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DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES AND THEMES IN THE DISCIPLINE

SETTING--SUGGESTIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

(A Study of the Moral Development of College Students in Disciplinary Trouble)

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Alexander Forward Smith, B.A., M.S.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1978

Reading Committee:

Dr. Philip A. Tripp
Dr. Robert R. Bargar
Dr. Donald P. Sanders

Approved By

[Signature]

Adviser
College of Education
Dedication

This study is dedicated to those whose personal lives were directly affected by this study. First, those young adults who willingly consented to participate in this study. By sharing their moral judgments, they have provided for a developmental understanding of their own life situation and for an improved basis for professional practice.

And, second, to my family—my wife Sharon, my daughter Sandy, and my son Scott—for their understanding, support, and personal sacrifice as they persevered with the loss of the full-time companionship of husband and father while this study was in process.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Sincere appreciation and gratitude is expressed to the many individuals who have contributed in so many different ways to the development and completion of this study. Particular appreciation is extended to members of the reading committee for their encouragement, suggestions, and time. Members of this committee included: Dr. Philip Tripp, doctoral adviser, who first encouraged me to consider college student discipline as the setting for this study and who has long expressed the view that student personnel workers are moral educators without portfolio; Dr. Donald Sanders, whose helpful insights enabled me to focus on the important and basic research questions and who supported and reinforced the need for a person-centered study; and Dr. Robert Bargar, whose concern for the creative process and his understanding of both empirical and qualitative research methods provided helpful guidance throughout this study.

Throughout my graduate program and during the formative stages of this research, there were two individuals who served as Mentors. I want to expressly thank Bob Rodgers, a true friend and colleague who has inspired me by his standards of excellence and by his
commitment to student development principles and practice, and Dr. Ross Mooney whose penetrating understanding of the human condition and his concern that the educational process, including research, be life-giving not life-taking, has sustained me throughout my graduate program.

I also want to thank my former secretary, Joyce Towns, who helped transcribe some of the taped interviews; my wife, Sharon, who transcribed some of the copies of this manuscript; and Mary Bartels who patiently typed and helped organize both the final draft and completed manuscript copies. And, finally, I want to acknowledge the support, understanding, and encouragement of my parents throughout my formal education.
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CHAPTER I

PERSONAL INTRODUCTION

Origins of the Study--A Culmination of Several Influences

Selecting this approach and this subject matter as the dissertation study was the result of a culmination of several influential factors. One of the first arose from my responsibilities as administrator of The Ohio State University's Code of Student Rights and Responsibilities.

Almost from the day that I assumed this position, with responsibility for college student discipline, I have had to answer the same question that I sometimes ask myself: "Why would anyone want to take on responsibility for the discipline of college students?" Four years ago when I began, there was no time to reflect in any depth on that question. It was a new position with a new responsibility. The University just experienced a year (1970) of tremendous strife and turmoil--out of which grew a Code of Student Rights and Responsibilities, which I was to administer. Those were busy days, filled with many administrative burdens and decisions. It was only
later that I came to face the more pressing and important questions.

Eight to 10 times a week, and sometimes more often, I either talked directly with, or was consulted on, students whose behavior had raised questions and concerns about their level of maturity. Even when such frequent offenses as academic misconduct or theft seemed on the surface to have very similar characteristics, each case was different. The cases were different because the people involved were different—different in the way they handled and personally processed their particular set of circumstances.

Intuitively, at first, I could note apparently subtle qualitative differences in students' responses to similar questions that I asked during the discipline interview process. For example, one noticeable aspect was the different ways in which students attempted to explain to themselves and to others why they had done what they had done and what they considered wrong, if anything, with what they did.

I also began to think about the discipline process as a possible source of learning for the students. Could the "discipline encounter," I wondered, have sufficient impact to stimulate the students in the direction of more self-discipline and more mature ways of behaving? At first, I was unable to explain satisfactorily to
myself why differences in response patterns existed among the students whom I interviewed. Pushing for answers, I began to search through the literature and explore possible theoretical conceptions that would provide a framework for understanding and for practice. This pursuit led to a body of literature which focused on moral development, specifically the research and writings of Lawrence Kohlberg (1969 and 1972), which will be discussed in more detail in later sections.

