairs responsibilities helps explain congressional response.

The congressional response on both the general and presidential dimensions is congruent with previous research. There is a partisan response during the Democratic Administration, a pattern which is largely erased during the Republican Administration when Republican congressmen, as a group, assume higher policy positions and Democrats, slightly lower. (Figure 5) The change scores for congressmen across partisan turnover confirm these findings; over 50% of the Republican congressmen change to higher support categories while the Democrats tend to remain stable or shift to lower policy positions. (Figure 6)
Congressional response was similar on both the general and presidential dimensions, indicating that the presidential selection of issues does not elicit a unique congressional response at the macro level. This pattern occurs even though there was only a slight overlap in votes on the two types of dimensions, two roll call votes are on both dimensions in the 91st Congress and only one on the 92nd. Apparently, President Nixon took a public stand on issues which differed from those on the general dimensions. Despite this, congressional response on the presidential dimensions was similar to that on the general, suggesting that international involvement issues in general elicit a certain type of congressional behavior.

There is one characteristic unique to the presidential dimensions for the 92nd and 93rd Congresses, however, and this is the low variance for both parties. This pattern also appears in the change scores; both Democrats and Republicans exhibited greater instability between the 90th-92nd and 90th-93rd, with a slight tendency to change to both higher and lower policy positions by members of both parties. (Figure 6) Since this pattern of voting behavior occurs among both Democrats and Republicans, the most plausible explanation is that the subset of votes is responsible. That is, President Nixon took a public stand on issues which elicited a lower degree of agreement than did the issues on the general dimension.

Despite the lack of overlap in votes on the presidential and general dimensions, an examination of the differences in congressional policy scores on the general and presidential dimensions for the 91st and 92nd Congresses indicated that there was little difference in
congressional response. (Figure 7) In other words, congressmen tended to change policy positions in a similar manner on both the general and presidential dimensions. This pattern of behavior reinforces the conclusion that, at the group level, the presidential selection of issues does not elicit an unusual congressional response or add to current information regarding presidential influence on the international involvement dimension.

Congressional Response to Presidential Influence at the Micro Level

As discussed earlier, congressional voting behavior on the international involvement dimension at the micro level has been studied, and this research has found that constituency, as measured by region, influences congressional decision-making. Therefore, if congressional voting behavior is similar on the general and presidential dimensions, constituency should also be influential on the presidential dimensions. Congressional voting behavior at the macro level suggests that there will be few differences in voting on the presidential and general dimensions at the micro level. However, a lack of constituency influence on voting decisions on the presidential dimensions would mean that congressmen put these issues into a unique category, a behavior pattern which would emphasize the importance of presidential selection of issues.

In order to facilitate the study of constituency influence on both the presidential and general dimensions, the methodology used by Clausen on the general dimensions will also be used on the presidential. Therefore, the regional break down is the same as that used on the
general dimensions; congressmen are divided into four groups—
southern and northern Democrats, interior and coastal Republicans. 
Southern Democrats are from the border and southern states, and 
northern Democrats include the remainder. Coastal Republicans are 
from the Northeast, Middle Atlantic, and Pacific regions; all other 
regions are considered interior Republicans. The first test for 
regional variations in policy positions examines the changes in 
distribution of congressmen along the continuum from high to low 
support that occur with presidential turnovers. This will be done for 
each of the regional party groupings specified above.

Using this regional classification for the general dimensions, 
Clausen found that in the Democratic Party the main difference is 
between northerners and southerners. The northerners being more 
supportive of international involvement. Within the Republican Party, 
the interior Republican distribution is toward the low support end of 
the continuum, while the center of gravity among coastal Republicans 
is much more towards the high support pole of the continuum. However, 
both groups tend to change support positions in response to partisan 
changeover in administrations. Among the Democrats, it is the southern 
contingent that displays the greatest movement from one administration 
to the next. They are high supporters of international involvement 
during a Democratic Administration and low supporters during a 
Republican Administration. In contrast, the northern Democrats are 
consistently strong supporters of international involvement. 

The regional voting patterns on the presidential dimensions are 
very similar to those on the general dimensions. (Figures 8 and 9)
The northern Democrats tend to occupy the highest support category with southern Democrats concentrated in the lower support categories. Among Republicans, coastal Republicans tend to be concentrated in higher support categories while interior Republicans occupy the lower categories. Therefore, it appears that constituency plays the same role in congressional decision-making on both the presidential and general dimensions.

Another perspective on constituency influence can be gained by examining the distribution of change scores for congressmen in the four regions. (Figures 10 and 11) This perspective presents quite a different picture of constituency influence. When attention is focused on the change scores across partisan presidential turnover, the regional differences are virtually eliminated. The southern Democrats still exhibit a tendency, with the exception of the 90th-93rd comparison, to shift to lower policy positions under a Republican president. However, among Republicans the tendency to change policy positions is quite similar for both regional groupings. Thus while there may be regional differences in the patterns of support for international involvement, it cannot be asserted that there are regional differences in the response of Republican congressmen to President Nixon. Since similar data is not available for the general dimensions, it is not possible to evaluate whether this pattern is unique to the presidential dimensions.

The distinction which has just been made is an important one and deserves further attention. It is clear that constituency influences the policy positions assumed by congressmen on both the general and
presidential dimensions. However, the finding that there is little regional variation in the response of Republican congressmen to partisan turnover indicates that constituency (as measured in this analysis) does not influence the congressional response to presidential influence. That is, when congressmen are deciding whether to respond to presidential wishes, constituency apparently does not play a very big role in influencing that decision. Therefore, as on the social welfare dimension, a variable which helps explain stability does not explain change in voting behavior.

If constituency, as measured by region, does not explain congressional response to presidential wishes, what does? A multiple regression on the change scores using a number of variables commonly used to explain congressional voting behavior did not provide any answers. Therefore, the influences and circumstances which often influence congressional behavior cannot explain why some congressmen changed policy position in response to presidential influence while others did not. Apparently, congressional change on the presidential dimensions is due to other factors, perhaps individualistic ones such as loyalty to the president with each congressman deciding whether his commitment to this policy position exceeds his desire to support his president.

Nature of the International Involvement Dimension

Congressional response to presidential influence on the international involvement dimension is clearly influenced by the nature of the policy issues. Because this policy area has been thoroughly
studied, explanations for congressional voting behavior have been developed. The most frequent explanation, and the one which will be used here, is that the issues in the international involvement dimension are viewed as instruments which assist the president in carrying out a responsibility which is generally considered to be uniquely his—the conduct of American foreign policy. Therefore, many congressmen who may not personally feel a commitment to support international involvement issues shift to higher policy positions so that a president of their own party may have useful tools to help him conduct foreign policy. However, when a partisan changeover occurs, the congressmen can retreat to a lower policy position, if that is their preference, and allow congressmen from the other party to perform the task of voting for passage of international involvement issues. Because constituents, with the exception of small, interested publics, are largely indifferent toward these issues, congressmen may shift position without invoking a response from their district.  

The international involvement issues elicit a congressional and presidential response which are quite different from the interaction between policy area, presidential influence and congressional response on the social welfare dimension. First, as already noted, the Presidents from both parties assume high support positions on the international involvement dimension, a phenomenon which does not occur on the other policy dimensions. A second characteristic unique to the international involvement dimension is that congressmen are apparently free from either constituency pressures or strong partisan beliefs when deciding whether to
change policy positions in order to support the president. The lack of partisan division has been demonstrated by this study and by research on past congressional behavior. And, as demonstrated by the analysis of congressional change scores, congressmen apparently do not respond to their constituency either. This lack of influence may reflect constituency indifference to foreign policy issues and the fact that material benefits for congressional districts are not involved as is the situation with social welfare issues.

Therefore, let me suggest that the two factors in the congressional decision-making calculus are loyalty to the president and personal policy attitudes. The relative strength of these two influences obviously varies from congressman to congressman, but this analysis has not found any characteristics unique to the group who respond to the president as opposed to those who do not. In any case, the international involvement dimension demonstrates the strength of loyalty to the president and congressional willingness to support their president "when they can."

Therefore, presidents influence congressional voting by appealing to their loyalty rather than by defining acceptable issues as occurred on the social welfare dimension. Since the appeal which is made remains the same throughout several administrations, congressional response is also stable and follows predictable patterns. It is the stable, predictable behavior which has permitted the easy identification of congressional response to presidential influence. This is not the situation on a dimension, such as social welfare where presidential appeal and the character and intensity of other influences vary
considerably.

