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DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
Susan Mary Smith, B.A., M.A.

* * * *

The Ohio State University
1978

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To my parents

and

To Bernie

a real teacher and friend
VITA

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

...our chief duty consists, according to the profound saying of the Greek poet, Pindar, in becoming who we are, nothing is more important for each of us, or more difficult, than to become a man. Thus the chief task of education is above all to shape man, or to guide the evolving dynamism through which man forms himself as a man.\(^1\)

Man is a unit: his thinking, feeling, and his practice of life are inseparably connected.\(^2\)

History is a kind of ecology which says that ideas and inventions must blend in with the history of a people or things go wrong.\(^3\)

...man is the center and purpose of his life; ...the growth and realization of man's individuality is an end that can never be subordinated to purposes which are supposed to have greater dignity.\(^4\)

Modern man seems to equate freedom with lack of commitment. We pride ourselves in "doing our own thing," and not being "tied down." We believe that by throwing off external constraints--Church, family, repressive laws, etc.--we are


\(^3\)Bernard Mehl, *Classic Educational Ideas* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1972), p. 3.

automatically free. And yet, there is the deep realization—during some unguarded moment—that we really don't have our own thing to do. We come to the realization that our society is "one-dimensional" and "our thing" in reality is "everybody else's thing."

Erich Fromm has dealt with the qualitative aspects of freedom. As modern men we forget:

...that we not only have to preserve and increase the traditional freedom, but that we have to gain a new kind of freedom, one which enables us to realize our own individual self, to have faith in this self and in life.5

Modern man seems to have concentrated on the quantitative aspects of freedom—"freedom from,"—ridding ourselves of external constraints. While "freedom from" is important, it does not automatically lead to "freedom to"—qualitative freedom. Fromm's thesis is that modern man, though he has freed himself from the "bonds of pre-individualistic society,"6 has not gained freedom in a positive sense. In losing the constraints of that "pre-individualistic society," we also lost the security of that society. Modern man is now faced with feelings of powerlessness and isolation and to escape from these feelings he enters into new dependencies instead of gaining freedom in the "positive sense of the realization of his individual self;

5Ibid., p. 126.
6Ibid., p. viii.
that is, the expression of his intellectual, emotional and sensuous potentialities."\(^7\)

This study, in dealing with education, takes the stance that education, as Maritain says above, conceived as the shaping and guiding of "the evolving dynamism through which man forms himself as a man,"\(^8\) is necessarily related to freedom in that positive sense expressed by Fromm. We believe that schools can and do make sense out of the absurd in the modern world. We believe that man must be central in any philosophy of education or society and that all educational and societal schemes should be judged on that score. As Mehl says:

...schools, like the Church, will remain, simply because they can provide sanctity and sanity to our age. To paraphrase Dostoevsky, "If faith in education is dead, than all is possible."\(^9\)

To provide sanctity and sanity in a world devoted to technology and behavioral science is a profoundly difficult task. It demands:

...a deep sense of commitment to teaching and learning and a love of that history which is the harbinger of ambiguity necessary to the continuation of a foolish human condition which stops short of perfection.\(^10\)

This study will involve an historical-philosophical mode of inquiry into one of the most crucial and persistent problems

\(^7\)Ibid.

\(^8\)Maritain, *Education At The Crossroads*, 1.


\(^10\)Ibid., p. 2.
in the foundations of educational theory and practice—namely
the confrontation between a humanistic alternative and the
increasingly technological pressures on society and schooling.

The study, "The Emerging Capitalistic Society: A Source
for Technocracy," will first explore, through the works of
Max Weber and Erich Fromm, the early development of capitalism
as a source of modern alienation and fragmentation. It will
then examine the aspects of "freedom from" vs. "freedom to"
and the subordination of man's central position to "suprapersonal
forces."

This will be followed by a theoretical examination of
modern technocratic society through the works of selected
social critics: Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Habermas, and Jacques
Ellul. Returning to the Greek conception of "the good man in
the good society," we will examine the transition of politics
from "praxis" to "techne--the expert mastery of objectified
tasks." This analysis will call for a "critical theory" of
society as opposed to mere submission to the "objective
exigencies" of modern technocratic society.

We will then present a view of "education as an art"
whose primary aim is "the making of a man." We will examine
the works of Jacques Maritain, Robert M. Hutchins, Gilbert

11 Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice (Boston: Beacon
Highet, Jacques Barzun, and Maxine Greene, which embody this philosophy. We believe that this humanistic approach to education contributes to "positive freedom."

Following this view of education as an art is the presentation of another view—education as a science. Using as a base, the work of Raymond E. Callahan,¹² who explored the application to education of the scientific management movement in the early part of this century, we will proceed to an examination of the current educational accountability movement. We see this current movement as another manifestation of the attempt to scientize education.

Finally, we will draw some general conclusions about the role educators can take towards humanistic education in the technocratic atmosphere of the last two decades of the twentieth century.

To better understand the significance of technique in modern society, it is useful to return to the past and examine the transition from pre-capitalistic to capitalistic society. Erich Fromm, in *Escape from Freedom*, offers one of the most comprehensive psychological analyses available of that transition and its significance. One can, of course, also consider Max Weber's classic, *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism*.

We characterize pre-capitalistic society as a "dark" period lacking in personal freedom for the majority who were ruled by a small group of elite. A person was born into a certain social order and was unable to move out of that order. The lack of individual freedom extended even to matters of dress and geographic mobility. Nevertheless, a person had an identity--a place in society--from the moment of birth. This identity brought security and a sense of belonging. The problems of life were solved in the light of tradition and through the overarching authority of the Catholic Church. As Fromm points out:
But within the limits of his social sphere the individual actually had much freedom to express his self in his work and in his emotional life. Although there was no individualism in the modern sense of the unrestricted choice between many possible ways of life (a freedom of choice which is largely abstract), there was a great deal of concrete individualism in real life.¹

Fromm says that although there was much pain and suffering, the Church made it tolerable by attributing it to original and personal sin and at the same time offering unconditional love and forgiveness.² The spirit of Catholic theology was basically different from what was to come with the Reformation. The Church held that the nature of man was innately good, even though it had been corrupted by original sin. Man had free will and could strive for his own salvation; he could be saved from sin through the merits of Christ’s death through the sacraments of the Church. Weber characterizes the Catholic Church as “punishing the heretic, but indulgent to the sinner.”³ This belief in man’s dignity, free will and the efficacy of efforts toward salvation, made for a relationship with God (and the world) based more on love and confidence than on doubt and fear. Weber calls attention to “the very human Catholic cycle of sin,

¹Fromm, Escape From Freedom, 58.
²Ibid., p. 58-59.
repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin.\textsuperscript{4} Sin was understood as human frailty which could be forgiven. There had not yet developed an awareness of or a concern with individual freedom since man did not conceive of himself as an entity outside of his social group.

Under the structure of medieval society, guilds controlled economic activity by enforcing co-operation among members, controlling standards and practices. Ethics pervaded economic activity as expressed in Church and secular law. Tawney cites two basic assumptions of medieval economic life:

That economic interests are subordinate to the real business of life, which is salvation, and that economic conduct is one aspect of personal conduct, upon which as on other parts of it, the rules of morality are binding.\textsuperscript{5}

Economic activity was related to a moral end and there were constant warnings against avarice and against allowing economic interests to interfere with the real business of life.

In the late Middle Ages vast economic changes were underway. Even as early as the fourteenth century, the strong traditions maintained by the guilds began to yield to the pressures of monopoly. By the fifteenth century, commerce had developed into a national and international business and monopolies developed more and more power. With the breakdown

\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., p. 117.

of feudal society, capital, initiative, and competition became important. The role of capital assumed greater importance and it was possible for the monetary benefits of industry to accrue to those who did no work. The traditional way of life was threatened; man began to move out of his family, his village, and his social structure. For some, a cosmopolitan spirit began to take hold. New possibilities existed as the birth of capitalism brought into being a new class of wealthy nobles and burghers—a class possessed of new sensibilities towards freedom and individuality, but also possessed of new sensibilities towards aloneness. The structure and stability of human relationships changed with the changes in the economic order. Competition and success required that human beings be manipulated by other human beings. The effect of this thrust was a new view of individuality.

Fromm says that the situation was different for each class. The land of the peasants became more and more subject to dues and taxes, thus decreasing their economic freedom. In addition to this economic exploitation, they were losing their traditional rights and privileges. Of course, some fled to the cities, but:

It was also the policy of many cities to refuse civic rights to the peasants who constantly flocked to the towns, and thus a real class of non-possessors was created.6

The urban poor, workers and apprentices, experienced more exploitation and poverty and felt much the same desperation as the peasants. These two groups were in a revolutionary mood and Luther's teaching gave them hope because he attacked authority. However, in Luther's view, these groups were too revolutionary, threatening to destroy the social order. Fromm says that Luther had "hatred and contempt for the powerless masses, the 'rabble,' especially when they went beyond certain limits in their revolutionary attempts."  

As we shall see, Luther's theology more nearly met the needs of the middle class. In theory, rising capitalism presented them with opportunities to better their lot through independence and initiative; in practice, however, capitalism was more of a threat to them. The middle class did have some rights and some economic security under the old feudal order—something to protect. They saw the rural and urban poor clamoring for better conditions; this was a threat. On the other hand, the middle class resented the wealth and power of the upper classes, the Church included, and felt exploited by them. Indeed, the middle class was caught in the middle.

Fromm points to changes in the psychological atmosphere as capitalism developed:

A spirit of restlessness began to pervade life toward the end of the Middle Ages. The concept of time in the modern sense began to develop. Minutes became valuable.  

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8 Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom, 76.
Clocks were installed in larger cities, striking at fifteen minute intervals. Time became increasingly important. Work was beginning to become an end in itself and "efficiency assumed the role of one of the highest moral virtues." The medieval social system was destroyed and social classes were in a state of flux. "The individual was left alone; everything depended on his own effort, not on the security of his traditional status." In order to be economically successful one needed capital. Fromm calls it a "suprapersonal" force. Instead of money serving the needs of man, there was a reversal and capital became a master. As markets expanded, demand became less predictable. Competition reigned where co-operation had previously been the rule.

Fromm cautions us not to lose sight of the positive side of the picture of capitalistic expansion. It did free the individual from his fixed place in the medieval social and economic order and allowed him to better his position through individual effort and risk. Money took over where birth and caste left off. However, the security and sense of belonging once provided by the traditional order were gone and the feelings of insecurity and powerlessness and aloneness took over. Since the new freedom was a reality only if one had the capital

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9Ibid.
10Ibid., p. 77.
11Ibid., pp. 79-81.
to put that freedom into action, "only the most successful class of society profited from rising capitalism to an extent which gave them real wealth and power."\textsuperscript{12}

It is into this changing world that Protestantism makes its entry. Martin Luther's system reflected the situation of the middle class caught between the forces of tradition and rising capitalism. Luther's doctrine differed from Catholic doctrine in that he believed in the subjective individual experience of faith, while the Catholic approached God through the Church. For example, Luther stressed individual interpretation of Scripture. In one sense, this represented an emancipation from Church authority, an affirmation of individual freedom. On the other hand, the individual was left alone and powerless; he could expect nothing from an authority.

Luther assumed the existence of an innate evilness in man's nature, which directs his will for evil and makes it impossible for any man to perform any good deed on the basis of his nature. Man has an evil and vicious nature. The depravity of man's nature and its complete lack of freedom to choose the right is one of the fundamental concepts of Luther's whole thinking.\textsuperscript{13}

This belief in one's own depravity and powerlessness to do good was a necessity in order to receive grace. Luther believed that only if one humiliated himself, giving up pride and will, would God's grace come to him. Thus by becoming powerless before God, God would save him—save him "...as the result

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 119.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 93.
of an incomprehensible act of justice."\(^{14}\)

The feeling of powerlessness before God reflected the middle class feeling of powerlessness in regard to the new economic order. Luther's conviction that the relationship with God must be one of total submission, in the hope that God might deign to save him, prepared the individual...to accept a role in which his life became a means to purposes outside of himself, those of economic productivity and accumulation of capital...his emphasis on the nothingness of the individual...paved the way for a development in which man not only was to obey secular authorities but had to subordinate his life to the ends of economic achievements.\(^{15}\)

According to Fromm, intense doubt was characteristic of Luther's personality. He believed that man could have certainty of salvation if he had faith. This certainty came in an "indubitable subjective experience."\(^{16}\) Ideally this certainty would silence the doubt, but Fromm characterizes Luther's doubt as "irrational."

This irrational doubt can never be cured by rational answers, it can only disappear if the individual becomes an integral part of a meaningful world. If this does not happen, as it did not happen with Luther and the middle class which he represented, the doubt can only be silenced, driven underground, so to speak, and this can be done by some formula which promises absolute certainty. The compulsive quest for certainty, as we find with Luther, is not the expression of genuine faith but is rooted in the need to conquer the unbearable

\(^{14}\)Ibid., p. 95.

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p. 103.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 95.
doubt. Luther's solution... (was to become) an instrument in the hands of an overwhelmingly strong power outside of the individual.17

As Weber cautions us, and as we can see from Fromm's analysis, capitalism was not a creation of the Reformation. The forces of capitalism were well underway before Luther wielded any influence. The ideas of Luther and Calvin were not isolated ideas which took hold out of the blue.

They appealed to needs and anxieties that were present in the character structure of the people to whom they were addressed. In other words, ideas can become powerful forces, but only to the extent to which they are answers to specific human needs prominent in a given social character.18 Protestantism found acceptance in this group of people who felt frightened and isolated because of the flux in the social and economic order.

The central point of Weber's analysis is the ethos of capitalism. Making money became a "standard of life claiming ethical sanction."19 As noted above, capitalism did exist in the classical world and in the Middle Ages, but "in all of these cases... this particular ethos was lacking."20 "Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the ultimate purpose

17 Ibid., pp. 96-97.
18 Ibid., p. 308.
20 Ibid., p. 52.
of his life."\textsuperscript{21} Making money became a felt obligation. In order for capitalism to take hold and become a way of life, it was not enough for just a few to feel this sense of obligation, but it had to become a "way of life common to whole groups of men."\textsuperscript{22} In order to establish this way of life,

The most important opponent with which the spirit of capitalism, in the sense of a definite standard of life claiming ethical sanction, has had to struggle, was that type of attitude and reaction to new situations which we may designate as traditionalism.\textsuperscript{23}

So although Weber was well aware that capitalism was not a creation of the Reformation, he fully realized that the Reformation played a role in the proliferation of that capitalistic spirit.

We want to ascertain whether and to what extent religious forces have taken part in that qualitative formation and the quantitative expansion of the spirit over the world. Furthermore, what concrete aspects of our capitalistic culture can be traced to them.\textsuperscript{24}

In order to analyze the relationship between religious forces and capitalism, Weber starts with the idea of a "calling," the German word "Beruf" which in a religious sense suggests "a task set by God."\textsuperscript{25} The word "calling" takes on new meaning

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 53.
\textsuperscript{22}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 58-59.
\textsuperscript{24}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 91.
\textsuperscript{25}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 79.
with the Reformation.

In contrasting the views of Luther and John Calvin, Weber followed the changes in Luther's conception of the "calling." He first held a view similar to that of Thomas Aquinas in that worldly activity was a necessity but morally neutral. Like eating or drinking, its good or evil depended on the importance placed in it and in the way it was actually executed. As time passed, Luther increasingly viewed monastic life as:

...not only quite devoid of value as a means of justification before God, but he also looks upon its renunciation of the duties of this world as the product of selfishness, withdrawing from temporal obligations. In contrast, labour in a calling appears to him as the outward expression of brotherly love... (The importance of calling increased for Luther until) the fulfilment of worldly duties is under all circumstances the only way to live acceptably to God.26

In this move from monastic asceticism to worldly asceticism, worldly activity was morally justified. Weber considers this moral justification "one of the most important results of the Reformation."27

Another idea important to the development of the spirit of capitalism is that every "legitimate calling has exactly the same worth in the sight of God."28 Therefore, in waiting for the second coming of the Lord, one should remain in the calling in which God had placed him. One had to accept his calling as divine providence instead of trying to change the

26 Ibid., p. 81.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
inevitable. It became a religious duty to persevere in the work which God had assigned. Of course, this rationalized the various social and economic classes of society. Indeed, every calling was legitimate, but if more wealth or status accrued to certain callings, that too was part of the divine plan. As we shall see, material success came to be viewed as evidence of membership in the elect.

Weber is careful not to unduly attribute motivations to Luther and points out that Luther would have abhorred any connection with capitalistic expansion. His prime motivation was spiritual. Nevertheless, his conception of the "calling" paves the way for other interpretations in different Protestant churches. Weber thus turns his analysis to Calvinism and other Puritan sects but again cautions:

It is not to be understood that we expect to find any of the founders or representatives of these religious movements considering the promotion of what we have called the spirit of capitalism as in any sense the end of his life work. ...The salvation of the soul and that alone was the centre of their life and work. ...We shall thus have to admit that the cultural consequences of the Reformation were to a great extent...unforeseen and even unwished for results of the labours of the Reformers.29

As Weber cautioned earlier that capitalism was not a creation of the Reformation, he now warns us not to make the reverse assumption that the Reformation was a "historically necessary

29Ibid., pp. 89-90.
result, from certain economic changes."

Countless historical circumstances which cannot be reduced to any economic law, and are not susceptible of economic explanation of any sort, especially purely political processes, had to concur in order that the newly created Churches should survive at all.30

Weber classified predestination as the most characteristic dogma of Calvinism and very significant in terms of "cultural and historical consequences."31 Luther also believed that "God's secret decree was...the sole and ultimate source of his state of religious grace,"32 but as time passed predestination assumed less and less importance for him. His colleague, Melancthon quite deliberately avoided adopting the dark and dangerous teaching in the Augsburg Confession, and for the Church fathers of Lutheranism it was an article of faith that grace was revocable and could be won again by penitent humility and faithful trust in the word of God and in the sacraments.33

For Calvin, the process was the exact opposite; throughout his life, the significance of predestination increased. Men existed for the sake of God and in the divine plan some are saved and some are damned. There is absolutely no way to influence that destiny.

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30 Ibid., p. 91.
31 Ibid., p. 99.
32 Ibid., p. 102.
33 Ibid.
To assume that human merit or guilt play a part in determining this destiny would be to think of God's absolutely free decrees, which have been settled from eternity, as subject to change by human influence, an impossible contradiction.34

This inhuman doctrine meant that for the man of the Reformation—for whom salvation was the most important thing—he was alone with no help from God, from the clergy, from his fellow man. Even sacraments and religious ceremony were rejected as magic and superstition. This accounts for the Puritan rejection of

...sensuous culture of all kinds. On the other hand, it forms one of the roots of that disillusioned and pessimistically inclined individualism which can even to-day be identified in the national characters of the institutions of the peoples with a Puritan past, in such a striking contrast to the quite different spectacles through which the Enlightenment later looked upon men.35

There seems to be a contradiction in that the Calvinist was totally alone in regard to salvation and yet membership in the Church was necessary. Social organization was extremely important:

The Calvinist was fascinated by the idea that God in creating the world, including the order of society, must have willed things to be objectively purposeful as a means of adding to His glory; not the flesh for its own sake, but the organization of the things of the flesh under His will. The active energies of the elect, liberated by the doctrine of predestination, thus flowed into the struggle to rationalize the world.36

34 Ibid., p. 103.
35 Ibid., pp. 105-106.
36 Ibid., p. 224.
The outcome of this struggle to rationalize the world through intense activity was a group of "self-confident saints." After all, it was one's duty to dispel doubts about one's salvation and come to certainty through good works. Good works, of course, did not change one's predestined fate one iota, but it did divert one's mind from the horrible insecurity of not knowing.

For Calvin, as for Luther, monastic asceticism moved out of the monastery and into the world. Weber characterizes the rule of St. Benedict, the monks of Cluny, the Cistercians and the Jesuits as a system to overcome irrational impulses and the weaknesses of nature.

This active self-control, which formed the end of the exercitia of St. Ignatius and of the rational monastic virtues everywhere, was also the most important practical ideal of Puritanism.

The monk and the Puritan had to be constantly on guard against emotionalism; there was no room for spontaneity or impulse. The difference in monastic and Puritan asceticism was not the theory but the theater. Even in matters of sex, the ascetic principle was the same as that of the monastery; the difference was in degree since the Puritan believed in "increase and multiply." The Puritan moved asceticism to the world through his "calling." Instead of moving him away from the world to the

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37 Ibid., p. 112.
38 Ibid., p. 119.
cloister, his spiritual drives pushed him into the world to fulfill his duty. "The God of Calvinism demanded of his believers not single good works, but a life of good works combined into a unified system." 39

Since Luther did not reject the idea of grace and the regaining of it through penitent contrition, there never developed for Lutheranism that rational ordering of moral life so typical of Calvinism. Thus, since grace could be regained, there was room for spontaneity and emotion for the Lutheran.

The idea of God as a statistician may not have started with Calvinism, but it was certainly very much alive in the Puritan world. The methodical process of sanctifying life had the characteristics of a business. This rationality pervaded all of life and it came to be viewed as God's plan—a world of objectively purposeful activity, populated with workers totally dedicated to their "calling" to that activity. There developed an internal compulsion to work which is much more efficient than external coercion. Man substituted external controls with the internal controls of his own conscience. What a perfect breeding ground for an incipient capitalism!

Weber calls the movement of Pietism in continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon movement of Methodism secondary in terms of historical significance. In its extreme, Pietism was characterized

39 Ibid., p. 117.
by a hysterical emotionalism marking the presence of God in the soul. But when the rational and ascetic in Pietism ruled, the methodical development of the state of grace through good works similar to the approach of Calvinism was essential to Pietism. This rationalization of life, of course, was tempered to a certain degree by the emotionalism of Pietism and the need to feel the presence of God. Weber concludes that as far as practical differences:

...we may say that the virtues favoured by Pietism were more those on the one hand of the faithful official, clerk, labourer, or domestic worker, and on the other of the predominantly patriarchal employer with a pious condescension. Calvinism, in comparison, appears to be more closely related to the hard legalism and the active enterprise of bourgeois-capitalistic entrepreneurs.40

Methodism too combined emotionalism and asceticism. Emotion was a necessity to "rebirth...a pure feeling of absolute certainty of forgiveness, derived immediately from the testimony of the spirit, the coming of which could be definitely placed to the hour."41 After rebirth, the reborn should be free from the power of sin. This was followed not by a life of resting on one's laurels, but by a life of rational conduct exemplified by labor in a calling. Weber says Methodism added nothing new to the idea of calling.

