PHENOMENOLOGY AND CRITICAL THEORY:
TOWARD A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FOUNDATION OF SOCIOLOGY

DISSERTATION

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* * * * *

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TO MY PARENTS
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When I first studied sociology in Taiwan, my teacher and textbook told me, "Sociology is a science." I took it for granted that was true and I believed that sociology would help me to understand my own society in a better way. But, the more I learned, the more uneasy I felt. When I tried to apply the sociological concepts and theories to my own society, they simply did not make much sense to me. Often, the so-called "sociological explanation" seem to be, rather than anything else, an imposition of conceptual and theoretical categories upon social reality. However, at that time, I was unable to point out precisely what the problems were. I was puzzled. But the feeling was so real that I told myself that there must be something wrong with western sociology. So, when I came to the United States to study, instead of hastily engaging in substantive research I spent most of my time investigating the foundations of sociology. I hoped, by doing so, that I could not only answer my questions, but also find a strategy for the reconstruction of the foundations of sociology. For many years, I have tried to locate the difficulties and search
for alternatives. This dissertation is a product of such a searching process—a process full of both despair and enlightenment.

For many naive positivists, most of the fundamental problematics have already been settled. According to the doctrine of positivism, under the name of "unified sciences," the natural sciences have already set up a standard model for the social sciences.¹ The difference, if there is any, between the social sciences and the natural sciences is just a matter of degree, not of type. Therefore, the universal validity of sociological theory and methodology is presupposed. According to those positivistic-oriented sociologists, what we need is more "empirical" studies. There is no necessity to examine or reflect upon the foundations: at best, such reflection is the language game of philosophers. This positivistic point of view was predominant during the 50's and 60's. Many so-called "comparative studies" were done without reflection on the nature of the theory and method utilized. But the lack of self-understanding of the discipline is not merely naive, but mistaken. Until we have a better understanding of the basic problematics—i.e., the nature of sociology and human action—any claim for universal validity of sociological knowledge is premature.

The process of searching for answers to fundamental questions is endless. It is a task of, in Thomas Kuhn's sense, "paradigm testing" rather than "problem solving."
For it inevitably involves philosophical issues which can not be proved by evidence but which are justified by discursive argumentation. This view certainly is not shared by most of the so-called "mainstream" sociologists. However, since the late 60's there has been a growing interest in re-examining the foundation of sociology. Many fundamental issues have been reopened and reorientation is demanded. Among the different approaches, phenomenological sociology and critical theory I consider to be the two most challenging: they not only have forcefully criticized the fallacy of objectivism, but also have significantly attempted to provide theoretical alternatives for the reconstruction of sociology.

(A) Phenomenological Alternative

In the past ten years, there has been a revitalized interest, particularly in the English-speaking world, in the writings of Alfred Schutz. Many factors contribute to this development, one of them is the recent significant development of ethnomethodology. In Garfinkel's writings we can clearly see the impact of Schutz's phenomenology. But here, I am surveying the importance of Schutz from a different angle. At the cost of some considerable oversimplification, we may conceive the history of sociology as a dialectic between the positivistic approach and that of the German Geisteswissenschaften tradition. The former aims at objective knowledge in explanatory (or quasi-explanatory) form,
whereas the latter is interested in understanding the subjective meaning of human action. In the historical development of the discipline, Max Weber is certainly the most important critic to have attempted to resolve the tension between these two opposing perspectives. His idea of "interpretive sociology" tries to provide a methodological scheme which can not only grasp the subjective meaning of human action, but also provide some kind of explanation for social development. Such an attempt is ambitious, nevertheless unsatisfactory. The notion of "understanding" remains subjectivistic. Alfred Schutz takes the problem left by Weber as his point of departure and tries to reconstruct the project of "interpretive sociology" with the aid of Edmund Husserl's phenomenological approach. As he tells us in the preface to his first book, The Phenomenology of the Social World,

The present study is based on an intensive concern of many years' duration with the theoretical writings of Max Weber. During this time I become convinced that while Weber's approach was correct and that he had determined the proper starting point of the philosophy of the social sciences, nevertheless his analyses did not go deeply enough to lay the foundation on which alone many important problems of the human sciences could be solved. Above all, Weber's central concept of subjective meaning call for thorough going analysis. As Weber left his concept, it was little more than a heading for a number of important problems which he did not examine in detail, even though they were hardly foreign to him. It is quite proper to see Schutz's writings as a continuation of the great tradition of "interpretive sociology." The aspect of Weber's contribution that Schutz has emphasized
is his concept of "understanding" ([Verstehen]). With the aid of intellectual resources from Husserl and Bergson, Schutz reinterprets the concept of "meaning" and analyzes intentionality, internal time consciousness, commonsense knowledge, and everyday life world, aiming at a reconstruction of the foundation of social sciences, particularly sociology.

Like Weber, Schutz tries very hard to reconcile the contradiction between the subjectivistic and objectivistic approaches. From his debate with Nagel and Hempel, we can clearly see that Schutz shares a number of fundamental issues with the positivists. He never questions Weber's general thesis that social science ought to be a "value-free" (wertfrei) discipline. He agrees that "'theory' means in all the empirical sciences the explicit formulation of determinate relations between a set of variables in terms of which a fairly extensive class of empirically ascertainable regularities can be explained." And he insists that "a set of rules for scientific procedure is equally valid for all empirical sciences whether they deal with objects of nature or with human affairs." Again, like Weber, Schutz is asking a very ambitious, nevertheless misconceived question: "how is it possible to form objectively verifiable theory of subjective meaningstructures?" It is proper to say that Schutz is the single most important and influential figure in the movement to phenomenologically reconstruct "interpretive sociology" in particular, social sciences in general.
Unfortunately, most fellow phenomenologists have treated Schutz with admiration and subservience rather than critical reflection. This contention will be defended and used as a basis for a critique of the whole effort of phenomenological sociology. It seems to me that a critical analysis such as this is particularly appropriate and timely in view of the evolution of interpretive sociology and the increasingly important role Schutz occupies.

For this analysis, a critical reflection on Schutz's own foundation—i.e., Husserlian phenomenology—is necessary. The uniqueness of Schutz's approach is that he uses Husserl's phenomenology as the philosophical groundwork for developing an explicit definition of subjectivity and meaning. Schutz feels that Husserl's search for the ultimate source of meaning and understanding in consciousness leads to a satisfactory solution to the problem of interpreting human action. Using the principles of Husserlian phenomenology, Schutz hopes to clarify and strengthen Weber's sociological method. But what is the nature of Husserlian phenomenology; i.e., what are the structure, assumptions, method, power and limitations of this approach? Without a thoroughgoing understanding of this foundation, phenomenologists are destined, though in a different form, to make the same mistake positivists made—a lack of self-understanding.

Most of the phenomenologically-oriented social scientists are aware that Schutz rejects Husserl's transcendental phenomenology but adopts his phenomenology of natural
attitude. However, it seems they seldom have the patience to take Husserl's phenomenology as a whole to see whether the deletion of his transcendental analysis is justified. Since Husserl is a most systematic philosopher who rigorously develops concepts and theories step by step, it can be argued that Schutz himself does not reflect enough upon Husserl's phenomenology. I think the main problem of Husserl's approach is not located in his transcendental analysis. Actually, Husserl's transcendental analysis is a continuation of his early description of natural attitude. The real problem is that the theory Husserl developed is essentially a pure theory of knowledge that cannot be grounded in a theory of society.

Henri Bergson was probably right in saying that every philosopher in his life says only one thing, conveying one leading idea or intention that endows all his works with meaning. As Husserl himself proclaimed, he was trying to find the absolutely unquestionable foundation of knowledge. Like most philosophers, he was writing the same book throughout his life, always returning to the beginning, correcting himself, struggling with his own presuppositions. The goal was invariably the same.

Husserl's phenomenology may well be the greatest and the most serious attempt in our century to reach the ultimate sources of knowledge. However, Husserl never intended to develop a theory of society based on his theory of knowledge. From a social scientist's point of view, the question of
whether Husserl's theory of knowledge can serve as a foundation for a theory of society is crucial. There is always a gap between these two kinds of theory, and although it is legitimate and necessary to bridge this gap in order to make philosophical thinking relevant to the analysis of social reality, doing so requires critical reflection on the underlying theory of knowledge. This is especially true when the philosopher did not explicitly intend to extend his theory to a theory of society.

At this point, some phenomenologists may argue that Husserl's later writings on the notion of "intersubjectivity" in _Cartesian Meditations_, and of _Lebenswelt_ (life world) in _The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology_ are particularly significant to the analysis of social reality. However without an understanding of the very nature of the approach, its application can be very superficial and misleading. Briefly, while most phenomenologically-oriented sociologists utilize Schutz's ideas to reflect on the foundation of sociology, Schutz adopted Husserl's philosophy to reconstruct the discipline. Thus I require a critical understanding of Husserl as background for assessing the significances and limitations of Schutz's phenomenological project.

Quite often, a study like this appears to be an endless project. And I, as a student of sociology, do not pretend to be an expert on Husserl. Neither do I believe, as do some, that if one goes deeply enough into his work, one may
be initiated into an absolutely reliable method of thinking. However, I do admit that Husserl was indeed a great philosopher, and in the process of trying to understand him, I have come upon some ideas that not only help to clarify the nature and difficulty of phenomenological sociology, but also indicate a significant alternative path toward a better understanding of the human world.

During his life, Husserl piled up a great number of very detailed distinctions and concepts not easily grasped by the reader who is not devoting his entire life to Husserl studies. Certainly, I am not interested in analyzing every step in his intellectual development or reconciling everything he said. What I intend to do is to put Husserl back in his own intellectual context in order to comprehend what he expected to achieve. Like any philosopher, he is intelligible only in contrast to, and against the background of, the philosophical culture he was attacking—i.e., psychologism, historicism, and objectivism. Ultimately Husserl hoped to discover the self-supporting foundation of our knowledge. By achieving this, he believed that his philosophy would play a great role in saving European culture from crisis.

Indeed, such an attempt is not unique to Husserl. The novelty of his philosophy lies in the method, that of phenomenological reduction (epoché). If we want to evaluate whether his attempt succeeded or not and ask why it succeeded or failed, we must carefully analyze his method. Then we
can properly work out what he has achieved and what he has been unable to resolve.

Reflecting upon Husserl's philosophy as a point of departure has a double function. It not only provides a better understanding of phenomenological sociology, but also adds to a growing body of work seeking to reorient the general direction of sociological inquiry. In the past four decades, so-called "mainstream" sociology, by taking positivistic presuppositions for granted, has treated philosophical reflection as "non-scientific." Though positivists are anxious to separate "scientific" sociology from "philosophy," in fact they consciously or unconsciously accept the positivistic philosophy of sciences as their guiding principle. If we look at recent developments in the history and philosophy of science, however, we will discover that the positivistic understanding of science is wrong. Since Thomas Kuhn published his stimulating book, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, in the early sixties, critics have been reexamining the foundations of science. The image of "science," the growth of scientific knowledge, the issue of objectivity and "value-free" science, the problem between "understanding" and "explanation," the theory of "truth," the structure of scientific community, etc.—all these fundamentals have been questioned. Although there is no consensus among the theorists (among them, Popper, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos, Toulmin) who engaged in the debate, they do share the view that the nature of science is not
what the positivists, particularly the logical empiricists thought. This development certainly has (or will have) fundamental impact on the theory and methodology of the social sciences, many basic concepts of positivistic sociology having been derived from positivistic philosophy. Many sociologists seem insensitive to this development. They are more interested in and contented with their empirical studies. More often they consider philosophical discussions futile. However, it is now clear that their attitude is "dogmatic," though in a "scientific" disguise, and that this attitude has not only theoretical and methodological but also (in the ethical and political sense) "practical" consequences. In the early seventies, Alvin Gouldner, in The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, Robert Friedrichs, in A Sociology of Sociology, and others all demanded reflection on this problem. Nevertheless, most their discussions are in the form of criticism rather than a systematic reconstruction of the epistemological foundation. In other words, most of their criticism does not delve into the fundamental problematics. They raise some significant issues but do not provide the new theoretical alternative that is important if we are not to be content with mere negative critique.

Actually, this problem is one major reason for my choice of phenomenology and critical theory as the core of my study. Both theories not only systematically criticize the problems of positivistic presuppositions, but also constructively attempt to provide a better epistemological ground for the
discipline. And both approaches, in contrast with the positivistic, emphasize the importance of interplay between philosophical reflection and empirical sociological inquiry. At the present time, I expect that this perspective is not yet accepted by most of the "mainstream" American sociologists. However, if the goal of sociology remains to provide a better understanding of human society, and to liberate people from unnecessary domination, then it is necessary to consider both perspectives seriously.

(B) Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School

If phenomenological reflection is one big step forward in the process of restructuring the foundation of sociology, the development of critical theory is another more radical step. Interestingly enough, although these two approaches disagree on many important philosophical and sociological issues, they share some concerns that provide the common ground for significant dialogue. The critical theorists, no less than the phenomenologists, are critical of the positivistic and objectivistic tendencies increasingly affecting all intellectual disciplines. They too react against the "positivistic restriction of the idea of science," whereby all legitimate knowledge, all theory was seen through the vision of positivism. They too realize that such a development is not only an intellectual but also a human crisis. They endeavor to provide alternative approaches to the problems; however they disagree on the solutions. The
fundamental disagreement is rooted in their different points of view on the role of theory and the theorist. A brief comparison between Husserl and Horkheimer can help us to grasp their similarities and differences.

When Husserl wrote his *Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, he termed what had taken place in the modern world a "positivistic restriction of the idea of science," and stated that this positivism "decapitates philosophy." The guidance that philosophy as theoria was to provide "in the completely new shaping of European humanity" had collapsed. In order to save Western civilization, Husserl hoped that a recovery of pure theoria could provide a sufficient rational basis for guiding our lives. The recovery and fulfillment of such a pure theoria are Husserl's primary objective in the *Crisis*. That the only way out of the crisis is by the difficult path of transcendental phenomenology remains pure theoria; he never succeeds in showing us the intrinsic connection between pure theoria and its practical efficacy in transforming mankind. One is left with no basis for bridging the gap between theoria and praxis. Despite the nobility of his intentions, his phenomenology leaves us impotent in the face of the concrete historical determinations of social reality. Surely, this problem is not unique to Husserl. It has its origins in the beginnings of modern philosophy, especially in the Cartesian conception of method. We can see that this separation between "theoria" and "praxis," "fact" and
"value," "empirical-descriptive" and "normative" statement has continued in the modern Western philosophical tradition. Husserl did attempt to find an absolute foundation for knowledge; however, he never succeeded in solving this old paradox. And this is exactly the point the Frankfurt School critical theorists picked up as their point of departure.

At the time that Husserl was struggling to understand the fundamental crisis of the times, Max Horkheimer and his fellow Frankfurt theorists were doing something similar, though with a different approach that essentially has its roots in the Hegelian-Marsian tradition. At just about the same time that the first edition of Husserl's Crisis appeared, Horkheimer published an essay, the well-known "Traditional and Critical Theory," which can be considered a position paper for the Frankfurt School critical theorists. In this paper Horkheimer suggests that the basic distinction between "traditional theory" and "critical theory" is that the former confines itself to theoretical contemplation, whereas the latter stresses the intrinsic connection between theory and practice. The general goal of all traditional theory is

A universal systematic science, not limited to any particular subject but embracing all possible objects, the division of sciences is being broken down by deriving the principles for special areas from the same basic premises. The same conceptual which was elaborated for the analysis of inanimate nature is serving to classify animate nature as well, and anyone who has once mastered the use of it, that is the rules for derivation, the symbols, the process of comparing derived propositions with observable fact, can use it at any time.
This statement apparently takes positivism as the main target, but Horkheimer thinks that phenomenologists share the conception. He cites Husserl's statement that theory consists of a "systematically linked set of propositions taking the form of a systematically unified deduction." According to such a conception of theory, Horkheimer argues that theoretical knowledge can be related to our lives in only a "technical," not a "practical" sense. By "technical" is meant that theoretical knowledge serves as a means to achieve a given end. The term "practical," on the other hand, always involves "ethical" and "political" meaning, intrinsically related to "value" and "ends." Consistent with this conception is a dichotomy between fact and value in traditional theory, hence a strict limit upon moral reason. Because of this dichotomy and its limitations, traditional theory maintains a split between theorist as scientist and theorist as citizen. As Horkheimer indicates:

The scholarly specialist "as" scientist regards social reality and its products extrinsic to him, and "as" citizen exercises his interest in them through political articles, membership in political parties or social service organizations, and participation in elections. But he does not unify these two activities, and his other activities as well, except, at best, by psychological interpretation.

It is this explicit recognition of the connection of knowledge and interest that distinguishes critical theory from traditional theory. As Anthony Giddens rightly puts it: "If there is a single dominating element in critical theory, it is the defence of Reason (Vernunft) understood in the
sense of Hegel and classical German philosophy: as the critical faculty which reconciles knowledge with the transformation of the world so as to further human fulfilment and freedom.  

Clearly enough, critical theory is deeply rooted in the Hegelian-Marxian tradition. It attempts to follow Marx, and thereby to reconstruct modern Marxism itself, by appealing to Hegel's transcendence of two central Kantian dualisms: that of pure and practical reason and that of the apperception of phenomena and the unknowable "things-in-themselves." "Such dualisms are regarded as both expression and source of a passive, contemplative attitude to knowledge: an attitude which reduces the practical import of knowledge to "technology" or "technique" robbed of the unifying potentialities of historical Reason."  

So Horkheimer puts it: whereas in Hegel reason is seen to be inherent in reality, in Hume and in Kant, as well as in Cartesian philosophy, it becomes a "subjective faculty of the mind."  

It is an important methodological task to overcome such dualism in traditional theory, since it leads to the eclipse of reason. As a means of recovering a comprehensive idea of reason, the critique of instrumental rationality has been the central theme among the members since the early period of the Frankfurt School.

In placing explicit emphasis upon the connection between theory and praxis, critical theorists are indebted to Marx's critique of ideology. Unlike traditional theorists,
they do not view reality passively, taking phenomena as given. Whereas traditional theory is applied to existing social reality, critical theory aims at relentless criticism of all existing conditions. As Horkheimer puts it:

By criticism, we mean that intellectual, and eventually practical effort which is not satisfied to accept the prevailing ideas, actions, and social conditions unthinkingly and from mere habit; effort which aims to coordinate the individual sides of social life with each other and with the general ideas and aims of the epoch, to deduce them genetically, to distinguish the appearance from the essence, to examine the foundations of things, in short, really to know them.18

Such a radical critique has a fundamental interest to guide it. Critical theory has the function of fostering the self-consciousness and understanding of existing social conditions in order to free us from domination and to further human emancipation. In short, critical theory is not content with a merely negative attitude toward existing social conditions, but seeks to stimulate change and to improve human existence. Whereas traditional theory takes the ideology of the existing society for granted and tends to legitimize the status quo, critical theory wants to penetrate the ideological mystifications that distort the meaning of existing social conditions.

Like Marx, Horkheimer and the earlier Frankfurt philosophers are unsatisfied with vague talk about the promise of critique and turn their attention more and more toward the specific analysis of capitalism. Most of their writings are in the form of a critique of capitalist culture.19 From their point of view, positivistic sociology that uncritically
accepts the basic premises of traditional theory is not only methodologically wrong but also ideologically immoral. Thus, they argue, positivistic sociology has tended to offer elitist re-mystifications of the world, criticizing and replacing commonsense understandings with scientific descriptions that better serve the purpose of the legitimation and rationalization of the given social order. Positivistic sociology, moreover, has failed to reveal the historicity of appearance or to transcend the facts through a revelation of the immanent possibilities (Möglichkeiten) of society. So, the critique of capitalist culture has the important emancipatory function of enlightening the people by indicating possible alternatives for the future.

For many sociologists the very idea of a critical theory may contradict a belief in the scientific enterprise, because critical theorists seem to violate the basic principle of empirical science—the separation between fact and value, the empirical and the normative. It is necessary for the critical theorists to examine the epistemological foundations and inadequacies of traditional theory and justify the move to critical theory. Otherwise, at best, critical theorists could find themselves in a relativistic position. They criticize positivistic science as being "bourgeois" and as hidden by a kind of scientific pretension. However, even if this is the case then what kind of perspective shall theorists take? Replacing the "bourgeois" perspective with a "proletarian" one is epistemologically indefensible.
In what way can the interest in the future and the emancipation that guides critical theory be distinguished from the particularistic interests concealed behind other ideological theories? This question obviously must be answered if critical theory itself is to be free from the suspicion of ideology it applies to other theories. All these problems have been left unresolved by the earlier classic figures, including Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse. This puts them in a position vulnerable to claims that critical theory is merely another "culture-bound" and even "class-bound" standpoint.

If the development of critical theory had stopped at the point reached by the earlier Frankfurt School philosophers, it would have not been valuable to the development of sociology and the critical understanding of human society. It had to wait until the late fifties and early sixties when the younger generation of the Frankfurt School, particularly Jürgen Habermas and Albrecht Wellmer, began systematically to reexamine the epistemological foundations of critical theory itself. This study has led to a breakthrough on the important issues raised by the earlier critical theorists.

In order to provide a better epistemological foundation for critical theory, and even more broadly, for human sciences, Habermas has undertaken a very ambitious project. He critically examines Marx's writings with the aim of distinguishing what is still valid from what must be rejected. Both Habermas and Wellmer argue that the "positivistic" elements in Marx's analysis undermine its critical content.
The idea of a science of man is obscured in Marx's writings by the identification of science with natural science. The sterility of Marxism is a consequence of Marx's narrow focus on social labor to the exclusion of the structures of interaction and communication. Yet the full dimensions of Habermas' project are much broader. He critically interprets Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, Diethey, Comte, Peirce, Mach, and Freud "to reconstruct the prehistory of modern positivism with the systematic intention of analyzing the connections between knowledge and human interests." Thus he establishes a rational basis from which to assess the methodological biases of positivistic social science and to develop a comprehensive critical theory of society. Moreover, Habermas has developed a theory of communicative competence and a consensus theory of truth which is capable of directly meeting some of the deepest challenges of the analytic philosophy of science, as well as those of phenomenology and hermeneutics. Using this research, he sketches a theory of crises in advanced capitalism. In short, Habermas is trying to develop a theory of knowledge that can be grounded in the social life world. Such a comprehensive theory should provide a rational basis for reconsidering the intrinsic connection between theory and praxis, and for a critical analysis of advanced capitalism that aims at emancipating humankind from unnecessary domination.

Here we can see both continuity and discontinuity between Habermas and the earlier Frankfurt theorists. Indeed,
in Habermas' critical stance toward social reality, and in his emphasis on the connection between theory and praxis, on the critique of ideology and on an anti-postivistic understanding of knowledge, he shows concerns similar to those of his predecessors. However, a significant break between Habermas and the first generation of the School is also evident. In his Frankfurt inaugural address of June, 1965, Habermas took as point of departure Husserl's discussion of the crisis of the European sciences. In fact, in his classic, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, the names and the writings of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse are seldom mentioned. The disagreement between Habermas and Marcuse is obvious in the articles edited in *Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse*. Habermas wants to go beyond the framework set by the earlier critical theorists. And the Hegelian-Marxian tradition (particularly Horkheimer) is merely one of the many intellectual resources which he draws upon. Recently Habermas' emphasis on communicative action has led to a positive encounter with the Wittgensteinian philosophy, Austin's linguistics, and Gadamer's Hermeneutics. As Wellmer points out, there is a so-call "linguistic turn" in the recent development of critical theory. It not only criticizes the positivistic elements in Marx's writings and Marxism, but also bridges the gap between the Anglo-American analytical tradition and the Continental hemeneutical-dialectical tradition.

In a sense, Habermas' theory is a product of the dialectic between the positivistic and the German
Geisteswissenschaften tradition. Both traditions have had far-reaching impact on the theory and methodology of social sciences. And for a long period of time, proponents of these two approaches have attacked each other from their own perspectives. From Habermas' point of view, both approaches are limited but have their valid claims. What he attempts to do is to develop a complex dialectical synthesis of what he takes to be legitimate in both traditions. At the same time, he finds it necessary to go beyond both, indicating that an adequate social theory must also be critical. This task he first systematically undertook in his Knowledge and Human Interests, critically reflecting upon the major philosophical and sociological traditions, namely German idealism, positivism, pragmatism, and historicism. Eventually, Habermas hopes to reach his aim—to develop a theory of knowledge for critical social science that can be grounded in the social life world.

This task is ambitious and difficult, seeming at present, to comprise more questions than answers and solutions. Habermas is aware of its programmatic nature and is still working on it. The fact that he has been attacked from a variety of stand points is an indication not only of the complexity but also of the centrality and importance of the issues that Habermas examines. Indeed, scarcely an area from the humanities to the social sciences has escaped the influence of his thought. As George Lichtheim remarked: "The baffling thing about Habermas is that, at an age when
most of his colleagues have painfully established control over one corner of the field, he has made himself master of the whole, in depth and breadth alike."

It is impossible to cover every part of Habermas' work, since it encompasses such a wide range of disciplines (from social sciences to philosophy), authors (from Kant, Hegel to Parsons), and approaches (from system theory to phenomenology). In the present work, I will concentrate on his understanding and justification of a critical theory of society. This part of his work mainly deals with the theoretical and metatheoretical problems fundamental to a reconstruction of the foundation of sociology. Finally, in my conclusion, I will try to demonstrate the possible dialectic between phenomenology and critical theory in the process of restructuring sociology.

(C) The Methodological Perspective

After presenting the intention of this dissertation, I should like to discuss the method of my inquiry. First of all, the term "method" is defined in the sense that European social philosophers characteristically employ. That is to say, it is not a guide to empirical research or surveys. Rather it is primarily an exercise in clarification of conceptual, logical, theoretical issues. In this sense, my approach primarily includes three steps. First, I will try to interpret each theory comprehensively, from its own perspective. Secondly, I will critically examine the
difficulties of each theory in its own terms. At the end, I will try to show the possible complementary relationship between the different theories.

In the past several decades of English-speaking sociology, whenever we discuss a theoretical topic like this, operational definitions, formal logic (inductive and deductive), empirical verification have been the standard guidelines. This mainly is due to the Anglo-American tradition that insists that the social sciences should model their aspirations on the natural sciences. As the widespread citings and references to such representatives of positivistic social sciences as Nagel, Hempel and Zetterberg indicate, "science" can be identified with the positivistic philosophy of science. According to Nagel, scientific theory should be in a deductive-nomological form, the propositions to be verified by empirical facts. In fact, he defines fact as something like that of sensory experience, in which hypotheses then must be tested by controlled sensory observation. Since observational evidence is required to verify hypotheses, only "overt behavior" should be counted as "scientific." Anything like "interpretative understanding," says Nagel, is prescientific or unscientific.27

While Nagel consciously develops his philosophy of science, Zetterberg is more concerned to describe the connection between research and what he calls "theoretical sociology."28 Like Nagel, he argues that theoretical explanation in sociology, if it is to advance beyond common-sense
knowledge, must assume the same deductive-nomological form which it has in natural science. "Theory" in sociology means a set of deductively connected laws, to which any particular event, within boundary conditions, can be referred. If sociology is to meet the demands of being an empirical science, the language it uses must be formalized. And such formalized language should be reducible to observational language. Hence the validity of a theory is dependent upon the verification of observational facts. Clearly enough such empiricist-positivist conceptions consider sensory experience, i.e., observational facts as "objective." A valid theory, in other words, is a correspondence or an objective copy of reality. Apparently, then, Nagel and Zetterberg adopt a objectivistic philosophy of the natural sciences and extend it to the realm of the social sciences. If we accept this standpoint, phenomenology and critical theory will not be considered as "theory," since both phenomenology and critical theory reject such an objectification of social reality. However, here we can not simply dismiss the problem by calling them different incommensurable paradigms. Indeed, there is something seriously wrong in the positivistic philosophy of science and the social sciences which has prevented the social sciences from understanding and transforming social and political reality.

