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THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, PH.D., 1978
THE INTEGRATION OF STATE ADMINISTRATIONS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By
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The Ohio State University
1978

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I have benefited from the support and encouragement of numerous people during the writing of this dissertation. The research was done in Connecticut several hundred miles from The Ohio State University and was also undertaken several years after residency at the university. It seems likely that debts increase along with distance and elapsed time.

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Finally, my husband, Carl, deserves acknowledgement of his role. His involvement with the Connecticut General Assembly led to my initial interest in reorganization and his familiarity with state legislatures and state governments in general proved valuable many times. He not only tolerated the writing of the paper and its accompanying disruptions, he also contributed to it.

Each of the individuals listed above has contributed significantly to the completion of this research, but is in no way responsible for the shortcomings contained therein.
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Administrative Obstacles to Voting, with Dr. Kenneth Eckhardt and Charlene Haykel, Published by the National League of Women Voters.
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INTRODUCTION

This research focuses on the variety of administrative structures found in the fifty state governments. In particular, the research concerns the location of each state's administrative structures on a continuum ranging from fragmented arrangements to integrated arrangements. At one extreme are administrative units that are both non-hierarchically organized and relatively free of gubernatorial control (fragmented), and at the other extreme are administrative units that are both hierarchically structured and include considerable gubernatorial control (integrated).

Despite the noticeably wide variation among the states and the long-standing debates (both at the state and national level) concerning the advantages of either approach, only limited academic attention has been directed to this area. The first goal of this research is, therefore, to begin to address this gap by creating and presenting meaningful descriptions of the variety of arrangements found in the states and beginning a search for explanations for these variations.
In order to accomplish this first goal, a numeric score reflecting the extent to which administrative structures are integrated will be calculated for each state. This score will reflect both differences in formal gubernatorial powers and differences in the centralization or independence of selected state functions. The resulting scores will then be used in analysis to determine which, if any, of a set of potential factors may account for the alternative approaches employed by the states. Three sets of factors that have been isolated as important in case studies and have also been found to be influential in other policy choices at the state level will be examined. These three sets of factors are (1) socio-economic factors, (2) political factors, and (3) traditional factors.

A second emphasis of the research will be on the variations in administrative structure characteristic of several specific functions that are typically administered by state governments. Some functions are always administered by independent agencies, others are always administered by centralized agencies (agencies located within a larger department), and most lie on the continuum between these two extremes. The goal again is to create and present meaningful descriptions of where each function lies on the continuum and to begin a search for explanations for the variations thus documented.
Scores that reflect the relative location of each function will be developed and six factors that conceptually influence the scores will be considered. The six factors are: size of the function, uniqueness of the function, traditional independence of the function, type of function, interest group support for the functions, and federal regulations within the area.

The goals of the research as stated above are relatively simple: to describe and begin to explain structural variations among state governments and among selected functions. The concepts involved are, however, far from simple and require considerable definition before the research proceeds. The remainder of this introductory chapter is devoted to a detailed discussion of integration and of fragmentation, and to a brief consideration of the importance of the choice between the two.

FRAGMENTATION

Fragmentation is "the most striking feature of governmental structure at any level in the United States. Division and separation, rather than coordination and control characterize American government." ¹ In terms

¹Douglas M. Fox, The Politics of City and State Bureaucracy, p. 11.
specific to the fifty state governments, this means that state administrative structures are typified by non-hierarchical organizational structures and weak gubernatorial control.

Independent agencies abound. According to The Committee for Economic Development, the average number of agencies per state is 85.\(^2\) The range is considerable with many states such as Illinois, West Virginia, and Nevada operating with more than 100 agencies. Connecticut, prior to the reorganization of 1977, had 210 independent agencies.

The varying number of agencies is a reflection of the way that specific functions are organized in a state. For example, agricultural programs are consolidated into one agency in many states and on rare occasions are even grouped with other functional areas such as natural resources or commerce. Other states maintain independent agencies for specific crops and other aspects of agriculture. Prior to a reorganization in the 1970's, Idaho had a wheat commission, sheep commission, prune commission, potato commission, pea and lentil commission, apple commission, and cherry commission among others which might have been and were eventually included in an integrated agricultural department.

\(^2\)Modernizing State Government, p. 50.
In addition to an abundance of independent agencies in most states, there is also a lack of overall gubernatorial control. One indication of the powerlessness of the governor is the number of elective officials in addition to the governor. An average state today has five elective officials lending validity to the observation that the governor is not a chief executive but is only "chief among several executive officials." Even in those cases where agency heads are appointed rather than elected, the governor does not necessarily control them. The governor may not have powers of removal or may be required to appoint members to lengthy and staggered terms. Gubernatorial control is further diminished by the relatively short tenure, lack of budget-making authority, and weak veto power found in many states.

The Reasons for Fragmentation

The predominance of fragmented systems may be attributed to a number of factors. First, and perhaps most importantly, the constitutions of the fifty states were as a rule written by men who held a keen distrust of executive power. Their distrust, grown from years of association with strong British executive authority, is obvious in the limited powers given to most governors.

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3Fox, p. 14.

4Coleman B. Ransone, The Office of Governor in the United States, p. 224.
This influence is particularly evident in the plural executive approach. By dividing authority and responsibility among several elective officials, the framers of state constitutions hoped to prevent any one official from becoming too strong.

Other limitations on gubernatorial power also grew out of the colonial experience. Short terms with limited reelection possibilities, low salaries, and relatively weak appointive powers all combined to deny governors the power often associated with chief executives.

The colonial desire for a weak executive was buttressed by the reform movements of the latter twentieth century. These reform movements sprang up in reaction to graft and corruption in the political system. The methods chosen for purging the system had the side effect of further decreasing the governor's power and further fragmenting the system. The theme of the reformers was that "some things are just too political to be given to politicians," and in order to isolate these things from politicians, numerous independent boards and commissions were established. These boards and commissions were typically composed of persons appointed (sometimes elected)
for fixed, long, and staggered terms. Such arrangements were intended to remove the governor and other political leaders as influences. The independence of educational bodies (Boards of Regents, School Boards, etc.) and of numerous regulatory agencies are symptomatic of this reform concern.

Considered opinions and philosophies about the role of executive leadership and departmental independence have been important in shaping the administrative structures of today, but so have other, less controllable and less conscious factors. The continual growth of state expenditures and services has without a doubt contributed to fragmentation. State expenditures which were 7 billion dollars in 1947 mushroomed to 28 billion dollars in 1956 and to 66 billion dollars in 1968. 1974 figures indicate that states were then spending in excess of 132 billions of dollars a year.\(^6\) The dollar growth in state government is spectacular but the program expansion seems even more incredible.

The states in 1978 are involved with programs for the aging, the arts, consumer protection, drug abuse, ethics, human rights, mass transit, nuclear energy, occupational safety and health, and vocational education. None of the

\(^6\)Expenditure figures for the states were taken from several editions of the Council of State Governments, *The Book of the States*. 
aforementioned functions were even included as functions in a 1961 publication of the Council of State Governments but all were included in the 1977 edition of the same publication.\textsuperscript{7}

New programs and new concerns would not necessarily have to lead to fragmentation, but in fact these new problems have usually been solved by creating new agencies. Illustrative of this trend is the fact that thirty-five states have independent or fragmented structures for dealing with one of the most recently added problems, energy. Furthermore, once an agency is created, it often seems to be immortal. Kaufman's study of agencies at the national level indicated that 148 or 85\% of the agencies studied in 1923 were still around in 1973.\textsuperscript{8} Such staying power combined with continual creation of new agencies suggests that the trend to fragmentation will be difficult to overcome.

In summary, state administrative units are usually more fragmented than integrated. This tendency to fragmentation is understandable in view of the many factors that have combined to create numerous and independent agencies and weak governors.

\textsuperscript{7}Administrative Officials: Classified by Functions 1961 and 1977 editions.

\textsuperscript{8}Herbert Kaufman, Are Government Organizations Immortal?, p. 34.
Integration, in contrast to fragmentation, describes a system with a limited number of agencies at the top of a hierarchical structure. Overseeing the hierarchical structure in an integrated system is a powerful governor. Stated somewhat differently, the goal of integration is to "... combine like functions and place them under a clear chain of command with the governor at the top."  

Historical Development

The demand for integration, an alternative to rapidly expanding fragmentation, began in the early years of this century and grew out of the feeling that "no one seemed to be steering the governmental machinery, though everyone had a hand in it."  

This feeling was manifested in numerous reports and study commissions. As early as 1909, the People's Power League of Oregon expressed its fears about continuing fragmentation and proposed some of the earliest recommendations for dealing with the problem. Numerous commissions, including the Taft Economy and Efficiency Commission, the Hoover Commission, and a multitude of Little Hoover Commissions added fuel to the movement. In addition, several organizations including The Council of State Governments, The National Municipal

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9 Fox, p. 15.

League, and The Institute of Public Affairs combined with academicians to encourage integration. A 1938 publication by A.E. Buck outlined the principles of the movement towards integration and perhaps marked the high tide of enthusiasm for the idea.\footnote{A.E.Buck, The Reorganization of State Governments in the United States.} The momentum towards integration was interrupted at the mid-point of the century by the renewed demands for independent agencies and weakened political control.

While fragmentation is a natural characteristic of bureaucracy, integration must be artificially imposed on the system. The specific means of imposing integration are through (1) combining like functions and (2) granting increased power to the governor. The specifics of these changes are discussed below.

**Combining Like Functions**

The extent to which like functions are combined varies considerably among the states. Some states have made considerable progress towards combining like functions, and the best indicator of this progress is the total number of agencies found in the state. Alaska with twelve agencies and Maine with thirteen have obviously combined a larger portion of their functions than has a state with 100 or more independent agencies. The goal is simply to place all similar functions within one
administrative unit which is most frequently called a department. This means, for example, that all programs relating to education will be administered by an overall education agency rather than by a board for technical education, a school board, and a board of regents. Likewise, all programs relating to mental health or natural resources would be grouped together.

No specific rules are available regarding which department or agency is correct for any particular function. In Oklahoma, forestry is centralized into a Department of Agriculture while most other states place forestry in something like a Department of Conservation or a Department of Natural Resources. While the decision concerning where to locate a specific function can be quite important to policy outcomes, both arrangements represent integration for purposes of this research.

**Power of the Governor**

The second characteristic of integration is a strong governor at the top of the hierarchical structure. Some of a governor's powers are obviously related to his ability to control the bureaucracy. For instance, a governor confronted with weak appointive and removal powers and numerous other popularly elected officials has less chance of influencing administrative behavior than a governor who can hire and fire at his pleasure the heads of all state agencies.
Other less obvious powers also influence the governor's ability to influence the behavior of the administrative arm of state government. For example, short tenure in office may prevent a governor from administering the very policies which he or she had created through legislation. Schlesinger points out that in close to three-quarters of the states, "governors can expect to hold office for less than five years." Governors who have strong budget-making authority are also more powerful since they, rather than the legislature or a third party, control the requested amounts for each agency. Similarly, governors with strong veto powers have an additional tool to insure that administrative agencies follow their lead and not that of the legislature.

Finally, a governor's power in relation to bureaucracy may be influenced by the tools which the governor has to rearrange the administrative structures. Until recently, legislatures were universally responsible for creating, reorganizing, and abolishing agencies. A recent trend has been to transfer a large portion of that power to the governor. Fifteen states now give the governor the power to initiate reorganizations subject only to legislative veto.

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States which have granted their governors the powers outlined above and have combined like functions in their administrative structures are referred to in this paper as integrated states.

The preceding pages have described in considerable detail the terms fragmentation and integration. A discussion of the importance of the choice between the two follows.

FRAGMENTATION OR INTEGRATION: AN IMPORTANT CHOICE

The research outlined above is important not only because it focuses on a basically unexplored area of state politics, but also because the type of administrative structures characteristic of a specific state or function may influence policy decisions within that state or functional area.

Although a relationship between structure and policy is not confirmed by empirical data, it seems likely that one exists. The likelihood is enhanced by the facts that (1) power is shifted when structures are changed, (2) participants in the political arena react as if they believe structural decisions to be important, and (3) both those opposing and favoring integration on the academic level argue that a relationship exists.

The first argument is that power is shifted when structures are altered. Seidman sees the issue of
power as central. According to him, structural changes "... relate to power: who shall use it and to what ends?" 13 The power to recommend and administer policies devolves on individual administrators in a fragmented system but resides in the governor in an integrated system. Presumably, a governor would bring to decision-making a wider perspective on state problems than would an administrator with interests and expertise in only one area. The result should be more coordinated policy with a governor as the primary wielder of power.

Similarly, the requirement that a governor periodically face the voters should also influence his or her use of power. Democratic theory strongly asserts that elected officials will be more responsive to the needs and desires of the public than will appointed officials. Therefore, a highly integrated state should have policies that are more satisfactory to the voters than a fragmented state has. Likewise, a function will be administered differently if the structures are centralized and responsibility lies with a governor than if the structures are fragmented.

Other reasons exist for believing that structure is ultimately important to policy. It seems likely, for instance, that interest groups will be less effective

13 Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power, p. 28.
in attaining their specialized interests when a governor rather than an administrator or legislative committee was in charge.

A second bit of evidence of a relationship between structure and policy is the importance attached to re-organizational decisions by virtually every actor in the political arena. While some of this activity may well grow out of a concern for individual prestige and power, it certainly also reflects a concern that policy changes will occur when structures are changed and responsibility reassigned. Agency directors almost always oppose the integration or centralization of their own agencies. Interest groups lobby with dedication to retain the independent agencies to which they are closely aligned and legislators frequently oppose plans which would integrate administrative units under a more powerful governor. The fact that most political participants believe structure to be important does not prove a linkage between structure and policy but it seems to strengthen the likelihood that one does in fact exist.