Another influential factor occurred at the professional level among student personnel practitioners. Searching for some unifying force and statement on which to build the practice of student personnel work, several major position papers and conferences were built around the theme of "student development." Briefly, these statements centered on the assumption that a primary goal of higher education was the total development of students. Without elaborating on all the nuances implied in the reiteration of this position, which also can be generally associated with the definition of the "liberally educated person," student personnel workers were encouraged through their relationships with students, in their practices and through organizational structure, to facilitate human development. This point of view was reinforced at professional meetings, in the
literature, and in the classroom. This view obviously had a personal impact on me; I adopted personally and professionally this perspective and attempted to apply this concept in the discipline setting.

In my graduate work and beginning professional years of full-time employment, I had begun to appreciate the fact that student personnel work could, in fact, be a medium through which and by which professional practitioners could contribute directly to student learning and student development. The espoused "professional rationale" behind continued involvement with student discipline often hinged on the fact that discipline could be a learning experience for students. I subscribed to that position too--perhaps as the only sane way of dealing with my day-to-day responsibilities. But, I think I was moved more by strong intuitive feelings and notions, as I watched young adults struggle with the predicaments that confronted them in their college lives, that many of them were at a point in their lives where they could make significant inroads to self-understanding and self-discipline.

A third and pervasive influence that occurred both at a broad societal level and in educational institutions was an arousal of sensitivity in many people to ethical and moral issues that seemed evident at every level--from the "Mi Lais'" and "Watergate's,"
to abuses of power in government, to welfare fraud, to a rash of cheating scandals at the service academies, and even locally to the establishment of store-front term paper companies for the handy use of our students. One episode after another seemed to fill the front pages of the papers. One obvious reaction was to ask what educational institutions were doing about the "moral education" of their students. Attention to this problem was quickly generated in both political and academic circles. Not since the days of John Dewey had the role of the school in the moral development of students received such attention. My conscience was pricked, too. I asked myself why moral education could not be an aim of education, as Kohlberg (1972) had suggested in an article which appeared in the Harvard Educational Review, and, particularly, why it could not be the aim of campus discipline.

All of these influences culminated to reinforce my interest in conducting a dissertation study that was developmental, had as a focus moral development, and that would be relevant to the discipline setting. A student development perspective presented an excellent opportunity to focus on developmental needs of individual students. By assuming that moral maturity and moral judgment reflect a developmental process, moral development could be easily placed within a student
development framework. Suddenly, I saw that these constructs could be neatly applied in an educational context where it might have great utility.

The search for a useful construct

Intuitive feelings about the importance of making the discipline setting an educational and developmental experience for students was not a sufficient base for practice over the long term. I began to explore possible theoretical conceptions that would provide such a framework for practice. This pursuit led to the body of literature which focused on moral education and moral development, specifically the research and writings of Kohlberg (1969 and 1972) who has been closely identified with the study of moral development ever since he did his doctoral study at the University of Chicago in the late 1950's. Kohlberg drew extensively on the earlier work conducted by Piaget (1965) and Dewey (1939) for much of his notion that moral development ensued through a series of six invariant stages. It was not the fact that I became enamored with cognitive stage theories that attracted me to Kohlberg's work. Rather, it was a notion that individuals did move in developmental steps from more primitive or pre-conventional levels of moral thinking to more principled ways of making moral judgments.
One of the facts that has been quite noticeable to me in my interactions with students, but which I never quite knew what to make of, was the very different way in which students attempted to explain to themselves and to others why they had done what they had done and what they perceived or conceived was wrong with what they had done. Now, for the first time, I could see that such differences might well be a function of that student's particular stage of moral development. Kohlberg (1969a, 1969b, 1972a, and 1972b) had documented in many studies the fact that there are such developmental differences in moral judgments among individuals and that for apparent lack of appropriate experiences and stimulation, only a small percentage of the adult population reaches what he described as the "principled" or most mature stages of moral development (post conventional).

Integration of theory and practice

Kohlberg's research, and that of others (Rest, 1973) as well, has indicated that moral development can be stimulated by appropriate experiences. So, one finds that in addition to a cognitive theory of moral development with theoretical potency, that there is also a suggestion for educational practice. For the first time I was beginning to appreciate, from a theoretical and conceptual perspective, a framework
from which to establish the possible educational worth of a discipline setting.