40 Ibid., p. 139.
41 Ibid., p. 140.
The Baptist sects, including Mennonites and Quakers were an additional source of Protestant asceticism. For the Baptists, salvation came not through work in the world, but through individual revelation and "taking spiritual possession of His gift of salvation."\(^2\) This was offered to everyone, but one had to avoid sinful attachments so as to be ready when the Spirit was offered. Revelation—the inner light—was a continual process of the Holy Spirit speaking directly to anyone willing to hear. The Bible, therefore, was no longer a sole authority.

The Baptist denominations along with the predestinationists, especially the strict Calvinists, carried out the most radical devaluation of all sacraments as means to salvation, and thus accomplished the religious rationalization of the world in its most extreme form. Only the inner light of continual revelation could enable one truly to understand even the Biblical revelation of God.\(^3\)

In the process of silent waiting, impulse and irrationality were to be overcome. With the elimination of magic from the world, asceticism resulted, "...the strict morality of the Baptists had turned in practice into the path prepared by the Calvinistic ethic."\(^4\)

\(^{42}\)Ibid., p. 145.
\(^{43}\)Ibid., p. 147.
\(^{44}\)Ibid., p. 149.
Weber relies in his last chapter, on the writings of Richard Baxter, a Presbyterian minister and an apologist of the Westminster Synod—"one of the most successful ministers known to history," to further probe the connection between Protestantism and the economic spirit. Baxter's writings stressed the value of time and the waste of it was considered a deadly sin. Sociability, luxury, too much sleep, etc. were not acceptable "because every hour lost is lost to labour for the glory of God." Therefore, hard physical or mental labor was the only acceptable course of action. Even contemplation was unacceptable—especially if it kept one from labor. For Baxter and his followers, sexual matters took on an air of monastic asceticism. For sexual temptations, "a moderate vegetable diet and cold baths and...'work hard in your calling,'" were the prescriptions.

St. Paul said: "he who will not work shall not eat," and Baxter held to this literally. Even the wealthy were not exempt from labor. Labor must not be haphazard, but must be directed through a calling:

...outside of a well-marked calling the accomplishments of a man are only casual and irregular and he spends more time in idleness than at work.

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45 Ibid., p. 156.
46 Ibid., p. 158.
47 Ibid., p. 159.
48 Ibid., p. 161.
Labor in a calling led to the common good because it allowed for development of skill in one's occupation and therefore to more and better production for the community. But private profit also resulted from labor in a calling. If God showed one laboring in a calling how to make a profit and he refused, he refused to be God's steward. Wealth was bad only if it led to idleness and sinful enjoyment. Otherwise, it was viewed as the natural result of labor in a calling—a sign of membership in the elect. In addition, the elect were to be thankful for their "own perfection by the grace of God." 49

As we have seen, the result of this rationalization of all of life, was the elimination of spontaneous enjoyment and impulse which were viewed as contradictory to rational asceticism. This, of course, was in direct contrast to "Merrie Old England," which represented an "unspoiled naive joy of life." Weber says that the national character of England today combines the above with the Puritan "strictly regulated, reserved self-control, and conventional ethical conduct." 50 Puritanism attempted to eliminate

superfluities and vain ostentation...in favor of sober utility. That powerful tendency toward uniformity of life, which to-day so immensely aids the capitalistic interest in the standardization of production, had its ideal foundations in the repudiation of all idolatry of the flesh. 51

49 Ibid., p. 166.
50 Ibid., p. 173.
51 Ibid., p. 169.
Since the Puritan regarded his material wealth as a divine gift, he had to account for all of it and ensure that it was used only for God's purposes and not for frivolous enjoyment. The greater the wealth, the heavier the burden.

On the other hand, they approved the rational and utilitarian uses of wealth which were willed by God for the needs of the individual and the community...they set the clean and solid comfort of the middle class home as an ideal.  

The point important here for the development of capitalism is that this restriction of consumption combined with continuous, hard labor resulted in accumulation of capital and the ability to "plowback" capital into the business or industry. The Puritan outlook "favoured the development of a rational bourgeois economic life."  

But with the accumulation of material wealth, temptations develop. John Wesley realized the paradoxical relationship between asceticism and wealth. Religion, according to him, produces industry and frugality, therefore riches. With riches come pride, anger, desires of the flesh, etc., so that the spirit of religion is gone while only the form remains. Wesley concluded:

We ought not to prevent people from being diligent and frugal; we must exhort all Christians to gain all they can, and to save all they can; that is, in effect to grow rich.

Wesley advised his followers to be generous to others and grow in grace and store up a heavenly treasure in addition to their

52Ibid., p. 171.
53Ibid., p. 174.
54Ibid., p. 175.
earthly riches. A good conscience was important to those visibly blessed.

What the great religious epoch of the seventeenth century bequeathed to its utilitarian successor was, however, above all an amazingly good, we may even say a pharasaically good, conscience in the acquisition of money, so long as it took place legally. ...A specifically bourgeois economic ethic had grown up. ...Finally, it gave him the comforting assurance that the unequal distribution of the goods of this world was a special dispensation of Divine Providence.55

In addition there had developed the theory of the productivity of low wages— that "the mass of men only labour when necessity forces them to do so."56 Calvin believed that the masses remained obedient to God only so long as they were poor. Some believed that it was God's plan that many should remain poor because they would be drawn away from Him by wealth. These attitudes supported and legitimized the exploitation of the mass of laborers so important to the development of capitalism. The employer viewed his manipulation of laborers as his calling and his task was made easy by the attitude of the submissive worker toward his own calling.

The internal compulsion to work was crucial for the development of capitalism. Fromm ranks it with the development of steam and electrical power. As Fromm and Weber both show, the medieval idea of working only to maintain one's traditional

55Ibid., pp. 176-177.
56Ibid., p. 177.
standard of living, of allowing time for "nobler" occupations, was replaced by relentless work for its own sake. There was no concern that "all work and no play made for dull Puritans;" that was the view of life.

Nevertheless, Fromm believes that man's emotional and sensual needs cannot be repressed without eruptions of some sort. Hostility and resentment developed in the middle class, but could not be expressed. Hence, it pervaded the whole personality as exemplified by Luther and Calvin who "belong to the ranks of the greatest haters among the leading figures of history, certainly among religious leaders." The God of the Reformation was a projection of that hostility and resentment, a despotic, exacting God who demanded total subjection and humiliation.

Thus Luther and Calvin psychologically prepared man for the role which he had to assume in modern society: of feeling his own self to be insignificant and of being ready to subordinate his life exclusively for purposes which were not his own.

The Continued Effect of the Spirit of Capitalism

Having established through the works of Max Weber and Erich Fromm, the background for the growth of the spirit of capitalism, the task remains to trace the continued effect of that spirit on man. We have seen briefly how economic,

57Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom, 115.
58Ibid., p. 131.
social and religious forces affected man from the Middle Ages through the Reformation. It is Fromm's thesis that the development begun through the Reformation and the early growth of capitalism has continued in that same direction. Bernard Mehl draws a parallel between the time of the Reformation and today:

The modern world is at a point in history similar to the time of the Reformation. Great riches, leisure, culture and learning abound, and modern man feels lost and alienated. In the Middle Ages, immortality was in the hand of the Church, which gave it control of a large hunk of European capital and landed wealth. Today insurance companies have become the grantors of immortality, and they are in the process of owning a large hunk of American land and capital. Modern man buys indulgences by contributing to the development funds of large universities and large research centers and huge hospitals. An entrenched intelligensia is living better and higher and further away from ordinary people. Temples of learning provide high salaries for personnel who claim to aid mankind, but who garner a larger share of the communities' wealth and status and return little to that community. Technocracy reigns supreme.59

The domination of man and nature in the modern technological world is a wide and recurrent theme of the works of sociologists, psychologists, theologians, political and educational theorists. Analysis of that literature clearly demonstrates that modern, manipulated, alienated man has irrevocably lost touch with all that constitutes "humanity" in the best sense of that word and has become a cog in the modern machine.

59 Bernard Mehl, Classical Educational Ideas, 212-213.
The focus of this research is technocracy as it affects late twentieth century man and especially its effects on education. We will therefore examine what selected critics of modern society have written about technocracy and its effects on man. However, before turning to that task, it would be useful to stop and briefly recognize the positive aspects of the Reformation and the growth of capitalistic society. It is easy to romanticize the past, to sing the praises of pre-industrial society, to wish for a return to the "good old days." But given the choice, none of us would opt to return to the "good old days." We like the freedoms and comforts of the modern age—our climate controlled homes and cars, our higher standard of living, our better medical care, our educational opportunities, our increased leisure, our items of conspicuous consumption. We don't want to return to the days of sweatshops and child labor, to the lower standard of living, to the limitations of caste and religious controls, and to higher death rates. (Of course, one must also remember that these undreamed of advantages are not available to everyone and vast pockets of poverty remain in the shadows of affluence.)

Nevertheless, while recognizing our modern advantages, comforts, and freedoms, we must also ask what we have lost in the process. By breaking the chains of previous economic, religious, and social controls, have we gained freedom in a positive sense? We must ask, as Herbert Marcuse asks, whether the greater capabilities of modern society contribute to human life worth living and the alleviation of "man's struggle for
existence," or a merely expanded societal control of the individual. Does modern technological society preserve and foster freedom or only the illusion of freedom through the manipulation of false needs and the satisfaction of those needs. A totalitarian society does not have to be a terroristic society; indeed internalization of societal goals by individuals, as seen in relation to the development of capitalism, is much more efficient.

The Protestant Reformation did free man from external religious authorities. At the same time, the growth of capitalism opened up the fixed social and economic constraints and made it possible, for the middle class especially, to strive to better themselves on their own merits. In addition to the positive aspects of the Reformation and the growth of capitalism, the emphasis on individualism and self-reliance, the belief in predestination and the idea of total submission to God, gave man an unprecedented feeling of insignificance and aloneness. As Weber and Fromm have shown, these feelings on a spiritual level prepared man for "the individualistic character of man's secular activities." Man increasingly began to submit to purposes outside of himself; capital and the rational order of things became his master. As Marcuse sees it, we

60Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. x.

61Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom, 129.
...alter the base of domination by gradually replacing personal dependence (of the slave on the master, the serf on the lord of the manor, the lord on the donor of the fief, etc.) with dependence on the "objective order of things" on economic laws, the market etc.).

The idea that we have not gained freedom in a positive sense by throwing off past constraints, may seem contradictory on the surface. We believe that by throwing off external constraints we automatically realize freedom. However, we fail to examine the internal aspects of freedom. Fromm differentiates between "freedom from" and "freedom to." In freeing ourselves from traditional external restraints, we forget the qualitative aspect of freedom:

...that we not only have to preserve and increase the traditional freedom, but that we have to gain a new kind of freedom, one which enables us to realize our own individual self, to have faith in this self and in life.

This positive freedom requires that society give a central place to man and to the growth and realization of individuality. It implies our unwillingness to subordinate man's central position to other ends. As we will see, our selected critics also operate on the premise that man's position should be central in society.

The forces of the Reformation and of capitalism did, of course, free man from traditional bonds and in that sense also

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62 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 144.

63 Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom, 126.
contributed to freedom to, as realization of the individual self. However, these forces also severed ties between individuals, stressed individualistic activity, set man up for manipulation in the sense of making him a means to ends outside himself, and led to a "self negation and asceticism." Indeed, capitalism operates on the "Invisible Hand" theory that each individual, by pursuing his own interests, will unconsciously contribute to the welfare of society.

How can we reconcile the fact that objectively he (modern man) became a servant to ends which were not his, and yet that subjectively he believed himself to be motivated by his self-interest? While it would seem that modern man's selfishness rules out self negation and asceticism and submission to forces outside of oneself, Fromm shows that "selfishness is rooted in the very lack of fondness for oneself." Lacking security and satisfaction, modern man must be greedy and concentrate on self.

Modern selfishness is the greed that is rooted in the frustration of the real self and whose object is the social self. While modern man seems to be characterized by utmost assertion of the self, actually his self has been weakened and reduced to a segment of the total self--intellect and will power--to the exclusion of all other parts of the total personality.

64Ibid., p. 130.
65Ibid., pp. 133-134.
66Ibid., p. 136.
While on the one hand we've achieved tremendous mastery of nature, on the other hand we've lost control of social aspects of life; we've built a world which has become our master. We've lost touch with ourselves and others. We use or "employ" other human beings; we feel used ourselves; we've been reduced to selling our labor--or our "personality"--the "package." We measure worth as market value and conform our total "package" to the market demand. We look to society to tell us what we are--instead of searching our inner selves. The "package" demands that we produce the right image through the right clothing, possessions, hairstyles, cars, mannerisms, speech etc. We conform to the image of the slick magazines and advertising hypes; the closer we conform, the more we "have it together." All of this seems to "dull the capacity for critical thinking." As pointed out earlier, this tendency toward uniformity of life was a tremendous aid to standardization of production; it is still important today.

Keeping in mind the above analysis of the historical development of the spirit of capitalistic society and the changes brought about in social, economic and religious life through capitalism and the Protestant Reformation, we now turn to a theoretical examination of modern technocratic society through the eyes of several social critics. We will examine

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68 Ibid., p. 150.
the continued struggle against traditionalism, the continuation of man's submission to forces outside of himself, and the continued "rationalization" of all of life.
CHAPTER III
CRITICS IDENTIFY THE TECHNOLOGICAL DILEMMA

Modern technocratic society and the aspects of that society reflected in education, owe much to the historical movement called logical positivism. One can refer to many sources for a history of the positivist movement and an explication of its characteristics. Herbert Marcuse traces it to Saint-Simon.¹ Martin, Overholt and Urban, in their critique of the accountability movement in American education growing out of positivism, point to Auguste Comte and Ernst Mach as proponents of nineteenth century positivism, and to the "Oxford School" of philosophy, including Ludwig Wittgenstein, G.E. Moore, Gilbert Ryle, and A.J. Ayer, for the roots of twentieth century positivism.² Marcuse sees positivism as encompassing three characteristics:

1) the validation of cognitive thought by experience of facts; 2) the orientation of cognitive thought to the physical sciences as a model of certainty and exactness; 3) the belief that progress in knowledge depends on this orientation. Consequently, positivism is a struggle against all metaphysics, transcendentalisms, and idealisms as obscurantist and regressive modes of thought.³

¹Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 172.


³Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 172.
As science was seen as the only mode of knowledge, metaphysics, transcendentalisms, and idealisms were dismissed as "irrational and unscientific." Social sciences began to model themselves on the natural sciences and their empirical methods. The "mainstream" social scientists coming out of this movement believed that by eliminating value and normative aspects from social science and by insisting on exact, systematic, empirical methods, a revolution of the social sciences would take place, much the same as the revolution of the natural sciences, transforming them into genuine sciences which would differ in degree only from the natural sciences. As Richard Bernstein explains, those "mainstream" social scientists following Comte and the members of the Vienna Circle were not positivists in the strict sense that their predecessors had been. But the basic stance toward positivism profoundly influences the work of those "mainstreamers." Anything which could not be reduced to either the empirical or natural sciences on the one hand, or the formal disciplines of math and logic on the other, was "viewed with suspicion." Therefore, the social sciences, including philosophy, became disciplines of a second order. Analysis became less important as philosophy moved away from the normative toward clarifying.

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But in the positivists' very attempt to remain value neutral, there is an underlying value:

...its underlying premise is the value of empirical science theories, and this is not simply hypothetically, but normatively. For with its first analytic step it already presupposes, normatively, that behaving in accordance with the technical recommendation is not only desirable, but also "rational."  

But empiricism and the elimination of value and norms, metaphysics, transcendentalisms and idealisms are empty in the sense of "enlightened action." Positivism reduces social science to merely describing what is rather than calling for what ought to be in accordance with a conception of the nature of man and the good society.

It is this divorce from enlightened action in a society which prides itself on "rationality" which upsets the members of the Frankfurt School. The Frankfurt School, founded as the Institute for Social Research in 1923, became one of the main sources of criticism against positivism and its adoption by the social sciences. Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse are the central members of the first generation of the Frankfurt School. Jurgen Habermas, the most prominent member of the second generation, now a member of the Max-Planck Institute in Starnberg, West Germany,

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5Ibid., pp. 5-6.

6 Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, 269.
...has re-examined the foundations of critical theory and sought to develop a comprehensive social theory which is a dialectical synthesis of empiricist, phenomenological, hermeneutic, and Marxist-Hegelian themes.7

It is to two of the members of the Frankfurt School, Marcuse and Habermas, whom we now turn. Their criticism of modern technological society and their belief that enlightened action proceeds from "critical theory" serves as a base from which the examination of educational issues is undertaken.

Herbert Marcuse believes that in order to critically examine modern society, one must have a concept of the nature of man and the nature of society. This is meant not merely in the sense of an objective, empirical analysis of what man is and what society is, but in the sense of an investigation of what is man's potential for full humanity and what is society's potential for development and encouragement of that full humanity. This "'critical theory' analyzes society in the light of its used and unused or abused capabilities for improving the human condition."8 Critical theory must analyze the developments of society and their alternatives; it must deal with the concept of "the good life," i.e. "a life which is as much as possible free from toil, dependence, and ugliness."9

8 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, x.
9 Ibid., p. 126.
and whether the state exists for the extension or repression of that "good life" for its citizens. This critical stance involves a transcendence of the status quo—a refusal to accept the powers which limit or destroy the free development of full humanity: man's position must remain central. Marcuse sees critical theory operating out of two value judgments:

1. the judgment that human life is worth living, or rather can and ought to be made worth living...it is the a priori of social theory, and its rejection rejects theory itself;

2. the judgment that, in a given society, specific possibilities exist for the amelioration of human life and specific ways and means of realizing these possibilities.¹⁰

A smooth functioning society is not necessarily a society which holds dear the optimal development of human life worth living. The fact that a majority accepts the status quo does not make the status quo really rational.

The tradition of analyzing and describing what the good man and the good society ought to be goes back to classical Greek philosophy. It is for the "conspicuous absence of such visions," that Erich Fromm indicts twentieth century society.¹¹ Habermas takes us back to the Greek conception of politics as "the doctrine of the good and just life; it was the continuation

¹⁰Ibid., pp. x-xi.

of ethics." It is also important to remember the distinction between "praxis" and "techne." The latter referred simply to the "skillful production of artifacts and expert mastery of objectified tasks." Praxis, on the other hand had to do with politics as "directed toward the formation and cultivation of character; it proceeded pedagogically and not technically."

Habermas turns to Thomas Hobbes as exemplifying a modern conception of politics:

First, a claim of scientifically grounded social philosophy aims at establishing once and for all the conditions for the correct order of the state and society as such. Its assertions are to be valid independently of place, time, and circumstances, and to permit an enduring foundation for communal life, regardless of the historical situation. Second, the translation of knowledge into practice, the application, is a technical problem. With a knowledge of the general conditions for a correct order of the state and of society, a practical prudent action of human beings toward each other is no longer required, but what is required instead is the correctly calculated generation of rules, relationships, and institutions. Third, human behavior is therefore to be now considered only as the material for science. The engineers of the correct order can disregard the categories of ethical social intercourse and confine themselves to the construction of conditions under which human beings, just like objects within nature, will necessarily behave in a calculable manner. This separation of politics from morality replaces instruction in leading a good and just life (pedagogical) with making possible a life of well-being within a correctly instituted order. (technique)

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12 Jurgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, 42.
13 Ibid., p. 43.
This represents a definite turn to the technical and a move away from the classical Aristotelian conception of the state existing for the sake of the "good life" of its citizens. With the move to technique, the old concerns with the moral elements of the good life become divorced from politics and politics becomes the technical skill of acquiring and maintaining power. Human behavior and the manipulation of that behavior to obtain the desired results constitutes this new conception of technique. From Machiavelli to our contemporary, B.F. Skinner, technical skill has been expanded.

The laws of self-reproduction demand of an industrially advanced society that it look after its survival on the escalating scale of a continually expanded technical control over nature and a continually refined administration of human beings and their relations to each other by means of social organization. In this system, science, technology, industry, and administration interlock in a circular process. In this process the relationship of theory to praxis can now only assert itself as the purposive-rational application of techniques assured by empirical science. The social potential of science is reduced to the powers of technical control--its potential for enlightened action is no longer considered.\textsuperscript{14}

Habermas sees a technical interest guiding the empirical sciences and in the name of rationality and administration of society, technology imposes its own value system. This brings us to Marcuse's concept of "the political content of technical reason." More and more areas of modern life are becoming increasingly

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 254.
subject to the domination of the rationality of the scientific-technical world. Max Weber saw rationalization as involving "the extension of the areas of society subject to the criteria of rational decision." Marcuse and Habermas note our increasing attitude that the correct technology is the solution to all problems. For Marcuse, this technical control, which is part of a rational system, is domination.

...the very concept of technical reason is perhaps ideological. Not only the application of technology but technology itself is domination (of nature and men)—methodical, scientific, calculated, calculating control. Specific purposes and interests of domination are not foisted upon technology "subsequently" and from the outside; they enter the very construction of the technical apparatus. Technology is always a historical social project: in it is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and things. Such a "purpose" of domination is "substantive" and to this extent belongs to the very form of technical reason. 15

This domination inherent in technical reason is not easily identifiable as oppressive or exploitative. It is a domination of efficiency and technology—not a domination of terror. Domination under the guise of rationality legitimizes itself; it maintains and ensures the growth of the scientific-technical system. The repressive character of this domination is hidden from the consciousness of the citizens because they have internalized the "value" of increased productivity and scientific-technical progress. (Protestant ethic) They have


been bought off in the sense that the domination allows them to live "in increasing comfort."¹⁷ Thus, domination becomes institutionalized and growth of productive forces plus scientific-technical progress becomes the basis of legitimation of the system. This is a new historical phenomenon:

The principles of modern science were a priori structured in such a way that they could serve as a conceptual instrument for a universe of self-propelling, productive control. ...The scientific method led to the ever-more-effective domination of man by man through the domination of nature. ...Today, domination perpetuates and extends itself not only through technology but as technology, and the latter provides the great legitimation of the expanding political power, which absorbs all spheres of culture. ...Technological rationality thus protects rather than cancels the legitimacy of domination and the instrumentalist horizon of reason opens on a rationally totalitarian society.¹⁸

As Habermas agrees, rationality is "weakened as a critical standard and degraded to a corrective within the system."¹⁹ Marcuse focuses on the irrationality of a society which appears to be "the very embodiment of Reason,"²⁰ and prides itself on rationality. He speaks of "the paralysis of criticism," and the "negation of life" in a society so

¹⁸Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 158-159.
¹⁹Jurgen Habermas, Toward A Rational Society, 83.
²⁰Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, ix.
concentrated on productivity that genuine human needs and the development of humanity are repressed. While material needs are met for the majority of the population in industrial societies, needs beyond basic human necessities are often false needs in that they have been "superimposed upon the individual by particular social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery, and injustice."\(^{21}\) These needs are determined by powers outside of the individual and are in the interest of the current arrangements of power in society rather than in the interest of the individual. Read needs:

...involve standards of priority--standards which refer to the optimal development of the individual, of all individuals, under the optimal utilization of the material and intellectual resources available to man.\(^{22}\)

Marcuse maintains that individuals themselves must know the difference between true and false needs, but he wonders if people who have been so conditioned are capable of making that distinction.