Even though the international involvement dimension presents the strongest evidence of presidential influence, presidential actions do not meet popularly conceptualized forms of "presidential influence." First, the president is not playing the role of a policy leader nor is he influencing Congress by setting their agenda, two functions which are commonly linked with presidential influence. In fact, they are frequently defined as a major source of presidential power and dominance. Instead, presidents are asking for the passage of policy which is similar to that supported by their predecessors.

Secondly, the data clearly indicates that the personal characteristics of a president do not influence congressional voting response. If they did, the same patterns would not be repeated throughout a number of administrations. Presidential success on international involvement issues does not depend upon their ability to define and sell an issue to Congress and the public; nor does it depend upon their administration's lobbying skills in Congress. Such observations are contrary to the emphasis placed upon presidential success in getting their legislation through Congress. The literature on presidential-congressional relations has tended to emphasize presidential responsibility for passage of their legislation and imply, directly or indirectly, that presidential skills and powers influence the legislation's fate in Congress.

In summary, congressmen apparently respond to presidential wishes on international involvement issues because of a sense of loyalty to the president of their party. They are able to do so because they are
relatively free from constituency pressures. Therefore, it follows that issue areas which have characteristics similar to the international involvement dimension, i.e., 1) an area in which presidents are expected to provide leadership and 2) does not generate very much interest among the general public, would elicit a similar congressional response.

**Congressional Voting on Debt Limit Bills**

In order to test this hypothesis, congressional voting on debt limit bills will be examined. This issue area meets the two specified criteria because the management of the economy has come to be viewed as a major presidential responsibility; the size of the federal deficit is one means used to manage the economy and is, therefore, part of that responsibility. Further, while voters are interested in the overall health of the economy—e.g., recessions, unemployment and inflation—it is not likely that many voters are concerned with the mechanisms used to manage the economy.

Periodically, Congress must vote to increase the national debt limit. Such approval is necessary because the budget-making process, involving both the executive and legislative branches, has produced a deficit which increases the national debt beyond the existing legal limit. Obviously, the important decisions are made during the budgetary process and raising the legal debt limit is a necessary consequence of those decisions. All that remains is deciding who will be responsible for passing a not particularly popular bill. Since the failure to pass the bill would create economic problems and involve
difficult decisions regarding which programs would be cut, the members of the president's party have incentive to vote for passage. Because of the high visibility of the president, he would undoubtedly be held responsible for the unpleasant consequences by much of the public.

The figures in Table 6 indicate that our expectations are correct; congressional voting does follow patterns similar to those for international involvement. The Democrats are fairly stable, but the percentage who support increasing the debt limit drops considerably during the Nixon Administration. The voting among the Republican congressmen fluctuates quite dramatically. A large percentage supports raising the debt limit when a Republican is in office, but the percentage is very low when a Democrat is president. Thus, the example of the debt limit supports the argument that when the nature of a policy area is similar to that of international involvement, a similar congressional response will follow.

Summary

This analysis has confirmed earlier findings that congressmen do support their president on the international involvement dimension. This support is similar on both the general and presidential dimensions, indicating that presidential definition of issues had little influence on congressional voting. However, the findings of this research differed from existing information in one important respect. Previous research has established that constituency influences the policy position assumed by congressmen; but an analysis of the change scores on the presidential dimensions revealed that constituency does not
influence the decision to change positions in order to support the president. Therefore, the decision to support the president is apparently based on a sense of loyalty and a willingness to support the president when possible. Because congressional voting behavior has followed regular patterns over several administrations, the factors which influence the response apparently do not include the leadership skills of individual presidents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eisenhower Administration</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85th and 86th Congresses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kennedy Administration</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87th and 88th Congresses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnson Administration</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89th and 90th Congresses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nixon Administration</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st, 92nd, 93rd Congresses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures are average of all votes on debt limit increases for the two congresses.
Congress

88th (General)
90th (Presidential)
91st
92nd
93rd

President Johnson

President Nixon

President Nixon

President Nixon

FIGURE 5

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT DIMENSION: PARTY MEAN AND PARTY VARIANCE FOR ALL CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS

GD and GR represent the general dimensions; PD and PR, the presidential
FIGURE 6
INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT DIMENSION: PERCENTAGE CONGRESSMEN IN SCORE CHANGE CATEGORIES BY POLITICAL PARTY ON PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSIONS
FIGURE 6

- - - - Democrats
- - - - Republicans
FIGURE 7

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT DIMENSION: PERCENTAGE CONGRESSMEN IN SCORE CHANGE CATEGORIES
ON GENERAL AND PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSIONS
FIGURE 8

DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN ON INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT DIMENSION

(PERCENTAGES TAKING HIGH TO LOW POSITIONS)
FIGURE 8 (continued)
FIGURE 9

DISTRIBUTION OF REPUBLICAN CONGRESSMEN ON INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT DIMENSION

(PERCENTAGES TAKING HIGH TO LOW POSITIONS)
FIGURE 9 (continued)
FIGURE 10
INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT DIMENSION: PERCENTAGE DEMOCRATIC CONGRESSMEN IN SCORE CHANGE CATEGORIES BY REGION ON PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSIONS
FIGURE 10

Congress:

- - - - - Southern Democrats
- - - - - Northern Democrats
FIGURE 11

INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT DIMENSION: PERCENTAGE REPUBLICAN CONGRESSMEN IN SCORE CHANGI CATEGORIES BY REGION ON PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSIONS
FIGURE 11

Congress 90-91 90-92 90-93

--- Interior Republicans
- - - Coastal Republicans
FOOTNOTES


3. Ibid., pp. 41-43.

4. Ibid., p. 209.


7. Ibid., p. 225.

8. Ibid., p. 199.

9. Ibid., p. 212.

10. Ibid., pp. 227-229.

CHAPTER 6
PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON CONGRESSIONAL VOTING BEHAVIOR:
GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT DIMENSION

Congressional response on the international involvement dimension illustrated how political party can enhance presidential influence. Since party has been established as a dominant influence on government management issues, this dimension allows a more detailed study of the interaction between presidential wishes, congressional response and political party. Further, this interaction will be examined on two different policy areas within the economic policy domain, the government management dimension and management of the economy issues.

Definition and History

The concept of government management, as defined by Clausen implies a rather direct intervention of the government in economic affairs and in the disposition of natural resources. It is biased toward immediate benefits for the mass of the citizenry, as in public works expenditures during periods of unemployment, rather than a system of incentives to private business to encourage expansion and employment. There is a bias toward a broader distribution of the wealth, less concern for the growth of government. "The concept of government management leans toward a preference for the demands of the poor over the rich, the consumer over the producer, the public over
the private interest, and the borrower over the lender. Examples of legislation included in the government management dimensions of this study are anti-trust policy, interest policy, public works, banking regulations, wage and price controls.

A major difference between the welfare and government management dimensions is the difference between providing assistance directly to the individual and creating an economic and physical environment favorable to the great mass of citizenry. Under the welfare policy concept the individual is assisted with respect to education, housing, wages, working conditions, and retirement benefits. The effects on the individual of the policies subsumed under the government management concept are less direct and not always easy to predict.

Clausen's research on the 83rd through the 88th Congresses clearly demonstrated that government management is a partisan dimension. In an examination of the relative importance of the factors affecting policy positions by means of multiple regression, political party explained 80 to 90 percent of the total congressional variation in policy positions, a figure considerably higher than for the other policy dimensions. Furthermore, there were few individual Democratic congressmen who were more conservative than the most liberal Republican congressmen.

When developing an explanation for this pattern of behavior, Clausen argued that the policy attitudes for government management have been transmitted from one generation of partisans to another because many of the problems are too complex for most to understand and are beyond the capacity of anyone to solve. Faced with this
situation, many policy makers will follow the system that is "right" according to their system of beliefs. For these reasons, government management is not a constituency dimension. Because of the unpredictability and complexity of the policy alternatives, the voter is in no position to even have an opinion. Therefore, constituency attitudes do not serve as constraints on the behavior of congressmen; at most, the more involved partisans may share in their party's beliefs about economic policy.

Congressional Reaction to Presidential Influence at the Macro and Micro Levels

Congressional response to presidential influence can be easily summarized; there does not appear to be any response at either the macro or micro levels. A comparison of general and presidential dimensions (Figure 12) reveals a greater degree of partisan cohesiveness on the presidential dimensions, but this pattern occurs for both parties and therefore cannot be attributed to presidential influence. Apparently both Presidents took a public stand on issues which elicited a high degree of agreement among members of both parties. The other analytic methods used in this study also failed to find evidence of congressional response to presidential influence.