Kohlberg (1972) has attempted to make applicable his cognitive approach to moral development to the educational setting by combining it with the thoughts of Dewey (1959). Primarily, some of Kohlberg's studies have demonstrated that moral development can be enhanced—or at least stimulated—through appropriate experiences. In his studies, Kohlberg found, for example, that while many individuals in the adult society can reach the highest stage of cognitive thinking—namely that of formal operations—a much smaller percentage actually developed to the highest or post conventional stages of moral judgment. Creating the necessary experience, with a sufficient degree of cognitive conflict that individuals could reconceptualize or reorganize their moral thinking to make more mature (more differentiated yet integrated judgments) moral judgments became the basis for educational intervention and educational programing. Application of his theory to practice was an important concern to Kohlberg. When I talked with him at a workshop offered at Harvard University in June of 1974, he indicated that so many of the questions directed to him concerned not the apparent soundness of the conceptual notions which he was espousing, but their demonstrated practical utility
that much of his current effort has gone into applying the theory in educational and prison systems. I make mention of this fact for two reasons. One has to do with the further development and elaboration of the conceptual or theoretical scheme of moral development. The second has to do with how to apply or to make it work in an actual setting.

First, further theoretical research and evaluation may lead to further elaboration of the theoretical scheme and will open the door to other potential applications of the theory. Second, through application of the present theoretical conceptions, conclusions and inferences can be made based on the success or failure of such applications that can also lead to further theoretical refinement and elaboration. Both approaches hold some interest for me, but, truthfully, my heart lies in the second of these two approaches to elaborating on developmental or educational theory. I cast my role much more closely to that of the "developer" than to that of the theorist. But, in this situation, too, there is a need for a strong conceptual approach to the problem to determine even the basic suitability of the discipline context for educational intervention and program development. Are there certain developmental themes and issues that appear with some consistency within the discipline setting that have
import or significance for the present or for the future moral development of the students involved? If so, what are they and in what way are they significant? Pursuing these questions provides a basis for testing some of the general assumptions of moral development theory. By doing so in a natural field setting, it will aid in learning more about students, and it will provide the ideal opportunity to integrate theory and practice.

Hypothetical vs. real moral dilemmas

There is another issue in the way in which moral development theory has been applied in educational and other settings that makes this particular study of interest. One of the applications of the theoretical model, which Kohlberg himself suggests, is through the use of what he refers to as moral discussions. The moral discussion is based on a set of hypothetical dilemmas which the participants discuss. The thrust of such a discussion is to expose the students to higher stages (more differentiated and integrated) of moral reasoning so that they can see inadequacies of their particular stage of moral reasoning. If sufficient cognitive conflict can be created, then further development of moral judgment may be stimulated. In certain settings that might be a very appropriate and effective way to get at moral development, but it
certainly seems far removed from the lives of the typical college students whom I see on a daily basis. It is certainly removed from the current dilemmas that they are experiencing, brought about by their own particular involvement in a discipline situation. Out of that situation a real immediacy confronts the individuals involved. They are in a situation that has potential, if not immediate, consequences to them individually. It is in this setting where they will have to explain their behavior to others, where they will have to make personal judgments about their own behavior to themselves and to others; and where they will have to look for the personal meaning of this behavior in their lives.

In a very real way, this discipline setting has many of the ingredients that Kohlberg spoke about as conditions for stimulating moral development. This set of circumstances and factors provides a vehicle for beginning to work out the inter-relationships between the actual stimulation of development and the theoretical conceptions underlying this cognitive process.

The Need for This Study—A Personal Statement and Summary

As was stated, initial interest in this area of moral development emerged from my own individual experience working in a discipline role and in a student
personnel work setting. As this area of interest was blossoming, a growing revival in questions of a moral nature in society at large and on college campuses specifically was occurring. Moral development and moral education have become recognizably more important and legitimate areas for study. My interest also was stimulated by what I saw as a void in student personnel literature. I account for this for two reasons. One, much of the literature derived from court cases. The experience of the 1960's on campus and through the courts, as constitutional protections were clearly extended to college and university campuses, brought very specific attention to the legal issues.