The final reason for believing that structure and policy are related involves the arguments found in academic circles. Those who favor integrated structures have generally argued that efficiency will be the major change brought about by integration, but they also feel that policy will become more responsive as systems become
more integrated. The opponents of integration also believe that structural change will have an impact on policy although they stress the disadvantages of integration. In general, both sides seem to agree that "organizational arrangements are not neutral," but "...give some interests, some perspectives, more effective access to those with decision making authority." 14

Those who oppose integration seem to do so for several reasons. Some admittedly argue, in contradiction to the point being made, that structural changes are little more than shuffling of papers or rearranging of boxes on an organizational chart. The majority of critics, however, fear that integration will stifle creativity, destroy the separation of powers basic to our system of government, and put decision making power into the hands of less knowledgeable persons.

New ideas and programs, according to these critics, are more likely to survive and perhaps flourish if they are not "assimilated into the system" 15 They point to Roosevelt's attempts to keep new programs (especially agricultural programs) independent of the conservative dominated agricultural department as an example. 16 Not

15 Seidman, p. 19.
16 Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy, p. 75.
only are new ideas more likely to survive in a fragmented system, they are also more likely to be born. Competition has worked in the business world and competition in the political world is the best hope for new ideas according to the critics of integration. 17

A second reason given for opposing integration is that it is dangerous to grant too much power to governors. In fact many plans to restructure administrative bodies and to increase gubernatorial control over these bodies have been referred to as "dictatorship bills". Underlying the concern over increased gubernatorial power, is, of course, a belief that policies will be less reflective of public concerns if checks and balances are destroyed or minimized.

Finally, as Rourke points out, hierarchies create a "disjunction between power and knowledge" 18 Those with the most specialized knowledge (for example an agency chief) have considerable power over decision making in non-hierarchical structures while less specialized, more political persons (department heads and governors) are given much of this power in hierarchical arrangements.

Those who favor integrated systems are similarly convinced of the ultimate impact of these decisions on

17 For a more complete discussion of this idea see Robert A. Levine, Public Planning: Failure and Re-Direction. 18 Rourke, pp. 106-107.
policy. As long as no one person has the power to control the state administrative branch, consistent and efficient policy cannot be made since "left to themselves, subordinate units cannot eliminate duplication of effort or the pursuit of contradictory objectives." The governor, the logical person to receive this power, is adequately checked by the state legislature and is not to be feared.

A study by Wright, which focused on 933 agency and department heads at the state level, suggests that gubernatorial domination is probably not to be feared at this point. According to Wright, "... even in states where governors are the strongest they are far from having dictatorial, monopoly, or predominant control in the eyes of top state administrators." 20

The arguments cited above lead to the conclusion that structural arrangements and the location of power are important and probably do influence policy decisions. Despite the apparent strength of the arguments, the only attempt thus far to empirically measure or confirm the relationship failed to show an impact. The study by

19 Rourke, p. 105.

Dye\textsuperscript{21} was built around a limited measure of structure (the number of elected officials in each state) that may well have failed to capture the true variations among the states. Future testing with more elaborate measures of inter-state variations will perhaps document the relationship.

Despite the lack of empirical verification, there is at the base of this research a belief that structures must make a difference, that states with integrated systems will arrive at different solutions to problems and challenges than those with fragmented systems, and that functions that are administered by centralized agencies will tend to have a different type of output than functions which are administered by independent agencies.

Chapter one has provided an explanation and a justification of the goals of the research and has also outlined in detail the meaning of the major concepts: fragmentation and integration. This chapter turns from such conceptual considerations to questions of design and measurement. The concepts of fragmentation and integration must somehow be translated into numeric values if they are to be useful in statistical analysis.

The translation of a concept into numeric terms is necessary in those cases where "A vague intuitive understanding does not suffice . . .". Integration and fragmentation are examples of complex concepts that are unlikely to be totally comprehended on an intuitive level. It is, therefore, necessary to create social indicators or "quantitative data that serve as indexes to socially important conditions of the society" for these concepts.

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Whenever social indicators are employed, caution is in order. It is necessary to comprehend the principles (Hempel refers to them as "bridge principles" 3) that link the concepts to their empirical referents. It is also important to be sensitive to the accuracy of the data and to any value distortions in the choice of data sources. The principles underlying the indicators for integration and fragmentation have been discussed in the preceding chapter. The remaining problems will be covered in this chapter which outlines the procedures followed in translating these concepts and includes a consideration of the problems and strengths of the measures chosen.

VARIATIONS AMONG STATES

The task of describing the variations among the states in terms of degrees of integration demands consideration of several variables. Chapter one asserts that integration has two major components: (1) the extent to which functions are centralized and (2) the extent to which the governor is given the power to control the administrative branch of government. Each of these aspects of integration must be measured or operationalized

3Hempel, p. 73.
and the measures combined to form an overall description of each state's location on a continuum from fragmentation to integration. The resulting index score will provide a pioneering description of the variations among the states and will also be useful for later analysis.

Centralization of Functions

The first component, centralization of functions in each state, will be determined using data from a Council of State Governments publication. This publication, *State Administrative Officials: Classified by Functions*, is published biannually and contains the names and addresses of the individual responsible for each of 100 selected functions. Fifty-four of these functions will be used in the research and they are listed in Table One.⁴ The names and addresses included were gathered by the Council with the help of legislative service agencies and state officials. Fortunately, the

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⁴ A number of factors entered into the decision about which functions were to be included in the study. Basically, functions were eliminated from consideration for three reasons: (1) The function was an umbrella or overall function and was independent in virtually all the states. Agriculture and Transportation are examples., (2) The function was frequently under the control of an elective official other than the governor. Consumer Protection, which is often in an Attorney General's Department is an example., and (3) The function is found in a limited number of states. Lotteries, for example, are not a function of state government in most states and were not included in the analysis.
titles and addresses in the publication provide valuable insights into the structural arrangements of each state.

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Considering each of the functions for each state, a composite measure of centralization can be created. If a particular function is centralized, the state receives one point. If the function is administered by an independent agency, the state receives no points for that particular function. Basically, a function is
considered to be independent if the name of the function is included in the last agency or department listed in the address.

Some actual examples may demonstrate the procedure and the information summarized in this measure.

Example 1: Mining

In Kentucky the person in charge of mining administration is:

Commissioner
Department of Mines and Minerals

In neighboring Ohio, the top person for mining administration is:

Chief
Division of Mines
Department of Industrial Relations

The contrast in structures is evident in this example. Kentucky has an independent or fragmented agency (the word "mines" appears in the last agency listed) to deal with mining while Ohio has integrated that function into a department that handles all industrial relations. Ohio would, therefore, receive a point for having an integrated mining administration while Kentucky would not receive a point.

A second example also demonstrates variations among the states.

Example 2: Drug Abuse

California's drug abuse programs are administered through:
California's highly integrated or centralized structure in this particular area stands in sharp contrast to Nebraska's fragmented structure. In Nebraska, drug abuse is handled by:

Executive Director
Commission on Drugs

The specific agency dealing with drug abuse in California is a part of a much larger agency, while in Nebraska the drug agency is independent. The fact that the Nebraska governing unit is a commission further suggests independence from the governor, but is not important in the ranking of the state.

One particularly difficult decision involved what to do with arrangements such as that found in New Hampshire for the drug abuse function. The function is administered by:

Coordinator of Drug Abuse
Office of the Governor

Due to the tendency for governor's offices to become catch-alls for unrelated programs, all programs located within a governor's office are considered to be independent. This decision is particularly important in the case of New York state which has been very eager to use
the governor's office in this way. A constitutional limitation on the number of agencies which can exist has probably led to the situation where "Everything from liquor control to atomic development" is included in the governor's office. While it is possible that the governor is particularly powerful in relation to agencies within his own office, the concern here is with centralization not gubernatorial control.

The procedure outlined above for ranking the states, while somewhat complicated, seems to be preferable to the alternatives. It is not possible, for example, to rely on newspaper type accounts to discover which states are reorganized or have streamlined their agencies. These accounts may point out that a state has reduced its administrative units into 22 departments but fail to mention that 78 agencies were excluded from the centralization plan. The technique outlined above will not rely on the publicity about a state and should equally recognize the arrangements of a state that never became too fragmented and state which has had a highly publicized reorganization.

Organizational charts, likewise, are not too promising. They may suggest a highly centralized structure without

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revealing that many of the functions within a specific box may be there for budgetary purposes only and are, in fact, quite independent. The measure chosen for this research hopefully avoids some of these pitfalls, but its weaknesses must also be recognized.

One of the weaknesses of the index of centralization is that it relies on published data. On the positive side, the use of published data means that there are fewer data gaps. Past experience has indicated the near impossibility of getting complete data on state governments through questionnaires. Furthermore, the use of published data allows a consideration of a much wider range of policy areas than would have been possible if a separate data collection had been undertaken. The problems of using data collected for another purpose are considerable. The data were collected for use by those wishing to know of or to contact the person in charge of specific policy areas in each state. It can be assumed but not guaranteed that those preparing the lists were sensitive to and knowledgeable of organizational arrangements. In order to provide some verification of the accuracy of the data, the information included in the publication was compared to other informational sources or organizational charts

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6A survey sent out by the Council of State Governments in 1970 resulted in useable data from only 40 states. This data is reported in their report, Central Management in the States.
from several states. No major discrepancies were discovered between the independent sources.

A second problem exists in relation to the index score for centralization of administrative units. That problem is time lapse. Minor changes in administrative structure occur routinely and major structural overhauls are far from unusual. Despite that fact that a 1977 publication is available, some changes will not be reflected in the data. Connecticut, for example, has experienced major structural revisions as of October 1, 1977, but these are too recent to show up in the published material. The temptation to update the data was great, but the need for consistency among the states demands that the most recent changes be saved for analysis in later research.

A final, and extremely important, shortcoming of the proposed index is the concentration on formal channels of power. Just because an agency is viewed for address and organizational chart purposes as a part of an overall department does not demonstrate conclusively that the agency is in any real sense controlled by or even influenced by its formal subordinate position. It must be remembered that "Reorganization is only an opportunity for those who
wish to control agencies more tightly not a guarantee that they can do so."  

Powers of the Governor

In order to evaluate the extent to which a state has achieved integration, a measure of the governor's power to control structures is also needed. Chapter one isolates five specific powers which generally separate weak from strong governors. The five factors are: (1) tenure potential, (2) budget-making authority, (3) appointive power, (4) veto power, and (5) reorganizational power. Fortunately, established procedures exist for measuring the first four aspects. These procedures are outlined in a piece by Schlesinger. The data he uses are from the 1968-69 Book of the States and are now seriously out of date. His techniques remain valid and will be employed using data from the 1976-77 publication. The final aspect of gubernatorial power to be included in the index is reorganizational power. While the power to reorganize was not a particularly useful concept in 1969, it has now become quite important as a means of distinguishing weak from strong governors.

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8 Schlesinger.
9 Council of State Governments.
The inclusion of this new dimension of gubernatorial power and the updating of the established Schlesinger index will provide an adequate measure for this research.

Problems exist with this measure which should be noted. Informal powers of the governor are not captured by the measure and "...the governor's actual position may be very different in states where his legal position is technically the same." 10 A second problem is time lag. 1976-77 data will certainly bring the measure closer to reality but the most recent changes will still not be included in the measure.

The two major facets of integration have been discussed here and some indicators for each have been suggested and analyzed for strengths and weaknesses. Although the measures have certain limitations, they should provide "yardsticks by which to know if things are getting better or worse." 11 The following chapter describes the variations among the states using these indicators.

10 Coleman B. Ransone, The Office of Governor in the United States, p. 221.

VARIATIONS AMONG FUNCTIONS

Similar problems and advantages exist in terms of measuring the second major variable in the research. That variable is the extent to which each specific function or policy area is integrated or fragmented across the states. The functions chosen for analysis are the same functional areas that are listed in Table 1. While no particular theory was involved in the selection of these particular functions, it is assumed that the compilers of the data chose the most important and the most common functional areas based on their own considerable observation. Some functions were eliminated because they were seldom, if ever, centralized. Others were eliminated if they were frequently administered by an elective officer other than the governor and others were left out of the analysis because so few states reported having that function. A simple tabulation of the number of states that have independent agencies for the fifty-four remaining functions will separate the most from the least centralized of these functions and allow for further analysis.
INTEGRATION: THE DATA

The data resulting from the techniques outlined in the second chapter are presented in this third chapter. The data demonstrate for the first time the extent to which each state is integrated and each of the fifty-four separate functions is centralized. These data are viewed descriptively in this chapter and provide the basis for analytical discussions in chapters four and five.

VARIATIONS AMONG THE STATES

As in earlier chapters, attention will first be focused on the differences among the fifty states. The ultimate concern is with the consolidated index score for integration that will reflect variations in gubernatorial control and in centralization of functions. It is interesting and helpful to consider the variations in the separate measures used to construct the final index.
Centralization of Functions

Table 2 describes the extent to which functions are centralized in each of the states. The measurement technique that was outlined in chapter two reveals a considerable range of centralization. Missouri, which ranks the highest, has 91% of its functions centralized compared to South Carolina, which ranks the lowest and has only 27% of its functions centralized.

While the data basically conform to expectations, there are a few states that rank surprisingly high on the centralization measure and at least one state which falls considerably lower in the rankings than might have been expected.