A trend within the realm of philosophy of science should be helpful in clarifying some of the key issues we discuss here. First, let us note Karl Popper's refutation of the
early positivist's notion of "verification." Popper completely rejects the notion of induction, concomitantly rejects the concept of "sensory certainty," and substitutes "falsification" for "verification." The distinctive characteristic of science is that instead of merely seeking confirmation or verification of a theory, the scientist attempts to refute it. Confirmation of a theory results from its successful withstanding of empirical assaults that have the aim of falsifying it. As Popper says, "One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability." However there are also some major overall similarities clearly apparent between Popper's writings and those of the logical positivists. Popper shares the conviction that scientific knowledge, imperfect though it may be, is the most certain and reliable knowledge to which human beings can aspire. Science is separated from other forms of knowledge insofar as its theories are capable of being exposed to empirical testing and therefore to potential falsification. The object of science is still conceived in a traditional manner as the securing of abstract generalizations that are true insofar as they correspond to facts. According to Popper, although we can never be logically certain that we have attained truth, we can approach closer and closer to such certainty by the elimination of false theories.
Although he never admits it himself, in a sense Popper can be seen as the most sophisticated of the positivists, depending upon the way we interpret his work. It seems to me that Popper occupies a marginal position, connecting the Vienna Circle logical positivists and the "newer philosophy of science," represented by Kuhn, Toulmin, Lakatos, and Feyerabend. One thing that clearly distinguishes Popper's thought from logical positivism, and more generally positivistic philosophy, is his pointing out that there is no "pure observation" prior to "theory" in the method integral to the notion of inductive logic, and fundamental to logical positivism in the form of protocol statements. All observations are "theory-impregnated" and are interpretations of facts. Hence, in this sense, scientific theory is built on shifting sand, and what is important is not where we begin but how we are able to subject our conjectures to empirical testing. In this way, the aim of science, according to Popper, is more accurately described as being concerned with "verisimilitude" rather than with truth. But the idea of verisimilitude is only defensible if we assume a finite number of possible conjectures or theories about nature, such that by progressively refuting them we get nearer and nearer to the truth. Apparently, Popper's view of the growth of scientific knowledge is evolutionary; i.e., a better theory replaces an inadequate one. Here it is clear that Popper is committed to a correspondence theory of truth; that is to say, he presupposes that there is an objective reality
"out there." Popper has made some serious criticisms and modifications of logical positivism. Nevertheless, his effort is not radical enough. At the cost of oversimplification, his problems can briefly be summarized and refuted under two categories. First, his general theory of scientific development, particularly the evolutionary perspective and the notion of falsification, is challenged by Thomas Kuhn. Secondly, the "positivistic" elements of his theory of knowledge are criticized by theorists of the dialectical tradition, particularly Adorno and Habermas.34

Perhaps no work has had a greater influence on the recent "image of science" than Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, despite his influence having been a confusing and obfuscating one. Since his work has become very well known indeed, there is no need here to summarize his ideas. Here I will examine two issues directly relevant to our discussion. First, in contrast to the positivists and Popper, Kuhn sees the important change in a scientific theory as occurring through a process not of verification or falsification, but of revolution. And a revolution in science is a change in world-view, a gestalt-switch: the conceptual transformation thus effected infuses "observation" itself. As Kuhn observes:

In sensory experience fixed and neutral? The epistemological viewpoint that has most often guided Western Philosophy for three centuries dictates an immediate and unequivocal, Yes! In the absence of a developed alternative, I find it impossible to relinquish entirely that viewpoint. Yet it no longer functions effectively, and the attempts to
make it do so through the introduction of a neural language of observations now seem to me hopeless.\textsuperscript{35}

The positivistic understanding of the connection between theory and fact has been rejected. According to Kuhn, the scientific revolution is a displacement of the conceptual framework through which scientists view the world. It does not involve the introduction of additional objects or facts. All historically significant theories have agreed with the facts, but only more or less.\textsuperscript{36} The competition between paradigms is not the sort of battle that can be resolved by proofs. It inevitably involves a recourse to philosophy and to debate over fundamentals. If a new paradigm is going to win its fight, the number and strength of the persuasive arguments in its favor must increase. That is to say, a new theory is accepted by rational argumentation and persuasion within a scientific community rather than being unequivocally settled by formal logic and experiment alone. Different paradigm theories respond to different worlds. Hence, what occurs during a scientific revolution is not fully reducible to a reinterpretation of stable data, because data that scientists collect from diverse objects are themselves different. As Kuhn suggests, the fit between nature and theory is always imperfect: "no paradigm even solves all the problems it defines and since no two paradigms leave all the same problems unsolved, paradigm debate always involve the question: which problems is it more significant to have solved?"\textsuperscript{37}

A decision of this kind can be made only on faith. The man
who embraces a new paradigm "at an early stage must have faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a few." Hence, the role a theorist plays is not merely fact gathering and hypothesis testing. He or she always has commitments to his or her views. The commitments lead him or her to scrutinize some aspects of nature in great empirical detail. After a new paradigm theory is accepted, so-called "normal science" research practices follow. In normal scientific research the rules, assumptions, perspectives, criteria of validity, and model problems are prescribed by the paradigm theory. "It is only during periods of normal science that progress seems both obvious and assured. During those periods, however, the scientific community could view the fruits of its work in no other way." \(^{39}\)

Clearly, in Kuhn's work the connection between theory and the empirical world, as well as the role of theory are redefined. Despite the complexity and some ambiguities of Kuhn's definition of "paradigm,"\(^{40}\) his analysis of the history and philosophy of science has not only overthrown the positivistic understanding of science and theory, but also significantly pointed out that scientific enterprise, like any other activity, always involves a fundamental hermeneutical dimension: that is to say, communication and intersubjective understanding among the participants in a scientific community is an integral part of science. In
science, neither "strict proof" (logical deduction) nor simple verification nor falsification is sufficient to account for the choice of theories or paradigms.

Kuhn's work has primarily dealt with the natural sciences; he cautioned in the first edition of his book that his thesis could be applied with profit only to the "mature," that is, natural sciences. However, his theory obviously has important impact for the social sciences, since the positivistic interpretation of the social sciences depends upon an identification with the primary characteristics of the natural sciences. It follows that Kuhn's thought can be fruitful to the self-understanding of the social sciences. Nevertheless, the differences between the social and natural sciences should not be overlooked. Otherwise, Kuhn's theory is more likely to lead to confusion and contradiction than to clarification. 41

Kuhn's writings have provoked a tremendous number of debates. A comprehensive discussion obviously would be completely out of the question here. It seems to me that the significance of Kuhn's analysis to the social scientists is that his interpretation of scientific knowledge has liberated us from the positivistic illusion--the reduction of meaning to testability--and has provoked a demand for reflection upon the epistemological foundation of our own discipline. It is futile to argue whether the social sciences have a "paradigm" or not, since the context in which Kuhn uses the term is very different from the context we use
in the social sciences, and the conception of "paradigm" is by no means unproblematical. The major criticism of Kuhn's interpretation is that he tends to exaggerate the internal unity of paradigms, treating them as "closed systems." Then, as Anthony Giddens rightly commented: "If paradigms are closed systems of epistemological premises, which succeed each other by processes of revolutionary change, how is anyone to be able rationally to adjudge one paradigm against another?" If this problem cannot be successfully solved, Kuhn threatens to slide into a kind of relativism. Kuhn has consistently withdrawn from the relativistic implications of his account of the development of science, but he still has the urgent task of how to show the relativity of different paradigms without meanwhile being trapped by the difficulty of relativism.

From this brief discussion of the recent development of philosophy of science, we learn that intersubjective, interpretive understanding is the integral part of scientific knowledge that is not reducible to empirical testibility. The meanings of the terms, expressions, and descriptions of a theory have to be grasped interpretatively. In order to avoid objectivistic distortion, we must first view a theory from an internal perspective; that is to say, to sympathetically understand its presuppositions and perspectives. But this is not enough. If we want to overcome the problems of relativism, the inquiry should not stop here. After understanding a theory in its own terms, we should view the theory
from a critical viewpoint, reflecting on its possible limits. It seem to me that an adequate approach should be able to grasp each theory from its own perspective of self-understanding and to see how its internal difficulties lead us to comprehend both its one-sidedness and its truth. Furthermore, since there is always more than one theory existence, we must take the mediation of different theories into consideration. From the study of the history of science, we know that there is not a single theory which is complete. No theory is an isolated, discrete, closed system; rather connections and possible mediations always exist. Hence, a critique of theory aims at enhancing meaningful dialogue with other theories without forcing any of them into a "given" framework. Not only is this the way I will undertake my inquiry of phenomenology and critical theory; also, I believe, it is the way human knowledge grows.
CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES


2 The first book of Alfred Schutz, Der Sinnhafte Aufbau der Sozialen Welt was published in Vienna in 1932. But it must wait until 1964 the first volume of his Collected Papers became available in English.


5 Ibid., p. 49.

6 Ibid., p. 62.


9 Ibid., pp. 10-11.


12Ibid., p. 190.

13In the tradition of critical theory of society, the distinction between "practical" and "technical" is essential. See particularly Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959); and Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, tr. by John Viertel, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973).


16Ibid.


18Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory, p. 270.

19This type of cultural critique is characterized by the writings of George Lukacs and the early Frankfurt School. For a brief summary of cultural-marxism, see Trent Schroyer, The Critique of Domination (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 199-223.

20The German word Möglichkeiten can be roughly translated in English as "possibilities." The meaning of this word must be understood in the context of German idealism. In contrast to the tradition of empiricism, idealists see that there are immanent possibilities of transforming the existence. In other words, reality is not fixed or determined but opened for change.


23 See Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, tr. by Thomas McCarthy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975).

24 For the disagreement between Marcuse and Habermas, see Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, tr. by Jeremy Shapiro, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), Chapter six, pp. 81-122.


26 Until the end of the year of 1977, Habermas has already published fourteen books and more than twenty papers in German. There is no doubt that he is the most distinguished social theorist and political philosopher writing in German today. Four of Habermas' major writings have been translated into English under the titles of Toward a Rational Society, Knowledge and Human Interests, Theory and Practice, and Legitimation Crisis. The fifth one, Toward a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism is translated by Thomas McCarthy, and will be published in 1978.


29 Ibid., pp. 46-47. Also see Hubert Blalock Jr., Theory Construction (New Jersey, 1969), p. 10.


See Karl Popper, "The Logic of the Social Sciences" in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, tr. by Glyn Adey and David Friby, (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1976). It is clear that Popper has a very precise conception of positivism which his opponents in this dispute do not share.


Ibid., p. 110.

Ibid., p. 158.

Ibid., p. 163.

See Margaret Mastermann, "The Nature of a Paradigm," in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave ed., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. According to Mastermann, there are at least twenty-two sense in which the term "paradigm" is used in Kuhn's book.


Phenomenology is a vast project whose expression is not restricted to one work or to any specific group of works. It is less a doctrine than a method capable of many exemplifications of which Edmund Husserl exploited only a few. Nevertheless, unlike many phenomenologically-oriented social scientists who stop their inquiries at Alfred Schutz, I want go further and take Husserl's Philosophical project as a paradigm for investigating the very foundation of phenomenology itself. By doing so, we not only can arrive at a better understanding of the significance and difficulty of phenomenological method, but also later can be in a better position to see how and why Schutz's phenomenological sociology has succeeded and failed.

In discussing about Husser's philosophy, I am attempting to take a scope that is neither too broad nor too narrow. Too broad a scope would be to systematically cover all his major writings, from his early *Logical Investigation* to his later inquiry of transcendental consciousness
and *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*; and to examine step by step the evolution of his thought. Too narrow, on the other hand, would be to focus on only one or two specific issues. What I will do is to take Husserl's work as a whole, to review his goal in his own intellectual context, to point out the approach he uses, and his achievements and difficulties. Briefly, by reading Husserl's original writings and secondary interpretations, I am attempting to offer a comprehensive understanding of the essence of his program and to make it relevant to my analysis of the foundation of sociology.

(A) Ends: A Search for the Absolute Foundation of Human Knowledge

As Leszek Kolakowski comments: "I believe that phenomenology was the greatest and the most serious attempt in our century to reach the ultimate sources of knowledge." Despite the gradual evolution of Husserl's thought the aim of his project remained invariably the same: how to discover the unshakable, the absolutely unquestionable foundation of knowledge. The concept of certainty can be regarded as the key to Husserl's thought. Decidedly, this is not a new goal, one which has never been sought. Rather, Husserl's project is a resurrection of an old preoccupation of philosophers.

It is helpful to put Husserl in his own intellectual context to understand the intention that endows all his
works with meaning. Husserl believed that the search for certitude was a necessary constituent of European culture and that giving up this search would amount to destroying that culture. The task that European philosophy assumed from the very beginning, not only from Descartes, was to destroy apparent certitudes in order to gain "genuine" ones; to cast doubt on everything, in order to free oneself from doubting. Husserl's first book, *Logical Investigation*, is primarily an attack against the psychologistic interpretation of logic and mathematics. Husserl builds his program on pure logic, the validity of which does not depend upon psychology or any other science. He is sure that psychologism ended in skepticism and relativism— that is, made science impossible— and that it devastated the entire intellectual legacy of mankind. Hence, according to Husserl, if we want to save our trust in reason, in the validity of knowledge, and to preserve the very meaning of the concept of "truth," we must not base logic on psychological laws. We have to find the transcendental foundation of certitude. This idea led Husserl from his attacks on psychologism to his program of transcendental phenomenology.

As a philosopher, Husserl saw that the growing mass of facts, theories, and hypotheses, which allows us to predict events and improve our technology, does not really help us in understanding the world. While increasing his power over nature, man extends the distance between his technological skill and his capacity to understand. Sciences
believe in themselves—such a scientistic attitude tends to equate science with truth. But the sciences measure things without realizing what they measure; in carrying out cognitive acts, they are incapable of grasping the meaning of these very acts. Scientific theories describe relatively constant regularities in experience, but they do not and must not pretend to discover any immanent necessity. Here, clearly enough, Husserl wants to replace a positivistic correspondence theory of truth with a transcendental theory of truth. In defiance of scientism, positivism and relativism—all germs of the dissolution of European culture—Husserl looks for a method that would justify the claims of knowledge to a validity independent of history, persons, society, or biological circumstance. This is a search for absolute criteria which keep the same validity whether or not the world exists. Husserl wants to escape the skepticism that reduces the laws of thought to contingent qualities of a certain species, that destroys the objective validity of knowledge. Once we yield to skepticism, we deny ourselves the right to understand the world. What remains is a contingent picture produced in the brain as the result of contingent circumstances. Husserl believes that such a pursuit of truth is distinct from the pursuit of technically reliable knowledge. And that this technically reliable knowledge is after the case proves that if people had not expected to derive from their knowledge more than technical use, and had not sought after truth and certitude
as values in themselves, they would not have produced technically fruitful science. Husserl is more interested in reason, not the fruit.

Up to this point, we can see that Husserl's transcendental interpretation of knowledge, certainty, validity, and differs vastly from the empiricist view that has dominated the epistemological orientation of the Anglo-American social sciences for more than a century. As Kolakowski succinctly puts it:

It is arguable that the controversy can not be decided with appeal to premises which the antagonists--an empiricist and a transcendentalist--would both agree to be valid. The empiricist will argue that transcendental arguments imply the existence of the realm of ideal meaning, and that we have no empirical grounds to believe in it. The transcendentalist will argue that this very argument, just advanced by the empiricist, implies the monopoly of experience as the highest tribunal of our thought, that this privileged position is precisely under question, and that it is arbitrary to establish such a monopoly. The transcendentalist compels the empiricist to renounce--for the sake of consistency--the concept of truth; the empiricist compels the transcendentalist to confess that in order to save the belief in Reason, he is in duty bound to admit a kingdom of beings (or quasi-beings) he can not justify. This was Husserl's great merit; to lead this discussion to the extreme point.

(B) The Way of Achieving the Absolute Foundation

If the goal of Husserl's philosophical project is to restore human knowledge to a sound and unshakable foundations, then the next question is how to proceed. The means is the phenomenological epoché or reduction. Husserl's use of terminology is far from consistent throughout his work.
It seems that he uses the term "phenomenological reduction" variously at different times. Herbert Spiegelberg points out that "... Husserl himself never succeeded in formulating the meaning and the function of the phenomenological reduction in any unambiguous and definitive fashion, not even in a way that satisfied him personally." Therefore, my discussion will necessarily be interpretive to some degree; I will concentrate on the general characteristics of the method and try to be faithful to Husserl's most frequent and repeated expositions of the reductions.

In spite of the ambiguity and evolution of his thought concerning reduction, it is fair to say that Husserl's frequent use of the notion of phenomenological reduction is to designate an activity with two specific characteristics: first, it is the reducing of a real transcendent object to a real immanent object by bracketing out all considerations of its spatial existence—that is, the reduction of transcendent reality to phenomenal reality; Secondly, it is the restricting of what is acceptable as true to what is immediately self-evident. As Husserl points out in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, the second characteristic is really simply a variation on the first because the only objects that carry with them self-evidence are the immanent objects. The truth we gain is independent of philosophical prejudices and artificial abstractions, and is rooted in an absolutely primordial insight. Nothing may be accepted unless it is found in this primordial insight.
That is, in order to gain the truth, it is necessary to purify the nuclear experience from foreign inadmissable admixtures, and let things reveal themselves to the consciousness directly, "bodily," and undistorted. This kind of insight is neither analytical theoretical knowledge nor common perception, with its beliefs concerning understanding. Hence, philosophy should purposively neglect the existing body of knowledge as a whole, because the reality science presents is either mediated through theories or known only as a stream of subjective perceptions that can be always suspected of being just the product of a personal psyche. The philosopher must suspend all belief in the natural attitude that accepts the world as an unquestionable datum and is unable to face the problems of existence and validity.

According to Husserl, when the phenomenologist practices epoché he does not deny the existence of the outer world, but for analytical purposes he suspends all prejudices of common sense, in particular concerning the existence of both the world and the subject. For the time being, all alleged evidence, all realities of daily life--external bodies, my own body, constructions of physical, social, or mathematical sciences--are cancelled. Thus the process of reduction transcends the world in every respect, and in the reduced sphere the very meaning of the world is transcendental or aprioristic. But, is it not the only possible conclusion that nothing can be left outside the brackets when all the world has been bracketed? The answer is no.
As Spiegelberg points out, many discussions phenomenological method have been "negative"—a bracketing out and a limiting. The purpose of transcendental reduction is more positive: the uncovering of the subjective pole of consciousness, the transcendental ego, as the necessary correlative of the objective pole in every conscious act. What remains after the reduction, as Schutz notes, "is nothing less than the universe of our conscious life, the stream of thought in its integrity, with all its activities and with all its cogitations and experiences." The world before and after the reduction does not differ in content, only in my attitude. Such a purification of the field of consciousness from any existence is the first and necessary operation on the way toward certitude.

The primary mode of consciousness within the reduction, then, is reflection. For example, I am reflecting on my act of perceiving a flower. Both my act of perceiving and its intentional object remain real, individual, and self-given, but are considered apart from any metaphysical, methodological presupposition—merely as phenomena, objects for my reflecting consciousness. The world, so reduced on both sides, the subject and the object, can be investigated and can reveal to us the secret of the meaning of our knowledge. The phenomenological reduction discloses the intimate relation between consciousness, the acts (cognitiones) and the objects (cogitata). According to Husserl's theory of intentionality, the act of our consciousness is intentional, is
always conscious "of" something. The act synthesizes the object. The object in other words, is said to be an intention: the object is meant and intended by the act. Hence, the act of apprehension "constitutes," in the phenomenological sense, the object. Within the reduced sphere, it is not the corporeal thing to which my perception intentionally refers; the intentional object of my preserved perception is "the object as I have perceived it." It is the phenomenon as it appears to me, which may or may not have an equivalent in the bracketed outer world. Thus the whole world is preserved within the reduced sphere insofar as it is the intentional correlate of my conscious act. The intentional objects are no longer things of the outer world as they exist and as they really are, but phenomena as they appear to me. The act of cogitatio and its content, noesis and noema (in Husserl's technical terms), have to be distinguished, but they are given together. An object is an object only to consciousness, and consciousness is always directed toward an object. Here we can see that phenomenology protects itself from narrow idealism by pointing out the intentional character of consciousness. The term "intentionality" designates the essential interrelationship and interdependency of subject and object. Consciousness is a matrix of events.

Eventually, through successive reductions, Husserl's focus retreats further from the objects, goes behind the acts, and comes to rest on the ego itself. When the ultimate
locus of apprehension and subjectivity has been reached, we understand and experience the true source of knowledge and constitution: the transcendental ego whose only concretion is in its acts and objects. It is this subjective pole which gives unity and direction to the various acts of consciousness and which designates the objects of consciousness as being. Hence, for Husserl the ego is termed "transcendental," i.e., the "giver of meaning" to its entire universe of consciousness. This function of the ego in bestowing unity and meaning upon all acts and objects of consciousness, as well as upon itself, is precisely what Husserl calls "constitution."

At point, we can see that the method of phenomenology, rather than being adopted from the sciences, is simply the uncovering of the transcendental ego with all its correlative meanings and structures. Husserl's phenomenology is primarily a "transcendental" investigation. It is a study of the total structures within which consciousness constitutes meaning. Nevertheless, Husserl's reduction includes another step, usually called the "eidetic reduction." With this reduction consciousness moves toward generality both of act and of object. The eidetic reduction focuses and abstracts the general properties, ideas, or forms of the phenomenon under investigation, rather than investigating the particularizing elements of the object in question. By reducing the object, the cogitatum, to its absolutely essential elements, consciousness introduces
itself into the realm of the ideal object—the realm of
the a-temporal and non-spatial. This reduction of the ob-
ject is accomplished by varying the mode of consciousness
which apprehends the object with special concentration on
the mode of imagination, since it requires the least amount
of individuation and particularization. This eidetic reduc-
tion is to be carried out not only with regard to the ob-
jects of consciousness (cogitata), but also with regard to
the acts of consciousness (cogitationes). As Husserl
tells us, by merely imagining ourselves as perceiving,
cutting all ties with actuality and moving by fantasy into
the realm of pure possibility, one arrives at perception, of
"the universal type," the "pure eidos."15

As the act and object of consciousness are raised to
the level of universal type, "pure eidos," so also is the
subjective pole. The transcendental ego is no longer my
de facto ego, but becomes any possible transcendental ego
of which my own is merely one actual exemplification. By
the eidetic reduction, then, the intentional object of re-
reflecting consciousness—namely, the subjective pole in con-
scious relation to its intentional objective pole—is re-
duced completely to the status of a universal. So, the
"essences" are uncovered within the intentional structure
as elements of conscious experience. Essences are "objects"
insofar as they can be known by consciousness, but are
clearly not objects in any spatio-temporal sense; rather,
an essence is a set of conditions necessary for the
possibility of an experience of a given sort. To "intuit" an essence means that the transcendental ego, in such a reduced sphere, has unmediated insight into the conditions necessary, not for the independent thing but for its being experienced. Our insight into essences may well be incomplete, that is, the set of conditions which we uncover for a given structure may be partial; however, this in no way destroys the possibility of our knowledge of this partial set being certain knowledge. Simply speaking, Husserl's "intuition of essences" is the awareness of what is presented to consciousness as universally and undeniably valid. The eidetic reduction is intended to be the final step toward generalization, toward the pure eidos, or essence, which can be drawn out of the experience of the individual.

(C) The Problems of Husserl's Phenomenology

Edmund Husserl's phenomenology was an attempt to achieve the absolute certain foundations for knowledge by providing a new methodology, the application of reduction or epoché. By this means he hoped to eliminate unjustifiable presuppositions and uncover the essential structure of human knowledge. Through successive reductions, at the end a pure subjectivity—the transcendental subjectivity—emerges. According to Husserl, this transcendental subjectivity is the ultimate resource of our possible knowledge. The validity, objectivity, meaning, and truth of our knowledge
must be apprehended by means of this transcendental subjectivity within a reduced sphere. After reduction, the world is a meaning; things and other people are constituted phenomena. The objects are sedimentations of creative acts of transcendental consciousness, and the objects are "immediately intuited." Skepticism and relativism can be overcome only if we discover the source of absolute certitude. We can gain this certitude where there is an absolute immediacy in which the act of cognition and its content are not mediated in any way. Thus we may find certitude only if subjectivity is not a "reflection" of objects, but constitutes them. Husserl began with attacks on subjectivism (in the sense of psychologism, relativism, irrationalism) and objectivism (in the sense of empiricism and positivism), and finally came to the conclusion that "objectivity" could only be achieved within transcendental consciousness, that no rationalism was possible unless it was based on consciousness as the only self-grounding reality.

But is such a transcendental approach, suspension of existence, feasible? Let us examine the difficulties in Husserl's own terms; then in the next chapter I will try to relate them to the foundation of social sciences in general, and to Schutz's phenomenological sociology in particular.

In Husserl's phenomenology, "transcendental ego" is certainly the key concept of his theory of knowledge, the ultimate source he painstakingly found. But we do not know what the transcendental ego—that which remains after the
reduction—really is. Nor is it clear why the word "ego" is used. Husserl stresses the distinction between the psychological and the transcendental ego. The latter is a pure non-psychological subject of cognition. It is not a part of the world, Husserl says: it is not me, a human person knowing myself by means of "natural" experience. Perhaps, when we repeat this distinction often enough, it begins ultimately to seem intelligible. But this intelligibility itself may be illusory. In Husserl's schema, the transcendental ego is an empty recipient of cognitive content, a place where phenomena appear, and nothing else. Husserl perhaps experienced this kind of reduction of himself, but in order that a method be of value, it has to be shared with others. This part of his analysis concerns the subjective pole of the act of consciousness, but what about the objective pole? According to Husserl, the task of phenomenology is not to describe a singular object, or phenomenon, but to uncover in it the universally valid and scientifically fruitful essence, or "eidos" which is immediately intuited. However, can this essence be communicated? Here we come to see a dilemma of Husserl's project—a dilemma between his two main slogans, or principles: "Back to things themselves" (zu den Sachen selbst), and "philosophy should be rigorous science."

"Back to things themselves" means "back to universals," as direct objects of intellectual intuition. According to Husserl's reduction, everything depends ultimately on the
quality of the original insight in which things are revealed. This is a nonanalytical certitude. But, if the certitude has this kind of quality, then how can we know whether or not we have gained a "genuine" certitude? How can we communicate this certitude to other people? Here, we are not saying that empirical verification or falsification is a requisite for scientific knowledge, but if we claim that the knowledge is "scientific," even in its broadest sense, we must be able to communicate it with others. So, although Husserl says "philosophy should be rigorous science," his reduction does not meet the very basic requirement of being scientific: that its content may be conveyed words.

Husserl's phenomenology seems to describe a very peculiar type of experience, which, though not mystical, is incommunicable. This kind of experience can not be replaced by description; hence what the phenomenological method does is, at best, to make it easier for another person to gain a similar experience or insight. Interestingly enough, to a Chinese student, this kind of direct, unmediated experience or insight is not unfamiliar at all. For example, the term "Tao" (Logos) of Taoism has a similar quality. We can find also the same type of "intuition," which is not symbolically communicable, in the tradition of Zen Buddhism. I do not think this type of experience is mystical or irrational; nevertheless, it is beyond scientific rationality. Thus, it does not make too much sense to say that phenomenological method is "rigorous," since
a "rigorous" method is one that, whenever applied, will lead every person to approximately the same result.

Phenomenology can certainly be, and in fact has been, defined in various ways. However, for Husserl, it included transcendental and eidetic reductions. The absolute foundation of knowledge, the certitude he found is within the reduced sphere. This certainty can be guaranteed only at the transcendental level. If so, then the reduction is not a temporal suspension which we might hope to abrogate later. It seems that we always have to put the world within the bracket. Husserl's description of the phenomenological reduction makes it clear that it was intended to eliminate all existential commitments and to admit only that which is absolutely certain. If all existential commitments are genuinely cut, one is left with a pure consciousness, an isolated transcendental ego. There is no way back from reduction except for the return to naive, natural attitudes. Once we go back to natural attitudes, the certitude disappears.

In addition to the difficulty of the incommunicability of Husserl's certitude, two more important problems must be discussed: first, the problem of language; and secondly, the problem of intersubjectivity. Husserl says in Ideas, "Science is possible only when the results of thoughts can be preserved in the form of knowledge and remain available for further thinking as a system of propositions distinctly, stated in accordance with logical requirements but lacking
the clear support of presentations, and so, understood without insight, or else actualized after the manner of a judgment." Language, then, plays a very crucial role in representing essences in the absence of intuition. It is important for Husserl that language acquire the unambiguous clarity that the intuited essences themselves possess. But, how this is to be accomplished is unclear. If Husserl's reductions aim at eventually bracketing out all social context, one is left, at best, with a private language. Such a private language lacks any assurance of consistent use at different times, since any language-game presupposes the existence of a community of speakers and establishes a intersubjective social context. Such a context, of course, necessitates an existential commitment, and thus leads directly back to the naive, natural world again. Certainly, it vitiates the radical nature of Husserl's reduction, the purity of consciousness, and the immediacy of the intuition of essence.

Within the reduced sphere, according to Husserl, the meaning of language is constituted by consciousness. But, from the study of language, we know that language lends itself not only to the lived experience but also to objectification. The meaning of a language is already intersubjectively constructed and objectified. Language is instrumental in the constitution and expression of meanings in the experienced world, and is simultaneously constitutive and expressive of the meaning of the conscious person who
uses it. The relationship between the signs of language and their semantic "meanings" is quite uncertain. As the philosophy of Wittgenstein suggested, language certainly operates, but its semantic relationships with the world it characterises are far from certain. Analysis has shown that any given linguistic context imposes an unavoidable limitation upon our view of "possibilities," since we structure the possibilities of our mundane situation in harmony with the structures of our language. Language, in its actual use, has already limited the possibilities of meaning through its very structures. In this way, essences are linguistic entities, and can not be found to exist outside the limits imposed by language. Any given language limits the possibilities for interpreting experience—let alone for describing its universal and necessary structures for every possible consciousness. Since we must perform our investigation of experience with the aid of language—even within the bracket, Husserl could not deny this—the relativity of the circle seems virtually unbreakable.

In pointing out the limits and relativity imposed by the very nature and the uses of language, I am not suggesting that we conclude with skepticism or Wittgensteinian relativism. (In fact, this is a large issue to be elaborated when we discuss hermeneutics in chapter four.) Rather, this is to note the inaccessibility of the sorts of absolutes which Husserl discovered as the foundation of all knowledge, and to show the necessity of a transformation from the
philosophy of consciousness to the philosophy of language.