The old concept of in loco parentis also was frequently disparaged. There were some legitimate reasons for this, but one of the apparent side effects was to eliminate any concern for the moral development of students. For to do so would be to continue what many felt should now be rejected—the substitute family model for student personnel workers. It was not until some student personnel people began to reconstruct a new basis for practice, one that has become generally referred to as a "student development" point of view (Brown, 1972) that an opportunity presented itself to renew interest in this area. Still most people in the profession have steered clear of doing anything with this
topic, and legal concerns still dominate the literature in the "student discipline" area as we shall see in the following section. The student personnel perspective, however, presented an excellent opportunity to focus on the needs and on the development of the individual student. By looking at moral maturity as a developmental process, suddenly moral development could be easily placed within this student development framework without reopening concerns about a prescriptive value orientation or an authoritarian approach (value indoctrination) that some felt might have been implicit in the in loco parentis relationship.

While the profession may have practiced a stance of active neutrality when it came to moral issues and moral values, I agree with Kohlberg's (1973) frequent admonishment to educators that one cannot, in fact, be neutral. There is a "hidden curriculum" at work that is reflected in the examples we set, the rewards that we administer, and in other aspects of our language and behavior. I personally felt that not enough was done in contact with students to help students focus on important moral issues and sometimes more than an issue--a crisis--in their personal lives.

When one is surrounded by student misconduct much of the working day, one could become discouraged and, perhaps, assume a view of the human race that is less
than positive. Fortunately, that did not happen to me. In fact, I felt challenged to see what could be made positive from this situation. I believed that at those times the discipline system touched on important moral issues, and even those times when it did not, that some positive and enhancing benefit could accrue for the student. I had no grandiose or self-righteous scheme to "save the world" from bad characters. But it did seem that the discipline setting, with a primary focus on one-to-one interactions could serve as a mutual learning situation and as a potential stimulus to the student's own development. What I found, though, because of my growing interest in moral development, was that I had a more sophisticated (differentiated) view from which I could more fully appreciate, understand, and respond to the student. As I began to recognize this, I began to see the potential for discipline to actually help the student continue along the road to more mature moral reasoning.

Moral development theory—its application and its utility to the practice of student personnel work, albeit in this example to the specific domain of student discipline—may have real relevancy to this setting. And, there is a greater hope and intent, and that is to go beyond my first concern to make fair and just administrative decisions and to create a situation with
enough potency or stimulus to assist those students I encounter through the discipline process with their own development. Discipline should not be an end— a dispensing of sanctions only— but a beginning. And, if not a beginning, at least a marker along the way. This study will define the setting, themes, and issues to make this possible.

Beyond my personal concern to maximize the potential educational impact of the discipline setting, professionally the field of student personnel work, as we shall see in the following section, has not addressed itself in the discipline area to a student development point of view. Some of the old assumptions and approaches still prevail.

College Student Discipline— Past, Present and Future

Historical antecedents

Concern for the conduct and the discipline of college students dates with the earliest days of the history of American colleges and universities. Brubacher and Rudy (1958) wrote that, during the colonial to the Civil War period, college government could at best be described as "paternal despotism" and that "most of the time at faculty meetings was taken up with discipline cases" (p. 52). Student life was closely regulated, punishment harsh and often severe. Student rebellions
and open conflict between faculty and students were commonplace. As colleges and universities grew in size and complexity, the discipline responsibilities devolved upon the institutions' presidents and were no longer considered to be a primary responsibility of the faculty. Strict adherence to prevailing moral codes and the "puritanical" ethic were instilled. Discipline was viewed primarily in terms of strict control and punishment function and as a necessary administrative responsibility (Brubacher and Rudy, 1958).

Other factors contributed to changes in attitude toward discipline. Under the influence of the German (continental) system of education, there was less interest in enforcing strict moralistic discipline (Williamson, 1961). Brubacher and Rudy (1958) noted that as the German educational influence grew after the Civil War, students were given more responsibility.

It was not only the imported German model that influenced the mode of discipline employed.

... but the changing American frontier produced new enlightenment, as did the later Freudian search for understanding of motivations or means of influencing the form of behavior. All of these changed conditions provided the college administrator a variety of new models for relationships between faculty and students. In the literature we find a pleading for more relaxed and less severe form of punishment and control... (Williamson, 1961, p. 153)
According to Brubacher and Rudy (1958), these two educational influences presented two opposing concepts of discipline—one drawing on the English tradition and the other on the German.