Since congressional response occurred on both the social welfare and international involvement dimensions, the lack of response on the government management dimension is a phenomena which deserves an explanation. It is easy to understand why there is little response at the micro level. Because political party has been a strong influence, party members are likely to respond to presidential policy stands as a
group, if they do respond, rather than as identifiable subgroups. When congressional party members are committed to a common belief, it is not likely that their unity will disintegrate when presidential influence enters the picture. The reaction of congressmen at the macro level indicates that presidents are not able to influence congressional decision-making when presidential influence competes with partisan attitudes. Thus, when political party, as a variable, represents strongly held partisan beliefs, it is a hindrance rather than an asset to the president.

However, it is interesting to speculate on the potential for presidential influence when other strong forces are also working for policy change on government management issues. If an economic crisis required new solutions, would a president, by appealing to a common ideology, be able to influence his party members to support new policy stands? It is possible that he could. The support positions assumed by the two parties are on the government management dimension as presently defined. However, it is possible that an economic crisis could lead to new policies, but the two parties could maintain the same positions and distance from one another. For example, since Democratic congressmen have maintained a relatively high support position on the issue of direct intervention of the government in economic affairs, a Democratic president may be able to appeal to these beliefs and gain support for stronger government intervention and controls than have been used in the past. While this discussion is speculative, congressional voting behavior does suggest that the potential for presidential influence is greater when appealing to
partisan beliefs than when trying to compete with constituency.

Management of the Economy

Political party may assist presidents in influencing congressional decision-making because it provides a common link between the president and congressmen in the eyes of the public. As congressmen are aware, the general public often judges a party by the actions of the president. Because the president has high visibility, the public will often assume that he is responsible for much that occurs in domestic and foreign policy. Because of the security provided by incumbency, a congressman may not be personally threatened by a negative assessment of a president from his party. An exception to this generalization may be issues concerning management of the economy.

Since the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt, presidents have been expected to successfully manage the economy. While most citizens may be indifferent about the mechanisms used, they are aware of recessions and inflation and have demonstrated a willingness to vote against the president's party when the economy is in a poor state, such as the backlash which occurred during the Eisenhower Administration. Understandably, congressmen would rather not run for reelection if the economy is in poor health and their president occupies the White House. Therefore, since party provides a link between the president and congressmen of the same party, self-interest would dictate that congressmen help their president to successfully manage the economy.

The economic conditions during the time period of this study permit an evaluation of this line of reasoning. During the latter
years of the Johnson Administration and during the Nixon Administration the economy was afflicted with both high rates of inflation and a recession. This state of the economy aroused public attention, and both Presidents were expected, in their role as managers of the economy, to cope with the situation. During both Administrations a surtax was a tool used to control inflation. Such a tax, needless to say, was not particularly popular with the general public, but economists felt that it was vitally important that an attempt, such as this, be made to control inflation.

This discussion has suggested that there are valid reasons for expecting a congressional voting pattern on management of the economy issues which is different from that on the government management dimensions. However, this expectation does not rest upon reasoning alone. Although both government management dimensions and management of the economy issues are subsumed under the economic policy domain, the surtax bills are not a part of government management dimensions. Therefore, there are both conceptual and analytical reasons for treating management of the economy issues as a distinctive policy area.

As expected, the voting patterns indicate that congressmen were willing to support the unpopular surtax bills when their president was in the White House. (Table 7) While a majority of congressmen were willing to support surtax bills when their president was in office, there was a tendency for congressmen to change to nonsupportive positions when he was not. For example, a majority of Democratic congressmen supported the bill when President Johnson was in office, but an erosion of support occurred, and a majority were in opposition
during the Nixon Administration. Since a majority of Republican congressmen supported the surtax during both Administrations, it would appear that they did not respond to partisan turnover in the same manner. However, there is an explanation for the Republican voting behavior. During the 90th Congress there was a drive by Republican congressmen to put mandatory limits on federal spending, and, as a consequence, the surtax bill included a provision which cut fiscal 1969 expenditures by $6 billion. The Republican support for the surtax bill during the 90th Congress undoubtedly reflects their success in gaining this compromise.

Therefore, the manner in which political party influences decision-making is different for the government management dimensions and management of the economy issues which underscores the validity of treating them as two distinct policy areas. On the government management dimensions party represents partisan beliefs, but on management of the economy issues, political party is indirectly influential because the constituency reacts to party labels. That is, constituency attitudes are important to congressmen because a common party label will include them in the public's appraisal of presidential management of the economy. Thus, congressmen of the president's party have a personal interest in assisting their president to be successful.

**Summary**

Political party as an influence on congressional voting behavior can assist or hinder a president in influencing congressional voting behavior in different ways: on international involvement issues, party
assisted presidents because congressmen apparently feel a sense of loyalty to the leader of their party. On the government management dimension, strong partisan beliefs prevented congressmen from responding to their president. However, on management of the economy issues, party was indirectly influential because of constituency response to party labels. While the manner in which political party influences congressional response obviously cannot be classified into distinct categories, this study indicates that the relationship between presidential influence, congressional response and political party is complex and can assume different forms.
TABLE 7

CONGRESSIONAL VOTING ON SURTAX BILLS IN 90TH AND 91ST CONGRESSES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers are average of votes cast on three roll call votes.
Numbers are average of votes cast on two roll call votes.
FIGURE 12
GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT DIMENSION:
PARTY MEAN AND PARTY VARIANCE
FOR ALL CONGRESSES
GD and GR represent the general dimensions; PD and PR, the presidential.

As demonstrated in Chapter 3, there is not a valid presidential dimension for the 92nd Congress.

FIGURE 12
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 48.

3. Ibid., p. 173.

CHAPTER 7
PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON CONGRESSIONAL VOTING BEHAVIOR:
CIVIL LIBERTIES DIMENSION

The civil liberties policy area differs from the preceding policy
dimension in one important respect; it was an issue area undergoing
turmoil and change during the years covered by this study. Therefore,
congressmen are less likely to be relying on past decisions and voting
histories when voting on civil liberties issues. For these reasons,
the civil liberties dimension provides a unique opportunity to study
presidential influence when an issue area is characterized by
instability.

Definition and History

The civil liberties policy concept includes all aspects of civil
liberty such as the right to a free trial and general democratic norms
including equality and civil rights. Specifically, the central concept
involves federal support for civil liberties.

The source of influence on congressional voting behavior for the
civil liberties dimension has been established as exclusively constitu-
ency. Clausen's analysis of the 83rd through the 88th Congresses
found that national party differences were so small as to warrant no
consideration. Instead, the variation in policy positions within each
party was explained by constituency variables. Within the Democratic
Party, the major source of variation was, of course, the North-South regional division. Second in importance was urbanization which reflects in part the North-South division since northern Democrats are elected from more urban constituencies than southern Democrats. Within the Republican Party, only a small amount of variation was explained, a phenomena which undoubtedly reflects the lack of a North-South division in the Republican Party.\(^1\)

The influence of constituency on civil liberties issues has been recognized and verified by other studies. For example, Kingdon found that the saliency of an issue and the intensity of constituency attitudes, two characteristics of civil liberties issues, increased the importance of constituency in congressional decision-making.\(^2\) Another study which explored congressional representation of constituency attitudes found that congressmen tended to be aware of constituency attitudes on civil rights issues and to vote in accordance with those attitudes.\(^3\)

Clearly, if constituency is the source of congressional policy positions, it should also be the source of change in both policy positions and voting on specific questions such as school busing. This observation is significant because the civil rights policy area, which makes up a large proportion of the presidential civil liberties dimension, was undergoing change during the time frame of this study. Traditionally, civil rights issues had pitted a segregated South against the liberal North with much of the civil rights legislation during the late '50's and early '60's designed to protect the civil rights of blacks. During the mid- and late-'60's the battle for black
rights moved north, and issues such as anti-riot legislation, affirmative action and school desegregation become prominent. As the civil rights issues changed, constituency attitudes were also changing to a position of less support for civil rights issues. For example, a Louis Harris poll taken in 1966 reported that 75% of the whites felt that Negroes were moving too fast as contrasted to 50% two years earlier.4

In this situation, congressmen should be moving to lower policy positions if a change in constituency attitudes has an impact on congressional decision-making. And an examination of continuing members of the House in the 88th and 92nd Congresses demonstrated that many members did shift to lower support positions in the 92nd Congress. The movement to lower positions occurred in both parties but was somewhat greater among Republicans.5 Therefore, we are beginning the exploration of congressional response to presidential influence with the awareness that congressmen are shifting to lower support positions at the same time that support for civil rights is declining in the general public. Given the apparently overwhelming influence of constituency, what role, if any, is left for presidents?

