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THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF REGIME
PERFORMANCE IN NIGERIA.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, PH.D., 1978

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THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT:
AN ANALYSIS OF REGIME PERFORMANCE IN NIGERIA

DISSERATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Lawrence Okey Onyejekwe, B.A., M.A., M.A.

** * * * *

The Ohio State University
1978

Reading Committee:
Dr. R. William Liddle
Dr. William Nelson, Jr.
Dr. Robert Trice

Approved By

Advisor
Department of Political Science
Dedicated to all the oppressed people of the world who have the will and resolve to overcome.
PREFACE

There are very few states today which do not aspire to modernity. Not all of them, and not all of the sectors of their elites, pursue each of the constituent elements of modernity with equal vigor and zeal. Nonetheless, in practically every new state, the drive toward modernity is a major factor in the country's public life.

—Edward Shils

The notion of political development is predicated upon the premise that most nations aspire to be modern and also that modernity is a very desirable phenomenon which Third World countries must embrace vigorously. There are many dimensions of this concept propounded by as many scholars that have attempted to define modernity. However, there are a few elements which pervade the general literature on modernity and political development.

According to Edward Shils modernity for the Third World means to be democratic, to be western without depending on the west, to possess national sovereignty, national integration, national identification, to be economically advanced, to be industrialized and to have a high standard of living.\(^1\) Lucian Pye also shares the basic premise of Shils's argument except that, unlike Shils, he believes that nations do not aspire to be modern, it is forced upon them due to the inevitability of history. Therefore nations are confronted with how to modernize rather than whether they should modernize.\(^2\)

iii
Modernization entails two broad concepts for Samuel Huntington. They are social modernization and economic development. The former is an all-embracing concept which is the process by which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of behavior and socialization.\(^3\)

Aristide Zolberg contends that most Third World countries are not modern because the most prominent feature of political life in the Third World countries is the presence of institutional arenas replete with disorder and conflict. Since many third world countries on attaining independence only had superficial features of political systems that were never institutionalized.\(^4\) Therefore what we find in Third World countries is a state of praetorianism which Huntington describes as a system where social forces confront each other noticeably: no political institutions, no crops of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict, no agreement exists among groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods of resolving conflict.\(^5\)

I do not intend to question the merits of the preceding arguments about modernity and modernization. Whether one accepts Edward Shil's contention about the desirability of modernization or Pye's inevitability of modernization there is no doubt that Third World countries are pursuing modernization in one form or another with varying degrees of success. It is also questionable that Third
World countries possess all those characteristics of praetorianism as described by Huntington.

However, it must be pointed out despite Zolberg's or Huntington's characterization of Third World politics, that the latter also perform similar functions with their western counterparts. These functions are regulative, extractive and distributive. According to Almond and Powell, extractive capability refers to the performance of a government in drawing material and human resources from the domestic and international environments. Regulative capability refers to the performance of a government in exercising control over behavior of individuals or groups, through the employment of legitimate coercion to control behavior. Distributive capability refers to government's performance in the allocation of services, houses, statutes and opportunities of various kinds from the political system to individuals and groups in the society.6

Since all governments and regimes perform the functions already described, we have tried in this dissertation to make a comparison of which regime be it military or civilian has more capability of performing extractive, regulative and distributive functions in Nigeria. This study has become necessary in view of the surprising longevity being exhibited by military regimes in Africa. Therefore, before we clamor for the return to civilian rule, we should take a critical appraisal of the score cards of performance of civilian and military regimes in our respective countries instead of accepting regime performance at face value.
Our findings indicate that the military regime was more able to engender social and economic development in Nigeria than the civilian regime. However, the evidence indicates that the better performance of the military is not as a result of intrinsic military virtues, but as a result of factors exogenous to the military.

The accomplishment of this task would not have been possible but for the multi-dimensional support I received from many people. Due to limited space, it is impossible for me to mention all the people whom I am indebted to. Within the available space, I would like to express my gratitude to the Chairman of the Political Science Department for offering me the opportunity to serve as a graduate teaching associate. The experience I have gained through this opportunity is invaluable.

I also wish to express my gratitude to Jan Prelog and Rosemary Onyejekwe whose support and understanding in every way imaginable were responsible for cushioning the hardships normally encountered in the pursuit of the golden fleece.

Many thanks to the members of my committee, especially Professor William Liddle, who has been very helpful in guiding me through the often times uncharted course of a doctoral pursuit. I would also wish to express my gratitude to Dr. William Nelson the Chairman of the Black Studies Department for his patience and willingness to be of assistance to me whenever I needed his help.

Special thanks to Isaac Mowoe, whose friendship and exhortations have encouraged me to realize the inherent virtues of patience in an
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tion. For all those not mentioned here, the omission is rather adver-
tent than a lack of gratitude.


3 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies. (Yale University, 1968), p. 33.


VITA

August 7, 1947. . . . . . . . Born - Onitsha, Nigeria

1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . B.A. (Honors), Journalism, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria

1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . M.A., Journalism, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1974. . . . . . . . . . . . . . M.A., Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1974-75, 1976-77, 1977-'8. . . Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Comparative Politics

Minor Field: International Relations
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>xiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS: A LITERATURE REVIEW.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. COLONIAL AND POST COLONIAL POLITICS IN NIGERIA: A BACKGROUND DISCUSSION</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA; 1961–1975: A COMPARISON OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY REGIMES</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. ANALYSES OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Distribution of Seats in The Federal House of Representatives.
4. Final Election Results (Interim Election Results of December 1964 in Brackets).
7. Nigerian Census Figures: Percentage of Increase or Decrease by States.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Number of Passengers Transported by the Nigerian Airways 1950–1960.</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product at Constant 1974–1975 Prices.</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Selected Petroleum Sector Accounts.</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Value of Exports by Major Commodities, 1958–1971</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product by Type of Economic Activity.</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Sectoral Growth Rates.</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Tonnages of Goods Moved by Road to and From Apapa Port, 1955–1968.</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Number of Railway Engines in Stock, 1962–1968.</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Economic Analysis of the Nigerian Railway Corporation.</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Railway Locomotives in Stock as of 31st March, 1974.</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>CargoHandled by Nigerian Ports.</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>University Graduates (Bachelor degrees) in 1966.</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xii
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Map of Twelve States of Nigeria
INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been a tremendous upsurge in the field of comparative politics to study the politics of the Third World. Almond and Powell contend that part of this interest in studying the politics of the Third World can be attributed to two factors: the fact that almost all the Third World countries have in the last decade or two attained independence status or nation statehood, thereby deserving separate attention and no longer as part and parcel of the colonizing country. Secondly, the evidence is overwhelming that the traditional western political institutions bequeathed by the colonial masters have failed woefully to meet the needs of most Third World countries (see Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, 1966). Consequently, many African, Latin American, and Asian countries have been faced with turmoil, internecine wars, instability and disorder.

New nations arose out of past colonial empires, grew and developed, yet not much was known or could be used to account for these changes because of the non-dynamic nature of the discipline. The field of comparative politics was soon replete with theories, conceptual frameworks, generalizations which not only sought to facilitate understanding of within and between country differences,
but took into consideration other units of analysis like social configurations, elites, ideology, political parties, interest groups, and political culture.

The collapse of liberal democracies in the Third World has ushered in regimes that range from one-man rule, single party regimes, authoritarian, to dictatorial, and military regimes. The trend now is on military regimes and the most notable phenomenon is that the military regimes are no longer transient but are increasingly taking a posture of permanence. The evidence indicates that most of the Third World countries are either ruled directly by the military or enormously influenced by it.

Students of comparative politics have not failed to keep abreast of the proliferation of military regimes in Africa and the rest of the Third World, and have accordingly proceeded to study not only why the military takes over power but also its performance after it overthrows the civilians. There are a great many scholars (see Chapter I) who have taken the view that the military has a positive influence on development in the Third World while a corresponding number disagree. Because of this dissension on the role of the military in development, by different scholars, I ask the following question: Has the Nigerian military been a more positive influence on social and economic development in Nigeria than its civilian counterpart?

Since Nigeria attained its independence from Britain in 1960, it has been plagued by one crisis after another, such as
major party confrontations, constitutional crises, a major civil war (known as the Nigerian-Biafran War), military coups and counter-coup, and tribal/ethnic conflagrations.

The problems confronting Nigeria were not actually born after independence. Notable scholars like James Coleman, Panter-Brick, John Mackintosh (see Chapter II) and so many others believe that the major problems confronting Nigeria today started from the day the North and South were amalgamated in 1914. They describe the situation as that of uneven development, economically and socially, a polarization of the North and the South, a polarization of ethnic and tribal groupings which were to surface in the political events to come later.

Prior to independence, there were indications that the fragile relationship which had existed amongst the various nationalist leaders from different major tribes was collapsing. A few observers were optimistic that the nationalist leaders would weather the problem for the sake of Nigerian nationhood. Unfortunately, those who had predicted a collapse of the fragile unity were proven right.

Panter-Brick aptly described the factors which enhanced ethnicity in post-independence Nigeria when he said that "...in July, 1966 the army itself became a casualty with far-reaching consequences. It ceased to be an integrating force obeying a single command, and so ceased to be an integrating force for the country as a whole. Its dislocation under the impact of the July coup unleashed widespread political demands for regional autonomy, not only in the Eastern but also in the Northern and Western regions,
instead of the regions drawing together they were moving apart, endangering Nigeria's very existence except as a loose confederation."
(See Chapter II)

There was a civil war in Nigeria which erupted in July 1967, and ended in January 1970. The significance of the war and the light it sheds on time honored generalizations on the military in politics will be discussed in the dissertation. Since the first military coup in January 1966, until the end of the war in January 1970, Nigeria witnessed the most tumultuous period of its existence. This explosive period occurred under the military regime.

It is the major task of this study to evaluate the role of the Nigerian military regime in fostering economic and social development in order to answer this question: Has the Nigerian military been more committed to economic and social development than the civilian regime? The next logical step is to find out if there are some unique or intrinsic qualities of the military that may make them succeed where the civilians had failed and the same will be applicable if the reverse were to be the answer.

At this juncture, one should operationalize these concepts--social and economic development--before stating the theoretical significance of the research. While there may be several indicators of economic development, this author's indicators will be the growth in the economy encompassing the growth of Gross National Product, Gross Domestic Product, agricultural production and industrial development. Social development will be defined as the qualitative
benefits of economic development using the following indicators—improvement in health care, e.g., percentage of doctors vis-a-vis the entire population and increase in the number of hospitals; education—percentage of population attending schools, number of elementary, secondary and universities; development in transport and communications, e.g., improvement in roads, the airways, ports, telephones, posts and telegraphs. Most of the time the term economic development will be used in an all embracing way to avoid any confusion on terminology.

The interest in this research stems mainly from the myriad of literature that has been produced on the role of the military in the politics of the Third World and particularly many contradictory generalizations that have resulted from scholars' endeavors to answer these questions. One may ask, why study just regimes? Regimes and governments are particularly important here because of the acute underdevelopment of the private sector, which means that the burden of social and economic development falls on the governments.

The military has often been credited with certain organizational characteristics, such as cohesiveness, a highly nationalistic attitude, a hierarchal command structure and a lot more. It is also argued, by some scholars, that these characteristics guarantee their success over civilian regimes. It is my contention that while these characteristics may help the military to promote development, they are not in themselves sufficient conditions for economic and social development.
In order to reconcile the obvious invalidity that might arise if one looked at only the organizational characteristics of the military alone in evaluating the military's performance, it is necessary, especially in the case of Nigeria, to look at what one might call intervening variables. These variables will be defined as those factors which are external to the military organization, phenomena unrelated to military attributes which the presence of or lack of might undermine the effectiveness of the military in carrying out social and economic development. Three variables will be discussed namely social cleavages encompassing regionalism and ethnicity; political leadership and the resources and revenues available to each regime for implementing its programs.

It has become necessary to look at these intervening variables because they might help to explain the intercountry differences in level of performance of different military regimes in the Third World. There is an implicit assumption made by some scholars in the literature (see Chapter I) that military regimes must necessarily perform better than civilian regimes because they possess some organizational attributes which civilian regimes lack. The logical deduction from the above generalization is that military regimes will perform better than civilian regimes everywhere. But the track record of military regimes does not bear out this deduction.

In Nigeria, the ability of the military to perform better than the civilian regime in the area of economic development will depend on the ability of the former to reduce the potency of those
cleavages already mentioned. The capability of the military to perform better than the civilians will also be influenced by the resources and revenue available to it and its ability to use the resources effectively.

Since most regimes profess to be committed to economic development, this study will seek to evaluate only performance or accomplishments rather than expressed intentions.

It will be argued that the fruition of policies of both the civilian regime and military regime will depend on the relative potency of the intervening variables under both regimes. The question here is not just the existence of the intervening variables but to what extent do they affect or hinder decision making and which regime has the capability to remove the cogs which they throw in the wheels of progress.

The first chapter of this research will be devoted to a literature review of the role of the military as rulers and what characteristics make them better or woeful administrations. The literature review will be discussed on two opposing themes, i.e., those scholars who contend that the military is a better purveyor of development and those who disagree.

The second chapter will deal with a historical background of Nigerian politics with fairly exhaustive discussion of the potency of cleavages. This chapter is necessary because it gives us an understanding of the origin and development of cleavages in Nigeria without which subsequent interpretation of performance may not be clearly understood.
The third chapter will deal with a comparison of the economic development policies and accomplishments of both the civilian and military regimes. For the civilian regime, the period between 1960 till 1966 will be reviewed (i.e., from independence till the first military coup). The period between 1970-1975 will be discussed for the military regime (i.e. from the end of the civil war till the overthrow of Gowon). The civil war years (1967-1969) have been omitted since most of the government's efforts were devoted to winning the war.

The last chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the findings, trying to explain the results in terms of the relative degree of presence of the intervening variables. It is expected that the relative degree to which either regime staves off the incipient influence of most of the cleavages will affect the relative degree of its performance on social and economic development.

It is of particular significance to this research to find out how the so-called organizational characteristics of the military will help to mitigate the influence of the intervening variables. In other words how valid is it to generalize about the capability of the military to initiate and execute social and economic development based only on their so-called organizational and institutional characteristics without due regard to the intervening variables? Essentially, has the military accomplished more in the areas of social and economic development than the civilians they ousted? If they have, why have they been able to do more, if not, why not?
Chapter I

The Role of the Military in Politics:
A Literature Review

The proliferation of military regimes in Africa and Latin America since the end of World War II has brought about a corresponding upsurge in the literature on military regimes by students of comparative politics. Some of the early pioneers like Samuel Huntington, Fred Greene, Lucian Pye, and Morris Janowitz were pre-occupied with pre-theoretic and theoretical exercises as to why the military intervenes in politics and in the process opened the avenue for other scholars to probe a step further into what the military does when it takes over power. According to Claude Welch and Arthur Smith, the number of governments under military leadership has recently increased in Latin America. The total rose from one in early 1962 to ten by mid-1973; in Africa the total jumped from two to fifteen in the same time period.¹ There have been more coups and counter coups since this was written. For example, Niger in May 1974, Ethiopia in October 1974, Chad in April 1975, and again in Nigeria in July 1975.

While one is not out to make a primafacie case for military regimes, it is nevertheless important to remark that some of the pioneers in this endeavor have based their writings on very subjective
evaluations, especially on value premises that extol the sacrosanct virtues of liberal democracies. But it would also be fair to say that there are also some who have been influenced by the writings of Gabriel Almond to look not only at structures that perform certain functions in the Third World countries but also on those functions that are performed in all societies irrespective of that type of regime.

The study of regimes in the Third World cannot be over emphasized because regimes and governments are particularly important in the Third World because of the acute underdevelopment of the private sector which means that the burden of development invariably falls on the government.

Why is the Third World especially Africa witnessing military coups and counter coups at an alarming rate? One of the early scholars who attempts to answer this question is Aristide Zolberg who says that:

the most salient characteristic of political life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features... pre-existing distinctions between groups in Africa were usually supplemented by others stemming from the uneven impact of European generated change often by the time of independence, one tribe or group of tribes had become more urban, more educated, more christian, and richer than others in the country. Hence at the mass level, old and new cleavages tend to be consistent rather than cross-cutting; camps are clear cut and individuals can engage wholeheartedly in the disputes that occur. Almost any issue can precipitate a severe conflict...²

Zolberg contends that in the process of shifting from power to force, governments tend to become over-confident in their ability to
reduce the disturbing flow of demands by dealing harshly with the source from which the demands are emanating. They become afraid that any concession might be interpreted as weakness and open up a Pandora's box of claims. Hence, less change occurs altogether.

Further, he states that when individuals and groups are deprived of the right and opportunity of influencing political decisions, they have no choice but to submit to force or use it themselves to express their demands. But when the government's capital of force is discovered to be limited, opposition groups are encouraged to use force themselves. Often, since authority is personalized and the government is committed to a rigid course, specific demands tend to be translated into demands for a general change of rulers.

He concludes that it is in the context of inter-relationships between governments which rely on force and the remainder of the society that the growing frequency of military and civilian coups, successful or unsuccessful; of mutinies, large-scale and prolonged urban strikes or rural disturbances; of near-civil wars, insurrections, and revolutionary-minded movements, must be understood.3

The whole of Zolberg's argument is predicted on the "institutional arenas" which contends that many Third World countries on attaining independence have only superficial features of political systems that were never institutionalized and therefore lack the operative prerequisites of the master country, and as a result the military as the only institutional organization in the developing countries is bound to intervene in politics to fill the vacuum.4
Zolberg's contention is made more explicit when he says that "because the civilian institutions like the legislatures and political parties have failed to hold the society together and failed to make good on the promise which they made, they lack the legitimacy to govern and in this chaotic situation only the military has the capacity to govern because it brings order to the society."\(^5\)

Arguing almost in the same vein, Samuel Huntington advances the concept of praetorianism where he attempts to explain the reasons for military intervention in politics on societal characteristics rather than on what Morris Janowitz calls "characteristics of the military establishment". He says that "the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not military but political and reflect not the social and organizational characteristics of the military establishment but the political and institutional structure of the society... Military explanations do not explain military interventions. The reason for this is simply that military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions. In such societies, politics lacks autonomy, complexity, coherence, and adaptability."\(^6\)

Furthermore, he argues that "in all societies specialized social groups engage in politics. What makes such groups seem more 'politicized' in a praetorian society is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action. In a praetorian system, social forces
confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict. Equally important, no agreement exists among groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods of resolving conflicts.\(^7\) There is no doubt that Huntington regards most Third World countries as being in one stage of praetorianism or another by which implication they are more likely to possess the qualities discussed above.

It is also implicit in the author's arguments that only in praetorian societies is there a likelihood of military intervention in politics, thereby leaving an important question unanswered. If the organizational, and institutional characteristics of the military do not explain military intervention, what precludes other organizations like the trade unions from intervention? Some scholars have tended to answer this question by simply saying that the military intervenes because it has a monopoly of the instruments of violence.

I am not arguing completely against the validity of Huntington's use of praetorianism to explain military intervention. But my contention is that while praetorianism may be the precondition for military intervention, organizational, and institutional characterizations of the armed forces are certainly important in explaining why they are most likely and capable of intervention.

When Almond and Verba published their \textit{Civic Culture}, they had reached some findings and conclusions that were to be useful in other societies besides the ones involved in their studies. The
concept of political culture is increasingly becoming an essential element of explaining inter-country or intra-country differences or similarities of political behavior. It is no wonder that the concept has also become useful in explaining the reasons for military intervention.

Samuel Finer has classified four degrees of political culture and says that: In countries of "minimal" political culture, the government can be readily toppled by the use, or threatened use, of coercion. The armed forces may press their intervention beyond ouster to supplantment: officers assume governmental positions in the apparent presumption they will continue in these offices for an indefinite period. The "minimal" culture presents few deterrents to the use of force.

Also in countries of "low" political culture, legitimacy assumes somewhat greater importance. Although the government can be supplanted totally by a military junta, it is more likely to be displaced temporarily by a military-based regime, or by a coalition drawn from civilian and military elements, otherwise known as the armed bureaucracy. Legitimacy is fluid, Finer asserts, ebbing and flowing from one government to another.

On the other hand, "developed" political culture entails a high degree of government legitimacy—that is, accepted procedures for the transfer of political power, legitimacy for the holders of public office, and large and well-mobilized nongovernmental associations. Total supplantment or partial displacement of the government
by the armed forces, either directly or by a civilian-military coalition, is often difficult to accomplish. Nevertheless, the armed forces can still exert strong, behind-the-scenes pressures that Finer equates with blackmail.

It is only in a "mature" political culture that military influence rather than intervention becomes the normal avenue, the legitimacy of the government being sufficiently strong to prevent military intervention.  

Closely related to Finer's classification is the concept of legitimacy advanced by Welch and Smith when they argue that military intervention rarely occurs in countries marked by a high degree of legitimacy. In the face of articulate, mobilized public opinion, officers would find their attempt at seizing power greeted with strong opposition.

Coups d'état usually occur in states marked by low levels of legitimacy. When there is no agreement among politically relevant groups on the ways of resolving political conflict, the only recourse is to turn to the military or the military injects itself into politics.

Despite the appealing nature of the arguments of people like Huntington, Claude Welch and Zolberg, most of the literature on the military is heavily concentrated on the organizational and institutional characteristics of the military. Reasons for intervention, failures and successes of military regimes have also been explained in terms of the organizational characteristics of the military.
Some people may believe that the study of why armies intervene in politics is an exercise in futility because what really matters is what the military does when it takes over power. Others may argue that a proper explanation or evaluation of what the military does when it assumes power cannot be accomplished in the absence of understanding why they intervened in the first place. This author is of the opinion that both schools of thought are complementary to each other and efforts should always be made to establish a linkage wherever possible.

In order to discuss the organizational and institutional characteristics of the military it is essential to know what the characteristics are. Welch and Smith do a good job of summarizing what the characteristics are, when they state that one of the most significant aspects of the military is its organization. These characteristics include centralized command, discipline, hierarchy, formalized internal communication, and esprit de corps. The last two in particular, tend to enhance the cohesion of the armed forces and to isolate them from society as a whole. All the organizational attributes cited above contribute greatly to the cohesion of the institution. The uniform, the training, clubs and the salute all tend to provide completely new plans of identification and stratification for the new soldier.

Sometimes, a high degree of cohesion may encourage coups d'état. Theoretically, a disciplined, cohesive army would unhesitatingly obey any order received through the appropriate channels, even if that order were a command to march on the presidential palace and eliminate its occupants.
Therefore, an army with high internal cohesion has a greater capacity to intervene in domestic politics than armed forces with lesser cohesion; and also countercoups after the seizure of power are more likely to occur if the new military regime is one of low internal cohesion.

Other organizational characteristics of the military that are liable to induce the military to intervene are structural differentiation and functional specialization. Increasingly the trend in military organization has been toward increased structural differentiation. Complex weaponry has led to the multiplication of service branches. In the developing world, the other branches of the military are not very developed. Therefore, the army still remains the most effective unit. Nevertheless, growth in the service branches enhances the military potential of intervention.

Another marked trend in military organization is that of functional specialization. Functional specialization serves to deter military intervention in government. It makes it mandatory that the would-be coup maker build a coalition of divergent interests, as each branch of the armed forces has its own perspective on national priorities. But in the less functionally specialized armies of many Third World countries, this may not apply.

Political awareness also determines the likelihood of military intervention in politics. Welch and Smith further state that military intervention means that members of the armed forces make themselves, or their chosen front-men, the supreme political arbiters
within a state. The gamut of political awareness runs from total
disinvolvement (the armed forces are willingly or necessarily on the
political sidelines) to total involvement (the armed forces create
military regimes drawn from within their own ranks). The lower the
political awareness and involvement of the military, the less likely
is military intervention.10

The propensity of the military to intervene in politics derives
from a number of factors according to Samuel Finer. First is the
so-called manifest destiny of the soldiers which is nurtured by such
sentiments as the military's right to defend the national interest
based on its "recognition of its unique mission (defender of national
values and virtues) in society and complacency with its self-
sacrificial virtues and consciousness of its power provides the
basis for its belief or its sacred trust. "The duty of the army is
to intervene and save the nation".11

A second factor is the motive of 'national interest' which the
military interprets in two ways, namely: that the armed forces are
the custodians of the society, meaning: "their overt rulership of the
nation and the establishment of a more or less complete political
program under their authority."12 Another interpretation of this is
when "they see it as their duty to arbitrate or veto. They feel
authorized to exercise it when some convulsion or decision of the
civil authorities seems to them to threaten what they think are
the permanent interests of the nation."13
Third is the motive of sectional interest, where the army's plea of national interest is often a synonym for sectional interest. Finer says that "the plea of 'national interest' is often hypocritical. It becomes more and more suspect as the interests of the military shift from the more general to the particular—from the defense of a region to the defense of a class, from the defense of a class to the defense of the army as an institution until it reaches its ultimate degradation in those cases—and there are very many—where officers intervene in order (even among other things) to improve their own personal careers."\(^{14}\)

So far we have discussed why the military intervenes in politics. But our main concern is not with reasons for military intervention (which is the bulk of the literature), but with what the military does when it takes over power. When we start looking at what scholars have said about the performance of the military in power, we find out that scholars usually disagree. We also find out that as military regimes proliferate and stabilize, many assumptions falter when empirically tested.

On the question of the role and capability of military regimes in office we also find out that here are two schools of thought in the literature. One school argues that the military organization possesses some attributes which makes it a better performer of economic and social development than the civilians. The other school of thought disagrees that the military possesses some unique qualities which would in all cases make it a better performer.
Adherents of the latter school contend that what affects the performance of any regime is the relative potency of cleavages in the society. They also argue that some of the so-called organizational characteristics of the military do not apply to Third World countries because of the intensity of reinforcing cleavages and the fact that most Third World armies (especially African armies) are small and recent and do not as yet possess some organizational attributes which their counterparts in the more developed countries possess.

Since the rash of military regimes in the Third World, the literature has been replete with theoretical assumptions about the relative and absolute capability of the military regime to rule vis-a-vis the civilian regimes which they oust. But unfortunately, many generalizations—especially ones which contend that the military are better performers—have not been substantiated empirically.

However, there are some scholars who express reservations and skepticism about the capability of the military to engender more development than the civilians. They are finding out empirically that Third World armies may actually be a microcosm of the entire society rather than the highly nationalistic, skilled and well organized and cohesive organizations which they were thought to be.

Before we discuss the arguments for and against the role of the military in development, it might be necessary to specify some of the organizational characteristics which have permeated the literature.
The argument in favor of military rule in the Third World has revolved around the following organizational characteristics namely:

(i) That the military organization possesses a hierarchical command structure which makes it easier for the military to implement policies which the civilians could not.

(ii) That the military organization is a more cohesive entity which ensures that policy makers are not distracted by divided loyalties which usually plague civilian politicians.

(iii) That the military possesses a better trained personnel than civilians which makes it possible for the military to provide a leadership that is more innovative and development oriented than the civilians.

(iv) That the military leaders are usually recruited from the lower middle classes. Because of this background, military leaders are more likely to be reformists and less likely to preserve the status quo and

(v) That the army is imbued with esprit de corps which emphasizes national identification and national integration which are prerequisites for economic development as military leaders' parochial loyalties are subsumed under national loyalties.

There are several scholars who subscribe to these assertions with varying degrees of intensity. One of the pioneers is Lucian Pye, who makes some assertions which seem very convincing when taken at surface value. But judged in the time context in which he published his work, there may be a lot of merit to his assumptions. He is an
explicit believer in what he and his cohorts call the inevitability of modernization. Pye is of the opinion that all countries are striving toward modernity partly as of choice and mainly due to the 'diffusionist' wave that is moving from the Western hemisphere to the rest of the world. Therefore, regimes are judged by the amount of modernization which they bring to their people. To underscore this point, he says that "in all societies it is recognized that armies must make those who enter them into the image of the good soldier. The underdeveloped society adds a new dimension: the good soldier is also to some degree a modernized man. Thus it is that the armies in the newly emergent countries come to play key roles in the process by which traditional ways give way to more westernized ideas and practices. The very fact that the recruit must break his ties and associations with civilian life and adjust to the more impersonal world of the army tends to emphasize the fundamental nature of the process, which involves the movement out of the pluralistic relationships of traditional life and into the more impersonal and universalistic relationships of an industrial society."\(^{15}\)

Besides the reasons mentioned above, the author has a host of other assumptions which he makes which at best, could be described as pre-theoretical, but are in many ways highly questionable. For instance, he says that "the division between traditional and rational oriented behavior is not very great within armies...in most of the newly emergent countries, armies have tended to emphasize a rational outlook and to champion responsible change and national
development... Armies of the new countries are instilled with the spirit of rapid technological development... As the armies have strived to approximate their ideal models, they have had to establish all manner of specialized organizations and departments that require skills that are either in short supply or non-existent in their societies... Armies of the newly emergent countries can feel somewhat divorced from the realities of a transitional society and focus more on the standards common to the more industrialized world...

These are a few of his generalizations and characteristically he concludes that "the army is often the most modernized public organization in an underdeveloped country, and as a consequence its leaders often feel more self-confident and are more able to deal frankly and cordially with representatives of industrialized countries." It may be fair to paraphrase Pye by saying that he believes that the military is the most organized, disciplined, modern and technologically advanced institution in the Third World and as a result, the military is the most competent institution to rule, because the civilian administrators lack the legitimacy and self discipline necessary to modernize. He is also of the opinion that with the influence of western training and skills, with their organizational and hierarchical structure, with their dedication to national services and national integration, the military has the capability to do what the civilians were unable to do.
From a more cautious standpoint, Samuel Huntington in his book *Political Order in Changing Societies* states that the military in the early stages of political modernization plays a very progressive and positive role. He goes on to say that the military promotes social and economic reform, national integration and sometimes some form of political participation because it possesses the rare qualities of honesty, integrity, efficiency and austerity and also brings much needed order to the society. However, he sounds a note of warning by saying that "military leaders can easily envision themselves as the foreseeing impartial promoters of social and economic reform in their societies. But with rare exceptions, they shrink from assuming the role of political organizer. In particular they condemn political parties. They try to rule the state without parties, and they thereby cut off one major way in which they could move their countries out of their praetorian condition."  

Furthermore he says that,

In these early stages of political modernization, the military officers play a highly modernizing and progressive role. They challenge the oligarchy, and they promote social and economic reform, national integration, and, in some measure, the extension of political participation. They assail waste, backwardness, and corruption, and they introduce into the society highly middle-class ideas of efficiency, honesty, and national loyalty. Like the Protestant entrepreneurs of western Europe, the soldiers, reformers in non-Western societies embody and promote a puritanism which, while not perhaps as extreme as that of the radical revolutionaries, is nonetheless a distinctive innovation in their societies. Military leaders and military groups played this innovating role in the larger and more complex societies in Latin America in the late nineteenth century. In Brazil, Mexico, and other
countries military officers and their civilian allies adopted positivism and their philosophy of development.

In the twentieth century the professionalization of the officer corps produced a still greater commitment to modernization and to national development and also transformed the typical expression of military participation in politics from the individualistic leader to the collective junta.19

Among those who have contributed significantly in this exercise is Fred Greene. In an article "Toward Understanding Military Coups," Greene recognizes the general characteristics of new states which include "the weakness of administrative systems, the uncertainty of political cultures, the ambiguities of national loyalty, and the lack of confidence in a government's capacity to execute its self appointed tasks." He concludes, that in this porous civilian political order, the military have a capacity to act with force and authority.20 He also mentions the fact that the military's capacity to act with force and authority is strengthened by the influx of technical training and ideas from industrialized societies.

In a great many instances the role of the military as a modernizer has been explained by advancing the sociological model which essentially says that officers' social backgrounds affect their political attitudes and behavior. Notable scholars like Guy Pauker, Edward Shils, John Johnson and Morris Janowitz are exponents of this model of progressive modernizing soldier. Essentially they are of the opinion that the officer core is recruited from the low-middle class and because of this origin are bound to be reform minded, egalitarian, progressive and champions of social change.21
In his new book *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, Eric Nordlinger offers a revision for this model when he states that "military officers are inclined to act in accordance with middle class interests. The extent to which they pursue modernizing and progressive economic goals or define the status quo is then likely dependent upon the nature of these middle-class interests which vary markedly depending on prevailing distribution of political power and shape of the class structure." In conclusion he says that "officers consequently tend to act as a force for change under certain conditions and as ardent defenders of the status quo under others." 22 The above statements underscore the importance of a wary and thrifty approach towards making broad generalizations about the role of the military in politics.

While Morris Janowitz does not entirely espouse the belief that the military is the only institution best suited to modernization and development in the Third World, he is nevertheless in basic agreement with Pye, Huntington and Greene when he states the following:

1) That the capacity of the military establishment in new nations to intervene in domestic politics derives from its control of the instruments of violence, its ethos of public service and national identification, and its skill structure, which combine managerial ability with heroic posture; 2) That in the new nations, the military establishment is recruited from the middle and lower-middle classes, drawn mainly from rural areas or hinterlands. In comparison to Western European professional armies, there is a marked absence of a history of
feudal domination. And because of that, the military profession does not have strong allegiance to an integrated upper class which it accepts as its political leader, nor does it have a pervasive conservative outlook because military education has contributed to an innovating outlook toward modernization. 3) That as a result of social background, education, and career experiences, military personnel of the new nations become interested in politics, but they maintain a strong distrust of organized politics and civilian political leaders. 4) That they also possess a strong sense of nationalism. The ability of officers to intervene in domestic politics and produce stable leadership is related to internal social cohesion. The military establishments of new nations differ greatly in their internal social cohesion because of differences in training, indoctrination, operational experience, and integrational cleavages. Therefore, their ability to intervene and capability to govern will vary from country to country, and 5) the contributions of the military to political modernization are not only economic; the military also serves as an agent of social change. At a minimum, this implies that the army becomes a device for developing a sense of identity—a social psychological element of national unity—which is especially crucial for a nation which has suffered because of colonialism and which is struggling to incorporate diverse ethnic and tribal groups.23

It is implicit in these discussions that scholars are aware of the underdevelopment of the private sector in the Third World, hence most of the discussions have centered on regimes. It is safe to
assume that scholars like Huntington, Pye, Janowitz believe that the military can do what the civilians failed to do. Therefore when Robert Sinai states that for the Third World to develop, they need a new brand of elites who are willing to assume the hardships and risks of modernization and who can develop a new ideology with the power to bring about cultural change and make people development minded, he is implicitly agreeing with the above named scholars that the military is best suited for the tasks mentioned above.24

But there is increasing evidence that those organizational characteristics already discussed may have been taken for granted in many instances. There is also the evidence that Third World armies do not possess all the attributes already discussed. In cases where they appear to possess these characteristics, their effectiveness has been hampered by societal factors. For example, the potency of cleavages like regionalism, tribalism, and religion may likely affect the relative degree of the military organization to be a better performer. Therefore it is imperative that we be wary about the sort of broad generalizations which we make about the role of the military as modernizers.

Just as there are many scholars who contend that the military is a better performer, there are equally or even more authors who are not positive about the role of the military in politics. Perhaps one reason for this is that as more countries witness coups and countercoups, the opportunity is offered to scholars to test their hypotheses and also as military regimes become more or less a permanent
feature of Third World political systems, there is more time for longitudinal studies. It should be mentioned that even with more cases to study now, both proponents and opponents of military rule have not been conclusive and exhaustive in the presentation of their evidence. One thing encouraging is the fact that more in depth studies of countries are being conducted as scholars are beginning to realize the futility of making broad generalizations about military regimes, just as the broad generalizations made about liberal democracies crumbled in the wake of past colonial territories attaining nation statehood.

On the effectiveness of military oligarchies, David Apter says that "despite the fact that military oligarchies appear to have modernizing values, and indeed, the nature of a military organization, with its command, planning, and technological biases, appears almost the prototype of modernity, they rarely serve as successful modernizers. The army may force peasants and turn them into modern men, but it cannot rule effectively. Nor is it able to generalize its values into society..."25

Furthermore, he states that "the striking feature of military oligarchies is that they fail to modernize society... Perhaps one reason for this is that military personnel tend to take the purposes of a society as given, and restrict their interest to carrying out limited tasks even when military officers take political office. They tend to reduce the importance of their erstwhile comrades and use the army to maintain themselves in power instead of a modernizing instrument... Other reasons for this failure may be found in the
military role itself. Either it is technical, involving a certain limitation of competence based on expertise, or it is conceived of as romantic, in which case it is highly unrealistic and likely to be unsuccessful except within the military structure." Even Morris Janowitz points out that although military roles are technological, rational and bureaucratic and in a real sense represent organizational modernity, they lack the ability to modernize a total community.

When we begin to look at empirical evidence, there is the realization that actually many of the organizational attributes of the military have little or no validity in the Third World. For example, the claim that the military is more nationalistic, selfless, patriotic than the civilians is highly disputed by the findings of Eric Nordlinger in his article entitled "Soldiers in Mufti." In this article he argues that military officers are not basically interested in reform and are very prone to suppress elements in the society who opt for reforms. He contends that the military spends more on itself than on social programs when compared with civilian regimes. The military, he says, often seeks legitimacy by enumerating a myriad of programs which they intend to offer the nation and eventually do not meet these goals. This point underscores the importance of making a distinction between rhetoric and substance because a great many scholars have based their propositions and pre-theories on military rhetoric rather than on a thorough examination of events and output.
It might be helpful to mention a summary of Nordlinger's study on 74 countries with direct or indirect military involvement in politics. Using data from 74 countries, Nordlinger divided them into three groups: those directly ruled by the military at some time during 1957-62; those where the military was highly influential in that period; and those where their influence was little or nothing. He then correlated this military dimension with seven indicators of economic and social change, each of which could reasonably be regarded as amenable to governmental manipulation. They were (1) Rate of growth of per capita income 195-63; (2) Change in degree of industrial 1950-63; (3) Degree of improvement in agricultural productivity since 1950; (4) Rate of improvement in educational enrollment 1957-61; (5) Gross investment rate 1957-62; (6) A measure reflecting the change in the effectiveness of tax system 1950-63; and (7) A composite measure—and a crucial one—which is qualitative, and assesses (by posing three questions) how far the government and higher civil servants were committed to economic development.

Taking all seven indicators together, it turns out that the political strength of the military is correlated with them to the level of only 0.04. In other words, the performance was the same irrespective of whether the military were in control or not. Agricultural development and the expansion of education were in like case being correlated at only 0.07 and 0.08 respectively. Likewise with changes in tax level—correlated at only 0.04. Investment level showed
a slightly negative correlation; i.e. to a slight degree, the greater the military control, the less the investment.