The old system, derived from English, regarded college education as far more than a purely intellectual enterprise. In its view, the college was to look after the moral, as well as, intellectual development of its students; character training was just as important as mind training. (p. 122)

However, until the twentieth century there was really no explicated rationale for the purpose of discipline other than the control of students and imparting to students moral mandates carried out through administrative officers. Thus, any discussion of discipline by faculty or administration during this period generally focused on the amount of discipline to be imposed or on the degree of control over students. There was little humanizing in the form or type of discipline administered to students. The idea of discipline as punishment was the all-inclusive concept of discipline during this period (Wrenn, 1951).

Beginning in the early 1900's, college and university presidents became too busy with other administrative chores and delegated to others the responsibility for student discipline. The roles of dean of men and dean of women emerged, with those individuals assuming
a major responsibility for student discipline. From that point student personnel work had its beginning, and the discipline responsibility for students was firmly ensconced in the hands of student personnel administrators.

In discussing the history of American colleges and universities, Brubacher and Rudy point to the "personnel movement" as one of the major characteristics of the twentieth century and of the American form of higher education. This development was apparently in part a reaction to the strictly German intellectual tradition and in part a desire to strengthen or assert the English tradition of education.

The characteristic expression of this new concern for the "whole student" and for establishing a new unity in the American college of the twentieth century came to be the student personnel movement. . . . When the personnel movement arose in the twentieth century, it thus represented not only a major effort to restore a unified life to the American college but also a revival of the old-time college's concern for the non-intellectual side of the student's career. (p. 330)

The growth of psychology and other human and behavioral sciences, including an emphasis on psychological testing, established a new basis from which to focus on student life. The personnel movement grew out of this foundation, and a career field
developed. It was not long before the influence of the behavioral sciences and the emphasis on the "whole person" had an effect on discipline. Those in the field of student personnel work began to protest against the single view of discipline as punishment. "So discipline and behavior control took new forms. New emphasis and points of view about effective means of control substituted for earlier ones" (Williamson, 1961, p. 153).

Wrenn (1951) believed that it was important to take a positive approach to discipline because the premise that fear of punishment will prevent individuals from misbehaving was based on false assumptions. He noted that a possible approach to discipline leads to two principles of modern discipline. The first principle was that the most constructive and efficient approach to student discipline was to look at the causes of misbehavior and attack those causes. The second principle emphasized what the student might learn from the experience as well as continuing the responsibility for institutional well-being. In the first principle "prevention is to be given more attention than cure" and in the second "the learning values of the experience for the student are the first concern of those responsible for handling discipline situations" (Wrenn, 1951, p. 455).
"We have argued at length, repeatedly," Williamson (1961) wrote, "that the harsh repressive-punishment approach to control student behavior must be replaced by more humane efforts to teach them the necessary adaptation of behavior which are imposed by their membership in organized society" (p. 158). For Williamson, the issue in the discipline process was to search for accommodation between overly emphasizing individual autonomy, or group regulation, and strict authoritarian punishment. Helping the individual, though, to become an effective member of the group was an important focus in Williamson's approach to student discipline.

"Success" under such an approach would have to place a heavy burden on the individual to meet the normative standards of the group.

One can see in these ideas a strong orientation toward conformance by students to the regulations of society and to the academic institution as an important assumption behind the student personnel worker's attitude toward his disciplinary responsibility. But, student welfare and rehabilitation also began to emerge as important aims of student discipline during this period (Williamson and Foley, 1949). While discipline was beginning to be cast in educational terms by professional leaders like Williamson, little was offered in the way of concrete suggestions, except for the idea of
"disciplinary counseling," to specify how students might be "rehabilitated" or have their welfare promoted.

The rapid expansion of higher education following World War II focused everyone's attention on accommodating mass numbers of students. Little that was new about student disciplinary practice was written during this time. But, before attention could be re-focused on the issue of student discipline, a dramatic upheaval occurred which shook college campuses in the 1960's and early 1970's and brought a different attitude about student discipline to the forefront.

Dissent and protest—sometimes open and tragic conflict—took place, and often the focus was aimed at challenging institutional authority and de-regulating campus life. Also contributing to this upheaval in staid personnel practices was the entry of the courts and the extension of the constitution to the campus. Educators and non-educators alike became preoccupied with legalistic concerns. Discipline systems were overhauled, many became more formal, as specific elements of due process were required. Obviously, attention to legal issues was needed and, perhaps, challenges to the heavy orientation on student welfare which was expressed legally in the doctrine of in loco parentis were overdue.