While the decision-making environment for civil liberties issues obviously places limitations on presidential influence, the changing conditions and congressional voting instability should also provide unusual opportunities for presidential leadership. When a policy area is in a state of flux, strong, centralized leadership is often needed which gives the president an opportunity to define the policies and, because of his visibility, to identify his party with the new policies.
It is a rare occasion when a president has an opportunity to provide this type of leadership. Such opportunities have often occurred during realignments; for example, during the 1930's President Roosevelt and the Democratic Party defined and became identified with social welfare issues, among others. During the late 1960's, candidate and President Nixon took advantage of the instability in the civil rights area to develop his "Southern strategy" which identified the Republican Party with a go-slow or retreat on civil rights issues. The question which will be explored in this analysis is whether his policy stance influenced the voting behavior of Republican congressmen.

Congressional Reaction to Presidential Influence at the Macro Level

Because of the rapid changes in the civil liberties policy area, each president may have given attention to unique issues. If this occurred, it would not be possible to determine whether congressional response was due to presidential influence or the issue content of the dimension. A review of the presidential dimensions for the 90th and 91st Congresses reveals that both Presidents took public stands on similar issues. The roll call votes on which President Johnson took a stand consisted largely of civil rights, of which two were related to school busing. A similar pattern is found in the 91st presidential dimension with six of the eight roll calls related to civil rights issues. However, for the 92nd Congress, 50% of the roll calls in the presidential dimension concerned busing and in the 93rd, 80%.

The similar issue structure in presidential dimensions for the 90th and 91st Congresses permits an evaluation of congressional
response to presidential influence because the voting patterns cannot be attributed to differences in dimensional issue content. However, while the content of the 92nd presidential dimension would appear to be different, the analysis in Chapter 3 found continuity for the presidential civil liberties dimensions for the 90th, 91st, and 92nd Congresses; therefore, the analysis will include all three dimensions. Since it was not clear that the 93rd dimension was measuring the same concept as the others, it will receive relatively little attention.

As expected, congressional members from both parties were moving to lower support positions on both the general and presidential dimensions. (Figure 13) Since the movement occurred among members of both parties, the response was clearly due to forces in the environment which affected both parties. However, the movement to lower policy positions was greater among Republicans. (Table 8, Figure 13) The partisan difference in score changes between the 90th and 91st Congresses is particularly significant because partisan turnover in the presidency occurred between these two Congresses. But an argument for presidential influence cannot be based on partisan differences along because other forces, such as a lesser degree of commitment to civil rights, could be responsible for the greater movement by Republican congressmen. Therefore, if a case is to be made for presidential influence, it must include other evidence.

The first piece of supporting evidence for presidential influence is provided by observing the response of Republican congressmen on the presidential dimensions. (Figure 13) The Republicans reacted in a cohesive manner to presidential issues in the 91st Congress with a
mean score close to that of President Nixon's, suggesting that, as a
group, Republican congressmen found the presidential issues to be more
acceptable than those in the general dimension. Further, in the 92nd
Congress, the mean score on the presidential dimension was lower than
on the general, a reaction contrary to that made by Democrats.

The extent to which presidential definition of issues influenced
congressional voting can also be explored by comparing the reactions of
congressmen on the general and presidential dimensions for each
Congress. All of the roll call votes on the presidential dimension
for the 91st Congress were on the general dimension with the exception
of one, a bill appropriating money to aid in the cost of desegregating
public schools. For the 92nd Congress, the roll call votes on the
presidential dimension were also on the general except for two votes
on a bill providing the EEOC with greater enforcement powers. This
portion of the analysis is, therefore, comparing a general dimension
with a subset of votes from that dimension, the presidential dimensions.

The voting behavior of the Republican congressmen on the presi­
dential dimensions, as compared to the general, also appears to be in
response to presidential definition of issues. (Figure 14) Considerably
more Republicans than Democrats assumed lower policy positions, nearer
to President Nixon's policy position, on the presidential dimensions.
During the 91st Congress, 76% of the Republican congressmen assumed
lower positions on the presidential dimension, contrasted to 38% for
the Democrats, and during the 92nd Congress the figures were 50% for
the Republicans and 16% for the Democrats. Such congressional voting
behavior is, of course, consistent with presidential influence.
The analysis to this point has indicated that Republican congressmen responded to presidential definition of issues. Before a conclusion is reached, however, two alternative explanations for the differences in partisan behavior should be explored. First, this analysis has dealt with change in congressional policy positions in the direction of President Nixon's policy positions which were low. However, the congressional members who assumed the lowest support scores before the partisan turnover obviously could not shift to lower scores. Because many southern Democrats occupied low support positions, the higher stability rates by Democrats may reflect the inability of southern Democrats to move to lower scores. However, even when the Democratic congressmen who occupied the lowest support category in the 90th Congress were removed from the analysis, the percentage of Democrats who remained stable is still considerably higher than the rate for Republicans. (Table 9)

Second, the partisan response to presidential influence may be due to the distribution of party members by support category. In the 90th Congress the majority of Democrats were either concentrated in the highest support category (62%) or the lowest (25%), reflecting the North-South split in the party on this dimension. The Republicans, however, did not have such a high concentration in the higher support category (39%). It is reasonable to expect that congressmen in the highest support category are definitely committed to civil liberties (or more precisely, federal support of civil liberties), while those in the middle have "softer" positions. If this line of reasoning is correct, the score distribution may be responsible for the greater
movement to lower support scores by Republicans. However, this explanation for partisan differences must also be discarded. Following the partisan changeover, 94% of the Republicans who were in the high support category shifted to lower positions while only 53% of the Democrats did so. (Table 10)

Congressional Reaction to Presidential Influence at the Micro Level

As indicated earlier, the influence of constituency on congressional voting behavior has been established. The change in constituency attitudes has also been held responsible for the movement to lower policy positions by the members of both parties. However, this analysis has found that, in addition to the general movement to lower scores, Republican congressmen responded to presidential definition of issues by assuming lower policy positions on the presidential dimensions, nearer to President Nixon's position. In an effort to evaluate the extent to which congressional voting behavior on the presidential dimensions was influenced by constituency, a multiple regression, using the standard constituency variables, was performed on the score changes across partisan turnover.

The analysis did not uncover evidence that any specific constituency characteristic was influencing congressional voting on the presidential dimensions. Therefore, as has occurred on other dimensions, a variable which explains stable voting behavior does not explain change in voting on the presidential dimensions. The lack of constituency influence, of course, reinforces the conclusion that Republican congressmen were responding to presidential influence,
Summary

As discussed earlier in the chapter, the opportunities for presidents to provide leadership in defining policy are likely to be increased when a policy area is in a state of flux. Such an opportunity presented itself in civil rights during the '60's and early '70's, and two recent presidents did seize the opportunity to provide strong leadership.

President Johnson was president during a time when the civil rights movement was at its peak and support for legislation to end the more gross inequities was growing among the general public in the North. President Johnson used these developments together with the large margin of Democratic congressmen elected to office during the "Johnson landslide" to define and help pass civil rights legislation which was far more sweeping and comprehensive than could reasonably have been expected a few years earlier. Another president might have done as little as possible to satisfy the demands of the civil rights movement, and the legislation would have been different.

President Nixon ran for office and became president during a time when civil rights issues began to change and support for civil rights was declining in the public and Congress. He used this situation to place himself on the side of those wishing to slow down, if not halt, progress in civil rights. Again, another president might have sought to minimize the impact of the growing disenchantment.