Only in two matters is the correlation large enough to permit of an inference. The pace of industrialization is quite positively correlated to the strength of the military: the correlation is 0.29. This, it is argued, is the one type of modernization that one would expect of the military because of its corporate interest in planning industries. On the other hand, the correlation between military rule and 'subjective commitment' to economic development is quite clearly negative. It stands at -0.22. The implication from this study is that the military actually opposes groups and strata that are demanding economic change.

Furthermore, Nordlinger went on to divide the seventy-four countries into geographical regions: Latin America (21 states), Middle East and North Africa (15), Asia (15) and Tropical Africa (27). Africa stands apart. There, the stronger the military, the higher the rate of G.N.P. increase (0.45), of industrial growth (0.42), of agricultural production (0.60) and of educational expansion (0.34).

But when we turn to the regions other than Africa the performance is dismal. In each, leaders are antagonistic to modernization: in each region the correlations are negative. It is -0.16 in the Middle East, and -0.17 in Asia — and in Latin America it is -0.43.

These results are not very encouraging. With one exception—a very modest correlation between military rule and industrialization, which is confined to Latin America—on no matter was there any
significant correlation between military rule and economic social advance; on the contrary, there are sometimes strong indications that the greater the strength of military interventions the slighter that advance was likely to be. For Latin America, the more military rule, the less the advance in educational enrollment. In Asia, the more military rule the less the advances in agricultural production, and the less the advance in investment levels. The Middle East and North Africa show the most striking negative correlation of all: The more military rule, the less the advance in G.N.P. per capita.

However, he states that "there are instances in which a military or a civilian government largely under the military's influence does bring about economic change and reform. But even in the minority of cases the officers corporate interests decrease the extensiveness of such efforts. The officer-politician may permit the government to carry out developmental and reform programs, but only if the military's corporate interests are first satisfied, the costs of the latter, thereby detraacting from the extensiveness of the former."28

Although Nordlinger's article dwells mainly on the military's intensive pursuit and safeguard of its corporate interests, he also discusses other issues like military values which he says are the "normative attachments to order, dignity and hierarchy—with which most officers are strongly imbued and out of which emerges on overwhelming concern for political stability, and thus a keen sensitivity to any divergence, from the status quo that contains the potential for unwieldy change. Essentially Nordlinger is saying that the military
is preoccupied with order at the expense of other goals."29 The question arises as to how any regime can accomplish other goals in the absence of order, but the author explains by saying that it is one thing to place an extremely high value upon stability in the context of fissiparous politics, it is quite another when stability is merely intended to replace a cacophonous politics.30 In a large number of cases there may not be any limit to what the military would do in this obsession to maintain order and stability.

However, there is a caveat here where he introduces two other variables that may affect the intensity with which the military pursues its corporate interests. These variables are the size and the age of the military. He says that where the armed forces number less than 2,000 men we would not expect the "weight" of such a small establishment to have as pronounced an impact upon the emergence of a broadly defined and intensely pursued corporate interest as in the case of a larger military establishment. Therefore, we should not expect military values to be as pervasively and deeply inculcated where the armed forces have only been recently created, without a long tradition to give shape and support to these values and without an extensive period within which these values may be instilled, internalized, and assimilated.31

The element of size introduced by Nordlinger is also supported by Bienen who states that "African armies have small, indigenous officer corps, often composed of former non-commissioned officers who are much more advanced in terms of education, absorption of
rational norms, and exposure to outside influence than many civilians."

His contention does well to point out some oversights which otherwise might help to explain why many armies have failed in their bid to modernize their respective societies. Also on the question of size, Gutteridge states that in Africa, the size of armed forces in relation to the total population of a country has little bearing on their liability to intervene in politics. But the nature of a subsequent military administration is likely to be considerably affected by the number of trained men in uniform available to play administrative roles."

Referring to the expertise possessed by African armies, he says that "such 'know how' as armed forces personnel possess is clearly important to the effectiveness of intervention, but in the cases concerned, it happens that this expertise has not generally extended beyond basic knowledge of the operation of mechanical and transport, radio communications, temporary bridge building, and demolition..."

The question of size is of particular importance because to a great extent it can also show an insight into the sophistication, diversity and sometimes complexity of an army which are necessary to make them effective as the ruling organization. This is not to say that the sophistication and expertise of an army is determined by its size, but from what Gutteridge and Nordlinger have said, small armies like the ones Africans inherited and developed post independence, rarely have the much vaunted expertise and know-how which meet the sort of prototypes people like Pye have talked about.
However, there have been cases where the military has grown in size in situations, like in Nigeria, where there has not been a corresponding growth in expertise and technical know how because of inadequate preparation, training and time. What is being argued is that African armies do not possess all the attributes which have been associated with armies in other parts of the world and therefore care must be taken while generalizing about their capabilities to rule.

The earlier assumptions made by Pye, Janowitz, and Greene about the nationalistic and selfless characteristics of the military were heavily disputed by Robert Price in his work on Ghana. In this article entitled "A Theoretical Approach to Military Rule in New States: Reference Group Theory and the Ghanain Case," he states that there is a theory-research gap on the role of the military because of "an excessive reliance on what can be termed a formal organizational model." Then he starts out with a theoretical position that the training process undergone by the officer corps of many of the new states is such as to produce reference-group identification with the officer corps of the ex-colonial power and concomitant commitments to its set of traditions, symbols and values. Such identifications and commitments affect the behavior of these officers, both in their relations with civilian political authorities and in their capacity as governmental leaders should they accede to political power, in ways that are neither explicable nor predictable in terms of a formal organizational model.
It might be worthwhile to summarize his findings in detail since they dwell on many facets of the organization model. He states that

Through the analysis of a single empirical case we attempted to demonstrate that the commonly used theoretical model of military rule in new states—otherwise known as the formal organizational model—is an inadequate analytic tool. Its use could explain or predict neither the ideology of the military men who ruled Ghana between 1966 and 1969 nor important economic and political policies undertaken by their regime. Therefore, the reference-group theory, was introduced in the belief that it could help make understandable what on the basis of the formal organizational model appeared anomalous. In this, an attempt was made to narrow the theory-research gap that has existed in the subdiscipline of military rule and modernization.

The reference-group theory is predicated upon the hypothesis that as a consequence of foreign reference-group commitments the military tends to be cut off from the expressive symbols that will have resonance in their own societies. The military will, therefore, tend to rely instead on the martial rituals and symbols of a foreign cultural milieu, and this difficulty in the area of indigenous symbol manipulation will seriously reduce their political leadership capacity.

Perhaps the main strength of the reference-group approach is that, unlike the formal organizational model, it does not claim that military organizations will perform similarly in all new states. On the contrary, the performance of military officers in political roles is seen to vary according to differences in their reference-group identifications. These in turn are seen to vary according to differences in the professional socialization process undergone by a nation's office corps.37

What we have seen in Nordlinger's and Price's articles is that when some of the time honored assumptions about military rule are tested empirically they falter considerably. It shows that instead of just testing the whole gamut of military rule and performance we should sometimes be concerned with only a few variables at a time for more effective and in depth results.
Perhaps an appraisal of a few more studies conducted by scholars using a few variables at a time might help to illuminate the point made above. There are more empirical studies that demonstrate the need for case studies and the lack of wisdom in making broad sweeping generalizations about the capability of the military to provide more economic development than civilians. One of such studies was conducted by Margaret Hayes.

In an article entitled "Policy Consequences of Military Participation in Politics: An Analysis of Tradeoffs in Brazilian Federal Expenditures," she looks into the problem of tradeoffs between spending and economic and social investment.38

According to her, a special study conducted by the United Nations Secretary General reports that in developing countries military spending increased at a rate of 7% per year during the 1960's and this is even more important because according to a United Nations report "when the needs of economic development are so pressing, it is a disturbing thought that these countries have found it necessary to increase military spending so speedily, particularly when their per capita income is so low. To the citizen of a developing country... even a diversion of a few dollars for military purposes may rob him of one of the necessities of life."39

Since scholars like Nordlinger and Finer have argued the following: 1) that military corporate interests and their autonomous constituency are very likely to hinder their motivation to promote economic progress. 2) That in the Third World countries, the army
is likely to allocate scarce resources to supporting itself at the expense of social services, economic growth, health and welfare programs. (Finer) This report is of immense importance as it further illuminates their findings.

In the article the author sought to answer these questions: Do substitutions occur between military and economic and social spending categories, and do such substitutions occur more intensely under military than under civilian governments?

She came up with the following findings and conclusions:

Substitutions between military allocations and allocations to other sectors do occur frequently, but that the burden of these substitutions are distributed across all categories at one time or another. As a result, substitutions are not severe. Overall, increased military spending accompanied substantial increases in spending for infrastructure development and aspects of this associated with greater central government activity (for example, industrial investment and direct government investment). On the other hand, increased military spending had some negative effect on social spending, but this was mild because social investment was not a major priority of any of the regimes examined. It was found that military allocations was the category least frequently burdened in tradeoffs, but hat when tradeoffs did occur, the burden for the military was often severe.

Because of the different role of the military in the developing country context, and because of generally scarcer resources, allocations will be devoted to overtly "defense"-oriented applications as is the case for the industrialized state. Rather, military allocations are likely to be applied to ends which reinforce the political position of the armed services. Yet a third consideration suggested in the literature on the military in the developing context is that military corporate interests may be increasingly defined in terms of national economic development and industrialization—terms identical to those of many of the military's civilian counterparts. We should not forget that the Brazilian military intervention of 1964 was not without its civilian supporters.40
The value of these findings and conclusion in terms of highlighting societal or exogenous factors vis-a-vis organizational characteristics of the military cannot be over-emphasized.

In a related study, Barry Ames and Ed Goff in their article "Education and Defense Expenditures in Latin America: 1948-1968," sought to answer the following questions:

1. What is the relationship between changes in spending for defense and changes in spending for education?
2. How well can changes in defense and education spending be explained with a model utilizing only "economic" variables?

They introduce two elements—political and economic factors in explaining government allocations, because they believe that factors external to the organizational and institutional characteristics of any regime could play a very important role in regime performance.

Two segments of their findings seem very appropriate to this dissertation since they underscore the importance of such exogenous factors as the political climate and economic situation. Both factors bear very much on social and economic development. The question of political climate is important since in often turbulent Africa, with a multitude of divisions and cleavages, resource allocation may be affected by the relative weight the cleavages are able to exert on any regime, while the economic factor may really determine how much the regime is able to dispense to meet such demands. The whole issue here is a matter of the constituency---
whether it is regional or national to which (either a civilian or military regime may be appealing to and what resources are available at a particular time.

Ames and Goff say that attention should be paid to regimes' efforts to use expenditures as means of increasing political support. Allocations have programmatic purposes but they also provide reward for followers and bribe potential opponents.41

In this chapter we have examined a variety of views, some of them mutually exclusive, some of them complementary and some threading a middle ground held by a number of scholars on a) why the military intervenes in politics b) what they do when they take over the reins of power. There may never by any consensus on these questions, but one thing that pervades the entire discussion is the need to study and understand military regimes, particularly as they are inching towards a posture of permanence in Third World political scene.

As we review the literature, it becomes increasingly obvious that there is a definite limitation in evaluating the performance of military regimes only in terms of their organizational characteristics. By looking at western armies, some scholars have attributed virtually the same characteristics to the armies of the Third World, which in the mind of this author is misleading. If all the armies possess the same organizational characteristics, then they all should perform similarly, but the dismal truth is that they have not. There is no quarrel with using the organizational model, but the problem is
that a lot of the so-called organizational attributes have been taken for granted and not based on empiricism.

Bienen may be right when he says that the factors that explain military intervention also reveal the limit of the military capacity, but the use of the non-dynamic organizational model in isolation of the environmental variables would always obscure the answers to the questions posed earlier. It will continue to frustrate our efforts to evaluate military regimes.

What we can conclude from the later part of the literature review especially from empirical findings of Nordlinger, Price, Hayes, Ames and Goff is that the capability of the military to engender development cannot be explained in terms of

a) The hierarchical command structure
b) Skill structure of the officer corps
c) Recruitment patterns of the officer corps
d) Cohesiveness of the office corps

We take this position because what have actually influenced the performance of the military in the Third World countries have been in the main factors which are external to the military and not necessarily military organizational characteristics. Moreover, most of these organizational characteristics do not exist substantially in Third World armies.

Arguing along these lines, Samuel Huntington contends that most Third World countries are praetorian in nature by which he means that they possess no discernible political institutions or political leaders that are accepted as arbiters of group conflict. That there is not agreement by contending forces on legitimate and authoritative
methods of conflict resolution. An unadulterated praetorian society may be difficult to find, but there are certain attitudes and behavior in some Third World countries that may approximate to some elements of praetorianism. Welch and Smith give a list of what they consider environmental variables which may also affect the performance of any regime, civilian, authoritarian or military. They are class divisions, ethnic tensions, regional differences, cleavages based on education, religion, culture, language and the deterioration of economic conditions which limits the ability of the government to meet a lot of expectations.

In order to reconcile the obvious discrepancy that might be if one looked at only the organizational characteristics of the military in evaluating the military's performance, it has become necessary especially in the case of Nigeria to look at what one might call intervening variables. These variables will be defined as those factors which are external to the military organization, phenomena present in the society which the presence or lack of might undermine the effectiveness of the military in carrying out social and economic development.

In order to avoid the same shortcomings evident in the literature especially - by proponents of military rule - it will be necessary to look at some intervening variables that may affect the performance of regimes, be it civilian or military. In the case of Nigeria, it will be argued that the capability of any regime to
mitigate the potency of the intervening variables will be translated into better performance. The cleavages that have been more visible and instrumental in shaping the events in Nigeria have been regionalism, tribalism and ethnicity.

While looking at the potency of cleavages in Nigeria it will be necessary to look at two exogenous factors that might affect performance of both regimes. These factors are (a) the resource base of each regime which may make it possible or difficult for both regimes to engender economic and social development. (b) The character of political leadership which is capable of rising above the pressures of cleavages and establish enough legitimacy to direct development efforts. We shall examine the relative potency of these cleavages and the two exogenous factors in the subsequent chapters.
FOOTNOTES


4 *Ibid*.

5 *Ibid*.


9 *Ibid*.


11 Finer, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

12 *Ibid*.

13 *Ibid*.

14 *Ibid*.


18 Huntington, op. cit., p. 203.
19 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 36.
26 Ibid., p. 264.
29 Ibid., p. 1137.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., p. 1138.
34 Ibid., p. 142.
36Ibid.

37Ibid.

38Margaret Hayes, "Policy Consequences of Military Participation in Politics: An Analysis of Trade Offs in Brazilian Federal Expenditures," in Liske, Comparative Public Policy, pp. 21-52.

39Ibid.

40Ibid.

CHAPTER II
Colonial and Post Colonial Politics in Nigeria:
A Background Discussion

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NIGERIA: STRUGGLE FOR NATIONHOOD, 1914-1975

It is not unusual for many historians and politicians to characterize Nigeria as merely a country carved out of expedience to facilitate British colonial administration. One of the architects of Nigerian independence, Chief Obafemi Awolowo described the country as "a mere geographical expression...The word 'Nigerian' is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live in, within, Nigeria from those who do not."¹

Perhaps a very apt characterization of Nigeria is the one given by a British Governor Hugh Clifford in an address to the Nigerian Council on December 29, 1920, when he described Nigeria as a "...collection of self-contained and mutually independent native states separated from one another by vast distances, by differences of history and traditions, and by ethnological, racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers."²

These characterizations on the surface value may appear to apply to a number of countries that have struggled from nation-statehood to nationhood. It is not necessary to make a distinction between the
two. There is usually the belief that residents of any nation-state have to express the desire to and work towards achieving the latter; but in the case of Nigeria, it appears that the "nation" itself was doomed to failure from its inception because of what some people might describe as the unrealities of making a nation out of a group of people with mutually exclusive cleavages with irreconcilable differences and especially from people, who through their words and actions have not grasped the rudiments of nationhood. Some critics have retorted that the failings of Nigeria have been the result of British maladministration. But a more balanced view might be to say that the problems confronting Nigeria today are partly due to British Administration in Nigeria and compounded by Nigerian politicians who have often capitalized on divisiveness for selfish political gains. However, the thinking of British Colonial administrators could not be expressed more succinctly than in the words of Sir Hugh Clifford when he said in 1920 that "It is the consistent policy of the government of Nigeria to maintain and to support the local tribal institutions and the indigenous forms of government...I am entirely convinced of the right, for example: of the people of Egbaland...or any of the great emirates of the North...to maintain that each of them is, in a very real sense, a nation... National self-government in Nigeria serves to each separate person the rights to maintain its identity, its individuality and its nationality, its own chosen form of government; and the peculiar political and social institutions which have evolved for it by the wisdom and by the accumulated experience
of generations of its forebears." It is no wonder then that the Colonial Administrators proceeded to govern Nigeria the way they did by constantly reinforcing the cleavages in the society for as long as the tribes were involved in fighting for separateness and against each other, their effectiveness was assumed. Some policy decisions might help to explain how Clifford's thinking (and also the Colonial Administration's) was translated into actual policies.

Before the advent of the British in Africa, the area presently known as Nigeria comprised several kingdoms, empires, and a multitude of ethnic tribes each with its own distinct history and origin. The Oyo empire was to the west and was inhabited mainly by the Yorubas; to the southwest was the Benin kingdom mainly inhabited by the Edos; to the east was the Ibo nation inhabited mainly by the Ibo and the north comprised the Hausa-Fulani emirates and empire.

British entry into Nigeria had started as a commercial adventure and when in 1885 the Berlin Conference acknowledged the British claims to the Niger Basin, Britain gave the Royal Niger Company power to "administer, make treaties, levy customs and trade in all territories in the basis of the Niger and its affluents." In 1900, the British government took over from the Royal Niger Company and proceeded to proclaim the protectorate of northern Nigeria. Also in 1900, the British merged the Southern Kingdoms and tribes with the crown of Lagos into a single administrative unit known as southern protectorate and the northern protectorate, the southern protectorate and the crown
colony of Lagos were administered separately before by different administrators. In 1900, the southern protectorate and the crown colony of Lagos were brought under the same administrator and in 1914, the two protectorates were amalgamated into one country known as Nigeria. As Michael Crowder points out, "the immediate reason for the decision was economic expediency. The Northern protectorate was running at a severe deficit which was being met by a subsidy from the southern protectorate and an imperial grant-in-aid from Britain of about 300,000 pounds a year. This conflicted with the age-old colonial policy that each territory should be self-subsisting... It was also felt that the prosperous southern protectorate could subsidize its northern neighbor until such a time as it became self-supporting..."^5

Besides the reasons that prompted the British to amalgamate the two protectorates, the manner of the acquisition of the territory and the piecemeal approach to the Amalgamation did not make it easy for actual unification which was not the British intention anyway. To this end James Coleman states that "the fact that such acquisition was piecemeal and occurred in successive stages accounts in part for the extreme unevenness in the degree of social change and modernization among the various groups and areas of Nigeria. This unevenness had added in more stress to the already existing tensions."^6

Right from the birth of modern Nigeria it was obvious from the proclamations of different ethnic and tribal leaders that "unification" was an imposition that hardly met the approval of the indigenes. There
was no attempt on the part of the British to minimize these cleavages. Different policies were made for different regions, and the only contact which the leaders of the regions had with each other was at the legislative council in Lagos which could be at best described as superficial. The northern administrators had clamored for separation from the south as a way of preserving its culture and moslem heritage which hitherto had been unperturbed by western religion and education which was to account for the imbalance in education between the north and the south. Through a system of 'indirect rule' and in keeping with the promise Lord Luggard (the first governor general of Nigeria) made to the northerners to preserve their religion and culture, western missionaries could not penetrate the north. The result of this pledge was to have far reaching implications in Nigeria, as the southerners imbibed western education with unquenching appetite while the northerners remained mostly uneducated.

At the outbreak of World War II it became virtually impossible for the British to centrally administer Nigeria at least from an economic standpoint. As a result of this fact, they decided to delegate more authority to the various administrative units and by the end of the war the powers of the administrative units had grown tremendously. They were formalized by the now-notorious Richards Constitution of 1946, named after Governor Arthur Richards. This constitution is generally regarded by Nigerians as one main factor that entrenched regionalism in Nigeria. This constitution provided for three regional houses of assembly to be created and a revised constitution of 1951
designated the provinces as 'regions' and a further revised form of
the constitution in 1954, gave quasi-autonomy to the regions and
by 1957 the regions had firmly evolved as de facto 'nation-states'. The
drive towards maintaining autonomy and separateness was further
accentuated one step further when in 1957 the southern regions became
self governing as the north followed suit two years later.

On October 1, 1960, Nigeria became an independent country and
from that day the onus of creating one nation out of different nations
fell on Nigerians who without much success tried to create 'Unity in
Diversity', a task made difficult by colonial legacies and compounded
by Nigerian leaders.

REGIONALISM VS NATIONALISM IN POST INDEPENDENCE NIGERIA

Contemporary scholars often tend to make a distinction between
nationstates and nations and through so many definitions have come to
associate the former with just sovereign territories occupied by a
group of people. The latter has been ascribed with a lot of character-
istics the main one being psychological and emotional.

Karl Deutsch tries to make this distinction clearer when he says
that a nation is "a people pressing to acquire a measure of effective
control over the behavior of its members. It is a people striving to
equip itself with power, with some form of compulsion strong enough
to make the enforcement of its commands sufficiently probable to aid
in the spread of habits, of voluntary compliance with them."
Brian Weinstein defines a nation as "a community of order which, by the intermediary of its institutions, symbols, and leaders, now have the power to be efficacious in the maintenance of norms of behavior and internal peace; it is a social cultural system whose norms for behavior are widely accepted and stored in a given territory. It is the highest level of loyalty group now—the supreme loyalty group—for members who are not kin are expected to be willing to give their lives." There are those who argue that a nation-state is not different from a nation. I definitely part company with that school of thought; because while territory may be a necessary condition for nationhood, it is not a sufficient condition. The sufficient condition must be commitment, loyalty and identification to the entire entity called a nation-state, a willingness to subjugate parochial loyalties to national loyalties. The concept of 'nationhood' may be an abstract one, but not intangible. It is a concept that can be translated into policy and actions only through a desire to do so, nurtured by an understanding of what it really means by the elites who strive to create a nation out of a nation-state.

The early discussion of Nigerian history clearly indicates that the seeds of regionalism were sown even before the 'unification' of the country in 1914. Through several well planned and calculated policies the British had carved out four 'nation-states' within a country which were euphemistically called regions. It is not uncommon for students of Nigerian history and politics to use the words regionalism and tribalism interchangeably, and there are a lot of
justifiable reasons for doing so. The most important reason is the
fact that the regions were mere consolidations of tribal cleavages,
and when some people talk of tribalism they may be talking of
regionalism. Though both terms are often times difficult to separate
like the "chicken-egg" puzzle, efforts will be made where applicable
to distinguish the two.

Most of the prominent leaders of the country also recognized the
enormity of the problems of regionalism vis-a-vis the artificial
creation of the country known as Nigeria.

In an address to the legislative council in April 1947, Mallam
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, who later became the first prime minister of
Nigeria, had this to say:

Many Nigerians deceive themselves by thinking that Nigeria
is one. I am sorry to say that this presence of unity is
artificial and it ends outside this chamber. The southern
tribes who are now pouring into the north in ever increasing
numbers...do not mix with the northern people in social
matters, and we in the north took upon them as invaders...
Since the amalgamation of the southern and northern
provinces in 1914, Nigeria has existed as one country
only on paper. It is far from being united.9

Perhaps one statement that strikes at the core of regionalism in
Nigerian politics is the one made by Balewa in 1948 during a legis-
lative council meeting which states [inter alia that] "since 1914
the British government has been trying to make Nigeria into one
country but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different
in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs and do
not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite."10
It would almost be impossible to properly understand the dimensions of regionalism and ethnicity in Nigeran politics without discussing party politics in Nigeria, because political parties were formed along regional and tribal lines and since they were formed on this basis, they were out to sustain their origin. Party politics in Nigeria could not be appraised on a different plane save on regional and tribal configurations.

PARTY POLITICS

Before Nigeria became independent on October 1st, 1960, there were three main political parties whose basis of operation and power were in the regions.

The first political party chosen was the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (later known as the National Congress of Nigerian Citizens, after the southern Cameroons ceded from Nigeria). The birth of the N.C.N.C. could be traced to a meeting of the Nigerian Union of students in Lagos on August 26, 1944, attended by several tribal unions, religious groups, social clubs, women organizations, professional associations, and trade unions. The National Council of Nigeria was inaugurated with the avowed goal "to work in unity for the realization of our ultimate goal of self government within the British Empire," and Azikiwe was elected the General Secretary. A party formed earlier by Herbert Macaulay in 1923 known as the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) merged with the NCNC and in 1945, the NCNC expanded its umbrella to include
three Cameroonian groups thereby justifying the name of the party. From the very make up of the components who formed the NCNC and from their declared intentions one would surmise that this party had broad aspirations that cut across regional ethnic class and parochial lines, at least on the surface. In a speech delivered by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe in the Annual Convention of the NCNC in Kaduna on April 5, he summarized the goals and aspirations of the NCNC to unify the various elements of our communities: to crystalize the natural aspirations of our people, to express in concrete form the trend of public opinion, and to emancipate our nation from the manacles of political bondage. Despite these noble ideals subsequent events did not allow their fruition.

But Chief Obafemi Owolowo refused to believe that the NCNC was formed for such goals that were stated earlier. He saw the NCNC as an Ibo oriented organization which should also be matched by a Yoruba based organization. In the bid to pose a serious opposition to the NCNC and in his desire to "see to it that Yorubas evolved an ethnic solidarity among themselves, just as the Ibibios and the Ibos had done in order to ensure a strong and harmonious federal union among the people of Nigeria," the Action Group was formed on March 26, 1950, to fulfill these aspirations.

James Coleman says that the Action Group was formed to fulfill, among other things the following goal: "to encourage and strengthen most sedulously all the ethnic organizations in the western region..." and that the dominant theory of the Action Group leaders was that
under the prevailing circumstances then existing in Nigeria the only certain avenue to power was a regional political party. In keeping with these, one of the main themes in the A.G.'s electoral campaign was a systematic and relentless opposition to Azikiwe, Ibo domination and the NCNC, an effort that was in many ways paid in kind by the NCNC.

The North was not to be left out in these types of undertakings. The Richards Constitution and the cultural and regional sentiments prevailing in the country made it almost imperative that the north was to follow suit. The Northern People's Congress which started as a cultural organization, was formally inaugurated in December, 1949. And in keeping with the desire of the northerners to maintain their cultural separation and distinctiveness, the leaders of the NPC pledged that the party "does not intend to usurp the authority of our natural rulers; on the contrary, it is our ardent desire to enhance such authority whenever and wherever possible." It is worth mentioning that there was no unanimity among the northern leaders in terms of the goals and aspirations of the NPC, hence the radical faction of the party lead by Mallam Aminu Kano broke away and formed the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) which identified with the Southern Nationalist agitations. Essentially, though, the north was in virtual control of the NPC.

The formation of political parties in the three regions was to all intents and purposes based on ethnic and regional considerations rather than on promoting national goals. It is no wonder then that
most of the subsequent activities of the political parties were intended primarily to enhance ethnic and regional views even when they conflicted with national policies. Prior to Nigerian independence the political parties had participated in several legislative assemblies each representing its region and the place of debates and confrontations were drawn to coincide with regional horizons. Sometimes the battle lines were drawn on a north versus south basis that often times belied the West-East confrontation.

During a debate in the legislative assembly on March 31, 1953, a debate generally regarded as a major test of Nigerian 'unity', Chief Anthony Enahoro of the Action Group proposed that "this house accepts as a primary political objective the attainment of self government for Nigeria in 1956." The NPC quickly responded vehemently against it in terms that eloquently portrayed and deep seated regional sentiments in the country. The Sarduana of Sokoto had regarded the proposal as a political suicide for the north and also as a move designed to impose southern hegemony on the north. The reasoning behind the reluctance of the north to accept self-rule was that the numerically superior, educated southerners would control the country, leaving the north, as Sarduana indicated in his autobiography with "quite simply, just nothing, beyond a little window dressing". In fact the north had advocated secession from the country, and even the Sarduana found the idea "very tempting". In pursuit of self-rule, the AG and NCNC carried their crusade to the north in May 1956 only to be confronted by a riot in Kano in which 36 were killed and 241 wounded.
It should not be assumed that the south was a monolithic group. On the contrary it was not, while the north was one by virtue of their language, religion and culture. As mentioned earlier, the AG was formed primarily to oppose the NCNC and as subsequent events will show both political parties were primarily engaged in mutual opposition of each other and in the case of the AG it was not only involved in winning power in the west but in making sure that the NCNC was kept out of the western region.

The interim period between the 1946 Richards Constitution and independence in 1960, was characterized by a host of election squabbles sometimes intra south confrontations or south versus north. It may not be significant to discuss those election squabbles since they dwell mainly on the control of the regional houses. Not until the 1959 elections in which Nigerians sought to take complete control of the House of Representatives as a precondition for independence, did the inter-regional, inter-tribal, and inter-party rivalry virtually become more alarming to some 'patriots' and other observers who had wishfully thought that some acute differences between the tribes and regions would disappear by independence.

There were several events in Nigeria particularly during the civilian period, in which the ethnic and regional schism was very significant in the scheme of things, but a few of them were very crucial in terms of bringing to focus the theme of this chapter. These events were the 1959 elections, and the 1962 Western Nigerian Crisis. These events provided tests for the new leaders to prove they were adequately prepared to bear the mantle of leadership. The
federal election of 1959 was very crucial because the colonial government had given the outcome of the election as a precondition for granting independence. The reason was that only members of the new assembly would ratify Nigeria's demands for independence on October 1, 1960. The previous "National Government", a coalition of all the parties, under the prime ministership of Alhaji Balewa was not granted the power to do so. Realizing the high stakes involved in the outcome of the elections, the leaders of all the major parties showed some form of cooperation that had hitherto not existed. There were 312 single member seats to be filled in the Federal House of Representatives, but the distribution of the seats by regions was heavily stacked in favor of the north and the NPC which had 174 of the seats [in the north]. (See Table 1)

As the elections drew near, the strategies of the political parties were more obvious. The NPC banked heavily on the Muslim north. It sought to win as many seats as possible in the north and probably picking a few more seats by allying with some dissident groups in the west and east. These dissident groups were members of the minority groups whose existence had increasingly become a thorny issue. The north had its own share of dissidents. The NEPU had become an ally of the NCNC and the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC) based in the Tiv area of the north also became an ally of the Action Group. The question of creating more states in these minority areas had become a very attractive campaign issue. However, the gains made by the
Table 1

Distribution of Seats in the Federal House of Representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appointed by governor</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex-officio (includes 3 regional attorney-generals)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(excludes 3 regional attorney-generals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected (indirectly by regional legislatures)</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1964</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/250,000 (\times)</td>
<td>(50%)</td>
<td>1/98,500 (\times)</td>
<td>(54.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/184,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/99,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/184,000</td>
<td></td>
<td>1/99,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Cameroon</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/94,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1/93,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(a\) Many MP's were members of both a regional assembly and the Federal House of Representatives.
\(b\) This fraction indicates the ratio of legislators to population.
\(c\) After a UN plebiscite in 1961, Northern Cameroon entered Nigeria, while the southern part of the Trust Territory chose to become part of the neighboring Republic of Cameroon. It was at this time that the Ibo dominated National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) changed its name to National Congress of Nigerian Citizens.

NEPU and UMBC were too modest to offset the NPC's strategy but they were enough to deny the NPC an absolute majority.

After the elections, the NPC had won 147 seats together with its allies, the NCNC-NEPU alliance had won 89 and the Action Group had won 75. (See Table 2)

It should be pointed out here that the federal legislature was bicameral. The federal senate "was composed of 54 members; 10 from the Council of Ministers, 12 Senators from each region, 4 from Lagos and 4 appointed by the governor-general. Like the United States Senate before 1913, this indirectly elected Senate was a legislative house that was subservient to the wishes of each respective regional government. Though the Nigerian Constitution stated that regional delegations to the senate should be the representatives of all major viewpoints in the region, each delegation was more likely to represent its major ethnic group."20

The delineation of the seats won by the respective parties clearly indicate the dominant political behavior patterns and intensification of the existing cleavages, regionalism and ethnicity, and according to Frederick Schwarz, Jr.,

The voting pattern demonstrates conclusively that the dominant factor in the 1959 election was ethnic, or regional-religious, cohesiveness. In the East the NCNC won all 51 of the Ibo seats, obtaining over 80 percent of the vote in 25 of those constituencies. In the North, the NPC won over 80 percent of the vote in 42 constituencies in Kano and Sokoto Provinces and Bornu Division. The NPC lost only a few seats in the North outside the Middle Belt, some of which, such as Kano East, were notable because of the number of Southerners registered in the constituency. In the West, the Action Group won 30 of the 35 Yoruba seats. All the NPC seats and almost two-thirds of the NCNC seats came from the regions
### Table 2

Nigerian Federal Election Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1954 Seats</th>
<th>1959 Percent of total Vote in region</th>
<th>1959 Seats</th>
<th>1964 Percent of total Vote in region</th>
<th>1964 Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNC</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>NCNC 40.2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>UPGA</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>AG 49.5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>NNA</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>NPC 1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>other</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCNC</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>NCNC-NEPU 64.6</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>UPGA</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AG</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>AG 23.1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>other 12.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>NPC 61.2</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>NNA</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Independents &amp; others</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NCNC-NEPU 16.1</td>
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<td>Lagos</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>1954 Seats</td>
<td>1959 Percent of Total</td>
<td>1959 Seats</td>
<td>Vote in region</td>
<td>1964 Percent of total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>79 NPC</td>
<td>NPC 28.2</td>
<td>134 NNA</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>56 NCNC-NEPU 36.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>23 AG</td>
<td>AG 27.6</td>
<td>73 other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18 others</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

which those parties respectively controlled. Though the Action Group won slightly more than half its seats outside the West, it won support in the North and East from minority ethnic groups expressing resentment or fear of the dominant majority in their region.\textsuperscript{21}

The results of the election which failed to give an absolute majority to any of the parties or alliances brought a strange pattern-ship in the coalition matrix that became an absolute necessity for forming a government. The conventional wisdom at the end of the elections was that the NCNC would form a coalition government with the Action Group thereby leaving the NPC as the official opposition party. Most of the participants in the guessing game were dumb founded when after a series of negotiations, the NCNC agreed to form a coalition government with the NPC with the former as a junior partner. In attempting to give some logical explanations out of a maze of apparent inconsistencies and contradictions between the view points of the NCNC and the NPC (on a left-right continuum), the NCNC was thought to be closer on the continuum with the AG than the NPC. Mackintosh tries to explain the reasons behind the coalition when he states that

It has already been seen that the NPC and NCNC had as one common factor a deep mutual dislike of the Action Group, which had attempted since 1957, and was attempting even more strongly in 1959, to win support in the minority areas of the North and East with a view of creating new 'states' there. Both major parties, then, resented the attempt of the third to reduce the size of the Regions which they controlled. Both were also concerned with power, the prize to be won when British sovereignty was withdrawn. The NCNC, as the oldest of the Nigerian parties, the original nationalist organization, and the claimant to be the only truly 'national' party, felt the acquisition of power at the federal level to be its rightful due. The NPC's interest in the central government is less easy to perceive; certainly its leader, the
Sarduana of Sokoto, was interested in the North to the exclusion of all of his 'lieutenants', as he announced during the 1959 campaign. However, the Sarduana knew that his party needed to control the central government, if only to protect its position in the North from interference by a hostile party or coalition which might otherwise assume the federal powers. (The importance of such control was amply demonstrated in May 1962, when the Federal Government took control of the West.) Thirdly, from Dr. Azikiwe's point of view, his flirtation with the Sarduana probably represented insurance should the NCNC-NEPU Alliance fail to do as well in the election as it expected, even though, as has been shown, the Alliance made as its primary task the winning of seats, at the expense of the NPC, as much as that of Action Group.22

The British colonial office was not aloof during the whole process. The Governor-general then, Sir James Robertson, had called on the NPC to form a government and by so doing had indicated where their interest lay. The British and some national leaders had feared the north would opt for secession if the NPC was forced into opposition. Even Azikiwe gave this reason for opting to ally with the NPC rather than an ostensibly more compatible Action Group.

For further justification of this alliance, I. S. McEwen, the National Secretary of the NCNC (after Azikiwe became the Governor-General) in a report to the annual convention of the party in 1960 stated that "although we are a junior partner in the coalition Government, yet with sound planning and coordination we can play an effective part. As sincere patriots we are in duty bound to make the coalition a success in the interest of a stable and united fatherland."23 A lot of critics argue the thinly veiled 'unity' was a white wash since subsequent events proved that the immediate goal mutually shared between the partners in the coalition was to keep the AG out. As events
were to prove later the only thread that kept the coalition was the common dislike of Awolowo and the AG, but this common hatred was not enough to sustain the coalition. Of course it should be mentioned that the British colonial office was satisfied with the set up and as a result granted independence to Nigeria in October 1, 1960. (Which is perhaps the best that could be said of the coalition.)

Besides the struggle for political control at the center which continuously threatened the coalition, there were other issues which continually threatened the coalition. The question of distribution and allocation of resources in which the NPC was accused by the NCNC of taking undue advantage of their strength at the centre to take some spoils to the north. For example, why could the north push a proposal for a road to be built from Sokoto to the Kainji Dam into the Development plan when it was not in the original proposal? Why was eastern Nigeria's government's request for pioneer certificates tax exemptions and visas for would be industrialists delayed much longer than the requests from northern Nigeria? One issue which hit the headlines was the location of an iron and steel industry. In the National Development of 1962-68, a proposal was made for an iron and steel industry to be built in Onitsha (feasibility studies had recommended Onitsha as the most suitable site for the Mill) at a cost of ₦30M ($90M approximately then). The north argued vehemently that the industry should be sited in Idah in the north, and the west joined in a few years later. But a compromise was reached in which it was suggested that the project be divided into two, one half in
the north and the other in the east. The absurdity of this decision made it unwise to build the industry and the project was postponed indefinitely as the cost soared yearly. There was also the problem of revenue allocation, an issue which has been very divisive since the amalgamation of the north and the south in 1914.