But, as a result, an overemphasis was placed on legal issues and prescriptive formality. It is very
difficult to find recent articles on discipline or judicial affairs in any of the professional personnel journals that do not deal with some legal issue or related administrative concern. A review of the college student personnel abstracts for the past three years revealed only one study that in some direct way related to any "personal or human development" concerns that might be related to student discipline. Reviews of court cases, statements about the requirements of procedural due process in discipline hearings or other substantive due process concerns dominate the professional literature. Other legal or administrative issues covering such topics as "majority age," "collective bargaining," "affirmative action," and "discrimination" make up the majority of articles. This reflects what I believe is the current focus of professional awareness and concern in the area of college student disciplines. The balance has swung so far that student personnel practitioners have over reacted and have retreated from their initial professional concerns, albeit that were sometimes misplaced or misguided, for the well-being of students.

The traditional student personnel model for college discipline

Only a few pieces of writing of any length exist that attempt to establish a basis for student
discipline. Williamson's and Foley's (1949) classic work *Counseling and Discipline* and an ACPA Monograph entitled "Student Discipline in Higher Education" by Brady and Snoxell (1965) are the two that are most notable. Other works have focused almost exclusively on the legal aspects of student personnel work. But, these two publications take very singular approaches to student discipline, and represent what has been the principal rationale behind college discipline.

Brady and Snoxell (1965) in their monograph continued the position taken earlier by Williamson and Foley that student discipline should be viewed as a process of rehabilitation and welfare.

Discipline is always exercised with the primary aim of promoting the welfare of the person who is the subject of it. . . . The main aim is not the reform of the person or the redemption of the person, but of his welfare--specifically his education, his tutelage, his progress in maturity, in rationality, in capacity for intellectual and moral achievement. (p. 15)

A second aim of discipline is that of rehabilitation. "The penalties used in disciplinary procedures must be chosen primarily with the aim that the penalty itself will assist in the rehabilitation of the student" (Brady and Snoxell, 1965, p. 15). While the Brady and Snoxell monograph acknowledged a need to help the student "progress in maturity" and "in capacity for . . . moral achievement," it reflected no understanding
of what process the individual goes through to achieve that maturity. Further, the idea of moral achievement was expressed as responsibility as a member of society. This suggests that what they were really implying was a process of inculcating in the student either society's or the institution's values and standards.

Williamson and Foley (1949) attempted to establish the view that discipline was a legitimate part of the educational process, and, as such, a professional student personnel person or counselor was needed to engage in "disciplinary counseling."

Based upon this conception of education, discipline, the result of "bad behavior," is conceived as inherent in the educational process itself, and thus is not imposed directly and arbitrarily from external authorities. Disciplinary counseling conceived as a constructive educational force when performed by professionally trained counselors, takes its place in the broad methodology of education. . . . The prevention of misconduct is an integral part of the educational process. . . . Re-education involves assisting the student to re-orient, and retrain himself with respect to his social, personal, or ethical development. (pp. 2-3)

Williamson and Foley approached discipline as a rehabilitative function. "Disregarding certain infrequent situations in which the security and protection of the institution are paramount, by all odds the major purpose of disciplinary action takes on the character of rehabilitation. . . ." (pp. 168-169).
Williamson was one of the first to talk about the need for discipline counseling. He was also a strong proponent of treating discipline as part of the total educational context. He believed that discipline was not just an administrative function but should be carried out by an educator. Williamson and Foley also approached the discipline responsibility as a process of helping students gain insight into their behavior. They compared disciplinary counseling with teaching, "In a real sense such counseling is a type of teaching--teaching students the causes and consequences of their motivations and behavior and also teaching substitute behavior and motivation" (p. 191).

To approach the disciplinary situation, as an educational responsibility, was a noteworthy departure from the early rationale for discipline. By taking this view, Williamson and Foley emphasized the learning potential of the educational process which "calls for the utilization of all faculties of a college in providing adequate learning situations so that all students may make developmental adjustments within the environment in which they find themselves" (p. 9). But, their overriding concern was rehabilitation, and counseling was the mechanism that Williamson and Foley proposed to accomplish this rehabilitation.
In disciplinary situations, the counseling process helps the individual to face and gain insight into the consequences of his delinquent behavior. . . . In this sense, the counseling process promotes and effects rehabilitation and is, in its own right, a rehabilitation process. Within its inherent dimension, disciplinary counseling is rehabilitation. (pp. 205-206)