The manner in which Republican congressmen responded to President Nixon's definition of civil rights issues suggests that they supported the President's handling of civil rights. While the data do not allow
the development of cause-and-effect relationships, the history of congressional behavior on civil rights together with the patterns discovered in this analysis do permit the development of generalizations regarding the interaction between presidential influence and congressional response. Constituency has been established as the dominant influence on civil rights issues. While constituency attitudes would normally place restraints on the behavior of elected officials, attitudes towards civil rights were undergoing such change during the last 15 years or so that the presidents and congressmen could define policy and change policy positions as long as they did not move against the general tide of public opinion. Thus, constituency opinion provided the general framework, but the presidents and congressmen had freedom in defining the policies (the exception may be specific issues such as school busing). The apparent lack of influence of any specific constituency on the change scores of congressmen supports this line of reasoning; as long as congressmen were stable or changing in the direction dictated by public opinion, there were not specific, identifiable influential constituencies. Therefore, constituency influence, because it was in a changing, unstable condition, permitted and aided presidential influence of congressional voting behavior.
TABLE 8
MEAN PARTY CHANGES IN SUPPORT SCORES FOR CONTINUING MEMBERS ON THE CIVIL LIBERTIES PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90-91 Change Scores</td>
<td>-.1727</td>
<td>-.4993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-92 Change Scores</td>
<td>-.2101</td>
<td>-.8119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90-93 Change Scores</td>
<td>-.5185</td>
<td>-.7491</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 9
CIVIL LIBERTIES DIMENSION: PERCENTAGE CONGRESSMEN CHANGING POLICY POSITION ON PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSIONS FOR 90-91 COMPARISON CROSS-TABULATED WITH SUPPORT CATEGORY IN 90TH CONGRESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support Category in 90th Congress</th>
<th>Percentage Who Changed Scores 90-91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00-1.49</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.50-1.99</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.00-2.49</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 10
CIVIL LIBERTIES DIMENSION: PERCENTAGE CONGRESSMEN CHANGING POLICY POSITION ACROSS PARTISAN TURNOVER IN PRESIDENCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>90-91 Comparison</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To Higher Categories</td>
<td>Remained the Same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Democrats:</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without Democrats in Low Support Category in 90th Congress</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GD and GR represent the general dimensions; PD and PR, the presidential

FIGURE 13

CIVIL LIBERTIES DIMENSION: PARTY MEAN AND PARTY VARIANCE FOR ALL CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS
FIGURE 14

DIFFERENCES IN CONGRESSIONAL POLICY POSITIONS ON GENERAL AND PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSIONS: CIVIL LIBERTIES DIMENSIONS

(SCORE ON GENERAL DIMENSION MINUS SCORE ON PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSION)
FIGURE 14

Democrats

Republicans
FOOTNOTES


6. The variables included: state, region, % population in metropolitan district, % population in central city, % population white collar worker, % population black.
CHAPTER 8

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON AN
INTER- AND INTRA-DIMENSIONAL BASIS

The preceding analysis has studied congressional response on a
dimension by dimension basis, identifying the circumstances which
hinder or enhance presidential influence. To this point, the consist­
ency of congressional response on an intra-dimensional basis has not
been studied. For example, is a congressman who changed from his
international involvement policy position in the 90th Congress to a
position nearer to President Nixon in the 91st Congress likely to do
so in the 92nd and 93rd Congresses? A second unexplored topic is the
pattern of congressional change scores across dimensions or inter­
dimensions. These two topics permit congressional response to presi­
dential influence to be studied from a different perspective and will
be the concern of this chapter.

Congressional Response to Presidential Influence on Intra-Dimensions

If congressmen respond in a consistent manner on an intra-
dimensional basis, the patterns of presidential-congressional relations
which have been uncovered in this analysis would be supported. First,
this research has indicated that policy dimension theory also explains
congressional decision-making when presidential influence is present.
Therefore, the congressional decision to support the president has
been influenced by the policy concepts under consideration. Further, since presidential influence competes with different influences on each dimension, the circumstances and motivations underlying congressional response to presidential influence have varied from one dimension to another. For example, a sense of loyalty to the president, together with relative freedom from constituency influence, motivated many congressmen to support their president on the international involvement dimension. The prominent role played by the policy concepts in congressional decision-making, together with the stable mix of influences on each dimension, indicate that congressional response to presidential influence should be consistent over time. For example, if a congressman finds that circumstances allow him to respond to presidential influence on the international involvement dimension in the 91st Congress, he should also be able to respond to the president in the 92nd Congress since the circumstances surrounding decision-making tend to be stable.

The analytic technique used to measure consistency in change on individual dimensions was a Pearson r correlation performed on congressional change scores on the presidential dimensions. As usual, the question of standards presents a problem. How high must the correlation be before it can be asserted that there is consistency in the change scores? The criterion used here is that the intra-dimensional correlations should be higher than the inter-dimensional correlations. However, before examining the results, it should be noted that since there is a certain amount of random movement, correlations of change scores cannot reasonably be expected to be as
Despite this reservation, the analysis shows that there is consistency in congressional change in policy positions in response to presidential influence. (Table 11) That is, if a congressman made the decision to change his policy position on the international involvement dimension in order to support President Nixon in the 91st Congress, there was a tendency for him to maintain the new position for the remainder of the Administration. With the exception of the government management dimensions, the intra-dimensional correlations are quite high for change data; they are certainly higher than the inter-dimensional correlations. (Tables 12 and 13)

The exception to this generalization is the government management dimension. However, this exception tends to confirm rather than detract from the conclusions. Since this is the only dimension on which congressmen did not respond to presidential influence, it is logical that there would be no consistency in congressional response. In fact, a high correlation on this dimension would have cast doubt on the validity of the data and results.

A notable characteristic in the congressional change scores is the tendency for the correlation figures to be similar within each dimension. It will be remembered that since presidential influence competed with different influences on each dimension, the extent of and motivation behind congressional response varied according to the circumstances and nature of competing influences. However, this analysis shows that while the motivations and circumstances may vary, the consistency of congressional response is not affected. Therefore,
a president can apparently rely on the same group of congressmen for support on each dimension regardless of the nature of competing forces.

There was a tendency for the Democrats to have less consistent patterns of change than the Republicans. Because the data set does not include a change from a Republican to a Democratic Administration, it is not possible to determine whether the greater consistency among Republicans occurs because a Republican occupies the White House. It does, however, seem likely that when a president is exerting an influence, the more consistent patterns would appear.

**Congressional Response to Presidential Influence on Inter-Dimensions**

When attention is turned to congressional response across dimensions, or inter-dimensions, the question which is being asked is: Are there congressmen who consistently respond to presidential influence regardless of the type of policy issue? Congressmen who vote in this manner would be putting high priority on presidential wishes, ahead of other influences, since the policy dimensions are characterized by different influences on congressional voting behavior. The previous analysis indicates that it is not likely that many congressmen react in this manner; nevertheless, even though the numbers may be small, the extent of such support and the characteristics associated with the congressmen is of interest.

The consistency of congressional response on inter-dimensions was measured with the same analytic technique used to measure congressional response on intra-dimensions. A Pearson r correlation was performed on congressional change scores for all of the presidential
dimensions. Therefore, this methodology is measuring the extent to which a congressman who changed scores to support the president on the social welfare dimension in the 91st Congress would also change scores on the civil liberties, international involvement and government management dimensions.

While the inter-dimensional correlations for the Republicans are low, (Table 12) there are voting patterns worth noting. First, with one exception (civil liberties and social welfare 90-92), the change scores on the civil liberties dimension correlate very poorly or not at all with the other dimensions. This finding reinforces the earlier discussion which concluded that the civil liberties issue area is a unique phenomenon which doesn't occur very often. When the civil liberties dimension is removed, there are low, but meaningful, correlations between the change scores on the remaining three dimensions. These figures indicate that there are Republican congressmen who tend to place presidential wishes ahead of other influences. However, these numbers are small and do not lead to a rejection of the generalization that policy concepts play a major role in congressional decision-making when presidential influence is present.

The correlation figures for Democrats are considerably less clear-cut. (Table 13) There is a regional pattern with greater consistency in inter-dimensional change scores among southern Democrats. This regional pattern undoubtedly occurs because in this situation, as in many others, southern Democrats behave as though they were a third party. There is slight tendency for consistency in change among non-southern Democrats except on civil liberties-international
involvement for 90-92 and 90-93. This consistency probably occurs because of the large-scale movement to lower scores on the civil liberties dimension and the tendency for Democrats to shift to lower scores on international involvement issues when a Republican is president. Again, the greater consistency among Republicans would logically occur because of the influence exerted by a Republican president, but the data does not allow a definite conclusion.

While only a limited number of Republican congressmen responded to presidential influence on an inter-dimensional basis, the correlation figures are large enough to justify further study. The next stage of the analysis will be searching for common characteristics among the congressmen who made inter-dimensional changes in policy positions. Because of the lack of previous research on this topic, it is difficult to develop expectations regarding who these congressmen would be with one exception; the president's party leaders in Congress should be more likely to consistently support the president.