In 1954, public revenues were regionalized a great deal on the principle of "derivation". In 1958, a system of distributable pool was created to foster national integration and balanced economic development. By this system 30 percent of mining revenues and import duties were allocated to this pool for distribution to the regions. Twenty percent to the federal government and fifty percent to the region of deviation. The principle of distribution had been based on need and population, but when large deposits of oil were discovered in Delta (eastern Nigeria) the leaders of the NCNC resented the idea of financing almost entirely the development of northern Nigeria. They therefore argued that most of the oil royalties should be returned to the region of derivation; a proposal that was vehemently opposed by the north and it remained unsettled throughout the civilian regime. Perhaps the one event which really exposed how fragile the coalition in Lagos was, and exacerbated regional and ethnic sentiments was the 1962-63 census controversy.

Under the British Colonial administration, there was a population census between 1952 and 1953. The figures showed that the north had a population of 17,573,000; the east 7,497,000; the west 6,408,000 and the territory of Lagos 272,000 giving a total of 31,750,000. A
slight variation in these figures can be seen in a number of publications. The major significance of the results was that the distribution and allocation of parliamentary seats were based on these figures. Based on these figures, the north was allocated 174 out of the 312 seats in the federal elections.

Despite the fact that the census was conducted under British rule (supposedly an impartial arbiter) there were many questions as to the accuracy of these figures. One of the sources of doubt was the fact that many Nigerians avoided being counted because they had been misled into believing that the population census was being conducted with a view to increasing taxes. In a paper entitled "A Preliminary Medium Estimate of the 1962 population" Dr. Chukuka Okonjo discounted those figures, arguing that accepted population growth, in fact mortality rate and unrecorded mobility between the south and the north did not justify those figures. But the 1962-63 census was more controversial. The politicians had learned from the 1952-53 experience that there was more political leverage and muscle to be gained by inflating the figures.

Early in 1962 the Prime Minister Alhaji Tafawa Balewa announced that the nation was going to conduct a new population census. On May 13, 1962, a new census commenced under the supervision of Mr. J. Warren and placed under the management of the Minister of Economic Development, Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim (a member of the NPC and also a northerner). When all the results were received, the north recorded a population of 22.5 million, an increase of 30 percent over
the previous census; both the east and west recorded an amazing increase of 70 percent with figures of 12.4 million and 10 million (the midwest with 2.2 million) respectively. Mr. Warren had recommended that the northern figures were more reasonable while these of the eastern region were "grossly inflated." This report was met by stiff opposition from the NCNC which resulted in an outcry of "Warren must go!" and subsequently NCNC backbenchers walked out of the House of Representatives. The Prime Minister tried his best to calm down the storm and he described an inflammatory statement made by his Minister of Economic Development and the walk-out by NCNC members as 'embarrassing and unfortunate.'

In order to appease all the segments of the nation who had been incensed by the figures, the Prime Minister announced on November 2, 1963, in a radio broadcast that "the life of the present federal parliament ends in 1964, and it is my intention to have a general election as soon as possible. The electoral register now in use does not reflect sufficiently the changes in population over the years. It is therefore agreed by all the governments that particulars of eligible voters obtained through the census will be used in compiling a new electoral register for the general election next year." In this broadcast he assured the nation of the impartiality and expertise of the officials that were to conduct the new census.

Between November 5-8, 1963, the new census was conducted and then the new figures were released. The distribution was as follows: the north 29.8 million, the east 12.4 million, the west 10.3 million,
the midwest 2.5 million, Lagos 0.7 and the total was 55.7 million (See Table 3). As would be expected these figures were acceptable to the north but the east and midwest burst out with much outcry that engulfed the whole nation for a long while. The battle lines were drawn on regional and ethnic dimensions which was as expected. This time the west under Chief S. L. Akintola accepted the figures because he found them suitable. (This was the beginning of a new alliance between the north and the west.) Dr. M. I. Okpara, the premier of the eastern region in rejecting the figures stated that "I regret that the inflations disclosed are of such astronomical proportions that the figures obtained, taken as a whole are worse than useless." The premier of the midwest, also a member of the NCNC called the results, "the most stupendous joke of our age." The north was undaunted by this outcry and on March 16, 1964, the prime minister announced that he had accepted the figures and that the matter was closed as far as he was concerned. And the premier of the north and leader of the NPC, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, announced that he had accepted the figures and would proceed to use them for future planning.

Prelude to Military Intervention: The 1964 Federal Elections

So far, I have been attempting to describe and explain events in Nigeria before and after independence in order to show how regional (ethnic and tribal) cleavages dominated the affairs of the country. Some selected events have been cited since one cannot possibly dwell on all events that took place in Nigeria. The bases of choosing
Table 3
Nigerian Population Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-West</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

these events have been the author's subjective evaluation and the evaluations of several scholars like Mackintosh, Coleman, Frederick Schwarz, Walter Schwarz, Kenneth Post, and Panter-Brick. (See Bibliography)

The 1964 elections and the preceding party alignments and realignments perhaps demonstrate the intensity of these cleavages more than any single event. While the census controversy was raging, political alliances were being broken and new ones were being formed. The political expediency at the time brought in a strange and unforeseen alliance between the NCNC and the Action Group, two arch rivals. In justifying this alliance the premier of the east, Dr. M. I. Okpara, indicated that both the NCNC and the A.G. were not far apart in their ideologies. The NCNC and the AG had espoused Pragmatic African Socialism and Democratic Socialism and the premier states that

The main differences between pragmatic African socialism (of the NCNC) and democratic socialism (of the AG) are:

pragmatic African socialism is African in origin. Democratic socialism is essentially the socialism of Western Europe.

Pragmatic African socialism therefore includes a revolt against foreign domination in thought. But the characteristic feature of democratic socialism is that in Western Europe it seeks to superimpose socialism on a society that has gone through the metamorphosis of an industrial revolution and installed capitalism. Pragmatic African socialism starts off with a society which has not yet gone through the changes of industrial revolution, and where capitalist control is yet relatively young and weak...we have discovered that the democratic socialism of the Action Group is practically indistinguishable from the pragmatic African socialism of the NCNC, since the economic picture has not been distorted by an industrial revolution and capitalism. This is the key to the coming together of progressive nationalists under United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA).
Irrespective of these rationalizations, it was evident that the alliance was a matter of convenience, primarily entered into for the sake of opposing the NPC and fostering anti-northern sentiments. There were two major alliances namely the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) made up of the NCNC, the Action Group, defectors from Akintola's NNNDP, NEPU and UMBC. The second alliance was the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) consisting of the NPC, the Nigerian National Democratic Party of Akintola, the Midwest Democratic Prong (MDF) and a dissident party from the midwest.36

The incompatibility of the various parties that had formed the two major alliances were not as alarming as the conduct of the elections in December 1964. The formation of these alliances meant a de facto dissolution of the NPC -NCNC alliance since the leaders of both parties consistently attacked each other.

Ethnicity was a more potent and salient cleavage that surfaced in this election. Regionalism was withered down to a minimum, because the two alliances had penetrated different regions. One of the NNA election pamphlets circulated by the NNNDP entitled "UPGA-ism the truth unexpurgated", warned the Yorubas of 'Ibo-domination' and what it described as the 'excesses of the Ibo ministers while in power.'37 The attacks on the Ibos became extremely violent. The NPC followed suit in the north warning against the dangers of Ibo imperialism, citing Ibo businesses in the north as examples of 'Ibo domination.' There were persistent charges of irregularities and thuggery as law and order broke down. The NPC put into effect all the machinery of government to ensure the election of the NNA.
Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers in their book, *Structure and Conflict in Nigeria 1960-1966* aptly describe the prevailing situation when they state that "more and more the primordial sentiment of loyalty to one's culture section was being invoked as the ultimate argument. All other conflicts were being subsumed under those between sections in a polarization which left little room for compromise." The breakdown of law and order did not escape the attention of Dr. Azikiwe who was then the president of Nigeria (a purely ceremonial post). He foresaw the dangers looming ahead and the damage that the over sensitized ethnic and tribal slurs might do to the country and accordingly in a radio broadcast on May 6, 1964, he declared that "in the light of the above circumstances I hereby call upon the citizens and inhabitants of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to desist hence forth from engaging in defamatory propaganda which entails the use of insulting words likely to cause public disorder, incite hatred among any segment of the people of Nigeria, caluminate any particular section of our country and thereby disturb the tranquility of our federal republic." The UPGA had decided to boycott the elections as a result of blatant irregularities, and it met with little success since the election proceeded without it. After a series of crises, bye elections were held in areas that were boycotted and the final breakdown of the seats gave the NNA a resounding victory. (See Table 4) On April 1, 1965, a 'broad based government' was formed by Balewa with a cabinet composed of twenty-two members of the UPGA and the NNDP.
Table 4
Final Election Results
(interim results of December 1964 in brackets)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>NPC</th>
<th>NNDP</th>
<th>NCNC</th>
<th>AG</th>
<th>NPF</th>
<th>Inds.</th>
<th>Totals</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>(162)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>167(167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>57(57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1(13)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>49(15)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>70(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>4(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Party Totals</td>
<td>(162)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>84(33)</td>
<td>21(15)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>5(3)</td>
<td>312(253)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers, *op. cit.*
The coalition again could be described as extremely superficial. The north was firmly in control more than ever before and this balance did nothing to ease the ethnic and regional differences that had plagued the country. Describing the situation after April 1, 1965, Kenneth Post and Michael Vickers state that

And, of course, beneath all the trappings of power which in successive months had been arranged by the N.P.C., and grudgingly and resentfully agreed to by the NCNC, fundamental inter-sectional hostilities persisted relatively unabated. Particularly, eastern Ibo hostility, polarizing behind Okpara and the NCNC, continued to fester against Hausa-Fulani antagonists. The election had done nothing to moderate or resolve these inter-sectional hostilities, which in the final pre-election period had generated such stress on the political system. Rather, the election had served to exacerbate these tensions even further; and though it was frowned on to refer to the settlement between the North and the Okpara-led contingent from the East as a 'deal', in effect a 'deal' it was. Thus, widespread inter-sectional antagonism between the North and East particularly, antagonism which had been whipped up over a long period of time in the pre-election campaign, had been afforded no opportunity for a cathartic expression but instead, suppressed by the 'deal' between East and North party leaders, had been internalized. An explosive potential, therefore, was being confined within regional bounds.40

Because of these series of events the military finally seized control of the government which resulted in the assassination of the prime minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the Finance Minister, Festus Okotie-Eboh, the premier of the north Sarduana of Sokoto and the premier of the Western region S. L. Akintola.

First Military Coup

On January 15, 1966, a group of five young officers staged a coup d'etat that was militarily a partial success. The coup is described as a partial success because it succeeded only in Lagos and
part of the north. The bulk of the army did not go along with the ring leaders of the coup. The leader of the coup was Major Nzeogwu, an Ibo from the midwest. Many senior officers of the Nigerian army were killed and also a lot of politicians including the Prime Minister, the Northern Premier, and the Western Premier. Either by coincidence or design, most of the people who were executed were from the north and from the west, which tended to lend credence to the claim that it was an Ibo inspired coup. It should be pointed out that all but one of the leaders of the coup were Ibos. (See Table 5)

From the pronouncements made by Major Nzeogwu after the coup, one could not detect any ethnic or regional undertones. On the night of the coup Nzeogwu proclaimed that looting, arson, homosexuality, rape, embezzlement, bribery, corruption, etc., were all punishable by death. This is a proclamation that hardly justifies the ethnic interpretations that were given to the coup.

John Colas in his paper entitled "The Social and Career Correlates of Military Intervention in Nigeria: A Background Study of the January 15th Coup," states that "fragmentary" evidence suggests that conspirators were sick of politics and of politicians, they were highly idealistic nationalists fed up with the corruption around them and prepared to resort to violence to remold Nigeria in their own image of the ideal society.

Major Nzeogwu himself, in an interview made on British television explained that "we wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties, trade unions and the whole clumsy
Table 5
Training and Regional/Tribal Origin of Officers Detained for Alleged Complicity in the January 15, 1966 Coup

A. Federal List (all with regular combatant commissions at date of coup)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Commission</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Nzeogwu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Ifeajuna</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. D.O. Okafor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Anuforo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Ademoyega</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Onwuatuogwu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Obulie</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Nwobosi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Oji</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Oyewole</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/Lt. Azubuogor</td>
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<tr>
<td>2/Lt. Nwokocha</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/Lt. Ojukwu</td>
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B. Additional Names on Eastern List only
(i) with regular combatant commissions at date of coup

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<th>Name</th>
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<th>Commission</th>
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<td>Lt-Col. Banjo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Udeaja</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capt. Udo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Adeleka</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Ezedigbo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/Lt. Onyefuru</td>
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</tr>
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<td>2/Lt. Igwere</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/Lt. Egibkor</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/Lt. Olafimihan</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2/Lt. Ngwuluka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/Lt. Nwaka</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/Lt. Ikejiofor</td>
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</table>

(ii) five officers with direct short service commissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Commission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maj. Aghaya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Oksfor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Okaka</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Anyafulu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. Okocha</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iii) one Nigerian Air Force officer

Lt. Amuchinwa.

Notes: *denotes an officer with a degree or professional qualification.

Source: N. J. Miners, p. 188.
apparatus of the federal system. We wanted to gun down the big wigs on our way. This was the only way. We could not afford to let them live if this was to work. We got them but not all. General Ironsi was to have been shot. But we were not ruthless enough. As a result he and other compromisers were able to supplement us."43

The success of the coup and the ability of the organizers to take over the reins of authority after they had disposed of the civilian leaders, was stalemated by the refusal of supreme commander Major-General J. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi and other battalion commanders to join forces with them. Through a series of negotiations Major Nzeogwu surrendered to the supreme commander Ironsi on January 17, 1966, declaring that Ironsi had accepted to meet his demands which, among other things, included safety for him and his collaborators, compensation for members of the families of those officers who lost their lives in the coup and that "those whom we fought to remove would not be returned to office."44

Explaining his reasons for surrendering to Ironsi he declared that "I was being sensible. The last thing we desired was unnecessary waste of life. If I had stuck to my guns there would have been a civil war, and as the official head of the army, he would have split the loyalty of my men. Again, you must remember that the British and other foreigners were standing by to help him. Our purpose was to change our country and make it a place we could be proud to call our home, not to wage war."45
With the formal surrender to Ironsi, he promptly assumed the title of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the Head of the Military Government. His first task was to restore law and order in the western region and the Tiv division of the north, declaring that "it is our intention to maintain law and order until such a time when a constitution was brought out, according to the wishes of the people." Accordingly he also imposed military governments in the four regions with a military governor in each of the regions. Lieutenant Colonels C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, F. A. Fajuyi, D. A. Ejoor and Hassan Katsina were appointed military governors for the east, west, midwest and the north respectively. A command structure was established known as the Supreme Military Council composed of the Supreme Commander, Head of the Nigerian Army, Navy, Air Force and the four military governors. Another body known as the Federal Executive Council was established composed of all the members of the Supreme Military Council and the Inspector General of the police and his deputy.

Besides trying to restore law and order to the west and in Tiv division, one of Ironsi's main tasks was to get the army back in shape after the disorientation of the coup. A lot of army officers had fled the barracks and Directive No. 1 ordered that all officers must return and resume normal duties.

From public pronouncements and subsequent government policies, it was obvious that the new military government considered regionalism and ethnicity problems that had to be dealt with immediately. This was an awesome task considering the disposition of the north towards
the coup and the loss of their spiritual leader and premier, the
Sarduana of Sokoto. There was also the question of the loyalty of
the army officers from the north, a restive situation that plagued
Irons' regime all through. To placate the northerners, Major
Hassan Katsina, the son of one of the influential emirs was appointed
the governor of the north and was promoted to lieutenant colonel and
lieutenant colonel Yakubu Gowon was appointed Army Chief of Staff.
In May, a list of promotions was published in which three acting majors
Shuwa Mohammed, Muhammed Murtala and Haruna all northerners were
promoted acting lieutenant-colonel superceding their southern counter­
parts. 48

In his first major broadcast to the nation on January 28, 1966,
General Ironsi declared that "All Nigerians want an end to regionalism.
Tribal loyalties and activities which promote tribal consciousness
and sectional interests must give way to the urgent task of national
reconstruction." 49 Also in his budget speech made on March 29, 1966,
he (Irons) said inter alia "I have no doubt that the vast majority
of Nigerians are with us in our determination to work for the
eradication of those features of our public life that wrecked our
first attempt at democratic government. One of them, undoubtedly, was
divisive regionalism resulting from the nature of our original
constitution. I am convinced that the bulk of our people want a
united Nigeria and that they want in future, one government for
Nigeria and not a multitude of governments. This is the aim of the
Supreme Military Council and this is the frame of reference within which all our measures of national reconstruction, political, economic and administrative, must be formulated. 50

It was clear that the frame of reference referred to in the above address was really operative when in May he issued two decrees, No. 33 and 34 which were designed to "remove the last vestiges of the intense regionalism of the recent past." 51 Decree No. 33 abolished all political parties for three years: while Decree No. 34 in essence abolished the four regions by unifying the federal and regional civil services, vesting all legislative and economic powers on the National Military Government, only delegating powers to the military governors of the new group of provinces. Despite the well-meaning intent of the decree, it met with deep resentment from the northerners who saw this as a move to over extend Ibo domination to the north.

The Unification decree provoked a series of attacks on the Ibos, resident in the north, allegedly organized by former NPC leaders. The attacks continued unabated and it resulted in the murder of several Ibos. Attempts were made by Ironsi to back pedal from the decree when he announced that Decree 34 "in no way affected the territorial divisions of the country, because it was designed to meet the demands of the military government and enable it to carry out its day-to-day administration." 52

The cohesiveness of the army elite was shattered by the coup of January 1966, and in all indications could not be restored by Ironsi. The northern army officers had demanded retributive justice
for the participants of the January coup, but due to the sensitivity of the request, the matter was not dealt with. Northern army officers were further angered by the fact that the organizers of the coup were still being paid their salaries while in prison. To make matters worse, a list of promotions published in May 1966, showed that out of the twenty five officers promoted, only five were northerners. These promotions obscured the fact that three of the northerners promoted had superceded their southern counterparts and that in terms of army seniority system, the promotions were justified. After a series of unrests in the north and within the army, a group of northerners in the army murdered Ironsi on the night of July 29, 1966, and a new era began.

The wisdom of Ironsi' attempt to mitigate the cleavages in Nigeria is often questioned. One thing that is evident is that timing of the 'unification decree' was inexpedient and as Claude Welch and Arthur Smith put it, his "conceptions of what was politically appropriate were off the mark." Apart from the poor timing of his unification decree, he had sought very much to ingratiate himself with the northerners after the anti-Ibo riots in the north to a point where he appeared to be apologetic. One of his main short comings was his indecision and lack of firmness in a situation that called for nothing short of firmness and decisiveness. It may be a matter for historians to judge as to whether he embarked on the right approach for curbing the divisiveness in the Nigerian society or whether Nigerians were not yet prepared to sink their parochial differences for the common
good. However, one thing that was obvious from the events that followed Decrees 33 and 34 was that attempts to achieve unity failed woefully and further exacerbated the regional and ethnic differences and particularly discord within the army. On July 29, 1966, Ironsi was overthrown through a military coup.

The Second Coup

The July 29th, 1966, coup had all the trappings of a premeditated and well orchestrated vengeance against the Ibos as evidenced by the killings of Ibo officers in the Nigerian army. (See Table 6) There were conflicting accounts of the events of July 29, 1966. The northerners had claimed that the countercoup was a preemptive effort by northern officers to prevent the Ibos from finishing the work which they had started in January. A northern publication entitled "The Nigerian Situation: Facts and Background," had this to say:

Ironsi and his Ibo clique had in fact planned to do more than just conquer the North. But unfortunately for them...The God of Africa... did not permit the execution of the next part of the plan—'operation annihilation of Northern Nigerians'. A plan designed to annihilate completely certain categories of Northern Nigerians, including Chiefs, Commissioned and Warrant officers of the Nigerian Army and senior civil servants. The plan was spear-headed by zealous and over-confident Ibos who felt that Ironsi was not fast enough. Lt. Colonel Ojukwu was to be the new leader.

To implement the plan a group of Ibo Army Officers in Abeokuta in the early hours of July 29, 1966, attempted to disarm the Northern soldiers of the same unit. But after a scuffle the tide turned against the Ibos and by the end of the second day the Army personnel of Northern origin were in complete control all over the country...54
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Deaths of Officers (^a)</th>
<th>Deaths of Men (^b)</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Deaths of officers only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>Ibo</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-West</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Non-Ibo Mid West</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Non-Ibo East</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An eastern Nigerian publication gave a different account of the events and it explained that

Just as the pogrom of May 29, 1955, and after was largely a civilian affair so the holocaust of July 29 and after at least began as largely a military affair. In accordance with the decades-old policy of the North, the aim of the July 29 massacres was clearly two-fold: to split the country and establish an independent REPUBLIC OF THE NORTH: or to re-establish the dominance of the North (in cooperation with some elements in the West) over the rest of Nigeria...

As available evidence indicates the details of the second phase of the pogrom which started on July 29 are as follows: selected Northern Army officers and men were to be organized in formations at strategic military centres and given assignments for capturing various military installations, particularly armouries and magazines, and creating a situation which would make it appear that Eastern soldiers were on the offensive. At this point senior Northern Army officers would signal to their men in the various centers to commence operations on the pretext of crushing this 'Eastern Offensive'. The D-Day was given the code name 'ARABA (Hausa for "SECESSION") DAY'. On that day all arms and ammunition in all military units and installations were to be seized from Eastern soldiers and given to Northern soldiers. Eastern soldiers on guard duty would likewise be replaced by Northern soldiers. All this would leave the Easterners totally defenceless. In Lagos Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon (Chief of Staff, Army) was to install himself in the Central Operations Room to enable him to discharge his overall responsibility for co-ordinating the operations throughout the country. In the North the Military Governor Lt. Col. Hassan Usman Katsina, was to disappear so that no authority could have access to him to direct any counter-move. In the East the Military Governor, Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu was to be killed as early as possible. Most important of all, the Supreme Commander and Head of the National Military Government, Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi, was to be captured, wherever he might happen to be at the time, and killed. Finally, in all military centres all Eastern Officers were to be annihilated and any skilled Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and other soldiers of Eastern origin were to be detained and killed...

As was the case with the pogrom of May 29 among the leading personalities involved in the initial planning of the broad outlines of the operations were the discredited Northern ex-politicians and the Northern civil servants...
Despite these conflicting accounts of the events of July 1966, the origin and the identity of the planners and executioners was not in doubt. There were repeated calls for ARABA (Meaning Secession in Hausa) by northerners who in the few months of Ironsi's reign had believed it was the only way out. After the counter coup and bloodshed, there was doubt as to who was to emerge as the real leader of the coup. At first it was thought that Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed was to emerge as the strongman since he was the most prominent advocate of northern secession.

After a series of negotiations which included some civilians like the Chief Justice Sir Adetokunbo Ademola, a compromise candidate by the name of Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon emerged. He was a very unlikely prospect since he was from a minority tribe in the north. And also before the coup he had served as the army Chief of Staff, a position which hardly qualified him as the next in line. The logical successor was Brigadier Ogundipe who was not acceptable to the mutineers. This later turned out to be one of the main reasons why the governor of the eastern group of provinces Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu had declined to recognize Gowon as a legitimate leader.

In a broadcast on August 1, 1966, Gowon said among other things, that "as a result of recent events and other previous similar ones, I have come to strongly believe that one cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this wise as the basis for trust and confidence in our unitary system of government has been unable to stand the test of time...suffice it to say that putting all considerations to test,
political, economic as well as social, the basis for unity is not there or is so badly rocked not only once but several times. I therefore, feel that we should review the issue of our national standing and see if we can help stop the country from drifting away into other destruction."56

The northerners may have been placated temporarily by this broadcast, but an editorial by the leading Nigerian Daily, The Daily Times of August 2, 1966, fairly reflected the mood in the other parts of the country when it stated that "when a country is governed by the armed forces, members of those forces are involved in the kind of revolt which we have all witnessed in the past four days, all responsible people, however restrained they may be in their emotions know now that the follow up is anarchy...facing the blunt truth, we are moving towards the brink of anarchy, for the military men of our country have been killing themselves that it cannot truthfully be said that there is an effective Nigerian government."57

In a similar vein, Panter-Brick described the factors which enhanced ethnicity after the counter coup when he said that, "in July (1966) the army itself became a casualty with far-reaching consequences. It ceased to be an integrating force obeying a single command, and so ceased to be an integrating force for the country as a whole. Its dislocation under the July coup unleashed widespread political demands for regional autonomy, not only in the eastern but also in the northern and western regions. The situation in August 1966 was thus the reverse of that which had prevailed in mid-January. Instead of the regions
drawing together they were moving apart, endangering Nigeria's existence..."58 The circumstances under which Gowon took over office were to say the least unenviable from the standpoint of trying to unite a country that was plagued with a multitude of divisions and cleavages.

The Gowon Administration

During Gowon's broadcast on August 1, 1966, he had promised among other things to release political prisoners. These prisoners were those who had been detained after the Tiv riots of 1964 and those jailed with Chief Awolowo (twenty two in number) after they were found guilty of treasonable felony. The other promise was to review our 'national standing'. By releasing Chief Awolowo he sought to placate the Yorubas, and pursuant to the said promise, he ordered that all military personnel should return to their regions of origin. Meanwhile he had abrogated Decree No. 34, and the country had reverted to a federal system of government. On August 9th, Ibo soldiers outside the east were transferred home while northern soldiers in the east went back to the north. This was the beginning of a break up of the federation, a move that Gowon hardly envisaged in his bid to cool tempers off.

The division in the nation was pervasive engulfing virtually all segments in the country. Describing the situation B. J. Dudley states that:

In a frenzy of self-destruction, the once unified army had splintered into three 'factions': an 'eastern faction,' largely Ibo but including a number from the 'minority' groups
of the Eastern Region; a 'Mid-Western faction', some 40 percent of whom were Ibo-speaking Mid-Westerners, the remain-
ing 60 percent being made up of the other culture groups of the Mid-West; and a 'federal faction', mainly Northerners but still including Yoruba, non-Ibo-speaking Mid-Westerners and about 50 percent of the non-Ibo elements of the Eastern Region who had been in the army and had not fled to the East after the July rebellion. Between and within these three factions there were varying degrees of hostility, the most pronounced being that between the 'Eastern faction,' and the 'federal faction'. Like the army, the intelligentsia were also divided: between those who saw the rebellion of the Northern soldiers as an attempt to re-establish the 'dominance' of the North and who were therefore opposed to the new regime, and those who, while deploring the killings that marked the July rebellion, nevertheless, still held to the idea of federation. In other words, the intelligentsia were divided into two opposing camps—the anti-federalists and the federalists. The former itself was made up of two broad groups: in the first category were those who, though opposed to federation, would however prefer to see the country split into two, into a North and a South; while the second represented those who now saw the Federation as a 'geographical expression' whose component cultural groups would be best constituted as autonomous political units.59

It should not be taken for granted that the 'federal faction'
was a monolith as the Yorubas themselves were envisaging a separate existence, but playing it safe. By September-October, there was renewed violence in the North against Ibos. Reports indicated that Ibos were brutally murdered, their properties were looted and destroyed. The prevailing mood was that these actions were being instigated by northern leaders with benign neglect from the federal government. The refugees that had fled from the north to the east constituted an eloquent testimony to the fact that the whole assault on the Ibos had at least the tacit support of the federal government when the latter failed to make good on a promise to provide some money for the rehabilitation of refugees.60
Events were fastly gravitating toward a break up of the federation. The intra ethnic problem was also quickly turning into a personality conflict between Gowon and Ojukwu. The later had vehemently refused to accept the authority of Gowon claiming that the appointment of Gowon as the Supreme Commander had defied the hierarchical structure of the army.61

A constitutional conference which convened in September, 1966, had all but recommended a confederal arrangement giving the regions near autonomy, had also aroused one of the thorny issues that had beset the country since the colonial days. There was also the question of minorities that was still unresolved. Part of the northern delegation especially from the middle belt had advocated that the north be broken up into smaller states which meant that the east would also be broken up. This suggestion was not favorable to Ojukwu as it would weaken his power base.62

Another attempt was made in January 1967, to forestall the breaking up of the country. A meeting of the military leaders was summoned in Aburi Ghana. The differences between Gowon and Ojukwu appeared irreconcilable. Decree No. 8 which was issued in March 1967, almost gave veto powers to the regions on territorial matters and on capital expenditure of the federation, but provided a caveat which gave the federal government the right to declare a state of emergency in the regions with the consent of the governors. With the meeting deadlocked, it became obvious that the east was bound for secession.63

On the night of May 26, 1967, a conference of eastern leaders of
thought gave Ojukwu a mandate to secede. On the same night, Gowon announced the creation of more states in the federation for a total of twelve. The north was divided into four regions, the east into three, and one for west, Lagos and midwest (see Figure 1). On May 30, 1967, Ojukwu announced the birth of a new nation called Biafra and in July 1967, the war between the federal government of Nigeria and Biafra commenced and ended with the Biafran surrender on January 12, 1970.

There is one contention that states that the creation of states was a ploy at forestalling Ojukwu's move to secede while another contention is that the move by Gowon was a bold venture in diffusing the age long problem of minorities which the civilians were unable to do. Irrespective of the timing, it was thought that the creation of more states represented a positive step towards allaying inter-regional rivalry that had been occasioned by the sheer size of the north and the unfair revenue allocation system that favored only the large regions.

The timing of the creation of states coincided almost with the period of the civil war and the benefits were hard to judge. If it was an attempt to create dissension within the Eastern Region, it failed because a preponderance of military officers and top ranking civil servants that belonged to the new states in the Eastern Region were active participants on the Biafran side.

The secession of Biafra poses a very serious problem of interpretation in terms of what it tells one of elite cohesiveness within
Figure 1: Nigeria: The Twelve States
the army and national unity as a whole. It could be argued that the fact that the rest of the nation stuck with Gowon was an indication that the east was an odd state out since the other tribes appeared united to fight against Biafra. It could also be argued that the secession of Biafra represented an eloquent testimony to the fact that the elites were divided, cleavages unmanageable, and that Gowon had failed to meet the serious challenges posed by cleavages. In spite of these arguments one must concede that there are two ways on legitimizing a government. One is by constitutional and peaceful means and the other is by coercion. The collapse of Biafra indicates that Gowon had established the legitimacy of the federal government, albeit through force.

After the capitulation of Biafra on January 1970, the problem of cleavages loomed even larger, but from the onset, Gowon seemed to be addressing himself to the solution of those problems. He had declared at the end of the war that "There will be no Nuremberg trials...we will bind up the nation's wounds."64 This declaration was followed by a policy of reconciliation in which many Ibo officers were reabsorbed into the Nigerian army and ex-civil servants who had stayed in Biafra were ordered to be rehabilitated by giving them salary advances. To say the least, these gestures were magnanimous and went a long way towards ameliorating the intensity of ethnic cleavages that had existed between the Ibos and the rest of Nigeria.
Before the civil war, the most divisive issues were, other than regionalism/ethnicity, revenue allocation, the census, and the creation of more states. These issues were greatly responsible for inter-regional and inter-ethnic cleavages that badly divided the elites and thereby dissipated energies that could have been best used to promote economic and social development in Nigeria.

In his address to the country, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Nigeria's Independence on October 1st, 1970, Gowon addressed himself to these problems that were mentioned above. He listed nine tasks which he considered most crucial for the military to accomplish before handing over to civilians and among them were:

a) the introduction of a new revenue allocation formula; b) conducting a national population census; c) the settlement and the creation of more states.65

The question of creating more states was treated with some emphasis since one of the problems that had plagued the nation during the civilian days was the domination of the north over the southern regions that were disproportionately smaller in population and size. This advantage in size and population had given the north unfair advantages in revenue allocation and a share of parliamentary seats. Gowon had created more states in May 1967, as a pre-emptive move to create dissension within the eastern region, but by the end of the war that move had proved beneficial in terms of allaying the fears of the minorities. In this broadcast he stated among other things that "no one state should be in a position to dominate or control the central government."66
However his explanation was meant to justify the creation of states in May 1967, rather than justification for more states because he had declared that "the instability and the difficulties involved in embarking upon an exercise of creating more states will not be worthwhile in the present circumstances."\textsuperscript{67}

**Revenue Allocation Dispute**

This was one of the major tasks to which Gowon had addressed himself to, realizing that revenue allocation is inextricably linked to regional rivalry. The existing formula used by the federal government played an important role in fomenting ethnic and regional animosities because, the principle of derivation enabled the richer regions to grow wealthier, thereby breeding ill feelings and resentment and further aggravating the problems of cleavages.\textsuperscript{68} Gowon himself had declared that the federal government was committed to giving financial assistance to needy states to enable them to stand on their own feet and play an effective role in the task of nation building.

The recommendations of the Dina Commission set in 1969 to review the allocation formula was rejected but by 1970, the federal government had made some compromises by holding back only 55 percent of the revenues and sending back 45 percent to the states of derivation. The distributable pool was divided into two. The first half was distributed to the states equally, irrespective of size and the other half was distributed according to population.\textsuperscript{69} In 1971, there was a further modification of the formula and the federal
government held back as much as 80 percent of the revenues and the
states of origins got 20 percent. This new formula met the needs of
ten out of the twelve states except for the Mid-west and Rivers which
produced the bulk of the revenues from oil alone.

In terms of population, these two states were too insignificant
to make any appreciable impact. Gowon announced in a broadcast in
October 1, 1974, a modified formula which was designed to solve the
problem. While the royalties paid to the state government still
remained at 20 percent, the federal government was to surrender its
share of the royalties and add them to the distributable pool account.
The reasoning behind this according to Gowon was "our (federal govern­
ment) desire to promote even development throughout the federation."70

The adequacy of the new formula in meeting the desire expressed by
Gowon cannot be assessed at this time, but the formula met with the
approval of a great majority of the states and for a while minimized
the divisive potential of revenue allocation formula, a problem which
Ojukwu had cited as one of his reasons for secession. However, this
new formula heightened the demand for more states since any new state
would be assured of viability.

The New Census Controversy

In fulfillment of his nine point program, Gowon announced in a
broadcast that the military government would conduct another census in
1973, remarking that "the last population census was taken in 1963
amidst a great deal of acrimony."71 Earlier in this chapter there
was a discussion of the census of 1962/63 and the attendant discord and disunity it had created. The census was conducted between November 23 and December 2, 1973, and on May 8, 1974 the provisional figures were released giving Nigeria a total of 79.76 million as against 55.66 million in 1963, a percentage rise of 43.5%. (See total breakdown by states in Table 7.) The six northern states had risen by 72.4% and the six southern states had risen by only 9.7%. These figures no doubt raised once more the specter of 1963. It had all the potential of exacerbating the old north-south cleavage.

Realizing this great danger, Gowon sought to placate many Nigerians by announcing that the figures were provisional and that they would not be used for planning. The results were unnecessarily delayed thereby giving rise to speculations that the figures were manipulated.

The controversy over these results did not reach the magnitude of the 1962/63 controversy, nevertheless, the same mood was there except that the dispute over the figures were based on individual states. The Ibos could not be involved in the controversy because of their subdued position after their defeat in the war. The Yorubas were known to have complained bitterly about the figures, but they could not be joined by the Ibos to make a strong impact on the federal government. The figures were called provisional, yet they were used in revenue allocation. (See Table 8)

One of the strongest critics of the census figures was Chief Obafemi Awolowo. He stated that the interim results had sown "The seeds of fierce inter-ethnic strife...the provisional figures have
Table 7

Nigerian Census Figures: Percentage of Increase or Decrease by States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>Approx. % increase or decrease</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benue-Plateau</td>
<td>4.01m.</td>
<td>5.17m.</td>
<td>+28.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>5.77m.</td>
<td>10.90m.</td>
<td>+88.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>2.40m.</td>
<td>4.64m.</td>
<td>+93.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Central</td>
<td>4.10m.</td>
<td>6.79m.</td>
<td>+65.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern</td>
<td>7.79m.</td>
<td>15.38m.</td>
<td>+97.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Western</td>
<td>5.73m.</td>
<td>8.50m.</td>
<td>+48.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Central</td>
<td>7.23m.</td>
<td>8.06m.</td>
<td>+11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>1.44m.</td>
<td>2.47m.</td>
<td>+71.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-West</td>
<td>2.54m.</td>
<td>3.24m.</td>
<td>+27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>1.54m.</td>
<td>2.23m.</td>
<td>+44.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Eastern</td>
<td>3.62m.</td>
<td>3.46m.</td>
<td>-4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>9.49m.</td>
<td>8.92m.</td>
<td>-5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55.66m.</td>
<td>79.76m.</td>
<td>+43.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8
Nigeria: Population and Statutory Allocation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N. West</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>34.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Central</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>11.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>47.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>139.9</td>
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<td>70.0</td>
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(N1.5 = 1)

Nigeria - Population and percentage, old regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old Region</th>
<th>1963 census (mill.)</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>1973 census (mill.)</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mid-West</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
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</table>

revised with greater vividness and starker reality, the erstwhile fear of permanent domination of one group of Nigerians by another..."73 He proposed that Nigeria stick for 20 years by the 1963 statistics as "the least bad; the least ugly, and therefore the most acceptable of all our bad, ugly and disreputable census results."74 Despite all these protestations, Nigerians seemed to have weathered the potential storm by heeding the admonition of Mr. J.S. Tarka (a prominent northerner from Gowon's Tiv area) "to shut up in the interest of national unity."75

This statement by J.J. Tarka seemed to have characterized the general mood in the country at least by the elites. Dissension was mooted but never to a point that the legitimacy of the government was challenged. But that was not to last for a long time.

In spite of this apparent 'success' on the part of Gowon there were definite indications that the nation was getting restive with Gowon's administration. This restiveness finally resulted in his overthrow on July 29, 1975, while he was attending a meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Kampala Uganda.

There have been several speculations as to why he was overthrown, but one reason that has surfaced very often is the fact that he had stayed too long in power—nine years.76 But perhaps the most immediate reason for his ouster was his public announcement in October 1974, in which he stated that the army would not return the country to civilian rule in 1976, as had been expected by millions of Nigerians.
The disenchantment with Gowon also surfaced within his administration which ultimately weakened his power base.