The second problem, the issue of intersubjectively, can be considered as a natural consequence of the application of Husserl's reductions. If we want to remain faithful to the principles of reduction, then the world is an achievement of the intentional movement of consciousness; transcendental subjectivity is the only self-grounding reality. But how can Husserl encounter the problem of intersubjectivity and simultaneously avoid the trap of solipsism? The question probably is directed toward the most obscure side of Husserl's philosophy; nevertheless, it is the most important issue which every phenomenologically-oriented social scientist must tackle. Here I will briefly summarize Husserl's ideas, then demonstrate the internal difficulties that will explain why Schutz's attempt to construct a phenomenological sociology failed and why I believe it was bound to fail.

Husserl is aware of the problem of solipsism. He believes not only that solipsism can be overcome but that this can be done only within his transcendental phenomenology. It is clear that he wants to avoid solipsism without destroying his method of reduction and theory of constitution. Husserl thinks that the alter ego is constituted in intentional movement. The alter ego goes beyond my ego; I constitute it as reflected in my own ego. The question is: How can I, as a transcendental ego constituting my entire experience, constitute another ego and yet experience what is constituted in me as another ego. As Husserl
explicitly says, this way of posing the problem is para-adoxical. On the one hand, it is I who constitute the other as an element of my world; but the other, as such, cannot be given to me originally in its own constitutive activities, as in principle it would have to be if the other were constituted by me. It must therefore be made intelligible how my transcendental ego can constitute in itself another transcendental ego, and how it can also, thereafter, constitute an open plurality of such egos. Since these are egos of others, they are inaccessible to me in their original being, and yet they have existence for me and are apprehended by me. How did Husserl solve this problem? He tried to solve it with the help of the second *epoche*. In the fifth *Cartesian Meditation* Husserl offered the following solution.

Within the transcendental experience I separate what is particularly "mine" from phenomena that are related to other egos as subjects. In this way I reduce the universe of my conscious life to my own transcendental sphere. What is left by the abstractive elimination of the sense of other subjectivities is a "primordial world"—no longer a world objectively existing for everybody, but my world belonging peculiarly to me alone. In short, it is my private world.

Within this reduced private world (or world-phenomenon), one object is distinguished from all others. I call it my body. It is distinguished by the fact that
my living body is the extraordinary body in which I rule and govern while I am constituting my world. I can control my body in action and attribute sensorial fields to it in conformity with my experience. Taking this as his reference point, Husserl tries to solve the problem of intersubjectivity in two further steps.

(1) Experiencing my own body in an original manner, I first encounter the other within my primordial world as a body. In an analogizing apprehension, I can perceive this body as one similar to my own living body. I interpret it as another living body. In so doing, and being conscious of the inner life that is always connected with my body in original experience, I construct an analogy: I assume that the other living body is associated in the same way as mine with an inner life, although this life is not accessible to me originally. Husserl calls such a presentation, "appresentation." The living body of the other "appresents" a life of conscious acts that is at first inaccessible to me. The life of the conscious acts of the other, mediated by his living body, is the absolutely first foreign object that comes into being in my primordial world.

(2) The second step of Husserl's argument is to derive the community of monads directly from the meaning of the appresentation of the other's inner life. He argues that the spatial perspectives of "Here" and "There," which are centered in the living body, are in principle interchangeable and, in this way, can be objectified. I can
interpret the other's body by analogy with my own, as though my body here were in the place of the other's body there. Having done this, and inferring from the appresented inner life of the other, I can constitute the other's world by analogy with my own. Husserl now wants to show that, with the constitution of the other, a "transcendental we" is also formed. To demonstrate this, Husserl has recourse to the interchangeability of spatial perspectives. Just as I can virtually occupy the place of the other's body and exchange my Here for his There, still the other person has the status of alter ego only as it is constituted within my transcendental field. The transcendental intersubjectivity of separated monads is formed in me, but as a community is constituted in every other monad as well. The "transcendental we" of communalized monads is constituted through interchangeability.

If this is Husserl's solution to the problem of intersubjectivity, then what are the difficulties? First, we still do not know how we reach a person as a real subjectivity. In Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity, my ego encounters another ego not by inference or by analogy, but in a kind of very special communication--"appresentation"--that is different from other perceptions and not necessarily based on verbal contact. But introducing the concept of "appresentation" does not solve the problem of solipsism. I think Husserl is right in his basic assumption that an intersubjective world of communalized subjects comes into being.
through the reciprocal interchanging of perspectives. In this reciprocity, each participant apprehends himself, others, and nature simultaneously from his own standpoint and from the standpoint of every possible other subject. In this way, the subjects, commonly constitute an objective world. A common world is constituted through a symmetrical relation that allows the other equally to put himself in my place, that is, in place of the appresented inner life of mine, and to identify my world with his. However, Husserl can not adequately account for this reciprocity because he develops his solution only to the point where I put myself in the place of the appresented inner life of the other and identify his world with mine. Husserl's phenomenological approach begins with the meditating ego, whose subjectivity must always be the last resource of demonstration and verification, thus leading inevitably to an asymmetrical relation between myself and any other. As Leszek Kolakowski rightly comments:

I carry out a second reduction which, within the transcendental ego, separates the ego proper and the "Otherness". But it is unintelligible how within the transcendental field, which is present only as correlate of my transcendental acts, the other ego could be constituted as being absolute in the same sense as I am. . . . From this point of view other subjects can not appear in the same form of independence. Alter ego cannot be anything else but a concretion of my consciousness. To say that I constitute all objects, and among them myself as an object, is self-contradictory; and to call a contradiction a paradox does not make it go away.23
Thus it is clear that if we want to remain faithful to Husserl's reduction, it excludes inevitably and on principle the possibility that the others constituted by and for me could have exactly the same relation to me that I have to them as my intentional objects. Rather, within the reduced sphere, I am forced methodically to assert myself against all others as the fundamental original ego.

It is important to note that we should not forget Husserl's aim—a truly radical search for certitude—while we try to understand the problems and difficulties of his project. I think there is an evolution from the ideal of unquestionable validity of knowledge to transcendental idealism. In a sense, his solipsistic solution of intersubjectivity is a natural consequence of his search for absolute certainty. If the ultimate source of the validity of knowledge lies in transcendental subjectivity, then there seems to be no other alternative which can solve the question of inter-subjectivity in a non-solipsistic way. For there is no logical possibility of demonstrating that the other ego has the same form of absolute independence that I, the transcendental ego, have. Indeed, it is a dilemma without viable solution. If we take subjectivity seriously the conception of others as autonomous subjects becomes impossible.

In Husserl's later writing, he has attempted to include a kind of intersubjectivity within the reduced world through the Lebenswelt, all of the surrounding everyday world. This
intersubjectivity is given directly, naively, pre-predicatively within the Lebenswelt. The Lebenswelt (our life as we live it daily and as we experience it prior to any theoretical experience,) is the only source of knowledge. The conception of Lebenswelt, as suggested by Paul Ricoeur, indicates the very delicate balance that Husserl sought to maintain between the demands of idealism, which required purity and radicalness in the vision of origins, and the demands of realism, which required faithfulness to the concrete and concentration upon the objective in experience. Nevertheless the tension between the idealistic and realistic tendencies is incompletely resolved. If Husserl wants to be faithful to his transcendental reduction, then how can it be shown that other subjectivities are indeed given in a unique pre-predicative mode without invoking any "existential" commitment? Can the sort of intersubjectivity introduced with the Lebenswelt be merely the content of my consciousness, bearing, like everything else, only phenomenal status? From these unresolved questions, we see the logical impossibility of all philosophical endeavors that start from subjectivity and try to restore the path toward the common world. Moreover, Husserl's failure to solve the problem of intersubjectivity and Lebenswelt compells us to realize, as Kolakowski puts it, the painful dilemma of human knowledge:

... either consistent empiricism, with its relativistic, skeptical results (a standpoint which many regard as discouraging, inadmissable,
and in fact ruinous for culture) or transcendentalist dogmatism, which can not really justify itself and remains in the end an arbitrary decision. 25

In order to find the absolute foundation of knowledge and to save European culture from destruction by relativism, Husserl bravely takes the transcendental path. With such an intention in mind, Husserl inevitably has to face another dilemma between his pure theory of knowledge and a theory of society that must deal with historical, cultural conditions. Of course, to a philosopher this dilemma is not so urgent as to a social scientist; however, the difficulty of grounding is intrinsically built into the transcendental theory of knowledge.

When Husserl's followers, such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre, abandon Husserl's transcendental approach, in a sense, the abandonment can be viewed as an attempt to solve the dilemma faced by Husserl. Whether or not such an "existential" turn has successfully solved the problems of subjectivity and intersubjectivity is a large issue that I do not intend to discuss here. In the next chapter, I will focus on Schutz's project. For among the leading disciples of Husserl, only Schutz began and ended his career in pursuit of the ambition of applying Husserlian phenomenology to resolve pre-existing problems of sociology; and only Schutz continued throughout his life to maintain a thoroughly rationalistic position, according to which phenomenology could and must provide the basis for a full-fledged science of social action.
It is quite clear that in order to account for the problem of intersubjectivity, Schutz devotes himself to a descriptive phenomenology of the *Lebenswelt*. In this sense, he certainly does not continue Husserl's unfinished program; rather, he attempts to escape the dilemma Husserl encountered by abandoning the concept of the transcendental ego. But by doing so, can Schutz really escape the dilemma? Since in Husserl's project, the transcendental subjectivity is the place in which the certainty of knowledge lies, if Schutz gives up the search for it, what is the consequence? What kind of new difficulty will Schutz face? Is Schutz's solution a better one than Husserl's? Can Schutz, with his mundane phenomenology, successfully ground his theory of knowledge in a theory of society? These are among the questions the next chapter will address.
CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES


2Ibid., p. 8.

3Ibid.

4Ibid., p. 29.


15 Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 70.

16 Interesting enough, in the tradition of Zen Buddhism, the ultimate essence is not mediated by language or any other symbolic form. This ultimate essence is a kind of direct insight experienced by the individual.


19 Ibid., pp. 90.


CHAPTER III

ALFRED SCHUTZ'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOCIOLOGY:
THE "MUNDANE" TURN OF HUSSERL'S
PHENOMENOLOGY AND ITS DILEMMAS

After examining the ends, means and difficulties of Husserl's phenomenology, we are in a better position to see Schutz's project, which primarily aims at an reorientation of the foundation of sociology. I do not intend to make a systematic summary of Schutz's writings here, but only to focus on the issues directly relevant to my major interest—to what extent, and in what sense, phenomenological sociology can or cannot contribute to a reconstruction of the foundation of sociology.

Unlike Husserl, who insistently pursues the new transcendental rationality and the source of absolute certainty, Schutz shifts his aim toward a clarification of the mundane life world. Schutz emphatically states that the phenomenon of the other is not a philosophical problem to be solved by a phenomenology of transcendental subjectivity. He does not think it possible to reconcile the notion of the transcendental ego as source of the constitution of the world with
the idea of a plurality of coexistent transcendental subjects. Thus Schutz rejects Husserl's transcendental solipsistic interpretation of intersubjectivity. Schutz's phenomenology is concerned not with "others-for-me" but with community as a subject in its own right. Only by making intersubjectivity itself thematic does Schutz think it possible to develop a genuine theory of intersubjectivity in the mundane sphere. In other words, Schutz wants to replace Husserl's transcendental phenomenology with a mundane one. In his mundane phenomenology Schutz is concerned with clarifying the constitutive processes and meaning structure involved in intersubjective understanding. He is concerned not with the transcendental problem of intersubjectivity, but rather with the way one knows of others' experiences, taking for granted the general thesis of the alter ego within the natural attitude.

(A) Point of Departure: A Reconstruction of Weber's Interpretive Sociology

If Husserl tries to search for an absolute foundation of knowledge in general, Schutz attempts to provide a better basis for the social sciences with the aid of phenomenological analysis. In his first study, Schutz confronted Max Weber with Edmund Husserl. As the major founder of the tradition of interpretive sociology, Weber explicitly defined sociology as "a science which attempts to understand social action interpretatively and, thereby, to
explain it causally in its course and effects." Human conduct is considered action only when the person acting attaches a meaning to the action and gives it a direction which, in turn, can be understood as meaningful. If such intentional conduct is directed toward the conduct of others, then it becomes social action. Clearly, the conception of subjectively-intended meaning is a crucial criterion of human action.

Weber insisted that sociology should be centrally concerned with the subjective meaning of social action. In order to grasp the subjectively-intended meaning of social conduct, Weber developed his famous concept of Verstehen, or understanding. Understanding may be empathic or rational. As a sociologist, however, Weber was primarily concerned with rational understanding. Such understanding may issue from the direct observation of an actor and thus constitute "actual understanding." Or it may be based on the underlying motivations for the observed action; in this case, it is "explanatory understanding." A motive is a "context of meaning" that appears as the "reason" for human conduct first of all to the actor himself, and secondarily to the observing sociologist. In paying attention to motives, the sociologist is involved in motivational interpretation.

According to Weber, there are two senses in which sociologists may speak of the validity of finding related to subjective meaning. The motivational interpretation of an action is "meaningfully evident" but not causally certain.
However, it becomes "causally adequate" when the sociologist convinces himself of the existence of a chance that a certain succession of meaningful actions, when enacted by numerous persons at various times, will frequently or always occur in the same fashion. No causal laws of human conduct can be established; a sociologist deals at best with "typical chances" that certain factual constellations will lead to certain courses of social action. In agreement with this postulate, Weber's concept of "causality" is rather a kind of "probability."

In their historical context, Weber's methodological writings are determined efforts at mediating the irreconcilable positions of the neo-Kantians and positivists. His idea of "explanatory understanding" is clearly an attempt to synthesize the scientific-objective method of the positivists, which aims at the derivation of causal explanation of human behavior, and the German Geisteswissenschaften tradition, which emphasizes the uniqueness of understanding the subjective meaning of human conduct. Weber accepts the logical separation of natural and cultural sciences that Windelband and Rickert prescribe, but rejects their contention that these sciences are classified by different methods. Instead, Weber believes that every science can and does use both, subjective individualizing and objective generalizing, methods. But how can Weber traverse the gap separating the subjectivists from the positivists without sacrificing invaluable elements of both sides? Weber's solution lies
mainly in his general sociological method. Here I do not intend to make a systematic analysis of Weber's methodology, but want only to discuss succinctly the concept of Verstehen, or interpretive understanding. For this is the sky to understanding how Weber proposes to explain an event in terms of its uniqueness rather than in terms of a general law, without sacrificing the scientific validity of the explanation. And this is precisely the point that Schutz takes as the point of departure for his phenomenological critique of Weber's interpretive sociology.

The goal of Verstehen, according to Weber, is to recreate the meaning observed by experienced actors at the moment of action. Weber thus make it clear that, in scientifically studying society, we direct ourselves toward social actors and, in particular, the meaning for them of observed social acts. Some psychologically oriented methodologists contend that Weber's use of terms such as "reliving" (Nacherleben) and "empathy" (Einfühlung), in relation to the operation of Verstehen, involves investigating an actor's "inner" psychological state. I think, however, that this is inaccurate. Weber has given equal consideration to the subjective uniqueness of human action and the necessity of understanding such behavior scientifically. Verstehen is a useful tool in our efforts at understanding subjective attitudes, but does not suffice as scientific explanation. Weber's goal remains that of
putting Verstehen to use in creating an objective, inter-subjectively-verifiable method of social study that will not be caught in a web of subjective vagueness. Verstehen is only a partial means of grasping the subjective meaning of social action. It must be substantiated by statistical data. Interpretation is valid only when accompanied by supporting empirical evidence.

If Verstehen is only a partial means, then the difficult problem is that of how we can integrate subjective-meaning complexes of social action into an objective framework that will permit our accumulating scientifically-valid empirical data, and arriving at causal explanation. The process of validating the knowledge of social sciences should take place with objective, empirically-confirmable relationships, scientifically explaining social action by discovering the causes. But we should keep in mind that Weber did not mean by "causality" the reduction of all human conduct to an inclusive causal law. This is the procedure of natural science, differing in crucial ways from that used in studying society. It is more proper to speak of probability than of causality in describing Weber's idea of causal explanation. Since only a limited number of antecedents and consequences are isolated in any one case, at best, we are able to discover only a single cause among many possible ones. Therefore, our predictive power is also highly limited, the possibility always remaining that
other causal elements lie beyond our selective attention. Though Weber's writings are replete with references to empirical probabilities of prediction, apparently he does not accept the positivistic definition of causation. By altering the definition of causation and emphasizing the unique subjective dimension of human action, Weber apparently rules out the positivists' idea of a universally valid system of scientific theory for the social sciences. His methodology of social science attempts to include both causal explanation and meaningful understanding. Thus the study of social action must simultaneously be causally adequate—revealing relevant causes that in all probability always have the same consequences—and meaningfully adequate—revealing the experienced subjective meaning accompanying the action.

Weber may well be the first sociologist to confront these issues directly. However, is his solution satisfactory? Because the dilemma between subjectivistic and objectivistic approaches remains unsolved, the answer is no. The notion of Verstehen is epistemologically unclear. The verifiability of the so-called "subjectively-intended meaning of actor" is still problematical and unconvincing. Schutz takes these important issues as his point of departure and tries to reconstruct them phenomenologically.

Schutz agrees, at least in principle, with the major elements of Weber's methodology. He accepts Weber's
insistence on the inherently subjective quality of human behavior and on the need for social science to take subjectivity into account. Consequently, he agrees that a scientific method ignoring this human perspective will distort the behavior it pretends to faithfully explain. Also, he adopts Weber's idea that only empirically verifiable facts are reliable and worthy of the label "scientific knowledge."

From Schutz's point of view, Weber is correct in trying to bridge the gap between scientific explanation and the understanding of meaning. And Schutz is so impressed with the quality of Weber's approach to social science that his own writings are intended more to perfect than to supplant it. But Schutz is concerned that Weber is vague in his conceptualization of the word "meaning," on which the very explanation of social action hinges. The concept of "meaning" is the cornerstone of interpretive sociology, and Weber's prime goal is to explain human action scientifically: "all human behavior when and in so far as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it." Also, the method he proposes requires our creating ideal constructs that are clues to the subjective motivations of involved actors, the "complex of subjective meaning which seems to the actor himself or to the observer an adequate ground for the conduct in question." Thus, Schutz argues that unless we know what "meaning" refers to we can never
be certain how Weber interprets terms such as "action" and "motivation."

In a broader sense, Weber attempts to bridge the gap between subjectivity and objectivity without ever developing any clear idea of what subjectivity is. To adequately define "subjective meaning," we must investigate the nature of subjectivity. Without an epistemological basis for the notion of subjectivity, the concept of Verstehen becomes vague and loses its clarity and scientific value. By neglecting to deal with various philosophical problems related to the nature of subjectivity and meaning, it seems to be easy to make a reconciliation, solving the apparent contradiction by ignoring it. Weber, in attempting to intellectually transcend the dilemma between subjectivism and objectivism, has, instead, ignored one and distorted the other.

The first published work of Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, addresses the correction of these problems in Weber's methodology. Schutz contends that one can confront all these issues only by a thorough philosophical analysis of subjectivity and of the meanings of terms like "meaning," "action," and "understanding." In such of an adequate philosophical ground, Schutz turns to Husserl's phenomenology.

Husserl claims that the ultimate source of meaning and understanding is found in consciousness, and that
action is to be broadly understood as the end product of a conscious process of perceiving and defining our situations as we experience them. The basic quality of consciousness is its intentional character: perception implies the intending of objects within the sphere of awareness. Hence, knowledge is a function of consciousness, and absolute knowledge is constituted by a pure or transcendental ego, the final residue of a series of phenomenological reductions or epoché. The synthesis of objectivity and subjectivity occurs only through this methodical purification of consciousness. In other words, the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity can be transcended only in transcendental consciousness.

Schutz is particularly impressed with Husserl's later description of the Lebenswelt, that pre-reflective world of everyday existence in which meanings and values are naively accepted. Husserl thinks that by understanding the Lebenswelt, consciously constituting knowledge related to it through a transcendental phenomenological reduction, we also understand the essence of reality. Schutz believes that he can best accomplish Weber's goal of interpretatively understanding meaningful behavior by utilizing most of Husserl's phenomenology in the service of investigating the Lebenswelt. However, Husserl's science is founded on the merging of objectivity and subjectivity in the transcendental ego, whereas it is precisely this transcendental
element in Husserl that Schutz intends to reject.

Now we can see that Schutz is taking a tremendous task—to solve a double dilemma—to maintain a delicate balance between subjectivity and objectivity, transcendentalism and empiricism, which Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology fails to achieve; and to reconcile the contradiction between objective causal explanation and the understanding of subjective meaning, which Weber’s interpretive sociology is unable to accomplish. Our next task is to describe Schutz’s solutions.

(B) Phenomenological Reflection upon the Foundation of Social Sciences

It is imperative, in examining Schutz’s methodology, that we bear in mind the intellectual context within which he writes. In his time, the concept of "science," including both natural science and social science, is predominantly prescribed by the positivistic philosophy of science. While emphasizing the significance of subjectivity, Schutz has to face the challenges of positivists and empiricists. This tendency is evident in his article, "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences." In this article, Schutz assents to the views of Ernest Nagel and Carl Hempel on a number of basic issues. He agrees that "All empirical knowledge involves discovery through processes of controlled inference, and that it must be statable in propositional
form and capable of being verified by anyone who is prepared to make the effort to do so through observation." He agrees that "theory means in all the empirical sciences the explicit formulation of determinate relations between a set of variables in terms of which a fairly extensive class of empirically ascertainable regularities can be explained." Furthermore, Schutz himself rejects the neo-Kantian position that the "methods of the social sciences are toto coelo different from those of the natural sciences." Schutz agrees that the fact that regularities in the social sciences have a restricted universality, and that they permit prediction only to a limited extent, does not constitute a basic difference between the natural and the social sciences. And he never questions the positivistic thesis that social science ought to be a "value-free" discipline.

Nevertheless, Schutz argues that the positivistic social scientists misunderstand the Weberian "postulate of subjective interpretation" and its connection with the primary goal of the social sciences: to obtain organized knowledge of social reality. He says:

By the term "social reality" I wish to be understood the sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural world as experienced by the common-sense thinking of men living their daily lives among their fellow-men, connected with them in manifold relations of interaction. It is the world of cultural objects and social institutions into which we are all born, within which we have to find our bearings, and with which we have to come to terms. From the outset, we the actors on the social scene, experience the
world we live in as a world both of nature and of culture, not as a private but an intersubjective one, that is, as a world common to all of us, either actually given or potentially accessible to everyone; and this involves intercommunication and language.9

From Schutz's point of view, the problem of positivism is that it simply takes this social reality for granted, as the presupposed but unclarified foundation of the social sciences. In other words, positivists take the social reality merely as a source, not as a topic. They do not account for the way in which this social reality is constituted and maintained, for the ways in which it is intersubjective, or for the ways in which actors in their common-sense thinking interpret their own actions and the actions of others. With an adequate foundation of the social sciences we should be able to grasp and describe the basic structure of this everyday life world. Once and insofar as we properly locate the subject matter and aim of the social sciences, we will have a perspective for clarifying the mistakes and confusions concerning Verstehen and the "subjective meaning of human action." Schutz argues that the problem of Verstehen "suffers from the failure to distinguish clearly between it? (1) as an experiential form of common-sense knowledge of human affairs, (2) as an epistemological problem, and (3) as a method peculiar to the social sciences.10
The Redefinition of "Verstehen"

According to Schutz, *Verstehen* as an experiential form of common-sense knowledge of human affairs has nothing to do with psychological introspection. It is neither a form of "private" knowledge about oneself nor an inference regarding the "purely" subjective states of others. "It is a result of processes of learning or acculturation in the same way as is the common-sense experience of the so-called natural world. *Verstehen* is, moreover, by no means a private affair of the observer which can not be controlled by the experiences of other observers."¹¹ In our everyday life, we continuously make predictions based on *Verstehen*, using common-sense thinking with high success. As Schutz says, "there is more than a fair chance that a duly stamped and addressed letter put in a New York mailbox will reach the addressee in Chicago."¹⁹ So, according to Schutz, "the solution of this most difficult problem of philosophical interpretation is one of the first things taken of granted in our common-sense thinking and practically solved without any difficulty in each of our everyday actions."¹²

The epistemological problem of *Verstehen* is that of how such common-sense understanding or interpretation is possible. Schutz calls it the "scandal of philosophy"¹³ that until recently there has been no satisfactory solution of this question. It is a manifest fact in the everyday world that we constantly engage in common-sense
interpretation and thinking. However, we must make what is familiar into an enigma if we are to gain understanding. Schutz believes that Husserl has provided us with intellectual tools for confronting the many issues, such as intentionality, meaning, and intersubjectivity, that are presupposed in our common-sense interpretations.

The third problem concerning Verstehen arises when we conceive it as a "method peculiar to the social sciences." If our goal is an understanding of social reality as experienced by people in everyday life, and if everyday life is characterized by the intersubjective context in which common-sense interpretation takes place, then a scientific understanding of this life-world requires that we develop and elaborate categories and constructs adequate to explaining its structures. Schutz tells us:

The world of nature, as explored by the natural scientist, does not "mean" anything to molecules, atoms, and electrons. But the observational field of the social scientist--social reality--has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, acting, and thinking within it. By a series of common-sense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives. It is these thought objects of theirs which determine their behavior by motivating it. The thought objects constructed by the social scientists, in order to grasp this social reality have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men, living their daily life within their social world. Thus, the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, that is constructs of the constructs made by actors on the social sense, whose behavior the social scientist
has to observe and explain in accordance with the procedural rules of his sciences.\textsuperscript{14}

This analysis of the three aspects of Verstehen indicates how Schutz understands the "postulate of subjective interpretation": the postulate or demand that the constructs of the social sciences include a first-level reference to the meaning that an action has for an actor. Schutz says, "the postulate of subjective interpretation has to be understood in the sense that all scientific explanations of the social world can, and for certain purposes must, refer to the subjective meaning of the actions of human beings from which social reality originates."\textsuperscript{15}

It is necessary to make a careful distinction between Verstehen as a first level process by which we all interpret the world, and Verstehen as a second-level process by which the social scientist seeks to understand the first level process. The second-level constructs that the social scientists build are intended to explain the first-level constructs that we use in everyday interpretation.

But Schutz sees that a major problem emerges. "On the one hand it has been shown that the constructs on the first level, the common-sense constructs, refer to subjective elements; namely the 'Verstehen' of the actor's action from his, the actor's point of view."\textsuperscript{16} On the other hand, Schutz agrees with Nagel that "the social sciences, like all empirical sciences, have to be objective in the sense that
their propositions are subjected to controlled verification and must not refer to private uncontrollable experience."\textsuperscript{17}

Schutz raises several questions: how is it possible to form objective concepts and an objectively verifiable theory of subjective meaning-structures? Are these two principles contradictory?

How does the social scientist proceed? He observes certain facts and events within social reality which refer to human action and he constructs typical behavior or course-of-action patterns from what he has observed. Thereupon he coordinates to these typical course-of-action patterns models of an ideal actor or actors, whom he imagines as being gifted with consciousness. Yet it is a consciousness restricted so as to contain nothing but the elements relevant to the performing of the course-of-action patterns observed. He thus ascribes to this fictitious consciousness a set of typical motions, purposes, goals, which are assumed to be invariant in the specious consciousness of the imaginary actor-model. This homunculus or puppet is supposed to be interrelated in interaction patterns to other homunculi or puppets constructed in a similar way. Among these homunculi with which the social scientist postulates his model of the social world of everyday life, set of motives, goals, roles— in general systems of relevances— are distributed in such a way as the scientific problems under scrutiny require. Yet—and this is the main point— these constructs are by no means arbitrary. They are subject to the postulate of logical consistency and to the postulate of adequacy. The latter means that each term in such a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the real world by an individual actor as indicated by the typical construct would be understandable to the actor himself as well as to his fellow-men in terms of common-sense interpretation of everyday life. Compliance with the postulate of logical consistency warrants the objective validity of the thought objects constructed by the social scientist; compliance with the postulate of adequacy warrants their compatibility with the constructs of everyday life."\textsuperscript{18}
By doing so, Schutz believes that by empirical observation we can verify each step involved in the construction and use of the scientific model, "provided that we do not restrict this term to sensory perceptions of objects and events in the outer world but include the experiential form, by which common-sense thinking in everyday life understands human actions and their outcome in terms of their underlying motives and goals." 19

So, according to Schutz, there are three dimensions of the role the social scientist plays. First, like every other man, he is a participant in the everyday life-world and engages in the interpretation of this Lebenswelt. Second, as a social scientist, like any other scientist, he participates in distinctive forms of social interaction with his scientific colleagues in scientific communities. But as a social scientist, he is particularly concerned with an objective representation and explanation of the structures and dynamics of the everyday life-world. His attitude then is a theoretical one, rather than the practical one characteristic of action in the everyday life-world.