Expectations were based on information concerning which states have reorganized in recent years. Table 3 lists those states that have had major reorganizations of their administrative structures since 1965 and the year of that reorganization. In addition, these states are indicated in Table 2. The states that have streamlined their structures are expected to receive the highest scores. For the most part, this expectation is fulfilled. Among the most highly centralized group only Hawaii, Alaska, New Jersey, and Utah have not experienced major restructuring in the past few years. Hawaii and Alaska, the youngest states in the Union, drew up their organizational charts after much of the
### TABLE 2: Centralization Index, Rankings by State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Carolina</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>So. Dakota</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Jersey</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utah</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delware</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>West Virginia</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>N. Dakota</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minnesota</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>So. Carolina</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( ^a \) States which have experienced major reorganizations since 1965. Information was obtained from a series of articles in The Book of the States. These articles by George Bell covered major reorganizations.
reformist demand for separate agencies had died down. In addition, their very youth denies the likelihood of too many old, no longer useful agencies. New Jersey's location is explained by its comprehensive organization just prior to 1965 and the reorganizational power to protect the gains made in that restructuring. Utah, while not included in the discussions of those with major reforms, did significantly restructure its agencies in the late 1960's.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3: Major Reorganizations Since 1965</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas, 1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California, 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado, 1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware, 1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida, 1969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia, 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky, 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana, 1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine, 1971</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only one state at the lower end of the scale has been subject to a major reorganization since 1965. That state, Virginia, was reorganized in 1972 but the reorganization appears on the basis of this measure to have been only a limited step with numerous exceptions.

The similarity between the measure of centralization employed here and the existence of recent reorganizations lends validity to our measure. At the same time, the
isolated differences demonstrate the usefulness of going beyond historical accounts of the states which have reorganized. The scores reported in Table 2 will be combined with a score of gubernatorial power to provide an overall measure of integration. The score for gubernatorial power is presented in the following section.

**Powers of the Governor**

Chapter two introduces the factors which are used to discriminate states with strong governors from states with weak governors. These characteristics are (1) the tenure potential of the governor, (2) the appointive power of the governor, (3) the budget-making power of the governor, (4) the veto power of the governor, and (5) the reorganizational authority vested in the governor. Each of these five characteristics of gubernatorial power has been measured according to the procedures outlined below. The results of the individual measures are reported along with a composite score of gubernatorial power. In addition, the first four factors are contrasted with Schlesinger's 1968-69 measures of these same factors in order to demonstrate trends which may have occurred over the past eight years.¹

The tenure potential of the governor is the first measure of gubernatorial power and it is reported in Table 4. This measurement is based on two distinct elements: (1) the length of the term for which the governor is elected and (2) the existence or non-existence of restraints on reelection, if any. All but four states now elect their governors for a four year term. These states are Arkansas, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. They do not impose any restraints on reelection. When Schlesinger compiled similar data in 1968-69, he discovered ten states which had two year terms and two of these states coupled the short term with some type of restraint on reelection. The four states which still have the two year term make up the low category on Table 4.

Twenty-seven states are included in the medium category. While these states all have four year terms for their governors they also impose some type of restriction on reelection. In some cases (8), no reelection is allowed while in others (19), only one reelection is permitted. Schlesinger located twenty-three states in this particular category in his earlier study. The change from twenty-three to twenty-seven, while not dramatic, provides further evidence of a general trend toward increased tenure potential since the high category gains in size.
### TABLE 4: Governor's Tenure Potential, 1976-77

**High (2 points)\(^a\)**

Four-year term, no restraint on reelection

- Arizona (b)
- California
- Colorado
- Connecticut
- Hawaii
- Idaho
- Illinois
- Iowa (b)
- Massachusetts
- Michigan
- Minnesota
- Montana
- New York
- No. Dakota
- Texas (b)
- Utah
- Washington
- Wisconsin
- Wyoming

**Medium (1 point)\(^a\)**

Four-year term, some restraint on reelection

- Alabama (b)
- Alaska
- Delaware
- Florida (b)
- Georgia
- Indiana (b)
- Kansas (b)
- Kentucky
- Louisiana
- Maine
- Maryland
- Mississippi
- Missouri
- Nebraska
- Nevada (c)
- New Jersey
- New Mexico
- No. Carolina
- Ohio
- Oklahoma
- Oregon
- Pennsylvania
- So. Carolina
- So. Dakota
- Tennessee
- Virginia
- W. Virginia

**Low (0 points)\(^a\)**

Two-year term

- Arkansas
- New Hampshire
- Rhode Island
- Vermont

\(^a\)The points are used for the construction of the index of gubernatorial strength (Table 9).

\(^b\)States which rank higher in 1976-77 than they did in 1968-69.

\(^c\)States which rank lower in 1976-77 than they did in 1968-69.
Nineteen states are included in the high category on tenure potential. These states not only elect their governors for a four year term but they also allow unrestrained attempts at reelection. The slight trend described earlier is also evidenced in this category. Schlesinger's data included only seventeen states in this category. While Nevada was reclassified into a lower category with the most recent data, three new states, that have removed restraints on reelection, are added to the top category. These states, as well as all other states that have increased the tenure potential of their governor since 1968-69 are indicated on Table 4. Arizona, Iowa, and Texas all had two year terms for governor in 1968, but have now adopted four year terms with no restrictions on reelection. Kansas and South Dakota have also abandoned the two year term while maintaining a one term restriction on reelection. Alabama, Florida, Indiana, and West Virginia had four year terms in 1968 but have moved since then to remove some reelection restrictions. Nevada, the only state that ranks lower in the later data than in the original data, has changed its law to limit the governor to one reelection.

The second aspect of gubernatorial power is the appointive power of the governor. Data based on the method of selection of the heads for sixteen state government functions are reported in Table 5. For each
TABLE 5: Governor's Appointive Power, 1976-77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High (2 points)</th>
<th>Medium (1 point)</th>
<th>Low (0 points)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Virginia (c)</td>
<td>50 Delaware (c)</td>
<td>29 Arkansas (d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 New Jersey</td>
<td>50 Minnesota</td>
<td>26 Oklahoma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 Tennessee</td>
<td>50 So. Dakota</td>
<td>25 Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 Hawaii</td>
<td>49 Connecticut</td>
<td>25 So. Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63 Kentucky (c)</td>
<td>48 Kansas (c)</td>
<td>23 Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 Montana (c)</td>
<td>46 N. Hampshire (c)</td>
<td>20 Mississippi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 Wyoming (c)</td>
<td>45 Georgia (c)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59 Indiana</td>
<td>45 Rhode Island</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59 New York</td>
<td>44 Michigan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58 Massachusetts</td>
<td>43 Missouri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57 Alabama (c)</td>
<td>42 Vermont</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56 Pennsylvania (d)</td>
<td>41 Idaho</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 California</td>
<td>41 Louisiana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 Nebraska (c)</td>
<td>41 Maryland (d)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 Illinois</td>
<td>41 W. Virginia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53 Ohio (c)</td>
<td>39 Arizona (c)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 Colorado (c)</td>
<td>39 Iowa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 Wisconsin</td>
<td>36 Alaska</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 Nevada</td>
<td>35 No. Carolina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 Utah</td>
<td>34 Maine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 No. Dakota</td>
<td>34 Oregon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34 Washington (d)</td>
<td>30 New Mexico</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 New Mexico.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The score for each state is based on the governor's power of appointment in sixteen major functional areas (administration and finance, agriculture, attorney general, secretary of state, treasurer, post-audit, centralized accounting, overall revenue and/or taxation, budget, transportation/highways, insurance, education, health, public assistance, labor, and conservation). For each of the functions, a state was given 0-5 points depending on the governor's influence in the appointment. 5 (governor appoints), 4 (governor with 1 house of legislature), 3 (governor with 2 houses of legislature), 2 (director with governor's approval or governor and council, 1 (department director, board, legislature or civil service), and 0 (elected).

The points are used for the construction of the index of gubernatorial strength (Table 9).

c Ranks at least 10 points higher than in 1968-69.

d Ranks at least 10 points lower than in 1968-69.
of the sixteen functions, each state was scored from 0 to 5 points depending on the extent to which the governor had an influence on that choice. The specific rules for scoring are outlined in the notes to Table 5. An average score for each state was then calculated and presented in Table 5. The range of scores is from 84 (the highest possible score is 90) in Virginia to 20 in Mississippi. The higher the score, the greater the governor's appointive power. The data demonstrate the extreme variations among the governors in their power to appoint administrative heads. For purposes of analysis, the continuous scores are grouped into high, medium, and low categories. The sixteen states with scores above 50 are considered to have governors with strong or high appointive powers. Twenty-eight states, with scores ranging from 30 to 50, have governors with medium appointive powers and the remaining six states, which scored 29 or lower on the index, are ranked in the low or weak category.

It is more difficult to observe or describe trends in appointive powers here than it was with tenure potential since the measurements used in this study vary in at least one important way from Schlesinger's measure. Data on the method of selection of the controller, that are included in the 1968-69 measure, are no longer reported in The Book of the States.² The

²Council of State Governments, 1976-77.
The method used to select the person in charge of centralized accounting was substituted in the current calculations. The result is that most states vary somewhat from their original scores. For purposes of locating trends, only those states which vary by ten or more points are, therefore, considered. The seventeen states that did score much differently on the two measures are indicated on Table 5. There does appear to be a trend towards more or stronger appointive powers for the governor. Thirteen of the seventeen states with significant changes moved towards increased gubernatorial power. Some of the changes were quite substantial. Virginia's score moved from 56 on Schlesinger's scale to an 84 on the current measure. Wyoming's score increased by 29 points and several other states increased their rankings by at least 20 points. The four states (Pennsylvania, Maryland, Washington, and Arkansas) that scored considerably lower on the present scale have apparently decreased the power of their governors in the area of appointments. Pennsylvania, for example, now reports that more of the governor's appointees require approval by both houses of the legislature than in the past. Arkansas has many departments that are now headed by agency director appointees in contrast to direct gubernatorial appointment.
The third aspect of gubernatorial power to be used in constructing the index is the governor's budget powers. A quick glance at Table 6 reveals that the vast majority of states rank high on this measure. Forty-three states grant full responsibility to the governor for the preparation of the state budget. In three states the governor shares responsibility with a civil service appointee. These three states are ranked as medium on the measure. The low category of gubernatorial budget-making authority includes four states in which the governor shares responsibility with several others with independent sources of strength. Texas, as an example, divides budget-making authority among the governor, the budget director, and a legislative budget board. This board is chosen by the legislature and would not necessarily reflect the wishes or preferences of the Texas governor.

A trend towards increasing gubernatorial power in budget preparation is quite evident although precise comparisons with Schlesinger's tables are difficult due to unclear coding procedures and changed methods of reporting data. Schlesinger located thirty-six states in the highest category and this research places forty-three states there. It is possible that coding differences account for two of the new states but the others have obviously handed over additional powers to the governor.
### TABLE 6: Governor's Budget Authority, 1976-77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor has full responsibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium (1 point)</td>
<td>Connecticut, Kansas, Louisiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor shares responsibility with a civil service appointee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (0 points)</td>
<td>Indiana, Mississippi, So. Carolina, Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor shares responsibility with several others with independent sources of strength</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The points are used for the construction of the index of gubernatorial strength (Table 9).*
since 1968. Most dramatic perhaps is the case of West Virginia. In 1968-69 authority for budget preparation in that state resided in a Board of Public Works which included the governor, secretary of state, auditor, attorney general, treasurer, superintendent of schools, and the commissioner of agriculture. By 1976-77 the power for preparation of the budget had been consolidated with the governor and his direct appointees assuming the responsibility.

Veto power is the fourth aspect of a governor's strength. The states are distributed or classified in Table 7 according to the kind of veto power that is available to the governor. A vast majority of the states now grant an item veto to their governors. Among these states with item vetoes there are, however, some states that further strengthen the governor's hand by requiring a vote of at least 3/5 of the legislature to override the governor's veto. Thirty-three states fall into this high grouping based on veto powers. Ten states receive a medium score indicating that the governor has a veto power which can be overridden by a majority (voting or present) of the legislature. The "low" category has seven states in it. These seven states are the only states which do not give an item veto to their governors. North Carolina, which is included in this category, grants no veto power to its governor.
TABLE 7: Governor's Veto Power, 1976-77

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High (2 points) (^a)</th>
<th>Item Veto plus at least 3/5 of legislature to override</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>Illinois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Iowa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>Kansas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>Michigan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>Minnesota</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium (1 point) (^a)</th>
<th>Item veto plus a majority (voting or present) to override</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Kentucky</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low (0 points) (^a)</th>
<th>No item veto</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Nevada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)The points are used for the construction of the index of gubernatorial strength (Table 9).
A comparison of Table 7 with the results reported in Schlesinger's study shows a trend similar to that noted in tenure potential, appointive powers, and budget-making authority. That trend, increasing gubernatorial power, is perhaps best evidenced by the high category. Using identical measurements, Schlesinger located only twenty-five states in this category compared to thirty-three states which meet the criteria of the high category in 1976-77. Schlesinger used five categories in contrast to the three used here but totalling his categories reveals that nine states had no item veto in 1968-69 while seven such states now exist. The changes are slight, but the trend over only eight years is clearly towards a more powerful gubernatorial veto.