At the end of the civil war, Gowon had set some goals which he hoped to accomplish before the army relinquished power to the civilians. Some of these goals were the creation of more states, eradication of bribery and corruption and return to civilian rule by 1976. These goals were unfulfilled and his stature within the military and the general public began to diminish. The public began to perceive him as undecisive and incompetent. This perception of him created the atmosphere for Brigadier Murtala Mohammed to muster enough support within the army to overthrow Gowon's administration.

It may be too early to evaluate Gowon's performance relative to how he tried to accomplish his goals. The broadcast made by Gowon's successor on July 30, 1975, gives us an indication that the overthrow of Gowon may have been due in part to power struggle with the army, very unrelated to Gowon's failure as a national leader. In this broadcast Murtala Mohammed states among other things that "after the civil war, the affairs of the state, hitherto a collective responsibility, became characterized by lack of consultation, indecision, indiscipline and even neglect...the feeling of disillusion was also evident among members of the armed forces who's administration was neglected, but, who, out of sheer loyalty to the nation, and, in the hope that there would be a change, continued to suffer in silence."
In the subsequent chapters, we hope to test the following hypotheses:

(1) In a civilian regime, the potency of cleavages is very high thereby reducing the ability of the government to engender social and economic development.

(2) In a military regime the potency of cleavages is very low thereby enhancing the government's ability to promote social and economic development.
FOOTNOTES


2Ibid., p. 3.


6Ibid., p. 47.


8Ibid., p. 47.

9Frederick Schwarz, Jr., op. cit., p. 72.

10James Coleman, op. cit., p. 320.


13Isaac Mowoe, op. cit., p. 350.

14James Coleman, op. cit., p. 350.

15Frederick Schwarz, Jr., op. cit., p. 75.

16Ibid., p. 75.

17Ahmadu Bello, My Life (An Autobiography) Quoted in F. Schwarz, Jr., p. 79.
18Frederick Schwarz, op. cit., p. 79.


21Frederick Schwarz, Jr., op. cit., p. 111.

22John Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 423.


24John Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 546.


27Arthur Nwankwo, op. cit., p. 45.


31Ibid., p. 184.


33Ibid., March 11, 1964.

34*Sarduana Accepts Census Figures: Answers Critics One by One* (Gaskiya Corporation, Zaria, 1964), p. 2.

35Dr. M.I. Okpara, "Pragmatic African Socialism" (Lecture delivered to students at the University of Ife) Ibadan, 1965.


37Walter Schwarz, op. cit., p. 166.


48 Ibid., p. 185.


51 See Claude Welch, op. cit., p. 127.


53 Claude Welch, op. cit., p. 127.


55 January 15th, Before and After, (Enugu, Nigeria). See also Luckham, op. cit., p. 62.


62 Ibid., p. 228.

63 Ibid., p. 229.


66 Ibid., p. 6.

67 Ibid., p. 7.

68 See Isaac Mowoe, op. cit., p. 133.

69 Africa Confidential, October 18, 1974, p. 2.

70 Ibid., p. 2.

71 Yakubu Gowon, op. cit., p. 8.


73 Africa Confidential, July 26, 1974, p. 2.

74 Ibid., p. 4.

75 Ibid., p. 4.


77 Africa Confidential "Why Gowon Feil", August 1, 1975.

Chapter III

Economic and Social Development in Nigeria; 1961-1975:
A Comparison of Civilian and Military Regimes

The central theme of this dissertation is to compare the level of economic and social development under the civilian regime (1961-1966) with that of the military regime 1970-1975 in order to make a judgement as to the capability of each regime to perform in those areas. Sometimes the distinction between economic and social development is a very tenuous one because the indices which are often times used are overlapping and confusing. To avoid any confusion in terminology, the term economic development will be used in an all embracing way except where explanations are necessary.

What do we mean by economic and social development? Samuel Huntington says that economic development entails "a diversification of activity as a few simple occupations give way to many complex ones; the level of occupational skills rises significantly; the ratio of capital to labor increases; subsistence agriculture itself declines in significance compared to commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural activities."\(^1\)

He states further that economic development is "the growth in the total economic activity and output of a society. It may be measured by per capita gross national product, level of industrialization, the level of individual welfare gauged by such indices as life
expectancy, caloric intake, supply of hospitals and doctors." ²

From the above definition, it is obvious that the author encompasses both quantitative and qualitative facets of economic development.

The problem with the standard definitions of economic development is the great emphasis usually placed on growth exemplified by indices such as Gross National Product, Gross Domestic Product, Income per capita. While these indices may be meaningful in terms of industrialized societies, they hardly address the critical issues of distribution and even development in the Third World.

For one to understand or perhaps appraise developments in a country like Nigeria, it is necessary to note that Nigeria's economy is characterized by the common attributes of underdeveloped economy such as:

1) low life expectancy at birth, high infant mortality rates, poor health, and illiteracy;

ii) low per capita output and poverty

iii) high level of subsistence production

iv) non diversified economy and great emphasis on primary production

v) little or no manufacturing industry

vi) inadequate scientific and technological know how applying to agriculture and industry. ³

Some of these characteristics may be mitigated in the case of Nigeria, primarily as a result of huge revenues accruing from petroleum. Nevertheless, one must look at economic development in Nigeria not only from the standpoint of gross economic indicators, even though they may give one an indication of the state of economy, but also
from the standpoint of improvement in the qualitative aspects of life, "the capacity of the economy to provide social services, food and shelter for the populace."

With the acute underdevelopment of the private sector in Nigeria, the role of the government and its capability to engender economic development becomes increasingly crucial.

One issue which this study will attempt to do is to evaluate priorities of the two regimes. By this I mean sectoral priorities. Sectoral priorities refer to such decisions as to whether more effort and money should be devoted to agriculture instead of industry or whether more effort should be allocated to transport and communications rather than education and many other decisions of this nature. The reason for this is that sectoral priorities will invariably determine the qualitative benefits of development. For example an emphasis on industry rather than on agriculture or food production may or may not put Nigeria in the track of Western route of development while at the same time undermining the importance of domestic food production.

The view that economic development should not be measured only in terms of economic growth is shared by Charles Kindleberger, when he states that "economic growth is generally thought of as unidimensional and is measured by increases in income, while economic development involves growth as well as structural and functional changes."
In the Third World countries, the question confronting all the leaders there is not whether to develop but how to develop. Most governments of the Third World, particularly military regimes, profess to have economic development as their topmost priority. There is a growing awareness and dependability of most developing countries on western technology, partly due to exposure of elites to western thought processes and also as a result of colonial legacy. This phenomenon is described by Richard Gill as the "demonstration effect." And he states that through the mass media, the underdeveloped countries have become exposed to the high standards of living of the advanced societies which consequently resulted in demands for rapid development.5 One of the by products of this dependency on western technology and western thinking is that original and imaginative economic development approach is lacking. Therefore, many African regimes have failed to provide cures for the economic ills of their societies because they have tried to cure the ills with the wrong prescriptions.

From a political development standpoint, it is being argued that economic development may be one of the most effective means of nation building and national integration. Ideally, economic development should represent an equitable distribution of products of economic growth and where there is an attempt at equity—economic and social well being—the net result is to reduce social frustrations and consequently political instability.6 On the other hand economic development could be a highly destabilizing process. Huntington advances the arguments
that rapid economic development could result in the following:

a) disruption of traditional social groupings
b) increasing the incomes of some people absolutely but not relatively and hence increasing their dissatisfaction with the existing order
c) increasing literacy, education and exposure to news media which increases aspirations beyond levels where they can be satisfied, i.e., the "frustration of rising expectations"
d) aggravating regional and ethnic conflicts over the distribution of investment and consumption. 7

There is a lot of merit in Huntington's contentions, but the most obvious reason for the problems he mentions above is not intrinsic in economic development itself, but in the management of economic development. Because of the acute underdevelopment of the private sector, the government is most of the time the sole arbiter of economic activity in the underdeveloped world. Besides the problems mentioned above, there are other difficulties which confront developing nations as they try to develop economically, for example the acute shortage of skilled labor and management, the uneasy political climate which is often beset by cleavages and the ever increasing population.

In the case of Nigeria, some of these problems may appear more intense than in a lot of other countries. The analysis provided by Edwin Dean in his book Plan Implementation In Nigeria, provides a good indication of problems facing Nigeria in her bid to develop. He states among other things that:

Theregional orientation of Nigerian politics conflicted with the attempt to implement a national plan, and in particular
with the attempt to implement the priorities set forth under the inspiration of the Federal planners. The Federal Government did not use its considerable financial leverage to influence the performance of the regional governments.

Regional rivalries, and the difficulty of influencing the regions to implement the plan's policies and priorities, influenced the formulation of the plan itself. Each region attempted to secure the largest possible expenditure target for its own plan, and, by implication, the largest Federal financial support for its plan; this rivalry was mentioned in the previous chapter. Further, Peter Clark stated that 'the regional planning was about the planning exercise independently; each drew up its own programme and employed its own method of review and evaluation. Only under strong pressure was a uniform sectoral format employed for the presentation of the regional plans in the national document.' He further explained that 'rivalry among the governments often hindered...the regional interchange of ideas, information, or personnel...'

Earlier it was stated that the government is usually the sole arbiter of economic activity in the third world and with a few exceptions like agriculture, development and all the growth of other sectors of the economy are significantly dependent on what the government does. For the sake of clarity, an evaluation of the economic development performance of both regimes will be subdivided into

a) The general state of the economy which will look at broad measures like Gross National Product and Gross Domestic Product. These indicators will give one a general picture of the state of the economy.

b) direct government services and their impact on such sectors as agriculture, education, transport and communications, industries, power (electricity generation)

c) The revenues generated by the government, both internal and external.
If one knows the resources i.e. monetary/fiscal, one is exposed to one more variable which may help in explaining any difference in performance.

In discussing the agricultural sector we will look at the role of farmers especially with regard to food production. The reason for this is that the bulk of agricultural production has taken place in Nigeria with little or no government directed policy or incentives. Though recently, the government is getting involved in providing fertilizers and more information for improved agricultural techniques. Therefore one should look at food production for domestic consumption and export which were done in spite of government involvement and also at government directed efforts to improve agricultural development.

Using the indices of economic development already discussed, an attempt will be made to compare each sectoral performance of the civilian regime (from 1961-66) to that of the military (from 1970-75) with a view to determining which regime had a better overall performance.

However, a proper place to start is to give a general economic picture or rather the state of the Nigerian economy by the time of the Nigerian independence in 1960. This preamble is necessary because it gives one a base from which further comparisons can be made.
When the British colonial administration took control of the territory now known as Nigeria in 1900 they inherited a collection of communities which were practically isolated from one another and from the rest of the world. The inhabitants were primarily engaged in subsistence farming. Food production and processing were done mainly for feeding one's own family and very localized trade. The level of technology was very prosaic, involving the use of hoes.

It should be pointed out here that in the northern part of Nigeria especially in Kano, there are historical facts that indicate some trading activities across the Sahara prior to British arrival. But these facts do not alter the general picture of the Nigerian economy before the advent of the British. Nigeria's economy was essentially static until the British introduced some external impetus.

The arrival of British and European trading firms and missionaries changed the structural make-up of the Nigerian economy by providing local farmers with rewards for purchase of such items as groundnuts cocoa and palm oil and palm kernels.

British colonial policy placed a high priority on developing a transport and communications system to promote trade across the country. This in turn made possible the beginning of an export economy. The expansion of trade was very much crucial to the British economy and they introduced measures to diversify the Nigerian economy and encouraged farmers to utilize more land.
Export crop production rose significantly especially with the introduction of cotton which was a valuable commodity in the international market. Cocoa exports rose from 202 tons in 1900 to 52,331 tons in 1935. Palm kernels rose from 85,624 tons to 312,746 in the same time period.12

Mining and manufacturing were virtually non-existent until the 1950's, as the British administration was more interested in building an agricultural economy. This sector was not developed because the large trading companies like the United Africa Company and the United Trading Company realized that there was much profit in exporting agriculture produce and in turn importing consumer goods for sale in Nigeria.13

Before Nigerian independence in 1960, the Nigerian economy had just begun to recover from a period of stagnation due to the depression. The main economic activities centered on agriculture and trading because the colonial regime devoted itself to balancing the budget. But the economy did not pick up significantly until after World War II when the production and distribution of agricultural products both for domestic consumption and export dominated the Nigerian economy.14

However, it is not until the 1950's that industrial development took place in Nigeria and the government became more involved in planning. Following this take off, there was a remarkable growth in economic activity especially from 1950-1960. The GNP at factor cost (indicates cost of production before taxation) between 1950-1954...
was increasing at the rate of 6.1 percent per year and the final expenditure (indicates total resource used) at 7.2 percent. But between 1954-1960 there was a slow down of growth. The GDP grew at 2.7 percent and final expenditure grew at 3.7 percent yearly.¹⁵ There was also a remarkable increase in the gross investment ratio from 6.9 percent in 1950 to 15.4 percent in 1960. Also the current expenditure of the government on goods and services increased from 3.4 percent of GDP in 1950 to 7.5 percent in 1960. Also accounting for the boost in the economy was the growth in the imports, which accounted for 24.7 percent of GDP in 1960 while it accounted for only 10.7 percent in 1950.¹⁶ Generally, these figures indicate a real growth of Gross Domestic Product.

At this point it might be necessary to look at sectoral growth of the economy by independence in order to give us a fairly accurate indication of the state of the economy when the civilians took over the reins of government.

**Industrial Development in Nigeria 1950-1960**

Industrial development did not take off in Nigeria before 1950. The industrial sector in Nigeria is usually defined to include manufacturing, mining, and public utilities. The growth rates of the individual components of the industrial sector vary. (See Table 1) The table indicates that mining contributed little in the overall economy because before 1960, petroleum yield was very low. Public utilities grew consistently at an annual rate of 19 percent. Manufacturing also grew tremendously from almost nothing prior to 1950 to an annual rate of 16.6 percent.¹⁷
Table 9
Volume Index of Industrial Production

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<th></th>
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<td>93</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>151</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: O. Aboyade, *Foundations of an African Economy* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 134. These indexes were computed by Aboyade from the files of the Federal Office of Statistics. For manufacturing, 93 percent of the value added in 1957 is included. (See Eicher, pg. 73)

The value of manufacturing production rose from 3 million pounds in 1950 to roughly 15 million pounds in 1960. Despite this rapid growth, total production represented only 1.3 percent of GDP in 1960 and one of the main impediments to increased production was the deficiency of high and intermediate level manpower like entrepreneurs, managers, supervisors, foremen and technologists.  

In 1950, a great deal of manufacturing activity was concentrated in Lagos and the Western Region as a matter of fact, accounting for 86 percent of the manufacturing. This remained the case until 1954 when manufacturing activity shifted more to the eastern and northern regions. This diversification of industrial production may be attributed to the establishment of a department of commerce with one of the aims of accelerating "the tempo of industrial development in Nigeria". One other reason accounting for rapid industrial production was according to Gerald Helleiner, "the new
interest was to a great extent the product of the gradual transfer of governmental authority from representatives of the colonial power to Nigerians, who were, in general, far more anxious to attain rapid economic development, decreased dependence upon raw material exports, expanding urban employment opportunities, and modernity for their economy.20

One of the factors which aided industrial development in Nigeria was the sizeable increase in power generation for industrial use. In 1950 output was 61.1 million kilowatt hours and by 1960 it had risen to 448.3 million kilowatt hours.21 Industry was consuming 48.6 percent of total energy production. Another significant factor which aided industrial development was a host of incentives dished out by the government. These incentives include among other things:

a) income tax relief
b) import duties relief on industrial outputs
c) accelerated depreciation allowances particularly on plants for which 40 percent was chargeable in the first year
d) protected import duties or quotas and
e) reassuring declarations of intent with respect to foreign investments.22

Agricultural Development (1950-60)

Agriculture, (non-subsistence) for a long period accounted for the bulk of the Nigerian GDP. By 1960, it accounted for 56.7 percent of GDP.23 In terms of contribution to the national income, it represented 75 percent while industry accounted for only 2 percent.
In the last two decades before independence, there was a rapid increase in the export crop production and the main export commodities like cocoa, groundnuts and palm products virtually doubled in the same period. (See Table 10) One of the factors responsible for the increase in export produce was due to improvement in agricultural techniques and plenty of land acquisition. Within this same period researchers had found the causes of blackpod and capsid diseases of cocoa. And between 1958-59 a heavy spraying campaign was mounted which destroyed the disease and consequently accounted for as much as 40-50 percent of the increase in production. Meanwhile Nigeria emerged as the world's largest exports of groundnut raising its export from 169,480 tons in 1940 to 332,916 tons in 1960.24

Other major export crops like cocoa, palm kernels, palm oil, cotton and rubber had risen significantly. Between 1950 and 1960, cocoa exports had risen in volume from 100,000 tons to 180,000 with a corresponding rise in revenue from 19 million pounds to 35 million pounds in 1960. Export of palm kernels remained at 420,000 tons, but the revenue had increased from 16.5 million pounds to 25 million pounds (approximate figures, see Table 10). The government was actively involved in this development between 1955-61; the government had spent about 18.9 million pounds which represents 5.7% of the capital expenditure.25
### Table 10

**Principal Export Commodities from Nigeria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cocoa (Long Tons)</th>
<th>Palm Kernels (Long Tons)</th>
<th>Palm Oil (Long Tons)</th>
<th>Peanuts (Long Tons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>000</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>77,004</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>292,588</td>
<td>3,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>114,199</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>176,242</td>
<td>2,696</td>
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<tr>
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<td>99,949</td>
<td>18,984</td>
<td>415,906</td>
<td>16,694</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>173,010</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>311,221</td>
<td>15,237</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>88,413</td>
<td>26,187</td>
<td>433,234</td>
<td>19,196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>182,143</td>
<td>13,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>396,904</td>
<td>23,134</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>154,176</td>
<td>36,772</td>
<td>418,176</td>
<td>26,062</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>183,360</td>
<td>13,892</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>332,916</td>
<td>22,878</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Nigeria, Trade Reports. See also Carl Eicher and Carl Liedholm, *Growth and Development of the Nigerian Economy*, p. 11.*
Educational Development (1950-60)

Both the colonial and Nigerian administrators had expressed firm commitment to the development of education in Nigeria. Educational development was basically possible in the Southern part of Nigeria because of the relatively easy adaptation and assimilation of the southerners to western education. The north had been hampered by the strong attachment to its Islamic culture and heritage. By 1952, the eastern and western regions had pioneered several efforts to promote education in the two regions by establishing regional ministries of education.

To underscore the importance of educational development, Mr. Awokoya, the Minister of Education for the Western Region argued that "the establishment of universal primary education and secondary primary education was of utmost importance because educational development is imperative and urgent. It must be treated as a national emergency, second only to war..."26 In the same vein, Chief Awolowo states that "to educate the children and enlighten the illiterate adults is to lay a solid foundation not only for future social and economic progress but also for political stability. A truly educated citizenry is, in my view, one of the most powerful deterrents to dictatorship, oligarchy and feudal autocracy."27 To this end he argues that "as far as possible, expenditure on services which tends to the welfare, health and education of the people should be increased at the expense of any expenditure that does not answer to the same test."28
In January 1955, the Western House had passed legislation providing for universal primary education. A year later primary school enrollment in the west had increased by 26 percent, rising from 35 percent to 61 percent or from 457,000 to 811,000 pupils. The number of primary schools also increased by 30 percent and the number of primary school teachers increased from 17,000 to 27,000. Meanwhile government expenditure on education was about 34 percent of the government's total expenditure.

The Eastern Region followed almost the same pattern of development. Universal free primary education was introduced in 1957. From 1956 to 1957, enrollment in the primary schools increased by 48 percent. The number of primary school teachers also increased from 30,000 to 41,000 and the number of primary schools increased from 5,060 to 6,986. The government in turn was spending about 33 percent of its total expenditure on educational development.

Immediately before World War II, total enrollment in Nigerian primary schools was about 300,000 and 6,000 in secondary schools. In the North educational development was not significant since 90 percent of primary school enrollment and even a greater proportion of secondary school enrollment was in the south. In percentage terms, about 2 percent were enrolled in the North, while 18 percent of school age were enrolled in the South. Constitutional provisions had entrusted educational development to the regions, and perhaps some interregional rivalry had made the regions to embark upon rapid and ambitious ventures. The enrollment in schools had far exceeded the anticipated projection and this in turn created
problems in terms of adequate and skilled teachers and employment for school leavers. Schools were becoming over crowded and teachers were ill prepared for the task. Despite these problems, the south had embarked on a right course of action to stamp out illiteracy. However, the regional dimension of educational development had created a large disparity between the North and the South, a fact which is generally regarded as one of the main problems that heightened regional rivalry.

The government had also embarked on university level education which resulted in the establishment of a medical school in Lagos in 1930 and a higher college which granted diplomas in narrow gauged vocational training. In 1937, the government granted a few scholarships for study abroad. It was not until 1948 that a university-college was established in Ibadon which granted University of London degrees. In the same year, Colleges of Arts and Sciences and technology were established in each of the regions granting technical degrees. It was estimated that at independence, total enrollment in higher institutions was about 2,000; about half were believed to be studying abroad on private funding.32

Transport and Communications (1950-60)

Table 11 clearly indicates the commitment of the government in developing a sound and meaningful transport and communications system in Nigeria. Between 1951 and 1955 federal government expenditure constituted 24.3 percent of the total budget and between 1956 and 1960 it had risen to 33.3 percent. The importance of this
Table 11


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>1951-1955</th>
<th>1956-1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and Communications</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other unallocable</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other general</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal development institutions</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and justice</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocable public works</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other community</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expenditures</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

expenditure cannot be over emphasized since the success of economic and social undertakings depend a great deal on the adequacy and effectiveness of a network of transport and communications system. Government activity in this area took the form of construction and improvement of roads, bridges, port facilities, electricity installations, dams, railway mileage, airports, telephone and telegraph services, etc. 33

A great bulk of the expenditure was in the area of road building. In 1946, only 705 miles of tarred roads existed in all of Nigeria. By 1960, Nigeria had a total of over 40,000 miles of road of which over 5,000 miles was tarred (See Table 12). The federal government maintained what is known as Trunk 'A' roads which linked the major cities in the three regions. By 1960, 6,000 miles of roads had linked the North and South, the East and the West.

There was also development in the area of rail transportation. In 1948, only about 34 mainline railway engines were operative. Following a recommendation of the International Bank mission to Nigeria in 1953, the Nigerian Railway Corporation was established. It proceeded right away to introduce diesel locomotives in 1955 which made it possible to handle heavier loads that were easier to maintain. The railway system was also extended between the North and East of Nigeria. 34 The railway system had helped tremendously in both transportation of goods and passengers and also provided a lot of employment. (See Table 13) Between 1956-60, the Railway Corporation had spent over 12 million pounds in general improvements of tracks, signalling equipment etc. 35 By 1960, it owned 1,800
Table 12
Length of Nigerian Roads, 1945–1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date 31 March</th>
<th>Local authorities</th>
<th>Government outside townships</th>
<th>Government in townships</th>
<th>Tarred</th>
<th>Gravel or earth</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>20,686</td>
<td>7,066</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>1,024</td>
<td>27,018</td>
<td>28,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>19,774</td>
<td>7,673</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>1,114</td>
<td>26,570</td>
<td>27,759*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>20,424</td>
<td>7,382</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>26,866</td>
<td>28,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>21,274</td>
<td>7,211</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>1,631</td>
<td>27,176</td>
<td>28,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>24,451</td>
<td>7,159</td>
<td>374</td>
<td>2,022</td>
<td>29,962</td>
<td>31,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>23,959</td>
<td>11,376</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>2,442</td>
<td>33,254</td>
<td>35,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>23,860</td>
<td>11,036</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>2,688</td>
<td>32,575</td>
<td>35,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>26,819</td>
<td>8,737</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>3,389</td>
<td>32,605</td>
<td>35,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>25,300</td>
<td>11,022</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>3,905</td>
<td>32,815</td>
<td>36,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>30,225</td>
<td>10,354</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>4,752</td>
<td>36,081</td>
<td>40,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>29,825</td>
<td>10,772</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>5,434</td>
<td>35,631</td>
<td>41,065</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The apparent reduction in total mileage is due to deletion of certain old dry season tracks which were no longer required.

### Table 13

Number Employed By the Nigerian Railway Corporation, 1947-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period as at 31 March</th>
<th>Civil Engineering</th>
<th>Mechanical Engineering</th>
<th>Operating and Commercial</th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Capital Works</th>
<th>Total: all departments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>12,886</td>
<td>5,525</td>
<td>9,977</td>
<td>1,745</td>
<td>3,648</td>
<td>33,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>12,186</td>
<td>5,578</td>
<td>9,810</td>
<td>1,689</td>
<td>4,423</td>
<td>33,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>10,023</td>
<td>6,046</td>
<td>10,268</td>
<td>1,848</td>
<td>4,601</td>
<td>32,786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>10,413</td>
<td>6,476</td>
<td>10,217</td>
<td>2,254</td>
<td>4,676</td>
<td>34,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>10,177</td>
<td>6,754</td>
<td>10,955</td>
<td>2,305</td>
<td>2,597</td>
<td>32,788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>9,752</td>
<td>6,668</td>
<td>10,743</td>
<td>2,413</td>
<td>1,709</td>
<td>31,285</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: See Ekundare, op. cit., p. 263.
miles of railroad track, most of which ran north and south in two
types of tracks and single track lines from Lagos in the West to Port Harcourt
in the East.

Commercial air transportation was effectively established in
May 1946 under the auspices of the West African Airways Corporation
which operated throughout British West Africa. Services were established
between the main cities of Lagos, Benin, Port Harcourt, Calabar,
Enugu and Tiko. Later in October 1958, the Nigerian Airways replaced
the WAAC and also operated international flights. The airways was
responsible for a lot of passenger and mail transportation. By
1960, it had transported at least 59,880 passengers, 468 tons of mail
and 696 tons of commercial goods.36 (See Table 14)

Post and Telegraphs had improved dramatically also. In 1946,
there were 125 post offices and 331 postal agencies in the country.
By 1960, the number of post offices increased in 176 and postal
agencies increased to 1,000 in the same year. By 1960, the post
office had handled about 79,617 articles posted in Nigeria, 20,521
from abroad and about 2,036 telegrams.37 During the same period
1950-60, telephone exchanges increased from 72-130 and telephones
increased from 9,000 to about 39,000.38 The post office also
provided saving facilities for areas that had no banks.

By the time the civilians took over from the British, the state
of the Economy had improved considerably at least in comparison to
the last few decades before independence. However, one must not
be fooled by the improvement over the last two decades because the
economic base which the civilians inherited was still very minimal
Table 14

Number of Passengers Transported by the Nigerian Airways
1950-1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Lagos</th>
<th>Kano</th>
<th>Other Airports</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>1,561</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>1,843</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>2,881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>1,838</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>2,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>1,027</td>
<td>1,851</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>2,029</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>1,947</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>2,534</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>4,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>2,772</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>4,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1,456</td>
<td>2,442</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1,428</td>
<td>2,276</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2,016</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>3,588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ekundare, op.cit., p. 271.
and unsophisticated to say the least. It is in the light of these observations that one must evaluate the performance of the civilian regime.

**COMPARISONS OF GROWTH OF THE ECONOMY 1961-66, 1970-75**

**Gross Domestic Product**

**The Civilian Regime**

The two aggregate measures of the economy usually employed by economists are the Gross Domestic Product and the Gross National Product. The GNP is defined as the total market value of all final goods and services produced in the economy in one year—the economy's aggregate output. The GNP is usually regarded as the best available indicator of an economy's health or growth and is measured in monetary terms.

We have talked about the desirability of measuring growth in the economy simultaneously with distribution. But it is often times difficult to discuss economic development (growth and distribution) without discussing economic growth. Presumably, if the economy grows, there will be more to distribute. It should be remarked that the GNP emphasizes current production at home and abroad, but attributable to services supplied by people resident at home.

Since the emphasis of this dissertation is more on internal consumption and distribution, the other aggregate measurement known as the Gross Domestic Product will be used in the evaluation of growth. However, brief mention of the growth of GNP must be made.
Since 1960, the GNP has maintained a steady growth, even though not at a rate that would be considered remarkable. Between 1961-1966, the GNP at market prices rose from 978.4 million pounds to 1,425.3 million pounds. It must be remarked that throughout this period, there was never a fluctuation. During the military regime i.e., from 1970-1975, the GNP at market prices rose from 1,930.0 million pounds to 7.033 billion pounds in the same time period. By comparison, the growth of the GNP from 1,425.3 million in 1966 to 7.033 billion pounds in 1975 represents a major growth and there is no question that the GNP grew better during the military regime.

At this point we should compare the Gross Domestic Product. It should be stated that GDP figures are much more accurate and easier to come by in the case of Nigeria. What is the Gross Domestic Product as distinct from the Gross National Product? The GDP will be defined as the total amount of goods and services produced in the nation yearly. (The GNP includes foreign production.)

The first comprehensive indication of the civilian regime's efforts at bolstering the economy was the national development plan which was launched in April 1962 for a six year period. This plan had among other things, the following objectives: 1) to achieve a growth rate of four percent or more, 2) to achieve the first objective by investing 15 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, while trying to raise the per capita consumption by one percent yearly, and 3) to achieve an increase in the domestic savings ratio of about 4.5 percent by increasing it from about 9.5 percent of GDP to about 15 percent by 1975. (See Second National Development Plan)
Between 1961-62 and 1965-66, GDP measured at current factor cost had increased at the rate of 6.7 percent. At 1962-63 factor cost, the Gross Domestic Product rose from 1,256 million pounds to 1,543 million pounds between 1961-62 and 1965-66 at an annual growth rate of 5.3 percent. See Table 15

A lot of factors were responsible for the increase. One of them was the tremendous growth in the petroleum industry which had grown from 0.8 percent in 1958 to 1.4 percent in 1961 and 2.8 percent in 1964 (i.e. contribution to GDP). These figures indicate the growth in sectoral output as a percentage of each sector's share of Gross Domestic Product. Agriculture has accounted for more than half of the growth; however, the growth in the Agricultural Sector has been slightly slower than the other sectors taken as a whole. It has been mentioned earlier that the industrial sector had been virtually non-existent especially before 1950. In 1958, the contribution of manufacturing activity to the Gross Domestic Product (national output) amounted to 40.5 million pounds or about 4 percent of the total. In 1963, the value had risen to 78.9 million pounds and the percentage contribution went up to 5.6 percent. Figures show that by subtracting the oil/petroleum sector from the GDP, we find that the GDP drops from 5.3 percent to 4.3 percent which in percentage terms significant in assessing the performance of the GDP. Edwin Dean says that:

The fact that the rate of increase in estimated real GDP was 5.3 percent does not conclusively establish that the plan target of four percent or more was achieved, for two reasons. First, the very rapid increase in oil output, between the years 1961-62 and 1965-66, substantially influenced estimated
Table 15
Gross Domestic Product, Capital Formation
And Government Revenue; Selected Years, 1950-1967
million

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961/62</td>
<td>1256.0</td>
<td>1186.7</td>
<td>140.2</td>
<td>152.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>123.7 or 130.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962/63</td>
<td>1315.4</td>
<td>1315.4</td>
<td>137.1</td>
<td>159.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>136.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963/64</td>
<td>1425.7</td>
<td>1403.2</td>
<td>153.0</td>
<td>177.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>143.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964/65</td>
<td>1463.4</td>
<td>1457.0</td>
<td>167.0</td>
<td>195.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>175.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965/66</td>
<td>1543.0</td>
<td>1540.3</td>
<td>200.6</td>
<td>234.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>190.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966/67</td>
<td>1583.1</td>
<td>1605.0</td>
<td>207.8</td>
<td>242.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>198.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Implicit annual growth rates
1958/59-1961/62: 7.0% 8.7% 8.9% 11.8% 11.3%
1961/62-1965/66: 5.3% 6.7% 9.4% 11.3% 9.8%

GDP. But oil production statistics reflect only very indirectly the performance of the Nigerian economy: oil was produced by foreign companies, which relied mainly on imported capital equipment, materials, and technicians; and the plan, and general economic policies, did not influence oil production strongly. Further, the planners had underestimated the rate of increase of oil production, so from the viewpoint of their target growth rate, there was a windfall element in this rapid increase. Second, the study which lead to the published estimates of GDP, though carefully carried out, necessarily relied on extremely weak statistics. There is special reason to doubt the reliability of the deflation process, in view of the variety of methods used, and in view of the fact that the deflator increased more slowly, between 1961/62 and 1965/66, than either the 'National consumer price index' or the import price index.

These two problems may be dealt with by manipulating the GDP estimates. If the oil sector is eliminated from GDP, the annual rate of increase of real GDP between 1961/62 and 1965/66 falls from 5.3 to 4.3 percent. If the oil sector is subtracted from current value GDP, and the resulting statistics are deflated by the consumer price index, the annual rate of growth is 3.8 percent.

The structure of production which had changed considerably was a big catalyst for the economy. The output of electricity also rose considerably and the proportion consumed by commercial and industrial users rose from 46 to 52 percent between 1961/62 and 1965/66.

The civilian regime inherited more than a decade of sustained growth and after independence there was a brief period of stagnation in 1963 of export agriculture. In addition to this relatively moderate growth in agriculture, the expansion of large scale industries was high. There was a high demand as a result of this growth in export agriculture and industrial production and this in turn led to very substantial expansion in the public utilities, transport and construction sectors.
Perhaps the state of the Nigerian economy during the civilian period may be best described by Helleiner in his book *Peasant Agriculture, Government, and Economic Growth in Nigeria*, when he states that "Nigeria's transition from a peasant agricultural economy to a diversified, semi-industrialized one is proceeding rapidly and with comparative freedom from the foreign exchange, inflation, and population problems which beset many other countries. Its development efforts were reflected in the growth in the shares of investment and government expenditures in Gross Domestic Product...and the rapid expansion of industrial production."\(^47\) The byproducts of this growth were reflected in improved roads, expanded educational facilities, and better health facilities.

From available figures, the rate of development in the agricultural sector has accounted for the growth rate of the GDP. Nevertheless, without the petroleum sector the growth rate of the GNP would have been substantially lowered by as much as 1 percent.

**The Military Regime**

The civil war greatly disrupted a lot of economic and social activities especially in the Eastern region. The GDP at current factor cost fell by about 16 percent in 1967-68 when compared to the 1966-67 level. The reason for this was the exclusion of the three eastern states which probably would account for about 20 percent of GDP.\(^48\)
The war caused major losses of production and major damages to the infrastructure and a resultant decline in the growth investment. Prior to the civil war, petroleum had become a major source of government revenues. But during the war, onshore operations which account for most of the petroleum output had declined to less than 10 percent of its prewar peak of 580,000 barrels a day. 49

About one quarter of the country's manufacturing activities were done in the Eastern states and these activities were crippled as a result of the war. Food production also fell significantly and the government lost a lot of revenue with which to bolster the economy. The whole machinery of government activity was geared towards winning the war, hence the federal government spent an estimated 300 million pounds on the war. 50 It was against this background that the Gowon government battled to put the Nigerian economy back in full gear. The oil boom after the end of the civil war made his task a little easier.

The Gowon government launched the Second National development plan: 1970-74. One of the goals of the plan was "the achievement of a rate of growth of per capita output sufficiently high to bring about a doubling of real income per head before 1985. As a beginning, an average rate of 6.6 percent per annum in the Gross Domestic Product has been set as a minimum target for the 1970-74 plan." 51

The projected levels of GDP at constant 1962/63 factor cost in the Second National Plan were 1,585.6 million pounds for 1970/71 and 1,685.9 million pounds for 1971/72. The rates of growth were 4.7 percent and 6.3 percent respectively.
A revised estimate by the central planning office puts the Gross Domestic Product at 1,995.9 million pounds for 1970/71 and 2,234.9 million pounds for 1971/72 which were substantially beyond the plan estimates.\(^5\)

It was also expected that the level of output of the economy would reach 3,639.4 million Naira by 1972/73 thereby implying a growth rate of 7.9 percent. The current estimates of GDP at 1962/63 factor cost show growth rates of 4,928.2 million Naira for 1971/72 and 5,402.4 million Naira for 1972/73, indicating growth rates of 17.9 percent and 9.6 percent respectively.\(^5\)

From 1970/71 to 1974/75, the GDP of 1974/75 at factor cost grew at the average rate of 8.2 percent per annum. However, there was fluctuation in the growth rate. For example, it fell from 18.4 percent in 1971/72 to 7.3 percent in 1973/74, rising again the 9.5 percent and 9.7 percent in 1973/74 and 1974/75 respectively. See Table

The fluctuation in the growth rate of the GDP was due in part to the poor performance of some of the sectors especially agriculture. There was a 7 percent fall in agricultural production in 1972/73. Another reason for the fluctuation was due to the fall in the rate of expansion of the mining and quarrying sector during the same year. Growth in that sector fell from 40.4 percent in 1971/72 to 18.4 percent in 1972/73.\(^5\) (See Tables 16 and 17)

During the period under review, one cannot help but state that the GDP grew above the plan estimates. The establishment of the
A revised estimate by the central planning office puts the Gross Domestic Product at 1,995.9 million pounds for 1970/71 and 2,234.9 million pounds for 1971/72 which were substantially beyond the plan estimates.  