In order to identify the congressmen who supported the president on an inter-dimensional basis, the following technique was used. The support scores were divided into four categories for each dimension: High, 1.00-1.49; Medium-high, 1.50-1.99; Medium-low, 2.00-2.49; Low, 2.50-3.00. A congressman who shifted from one category to another in the direction of the president's policy position was identified as supporting the president. This is a strict test of presidential influence because it eliminates those congressmen who already occupy the same support category as the president and, therefore, cannot change position in his direction. These congressmen were eliminated
because it is difficult to interpret their motives; they may be in the
same category as the president for a variety of reasons other than a
desire to support the president.

The search for inter-dimensional change was made only when the
correlation figures indicated that there was a relationship in the
change scores. In the change from the 90th to the 91st Congress, only
three combinations were worth pursuing: government management and
social welfare; government management and international involvement;
social welfare and international involvement. Ten Republican congress-
men shifted on both the government management and social welfare
dimensions; sixteen on the government management and international
involvement dimensions; and twenty-two on social welfare and inter-
national involvement. Further, three Republicans shifted on two of
the comparisons, including Congressman Arends, the minority whip, and
six shifted to lower policy positions on all three comparisons,
including Minority Leader Ford.

In the change from the 90th to the 92nd Congress, there was a
large-scale movement to lower scores by Republican congressmen on
both the social welfare and civil liberties dimensions. Undoubtedly
because of this, there was a great deal of inter-dimensional movement
for this Congress. On the social welfare and international involvement
dimensions, 42 shifted in President Nixon's direction and on the
social welfare and international involvement dimensions, 62. Twenty-
seven Republicans shifted position on both of these comparisons,
including Arends and Gerald Ford.
For the 90th-93rd comparison, three comparisons merit attention; government management and social welfare with 16 Republican congressmen changing position; 19 shifted on both government management and international involvement; and on social welfare and international involvement, 22. One Republican congressman changed on two of the comparisons and seven shifted to lower policy positions on all three including Congressman Rhodes, the new Minority Leader.

In summary, the number of congressmen who changed scores on an inter-dimensional basis was small, and they did not appear to have any identifiable characteristic in common except for one; the leaders of the president's party in Congress tended to shift policy position on an inter-dimensional basis in order to support the president. This observation is true of all three minority leaders; Gerald Ford was minority leader until he became vice-president in December, 1973 when he was succeeded by John Rhodes. The minority whip was Leslie Arends.

Summary

The analysis in this chapter has both confirmed earlier conclusions regarding presidential-congressional relations and provided new insights. The consistency in congressional response on individual dimensions reinforced earlier conclusions that congressional decision-making when presidential influence is present is consistent with policy dimension theory, i.e., policy concepts are still dominant in congressional decision-making. In practice, since congressional support varied by policy dimension, presidents must identify the congressmen who will support him on a dimension by dimension basis and
make his appeal to that particular group. However, there is a small
group of congressmen who tend to support the president on several
dimensions, including the congressional leaders of the president's
party.

The consistency in congressional response on an intra-dimensional
basis is heartening for a second reason. Because the consistency
occurred despite the variety of competing influences and circumstances
on each dimension, the case for presidential influence is strengthened.
The response patterns indicate that the presidential influence which
has been identified to this point does not reflect unique situations.
Instead, congressmen are voting in a manner consistent with both
established characteristics of congressional behavior and presidential
influence.
TABLE 11
INTRA-DIMENSIONAL CORRELATIONS OF CHANGE SCORES ON PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSIONS BY POLITICAL PARTY

Democrats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Government Management(^a)</th>
<th>Social Welfare</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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\(^a\)Since there was not a presidential dimension for the 92nd Congress, only one correlation figure is available.
TABLE 12
INTER-DIMENSIONAL CORRELATIONS OF CHANGE SCORES ON
PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSIONS FOR REPUBLICANS

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TABLE 13

INTER-DIMENSIONAL CORRELATIONS OF CHANGE SCORES ON
PRESIDENTIAL DIMENSIONS FOR DEMOCRATS BY REGION

**90-91**

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|                      | Non-Southern Democrats |               |               |               |
|                      | Government Management | Social Welfare | Civil Liberties | International Involvement |
| Government Management | -.009            | -.087         | .018          |               |
| Social Welfare       | -.036             |               | -.182         | .103          |
| Civil Liberties      |                    |               |               |               |

**90-92**

|                      | Southern Democrats |               |               |               |
|                      | Government Management | Social Welfare | Civil Liberties | International Involvement |
| Government Management |                    | .312          | .046          |               |
| Social Welfare       |                    |               |               | .245          |
| Civil Liberties      |                    |               |               |               |

|                      | Non-Southern Democrats |               |               |               |
|                      | Government Management | Social Welfare | Civil Liberties | International Involvement |
| Government Management |                    | -.028         | .191          | .285          |
| Social Welfare       |                    |               |               |               |
| Civil Liberties      |                    |               |               |               |
TABLE 13 (continued)

90-93

**Southern Democrats**

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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION

The complex, mysterious and fascinating world of presidential-congressional interactions has attracted the attention of many scholars. Because the relationship is so varied and complex, the descriptions of it have also varied, depending in part on which aspect is under review. However, on the portion of the relationship which is the concern of this study, presidential influence upon congressional voting behavior, there has been a surprising amount of unanimity among both presidential and congressional scholars; with the exception of foreign affairs issues, the conclusion has been that the president does not influence the voting behavior of congressmen.

Despite this agreement, the central finding of this study is that congressmen do respond to presidential wishes when making voting decisions on domestic issues. Besides providing information on presidential-congressional relations, the responsiveness to presidential wishes revealed a new aspect of congressional voting behavior. Previous studies have found a remarkable stability in congressional voting histories and policy positions. While this study does not challenge the proposition that stability is a general characteristic of congressional decision-making, it did identify circumstances associated with flexibility and change in voting behavior. In response to change in
a short-term force, the president, many congressmen temporarily changed their policy position in order to accommodate presidential wishes.

The substance and implications of these findings are the concern of this chapter. The consequences of presidential interaction with other forces in the decision-making environment will be summarized by identifying the circumstances which enhance or hinder presidential influence. Second, the implications of the methodological approach and findings for the study of congressional decision-making will be discussed. Third, the patterns in the congressional response provide information on presidential options for influencing congressional responses as well as the general nature of presidential-congressional relations.

Before turning to these topics, however, the new findings deserve an explanation, i.e., why did this study find previously undetected aspects of congressional voting behavior? The primary reason is the manner in which influence was defined. Specifically, "influence" was defined to mean that A persuades B to do something that A wants him to do or that the president persuades congressmen to vote in the manner he prefers. Therefore, the assessment of presidential influence included the following information: 1) evidence that the president was attempting to influence the outcome of a roll call vote; 2) the outcome the president preferred; 3) a measurement of congressional reaction to presidential efforts to influence the outcome.

As a consequence of the operationalization of this definition, two important methodological strategies were invoked. First, in order to meet the requirement of "1) evidence that the president was attempting
to influence the outcome of a roll call vote" the roll calls which received presidential attention were subsetted in the analysis. By focusing on the subset of votes which concerned the president, a reasonable requirement when evaluating influence, evidence of presidential influence was found.

A second component of the definition of "influence" required: "a measurement of congressional reaction to presidential efforts to influence the outcome." In order to meet this criterion, congressmen were required to change their policy position in the direction of the president's position. Therefore, the methodology was specifically designed to measure change in congressional voting behavior, and the empirical analysis found that many congressmen did change their policy positions in response to presidential influence.

Patterns of Presidential-Congressional Interaction

The detailed study of presidential interaction with other forces in the environment and the congressional response has permitted an identification of the circumstances which hinder or enhance presidential influence. Past studies of congressional decision-making have tended to establish competitive decision-making models in which a variety of forces compete for congressional support, with some forces labeled as the dominant force while others are considered to be less influential. Further, these models have tended to be static; i.e., they have evaluated the influence of the forces in the environment at any given time rather than congressional response to change in the environment. However, by utilizing change scores and studying
congressional response to a change in the decision-making environment, this study has gained insights into the relationship between the various influences and congressional voting behavior. This approach has permitted the development of generalizations regarding the circumstances associated with a force's ability to influence voting decisions. This approach, therefore, provides insights which can supplement the information provided by the static models of congressional decision-making.