The more rational, productive, technical, and total the repressive administration of society becomes, the more unimaginable the means and ways by which the administered individuals might break their servitude and seize their own liberation...all liberation depends on the consciousness of servitude.\(^{23}\)

\(^{21}\)Ibid., p. 5.

\(^{22}\)Ibid., p. 6.

\(^{23}\)Ibid., pp. 6-7.
Modern industry considers "advertising, public relations, indoctrination, and planned obsolescence"\textsuperscript{24} as basic production costs. These methods help to blur the line between real and false needs.

In order to be effective, such production of socially necessary waste requires continuous rationalization—the relentless utilization of advanced techniques and science.\textsuperscript{25}

Marcuse wonders whether the concept of alienation is relevant in modern society because this "civilization transforms the object world into an extension of man's mind and body."\textsuperscript{26} People see themselves in their possessions—"social control is anchored in the new needs which it has produced."\textsuperscript{27} Neither is "introjection" the correct term to be applied to the internalization of the controls of society. Introjection implies an "inner space" and an "inner freedom" apart from society.

Today this private space has been invaded and whittled down by the technological reality... The result is not adjustment but Mimesis: an immediate identification of the individual with his society and, through it, with the society as a whole.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 49.
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26}Ibid., p. 9.
\textsuperscript{27}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., p. 10.
Marcuse's point in all of this is that our society is a one-dimensional, totalitarian society, whose efficiency and material rewards hide from the individual its repressive powers. This is difficult for us to see as we connect totalitarianism with terror, while the current totalitarianism is benevolent, characterized by "a comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom," based on technical progress. This totalitarianism is characterized by an "integration of opposites," and one-dimensional thought and behavior which prevents critical thought and qualitative change. This domination seems rational because it maintains the system and ensures the growth of productive forces, while paying off individuals in material goods. The consciousness of domination is repressed, and consciousness of repression is necessary for steps toward freedom.

Another aspect of the irrationality of our rationality is that modern society does not use its capability for the "pacification of existence." Our society has developed to the extent that organization according to scarcity, domination, and competition is no longer necessary and yet we perpetuate these forms of organization. Our powers could be used for the

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29 Ibid., p. 1.
31 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 16.
development of "new dimensions of human realization," and yet we organize for war instead of peace; we organize for competition instead of cooperation; we organize for repression instead of liberation and realization of full humanity. "Life as an end is qualitatively different from life as a means." When society is viewed in the light of unused, abused and misguided capabilities, the irrationality of our rationality and the political content of technical reason are easier to recognize.

Marcuse sees, in the evolution of rights and liberties considered vital in earlier stages of development, a loss of "their traditional rationale and content:

Freedom of thought, speech, and conscience were—just as free enterprise, which they served to promote and protect essentially critical ideas, designed to replace an obsolescent material and intellectual culture by a more productive and rational one. Once institutionalized, these rights and liberties shared the fate of the society of which they had become an integral part. The achievement cancels the premises.

In a society which seems increasingly able to satisfy the material needs of its members through its scientific-technical organization, critical theory seems useless and unnecessary. The system pays in terms of material goods and standard of

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32 Ibid., p. 17.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., p. 1.
living. Given these achievements, there seems to be no reason for transcending the status quo. Earlier industrial society encompassed the dialectical relationship between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. These two groups, in facing each other, provided an arena for the mediation of opposites. In modern society, we have an increasing "integration of opposites," which provides for the "containment of social change."

...An overriding interest in the preservation and improvement of the institutional status quo unites the former antagonists in the most advanced areas of contemporary society. ...There is no ground on which theory and practice, thought and action meet.35

All seems to be subsumed under the interests of "progress."

Other alternatives are submerged and the ultimate goal becomes the stabilization of the system and the containment of change. For Marcuse and Habermas, capitalism is an example of a system which is dependent on the state for stabilization. It is a manipulated system which guarantees "social security and the chance for individual upward mobility."36 The "good life" has come to mean material wealth. Real public discussion presents problems to the smooth functioning of the system. "Therefore the new politics of state interventionism requires a depoliticization of the mass of the population."37

36 Jurgen Habermas, Toward A Rational Society, 102.
37 Ibid., pp. 103-104.
Is there an alternative to organization for domination? Marcuse advocates a new relationship between the scientific-technical world and nature—a liberating mastery instead of a repressive mastery. This involves meeting nature as an opposing partner rather than as an entity to be controlled. It involves a change of consciousness from exploitation to intersubjectivity. There would also need to be a concurrent development of communication among men and a recognition of the Other on the order of Martin Buber's "I-Thou" concept.

It is at this point that Habermas enters with a new formulation of Marcuse's theories. Habermas realizes that Marcuse's scheme of a liberating relationship with nature is not going to be substituted for the achievements of modern technology. Modern science is oriented toward technical control—not toward a relationship with nature as opposing partner. Modern society separates the institutional framework, or its social life-world, from the scientific-technical world.

What is singular about the "rationality" of science and technology is that it characterizes the growing potential of self-surpassing productive forces which continually threaten the institutional framework and at the same time, set the standard of legitimation for the production relations that restrain that potential.

Marcuse himself toyed with the idea of the neutrality of science and technology—the idea that technology can be used

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38 Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 236.
for positive or negative ends—but rejected that possibility and concluded instead that science is oriented toward control of nature and men and as such the

...technological a priori is a political a priori—when technics becomes the universal form of material production, it circumscribes an entire culture; it projects a historical totality.\(^{40}\)

This totality is a closed, self-legitimizing world, into which non-scientific-technical concerns do not fit.

Habermas, in order to reformulate Weber's ideas on rationalization and Marcuse's thesis on technology and domination, rationality and oppression in modern society, proposes a new interpretative scheme as represented in Table 1. He starts by distinguishing between the concepts of "work" and "interaction."

For Habermas, work is purposive-rational action—"either instrumental action or rational choice or their conjunction... governed by strategies based on analytic knowledge.\(^{41}\) This framework of purposive-rational action is represented by the right hand column of Table 1. "Interaction" is communicative action represented by the institutional framework of society—the sociocultural world. (left hand column) Habermas distinguishes between social systems according to the predominance of systems of interaction or purposive-rational action. Traditional societies, such as pre-capitalistic society, fall generally

\(^{40}\)Herbert Marcuse, \textit{One-Dimensional Man}, p. 154.

\(^{41}\)Jurgen Habermas, \textit{Toward A Rational Society}, p. 92.
### TABLE 1

**HABERMAS’ INTERPRETATIVE SCHEME**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action-orienting rules</th>
<th>Social norms</th>
<th>Technical rules</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional framework:</td>
<td>systems of purposive-rational (instrumental and strategic) action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic interaction</td>
<td>systems of purposive-rational (instrumental and strategic) action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of definition</th>
<th>Intersubjectively shared ordinary language</th>
<th>Context-free language</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of definition</td>
<td>Reciprocal expectations about behavior</td>
<td>Conditional predictions, conditional imperatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanisms of acquisition</th>
<th>Role internalization</th>
<th>Learning of skills and qualifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Function of action type</td>
<td>Maintenance of institutions (conformity to norms on the basis of reciprocal enforcement)</td>
<td>Problem-solving (goal attainment, defined in means-ends relations)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanctions against violations of rules</th>
<th>Punishment on the basis of conventional sanctions</th>
<th>Inefficacy: failure in reality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Failure against authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Rationalization" emancipation, individualization; extension of communication free of domination growth of productive forces; extension of power of technical control

*Jurgen Habermas, Toward A Rational Society, 93.*
under the category of interactive systems. This is not to say that a traditional society encompasses no purposive-rational subsystems, but these subsystems are subject to, and guided and enforced by the norms of the institutional framework. Modern western societies, on the other hand, increasingly fit into the category of systems of purposive-rational action and follow patterns of instrumental and strategic action. A traditional society can exist as long as the elements of purposive-rational action are kept within limits, or mediated by, the institutional framework and its cultural traditions. This does not mean that the institutional framework never changes; the evolution of societies has always necessitated some structural modification. Habermas notes that traditional civilizations where economies were based on agriculture and craft production "have tolerated technical innovation and organizational improvement only within definite limits."^2 Purposive-rational subsystems within these traditional civilizations were never extended to the point where the authority of the institutional framework was threatened. It was noted earlier that Weber characterized "traditionalism" as a most important opponent of capitalism. There had to be a move away from traditionalism in order for capitalism to flourish. What characterizes this move from the interactive

^2Ibid., pp. 94-95.
...is a level of development of the productive forces that makes permanent the extension of subsystems of purposive-rational action and thereby calls into question the traditional forms of the legitimation of power.43

Capitalism, as stated earlier, is an example of a system which ensures its own permanent growth. Habermas calls it the "first mode of production in world history to institutionalize self-sustaining economic growth."44 By so doing, capitalism ensures the growth of systems of purposive-rational action and creates its own legitimation by imposing its rationality on the political system. To clarify, Habermas distinguishes between rationalization "from below" and "from above." There is pressure from below:

...as soon as the new mode of production becomes fully operative through the institutionalization of a domestic market for goods and labor power and of the capitalist enterprise.45

This means that subsystems of purposive-rational action are ensured of growth and strategic and instrumental action replace traditional structures. Society becomes more and more modernized and better able to "switch over" at any moment from an interaction context to purposive-rational action."46

43Ibid., p. 96.
44Ibid.
45Ibid., p. 98.
46Ibid.
Rationalization "from above" had historically encompassed traditional world view, myth, religion, and metaphysics, which now "lose their cogency," and are "reshaped into subjective belief systems and ethics which ensure the private cogency of modern value-orientation (the 'Protestant ethic')."^7 Modern science replaced traditional legitimation. Habermas says that since Galileo, modern empirical science produces technically exploitable knowledge and science and technology have become interdependent since the late nineteenth century.^8 Since then, two tendencies have developed in advanced capitalistic countries:

...an increase in state intervention in order to secure the system's stability, and a growing interdependence of research and technology.^9

These tendencies nourish systems of purposive-rational action. Capitalism is dependent on state intervention for stabilization and "elimination of dysfunctions." It is a manipulated system which guarantees "social security and the chance for individual upward mobility."^10 This governmental action toward stabilization and perpetuation of the system turns politics away from "praxis" in the sense of practical goals toward

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^7 Ibid., p. 99.
^8 Ibid., pp. 98-99.
^9 Ibid., p. 100.
^10 Ibid., p. 102.
realization of the "good life," toward "solution of technical problems."51 The "good life" has come to mean material wealth. Real public discussion in the sense of the interactive framework presents problems to the smooth running of the system because practical questions regarding the quality of life lose their importance. "Therefore the new politics of state interventionism requires a depoliticization of the mass of the population."52 This idea of depoliticization has been treated by others.

In C. Wright Mills terms, we have become a "mass" instead of a "public." In explicating the differences between public and mass, Mills attends first to four factors:

1. The ratio of the givers of opinion to its receivers.
2. Organization of communication—the possibility of answering back an opinion without internal or external reprisals being taken.
3. Ease with which opinion is effective in the shaping of decisions of powerful consequence.
4. The degree to which instituted authorities with their sanctions and controls, infiltrate the public.53

In a public, as many people express as receive opinions. Communications are organized so that one can immediately and effectively answer back. The communication does affect action

51Ibid., p. 103.
52Ibid., pp. 103-104.
and "authoritative institutions do not interpenetrate the public, which is thus more or less autonomous in its operations."54 This model closely fits the ideals of classical democracy.

In a mass, many people receive opinion and few people give. Communications are organized through the formal media so that it is very difficult, almost impossible, to answer back. If you do answer back, it has no effect on decisions and "the mass has no autonomy from institutions."55

Instead of the classic idea of "public" giving and receiving opinions, answering back and actually affecting policy, we now have the "unattached expert" who is well-informed, but unwilling to take clear-cut public stands on anything.

What the public stands for, accordingly, is often a vagueness of policy (called open-mindedness), a lack of involvement in public affairs (known as reasonableness), and a professional disinterest (often known as tolerance).56

Mills cites four major trends which help explain the rise of "mass" and the demise of "public."

1. The rise of bureaucratic structures of executive power, in the economic, the military, and the political orders,...It is not only that the institutions of power have become large-scale and inaccessibly centralized; they have at the same time become less political and more administrative.

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54Ibid., p. 355.
55Ibid.
56Ibid., p. 358.
2. As the scale of institutions has become larger and more centralized, so have the range and intensity of the opinion makers' efforts. For the means of opinion-making—and this is the second master trend—have paralleled in range and efficiency the other institutions of greater scale that make up the modern society of masses.

3. ...the numerical decline of the old middle class of independent entrepreneurs and practitioners, and the rise of the new middle class of dependent white collar workers.

4. The rise of the metropolis...the growth of this metropolitan society has segregated men and women into narrowed routines and milieux, and it has done so with the constant loss of community structure. ...Pre-judgment and stereotype flourish when people meet only in this segmental manner.57

As noted earlier, practical questions in relationship to the pursuit of "the good life," are eliminated in Mills' "mass" society and Habermas' and Marcuse's "depoliticized" society. Questions pertaining to "the good life," found in the realm of the institutional framework of Table 1 are set aside, separated from, the scientific-technical, purposive-rational framework.

The old institutional framework involves interaction and attempts to answer "the central questions of man's collective existence and of individual life history."58 These are questions of life and death, justice and freedom, love and hate.

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57Ibid., pp. 360-365.

58Jurgen Habermas, Toward A Rational Society, p. 96.
The rationality of language games, associated with communicative action is confronted at the threshold of the modern period with the rationality of means-ends relations, associated with instrumental and strategic action. As soon as this confrontation can arise, the end of traditional society is in sight: the traditional form of legitimation breaks down.59

Table 1 also helps us to understand what Habermas calls the cleavage between the "social life-world" and the world of science-technology. He points to the work of C.P. Snow, The Two Cultures, and Aldous Huxley, Literature and Science, both of whom see this cleavage as inevitable. The subject of literature is the social life-world—a contextual world—which deals with what Marcuse calls "the oppositional and transcending elements in the 'higher culture.'"60 The realm of science is "the worldless universe of facts," which attempts to eliminate context and the oppositional and transcending elements. The language of literature must attempt to verbalize what is in principle unrepeatable and must generate an intersubjectivity of mutual understanding in each concrete case.61

The elements of antagonism, individual experience, life and death, joy and sorrow, the ideals of humanism, etc., ad infinitum—all of which we might call human concerns—have no place in the positivistic framework of the scientific-technical.

59Ibid.
60Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 56.
61Jurgen Habermas, Toward A Rational Society, 50.
purposive-rational world. These elements defy explanation; they follow no laws. They are contextual, not context free. The formal language of the scientific-technical world cannot accomodate the uncertainty, the unmeasurability of the world of "higher culture." For Marcuse again, this positivist approach--this obsession with rationality--is an example of rationality become irrationality. The rationalization in the Freudian sense which is built into the scientific-technical system allows no questioning of the system itself (something literature attempts to do). The scientific-technical framework demands conformity with the insanity of our "rational" (irrational?) world. Real rationality is not irrationality:

...and the difference between an exact recognition and analysis of the facts and a vague and emotional speculation is as essential as ever before. The trouble is that the statistics, measurements, and field studies of empirical sociology and political science are not rational enough. They become mystifying to the extent to which they are isolated from the truly concrete context which makes the facts and determines their function. This context is larger. ...This real context in which the particular subjects obtain their real significance is definable only within a theory of society. 52

Marcuse speaks of this separation "above reality" of ideas that by their very nature cannot be verified by scientific method:

62Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 190.
Humanitarian, religious and moral ideas are only "ideal;" they don't disturb unduly the established way of life and are not invalidated by the fact that they are contradicted by a behavior dictated by the daily necessities of business and politics.  

But the questions raised in the institutional framework still present problems to the smooth functioning of the system. Habermas sees that this "bracketing out"—this separation into two worlds—is not itself sufficient legitimation. The question remains: "How will the depoliticization of the masses be made plausible to them?" Habermas answers by returning to Marcuse's idea of having science and technology assume the role of ideology. This has been accomplished through:

...the scientization of technology...with the advent of large-scale industrial research, science, technology and industrial utilization were fused into a system.

What is new here is that the institutionalization of scientific-technical progress causes an undermining of the traditional relationship between work and interaction—in other words, between the purposive-rational framework and the institutional framework. The instrumental and strategic action of the purposive-rational world (technique) has historically been mediated, or kept within limits, by the institutional world. The purposive-rational subsystems were subject to cultural tradition and institutions. Today it is difficult to determine whether social

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62Ibid., p. 148.
63Jurgen Habermas, Toward A Rational Society, 104.
64Ibid.
interests still determine the direction of technical progress because of the internalization of social needs discussed earlier. Are the individual's interests in maintaining the system due to the fulfilling by the system of his internalized false needs:

In several places Habermas refers to "the technocratic model" described in the works of Jacques Ellul, Hans Freyer and Helmut Schelsky, who recognize "technology as an independent force." According to this model, "the development of the social system seems to be determined by the logic of scientific-technical progress." Habermas quotes Schelsky:

Political norms and laws are replaced by objective exigencies of scientific-technical civilization which are not posited as political decisions and cannot be understood as norms of conviction or weltanschauung. Hence, the idea of democracy loses its classical substance, so to speak. In place of the political will of the people emerges an objective exigency, which man himself produces as science and labor.

Although Habermas rejects the technocracy thesis on the grounds that technical development has not become completely autonomous, he does not exclude the possibility of a future "cybernetic dream of...ultrastability." The possibility of this "negative utopia" does exist for Habermas. Consequently,

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65 Ibid., p. 58.
66 Ibid., p. 105.
67 Ibid., p. 59.
68 Ibid., p. 60.
69 Ibid., p. 118.
the concerns expressed by Ellul, Freyer, and Schelsky are in many ways similar to those of Habermas. Space does not permit a thorough analysis, but it would be useful to digress briefly to encapsulate the work of the French sociologist, Jacques Ellul.

Ellul defines technique as "the totality of methods rationally arrived at and having absolute efficiency in every field of human activity." In outlining the characteristics of today's technique, Ellul begins with rationality which "brings mechanics to bear on all that is spontaneous or irrational." The second characteristic is artificiality, which he sees as excluding the natural world and allowing no "symbiotic relation" between it and the world of technique. (Remember Habermas' distinction between the interactive world and the purposive-rational world.) Ellul's third characteristic of technique is automatism of technical choice, looking for the "one best way," the most rational and efficient. This leads to the fourth characteristic of self-augmentation. Technique progresses with little intervention by man. Ellul sees technical progress as irreversible and as growing according to geometric progression. Monism is the fifth characteristic. This is the forming of a whole system of technique out of all the separate

71 Ibid., p. 79.
techniques. Technique is divorced from the idea of good or evil; it's main concern is "efficient ordering."\textsuperscript{72}

We fit the human to the technical. Terrorism, as Marcuse also says, is unnecessary when technique has progressed sufficiently. Ellul sees technical necessity as imposing a kind of national concentration camp—a new kind of psychic camp, where armed guards and barbed wire fences are unnecessary. We are "educated" through schools, through modern surveillance techniques, and through propaganda. Social conformity is a virtue of modern society. The sixth aspect of technique is \textit{technical universalism}. This has a geographic element in that technique is expanding its influence throughout the world. Technical universalism also has a qualitative element. It is no longer one element of a civilization, but:

\ldots Today technique has taken over the whole of civilization...It controls procreation, influences growth, and alters the individual and the species. Death, procreation, birth, habitat; all must submit to technical efficiency and systematization, the end point of the industrial assembly line.\textsuperscript{73}

The final characteristic of technique is \textit{autonomy}. Here Ellul describes what Habermas and Marcuse call "self-legitimation," or "rationalization" in the Freudian sense. Technique accepts no judgment from outside itself. There is developing a situation of means, not ends. If there is a struggle between technique

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., p. 110.

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., pp. 127-128.
and a proposed human end, the end will be modified. Ellul states, as did Habermas, that in former times, technique was directed toward a pre-established end, an end established through human needs and concerns, ...

...almost unconsciously, men kept abreast of techniques and controlled their use and influence. This resulted not from an adaptation of men to techniques (as in modern times), but rather from the subordination of techniques to men.7^ Now technique gives birth to more technique—we look for ends after the fact, and only for rationalization purposes.

While we have thrown off some of the controls of past ages, Ellul thinks we are under the illusion of freedom in modern society while in actuality we are conditioned by technological civilization. Technique is no longer outside of man, facing him, but is integrated within man and progressively absorbs him and becomes autonomous.75 (Recall Marcuse's concept of "Mimesis") The distinction between science and technique has become blurred. Pure science is yielding to applied science and "we can no longer conceive of science without its technical outcome."76 We put our scientific techniques to immediate use without analyzing the consequences. The scientist is dependent on the state, directly or indirectly

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7^Ibid., p. 72.
75Ibid., p. 6.
76Ibid., p. 10.
for his support. "The state, then exercises a very real monopoly, and the scientist is obliged to accept its conditions."77

In *The Political Illusion*, Ellul shows how technique and the state work together. The essential element in "politization is "the growth of the state itself."78 Its personnel, its functions, and its responsibilities are constantly growing, bringing about the centralization and total organization of society. The second element in politization is the change in our conception of the political. We now place everything in the hands of the state—"we can't conceive of a society except as directed by a central omnipresent and omnipotent state."79 What concerns Ellul is not just the expansion of the control of the state into the private realm, but our "increasing conviction that things must be that way," the fact that we so really accept it.80

Habermas also speaks of this politization of private conflicts:

...what is peculiar is the short term displacement of the culturally normative border between private and public conflicts. Today difficulties that a mere two or three years ago would have passed for private matters—for conflicts between students and teachers, workers and employers, or marital partners, for conflicts between individual persons—now claim political significance and ask to be justified in political

concepts. Psychology seems to turn into politics—perhaps a reaction to the reality that politics insofar as it related to the masses, has long been translated into psychology.81

In this "cult of the expert," private conflicts which traditionally meant dealing with another person face to face are now relegated to the realm of the expert (or technician). The fixed end of technique is efficiency—"the one best means,"--the specialist chooses the means.82 We no longer feel competent to solve our own problems, we turn to the proper technique and the expert. All of this means we no longer have to deal with each other on human terms—within the interactive sphere of Table 1—we deal with each other as objects through intermediaries and techniques.