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The fluctuation in the growth rate of the GDP was due in part to the poor performance of some of the sectors especially agriculture. There was a 7 percent fall in agricultural production in 1972/73. Another reason for the fluctuation was due to the fall in the rate of expansion of the mining and quarrying sector during the same year. Growth in that sector fell from 40.4 percent in 1971/72 to 18.4 percent in 1972/73. (See Tables 16 and 17)  

During the period under review, one cannot help but state that the GDP grew above the plan estimates. The establishment of the
Table 16

Gross Domestic Product at Constant 1974-75 Prices: Percentage Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>23.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>45.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Crafts</td>
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<td>4.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electricity and Water</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Building and Construction</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<td>5.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Government</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Health</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Adapted from Third National Development Plan (1975-80)*
Table 17

Gross Domestic Product at Constant 1974-75 Prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture, etc.</td>
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<td>3575.3</td>
<td>3351.8</td>
<td>3246.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining and Quarrying</td>
<td>3127.9</td>
<td>4392.7</td>
<td>5202.9</td>
<td>5927.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing and Crafts</td>
<td>475.1</td>
<td>460.3</td>
<td>570.1</td>
<td>626.5</td>
<td>683.9</td>
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<td>Electricity and Water</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>42.4</td>
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<td>58.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and Construction</td>
<td>326.0</td>
<td>460.2</td>
<td>567.1</td>
<td>710.8</td>
<td>821.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>854.5</td>
<td>907.1</td>
<td>882.5</td>
<td>910.6</td>
<td>971.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
<td>172.0</td>
<td>209.5</td>
<td>257.6</td>
<td>278.2</td>
<td>325.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Government</td>
<td>594.6</td>
<td>614.9</td>
<td>551.4</td>
<td>764.3</td>
<td>901.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>257.5</td>
<td>296.2</td>
<td>302.2</td>
<td>312.5</td>
<td>376.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
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<td>74.1</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>109.8</td>
<td>132.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Services</td>
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<td>151.9</td>
<td>172.9</td>
<td>196.7</td>
<td>215.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP at Factor Cost</td>
<td>9442.1</td>
<td>11177.9</td>
<td>11993.1</td>
<td>13135.5</td>
<td>14410.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth Rate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Third National Development Plan (1975-80).
National Oil Corporation, the acquisition of controlling shares in foreign owned oil companies and the tremendous boost in the prize of oil have virtually guaranteed the Nigerian government a sizeable sum of oil revenue.

A World Bank report projects that by 1975/76, gross proceeds from petroleum would have reached a staggering sum of 1,055 million pounds. For World Bank projection, see Table 18.

These figures represent about 70 percent of total government revenue and is projected to rise to about 75 percent in 1975. The revenues generated from petroleum have been used to develop such other sectors as agriculture, and transport and communications, which explains growth in these sectors.

Although petroleum provides such a formidable impetus to economic growth at present, it is noted that agriculture will remain basic to the Nigerian economy and its development in the future since the agricultural sector is the main employer of labor. But considerable revenue from oil is being used for the development of a more diversified industrial base.

The continued success or growth of the GDP will depend to a great extent also on the level of political stability which the army seems to be providing at present. This is especially so in view of the fact that political stability is a must for economic growth.

It is obvious from all figures available that the GDP grew much more under the military regime than it did under the civilian regime. The GDP had an average growth of 5.3 percent under the civilian regime
### Table 18

**Selected Petroleum Sector Accounts**

*(In Millions of Current N)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Average daily produc-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tion (mil. bls)</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>2.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realized price (U.S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$/bl)</td>
<td>2.65</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contribution to Gross Domestic Product</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross proceeds</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>1055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>1030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local sales</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value-added</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

while the average growth rate under the military was 8.2. So by the
time civilians left office the growth rate was 5.3 and by the end of
Gowon's stay in office it rose to 9.7 percent (in 1974/75).

There is also no doubt that petroleum was the single most important
factor in the growth rate of the GDP. Federal Government of
Nigeria's figures indicate that petroleum would be contributing
about 40 percent of the GDP during the military regimes period under
review. For instance, by 1966, the GDP at factor cost was 1,543.0
million pounds while it was 7,205.3 million in 1975. The resource
base which was available to the military certainly was much greater
than that of the civilians. One can conclude from these figures that
the state of the economy improved significantly under the military.
But whether the general state of the economy is translated into
qualitative and quantitative growth in the various sectors of the
economy shall be seen when one looks at sectoral performances.

COMPARISONS OF SECTORAL PERFORMANCE OF THE ECONOMY
(1961-66 and 1970-75)

A. The Agricultural Sector

The Civilian Regime (1961-66)

In an article entitled "The Role of Agriculture and Industry in
Development," I.I. Ukpong states that "in highly developed economies,
less than 10 percent of the economically active population is
sufficient to provide the food requirements of the entire population...
but in developing countries as much as 70 percent of the economically
active population is engaged in agriculture. Yet the national food
supply remains inadequate. This is a serious obstacle to industrialization, for not only does inadequate food supply affect the supply of labour to industries it also affects the formation of capital which is crucial to industrialization.\textsuperscript{59}

This characterization of the economies of the underdeveloped countries aptly describes the situation in Nigeria. The significant point made in the entire statement is the fact that food production for local consumption is very crucial to the entire development of an economy. It is usual for agricultural policies of developing nations to place undue emphasis on export crops for the sake of foreign exchange earnings.

The bulk of agricultural production in Nigeria has been carried out by small farmers with little or no assistance or incentives from the government. By 1960, the government began to realize the importance of giving assistance to local farmers to improve their yield. The government started to take help to farmers by way of providing fertilizers, pesticides, improved farm practices and better prices for their products.

Prior to 1960, the agricultural sector was the main source of strength of the Nigerian economy. There was a brief period of stagnation in agricultural production between 1959 and 1962, but primary products increased substantially during 1963-65 only to be interrupted by the political upheaval in 1966. The importance attached to this sector by the federal government cannot be overemphasized. Realizing that more than two-thirds of the population of the country
depends on and more than half of the GDP is derived from agriculture (forestry, fisheries, and livestock), the federal government embarked upon a massive agricultural development program by allocating large sums of money in the 1962-68 national development plan to modernize and expand the agricultural sector with the following in mind:

a) the efficient expansion of domestic food production to enable Nigerians to eat better.

b) the reduction of dependence on imported foodstuffs.

c) the increase in productivity to enable a corresponding increase in the income of Nigerians.60

The significance and importance of the agricultural sector is highlighted by the fact that about 70% of the country's labor force is employed in this area. The increase in productivity of the other sectors, such as mining and extraction, did not diminish appreciably the contribution agriculture made to the entire GDP. However, by independence the percentage contribution of this sector to the GDP was about 70%, but only declined to about 55% by 1966.61

It must be mentioned that a lot of the potentialities of the agricultural sector remain unharnessed in view of the fact that more than half of the potential agricultural land in the country is at present unutilized.62 A lot of the economic growth which has taken place in Nigeria, especially in the decade after independence, could be attributed to the revenue generated from export produce. It not only provided income for the domestic economy but also provided the foreign exchange which made possible the importation of machinery and other capital goods necessary for industrialization.
A look at the Gross National Product at current prices underscores the points made earlier. By 1959-60, the sectoral contribution of agriculture, forestry, and fishing was 642.0 million pounds and had risen to 845.9 million pounds by 1966. Petroleum and mining rose from 8.8 million pounds in 1959-60 to 74.3 million pounds by 1966, though a substantial increase, nevertheless, far less than the agricultural sector.

A breakdown of the value of exports by major commodities indicates that the major export produce steadily improved both in tonnage and in the income derived. Groundnuts, groundnut oil, cocoa, rubber, cotton, and palm kernels are some of them. See Table 19.

Despite these obvious accomplishments, many problems existed, including, among other things, low productivity, structural problems such as poor production techniques, low yields, inadequate infrastructural facilities, et cetera. The government seemed to be addressing itself to these problems when it allocated 91.9 million pounds, 13.5% out of a total of 676.5 million pounds (the total capital expenditure), of the 1962-68 development plan to agriculture. About 34% of the government's allocations to primary production went to projects like farm settlements, plantations, irrigation schemes, et cetera. Twenty-three percent was allocated to extension, 13.3% to credit, 11% to research, 2.9% to education and training, and 7% to processing and distribution.63
Table 19

Value of Exports By Major Commodities, 1958-71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groundnuts</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>40.8</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocoa</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>32.4</td>
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<td>52.6</td>
<td>66.5</td>
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<td>Petroleum crude oil</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>92.0</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>130.9</td>
<td>254.9</td>
<td>476.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palm kernels</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw cotton</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palm oil</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total exports</td>
<td>132.8</td>
<td>160.5</td>
<td>165.6</td>
<td>170.1</td>
<td>164.0</td>
<td>184.9</td>
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<td>238.1</td>
<td>206.5</td>
<td>314.6</td>
<td>438.5</td>
<td>640.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*aProvisional.

Source: Wounter Tims, op. cit.
Traditionally, it has been argued that the lesser role agriculture plays in its contribution to the GNP and GDP the better it portends for the entire economy. And also the fewer people employed in the agricultural sector the more people thus available for the industrial sector. Although the industrial sector was rapidly gaining ground, at this juncture it might be premature to decide if these gains were significant enough to justify the rationale behind those arguments.

One of the major expectations of the agricultural policy of the civilian government was the reduction in the importation of foodstuffs while production grew at home also. Available statistics reveal that the amount of food imports in Nigeria (as indicated by government expenditures) declined from 1960 to 1966 except for a brief period in 1966. The government had spent approximately thirty-one million pounds in 1960 on importation of food. Food importation fell to 29.8, 29.4, 25.6 24.3 pounds and rose slightly to 25.8 and 29.3 pounds in 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, and 1966 respectively. When these figures are compared to other items, such as transport equipment, these are obviously proportionately higher.

It is generally stated that an effective agricultural policy should embody structural changes in the system, i.e. more of 'transformational' rather than 'improvement' types of activities. The government's stated intentions of both transformational and improvement ventures in agriculture in the areas of direct investments, extension activities, research and investigation, provision of credit, and
education did not seem to have been fully accomplished, or at least no evidence exists that they were priority items in view of budgetary allocations.

Most of the sources and data on agricultural production come from the Nigerian government sources. Thus the accuracy of these figures may be open to question at times.

The United States Department of Agriculture credits the gross food production and gross agriculture production with .07% respective growth in the period between 1960-68. This figure becomes more glaring when compared to other countries like Ghana, Niger, et cetera, which have higher percentages.

It is very difficult to assess the effect of government policies and actions on improved agricultural production in Nigeria during the civilian period. The question is not whether government's policies and actions were instrumental to improvement in the agricultural sector, but how much impact did they have. It is difficult to answer given the fact that in this period governmental efforts were not massive, one would assume that the impact was not very much. However, one must give credit to the government for its' efforts no matter how minimal. Through allocations to the state government, farmers were provided with extension services, fertilizer subsidy, factor hiring scheme, credit facilities, agricultural education and training.

Even though the importation of food declined during this period, the size of food imports indicates that there were still inadequacies in the agricultural development policies of the government.
The marketing board was established for the purpose of stabilizing prices earned by farmers and giving farmers enough incentives to increase their production. Unfortunately the marketing board placed undue emphasis on generating income for the government. Consequently it encouraged the farmers to grow more export crops while food and food crops have been neglected.

Criticisms of the agricultural policies of the civilian regime lie in the following areas namely (i) that the emphasis on export produce like cocoa, rubber, cotton and groundnuts over food crops was a faulty policy in view of the under nourishment that was acute in Nigeria, (ii) that too few extension services were provided to aid the farmers, (iii) that enough fertilizers were not made available to farmers. By the end of 1966, the government was providing about five pounds per acre which was very inadequate. (iv) That the government was providing very little by way of research to farmers to enable them to improve their farming techniques. (v) That the government did not do much to increase land utilization which was between 25-35 percent of usable land. There is no doubt that despite well meaning goals, agricultural development under the civilian regime left much to be desired.

The Military Regime 1970-75

Agricultural development policies and actions of the military regime seem to indicate that the policy makers were aware of the shortcomings of past strategies of the civilian regime. This
recognition was evidenced by both commitment and performance, but whether they were adequate is an entirely different issue.

Agriculture remains the mainstay of the Nigerian economy even though there is evidence that its contribution to the GDP has been declining. However, the value added by the sector has been rising. The relative contribution to the GDP (when petroleum is excluded) at current prices shows 53 percent and 49 percent for 1970-71 and 1973-74 respectively.68

The importance of developing the agricultural sector cannot be overemphasized since the sector will continue to provide the bulk of the nation's employment. It is also important that this sector be developed in view of the fact that as population grows, there will be an absolute need for increases in food production of at least 5 percent to 7 percent69.

Several problems made development in the agricultural sector by the military very difficult as was the case under the civilian regime. By 1974-75 less than half of the potential agricultural land was being utilized. This in turn was responsible for low productivity.

The federal government in the Second National Development plan listed the following constraints on the agricultural sector which must of necessity be overcome.

a. An abundance of land and human resources where potentialities are not being fully realized.
b. Shortage of qualified manpower in key areas;
c. Inadequate supplies of agricultural inputs;
d. Inadequate extension service;

e. the problem posed by labour shortage in the rural areas in consequence of rural migration;

f. drudgery in farm work and low returns from agriculture which forces rural youth to migrate to urban areas...70

With a view to correcting some of these problems the federal government decided to pursue the following policies:

a. Ensuring food supplies in adequate quantity and quality to keep pace with increased population and urbanization.

b. Expanding the production of export crops, with a view to increasing and further diversifying the country's foreign exchange earnings so vital to the development process.

c. Propagating the production of agricultural materials for extensive domestic manufacturing activities, especially in the field of agro-based industries.

d. Creating rural employment opportunities to absorb more of the increasing labour force in the nation.71

In order to increase food production, the military government established food companies in the Mid-West, Kwara and East-central states. Besides these food companies, the government established the National Agricultural Bank, Agricultural Development Authorities and the National Agriculture Council. The Agricultural Bank has been very useful in providing incentives to farmers even though only 20 million naira has been disbursed by the bank since its inception in 1973.72
However, Gowon allocated another sum of 10 million naira in 1974 to the bank for disbursement to farmers and farmers' cooperatives. Farmers also received more money for their produce as a result of the reform measures taken with regard to the marketing boards.73

These reforms specify that the head of state assisted by a technical committee will fix prices payable by the boards to farmers. The commodities in question include palm oil, cocoa, groundnuts and cotton. Through these reform measures, the government sought to stem the tide of low productivity of these major crops which was partly attributable to low incentives to farmers.74 It should be remarked that the reform of the marketing board was prompted by the fall in production of cocoa, cotton, and groundnut crops.75

It might be appropriate to look at actual food and crop production in this period. Figures show that production of all food commodities rose by approximately 2.5 percent per annum during the period, 1969-74, which was insufficient to keep pace with the growing population. A FAO report entitled "A Quantitative Analysis of Food Requirements, Supplies and Demands in Nigeria, 1968-1985" shows that Nigerians were consuming less than the minimum requirements of calories and proteins. Minimum requirements according to FAO are 2,191, KCal and 53.8 grams of crude protein.76

A report issued by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development projects that "if immediate steps are taken to improve price incentives, the supply of farm inputs and transportation to restore production in the East, agriculture production could achieve and average growth rate of 3 percent through 1975.77
The agricultural season improved in 1974-75, much better than the two previous seasons which were hit by drought in the Northern states. One estimate gave the rise of 10 percent in agricultural production in 1974.78

An evaluation of food production in Nigeria should be broken down into two components namely: Food production for internal consumption and major exports crops.

In 1974-75, the following food staples: maize, rice, wheat, yam, cassava, and cocoyam were produced in these respective quantities (in millions of tons) 1.62, 9.42, 14.4, 5.5, 3.05, and 1.63.79 For wheat and yam there were more imports than the production at home. For wheat, the import was 0.575—very substantial.

With regard to export produce, the only reliable figures available are the ones released by the IBRD in Table 19. However, other figures released by the Central Bank on purchases made by the Marketing Board may shed some light on the effects of the military government agricultural policy. For major crops like cotton, (seed cotton), groundnuts, cocoa, palm oil and palm kernel there were fluctuation in purchases. In fact, except for palm oil purchases of other crops declined, but the producer incomes rose appreciably by 1974-75. This is mainly attributable to the incentives being provided by the military government for farmers.

However, income derived from export of crops like cocoa rose from 133,075 (thousand naira) in 1970 to 180,954 (thousand naira) in 1975. But income from others such as palm kernels, palm oil and cotton declined appreciably.80
The evidence adduced from this study shows that the federal military government fell short of its goals despite some tangible achievement. Before making a relative comparison of performance of the two regimes, one must say that one of the most tangible accomplishments of the military regime in agricultural production is the establishment of the Agricultural Bank which disbursed over 28 million naira since its inception in 1973. But perhaps the most significant accomplishment is the fact that the federal government got directly involved in food production.

Through various states, the government acquired extensive proportions of land for food production. For example in the midwest there is the Agbede Farm project has about 2,000 acres of land for the cultivation of rice and maize. There are nine model farms in the South-Eastern State with approximately the same acreage serving the same purpose. Lagos state and Rivers states have over 4,000 acres for the same purpose.

Food production companies in the Mid-west, Kwara and East Central States cultivate about 72,000 acres of land which produce maize, cassava and rice.81

The military regime's efforts also extend to other areas like livestock and dairy production to take care of protein deficiencies in the country. The government built and expanded for ranches which produce about 22,500 fattened bulls annually. There are other breeding centers in Biedin Kudu, Gumel, Hotoro and Demgora. There are also two dairy plans in Kaduna and Minna which produce 800 and 3,000 litres of milk per hour respectively.
In virtually all problem areas, in the agricultural sector, the military government made significant progress. In order to compare the development of the agricultural sector, under the civilian and military regime, one must look at both the emphasis or direction of policy and actual output. With regard to emphasis or direction, it is clear from the evidence, that the military government de-emphasized export crops while emphasizing food production to meet home consumption. By this author's judgement this constitutes a sound policy. In terms of actual production, one can say with the available evidence that food production increased much more under the military than it did under the civilian regime.

The production of major export crops increased substantially. For instance groundnut production increased from 625 thousand tons in 1964-65 to 1,100 thousand tons in 1974-75, seed cotton from 126 thousand tons to 240 tons, cocoa from 203 thousand tons to 625 thousand tons in the same time period. Figures for non export crops are hard to come by since the marketing boards have little or no need for such figures.

The reason for the better performance of agriculture production under the military as compared to the civilian regime may be attributable to many factors such as:

a) better incentives to farmers. Produce incomes rose significantly in 1974-75. Producer income rose from 153.2 million naira in 1965-66 to 1274.9 million naira in 1974-75. Also producer prices rose significantly on many crops. For example
producer price of cocoa rose from 122 naira per ton in 1965-66 to 660 naira per ton in 1974-75; groundnuts rose from 84 naira per ton in 1965-66 to 250 naira per ton in 1974-75 and Benni-seed rose from 92 naira per ton in 1965-66 to 2.64 naira per ton. The same producer price increase applied to other commodities.

b) improvement in research facilities and coordination. Besides establishing more research facilities, the federal military government introduced research coordination and specialization among the research institutes. For example the Umudike research station in the East dealt with root crops - cassava, yam, and cocoyams, while the Jos station with its subtropical climate concentrates on potato. The Moor Plantation Research Station in Ibadan, specializes in maize, rice and pulses while samaru in Zaria specializes in wheat, millet and sorghum.

c) Introduction of more modern means of farming for example tractors. This was made easier by the establishment of the agricultural credit bank which provided money to farmers for the purchase of modern farm implements. The large number of college trained graduates in Agriculture who came out of the Universities helped a great deal, and;

d) The improvement in transport facilities which improved marketing of farm produce. The improvement in transport facilities also helped to increase the success of seed multiplication
scheme, through which large tons of seeds to farmers in
different parts of the country which otherwise would have been
impossible.

Agricultural development under the military regime was much more
productive than it was under the civilian regime. Whether it
is judged by governmental actions or mere production, the conclusion
will hold true.

The Industrial Sector

Industrial Development (Civilian Regime 1961-66)

The role of the Federal Government in industrial development in
Nigeria is enormous.

A lot of policy debates in Nigeria, like other developing
countries, center on the question of priorities between agricultural
development and industrial development. It is usually a problem in
trying to find sectoral balance especially in a country where pre-
requisites for industrialization are very inadequate.

One of the arguments for industrialization is a prima facie one
which stems from the political development literature. In the
literature there are those who equate political development to
industrialization. Other arguments in favor of industrialization
over agricultural development include statements to the effect
industry provides more meaningful employment, industry acts as a
catalyst to other sectors and that industrialization brings about
urbanization. Therefore it is argued that it is preferable to
industrialize than to stimulate agriculture.
Other policy makers who emphasize agriculture over industry usually base their arguments on both humanistic and economic considerations. They argue that agriculture provides workers for industry; that the need to increase domestic food production is an urgent one in the third world. It is also argued that agriculture provides the needed stimulus for eventual industrial development since agriculture is usually the prime employer and the mainstay of the economy.

From looking at industrial development policies of the Nigerian government, it is safe to say that policymakers or planners have been mostly influenced by the third school of thought which argues thus:

1) That there are no inherent advantages of manufacturing industry over industry or agriculture over industry.

2) That a proper policy for development in the third world should be based on mutual self support between agriculture and industry.  

The role of the federal government in industrial development in Nigeria is tremendous. This is evidenced by the fact that of all the investment groups in industry, the federal government accounts for about 93.62 percent.

The growth in GDP indicates the overall performance of the economy without much introspection on sectoral performance. It is very tempting to make superficial judgements on economic performance by looking at some abstract figure such as Gross National Product, Gross Domestic Product, Income Per Capita. But the main problem with basing analysis on these indicators is that they totally omit the issue of
distribution i.e., the benefits derived from growth by the population. In the case of Nigeria, there is a dearth of statistics and data on distribution. Even where they exist they are usually suspect. However, one has to work with what is available.

The government is also actively involved in the development of industry through a number of incentives and directives coupled with a lot of capital investment. Between 1961-66 the government investment in industry was about 30 million pounds annually. The development of electricity, water supplies, road, air, rail and waterways had helped to facilitate this sector. Since various segments of the country had been linked together and made it easier for movement of goods and materials necessary for industry. The educational development programs were helping to provide skilled labor for the industrial sector.

Despite the many incentives in the form of tax breaks and rebates given to investors in industry, the government had many problems in meeting the following objectives; 1) to promote even development and fair distribution to industries in all parts of the country, 2) to ensure a rapid expansion and diversification of the industrial sector of the economy, and 3) to raise the proportion of indigenous ownership of industrial investments, one of the problems mentioned was that the value added as a percentage of gross output in most industries was low except for beverages and cement. Imported materials were constituting about 45 percent of the industrial costs to the country. Another problem that slowed down industrial production was the fact that metal production was adding as low as 7 percent of gross output.
Virtually all the stages of metal production were undertaken abroad except the final stage of metal fabrication.88

Despite the fact that manufacturing was steadily increasing and contributing more to the GDP, there was the problem of linkage and interdependence among industries. The industrial sector also faced the problem of a low level of indigenous ownership and control. Meanwhile the government had set aside 30 million pounds for the establishment of an iron and steel mill, but as will be discussed later, the complex was never built because regional rivalry would not give way to national interest. The implications of not building the mill were great because it was anticipated that a yield of 125,000 tons of steel in 1966 required at least 242,400 tons of iron ore, 75,200 of limestone, and 110,000 tons of coal. If the complex was located in Onitsha or Lokoja (the sites in debate) it would add about 53 million ton miles of traffic, an increase of about 45 percent of traffic carried in 1960. The complex would have consumed about 13 percent of electricity, generated at Kainji dam and provide direct employment for about 1500 people.89

In spite of some problems confronting industrial development in Nigeria, the government embarked on more capital investment to bolster the industrial sector. In the first development plan, iron and steel was allocated 30 million pounds, the petroleum refinery (federal share) 2 million pounds, the coal corporation 500,000 pounds, direct investment in industry 5 million pounds, National Development Bank 4 million pounds, etc.90
The two most important areas of Nigeria's industrial sector are manufacturing and mining (including petroleum), but manufacturing was more of a contributor to the GDP. By 1962/63 mining was contributing 2.1 percent of GDP and by 1966/67 it was contributing 5.0 while manufacturing was contributing 5.8 percent in 1962/63 and 7.3 percent in 1966/67. See Table 20. In terms of growth, mining grew 27.0 percent in 1958/59-1962/63 to 44 percent in 1962/63-1966/67, while manufacturing fell from 13.9 percent in 1958/59-1962/63 to 10.5 percent in 1962/63-1966/67. See Table 21. This drop could be accounted for by the period of stagnation around 1963. Export processing industries have grown slower than import-substitution industries and their share of manufacturing value-added* declined from 50 percent in 1958 to 25 percent in 1967. One significant increase in the area of manufacturing was the index of manufacturing production average which rose from 100 in 1963 to 164.5 in 1966.91

The largest manufacturing group with 10 or more employed is the food, drink, and tobacco industry and for a number of years has accounted for roughly 30 percent share of total large-scale manufacturing valued-added; textiles account for 16 percent.92 Significantly, Lagos no longer has a predominance over the other regions in terms of location of industries, which have shifted to Kaduna-Kano-Zaria triangle.

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*Cost of raw materials including cost of finished products.
Table 20

Gross Domestic Product by Type of Economic Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power, transport and construction</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 21

Sectoral Growth Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average annual over period, in real terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining (including petroleum)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power, transport and construction</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aProvisional estimates

The development of the petroleum sector has contributed a great deal to industrialization, by carrying off much of the burden of sustaining the GDP from agriculture. Crude oil production rose steeply until the outbreak of the war in 1967. But before the military takeover on January 15, 1966, production had reached 32,080,462 barrels in the first quarter of 1966 against 6,332,806 barrels in the first quarter of 1963. By the fourth quarter of 1966, it had reached 47,766,624 barrels per quarter.\(^{93}\) In terms of the contribution of petroleum to the Nigerian economy, there was a jump from 33 million pounds in gross proceeds in 1964 to 101 million pounds in gross proceeds in 1966. In value-added (factor costs) the increase was from 15 million pounds in 1964 to 76 million in 1966. Wages and salaries had risen from 2 million pounds to 3 million pounds in the same time period. Government income rose from 11 to 16 million pounds, investment income from 1 to 57 million pounds and the percentage of total imports of goods and non-factor services rose from 9 percent to 14 percent in the same time period. For details see Table 22.

Contributing vigorously to industrial development was a great leap in power production especially in terms of power allocation to industry. By 1960, total generation of electricity was 532.1 million kilowatt hours of which 274.9 went for industrial and commercial uses. This consumption ratio accounted to 51.7 percent of total and by 1966 total generation had risen to 1,201.3 million kilowatt hours and 672.6 went to industry and commercial uses. This consumption represents 56 percent of total\(^{94}\) (See Table 23). Other essential commodities like
Table 22
Petroleum Sector Accounts
1963-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volume of production (million barrels)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>558</td>
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<tr>
<td>Contribution to Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross proceeds</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>100.5</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>132.9</td>
<td>270.6</td>
<td>508.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>130.8</td>
<td>258.6</td>
<td>489.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local proceeds</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Intermediate inputs</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect taxes</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor dues and port charges</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Value-added</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>219.4</td>
<td>450.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages and salaries</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government income</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>247.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment income$^b$</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>134.3</td>
<td>196.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 23

**Electricity Generation and Consumption, 1957-1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Capacity (mega-watts)</th>
<th>Total generation¹</th>
<th>Industrial and commercial</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957-58</td>
<td>190.2</td>
<td>321.5</td>
<td>168.1</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-59</td>
<td>121.8</td>
<td>340.9</td>
<td>168.5</td>
<td>49.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>151.1</td>
<td>409.5</td>
<td>199.1</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>199.8</td>
<td>532.1</td>
<td>274.9</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>200.3</td>
<td>631.8</td>
<td>327.7</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>231.8</td>
<td>755.9</td>
<td>394.7</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>241.0</td>
<td>904.3</td>
<td>491.4</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>267.4</td>
<td>1,037.8</td>
<td>587.4</td>
<td>56.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>363.5</td>
<td>1,201.3</td>
<td>672.6</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>458.0</td>
<td>1,285.5</td>
<td>736.6</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>480.1</td>
<td>1,014.1</td>
<td>555.6</td>
<td>54.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>479.5</td>
<td>1,146.5</td>
<td>645.4</td>
<td>56.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>804.7</td>
<td>1,284.4</td>
<td>686.8</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

cement, rubber products, vegetable oil etc., rose sharply in production from 1963 to 1966.

In spite of what apparently is a good improvement in the industrial sector, the civilian regime failed to address some crucial problems that had to be dealt with. For instance most of the industries are cottage or small scale industries, import substitution industries, e.g., textiles, beer and soft drinks. Essentially these industries produce goods for direct sale to the consumer. But what is actually needed is to produce more intermediate and capital goods for sale to other industries for actual industrial development to occur.95

The civilian government failed to address adequately the demand for even development. Interstate rivalry surfaced very much in the location of industries and sometimes prevented the establishment of industries. In the process of regional or state rivalries many industries have been established merely to pacify the contending forces. Consequently there have been several duplications of industries or industries that were established against all recommendations of experts. The injection of political considerations into the establishment and relation of industries remained a handicap to industrial growth during the civilian regime.

**Military Regime 1970-75**

The military regime placed industrial development as one of its top most priorities. There is evidence that many new industries were built and some existing one like metal works, flour mill and eastern enamel ware in Port Harcourt were rebuilt and expanded.
Under the military regime, the industrial sector has been steadily attaining most growth and development. It is no longer peripheral in the general economic development. The military regime has indicated its recognition of developing this sector through public pronouncements and public policy.

Some of the objectives of the industrial policy of the military regime are to:

i) Promote even development and fair distribution of industries in all parts of the country.

ii) Ensure a rapid expansion and diversification of the industrial sector of the economy.

iii) Promote the establishment of industries which cater for overseas markets in order to earn foreign exchange.

iv) Raise the proportion of indigenous ownership of industrial investments.96

One fact that permeated the industrial policy of the military regime was the recognition that "for a sound base to be established for the growth of the manufacturing industry, certain key industries, particularly the production of intermediate goods, are pre-requisites and it is the retained income that is important and not merely additions to the GDP".97

Mining has already displaced agriculture as the highest contributor to the GDP. Besides sharp increases in petroleum mining, the federal government took steps to rehabilitate the Nigerian Coal Corporation at Enugu and also set up the Nigerian Mining Corporation
(The Nigerian Oil Corporation was established in 1971.) Another coal mine was developed at Okaba with a total production of 26,520 tons in 1973-74.

The Nigerian Mining Corporation which was established in 1972 engaged in commercial prospecting for mining, refining and marketing for all solid materials except coal. This corporation is at present participating in a project of underground mines at Luruie--Kano.98

In addition to mining, manufacturing grew rapidly during the 1970-75 period. The growth rate was 10 percent between 1970-73. The contribution of manufacturing to the GDP is still low despite some significant growth in the last decade. In 1972, food, beverages and tobacco contributed 34.3 percent of the value added in manufacturing while textile contributed 17 percent. These two sub-sectors represent low technology light industries. The contribution of these two sub-sectors clearly indicates that manufacturing is still underdeveloped in Nigeria.99

Another problem which faces the manufacturing sector is the low level of real engineering sub-sectors like: manufacturing, transport equipment, and household electrical apparatus. This sub-sector accounts for only 2.3 percent of value added in manufacturing.100

The federal government reviewed the general performance of this sub-sector and remarked that "although about 52 projects in the entire manufacturing plan can be said to have been completed, or are at advanced stages of implementation, only three of the 55 basically new manufacturing projects have been completed. These are prospect
textiles, (in Kwara State), Oil seed processing and Sokoto Tannery (in N.W. State). There are other projects which are nearing completion. Among these projects are sugar estates, a second oil refinery, and passenger car assembly.

One of the problems that slowed down growth in this sector was the fact that there was a lot of controversy within the ruling elite as to the site and location of industries. Most of the industries were heavily concentrated in the Lagos area. The military government realized that it was necessary to disperse industries not only for economic reasons, but for social benefits as well. To this effect the government declared that "industries sponsored by the federal and state governments will as a matter of location policy be sited purely on economic considerations. A measure of administrative discrimination will, however be allowed in favor of less industrially developed towns and districts when considering the marginal levels of selective incentives. Any such subsidies will be specific and explicit."

It is very arguable that the military government did not do very much by way of stimulating industrial growth. This contention could stem from the fact that when the allocation made to industry in the national plan is compared to the allocation to the other sectors, it leaves much to be desired. For example, only 86.1 million pounds was budgeted for industry as opposed to 132.7 million pounds to agriculture, forestry and fishing, 139.2 for education, and 287.2 million pounds for transport and communications. In percentage terms only 11 percent of the allocation went to industrial development. However, one must realize that one of the banes of industrial development under the
civilian regime was the lack of an adequate transport and communications network necessary for industrial development. The other handicap was the lack of skilled manpower necessary to man the industrial sector. Therefore, one could justify the allocation on the grounds that educational development and a sound transport and communications network are necessary conditions for industrial growth.

One other pre-condition for industrial development is a significant increase in power generation. In this regard electricity generation increased significantly to help in the most gains made in the industrial sector.

Between 1970 and 1974-75, total generation of electricity in Nigeria had risen from 1,541.0 million kilowatt hours to 2,287.2 million kilowatt hours. Industrial and commercial consumption rose from 801 million kilowatt hours to 1,429.6 million kilowatt hours in the same period. See Table 24.

The Gowon government failed to resolve one issue which had become the "whipping boy" of both civilian and military leaders; the location of the proposed iron and steel complex. This complex has been regarded as a major stepping stone to an industrial boom in Nigeria. The politics behind this complex will be discussed. One might say that the military government did a little more than the civilian government to execute the project when it did the following: it established the Nigerian Steel Development Authority which decided to locate the steel complex in Ajaokuta, and set 1980 as the deadline for establishing the industry. It is yet to be seen if the Steel
### Table 24

**Electricity Generation and Consumption**  
1970-1976  
(In million kilowatt hours, unless otherwise stated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Capacity (megawatts)</th>
<th>Total Generation</th>
<th>Industrial and Commercial</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>804.7</td>
<td>1,541.0</td>
<td>801.0</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>804.7</td>
<td>1,887.3</td>
<td>1,006.4</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>786.7</td>
<td>2,237.2</td>
<td>1,210.5</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>670.6</td>
<td>2,625.2</td>
<td>1,280.1</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>721.0</td>
<td>2,287.2</td>
<td>1,429.6</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Authority is able to pull through this project without further political intervention from different sections of the country.

According to the noted economist, Arthur Lewis, a developed industrial sector should be able to employ more people than the agricultural sector. This, he argues, is an indication of economic growth. The fewer people employed in Agriculture indicates that more people will be available for other sectors. However, industrialization has not provided adequate jobs for the new entrants into the labor force and the possibility of its doing so in the near future is remote.

By 1970, the percentage share of employment in the industrial sector (mining and manufacturing) was 12.4 percent and increased to about 16.9 percent in 1974. In the same period agriculture's share of employment was 69.8 percent and 65.5 percent in the same time period. The decline for agriculture augurs well for the conventional yard stick of economic growth. See Table 25.

What is then the relative performance of the industrial sector under the military vis-a-vis the civilian regime? If one judged performance by the number of industries alone, the conclusion would be that the military regime performed better. All across the states new industries were established for example, in the midwest the Delta Boat Yard in Warri, PVC Floor tiles, Bauwi Breweries, Medical cotton production, soap factory, tires and tubes. In the North-Central State, there are these industries: Oil Mill, Funtua Cotton Seed Crushing Factor, Stirling Astaldi and the Peugeot Automobile Limited and many
Table 25

Pattern of Total Gainful Occupation (1969-74)  
(Selected Sectors)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>16.790</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>17.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>262.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining, Manufacturing Crafts, etc.</td>
<td>2.930</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>4.524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communications</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24.054</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>27.316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

more. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that the federal military government has established many more industries than the civilians.

Judged in terms of contribution to the GDP the military regime performed much better. The percentage distribution of GDP at factory cost, for both mining and manufacturing rose from 13.1 percent in 1966-67 to 50.2 in 1974-75. This represents a tremendous increase by any standard.

One aspect which did not change appreciably is the direction and emphasis. Under the military regime, the industrial sector was still dominated by low technology light industries and also there is the virtually non-existent engineering industry. As a result of this manufacturing of agricultural and special industrial machinery, machinery and equipment, household electrical apparatus and transport equipment account for only 2.3 percent of value added to manufacturing.107

Another feature of this sector which has not changed is the relative weakness of the intermediate good sector. For example basic industrial chemicals like fertilizers and pesticides only accounted for 0.2 percent of the total value added to the sector.108 The building of iron and steel mill is vital to more industrial development.

However, the performance of the military regime with regard to industrial development is much more remarkable relative to the civilian regime.
C. Transport and Communications Sector

The Civilian Regime (1961-66)

The importance of developing the transport and communications sector in the underdeveloped world cannot be overemphasized. An effective well organized transport and communications system is a definite catalyst and also a sine quanon for political, social and economic development. Progress made in other sectors of the economy, e.g. agriculture and industry, are in part attributable to the improvement in this sector because of better improvement in movement of labor, services and goods across the country.

The agricultural sector benefitted from faster and improved methods of disseminating new techniques and food crops to farmers in the rural areas. Agricultural products were easier to market at lower costs to farmers as all modes of transportation and communications became more developed. A good transport system allows the free exchange of goods between rural areas and urban centers and it becomes possible for the economic position of the local farmer to live above subsistence level.109

The development of this sector has also made it possible for Nigerians from all ethnic and cultural backgrounds to interact with one another. It has made it possible for Nigerians of different environments to travel and communicate with one another especially in the urban centers. Some political scientists like Seymour Lipset110 would argue that urbanization leads to more democratic ideals and subsequently to national integration. The extent of the growth of urban centers,
occasioned by improved transport and communications sector, in bringing about national integration, cannot be easily assessed. But it is not difficult to imagine what the level of national integration in Nigeria would have been without improvement in this sector.

This sector is virtually the king-pin of economic, political, and social progress in Nigeria. Development in this sector encompasses other full sectors like roads, ports, civil aviation, railways, telephone services, and post and telegraphs. From the attention that was paid to this sector by the civilian regime, it appears that it fully recognized the importance of developing this sector.

The bulk of the development effort was geared towards road transportation which accounts for 77 percent of freight for mileage. Because of the importance of good transportation 69 percent of public capital investment has been allocated to this subsector. 111

There was a great improvement in road construction and maintenance. By 1960, Nigeria had a total of over 40,000 miles of road, but by 1962, it had risen to 44,919 miles and by 1968, to 55,300. 112 Because of this expansion, road transport became the key element in the total transportation sector. The Apapa Port in Lagos was the main port for both export and import. The evidence that road transport had become dominant over other transport systems can be seen in the fact that prior to 1961 only 24 percent of imports were moved by road and by 1962 about 53 percent were moved by road, whereas by 1967-68 it had risen to 68 percent. During the same period exports moved by road to and from Apapa were 13 percent, 43 percent, and 56 percent.
respectively (see Table 26). It must be remarked that road transportation not only helped in boosting general economic activity, but also helped in the movement of people from one region to another. Through this movement Nigerians became exposed to people from other ethnic background, which to some extent was a positive advancement toward national integration.