In further describing this function of disciplinary counseling, Wrenn (1951) stated:

The purpose of disciplinary counseling is to enable the student to gain insight into the consequences of his disapproved behavior, to understand better the causal significance of his personal background and drives in relation to this behavior, and to develop a pattern of behavior which will be personally satisfying and, at the same time, more socially acceptable. To the extent that disciplinary counseling achieves this purpose, it is a rehabilitation process (p. 462)

Williamson and Foley brought to light the view that discipline was a legitimate educational process and that counseling can be an aid to behavior change. What they failed to do was advance any educational theories to help understand that process or how to act as if one was both "educator" and "counselor." Disciplinary counseling and the identification and elimination of the causes of disciplinary problems, which they also emphasized, are not unimportant functions. But from an educational and psychological perspective, there are important and unexplored dimensions of human growth and development that I
believe can be tied to a sound conception of student discipline and the campus judicial process.

**Time for a new model?**

The educational model for student discipline has been rehabilitation, as can be seen from the following quotation: "Gradually the rehabilitation emphasis entered the discussions, and today it is well established as the prevailing model of relationships" (Williamson, 1961, p. 153). This model for student discipline certainly reflects a concern for the welfare of the student, but it is a limiting, although enlightened perspective. By emphasizing rehabilitation and welfare concerns only, the aim of discipline becomes that of re-educating the student. Such an aim can easily be misinterpreted and it seems too one-sided. The student often is forced by this approach to comply to the norms of the institution or the group, perhaps without any real growth in maturity, self-understanding, or self-discipline. Compliance might easily be the name of the game in such a setting. It seems timely to suggest a new model for student discipline, one that is based in the emerging concern for the overall development of the student.

While there is a growing commitment to "student development," as evidenced by the number of professional
journal articles that have appeared, few such articles appear in relationship to student discipline. This suggests that another prevailing model for student discipline is what may be called an administrative model in which student discipline is not considered apropos for recasting with other functional areas of student personnel services along developmental lines. In an administrative model discipline is viewed as a necessary, but not necessarily welcomed, administrative task that must be carried out. It is unfortunate, I believe, that as attention has focused on the process of development during the adolescent and young adult years that responsibility for student discipline has not been expressed also in these terms. It is my contention that the function of discipline does not need to be solely described in administrative and legal terms and models, although those aspects cannot be ignored either, nor should the earlier educational and counseling model proposed by Williamson and Foley need only to endorse the concept of rehabilitation.

It would be unfortunate if student personnel work was limited only to legal, quasi-legal, or administrative concerns when the potential for working positively, productively, and developmentally with students who are involved in a campus discipline incident, or who have elected to become involved as a student participant in
the campus judicial process exists. The basic thrust of this study is to delineate the importance of considering the discipline process in new terms.

A summary of the phases of attitudes toward campus discipline

The history of attitudes toward college discipline problems and responses to those problems have progressed through three phases and is about to enter a fourth. In Phase I, which existed even prior to the designation and appointment of student personnel workers to campus administrative staffs were made, discipline was the prerogative of the president or of the faculty. Discipline reflected the strong moralistic overtones associated with those times, and punishment was the form by which student impulses could be repressed and student behavior kept in line.

During Phase II, student discipline became the responsibility of the student personnel worker. Preventing discipline problems became an important concern as did the welfare and rehabilitation of the student. Counseling was the principal mode by which behavior change and conformance was to be attained. This phase represented a dramatic shift in orientation toward discipline, but the counseling and welfare attitude expressed during that time did not include much understanding of how students grow and develop. Phase II
provided a more humanizing orientation to this role and provided a strong rationale for this to be a major responsibility for the student personnel staff member.

Phase III was a direct departure from welfare or remedial concerns all together. This phase, which still represents a prevailing professional concern, represents the legal orientation—the application of substantive and procedural due process to campus disciplinary problems. Disciplinary counseling, student welfare concerns, and rehabilitation are still expressed as the educational concerns, but the legal and other administrative concerns are of overriding importance.