The fifth and final component of the index of gubernatorial strength is the governor's power to initiate reorganization within the executive branch of government. Table 8 groups the states according to this criteria. The top group of fifteen states includes all those states where the governor has the right to initiate reorganizational plans that take effect unless vetoed by the legislature. In the eight states which are indicated by a "C" on Table 8, this authority is provided in the Constitution. The remaining seven states, indicated by an "S", have given the governor
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 8: Governor's Reorganizational Powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**High (2 points) a**
Governor has the power to initiate reorganizational plans subject to legislative veto

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alaska-C</td>
<td>Maryland-C</td>
<td>New Jersey-S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California-S</td>
<td>Massachusetts-C</td>
<td>No. Carolina-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia-S</td>
<td>Michigan-C</td>
<td>Pennsylvania-S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas-C</td>
<td>Minnesota-S</td>
<td>So. Dakota-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois-C</td>
<td>Missouri-S</td>
<td>Vermont-S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Medium (1 point) a**
Governor has the right to put reorganizational plans into effect immediately but must have legislative approval within a year.

Kentucky

**Low (0 points) a**
Legislature must take initiative in reorganization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>Oregon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>Montana</td>
<td>So. Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>Texas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>Utah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho</td>
<td>No. Dakota</td>
<td>W. Virginia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>Oklahoma</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aThe points are used for the construction of the index of gubernatorial strength (Table 9).
statutory power in the area. The middle category includes only one state, Kentucky. In Kentucky the governor may make reorganizational decisions which go into effect immediately. During the next session of the legislature these decisions must be approved by the legislative body. While the Kentucky governor would seem to have more power because changes can be made immediately, his power ultimately relies on the positive action (rather than the inaction) of the legislature. The states that are weakest in reorganizational powers are listed in the low or third category. These thirty-four states basically place the initiative for administrative reform with the legislature rather than with the governor.

Since this measure was not a part of Schlesinger's original index, it is more difficult to make comparisons and describe trends. It is perhaps helpful to note that a 1967 report by The Committee for Economic recommended the institution of such powers and most of the movement has occurred since that time.\(^3\)

Powers of the Governor: An Index

Table 9 presents the combined measure of all five factors making up the index of governor's power. Since all but the final factor located most states in the upper categories, the combined scores are not normally

\(^3\)Committee for Economic Development, Modernizing State Government, p. 56.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State and Rank</th>
<th>Tenure</th>
<th>Appointment</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Veto</th>
<th>Reorganize</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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Table 9 continued on next page
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<tr>
<th>State and Rank</th>
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<th>Appointment</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Veto</th>
<th>Reorganize</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
distributed from 0-10 but are generally high. The average score is 6.2. Two states received ten points, the highest possible score. These two states, California and Illinois, ranked in the high category on all five measures. Their governors have high tenure potential, appoint the bulk of department heads in their states, share budget-making responsibility only with their own appointees, have an item veto that cannot be overridden without a 3/5 vote, and have been given the authority to initiate changes in administrative structure subject to legislative veto. In contrast, South Carolina accumulated only two points on the index. In South Carolina the governor has a four year term but is not allowed to run for reelection, the appointive powers of the governor are extremely weak, budgetary preparation is shared with a control board, the item veto (while available) is easily overridden, and no provision is made for the governor to readjust administrative structures without prior and positive legislative action.

The action in the direction of increasing gubernatorial power over the past eight years that has been demonstrated with the individual factors and the addition of a fifth consideration makes it difficult to compare Table 9 with the final scores reported by Schlesinger. Some consistency is evident, however. Of the top twenty-four states on Schlesinger's index, eighteen are included
in the top twenty-four on the current index. At the other extreme, seven of the ten lowest scoring states in 1968-69 are also included in the ten lowest scoring states in 1976-77. Despite legislative actions and changes in measurement techniques, most states still rank relatively the same as they did eight years ago.

**Combining Centralization and Gubernatorial Power**

Two separate scores, one reflecting centralization and the other gubernatorial power, have been developed for each state. Table 10 demonstrates the relationship between the two scores. There is an observable tendency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gubernatorial Power</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centralization High</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization Medium</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralization Low</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)The gubernatorial power scores were grouped as follows: 8-10 points=high, 6-7 points=medium, and 5 and under=low.

\(^b\)The Centralization scores were grouped as follows: 70-91 points=high, 50-69 points=medium, and less than 50 points=low.

for those states that ranked high on the centralization score to also rank high on the gubernatorial power score. Specifically, 55% of the states that ranked high in
centralization also ranked high in gubernatorial power. In contrast, only 7% of the states that ranked low in centralization ranked high in gubernatorial power. The two factors that are to comprise the final integration score are, therefore, likely to occur together. The relationship is far from perfect with one state, Wyoming, ranking low in centralization and high in gubernatorial power. Four other states, Rhode Island, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Florida, have highly centralized structures combined with relatively weak governors.

Combining the data from Table 2 (Centralization Index) and the data from Table 9 (Index of Gubernatorial Strength) provides the overall measure of integration which is the focus of this paper. The combined results are reported in Table 11. The scores reported are calculated by adding the gubernatorial power score and a converted centralization score and dividing by two. The resulting scores range from 9.0 in California to 2.0 in South Carolina. The median score is 6.0. The wide range of scores presents a challenge for the next chapter: What factor or factors account for these differences?

The centralization scores were reported as percentages in Table 2 but are converted to real numbers here. For instance, Minnesota scored .66 on the scale and it is scored as a 6 in Table 11. Conversions are as follows: 9.0-9.9=9, 8.0-8.9=8, 7.0-7.9=7, 6.0-6.9=6, 5.0-5.9=5, 4.0-4.9=4, 3.0-3.9=3, 2.0-2.9=2, 1.0-1.9=1, and 0.0-0.9=0.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>State</th>
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<td>Connecticut</td>
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<td>Kansas</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Illinois</td>
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</table>

*The integration score is computed by averaging the centralization scores from Table 2 and the gubernatorial power scores from Table 9. It was necessary to convert the percentages from Table 2 to a 1-10 scale (see note 4 on preceding page for exact procedures).*
VARIATIONS AMONG FUNCTIONS

The second focus of this research is on functions. Are there variations in the way that different functions are administered? Are certain types of functions likely to maintain their independence even within a centralized administrative structure? The data in Table 12 demonstrate conclusively that an affirmative answer to the above question is correct. Using the data provided by the Council of State Governments in State Administrative Officials: Classified by Functions, scores were derived for each of the fifty-four functions. The percentages reported in Table 12 reflect the proportion of the fifty states which centralize that particular function. The food and drug function is centralized in all fifty states and receives a score of 1.00. In other words, no state has an independent agency to deal with food and drug related functions. Other functions receiving high scores reflective of their usual centralization are occupational safety and health, solid waste management, mass transit, and medicaid. These functions are only rarely administered by independent agencies. Higher education, in contrast, is not centralized but remains an independent function in 80% of the states. Health, vocational rehabilitation, ethics, and the arts are likewise likely to stand independent within the administrative structure of the state.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Rehabilitation</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Employees Retirement</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Utility Regulation</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Affairs</td>
<td>.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Finance</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquor Control</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans Affairs</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish and Game</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historic Preservation</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aging</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil and Water Conservation</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parole and Probation</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highways</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and Highway Patrol</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Resources Management</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Security</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workmens Compensation</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeronautics</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children and Youth Services</td>
<td>.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Marshall</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinarian</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational Systems</td>
<td>.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Education</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Retardation</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Abuse</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollution Control (Water)</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollution Control (Air)</td>
<td>.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroads</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing</td>
<td>.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicaid</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Transit</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid Waste Management</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Safety and Health</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Drug</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This chapter has provided the measures of variations among the states and among the fifty-four selected functions. It has been demonstrated that some states rank high in integration while others rank quite low. It has also been shown that certain functions are usually centralized in the states while others are typically independent. The two chapters which follow will delve more deeply into the data presented in Tables 11 and 12 and attempt to explain some of the variations described therein. Chapter four will deal specifically with variations among the states while chapter five will focus on variations among functions.
VARIATIONS AMONG STATES

The preceding chapter has provided an in-depth description of the variations in administrative organization found among the fifty states. Chapter four examines these variations and their relationship to a series of other factors. The hope is that the analysis will provide answers concerning the relationship between administrative characteristics and (1) the socio-economic conditions of the individual states, (2) some selected characteristics of the political system found in the states, and (3) the traditional or historical reaction to new ideas of each particular state. While it is tempting to search for causal relationships among these several sets of factors, the analysis must be preliminary and descriptive in nature. The unavailability or condition of both the specific kinds of data needed and the appropriate theories of political relationships preclude serious hypothesis testing. At the same time, these deficiencies in data and theory emphasize the need to study suspected relationships.
The statistical means for examining these suspected relationships will be correlational analysis. Correlational analysis provides a measure of the "strength of association between two variables."¹ In this particular instance the dependent variable (degree of integration of state administrations) will be tested against a series of socio-economic, political, and traditional variables. The resulting correlation coefficients will be presented and analyzed in order to provide a basic understanding of the strength of the relationship among the variables. Most of the variables to be considered are interval in nature and are subjected to Pearson product-moment correlations. In the case of the measure of legislative strength, only rank-order scores are available making it necessary to use a non-parametric test, Spearman $R_s$. Partial correlations are also used in an attempt to discover relationships which are not meaningful despite correlational coefficients which appear to be strong. Specifically, partial correlations are utilized as a way of determining whether computed relationships between political and traditional factors and the degree of integration are true relationships or whether they result from the coincidence of the relationship between

the political and traditional factors and the series of socio-economic factors used in this particular research. Each of the relationships resulting from the analysis is tested for significance. The .05 level of significance is used.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS: THEIR IMPACT

The first set of relationships to be calculated and reviewed are those between socio-economic factors and the dependent variable, degree of integration in state administration.

Considerable reason exists to suggest the impact or influence of socio-economic variables on any policy decision of a governmental unit. These reasons include both a relatively well-developed theory or group or theories concerning the interrelatedness of socio-economic and political characteristics and a series of empirical studies which have tended to confirm these theories.

The theoretical relationships between several aspects of any social system, including the political and economic aspects, are perhaps most elaborately outlined by Parsons.

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2 Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics, provides an excellent explanation of correlational analysis. See chapters 17, 18, and 19.

3 Blalock, Chapter 10.

4 Talcott Parsons, The Social System.
His theoretical construct of social systems at all levels describes the inevitable interplay between the economic and social subsystems and the political subsystem. In more concrete terms, as the wealth, education, and urbanization of a system change, there are likely to be corresponding changes in the political system.

Numerous applications of this general theory are evident in studies of political systems. Students of political development have recognized and, in some cases, documented the impact of social and economic development on political development. Lipset, for example, notes the socio-economic differences between stable and unstable democratic systems in Europe and Latin America and concludes that a certain level of socio-economic development is necessary to sustain democratic political institutions. Phillips Cutright focuses on a specific policy area, social security programs in 76 nations, and discovers that this particular policy outcome is highly associated with the levels of economic development in each country. As the level of economic development changes there seems to be increased ability and desire to provide social security programs.


These cross-national studies have also inspired a wealth of research at the state level. The states, which are strikingly similar in tradition and political structure, provide an excellent laboratory to test the relationships suggested by theory and by cross-national studies. An early study by Dawson and Robinson considers welfare policy decisions in the states and locates a strong relationship between welfare policies and the wealth of the state.\(^7\) The theoretical explanation is that the states which are most able to pay large benefits are the most likely to do so. Dye, in subsequent studies, reinforces and elaborates the findings of Dawson and Robinson. He finds that policies regarding education, highways, taxation, and regulation of public morality as well as welfare all reflect, to some extent, the social and economic characteristics of the states.\(^8\) Dye goes beyond consideration of wealth as a sole indicator and relies on several indicators of economic development including urbanization, industrialization and education. His findings indicate that the relationship is not

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merely one of having enough money to finance a program. Apparently, more complicated factors such as changes in demand are involved.

The relationship between socio-economic variables and policy choices has been elaborated and refined in additional research. Articles by Dye, Cnudde and McCrone, and Sharkansky and Hofferbert all indicate that the effect of socio-economic variables is not constant but varies with time and policy type. In each case, however, socio-economic factors do seem to be important.

The studies mentioned above show that in general policy decisions at the state level are reflective of the social and economic characteristics of the individual states. Extending the reasoning, it is likely that the structure of a state's administrative or bureaucratic system might also be influenced by socio-economic conditions. Changes in socio-economic condition may well have an impact on bureaucratic structures since urbanization, industrialization, and racial and ethnic heterogeneity create new problems and new demands not evident in an agricultural economy. While a state with a less

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complex, agricultural economy may be able to function adequately with a loosely structured, non-integrated administrative system, a state with a more complex and developed economy and social structure might find a weak governor and a multitude of independent boards and commissions intolerable. It is expected, therefore, that in order to cope with increased demands, the more highly developed states will have reformed their administrative structures.

Seven indicators of economic and social development were selected for the analysis. Societal and economic development have often been described in terms of industrialization, urbanization, and racial and ethnic heterogeneity. Industrialization is measured by considering the percentage of the labor force which is employed in agriculture and in manufacturing. Wealth and increased formal education are also characteristic of industrialized society with its role specialization and differentiation. Urbanization is measured using U.S. Census data to show the percentage of the population of each state which resides in urbanized areas. Racial and ethnic heterogeneity variations are measured by considering the percentage of black and the percentage of foreign stock in the population of each state. These seven indicators are listed in Table 13 along with their multiple and individual correlations with integration.
TABLE 13: Integration in relation to selected indicators of social and economic development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiple Correlation</td>
<td>.60&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population living in urban areas</td>
<td>.34&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of blacks in population</td>
<td>-.25&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of foreign stock in population</td>
<td>.36&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>.48&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median School Years Completed</td>
<td>.35&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of labor force in agriculture</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of labor force in manufacturing</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The measure of integration is from Table 11, Chapter 3.<sup>a</sup>

The measures of social and economic development are from U.S. Census publications and are based on the 1970 Census.<sup>b</sup>

Statistically significant at the .05 level.<sup>c</sup>

All seven variable taken together result in a multiple correlation coefficient of .60 which explains 36% of the variation among the states. Five of the individual variables analyzed are also significantly related to the degree of integration in administrative units according to the data in Table 13. As expected, the states with the largest percentages of their populations residing in urban areas are most likely to have adopted highly integrated administrative structures. This relationship was expected since urban states have a wider and more complex range of problems to confront than rural states have. This wider range of problems makes it more difficult to rely on loosely structured
(non-integrated or fragmented) bureaucracies. The correlation coefficient of .34 is statistically significant at the .05 level and explains about 11% of the variations among the states.