Since the inception of the Nigerian Railway Corporation in 1955, railway services had faced a lot of ups and downs. In the early 1960's, the rail system had about 2,178 route miles of single lane track. In 1963-64, the railways hauled about three million tons of freight and earned a net profit of 34,000 Nigerian pounds from revenues of 16.3 million Nigerian pounds. In 1964-65, the tonnage carried declined by five percent, ton miles by 13 percent, and operating revenues by 15 percent. Between 1963-64 and 1964-65 average turn-around time increased from 12.2 to 14.7 days and net ton-miles per man employed fell from 50,747 to 41,400.113

In 1965, a World Bank mission had reported serious deficiencies in the management, technical operations, staffing and investment, and especially deficiencies in equipment. The railways suffered from inadequate stock of equipment, especially engines. It had a total of 307 engines for mainline, rail cars, and shunting purposes in 1962/63. These figures declined to 297 in 1964/65 (see Table 27).

The 1962-68 Development Plan envisaged correcting these deficiencies when it sought to spend 20.17 million pounds to complete the Bornu extension and purchase 14 diesel locomotives and 1,485 wagons.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'000 tons</td>
<td>% of Total moved by Road</td>
<td>'000 tons</td>
<td>% of Total moved by road</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite these obvious short-comings of the Nigerian Railway Corporation, there were signs, albeit modest, of improvements for the future. Some of the undertakings of the Corporation to improve rail transportation would only yield success in years to come. Under the civilian regime the gross income of the Corporation left much to be desired, but it is worth noting that they never declined especially from 1961 to 1966 when the figures rose from 15,406 million pounds to 19.870 million pounds in this time period. Freight traffic rose from 1.366 million pounds to 1.739 million pounds (see Table 28).

Commercial transportation had suffered from the same problems that plagued the railways. One of its major difficulties was the lack of adequate equipment in terms of modern aircraft and ground equipment. Commercial transportation was heavily weakened by the shortage of airports, especially one suitable for smooth operations of the aircraft. During the civilian period, there were two international airports which fell short of the requirements of an actual international airport. The one in Lagos was barely 7,600 feet and the same was true of the one in Kano. Besides these two, there were ten other airports of lesser quality and 78 other airstrips.

The civilian regime took several steps to improve commercial air transportation. One of its major accomplishments was to purchase more aircrafts. Five more Fokker (F-27) Friendship airplanes were purchased to either replace or complement the existing seven Dakota airplanes. The Fokker Friendship planes had 25 percent more capacity and would enhance domestic flights.
### Table 27

**Number of Railway Engines in Stock**

1962-68

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>1962-63</th>
<th>1964-65</th>
<th>1967-68</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mainline</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steam</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shunting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steam</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rail Cars</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steam</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diesel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>307</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Table 28

**Economic Analysis of the Nigerian Railway Corporation**

All figures in million unless otherwise stated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Calculation of Average Revenue per ton/mile</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(i) Gross Income</td>
<td>15.406</td>
<td>15.793</td>
<td>15.950</td>
<td>17.941</td>
<td>18.562</td>
<td>19.870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ii) Estimated Freight Traffic (million ton/miles)</td>
<td>1.366</td>
<td>1.396</td>
<td>1.411</td>
<td>1.570</td>
<td>1.618</td>
<td>1.739</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *First National Development Plan*, p. 78.
In order to improve services and efficiency, an engineering base was built in Ikeja in 1963, providing much needed and faster services for the aircrafts. Another important step taken by the Nigerian airways was to bolster international routes. The Fokker Friendship planes enabled the airways to extend services to some parts of West Africa. The airways also built a West African Aeronautical Training School in Lagos, sponsored by the International Civilian Aviation Organization to help train Nigerians in aircraft operations.

Despite the fact that post and telegraphs had made remarkable improvements in the early 1960s when compared to pre-independence period, nevertheless they were grossly inadequate.

One cannot say enough about the indispensability of efficient communications system in facilitating economic development. Communications had not improved at the rate at which other facets of the economy had grown. The result of this slow growth in the provision of post offices, postal agencies, telephones, and telephone exchanges has been a comparatively slow progress in the industrial and commercial sectors. The efficiency of these sectors depends to a large degree on effective communication systems.

However, there were modest improvements in the postal services. The total number of all types of offices rose from 1,192 in 1960, to 1,305 in 1964. In 1960, the post office handled about 100,000 postal articles while it handled about 230 million in 1965.

In the area of telecommunications there was also a slow pace of growth and progress. In 1960, there were about 38,690 telephones. This rose to 48,919 in 1962. In 1966, the figure was 68,748, approxi-
mately one phone to every 1,000 persons, a figure considered one of the lowest in the world. In 1960, there were only five automatic and 116 manual telephone exchanges. By 1964, the number of automatic exchanges had risen to only 31.

The government embarked upon a number of projects designed to improve communications in Nigeria, but these ventures were not enhanced by the fact that there was an under expenditure of about 55 percent. Perhaps the most significant achievement of the civilian regime in the area of telecommunications was the establishment of the Nigerian External Communications Ltd. in 1963. This new company replaced the Cable and Wireless Ltd. thereby giving the Nigerian government a controlling share of the external communications business.

Within the period of the First Development Plan, the number of telephones increased from 49,000 to 75,000. Telephone exchanges increased from 121 to 144, teleprinter machines rose from 180 to 410, and 23 postal agencies were upgraded to sub-post offices.

The evidence points to the fact that only the land transportation made any significant progress, but the other subsectors like air transportation, postal services, telecommunications made only modest progress.

The Military Regime (1970–75)

The military regime also considered the transport and communications system very high in its list of priorities. Policy makers appeared to realize that economic progress especially reconstruction
and rehabilitation of economic activity damaged during the civil war depended on what happened in this sector.

The task of the military government in this endeavor was an enormous one in view of the massive damage done to the infrastructure as a result of the civil war. The government then had the dual task of reconstructing damaged facilities and embarking on new projects.

Transport policy in Nigeria under Gowon had two main objectives, to repair war damage and restore broken communication, particularly in the Rivers and East Central states, and strengthen social and economic links between the country's diverse regions.

Of all sectors of the economy, transport and communications made the heaviest claims on the available capital development funds.

In the Second National Development Plan - 1970-74, 36.82 percent of the allocated funds went to this sector, underscoring the importance attached to this sector. This sum was to be used for such projects as road development, the construction of rail tracks and the purchase of new railroad box cars; the construction of new airports, and the purchase of new planes; the expansion of airport facilities; and the expansion of telephone and telecommunications facilities. Road transportation was considered the most important subsector. The government then embarked on a road program which involved the rehabilitation of over 2,000 miles of roads and permanent reconstruction of continuing and new road projects stretching over 1700 miles.

This road programme provided for five major bridges at Koton-Karfe, Jebba, Makurdi, Katsina Ala nad Numru-Yola, and major repairs of the
Niger bridge at Onitsha damaged during the civil war. Four of the major roads planned run south to north from the main ports: from Lagos to Ibadan to Ilorin, Kotongora-Yelwa-Jega and Sokoto; from Warri to Benin-Okene-Kaduna-Kano and Daura; and from Port Harcourt to Enugu-Jos-Bauchi and Maiduguri. To say the least, these programmes were ambitious. For example, the total length of existing roads had increased from 56,849 miles in 1969 to 59,609. This was a modest improvement. But given the massive destruction of roads during the civil war this was very encouraging. By October 1974, reconstruction was completed on 3,502 kilometers due to the fact that the federal government had taken over selected state roads. As a result, the total road mileage under federal control went from 11,000 kilometers to 27,000 kilometers.

The Nigerian Railway Corporation also made considerable progress. During the plan period, the motive power of the railway's stock rose from 273 mainline and shunting locomotives to 353. The dieselisation programme reduced the steam locomotives number from 273 to 176 in 1974, whereas diesel locomotives increased from 39 in 1965 to 177 in 1974 (See Table 29).

Even though the railways increased its stocks in locomotives, there have been steady declines in agricultural freight liftings and passenger traffic. As a result of this decline, the railways continually ran at a deficit. Operating deficits rose from 10.3 million naira in 1965-66 to 23.1 million naira in 1973-74. For figures on freight and passenger liftings see Table 30.
Table 29
Railway Locomotives in Stock as of 31st March, 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Mainline Locomotives</th>
<th>Shunting Locomotives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steam</td>
<td>Diesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 30
The Railways Freight and Passenger Liftings, 1954-74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Goods Traffic</th>
<th></th>
<th>Passengers Traffic</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tonnages (000)</td>
<td>Ton-miles (millions)</td>
<td>Passengers (000)</td>
<td>Pass-miles (millions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-55</td>
<td>2,602</td>
<td>1,079</td>
<td>5,451</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959-60</td>
<td>2,803</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>7,881</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-62</td>
<td>3,003</td>
<td>1,412</td>
<td>11,061</td>
<td>481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>1,868</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>6,916</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>1,553</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>8,370</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>1,604</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>8,942</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>1,406</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>6,151</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>5,819</td>
<td>640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>1,978</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>4,670</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Third National Development Plan, op. cit.*
The federal government blames this poor programme on the inability of the corporation's management to compete favorably with road transportation. In fact the railways' goods wagon utilization has averaged 6 to 12 wagon loads per available wagon load per year which compares with 30 to 60 wagon loads about 10 years ago.

Apart from mismanagement, the development in other modes of transportation provided competition for the railway which proved to be outside the control of the management. For instance, motor vehicles had increased considerably in Nigeria by 1972. In 1970 there were about 57,000 passenger cars while in 1972 there were 120,000. The number of commercial vehicles also rose from 40,000 to 69,000 in the same period.

Civil aviation also competed favorably with the railways, at least enough to deny it many passengers and freight. Passengers carried domestically rose from 111,000 in 1970 to 160,000 in 1972, and freight ton per kilometer rose from 0.5 to 0.6 in the same period.122

One of the subsectors of the economy damaged during the war was the area of civil aviation. The airports at Enugu, Calabar and Port Harcourt were damaged. The airports were reconstructed while contracts were awarded for the construction of airports at Kano, Lagos and Jos. The government abandoned its original proposal to build 18 aerodromes simultaneously. This was left for a future date.

The Nigerian Airways acquired two Boeing 707, two Boeing 737 and two Fokker 28 aircrafts. This purchase seems to be the major tangible achievement of the airways. These purchases have not kept up with the growth in air traffic demand. Besides, the airways have been
continually plagued by lack of adequate organizational and managerial know-how. It was still depending on foreign institutions for major aircraft repairs and the airline also employs several expatriate personnel.

The Nigerian ports authority can be said to rank more favorably than its airways counterpart. One of the reasons for this is that there was actually more disbursement of funds in this sector than was allocated in the first plan, but progress was not as much during the second plan because of the damages done to the port facilities at Calabar and Port Harcourt during the war. Rehabilitation efforts at these ports started slowly but much has been done. Major efforts are being undertaken to further develop the ports at Lagos and Warri.

One of the problems that has confronted the port authority for a long period of time especially after the war, is congestion at the Lagos port. At least 75 percent of all cargo tonnages were handled at Lagos harbor, 16 percent at Port Harcourt while the other four ports account for only 9 percent. This congestion is unavoidable because of the technical limitations of the other ports.

Except for Warri and Calabar, cargo handled in other ports has increased considerably over the least few years.123 (See Table 31).

COMMUNICATIONS

From 1970 to 1974, the total number of telephones in Nigeria increased from 70,000 to 109,000 which represented an annual growth rate of about 14 percent. The corresponding per capita telephones
Table 31

Cargo Handled by Nigerian Ports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Lagos</th>
<th>Port Harcourt</th>
<th>Warri</th>
<th>Calabar</th>
<th>Total all Parts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,695</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>2,533</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>2,599</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>2,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>2,891</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>3,895</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>3,049</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4,104</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Third National Development Plan, op. cit., p. 221.

indicates a ratio of 1.5 telephones per 1,000. This ratio is considerably lower than the ratio of most developing countries which is estimated at 1 per 100 of population. A United Nations estimate gives the number of telephones in Nigeria by 1970 at 80,000 and that of 1972 at 97,000.

The number of telex working lines increased from 196 to 594 between 1970-74.

The post and telegraphs did not achieve a high rate of growth. Many planned postal facilities were not completed. The number of postal establishments increased from 1,649 to 1,730 between 1970-74 at an annual increase of 1.2 percent. This gives Nigeria a ratio of 1 postal establishment per 42,000 population which is far below 1 to 6,000 of the population recommended for the developing nations by the Universal Postal Union.
Mail traffic (domestic) increased from 198,863,000 in 1970 to 311,479,000 in 1972 while the telegraph service handled 1,155,000 telegrams in 1970 and 1,407,000 in 1972.\textsuperscript{126}

Performance in the External Communications subsector was more impressive than the post and telegraphs. Several projects in this area were completed or nearing completion. Some of the finished projects include: the extension to international automatic telex exchange, the upgrading of the Nigeria-Dahomey UHF-Link, and the expansion of UHF-radio links to OAU countries. Other projects have been slowed down pending the completion of the marina main office where most of the equipment and operations will be housed.\textsuperscript{127}

The overall performance of this sector though showed a marked improvement over that of the civilian regime. It also had a performance ratio more than that of other sectors of the economy during the 1970–74 period.

Eventhough there was a marked improvement in virtually all the subsectors of the transport and communications sector, under the military regime, the improvement cannot be considered remarkable. The communications subsector fared less than the transport subsector. By 1972, only about 4,000 miles of roads had been built. This does not tell the whole story of road transportation. The federal government also took over about 16,000 kilometers of roads from the states and about 4,000 kilometers of roads had been reconstructed. A lot of avenues were opened for more mobility and penetration of many parts of the country that hitherto had been difficult. The Nigerian Railways
improved its stocks and penetration, but it carried less passengers than it did under the civilian regime. However, in terms of tonnages of goods carried, it fared better under the military regime. The performance here is mixed. The results here are understandable in view of advancements in areas like commercial vehicles which had quadrupled by 1974. The same was true of passengers carried by the Nigerian airways domestically.

The communications sector fared much better. The postal services had improved in comparison to the civilian regime. Mail traffic quadrupled also. The number of telephones rose from 68,748 in 1966 to 109,000 in 1974 indicating a 14 percent annual growth rate. This per capita telephones indicates a ratio of 1.5 per 1,000 under the military regime and 1 telephone per 1,000 persons under the civilian regime.

The performance level of this sector under the military regimes falls below the standards of many developing countries. Nevertheless it is much more remarkable when compared to the civilian regime.

D. The Educational Sector

The Civilian Regime (1961-66)

Sociologists contend that education has five social functions in a society. They are: the transmission of the culture of society; the provision of innovations; the political function of providing leaders and making citizens; the selection of the more able out of the population as a whole; and the economic function of providing the labor force
with the quantity and quality of educated manpower that matches the needs of the economy.128

The last three functions, have economic ramifications besides merely acquiring knowledge and skills. Not only does education have economic implications, but it also has political implications. For instance, Seymour Lipset has indicated that the higher the educational level of a nation's population, the better the chances for democracy.129 Furthermore he states that education presumably broadens man's outlook which enables him to understand the needs for norms of tolerance.130 In view of the complexity of the Nigerian ethnic make-up, Lipset's description of the functions of education would seem to foster national integration efforts while at the same time promoting economic development.

The civilian regime seemed to have realized the necessity for an educated citizenry especially after the British colonial administration had relinquished power to Nigeria. The need to educate Nigerians became a question of survival of the new country after independence in 1960.

One of the boldest ventures undertaken by the civilian regime was in the area of educational development. The civilian government took its bearing from the Ashby Commission Report of 1960 which the members of the commission themselves described as "massive, unconventional and expensive."131
The commission argued that a modest and cautious programme in educational development would be a disservice to the country since any such program would be inadequate to keep pace with the rate of economic growth in the country. In part the commission declared that "we propose a rate of investment in education which far outstrips the probable growth of Nigeria's economy by 1970... We propose also to double the number of primary school pupils, almost to quadruple the number of students in secondary schools, and to multiply by more than five the present number of university students in Nigerian institutions."132

A federal government white paper issued in 1961 accepted the report and even went further by exceeding some of the targets of the commission especially in the area of primary education in the north and university and secondary enrollment in the nation.133

The Nigerian government had pursued educational development from the philosophical perspectives. The first perspective is the concept of education as a capital good—human capital, which attaches importance to skill as a precondition to economic development. The second perspective stems from the values of education as a means of making the citizenry more receptive to changing ideas.

Despite this bold venture by the federal government the gains in educational development were modest during the 1960s, primary and secondary school enrollment grew by about 2 percent and 1.5 percent respectively.
Between 1961 and 1966, primary school enrollment in the country rose from 2.8 million to 3 million. Secondary school enrollment rose from 195,000 in 1962 to 211,000 in 1966. In the technical and vocational schools the figure rose from 6,000 in 1962 to 10,000 in 1966. When these figures are judged from low base figures their achievement seem astounding. But when compared to other African countries they are comparatively low.

The primary school enrollment ratio for the country was about 30 percent which means that during the period under review, about 1 child in 3 was in school. At the secondary school level the ratio was about 3 percent—an abysmally low ratio.

Besides the low enrollment, there were imbalances in the educational development between the regions.

A major effort was also made by the Federal Government to increase significantly the number of universities and the enrollment of students in those universities. 4.6 million pounds was allocated to expand the University College in Ibadan. Student enrollment was to rise from 1,138 students in 1961 to 3,380 in 1967.

The federal government was very much influenced by the Ashby Commission report on higher education which had recommended among other things that:

(a) the number of Nigerian students should exceed 10,000 by 1980 and in pursuit of this, two new universities must be created.

(b) that one of the two new universities be established in Lagos (capital of the country) and the other at Zaria in the Northern Region.
The rationale for these recommendations was based on the realities of the intensity of regional cleavages in Nigeria at the time. Plans were underway to build a university at Nsukka in the Eastern Region and already one was established in Ibadan in 1948.

According to the commission, "The distances in Nigeria, the variety of people which comprise her population and above all, the need for diversity in higher education all point to the need for at least one university in each region. But the borders between regions must never become barriers to the migration of brains. Nigeria's intellectual life and her economy will suffer unless there is free migration of both staff and students from one region to another... One of the purposes of education in this country is to promote cohesion between her regions. Universities should be powerful instruments for this purpose and it is their duty to respond." 135

As a result of this recommendation, the University of Nigeria, Nsukka was opened in October 1960. In October 1962, Ahmadu Bello University was opened in Zaria (the university was named after the premier of the Northern Region) and the University of Lagos was also opened in the same month and year. 136

Apparently, Nigeria had made some remarkable achievements in the area of educational development. The government was devoting a sizeable part of the country's resources to education. Before the Ashby Commission was set up, Nigeria was spending about one and a half percent of GDP on education and by 1966 the expenditure rose to about three percent. Even more remarkable was the fact that the annual
compound growth rate of recurrent expenditure on education was averaging about 15 percent as compared with a GDP annual growth of about four percent. Whether these accomplishments were adequate or not in meeting the needs of the country would better be ascertained when they are compared to the undertakings of the military regime.

Besides the problem of low enrollment in schools and colleges in Nigeria, there have been criticisms to the effect that Nigeria's educational policies under the civilian regime were not adequately serving the needs of the country. A look at the number of university graduates by 1966 may further amplify these criticisms. The number of graduates in the Social Sciences, Humanities and the Liberal Arts far outweighed the number in the Sciences (see Table 32).

Table 32

University Graduates (bachelor degrees) in 1966

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Humanities</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine Arts</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Sciences</td>
<td>1,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Sciences</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering (including technology)</td>
<td>321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Register of High Level Manpower. See also Damachi *op. cit.*, p. 85.
There is always the problem in transitional societies for policy makers to choose discipline for students. Not only should they consider what are the critical skills needed for development, but they must also consider what the educational background and preparation of students are to enable them to pursue those desired careers. Some of the secondary schools do not give students adequate background that would enable them to pursue career goals prescribed by the government. Care must be taken to bear this in mind when evaluating the educational policies of both the civilian and military regimes.

**Educational Development**

**The Military Regime: 1970-75**

By 1970, the military regime was faced with an enormous task of reconstructing and rehabilitating the damage done to educational institutions during the Nigerian civil war. Not only were the schools disrupted and damaged, but the number of school age children in the war-affected areas had increased tremendously. This meant that reconstructing old schools was not enough unless new schools were built. The military government sought to address these problems. The military regime has since been criticized for some of its educational policies.

One of the main criticisms against the military regime is the absence of a coherent strategy for educational development. A United Nations report states that the current plans of the federal government for capital investment during the period 1970-74 does not
purport to offer a coherent strategy for educational development. It is simply a statement of intent to restore facilities and equipment damaged or disrupted during the period of unrest and expand education at all levels to achieve higher enrollment ratios, improve quality and educational equality between the states..."138

This criticism was true up till 1974, because it was not until 1975 that the Head of State, General Gowon addressed some of the critical issues confronting educational development in Nigeria. Offering guidelines to the third development plan 1975-80, Gowon stated that it was necessary "that education is available to all our peoples as soon as possible; that high and uniform standards are attained and maintained, that there is a uniform educational policy..."139

In reviewing, the performance of the educational sector from 1970-74, Gowon announced in a broadcast on October 1, 1974 that total enrollment in primary schools rose from 3,500,000 in 1970 to about 4,500,000 in 1973. At the secondary school level, 12 federal government colleges for boys and 12 colleges for girls were established; 4 new colleges of Technology and 9 trade centers were established by the state governments. University enrollment also rose from 14,500 in 1970-71 to 20,000 in 1973-74.140

These figures may belie the abysmally low state of progress of the educational sector. Despite the fact that the government was investing heavily in education (17.9 percent of the total budget in the 1970-74 plan) enrollment ratio per population was shockingly low.
On the average in 1970 only one child in three of primary school age and one in 25 of secondary school age was actually in school.141

Given the low base from which performance is being assessed, one must remark that improvements in both enrollment and additional new institutions were encouraging. In 1973, the number of primary schools had fallen from 15,324 in 1971 to 14,525 in 1973. This decline can be attributed to government's merger of some schools and the closing of substandard schools in some of the states. In percentage terms, the number of schools declined by about seven percent while enrollment increased by about 64 percent between the 1963-73 period.142 (see Table 33).

The number of secondary schools increased from 1,234 in 1971 to 1,499 in 1973 after some earlier decline. The figures should have been higher for this period but for the merger of some schools and the closing of other substandard institutions. Enrollment figures show 135,364 in 1960 to 205,002 in 1964, to 343,313 in 1971 and to 448,904 in 1973. In percentage terms, the number of schools increased by about 70 percent between 1960 and 1973 while enrollment was 232 percent143 (see Table 34).

Secondary technical development also took the same pattern like the secondary grammar schools. There were 84 secondary technical institutions in 1973 with an enrollment figure of 22,588 students in the same period. The increase represents 169 percent and 248 percent respectively.
Table 33

Enrollment Targets in Primary Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governments</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of Schools</td>
<td>Enrolment</td>
<td>No. of Schools</td>
<td>Enrolment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue-Plateau</td>
<td>2,600</td>
<td>282,848</td>
<td>2,684</td>
<td>452,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>81,464</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>120,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwara</td>
<td>551</td>
<td>136,749</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>151,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Central</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>144,314</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>171,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Eastern</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>92,018</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>153,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Western</td>
<td>3,561</td>
<td>987,869</td>
<td>2,135</td>
<td>1,268,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Eastern</td>
<td>6,451</td>
<td>1,430,514</td>
<td>5,986</td>
<td>1,173,277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>74,468</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>119,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>1,124,788</td>
<td>1,807</td>
<td>371,709</td>
<td>1,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Western</td>
<td>6,540</td>
<td>1,124,788</td>
<td>4,375</td>
<td>773,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>1,525</td>
<td>4,746,808</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15,703</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,912,618</strong></td>
<td><strong>14,976</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,849,488</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Third National Development Plan, op. cit.,
Table 34
Enrollment Targets in Secondary Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governments</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No. of Schools</td>
<td>Enrollment</td>
<td>No. of Schools</td>
<td>Enrollment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benue-Plateau</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kano</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwaara</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Central</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6,264</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>12,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Eastern</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-Western</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East-Central</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-Eastern</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>22,137</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>47,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivers</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>5,714</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Western</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>101,249</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>883</td>
<td>135,364</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>205,002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Third National Development Plan, op. cit.
In 1970, there were 5 universities in the country and by 1971-73 a new university was built in Benin. The government approved the plan for branch campuses to be opened in Jos (University of Ibadan) and Calabar (University of Nigeria, Nsukka). Meanwhile the federal government had taken over all the universities through a constitutional change which was introduced in October 1972. As a consequence of this constitutional amendment higher education was transferred from the concurrent list to the executive list.\footnote{144}

One problem which the military government failed to tackle successfully—even though it made statements indicating its awareness of the problem—was the correction of imbalances in educational development between the northern and southern states. The following statistics may illuminate the point made above. Out of the six universities in Nigeria, five are in the south. Only the Ahmadu Bello University is located in the north.

About five percent of the student population of 7,500 in the two universities of Lagos and Ibadan, come from the north as opposed to 40 percent from the western states and 35 percent from the East Central state. Out of a total primary school population of about 4.2 million, the six northern states had fallen to about 13 percent, the Western state alone constituted about 35 percent and the East Central state, 32 percent. The other southern states had about 20 percent.

At the secondary school level, only 25,000 students or 5.5 percent are enrolled in the northern states out of a national total of 450,000 compared with 210,000 enrolled in the Western state in 1972.\footnote{145}
Granted that this problem has been existing virtually since the amalgamation of Nigeria in 1914, the military government's effort at correcting this imbalance is at best minimal.

The figures shown in Table 35 indicate that the military regime's performance in educational development is much more remarkable than that of the civilian regime. The number of schools increased by about 70 percent also. The number of secondary and primary schools decline somewhat in 1973, but it was as a result of the merger of some schools. The universities increased by the addition of University of Benin and additional campuses in Calabar and Jos which helped to boost the enrollment of university students.

Table 35
Comparison of Educational Development in Nigeria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1961-66</th>
<th>1970-75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primary School Enrollment</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>4,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School</td>
<td>211,000</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical and Vocational Schools</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>22,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>3,380</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Second and Third National Development Plans, op. cit.
E. Health Development

Civilian Regime (1961-66)

To invest in health programs is to invest in human capital. There is an old adage which states that a healthy body is a healthy mind. To go a step further, one would state that a healthy populace is necessary for a healthy economy.

Recognizing the relationship between the standard of health of people and their level of productivity, the chief medical adviser to the federal government prior to independence, Dr. J.W.P. Harkness stated that it would be irrational "to attempt to apply a plan which would call for greater effort on the part of the people, while many of them are in a debilitated condition from worm infestations and endemic and epidemic diseases. A healthy body, reasonably nourished, is essential before further productive effort can be expected."11 In purely economic rationale, high mortality and morbidity rates obviously depress productivity and output.

Some independent sources have stated that in Nigeria "50 percent of the babies die before they are five days old, another 50 percent of the remaining children die before they are five years old, and women over forty-five on the average have given birth to 11 children, of whom only 3 are alive."147

One major shortcoming of health development in Nigeria is the disproportionate attention given to curative programs rather than preventive policies. There are several factors that contribute towards healthy life. For example, good water supplies, housing, nutrition,
and sanitation. These are not priority items and hence they compound the health problems of the country.

In his paper entitled "Environmental Sanitation," Dr. G.A. Ademola states that "bronchitis and pneumonia were the commonest causes of death in Nigeria; that 79,000 cases of dysentery were reported in 1964 while 10,000 cases of tuberculosis were diagnosed annually and that these conditions were in the main due to poor housing and bad environmental sanitation." In 1966, 43.1 percent of all deaths reported in Lagos were due to preventable diseases like malaria, dysentery and diarrhea, tetanus, tuberculosis, malnutrition and measles. By 1967, the death rate resulting from these diseases rose to 44.6 percent. The unfortunate aspect of these statistics is the fact that Lagos is supposed to have the highest standard of medical care in the whole country.

But inspite of these facts, health development plans of the federal government continued to devote most of its efforts and resources to curative services. This may account for the abysmally low performance of the health sector. This shortcoming is compounded by the fact that most or all improvements in health facilities are not distributed evenly. Health programs were geared towards improving the health conditions of the urban areas at the expense of the rural areas. With the poor transport facilities in Nigeria, residents of the rural areas are hardly presented with the opportunity of taking advantage of the meager health facilities available. In view of all these problems one would have thought that the efforts of the federal
government toward health development of health facilities and services under the Civilian Regime was minimal when compared to other sectors like defense, education, transport and communications (Table 36). This low level of commitment by the federal government was an obvious shortsightedness on the part of policy makers to the necessity of a healthy citizenry as one of the most important prerequisites for social and economic development.

By the time of Nigeria's independence in 1960, there were approximately 1,079 physicians, 49 dentists and 5,558 mid-wives. These figures were abysmally low for a country with a projected population of over 55 million. Estimated ratio of physicians for the country was 1 to 32,000. This problem was compounded by the fact that transport and communications were not developed enough to give most of the citizenry access to physicians who were sometimes hundreds of miles away.

One of the major efforts of the government was directed towards increasing the number of doctors and also a corresponding increase in the number of mid-wives and nurses.

To this end, the government allocated funds for the expansion of University College Hospital, Ibadan and the Lagos University Teaching Hospital to provide teaching facilities for clinical medicine. The goal was for the teaching hospitals to produce at least 200 doctors annually: a figure that was grossly inadequate. Besides these two projects, the federal government proceeded to expand the Royal Orthopedic Hospital in Igbobi, Lagos, the Yaba smallpox vaccine
Table 36
Federal Expenditure for Each Sector as a Percentage of Total Expenditure, 1961/62 to 1965/66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>61/62</th>
<th>62/63</th>
<th>63/64</th>
<th>64/65</th>
<th>65/66</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>44.46</td>
<td>43.16</td>
<td>28.92</td>
<td>29.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other general</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other unallocable</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and justice</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10.18</td>
<td>5.88</td>
<td>10.39</td>
<td>8.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unallocable public</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Works</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other community</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10.11</td>
<td>10.33</td>
<td>29.26</td>
<td>40.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expenditures</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>33.55</td>
<td>38.98</td>
<td>29.96</td>
<td>20.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

laboratory, the Lagos Hospital the National Institutes of Social and Preventive Medicine and the chemistry division and Public Health Laboratories.150

These efforts did not yield much of the desired effect because by 1963, there were only 1,108 physicians, 59 dentists, 7,763 mid-wives and 454 pharmacists. The doctor population ratio was estimated to be 1 to 34,000.151

United Nations studies indicate that by 1965 the health programs of the federal government had not improved significantly to meet the demands of the growing population. In this year Nigeria had only 1,300 physicians, 50 dentists, 662 pharmacists, 9,362 nurses and 9,559 mid-wives.152 The doctor population ratio had increased to 1 to 44,620 according to the same UN sources even though the Nigerian government's estimates gave the figures at 1 to 32,000.

There were also some efforts made by the government to improve in-patient facilities in various health establishments in the country. By 1966, there were about 1,163 hospital establishments (dispensaries, clinics, etc.) and an estimated 27,318 beds which meant that there was only one bed per 2,190 citizens.153

One of the problems that impeded the growth of health facilities and services was the fact that the money allocated for capital projects was grossly underspent. During the first National Development Plan, the federal government spent 2,995 million pounds out of an allocation of 10,304 million pounds. The regional governments fared better in terms of capital expenditures. They spent 4,465 million pounds out of a total allocation of 6,772 million pounds.
It is obvious from the above discussions that the civilian government either by commitment or performance was grossly inadequate; even though the federal government was mainly involved in just increasing the number of health personnel.

**Military Regime**

Some of the targets and goals set by the military regime in the area of health development in 1975 include among other things, increasing the ratio of doctors from 1:22,000 to 1:14,000; dentists from 1:548 to 1:400,000; registered midwives 1:4,200 to 1:3,000; registered nurses 1:4,400 to 1:3,000; pharmacists 1:68,000 to 1:40,000. These targets on paper seem very laudable. But given the present state of health development in the country, one would say that they are difficult to attain.

Apart from inadequate health facilities which have become the rule rather than the exception, there exists shortages in health manpower for both administrative and technical know-how. The World Health Organization sets a target of doctor-population ratio for 1:10,000 for the underdeveloped countries, but the recorded ratio of 1:22,000 in 1972 for Nigeria has not changed.

The total actual expenditure on health programs between 1970-73 as a proportion of the second development plan allocation was 50.6 percent. Out of a total allocation of 138,755,715 naira, 70,202,220 was spent. This is a fairly high performance ratio. But the original allocation of funds was not even enough to meet the goals set by the federal military government.
In any event, some modest gains were made. Available figures from both federal government and United Nations sources are valid up till 1972. However, there are no indications that much has changed since then.

The doctor-population ratio for 1972 was 1:22,000 as compared to 1:40,000 in 1962. The number of doctors was 3,112 and 1,354 for the same period. The ratio for dentists rose from 1:930,000 in 1962 to 1:548,000 in 1972. It must be borne in mind that about 41 percent of these doctors were expatriates. The out turn of doctors from the Nigerian medical schools was 203 of which 115 or 57 percent were from the University of Ibadan medical school. This underscores the importance of a new functional educational policy geared towards the immediate manpower needs of the country.

There were 7,107 registered nurses and 6,917 registered midwives in 1962 but by 1972 the figures had risen to 15,529 and 16,034. This shows an increase of 118.5 percent and 131.8 percent respectively. Unfortunately the number of pharmacists did not grow considerably. The number grew from 583 in 1962 to 1,005 in 1972. But medical laboratory technologists grew from 71 in 1962 to 240 in 1972. These figures are barely enough to meet the growing health needs of the country as more people become aware of the need for better health care. Hospital facilities increased from 2,793 in 1962 with a combined bed capacity of 21,986 to 4,958 with a combined bed capacity of 42,698 in 1972. In terms of bed-population ratio, it improved from 1:2,500 in 1962 to 1:1,700 in 1972.156 (See Table 37).
### Table 37

**Targets for Health Manpower and Facilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A. HEALTH MANPOWER</th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Doctor per population</td>
<td>1/40,000</td>
<td>1/22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentist per population</td>
<td>1/931,000</td>
<td>1/548,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered midwife per population</td>
<td>1/7,800</td>
<td>1/4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered nurse per population</td>
<td>1/7,600</td>
<td>1/4,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community nurse per population</td>
<td>1/370,000</td>
<td>1/69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacist per population</td>
<td>1/93,000</td>
<td>1/68,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Laboratory Technologist</td>
<td>1/761,000</td>
<td>1/283,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radiographer per population</td>
<td>1/1,800,000</td>
<td>1/567,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| B. HEALTH ESTABLISHMENTS               |               |               |
| TOTAL                                  | 2,793(21,986) | 4,958(42,698) |
| Bed per population                     | 1/2,455       | 1/1,700       |
| Teaching Hospitals                     | 2(285)        | 6(2,798)      |
| General Hospitals                      | N.A.          | 339(25,307)   |
| Health Centres                         | N.A.          | 239(1,310)    |
| Health Clinics                         | N.A.          | 1,605(-- --)   |

**NOTE:** 2,793 (21,986) refers to 2,793 health establishments with 21,986 beds.

**Source:** Third National Development Plan.
Table 38

Comparison of Health Development in
Nigeria: Civilian and Military
Regime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Civilian Regime</th>
<th>Military Regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physicians</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>3,112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dentists</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>95 (approx.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses</td>
<td>9,362</td>
<td>15,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwives</td>
<td>9,559</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Facilities</td>
<td>2,793</td>
<td>4,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacists</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>1,005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from UN Statistical Yearbook and 3rd National Development Plan 1975-80.
The federal military government has not addressed itself adequately to correcting the inadequate distribution of health facilities and institutions in the country. The present trend is to site most of the facilities in urban centers. When all health development statistics are computed for the rural areas, they are shamefully low. These figures in Table 38 clearly indicate that the military government performed better in all the indices used.

In a country like Nigeria still lacking adequate communication and transport facilities, the government has not taken enough steps toward providing preventive health services. Health development under the military improved substantially when compared to the civilian regime, but this improvement is still too low to make any dent in correcting the poor state of health facilities and services in Nigeria.


Nigeria has always been a country endowed with multiple resources. It is a country with immense agricultural and mineral resources. Because of its rich and extensive agricultural land, Nigeria produces a wide range of agricultural products including rice, millet, cassava groundnuts, cocoa, rubber, tobacco, etc. The varied climatic conditions make possible the cultivation of almost every tropical crop. Until the outbreak of the civil war in 1967, Nigeria produced enough food to feed the population and even exported some food to Dahomey, Togo and Ghana.
In terms of mineral resource potential, Nigeria is one of the richest countries in Black Africa or Africa as a whole. Identifiable mineral resources include, tin, columbite, gold, wolfram, lead-zinc, limestone, coal, lignite, petroleum, natural gas, etc. But the most prominent of these minerals is petroleum which has become the biggest foreign exchange earner of the Nigerian government. In 1966, the value of mineral export (including petroleum) was about 109 million pounds (218 million naira) of which petroleum earned 92 million pounds (184 million naira). Since then the petroleum has witnessed a major boom which has in time made Nigeria a major oil exporter in the world.

The resources of any nations are also evaluated in terms of her human resources potential and actual. By 1966, Nigeria had an estimated population of over 60 million and by 1973 it was estimated that the total labor force would be 20.64 million (by 1966 estimates). Though Nigeria suffers from a high percentage of illiteracy, nevertheless, it has an extremely high potential of human resources that is not harnessed.

The quality of the human resources has been steadily growing since independence as evidenced by the amount of school leavers. This means that given the vast mineral resources available in Nigeria and the potential qualitative growth of her human resources, the chances of progressive economic and social development are tremendous. It is one thing to have resources and another to harness and utilize resources properly. This is where managerial and leadership qualities of leaders become very crucial and this is where regimes come in too.
When we compare the relative performance of the civilian regime with that of the military regime, the evidence is overwhelming that in terms of economic development — using this author's indicators — the military regime performed better. The conclusion is true where one looks at gross measures like GDP or sectoral performances of agriculture, industry, transport and communications, education and health.