The modern state is "primarily an enormous machinery of bureaus."83 We are under the illusion that the person at the top of the organization makes the decisions, but in reality the problems are handled by the bureaus. If you change the personnel, even the regulations, you change very little. A Carter or a Ford in office makes little difference.

Efficiency is, after all, the machines fundamental law...It does not seek to promote verities. It cannot consider individuals. It obeys the sole rule of efficiency. ...If a political aim is set, it becomes diluted in the machine and soon has no more content.84

81 Jurgen Habermas, Toward A Rational Society, 42.
83 Jacques Ellul, The Political Illusion, 141.
84 Ibid., p. 146.
The objective bureaucracy cannot consider individual needs or differences. But the "art" of public relations ensures the efficiency of the bureaucratic machine by securing "the social body's complete psychic and moral adjustment to that administration." Ellul calls public relations:

...a method of psychologically integrating the administratee into the administration, of making him accept in good grace the acts committed and sympathize with their reasons.

Public relations is an example of modern "psychotechnique."

The citizen believes—and for Ellul this is part of the political illusion—that through political channels he can influence or change the system.

For Ellul, freedom is not an immutable part of human nature, rather "freedom is not static but dynamic; ...a prize continually to be won." He sees the technological phenomenon as our modern world's most dangerous form of determinism, and freedom consists in transcending it. Ellul, like other theorists, does not give an exact prescription for transcending modern determinism, but he believes that man,

...by grasping the real nature of the technological phenomenon, and the extent to which it is robbing him of freedom, he confronts the blind mechanisms as a conscious being.

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85 Ibid., p. 147.
86 Ibid., p. 160.
88 Ibid., p. xxxiii.
Ellul has been accused of pessimism—of subscribing to the belief that science-technology has become an independent force beyond human control. But this "pessimist" does exhibit hope:

...if man—if each one of us—abdicates his responsibilities with regard to values; if each of us limits himself to leading a trivial existence in a technological civilization, with greater adaptation and increasing success as his sole objectives; if we do not even consider the possibility of making a stand against these determinants, then everything will happen as I have described it, and the determinants will be transformed into inevitabilities.39

The future, then, is up to us. Freedom, for Ellul, is not a gift, but something to be continually sought after and guarded. We must take our freedom in hand, and the first step for Ellul, as for Habermas and Marcuse, is a recognition of our unfreedom.

Habermas does not give exact prescriptions either, probably because dogmatic prescriptions do not fit in with praxis. For him, the problem is one of integrating the two worlds of his Table 1—the social life-world, his institutional framework, with the scientific-technical world, his purposive-rational world. Stated another way, the problem is one of the relationship between technology and democracy. For Habermas, "democracy" must encompass uninhibited communication between citizens about practical problems of "how men can and want to live under the

39Ibid., p. xxix.
objective conditions of their ever-expanding power of control."90 These qualitative aspects of life are not solved by technology.

According to Habermas, we can take one of two stances. We can assume optimistically that science-technology will converge with democracy, or we can pessimistically assert that science-technology excludes democracy. The truth lies in neither stance. Neither answers "how we can actually bring under control the pre-existing, unplanned relations of technical progress and the social-life world."91 Habermas believes that social interests still exert some influence in the control of both the pace and direction of technical progress. He points to public investments and government contracts as examples of this control. But this control comes out of the spontaneous and unreflected "compulsion of the reproduction of social life."92 Habermas calls for a conscious mediation between technical progress and the social life-world. Technical rationality does not translate automatically into "the good life."

The capacity for control made possible by the empirical sciences is not to be confused with the capacity for enlightened action.93

If we do not consciously attempt to bring together the two worlds of Table 1, Habermas points to certain "developmental

90 Jurgen Habermas, Toward A Rational Society, 57.
91 Ibid., p. 60.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., p. 56.
tendencies" which could lead to the complete enveloping of the institutional framework by systems of purposive-rational action. These developmental trends are exemplified in the increase in adaptive behavior in advanced industrial societies, where control is increasingly accomplished through internalization of societal values rather than through domination in the traditional sense. If we refuse to apply the limits of the institutional world to the purposive-rational world, the "cybernetic dream" of a "negative utopia" is possible. Habermas would agree with Ellul that a "dictatorship of test tubes rather than of hobnailed boots will not make it any less a dictatorship." 94

How is this mediation of the two worlds to come about? For Habermas there must be a removal of "restrictions of communication."

...the solution demands precisely that unrestricted communication about the goals of life activity and conduct against which advanced capitalism, structurally dependent on a depoliticized public realm, puts up a strong resistance. 95

If we are to avoid a negative utopia, we must keep alive the difference between "techne" and "praxis." We must question the use of every available technique--question in the sense of determining whether that technique contributes to the direction


95Jurgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, p. 120.
we want life to take. We must consider whether it contributes
to "the good life" and to the "pacification and gratification
of existence." If Habermas' communicative ethic could take
effect, perhaps we could consider ourselves a truly rational
society:

A scientized society could constitute itself
as a rational one only to the extent that
science and technology are mediated with the
conduct of life through the minds of its
citizens.97

Application To Educational Problems

Society is reflected in its schools. The recent educational
movement called "accountability" which is a reflection of the
positivistic, purposive-rational mentality of modern society,
provides excellent case material to analyze the relationship
between school and society and the pervasive influence of a
technological perspective. Before moving to this analysis,
it is crucial that we confront the significant benchmarks of
the criticism of modern society offered by Marcuse, Habermas,
and Ellul which have direct application to education.

One of the main points made by those critics has been that
modern society lacks a "critical theory" which operates out of
the classical conception of the difference between "praxis" and
"techne." This critical theory emphasizes the centrality of

96 Ibid., p. 119.
97 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
man's position—that man is always an end and never a means. In other words, critical theory assumes a conception of "the good man in the good society," and the state as existing for the encouragement and protection of that concept. This is necessarily a value-laden theory and it deals with the unmeasurables and ambiguities which positivism relegates to a separate world. In examining any educational movement, therefore, we must look for the presence or absence of this concept of man and society and the willingness or unwillingness to deal with values, ambiguities and unmeasurables. We must keep in mind, as our critics stressed, that correct technology does not mean enlightened action and that material well-being alone does not constitute the good life.

Our critics have made it clear that modern society increasingly exhibits a cleavage between what Habermas calls the "social life-world and the scientific-technical world." Are schools, and particularly accountability, contributing to that cleavage of to the mediation of those two worlds?

Our critics have stressed that consciousness of repression is the first step toward liberation. Are schools encouraging this consciousness, or the repression of that consciousness? Are schools creating adaptable cogs for the scientific-technical machine or thinking, feeling human beings for "the good society?" Are efficiency and the smooth functioning of the system our prime concerns?
The following chapters therefore, will examine educational theory which recognizes the innate dignity of man as the beginning principle of education. This theory recognizes teaching as an art filled with ambiguity, unmeasurables, and complexities. The end of this art is the "making of a man." This educational theory operates out of the classical theory of "the good man in the good society." Secondly, we will examine the contemporary movement known as "accountability," followed by an examination of the historical movement of the application of "scientific management" to the schools. The latter was an attempt to apply business management practices and philosophy to education. The former takes as its model space engineering and attempts to apply its principles to education. Both of these efficiency movements are characterized by the absence of a vision of the "making of a man," with all its profound implications, and instead concentrate on the technical aspects of education. The philosophies of each speak for themselves. Therefore, we now turn to "teaching as the making of a man."
The concept of education as "the making of a man," or helping and guiding the student in the process of becoming a man or a woman is not a new concept. Greek philosophy developed such a view. This view of education as part of a lifelong process of "becoming who we are" rests on the belief in the innate dignity and goodness of man and the centrality of his position in society. As we saw earlier, this was a concept kept alive by the Catholic Church. As we have also seen, with the changes brought about by rising capitalism and the Protestant Reformation, man was submitted to ends outside of himself and exploitation of fellow human beings was rationalized in the interests of capitalism.

Man in modern twentieth century society also submits to "extrapersonal" forces and our society has been characterized as one-dimensional and totalitarian. The centrality of man's position has been compromised in the interest of "the objective order of things."

While education has been pressured to contribute to this objective order" by producing adaptable, employable, well-adjusted, unthinking people, there have been educators who have
protested this "blowing with the winds of change." These educators see a continuity of purpose in education from the beginning of civilization. While secondary aims of education do change with changes in society, the primary aim of the "making of man" does not change. As long as man remains man, he will continue to ask questions about his existence, his meaning, his relationship to fellow men and to a higher existence. His life, as long as he remains truly alive, will be a process of becoming and growing and the educators we will examine in this section respect and encourage that process and have a firm faith in a teacher's responsibility and ability to help in that process.

The work of Jacques Maritain is a case in point. He has grasped most deeply the significance of education as "the making of a man." We will also briefly examine the ideas of Robert M. Hutchins, Jacques Barzun, Gilbert Highet, and Maxine Greene, who also extend this view. This literature stands as an affirmation of faith in a humanistic base for education.

**Jacques Maritain**

Of course the job of education is not to shape the Platonist man-in-himself, but to shape a particular child belonging to a given nation, a given social environment, a given historical age. Yet before being a child of the twentieth century, an American-born or European-born child, a gifted or a retarded child, this child is a child of man. Before being a civilized man—at least I hope I am—and a Frenchman nurtured in Parisian intellectual circles, I am a man. If it is true, moreover, that our chief duty
consists, according to the profound saying of the Greek poet, Pindar, in becoming who we are, nothing is more important for each of us, or more difficult, than to become a man. Thus the chief task of education is above all to shape man, or to guide the evolving dynamism through which man forms himself as a man.1

Thus, with the opening statement of the 1943 Yale University Terry Lectures, Jacques Maritain recognized, much as did Jean Jacques Rousseau, his countryman before him, that the prime aim of education is the making of a man with all the dynamism, complexity and ambiguity inherent in that process. Also evident in this statement is Maritain's recognition that this man in the process of formation and evolution is a being in society, whose personal unfolding from within must be accompanied by the help of "collective experience previously accumulated and preserved, and by a regular transmission of acquired knowledge."2 But social adaptation is secondary to the prime aim of making a man:

The other aims (to convey the heritage of culture of a given area of civilization, to prepare for life in society and for good citizenship, and to secure the mental equipment required for implementing a particular function in the social whole, for performing family responsibilities, and for making a living) are corollaries and essential but secondary aims.3


2 Ibid., p. 2.

While it is true that times change and man evolves, the primary aim of education does not change because this primary aim is based on the nature of man, his dignity and value, his destiny and fulfillment as a person. The secondary aims of education listed above can be adjusted, indeed they should be adjusted, but the secondary aims are dependent on the prime aim. Without the making of man, there can be no real society.

...to be a good citizen and a man of civilization what matters above all is the inner center, the living source of personal conscience in which originate idealism and generosity, the sense of law and the sense of friendship, respect for others, but at the same time deep-rooted independence with regard to common opinion.4

For Maritain, "education is an art, and an especially difficult one."5 Every art has an end and in education, we must never lose sight of that end, becoming fixated on means for their own sake. Maritain speaks of the proliferation of modern educational means:

The child is so well tested and observed, his needs so well detailed, his psychology so clearly cut out, the methods for making it easy for him everywhere so perfected, that the end of all these commendable improvements runs the risk of being forgotten or disregarded.6

While empirical psychology, methods and techniques are important, they are not ends; they cannot tell us what we are about. The

4 Jacques Maritain, Education At The Crossroads, 16.
5 Ibid., p. 2.
6 Ibid., p. 3.
end of education being "the helping and guiding of man toward his own human achievement," we must ask, "What is man?"
Therefore we must deal with the philosophy of man and all its "problems and entanglements." There are two ways to approach this philosophy of man. Maritain decries the first—"the purely scientific ideal of man,"—the approach of the "neopositivists of the school of Vienna." As we saw earlier, using this approach it is necessary to exclude all ontological content and questions of being and essence and concentrate strictly on measurable and observable elements. While there is a place for this scientific approach, Maritain believes that it can never tell us what man is, "but only what emerges from the human being in the realm of sense observation and measurement." In Marcuse's terms, exclusive concentration on measurables is rationality become irrationality. Maritain believes that since man is a spiritual being, spiritual and metaphysical values must have a place—a prime place—in the philosophy of man. He turns therefore to the second approach to the philosophy of man—the "philosophical-religious one."

Thus the fact remains that the complete and integral idea of man which is the prerequisite of education can only be a philosophical and religious idea of man. I say philosophical, because this idea pertains to

7 Ibid., p. 4.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 5.
the nature or essence of man; I say religious, because of the existential status of this human nature in relation to God and the special gifts and trials and vocation involved.9

Maritain accepts the Judaeo-Greco-Christian concept of man:

...man is an animal endowed with reason, whose supreme dignity is in the intellect; and man as a free individual in personal relation with God, whose supreme righteousness consists in voluntarily obeying the law of God; and man as a sinful and wounded creature called to divine life and to the freedom of grace, whose supreme perfection consists of love.10

George S. Counts stated the same idea:

Underlying the tradition of liberty is a profound moral commitment which we in the West derive from the Judaeo-Christian ethic. This ethic proclaims, without qualification, the supreme worth and dignity of the individual human being. Every man is precious simply because he is a man. Every man is precious also because he is unique, because he is himself and no other. Here, then is the source of all values. The development of the individual to his full stature, physical, intellectual, moral, aesthetic, and spiritual, is the purpose and the gauge of human society and relationships. ...All institutions and social arrangements...are to be judged, accepted or rejected, preserved or modified, as they affect the lives of individual human beings.11

Because man is endowed with intelligence and will and because of his innate dignity, education cannot be mere animal training. "The education of man is a human awakening."12

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9Ibid., p. 6.
10Ibid., p. 7.
12Jacques Maritain, Education At The Crossroads, 9.
Educators must therefore have a great respect for the soul of the child:

...the sense of his innermost essence and his internal resources, and a sort of sacred and loving attention to his mysterious identity, which is a hidden thing that no techniques can reach.\(^\text{13}\)

With the background thus set, Maritain gives a more complete definition of the aim of education:

It is to guide man in the evolving dynamism through which he shapes himself as a human person—armed with knowledge, strength of judgment, and moral virtues—while at the same time conveying to him the spiritual heritage of the nation and the civilization in which he is involved, and preserving in this way the century-old achievements of generations.\(^\text{14}\)

Maritain does not discount the utilitarian aspects of education. But specialized training must never take precedence over the "essential aim of education."\(^\text{15}\) Extreme concentration on specialization is a characteristic of modern life and Maritain admits the necessity of some specialization. But the technical organization of modern life demands not less but "a more vigorous general training, especially during youth."\(^\text{16}\) Technocracy and specialization dehumanize life and specialists

\(^{13}\)Ibid.

\(^{14}\)Ibid., p. 10.

\(^{15}\)Ibid.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 19.
without a general background have no appreciation or understanding of matters outside their areas of specialization. This is inconsistent with democracy because:

...the democratic way of life demands primarily liberal education for all and a general humanistic development throughout society.17

This liberal education and the humanistic development in a society enables its members to pass judgment on areas outside of their immediate specialization. Obviously there is a connection here with Habermas' communicative ethic and the mediation of the social life-world and the scientific-technical world.

Every individual longs for freedom in the sense of the ...spontaneity, expansion, or autonomy...which we have to gain through constant effort and struggle...(this is) inner and spiritual freedom.18

Education must keep this freedom ever in mind in the individual's growth toward "liberation through knowledge and wisdom, good will and love."19 This growth is a life-long process as "truth is an infinite realm" and its attainment is progressive. Real knowledge means not just information about, but insights into what things are--"knowledge into,"

At the beginning of human action, insofar as it is human, there is truth. Without trust in truth, there is no human effectiveness. Such is, to my mind, the chief criticism to be made of the pragmatic and instrumentalist theory of knowledge.20

17Ibid., p. 20.
18Ibid., p. 11.
19Ibid.
20Ibid., p. 13.
(Recall Habermas' characterization of the strategic and instrumental action of the scientific-technical framework.)

Truth for Maritain is "the conformity of the mind with reality--with what exists independently of the mind." He fears that pragmatic and instrumentalist theories of knowledge produce youth so saturated with "scholarly skepticism" that they "distrust the very idea of truth and wisdom and...give up any hope of inner dynamic unity." 

We mistakenly regard schools as big factories:

through the back door of which the young child enters like a raw material, and from the front door of which the youth in his brilliant twenties will go out as a successfully manufactured man. Our education goes on until our death. Further, even in this preparatory field, school education itself has only a partial task, and this task is primarily concerned with knowledge and intelligence.

We must remember that school is just one aspect of education. There is also the "extra-educational sphere--the entire field of human activity..." and this in Maritain's view, exerts more influence on man than does the educational sphere itself.

The domain of teaching is the domain of truth and this truth and its pursuit must be the exclusive "dominating

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21Jacques Maritain, The Education of Man, 47.
24Ibid., p. 25.
influence in the school and the college."25 The teacher must constantly hold in mind the dignity of the child, never losing sight of the purpose of "preparing a human mind to think for itself."26 Maritain recognizes some exaggeration, but also great truths, in the Socratic conception of learning as innate in the learner and the teacher as only drawing attention to those things already in the soul of the learner so that the learner can remember. An educator is not an artist such as a sculptor or a potter who works on passive materials. The teacher is an artist dealing with living beings; teaching is "an art of ministering, an art subservient to nature."27

Ready-made knowledge does not, as Plato believed, exist in human soul; . . But the vital and active principle of knowledge does exist in each of us. . . .This inner vital principle the teacher must respect above all; his art consists in imitating the ways of the intellectual nature in its own operations.28

This is not to say that the teacher is not a dynamic factor or an important agent of education; but the fact remains that the primary force is "the internal vital principle in the one to be educated."29 The child needs positive guidance and help; education is bankrupt if it does not recognize this

26Ibid.
27Ibid., p. 30.
28Ibid., p. 31.
29Ibid.
responsibility and authority. The truth in education lies not in despotism or in anarchy, but somewhere in between.

Maritain lists four rules of education which seem to deal with the very essence of "teacher" and "teaching." The first is "to foster those fundamental dispositions which enable the principal agent to grow in the life of the mind." There are five of these fundamental dispositions: love of truth, love of good and justice, simplicity and openness with regard to existence, the sense of a job well done, and finally, the sense of cooperation. Maritain sees the function of this first rule of education as a liberation. Direct repression of bad energies should be used only secondarily. The best way of repressing bad energies is to liberate the good energies.

The second rule of education is:

...to center attention on the inner depths of personality and its preconsciously spiritual dynamism, in other words, to lay stress on inwardness and the internalization of the educational influence.

Under this rule Maritain emphasizes the great importance of the personal contact of teacher with student:

...not only as a better technique for making study more attractive and stimulating, but above all to give to that mysterious identity

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30Ibid., p. 39.
31Ibid., pp. 36-39.
32Ibid.
of the child's soul, which is unknown to himself, and which no techniques can reach, the comforting assurance of being in some way recognized by a human personal gaze, inexpressive either in concepts or words.33

No tricks or techniques can substitute for the "intellectual sympathy and intuition on the part of the teacher."34 (As we will see later, Martin Buber also speaks of this "presence" between teacher and child.) There is no room for exploitation of one human being by another; the student can never be regarded as raw material when this real meeting between two human beings takes place. There develops a "mood" of mutual learning and community in the classroom.

If a teacher himself is concerned with discerning and seeing, with getting vision, rather than with collecting facts and opinions, and if he handles his burden of knowledge so as to see through it into the reality of things, then in the mind of the student the power of intuition will be awakened and strengthened unawares, by the very intuitivity traversing such teaching.35

The third rule of teaching is "the whole work of education and teaching must tend to unify, not to spread out; it must strive to foster internal unity in man."36 This means the unification of hands and mind and the combination of experience and reason. Unification is difficult in our modern world

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33Ibid., p. 41.
34Ibid., p. 43.
35Ibid., p. 45.
36Ibid.
characterized by "atomization of human life." 37 This attempt to bring about unity instead of contributing to dispersion requires "inspiration and vision." 38 There is a parallel here between Maritain's hope for unity and Habermas' hope of mediation of the institutional and the scientific-technical world.

The fourth rule of education is "that teaching result in the freeing of the mind through mastery of reason over the things learned." 39 This means that anything learned must "be actively transformed by understanding into the very life of the mind, and thus strengthen the latter." 40 As Robert Hutchins pointed out, straight thinking and reasoning can develop excellent habits toward the good life in the good society, but "something is needed to preserve them, and this is understanding." 41 Higher education should provide a groundwork for the sustaining of these excellent habits under pressure of adult life.

For Maritain, all knowledge is not of equal worth; we must learn to choose that richest in truth. We have the misconception that education means collecting information.

37 Ibid., p. 47.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 49.
40 Ibid., p. 50.
There is a danger in modern universities of the cultivation of minds that are quick and clever, capable of presenting the pros and cons of any issue, "regardless of what is thought about, what is discussed, and how important the matter is."\(^2\) This is reminiscent of sophistry and no attempt is made at that deeper understanding so important to Maritain and Hutchins.

The crucial error is that of holding that nothing is any more important than anything else, that there can be no order of goods and no order in the intellectual realm. There is nothing central and nothing peripheral, nothing primary and nothing secondary, nothing basic and nothing superficial.\(^3\)

This is the substitution of "mental gymnastics for truth."\(^4\)

The human mind is set free by truth—truth "vitaually assimilated by the insatiable activity which is rooted in the depths of self."\(^5\)

In liberal education, Maritain sees the opportunity for youth to "penetrate as deeply as possible into the great achievements of the human mind."\(^6\) His description of liberal education is charged with his faith in the human being and the belief that truth is the "inspiring force needed in the

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 52.
\(^6\)Ibid., p. 63.
education of the youth."  

The objective of education is to see to it that the youth grasps this truth or beauty by the natural power and gifts of his mind and the natural intuitive energy of his reason backed up by his whole sensuous, imaginative, and emotional dynamism.

We can see therefore, that Maritain has a holistic conception of education—it takes the natural gifts of the mind, the intuitive energy of reason, the senses, the imagination and the emotions—all directed toward truth and beauty. It is important then for the teacher to approach teaching holistically:

The quality of the mode of style is of much greater moment than the quantity of things taught, it constitutes the very soul of teaching and preserves its unity and makes it alive and buoyant.