While a significant (-.25) relationship also exists between the percentage of blacks in the population and the degree of integration, the relationship is in the direction opposite to that which was predicted. The expectation was that the presence of a large minority group within a state would again be reflective of a more complex society and more complex pressures on the political institutions. Such complex pressures, it would seem, would result in a need for a more integrated administrative system. On the contrary, the data show that as the percentage of blacks in the population increases, the likelihood of an integrated administrative structure decreases. This contradictory finding suggests either a weakness in the theory or a failure to account for the large number of blacks in the Southern states which, despite their racial heterogeneity, are generally less urbanized and industrialized than much of the rest of the United States.

The percentage of foreign stock in the population is, as expected, positively correlated to the integration score. In this instance the measure of economic and social development explains about 13% (correlation
coefficient is .36) of the variation among the states.

Median income, as indicated in Table 13, is the most strongly associated with degree of integration (correlation coefficient is .48) and explains 23% of the variation among the states. This particularly strong finding reaffirms the expectation that high income levels in a state indicate high levels of social and economic development and will be associated with more complex administrative structures.

The measure of median school years completed is also significantly correlated with degree of integration. High educational levels are associated with specialization and differentiation of roles and are excellent indicators of development. The correlation coefficient of .35 means that 12% of the variation among the states in integration is explained by differences in median school years completed.

The two final variables reported in Table 13 are not significantly correlated with integration. The theory suggested that a state with a large percentage of its labor force in agriculture would have a less complex society and, therefore, have less need for an integrated administrative system. The data do not support the theory and also fail to show the contrasting relationship. States with a large percentage of their populations in manufacturing are not more likely to have
integrated structures than states scoring lower on the measure. In fact the correlational coefficient (though not statistically significant) leans in the opposite direction. It is difficult to speculate as to this lack of support for the expectations. Development may not be adequately depicted by measures of percentage of persons engaged in manufacturing.

Basically, the data in Table 13 confirm the expectation that decisions concerning administrative integration, like many other policy decision, are influenced by socio-economic factors. In general, states with the most highly developed societies and economies are the most likely to have highly integrated administrative structures.

Despite the consistently strong correlations found between socio-economic variables and policy choices here and in earlier studies, it is not to be assumed that a causal relationship has been established. The relationship without an underlying theory is meaningless and in virtually all the theories that would explain the linkage, there is "an ever-present, necessary, intervening variable" which is "somebody's political participation."\textsuperscript{10} In other words, societal development is important in explaining governmental choices presumably because different needs exist and different

demands are expressed in developed societies and underdeveloped societies. Socio-economic factors can, therefore, only be important as indicators of political differences.

**POLITICAL FACTORS: THEIR IMPACT**

The second set of factors to be examined is political in nature. Variations within the political system have generated considerable interest because these variations presumably have an impact on the policy choices of the system. Why should anyone care how many people vote or whether there is competition between Democrats and Republicans? Why does it seem important to know how well apportioned the state legislature is or whether a specific state has a strong or weak governor? The interest in these questions grows out of a belief that political characteristics do influence policy outcomes. The relationship was described early by V.O. Key in *Southern Politics*. His analysis of the governments of the southern states led him to believe that the structures of government (particularly the lack of two viable political parties) influenced many policy choices.11

Empirical studies, for the most part, deny or at least diminish this belief in the explanatory value of political variables. The study by Dawson and Robinson

11 V.O. Key, *Southern Politics*. 
that was cited above measures the impact of political factors (inter-party competition) as well as the impact of socio-economic variables.\textsuperscript{12} The conclusion is that inter-party competition does not have an independent influence on welfare policies. Dye's study also demonstrates that partisanship, participation levels, competition, and apportionment cannot account for variations in the several policy areas once the effects of economic variables are statistically controlled.\textsuperscript{13} More directly related to the present research is a second study by Dye. In this study, Dye views the governor's formal power and organizational structures as the dependent variables. His research again verifies that structural or political variables "do not appear to have as much impact as the economic development variables."\textsuperscript{14}

Despite this empirical data which strongly discounts the independent influence of political factors, students of politics have not been willing to discontinue the search. Jacob and Vines feel that additional research

\textsuperscript{12} Dawson and Robinson.

\textsuperscript{13} Dye, Politics, Politics, Economics, and the Public.

\textsuperscript{14} Thomas R. Dye, "Executive Power and Public Policy in the United States," \textit{The American Governor in Behavioral Perspective}, edited by Thad Beyle and J. Oliver Williams, p. 252.
and improved techniques will eventually lead to more positive results. They

"believe that this seemingly outrageous description of state politics is an artifact of inadequate measurements of concepts, the utilization of inappropriate techniques of analysis, and overly narrow definitions of what constitutes politically relevant outputs and outcomes."15

Sharkansky also feels that the measurement of political variables has been extremely weak in the past.16 Primarily researchers have focused on party competitiveness, voter turnout, and levels of apportionment. These measurements have been utilized primarily because they are readily available and easy to use. Sharkansky suggests that new, more sophisticated and diversified measures of political variation must be developed and used. In addition, he warns against discounting political variables forever because they seemed unimportant at one point in time. The increasing levels of federal aid may diminish the economic variation among the states leaving political factors to play a more important role.17


17 Sharkansky.
Despite the empirical evidence to the contrary, it would seem premature to discount any potential influence of political factors. Several political factors might be expected to influence the policy under consideration in this research. Two factors, inter-party competition and legislative strength were chosen. They were chosen because of their theoretical relationship with integration and also because measures were readily available. Other factors, such as the strength of interest groups within the state, are admittedly as theoretically important but the only measure of interest group strength available is based on 1954 data. In other instances, data were available but did not seem to be particularly relevant to the policy decision in focus. Voter turnout rates, for example, have often been used to describe political variations among the states, but no strong theory suggests that a relationship should exist.

Inter-party competition, in contrast, is expected to be related for several reasons. Analyses of political systems have indicated that the largest proportion of changes (new programs) occur when a new administration comes into power. Reorganizational plans that integrate

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bureaucratic structures are new programs and, therefore, stand a better chance if changes in administration occur with some regularity. In one party or dominant one party states there is a continuity of administration that may not be conducive to the adoption of new programs. Put more simply, in a competitive state there may be more incentive to do something to gain the attention of the public and, perhaps, to use in the next campaign.

A second reason for believing that competitive states are more likely to adopt integrated administrative structures concerns the distribution of power. In a competitive state power is divided and parceled out for temporary periods. A state where the governor may well be defeated in the next election can more easily afford to grant that governor real control without fear of creating a dictator.

These theoretical reasons for anticipating a relationship between degree of integration and inter-party competition are buttressed by empirical data. Schlesinger's study of the power of the governor reveals that states with competitive party systems are indeed more likely to have powerful governors than are states with less competitive party systems. The focus of this study,

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administrative integration, goes beyond Schlesinger's measure of gubernatorial power but contains many of the same elements.

Legislative strength is the other political variable which is expected to explain some of the variations discovered among the states. The measure of legislative strength was developed by the Citizen's Conference on State Legislatures and reported in *The Sometime Governments: A Critical Study of the 50 American Legislatures*. The measure evaluates each of the 50 state legislatures according to five categories: functional, accountable, informed, independent, and representative. The expectation is that states with high scores in legislative strength will be most likely to have integrated the administrative functions of government. While in general legislators and legislative bodies are seen as chief obstacles to reorganizational plans which increase the governor's control, it seems that an independently powerful legislature might be less afraid to create a powerful governor. Wright's study of state administrators indicates that administrators view the legislature as the primary control on themselves even in states where the governor is especially strong. A strong legislature,

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confident of its own power and ability to maintain an influence over administrative units might not be so reluctant to increase the governor's role.

The opposite argument could be made, however. Legislatures have a lot to lose if they increase the governor's power. In particular, legislative committees that have long established relationships with independent agencies may find those relationships hampered by reorganizational plans.

Table 14 reports the correlations between integration and (1) inter-party competition, and (2) legislative strength.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 14: Integration² in relation to selected political variables.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-party competition b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Strength⁵</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²The measure of integration is from Table 11, Chapter 3.
³The measure of inter-party competition is the one developed by Austin Ranney in "Parties in State Politics," Politics in the American States, edited by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines, p. 87.
⁴The measure of legislative strength is from the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, The Sometime Governments, p. 49.
⁵Statistically significant at the .05 level.

Both correlations reported in Table 14 are statistically significant. The relationship between legislative strength and integration is, however, in the opposite
direction from that predicted. The correlation coefficient of \(-.42\) means that more than 17% of the variation in integration scores can be statistically explained by differences in legislative strength. Contrary to expectations, the strongest legislatures are less likely to grant administrative power to the governor. These strong legislatures are apparently more anxious about guarding their power than predicted. The weaker legislatures appear to be more willing to strengthen the governor's already powerful hand.

The relationship between inter-party competition and integration is strong (.43) and in the predicted direction. 18% of the variation among states is explained by looking at inter-party competition. Presumably, more competitive political systems are more anxious and willing to adopt integrated administrations.

These relationships between the two political variables and integration are interesting but past experience indicates the need to control for the effect of socioeconomic variables. It is important to know whether the relationships are real or whether they merely reflect the fact that wealthy, well-educated states happen to have different political characteristics than poor, lesser educated states. Table 15 presents partial correlations which will help to clarify the relationships. Inter-party competition is a significant factor
TABLE 15: Integration\textsuperscript{a} in relation to selected political variables when controlled for socio-economic factors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inter-party\textsubscript{b}</th>
<th>Legislative Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Simple Correlation</td>
<td>.43\textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>-.42\textsuperscript{d}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controlling for</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population urban</td>
<td>.35\textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>-.34\textsuperscript{d}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of blacks in population</td>
<td>.39\textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>-.41\textsuperscript{d}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of foreign stock in population</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>.19\textsuperscript{d}</td>
<td>-.26\textsuperscript{d}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median School years completed</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>-.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}The measure of integration is from Table 11, Chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{b}The measure of inter-party competition is from Austin Ranney's work. See note on Table 14.
\textsuperscript{c}The measure of legislative strength is from The Sometime Government. See note on Table 14.
\textsuperscript{d}Statistically significant at the .05 level.
\textsuperscript{e}The measures of social and economic development are from U.S. Census publications and are based on the 1970 census.

in explaining integration when urbanization, percentage of blacks, percentage of foreign stock, and median school years are controlled. However, the relationship becomes insignificant when income is held constant. This means that variations in integration cannot be attributed to inter-party competition but are, in actuality, reflections of variations in income. This finding is not too surprising in view of past empirical studies. It does indicate that the income level remains important despite increased federal aid. It also suggests that income is influential
in determining policies that primarily concern structure and power distribution as well as with policies that decide spending levels.

Similar results are attained when the influence of legislative strength is controlled for socio-economic factors. Again, the relationship remains statistically significant despite controls for the percentage of urban population, the percentage of blacks in the population, the percentage of foreign stock in the population, and the median school years completed. Controlling for median income, however, shows the relationship to be meaningless. Income levels, not legislative strength, are the primary determinants of degree of integration.

TRADITIONAL FACTORS: THEIR IMPACT

A third set of factors exists that may logically be expected to influence degrees of integration. These factors are traditional or historical factors. The argument is that some political units (in this instance states) typically adopt new programs earlier than do comparable political units. Specifically, some states will adopt integrated structures earlier than other states simply because they always are on the frontier in new program or policy areas.
A rather elaborate theory has been developed over the years to describe the existence of these "innovators" be they states or farm organizations. Rogers, whose work is fundamental to the theory, points out that in the dissemination of any idea there will be innovators, early adopters, early majorities, late majorities, and laggards. Jack Walker applies Roger's general theory to the area of state politics. Walker examines the dates of adoption of eighty-eight policies prior to the year 1965. Based on the dates that the state adopted each of the policies, a score is calculated for each state. The scores, which are intended to reflect the degree to which a state is innovative should provide a basis for predicting which states will adopt other new policies such as integrated administrative structures. Table 16 indicates that, as expected, Walker's innovation scores are positively correlated with the measure of integration. The correlation coefficient of .47 means that 22% of the variation may be attributed to the traditional status of the state as an innovator or perhaps as a laggard.

Table 16 also contains five correlation coefficients that further elaborate the role of tradition in determining

23 Everett M. Rogers and F. Floyd Shoemaker, Communication on Innovation, p. 185.

state policies. Walker's scores were all based on policy decisions made prior to 1965. In addition, he focused on specific policy areas. In an attempt to find some decisions which are closer to the integration decision both in time and in type, five specific policy decisions were considered. Several of these are included in Walker's original measure, but the procedural or general nature of these five factors suggested that these, in particular, would be highly related to the decisions concerning integration. Specifically, these

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 16: Integration$^a$ in relation to innovation$^b$ and speed of adoption of other programs.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innovation score$^b$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of Initiative/Referendum$^c$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of Collective Bargaining$^c$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of Direct Primary$^c$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of Home Rule$^c$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adoption of Retirement Plan for State Employees$^c$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^a$The measure of integration is from Table 11, Chapter 3.
$^b$The innovation score is from Jack Walker, "Innovation in State Politics," Politics in the American States, edited by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines.
$^c$A score for each state was calculated based on the percentage of time between the earliest and latest adoption of the specific program. More details are provided in the following text.
$^d$Statistically significant at the .05 level.
programs like reorganizational programs have been promoted by organizations like the National Municipal League, the National Conference for State Legislatures, and the Council of State Governments. Collective bargaining was included because it was not only a procedural decision but also was more recent than the items used by Walker.