The members of any scientific community or discipline develop "second-level" constructs to understand the first-level phenomena, natural and social, which comprise the subject matter of their discipline. They generate these constructs in a scientific attitude of reflection upon the
world. We can regard this attitude as a move toward phenomenological reduction, for it is a partial move out of the practical common-sense attitude of everyday life. In talking of this move in sociology, Peter Berger calls it "ecstasy," or the attempt to step outside routines taken for granted. However, it is important to note that these "partial reductions" are still performed, as Husserl has pointed out, within the "natural standpoint"; all scientists are naive in this sense for they take the world, their subject matter, as indubitable. Because they remain within the natural attitude, the reliance on common-sense reasoning and interpretation which characterizes their attitude and through which they generate concepts still requires investigation. We need to clarify the relationship of their concepts to the common-sense world. This clarification can be provided, as Schutz believes, by a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude. Unless we can establish how concepts had their foundation in, emerged from, and relate to the pre-scientific life world, their meanings will remain ambiguous both for observers and for those who read the interpretations of the observers. Thus, Schutz argues that sociological methods "can only become fully intelligible by means of the far-reaching investigation of a constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude."21

The expressions "everyday world," "common-sense world," "world of daily life," "life-world" (Lebenswelt), and the
world of the "natural attitude" are all variant expressions for the intersubjective world that every man in his wide-awake consciousness experiences and participates in during his daily life. The primary feature of this everyday world is its intersubjectivity and social character. From what we have discussed above, we can clearly see that Schutz's redefinition of the concept and method of Verstehen is precisely grounded in this intersubjective everyday life-world. It is the matrix of all scientific knowledge. We will examine the basic structure of this life world and see how the problem of intersubjectivity is solved in Schutz's mundane phenomenology.

The Everyday Life-World

We are born into a world which pre-exists intersubjectively. This is the intersubjective world of daily life. For the wide-awake individual as he acts in this world, Schutz observes, "All interpretation of this world is based on a stock of previous experiences of it, our own and those handed down to us by parents or teachers; these experiences in the form of 'knowledge at hand' function as a scheme of reference." Every wide-awake, grown-up individual approaches his world with a stock of knowledge at hand. This stock of knowledge at hand is formed of both our personal experiences and the socially-acquired knowledge that we inherit; in our daily life, it is constantly being
refined, tested and changed. At any moment in an individual's life, he finds himself in a biographically determined situation. He is not merely a physical being in an objective spatialtemporal world. As a living being who endows his experiences with meaning, he has a position in a world that is meaningful to him. To say that an individual's situation is "biographically determined is to say that it has a history; it is the sedimentation of all man's previous experiences, organized in the habitual possessions of his stock of knowledge at hand, and as such his unique possession given to him and to him alone." 23

Although the individual's stock of knowledge at hand is continually undergoing change, the total configuration of this knowledge is structured. The wide-awake individual does not start from scratch in experiencing and interpreting the world. An individual approaches the world with commonsense constructs. "The outer world is not experienced as an arrangement of individual unique objects, dispersed in space and time, but as 'mountains,' 'trees,' 'animal.' 'fellow-men.' I may have never seen an Irish setter but if I see one, I know that it is an animal and in particular a dog, showing all the familiar features and typical behavior of a dog and not, say, of a cat." 24 My actual experience will confirm or modify my anticipation of the typical conformity with other objects; typification is never completely closed or fixed.
The stock of common-sense knowledge is socially acquired, and it is socially distributed. The actual stock of knowledge at hand in the everyday world differs not only among individuals, depending on personal experience, but also among various groups and classes, depending upon the common-sense knowledge they share. But no matter how distinctive one's stock of knowledge is, one also shares with others elements of this common-sense knowledge.

After indicating the subjective and intersubjective character of the life-world, Schutz goes on to speak of the different dimensions of this social world. First, there is the world of face-to-face relations and interactions. Schutz calls this the "we-relation." My experiences are not identical with those of my fellow man with whom I interact face-to-face, but we "participate" in each other's conscious life. There is a community of time and space, i.e., a "synchronization of two interior streams of consciousness," as well as a direct bodily presence by which we interpret each other's words, gestures, etc. The process by which I apprehend the conscious life of another is necessarily a process in my own conscious life.

The world of contemporaries is a second dimension. It involves persons whom I formerly encountered face-to-face, as well as persons who exist and affect my life, but with whom I may have no direct contact. "Whereas I experience the individual Thou directly in the concrete We-relation,
I apprehend the contemporary only mediately, by means of
typifications." A face-to-face interaction is constituted
primarily by a "Thou-orientation"; a social relation in the
world of contemporaries, by a "They-orientation." Finally,
Schutz makes a distinction between the "world of prede­
cessors" and the "world of successors." In actual daily
life, all these worlds are aspects of the life-world.

The Problem of Intersubjectivity

As we have already clearly seen, the discussion of the
life-world is inseparable from the issue of intersubjec­
tivity. The life-world is intersubjective from the outset,
and the intersubjectivity is manifested in the life-world.
"It is intersubjective because we live in it as men among
other men, bound to them through common influence and work,
understanding others and being understood by them. It is
a world of culture because, from the outset, the world of
everyday life is an universe of significance to us, that is,
a texture of meaning which we have to interpret in order to
find out bearings within it and come to terms with it."27

"The ordinary man in every moment of his lived expe­
rience lights upon past experiences in the storehouse of his
consciousness. He knows about the world and he knows what
to expect. With every moment of conscious life a new item
is filed away in this vast storehouse."28 We are continu­
ously ordering and interpreting our experiences according to
various interpretative schemes. But in our everyday life these interpretative schemes are themselves essentially social and intersubjective. Intersubjectivity lies at the very heart of human subjectivity. The analysis of human action leads to a realization that we are continuously endowing our lived experiences with meaning. In order to do this, we must choose interpretative schemes. These schemes are not intrinsically private; they are social or intersubjective interpretative schemes.

Furthermore, in our daily life, we interpret not only our own actions, but also those of others with whom we interact. There is a reciprocal relation between the way I interpret my own actions and the way I interpret those of others. The projects that I choose, those which define my actions, are themselves affected by the projects of others. Clearly enough, the problem of the "existence" of others or of intersubjectivity does not arise within our everyday life-world. Therefore, a phenomenology of this life-world is concerned not with proving that others exist but rather with how we come to interpret others and their actions, and with the complex ways in which we understand those with whom we interact within a social context.

The divergence between Husserl and Schutz on the problem of intersubjectivity is quite evident. Schutz emphatically states that the phenomenon of the other is not a philosophical problem to be solved by a phenomenology of
transcendental subjectivity. Unlike Husserl, Schutz thinks the "phenomenon of the world" is retained in full content even within the reduction. The life-world and its sense and meaning are by no means experienced as private and are not abandoned by performing the reduction.

Here, it is very important to note another contrast between Schutz and Husserl. Schutz's concern with intersubjectivity in the life-world leads him to situate the epistemological problem on the level of action rather than of perception, while for Husserl the theory of perception is predominant. Schutz, in contradistinction to Husserl, sees action, not perception as primary, precisely because the world of everyday experience is the "paramount reality." The life-world is first and for the most part a world of working, a world of praxis, and essentially a social world. All social action and interaction are founded on the general thesis of the alter ego's existence and are concretely worked out within the natural attitude by means of the socialization process and the typifications constructed by actors on the social scene. Therefore, for Schutz, the subject matter of his phenomenological study is the meaning structure of action and socially and not merely the perceptual experience of transcendental subjectivity.

By taking such a "mundane" turn, Schutz believes that he has solved the problems of intersubjectivity and Verstehen by grounding them in the everyday life-world. The
gap between Husserlian phenomenology and empirical sociology is bridged by his constitutive phenomenology of natural attitude. In other words, by his phenomenological project, Schutz could simultaneously overcome the difficulties left by Weber and by Husserl.

However, the reconciliation seems to be a promise rather than actual practice. Schutz, in recommending a clarification of methods and concepts, only pointed the way. His outline for a phenomenological sociology of everyday life is programmatic. He has not worked out the actual methodological problems involved in the empirical sociological investigation of the constitution of the natural attitude. Nor has he provided any detailed recommendations for studying the substantive issues of empirical sociology in a phenomenologically-oriented sociology. Answers to some of these questions have had to wait until the recent development of ethnomethodology, to a considerable extent inspired by Schutz's writings.35

But, do such problems mean that Schutz's phenomenological project is in principle correct but not sufficient? Or does something fundamentally wrong in his project prevent him from achieving his goal? Our next task is to examine his ideas critically from an internal perspective to see where the difficulties and limitations lie.
(C) The Problems of Schutz's Phenomenological Reorientation of Sociology

If Husserl has led the discussion of the dilemma between philosophical transcendentalism and empiricism to an extreme point, Schutz, to a similar extent, has indicated the dilemmas between subjectivity and objectivity, common-sense knowledge and scientific knowledge, actor-orientation and observer-orientation, and description and evaluation.

Subjectivity and Objectivity

Husserl found the absolute foundation of knowledge in a purified layer of awareness construed as transcendental ego consciousness—the transcendental subjectivity. However, his insistence on "egological" premises threatened to confine phenomenology to a solipsistic straitjacket, blocking access to intersubjective meanings and experiences. Later with the introduction of the life-world, his strenuous efforts to bridge the gulf between ego consciousness and the social world remained elusive. In order to provide a phenomenological foundation for interpretive sociology and especially for Weber's core notion of meaningful social action, Schutz applied the method of bracketing and argued that the source of meaning had to be found in lived experience or internal time-consciousness, more specifically, in the reflective glance of the ego upon such lived experience: "Meaning is a certain way of directing one's gaze at an item of one's own experience." Such an egological,
subjectivistic accent was evident in Schutz's earlier writings. Interestingly enough, however, in his subsequent writings, Schutz has moved progressively away from transcendental-egological concerns in the direction of a sociology of the life-world. It is quite clear that he wants to replace Husserl's transcendental approach with a mundane one; however it is also obvious that he does not want to relinquish altogether the emphasis upon subjective intentionality and motivation. The article "Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences" published in 1954, and most of his later writings manifest this ambivalent attitude.

We should remember that Husserl claims that objectivity and universality of human knowledge, including scientific knowledge, lies in the intuition of eidos by transcendental subjectivity; thus, there is no objectivity without subjectivity. From Husserl's point of view, the world exists only in our intentional perceptions. Scientific knowledge is not drawn from the objective world, for this world is an illusion. Knowledge exists, but it is constituted by a successively purified consciousness, able to transcend subjectivity and merge with the absolute. Science is an intuition of essences originating in the non-empirical world of the transcendental ego, and scientific knowledge lies originally in an ideal world of transcendental subjectivity, not in the empirically confirmable environment. Thus, the certitude of knowledge is incommunicable.
For Schutz, whose primary interest is in sociology rather than pure philosophy, this concept of scientific knowledge is unacceptable. His concept of science differs significantly from Husserl's. Husserl held that the transcendental reduction allows us to perceive apodictic knowledge, essentially independent of empirical objects but constituted subjectively. For Husserl, apodicticity requires our separating facticity from necessity, but Schutz explicitly rejects such separation. The apodictic knowledge that Husserl claims is universal in scope and yet independent of particular facts is, for Schutz, entwined with factual reality. Schutz thus accepts the empiricist contention that objective scientific knowledge is located in empirical reality, not in a world constituted by the transcendental ego. Similarly, he accepts the empiricist and positivist judgment that Husserl's transcendental phenomenological reduction is too subjective, even solipsistic, to comprise a method for uncovering empirical scientific knowledge.  

In contrast to Husserl's project, Schutz methodology provides no transcendental foundation for his objective criteria of knowledge, relying instead on an inductive compilation of empirical facts. Schutz admits that he agrees with Nagel that "all empirical knowledge involves discovery through processes of controlled inference, and that it must be statable in propositional form and capable of being verified by anyone who is prepared to make the
This commitment to objectivity as well as verifiability and his insistence upon subjectivity as a constitutive part of human action inevitably place Schutz's phenomenological sociology in an unsolvable dilemma.

As suggested by Robert Gorman, positivism and phenomenology represent two incommensurable organic views of "science." Positivists claim that there is a real objective world, including both the natural and the social. This world, and all the phenomena it is composed of can be measured by any scientist willing to follow methods, rules, and professional tests to insure objectivity. If the formal procedure is properly performed, the measurement process will reveal the causal relations among variables. These relations are then abstracted into generalizations or laws and are used in scientifically explaining the phenomena to which they are relevant. Causal analyses generalizations or laws constitute the body of our scientific knowledge. Knowledge, in this sense, lies in an objective reality that is empirically confirmable and impersonally understood.

In contrast to this view is Husserl's contention that the world exists only through our perceptions. We perceive objects and events subjectively, by extending ourselves outward and intending them with our conscious act. Hence all scientific knowledge is valid only to the extent that it is intentionally constituted by reflective subjectivities.
Husserlian phenomenology and positivism represent two different theories of truth, different criteria of objectivity and validity. Both can be defended as living up to their own norms of rigorous objectivity, provided they are recognized as organic positions in which various internally consistent principles are closely interconnected in such a way that they mutually supplement and support one another. Both of them are based upon their own respective premises which are logically tenable. The irreconcilable quality of the conflict between these two positions is effectively summarized from the positivist side, by Theodore Abel:

It is difficult to see how the scientific validity of the phenomenological method can be maintained. Its claim for absolute certainty alone is unscientific. It furthermore rests upon the assumption of a "pure ego" which is a metaphysical postulate. It implies uniformity of mental life that can not be proved. Its criteria—the inner evidence—is only a subjective test, which unjustifiably claims objectivity. Its judgements, which are arrived at through contemplation of the nature of "things", are not susceptible of proof. Thus, if a statement made by the phenomenologist is not accepted as "evident" by another person, the phenomenologist can only accuse his opponent of inaccurate contemplation but has not means whereby to convince him of the validity of his assertion. Sociology can not be a phenomenology of society and an empirical science at the same time. A body of scientific knowledge can not include side by side theses that are derived by opposite methods. The results of the "perception of essences" are unacceptable to the empiricist who can not test these results by scientific methods, and, as Husserl says, the empirical discoveries are irrelevant to phenomenology since a phenomenological reduction has to exclude all judgements about empirical reality.
Quoting this statement does not mean that in order to avoid the dilemma I am adopting Abel's position and calling for a return to positivism. Rather, I am trying to point out that any attempt to synthesize the positivistic and phenomenological approaches is more difficult than Schutz has thought. The dilemma is precisely stated in Schutz's own question: "how is it possible to form objective concepts and an objectively verifiable theory of subjective meaning structures?" On the one hand, Schutz wants to confine his theory to the "objectivity" of scientific knowledge in an empirical sense; on the other hand, he must account for the subjectivity of human action and knowledge. But, ironically, once Schutz gives up Husserl's criteria of objectivity, and replaces the transcendental approach with an empirical one, he discusses his concept of subjectivity on an empirical level. Then the objectivity of his analysis of consciousness and interpretation of subjective meaning must be subjected to empirical verification. Unfortunately, as Abel already pointed out, the phenomenological analysis of subjectivity can not happily coexist with the scientific methods of the empiricist. Such a synthesis is destined to fail. Moreover, even worse, it immediately leads Schutz's position to a kind of psychologism rigorously criticized by Husserl. Once it falls back from Husserl's transcendental-egological analysis of subjectivity to a mundane psychological analysis of social action, the
danger of lapsing into psychologism and reductionism is inevitable. Thus Schutz's psychological interpretation of the meaning of human action is destined to be "subjective," unable to meet the demand of objective verification. Despite his strenuous efforts, the gulf between subjectivity and objectivity still remains. The dilemma previously encountered by Weber, has not been successfully solved by Schutz's phenomenological project.

**Common-sense Knowledge and Scientific Knowledge**

The followers of Schutz may argue that the problems of subjectivity, meaning, and understanding have been solved by his analyses of everyday life world, common-sense knowledge, and the process of typification. Indeed, Schutz has made significant progress in clarifying the notion of Verstehen by grounding it in his constitutive phenomenology of natural attitude. Nevertheless, this concept is by no means unproblematical. The difficulty can clearly be shown in his discussion of three postulates for scientific model constructs of the social world. According to Schutz, in order to deal objectively with the subjective meaning of human action, "the thought objects of the social sciences have to remain consistent with the thought objects of common sense, formed by men in everyday life in order to come to terms with social reality." The model construct can fulfill these requirements if they are formed in accordance
with the following three postulates: (1) the postulate of logical consistency, (2) the postulate of subjective interpretation, and (3) the postulate of adequacy. However, here we must carefully examine whether or not these three postulates are consistent with each other. If the answer is positive, it certainly is a beautiful solution, as Schutz wishes, for connecting common-sense and scientific interpretation. If the answer is negative, then what is the consequence?

The first postulate, of logical consistency, applies to scientific constructs. Schutz says:

The system of typical constructs designed by the scientist has to be established with the highest clarity and distinctness of the conceptual framework implied and must be fully compatible with the principles of formal logic. Fulfillment of this postulate warrants the objective validity of the thought objects constructed by the social scientist, and their strictly logical character is one of the most important features by which scientific thought objects are distinguished from the thought objects constructed by common-sense thinking in daily life which they have to supersede.46

If we simply look at this statement, we are amazed by the positivistic tone. In order to guarantee objective validity, formal logic is the highest principle. Here we can see that Schutz still confines himself to the standard set by logical positivists. However, the recent revolutionary development within the Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy which is particularly influenced by the later Wittgenstein's writings has shown us that the second-level
scientific language and the first-level common-sense language can be seen as two different language games.\textsuperscript{47} The practices of language games are seen as intimately "interwoven" with concrete "life-forms."\textsuperscript{48} Each language game has its own logic and rationality and is not reducible to another language game without distortion. The fluidity of language activities, in fact, does not permit rigorous description. That is to say, language games are always, to some extent, open to change and modification.\textsuperscript{49} The logic of the thought objects constructed by common-sense thinking in daily life is not necessarily compatible with formal logic.\textsuperscript{50} If Schutz wants to insist on this postulate of logical consistency, he may have to take the risk of imposing something foreign to the reality of everyday life. This solution precisely violates the very basic principle of phenomenology—"back to things themselves." In other words, by following this postulate, Schutz may arrive at some findings that are methodologically logical and scientific, but irrelevant and distorting.

In contrast to the postulate of logical consistency that emphasizes the "scientist's" perspective, the postulate of subjective interpretation and the postulate of adequacy stress the primacy of the "actor's" point of view. We have already discussed Schutz's redefinition of subjective interpretation in his analysis of Verstehen. He wants to warrant "the possibility of referring all kinds of human
action or their result to the subjective meaning such action
or result of an action had for the actor." Let us grant
that this problem may be solved by the process of "typi-
fication" in everyday life. Nevertheless, there is no
guarantee that the thought objects that can grasp "typical"
subjective meaning will be consistent with the principles
of formal logic. As Schutz himself has demonstrated, sub-
jective meaning is defined by actors in various contexts.
I do not see any possibility that subjective meaning is
amenable to rigorous description in a formal logical sense.
Here Schutz runs into a dilemma, centering on the extent
to which he wants to typify the general patterns of rational
action in daily life, and the extent to which he wants to
maintain the subjective contextual meanings of actions.
It is not that easy to achieve a delicate balance between
these two extremes, and Schutz has never clarified this
point.

The postulate of adequacy is even more problematical.

In accordance with this postulate,

(e)ach term in a scientific model of human action
must be constructed in such a way that a human
act performed within the life-world by an indi-
vidual actor in the way indicated by the typical
construct would be understandable for the actor
himself as well as for his fellow-men in terms
of common-sense interpretation of everyday life.
Compliance with this postulate warrants the con-
sistency of the constructs of the social scientist
with the constructs of common-sense experience
of social reality.
It is not at all clear what this really means. If Schutz's claim is taken to mean only that sociological concepts, however abstract, must ultimately be matched against concrete forms of meaningful action in daily life, this is hardly illuminating. If on the other hand the implication is that the technical concepts of social science must be capable of being translated into notions understandable by those to whose conduct they refer, it is difficult to see how this could be accomplished. As Schutz himself points out, the interests and therefore the criteria guiding the formation of sociological concepts and theories are different from those involved in everyday notions. We can see that if we take seriously both the postulate of logical consistency and that of adequacy, the two postulates are not compatible, but in fact are contradictory.

Moreover, there is a further difficulty of this postulate which Schutz and other actor-oriented subjectivists could not solve. That is: if the understanding of the actor and his fellow-men is the ultimate ground for judging the relevance of scientific concepts and interpretations, how can we squarely face the problem of ideology or "false consciousness"? As Schutz himself points out, people in their daily lives possess a "natural attitude" characterized by its suspension of doubt. In general, they lack self-understanding and tend to take things for granted. Within such a natural attitude, there are conventions and false
beliefs which in principle are alterable. Schutz seems to gloss over the actors' complex mechanisms of resistance, defense, and self-deception. Hence, this postulate can possibly lead to the construction of models that are ideological rather than scientific, in that they reflect our biases and false beliefs. Therefore, the thought objects constructed in everyday life cannot be a sufficient condition for judging whether the scientific constructs are adequate or not. If the common-sense interpretation of the actors cannot suffice as a basis, then Schutz faces a serious problem that critics of interpretative procedures constantly emphasize: how we are to evaluate competing interpretations, and how we are to determine the correct interpretation. Neither the postulate of logical consistency, nor the postulate of adequacy can satisfactorily answer this question. Rather, we see the tension between the different demands: on the one hand, to achieve objective validity and to supersede common-sense knowledge; and on the other, to be faithful to the subjectively-intended meaning of the actors and to make the scientific constructs consistent with the constructs of common-sense experience. Without a genuine solution to this problem, Schutz is caught in a dilemma between common-sense knowledge and scientific knowledge.
Actor-orientation and Observer-orientation

For the moment we may grant that the general goal of phenomenological analysis—whether understood as Husserlian transcendental phenomenology, or as the constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude—is to elucidate the most fundamental structures by which we constitute a meaningful world. In the process of pursuing this goal, what kind of attitude should a social theorist take? According to Schutz, "the attitude of the social scientist is that of a mere disinterested observer of the social world. He is not involved in the observed situation, which is to him not of practical but merely of cognitive interest." Certainly, there is nothing particularly new in this statement. It not only has its origins in Weber, but also is shared by positivists. There is no need to review at this point the various reasons for the endorsement of this ideal by so many diverse thinkers. What I intend is to reveal the tension between Schutz's ideal of being a disinterested observer and his intention of grasping the subjective meaning of the actor.

The ideal phenomenologist systematically removes himself from the pragmatic, worldly interests of everyday social life.
He must engage in the rigorous discipline of bracketing and performing the required epochés. As a pure theorist, he is interested in pure description, clarification, and elucidation. There is a clear-cut distinction between an individual as a citizen, and as a scientist. This attitude can certainly be seen as compatible with Schutz's commitment to the objectivity of scientific knowledge. But, if the scientific knowledge of social reality, as Schutz stresses, must also grasp the subjective meanings of human actions, then can a social scientist understand such meanings from the perspective of an aloof observer? It seems quite easy for the positivists to simply insist upon the necessity of studying social phenomena objectively, rejecting "meaning" as a primitive term. But, in Schutz's conceptual framework, meaning is a constitutive element. Then his approach raises the old controversy between the actor's perspective and the observer's perspective. Indeed, on this issue, Schutz has transcended the neo-Kantian and Weberian arguments and replaced the notion of "empathy" with the concept of "typifications are based on the sedimentation of past experiences, aspects and meanings in the life-world are not permanently fixed; rather they are variable and changing. Therefore the forms of typification and the meanings of the typical constructs of common-sense experiences are constantly changing. Moreover, such process does not take place in a private sphere, but is a collective learning process in
a private sphere, but is a collective learning process in the social world. The meanings of human actions are continuously produced and reproduced by the actors in various social contexts. Thus, if a social scientist wants to correctly interpret the meanings of actions that are already intersubjectively, not objectively, defined and structured by the actors, he must understand the contexts. Any attempt to universalize or absolutize the meanings of actions is destined to fall into an objectivistic distortion. In other words, there is no way to really understand the meanings of human action, unless the social scientist is able to "participate" in the actions and communicate with the actors. In human studies, an aloof detached perspective is more likely to be distortive than reflective. Schutz does not realize the incompatibility between an objective observer's perspective and the understanding of an actor's intended meaning. His epistemological position fails to resolve the dilemma between subjectivism and objectivism.

Clarification and Evaluation

The adoption of a disinterested objective perspective in studying social reality has implications not just for epistemological but also for ethical problems. There is no need to review at this point the old controversy of the notion of "value-freedom." Recent studies in the philosophy of science, metascience, language analysis, and also the
positivism debate between Karl Popper and T.W. Adorno and their followers have helped social scientists understand the inadequacies and limits of this postulate that has its origin in a false dichotomy between fact and value.\textsuperscript{56}

Although Schutz's writings do not contain a detailed discussion of the "value-free" issue, he never questions this postulate. He confines himself to the clarification and pure description of the meaning and structure of the everyday life-world. While, Schutz's phenomenological project does have some radical reflections on the very foundations of social sciences, they are epistemological and methodological rather than political and ethical. Some followers of Schutz such as Richard Zaner and John O'Neill argue that a genuine thoroughgoing phenomenological analysis is radical and critical in both the epistemological and the ethical sense, A reflective understanding of social political reality can enable us to see through the variety of ideological distortions and therefore free us from the unnecessary domination.\textsuperscript{57} I do not want to rule out the possibility of developing a critical phenomenology that aims at human freedom and emancipation.\textsuperscript{58} Nevertheless, in Schutz's own project, as Richard Bernstein rightly comments:

\begin{quote}
What is lacking in phenomenology, with its drive toward pure description, is any ground for evaluating these very different forms of political life, for saying that one form better approximates what political life is or ought to be. The discrimination of what is genuinely universal and a priori from what is changing and variable is not sufficient to assess any one
\end{quote}
historical form of social and political reality as dehumanizing or alienating or repressive. These concepts seem to have no place in a purely conceived disinterested, aloof phenomenological stance directed toward pure description.59

In this unresolved tension, phenomenologists are in a dilemma between description and evaluation. Bernstein continues:

... a pure phenomenology shuns explicit critical evaluation of the different forms of social and political reality. Or more accurately, when phenomenologists do make such judgements--as they inevitably do--they are violating their most fundamental methodological tenets by illicitly introducing their own fundamental values and norms--values and norms which appear to be without any foundation in phenomenological analysis itself. While such an analysis might reveal how such norms are constituted, it lacks the intellectual resources for rational critical evaluation of these norms.60

This problem becomes acute in Husserl's later writing, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. The tension between his conception of transcendental phenomenology, as a pure theory of knowledge, and his passionate concern with the fate of European humanity and Western civilization cannot be resolved by phenomenology alone. The aim of phenomenology is the theoretical one of advancing knowledge of structures and of processes of constitution. Its primary interest is to provide better understanding and description. Nothing relates it directly to political and ethical "praxis," which demands as rational basis a theory with practical intent. The reformulation of the concept of "theory" and its relation to "praxis" is precisely the beginning point and central problematic of
Jürgen Habermas' critical theory of society. It is not surprising that in his inaugural speech, "Knowledge and Human Interests: A General Perspective," Habermas takes Husserl as departure point, for Husserl in his analysis of "The Crisis of European Crisis" has squarely confronted this important problem. Schutz, however, never has.

Concluding Remarks

In the last two decades, despite the difficulties I have discussed, there has been a gradual but persistent increase in the popularity of phenomenology as a philosophical framework for empirically explaining aspects of social action. There are probably many reasons for this phenomenon. One reason is that students today find easier to find good English translations of phenomenological writings. The other one is the young social scientists' growing dissatisfaction toward mainstream positivistic approaches and the desire to search for new alternatives. But the most important reason is the intrinsic value of phenomenological analysis. The full import of phenomenological imperative of constitution and description is to require a radical reconstruction of both sociological methodology and substantive investigation. Phenomenology reorients sociology away from the blind alleys of natural scientific or positivistic models of investigation into the paths of a specifically human science that takes meaning and men's consciousness of themselves
and the life-world as its central focus. Removal of the positivistic natural-science model requires a new human criterion of validation, and phenomenological sociology tries to establish the adequacy of its interpretations by taking them back to the everyday life-world from which they were derived.

Briefly speaking, phenomenological sociology fundamentally alters the sociological tradition in two ways. First, it asks a series of new questions and draws attention to new problems for sociology. Second, by focusing on these new problems, it requires sociologists to reformulate the problems and questions that have traditionally formed their central concerns. Traditional sociology provides a series of second-level scientific accounts of the social world bear unknown relationships to that world. Phenomenological sociology inquires into members' and sociologists' common-sense constructions of the social world while at the same time attempting to make explicit its own ultimate reliance on the resource of common sense

In this sense, I will argue that phenomenology is not an alternative method of investigation to be substituted for the social sciences; as Parl Ricoeur suggests, "phenomenology is not just another science beside all the other sciences, rather it is the attempt to found these sciences."62 "The task of phenomenology is not only to ground objective knowledge in some pre-objective experience, but also to show
how the very objectivity of the social sciences is prescribed by the structures of this pre-objective experience. If phenomenology is in any sense "revolutionary," it is because of this fundamental claim—for the rediscovery of subjectivity and redefinition of objectivity. It is misleading to term the phenomenological approach "subjectivistic," for phenomenology opposes not "objectivity" but "objectivism," or the assertion that the world is a universe of facts whose law-like connection can be asserted simply on the basis of their being there, without any relation to consciousness. Husserl challenges this view and substitutes for it his transcendental idealism.

The problem of Schutz is precisely located at this point. It arises when Schutz truncates Husserl's transcendental project and replaces part of it with a mundane one. Although he mainly accepts Husserl's analysis of subjectivity, Schutz's conception of objectivity is more positivistic than Husserlian. In other words, Schutz's critique of objectivism, as I have argued earlier in this chapter, is far less radical than Husserl's. In Schutz's writings, we still can clearly see the residue of positivistic notions of objectivity, although in this case objectivity is located not in transcendental subjectivity, but in empirical reality.