As stated earlier, Maritain's belief in the humanities and liberal education arises out of his belief in the dignity of all men. It follows from the dignity of man, that all men have a right to liberal education "in order to be prepared for human work and for human leisure." Thus, specialization introduced to youth at a time when they should be grasping the truth and beauty of the liberal arts does "violence to the world of youth."

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48 Ibid., p. 63.  
49 Ibid.  
50 Ibid., p. 64.  
51 Ibid.
Education today, as has historically been the case, is charged with remedying all social deficiencies. This conception of education as a panacea tends to distort the 

...essential aims, which deal with the formation of man and the inner liberation of the human person, must be preserved, whatever the superimposed burdens may be.52

Schools must resist making themselves the tool of the state by jumping on the latest bandwagon propelled "by the pride, greed, or myths of the earthly community."53 In order to resist these bandwagons educators and administrators must ever keep in mind the real aim of education—the making of a man. This conception of education grows out of the philosophical-religious conception of man discussed previously and it justifies and sustains the "primacy and integrity of liberal education" over the latest "crisis" for which schools are blamed and charged with remedying.

Maritain's faith in liberal education grows out of the belief that even though times change, there are basics—that search for the "good life in the good society,"—that search for truth and beauty—that need of personal unfolding from within—those questions about the nature of man and the nature of society which remain consistent throughout human history.

52Ibid., p. 91.
53Ibid., p. 95.
We are historical beings and we can learn much from the history of man. We must deal with philosophical and religious ideas of man. Maritain's faith in education is based on the profound truth that man must always be an end, never a means, that man endowed with intellect and will is higher than the animals, recognizes and seeks after the good. Liberal education, in Maritain's view, is the best approach for "becoming who we are."

Robert M. Hutchins

Robert M. Hutchins, in Education for Freedom, speaks of the contemporary conception of the "menace of metaphysics." Modern man distrusts anything which cannot be tested by science; he labels these unknowables "superstition," thus dismissing them. Hutchins disagrees:

I am interested in education, in morals, in intellect, and in metaphysics. I even go so far as to hold that there is a necessary relation among all these things. I am willing to assert that without one we cannot have the others and that without the others we cannot have the one with which I am primarily concerned, namely education.\(^{54}\)

This conviction that education is related to metaphysics grows out of Hutchins' belief that the problems of America are not material--they are "moral, intellectual and spiritual,"\(^{55}\)

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\(^{54}\) Robert M. Hutchins, Education For Freedom, 22.

\(^{55}\) Ibid., p. 23.
and that the aim of education is "wisdom and goodness" just as they are the aim of human life. If we are truly educators, we must ask metaphysical questions:

How can we talk about preparing men for life unless we ask what the end of life may be? At the base of education, as at the base of every human activity, lies metaphysics.56 This leads us necessarily into questions of the "good life" and the "good state" and the "nature of man." These are questions as old as man and they will remain with us as long as man remains man. Hutchins points to four "isms" which prevent us from dealing with the true aims of education.

The first is skepticism. This means that we can't really know anything and "everything is a matter of opinion." There is no truth of a higher order and one man's opinion is as good as another's.57

The second "ism" is presentism or the "cult of immediacy." This is the belief that only the reality around us has meaning. History and philosophy have no meaning because they deal with yesterday. This leads to the

...worship of information...we attach old problems not knowing they are old and make the same mistakes because we do not know they were made.58

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56 Ibid., p. 24.
57 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
58 Ibid., p. 32.
The first two "isms" lead to the third, scientism. This is the belief that everything which is not science is irrelevant. For Hutchins, this is disconcerting because:

...science does not tell us where to go. Men may employ it for good or evil purposes; but it is the men that have the purposes, and they do not learn them from their scientific studies.59

The final "ism" is anti-intellectualism. This is a distrust of the intellect and a belief in the primacy of the will. Since an anti-intellectual cannot "know," he must feel, and operate out of those feelings. Hutchins believes that "the task of education is to make rational animals more perfectly rational."60 Since we have been endowed with reason, we must cultivate that reason.

Modern technological society, ruled as it is by materialism, views education as preparation for life conceived in economic terms. "The test of education is whether the graduates succeed in life."61 Education is encouraged because graduates will make more money than those not holding diplomas and degrees.

George S. Counts, in 1962, referred to popular radio messages urging students to finish high school because "it would be worth 'fifty-thousand dollars.'"62 In that same

59Ibid., p. 34.
60Ibid., p. 37.
61Ibid., p. 42.
address, Counts referred to Leo Perla's book, *Can We End The Cold War?*, which lists the values of modern society in the following order:

1) money, 2) power, 3) material possessions, 4) cleanliness, 5) intelligence and education, and 6) moral qualities. Our survival depends upon how swiftly and successfully we place "moral qualities" first and "money" last. 63

Hutchins shares Counts' concern with materialism. While recognizing that material possessions are necessary, Hutchins places them in perspective. "The law of human beings is wisdom and goodness, not unlimited acquisition." Extreme concentration on material goods hinders progress toward man's real goal, "which is the fullest development of his specific powers." 64 Going back to John Stuart Mill, Hutchins says that any government is excellent only to the extent that it promotes "the virtues and intelligence of the people." 65 The economic order must take second place to this political order but we confuse the two and rationalize life in economic terms. Life viewed in economic terms allows us to regard another person as a means to our economic advancement, thus,

The principle of the good of the person and the good of society is substituted for the principle of the largest returns at the lowest cost. 66

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64 *Ibid.*, p. 44.
By putting aside the primacy of the good life and the good of man, we can "attempt to justify man's inhumanity to man."67

Hutchins says that the question is often asked: "What is wrong with our educational system?" His answer is "nothing."

He poses a different question: "What is wrong with the country?"

The educational system that any country has will be the system that country wants. ...Whatever is honored in a country will be cultivated there. A means of cultivating it is the educational system.68

Our educational system therefore reflects our concentration on vocationalism:

The tendency is more and more to drive out of the course of study everything which is not immediately concerned with making a living.69

Hutchins points to the futility of concentration on current information since that information changes so rapidly. We seem to be doomed today to teach nothing "except things obviously not worth teaching." This is "educational futilitarianism."70

If education is merely a reflection of society and can be no better than that society, does that mean that education is doomed to "futilitarianism?" No! Hutchins reiterates his faith in education saying it is "the only way to secure a

67Ibid., p. 47.
68Ibid., p. 48.
69Ibid., p. 51.
70Ibid., p. 58.
spiritual revolution," and he suggests that we attempt "the reconstruction of the educational system, even if the attempt seems unrealistic or almost silly."71 What he is suggesting is an educational system based on "the common good as determined in the light of reason."72 This must be an education based on the principle that "every man is an end; no man is a means."73 This takes great faith in man.

...we must believe that man can discover truth, goodness and right by the exercise of his reason, and that he may do so even as to those problems which, in the nature of the case, science can never solve.74

These moral and intellectual powers of man are what make him truly man and each one of us is charged with the fullest possible development of these powers. For Hutchins, as for Maritain, education in the liberal arts and the humanities is the best way to develop these powers and it is also the basis for the beginning spiritual revolution.

Jacques Barzun

Jacques Barzun also speaks of teaching as an art. He recalls the beginning of his own teaching career as obedience

71Ibid., p. 59.
72Ibid.
73Ibid., p. 83.
74Ibid., p. 86.
to "the summons to teach. ...It is clear that teachers are born, not made, and circumstances usually permit rather than compel."75 The good teacher does not do for the student, but instead chooses the more difficult path of leading the student to learn to do for himself. There is no pat formula for teaching anything to anybody, rather,

...the teacher-artist builds by the familiar process of taking apart and putting together. He must break down the new and puzzling situation into simpler bits and lead the beginner in the right order from one bit to the next. What the simpler bits and the right order are no one can know ahead of time. They vary from each individual and the teacher must grope around until he finds a 'first step' that the particular pupil can manage. ...it takes the stubbornness of a saint coupled with the imagination of a demon for a teacher to pursue his art of improvisation gracefully, unwearyingly, endlessly.76

The relationship between teacher and student is "an emotional one and most complex and unstable besides."77 Those under the "summons to teach" have a great curiosity about the workings of the student's mind. Those teachers also remember the exhilaration of their own learning discoveries and,

...the master finds a satisfaction which I have called artistic in seeing how a new human being will meet and make his own some part of our culture—our ways, our thoughts, even our errors and superstitions.78

76Ibid., p. 18.
77Ibid.
78Ibid., p. 19.
Teaching and being taught cannot deal with the realm of the mind only; emotions are of necessity involved. A teacher-artist is not teaching subject matter only, he is also teaching form and feeling and approach to life. When the student and teacher really meet in a true learning experience, there is no substitute for that communion of thought by two separate minds.

Teaching is a two-way street. The energy flows in both directions. But a teacher is not just an older student, a big brother, he must be a responsible leader:

...what he knows, he knows better than his students, knows it in a different manner, and knows that he knows it.79

This is a concept which goes beyond "facilitation."

Barzun recognizes that regard for teachers and the art of teaching is on the decline. Part of the reason for this decline in respect for teaching is the fact that we expect education "to do everything that the rest of the world leaves undone."80 We expect the schools to:

...produce patriots, (create a) classless society, root out racial intolerance, (solve housing problems, turn out) practised engineers, affable hotelkeepers, and finished literary artists.81

Of course when the schools are measured against this giant yardstick, they fall short.

79 Ibid., p. 44.
80 Ibid., p. 6.
81 Ibid., p. 7.
...Free compulsory "education" is a great thing, an indispensable thing, but it will not make the City of God out of Public School No. 26.82

Most of these social virtues which the schools are held responsible for teaching cannot be taught in the sense of courses in the curriculum. They are "by-products" which come "from a teacher...from a human soul."83 We, as a society, want the good life, but somehow "the good life" translates into businesslike efficiency. We look askance at thinkers for "the world is not organized for the life of the mind."84 But thinking is not an orderly, efficient operation, it is:

...inwardly a haphazard, fitful, incoherent activity, ...messy, repetitious, silly, obtuse, subject to explosions that shatter the crucible and leave darkness behind.85

We cannot turn thinking into a technique—into an assembly line process. In thinking and in teaching, there can be no interchangeable parts, no assembly line, because the process is personal and unique. There is no tried and true formula for the making of a good teacher. Different students need different teachers. The common denominator of true teachers is that they "all are or should be artists, meaning by this craftsmen in

82Ibid., p. 8.
83Ibid., p. 9.
84Ibid., p. 299.
love with their work."36 The true teacher brings "self-discipline and indefatigable passion" to this art of "subtle growth called Education."37

Barzun sees the problem of the future as not just getting teachers, but to "recognize the good ones and not discourage them before they have done their stint."38

Everyone can recognize the difference between a teacher and a drudge. When a Jesus, a Buddha or a Socrates is met, one knows that one has met a teacher. As William James put it, the end of education is "knowing a good man when you see him."39

Gilbert Highet

...I believe that teaching is an art, not a science. It seems to me very dangerous to apply the aims and methods of science to human beings as individuals, although a statistical principle can often be used to explain their behavior in large groups and a scientific diagnosis of their physical structure is always valuable. But a "scientific" relationship between human beings is bound to be inadequate and perhaps distorted. ...Teaching involves emotions, which cannot be systematically appraised and employed, and human values, which are quite outside the grasp of science. ...You must throw your heart into it, you must realize that it cannot all be done by formulas, or you will spoil your work, and your pupils, and yourself.90

36Ibid., p. 308.
37Ibid., p. 116.
38Ibid., p. 12.
39Ibid., p. 309.
With the recognition that teaching is an art with all the ambiguity and uncertainty involved in art, Highet sees it as a profession with the inherent rewards of "leisure," "using the mind on valuable subjects," and "the happiness of making something."91 A good teacher knows his subject and ever continues to learn it. He knows its inner workings and its higher levels. The good teacher also likes his subject. Therefore, a good teacher chooses his subject carefully, guided by his own interests. It is also essential that a good teacher like his pupils. He feels the flow of energy from his class, he is excited about being with them. But liking them is not enough, a good teacher also knows his pupils. He remembers what it is like to be young. And finally, the good teacher has "wide and lively intellectual interests;" he has a zest for life; he "is an interesting man or woman."92 In addition to all this, a good teacher has humor, a good memory, will-power, and kindness.

Planning is a necessary part of teaching, and yet "planning and purpose can be very inhuman. They can stifle independence and originality."93 There is no one correct method and making a fetish of methods limits the range of the teacher and that of the child. Highet sees the mind of the

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91Ibid., pp. 10-11.
92Ibid., pp. 8-59.
93Ibid., p. 221.
child as "infinitely capacious," and the good teacher does not limit this capacity, rather he encourages the child to move as deeply into the subject as his ability allows. Since life is a process of change, the good teacher-artist is growing in his subject matter and in his understanding and love of human nature and teaching. He does not allow his teaching to atrophy. His life is an example to his students in that he is constantly learning and growing.

There is no certainty in teaching. Sometimes students revolt against a good teacher. Sometimes out of this conflict comes real growth. Highet speaks of the great energy of great teachers. Crowds seem to renew their energy. There is a sense of inspiration on both sides when there has been a real meeting of minds. He points out that Jesus was not organized and his speeches seem to have no plan or cogent argument. And yet, the crowds followed him and heard his message. If God the Father had imposed methods of teaching on Jesus, who knows the outcome. Part of Highet's point is that there is no certain correct method for accomplishing a teaching task. A real teacher could be dull or imaginative, warm or forbidding, organized or unorganized, but when present before one of them, the student knows it.

The school does not hold an exclusive on teaching; much teaching goes on in the rest of the world by fathers and mothers.

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husbands and wives, businessman, clergymen, etc. Their methods vary widely but Highet lists three common denominators of good teaching. The first is clarity. It is easy to be clear to yourself, it is not so easy to be clear to others because this involves an understanding of them. The second mark of good teaching is patience. Worthy learning takes time—both to learn and to teach. Finally, the third principle of good teaching is responsibility. "It is a serious thing to interfere with another man's life. It is hard enough to guide one's own."95 We must hold that other person's life in great respect and approach our task with great humility.

As is obvious, while Highet points to some commonalities of good teaching, there is no technology of teaching involved here. Rather, Highet concentrates on the relationship between teacher and learner and the variety of approaches which can be implemented to reach together than goal of understanding. Methods are important, but they have to grow out of the relationship of teacher and student; they cannot be imposed from without. The importance of this approach takes us to what is integral to an understanding of Highet and his respect for teaching, and that is his tremendous respect for the innate goodness and intelligence of the student and his belief that real teaching takes place when the student and the

95Ibid., pp. 280-281.
teacher can talk to each other from the center of their beings. Although Highe does not say it directly, one gets the feeling that he views the art of teaching as a gift, but a gift that must be constantly nurtured. The growth of the artist-teacher must be a growth toward self-understanding and an ever more complete understanding of history, philosophy, the contemporary social scene, and human nature.

Maxine Greene

In her 1967 work, *Existential Encounters For Teachers*, Maxine Greene, through the work of selected nineteenth and twentieth century existentialists, deals with education in the sense of:

...multiple modes of becoming, or confronting life situations, of engaging with others, of reflecting, forming, choosing, struggling to be.96

Recalling the concerns of Marcuse, Habermas and Ellul in regard to the place of man in late twentieth century life, it is appropriate to consider these existentialists,

...all of whom have been concerned with the problem of human existence in a universe barren of "sense" or sanction, concerned with the problem of freedom, with men's sometimes desperate efforts to create identities for themselves... (amid) the troubling moods--of anguish, nausea, anxiety, boredom--which color experience for the one conscious of his own existence in time.97


97Ibid., pp. 4-5.
Real living involves risk and uncertainty— that "dreadful freedom" for those who cannot accept mere existence as part of the mass or the "crowd." But it is when this dreadful freedom is confronted that the individual feels most intensely alive. It is easier and more comfortable to follow the crowd, think in stereotypes, "live automatically and indifferently." But Greene suggests that real teachers can help children overcome these modes of conformity and unreflective living. They can be "urged into the disquietude, the sense of crisis in which existential awareness begins." 

Existentialism recognizes the "separate" existence of each individual, and the consciousness of that separateness. It recognizes that each individual

...must act upon his own possibilities, recognizing them as such. And he must be held responsible for his choice. He must ache to learn and to grow; and we (teachers) must welcome his aching and unease. We must welcome the anguish he may feel, the guilt before his own refusals. There may be no sin so great as the sin of refusing to become, to be."

How then do teachers create this mode of becoming, this "urging into disquietude" in their classrooms? This question is especially relevant when one considers the stress placed on teachers to implement the latest district-wide or nation-

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98 Ibid., p. 9.

99 Ibid.

100 Ibid., p. 160.
wide policies which may be directed more toward adaptation of the child than toward his "becoming." For Greene, the teacher himself must be involved in the project of "creating himself." He, if he hopes to create a mode of "becoming in his classroom, must be ever in the process of becoming.

The teacher--or the teacher-to-be--who pays heed must acknowledge somehow that his effectiveness, like his authenticity, depends to some degree upon the nature of his personal commitment. The teacher must be personally involved in his teaching.

Martin Buber spoke of the "mutuality" between teacher and child. In order for there to be reality of mutuality between them, the teacher must be "truly present" to the child. This presence depends on "inclusion" or the gathering of

...the child's presence into his own store as one of the bearers of his communion with the world. 
...if he has really gathered the child into his life then that subterranean dialogic, that steady potential presence of the one to the other is established and endures.

But this relationship between teacher and child is necessarily a one-sided "inclusion." Although there is "the mutuality of giving and taking," the child doesn't experience the educating of the teacher. The teacher sees both sides of the situation, the student sees only one side. The teacher is calling

101 Ibid., p. 155.
102 Ibid. pp. 48-49.
103 Ibid.
forth the being and potential of the child and this involves tension and risk, because it is not the mere transmission of what the teacher knows, but the surprise involved in becoming. When there is real meeting—man with man—"something takes place between one being and another the like of which can be found nowhere in nature."104 This sphere of the "between" is the "primal category of human reality."105 It is the only real alternative to our solitary existence. The other common alternatives are "modern individualism," (which for Buber has "essentially an imaginary basis") and "modern collectivism" in which the individual tries to bury himself in the mass or lose himself in the group.106

This existential approach to teaching excludes doctrines and prescriptions. There is no invocation of formulae and definite outcomes, but an "engaging in" the mutuality of the teacher's personal becoming with the child's becoming. This is risk because we do not know exactly where the exploration will end. But for the existentialist, there is no alternative to this life of risk, because as for Buber, "All real living is meeting." For the teacher who has experienced "meeting" and has grasped its significance, a child can never be a

104Ibid., p. 140.
105Ibid., p. 141.
106Ibid., pp. 138-141.
"specimen" or an "object of study."\textsuperscript{107}

These individuals, then, clearly present a humanistic alternative to the technological dilemma in education and society.

\textsuperscript{107}Ibid., p. 160.
CHAPTER V

ACCOUNTABILITY MOVEMENT: A TESTING GROUND FOR EDUCATION

We turn now from the humanistic perspective of education seen as "the making of a man" and a view of teaching as an art to a concept of education as a science centered on measurables, observables and efficiency, the current benchmarks of a technological rationale.

There is no official definition of "accountability in education." Loosely defined, it is a movement growing out of behaviorism and operating on the principle that teaching should be competence and performance based and evaluated on observable and measurable behavior. Teachers are viewed as "educational engineers," who are held responsible for the results of their students as measured by standardized tests.

These (accountability) procedures include management by objectives, cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analyses, and the allocation of funds and other resources in terms of the contributors of various inputs to the final product—in this case, the pupils' educational achievement.¹

As Nash and Agne have shown, accountability is not a new movement. Americans have always felt the need to watch and check public institutions to see that taxes are not being

¹Martin Levit, "The Ideology of Accountability in Schooling," Educational Studies 3 (Fall, 1927):133.
misused. This watchdog attitude growing out of American "anti-intellectualism," made schools the target of public scrutiny and criticism. Out of this attitude grew the thrust for utilitarian education modeled on groups outside of education itself. In the early part of this century, the model for educational reform was business philosophy and practices, as we will see through the work of Raymond E. Callahan. Through Curti's The Social Ideas of American Educators, Nash and Agne have shown that schools have always answered to the public's demand for accountability:

...in life-adjustment programs, homemaking, vocational preparation, intergroup relations, and technical training...accountability has existed, at least as an implicit educational principle, in this country for three hundred years.²

In tracing the sources of the current accountability movement, one might return to the Soviet launching of Sputnik in October, 1957. The United States was suddenly second in the space race, and the fault, of course, was placed with our system of education and its failure to produce scientists and mathematicians. Through the 1958 National Defense Education Act, federal money was poured into new programs to upgrade science, math, and foreign language in our schools.

In the 1960s, society's mood changed and schools were seen as joyless jails which stifled the creativity of children with

"lock-step" curriculum. Radical critics advocated "deschooling society," while not-so-radical critics explored the possibility of "schools without walls and failure," "free schools," "alternative schools," "innovation" and "individualized instruction." Coupled with this push for "humanism" in our schools was the recognition that schools should address the problems of racial injustice.

While the neo-romanticists were exploring humanistic alternatives, another movement was taking shape simultaneously. Based on the work of behavioral scientists with animals in which contingencies were arranged to produce certain changes in behavior, some educational theorists in the early 1960s began to "reason" that the contingencies in the classroom could also be arranged to produce "learning." The first step was to establish exact objectives stated in terms of observable behavior. Behaviorists stressed that we substitute the use of such ambiguous and unmeasurable objectives such as "knowing" and "understanding," with statements of exactly what our students were to do as a result of our instruction.

By the early 1970s, the current accountability movement had begun to establish itself. There are now over thirty states with some type of accountability legislation.3 With school levys failing, schools closing, and the glut of "Johnny

Can't Read, Write, Do Simple Math or Much of Anything"
literature, the stage was set for the continued growth of
accountability. As Lieberman shows, we have gone from the
push of the sixties for innovative curriculum, alternative
approaches, and humanistic education to cries of "back to
basics," "trim the fat," and get rid of "frills."

...higher prices, fewer jobs, general dissatisfaction
with futures, ...the school represents the one place
where the public still has a chance to voice its
frustration with the many things gone wrong. 4

Schools have always been the target of criticism for many
conditions and events over which they have no control, even
though we know that schooling is just one aspect of education.
Coupled with the public's willingness to use the schools as
scapegoat and the school's tendency to assume that role, is
society's increasing mistrust of anything unscientific or
untechnical. Accountability as a "scientific" approach to
education offers a means of answering to the public, as did the
application of "scientific management" to the schools in the
early part of this century.