Scores for each state were computed in each area using the technique employed by Walker. The years from first adoption to last adoption were calculated. The first state to adopt the program received a score of .000, while the remaining states received a score reflecting the proportion of the total time that elapsed before that state adopted the program. The last state to adopt and all states which never adopted the program received scores of 1.000. The resulting scores were subtracted from 1.000 so as to insure a positive relationship. Three of the five factors selected were significantly correlated with integration (The adoption of the initiative and referendum, .27; The adoption of home rule, .31; and the adoption of a retirement plan for state employees, .38) but in no instance was the individual indicator more powerful than Walker's overall score. The adoption dates for collective bargaining for state employees and the direct primary were not significantly correlated with integration.
Perhaps other policies exist that parallel the eagerness of a state to adopt integrated administrations, but the efforts reported here are not helpful. The data suggest that a general willingness to adopt new programs of any kind is more evident than a specific tendency to adopt procedural innovations.

Walker's examination of innovation in the states includes a discussion of the relationship between innovation and several social and economic variables. He examines seven variables and finds that all seven are correlated with innovativeness. The finding suggests that the relationship reported above may be nothing more than a reflection of social and economic differences among the states. In order to clarify this possibility, a partial correlation between innovation and integration was calculated holding the effects of the socio-economic variables constant. The results are reported in Table 17.

Despite the controls for socio-economic factors, the significant relationship between integration and innovation remains. This finding, which is somewhat surprising in view of Walker's earlier studies, indicates

\[25\] Walker, p. 360.
that some states have a tradition for innovation that independently influences how fully they adopt integration.

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**TABLE 17: Integration\(^a\) in relation to innovation\(^b\), controlling for socio-economic factors\(^c\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simple Correlation</th>
<th>(0.47)(^d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Controlling for</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of population urban</td>
<td>(0.36)(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of blacks in population</td>
<td>(0.44)(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of foreign stock in population</td>
<td>(0.35)(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Income</td>
<td>(0.27)(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median School Years Completed</td>
<td>(0.40)(^d)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)The measure of integration is from Table 11, Chapter 3.

\(^b\)The innovation score is from Jack Walker, "Innovation in State Politics". See note with Table 16.

\(^c\)The measures of social and economic development are from U.S. Census publications and are based on the 1970 census.

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**THE COMBINED IMPACT**

The effects of each of three sets of variables on the integration level in the states have been described above. Socio-economic, political, and traditional factors all three correlate with the integration score. Due to the interrelationships among the three sets of factors, the correlations are not cumulative. In order to discover exactly how much these three sets of factors collectively
explain, it is necessary to compute a multiple correlation. The multiple correlation between the integration score and all of the socio-economic, political, and traditional variables is .73. The combined influence of these factors accounts for 53% of the variation among states. Certainly, other idiosyncratic factors play a role in each state but the variables included in this study are quite useful in separating integrated from non-integrated states.

CONCLUSIONS

The data presented above shed considerable light on the issue of integration. First, the data show that the decision to integrate structures is generally subject to the same influences as other policy decisions. This consistency of influence is particularly interesting since the integration decision usually involves a much wider range of participants than the typical fragmented decision.

Socio-economic factors proved to be useful. Five of the seven factors examined had significant independent impact on the integration scores, and all five taken together explained over one-third of the variation among the states. The strength of these relationships is not surprising since past policy studies have also
found socio-economic variables to be extremely important.

Two political variables, inter-party competition and independent legislative strength, were also correlated with the integration scores. Despite strong conceptual arguments for the value of these variables as predictors of integration, the relationships disappeared when median income was held constant. The statistical conclusion is that income rather than political differences lead to differences in integration. A general unwillingness to accept this conclusion means that more and more creative work in the development of political variables that can really capture the essence of politics is needed.

The most exciting finding in the research involves the impact of traditional factors. Walker's innovation scores for each state were correlated with the integration scores and a positive and significant relationship was noted. This relationship persisted despite controls for socio-economic factors. It appears, therefore, that the traditional approach to new ideas has an independent impact on integration.

Finally, the multiple or combined influence of socio-economic, political, and traditional variables was assessed. Over half of the variation among the states
was explained by these variables taken together. While much of the variation remains unexplained, the value of the factors studied is considerable.
VARIATIONS AMONG FUNCTIONS

A state by state examination of organizational charts reveals a bewildering array of agencies. State leaders have not been inclined to follow a pre-established pattern for organization but have developed arrangements that are acceptable in their particular states. This need to make structural decisions politically acceptable leads to some interesting contrasts. Veterans Affairs are independently administered in Georgia despite an overall reorganization while the same function has been centralized in Connecticut. The fish and game function remains independent in Maine, a state that ranks relatively high on the centralization scale, but is consolidated into a Department of Conservation and Wildlife in one of the least centralized states, Alabama. The highway patrol function is separately administered under Connecticut's new reorganization, although 70% of the states centralize this function. In general, no pattern seems to exist. Independence or centralization of a particular function appears to be a random, unexplainable phenomenon.
Chapter three included a first attempt to impose some order on these apparently random independence and centralization decisions. A ranking of fifty-four state functions according to how often each was centralized was reported in chapter three and this data is stated again in Table 18. The goal of this chapter is to search for explanations and patterns that might separate the frequently centralized from the less frequently centralized functions.

The goal described is an important one. The table provides unique documentation of the extent to which states have allowed certain functions to maintain an independent position in the bureaucracy while consistently structuring other functions into larger bureaucratic units. Any formal interpretation of this new data can only add to the current knowledge in the area of organizational decisions. If the data should indicate that independence is typically associated with a specific characteristic, administrators may choose to place more emphasis on that characteristic in the future. Those in charge of restructuring governmental agencies may, in contrast, choose to be more conscious of the existence of the characteristic and evaluate its impact more carefully.

In view of the above claims for the significance of the endeavor, it is also important to add a word of
caution. The final or conclusive answers to the questions of why one agency usually remains independent while another seemingly similar agency is typically centralized will not be discovered in this analysis. This analysis will at the best lead to the development of some ideas that can be tested in later research efforts.

A concentration on exploration and hypothesis building rather than on hypothesis testing is necessary. The literature treats the subject sparsely and the measurement of the percentage of states that have centralized a specific function is descriptive of gross differences but is not adequate for detailed statistical analysis. Furthermore, the factors that will be examined as possible determinants of functional independence are difficult to measure precisely. The relationships considered in this chapter will, therefore, be supported by observations and conceptual considerations rather than by correlation coefficients and tests of significance.

1The scores reported in Table 18, it must be remembered, are based of addresses of administrative officials rather than on strict analysis of official organizational charts. In addition, not all functions were included in the study. Basically, functions were excluded from consideration for three reasons: (1) the function was an umbrella or overall function and was independent in virtually all of the states, (2) the function was frequently under the control of an elective official other than the governor, and (3) the function was found in a limited number of states.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Rehabilitation</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
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<td>Arts</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Employees Retirement</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corrections</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Utility Regulation</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Affairs</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Finance</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquor Control</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Veterans Affairs</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>Fish and Game</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historic Preservation</td>
<td>57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aging</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil and Water Conservation</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geology</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parole and Probation</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Highways</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mental Health</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police and Highway Patrol</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Resources Management</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Security</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Workmens Compensation</td>
<td>71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aeronautics</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parks</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children and Youth Services</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire Marshall</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinarian</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational Systems</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Education</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Retardation</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Abuse</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollution Control (Water)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pollution Control (Air)</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and Gas Regulation</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroads</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchasing</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
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<td>Medicaid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mass Transit</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid Waste Management</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Safety and Health</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Drug</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The reader has been advised as to both the significance of the questions asked and the limitations to the type of answers to be found. The chapter continues with a review or re-description of the variations reported in Table 18. This restatement of the data will be followed by a consideration of a number of factors that might explain these variations. Each of these several factors will be employed in turn to locate patterns in the reported scores.

**A DESCRIPTION OF VARIATIONS**

Table 18 lists fifty-four functions commonly performed by state governments. Each function has an associated score that reflects the frequency with which that function is administered by an independent agency. A detailed description of these scores is provided in chapter three, but basically the functions with the higher scores are centralized in the states while those with the lower scores remain independent.

Food and drug functions, for example, are always centralized. The mental retardation function is centralized in 84% of the states and vocational rehabilitation is centralized in only 22% of the states.

For the fifty-four functions reported, the scores range from .20 to 1.00 with an average score of .64. Eighteen functions (exactly one-third of those considered) have associated scores of .50 or less meaning that they
are independently administered in a majority of the states. The remaining two-thirds of the functions are located within a larger administrative unit in a majority of the cases.

The data reveal a great deal about administrative organization. They pinpoint those functions that are most frequently allowed to remain independent and they describe those functions that rarely, if ever, exist as independent units. Perhaps most interestingly, the data reveal a number of agencies (with middle range scores) that are left independent in some states and are centralized in many others. This inconsistent treatment of the same functions in different states raises the likelihood that different factors are influential in different states.

The data alone do not and cannot provide the "whys" of the rankings. The remainder of the chapter centers on a search for these "whys".

**SOME POSSIBLE EXPLANATORY FACTORS**

Although no well-defined hypotheses or detailed theories exist to explain the centralization or independence of specific functions, several observers of governmental decision-making have made observations that promise to be extremely helpful in analyzing the difference. A study by York Willbern is particularly
germane to the issue and provides the basis for much of the following analysis.\textsuperscript{2} His piece for the American Assembly includes a discussion of pressures for separatism.\textsuperscript{3} Some of the pressures that he refers to are general in nature but others help to discriminate among functions. Downs' \textit{Inside Bureaucracy} is not so directly related to the question of location of agencies and is not specifically directed to the state level of government, but it provides a number of propositions that are supportive of Willbern's compilation of factors.\textsuperscript{4}

A third work, \textit{Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy}, by Rourke, provides additional theoretical reasons for examining the impact of several variables.\textsuperscript{5} Rourke's work again is general in nature and his remarks relate to the determinants of an agency's strength or its ability to accomplish its goals. These determinants would also bear on the question of structural decisions since one,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2}York Willbern, "Administration in State Governments," \textit{The Forty-Eight States: Their Tasks as Policy Makers and Administrators}, The American Assembly.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Willbern, pp. 115-119.
\item \textsuperscript{4}Anthony Downs, \textit{Inside Bureaucracy}.
\item \textsuperscript{5}Francis E. Rourke, \textit{Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy}.
\end{itemize}
if not the major, goal of any agency is to survive. 6 The fourth, and final, work that has supported the analysis that follows is Seidman's *Politics, Position, and Power.* 7 Seidman focuses on the national government but his general insistence that power and politics rather than efficiency or logic dictate organizational arrangements underlies the search for variables. Seidman would not be surprised to find any function left independent despite a logical position for it within a larger structure. He would simply begin to look for the obvious explanation: a political or power motive.

The Natural Desire for Independence

Before turning to a search for the political or power motives behind the variations in the data presented here, one more point should be made. That point concerns the desire of every agency to remain independent. Willbern comments on this desire and sees it as normal. 8 Downs observes that "All officials exhibit relatively strong loyalty to the organizations controlling their job security and promotion." 9 These officials typically

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6 Downs, p. 262.
7 Harold Seidman, *Politics, Position, and Power.*
8 Willbern, p. 115.
9 Downs, p. 262.
give expression to their loyalty by resisting any attempts to decrease the structural importance of that agency. Those who have witnessed or followed accounts of attempts to restructure any state government can testify to the eagerness of each agency to maintain its autonomy. "... struggles to avoid reduction of status and power" are very common.

The question to be resolved is not so much "Why do agencies resist?" as "Why do some agencies succeed in their resistance while others fail?" Resistance to centralization is normal. Successful resistance, while not rare, is limited. This variable attainment of success is the focus of concern.

There are a number of reasons why functions may be left independent in some states. Six of the most frequently cited reasons are discussed below and used to interpret the data in Table 18. These factors are

1. Size of the function—Some functions are left independent because they are seemingly too large to combine with other functions. Education is an example.

2. Uniqueness of the function—In certain cases a function may be left independent because it does not logically fit with anything else. State libraries might be an example.

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10 Council of State Governments, Human Services Integration: State Functions In Implementation, p. 13.
3. Historical or traditional independence of the function-The simple fact that an agency has existed independently in the past may make it more likely that it will remain independent.

4. Type of function-Functions that are particularly sensitive, have been added to the state agenda for symbolic purposes, or are regulatory in nature are expected to be independent in most instances.

5. Interest Group support for the function-Agencies that have the support of strong interest groups will be likely to maintain their independence.

6. Federal regulations-Any function that is controlled by federal regulations that suggest independence will be independent.

In order to simplify the analysis somewhat, primary attention will be directed to those eighteen functions that have succeeded in remaining independent in at least 50% of the states. Each of the factors will be used to explain the presence of functions in this category. If any relationships do seem to exist, it will then be necessary to review the entire table for exceptions to the rule.

Size of the function

One obvious reason for leaving a function independent in an administrative structure is size. While vast functions like health, education, and welfare could conceivably be grouped together into little HEWs, the size in terms of dollars spent, programs administered, and personnel involved makes such groupings highly unlikely. Educational programs, for example, accounted for 38.8%
of state expenditures in 1975-76.\textsuperscript{11} The sheer magnitude of educational programs provides a good reason for the independence of this function in all fifty states.