It seems that Schutz fails to appreciate the values of transcendental analysis. The Husserlian transcendental analysis of subjectivity and objectivity is a necessary step
in any phenomenological search for valid knowledge. Although, superficially, transcendental subjectivity appears to be experienced in an ideal or metaphysical reality removed from our everyday social involvement and hence irrelevant to our empirical social inquiries, a closer look shows this to be a misunderstanding. As Husserl himself indicates the aim of phenomenological philosophy is not to reduplicate lived experience, but to discover its fundamental structures and their significance. In this sense, then, phenomenology is not an alternative method of investigation that can be substituted for a so-called "objective" approach in the social sciences. Rather it is concerned with the conditions of possibility of these sciences. The claim that the life-world and its intersubjectivity provide the social sciences with their ultimate presupposition is not itself an "objective" claim, i.e., an assertion which could be falsified or verified by factual observation. It belongs to the same kind of philosophizing as does Kant's transcendental analysis of the conditions of "objectivity" in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. In this sense, transcendental analysis is not contradictory but complementary to empirical inquiry. However, Schutz is never clear about the logical relationship between the transcendental and empirical realms, and his abandonment of transcendental analysis not only has not solved the problems Husserl left, but has left the problem of the epistemological status of objectivity
unclear. Regarded from this point, it is quite clear why Schutz uncritically accepts the positivistic notion of objectivity.

Unfortunately, Schutz fails to see that Husserl's phenomenology and positivism are two mutually exclusive philosophies, whose different criteria of knowledge result in correspondingly different conceptions of objectivity and science. This failure causes Schutz's daring attempt to synthesize phenomenology and empirical social science to become logically indefensible. His partial acceptance of the naturalistic model of the social sciences prevents him from clearly delineating the significant differences between the natural sciences and the social sciences, though he recognizes the uniqueness of subjective interpretation in human action. Lacking such a thoroughgoing critical reflection on positivism, Schutz finds himself in dilemmas between subjectivity and objectivity, common-sense knowledge and scientific knowledge, actor-orientation and observer-orientation description and evaluation. In general, Schutz has failed to reach his goal of providing a philosophical foundation for sociology which can simultaneously grasp the subjectivity of human action and the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Nevertheless, I still consider his work to be of tremendous value for our understanding of human action, and this for two reasons. First, his analyses of Verstehen, common-sense knowledge, and the everyday
life-world have not only provided an understanding of the discipline itself and hence clarified many important methodological issues within the tradition of interpretive sociology, but also opened up a new area for sociological inquiries. Second, the difficulties Schutz has encountered compel us to reexamine the problems and their presuppositions that Schutz has discussed. Although he does not provide us with satisfactory answers, we certainly recognize the importance and legitimacy of the questions. His achievements contribute to a better understanding of our world, and his difficulties suggest method for our inquiries. The revelation of limitations to the phenomenological approach should not serve as a recommendation for a return to the positivistic position, to a tolerance of unexamined presuppositions or to an acceptance of the sociological reification of social reality. The phenomenological approach has demonstrated the significance of the interpretive procedures in our daily social life as well as in the formation of social scientific knowledge.

As a matter of fact, some of the difficulties in the enterprise of the interpretation and understanding of meaning have been transcended by the recent development of ethnomethodology and hermeneutics. It is quite controversial to treat ethnomethodology as a type of phenomenological sociology. Although many argue that ethnomethodology exemplifies the development of phenomenological premises, others claim
that ethnomethodology is more broadly in agreement with positivistic approaches than with phenomenological principles. Some ethnomethodologists consider themselves more Wittgensteinian than phenomenological. However, all these arguments are beyond the confines of my present work. What I intend to point out is that although ethnomethodological approach, not unlike phenomenological sociology, focuses upon the common-sense world, it is important to note that the emphasis of ethnomethodology on the analysis of ordinary daily language, communication processes, and ways in which members accomplish a sense of objective reality indicates a "linguistic" turn in the phenomenological tradition, which stresses the phenomena of language and inter-communication rather than consciousness and motivation. Interestingly enough, the Geisteswissenschaften tradition, which also takes meaning interpretation as its central concern, has shown some parallel development. Particularly, Hans-Georg Gadamer's main work *Truth and Method* (Wahrheit und Method), markedly influenced by Heidegger's ontology of language, discloses "Linguisticality" (Sprachlichkeit) as the basic mode of human existence and abandons Dilthey's psychologistic approach to Verstehen. According to Gadamer, understanding is inseparable from interpretation, from linguistic articulation of the meanings grasped. In this sense, we can regard both ethnomethodology and hermeneutics as efforts to overcome the unresolved problem of human understanding in
human sciences, and as alternatives to Schutz's phenomenological project. Whether they are directly or indirectly influenced by phenomenological philosophy, they are sharing some similar concerns and making fundamental impacts on the foundations of contemporary social sciences. Since ethnomethodology has already been discussed by many writers, and hermeneutics is relatively unknown in the English-speaking world, I will not discuss ethnomethodology but will elaborate upon the significance and problems of hermeneutics in the next chapter. Although hermeneutics is closer to the phenomenological tradition, the most extensive contemporary discussion of the relevance of hermeneutics to social inquiry is to be found in the debate between Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas.
FOOTNOTES


3 Ibid.

4 Ibid.


6 Ibid., p. 51.

7 Ibid., p. 52.

8 Ibid., p. 48.

9 Ibid., p. 53.

10 Ibid., p. 57.

11 Ibid., p. 56.

12 Ibid., p. 57.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., p. 59.
15 Ibid., p. 62.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., pp. 63-64. Also see Alfred Schutz, "Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action" in Collected Papers vol. I, pp. 43 ff.
19 Ibid., p. 65.
22 Ibid., p. 7.
23 Ibid., p. 9.
24 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
26 Ibid., p. 42.


33 Ibid.


37 Ibid., p. 42.


41 Ibid., p. 131.


43 Interestingly enough, on this question there are some significant convergencies between Schutz's phenomenological sociology and Talcott Parsons' theory of action. See Walter Sprondel, ed., Alfred Schütz und Talcott Parsons Zur Theorie Sozialen Handelns: Ein Briefwechsel (Frankfurt am Main: Schrickamp Verlag, 1977).

Although Wittgenstein did not himself focus on the problem of sociological understanding, the importance of his later ideas for the foundation of social science is evident. Language is no longer thought of as a logically rigid essence. Rather, words have meanings only within different language games that are forms of life. In 1958 Peter Winch attempted to draw out the implications of Wittgenstein's theory of language games for the foundations of social inquiry. See Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958).


52 Ibid., p. 44.

53 Ibid., p. 36.

54 Ibid.

55 Here the word "participate" means that the scientist can intellectually interact or have dialogue with the actors. It does not mean that physical presence is necessary. See Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, Texas: The Texas Christian University Press, 1976).


Ibid.

In U.S.A. the Northwestern University Press under the editorship of John Wild and James Edie has translated and published many important writings in phenomenology and existential philosophy. In England, John Rex has edited *International Library of Sociology* published by Routledge, Kegan and Paul Co. Recently, quite a few writings in phenomenological sociology have been published. In Netherlands, the Phaenomenologica founded by H.L. van Breda and published by Martinus Nijhoff Company, apparently is the center of the phenomenological writings.


Ibid., p. 152.
In his article, "Phenomenology and Social Sciences," Ricoeur has clearly demonstrated how Husserlian transcendental analysis, especially the fifth Cartesian Meditation, can significantly connect with Weber's empirical work, Economy and Society.


According to James Heap and Philip Roth, ethnomethodology can be seen as major type of a "reconstituted" phenomenology, a type untroubled by the dilemmas of pure eidetic analysis. See James Heap and Philip Roth, "On Phenomenological Sociology," ASR, vol. 38, p. 354.

Although Gadamer's hermeneutics is mainly influenced by Hegel and Heidegger rather than Husserl, Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutics is deeply rooted in Husserlian phenomenology.
(A) Traditional Theory and Critical Theory

Alfred Schutz has significantly demonstrated the necessity of interpretation and understanding for any adequate social theorizing. However, the purpose of interpreting and understanding is mainly to reveal and describe the phenomena of social reality as they are. In accordance with his commitment to the positivistic dichotomy between fact and value, Schutz never takes the problem of the "fate" and the "quality" of social and political life into consideration. On this point, Husserl differs. His transcendental phenomenology is not confined to the description of empirical existence; it is necessary to penetrate the existing form in order to grasp the very essence of reality. Hence, from Husserl's point of view, his phenomenology has implications not only for truth but also for goodness. In this sense, his later concern about the crisis of European science and Western civilization can be conceived as a natural outcome of this non-relativistic position. As Husserl writes,
A philosophy with the deepest and most universal self-understanding of the philosophic ego as the bearer of absolute reason coming to itself--that reason is precisely that which man qua man, in his innermost being, is aiming for, that which alone can satisfy him, make him "blessed"; that reason allows for no differentiation into "theoretical", "practical", "aesthetic", or whatever; that being human is teleological being and an ought-to-be, and that this teleology holds sway in each and every activity and project of an ego; that through self-understanding in all this it can know the apodictic telos; and that this knowing, the ultimate self-understanding, has no other form than self-understanding according to a priori principles as self-understanding in the form of philosophy.¹

Husserl believes that the "absolute self-responsibility" of man is based upon genuine theoretical insight and self-understanding. Thus, his solution of the crisis is the renovation of pure theory.

According to Jürgen Habermas, such a theoretical attitude is very much consistent with Western philosophical tradition. Like almost all philosophers before him, Husserl preserves the Platonic connection of pure theory with the conduct of life. The concept of pure theory probably can be best expressed in a quotation from Schelling, the German idealist,

The fear of speculation, the ostensible rush from the theoretical to the practical, brings about the same shallowness in action that it does in knowledge. It is by studying a strictly theoretical philosophy that we become most immediately acquainted with ideas, and only Ideas provide action with energy and ethical significance.²

From this viewpoint, "the only knowledge that can truly orient action is knowledge that frees itself from mere
human interests and is based on Ideas—in other words, knowledge that has taken a theoretical attitude." This is the way traditional philosophy defines theory. Husserl accepted this view and used it as his frame of reference to criticize the crisis of European sciences in the 1930's. The philosopher owes the theoretical attitude to a transposition that liberates him from the fabric of empirical interests. Husserl's *epoché* is certainly consistent with this spirit. In this regard, theory is "impractical," but this does not cut it off from practical life. For, as we have mentioned above, "according to the traditional concept, it is precisely the consistent abstinence of theory that produces action-orienting culture. Once the theoretical attitude has been adopted, it is capable in turn of being mediated with the practical attitude." With a basis of absolute theoretical insight, mankind will be enter into a novel form of practice and become transformed into a new humanity.

In his time, Husserl sees the positivistic sciences sharing the concept of theory with the major tradition of philosophy; nevertheless they destroy its classical claim. They are committed to a theoretical attitude that frees those who take it from association with the natural interests of life and their influence. On the other hand, however, they have abandoned the connection of *theoria* and *kosmos*, of *mimesis* and *bios theoretikos* that was assumed
from Plato through Husserl. "What was once supposed to comprise the practical efficacy of theory has now fallen prey to methodological prohibitions." Husserl wants to restore the concept of pure theory and its practical efficacy with the therapeutic power of his phenomenology. Habermas considers that Husserl's courage estimable, but the solution unfounded. Habermas comments:

At best, phenomenology grasps transcendental norms in accordance with which consciousness necessarily operates. It describes (in Kantian terms) laws of pure reason, but not norms of a universal legislation derived from practical reason, which a free will could obey. Why, then does Husserl believe that he can claim practical efficacy for phenomenology as pure theory? He errs because he does not discern the connection of positivism, which he justifiably criticizes, with the ontology from which he unconsciously borrows the traditional concept of theory.

Husserl rightly criticizes the objectivist illusion that deludes the sciences with the image of a reality-in-itself consisting of facts, structured in a lawlike manner; it conceals the constitution of these facts, and thereby prevents consciousness of the interlocking of knowledge with interests from the life-world. Because phenomenology brings this to consciousness, it is itself, in Husserl's view, free of such interests. It thus earns the title of pure theory unjustly claimed by the sciences. It is to this freeing of knowledge from interest that Husserl attaches the expectation of practical efficacy.

According to Habermas, Husserl is wrong. For, "theory had educational and cultural implications not because it freed knowledge from interest; to the contrary, it did so because it derived pseudonormative power from the concealment of its actual interest." While criticizing the positivistic objectivism, Husserl succumbs to another
objectivism that was always attached to the traditional concept of theory.

It is this gap between pure theory and its practical efficacy in transforming mankind, or between \textit{theoria} and \textit{praxis}, that is the key point the Frankfurt School critical theorists would criticize and correct with their alternative concept of theory in the sense of critique. In fact, this was the main object of Max Horkheimer's formulation of critical theory.\footnote{9} He raised many important questions, but most of them were unresolved. It had to wait for the younger generation of the School, particularly Jürgen Habermas, to provide the epistemological foundation and systematically examine the inadequacies of traditional theory and justify the move to critical theory.

To reconceptualize the very concept of theory in the sense of critique in order to bridge the gap between theory and praxis is certainly a very ambitious project.\footnote{10} At first glance, the concept of critique has its roots in the Marxian tradition. Nevertheless, the full dimensions of Habermas' critical project is not confined to this tradition. Unlike many Marxists, Habermas critically examines Marx's critique of political economy with the aim of distinguishing what must be rejected and what is still valid. Probably his critique is one of the most thoroughgoing reflections on Marx within the Marxian tradition. Moreover, he critically interprets Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx,
Nietzsche, Dilthey, Comte, Pierce, Mach and Freud. Habermas' work constitutes "an historically oriented attempt to reconstruct the prehistory of modern positivism with the systematic intention of analyzing the connections between knowledge and human interests." Based on this epistemological groundwork, Habermas assesses the methodological problems of mainstream social science, phenomenology and hermeneutics. Furthermore, he has been developing a comprehensive theory of communicative competence and a consensus theory of truth that ranges over a variety of problems and issues in the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, with relevance to the philosophical foundations of social theory; and all these analyses ultimately should lead to the development of a communication theory of society. Drawing upon all this research, Habermas sketches a theory of crises in advanced capitalism and a theory of social evolution.

At the cost of simplification, as suggested by Anthony Giddens, two leading themes recur throughout Habermas' writings and give his works their continuity. "One is a concern with metatheoretical problems in social theory, especially in respect of the relation between theory and critique. The other is the objective of placing such a critique in the context of an interpretation of the main trends of development in Western capitalism since the rise of bourgeois society in 18th-century Europe." For the
interest of my present study, I will focus on the first concern, the metatheoretical problems in social theory that are vital to the reconstruction of the foundation of sociology. Certainly the problems of advanced capitalism and his theory of social evolution are no less important. The reasons for making such a selection are: first, without knowing the nature and limits of Habermas' project, it seems quite difficult to understand the meaning of his substantive studies; second, most of his substantive studies remain highly programmatic and are still in progress. Any evaluation at the present stage would be premature and unfair.

(B) Theory and Praxis

Since the basic difference between traditional and critical theory is the problematical relationship between theory and praxis, Habermas feels that some rethinking of the concept of praxis is fundamental. He begins with a clarification of the confusion between the "practical" and the "technical."

The "Practical" vs. the "Technical"

In his early work, Theory and Practice, Habermas traces the major historical "moments" in the transition and transformation of the classical understanding of politics into the modern one. He sees large contrast between the classical and the modern conceptions of politics. Traditionally,
"politics was understood to be the doctrine of the good and just life; it was the continuation of ethics. Aristotle saw no opposition between the constitution formulated in the nomoi and the ethos of civil life; conversely, the ethical character of action was not separable from custom and law. Only the politeia makes the citizen capable of the good life; and he is altogether a zoom politikon, in the sense that he is dependent on the city, the polis, for the realization of human nature." Moreover, "the old doctrine of politics referred exclusively to praxis in the narrow sense of the Greeks. This had nothing to do with techne, the skillful production of artifacts and expert mastery of objectified tasks. In the final instance, politics was always directed toward the formation and cultivation of character; it proceeded pedagogically and not technically."  

In sharp contrast to the classical understanding of politics, Thomas Hobbes' conception makes different claims:  

The translation of knowledge into practice, the application, is a technical problem. With a knowledge of the general conditions for a correct order of the state and of society, a practical prudent action of human beings toward each other is no longer required, but what is required instead is the correctly calculated generation of rules, relationships, and institutions. Human behavior is therefore to be now considered only as the material for science. The engineers of the correct order can disregard the categories of ethical social intercourse and confine themselves to the construction of conditions under which human beings, just like objects within nature, will necessarily behave in a calculable manner. This separation of politics from morality replaces instruction in leading a good and just life with making possible a life of well-being within a correctly instituted order."
This separation of theory and praxis, confusion of the practical and the technical has further development in industrially advanced societies, as Habermas puts it,

For as our civilization has become increasingly scientific, the dimension within which theory was once directed toward praxis has become correspondingly constructed. The laws of self-reproduction demand of an industrially advanced society that it look after its survival on the escalating scale of a continually expanded technical control over nature and a continually refined administration of human beings and their relations to each other by means of social organization. In this system, science, technology, industry, and administration interlock in a circular process. In this process the relationship of theory to praxis can now only assert itself as the purposive-rational application of techniques assured by empirical science. The social potential of science is reduced to the powers of technical control--its potential for enlightened action is no longer considered. The empirical, analytical sciences produce technical recommendations, but they furnish no answer to practical questions.20

Clearly enough, what we have seen is not only the separation of theory and praxis, but also the reduction of praxis, which has political and ethical implications, to a matter of technical application or know-how. Habermas wants to correct this view and clarify the categorial distinction between the practical and the technical, because the consequences of confusing practical and technical issues are serious.

The real difficulty in the relation of theory and praxis does not arise from this new function of science as technological force, but rather from the fact that we are no longer able to distinguish between practical and technical power. Yet even a civilization that has been rendered scientific is not granted dispensation from practical questions: therefore a peculiar danger arises when
the process of scientification transgresses the
limit of technical questions, without, however,
departing from the level of reflection of a
rationality confined to the technological
horizon. For then no attempt at all is made
to attain a rational consensus on the part of
citizens concerned with the practical control
of their destiny. Its place is taken by the
attempt to attain technical control over his­
tory by perfecting the administration of
society, an attempt that is just as impractical
as it is unhistorical.21

The problem has become urgent in our time not only
because science and technology are the most important pre­
ductive forces in advanced industrial societies, but also
because a technological consciousness increasingly affects
all domains of human life and becomes a background ideology
with a legitimizing power. Such an ideological conscious­
ness tends to suppress the distinction between the prac­
tical and the technical, and to treat all problems of action
as technical.

Technology and Science as Ideology

According to Habermas, "since the last quarter of the
nineteenth century two developmental tendencies have become
noticeable in the most advanced capitalist countries: an
increase in state intervention in order to secure the sys­
tem's stability, and a growing interdependence of research
and technology, which has turned the sciences into the
leading productive force. Both tendencies have destroyed
the particular constellation of institutional framework and
subsystems of purposive-rational action which characterized
liberal capitalism . . . technology and science today also
take on the function of legitimating political power."  
"Insofar as government action is directed toward the economic system's stability and growth, politics now takes on a peculiarly negative character. For it is oriented toward the elimination of dysfunctions and the avoidance of risks that threaten the system: not, in other words, toward the realization of practical goals but toward the solution of technical problems." Under the circumstance, government activity is restricted to administratively soluble technical problems. A great deal of differentiated social-scientific information flows into the political system to aid in effective administration. The solution of technical problems is not dependent upon public discussion. Practical questions are eliminated; the tasks of government action present themselves as technical ones. The result inevitably is a "depoliticization of the mass of the population and the decline of the political realm as a political institution." 

Superficially, technology and science seem to have nothing to do with ideology or to be "less ideological" than all previous ideologies. For this new ideology does not have the opaque force of a delusion that only transfigures the implementation of interests. Nevertheless, precisely because of this scientistic reduction of practical questions to technical problems, science and technology become a very subtle type of ideology that treats issues of social life as mere technical problems for manipulation and domination. As
Habermas points out, it "is more irresistible and farther-reaching than ideologies of the old type. For with the veiling of practical problems it not only justifies a particular class's interest in domination and represses another class's partial need for emancipation, but affects the human race's emancipatory interest as such."^25

Today, the reified models of the sciences migrate into the socio-cultural life-world and gain objective power over the latter's self-understanding. Technocratic consciousness causes practical interests to disappear behind interest in the expansion of our power of technical control. This tendency prevails not only in the realm of work but also in the other realms of social life, or more precisely, in the realm of words, or communication. In other words, the new ideology consequently threatens the maintenance of intersubjectivity of mutual understanding as well as the creation of communication without domination. For a genuine communication is possible only through removing manipulation and control. And practical questions can be rationally discussed only in an institutional framework that is free from domination. Here we can see that Habermas's distinction between the practical and the technical has already implied the important distinction between work and words, or between purposive-rational (instrumental and strategic) action and symbolic interaction. The former is governed by technical rules based on empirical knowledge, whereas symbolic
interaction is governed by binding consensual norms that cannot be reduced to technical rules. This is the distinction that Karl Marx in his historical materialism failed to see. Habermas replaces the model of forces of production and relations of production with his more abstract model of work and interaction.

(C) A Critical Examination of Karl Marx

If we accept Habermas' diagnosis of what is happening in modern civilization, another question will immediately arise: what shall we do? On the one hand, Habermas is not pessimistic enough to consider that science and technology have their own internal logic over which there is no possibility of human direction. On the other hand, he is not so optimistic as to think that when the revolution comes, the very nature of science and technology will be transformed. He is critical of these two extremes, since both views are prophetic but lacking in a rational basis for their judgments.

Habermas does believe that we need a rational discipline to serve as a basis for criticism--criticism with a practical intent. He thinks that the classic Frankfurt theorists were not critical enough. Hence, a critical examination of Marx's dialectical theory is needed for the development of a critical theory of society.
The Reduction of Reflection to the Process of Production

Habermas' reconstruction of Marx shows how the very perspective from which Marx criticizes Hegel prevents him from adequately comprehending the theoretical impact of his own work. Marx's identification of the forces of production as the mechanism for abolishing abstract life forms encompasses both the Kantian and Fichtean moment of the dialectic of history. In Marx's historical materialism both the control of nature through the development of productive forces and the reflexive comprehension of externalized humanity are conceived as moments of the process of productivity. Thus, Fichte's concept of the independence of the self-constituting act of reflection is reduced, in Marx's theory, to a feedback mechanism of the production process. Because of his concept of "reflection" as a feedback of production, Marx is unable to recognize the methodological status of his work. Consequently, the distinction between natural and human sciences is no longer important for him, since all of man's activities can be conceptualized within the framework of feedback-controlled action. Since instrumental activity determines the scope of human action, for Marx the logically distinct moment of comprehension can be expressed theoretically within the method of the natural sciences.

Suppression of the dialectical independence of reflexive comprehension from the theory of historical materialism
has prevented Marx from explicitly reflecting on the nature of critique itself. Habermas claims, "Marx never explicitly discussed the specific meaning of a science of man elaborated as a critique of ideology and distinct from the instrumentalist meaning of natural science. Although he himself established the science of man in the form of a critique of ideology and not as natural science, he continually tended to classify it with the natural sciences." This precisely is the "latent positivism" of Marx's philosophy of history which Habermas and Albrecht Wellmer intend to criticize. In contrast to those humanistic interpreters who see Engels as the corrupter of Marx by elaborating a positivistic and scientistic understanding of Marxism, Habermas and Wellmer argue that we find such positivistic tendencies in Marx himself. These positivistic tendencies that arise from Marx's concept of labor and production have consequently made the Marxist critique a type of materialistic scientism. "Orthodox" Marxists have failed to recognize these tendencies and have rigidified Marxism in a positivistic manner. From Habermas' point of view, therefore, it is necessary to reinterpret the concept of reflection and critique, because the reductionism and positivism of Marxism not only is epistemologically inadequate, but also tends to prevent us from seeing the important distinction between work and interaction.
The Distinction between Work and Interaction

As a categorical framework, Habermas proposes the distinction between "work," i.e., purposive rational or instrumental action, and "interaction," i.e., communicative action. The former takes place according to technical rules based on empirical knowledge, the latter according to social norms that define mutual expectations of behavior. We can distinguish social systems by the type of action predominating in them: the institutional structure of society consists of social norms—such as the family, based primarily on normative rules of interaction—while the economy and the state are subsystems organized mainly according to standards of purposive rational action. Thus we arrive at the distinction between (1) the institutional framework of a society, or the sociocultural life world, and (2) the subsystems of purposive rational action that are "embedded" in the institutional framework. According to Habermas, these categories can be developed as a historical metatheory, by conceptualizing the history of mankind as constituted by the ongoing interrelation of two action systems. Purposive rational action secures the human capacity to satisfy human needs, and symbolic interaction systems form the institutional framework of society based upon grammatical rules and social norms that enable us to engage in communication and interaction.
From this perspective, we can speculate about human evolution. In pre-modern "traditional" societies, the development of instrumental action systems takes place within the limits of the cultural tradition. The normative-institutional framework is of primary importance, and social developments must be legitimated in accordance with it. The threshold of modern societies is crossed in the moment when the expansion of subsystems of purposive rational action no longer depends on legitimation by cultural tradition. This historically new phenomenon, appearing for the first time with the development of capitalism, is one which Weber tries to grasp with his concept of rationalization: the continuous institutionalized expansion of subsystems of purposive rational action, guided to a growing extent by the standards of scientific and technological progress.

Until the present time, the main drift of industrial societies has been the growing dominance of purposive rational action. The emergence of advanced capitalism is based on the extension of purposive rational action systems in the forms of bureaucratization, urbanization, and the growth of science and technology. In short, we have entered a period of instrumental rationalization in which the model of purposive rational action becomes prescriptive for more and more spheres of symbolic interaction. This is the crisis that Habermas sees as internal to the dynamic of all advanced industrial society.
This development brings about a change in the form of legitimation of power. In modern societies, the traditional relationship between the institutional framework and the subsystems of purposive rational action is changed. As discussed earlier, it is replaced by a "technocratic consciousness," a new ideology tending to hide the distinction between work and interaction. Because of his reduction of reflection to production, Marx failed to see this development. Consequently, his critique of political economy is unable to confront the rise of a new form of domination that appears as systematically distorted communication rather than exploitation of work. Thus, without a critical assessment of Marx's works, his ideas would be misleading rather than enlightening to our understanding of society.

Furthermore, from Habermas' point of view, a critique of Marx and "orthodox" Marxism alone is not sufficient to enable us to gain a better perspective toward the diagnosis of the crisis of modern societies. It is necessary to undertake a thoroughgoing inquiry of the development of positivism, objectivism, and scientism to locate the basic problems that have their roots in western intellectual tradition. This is the major goal of Habermas' ambitious inquiry, *Knowledge and Human Interests*. 
A Preliminary Note

Of all of Habermas' works, Knowledge and Human Interests is perhaps the most intrinsically difficult for Anglo-American readers to comprehend. Most of the theorists discussed, as well as the structure of the argument as a whole, are deeply rooted in the tradition of German philosophy and social theory. The text represents Habermas' first attempt to present his position systematically. The book is, as Habermas points out in the preface, an attempt to understand the "dissolution of epistemology which has left the philosophy of science in its place . . . to make one's way over abandoned stages of reflection." Thus it can be read as an effort to open, or rather to reopen, certain avenues of reflection that have been blocked by positivism during the last one hundred years.

The "abandoned stages of reflection" to which Habermas refers are historically located in the movement of German thought from Kant to Marx. According to Habermas' interpretation, in Kant's critical philosophy, science was comprehended as one category of possible knowledge; theoretical reason was located in a comprehensive framework that encompassed practical reason, reflective judgment and critical reflection itself. This construction was criticized subsequently by Hegel and Marx. But neither Hegel's idealistic nor Marx's materialistic construction was able to withstand
the onslaught of positivism later in the nineteenth century. The critique of knowledge, in the Kantian sense, has shrunk to a methodological concern with the nature of the positive sciences. "For the philosophy of science that has emerged since the mid-nineteenth century as the heir of the theory of knowledge is methodology pursued with a scientistic self-understanding of the sciences. 'Scientism' means science's belief in itself; that is, the conviction that we can no longer understand science as one form of possible knowledge, but rather must identify knowledge with science." 37

These then are "the abandoned stages of reflection" that Habermas hopes to revive. His theory of cognitive interests, or knowledge-constitutive interests, is an attempt to radicalize epistemology by unearthing the roots of knowledge in life. While in contemporary English, "interests" are attributed to private individuals or politically motivated groups, Habermas' Interesse in German has a different meaning.

"Cognitive interest" is therefore a peculiar category, which conforms as little to the distinction between empirical and the transcendental or factual and symbolic determinations as to that between motivation and cognition. For knowledge is neither a mere instrument of an organism's adaptation to a changing environment nor the act of a pure rational being removed from the context of life in contemplation. 38

Such interests are the specific viewpoints from which we apprehend reality, the "general cognitive strategies"
that guide systematic inquiry. They are "knowledge-constitutive" because they determine what count as the objects and types of knowledge: they determine the categories relevant to what we take to be knowledge, as well as the procedures for discovering and warranting the claims of knowledge. These interests have their "basis in the natural history of the human species;" they are tied to "imperatives of the socio-cultural form of life." Habermas' concern is not merely epistemological; he is developing a philosophical anthropology that singles out the distinctive characteristics of human social life that are the bases of these basic knowledge-constitutive interests.