Ralph A. Smith classifies the whole accountability
movement in all of its manifestations under PPBS--Planning,
Programming, Budgeting Systems. The essential elements of
PPBS came from the Rand Corporation's study of Air Force

4Ibid., p. 259.
defense strategies in the early 1960s and were eventually incorporated into Defense Department planning. These procedures soon found their way into education. The procedures used by school districts in implementing PPBS generally follow the procedures recommended by the Johnson Administration in an October, 1965 Bureau of the Budget Bulletin entitled, "Planning-Programming-Budgeting." As Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, under the Johnson Administration notes, the "byword" of that administration was "cost-benefit analysis."

It was hoped that this method of carefully weighing alternatives by measuring their costs against their projected benefits might introduce more rationality not only into the planning of military weaponry but into decision-making throughout the government. Yet this was the Administration which made decisions, not once but repeatedly that took the country ever more deeply into a war which had mounting costs and indiscernible benefits. ...How could the government with all the resources at its disposal...lose its sense of direction and its touch on reality.6

In a March 3, 1970 message to Congress, President Nixon endorsed accountability in education. He called for the establishment of a National Institute of Education which would lead in the accountability movement and develop "new measurements of educational output." Nixon cautioned us not


to lose sight of immeasurables such as "responsibility, wit and humanity." He urged that school administrators and teachers should be held accountable for their performance. We must get rid of our fear of "national standards," and start thinking of the "productivity of the schools."  

In 1972, Nixon's U.S. Commissioner of Education, Sidney P. Marland, Jr., focused on "management by objective" as the "key to the smooth operation of our contemporary educational institutions." Marland defined accountability:

as the process of establishing objectives and assessing the degree to which those objectives have been fulfilled.  

But establishing broad objectives was not enough; each objective "must be broken into specific and carefully defined sub-objectives."  

Marland glowingly described the management by objectives in the U.S. Office of Education and the commitment of all personnel to this approach. He listed eight objectives which the Office intended to accomplish through accountability. Space permits the analysis of just two which obviously have not been accomplished. The first is racial integration—"to achieve

9 Ibid., p. 340.
1977 equal educational opportunity for all racial, ethnic, and cultural minorities."\textsuperscript{10} The other was "The Right to Read."

To assure that 99 percent of all people in the United States who are 16 years old and 90 percent of all over 16 will be functionally literate by 1980.\textsuperscript{11}

We have a long way to go to meet the 1980 goal. Marland called for the involvement of "as many persons as possible," in the work of the schools through the boards of education. He noted that "our primary concern must always be the fulfillment of individual human beings rather than the fulfillment of managerial concepts."\textsuperscript{12} But, as accountabilists are prone to do, he passed off this concern by saying that this commitment can often be stated in measurable terms.

Marland called for a "science of evaluation,"\textsuperscript{13} very related to Leon Lessinger's "independent audit," which we will describe later.

Indeed, within our time—perhaps within the next ten years—there could well be a nationwide accounting process or institution which would act like a certified public accountant in business, objectively assessing the success and failure of our schools and reporting the findings to the public.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., p. 339.  
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., p. 340.  
\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., p. 343.  
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 345.  
\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., p. 344.
Marland lauded performance contracting and the independent audit because, even though they were crude and new, they would help us to develop an ever "more refined and exact" science of evaluation, which would account "to the people in more and more systematic ways."\(^{15}\) One gets the feeling that Marland equates evaluation of school programs with bank auditing.

We teach as we are taught, so a logical outgrowth of the behavioristic approach in elementary and secondary schools was the extension of that approach to teacher-education institutions. The U.S. Office of Education, under Marland's direction, supported the New Performance Based Teacher Education and Competency Based Teacher Education programs, hereafter known as PBTE/CBTE. Soon:

> The PBTE bandwagon was boarded by most teacher education institutions, by the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education and by teacher certification authorities in most of the fifty states.\(^{16}\)

A typical statement on PBTE/CBTE comes from Frederick J. McDonald. He sees the roots of PBTE/CBTE in behavioral psychology and in "systems analysis strategies for the development of effective man-machine systems."\(^{17}\) He sees

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p. 345.

\(^{16}\)J. Myron Atkin, "Professional Leadership and PBTE." Regaining Educational Leadership, Ralph A. Smith, ed., p. 16.

"teaching acts" as "observable performances." He asks: "What performances are required for effective teaching?" His conclusion is that "teaching competence means possessing a set of performances on which the teacher can draw as situations vary."18 McDonald calls the teacher-trainee an "information-processing organism."19 Teacher-education in essence becomes passing on the the "teacher-trainee" a bag of tricks called competencies:

Teaching competence means having available a diverse set of performances adaptable to a wide range of teaching situations. These performances are integratable in a variety of combinations. Some are simple; others are complex.20

Accountability demands teachers who are willing and able to follow the exact specifications of programs to be implemented in their classrooms. The move toward competency based and performance based teacher education is a move toward filling that demand.

Nash sees four assumptions in the competency-based teacher education model:

1. Teaching can be reduced to a series of performance functions and can be analyzed according to types of teaching activities.

2. Because teaching consists exclusively of these various kinds of activities (e.g. explaining, guiding demonstrating, testing, and evaluating, skills imparting), the best teacher education program is one which develops training protocols that foster these skills.

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18Ibid., pp. 23-24.
19Ibid., p. 27.
20Ibid., p. 29.
3. The performance or competency curriculum is rooted in a set of very clear objectives. This competency curriculum provides knowledge and develops skills to reach those objectives. Also, it systematically measures its effectiveness by checking on how well its trainees are fulfilling the objectives.

4. Such a curriculum is not concerned with liberal education, specialized knowledge an an academic area, the values and attitudes of the trainee, or the dilemmas of the larger society within which the school is located. Its primary and exclusive function is to train learning strategists and communicators of skills.21

As part of the accountability movement, CBTE/PBTE is based on the same principles of that movement. Nash traces these principles to three roots. First, we are still guided by positivism. We insist on measuring learning in demonstrable behavior. The second root is pragmatism—we look for learning that is "immediately reducible to utilitarian usefulness." Finally, the third root is opportunistic technologism—we look to technology to solve our problems.22

A March, 1978 report indicated that "thirty states now have legislation or regulations regarding minimum competency testing, either for promotion or high school graduation purposes."23 The same report indicated that CBTE has until recently been

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22 Ibid., p. 241.

introduced on an institutional basis. Now, Florida and Georgia are taking steps for state-wide conversion to C3TE. This concept has been endorsed by Georgia Governor, George Busbee, who said that C3TE/PBTE means:

...that those going into the teaching profession have to demonstrate that they have had proper training...and once trained...that they have what it takes to be effective teachers. 24

The Florida Committee on Teacher Education has developed "a list of twenty-three generic teacher competencies." 25

The Bible of Accountability

We will now turn to the work of Leon M. Lessinger, Every Kid A Winner: Accountability in Education, 1970. This work has been called the "Bible of the accountability movement." 26 Lessinger himself has been labeled "the foremost advocate of accountability," 27 and the "high priest of accountability." 28 We therefore turn to the "high priest" and his "Bible" for a statement of the theory of accountability.

Lessinger begins by claiming that schools have a failure rate of "one youngster in four." Kids are not learning basic

27 Martin Levit, "The Ideology of Accountability in Schooling," 133.
skills and these failures represent "social and economic fatalities" in terms of "taxes and in social unrest," not to mention the undeveloped potential of the child. Despite the sad state of affairs in education, Lessinger is optimistic that we can "transform our schools within this decade." The formula of transformation, of course, is accountability.

This opportunity springs from several sources: from a new and sophisticated process of management that defines educational goals in measurable terms; from stimulating innovations discovered by new alliances among local schools, the federal government, and private enterprise; from testing programs that can be used at low political, social, and economic risk to discover what actually works; from the ability to avoid bureaucratic delay and put effective programs in the classrooms immediately; and from the growing acceptance of the ideas that the schools, like other sectors of our society, are accountable to the public for what they do—or fail to do.29

Lessinger uses the space industry as an example of engineering for results. Just as the space industry produced results in terms of landing on the moon, so can education produce results if it follows this engineering model. Thus it can fulfill the public's demand for performance.

As Lessinger sees it, we must recognize "three basic rights in modern education."30 The first right is "the child's right to learn." The focus of this right is the "basic skills without

30 Ibid., p. 4.
which he would fail in modern society." These skills must be testable/demonstrable. The school must guarantee the acquisition of these basic skills and use the most economical means to that end. The second right is the "taxpayer's right to know." We pour billions of dollars into schools and we do not know what kind of results are produced by those funds. "The public wants to know for a start, whether young people can read, can get and hold a job, can go as far in higher education as their abilities warrant." The third right is "the schools right to teach." Schools should "define their output no longer as teaching done, but as learning proven." This involved standardized pre-testing and post-testing to measure actual change in learning basic skills. Once we produce valid, standardized measurement instruments, we can "relate learning to cost," and develop the concept of "learning-unit cost." Granted, education encompasses unmeasurables, but this, says Lessinger, should not deter us from gathering data on the measurable parts of learning. Up to this point, we have concentrated on financial inputs—we

know where the tax dollars go, but we don't know the results. We need to measure educational outputs—"the cost of skill acquisition."36

The process by which we will become accountable is "educational engineering."

...in engineering we define exactly what we want, then bring together resources and technology in such a way as to assure those results.37

The result we want to assure through educational engineering is "the guaranteed acquisition of basic skills by all of our children."38 A "well-engineered" program must specify educational goals in measurable terms. It must open itself to an "independent audit of results,"39 thus allowing the public to judge the results of tax expenditures. This program encourages continual innovation and the involvement of "talent and technology from all sectors of our society."40 This will allow schools to adopt the best new programs at limited risk. "In this sense, educational engineering is not a single program, but a technique for the management of change."41

36Ibid.
37Ibid., p. 12.
38Ibid.
39Ibid., p. 13.
40Ibid.
41Ibid.
Lessinger says we must stop regarding schools as a "kind of cottage industry" when in effect they have become "a modern corporation."\(^2\) Elementary and secondary schools do

...close to $40 billion of business annually, (they) serve as a supplier for every aspect of our economy as well as for higher education. Its clients include every person who pays taxes.\(^3\)

Lessinger explains some of the shortcomings of the schools:

In our technological age, what would we ordinarily think of an enterprise that spends only a fraction of one percent of its income on research and development? That often fails effectively to apply the knowledge which it does have? That is so labor-intensive that it spends, on the average, less than four percent of its budget for materials, equipment, and supplies? What future do we predict for an enterprise run by people who lack training in sophisticated management techniques, who exercise little creative control over their personnel, and who seldom know exactly what effect they are having? Unfortunately, our public schools make up such an enterprise.\(^4\)

By beginning to think of the educational enterprise as a "complex, adaptable kind of business,"\(^5\) we can begin to ally ourselves

...with those outside the schools who can develop, package, test, introduce, manage, and verify new methods for the guaranteed acquisition of necessary skills.\(^6\)

Lessinger says some of our beliefs about schools and our practices in schools are "rooted in the past," and remain

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 14.
\(^3\)Ibid.
\(^4\)Ibid.
\(^5\)Ibid.
\(^6\)Ibid.
unchanged despite assault. People fear that the quality of education decreases when we introduce business practices into the schools; people fear that individual freedom will be restricted and students will occupy a place of secondary importance to computers and efficiency. His answer to these fears is simply that we are under assault and we must respond.

To get the results that parents, their representatives, and even students are rightly demanding, we must learn to change.\textsuperscript{47}

Education needs capital for research and development and for stimulation of competition. Lessinger mentions the voucher system under which parents would be given a voucher which could be spent for education at any school. This however, while increasing competition, would also weaken the inner-city public schools. Lessinger claims that his plan would not.

We must, according to Lessinger, reach outside our schools for help. Why? Because business firms do. The answer lies in performance contracting.

\begin{quote}
Essentially, a performance contract is an agreement by a firm or individual to produce specified results by a certain date, using acceptable methods, for a set fee. The parties may agree in advance that, if the conditions are not met by that date, the firm must continue its efforts for no additional fee, until they are met; and also that if the requirements are exceeded, either by early completion or by a higher level of achievement, the fee will be increased by specified amounts.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{47}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{48}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 18.
This is a low risk venture for the school, as they are not required to pay unless requirements are met. The supplier of services is under incentive to exceed the requirements of the contract for additional money.

Referring to Rosenthal's study, *Pygmalion in the Classroom*, Lessinger stresses that we, as teachers, get what we expect. We must learn to take a new look at the concept of aptitude. Where basic skills are concerned, every child—except for a very small group—can achieve mastery. The difference between children and mastery of basic skills is not a matter of degree but a matter of the amount of time needed for that mastery.

At the present time, school officials know very little about the systems they administer. As stated earlier, we can always point to "inputs," but we know very little about educational "outputs." The first step in alleviating this difficulty is that we need to specify beforehand in behavioral terms "what we want the student to be able to do at the end of the program." This, of course, is to be followed by a test measuring that ability. The second step toward accountability is the opening of our schools to an "independent educational accomplishment audit." The third step is to make the results

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50Leon Lessinger, *Every Kid a Winner*, 32.
of that audit available to the public so that we can "compare the costs of producing certain benefits in various ways."51

To summarize then, Lessinger's educational engineering plan involves seven steps:

1. The LEA (Local Educational Authority) secures development capital—from a federal agency, state agency, the local school board, or from a private group. This could be as little as one percent of the operating budget devoted to the purpose of development of new programs.

2. The LEA retains a MSG (management support group) composed of members who have special skills and experience enabling them to assist local officials. "The MSG can act as a go-between in negotiations with the source of development capital and other outside parties. The LEA, however, retains control over all phases of the operation."52

3. With the help of school staff, community etc, the MSG prepares a RFP (request for proposal)—"a set of specifications setting forth as clearly as possible the services to be performed, the approximate amount of money to be invested, the restrictions to be observed, the standards to be met, and so forth."53

4. The RFP is put out for public bid. Interested firms are notified of a PBC (pre-bidding conference). "Here a rich and varied communication occurs between elements of the private and public sectors."54

5. After revisions, a final RFP is issued and final bids are entertained. "In short, the process is very similar to what the board would do if it were retaining an architect."55

52Ibid., p. 36.
53Ibid.
54Ibid.
55Ibid., p. 37.
6. The LEA selects the best bid and with the MSG negotiates with the selected firm for a performance contract.

7. While the performance contract is being finalized, the LEA secures an IEAA (independent educational accomplishment auditor) "both to monitor execution of the performance contract and to assess the actual results upon which payment to the contractor will depend." After the method of measuring results is agreed upon, the IEAA pretests the students who will be involved in the program. The program now begins.56

Lessinger tries to assuage the fears of "humanists" by saying that educational engineering provides the opportunity for the "symbiosis of technology and humanism, wedding the skills of one to the values of the other."57 He says there is no humanism when children feel failure and self-contempt because they are not learning. This can change if we get rid of our "bumbling, primitive technology of instruction."58

We cannot expect to make progress unless developmental capital is obtained. At present, "much less than one percent of our total national education investment goes into research and development."59 Industry, on the other hand, devotes "from three to fifteen percent of their budgets to research and development."60 Where will we get this developmental

56Ibid., pp. 36-37.
57Ibid., p. 37.
58Ibid.
59Ibid., p. 44.
60Ibid., p. 41.
capital? Lessinger sees it coming from federal allocations, from the operating budget of the school system itself, and from foundations and other private sources. He believes that once we begin, through educational engineering, to relate costs to results we will not be criticized for wasting allocations.

Lessinger reemphasizes the need of school systems for outside help. "School systems are better at running programs than at starting them." School systems, in his view, can no longer go it alone.

In the future, an educational manager will gain his reputation not by trying to do everything from within, but rather by calling deftly on a variety of outside services and putting them to work within the schools. He will recognize that for purposes of innovation, certain services are best organized outside the public school bureaucracy.

The educational manager supervises the work of experts toward the "turnkey phase" of a program. After the program is set in motion the keys are turned over to the local system and the local staff trained by the contractor.

What are the benefits of this performance contracting approach? Lessinger outlines five: 1) "A more sophisticated technology of instruction." Through the use of new media,

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61 Ibid., p. 46.
62 Ibid., p. 34.
63 Ibid., p. 64.
64 Ibid., p. 68.
the teacher will be freed from repetitious tasks and freed
to do now neglected tasks. 2) Performance contracting will
"introduce greater resources and versatility into our public
schools."65 This versatility will come through the ideas
coming into the system through outside resources. 3) "Performance
contracting allows a school system to experiment in an orderly,
responsible manner with low costs and low political
risks."66
4) With the implementation of desegregation programs, "we can
easily set up a transitional program in which previously
segregated children can gain their basic skills on a guaranteed
basis while they are attending a newly integrated school."67
This, says Lessinger, will not interrupt the progress of
children at more advanced stages of skill acquisition. 5) The
competitive character of performance contracting will "call
forth a high quality both of proposals and of work."68

We turn now to an historical precedent of the educational
accountability movement, the scientific management movement.

An Historical Precedent

The lessons of history are rarely learned. Reading the
pro-accountability literature gives one no indication that the
accountability advocates have ever heard of scientific management

65Ibid., p. 69.  
66Ibid., p. 70.  
67Ibid.  
68Ibid.
and its application to the schools during the early part of this century. The lessons which that marriage of business and education have to give are very applicable to the current "efficiency" movement in education.

The education profession is perhaps the least autonomous of the professions. As Raymond Callahan points out in his comprehensive *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*, the history of the relationship of business-industrial groups and of school administrators in the United States has been a history of strength of the former in its criticism of schools and of vulnerability and capitulation on the part of the latter, "...this vulnerability is built into our pattern of local support and control."69

The increased industrialization of the US. in the late nineteenth century and the rise of business and industry began to influence the values of Americans. By the turn of the century, business philosophy came to be widely accepted in American society and the businessman assumed the role of community leader. The "American dream" of success through determination and hard work was exemplified in the proliferation of "success literature." Many dreamed of "rags to riches" a l'a Carnegie and Rockefeller. Increasingly problems were viewed as solvable through business methodology, much as we rely

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69Raymond E. Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*, viii.
So the business ideology was spread continuously into the bloodstream of American life. It was strengthened, not weakened, by the muckrakers as they extolled "modern business methods" and "efficiency" and connected these in the public mind with progress and reform.\textsuperscript{70}

This pervasive business ideology spread to a call for reform of all public institutions including the schools, from 1900-1925.

It consisted of making unfavorable comparisons between the schools and business enterprise, of applying business-industrial criteria (e.g. economy and efficiency) to education, and of suggesting that business and industrial practices be adopted by educators.\textsuperscript{71}

In addition to the call for business-like operation of the schools, there was a demand that more emphasis be placed upon practical education. The anti-intellectual tradition of America was in full bloom as Andrew Carnegie saw college as a place to "waste energies,"\textsuperscript{72} and a Chicago bank president praised school superintendents for,

\ldots getting away, to an extent, from the mere scholastic education, and developing the practical side, making the school the place to learn how to manufacture.\textsuperscript{73}

American business became increasingly aware of the competition of the German industrial system. By 1905 there

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{70}Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., p. 6.
\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., p. 9.
\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., p. 9.
\end{quote}
was a strong push for vocational training in the schools modeled on Germany's industrial education system. If American industry was to survive and compete with Germany, it was viewed as crucial that industrial education become a part of the public school system.

The immediate result of this drive was that American education was pushed further into the training of clerks and factory workers and by that much away from the liberal education of free men. It also made school administrators more aware of the power of business in American society, and it served to condition them to the pattern of capitulation which was to become prevalent in educational administration between 1911 and 1925.74

(The fear that Germany was overtaking the U.S. in industry and the consequent effect on education, can, of course, be compared to the 1957 Sputnik scare and the consequent push of science, math, and foreign language programs in our schools.)

Added to this business mentality and the call for industrial education, the school system was trying to cope with the tremendous influx of immigrant children and the meeting of their needs. The need for increased taxes just to continue essentials was met by "a suspicious, economy-minded public wanting to cut costs."75

One of the first educators to advocate the factory model for schools was Leonard Ayres. In Laggards in our Schools,

74 Ibid., p. 14.
75 Ibid., p. 15.
1909, Ayres described the "retarded" children who were below grade level for their age. By using the normal yearly progress of a child through a school grade, Ayres developed his "Index of Efficiency" which showed the "relation of the finished product to the raw material." Through this relationship, Ayres was able to calculate actual percentages of efficiency in a school system.76

But the real impetus for the application of efficiency philosophy to the schools came from the work of Frederick W. Taylor in 1910 after application of the Taylor management system to railroad efficiency became well known. Briefly, Taylor's scientific management began in 1895 with his statement on piece-rate systems, followed in 1900 by his work with the steel industry. Courses on the Taylor system were taught as early as 1910 in the Harvard and Dartmouth business schools. However, Taylor was known only in engineering and its related fields until his plan was applied to the problem of increasing railroad efficiency without raising rates. The theory was hailed as a panacea in every field and soon the name of Frederick W. Taylor and "scientific management" became household words. It was the topic of ladies' magazines and technical journals and its principles were applied to:

76Ibid., p. 16.
...many aspects of American life, including the army and navy, the legal profession, the home, the family, the household, and last but not least to education.77

The system was based on increasing productivity from human labor. Taylor believed that there was always a best method for doing any task; this best method could be determined through scientific study. In a factory, scientific management involved "analyzing, planning, and controlling the whole manufacturing process in detail."78 The elements of scientific management consisted of: 1) Time and motion studies to determine the "unit times for the various components of any job."79 This involved the use of a stopwatch and the singling out of a potentially first-class worker, studying his movements, eliminating waste until the job was done in the best possible manner. 2) The second element was "standardization." All components of the job and all tools and movements, after perfected, were standardized. 3) The third element was the "task idea." Each worker was given an instruction card describing in detail exactly what was to be done, how it was to be done, and the time allowed to do it.80 The second half of the task idea was a bonus plan for efficiency above the norm, and punishment (lower pay) for inefficiency. 4) The fourth

77Ibid., p. 23.
78Ibid., p. 27.
79Ibid., p. 28.
80Ibid., p. 31.
element was "functional foremanship." These functional foreman were teachers who saw to it that the workers understood their tasks and adhered to the master plan. 5) The last element in Taylor's plan was the planning department.

The job of the planning department, through its scientific time and motion study, was to develop the science of the job, which involved the establishment of many rules, laws, and formulae to replace the judgment of the individual workman.81

As Callahan stresses, Taylor's system of scientific management was applied to the schools mainly by administrators and it had its greatest effect on administration and administrators. However, "the: influence extended to all of American education from the elementary school to the universities."82 Scientific management applied to the schools became cost accounting. Efficiency and economy were all important; quality education and the "higher" aims of education were rarely mentioned.