Since many of the larger state functions are excluded from the earlier analysis and from Table 18, a complete evaluation of the effect of this factor is not possible. Size may be at least partially responsible for the independence of the health, higher education, and corrections functions.

Size obviously does not provide a complete explanation for independence, however, since arts and ethics (relatively small state functions) are among the most frequently independent.

Size of a particular function may also vary considerably from state to state. In one state a function may be small and easily centralized while in another state the same function is so large as to suggest an independent agency. Regulation of mining and tourism, for example, are large state functions in some states and are almost non-existent in other states. Size may, therefore, account for some of the functions that have middle range scores.

\textsuperscript{11}Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, \textit{Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism}, p. 13.
Uniqueness of the function

The second argument that may explain the relative location of the functions listed in Table 18 is uniqueness of function. Some functions may be centralized because they logically fall into a category with similar functions. Other functions may be left independent primarily because there is no logical place to put them. Some states have created a "miscellaneous" category to deal with these agencies. Idaho, for example, has a "Department of Self-Governing Agencies" with no central governing administration. In actuality, the agencies within this department are independent. Most states have not chosen to create such miscellaneous categories and have ultimately been left with agencies that do not really fit into any category. State libraries, for example, are usually independent. When they are centralized they fall into such diverse categories as Departments of Education, Departments of Higher Education, Departments of Culture, Recreation, and Tourism, Departments of Law, and Departments of State. This wide-ranging variety of locations suggests that no widely accepted correct location exists. The lack of a logical place in the larger structure may be at least partially responsible for the independent status of most state libraries. The state library function was left independent under Connecticut's new reorganizational
plan. The commission recommending the independence also noted that the state library served all departments and could not reasonably be placed in any one. 12

At the other extreme of the table, the food and drug function fits so obviously into the health function that it is difficult not to include it there. Occupational safety and health also logically fits with a larger labor function of state government.

Despite the aforementioned examples, some functions remain independent even though they fit logically into another agency. Higher education fits perfectly into an overall education function, but it is independent in 80% of the states. Other factors such as size and traditional independence are needed to explain this exception. Similarly, energy fits logically into a resources agency but few states have chosen to put it there. The remainder have elected to leave the administration of the energy function to an independent agency. Additional factors such as symbolic independence may account for the location of this function. In general, uniqueness of function seems to explain the independence of some functions, but falls far short of providing an all-inclusive explanation for those agencies that remain independent.

Historical or traditional independence of the function

The fact that an independent agency for the administration of a certain function has existed in the past is one powerful reason for its continued existence. Willbern's observations of state reorganizational movements lead him to this conclusion.\(^{13}\) He finds it to be especially true if the agency has had an elective head in the past. Once the public becomes accustomed to controlling an agency by electing its leadership, they may not easily give up that control.

Downs also focuses on the theme of tradition and history. He feels, however, that an older agency is "less likely to die" because of the internal characteristics of older bureaucratic structures.\(^{14}\) Whether the impetus for independence comes from the people who have come to expect a separate agency or from within the agency itself, there is reason to believe that older, traditionally independent agencies have a head start in the contest to maintain an independent status.

Higher education provides the best example of a function that has traditionally been independent and has often had an elective official at its head. True to

\(^{13}\)Willbern, p. 115.

\(^{14}\)Downs, p. 264
expectations, higher education is independently administered in 80% of the states although it might have logically been placed in an overall education department.

Agriculture, which is not included in Table 18, provides further confirmation of the impact of tradition. Despite the lessening relative importance of agriculture and its logical fit in a resources department, this function remains independent in 90% of the states. In Connecticut, the reorganizational plan presented to the legislature called for the centralization of the agricultural function, but the legislature bowed to demands and restored it as an independent department.

If traditionally independent agencies are particularly adept at remaining independent, it might be the case that newer agencies would be generally unsuccessful in their attempts to achieve an independent status within the bureaucracy. Fourteen of the functions listed in Table 18 are functions that were not included in the Council of State Governments publication 15 until some point in the 1970's presumably because the function only then became a common concern of state governments. These fourteen functions, which are listed in Table 19, are spread across the range of scores. Two of these new programs,

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15 Council of State Governments. State Administrative Officials: Classified by Functions. Functions listed in the 1977 edition were traced to earliest edition that included them.
occupational safety and health and solid waste are centralized in 98% of the states. Three other new functions, arts, ethics, and vocational rehabilitation, are, in contrast, quite likely to be administered by independent agencies.

Other factors are obviously needed to explain this wide range of scores. Perhaps many of these new functions have been adopted by the states after their reorganizations. New agencies that obviously fit into existing structures were placed there, but more difficult to place functions were allowed to remain independent until the next major overhaul of the system. Other functions may serve a symbolic function (to be discussed in more detail below) for a few years before being absorbed into a new department.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Rehabilitation</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Employees Retirement</td>
<td>.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Affairs</td>
<td>.39</td>
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<td>Energy</td>
<td>.42</td>
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<td>Historic Preservation</td>
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<td>Children and Youth Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Veterinarian</td>
<td>.80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vocational Education</td>
<td>.84</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medicaid</td>
<td>.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Transit</td>
<td>.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solid Waste Management</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Safety and Health</td>
<td>.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In summary, tradition and age are valuable factors in explaining the location of certain functions, but they also fail to provide a one-dimensional explanation of all the variation among functions.

Type of function: Sensitive, symbolic, and regulatory

A fourth set of considerations that may explain some of the remaining variation is type of functions. Several arguments are found in the literature. Most consistently stated is the argument that "some things are just too political to be given to the politicians." These areas that are sensitive and generally considered to be above politics include "civil-rights agencies, liquor control, and education." Because of the sensitive and occasionally moral tenor of these functional areas, they are often left independent. This structural independence hopefully insulates the agencies from the suspected compromise and bargaining of politics.

A look at Table 18 provides some tentative confirmation for this expectation. All of the areas suggested by Adrian are, indeed, usually left independent. The most frequently centralized of these functions is liquor control but it is still independently administered

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16 Willbern, pp. 117-118.

17 Charles R. Adrian, *State and Local Governments*, p. 263.
in a majority of the states. Human rights, another function mentioned by Adrian, is independent in 66% of the states. Education, as noted earlier, is always independent. The functions listed in the tables include a few others that intuitively fall into this same "non-political" or sensitive category. One of the rather obvious additions is the ethics function. Ethics is a very moral and sensitive issue similar to human rights. It is not surprising, therefore, to discover that the ethics function is administered independently in 72% of the states that report such a function. It might also be argued that arts and state employees retirement systems, both of which are generally independent, have similar characteristics.

The lotteries function provides a final example of the trend to keep sensitive issues away from centralized political control. Lotteries are not included in the original tabulations because so few states had them, but the data do show that only four of the thirteen states reporting that function had centralized structures for the administration of lotteries. The 32% is consistent with the scores for the other sensitive areas.

Seidman's study of the federal bureaucracy leads him to suspect that some agencies or functions may be left independent for symbolic reasons. His observations are likely to be relevant to states as well as federal
experience. According to Seidman,

"For many organization is a symbol. Federal councils on aging, mental retardation, physical fitness, consumers, and the arts, for example, are more important as evidence of national concern than as molders of federal policies." 18

The functions listed in Table 18 include several that seem to meet Seidman's general criteria. Ethics, for example, may be independently administered at least partially because of a symbolic need for it to be autonomous. This function, which is centralized in only 28% of the states, may seem to be receiving more attention than it actually is because of the existence of separate commissions. Arts (30%), human rights (34%), and energy (42%) may also be symbolic rather than policy oriented agencies. The symbolic value would be considerably diminished by reducing them to a segment of a larger agency.

Once again, exceptions exist. The aging function is centralized more often than not despite Seidman's feeling that it is a symbolic function. Mental retardation is also generally centralized in contradiction to the proposed theory. Perhaps these functions had symbolic value in the past but have now lost that characteristic.

Willbern discusses another type of function that he feels is likely to be left independent. That type of

18 Seidman, p. 27.
function is regulatory. The argument is much the same as that stated for sensitive functions. The decisions to be made by regulatory agencies should be based on what is fair and right rather than on political factors. This non-political reasoning that characterizes the public attitude towards regulatory agencies may well be reflected in the structural location of these agencies. Furthermore, regulatory agencies were originally conceived as arms of the legislative branch rather than as parts of the administrative branch. The continued independence from gubernatorial control might reflect this historical difference.

In addition, agencies with a regulatory function will usually have strong interest group support that may provide an additional impetus for independence. More about the impact of groups is included later.

Fourteen functions have been selected from Table 18 and reported in Table 20. These fourteen functions are all regulatory in nature according to a breakdown by Anderson, Penniman, and Weidner.19 The table indicates that most of the regulatory functions have high centralization scores despite the expectation that they will be independent. Only five of the regulatory functions

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(liquor control, banking, housing finance, insurance, and public utilities) are independent more than 50% of the time. It appears, therefore, that regulatory agencies are not so effective in their battles against centralization efforts as had been expected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 20: Regulatory Functions of State Government</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Utilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing Finance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
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<td>Liquor Control</td>
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<td>Police and Highway Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Workmen's Compensation</td>
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<td>Aeronautics</td>
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<td>Fire Marshall</td>
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<td>Securities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Railroads</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupational Safety and Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food and Drug</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Three specific policy types: sensitive, symbolic, and regulatory have been considered. In each case, the type of policy helped to explain the location of some functions but failed to explain the location of others.

Interest group support for the function

A fifth set of factors that are often isolated as influential in reorganizational decisions are those surrounding interest groups. It is, in the majority of cases, to the advantage of an interest group to have an independent bureaucratic counterpart. Prune growers can
more easily dominate or influence the decisions of a prune commission than those of a general agricultural department. Senior citizen groups may be presumed to have a greater influence within an aging commission than within a department of human resources. Since groups can "more easily dominate policy"\textsuperscript{20} in a specialized independent agency, it seems likely that groups will use their resources to keep agencies independent.

All agencies, however, do not have constituent groups that can strongly defend the agency's independence. Groups that are "large, well-distributed geographically and societally" and which have "devoted supporters who derive tangible benefits from the services of the agency"\textsuperscript{21} are the most effective in helping the agency to attain its (and the group's) goals. Willbern feels that professionalism within the agency and its supporting groups also underlies some successful attempts at independence.\textsuperscript{22} In addition to education which obviously has professional group support, Willbern suggests librarians as a further example. The groups in this

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20}Adrain, p. 262.
  \item \textsuperscript{21}Rourke, p. 69.
  \item \textsuperscript{22}Willbern, p. 115.
\end{itemize}
case have members who "have a strong group consciousness which leads them to insist on being distinct from the common herd."  

Evaluating the impact of interest groups on independence is difficult. No readily available measure of interest group strength is available even on the national level and it is certain that even then there would be tremendous variations among the states. It is only possible to examine the data for obvious confirmations and exceptions to the expectations outlined above. Higher education (20%) is usually independent and so are state libraries (47%). The veterans affairs function which is independent in about half of the states seems to be a perfect example of the type of agency that Rourke suspected would be able to remain independent. The constituents or supporters of veteran's agencies probably are "large, well-distributed geographically and societally" with "tangible benefits" to supporters. 24 The result is an agency that has maintained its independence in at least half of the states.

There are included in the table, however, other agencies that might be expected to be independent because of the influence of interest groups but which are usually centralized. Police and Highway Patrol, for example, would

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24 Rourke, p. 69.
not only have a professional attitude but also seem to have a fairly large constituency. Police and highway patrol are centralized 69% of the time. Vocational education might also be expected to be independent according to the discussion above, but seldom is. Perhaps the fact that it fits so logically into an education department helps to explain the fact that it is usually centralized.

The results of the analysis are again non-conclusive. While it does seem possible that interest group strength influences decisions, measures of this strength must be developed before any actual testing can be done. Furthermore, the impact of interest group strength must be evaluated along with other factors that might be influential.

**Federal regulations**

Willbern discusses the possibility that the strings attached to federal grants to the states may also lead to some functions being left independent that would otherwise be unified. In some cases federal strings have supported moves toward integration. For example Title IV-A of the Social Security Act encourages integration by requiring that funds for day care and family planning be administered

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\(^{25}\)Willbern, p. 118.
through a public assistance agency. On the other hand, the congressional stipulation that a single organizational unit exist for vocational rehabilitation has resulted in a low centralization score for that function (22%). Some states have integrated or centralized vocational rehabilitation despite the stipulation, and the question of their funding remains unresolved. More detailed examination of grants-in-aid might reveal additional examples.

NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Six sets of variables; size, uniqueness of function, historical or traditional independence, type of function, interest group support, and federal regulations have been evaluated in the preceding pages. Examples of the strength of each of these types of variables were in evidence, but numerous exceptions also existed. It is clear that no one single factor determines whether an agency will remain independent or be centralized. Further research is needed to (1) develop more accurate measurements for the variables outlined here, (2) isolate and measure other variables that also influence

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26 Council of State Governments, Human Services Integration: State Functions In Implementation, p. 15.
the organizational decisions of a state (such as the
effect of a large number of patronage jobs within an
agency), and (3) determine ways to measure the joint or
combined impact of these several factors.

One of the most promising directions for continued
exploration of the variations seems to be interest group
strength. This factor may, in fact, underlie several of the
other factors. For example, traditionally independent
agencies may be left independent not so much out of
respect for tradition as because of the interest group
support that is liable to grow up over time around any
independent administrative unit. Similarly, regulatory
agencies may be left independent because they are captured
by groups outside of the government that prefer an in­
dependent agency rather than because their subject matter
is particularly non-political. Symbolic programs have
probably been added as a means of satisfying or neutralizing
the demands of concerned groups. Even in the case of
federal requirements, group pressures may still be part
of the explanation although the group pressure is at the
national rather than the state level.