Constituency-Presidential Influence

If a model of competitive decision-making is used, constituency clearly has the advantage in a conflict with the president. Since the Constitution has established that congressmen must remain in the good graces of a majority of the voters in their districts in order to be reelected, the constituency clearly has more power to bestow the ultimate reward or punishment than the president. Therefore, in a direct clash between constituency and presidential wishes, the president is likely to be the loser.

However, as will be discussed in greater detail, while the competitive model of decision-making is correct when there is a direct clash between constituency and the president, this model represents only a portion of the relationship. Presidential wishes and constituency often do not clash. On some issue areas a president can use an aroused constituency to gain support for his programs. Further, because of constituency indifference, the conflict between these two forces occurs infrequently, and congressmen are often free to respond
to presidential wishes if they choose to do so. Therefore, the variation in constituency interest allows presidential influence to vary. When constituency interest is high, presidential influence is likely to be low unless both forces are pursuing similar objectives; when constituency interest is low, presidents have a greater opportunity to influence the voting outcome.

The tendency for constituency to dominate in a conflict between presidential wishes and constituency interests was demonstrated by congressional voting behavior on the social welfare dimension. When Republican congressmen were voting on presidential issues which involved established programs providing benefits for the constituency, they did not support the president. But when these concerns were not present, Republican congressmen as a group did support their president. That constituency self-interest is a barrier to presidential influence is not a surprising finding; a casual observer of the political scene is aware of the tendency for congressmen to protect programs which bring economic benefits to their districts. Social welfare issues are often not placed in this category because of the tendency to think of such legislation as designed to aid the poor. However, much of the social welfare benefits do reach the middle class and, therefore, are in the same category as other "pork" bills.

While this example of congressional behavior supports the model of competitive decision-making, as argued earlier, presidential wishes and constituency often do not clash. Both public opinion and legislative studies have concluded that the constituency is interested in relatively few policy issues and, as a consequence, are seldom interested in their
congressman's voting decisions. This indifference presents presidents with an opportunity to influence the voting decisions. For example, on the international involvement dimension, where congressmen were relatively free from constituency pressures, they could, if they chose to do so, support their president, and the data shows that a majority of congressmen did make such a decision. Therefore, when constituency interest was present as on the social welfare dimension, there was weak congressional response to presidential wishes, but when constituency self-interest was absent, as on the 92nd social welfare dimension and international involvement issues, there was a response to presidential influence.

The argument that constituency disinterest gives congressmen freedom to respond to presidential wishes is also supported by the lack of constituency influence on congressional change scores. A variety of analytic techniques, using standard constituency variables, found that no measurable variation in constituency had an impact on individual change in policy positions on the presidential dimensions. Thus, while constituency often influences the policy position assumed by congressmen, there is no evidence of certain constituency characteristics predisposing congressional members to deviate from those positions in order to support the president.

Constituency is, therefore, often a strong explanatory variable for stable policy positions but cannot explain fluctuations in policy positions. However, the nature of constituency opinion may be responsible for this apparent dichotomy. When congressmen assume policy positions which reflect constituency opinion, they often do so
through their knowledge of the district they represent and not because the constituency has communicated their interest and concern. In this manner, the constituency can influence the congressman's voting behavior while having little knowledge or interest in his activities. However, because of the low degree of constituency interest in many policy areas, congressmen are free to deviate from their general policy positions, and possibly alter them permanently without electoral costs, if they choose to do so. Therefore, the decision to deviate from an established policy position may often reflect the personal attitudes of the congressman, and not his constituency, which would explain why constituency does not appear to have an impact on the change scores.

Not only does constituency indifference present opportunities for presidential influence, but there are also occasions when an aroused constituency opinion can assist the president in influencing congressional voting decisions. For example, as far as management of the economy issues are concerned, an aroused constituency, or the threat of an aroused constituency, can assist a president in gaining support from his party members in Congress. Since the public tends to judge the president and his party harshly when the economy is not doing well, the congressmen from the president's party have prudently decided that they should assist the president in his efforts to successfully manage the economy. While there may be disagreement regarding the measures which will lead to success, the president's position as leader allows him to define the policy, and congressmen have little choice except to accept or reject the president's proposals, with members of the president's party showing strong support usually.
Volatile constituency opinion regarding civil rights issues also assisted the president in defining new policy and influencing congressional voting response. The opportunities for presidential leadership in an issue area undergoing change and turmoil have been recognized, but what this analysis shows is that the opportunities for presidential influence exist not only in the already recognized areas of presidential leadership—defining new policy and setting congressional agenda—but also in congressional decision-making.

Party-Presidential Influence

The studies of congressional decision-making, using a model of competitive decision-making, have found that party is a strong predictor of congressional voting decisions. Since common party membership provides the one definite link between the president and congressmen, this analysis began with the expectation that party would enhance presidential influence. In general, this expectation was met, but again, by examining congressional response to a change in the environment, a relationship of greater complexity was found. The variable "party" represented a number of attitudes and motivations, and the relationship between party, presidential wishes, and congressional voting behavior varies as the attitudes and motivations vary.

When political party, as a variable, represented partisan beliefs, presidential influence varied, depending on the intensity of the beliefs and the influence of other forces. The dominance of party influence on the government management dimension has been established, congressmen in each party vote in accordance with partisan beliefs and
few other forces influence the voting decision. On this dimension, contrary to expectations, congressmen did not respond to presidential wishes. They did not respond as individuals which is not surprising given the tendency for congressional party members to vote as cohesive groups, but they also did not respond as a group, indicating that congressmen did not look to the president to define party issues and party positions. On this dimension, then, strong partisan beliefs together with a lack of influence by other forces prevented the presidents from influencing congressional voting behavior.

However, on two other dimensions where partisan beliefs are less dominant and other forces also influence the party positions, the president was sometimes able to define issues which appealed to common partisan beliefs thereby influencing the voting behavior of congressmen from his party. On the 92nd social welfare presidential dimension, President Nixon took a public stand on issues which elicited cohesive, dramatic support from Republican congressmen, but in the remaining Congresses, constituency pressures prevented congressmen from responding to presidential appeals. On the civil liberties dimension, although constituency exercises great influence, the movement to lower support positions also reflected a partisan influence with Republicans moving to lower support positions more rapidly than the Democrats. Therefore, President Nixon could appeal to partisan beliefs when defining presidential issues.

In addition to the influence of party through partisan beliefs, political party also represents two motivations for congressmen to support the president, loyalty to the president and the link provided
by a common party identification in the minds of the electorate. As congressmen themselves have noted, they tend to feel loyalty towards the president as the leader of their party, want his administration to succeed, and will support the president "when they can." The clearest examples of party loyalty as a motivation for congressional support occurred on the international involvement dimensions, both general and presidential, and on the debt limit bills. On these issues, congressmen from both parties have over several years, changed policy positions in order to support the president of their party. The explanation usually offered for this reaction is that congressmen recognize presidential responsibility for conducting foreign affairs, and many are willing to help provide their president with useful tools, such as foreign aid. Further, since constituents are relatively indifferent to foreign policy issues, congressmen are free to support their president, if they choose to do so.

In a closely related motivation, "party" can influence congressmen to support their president because a large percentage of the general public judges a political party by the actions of its president. This situation obviously gives congressmen a strong incentive to help the president of their party to have a successful administration. In this analysis, issues related to management of the economy provided a dramatic example of this type of motivation. As discussed earlier, since the public has demonstrated a willingness to punish the congressional members of the president's party when the economy is not in good health, congressmen in both parties have prudently decided to support their president's economic program.
In summary, a membership in the same political party can provide valuable assistance for a president attempting to influence congressional voting decisions. It is not an overwhelming influence, of course; if it were, congressional response to presidential influence on domestic issues would have been discovered long ago. Instead, political party provides a link between the president and congressmen which varies depending on the circumstances and presidential leadership.

Presidential Leadership-Congressional Response

The discussion of the interaction of presidential influence with other forces in the decision-making environment identified the circumstances which limit presidential influence as well as those which permit presidents to influence the voting decisions. However, whether the president seizes the opportunity to influence the decision-making depends upon his attitudes and leadership skills. Given that individual presidential qualities can make a difference, what strategies can presidents use to influence congressional voting response? This analysis has suggested a few options.