We have not as yet tried to give reasons why the military had a better performance or tried to make excuses as to why the civilians did not perform as well. In the subsequent chapter, we shall try to look at a number of independent variables which might explain the performance of the military regime. But it is essential at this juncture to discuss largely one independent variable which may help or interpret our results more perceptibly. Here we are making reference to revenues available to each regime. One must hasten to mention that the gross proceeds from oil in 1975 was 7.34 billion naira or approximately 11 billion dollars. This contribution was possible as a result of the boom in international oil prices. Decidedly, it gives the military unfair advantage over the civilian regime.

Table 39 shows the revenues accruing to the civilian government from 1961-1966 from several sources. The figures indicate that between 1961-66 the civilian government had revenues of approximately 810 million pounds (1,620 million naira). This gave the civilian regime an average of 133 million pounds (266 m naira) yearly to carry out its policies.
Table 39

| Revenue of the Federal Government (1961-66) (thousand pounds) |
|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|
| Tax Revenue       | 87,642           | 86,747           | 92,527           | 110,544          | 127,738          | 119,605          |
| Import Duties     | 60,174           | 59,016           | 61,278           | 75,799           | 84,821           | 58,504           |
| Export Duties     | 13,495           | 12,381           | 13,536           | 14,626           | 15,765           | 14,264           |
| Excise Duties     | 6,407            | 6,529            | 9,299            | 12,199           | 16,538           | 33,730           |
| Company Tax       | 4,738            | 6,033            | 6,173            | 4,800            | 6,510            | 8,442            |
| Personal Income Tax & Other Tax Revenue | 2,828 | 2,788 | 2,241 | 3,120 | 4,104 | 4,665 |
| Mining (royalties, rents, etc.) | 4,275 | 13,137 | 8,501 | 9,888 | 12,805 | 10,353 |
| Interest & Repayments | 5,243 | 5,786 | 11,483 | 6,066 | 7,352 | 8,948 |
| Posts and Telegraphs | 4,435 | 5,046 | 5,398 | 5,128 | 6,626 | 2,739 |
| Miscellaneous .  | 10,232           | 8,710            | 6,638            | 6,977            | 6,026            | 11,575           |
| Total             | 111,827          | 119,426          | 124,547          | 138,603          | 160,547          | 153,220          |

The conversion rate for one Nigerian pound is two naira. This table adapted from the Economic and Financial Review (Central Bank of Nigeria, Vol. 9, no. 1, June 1971).
Table 40 shows that between 1970-75 the federal military government had revenues of approximately 15 billion naira. This represents an average of 2.5 billion naira annually. Therefore the civilian regime had about 1.6 billion naira from 1961-66 while the military regime had about 15 billion naira with which to run the country. The financial resources of the military regime are enormous when compared to that of the civilian regime.

No prima facie judgement is being made with regard to these figures, but they certainly will be significant in explaining the findings. Since it has been established that the military regime had a better performance on economic development than the civilian regime, the next logical step would be to explain why. In the literature review on the role of the military in developing nations, there is the school of thought which claims that the military is a better achiever than the civilians. This school of thought ascribes a number of organizational characteristics to the military which makes it a better achiever. The evidence of the performance of the military regime seems to vindicate this school of thought. But any such vindication at this juncture seems premature. This author contends that besides the organizational characteristics of the military, there are other independent variables which might affect performance in Nigeria. These variables are ethnic/regional cleavage, cohesiveness of governing elites and resource base of each regime. Therefore, in the subsequent chapter we shall try to explain or account for the better performance of the military regime in terms of the variables discussed.
Table 40
(N million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Direct Taxes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company tax (including super tax)</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>146.6</td>
<td>261.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal income tax</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum profits tax</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>383.2</td>
<td>540.5</td>
<td>769.2</td>
<td>2,872.5</td>
<td>2,707.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other tax revenue(^1)</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indirect Taxes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import duties</td>
<td>369.4</td>
<td>491.2</td>
<td>481.1</td>
<td>516.2</td>
<td>498.2</td>
<td>760.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export duties</td>
<td>215.6</td>
<td>284.8</td>
<td>274.4</td>
<td>307.9</td>
<td>328.3</td>
<td>629.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excise duties</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests and repayments</td>
<td>112.6</td>
<td>168.6</td>
<td>179.8</td>
<td>196.0</td>
<td>164.4</td>
<td>125.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining (royalites, rents, etc.)</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>127.1</td>
<td>162.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous(^2)</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>127.0</td>
<td>223.8</td>
<td>246.8</td>
<td>854.2</td>
<td>1,564.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Board of Customs and Excise returns and Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazettes.

\(^1\)Includes capital gains casino and airport taxes.

\(^2\)Includes earnings and sales, fees and licences, reimbursements and other receipts not specified.
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid.


7. Ibid., p. 49.


17Garry Berry and Carl Liedholm, op. cit., p. 74.


20Gerald K. Helleiner, op. cit., p. 311.


22Gerald K. Helleiner, op. cit., p. 312.


28Ibid., p. 263.

29Western Region (7), Education Statistics, 1953-58, pp. 15, 30.


31Gerald Helleiner, op. cit., p. 306.

32Ibid., p. 310.

33Ibid., p. 301.


35Ibid., p. 262.

36Ibid., p. 271.

37Ibid., p. 275.
38Ibid., p. 276.


44Edwin Dean, op. cit.


47Gerald Helleiner, op. cit., p. 43.


50Ibid.

51Second National Development Plan, op. cit., p. 36.


54Third National Development Plan: 1975-80, p. 11.

55Wouter Tims, p. 75.


57Ibid., p. 1.


60. Second National Development Plan, op. cit.


63. Ibid., p. 103.

64. Ibid., p. 104.

65. Ibid., p. 105.


67. Ibid., p. 78.


69. Ibid., p. 63.

70. Ibid., pp. 65-66.


75. Peter Hill, op. cit., p. 1.


77. Wouter Tims, op. cit., p. 126.


79. Third National Plan, op. cit., p. 68.


83Third National Plan, op. cit., p. 85.


85Charles P. Kindleberger, op. cit., p. 213.

86B. W. Hodder, op. cit., p. 160.


90Ibid., p. 65.

91Edwin Dean, op. cit., p. 219.


93Wouter Tims, op. cit., p. 82.


96Ibid.


99Third National Plan, op. cit., p. 147.

100Ibid., p. 147.


102Second National Plan, op. cit., p. 44.


106 Ibid.

107 *Third National Plan*, op. cit., p. 147.

108 Ibid., p. 149.


118 Ibid., p. 9.

119 Ibid., p. 10.


121 Ibid., p. 213.


123 *Third National Plan*, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

124 Ibid., p. 229.

125 *United Nations Statistical Yearbook, op. cit.*

126 Ibid.


130 Ibid.


133 Ibid., p. 35.


136 Investment in Education, op. cit., p. 25.


138 Wouter Tims, op. cit., p. 85.


140 Daily Times (Lagos, Nigeria, October 2, 1974).

141 Wouter Tims, op. cit., p. 85.


143 Ibid., p. 237.


DAILY TIMES, (Lagos, April 1, 1975), p. 5.

Chapter IV
Analyses of Findings and Conclusion

In chapter three, we presented evidence to show that the military regime (1970-75) under Gowon achieved a higher rate of economic and social development than the civilian regime (1960-66). The evidence is overwhelming whether we looked at gross indicators such as the GDP or whether we looked at sectoral growth and development such as the agricultural, industrial, transport, communications, educational and health sectors.

As of this point no attempt has been made to explain why the military was able to perform better than the civilian regime. It is by no means an easy task, since economic growth and development may be occasioned by a multitude of factors which are sometimes not readily discernible. It is also more difficult to establish direct causality in social phenomena than it is to establish causality in the natural sciences. However, one must attempt to explain the differences in the economic development levels of the civilian and military regimes in Nigeria with the available evidence and, at times, resort to speculation where it becomes necessary.

One of the factors that definitely accounted for the difference in the degree of performance of the two regimes was the fact that the military regime had a preponderance of resources over the civilian
regime. In relative terms, the resources and revenues available to the Gowon administration during the 1970-75 period were enormous.

Through a variety of sources, such as petroleum, agricultural exports, company taxes, income taxes, export duties and excise duties, the military regime was able to raise a lot of revenue with which to implement most of its policy goals. For example, during the 1961-66 period, the civilian regime generated a total of 1,620 million Naira (approximately 2.430 billion dollars) while the military regime generated a total of 15 billion Naira (approximately 22.4 billion dollars) during the 1970-75 period. (See Tables 39, 40 for more details.)

If we look at the breakdown of revenues generated by subsectors, the evidence indicates that the military regime was able to, or more capable of generating more revenues and, consequently, was able to spend more money to accomplish some of its goals.

These revenues were generated through direct and indirect taxes. The direct taxes include such sub-categories as company tax, personal income tax, petroleum profits tax and other miscellaneous items like casino and airport taxes. The indirect taxes include other sub-categories such as import duties, export duties, excise duties, mining royalties and rents and interests and repayments. (For further details see Tables 39 and 40.)

It might be appropriate at this juncture to explain why the military regime was able to generate more revenues than the civilian regime. One of the main differences in the amount of revenue between the two regimes is the fact that during the 1970-75 period there was an inflation on the price of petroleum in the international market.
which in turn made more money available to Nigeria. Later on we shall discuss the contribution made by petroleum to the Nigerian economy.

Through a lot of policy actions, the military regime was able to insure that more taxes were paid to the federal government. Tax payments and collections were not some of the easiest tasks the civilians had to contend with. Because of the semi-autonomous set-up of the regions and the relative weakness of the federal government in exercising control over the regions, the country was not getting as much taxes as it should have during the civilian regime. However, the Gowon administration took some steps to change the situation and this was possible because of the change in the structural framework of decision making in Nigeria. Under Gowon, the federal government assumed greater control over the states and also got a great measure of compliance from the state governors which was not possible under the civilian regime. This enabled the military regime to institute such policy measures as tax reform, business decrees, and the establishment of national corporations, particularly a large revenue-generating oil corporation. (A more detailed discussion of the change in the structural make-up of the country will be given later in this chapter.)

The federal military government introduced a series of tax reforms which consequently yielded more revenue. The income tax decree in 1972 allowed the federal government to collect income taxes from civilian employees in the armed forces which hitherto was not the case. But the most reforms made were in company taxes. Starting from 1972, "ordinary company profit tax increased from 40 to 45 percent. Companies earning profits of less than 3,000 Nigerian pounds (6,000 Naira)
in the year will now be exempt from tax whilst those earning between 3,000 pounds and 5,000 pounds in the year will pay 45% as tax. A capital gains tax of 20% has been imposed on the sale of shares and stocks.\(^2\)

Also, in 1972, the military government made an amendment to Section 61A of the Companies Income Tax Act of 1961. This amendment was to insure that the taxes are "payable to revenue as at the time such interest, management fees and royalties are shown in the company's account as due to overseas beneficiaries." The federal military government also amended the Head Office Expenses, Fees and Profits Tax which stipulated that "only expenses 'wholly, exclusively, necessarily and reasonably' incurred in the production of revenue may be allowed as deductable expenses."\(^3\) The federal government also introduced a uniform system of personal income taxation throughout the country in 1974 which had not been the case.\(^4\)

There is no doubt that these tax reforms brought more income to the federal government. But perhaps one policy action of the military government that contributed significantly to more revenues by way of taxes was the indigenization of Business Decree of 1972 which took effect from March 31, 1974. This decree stated that aliens were to be disallowed from investing in 33 specified areas of trade in Nigeria. These specified trade areas include among others: beer brewing, boat building, coastal and inland waterways shipping, construction companies, departmental stores and supermarkets, newspaper publishing and printing, rice milling and distribution of spare parts.\(^5\)
By virtue of this decree, there were more Nigerian entrepreneurs who were willing to work hand-in-hand with the government. They were encouraged to invest their profits in Nigeria, thereby providing more sources of revenue for the nation. It must be remarked that when these businesses were foreign-owned, a lot of revenue was transferred from the country to the other countries where the parent companies were located. By establishing the Nigerian Enterprises and Promotion Board, it was easier for the federal government to adequately assess incomes and taxes of Nigerian-owned companies.

In spite of all these measures, nevertheless, the main source of revenue of the federal military government was the petroleum sector. Even under the civilian regime, the petroleum sector's contribution to the GDP was steadily increasing. For example, there was an increase of gross proceeds from oil of 66 million Naira in 1964 to 202 million Naira in 1966. But by 1974-75, the gross proceeds from oil had risen to approximately 6,633 billion Naira.

While oil was accounting for approximately 40 percent of the GDP, its contribution to government revenues and foreign exchange earnings during this period was about 85 percent. This contribution to government revenue is also reflected in petroleum profits tax which rose from 97.6 million Naira in 1972 to 2,705.5 billion Naira in 1975. (See Table 40.)

One may wonder what the military government had to do with the increasing revenue from oil. While it may be difficult to state the direct causality between governmental actions and increased oil profits, one can state without question that the establishment of a
national oil corporation by the military government enhanced and increased profits to the government. This assertion can be made not withstanding the international determinants of oil prices.

When Gowon established the national oil corporation, he stated that his policy action "will not only result ultimately in a greater yield of revenue to the government, but also in a meaningful and effective control of our natural resources."\(^8\) Through this corporation, the Nigerian Government became directly involved in the mining and marketing of petroleum. By 1974, the government acquired majority equity participation in virtually all the oil companies. In addition, production-sharing contracts ranging from 65 to 70 percent were signed with some new companies like Ashland Oil Company.\(^9\) There is no doubt that by acquiring majority shares in the corporations, the federal military government was able to generate more revenues from petroleum, than would otherwise be the case had foreign-owned companies controlled the oil companies.

So far we have shown that there was an enormous difference in revenues between the civilian regime (1961-66) and the military regime (1970-75). It is only natural to expect that because the military regime had a preponderance of revenues over the civilian regime, that the former could accomplish more of its goals than the latter.

But this conclusion offers us only a partial explanation of why the military government had a better performance record on economic development than the civilian government. It is not so much the availability of funds that determines per se the success of a project
(even though funds are prerequisites) but in the type of planning, management and implementation efforts that go into a project.

Earlier, it was shown that the federal military government took some policy actions that invariably increased its revenues. We shall attempt to show that besides generating more revenues, it was able to provide a government that had the capability and leadership of choosing, maintaining and implementing effective policy decisions. This was not the case under the civilian regime.

The civilian regime was characterized by ethnic and regional cleavages and above all weak leadership, while the military regime under Gowon provided a strong leadership that was able to minimize the potency of cleavages, that was able to use the military organization and his personal attributes to bring about elite consensus and above all was able to present the bureaucracy with a single and consistent policy line for implementation.

Before we try to explain the factors that accounted for the difference in the performance levels of the civilian and military regimes, it is important that we present some additional evidence (in addition to the discussion in Chapter II) to show why the civilian regime was unable to accomplish a great deal of economic development. These questions are appropriate: why did the civilian regime perform poorly and why did the military regime perform better?

The answer to the first question must be seen in a historical perspective, which attempts to explain the growth and development of cleavages in Nigerian politics and subsequently, how these cleavages became pervasive and impeded economic development.
The Role of Cleavages Under the Civilian Regime:

During the civilian regime, Nigeria's political scene was characterized by regional, tribal and ethnic cleavages. These cleavages impeded economic development, policy making and policy implementation. Because of the existence and pervasiveness of these cleavages, it was difficult to have a strong leadership at the centre which was necessary to pull all the elements together.

Nigeria did inherit a parliamentary system of government from Britain, but it failed because it did not inherit the culture that was needed to make it work. Party politics had aggravated the regional and tribal cleavages in the country. The three main political parties, namely the Northern People's Congress (NPC), the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (later changed to the National Council of Nigerian Citizens) and the Action Group were based in the north, the east and the west respectively. Only the N.C.N.C. had a broader appeal that transcended regional boundaries. Not only were the parties based in their respective regions, but their appeal and programs indicated that their loyalties were regional and tribal. It is sometimes difficult to make a distinction between regional and tribal cleavages in Nigeria. The reason for this is the fact that the British had divided the country into three main regions, and each of these regions was dominated by the major tribes, namely: the Hausas in the North, the Yorubas in the West and the Ibos in the East. Therefore when politicians spoke for their respective regions, they were also speaking for their respective tribes.
How did these cleavages impede progress in Nigeria? It is difficult to imagine any event in Nigeria where these cleavages did not play a negative role. The first major event which indicated that Nigeria was in for a long and tumultuous road to development was the first elections held prior to independence which was aimed at giving Nigerians control of their political fate. One would have expected the politicians to close ranks, especially after the British government had placed the conduct of the elections as a prerequisite for granting independence in 1960. (The elections were held in December, 1959.)

The central themes of the campaign were regional and tribal vituperations that stunned even the most partisan observers. Because of the British machinations, the North was allocated more than half of the seats in the parliament. Therefore, the NPC really did not need to take its campaign beyond its northern borders. Even before the elections were held, it was obvious that the NPC would win the majority of the seats needed to form a government. This realization intensified the parochial nature of the campaigns, as the N.C.N.C. and the A.G. intensified their slogans of "Northern domination" and "Hausa/Fulani imperialism."

The outcome of the elections confirmed the fears of the southern regions as the north won a majority of the seats. However, the NPC did not win an absolute majority and it subsequently went into a coalition with the N.C.N.C. which placed second in the elections. It was a coalition without consensus. It was a thinly veiled coalition which gave the semblance of unity, which enabled the British to grant
independence to Nigeria. The Action Group became the official opposition party and from its public pronouncements, it was bent on disrupting the effectiveness of the coalition.

The NPC/NCNC coalition itself was a non-workable alliance. The leaders were opposed to each other on every issue, be it domestic or foreign. One of the major areas of disagreement was over allocation and distribution of resources. (A case in point was the location of the iron and steel mill which was considered a prerequisite for economic development.) Feasibility studies conducted by the World Bank had recommended that the industry be built in Onitsha in the eastern region. The NPC wanted it built in the northern region. The economic effects of building it in the north were enormous. Locating the industry in the north meant that raw materials had to be shipped to the north from the east and then finished products had to be shipped back to the south for export and distribution as the north is landlocked. Besides, the skilled manpower required to operate such a giant structure was mainly in the south. Because of the dispute, and disagreement over the location of the industry, the building of the industry was postponed indefinitely.

The coalition failed to agree on an equitable revenue allocation formula. The issue of revenue allocation has always been a thorny issue between the regions, even before independence. The former allocation formula of 1958 was based on the principles of derivation. Fifty percent of revenues were to go to the region of derivation. This was an acceptable formula for the north, since they were providing the bulk of the revenue from groundnuts, cotton, hides and skins.¹⁰
When large deposits of oil were found in the eastern region (Delta) the north came up with a new formula which emphasized need and population. The N.C.N.C. was vehemently resentful of this formula. The N.C.N.C. proposed that the old formula should still be effective. The coalition partners could not agree on this and it remained unsettled.

This disagreement had other implications. Firstly, the N.C.N.C. opposed further developments in the north which would be financed from the oil revenues. Secondly, and perhaps the more important of the implications, is the effect of the dispute on the conduct of the 1962-63 population census.

Because of the high potency of cleavages that existed in the country, politicians had come to see the population census not as a means of providing economic planners with data for development, but as an avenue for increasing each region's share of the national pie. When the census was finally conducted in 1962-63, the figures proved not only grossly manipulated, but meaningless. The north showed an increase of 30 percent over the last census of 1952-53, the east and west showed a 70 percent increase. Because of the controversy that ensued over the figures, the Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, ordered a new census in 1963 and when the figures were released, the east and west were incensed. The figures showed that the north had 29.8 million, the east 12.4 million, the west 10.3, the new midwest (carved out of the west), 2.17 million and Lagos 0.7.11 The east and the midwest rejected these figures, the north and the west accepted them. The NPC instructed federal planners to use those
figures for planning. The NPC also proceeded to use these figures in redistribution of seats for the federal house of representatives, which meant that the north in any future elections would have a decided advantage.

Before the 1964 federal elections, the NPC-NCNC coalition crumbled. The new leadership in the west under S.L. Akintola decided that it was politically expedient to join the NPC if the west would get its own share of the pie. The NPC welcomed an opportunity to win more seats in the south. It therefore accepted the coalition which was known as the National Alliance of Nigerian Citizens. The NCNC teamed up with the splinter faction of the AG and the Northern Elements Progressive Union based in the middle belt of the northern region. This alliance was known as the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). Because the two grand alliances had cut across regional boundaries, the 1964 elections centered on ethnic and tribal sloganeering. Instead of northern or southern domination, it became Hausa and Yoruba domination. When the UPGA boycotted the elections and the NNA went on to win the elections, there was general unrest in the country which eventually led to a military coup in 1966.

So far, we have discussed the regions as if they were monolithic. One of the factors which helped to nurture the regional cleavages in Nigeria was the fact that in each region there were also some minority ethnic groups which wanted autonomy. Leaders of all the regional parties appealed to the sentiments of these minority groups who were, at the time, for the creation of more states. For example, in the east there were the Calabar and Rivers ethnic groups. In the north there
were the Tivs in the middle belt and the Fulanis in Kano, in the west Ondos, who felt that they did not belong with the west, and also the Ika Ibos. Probably, the most expedient political decision was to have created more states which actually was justified. But the major tribes refused to grant these ethnic groups autonomy for fear of weakening their power bases. Unfortunately, they misjudged the impact of their decisions, because the clamor for more states took violent turns. This is why we have talked about ethnicity as a major cleavage which impeded development in Nigeria.

In this brief summation of the role of cleavages in Nigeria, we have attempted to show that besides the divisiveness which reinforcing cleavages created in Nigeria, they also produced unrest and disorder, which were impediments to progress. We find that leaders had no consensus, let alone cohesiveness on issues that were of national interest. In a climate of political disorder and unrest, it is not difficult to imagine why the civilian regime could not generate substantial economic development in Nigeria during the 1961-1966 period.

So far we have tried to explain the failure of the civilian regime to achieve much progress in economic development in terms of the inability of the regime to minimize the potency of cleavages and create order. Later on we shall try to explain the effects of all these on economic development.

Perhaps one of the strongest factors which made cleavages unmanageable in Nigeria during the civilian period was the absence of strong leadership in the centre. The Prime Minister of the federation, Alhaji Abubakar Tafawa, was perceived as a weak leader, with no national
appeal and without the courage required to lead a transitional nation like Nigeria. There is a lot of merit in these criticisms because it was common knowledge that even though Abubakar was the Prime Minister, he was not the leader of his party. His directives came from the Sardauna in the north. Consequently, the cabinet ministers owed their appointments and allegiance to the Sardauna. The stature of the Sardauna was enhanced by the fact that he was also the spiritual leader of the north. Therefore, even if the Prime Minister had the intention of charting the course of the nation in the non-parochial sense, he did not have the authority and flexibility to do so. In an eulogy, the late Kwame Nkrumah stated that Abubakar was "sincere in his personal dealings, striving valiantly to master a situation which was beyond his capacity and was a martyr to a neocolonialist system of which he was a mere figurehead." This was a very apt characterization of him.

A case in point that comes readily to mind was the question of the recognition of Israel. During the civilian regime, the Israeli government had provided Nigeria with all forms of technical assistance, especially in the field of agricultural development. There were several Nigerian students who were studying in Israeli institutions, yet there was a sharp disagreement on the question of diplomatic recognition for Israel. The NPC was opposed to this recognition, but the NCNC was very much in favor. The Prime Minister had indicated that it was expedient to recognize Israel in view of their generous assistance to Nigeria. But his views were vetoed by the Sardauna who once asked "where is Israel, does it exist?" It was understandable in view
of the fact that the Sardauna was the vice president of the Arab League and the spiritual leader of the Muslim north. But the powerlessness of the Prime Minister was obvious in this situation and it did not augur well for national integration that the country had an ineffectual leader.

The essence of this example is to show that strong leadership is essential for a developing nation to develop. Leadership becomes increasingly important when we realize that the institutions of the state are not yet developed and organized enough to cope with the demands of the people. In the absence of strong institutional arenas, a country requires a strong, innovative and incisive leader who can, through his personal stature and policies, hold together the disparate elements in the nation. A strong leadership is required to convince people of the futility of placing regional and ethnic interests above national interests. A strong leader, therefore, must be seen as the champion of national causes, rather than a champion of parochial interests in order to have both the credibility and the legitimacy necessary for development. The evidence indicates that these qualities were lacking during the civilian regime.

What is the direct relationship between these preceding discussions and the poor performance of the civilian regime on economic development? From the previous discussions in Chapter II and also in this chapter, it is obvious that the civilian regime was handicapped by lack of cohesiveness and consensus from the ruling elite. It is obvious also that at the national level, the leaders' loyalties were mainly to their respective regions and ethnic groups and consequently
there were no consistent and unified policy actions designed to benefit the nation as a whole. Even if a policy line was evolved at the centre, there was no way by which the regions would comply, especially in view of the weak leadership at the centre. Therefore, what subsequently emerged by way of an economic development policy was acute regional rivalry over the location of industries and economic projects. Invariably, this led to a lot of duplication of industries and projects without any regard to their viability or desirability.

Writing in *Africa Magazine*, Donald H. Louchheim (former *Washington Post* foreign correspondent) stated that the civilian regime was characterized by "waste, corruption and shortsighted planning." He further stated that "In all four regions, costly and sometimes new factories stand as monuments to political greed or foolishness.... Regionalism under the civilian government was an economist's nightmare. Each of the four semi-autonomous regional governments competed for the biggest slice of the development pie, throwing up new factories as fast as possible... the key objective of every regional government was to build a factory, preferably in a town or area that needed a political boost. Whether this plant was needed or could ever become viable often appears to be of secondary importance." There are numerous examples of these types of practices. In fact, they were the rule rather than the exception. Even a major sector of the economy like agriculture was placed under the exclusive authority of the regions which impeded or prevented any coordinated planning.

It has been stated earlier that the reason we have chosen to evaluate the performance of regimes/governments in this dissertation
to the exclusion of the private sector is that in the Third World countries, the government is usually the sole arbiter of economic activity. This is so because of the underdevelopment of the private sector.

Therefore, any government that is incapable of planning, coordinating and executing its policy goals, also spells failure of economic development goals. For example, Edwin Dean states that the regional orientation of Nigerian politics conflicted with the attempt to implement a national plan and that also, the regional rivalries and the difficulty of influencing the regions to implement policies and priorities made economic development extremely difficult. This rivalry also hindered the regional interchange of ideas, information or personnel.16

It can therefore be stated that economic development could not be expected to foster adequately under a political system with no strong leadership, under institutions or organizations that thrived on parochial loyalties and, especially, under a government with virtually no elite consensus on policy decisions, let alone policy implementation.

In an attempt to find answers to the inadequacies exhibited by liberal democracies in post-independence Africa, many scholars have repeatedly turned their attention to military regimes as effective substitutes for liberal democracies. This discussion leads us to the second question posed earlier in this chapter which asked: why did the military regime achieve a better and higher rate of economic development than the civilian regime?
We have already concluded decisively that the military regime under Gowon (1970-75) achieved a higher rate of economic development than the civilian regime (1961-66). What then accounts for this difference?

It is very appropriate to discuss once more some of the arguments presented in Chapter I, especially those arguments that tend to support the view that military organizations possess some characteristics which make them more capable of generating more economic development than their civilian counterparts.

In the first chapter on literature review, there was some discussion as to why military regimes might perform better than civilian regimes. In the same chapter, proponents of military rule, like Lucian Pye, Fred Greene and Janowitz, argued that the reason why military regimes would perform better is that they possess some organizational characteristics which the civilian regime does not possess. These organizational characteristics are: a) a hierarchical command structure which they contend makes it easier for the military to carry out its policies as orders will be obeyed faithfully. b) Cohesiveness—this is an attribute which the above-named scholars contend is the pivot upon which other military attributes revolve. It is argued that because of cohesiveness among the military authority, policy formulation and implementation are not hampered by divided loyalties. c) Better trained and skilled personnel. These same authors argue that the military is able to perform better because of the superiority of its personnel which enables it to provide a more innovative and development-minded leadership. d) Lower and middle
class recruitment patterns. It is argued that because military officers are recruited from lower and middle class backgrounds, they are bound to be reformists and less likely to preserve the status quo than their civilian counterparts. Because of these recruitment patterns, the military leaders are imbued with esprit de corps which places emphasis on national identification and national integration. Their esprit de corps enables military leaders to sacrifice their parochial loyalties for the national good, which is a prerequisite for economic development.

As was discussed earlier in Chapter I, many scholars disagree with Lucian Pye, Fred Greene, Samuel Huntington and Janowitz. Their disagreement is not so much on theoretical grounds as much as the fact that Third World countries do not possess these so-called organizational characteristics. As a counter argument to these organizational characteristics, they contend it is not appropriate to explain the performance of the military solely in terms of these characteristics. For example, Nordlinger and Gutteridge state that African armies are usually very small and therefore do not have adequate manpower to govern their countries. They also argue that because African armies are thrown together in haste, they therefore lack the necessary time to imbibe enough esprit de corps, which emphasizes national loyalties over regional or tribal loyalties.

This latter group of scholars may be right in their assessment of African armies. However, one must not assume that their conclusions necessarily apply to all African countries. Since the task of this chapter is to explain why the military regime was able to do more in
the area of economic development than the civilian regime in Nigeria, it is worthwhile to see if the better performance of the military can be explained in terms of its organizational characteristics. It is also worthwhile to see if the Nigerian military possesses these so-called organizational characteristics. The evaluation of the Nigerian military will be discussed in two phases, namely: the Nigerian army before the first coup of January 15, 1966 and the Nigerian army after the civil war in January 1970.

While I do not disagree with most of the arguments presented by the proponents of military rule in Africa, I intend to argue that those organizational characteristics described earlier barely existed in the Nigerian army, especially from 1960-1966. And even some of these so-called organizational characteristics that may have existed prior to 1966, were negated by the effects of the first coup. It was not until the end of the Civil War that Gowon restored considerably two organizational characteristics, namely: hierarchical command structure and elite cohesiveness, which subsequently helped him in implementing most of his economic development goals.

Before the January 15th coup, the Nigerian army was one of the simplest and smallest armies in the world, mainly due to British colonial policy to man a small army in their colonies as a supplement to the police force. Before 1956, the Nigerian army (then known as the Nigerian Regiment) had been organized to meet the contingency needs of the British. It was involved in several expeditions like the liberation of Ethiopia and World War II.
During World War II the strength of the Nigerian Army had reached approximately 121,652 with about 28 battalions that were demobilized after the war. But in 1956, after a reorganization, the Nigerian military forces were made up of about 250 officers and about 6,400 other ranks consisting of five infantry battalions.\(^{18}\) By January 1956, only 15 of the 250 commissioned officers were Nigerians. On the eve of the army coup, the Nigerian armed forces were made up of the army, which had a size of 10,500 men of whom 511 were officers and 330 of these were of combat status; a small navy of one frigate and a small air force.\(^{19}\) By these accounts, the Nigerian military was structurally undifferentiated and functionally unspecialized. This is hardly the type of military which Pye described as highly skilled and technologically advanced to direct a nation to modernity. An unspecialized, undifferentiated and small army like that of Nigeria, could be expected to intervene in politics with relative ease, but not govern effectively. And with the attrition of officers resulting from two bloody coups in which about forty officers were killed, the administrative potential of the Nigerian military was greatly reduced. Now that we have discussed the organization of the Nigerian military, perhaps we will be better able to question some of the organizational characteristics attributed to the Nigerian military if we look at the four organizational characteristics already discussed, separately.
(A) Recruitment Patterns of the Officer Corps. What is it about the recruitment patterns of the Nigerian military that would enable the military organization to perform better than the civilians? The contention here is that unlike the proponents of military rule, the recruitment patterns of the Nigerian military militated against its effectiveness to govern. The recruitment patterns, far from promoting cohesiveness, esprit de corps, etc. merely reflected the basic ethnic and regional divisiveness that had handicapped the civilians. The patterns of the January 15 and July 29, 1966 coups clearly testify to the divisions within the military, which only surfaced because of these infractions.

In 1958, the British Army Council transferred control over recruitment to the Nigerian government in anticipation of Nigerian independence. The British Colonial government was extremely slow in the indigenization of the Nigerian military since only twenty-nine Nigerian officers were commissioned before January 1958.20 By 1960, only 18 percent were still Nigerians, but by January 1966, the percentage was 100.21

The recruitment patterns in the late 1950's gave the Eastern region a disproportionate share of the number of officers. (See Table 41.) The educational standards set by the British were disadvantageous to the North since it had by far less young men graduating from high schools than its counterpart in the East. According to Gutteridge, by January 1961, 60 out of 81 Nigerian officers were Ibos, 10 were Yorubas and 11 from the North.22
Table 41
Distribution of Officers by Tribal/Regional Origin, October 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>North</th>
<th>West (not Ika-Ibo)</th>
<th>East (plus Ika-Ibo)</th>
<th>South Cameroons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Serving Soldiers originally given Short Service Commissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adetunji</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Adekeye | Bassey* | Ikonomi* | Malong
| Shadiude | Iluwa+ | Igbada |       |
| Adoburo | Njoku |        |       |
| Ogundipe | Ikpa* |        |       |
| Fajuyi | Okonwaza+ |        |       |
|         | Akangha |        |       |
|         | Okafor, D.O. |        |       |
|         | Okafor, D.C. |        |       |
|         | Okoro |        |       |
|         | Brown* |        |       |

| (nil) | (5)  | (19)  | (1)   |

Officers Commissioned after course at R.M.A. Sandhurst

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mainmanari</td>
<td>Ejoor+</td>
<td>Kurobo*</td>
<td>Anwunah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kur Muhammad</td>
<td>Banjo</td>
<td>Madiebo</td>
<td>U腾飞</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Largema</td>
<td>Okwechime+</td>
<td>Nzeoni+</td>
<td>Eze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pam</td>
<td>Nwaji+</td>
<td>Keni+</td>
<td>Ezeugbana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gowon</td>
<td>Nzeogwu+</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ude</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akahen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chude-Sokei</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (7) | (2)  | (14)  | (nil) |

Graduates given a Regular Commission after a short course

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olotuyi</td>
<td>Ojukwu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (nil) | (1)  | (1)  | (nil) |

Short Service Commissioned Officers (not serving soldiers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>West</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyari</td>
<td>Satomi</td>
<td>Amai</td>
<td>Ndibo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obasanjo</td>
<td>Igboho*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| (1) | (2)  | (3)  | (1)   |

8 10 37 2

14% 17-5% 65% 3-5%
Table (continued)

Notes: # denotes an officer whose place of origin is in the Calabar/ Rivers/Ogoja area of the Eastern Region.

+ denotes an officer whose place of origin is in the Mid-West. (All are Ika-Ibo, except Ejoor-Urhobo.)

Source: Miners, p. 51.
It should be recalled that by 1961, the federal government was controlled by the Northern People's Congress from the North. The NPC-controlled government introduced a quota system in 1961 which required that fifty percent of officers should be recruited from the North, and twenty-five percent each from the East and the West. Ostensibly, this was an attempt to correct the imbalance in the origin of the officer corps. This stipulation sacrificed the basic educational prerequisite for officer selection for the region of origin.

According to Claude Welch and Arthur Smith, this action "in the long run was a necessary step, but in the short run, it may have affected the cohesion of the officer corp and indirectly, the political activities of the armed forces."23 Given the divisive and regional orientation of Nigerian politics, this new quota system was severely criticized by the Southern states who saw this system as yet another attempt by the Northerners to gain control of all spheres of the Nigerian society.

The introduction of the quota system had some other effects which potentially widened the divisions among various regional groups within the military. In the attempt to introduce "equity" in the numerical strength of the officer corps, many Northerners were rapidly promoted to catch up with their Southern counterparts. Some Northerners were even promoted over and above their seniors from the East and West. The element of regionalism was deliberately injected into the Nigerian military and, consequently, merit was no longer the most paramount criterion. Also, the new Nigerian officers who replaced the British officers were promoted rapidly without enough time for
the new officers to imbibe and assimilate the requisite organizational norms that supposedly distinguish the military from its civilian counterpart.

Robin Luckham states that "the officers who have experienced the fastest promotion are themselves likely to develop unrealistic expectations, to be unable to discern the limits between the possible and the impossible. Secondly, the officers whose promotions have not been as rapid as those of their salient reference groups will probably experience feelings of frustration and relative deprivation." The preceding contentions were partly responsible for the latent tension within the army which erupted during the two coups.

The recruitment pattern introduced by the federal government also exacerbated ethnic rivalry within the regions. The minority groups in the respective regions complained that they were discriminated against by the dominant ethnic groups. This was especially true in the Northern region. According to Luckham, "the centre of gravity of the Northern officers was in the Emirates of the far North, together with the areas in the sphere of their political and cultural influence in the areas of Hausa-Fulani penetration."

Therefore, the recruitment patterns of the Nigerian officer corps were based on regionalism and ethnicity rather than on socio-economic patterns as argued by scholars like Janowitz. One cannot agree, then, with Janowitz, Pye, and others when they argue that socio-economic status of the officer corps in the Third World will ensure that these officers will be more development-oriented and more reform-minded than their civilian counterparts. The Nigerian officer corp was essentially
recruited to ensure loyalty and primordial commitments to the dominant regional and ethnic groups. In essence, the Nigerian Army officers' loyalties were regional and ethnic and not national.

As we probe further, we find that the recruitment patterns of the Nigerian military had some negative dimensions on other organizational characteristics like cohesion and skill structure of the officer corps.

(B) Cohesiveness of the Officer Corps.

One of the major arguments usually made in favor of military regimes is that military organizations oftentimes have cohesive elite structures due to training and socialization. Accordingly, Claude Welch and Arthur Smith contend that "probably no institution can match the solidarity developed within the modern army. All of organizational attributes (centralized command, discipline, hierarchy, formalized internal communication, esprit de corps...) contribute greatly to the cohesion of the institution.... In theory, a disciplined, cohesive army would unhesitatingly obey any order received through appropriate channels..." 26

It has been suggested that we may be taking it for granted that the Nigerian military possesses some of these organizational characteristics because some other military may also possess them. Cohesiveness is certainly not one of the characteristics that we can readily attribute to the Nigerian military. There may be the tendency to believe that the cohesiveness of the Nigerian military was destroyed by the coup and counter coup of 1966. This is really not the case because from the very attempt to Nigerianize the Nigerian military in
the late 1950's, the seeds of discord and disunity were sown and they were only to bloom during the two coups.