While group strength alone cannot account for all
the differences among functions that are noted in Table
18, it is likely that a comprehensive measure of group
strength and lobbying effort could provide explanations
for many independent agencies. If a function has strong
interest group support in all or most of the states, that function will generally be independent. If a function has strong interest group support in some states and weak interest group support in others (Mining in Kentucky and mining in Connecticut or fish and game in New Jersey and fish and game in Maine are intuitive examples.), that function will be handled differently in the different states. Finally, if a function has little or no interest group strength in most states, it will generally be relegated to a position within an overall agency.

The prescribed next step is, therefore, to consider interest group strength in more depth. Detailed case studies and creative measurements of interest group strength will be needed if the suspected relationship is to be confirmed.
CONCLUSIONS AND NEW CHALLENGES

One observer of a state level reorganization move likened the action to that of "rebuilding an automobile while it is being driven on the highway." Describing state administrative structures is similarly challenging. While the data are being collected, assembled, and presented, the states are continuing down the road. The picture presented here is in a sense a two-dimensional, stop-action shot of state administrative structures that are in reality multi-dimensional and constantly shifting. Despite these limitations, the research provides a major first step towards understanding and explaining the variety of structural arrangements found among the states and among selected state functions. A brief consideration of these contributions and their importance to the growing body of political science is combined in this last chapter with a review of the specific findings of the research and an assessment of future research needs and possibilities.

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1 Council of State Governments, Human Services Integration: State Functions In Implementation, p. 65.
CONTRIBUTIONS

The picture of administrative structures outlined in the preceding pages has been particularly helpful in (1) developing a technique for contrasting the administrative structures of the states and of functions, (2) documenting the 1977 location of each state and each function, and (3) isolating some sets of variables that may help to explain the differences among the states and functions.

Considerable attention has been devoted to structural arrangements of the states in the past, but this research provides the first attempt to comprehensively examine and categorize each state. Two components of integration were isolated and measures for each were developed. The first component, gubernatorial power, was measured using the technique established by Schlesinger in 1965 and updated in 1970.² 1976-77 data were used in place of and in contrast to the 1967-68 data and, in addition, a fifth and new criterion of gubernatorial power (reorganizational authority) was entered into the formula. The resulting gubernatorial power scores generally placed states in relatively the same position as Schlesinger's scores, but a considerable increase in gubernatorial tenure,

appointive power, veto power, and budget-making authority was evident. The indicators of gubernatorial power that discriminated so well among the states in the 1960's are becoming less useful. New indicators that more accurately reflect the differences in the governors must be developed. One such indicator, reorganizational power, was incorporated into the index used here. The research emphasized the need for additional attention in this area.

The second component of integration was centralization of functions. A new and easily duplicated measure of centralization was used. A Council of State Governments bi-annual publication lists formal addresses for persons in charge of administering approximately one-hundred functions. These addresses were used to determine if each of a series of fifty-four functions was independent or centralized in each state. Totals by state and by function were calculated making it possible to talk about relative differences among states and functions for the first time. The procedure used has some limitations that are outlined earlier in the paper, but it escapes many of the problems associated with reliance on questionnaires or journalistic accounts. Most importantly, it

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is a simple and easily duplicated measure thereby making it easy to keep current and useful for studying changes over time.

A second contribution of the research is the documentation of the 1977 location of each state and of each function using the technique described above. The technique revealed considerable variations among the states. California, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Missouri ranked highest on the integration index and South Carolina, Texas, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Indiana ranked lowest. Functional variations were also documented. For example, in 1977 food and drug functions were centralized in all the states, tourism was centralized 79% of the time, fish and game was centralized 50% of the time, and vocational rehabilitation was centralized only 22% of the time.

The documentation of these variations in 1977 is unique. For the first time, it is possible to go beyond speculation in discussions of administrative arrangements. Contrasts can be made between states or groups of states, between functions, or between 1977 and future time periods. Conceptual relationships that are developed from case studies or preliminary analysis like that found in this paper can be empirically verified or rejected thus adding to the overall conceptual understanding of administrative structures and their significance.
The research makes its third major contribution by examining some of these factors that conceptually influence governmental decisions. The relationships are documented by statistical tests when possible. For the most part, variations among states seem to be most thoroughly influenced by the same socio-economic factors that have been found to explain differences in welfare and educational expenditures. In this case, however, an independent, traditional influence was isolated. States that are the most innovative in general are the most likely to have integrated administrative arrangements. While it is much too early for anything more than speculation, it is possible to posit a causal or influential relationship here. The relationship stressed prior to the tests was that states that adopt new programs early will be most likely to adopt integrated administrative arrangements early too. A contrasting relationship might also bear investigation at a later date. Perhaps states with integrated arrangements are better equipped to experiment with innovative ideas and to get them implemented early.

The three major contributions of the research are outlined above. The statement of these contributions hints at the overall findings of the research. These findings are stated in more detail below.
FINDINGS

Three sets of factors: socio-economic, political, and traditional, were chosen as the most likely to be related to the integration scores. Testing, using correlation techniques, revealed that all three sets of factors were significantly related to a state's position on the integration scale. Seven socio-economic factors were chosen for the analysis, and four of these turned out to be helpful in explaining differences. The percentage of population living in urban areas, the percentage of foreign stock in the population, median income in the state, and median school years each accounted for a significant amount of the variation in scores. States with high percentages of their populations residing in urban areas, relatively large percentages of foreign stock, and high income and educational levels were most likely to have integrated administrative arrangements. Median income alone explained 23% of the variation and all the socio-economic factors taken together explained 36% of the variation.

Two political factors were also tested to determine their relationship to the integration scores. These two factors, inter-party competition and independent legislative strength, were both significantly related to the integration score. As expected, states with competitive parties were most likely to be highly
integrated. States with independent legislative strength were significantly less likely to have integrated arrangements despite the expectation that they would be more integrated.

Since earlier studies have often reported that the effects of political variables are spurious and only reflect socio-economic differences, both of these relationships were recalculated with socio-economic effects held constant. The significant relationships remained despite controls for extent of urbanization, percentage of blacks, percentage of foreign stock, and median school years completed, but in the case of both inter-party competition and independent legislative strength, the effects of income differences erased the influence of the political variables. As other policy studies have shown so often, income appears to be more valuable as a predictor of administrative arrangements than do political variables.

A final set of factors was also tested against the integration scores and was found to have a surprisingly strong impact. These factors were selected to show traditional influence. A measure of the extent to which a state has been innovative in the past was found to be highly correlated (.47) with the integration scores. In addition, the relative speed with which the states had adopted three other policies (initiative and referendum,
home rule, and a retirement plan for state employees) was also significantly related. Speed of adoption of two other policies was not related.

The relationship between integration and innovation was subjected to partial correlation in order to establish that the relationship was not merely the result of interrelationships with socio-economic variables. The partial correlations verified the independent influence of innovativeness. Some states are early to adopt new programs. Those same states have been the most likely to integrate their administrative structures. This finding is probably the most exciting in the research since it demonstrates an impact unrelated to socio-economic conditions. There are some states that are more likely than others to have integrated administrative structures because they traditionally adopt new procedures and policies. This finding emphasizes the need for continuing examination and exploration of administrative integration.

In relation to variations among specific functions, six factors seemed most likely to explain the variations. These factors were size of the functions, uniqueness of the function, traditional independence of the function, type of function, interest group support for the function, and federal regulations. The paucity of reliable measures for these conceptually significant variables precluded serious testing, and forced reliance on observation of
discrete cases. These observations led to the conclusion that each of the six characteristics was helpful in explaining the location of some of the functions in the most often independent category. Numerous and significant exceptions existed, however, in each case. In short, the explanatory effort did not locate characteristics that can explain the many variations among functions. It does seem that additional attention to the measurement of interest group strength may eventually lead to a more comprehensive explanation.

FURTHER RESEARCH

Immersion in any topic, but particularly one so unexplored as state administrative arrangements, usually raises as many or more questions as it answers. The research cited here is no exception. While considerable amounts of data were collected and analyzed and numerous conceptually strong relationships were examined, there is still much to be done.

The "so-what?" question

Most pressing, perhaps, is the "so-what?" question. Unless administrative arrangements somehow influence the policy outcomes of the states, attention might best be directed elsewhere. Hopefully, one of the first uses of the data reported here will be in an endeavor to
respond to this challenge. The endeavor will not be simple. Some preliminary analysis might be done to determine if integration is related to the traditional measures of policy outcome (expenditures). The real need, however, is to relate integration to measures of efficiency, coordination, and responsiveness. The conceptual argument for integration is not that the state will be more liberal in its expenditures, but argues more nearly that the state will be efficient in its achievements of liberal or conservative goals, will be more coordinated in attaining its goals whether they involve more or less services, and will be more responsive to the will of the electorate regardless of the political leanings of that electorate.

In order to prove the effectiveness or the value of having integrated structures, some indicators of goals and goal achievement must be developed. In addition, some measures of the responsiveness of each state government are needed. Perhaps measures of citizen faith in government or participation levels could be employed as indicators of responsiveness. In a highly integrated state, fewer examples of conflicting policy goals and action should be visible.

The documentation of the effects of integration must be the subject of later research, but intuitive arguments for the importance of the choice can provide a temporary rationale for studies of integration.
Basically, integration involves simplifying and centralizing structures and giving the governor the authority to control these structures. Power is transferred from numerous, independent, detached board or commission members to a single elected government official. This transfer of power logically suggests decisions that are more coordinated (only one manager) and more responsive (the manager is selected by and subject to dismissal by the electorate). The change in the direction of coordination and responsiveness does assume a sensitive and capable governor for, as the committee that drew up Connecticut's reorganization plan expressed in its report,

"...people not structural charts, run government. Bad structures can make people less effective; bad procedures can make people less effective, but good structures and procedures cannot make good managers out of bad ones."

In states where adequate tools for the management or administration of state policies are available, a potential for coordinated, responsive, and efficient management exists. It is assumed that these tools are used when they do exist. Little evidence exists beyond the fact that no state has backed up on its journey towards integration.

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Strengthening the measurement of integration

Once the "so-what?" question is resolved, attention can be directed to the improvement or strengthening of the measurement of integration. The technique used in this research suggests a method of discriminating between integrated and fragmented administrative systems. While that technique provides satisfactory and useful data, it only isolates the gross or surface differences among states and functions. Hopefully, additional work will focus on the impact of actual lines of communication as well as on formal organizational lines. In some states there has been an admitted attempt to centralize some functions without really changing power relationships. California and Massachusetts, for example, have combined most human resources programs into an overall agency, but "the head . . . has little formal authority over operations within the agency; the program units retain the title of "department" and are headed usually by appointees of the governor." These variations that are not indicated by organizational charts or by the technique used in this paper must be considered in future research.

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5Council of State Governments, Human Services Integration, p. 31.
There are other variations among states and functions that rank the same on the present integration index. Additional attention could profitably be given to the use of management tools like zero-based budgeting and management by objectives. The size and use of gubernatorial staff could also indicate some important inter-state and intra-state differences. The degree to which a governor emphasizes administrative as opposed to policy making roles is also a potentially useful criterion. Ransone's discussion of this kind of variation provides a good starting place.\(^6\)

In general, the measure of integration used here is a measure of gross differences. While it serves adequately as a tool to categorize the states and functions, some more detailed information is necessary for a comprehensive understanding. A series of case studies that have a common and conceptually strong intent may provide the best vehicle for isolating deeper, less obvious differences.

**Strengthening the measure of independent variables**

The third, and final, suggestion for further research concerns the development of measurements for the independent variables. The need is not unique and has been

stressed by virtually everyone who has attempted to explain policy by correlating it with assorted indicators of state characteristics. The "yardsticks" that are used to measure any social, economic, or political variable are generally imprecise. When these yardsticks verify conceptually strong relationships, there is a tendency to ignore this imprecision. When, however, the yardsticks fail to confirm relationships that are conceptually strong, a search for better yardsticks begins anew.

The failure to establish and confirm that political variables are important is a case in point. The selected political variables (legislative strength and inter-party competition) were not significantly correlated with the integration scores once the effect of income was removed. The choices are to rule out political variables as important factors or to begin the search for better measurement techniques. The first option is unacceptable.

One yardstick that should be developed relates to interest group strength. Zeigler ranks states according to interest group strength but his is an indirect measure. A measure based on observation and some concrete measurement

of activity would be most helpful in explaining differences among states and among functions. An indicator of party strength as opposed to party competition would also clarify some relationships. A measure of party strength might be composed of evaluations of factors like patronage and nominating procedures.

Legislative strength might be more realistically captured by another measure. The measure used here has been criticized for its arbitrariness. A measure that more adequately depicts legislative strength might be developed.

In addition to developing and refining the traditional measures of political differences, further research might consider some more unique aspects of political variations. Case studies or intensive interviews with those involved on a day to day basis in state government could lead to the location of such factors. Perhaps the techniques used by a state may account for variations in success. For instance, what role do study commissions play and are they essential? Do Constitutional amendments limiting the number of state agencies really make a difference? What is the effect, if any, of the new sunset laws on administrative arrangements?

The development of more precise measures of political variables, the strengthening of the measures of integration, and the resolution of the significance of integration in
relation to policy outputs are next on the research agenda. All three items will demand creativity and detailed awareness of political systems, but will ultimately contribute to a growing awareness of how political systems actually work.
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