The literature on the presidency and presidential-congressional relations has viewed presidential abilities to write and define legislative programs and assist in establishing the congressional agenda as important sources of power for the president. This analysis has demonstrated for the first time that these abilities can also be used to influence individual members' policy decisions. If a president can define issues which both appeal to his party members in Congress and do not elicit opposition from a powerful force, usually
constituency, he can often win congressional support. For example, in this study congressmen responded to presidential definition of issues on two of the policy dimensions, social welfare and civil liberties. However, the ability to define legislation is not an overwhelming advantage. At least two conditions were found to limit congressional response, constituency interests and strongly-held partisan beliefs, and there is little the president can do to alter either one.

A president's ability to influence congressional voting is also influenced by the times such as when a policy area is undergoing change and upheaval. During these periods, the existing policy is under challenge, and many congressmen are undoubtedly reevaluating their policy position on the issue. The president's position as the visible, unified leader allows him to play a uniquely influential role in establishing new policy positions for members of his party. Recently, this process has occurred on civil rights issues, and there are a number of historical examples, such as Franklin Roosevelt's leadership during the first years of his Administration. Thus, it would be a mistake to conclude that a current lack of congressional response on a dimension where partisan beliefs are influential, such as government management, precludes the possibility of presidential influence in the future.

The manner in which congressional response to presidential influence varied by policy area suggests a third presidential strategy. This analysis found that congressmen respond to presidential wishes by policy area, responding to presidential wishes in some policy areas and
ignoring them in others. Further, congressmen tend to be consistent in their support; that is, once a congressman decides to support the president on a policy area, he will tend to continue that support. In this situation, it is obviously to the president's advantage to identify his congressional supporters in each policy area and tailor his appeal to them.

Congressional Decision-Making

Because of the methodological approach used in this study, a new aspect of congressional decision-making was identified and documented. Even though stability has been established as a general characteristic of congressional voting behavior, congressmen did deviate from their policy position in response to a change in a short-term force. A new finding such as this requires an explanation of the methodology responsible as well as a discussion of the implications of the findings for our present conceptualizations of congressional decision-making.

The methodology in this study was designed to measure congressional behavior in a specific situation, congressional response to a change in a short-term force in the decision-making environment. As a consequence, two techniques were used which differed from previous studies on congressional decision-making. First, a subset of votes, those which concerned the short-term force, were analyzed. In contrast, analyses of congressional voting behavior have usually included either all roll call votes or a representative sample. While this approach has provided information on the general characteristics of congressional decision-making, it has obscured congressional behavior in more specific
situations. When subsets of votes have been analyzed, they have usually been subjectively selected which can bias the results, i.e., roll call votes can be selected to support a variety of interpretations. This problem was avoided in this analysis, however, because the definition of "influence" provided objective criteria for selecting the roll call votes thereby creating a valid measuring instrument and enhancing confidence in the findings. In summary, the image of congressional decision-making which was found by studying a subset of votes differed from the image presented as a result of studying all roll call votes. Therefore, analyzing subsets can provide a more detailed and complete portrait of congressional decision-making.

Second, the methodology in this study was specifically designed to measure congressional response to a change in the environment while previous analyses have tended to measure the influence of stable forces in the environment, such as constituency and party. As discussed earlier, this methodology not only permitted change in congressional voting behavior to be detected, but the study of congressional response to a change in the environment provided new insights into the interaction and influence of several forces in the decision-making environment. Clearly, the study of change can also aid in developing more complete information on congressional decision-making.

While the findings in this study do not contradict established theories, they do have implications for conceptualizations of congressional voting behavior. First, stability in policy positions and voting histories has been observed and achieved the status of an empirically based generalization. However, the generalization should
be modified by recognizing that in response to a change in a short-term force, many congressmen will temporarily deviate from their policy positions.

Second, a major finding of this study was that the variables which explain congressional policy positions do not necessarily influence congressmen to change positions. For example, while constituency influences the policy positions assumed on the international involvement dimension, they do not have an impact on the decisions to deviate from those positions. Therefore, information about stable congressional voting behavior cannot necessarily be used to explain or predict changes in voting behavior.

This pattern of congressional response means that even though there is a relationship between the stable forces in the environment and stable policy positions, this relationship does not necessarily mean that the forces are constraining the congressmen, preventing them from deviating from their policy positions. Because of the lack of systematic studies of congressional response to environmental changes, the extent of congressional freedom in decision-making has not been explored, but the empirical findings in this study suggest that congressional freedom from constraints may be greater than expected.

Congressional responsiveness to a change in the environment casts light on an important question regarding congressional decision-making; does the stability in congressional policy positions reflect stability in the decision-making environment or is the stability an independent personal characteristic of congressmen? Although researchers have been careful to note that stable policy positions may reflect a stable
environment, it has not been possible to determine which interpretation is correct since the studies have used only stable explanatory variables.

Congressional voting stability in response to the decision-making environment has quite different implications than if the stability is an independent personal characteristic of congressmen. One implication is compatible with representation theory, i.e., congressmen are responding to their environment when they maintain stable policy positions. However, a second implication is that of a negative image of intransigent congressmen serenely maintaining policy positions regardless of social and political changes in society. By finding that congressmen respond to changes in the environment, this study has supported the first interpretation—that congressional voting behavior at least partially reflects the decision-making environment.

Congressional willingness to change in response to a change in the environment has implications for the policy-making process in general. The stability in congressional voting behavior when combined with the low rate of turnover (until recently) has made it difficult to explain how domestic policy could change except through the entrance of new members. While the changes in domestic policy are not frequent or dramatic, there are enough changes to create speculation on how they occurred. This study suggests an answer to this puzzle; congressmen can make temporary deviations in their general policy positions without disturbing the general portrait of stability. The temporary deviations can, of course, lead to modifications in existing policy or the creation of new policy.
Presidential-Congressional Relations

The new aspects of congressional behavior uncovered by this study reflect on general conceptualizations of the presidential-congressional relationship. Actually, congressional response to presidential influence indicated that congressional decision-making resembles other aspects of presidential-congressional relations. As discussed in Chapter One, Neustadt's conceptualization of the presidential-congressional relationship as "separated institutions sharing powers" is appropriate for most of the policy process. But empirical studies in the past indicated that this concept did not apply to congressional decision-making; when making voting decisions on domestic policy, congressmen were found to be independent from presidential wishes and, therefore, power was not shared. Since the voting patterns uncovered in this study indicate that congressmen do consider presidential needs and wishes when making voting decisions, Neustadt's conceptualization is appropriate; power is also shared in this portion of the policy process.

The findings in this study cast light on a second controversy regarding presidential-congressional relations. There has been an emphasis upon the conflict between the two branches, particularly congressional tendency to deny the president the support he needs to implement popularly-mandated programs. That conflict exists cannot be doubted. In fact, the Constitution contains provisions, such as creating different constituencies and staggering the terms of office, that promote conflict. However, congressional response to presidential influence suggests that the conflict image should be modified since
congressional collaboration with the president must result from voluntary cooperation on the part of congressmen; there are few sanctions a president can use to elicit congressional response. Further, a cooperative relationship between the president and Congress was reflected in the high percentage of roll call votes (approximately two-thirds on each dimension) on which the president and Congress agreed on the outcome; i.e., congressional actions concurred with the president's public stand on a bill. Thus while there is conflict between the two branches, the cooperative aspect of the relationship should also be recognized.

Because presidential-congressional relations affect both domestic and foreign policy, the topic is naturally of interest to political scientists. But the value of reaching an accurate assessment of this relationship extends beyond the field of political science. In recent times the presidential literature and media have tended to stress the theme of presidential power and, as a consequence, public expectations of presidential performance are quite high. These expectations have often led to disillusionment and cynicism; presidents are censured for failing to impose their will on Congress while Congress is criticized for performing its constitutional duty, acting as an independent decision-making branch of the government.

While this study has analyzed congressional-presidential relations, the influential role played by the bureaucracy, including the relationship between Congress and the bureaucracy, in the public policy process should not be overlooked. Further, congressional decision-making reflects a small portion of congressional-presidential relationship.
The policy process is a long one, and the president and Congress interact at most stages of the process with varying degrees of influence and cooperation.

Despite these limitations, this research has suggested that a realistic image of interbranch relations should include the recognition that both Congress and the president pursue their policy-making responsibilities among myriad conflicting demands and responsibilities to a variety of constituents in a wide-range of circumstances. Only one of these demands and responsibilities is to each other, and this research has found that despite the complex pressures, the two branches of government do manage to cooperate and support one another on many policy issues. To expect anything else may be unrealistic and lead to cynicism.
FOOTNOTES

BIBLIOGRAPHY


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