According to Habermas, there are three primary cognitive interests (Erkenntnisinteressen): the technical, practical, and emancipatory. Corresponding to these three irreducible cognitive interests are three categories of processes of inquiry (Forschungsprozessen): (1) empirical-analytic sciences, including the natural sciences and the social sciences insofar as they aim at producing nomological knowledge; (2) historical-hermeneutic sciences, including the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften) and the historical and social sciences insofar as they aim at interpretive understanding of meanings; (3) the critically oriented sciences, including psychoanalysis and the critique of ideology (i.e., critical social theory), as well as philosophy understood as a reflective and critical discipline. "The approach of the
empirical-analytic sciences incorporates a technical cognitive interest; that of the historical-hermeneutic sciences incorporates a practical one, and the approach of critically oriented sciences incorporates the emancipatory cognitive interest.39 These cognitive interests appear, as Habermas later puts it, as "general orientations" that guide the various modes of inquiry. As such they have a "quasi-transcendental" status.

These interests of knowledge are of significance neither for the psychology nor for the sociology of knowledge, nor for the critique of ideology in any narrower sense; for they are invariant. . . . interests of knowledge are not regulators of cognition which have to be eliminated for the sake of the objectivity of knowledge; instead, they themselves determine the aspect under which reality is objectified, and can thus be made accessible to experience to begin with. They are the conditions which are necessary in order that subjects capable of speech and action may have experience which can lay a claim to objectivity.48

Although the sciences must secure themselves against—i.e., preserve their objectivity in the face of—particular interests, the conditions of possibility of the very objectivity which they seek to preserve include fundamental cognitive interests.

While the cognitive interests, considered from the perspective of the different processes of inquiry, have a transcendental status, they have their basis in the natural history of the human species. Each of the cognitive interests is ground in one dimension of human existence: work, interaction, and power (Herrschaft). Work corresponds
to the technical interest that guides the empirical-analytic sciences; interaction, to the practical interest that guides the historical hermeneutic disciplines; power, to the emancipatory interest that guides the critical disciplines.

In order to avoid the problem of Hegelian idealism which puts everything into a single all-embracing dialectic of spirit (Geist), and Marxian materialism which reduces the levels of communicative interaction and power to the dialectic of work, Habermas stresses the irreducibility of work, communicative interaction, and power. But in social reality, these are not isolated dimensions. Habermas argues that we must not only carefully distinguish the three cognitive interests, the three dimensions of human social existence in which they are rooted, and the three corresponding disciplines, but also understand the specific ways in which they are interrelated.41

Technical Interest, the Empirical-Analytic Sciences, and Work

Habermas' idea of technical cognitive interest is inseparable from Marx's concept of work or labor, and Weber's concept of purposive rational (Zweckrational) action. According to his materialistic interpretation, Marx calls labor a condition of human existence that is independent of all forms of society, a perpetual necessity of nature in order to mediate the material exchange between man and nature, in other words, human life.42
As a primary level of action, labor refers to the ways in which individuals control and manipulate their environment in order to survive and preserve themselves. Marx stresses that "labor is above all a process between man and nature, a process in which man through his actions mediates, regulates, and controls his material exchange with nature. He confronts the substance of nature itself as a natural power. He sets in motion the natural forces belonging to his corporeal being, that is his arms and legs, head, and hand, in order to appropriate nature in a form usable for his own life."^43

Habermas basically agrees with Marx on his concept of labor and reformulates what Weber called "purposive-rational action." By "work," or "purposive-rational action," Habermas means

instrumental action or rational choice or their conjunction. Instrumental action is governed by technical rules based on empirical knowledge. In every case they imply conditional predictions about observable events, physical or social. These predictions can prove correct or incorrect. The conduct of rational choice is governed by strategies based on analytic knowledge. They imply deduction from preference rules (value systems) and decision procedures; these propositions are correctly or incorrectly deduced. Purposive-rational action realizes defined goals under given conditions. But while instrumental action organizes means that are appropriate or inappropriate according to criteria of an effective control of reality, strategic action depends on the correct evaluation of possible alternative choices, which result from calculation supplemented by values and maxims.^44
The capacity for purposive-rational control of the conditions of existence is acquired and exercised in a cumulative learning process. According to Habermas, scientific inquiry is the reflected and systematic form of this prescientific learning process, already posited with the structure of instrumental action of work as such. As the continuation of the cumulative learning process that proceeds on the prescientific level within the behavioral system of instrumental action, empirical-analytic inquiry aims to produce technically exploitable knowledge and to disclose reality from the viewpoint of possible technical control over objectified processes.

This type of empirical-analytic knowledge necessitates the isolation of objects and events into dependent and independent variables, and the investigation of regularities among them. The search for hypothetical-deductive theories, which permit the deduction of empirical generalizations from lawlike hypotheses, and the requirement of controlled observation and experimentation, indicate "that theories of the empirical sciences disclose reality subject to the constitutive interest in the possible securing and expansion, through information, of feedback-monitored action." The lawlike hypotheses characteristic of this type of inquiry can be interpreted as statement about the co-variance of events. Given a set of initial conditions, they make prediction possible. "Empirical-analytic
knowledge is thus possible predictive knowledge."\(^{46}\)

This does not mean, Habermas argues, that scientists engaged in the empirical-analytic disciplines are primarily interested in the technical application of their theories, or that theories in these disciplines are to be given an instrumental interpretation in the sense that they are merely instruments for systematically relating statements of observation. "It is not the theories themselves which are instruments but rather that their information is technically utilizable."\(^{47}\) Habermas later explains that "technical utilization of knowledge is, of course, in no way intended in the process of inquiry: actually, in many cases it is even excluded. Nevertheless, with the structure of propositions . . . and with the type of conditions of validation . . . a methodical decision has been taken in advance on the technical utility of information . . . ."\(^{48}\) "All the answers which the empirical sciences can supply are relative to the methodical significance of their presentation of problems and nothing more."\(^{49}\)

It should be clear from the preceding exposition that Habermas is not making a psychological claim about the intentions of empirical scientists. Rather, his analysis is directed to the meaning of a certain class of scientific statements and to the type of validity that they can claim. He argues that the behavioral system of instrumental action ultimately determines the structure of empirical-analytic
inquiry. The methodological commitments constitutive of such inquiry arise, in the final analysis, from structures of human life, from imperatives of a species that reproduces itself through purposive-rational action that is intrinsically tied to cumulative learning processes.

It is important to know that in contrast to the earlier Frankfurt critical theorists, such as Marcuse and Horkheimer, Habermas is not criticizing or denouncing this type of empirical-analytic knowledge. Habermas' primary object of attack is the ideological claim that this is the only type of legitimate knowledge, or the standard by which all knowledge is to be measured. In a debate with Hans Albert, Habermas makes his position clear, saying:

I am concerned with knowledge-guiding interests which in each case form the basis for a whole system of inquiries. In contrast to positivistic self-understanding, I should like to point out the connection of empirical-analytical science with technical interests in acquiring knowledge. But this has nothing to do with 'denunciation' as Albert insinuates. . . . On the contrary, I regard as abortive, even reactionary the attempts which characterized the old methodological dispute, namely, attempts to set up barriers from the outset in order to remove certain sectors altogether from the clutches of a certain type of research.50

The analysis of cognitive interests makes us aware of attitudes upon which fundamental decisions concerning the methodological framework of whole research systems are dependent. Only in this way do we learn to know what we are doing. Habermas claims that we make ourselves aware of the
fact that empirical analytic inquiries produce technically utilizable knowledge, but not knowledge which makes possible a better understanding of ourselves and others. We ought to devote our efforts to acquiring more and better empirical-analytic information: nevertheless, we should not restrict ourselves to this.

The Practical Interest, the Historical-Hermeneutic Sciences, and Symbolic Interaction

As discussed earlier, in his theoretical remarks, Marx often seemed to regard the development of the human species as determined solely in the dimension of labor, of processes of production. This tendency to reduce the "self-generative act" of the human species to labor—to eliminate in theory the structure of symbolic interaction—was, according to Habermas, at the root of the failure of "orthodox" Marxism to develop a reflective theory of knowledge. For it is in this very dimension of symbolic interaction that the critique of knowledge moves.

While technical interest arises from imperatives of a form of life bound to "work," practical interest is anchored in an equally deep-seated imperative of socio-cultural life. Habermas claims that the survival of individuals in society is linked to the existence of a reliable intersubjectivity of understanding in ordinary language communication. "Int "Interaction" or "communicative action" is an irreducible dimension of human social life. Habermas sees that
communicative action "is governed by consensual norms, which define reciprocal expectation about behavior and which must be understood and recognized by at least two acting subjects." The meaning of social norms is objectified in ordinary language communication. "While the validity of technical rules and strategies depends on that of empirically true or analytically correct propositions, the validity of social norms is grounded only in the intersubjectivity of the mutual understanding of intentions and secured by the general recognition of obligations."

If we accept Habermas' distinction between work and interaction and agree that individuals shape and determine themselves not only through their work but also through communicative action and language, then what leads him to call the knowledge-constitutive interest of the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) "practical"?

In its very structure hermeneutic understanding is designed to guarantee, within cultural traditions, the possible action-orienting self-understanding of individuals and groups as well as reciprocal understanding between different individuals and groups. It makes possible the form of unconstrained consensus and the type of open intersubjectivity on which communicative action depends. It bans the danger of communication breakdown in both dimensions: the vertical one of one's own individual life history and the collective tradition to which one belongs, and the horizontal one of mediating between the traditions of different individuals, groups and cultures. When these communication flows break off and the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding is either rigidified or falls apart, a condition of survival is disturbed, one that is as elementary as the
complementary condition of the success of instru-
menta ion: namely the possibility of uncon-
strained agreement and non-violent recognition.
Because this is the presupposition of practice,
we call the knowledge-constitutive interest of
the cultural sciences "practical." 53

It is precisely this sphere of unconstrained agreement
and open intersubjectivity to which Habermas appealed in
his critique of the positivist program for a unified science.
The communication structures presupposed by the community
of natural scientists cannot themselves be grasped within
the framework of empirical-analytic science. The dimension
in which concepts, methods, theories, etc. are discussed and
agreed upon, in which the framework of shared meanings,
norms, values etc. is grounded, is the dimension of symbolic
interaction. This dimension is neither identical with nor
reducible to instrumental action. The availability of an
intersubjectively valid pre-and meta-scientific language,
of a framework of shared meanings and values, is taken for
granted in the natural sciences. Thus the objective knowl-
edge produced by empirical-analytic inquiry is not possible
without knowledge in the form of intersubjective understand-
ing. The consequence of such a reflection is not to reject
the empirical-analytic sciences or to lessen the value of
what we can learn from them, but rather to make us aware
that the very intelligibility of these disciplines requires
a more comprehensive understanding of human communication
which is not guided by the technical cognitive interest.
The disciplines that are concerned with symbolic interaction or communicative action in all aspects of human life, according to Habermas, are the historical-hermeneutic disciplines. In *Knowledge and Human Interests*, the "self-reflection" of the Geisteswissenschaften is mainly developed through an interpretation of Dilthey. But in his more recent discussions of historical-hermeneutic knowledge and the procedures of interpreting meaning, Habermas draws instead on contemporary phenomenological, hermeneutic and linguistic approaches.

The historical-hermeneutic sciences gain knowledge in a different methodological framework. Here the meaning of validity of propositions is not constituted in the frame of reference of technical control. The levels of formalized language and objectified experience have not yet been divorced. For theories are not constructed deductively and experience is not organized with regard to the success of operations. Access to the facts is provided by the understanding of meaning, not observation. The verification of lawlike hypotheses in the empirical-analytic sciences has its counterpart here in the interpretation of texts. Thus the rules of hermeneutics determine the possible meaning of the validity of statements of the cultural sciences.

Clearly enough, Habermas is not trying to replace the empirical-analytic sciences with the historical-hermeneutic. He is critical of the monopolistic tendencies of the positivistic self-understanding of the empirical-analytic sciences, but he is just as critical of the claim that the historical-hermeneutic sciences provide the most fundamental knowledge of man and the world. This is the
point of his criticism that "historicism has become the positivism of the cultural and social sciences." Each of these "self-understandings" mistakes the part for the whole. This is the reason why Habermas wants to insist on the distinction between the irreducibility of different cognitive interests and their corresponding disciplines.

It is important to note that this distinction between different domains of inquiry is not an ontological distinction between different "material objects of inquiry." The distinction is, rather, an epistemological distinction between "formal objects of inquiry." The distinction rests on the different modes of "constituting" the objects of inquiry; that is, on "the system of primitive terms which categorize the objects of possible experience . . . and . . . the methods by which action-related primary experiences are selected, extracted from their own system and utilized for the purpose of the discursive examination of claims to validity and thus transformed into 'data'." In the one orientation we encounter bodies in motion, events and processes capable of being causally explained; in the other we encounter speaking and acting subjects, utterances and actions capable of being understood.

Like the empirical-analytic sciences the historical-hermeneutic sciences are anchored in a specific system of action, in this case the system of interactions mediated by ordinary language. This rootedness in a specific life
structure means that hermeneutic inquiry is governed by a specific cognitive interest, in this case a "practical interest" in maintaining the type of open intersubjectivity on which communicative action depends. Habermas suggests that "the cultural disciplines did not develop out of the crafts and other professions in which technical knowledge is required but rather out of the professionalized realms of action that require practical wisdom." In consequence of the different interest structure of hermeneutic inquiry, the logic of inquiry in the historical-hermeneutic disciplines is fundamentally different from that which obtains in the empirical-analytic sciences. Habermas puts it as follow:

Empirical-analytic sciences disclose reality in so far as it appears within the behavioral system of instrumental action . . . nomological statements about this object domain . . . grasp reality with regard to technical control that, under specified conditions, is possible everywhere and at all times. The hermeneutic sciences do not disclose reality under a different transcendental framework. Rather they are directed toward the transcendental structure of various actual forms of life, within each of which reality is interpreted according to a specific grammar of world views and of action . . . . They grasp interpretations of reality with regard to an intersubjectivity of action-orienting understanding possible from a given hermeneutic starting point.

Since hermeneutic knowledge is inseparable from ordinary language, the hermeneutic inquirer can interpret the meaning of his "texts" only in relation to the structure of the world to which he himself belongs. Thus the interpretation of meaning in hermeneutic inquiry is fundamentally different
from the explanation of causal relation in empirical-analytic inquiry. An interpreter inevitably has to interpret something from a certain point of view. This also is the point which Hans-Georg Gadamer tries to argue. It will be elaborated in a later section.

The Emancipatory Interest, the Critical Sciences, and Power

In dealing with technical and practical interests and their corresponding disciplines Habermas could take the natural sciences and the cultural sciences as models of different types of inquiry and go on to present arguments for their intrinsic connection to work and interaction. In the case of the emancipatory interest the situation is different. According to Habermas, the "critically oriented sciences" are concerned to go beyond the production of nomological knowledge and hermeneutical interpretation. The critical sciences want to determine when theoretical statements grasp invariant regularities of social action as such and when they express ideologically frozen relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed. To the extent that this is the case, the critique of ideology, as well, moreover, as psychoanalysis, take into account that information about lawlike connections sets off a process of reflection in the consciousness of those whom the laws are about. Thus the level of unreflected consciousness, which is one of the initial conditions of such laws, can be transform. Of course, to this end a critically mediated knowledge of laws can not through reflection alone render a law itself inoperative, but it can render it inapplicable. The methodological framework that determines the meaning of the validity of critical propositions of this category is established by the concept of
self-reflection. The latter releases the subject from dependence on hypostatized powers. Self-reflection is determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest.58

It is important to note that although Habermas utilizes Marxian critique of ideology and Freudian psychoanalysis as the classical examples of such critical inquiry, he never simply adopts them as paradigms. In Knowledge and Human Interests, Habermas argues that both Marx and Freud are subject to "scientistic misunderstanding." Consequently, in his discussion of emancipatory interest and the critical theory of society, Habermas cannot simply appeal to reflection on generally accepted modes of inquiry as he did with technical and practical interest. He is not plumbing the foundations of established disciplines, but engaging in epistemological reflection to formulate a new conception of social and philosophical inquiry.

Habermas' concept of self-reflection and emancipation is rooted in the tradition of German idealism. In this tradition, according to Habermas' interpretation, "reason contains both will and consciousness as its elements ... . Reason also means the will to reason. In self-reflection knowledge for the sake of knowledge attains congruence with the interest in autonomy and responsibility. The emancipatory cognitive interest aims at the pursuit of reflection as such."59 But Habermas agrees with Marx's critique of German idealism. In contrast to Hegel's absolute movement of mind (Geist), Marx conceives of the self-formative
process (Bildungsprozess) of the human species as conditioned: it depends on contingent conditions of nature. From Marx's point of view, the subject of world-constitution is not transcendental consciousness in general, but the concrete human species reproducing its life through processes of social labor. Therefore, domination that appears in the form of false consciousness and reified social relations and prevents people from being free and autonomous, cannot be overcome by an idealistic withdrawal into the autonomous subject. It must be criticized practically at the level of the system of social labor itself. False consciousness is suspended not idealistically, through the movement of an absolute mind (Geist), but materialistically, through the development of the forces of production and the struggle of social classes.

In Habermas' view, both Hegel's and Marx's work contains the principal elements required for an adequate conception of reason and the interest of reason in emancipation. Thus, to restore the notions of reason in human emancipation, one must return to the dimension of thought opened by Hegel and Marx: critical reflection. But since Marx tends to reduce self-generative act of the human species to labor, and to restrict conception of the species' self-reflection to work alone, Habermas suggests that not only a critique of Marx's conceptions is needed but also an incorporation of a number of Freud's ideas into a revised historical
In the work of earlier critical theorists, such as Horkheimer, Adorno, Fromm and Marcuse, we can already see the attempts to reconcile Freud and Marx. Even the first issue of the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung Horkheimer stressed the necessity of integrating individual psychology into Marxist social theory. Habermas' approach to Freud can be located with respect to these earlier discussions. However, in developing the psychological dimension of social analysis, Habermas draws heavily on different forms of identity theory, role theory, symbolic interactionism, and theories of cognitive development of Piaget and Kohlberg. As a result, Freudian psychoanalysis plays a more limited role in Habermas' treatment of the "links" between individual psychology and institutional framework than it did for earlier critical theorists. Habermas' orientation to Freud's own work is essentially methodological. In Knowledge and Human Interests he suggests that "psychoanalysis is relevant to us as the only tangible example of a science incorporating methodical self-reflection." Taking Alfred Lorenzer's work as a point of departure, he then goes on to reconstruct psychoanalysis as a theory of distorted communication. From Habermas' point of view, a methodological reconstruction can provide us with a more precise conception of the logic of a reflective science and some guidelines for the construction of a critical social theory.
From Freud's point of view, individual neuroses bring about a relatively rigid reproduction of behavior that is removed from self-consciousness. Repressed motives for action are excluded from communication and directed into channels of substitute gratification. The patient fundamentally and systematically misunderstands himself and fails to grasp the significance of his symptoms. Psychoanalysis is a discipline that incorporates methodological self-reflection and attempts to make the patient realize his own problems with the help of psychanalytic interpretation. As Habermas says, "the technique of dream interpretation goes beyond the art of hermeneutics insofar as it must grasp not only the meaning of a possibly distorted text, but the meaning of the text distortion itself, that is the transformation of a latent dream thought into the manifest dream." Such psychoanalytic interpretation is not disinterested. The analyst does not merely maintain a neutral attitude to analyze the problems objectively. Rather, he is guided by his interest to help the patient to be conscious of the difficulties and hence to overcome the sufferings. Thus Habermas claims that "psychoanalytic hermeneutics, unlike the cultural sciences, aims not at the understanding of symbolic structures in general. Rather, the act of understanding to which it leads is self-reflection." Following Freud, Habermas stresses that the analyst is not merely providing information or applying a theory to the
The task of psychoanalysis "consists in making the unconscious accessible to consciousness, which is done by overcoming the resistances." As Habermas points out,

the starting point of psychoanalytic theory is the experience of resistance, that is the blocking force that stands in the way of the free and public communication of repressed contents. The analytic process of making conscious reveals itself as a process of reflection in that it is not only a process on the cognitive level but also dissolves resistances on the affective level. The dogmatic limitation of false consciousness consists not only in the lack of specific information but in its specific inaccessibility. It is not only a cognitive deficiency; for the deficiency is fixated by habitualized standards on the basis of affective attitude.

From this point of view, the success of psychoanalytic treatment cannot solely depend upon the technical manipulation of the patient by the analyst. The treatment must lead to a process of depth self-reflection in the patient himself. The psychoanalytic knowledge "includes two moments equally: the cognitive, and the affective and motivational. It is critique in the sense that the analytic power to dissolve dogmatic attitudes inheres in analytic insight. . . . Critique would not have the power to break up false consciousness if it were not impelled by a passion for critique." Through a process of reconstruction and interpretation, the analyst searches the causes hidden from the patient's consciousness. Nevertheless, the success of therapy ultimately depends not on the analyst's understanding.
of the patient, but on the extent to which the patient by his own self-reflection can appropriate this analytic understanding and dissolve his own resistance.

If the success of the therapy ultimately depends on the patient's experience of dissolving resistance, then what is the criterion for the correctness of the interpretation of the patient's motive, behavior and condition? Shall we judge the correctness from the analyst's point of view or the patient's point of view? In regard to this question, Habermas suggests:

...If the patient rejects a construction, the interpretation from which it has been derived can not yet be considered refuted at all. For psychoanalytic assumptions refer to conditions in which the very experience in which they must corroborate themselves is suspended: the experience of reflection is the only criterion for the corroboration or failure of hypotheses. If it does not come about, there is still an alternative: either the interpretation is false (that is, the theory or its application to a given case) or, to the contrary, the resistances, which have been correctly diagnoses, are too strong. The criterion in virtue of which false constructions fail does not coincide with either controlled observation or communicative experience. The interpretation of a case is corroborated only by the successful continuation of a self-formative process, that is by the completion of self-reflection, and not in any unmistakable way by what the patient says, or how he behaves.69

Psychoanalysis is a discipline in which interpretations developed by the analyst involve concepts that may be unintelligible to the subjects themselves. The patient-subject may ascribe meaning to his actions and situations and interpret the reality from his perspective. However,
his interpretation may include not only occasional false beliefs about what he is doing, but systematically distorted misconceptions of himself, the meaning of his actions. Therefore, methodologically speaking, the recognition of the appropriateness of an interpretation by the subjects involved is not sufficient to justify the correctness of the interpretation.

Apparently, Habermas wants to avoid the problem of endorsing a conception of theory that is only an ideological reflection of prejudices and false beliefs. However, at the same time, he thinks that the subjects themselves must ultimately be able to appropriate the interpretations of their actions developed by the theorist. Habermas cautiously tries to avoid the two methodological extremes; that is to say, he depends neither solely on the observer's construction nor on the actor's interpretation alone. Rather, it is a combination of both, including a dialectical interplay between the observer's construction and the actor's interpretation. Such a dialectical interplay should ultimately lead to the actor's own self-understanding. This point is especially important not only for understanding psychoanalysis and critical theory, but also for the methodology of social science in general. It demonstrates the limits of both the analyst's perspective and the actor's perspective, and demands a solution to transcend these limits. From Habermas' point of view, the methodological principles
of psychoanalytic therapy have already provided us the basic guidelines. It is important to realize that Habermas is not treating psychoanalysis as a paradigm of critical theory. Rather, he uses the psychoanalytic model to illustrate a form of knowledge that exhibits the essential features of critique—a form of knowledge guided by an emancipatory interest that requires a depth interpretation achievable only through both the analysis of the analyst and the self-reflection of the actor.

The analogy between psychoanalysis and critical social theory is selective. Habermas sees the specific advantage of incorporating Freud's ideas into historical materialism: the possibilities this opens for reconceptualizing "power" and "ideology," and for clarifying the status of a critical science. According to Habermas, institutionalized power relations, like individual neuroses, bring about a relatively rigid reproduction of behavior that is removed from criticism. Ideology assumes a substantive role in the formation, maintenance and transformation of society. It is the major force that dominates consciousness by legitimating existing power relations. In this sense, institutions of power are rooted in distorted communication, in ideologically imprisoned consciousness. Imprisoned by such frozen consciousness, people tend to take the institutionalized power relations, or domination for granted. Therefore, a transformation of institutionalized frameworks
demands a destruction of ideologies. From this perspective, critical social theory has the role of awakening the self-understanding of social groups, of raising their consciousness to the point where they are able to free themselves from ideological delusions. But, like psychoanalytic therapy, critical social theory itself is not sufficient to attain this goal. Ultimately, the critique of ideology should lead to "an organization of social relations according to the principle that the validity of every norm of political consequence be made dependent on a consensus arrived at in communication free from domination." That is to say, critics unmask the institutionally anchored distortions of communication that prevent the organization of human relations on the basis of open intersubjectivity. And at the same time the subject of critical theory must realize his involvement in this development toward emancipation. He must direct the critique of ideology toward himself. In this way critical theory would pursue self-reflection out of an interest in self-emancipation.

After we comprehend the emancipatory interest behind critical reflective knowledge, Habermas claims, we can adequately grasp the intrinsic connection between knowledge and human interest in general. The elucidation of the category of critical reflective knowledge shows that the meaning of reason, and thus the criterion of its autonomy, cannot be accounted for without recourse to an interest of
reason that is constitutive of knowledge as such.

In the case of an objectivation whose power is based only on the subject not recognizing itself in it as its other, knowing it in the act of self-reflection is immediately identical with the interest in knowledge, namely in emancipation from that power. The analytic situation makes real in unity of intuition and emancipation, of insight and liberation from dogmatic dependence, and of reason and the interested employment of reason developed by Fichte in the concept of self-reflection. Only self-reflection is no longer the act of an absolute ego . . . . Given materialist presuppositions, the interest of reason therefore can no longer be conceived as an autarchic self-explication of reason. The proposition that interest inheres in reason has an adequate meaning only within idealism, that is only as long as we are convinced that reason can become transparent to itself by providing its own foundation. But if we comprehend the cognitive capacity and critical power of reason as deriving from the self-constitution of the human species under contingent natural conditions, then it is reason that inheres in interest.71

With this connection in mind, we can see the relation between theory and practice in the context of critical theory. Since the critique of ideology aims at the destruction of institutionalized repression in the form of power and ideology, the interest in alteration is simultaneously an interest in enlightenment. Habermas argues that "this interest aims at reflection on oneself . . . . Self-reflection brings to consciousness those determinants of a self-formative process . . . which ideologically determine a contemporary practice and conception of the world . . . . [This process] leads to insight due to the fact that what has previously been unconscious is made conscious
in a manner rich in consequences: analytic insights inter-vene in life . . . .”72 Thus, in this sense, critical reflection and liberation from “seemingly natural constraints,” from “dependence on hypostasized powers” are tied together. In Habermas’ words: “In self-reflection knowledge for the sake of knowledge attains congruence with the interest in autonomy and responsibility . . . in the power of self-reflection, knowledge and interest are one.”73 Since critical reflection undermines the dogmatic character of both a view of the world and a form of life, the cognitive process coincides with a self-formative process: knowing and acting are fused in a single act.

It is important to know that according to Habermas the emancipatory interest of self-reflection and self-liberation is different from the two "lower" interests: the technical and the practical interest. While in critical reflection acting and knowing are one, the two moments do not immediately coincide in the same way in technical control and practical communication. Moreover, the emancipatory interest with its aim of Mündigkeit (autonomy and responsibility) is not unrelated to the other two interests.74 For, as we have seen, the self-formative process of the species is not unconditioned. It depends on conditions of symbolic interaction and material exchange with nature. Habermas is aware of this and says:
Reason's interest in emancipation, which is invested in the self-formative process of the species and permeates the movement of reflection, aims at realizing those conditions of symbolic interaction and instrumental action; and, to this extent, it assumes the restricted form of the practical and technical cognitive interests. Indeed, in a certain measure, the concept of the interest of reason introduced by idealism needs to be reinterpreted materialistically: the emancipatory interest is itself dependent on interests in possible intersubjective action-orientation and in possible technical control.\textsuperscript{75}

Moreover, Habermas' use of psychoanalysis as an example of critical-reflective knowledge also subtly indicates the interconnection between the three different cognitive interests and their corresponding disciplines. Instead of regarding psychoanalysis as a form of natural science, as Freud did, Habermas sees that psychoanalysis incorporates an emancipatory interest within a framework that relates the hermeneutic understanding and the nomological explanation.\textsuperscript{76}

Psychoanalytic treatment essentially is a dialogue between analyst and patient, and in that sense proceeds on the level of ordinary language communication. Thus it is hermeneutical in the sense that it investigates the character and meaning of such a communicative process. But this hermeneutical interpretation is complemented by an interest in the discovery of the causal conditions influencing the behavior of the patient. In this way, according to Habermas, hermeneutical understanding and causal explanation are related to one another through the emancipatory project of analytic therapy: the liberation from distorted communication
through the self-reflection of the patient, whereby he is able to achieve his Mündigkeit (autonomy and responsibility).