While we were discussing the recruitment patterns of the Nigerian military prior to 1970, it was stated that one of the casualties of those patterns was the cohesion or what was left of the cohesion of the officer corps. The introduction of a quota system for recruitment into the Nigerian military in 1961 and the subsequent promotion of Northern Nigerian army officers superseding their Southern colleagues did not enhance the already thin-veiled cohesion that existed in the military. Primordial sentiments already prevailed within the officer corps contrary to the much-vaulted nationalistic and patriotic attributes ascribed to the military.

By coopting several Northerners who had below the minimum educational requirement for entry into the officer corps, the government thereby created a "group of Northern officers who were rather deficient in educational qualifications compared with their peers and who owed their position in the officer corps largely to the operation of a regional quota in their favor... they were, moreover, somewhat provincial in social background and likely to be sensitive about their social prestige compared with other officers."²⁷

Unlike the police and the federal civil service, which had maintained an "open" recruitment system, the military recruitment system was then seen as "an indication of the awareness of the political leaders that the armed forces could be used as a political instrument to subserve sectional ends."²⁸
When we look beyond the introduction of the quota system and compare the promotional opportunities between the Northern officers and the Southern officers, we see further evidence of the source of cleavage which was inbuilt into the Nigerian military. For example, Bill Dudley states that while it took officers from the East and West an average of 63 months to rise from the rank of Captain to Major, it took the Northerner an average of 37 months for the same mobility. It took the Easterner and Westerner an average of 48 months to rise from Lieutenant to Captain; it took the Northerner an average of 32 months for the same move.\(^2^9\)

Prior to the first coup, there were definite indications that the army was highly politicized. This is contrary to long-held beliefs that the Nigerian military was non-politicized and highly integrated until the coup. The political parties became interested in who was recruited into the military. During the trial of Chief Obafemi Awolowo for treason in 1963, one of the accusations against him was that he infiltrated the army with his party agents. There were also accusations that Colonel Ojukwu of the East and his Eastern colleagues had discussed the possibilities of an army take over with the supreme commander of the armed forces Major-General J.T.U. Aguiyi-Ironsi in 1964.\(^3^0\)

Gutteridge also states that the Emirs of the North were directly involved in the recruitment of the Northerners into the military. Those recruited were partisans of the NPC.\(^3^1\)
The lack of cohesion within the Nigerian military was more obvious after the January and July 1966 coups. Even if one accepted the conventional rationale for the two coups as a necessary consequence of the decay of liberal democracy, the pattern of the coups indicates also a major strain on the military organization itself. Because ethnicity and regionalism provided the main link with the social and political environment, conflicts between groups in the military corresponded with the struggle for power that existed between the different tribal and regional interests in the national political arena.

On the eve of January 15, 1966, a group of young army officers staged a coup-d'état which overthrew the civilian regime. The leader of the coup was Major Nzeogwu, and Ibo from the Mid-western region of Nigeria. All but one of his colleagues (collaborators) were Ibos. The fact that most of the leaders of the coup were Ibos tended to lend some credence to the accusation that it was an Ibo inspired coup. I submit that the selection of the participants was based on a number of other factors besides ethnic origin. First is the fact that most of the participants had direct personal relationships with each other through training in Sandhurst and through serving together in different assignments. The second factor was the fact that the young majors held strategic appointments which enabled them to mobilize effectively for the implementation of an army take-over. For example, Major Onwuatuegwu was, like Major Nzeogwu, an instructor at the Nigerian Military Training College attached to the infantry wing. Major Ifeajuna was the Brigade Major at the 2nd Brigade in Lagos. Major Anuforo was in command of the Abeokuta garrison, Major Okafor was in charge of the
federal guard and Major Okoro was second in command of the 3rd Battalion in Kaduna. By their commands, it is not difficult to understand that they were vital to the successful execution of the coup and their ethnic origins were of less importance.

However, the list of casualties often did not seem to bear out the contention that the first coup was not an Ibo inspired coup. The list of casualties included Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, the Finance Minister from the Mid-west (an Itsekiri); the Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, from the North; Alhaji S.L. Akintola, the Western Nigerian premier; Brigadier Maimalari; the Chief of Staff, Colonel Kur Mohammed, the Adjutant General, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Pam, Lieutenant Colonel Largema, all from the North. The only high ranking Ibo who was killed in the coup was Lieutenant Colonel Unegbe, a Mid-western Ibo who was the Quarter Master General.

Therefore, if one judges the motives of the first coup only by the list of casualties, the conclusion may be reached that it was an ethnic inspired coup. But if we evaluated the public pronouncements of the leader of the coup, Major Nzeogwu, we might reach a different conclusion. For example, in a British Television interview he (Nzeogwu) stated (among other things) that "we wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties... and the whole clumsy apparatus of the federal government." 32

I do not intend to debate whether the coup was an Ibo inspired coup or a coup that was designed to save the country from collapse. The important point to note here is that whatever the motives or the interpretations given to the coup, the so-called cohesiveness of the
officer corps was no longer a reality. It was damaged extensively, to
the point that when Ironsi subsequently took charge of events, he
could not effectively restore confidence and cohesiveness amongst the
Eastern and the Northern officers.

Following the assumption of office as the Head of State by
General Ironsi, the Northern officers demanded retributive justice
against the participants of the coup. Due to the sensitive nature of
the request, Ironsi procrastinated. The Northerners also did not like
the fact that the officers who led the coup were still being paid their
salaries while in prison.

The divisiveness within the officer corps was further aggravated
by the counter coup of July 29, 1966 in which General Ironsi was
assassinated along with several Ibo officers. The counter coup was a
well orchestrated and premeditated vengeance against the Ibos in the
Nigerian military. The proof of this is in the number of Ibo officers
and other ranks killed during the coup (see Table 6). It was a counter
coup organized by Northern army officers like Lieutenant Colonel Moham-
med, Major T.Y. Danjuma, Major Alao and Major Kyari. 33

Panter-Brick aptly described the effects of the counter coup
on the cohesiveness of the officer corps when he stated that "... in
July, 1966, the army itself became a casualty with far-reaching conse-
quences. It ceased to be an integrating force obeying a single com-
mand, and so ceased to be an integrating force for the country as a
whole." 34
With Ironsi out of the scene, the question of who was to succeed him became another thorny issue which further divided the officer corps into ethnic and regional camps. The logical successor or rather the next in command to succeed Ironsi was Brigadier B.A. Ogundipe, the Chief of Staff at the Supreme Headquarters, himself a Yoruba. Since the counter coup was organized and executed solely by Northern officers, Ogundipe was not an acceptable choice. On August 1, 1966, Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon emerged as a compromise candidate. He was quite an unlikely choice in view of his low ranking in the hierarchical structure of the military.

Following the assumption of office by Gowon, Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu refused to recognize him as the legitimate successor to Ironsi, since Gowon was Ojukwu's inferior by reason of the date of commission. After a series of negotiations between Gowon and Ojukwu on one hand and Gowon and other leaders of the counter coup on the other, an agreement was reached by which officers and troops were to be repatriated to their region of origin. Therefore, the Nigerian Army was regionalized, a move which disintegrated the Nigerian Army. The secession of the Eastern region was only the climax of a series of forces that had been set in motion for over three decades. We can therefore conclude that when Janowitz stated that in the military, as compared with other institutions of a new nation, the probability of equal treatment is greater, the result being a sense of cohesion and social solidarity because men of various regional and ethnic backgrounds are given a common experience and come to think of themselves as Indians, Egyptians, or Nigerians; or when Gutteridge similarly states that military
training helps turn the officer corps into "cohesive entities with a strong national consciousness"; the military units serving as "melting pots in which soldiers tend to lose some of their regional and tribal characteristics," they should have left Nigeria out as they are not applicable to Nigeria.

At this point we shall look at how the lack of cohesiveness within the officer corps may have weakened the command structure of the Nigerian military. As we have stated already, one of the strongest arguments which proponents of military rule advance is the assertion that the military possesses a hierarchical command structure which enables it to ensure that its orders and command are obeyed. How effective was the "hierarchical" command structure of the Nigerian military prior to 1970?

(C) Command Structure of the Nigerian Military Before 1970

Until the January 15 coup, the command structure of the Nigerian Army was never a topic of much concern, since there were no events to test the effectiveness of the command structure. The first military coup not only shattered the myth about the cohesiveness of the Nigerian military but it also exposed the weakness of the command structure. Until January 15, 1966 the Nigerian army was headed by Major-General Ironsi whose official designation was the Supreme Commander and directly under him were the Chief of Staff, Commanders of the 1st and 2nd Brigades and the next were the Adjutant-General, the Quarter Master-General and the five Battalion Commanders (Nigeria had only five
battalions) respectively. It was presumed that orders emanating from the Supreme Commander will in turn be transmitted and acted upon faithfully along the hierarchy. This may be so in a nonpoliticiied military.

When a group of five young officers staged a coup-d'état in 1966, the hitherto hierarchical command structure was disorganized and disrupted. The coup was perceived as an Ibo-inspired coup and as would be expected, the army hierarchy was broken down into tribal camps. Even though all the leaders of the coup but one were Ibos, they refused to surrender to the Supreme Commander (himself an Ibo) until several arrangements were finally worked out. One of the major tasks of Ironsi after the surrender of the coup leaders was to reactivate and restore the command structure. He tried to do this by imposing military governments on all the four regions and immediately appointing Lieutenant Colonels C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, F.A. Fajuyi, D.A. Ejoor and Hassan Katsina to the governorship of the East, West, Midwest and the North, respectively. He also established a new command structure known as the Supreme Military Council composed of the Supreme Commander, Head of the Nigerian Army, Navy, Air Force and the four military governors. This attempt to provide a hierarchical command structure was successful at least enough to get a semblance of order. But in the attempt to create order, many junior officers were appointed to positions over and above their superiors. This had the effect of creating discord within the army. This semblance of hierarchical structure was short-lived as a group of Northern Army officers staged a counter coup
on July 29, 1966 and assassinated the Supreme Commander and a number of senior army officers. The army had finally become tribalized and politicized.

After several days of uncertainty, Lieutenant Colonel Gowon emerged as the compromise leader and was appointed the Commander in Chief of the Nigerian armed forces. His appointment was vehemently opposed by the Eastern Governor who argued that by military codes and standards Gowon was not qualified to assume command of the Nigerian Military. He also argued that there were several officers who were senior to Gowon who should have succeeded Ironsi. From then on, the command structure was no longer effective as the Eastern Governor refused to take orders from Gowon. When the Eastern region finally seceded from the rest of the country, in 1967, the command structure was weakened. Not only was the command structure weakened, but the cohesiveness of the entire army, especially the officers' corps, was shattered. One can conclude from the above discussion that even though the Nigerian military had a command structure, nevertheless it was not an effective one, at least not effective enough to ensure a unified and faithful compliance with orders and policies.

The fact that Colonel Ojukwu refused to obey orders from Gowon, and the fact that the Eastern Region finally seceded from the federation indicate the weakness of the command structure.

The next military organizational characteristic that we shall discuss is the skill structure of the officer corps.
(D) **Skill Structure of the Officer Corps**

Scholars like Pye and John Johnson have argued that armies in the Third World possess better trained and skilled personnel compared to their civilian counterparts. Because of this attribute, the military is more capable of performing better in office than the civilians and because of the superiority of its personnel it is able to provide a more innovative and development-minded leadership.

Pye argues that these armies have complex organizations by standards of new nations and also a high concentration of modern skills. But Janowitz is careful to point out that while the military in developing nations may possess a higher skill structure than the civilians, the degree of skill structure varies from country to country.

What was the skill structure of the Nigerian military prior to 1970? In the 1950's, the army had attracted only a few Nigerians who possessed adequate educational background because of three factors. The first factor was the fact that the military paid relatively lower salaries than the civilian sector. The second factor was the fact that the British set relatively high standards of recruitment. Because of these standards, qualified Nigerians preferred to seek employment in the civilian sector with better salaries and more prestige. The third factor was that military personnel were held in lower esteem than their civilian counterparts in the eyes of the public who regarded, truly so, the army as a haven for people who could not make it in the civilian sector.

Dudley states that "as an occupation, the army offered fewer and less attractive prospects to Nigerians than other services or
professions. It was therefore the last choice for most Nigerians and those with any ability or academic qualifications avoided it. Those who sought recruitment into the army therefore came to be those who were unable to obtain or were incapable of obtaining alternative forms of employment.\textsuperscript{40}

When the officer corps of the Nigerian military is compared to that of its civilian counterpart, we find that educationally 58 percent of the federal public service held a university degree while 66 percent of the military officers had no more than a secondary education. And by 1965, only 13 percent of army officers had a university education.\textsuperscript{41}

The quota system introduced in 1961 lowered the minimum educational standards for recruitment in order to accommodate the Northerners. This further lowered the educational standard of the officer corps vis-à-vis the civilian sector. And by the time of the first coup in January 1966, only about 65 officers had university degrees or equivalent qualifications.\textsuperscript{42} Consequently, the educational level and skills of the officer corps was much lower than other comparable institutions, except for the police (see Table 42).

Luckham invariably believes that this educational handicap of the military militated against its performance in office. He argues that the inadequacies of the skill structure of the Nigerian military made it less likely that members of the elite would know how to respond in a flexible way to complex new situations.... The failure of Major General Ironsi's regime to take control of events in early 1966 and the tragic series of misunderstandings among the military leaders leading
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational group</th>
<th>Degree or equivalent professional qualifications</th>
<th>Secondary school entry</th>
<th>Entry from the ranks</th>
<th>Total N=</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The military (officer corps - combat only)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The military (officer corps - combat and non-combat)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The police (Asst Supt. and above)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal civil service (administrative class)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal profession (registered practitioners)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical profession (registered practitioners - doctors only)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party leaders</td>
<td>20-25</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Luckham, p. 96.
to the civil war would both seem to show the army did not possess skills of a type that were readily transferrable to the management of public affairs.  

What do we conclude from the preceding discussions? Based on available evidence we can unequivocally conclude that prior to 1970, the Nigerian military, like the politicians they ousted, got caught up in the cross-currents of personal and other loyalties that influenced the politicians also. Regional and ethnic cleavages superseded the dictates of a military esprit de corps. Essentially we find that the Nigerian military was no more cohesive, no more patriotic, no more skilled (in fact more educationally deficient) than the civilians they ousted. The so-called hierarchical command structure was weak and dysfunctional.

In view of the evidence adduced to show the fallacy of generalizing about organizational characteristics of the military (four characteristics) I intend to show that what accounted for the major difference in the performance between the civilian regime (1961-66) and the military regime (1970-75) was the leadership of Gowon. I daresay that after the civil war in 1970, Gowon was able through his personal popularity/charisma to activate two organizational characteristics of the military, namely: cohesiveness and hierarchical command structure, which enabled him to overcome ethnic and regional cleavages. It must be recalled that ethnic and regional cleavages destroyed the effectiveness of the civilian regime. By overcoming ethnic and regional cleavages, it was possible for Gowon to create a leadership with consensus
which enabled the nation to pursue a single policy line on economic development.

How did Gowon accomplish his goals? The answer to this question must be divided into two sub-categories, namely:

1) Gowon's personal qualities as an astute leader.

2) Gowon's substantive policy actions.

One of the greatest assets which Gowon brought along with him when he assumed office on August 1, 1966 was his personal background which even his most severe critics were quick to recognize.

Gowon hails from the Anga ethnic group in the northern plateau. Technically he comes from the North, but it must be remarked that members of Gowon's ethnic group had fought for several years for separate existence from the North. The confrontation is understandable, in view of the fact that the middle belt provinces which the Angas are a part of are mostly Christians while the rest of the North is essentially Muslim.

His unique background made him more acceptable to both the South and the North than any other top ranking officer associated with the leaders of July coup. An article which appeared in *West Africa* stated that "when the army erupted again in July 1966, it was Gowon, new Army Chief of Staff, whom the Northern mutineers demanded should take over; yet they were installing in power not a Muslim from the far North but a Christian who, although fully understanding and sympathizing with the special institutions of Northern Nigeria, was in no way dedicated to their preservation. He was also, in the best sense, 'detribalized.'"
Writing in the same vein, Gutteridge states that "it was possible for the rarities such as Yakubu Gowon to maintain the trust and friendship, up to a point, of men from different origins. But Gowon, from a minority tribe and with his obvious, almost over-honest professionalism, was near to being unique."46

The intricacies and complexities of governing a country like Nigeria are beyond comprehension. Even a man of Gowon's unique background found to his disappointment that the centrifugal forces prevalent in Nigeria were enormous. He was "bitterly sorry that the army, which he revered as a national institution, had succumbed to tribalism."47

He had inherited tremendous problems, especially after the throes of the second coup which finally divided the army and nation into conflicting ethnic camps. In spite of his enormous charm and determination to pull the nation together, the country finally broke up after the secession of the Eastern Region on May 31, 1967.

However, it was not until the end of the war in 1970 that he could use his unique background to "balance the often competing, if conflicting, interests of the major ethnic groups - Hausa/Fulani, the Yoruba and the Ibo - to whom the war had dealt a shattering blow in the power struggle."48

The successful conduct of the war and the ultimate capitulation of the Biafrans increased his personal stature at home and abroad. Many people saw him as "the Abraham Lincoln of Nigeria, as the great
It was with this newfound stature that he proceeded to embark on a variety of policy actions that would otherwise have been impossible a few years back.

One of the first major policy decisions of Gowon, following the end of the civil war in 1970, was the "Reconciliation and Rehabilitation" program which sought to bring back the Ibos to the mainstream of Nigerian life. He granted clemency to the Easterners who had participated in the war. At the end of the war he declared among other things that "there will be no Nuremberg trials... and we will bind up the nation's wounds." He was so overwhelmed by the cordial atmosphere which existed between the former Biafran soldiers and their Nigerian counterparts that he stated that "if they can get on so well after having wounded each other, why must it be assumed that the sad events of 1966 were typical of a permanent situation?"

What perhaps was more astounding was the fact that he ordered that most of the Biafran officers who were previously in the Nigerian army be re-absorbed with back pay. A few top ranking officers of the Biafran Army were discharged with full benefits, while the others were completely discharged from the military by the Military Board of Inquiry under Major General Adebayo. Only two groups of officers were further detained - those who participated in the January 1966 coup and those senior officers who assisted the Biafrians in their invasion of the Mid-west. On the whole, these actions were considered very magnanimous. It was a decision "so wise and magnanimous that we may have to go back to the American Civil War for a precedent. Certainly there is no hope of a comparable decision in the
vast majority of countries today. Courtmartials with doubtful procedures and summary executions would have been the fate of the majority of rebel officers even in several countries which gave Nigeria complete support during the civil war."\(^{52}\)

There were some sentiments in the North to the effect that the Ibos should be dealt severe punitive actions, but such sentiments were merely mooted.

It was only a leader of Gowon's stature who would have been able to carry out the policy of reconciliation and re-unification without much acrimony from the rest of the nation, especially from the North. The process of reconciliation went on very smoothly, more than was imagined even by the most optimistic observers.

Because of the trauma of the civil war, Gowon realized that not much rehabilitation and reconciliation could be achieved without law and order-stability. There were demands from several sections of the country for a rapid demobilization of the armed forces. From a logical and economic standpoint, the clamor for rapid demobilization made a lot of sense. However, such rationale did not take into account the political realities of the time. Large scale demobilization would have displeased the soldiers who fought on the victorious side. It would have meant unleashing thousands of unskilled soldiers whose only recourse to survival would have been terrorism. Some segments of the military, including the then Chief of Staff, Major General Usman Katsina, were opposed to the idea. Gowon carefully avoided rapid demobilization for political expediency.\(^{53}\)
In order for Gowon to overcome the divisiveness which impeded the performance of the civilian regime, it was necessary that he introduce measures which would ensure that the government could follow a consistent and unified policy line.

One of the measures, and a very important one, was to reactivate the command structure of the military which was introduced under the Ironsi administration. Under Ironsi the command structure was ineffectual and could not serve as a cohesive structure for the elites of the armed forces.

Gowon's astuteness as a national leader was very evident in the way he used the command structure of the military to implement his goals. Perhaps the only organizational characteristic of the military that changed considerably after the civil war was the command structure of the military or rather, the use of the command structure. The hierarchical command structure of the military was made up of a body known as the Supreme Military Council which had Gowon as the chairman, the Chief of Staff of Supreme Headquarters as the vice chairman, and the chief of staff of the army, all the heads of the branches of the armed forces and the twelve governors of the states as members. Except for the governor of the east central state, Mr. Ukpabi Asika, others were either military officers or police commissioners (see Table 43). The east central state governor was given the equivalent military rank of a colonel which made him liable to military orders and discipline.
### Table 43

**Command Structure of the Nigerian Military Since, 1970**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Duties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Military Council (SMC)</td>
<td>Chairman of SMC&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Supervises all Federal legislative and executive powers&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heads of Navy and Air Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12 Governors of States&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Exclusive Federal Powers: Post, Defense, Telecommunications, External Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief of Staff,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief of Staff,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Executive Council</td>
<td>SMC members</td>
<td>Assumed functions of former Council of Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inspector-General of Police</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attorney-General</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15 Cabinet department heads</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Title changed to "Chairman of SMC" by Constitutional Decree, March 17, 1967. This act ended use of the title "Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government" (created January 17, 1966).

<sup>b</sup>Vested by March 17, 1967 Constitution (Suppression and Modification Decree).

<sup>c</sup>After "12-state decree," May 86, 1967, abolished former four Regions.

Source: Adapted from Ostheimer, *op. cit.*, p. 71.
Since all the members of the Supreme Military Council were appointed and accountable to Gowon, it was assured that policy decisions made by the Council would be faithfully executed. In this case, their main allegiance was to Gowon and the supreme military council rather than to their respective region of origin as was the case during the civilian regime. This is not to say that they necessarily will execute policies because they were appointed by Gowon. But given the new organizational command structure, Gowon's personal stature and Gowon's interpersonal relationship with his appointees, federal government policies were most likely to be executed. This Council remained the main governing body of the nation, and it had succeeded in making the leadership of the military more cohesive than it had ever been.

Another body introduced by Gowon was the Federal Executive Council. This Council was composed of all the members of the Supreme Military Council, all the cabinet rank commissioners and the Inspector General of Police. The Supreme Military Council and the Federal Executive Council succeeded in doing two things. Firstly, it ensured a working harmony and accord between the states. It was no longer possible, as was previously the case, for state governors to disobey or challenge national policies, since this would go against military conventions and command. Once a policy was agreed upon, there were no more obstacles in the course of implementation. Secondly, the Federal Executive Council succeeded in coopting the top bureaucrats. Nigeria had never lacked qualified bureaucrats but the problem had always been in their divided primordial loyalties. The new command structure
ensured that top bureaucrats could no longer stall the implementation of policies once they were decided upon in the Supreme Military Council.

It must be remarked that the success of these bodies was made possible by the personal legitimacy which Gowon had acquired at the end of the war. One of Gowon's major priorities was to reduce the potency of cleavages in Nigeria and to achieve a higher standard of national integration as a precondition for economic development. Earlier in the chapter, it was argued that cleavages were impediments to economic development in Nigeria. Realizing this, Gowon took some important steps to ensure that those impediments were mitigated. In a major broadcast to the nation on October 1, 1970, Gowon indicated that cleavages had stood in the way of development in Nigeria, and outlined some policy actions designed to eradicate the destructive effects of cleavages. In the same broadcast, he set a policy guideline on economic development for the nation. He stated that "we are determined in the next four years to intensify the process of transforming the structure of the Nigerian economy.... It is equally necessary in the national interest to lay the foundations during the next few years for more even development in the country as a whole, both economically and educationally. We must not allow the continued existence of sharp contrasts of development and backwardness to threaten the stability of this country."55

Gowon then proceeded to introduce some measures which enabled him to accomplish his goals. One such measure was the creation of
more states, a second was a new revenue allocation formula. These were some of the main issues which had divided the elites and the nation under the civilian regime. It took a man of Gowon's stature to tackle these issues. Another issue which he tackled, unsuccessfully, was conducting a new population census. But the manner in which he prevented this policy failure from posing the same divisiveness as was the case under the civilian regime was further evidence of his personal charisma.

The issues listed above were perhaps the most divisive issues during the civilian regime (see Chapter II) and the urgency with which Gowon tried to deal with them indicates political astuteness. He was very bent on achieving a high rate of economic development and he wanted no obstacles. Let us now discuss the implication of these policy actions vis-a-vis economic development.

a. The creation of states. During the civilian era, there was clamor in the south to subdivide the north into more states. Because of the size of the northern region, the other southern states felt very insecure. The size and population of the north guaranteed its virtual domination of the federal legislature, the federal cabinet and most of all, an abundant share of the nation's resources. A lot of the southern politicians argued that the organizations of regions in Nigeria was inequitable and that the British had made a major blunder.

The northern leaders did not want the north to be broken into states and since they were in control of affairs, they refused to accede to the wishes of the southern leaders. It was not only the
southerners who wanted the creation of more states. The Tivs of the middle belt fought for several years for self rule, but the federal government used troops to suppress the revolt.56

There were also demands for the creation of more states in the Eastern and Western regions. When the northern leaders made an issue out of the demands of minority groups in the southern states, the southern leaders also refused to accede to the demands for creating more states in the east and west. There were several disturbances and skirmishes in the Delta area of the east and the south-east by the Calabari and Efik ethnic groups who wanted a separate existence from the dominant Ibo tribe. However, the real problem with regionalism as a most important cleavage in Nigeria was the issue of the big north versus the small south. There was no way the question of regionalism could be solved as long as the east and west remained fearful and distrustful of the northern hegemony. In spite of major opposition mounted against the subdivision of the north into different states by ex-northern politicians and traditional rulers, Gowon went ahead and did it in May 1967. The timing of the creation of states by Gowon—May 1967—was auspicious in a lot of ways; but the most important interpretation of his motives have been related to the secession of the former eastern region. There is a prevailing belief that Gowon created more states in order to undermine the power base of Ojukwu in the eastern region. Earlier, it was stated that the Calabarics and the Efiks were struggling for a separate existence from the east. The Gowon administration had calculated that if these two ethnic groups were granted their wishes, they would inevitably be indebted to
Gowon rather than Ojukwu. The fact that Gowon announced the creation of new states a few days before the eastern region announced its secession from Nigeria seemed to have confirmed this speculation. The Eastern region was divided into the Southeast, the Rivers and the East Central states. The Western region was divided into the Western and Lagos states. The Northern region was divided into the Northwestern, Kano, Northeastern, Benue-Plateau, Kwara and North Central states. It should be pointed out that the Tivs had finally got a state of their own, the Benue-Plateau, which appeased the large number of the Nigerian troops who are of Tiv origin. (Gowon also comes from the Benue-Plateau.)

Irrespective of Gowon's original intentions, one should be concerned with the effects of his policy action. Gowon himself stated on October 1, 1970 that "by the reorganization of the country into twelve states, we corrected the structural imbalance of the federation and fulfilled an essential condition for the country's political stability." 57

We must add that although the states were created in 1967, that the actual workings of the 12 state structure did not become effective until the end of the war in 1970. As a matter of fact, the 12 state structures became functionally effective in 1970 after the three eastern states were reunited with the rest of the country.

What, then, was accomplished by the creation of more states in the long run? One of the principal results of the creation of more states, according to Gowon's own evaluation, was that "no one state
should be in a position to dominate or control the central government." Also, the minority ethnic groups within the various regions were appeased. But most importantly, was the fact that the fear of "northern domination" was no longer pervasive. Initially, the southerners were cynical about the division of the north into six states. The sentiment in the south was that the existence of six states in the north was more on paper than in reality. This belief was sustained by the fact that subsequently the northern states joined in a common services organization which managed the assets and liabilities of the former northern region. But this belief was largely due to a lingering myth that the north was monolithic. It was a myth that did not take into account that within the northern region there were distinct minority groups who were not satisfied with their status. With time, this myth began to fade away from people's thinking in the south. The timing of Gowon's action attests to his political ingenuity.

The northerners believed and accepted the creation of the states, because they saw the decision as primarily a move to undermine Ojukwu's strength. He implicitly projected this belief. Since most of the country was united against Ojukwu, they accepted without opposition any decision that would thwart the eastern leader's efforts. He had succeeded in reducing the potency of regional cleavages in Nigeria—-one cannot say that the issue disappeared entirely. The potency of regional cleavage was further reduced by the capitulation of Biafra. Because of the defeat of Biafra, the former eastern region was no
longer a strong political factor in the political equation of the country. The Easterners were forced, albeit by military force, to unite with the rest of the country.

In assessing the other effects of the creating of states, Claude Welch and Arthur Smith state, among other things, that "the division of the North and the East focused political attention on the new states, giving the federal military government greater latitude in shaping national policy." The federal government definitely needed this latitude in order to successfully carry out its economic development policies.

b. The Census. With the creation of more states out of the way, Gowon was faced with another thorny and divisive issue which the civilians failed to resolve. The issue was the population census. The previous census conducted in 1962-63 divided the country into many and conflicting camps. The 1962-63 census is generally regarded as one of the major issues which resulted in the final breakdown of law and order under the civilian regime and subsequently the military take-over. The party politicians had always juggled the census figures for two main reasons, namely:

1) to obtain more seats in the federal house of representatives for their respective regions;

2) to get a bigger share of the federal revenue.

In order to accomplish these desires, figures were falsified and manipulated outrageously. The final figures could not be used effectively for national planning since they did not reflect even the approximate number of citizens in Nigeria.
The census controversy was linked inexorably to the issue of regionalism as the respective regions took different and opposing positions. There were obvious indications that the northern region had inflated the census figures and as a result got more seats allocated to it. This seemed to perpetuate the fear of northern domination. The south inflated their own figures, too. But even at that, the north had increased its numerical advantage over the south and the political consequences of this were alarming to the southerners. Hence they fought vehemently to oppose it. The subsequent breakdown of law and order did not resolve the controversy. It was with the knowledge of this dispute that Gowon set out to implement one of his post-civil war goals of conducting an accurate population census. He warned that the census "must be handled properly and with great care, remembering very well that mistakes and events, mainly due to the inordinate ambition and the dishonesty of a handful of people, which led to the collapse of the first republic."  

His warnings did not appear to be heeded because the conduct of the new census was very questionable and the results were also very distorted and controversial. The new census was conducted between November 23 and December 2, 1973, and the provisional figures were released on May 8, 1974 which gave Nigeria a total of 79.76 million. This figure indicates that Nigeria's population rose by 43.5 percent while the six southern states rose by 9.7 percent. The results sparked off a lot of controversy in the south and had the trappings of the old north-south controversy. A breakdown of the figures shows that while the 1963 census gave the north 52 percent of the
population, the new census gave the northern states 64 percent of the population. The figures for the west and south eastern states fell below the 1963 figures. The northern figures were incredible by all estimates and the southerners began to project that in a future civilian regime, the north would have the numerical supremacy to lord it over them. They also realized that these new figures would give the north an overwhelming advantage in terms of its share of the national revenue.62

Gowon tried to placate many southerners by announcing that the figures were provisional and that they would not be used for planning. He also realized that if uncontrolled, the issue could get out of hand—a prospect which seemed very frightening to all Nigerians following the civil war experience. He was able to weather this storm because of a variety of reasons. The first of those reasons was the fact that he had created personal legitimacy for himself and the nation was willing to give him a chance. Most people wished him success. The second reason was that the country was basking in the new peaceful atmosphere existing after three years of an excruciating civil war. It was a recent experience which the civilians were unwilling to go through again.

The third reason was that the political equation in the country had changed considerably after the civil war. Because of the defeat of Biafra, the Ibos stayed out of the dispute. As a result of this, the Yorubas could not mount an effective opposition alone. Gowon did not succeed in giving the nation a fairly reliable census. But the fact that he was able to stem the potential explosiveness of the
issue, indicates his astuteness in dealing with divisive issues. It must be mentioned also that he had created an effective command structure, which made all the regional governors accountable to him. In the past, confrontations among the regions were championed by their respective leaders. This was no longer possible because Gowon had the power to remove from office and discipline the state governors if they stepped out of line. Therefore, one can attribute the successful handling of the census controversy to Gowon's leadership ability—his personal legitimacy and his use of the command structure to get compliance from the respective states.

It has been stated earlier in this chapter that one of the reasons that the census became a big and controversial issue was the fact that revenue allocation was based in large part on population. Because of the potency of regional cleavages, the leaders of the regions tried to manipulate the census figures in order to get a greater share of the revenue from the federal government.

We must hasten to add that the population census issue had become intractable even for a man of Gowon's standing. Even though the issue remained largely unresolved, we must see the issue also for what it did not do. It did not get out of hand, it did not flare ethnic controversies, it did not send people rioting in the streets. Given the recent past of Nigeria, Gowon deserves some credit for reasons mentioned above.

c. Revenue Allocation Formula. An equitable revenue allocation formula was a very controversial issue under the civilians and it
remained unresolved until the end of the civil war. Gowon realized the importance of providing the nation with a revenue allocation formula which would at least appear equitable to the contending forces in the country. It was a difficult task to accomplish since the northerners were satisfied with the existing formula. Two previous commissions had been set up in 1945 and 1965 to deal with this problem and their recommendations fell far short of an equitable solution. The military government had set up a Dinah Commission in 1969 to review the revenue allocation formula. This commission's report was rejected by the Supreme Military Council because it had recommended that only 10 percent of the royalties and rents should go to the oil producing regions. It is understandable why this recommendation was rejected in view of the fact that the oil producing states felt that the existing formula, which weighed heavily on population, was not acceptable. The problem that confronted Gowon was how to distribute the revenue in the nation in order to promote even development. Because of ethnic and regional loyalties, no new formula would adequately satisfy all elements. The poorer states had claimed that the richer states got richer and to allay fears of the poor states, Gowon declared the "the federal government is committed to giving financial assistance to needy states to enable them to play an effective role in the task of nation building."

The new formula devised under Gowon stipulated that the federal government would hold back 55 percent of the revenues and send back 45 to the states. The first half
of the distributable pool would be distributed to all the states equally. The second half would be distributed according to the population of each state.64

It cannot be effectively stated at the present time if this new formula was equitable enough or not. But from the standpoint of promoting even development it was much better than the previous formula. Most states, with the exception of the mid-west and the Rivers states were appeased by this new formula. The new formula insured the viability of all states irrespective of their contribution to the general revenue. It was a sound policy that could only be effected by a man of Gowon's stature.

What can we conclude from all the discussions above? The evidence presented in this dissertation clearly indicates that the performance of the military regime cannot be explained solely on the organizational model. It is therefore myopic to try to explain the performance of a military regime in the terms of organizational characteristics that are often times presumed. There is no quarrel over the fact that the military may possess certain organizational characteristics. But there is usually the problem of internal validity when we try to state that organizational characteristics of the military per se lead to economic development. It may be more cautious to state that what may make the difference between a civilian and a military regime is the fact that a strong and popular leader may be able, as in the case of Gowon, to use the organizational capacity of the military to promote economic and social development. We have found out
that Gowon's ability as an astute leader enabled him to reduce the potency of cleavages in Nigeria, achieve a great deal of elite consensus if not cohesiveness, and consequently give the country the necessary stability for economic development.

The disputes over revenue allocation, the census, creation of states, location of industries, schools and hospitals were no longer pervasive and disruptive as before. The single most important variable for the better performance of the military regime was leadership. This is an important variable. In the Third World, especially Africa, political and economic institutions are usually diffuse and unstable. Therefore, one cannot expect much to be achieved through these institutions. This is where a strong and charismatic leader becomes necessary to bridge the gap created by institutionless arenas. This is a short run solution, but a necessary one until institutions age and become adaptive. It is doubtful if any other leader could have successfully managed the question of cleavages as well as Gowon was able to do.

There is no doubt that the preponderance of oil revenue and revenue from other sources during the 1970-75 period is in part responsible for the better performance of the Gowon Administration. But it is my belief, based on the evidence encountered in the course of this dissertation, that Gowon's personal leadership ability, his legitimacy and structural changes and policy actions that took place in the country reduced substantially the potency of ethnic and regional cleavages. As a result of this, it was possible for the
federal government to pursue a single or national economic development policy which also made possible the fact that the 1970-74 National Development Plan accomplished most of its goals.65

It is very difficult at this point to judge the relative impact of revenues vis-a-vis the relative performance of both regimes. But we have also shown that even though Nigeria benefitted tremendously from the boom in international oil prices under Gowon, federal government policies were also responsible for generating more revenues for the country. Therefore we are hedging our conclusion on the fact that governmental leadership, direction and execution of policy goals were mainly responsible for the difference in the level of performance between the civilian and military regimes.

This issue may not be entirely resolved for quite some time—until more scholars become privy to documents that actually show the rationale of decision making in Nigeria as opposed to official sanitized government publication.
FOOTNOTES

3 Ibid., p. 11. See also Federal Gazette, No. 17, Vol. 50, April, 1972.


6 Wouter Tims, op. cit., p. 82.

7 Third National Development Plan 1975-80, op. cit., p. 58.

9 Third National Development Plan, op. cit., p. 15.

10 For further details on revenue allocation formula, see chapter 2, p. 17.

11 See chapter 2, p. 19 and Table for more details on census figures.

12 See chapter 2, p. 22.


14 Ibid., p. 18.

15 Ibid., p. 18.

16 Edwin Dean, op. cit.

17 Claude Welch and Arthur Smith, op. cit., p. 115.


20 Robin Luckham, op. cit., p. 163.
21Ibid.


23Claude Welch and Arthur Smith, op. cit., p. 117.


25Robin Luckham, op. cit., p. 182.

26Claude Welch and Arthur Smith, op. cit., p. 13.

27Robin Luckham, op. cit., p. 185.

28B.J. Dudley, op. cit., p. 90.

29Ibid., p. 94.


31W. Gutteridge, op. cit., pp. 64-65.


33Robin Luckham, op. cit., p. 63.

34S.K. Panter-Brick (ed.), op. cit., p. 27.


36Morris Janowitz, op. cit., pp. 63 and 81.

37W. Gutteridge, op. cit., p. 40.

38Robin Luckham, op. cit., p. 155.

39Lucian Pye in J.J. Johnson, op. cit.

40B.J. Dudley, op. cit., p. 91.

41Ibid., p. 94.

42Robin Luckham, op. cit., p. 94.
292


44 Jacques Van Dooren, *op. cit.*


46 W. Gutteridge, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

47 *West Africa, op. cit.*


50 W. Gutteridge, *Conflict Studies, op. cit.*


53 W. Gutteridge, *op. cit.*


55 Yakubu Gowon, *op. cit.*


62 *Africa Confidential*, (May 17, 1974).


64 *Africa Confidential* (October 18, 1974), p. 2.

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293


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