Callahan traces the mounting criticism of education in the period from 1911 to 1913. With criticism of the schools coming from all sides, while society worshipped the new craze, scientific management, the time was right for scientific management to be applied to the schools.

82Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency, 41.
Educators accepted, in general, the business man's outlook and consciously or unconsciously molded the school system to accord with the canons of a profit-making economic system.\textsuperscript{83}

While many people contributed to the advance of the scientific management of the schools, Frank Spaulding and Franklin Bobbitt stand out among the rest.

Frank Spaulding

Frank Spaulding, superintendent of the Newton, Massachusetts schools gave an address to the N.E.A. convention in 1913 in which he advocated the application of Taylor's scientific management system to the schools. He expressed "momentary doubt" that "the multitude of stop watch observations and experiments, the innumerable, accurate measurements and comparison of processes and results..." might not have application to education since some aspects of education are not measurable. But the doubt was only momentary and Spaulding was not to be deterred.

...When we learn of the marvelous results achieved in some material industries through the elimination of waste motions...let us waste no time over the obvious but fruitless objection that the ultimate and real products of a school system--those products that are registered in the minds and hearts of the children that go out from the schools--are immeasurable, and hence incomparable.\textsuperscript{84}


\textsuperscript{84}Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency, 68.
It goes without saying, that the accountabilists also recognize the "immeasurables" of education, but believe that we should not be deterred from concentration on that which we can measure. As the reader will recall, Marcuse notes that positivists relegate unmeasurables to another realm.

Spaulding outlined the essentials of his system:

1. The measurement and comparison of comparable results.

2. The analysis and comparison of the conditions under which given results are secured—especially of the means and time employed in securing given results.

3. The consistent adoption and use of those means that justify themselves most fully by their results, abandoning those that fail so to justify themselves. 85

Callahan notes that Spaulding's system adopted "the form and some of the superficial aspects of Taylor's system and neglected its substance." 86 Spaulding concentrated on easily measurable results:

I refer to such results as the percentage of children of each year of age in the school district that the school enrolls; the average number of day's attendance secured annually from each child; the average length of time required for each child to do a given definite unit of work; the percentage of children who are inspired to continue their education in higher schools; and the quality of the education that the school affords. 87

In order to determine the last result—quality of education—Spaulding described its measurement in the Newton Schools.

85 Ibid.
86 Ibid., p. 69.
87 Ibid.
Glossing over the matter of statistical methods used to determine his quality analysis, Spaulding ascertained that one grammar school in Newton was seventeen percent superior to another. This was based on "average membership, per pupil cost, value of the plants occupied." Spaulding also devised formulae and charts to determine the value—from a financial standpoint—of all school subjects. Thus, Greek being more expensive than music, was less valuable. Spaulding's terminology indicated that he was doing cost analysis—not quality analysis—"precisely the kind of analysis one would expect of a businessman, not an educator."

Spaulding's application of cost accounting to the schools met with the approval of the times and by 1918 cost accounting in education was well established. Personal success and financial gain were in Spaulding's future. He was considered by some as a forerunner to a new breed of "educational engineers." (Note how the term "educational engineer" has been revived by Lessinger and other accountabilists with no acknowledgement of its source.) Spaulding's reports on the

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88 Ibid.
89 Ibid., p. 159.
90 Ibid., p. 71.
91 Ibid., p. 164.
92 Ibid., p. 77.
Newton schools were held up as models to be followed. In 1914, he was hired as superintendent by Minneapolis for $8,000 per year—double his Newton salary. In 1917, The Cleveland Board of Education hired him at $12,000 per year. In 1920, he became head of the new Department of Education at Yale. Callahan explains Spaulding's over-concern with financial matters as an outgrowth of the times when the main issue in most school districts was the cost of maintaining the system. Regardless, the point is that school administrations were becoming increasingly similar to corporate administrations.

Franklin Bobbitt

Spaulding was not alone in his efforts to apply scientific management to the schools. Franklin Bobbitt was a professor of educational administration at the University of Chicago. His book, The Supervision of City Schools, published in 1913, applied the Taylor system to educational management and supervision. In 1912, Bobbitt had written an article describing the Gary, Indiana "platoon school" and its use of scientific management. According to Bobbitt, the task of managing any organization involved the same principles. Schools were "rather backward" in comparison to the management of business and industry, but by modeling ourselves on business, schools had much to gain. Bobbitt's system encompassed eleven principles:
I. Definite qualitative and quantitative standards must be determined for the product.

II. Where the material that is acted upon by the labor processes passes through a number of progressive stages on its way from raw material to the ultimate product, definite qualitative standards must be determined for the product at each of these stages.93

(Leon Lessinger does not indicate that he is familiar with the work of Bobbitt, but the reader will see the obvious parallels between Bobbitt's scientific management plan and Lessinger's accountability plan.)

In Bobbitt's eyes, the above two principles dealing with standards were just as applicable to education as they were to the manufacture of steel rails. Those who ordered the steel rails determined the standards. Bobbitt invited the community to set specifications for the finished products of the schools. They must give us definite specifications and unless they could do this, they had no right to complain. After the specifications were set, we needed definite measuring scales and Bobbitt pointed to the work of T.W. Stone and S.A. Courtis in setting up scales for measuring arithmetical skills. Teachers should be judged on the way they met standards. Just as in business, evaluation was done by a department other than the production department, so too, in education, we needed a separate "inspectorial department" to independently test our work--

"independent audit" in Lessinger's terms. This would remove the temptation of cheating on the part of both teacher's and administrators.

Doubtless many educators who had devoted years of study and thought to the aims and purposes of education were surprised to learn that they had misunderstood their function. They were to be mechanics, not philosophers.94

Of course, extensive bookkeeping was required to implement Bobbitt's plan. As one school administrator pointed out, teachers "would have no time and energy left for teaching."95

Setting up exact standards and scales by which to measure the accomplishment of those objectives could overcome the shortcomings of schoolmen who were "intellectualists," and "individualists" who insisted on doing things their own way resulting in poor organization and management.96

Bobbitt's third principle dealt with methods:

III. Scientific Management finds the methods of procedure which are most efficient for actual service under actual conditions, and secures their use on the part of the workers.97

Teachers themselves were not capable of accomplishing the complicated task of implementing the science of education

94Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency, 84.


96Franklin Bobbitt, The Supervision of the City Schools, 49-50.

97Ibid., p. 51.
based on scientific management. We needed to transform education and business showed us how to do just that. Therefore, we should adopt Taylor's system. (Lessinger also places little faith in teachers, saying that they are better at running programs than starting them.) This led to Bobbit's next three principles dealing with the "workmen"--the teachers:

IV. Standard qualifications must be determined for the workers.  

Bobbitt pointed to Edward C. Elliott's teacher rating sheet. This was a device which drew up definite "plans and specifications which exhibit the elements and proportions of personality that are necessary for the fully equipped teacher."  

V. The management must train its workers previous to service in the measure demanded by its standard qualifications, in it must set up entrance requirements so specific and detailed in nature as to enforce upon training institutions the output of a supply of workers possessing the desirable qualifications in the degree necessary for entrance into service.

Just as business and industry should make specifications regarding "finished products" to the schools, so should the school systems make specifications regarding prospective teachers known to the colleges. We can, of course, draw

98Ibid., p. 62.
99Ibid., pp. 69-70.
100Ibid., p. 74.
parallels here with contemporary performance and competency based teacher education.

VI. The worker must be kept up to standard qualifications for his kind of work for his entire service.\textsuperscript{101} This involved detailed plans for the exercise of that standard personality required for the standard teacher. Unless continually exercised, Bobbitt feared that these ideal qualities would decay. The teacher's dedication had to be total—after school hours not needed for sleeping and eating were to be devoted to "a variety of necessary humanizing activities for keeping one's self up to standard."\textsuperscript{102} This might include professional meetings, community life, travel etc. Calvin would have been proud of Bobbitt's specifications for "labour in a calling."

VII. The worker must be kept supplied with detailed instructions as to the work to be done, the standards to be reached, the methods to be employed, and the appliances to be used.\textsuperscript{103} Bobbitt worried about the mechanization of the teacher and thought that some initiative should be left to the teachers. But obviously he felt that the advantages of strict adherence to the "best method" outweighed the chance of mechanization. Instructions must be

...transmitted to the teachers so that there can never be any misunderstanding as to what is expected of a teacher in the way of results or in the matter of method.\textsuperscript{104}

\textsuperscript{101}Ibid., p. 79.
\textsuperscript{102}Ibid., p. 85.
\textsuperscript{103}Ibid., p. 89.
\textsuperscript{104}Ibid., pp. 92-94.
Therefore, the limitations on the freedom of the teacher were justified in Bobbitt's eyes.

The remaining principles are:

VIII. It is a function of the management to discover and to supply the tools and appliances that are the most effective for the work in hand.

IX. Responsibility must be definite and undivided in the case of each task to be performed in the total series of processes.

X. Incentives must be placed before the workers so as to stimulate the output on their part of the optimum product.

XI. In a productive organization, the management must determine the order and sequence of all of the various processes through which the raw material or the partially developed product shall pass, in order to bring about the greatest possible effectiveness and economy; and it must see that the raw material or partially finished product is actually passed on from process to process, from worker to worker, in the manner that is most effective and most economical.¹⁰⁵

The Movement Grows

Demands for increased efficiency in the schools continued between 1911 and 1925. In order to meet these demands, administrators turned to the work of Spaulding, Bobbitt and others in an attempt to apply scientific management to the schools. "Efficiency bureaus" were established in school systems in large cities such as Boston, New York, New Orleans, Detroit, Kansas City, Rochester and Oakland. These efficiency

¹⁰⁵Ibid., pp. 95-96.
bureaus were staffed by "educational efficiency experts" or "engineers," and were supported by prominent professors of educational administration. One such administrator was Elwood P. Cubberley, dean of the School of Education at Stanford. His work, *Public School Administration*, 1916, was widely read and very influential and used as a textbook in school administration courses throughout the country.

Cubberley based his work on the ideas of Franklin Bobbitt:

> Every manufacturing establishment that turns out a standard product or series of products of any kind maintains a force of efficiency experts to study methods of procedure and to measure and test the output of its works. ...Our schools are, in a sense, factories in which the raw products (children) are to be shaped and fashioned into products to meet the various demands of life. The specifications for manufacturing come from the demands of twentieth century civilization, and it is the business of the school to build its pupils according to the specifications laid down. This demands good tools, specialized machinery, continuous measurement of production to see if it is according to specifications, the elimination of waste in manufacture, and a large variety in the output.106

Cubberley believed that the application of scientific management to the schools would demonstrate the efficiency of the schools to the public and would eliminate guess-work and promote "scientific accuracy." Extensive records were absolutely necessary and Cubberley encouraged every school system to establish an efficiency bureau.

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Callahan describes the proliferation of standardized tests to measure the efficiency of the schools. Examples of these are the arithmetic test developed by S.A. Courtis, the handwriting scales by Thorndike and Ayres, and the English scales of Thorndike and Hillegas. These tests were given "wide currency" and there was a call for the development of even more tests and scales.107 In 1915, the new profession of efficiency experts was officially established in the form of The National Society of Efficiency Men.

In addition to the tests and scales devised to measure accomplishment on school subjects, there were also rating sheets for teachers, superintendents, janitors, and students. The main function provided by the wide-scale adoption of these rating devices was the means of self-defense they provided administrators.

Another major attempt at self-defense was the procedure called the school survey. This involved bringing in an outside educational efficiency expert who conducted a systematic study of the school system. This required from one week to one year, but usually involved about one month. The voluminous reports produced by these surveys "were filled with business and industrial terminology, and parallels were drawn frequently between these areas and education."108 These surveys

107 Raymond E. Callahan, Education and the Cult of Efficiency, 100-101.

108 Ibid., p. 117.
contributed to the increased use of standardized tests and teacher-rating instruments. They also contributed to the increased modeling of educational administration on business administration, and of course, the expression of that business mentality in university courses in school administration. However, the survey accomplished one purpose--the increased ability to answer to the public.

Most of the opposition to the application of scientific management to education came from teachers. However, unorganized and "timid" as they were, "their voices were barely audible, and they were unable to stem the tide."109 The American Federation of Teachers raised the loudest protest on the grounds that the educational efficiency engineers had forgotten the real purpose of education--"increased humanism, increased power to do, increased capacity to appreciate."110

The Educational Administration Profession

In addition to the defense tactic of the application of scientific management to the schools, educational administrators took refuge in the hope that eventually they would be recognized as professionals on an equal footing with doctors, lawyers

109Ibid., pp. 120-121.

110Benjamin C. Gruenberg, "Some Economic Obstacles to Educational Progress," American Teacher 1 (September, 1912): 90.
and business executives. The push to elevate educational administration to the status of a profession resulted in a proliferation of university courses in educational administration. Callahan traces the increase in those courses. In 1899-1900, Teachers College listed just two courses in educational administration. As late as 1911-1912, the number still remained at two. But from 1914 on, the trend was markedly upward. By 1917, there were eight courses offered. The number steadily increased until 1925-1926 when the total was thirty. This growth was paralleled at the University of Chicago, Harvard, and Stanford.\textsuperscript{111} This growth in professional preparation of school administrators was brought about partially by the efforts of men such as Elwood Cubberley and George D. Strayer. Cubberley's main influence came through his widely used textbooks on educational administration. As a faculty member at Teachers College, Strayer "probably taught more courses in administration, directed more school surveys, and directed more dissertations than any other man."\textsuperscript{112}

He also produced, often in collaboration with Nickolaus Engelhardt, a series of materials to assist schoolmen with their business and building problems such as score cards and check lists for school buildings, standards for elementary and high school buildings, record books for high school and elementary school principals, records for

\footnote{111}{Raymond E. Callahan, \textit{Education and the Cult of Efficiency}, 198-200.}

\footnote{112}{Ibid., p. 185.}
school bonded indebtedness, monthly reports for principals to keep track of the attendance of teachers, inventory record books for high schools, and payroll forms.  

In his development of the philosophy of professional preparation for school administrators, Strayer constantly stressed the practical. He concluded that since doctors, lawyers and engineers were trained in internship programs and in first-hand acquaintance with practical problems, so too educational administration students should be trained in practicalities. There was no detail of educational administration work unsuitable for intense study in Strayer's eyes. This philosophy can be seen in the titles of dissertations done under Strayer's direction:

- Analysis of Janitor Service in Elementary Schools;
- Administrative Problems of the High School Cafeteria;
- The Technique of Estimating School Equipment Costs;
- Public School Plumbing Equipment;
- Principles of School Supply Management.

These titles show Strayer's definite emphasis on the financial, technical and mechanical aspects of education.

Cubberley also believed that educational administration courses should be "scientifically organized" and specialized. He stressed the use of statistical methods in the study of educational problems and he hailed the work of Edward Thorndike

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113 Ibid., p. 186.
114 Ibid., p. 187.
as "the beginning of a new era in the study of educational problems." While Cubberley admired business methods and urged their use in education, he also realized that merely saving money was not always in the best interest of really efficient education. Sometimes, efficient schools cost more money.

In an address given to The National Society of College Teachers of Education in 1910, Frank Spaulding, who was not a member of a university faculty, and "had neither given nor taken a course in educational administration," spoke of the urgent need of

a hundred different courses on school administration... nothing short of complete graduate school with studies focusing about the art of efficient educational administration... intensely practical, not at all academic; doing not mere knowing, should form the goal and the atmosphere of all the work.

What Spaulding was advocating was the "application of simple and sound business principles," to education. His remarks were supported by Edward C. Elliott, professor of education at the University of Wisconsin, who said that "as our society moved from the untechnical to the technical," educational

115Ibid., pp. 188-189.
116Ibid., p. 190.
117Ibid., p. 191.
118Ibid., p. 192.
administrators needed "special technical preparation."

The address of Spaulding did not go uncriticized. William Burris, dean of the College for Teachers of the University of Cincinnati, pointed to the need for a philosophical education of school administrators. Spaulding had remarked that a philosophy of education could grow out of an instructor's experience. But Burris warned that an administrator could not possess "a philosophy of education if he has never studied philosophy..." Burris also objected to Spaulding's view of the school as always answering to the pressures of the public. As a philosopher-administrator, Burris said,

I know what the needs of society and of the individual are. I will administer my trust so as to help the community to a fuller appreciation of these needs as a measure of human wants.

Burris' protest was insufficient to stem the tide. The ideas of Spaulding and Elliott fell on fertile ground and the efficiency fetish grew.

Jesse H. Newlon, a professor of education at Teachers College, was also upset with the narrowness of educational administration. He characterized the scientific-management concept of school administration as "permeated with the

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119 Ibid., p. 194.
120 Ibid., p. 193.
121 Ibid.
philosophy of management, of business efficiency.”

Newlon's diverse background as a teacher, principal, superintendent of schools and university professor of education, gave him much opportunity to observe the contemporary educational scene. He did extensive research on educational administration for the Commission on the Social Studies of the American Historical Association. By doing a content analysis on eighteen textbooks in educational administration, Newlon determined that they were almost entirely devoted to

...the purely executive, organizational, and legal aspects of administration...the "how" of administration...there was virtually no discussion of the "why," little critical examination of educational and social implications of the structure and procedures discussed.

Newlon also compiled a list of 290 doctoral studies done between 1910 and 1933 which he classified as shown in Table 2. He concluded:

The truth of the matter is that many of these techniques can be quickly learned in the field, on the job, when and if needed, and should receive a minimum amount of attention in the schools of education. More attention should be given in the future to the fundamental social and economic problems of school administration and to the social methods and techniques which their solution requires.


123 Ibid., p. 93.

124 Ibid., p. 262.
TABLE 2

THESES PERTAINING TO SCHOOL ADMINISTRATION
SUBMITTED FOR DOCTORAL DEGREES
IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES, 1910-1933*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Administration</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Administration</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupil Personnel</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Management</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Provisions</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings and Equipment</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course of Study and Materials of Instruction</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Aspects</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School District</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Superintendent</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Physical Education</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration and Organization of the Elementary Schools</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration and Organization of the Secondary Schools</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Organization</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Education</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Origin and Development</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicity and Public Relations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Organization</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Business management and efficiency were important, but they had received attention disproportionate to their proper place. Society had become preoccupied with scientific management to the neglect of the real purpose of education and to the total disregard of social problems. As Newlon concluded, the real significance of Table 2 lies in the problems omitted.
Newlon feared that superintendents would become merely business managers and technicians when they should be, students of the social sciences of all that is included in the fields of history, sociology, economics, psychology, political science... I like to think of the teaching staff as a company of scholars engaged in the education of youth. 125

As Callahan points out, this was a rare philosophy in the days of the business and efficiency craze. This adds to the greatness of Jesse Newlon; but his greatness was not recognized during his time. The efficiency mania continued.

By 1918, the profession of school administration had become established. As we have seen, the role of this professional was modeled on that of the corporate executive. His main task was to see that the school district was run as efficiently, scientifically, and economically as possible and thereby answer the demands and criticisms of the public. "There is no question that by 1918 administrators had followed the authoritarian role of the manager in industry and had applied it in their school systems." 126

While the school administration had been raised, at least in one sense, to the status of profession, the problems which plagued school administrators before 1920 did not magically

125 Raymond E. Callahan, Education and The Cult of Efficiency, 203.
126 Ibid., p. 220.
disappear with the new status of "professional." Those problems as we have already seen, began with the accusations of inefficiency and waste. The application of scientific management principles to the schools and the consequent voluminous reports did give school administrators an opportunity to answer to the public and did win them some public approval. However, administrators were just as vulnerable as before, for as they found out, approval and job security were assured only as long as they could run the schools efficiently without asking for increased taxes. This was almost impossible in the majority of school systems. Americans were demanding more education for their children—more years in school, increased course offerings—and yet were unwilling to pay for that education in higher taxes.

In a sense, some of the problems faced by school administrators in the 1920s were brought on by their own efforts to win the public approval in the two decades preceding the twenties. As we have seen there were outright invitations to the public (always translated as the business community) to interfere in the philosophy and management of the schools.

For they had not only proclaimed their intention to operate the schools economically, but had done so loudly and had received the applause of a business society for their efforts. Now they were committed to a platform of economy and forced to be preoccupied
with per-pupil costs. Furthermore, they had worked to establish themselves as executives and they had applied the management-and-worker parallel in education. 127

The administrator was now caught in the middle. Within his own organization teachers were demanding higher salaries, and recognition as professionals. The public was still clamoring for efficiency and tax stability. The superintendent was now faced with the difficult task of asking the public for more money.

The stage was set for advertising and the public relations expert. School administrators had to sell their enterprise to the public. Again, this was a tool adopted by the schools from government and big business. The government had used propaganda and advertising techniques successfully during World War I; business had already added advertising and public relations to their running expenses. "In the years after 1920, educators received continuous information on the value of advertising as well as abundant advice on how to carry on a publicity program." 128 Out of this public relations work grew the idea of the school as a "service station" for the public. This idea was in part due to the ideas of Bobbitt and Cubberley who believed that the community should provide specifications

127 Ibid., p. 222
128 Ibid., pp. 224-225.
for the schools in terms of end products—the students. Principals were asked to print up placards such as "America's service station, a public school," and "Citizens welcome. Tell us what you think." There were also public service projects such as "Clean Up Week." As the idea grew, so did abuses and overemphasis:

In Chicago under McAndrew (Superintendent William) and in many other places, it meant arranging the school program so as to impress the public that the schools were making a major contribution toward whatever fetish the nation happened to be concerned with at the time. Thus schoolmen outdid themselves to teach thrift when America was concerned with thrift. During World War I educators proved their patriotism by removing the teaching of German from the schools and in Cleveland Frank Spaulding and his educational council initiated a loyalty pledge for teachers to sign. After the way in the hysteria over Bolshevism schoolmen went all out for 100 percent Americanism.

Some Effects of the Efficiency Movement

Some of the practices growing out of the scientific management era have persisted to the present time. Callahan devotes Chapter Six of his book to the "platoon school" concept growing out of the need to demonstrate efficiency and economy. These schools were modeled on the factory and mass production. Class sizes and teacher loads were increased; children were marched about as raw materials on an assembly line, double

129Ibid., p. 226.

130Ibid., pp. 230-231.
shifts were sometimes introduced. The idea was to keep the "plant" in use as constantly as possible. The platoon schools themselves were abandoned; the concepts growing out of them lived on. One concept was to increase efficiency to get as much work out of the school "worker" as possible. Doctoral dissertations were devoted to the promotion of large classes, and statistical studies concluded that large schools of 4,000 or 5,000 students were more efficient. While many held that class size should be no larger than twenty-five, others reported equal ease with groups as large as seventy-five.\textsuperscript{131} The schools sent their specifications to teacher training institutions in the form of a demand of more emphasis on training teachers to handle large groups of students. Some school systems put minimum numbers on class size. "Hereafter no high school class will be organized for less than twenty pupils...(it was) futile to say that education should not be subjected to the rules of ordinary business."\textsuperscript{132} In addition to increasing class size, was the move to increase the number of daily classes taught per teacher to six and even seven; this remains the norm in many high schools today.