Of course, the use of the psychoanalytic model is not without criticism. Habermas has defended his major thesis in the postscript to *Knowledge and Human Interests*. He is well aware of the programmatic nature of his ideas of a critical theory of society. Recently, Habermas has pursued the theme of distorted communication from a linguistic point of view. It is not that he has changed his views on psychoanalytic knowledge as a kind of critical-reflective knowledge. Rather, he is attempting to broaden the ground of critical theory, in the face of attacks from various perspectives. It is important to realize that a concern with distorted communication has already presupposed an idea of what a situation of "undistorted communication" might be like—a notion of what Habermas calls an "ideal speech situation." In this sense, the development of his general theory of communicative action is a continuation and elaboration of his original ideas of critical theory rather than a new departure.

(E) A Theory of Communicative Competence

If Habermas' analysis of knowledge and human interests is a typical product of the German tradition, his theory of communicative competence is deeply rooted in Anglo-American thought. Building on Wittgenstein's understanding
of language games, and Austin's and Searle's analysis of speech acts, as well as Chomsky's analysis of linguistic competence, Habermas attempts to provide an adequate epistemological foundation for a critical theory of society. He hopes that his theory of communicative competence and "universal pragmatics" can not only solve the problems of the earlier psychoanalytic model, but also extend in a new direction his "systematic investigation of the relationship between theory and practice in the social sciences."

Communicative Competence

In his earlier discussions of the distinction between work and interaction, as well as the relationship between knowledge and human interests, Habermas has already pointed out that language is a universal medium in which the social life of human species unfolds; the symbolically mediated interaction is irreducible to the instrumentally oriented work. In The Logic of the Social Sciences (Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften) Habermas makes his own view clear: "Today the problem of language has replaced the traditional problem of consciousness; the transcendental critique of language supersedes that of consciousness." Thus, he critically examines the analytic philosophy of language and develops his own theory.

In his Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Chomsky introduces the distinction between linguistic competence and
linguistic performance. Following Chomsky's definition, linguistic competence is the capacity of the ideal speaker to master an abstract system of rules based on an innate language apparatus; linguistic performance is the actual use of the system under the limiting conditions (memory, attention, error, etc.) of concrete speech situations. According to Chomsky's general semantics, the ultimate components of meaning are part of the innate equipment of the individual speaking subject prior to all experience, and the semantic content of all possible natural languages consists of combinations of these components. In his critique of Chomsky's theory, Habermas argues that "semantic universals can also be part of an intersubjectively produced cultural system," that they can "reflect the universality of specific scopes of experience," and that "semantic fields can be formed and shifted in structural associations with global views of nature and society." He thinks Chomskian conception of communication as an application, limited by empirical conditions, of a monological linguistic competence is inadequate. Thus, a general theory of communication could be developed only in terms of an universal pragmatics or a theory of communicative competence.

Universal pragmatics, according to Habermas, "stands between linguistics on one side and empirical pragmatics on the other." Empirical pragmatics (socio-linguistic) investigates the extra-linguistic, empirical, and contingent
limiting conditions of actual communication. Linguistics studies the grammatical systems according to which competent speakers form and transform sentences. Universal pragmatics undertakes "the systematic investigation of general structures which appear in every possible speech situation, which are themselves produced through the performance of specific types of linguistic expression, and which serve to situate pragmatically the expression generated by the linguistically competent speaker."83

It is quite obvious that Habermas' notion of communicative competence, as opposed to linguistic competence, is influenced by the Austin-Searle tradition.84 According to Habermas, a speech act is not a symbol, word or sentence, but rather the production of a sentence under certain conditions, the transformation of a sentence into an utterance.85 Habermas designates the speech act as the elementary unit of linguistic communication. The competence of the ideal speaker must be regarded as including the ability to structure modes of communication, situations of intersubjectivity in which ordinary language communication is possible.

Universal pragmatics abstracts from the varying pragmatic features of concrete speech. It is an attempt to discover the fundamental presuppositions of speech and interaction processes in daily life. Habermas shows that reflection about universal pragmatics or communicative
competence reveals the fundamental "idealizations" (counter-factual assumptions) of all human communication: the ideal speech situation.

Above all communicative competence relates to an ideal speech situation in the same way that linguistic competence relates to the abstract system of linguistic rules. The dialogue-constitutive universals at the same time generate and describe the form of intersubjectivity which makes mutuality of understanding possible. Communicative competence is defined by the ideal speaker's mastery of the dialogue-constitutive universals, irrespective of actual restrictions under empirical conditions. 86

Habermas argues that human discourse or speech—even in its systematically distorted forms—presupposes and anticipates an ideal speech situation. To explain what this means, it is necessary to clarify a distinction that plays an important role in Habermas' recent work: the distinction between action and discourse.

Action and Discourse

Habermas attempts to draw a distinction between two different forms of communication: communicative action (interaction) and discourse. A smoothly functioning language game, he argues, rests on a background consensus formed from the mutual recognition of at least four different types of validity claims (Geltungsansprüche) that are involved in the exchange of speech acts. These four validity claims are the claim that the utterance is understandable, that its propositional content is true, that the
speaker is veracious or sincere (wahrhaftig) in uttering it, and that it is right or appropriate (richtig) for him to perform the speech act. 87

In communicative action we naively accept these implicitly raised validity claims. But situations exist in which one or more of them may become fundamentally problematical, in which the accepted framework may be questioned and challenged. In such cases, we call into question the basic consensus. Thus, we need specific forms of problem resolution to remove the disturbance and restore the original or a new background consensus. According to Habermas, the validity of claims to problematic truth can be settled only discursively. This means that we need to enter into a discourse with the purpose of distinguishing an "accepted" consensus—one that is now challenged—from a "rational" consensus. Then, by argumentation, we must judge the claims to validity implicit in the initial speech situation. It is argumentation itself that is the basis for determining whether a consensus is rational or not. Rather, we may judge a consensus to be rational when further reflection and argumentation are allowed. The discourse process is fluid, not fixed. But what are the criteria for determining whether the consensus reached is rational or not? What are the criteria of argumentation itself? Habermas claims that there are no explicit criteria and procedures that will definitively distinguish a rational consensus from one which
is not; we can only have recourse to argumentation itself. But this answer seems merely to push the question back one step further. It may be objected that we seem to be in a process of vicious infinite regression. Habermas is well aware of this problem and develops the concept of ideal speech situation to tackle the difficulties.

Ideal Speech Situation

The concept of ideal speech situation is an integral part of Habermas' analysis of communicative competence. In every speech act, an ideal speech act is both presupposed and anticipated. By Habermas' definition, a speech situation is ideal "where the communication is not only not hindered by external, contingent influences, but also not hindered by forces which result from the structure of communication itself. Only then does the peculiarly unforced compulsion of a better argument dominate." 88

No matter how the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding may be deformed, the design of an ideal speech situation is necessarily implied in the structure of potential speech, since all speech, even intentional deception, is oriented toward the idea of truth. This idea can be analyzed with regard to a consensus achieved in unrestrained and universal discourse. In so far as we master the means for the construction of the ideal speech situation, we can conceive the ideas of truth, freedom, and justice, which interpenetrate each—although of course only as ideas. On the strength of communicative competence alone, however, and independent of the empirical structures of the social system to which we belong, we are quite unable to realize the ideal speech situation, we can only anticipate it. 89
The very act of participating in a discourse, of attempting discursively to come to an agreement about the truth of a problematic statement or the correctness of a problematic norm, carries with it the supposition that a genuine agreement or consensus is possible. From Habermas' point of view, if we did not suppose that a rational consensus was possible and could in some way be distinguished from a false consensus, then the very meaning of discourse, of speech, would be called into question. In attempting to come to a "rational" decision about such matters, we must suppose that the outcome of our discussion will be the result simply of the force of the better argument and not of constraints on discussion. Habermas argues that this absence of constraint, or this exclusion of systematically distorted communication can be characterized formally in terms of the pragmatic structure of communication. His thesis is that the structure is free from constraint and domination only when objective social institutions and practices permit free, symmetrical, responsible discourse. This means that all participants share symmetrical distribution of chances to select and employ speech acts; there is an effective equality of chances for the assumption of dialogue roles. Thus in ideal speech situation rational argumentation itself is the only critical standard for judgment.
It is important to note that the conditions of actual speech rarely coincide with the ideal. Because of empirical limitations, actual speech or discourse seems to exclude a perfect realization of the conditions of ideal speech. That is the reason why Habermas calls the ideal speech situation "counterfactual." And Habermas insists that "on the strength of communicative competence alone . . . and independent of the empirical structures of the social system to which we belong, we are quite unable to realize the ideal speech situation, we can only anticipate it." In his article, "Theories of Truth" ("Wahrheitstheorien") Habermas explains that

the ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor simply a construct, but a reciprocal supposition or imputation (Unterstellung) unavoidable in discourse. This supposition can, but need not be counterfactual; but even when counterfactual it is a fiction which is operatively effective in communication. I would therefore prefer to speak of an anticipation of an ideal speech situation . . . . This anticipation alone is the warrant which permits us to join to an actually attained consensus the claim of a rational consensus. At the same time it is a critical standard against which every actually realized consensus can be called into question and checked . . . .

The ideal speech situation is an ideal that in actual speech can be more or less adequately approximated. It can serve as a guide for the institutionalization of discourse or the critique of systematically distorted communication.

From the preceding discussion, it is quite clear that there is normative implication in Habermas' concept of the ideal speech situation. In the first place, the conditions
for ideal speech are connected with conditions for an ideal form of life. In Habermas' words, the requirements for ideal speech situation, in which discourse results in genuine consensus, include linguistic conceptualizations of the traditional ideas of truth, freedom and justice. "Truth" can not be analyzed independently of "freedom" and "justice." In Habermas mind, "truth" and the "good life" are inseparable. He says in the inaugural lecture at Frankfurt University in 1965 that

> The human interest in autonomy and responsibility (Mündigkeit) is not mere fancy, for it can be apprehended a priori. What raises us out of nature is the only thing whose nature we can know: language. Through its structure autonomy and responsibility are posited for us. Our first sentence expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus. 93

Undoubtedly, Habermas regards the thesis of the normative foundation of linguistic communication as the keystone of his theory of communicative competence. This thesis is an attempt, connected with his early analysis of knowledge and human interests, to overcome the separation between fact and value, between theory and practice, which has been restricted in the positivistic theory of knowledge. Habermas' argument departs from an analysis of communicative interaction that shows it to be based on the mutual recognition of validity claims requiring discursive justification when questioned. He proceeds through an analysis of discourse that shows it to imply the supposition of ideal
speech, that is, a situation characterized by freedom from constraint. And this freedom from constraint or domination is precisely the content of the emancipatory interest guiding critical theory. Thus the emancipated form of life, the goal of critical theory, is at the same time inherent in the notion of discourse: it is anticipated in every act of communication. As succinctly summarized by Thomas McCarthy:

The analysis of speech shows it is oriented toward the idea of truth. The analysis of "truth" leads to the notion of a discursively achieved consensus. The analysis of "consensus" shows this concept to involve a normative dimension. The analysis of the notion of a grounded consensus ties it to a speech situation which is free from all external and internal constraints, that is, in which the resulting consensus is due simply to the force of the better argument. Finally, the analysis of the ideal speech situation shows it to involve assumptions about the context of interaction in which speech is located. The end result of this chain of argument is that the very structure of speech involves the anticipation of a form of life in which autonomy and responsibility are possible. 'The critical theory of society takes this as its point of departure.' Its normative foundation is therefore not arbitrary, but inherent in the very structure of social action which it analyzes.94

Clearly the theory of communicative competence remains in a highly programmatic stage of development.95 There is an urgent need for much more detailed analysis of all its major tenets. Habermas never claims to have already resolved the epistemological and methodological problems that have confronted critical theory since Marx. Nevertheless, his analysis of communicative competence not only has opened
a new direction for reconstructing the foundation of a
critical theory of society, but also has provided a common
ground for dialogue between the critical and hermeneutical
philosophies of social science.

(F) Critical Theory and Hermeneutics

Underlying Habermas' interpretation of psychoanalysis
and theory of communicative competence is a common theme:
self-understanding, Mündigkeit (autonomy and responsibility),
and linguistic expression are all tied to one another. In
other words, there is an intrinsic connection between com-
munication and emancipation. Thus, it seems quite natural
that Habermas' critical theory must confront the hermeneu-
tical disciplines that aim at methodical understanding of
meaning or language. The recent debates between Habermas
and Gadamer not only have made hermeneutics directly rele-
vant to social inquiry, but also have provided an oppor-
tunity for critical reflection on both sides.

Gadamer and Hermeneutics

Hermeneutics, the art of textual interpretation, origi-
nally developed in intimate connection with theology and
jurisprudence. Later, hermeneutics expanded to include
the whole range of studies in the interpretation of texts.
In late eighteenth and early nineteenth century Germany,
with the awakening of historical consciousness, scholars
became aware of the importance of interpretive procedures for deciphering the meaning of historical phenomena. Finally, Dilthey's investigation of the conditions of possibility and validity of Verstehen extended the generalization of hermeneutic procedures to the whole human world.

Dilthey's psychologistic approach to Verstehen sought to establish the basis of a radical discrepancy between the study of human conduct and the occurrence of events in nature. From his point of view, we must understand the former by grasping the subjective consciousness; we can causally explain the latter only "from the outside." In contrast to explanation, understanding is a kind of psychological "re-enactment" (nacherleben) or imaginative reconstruction (nachbilden) of the experience of the other.

This conception of Verstehen, even in a more qualified version by Weber, has been subjected to attack by numerous positivistically-oriented critics.

More recently, influenced by Heidegger's existential ontology, there has been a major change in the hermeneutic tradition itself, which separates the writings of recent authors from their nineteenth-century predecessors. The most outstanding presentation of this approach is to be found in the writings of Hans-Georg Gadamer. In his main work, Wahrheit und Method (Truth and Method), Gadamer is not concerned with working out methodological procedures for the social sciences or with elucidating their theoretical
foundations. Instead, he wants to disclose "linguistically" (Sprachlichkeit) as the basic mode of human existence. Gadamer's original interests lie in the traditional hermeneutic domains of aesthetics, philology and history. However Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel have introduced Gadamer's work into contemporary discussion of the foundations of social inquiry. 99

Gadamer's version of Verstehen stresses that understanding is not subjective, "but rather an entering into another tradition, such that past and present constantly mediate each other." 100 In Geisteswissenschaften, the observer must enter into dialogue with the actors in order to understand how they act. Following Dilthey, Gadamer considers "understanding" profoundly different from "explanation." Nevertheless, Gadamer excludes from the start an explication in psychological terms. He says: "Verstehen ist sprachgebunden" ("Understanding is tied to language"). 101 Verstehen consists, not in placing oneself "inside" the subjective experience of the actor, or the text's author, but in understanding literary art through grasping, to use Wittgenstein's term, the "form of life" that gives it meaning. Thus, from Gadamer's point of view, to understand a text of a historical period remote from our own, we perform essentially a creative process in which through penetrating an alien mode of existence, we enrich our own self-knowledge
through acquiring knowledge of others. Therefore, we achieve understanding through discourse.

In abandoning the individualistic and psychologistic conception of understanding, Gadamer also rejects the search for "objective" knowledge in the manner of Dilthey and Weber. All understanding is situated in history, within a particular frame of reference, tradition, or culture. That is to say, all understanding requires some measure of pre-understanding whereby further understanding is possible. This dialectical interplay between pre-understanding and understanding is what Gadamer calls the "hermeneutic circle."

The understanding of human activities by means of the hermeneutic circle is not, Gadamer argues, to be seen as a "method." Rather, it is the ontological process of human discourse in operation, in which, through language, "life mediates life." To understand a language is to be able to "live in it." In agreement with Heidegger, Gadamer asserts that language and understanding are inseparable structural aspects of human being-in-the-world, not simply optional functions that man engages in or does not engage in at will. What is given in language is not primarily a relation to this or that object, but rather a relation to the whole of being, a relation that we neither consciously create nor control and objectify as science does its objects. Thus Gadamer claims that our possessions of
language is the ontological condition for our understanding of the texts that address us.

It is important to note that from Gadamer's point of view, understanding is essentially linguistic, but this does not mean that understanding is frozen into one static language in such a fashion that translation from one language to another is impossible. Gadamer considers such a relativistic conviction to be a mistake fostered mainly by the tendency of linguistic studies to concentrate on the form or structure of language while overlooking the actual life of language as speech. In other words, the actual life of language is an essentially dialogic process of communication.

Clearly enough, Gadamer and Wittgenstein both affirm the unity of linguisticality, and both emphasize that the rules of a language game are discovered only by observing its concrete use in interpersonal communication. Nevertheless, from Gadamer's point of view, Wittgenstein overemphasized the unity and autonomy of language games; he also desired to avoid a transcendental position from which the plurality of games might be reduced to the rules of one transcendental game. Thus he overlooked the assimilative power of language as a constant mediation and translation. Gadamer thinks that the interpreter, instead of approaching his subject as a tabula rasa, brings with him a certain horizon of expectations and "prejudices"—of beliefs,
practices, norms and concepts—that comprise his own life-world. The hermeneutical situation always involves both the interpreter's and the subject's horizon. Achieving understanding is essentially mediating or integrative, transcending the old horizons marked out by the text and the interpreter's own initial position. When we learn a new language, according to Gadamer, we never learn the new language game in a vacuum. Instead, we bring our native language along, so that learning is not a new socialization, but an expansion of the horizons with which we began. This learning experience is a mediation of the new with the old. And this mediation is always achieved in particular, finite acts of language that are episodic and open to new mediations. Thus Gadamer claims that a successful interpretation involves a "fusion of horizons."

In contrast to Wittgenstein, the influence of Hegelian dialectic on Gadamer is evident. Gadamer refuses to leave language games in unmediated isolation from each other. He rejects any absolutizing of the horizons that distinguish the present from the past, or any individual structure of meaning from our own. So far as any alien horizon is a transmission of articulate meaning, it is open to assimilation by understanding. Worlds given in language is that such "mutually exclusive" worlds can merge in understanding. Gadamer says that "the other world that stands over against us is not only a foreign, but a relatively other world."
It does not have its own truth simply for itself but also its truth for us."¹⁰⁴

In the *Phenomenology of Mind*, Hegel sees knowledge as a dialectical process in which both the apprehending consciousness and its objects are altered. Every new achievement of knowledge is a mediation of the past within a new and expanded context. This dialectical self-transcending character of knowledge is at the center of Gadamer's concept of understanding as a fusion of horizons. Understanding is "the elevation to a higher universality which overcomes not only one's own particularity but also that of the other person."¹⁰⁵ However, it is important that for Gadamer this "higher universality" remains finite and surpassable and is not to be equated with Hegel's absolute knowledge.¹⁰⁶ That is, interpretation and understanding form an ongoing process in which language is the medium, making possible agreements that broaden and transform the horizons of those who use it.

From this point of view, clearly there is no such thing as the correct interpretation, "in itself" as it were. According to Gadamer, if interpretation is always a hermeneutic mediation of different language, the notion of a final interpretation, valid once and for all, makes no sense. The process of interpretation itself is always hypothetical and circular. From his prior understanding
(Vorverständnis) or perspective, the interpreter makes a preliminary projection of the sense of the text as a whole. With further penetration into the details of his material, he revises and alters this preliminary projection, and tests new projections. In such a process, he gains a progressively better understanding of the text, but not the final answer.

Subsequent understanding is in principle superior to the original production and can, therefore, be formulated as a "better understanding." This is not so much due to a subsequent bringing-to-consciousness that places us on a par with the author (as Schleiermacher thought). On the contrary, it describes the ineradicable difference between the author and the interpreter that is given with historical distance. Each time he will have to understand a transmitted text in its own way; for the text belongs in the whole of the tradition that is of substantive interest to the age and in which it tries to understand itself. The actual meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, is not dependent on the occasion represented by the author and his original public. At least it is not exhausted by it; for the meaning is also determined by the historical situation of the interpreter and thus by the whole of the objective course of history. An author like Chladenius, who has not yet submerged understanding in past history, takes this naively and artlessly into account when he suggests that an author need not himself recognize the true meaning of his text and, therefore, that the interpreter often can and must understand more than he. But this is of fundamental significance. The meaning of a text goes beyond its author, not only occasionally, but always. Understanding is therefore not merely reproductive but also productive.107

According to Gadamer, the standards of objectivity governing the process of interpretive understanding cannot be specified independently of the corroboration of a projected interpretation in the light of the material at
hand. Arbitrary preconceptions deriving from the interpreter's own cultural context show themselves to be arbitrary only in collision with his material. For the interpreter to rid himself of all preconceptions and pre-judgments would be a logical impossibility—the idea of an interpreter without a language. There is no possibility of raising to consciousness one's preconceptions and pre-judgments, all at once and once and for all. It is, rather, in the interpretive process itself that one's own prejudices gradually becomes clearer.

We must note that Gadamer's conception of "prejudice" (Vorurteil) differs from the ordinary usage in English. He explains:

... I am using it to restore to its rightful place a positive concept of prejudice that was driven out of our linguistic usage by the French and the English Enlightenment. It can be shown that the concept of prejudices, did not originally have the meaning we have attached to it. Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience something—whereby what we encounter says something to us.¹⁰⁸

From this perspective, the interpretive understanding of one's own tradition departs from a structure of prejudices, from preconceptualizations and pre-judgments, which themselves belong to this tradition. Especially in the study of
classical cultures and their products—these, by definition, have had an important historical influence (Wirkungsgeschichte). Thus their interpretive appropriation has played a significant role in developing the tradition to which the interpreter belongs. And his interpretation is itself a re-appropriation, a further development of the very tradition to which both he and his object belong. In Gadamer's view, this subjective circle has a positive significance: it insures a some common ground between the interpreter's horizon of expectations and the material that he is studying.

Thus the circle is not a formal circle. It is neither subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay between the movement of tradition and that of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning which guides our understanding of a text is not an action of subjectivity; it is determined instead by what is common to us and the tradition and binds us to it. What is common, however, is constantly being developed in our relationship to tradition.

Because of the hypothetical-circle character of redundant interpretive understanding, the meaning of a text is in principle incomplete, open for interpretations from future perspectives. The movement of history and the changing situation of the interpreter bring out new aspects and cast new light upon old elements. In this sense, from Gadamer's point of view, the historical description of events becomes in the course of time richer than empirical observation at the moment of their happening; for as long as
new points of view arise, the same events can enter into other narratives and acquire new significance.

From the above exposition, we can clearly see that Gadamer's conception of *Verstehen* is neither subjectivistic nor objectivistic. Rather, it is a dialectical interplay between the interpreter's subjectivity and the objectivity of the text or the data under investigation. Thus, an adequate interpretation must simultaneously incorporate the observer's and the actor's perspective. Furthermore, since the process of interpretation itself is a hypothetical and circular, every hermeneutical understanding results from dialectical interplay between common-sense knowledge and scientific knowledge. Thus viewed Gadamer's reconceptualizations of interpretation and understanding transcend some of the major difficulties of Schutz's phenomenological project and of interpretive sociology in general.

**Habermas' Critique of Hermeneutics**

It should now be clear why the discussion of hermeneutics is important to Habermas' formulation of a critical theory of society. Gadamer explicitly takes into account what Schutz and the Wittgensteinian philosophy of language either took for granted or failed to appreciate—the historical dimension of meaning (*Sinn*) and the understanding of meaning (*Sinnverstehen*). By drawing out the dependence of interpretive understanding on the socio-cultural
"initial situation" of the interpreter, and by disclosing the essentially historical nature of the "initial situation," hermeneutics forces us to reflect on the relation of theory to history. From Habermas' point of view, positivistic sociology, as a nomological science, is concerned to formulate and test general laws; the historical past ceases to function as a tradition that operates within social inquiry itself.

Today the predominant view is that the social sciences have broken away from the jurisdiction of the Geisteswissenschaften and have found an unproblematic relation to history. The general theories of social action lie, so to speak, perpendicular to the historical complex of tradition. Sociology . . . proceeds in indifference to history. It works up its data without considering the specific context; the historical position of the data is neutralized from the start. For sociology all history has become present . . . (it) is projected onto a plane of simultaneity and thus robbed of its real spirit.110

For Habermas, as for Gadamer, the ideas of a society freed from history, and of a post-historical social science freed from the context-bound interpretation of its historical situation are equally illusory. We must comprehend even these ideas hermeneutically, in relation to the socio-cultural development of modern society. In reality, the allegedly universal theories of social action remain rooted in and reflect this very development. Habermas points out that the basic categories and concepts of social science are shaped by their historical contexts.
Status and contract, Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, mechanical and organic solidarity, informal and formal groups, culture and civilization, traditional and bureaucratic authority, sacral and secular associations, military and industrial society, status group and class, etc. . . . [are] "historically rooted concepts" which, not by accident, arose in connection with the analysis of the unique historical transformation of European society from feudalism to modern capitalism. They emerged in the attempt to grasp specific tendencies in this development: urbanization, bureaucratization, industrialization, etc. . . . In the same way, categories like "role" and "reference group" are dependent on the self-understanding of industrially advanced society. None of these concepts lose their situation-bound, specific content through formalization. This can be seen precisely when a theoretical framework constituted of historically substantive concepts is supposed to be employed in the analysis of culturally foreign and removed contexts. In such transpositions the instrument becomes peculiarly blunt. This experience leads to the suspicion that there exists in sociology a tacit connection between the categorial framework of general theories and a guiding pre-understanding of the contemporary situation as a whole. The further such theories are removed from their domain of application, the less they contribute to interpretation, the less they "signify" or "make understandable."

It is precisely this tacit connection that hermeneutic reflection brings to consciousness. If the social scientist is not to have his head in the sand, he must consider the dependence of his conceptual apparatus on a prior understanding rooted in his own socio-cultural tradition. He must become hermeneutically and historically self-conscious.

From Habermas' point of view, one of the most significant features of Gadamer's hermeneutics is the claim—against historicism and phenomenology—that the understanding of
meaning (Sinnverstehen) has an irreducibly practical dimension. Behind hermeneutics is an interest in dialogue (with others, with the past, with alien cultures, etc.) about the common concerns of human life. The hermeneutic orientation is not that of the neutral observer, but that of the partner in dialogue. Since, as Gadamer has suggested, we have no monopoly on truth and goodness, we must maintain an openness to the beliefs and values of others; we must be prepared to learn from them. As Peter Winch puts it: "Seriously to study another way of life is necessarily to seek to extend our own." 112

Habermas accepts, at least in general outline, Gadamer's argument that the interpreter necessarily relates what is to be understood to his own hermeneutic situation. But Habermas has serious reservations about the conservative implications that Gadamer draws from his studies. Habermas comments:

... the hermeneutic insight is certainly correct, viz. the insight that understanding--no matter how controlled it may be--cannot simply leap over the interpreter's relationship to tradition. But from the fact that understanding is structurally a part of the traditions that it further develops through appropriation, it does not follow that the medium of tradition is profoundly altered by scientific reflection... Gadamer fails to appreciate the power of reflection that is developed in understanding. This type of reflection is no longer blinded by the appearance of an absolute that can only be self-grounded; it does not detach itself from the soil of contingency on which it finds itself. But in grasping the genesis of the tradition from which it proceeds and on which it turns
back, reflection shakes the dogmatism of life practice.113

The fact that "the moment of historical influence is and remains effective in all understanding of tradition" is itself no justification of the legitimacy and authority of tradition. From Habermas' point of view, to identify hermeneutic inquiry simply with the continuation of tradition is to place a one-sided stress on participation and dialogue over distancing and critique. In critical reflection we reject as well as accept traditional claims. In either case, Habermas suggests, "the element of authority that was simply domination" is replaced by the "less violent force of insight and rational decision."

Habermas sees the root of Gadamer's difficulty in the absolutizing of language and tradition. In an explicit counter-move to Hegel, Gadamer wants to demonstrate the finite, historical character of reflection. In Gadamer's framework, "Hegel's experience of reflection shrinks to the consciousness . . . in which the conditions of rationality change irrationally, according to time and place, epoch and culture."114 Reflection can no longer be conceived as absolute; it is always rooted in the contingent complex of tradition. While accepting Gadamer's point about the finitude and context-boundedness of human understanding, Habermas rejects Gadamer's relativistic and idealistic conclusions regarding the logic of Verstehen. From Habermas' perspective, hermeneutic interpretation must be
conjoined with the critique of ideology.

Like phenomenological and linguistic approaches, herméneutics tends to reduce social inquiry to the explication of meaning. Gadamer draws criticism from Habermas on this point. While Gadamer does not limit meaning (Sinn) to subjectively intended meaning, he hypostatizes cultural tradition to "the all-encompassing." Consequently, there is a tendency to sublimate social processes entirely into cultural tradition, and to reduce sociology to the interpretation of meaning. However, it is important to note that culture is not a self-sufficient system; it interacts with social, political and economic conditions of life. We could justify a reduction of social inquiry to the understanding of meaning (Sinnverstehen) only on the idealist assumption that a linguistically-articulated consciousness determined the material conditions of life. Nevertheless, we do not limit the objective framework of social action to the dimension of intersubjectively intended meaning. The dimension of meaning is rather a moment of a complex simultaneously constituted by subjective and objective conditions. Thus we cannot reduce sociology to interpretive (verstehenden) sociology. "Social action can only be comprehended in an objective framework that is constituted conjointly by language, labor and power."115

If social theorists are to investigate the conditions under which patterns of interpretation and of action develop
and change, their hermeneutic inquiry must systematically take empirical conditions into account. Thus hermeneutic understanding must, as Habermas maintains, be conjoined with the empirical analysis of social systems.116

The objective framework within which social action can be comprehended without surrendering its intentionality is not merely a web of transmitted meanings and linguistically articulated tradition. The dimensions of labor and domination cannot be suppressed in favor of subjectively intended symbolic contents. A functionalistic framework can also give non-normative conditions their due. Cultural tradition then loses the appearance of an absolute that a self-sufficient hermeneutics falsely lends to it. Tradition as a whole can be assigned its place; it can be conceived in its relation to the systems of social labor and political domination. It thus becomes possible to grasp functions that the cultural tradition assumes within the system as a whole . . . . In a word, functionalism permits the analysis of action complexes from the double perspective of the subjectively determining and the objective meaning.117

It should now be clear that Habermas is not opposed to hermeneutic understanding. In fact, he has made some considerable use of Gadamer's work in his own writings. The main target of Habermas' criticism is the thesis of the "universality of hermeneutics"--the aspiration to cover the whole range of human behavior, to accommodate everything to one particular theoretical scheme. One must, Habermas argues, resist the claim to universality with regard to the explanation of human conduct. From this perspective, both hermeneutics and positivism are reductionistic and one-sided. For Habermas, the social sciences are both
hermeneutic and nomological ("quasi-naturalistic"); and these two types of endeavor must be complemented by a critique of ideology.

Gadamer's writings successfully avoid some of the difficulties of the earlier phase of hermeneutics and interpretive sociology; they also create others. A purely hermeneutic account of the social sciences excludes the possibility--actually a necessity--of analyzing social conduct in terms that go beyond those of actors situated in particular traditions. Gadamer argues that hermeneutic is "a discipline which guarantees truth." But then truth inheres in being--a strong ontological claim shared by many existential phenomenologists. However, as Betti comments, while Gadamer's hermeneutic inquiry might very well guarantee the internal unity of interpretive materials, a work of literature, or the actions of men in another historical period or alien culture, it eschews as non-problematic any further question of the "correctness" of such interpretations. The absolutizing--by way of ontologizing--of hermeneutics results in an aprioristic devaluation of methods of social analysis that have a theoretical basis beyond normal linguistic competence. Thus hermeneutics, even with Gadamer's appeal to dialectics, remains impotent to solve the problem of relativism, to distinguish the "correct" interpretation from the "incorrect" ones.
From Habermas' point of view, Gadamer could escape the dilemma of either a Husserlian absolutism or the relativism of language analysis only if he recognized the universality of validity claims that make possible the immanent rationality of every process of reaching understanding. "The social-scientific interpreter, in the role of an (at least virtual) participant, must orient himself to the same validity claims to which those immediately involved also orient themselves. For this reason . . . he can start from the always implicitly shared rationality of speech—the rationality claimed by the participants—take it seriously and at the same time critically examine it."

In thematizing what the participants presuppose, in questioning the naive recognition of reciprocally raised validity claims, in thus assuming a reflective attitude to the interpretandum, the social-scientific interpreter does not place himself outside the communication context under investigation. He deepens and radicalizes it in a way that is in principle open to all participants when problems of understanding arise that they can resolve consensually. We can clearly see Habermas' attempt to utilize his theory of communicative competence to solve this problem. However, we must await the development of more comprehensive theory of communication and rationality; a convincing solution for avoiding the difficulty of absolutism and relativism would then become possible.
Habermas' attempt to develop a comprehensive critical theory of society is extraordinarily ambitious and suggestive. By drawing various resources from philosophical, social, and political disciplines, he attempts to bridge transcendental analysis and empirical inquiry, Kantian philosophy and Marx's writings as well as Freud's psychoanalysis, theory and practice, critique of knowledge and critique of ideology, the general conditions of knowledge and the self-formative process of the human species, idealism and materialism, critical reflection and practical engagement. In an unprecedented project, he has already indicated the central problems to be confronted in restructuring the foundations of sociology. However, there are major unresolved (perhaps unresolvable) difficulties in his theoretical framework that demand our critical examination.

The Problem of Reflection

Reflection, clearly, is the most important concept in Habermas' criticism of positivism, historicism, Marxism, and hermeneutics, and also in his reinterpretation of psychoanalysis and formulation of a theory of communicative competence. But is his conception of reflection unproblematical?

In Gadamer's reply to Habermas' critique, "Rhetorik Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik," Gadamer argues that
participation in a cultural heritage is a necessary condition for all thought, including critical reflection. Thus he accuses Habermas of employing an oversimplified concept of critique and of setting up an abstract opposition between tradition and reflection. From Gadamer's point of view, the reflecting subject inevitably takes for granted a host of concepts, judgments, perspectives, etc. that are not themselves made thematic; he cannot call everything into question all at once. Thus, critique is necessarily partial and from a particular point of view. If we subject the critical point of view itself to reflection, we do so inevitably from another point of view and on the basis of other presuppositions. From this perspective, Gadamer concludes, Habermas' concept of critique is "dogmatic," for Habermas ascribes to reflection a power that it could have only on idealistic premises. Reflection is no less dependent upon history and context than other modes of thought.

For Gadamer, hermeneutic understanding does not imply a blind subjection to tradition; we also understand when we see through prejudices that distort reality. Then, the point at issue is not whether we accept or reject a given validity claim. The question is rather how we become conscious of and evaluate preconceptions and pre-judgments. This is not, Gadamer argues, something that can be done all at once in a supreme act of reflection. Reflection is not opposed to understanding; it is an integral moment of the
attempt to understand. To separate them as Habermas does is a "dogmatic confusion" (dogmatische Gewalt).\textsuperscript{123}

From Gadamer's perspective, the claims that Habermas raises on behalf of critical reflection are excessive. The critic cannot pretend to be in sole possession of the truth. Habermas' ideas of the just life are not exempt from revision and rejection in dialogue with others. Thus critical reflection, as well as the critique of ideology, cannot be pursued in isolation from the attempt to come to an understanding with others.

Another major problem of Habermas' conception of reflection is his "simple identification of reflection and practical engagement."\textsuperscript{124} Reflection, in the sense of a relentless discursive examination of the presuppositions and grounds of any claim to cognitive or normative validity, may be said to pursue an interest in emancipation. But we should not confuse theoretical reflection in general with "situationally engaged enlightenment through self-reflection on unreflected."\textsuperscript{125} While the former is basically a Kantian critique of knowledge--reflection on the subjective conditions of knowledge--the latter is a Marxian critique of society, realized only through practical engagement in the sense of a risky, politically effective action. To identify these two is, as Karl-Otto Apel comments, to succumb to "an idealist illusion."\textsuperscript{126}
In an article, Dietrich Böhler makes this distinction clear:

Formal and universally valid reflection is the business of transcendental philosophy: knowledge at the abstract level of "consciousness in general" (Bewusstseins überhaupt). Reflection poses the question as to the conditions of possibility of knowledge. It can do so only by abstracting from the material content. This distancing (Distanzierung) from the unreflected, the uncomprehended, is as a matter of fact also one of the conditions of possibility of critique and practical emancipation; but it is not emancipation itself. If such distancing is to make possible a concrete turning away from (and transformation of) determinate relations and modes of life, whose meaning is not understood and whose possible effects are not comprehended, then there must be added a partisan identification with an anticipated state of affairs in which one sees oneself. Practical emancipation, as a historical self-reflection, does not aim at the pursuit of universal knowledge or reflection as such. Rather it aims at the practical transposition of the situational knowledge that particular individuals and groups can gain through clarifying their personal life history or their social situation.127

We cannot easily dismiss these criticisms, which obviously go to the very heart of Habermas' efforts to restructure the foundations of critical theory. The problem of the excessive claim for reflection and the confusion between critical reflection and practical engagement are indeed evident in Habermas' writings. Habermas would argue that he never intended to equate critical reflection with practical engagement or critical insight with practical emancipation. Yet, in his early use of the psychoanalytic model and in his later theory of communicative competence, he often seems to be doing just that. The Fichtean
conception of the emancipatory interest, in Habermas' framework, glides too easily into the materialist conception without sufficient attention to the crucial differences and relations between them. Thus there is an unbridged gap between the pursuit of reflection as such and the realization of certain conditions of symbolic interaction and instrumental action.

Granting these problems do exist and do tend to impair the formulation of a number of central theses, in Habermas' critical theory the connection between theory and practice seems to be stronger than in any other social theory. One could still argue that this type of theory is a necessary moment in any genuinely emancipatory practice, that a practice aiming at overcoming relations of domination and realizing conditions of autonomy must be informed by this kind of "action-orienting self-understanding."

The Problem of "Categorization"

In a critique of Habermas' concept of cognitive interests, Richard Bernstein comments:

Habermas wants to preserve the central claim of transcendental philosophy that there are categorially distinct object domains, types of experience, and corresponding forms of inquiry. But he has not succeeded in establishing this central thesis . . . . His typical strategy in criticizing previous thinkers is to show that they confuse categorially distinct levels of action. Thus, according to Habermas, Marx was guilty of stretching the concept of praxis encompass both instrumental action and symbolic
interaction. Hegel was guilty of a monistic drive that blurred the distinctions among the different levels of action, and of claiming that they could be comprehended in a single all-encompassing dialectic of Geist... But the validity of these criticisms is itself dependent on the acceptance of Habermas' categorial distinctions. The tables can be turned on Habermas by arguing that he seeks to introduce hard and fast distinctions where there is really only continuity... Despite his protestations, it begins to look as if Habermas is guilty of the type of hypostatization that he so brilliantly exposes in others.128

Bernstein accuses Habermas of adopting a misleading categorial differentiation between the natural and social sciences. Bernstein argues that the categorial distinction between the natural sciences and what Habermas calls the historical-hermeneutical disciplines is inadequate. Drawing arguments from recent developments of philosophy and history of science, Bernstein thinks the technical interest is not sufficient to characterize the empirical-analytic sciences, because basically they require hermeneutical interpretations and a rational resolution of competing interpretations.129 Thus Bernstein suggests that there is a "continuity"—neither a reduction nor a categorial distinction—among all forms of rational inquiry.

However, I consider Bernstein's criticism to be mistaken, resting upon a misapprehension of Habermas' views. There is indeed in Habermas' writings a tendency to categorize distinctive object domains, types of experience, and forms of knowledge. He intentionally does so in order to
overcome the problems of reductionism. From Habermas' point of view, the three cognitive interests are logically independent and irreducible. But an interest in technical control and prediction is not restricted to natural science. That is to say, he does not use the technical interest as a criterion to distinguish the natural sciences from humanities or the social sciences. Rather, Habermas tries to point out that control and prediction of the objectified process is the knowledge-constitutive interest of empirical-analytical science. This does not mean that empirical-analytic science is restricted to technical control and nomological explanation. Habermas is well aware that science presupposes the intersubjectivity of ordinary language communication, which can never be completely transposed into formal language. Such intersubjectivity constitutes what Karl-Otto Apel calls the "a priori of communication."¹³⁰ The point that Habermas makes is to identify the different cognitive interests and logically discrepant forms that claims to knowledge can assume. Such recognition of different types of knowledge-constitutive interest on which different forms of discipline rest undermines any excessive or reductionistic claim, without entirely repudiating the disciplines themselves. From this perspective, I think that Habermas' categorial distinctions are necessary to any understanding of human knowledge.
Nevertheless, Habermas' characterization of the nomological explanation of empirical-analytic science and of the interpretive understanding of historical-hermeneutic science is problematical. While he relentlessly criticizes positivistic misunderstandings, Habermas tends to take the "orthodox" hypothetical-deductive view of science as the model of empirical-analytic science. In other words, he often reflects on "positivistic understanding of natural science" rather than on "natural science" itself. Thus, in a positivistic model, empirical-analytic science categorically restricts itself to the derivation of nomological causal explanation without attention to the dimension of interpretive understanding. At this point, Habermas' view retains much of the old "explanation vs. understanding" opposition. And this opposition is, no doubt, a misleading categorial distinction.

From this perspective, I think that Habermas is correct in making categorial distinctions between different knowledge-constitutive interests and forms of inquiry. A knowledge-constitutive interest in prediction and control is fundamental to a nomological form of explanatory scheme. The empirical-analytical sciences, on the contrary, are by no means restricted to a cognitive interest in prediction and control and to nomological explanation. In the empirical sciences, practical interest and hermeneutic understanding can also be operative. However, we
always avoid equating empirical-analytic science with "the positivistic model of natural science." In the latter, hermeneutic understanding is categorically excluded.

Obviously, Habermas' analysis of knowledge and cognitive interests and his classification of different disciplines are far from being satisfactory. Nevertheless, his controversial but stimulating formulation has provided significant insight for a reconstruction of the foundations of sociology, to be discussed in my conclusion.

Work and Interaction

Habermas derives his distinction of "work" and "interaction" to a degree from his critical examination of Marx's theory of "force of production" and "relations of production." This differentiation also appears to derive from the abstract opposition between "interest in technical control" and "interest in mutual understanding." In order to make a clear categorical distinction, Habermas abstractly conceptualizes work as an ideal type of purposive-rational strategic action, and interaction as communicative action and dialogue. Such a distinction corrects the materialistic interpretation of Praxis that tends to reduce the "self-constitution" of human history to work alone. Habermas insists that work and interaction are logically independent of one another. However the separation of instrumental action and mutual understanding has certainly created some
problems in the analysis of social conduct. Habermas is correct in saying that instrumental action is fundamental to work. Nevertheless, work is not infused solely by instrumental action; nor is interaction oriented merely to mutual understanding or what Habermas calls "anticipated consensus."

The weakness of Habermas' position runs deep through the whole of his elaboration of the project of critical theory. By equating interaction with communicative symbolic action, Habermas has recently built his critical theory mainly on the model of a symmetrical, "idealized dialogue" that aims at the realization of consensus through rational non-strategic debate. But in such a formulation, what is supposedly at the very heart of Habermas' analysis--domination--tends to disappear from our view. The problem of exploitative domination of some groups of men over others as founded in unequal distribution of scarce resources is replaced by or even reduced to the idea of domination as equivalent to "distorted communication." In this way, power and domination enter into communicative interaction only as filtered through ideological distortion, not as fundamental to the relations between actors whereby interaction is constituted as an ongoing activity. In his theory of communicative competence, Habermas formulates the "ideal speech situation" as a constitutive but counterfactual condition of communicative action. But he never makes clear
how the model of symmetrical "idealized dialogue" relates to the actual circumstances in which power struggles and conflicts always exist. Without solving this problem, Habermas' critical theory remains as a "pure theory" or "ideal type" rather than something that we can relate to practice.

This problem is also evident in Habermas' earlier psychoanalytic model of critical theory. Habermas' appeal to psychoanalysis as an exemplar of critical theory and practice is significant because it demonstrates the mediation of "interpretation" by "explanation," involving the aim of furthering the autonomy of the analysand through his dialogue with the analyst. Psychoanalysis reveals the intrinsic connection between critical self-reflection and emancipation. But the problem is that psychoanalytic therapy takes place in a situation where individual persons—the analysand and the analyst—participate voluntarily. In therapy, interpretive understanding and causal explanations appear only in the form of uncovering hidden motives and removing distorted communication. Basically, no asymmetrical relationship or unequal distribution of scarce resources exists between the analyst and the analysand. From this perspective, the use of the psychoanalytic model gives us little clue to connect the model of symmetrical "idealized dialogue" with other social, political and economic factors in concrete social analysis.
This tendency to identify interaction with communicative action and to replace domination with distorted communication raises a further question. Habermas tries to develop a comprehensive theory of communicative competence to clarify and justify the foundations of a critical theory of society. He argues that all potential or actual speech presupposes and anticipates ideal speech or "idealized dialogue," which in turn requires the material conditions—the ideal form of community life—in which such speech can be concretely approximated and realized. But what leads human beings to overcome systematically distorted communication and move toward the realization of an ideal speech situation, a just form of life? What seems to be lacking in Habermas' theory is an analysis of the problem of human agency and motivation. In psychoanalytic therapy this problem is taken for granted, since both the analyst and the analysand are motivated to remove the repression that causes suffering. However, in contemporary society, with its powerful tendencies to suppress communicative action and force all rationality into the form of instrumental reason, how can people be motivated to overcome distorted communication and strive toward autonomy and justice? What are the concrete dynamics of this process? Who will become its agents?

Certainly, a comprehensive theory of communicative competence is not sufficient to answer such questions. Habermas
is acutely aware that the very idea of practical discourse—of individuals engaged in rational argumentation directed toward consensus—can easily degenerate into a "mere" ideal, unless the material conditions required for such discourse are concretely realized and objectively instituted. However, Habermas has not yet offered us any real understanding of how these conditions can be approximated or realized. Thus, his writings tend to give readers the impression that he talks about political emancipation merely on the symbolic level and that he labels the concrete practical problems "strategic" or "instrumental." I consider this is an unfortunate misunderstanding of Habermas' work. On several occasions, Habermas has clearly pointed out that the theory of communicative competence is not intended as an idealistic replacement for historical materialism. Rather, the intention is to develop a satisfactory metatheoretical framework for a theory of social evolution. Recently, in his debate with Niklas Luhmann, Habermas argues that an adequate theory of social evolution would have to proceed in three dimensions: the development of forces of production, the development of organizational forms and techniques to enhance the steering capacity of societies, and the development and critical dissolution of legitimating interpretive systems. In his analysis of the dynamics of advanced-capitalist society, Habermas attempts to integrate the economic, political and socio-cultural dimensions.
From these arguments, we realize that he has tried to avoid the extremes of Marxian economism that solely emphasizes work and neo-idealism that merely takes symbolic action into consideration. Whether or not Habermas can achieve such a delicate balance we must judge by the further development of his theory of social evolution.

As the leading figure of contemporary critical theory, Habermas remains faithful to the core of the critical tradition; that is, to the "insight that the truth of statements is linked in the last analysis to the intention of the good and true life." He believes that a critical theory guided by an emancipatory interest will lead to the enlightenment of the public and eventually to the concrete realization of truth, freedom, and justice. He does not mean that the gap between theory and practice has been or will be bridged in any absolute sense. Rather, Habermas shares with many great philosophers and theorists, a spirit brilliantly expressed by Paul Ricoeur in his preface to History and Truth.

I believe in the efficacy of reflection because I believe that man's greatness lies in the dialectic of work and the spoken word. Saying and doing, signifying and making are intermingled to such an extent that it is impossible to set up a lasting and deep opposition between "theoria" and "praxis." The word is my kingdom and I am not ashamed of it. To be more precise, I am ashamed of it to the extent that my speaking shares in the guilt of an unjust society which exploits work. I am not ashamed of it primordially, that is, with respect to its destination. As a university professor, I believe
in the efficacity of instructive speech; in teaching the history of philosophy, I believe in the enlightening power, even for a system of politics, of speaking devoted to elaborating our philosophical memory . . . . I believe in the efficacity of speech which thoughtfully elucidates the generating themes of an advancing civilization . . . . I believe that words may change the "heart," that is, the refugent core of our preferences and the positions which we embrace. In a sense, all of these essays are in praise of the word which reflects efficaciously and acts thoughtfully. 138

(H) Conclusion: Toward a Reconstruction of the Foundation of Sociology

In a sense, we can consider phenomenology and critical theory as the two major critiques of mainstream social science and the positivistic interpretation of social inquiry. They have approached the problems from different perspectives and provided divergent alternatives. I have now worked through Schutz's phenomenological sociology and Habermas' critical theory, attempting to assess their strengths and weaknesses. But my primary objective has been, as I suggested at the beginning, to show how we can reconstruct the foundations of sociology and how I can relate western sociology to my own society in a meaningful way.

In the restructuring process, I discover that Habermas' analyses of three cognitive or knowledge-constitutive interests and their corresponding disciplines are especially fruitful. It is not that I completely agree with Habermas. Rather, a restructuring of his theory can lead to a reconstruction of the foundations of sociology.
According to Habermas, there are three categories of knowledge-constitutive interest: the technical, practical and emancipatory. Each has its roots in the self-formative process of human species. The technical interest is fundamental to the empirical-analytic sciences; the practical interest to the historical-hermeneutic sciences. Such a categorial distinction, as we have discussed, creates some logical difficulties. If we consider the different cognitive interests and their disciplines as separated categories, then we immediately fall back to the old dichotomy between causal explanation and the understanding of meaning, between empirical theory and interpretive theory, between the natural sciences and the human sciences. In fact, as I have pointed out earlier, many critics who tend to view Habermas' theory from this old perspective are mistaken. From Habermas' point of view, we should regard the three cognitive interests—technical, practical, and emancipatory—as three theorizing moments: empirical, interpretive, and critical. There is also an internal dialectic between the different cognitive interests. Unfortunately, Habermas' failure to make this dialectic explicit has caused misunderstandings. If the three different disciplines are not simply an aggregate of several useful approaches, then how do they relate to each other? Here I will try to present a hierarchical structure to clarify their relation.
In social inquiry, the very lowest level is the empirical level. At this level we try to observe overt behavior, to technically control and manipulate the objectified process in order to discover the behavioral regularities and the relations of independent and dependent variables. Ultimately, we hope to formulate testable explanatory propositions. Since on this level, we admit only observable behavior as "fact," we exclude non-observable from investigation. The research-guiding interest is that of technical control and prediction. Social inquiry aims at producing quasi-nomological knowledge with the potential to be utilized technically.

The second level is the level of interpretation. This level involves something beyond observable empirical facts: the interpretive understanding of meaning including both subjective motivational and intersubjective linguistic meaning. The research-guiding interest is to promote understanding of self and of others. It aims at producing interpretation of human action that is meaningful and sensible to both the observer and the actor. It is important to note that this second level of interpretation has an empirical basis. But because of the different cognitive interest, we do not view the object in the same way as on the empirical level. In other words, on this level, interpretation is the understanding of the meaning of facts. Thus we base interpretation on fact but cannot reduce it to "more" fact.
From this perspective we can see that every interpretive understanding involves a dialectical interplay between the empirical moment and the interpretive moment. As we interpret a text, our perspective interplays dialectically with the text.

The third level, the highest, is the level of critique, involving something more than empirical facts and their interpretations. In a critique we are concerned to go beyond the production of quasi-nomological explanation and hermeneutical interpretation, to critically examine the ideology hidden behind our explanation and understanding. The research-guiding interest is critical reflection and emancipation. On this level the observer or the analyst must temporarily suspend, or in Husserl's term "bracket," his beliefs, norms, values, and standards in favor of critical reflection. Through critique we aim to free ourselves from unnecessary social constraints and dominations and to provide possible alternatives. From a critical point of view, we do not take things and their established meanings for granted. But any critique must also have its empirical and interpretive basis. A critique is simultaneously empirical, interpretive and critical. That is to say, we observe and interpret from a critical-reflective perspective. Thus critique is not exclusive to causal explanation and hermeneutical understanding. Rather, through the mediation between explanation and understanding, we
derive our critical insights and free ourselves from illusions and dominations. This interpretation certainly destroys the old dichotomy between explanation and understanding and combines them dialectically.

My inquiry of phenomenology and critical theory is on the critical level aiming at examining the nature and limits of both theories. It is guided by an emancipatory interest to free myself and the readers not only from the positivistic illusions, but also the phenomenological and Habermasian ones. We recognize that both phenomenology and critical theory have significant contributions to the reconstruction of the foundation of sociology. Nevertheless, if we do not want to be dominated by any single theory or form of doctrine, the critical theorizing moment is necessary. A genuine critique is certainly not easy to achieve. It is an ongoing restructuring process. There are no privilege knowers. In a process of enlightenment, there can only be participants who always subject themselves and their thoughts to critical reflection.

The foregoing is merely a preliminary sketch of my reconstruction of the foundations of sociology. But it has already provided us with some guidelines. Traditionally, sociologists tend to conceive the empirical, interpretive, and critical as three mutually exclusive approaches, and use them to attack each other from their own partial perspectives. We now see the three theorizing moments as
dialectically and hierarchically interrelated within an integrated framework. From this perspective, a complete sociological work should be simultaneously empirical, interpretive and critical. And only when sociology includes these three moments, can we meaningfully relate the concepts and theories to other socio-cultural contexts. Without hermeneutical interpretation and critical reflection, irrelevance and distortion seem inevitable.
CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES


3 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 301.

4 Ibid., p. 305.

5 Ibid., p. 304.

6 Ibid., p. 305.

7 Ibid., pp. 305-6.

8 Ibid., p. 306.


10 In English we can not find a word that has the same meaning as "praxis" has. For detailed discussions, see Chapter IV, section B.

11 Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. vii.
12 See Jürgen Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970).


16 Much of the empirical research in this area is already underway at the Max-Planck Institut Zur Erforschung der Lebensbedingungen der wissenschaftlich-technischen Welt in Starnberg, West Germany.


18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., p. 43.

20 Ibid., p. 254.

21 Ibid., p. 255.


23 Ibid., p. 103.

24 Ibid., p. 75.

25 Ibid., p. 111.

26 Ibid., pp. 91-3.
27Ibid., pp. 81-122.

28Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 25-42.

29Ibid., p. 45.


31For the meaning of "purposive-rational action," see Habermas' discussion on Max Weber's conception of "rationalization" in "Technology and Science as 'Ideology'" in Toward a Rational Society, pp. 81-122.

32See Jürgen Habermas, Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, and Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis.

33Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, pp. 81-104.

34Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, pp. 45-50.

35Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. vii.

36Ibid., p. 3.

37Ibid., p. 4.

38Ibid., p. 197.

39Ibid., p. 308.

40Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, pp. 8-9.

41For the criticism on Hegel, see Jürgen Habermas, "Remarks on Hegel's Jena Philosophy of Mind," in Theory and Practice, pp. 142-69.
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42 Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. 27.

43 Ibid., pp. 27-28.

44 Jürgen Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society*, pp. 91-92.

45 Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. 309.

46 Ibid., p. 308.


48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., pp. 206-7.

50 Ibid., p. 218.

51 Jürgen Habermas, *Toward a Rational Society*, p. 92.

52 Ibid.

53 Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. 176.

54 Ibid., p. 309.


56 Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. 176.

57 Ibid., p. 195.

58 Ibid., p. 310.

59 Ibid., p. 314.


62. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 214.

63. Alfred Lorenzer, Sprachzerstörung des Psychoanalytischen Symbolbegriff (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970).

64. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, pp. 220.

65. Ibid., p. 228.

66. Ibid., p. 229.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., p. 234.

69. Ibid., p. 266.

70. Ibid., p. 284.

71. Ibid., p. 287.

72. Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 22.

73. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 314.

74. The word Mündigkeit can be literally translated as "maturity." Here following J. Shapiro's translation in Knowledge and Human Interests, Mündigkeit means autonomy and responsibility. The Mündigkeit of an individual or group is conceived as the telos of self-formative process.

75. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 211.

See Hans Joachim Giegel, "Reflexion und Emanzipation." in *Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), pp. 244-82.

See Winfried Dallmayr, ed., *Materialien zu Habermas' Erkenntnis und Interesse* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1974).

"Heute ist an die Stellen der traditionellen Bewusstseinsproblematik die Sprachproblematik getreten: die transzendente Kritik der Sprache löst die des Bewusstseins ab." See Jürgen Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, p. 220.


Jürgen Habermas, "Thoughts on the Foundation of Sociology in the Philosophy of Language: Six Lectures," presented as the Christian Gauss Lectures at Princeton University in the Spring of 1971, unpublished. See the fourth lecture, "Universal Pragmatics--Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence."


See Jürgen Habermas, "The Gauss Lectures," the fourth lecture.

87. Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 18.


93. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 314.


95. In my conversation with Prof. Habermas, he pointed out that his theory of communicative competence is merely a part of his general theory of communicative action. In fact, Prof. Habermas is writing a book on theory of communication which will be published in 1979 or 1980.


See Jürgen Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, pp. 251-85.


The word "prejudice" is literally translated from "Vorurteil." It refers to our "pre-understandings."


Ibid., p. 288.


Jürgen Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, p. 93.

Ibid., pp. 121-22


114 Ibid., p. 286.

115 Ibid., p. 289.

116 Ibid., pp. 164 ff.

117 Ibid., p. 305.


121 Lecture notes of Jürgen Habermas, fall semester, University of Penn., 1976.


123 Ibid., p. 72.


126 Karl-Otto Apel, "Wissenschaft als Emanzipation?" p. 341.

At this point, some theorists' criticisms on Habermas are not fair. The interest in control and prediction is fundamental to a nomological form of explanatory scheme. However, Habermas never claims that this interest is the only knowledge-constitutive interest of the empirical-analytic sciences. For example, Anthony Giddens, Studies in Social and Political Theory (London: Hutchinson, 1977), p. 150.

For criticisms on Habermas' theory of cognitive interest, see articles in Winfried Dallmayr, ed., Materialien zu Habermas' "Erkenntnis und Interesse".


In the private conversations with Prof. Habermas, he clearly points out that his theory of communicative competence is a preparatory stage for a theory of rationality and social evolution.

Jürgen Habermas and Niklas Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie—Was leistet die Systemforschung? (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971).

See Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis.

Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 317.

Paul Ricoeur, History and Truth, p. 5.


Filmer, Paul; Phillipson, Michael; Silverman, David; and Walsh, David. New Directions in Sociological Theory. London: Collier-Macmillian, 1972.