As we have already seen, the real purposes of education were submerged in the overemphasis on minute details. Callahan dubs this phenomenon as "the descent into trivia." As he points out, with hundreds of doctoral candidates, and the

\textsuperscript{131}Ibid., p. 235.

\textsuperscript{132}Ibid., p. 236.
idea that no practical problem was too small for intense research, "someone was bound to end up with the plumbing." But it did not stop with the plumbing--there were the problems of toilet paper, and paper towels, the size of paper, liquid ink vs. powdered ink, toilet bowl cleaners, roach powders, laundry costs, ad infinitum. An introductory text on school administration contained a section on dusting recommending "straight strokes with the grain of the wood." As Callahan reiterates, the tragedy of this overemphasis on trivia was the total neglect of social problems.

As the material on dusting was being solemnly presented to educators, Hitler was annexing Austria and humiliating England and France at Munich. Neither does accountability address the problems of society nor attempt to promote "critical theory." Instead it tends to support the status quo.

The new profession of school administration was taking form at a time in American history in which the science of business-industrial management was the ultimate standard for all aspects of life. This resulted in the modeling of school administration on business instead of on the social sciences.

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133 ibid., p. 240.
134 ibid., pp. 240-243.
135 ibid., p. 243.
136 ibid.
Thus, by 1925, school administration was firmly established on the business-managerial philosophy. Callahan sees the tragedy of this business-education marriage as fourfold:

that educational questions were subordinated to business considerations; that administrators were produced who were not, in any true sense, educators; that a scientific label was put on some very unscientific and dubious methods and practices; and that an anti-intellectual climate, already prevalent, was strengthened.137

Educational decisions were made on economic grounds, administrators received superficial training, and schools were viewed as factories and business enterprises which had the sole purpose of efficient functioning without regard to educational goals in any sense of "personal illumination and liberation."138

The models of this new breed of school administrators were the Fords and Carnegies, not the Deweys, Beards or Veblens. These men were interested in action—not philosophy.139

After 1930, things did begin to change, partially because of the work of Jesse Newlon and George S. Counts, partially due to the depression and the consequent disenchantment with business. But the damage had been done and the reverberations would be felt even to the present day. The school administrators

137Ibid., p. 246.


139Raymond E. Callahan, *Education and the Cult of Efficiency*, 248.
receiving professional degrees during 1915-1929 were to have tremendous influence on schools and education throughout the United States. They were to occupy administrative positions in our schools, write books, teach courses in administration, influence legislation on education and in general to "diffuse the business-managerial conception throughout the nation."140

As Merle Curti eloquently states,

Thus from the days following the surrender at Appomattox, education rendered assistance to industrial and financial capitalism and its struggles with other groups, and helped to promote the spirit of business enterprise which captured America's middle class as well as her captains of industry and finance. Education, in turn, was affected by business methods and purposes. Despite these allegiances, the majority of educators subscribed to the principle of a classless society and advocated greater equality of educational opportunity to achieve that end. They were probably seldom conscious of having a class bias—they were simply supporting the order of things which, as they had grown up in it, seemed inevitably right.141

Curti goes on to say that if educators had truly subscribed to the ideals of a classless society, they might have been expected to revolt against "industrial capitalism and to endeavor to transform society into a quite different and economically democratic order." As it was, very little

140 Ibid., p. 251.
attempt was made to reform the "contradictions of democracy as the disenfranchisement of women, the exploitation of child labor, the graft in city politics."142

142 Ibid., p. 234.
CHAPTER VI
IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY FOR EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE

In this last third of the twentieth century we may be entering a stage of reduced freedom, but as yet we haven't gone all the way to escape our freedom. We are being asked to release our historical rights by appeals to happiness and well-being growing out of an increasing devotion to technology. These appeals appear to state that we can divorce ourselves from history and that we can place the educative process at the disposal of the scientific determiners of behavioral and genetic health. The issue is not one of progress versus the status quo, or one of being for sickness, cruelty or crime as against eliminating the world's evils. The historical reality of today demands a recognition of the concepts of limits...

To deal with limits, to apply them with humility and knowledge, to realize that limits will be opposed by the dogmatist on the one hand and the utopian on the other, is to assume a stance of courage. Such a stance cannot be taken with smugness, nor does it offer to anyone a superior moral or intellectual position. It calls for a deep sense of commitment to teaching and learning and a love of that history which is a harbinger of ambiguity necessary to that continuation of a foolish human condition which stops short of perfection.1

This study has dealt with "limits" and has called for a "stance of courage" in the kind of teaching described above. The study reaffirmed the historical-philosophical-religious conception of man which recognizes "limits" and the "ambiguity" and "foolishness" of the human condition, but prizes that very

1Bernard Mehl, Classic Educational Ideas From Sumeria to America. (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972) p. 2.
ambiguity and foolishness. This stance involves an historical-philosophical mode of inquiry into one of the most crucial and persistent problems in the foundations of educational theory and practice—namely, the confrontation between a humanistic alternative and the increasingly technological pressures in society and schooling. We have analyzed the sources of the modern technological rationale and have identified the most significant consequences it has had for education. We have explicated the nature of a humanistic alternative. And, finally, we have examined the accountability movement in education as a "case study" of the current manifestation of technology in education. In effect this movement was viewed as an educational backdrop showing up the forces of humanism and technology.

We have previously pointed to certain benchmarks of the criticism of modern technological society offered by Herbert Marcuse, Jurgen Habermas, and Jacques Ellul which had direct application to education. Now, having examined the educational accountability movement, it is appropriate to draw some general conclusions about educational accountability in the light of that criticism. It is beyond the scope of this investigation to predict the outcomes of this battle. Indeed the data are not yet available for such a prediction. But certain generalizations about the role educators can take are warranted extrapolations of the data which come out of the historical-philosophical analysis. In effect, these general-
izations stand as "implications" of the research. These generalizations grow out of three broad concerns about the future of education: "The Role of the Educator," "The Preparation of Teachers," and "The Preparation of the Citizen through Education."

While the goals of accountability and similar movements are good—"the guaranteed acquisition of basic skills by all of our children," the demonstration to the public that "young people can read, can get and hold a job, can go as far in higher education as their abilities warrant,"—we must ask if accountability is the best way to reach those goals. More importantly, we must ask whether important values are submerged in the accountability process. In other words, we ought to look at the "hidden curriculum" of accountability.

As a case in point, it has been noted that learning to read is more than merely mastering "the 'decoding' procedures most programs are designed to teach."

...learning to read is really a lifetime activity based fundamentally on one's attitude about books and is generated by curiosity and by an eagerness to explore and find enjoyment.2

This curiosity and eagerness does not grow out of finding the correct answer on an objective test. Rather it involves a questioning stance, a willingness to deal with ambiguity. Accountability may have some measure of success in teaching the mechanics of reading—in attaining functional literacy--

but we must question the movement's ability to produce "reading" as a way of life. There might even be a case made that accountability may retard reading as a way of life.

It is the conclusion of this research that while the goals of accountability are legitimate, they are secondary to the primary goals of the humanistic educational philosophy of Jacques Maritain, et.al. presented earlier. It is our thesis that the humanistic philosophy represents a richer, more viable alternative to education than do either of the efficiency movements of this century—educational accountability and its precedent, scientific management.

We dealt with the ideas of "critical theory" and its noticeable absence in modern society. Our critics stressed the necessity of critical theory—a value-laden theory which, unlike positivism, necessarily deals with the unmeasurables and ambiguities which are part of the "good life in the good society." We saw the difference between "techne" and "praxis"—the former as "expert mastery of objectified tasks" proceeds technically, the latter as "directed toward the formation and cultivation of character," proceeds pedagogically.3

The views upholding accountability reinforce what Habermas labeled a "modern conception of politics," as exemplified by a "scientifically grounded social philosophy" which established an independently valid, unchanging correct order of things, and a view of human behavior as something

3Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, 42.
Problems under the modern conception of politics, as under accountability, are viewed as matters of finding the correct technology. Thus under educational accountability, the complex human enterprise of education is viewed as an "engineering" problem.

Modern society worships science and technology. We have seen that education, through its increasing reliance on empirical, objective data has mirrored the positivistic stance of larger society. We mistrust feelings, unquantifiables, subjectivity and instead concentrate on efficiency and measurables. This positivistic stance makes us feel very "scientific," and therefore allows a measure of defense against a public which trusts science.

However, as some outstanding thinkers have shown, our reliance on positivism is itself unscientific. These scientists—Einstein, Heisenberg, and Schrödinger—were "engaged in the process of discovery,"

They freely accepted insight, they engaged in introspection, and they were creative. As a result, few modern natural scientists, and almost no physicists, accept the positivist view of science. ...Far from being accepted as the only paradigm of knowledge, science is being increasingly challenged regarding its capacity to make truth statements about the world and to translate these "truths" into technologies.5

4Ibid., p. 43.

The Heisenberg uncertainty principle recognized that the very act of examining subatomic particles changed what was seen. Therefore scientists began to see that they could "never accurately predict or measure the velocity of subatomic particles let alone the behavior of human beings."  

Apple supports the view that positivism is outmoded. He says most scientists see "good science" as including  

...the leap of faith, an aesthetic sensitivity, a personal commitment, and of great importance, an ability to accept ambiguity and uncertainty. 

The fact that the accountabilists are unaware of the scientific community's move away from positivism is perhaps indicative that we still, as Jesse Newlon noted in 1925, are not a company of scholars." It is ironic that accountabilists such as Lessinger, who decry the fact that beliefs and practices of our schools are "rooted in the past," are asking for a revolution of schooling based on the outmoded philosophy of positivism.

In no way does accountability attempt to correct the absence of critical theory in society. Indeed, by concentrating on pre-established goals, accountabilists are teaching students

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the importance of the correct answers through almost exclusive use of objective tests rather than employing themes, essay questions, or other subjective measures. The same answer is required of all students. There seems to be no room in the accountability scheme for encouraging critical thought through modes of inquiry—judging, pondering, questioning, analyzing and evaluating—those things which are often unobservable and unmeasurable, but nonetheless real and valuable. There is no room for the "widening and deepening of conscious life—a more intense, disciplined, and expanding realization of meanings."

Levit points to the "compartmentalized" learning, the packages and modules, the "extraneous rewards" and the measurement by standardized tests of the accountability movement which contributes to "the already too wide-spread programs of unreflective habit formation." We support the system of institutional rewards of modern technological society.

We are reminded here of Marcuse's analysis of the "paralysis of criticism," growing out of the imposition of false needs and the one-dimensional society's satisfaction of those needs. While the individual is bought off in terms of material well-being and increased comfort, real needs, in terms

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9 Martin Levit, "The Ideology of Accountability in Schooling," 137.
of individual development and growth are repressed. (In Fromm's terms, this contributes to the absence of "freedom to.") We perpetuate organization according to the myths of scarcity, domination and competition even though we have more capability than ever in history for "pacification of existence," i.e. organization for liberation and realization of full humanity and "new dimensions of human realization."¹⁰

Nash and Agne recognize the perpetuation of these "myths of scarcity, competitiveness, American supremacy, productivity, and acquisitiveness."¹¹ They feel that we should be held accountable for this, not for student achievement measured by an arbitrary standardized test.

Just as the scientific management movement supported the status quo to the neglect of blatant social problems, "accountabilists usually take moral and institutional conditions for granted and work within these frameworks."¹² The stress is on adaptation rather than on critical thought:

Accountability programs are geared to the production of functionaries within a technological society rather than to the development of independent people who are social critics and constructors.¹³

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¹⁰ Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, 17.


Accountability therefore contributes to the development of "mass" man in C. Wright Mills' terms, or to the development of "depoliticized" society in Habermas', Marcuse's, and Ellul's terms.

Marcuse noted that science-technology was not a value-free system, but rather, "interests of domination...enter the very construction of the technical apparatus."¹⁴ This domination maintains and ensures the growth of the scientific-technical system, while hiding the repressive character of the one-dimensional society. Marcuse and Habermas both focused on the institutionalization and self-legitimation of the "rationally totalitarian society."¹⁵ As Callahan has shown, there is application of this domination to education. Efficiency and scientific management in the schools took on the character of self-legitimation of the prevailing societal ethos. We believe that accountability is derived "from the very fabric of the technological age."¹⁶ and reinforces the current prevailing scientific-technological "ethos."

Nash and Agne have addressed this reinforcement by examining the "ethos" which accountability is generating:

This ethos--whose governing principles are based on a technological-economic world-view--is distinguished

¹⁴Herbert Marcuse, Negations, 223.
¹⁵Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 159.
by its frenzied insistence on the large-scale transportation of attitudes and practices from the world of business, engineering and science to the world of education. ... The creeping extrusion into education of an ethos which defines the successful educational experience primarily in terms of systems engineering and measurable outputs signifies a tragic loss of larger vision and purpose among educators... (accountability thus contributes to) the cleavage between our educational ideals and actual practice...

Levit touches on the same theme in speaking of the "illiberal ideology" of accountability. Ideologies, says Levit, should be judged on whether or not they "expand the ability of human beings throughout the world to understand themselves and others." Levit judges that accountability does not live up to this expansion of understanding; instead:

... it promises to worsen some of the worst features of schooling and to reduce the bits of enlightenment and liberalization that may be found now in schooling. With its mischievous bustle, it promises to divert attention from the crucial educational task of examining the pressing needs for a rational reconstruction of the socio-educational system of institutions, values, and beliefs within which schools operate.

Critical theory operates out of the centrality of man's position. Accountability, as did scientific management, compromises man's central position and subordinates it to the


18Martin Levit, "The Ideology of Accountability in Schooling," 137.

19Ibid., p. 137.
concerns of efficiency. Accountability represents a system of extreme concentration on means to the exclusion of educational aims beyond mere mastery of "specific sets of skills."

Concern with the humanistic aims of education described earlier—those concerns of a "higher" order—are usually dealt with in one of two ways by accountabilists: they are completely ignored, or they are acknowledged and then immediately relegated to a separate realm on the grounds that we should concentrate on what we can see and measure—a tactic of the positivists. Indeed Lessinger goes a step further by saying that through educational engineering:

...the schools will be able to share with students not merely airy objectives, such as "the ability to communicate effectively," but specific sets of skills.20

He further states that through accountability, students will be able to say, "I can do that," instead of the usual—"I've had that."21 The implicit assumption is that the realm of education should be only that which results in doing and therefore can be evaluated. "Airy objectives" and effective communication are devalued because they are unmeasurable.

If we are to believe Freud, language is never haphazard. Lessinger's devaluation of the term "airy" indicates either that he does not believe in man's transcendent powers or that

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20Leon M. Lessinger, Every Kid A Winner, 133.
21Ibid.
he thinks school is no place to deal with the development of those powers. Yet, man is "airy" in that he has the power to leap beyond the immediate, objective situation. This recognition of human transcendence and the belief that the nurturing of these "higher" human capacities and powers is central to education as the "making of a man," and central to this study. Man is more than a mere animal, a pigeon pecking a lever, or a robot programmed to perform certain functions. 

While it may be unjust to say that the accountabilists are unaware of these "higher" concerns, one could say that their awareness has become dulled by their fixation on means to basic skills and their concentration on efficiency with the result of a dehumanized view of students and teachers as "inputs." They have made the reductionist assumption that the observable behavior of the student indicates exactly what he has or has not learned. Likewise, the effectiveness of the teacher can be determined as to how she performs an objective from Florida's list of twenty-three or some other "equally definitive" list. They have forgotten or never knew that a human being is more complex than a pigeon. Perhaps it is as Albert Camus said, "when one has no character one has to apply a method."22

Just as the language employed by Franklin Bobbitt, Frank Spaulding and other scientific managers was indicative of their philosophies, we believe that the language of educational

accountability is revealing. Many have commented on the terms of systems engineering used by accountabilists. Lessinger himself speaks of "zero-defect," "input-output," "standardized reliable data," "learning-unit cost," "performance contract." We are already familiar with his space-age acronyms: LEA, MSG, RFP, PBC, IEAA, etc. Other accountabilists have added: "systems analysis," "thrust," "targets," "management and delivery systems," "energy output," "data-based feedback system," "internal control and predictability," "cybernetic models," "interface," etc. Why the penchant for "scientific" language? Apple sees the primary function of systems language as convincing the public of the "sophisticated state of education." He also sees another task of systems language: "generating money from the federal government." 

We believe accountability furthers the concept of education seen as "techne." By defining teaching in the sense of exact, behaviorally stated objectives, and observable and measurable outputs, teaching does become the "expert mastery of objectified tasks," not an art which ventures into the unknown, ambiguous, and uncertain realm of the "making of a man." A teacher becomes, under the accountability scheme, a learning technician or engineer who implements exact plans originating outside of the classroom. The teacher in Lessinger's

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24Ibid., p. 114.
plan is to become a manager of instruction. Through performance contracting,

...teachers will be called on not to initiate untried proposals but rather to take over the operation of programs that are already familiar and successful.25

As we have seen, Franklin Bobbitt also believed that teachers were better suited to carrying out exact instructions than to initiation of their own programs. With accountability, the trend again seems to be back to "teacher-proof" materials, and closer supervision of teachers to insure exact implementation of educational engineering plans.

The conclusions of the Rand Study are a case in point. In 1973, the U.S. Office of Education commissioned the Rand Corporation to conduct a four-year study to evaluate the effectiveness of innovative projects funded by the federal "Title" programs originating in the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act. They reported "disappointing" results and concluded that federally initiated programs were significantly affected by "the institutional setting," in other words--little change took place unless the local schools were involved in planning the new programs. Perhaps more significant for our purposes is what happened in individual classrooms. The study showed that teachers did not always heed the program plans:

25Leon M. Lessinger, Every Kid A Winner, 134.
We have seen cases in which teachers "continued" a project in their classrooms despite a formal district decision to drop it. Conversely we have seen teachers ignore or pay mere lip service to innovations mandated by official policy to be used in every classroom.  

While this independent behavior on the part of teachers can be seen positively by some, it undoubtedly causes problems for the accountabilists as it did for Bobbitt. He observed that scientific management would overcome the shortcomings of schoolmen who were "intellectualists and individualists."  

We believe that the humanistic educational alternative demands freedom of judgment on the part of the teacher—judgment as to the educational value of those mandates from without weighed against the needs of the students. This judgment, in our view, grows out of the "mutuality" between teacher and child in the "mode of becoming," instead of mere mechanical implementation of every new program interested in the "adaptation" of the child. But accountability militates against that freedom of judgment by attempting to impose uniform, technical, scientific, mechanical solutions to the complex problems of education in modern society. If, as the Rand study indicates, classroom teachers are not taking seriously the mandates of federal, state and local programs,


27Franklin Bobbitt, Supervision of City Schools, 49-50.
then serious accountabilists must devise means to overcome that "sabotage." As we have seen, Competency Based Teacher Education and Performance Based Teacher Education is one step toward production of teachers who can follow directions.

Another aspect of accountability—performance contracting—has not lived up to expectations. The Office of Economic Opportunity entered into performance contracting with six different educational firms, involving eighteen school districts in 1970-71. This cost over seven million dollars. The experiment was judged a failure:

The firms operating under performance contracts did not perform significantly better than the more traditional school systems. Indeed, both control and experimental students did equally poorly in terms of achievement gains, and this result was remarkably consistent across sites and among children with different degrees of initial capability.28

The tendency of accountability to erode the slowly gained collective power of teachers has been explicated by Martin, Overholt and Urban. They have also pointed to the increased tendency toward alienation of teachers. Teaching under accountability takes on the characteristics of assembly line work. Teachers are converted "into technocrats by requiring those teachers to give priority to a restless pursuit of efficiency and productivity."29 Tied to accountability has been

28U.S., Office of Economic Opportunity, An Experiment in Performance Contracting: Summary of Preliminary Results, Pamphlet 3400-5

the move to base teacher pay on the results their students achieve on standardized tests—a plan supported by Kenneth B. Clark.30

This alienation and fragmentation is, of course, related to what Habermas described as the cleavage between two realms of the modern world—the social life-world and the scientific-technical world. The future of democracy depends, in his view, on the communicative ethic—that uninhibited communication between citizens about practical problems of how men can and want to live under the objective conditions of their ever-expanding power of control." Teachers under accountability are asked "to become effective in an antiseptic, value-neutral world."31 Teaching under accountability calls for reduced communication and input on the part of teachers as to the direction of education.

Schooling should be concerned with the development of the communicative ethic. We do not believe that accountability contributes to that development. We live in a technological world; we cannot, and probably do not want to, go back to earlier times. But there are basic human values represented in the institutional framework of Table 1 which are valid despite changing times.


Lessinger bemoans the fact that some of our beliefs about schools and our practices in schools are "rooted in the past." He says we must, if we are to be good engineers, start with "a goal to be achieved, not with the dead weight of a precedent or unexamined beliefs." While anticipating the reaction of humanists to the term "engineering," he says accountability "can lead to a symbiosis of technology and humanism." If we recall Ellul's analysis of the autonomy of technique, we begin to question this "symbiosis."

According to Ellul, when there is a struggle between technique and a proposed human end, it is the end--not technique--which is modified. Marcuse and Habermas have also examined the scientific-technical framework into which human concerns do not fit.

Habermas calls for a conscious mediation between the institutional world and the scientific-technical world. The application to education, therefore, is that while we are educating citizens for the modern world in the last quarter of the twentieth century, we must also bring to bear the accumulated history, culture, wisdom, and values of the ages. Apple refers to:

33Ibid., p. 37.
...the complex problem of designing environments that mediate between a student's search for personal meaning and a society's need to preserve its social fabric of institutions and knowledge.34

In Maritain's terms we must be cognizant of the primary and secondary aims of education. In this manner, we can somehow attempt to make sense out of and give direction to an increasingly fragmented and alienated world.

Learning, we hope, constitutes a deeper process than any given technique no matter how good the technique. The deeper process does not need to be a mystery, but it needs to be arrived at through interhuman contact—a real teacher and a real class of live human beings. As an example, making reading a way of life is a precious end competing among many of today's alternatives: movies, television, computers, etc. It is a separate goal and making it a computer-like task may destroy it—like substituting a T.V. version of a book for the book. Sooner or later it has to lead to the book. If technology serves as a motivator toward the end in view, then why now. If it substitutes—then the age of the robots is upon us.

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BOOK REVIEW


REPORT