The fourth phase is just emerging. It represents a re-conceptualization of the disciplinary functions in terms of "student development." This phase represents, first, a better understanding of the process of human growth and development, particularly the dimension of moral maturity. Second, this phase will use intervention strategies of the social and behavioral sciences to stimulate that development. Development, not rehabilitation, will be the educational model for student discipline. This study represents a beginning articulation of this new phase.
Purpose of the Study

The general purpose of this study is to analyze the discipline setting, in this particular investigation through the mode of the discipline interview, from a developmental perspective. Because this study represents the application of general moral development theory to a new and naturalistic context, it is designed to be exploratory and largely inductive in scope and method. With this general purpose in mind, it is my hope to begin to build an educational base for practice in the area of college student discipline that is developmental in nature.

Specifically, students will be asked to respond to a pre-selected set of questions that this investigator believes are germane to the discipline interview setting and which are designed to enable the student to express moral judgments. These responses will be analyzed inductively to determine if any differences that might exist in the form and content of these responses can be attributed to developmental differences in the level of moral reasoning among the participating students.

If such differences can be identified, it has important implications for the role that student personnel professionals can fulfill in and outside of the discipline process. Student responses to select questions interspersed during the course of a discipline interview could
provide cues to the interviewer about the student's level of moral reasoning. If that is so, knowledge of what those cues are can provide a basis for intervention. Selecting appropriately challenging responses or questions to ask during the discipline process can serve as a stimulus to the student's further moral development, and as a way to increase the likelihood of greater self-discipline and internal control over behavior in the future.

These, then, are the rather high intentions set out for this study. A relatively small number of students (55) who participated in this study, an inductive process of qualitative analysis which is necessarily crude and unrefined in application, and the exploratory nature of this study all pose certain limitations that may restrict full attainment of those intentions.

**A Road Map—The Outline and Organization of This Study**

Laying out the context, as I have done in this chapter, always serves as an important beginning for me when I write. That is the opening to this chapter which indicates how I became interested in this research topic. I have written more personally at the outset to set out what I see as the educational, if not the personal, problems inherent in the discipline setting and the juxtaposition that I hold (the interface) between the
individual student and the institution. In the second
section of this chapter, I discussed the importance of
integrating theory and practice. From there I moved to
a historical review of the way in which the student per-
sonnel profession has responded to its discipline
responsibility and have suggested a different model for
the future. The fourth section was a statement on the
purposes and aims of this study. This section concludes
the first chapter with an outline of the organization
of this investigation.

Chapter II reviews primarily that literature which
focuses on moral development and reviews some of the
general theories and models of moral development. This
chapter also contains a review of approaches to the
assessment of moral judgment, and then examines speci-
fically some of the few studies that have particularly
focuses on the moral development of college students.

Chapter III discusses the procedures followed in
collecting data, the instrumentation used, and the
method of analysis employed to code and score the
student's responses to the questions that were asked
during the interview, and to compare those responses
with some of the moral development variables.

Chapter IV contains the results of the qualitative
analysis of student responses for each of the 18 ques-
tions that were asked during the interview. Twelve
questions were selected for further analysis and the results from the qualitative analysis of the responses to those questions are compared with the P score, a measure of moral development. The results of the multiple regression analysis used to compare those response variables with the P score measure of moral development are presented in Chapter V.

Chapter VI presents the conclusions, implications for practice, and summary of the results. This chapter concludes by drawing on the inferences and conclusions from the results to suggest ways in which the discipline process can be organized and utilized to enhance the moral maturity of students who participate as volunteers in the campus judicial system or who were "caught" in the discipline process.
CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

In the previous chapter the historical route and present orientation of college student discipline was considered. In this chapter that literature which relates to models and theories of moral development and to moral development research is discussed. The first section in this chapter presents some general approaches for classifying or organizing the various approaches that have been undertaken to study moral development. The second section reviews basic models and theories of moral development, selected to represent different approaches and perspectives. Only those researchers who have undertaken studies and who have postulated some general dimensions or theories of moral development are considered. The third section examines Rest’s (1973) description of the various phases of moral development research. Moral judgment as a specific developmental variable and its relationship to behavior and to other variables also is discussed in this chapter. Finally, those specific cognitive developmental studies using
either Kohlberg's (1958) or Rest's (1964) cognitive-stage development approach to assess moral development of college students are described. The next section discusses many of the research approaches to the study of moral development and moral behavior.

A Review of General Models and Approaches to Study of Morality and Moral Development

Several writers (Graham, 1972; Kay, 1969; Loevinger, 1974; Kohlberg, 1971 and 1972; and Rest, 1973) have suggested general categories to classify the various types of research that have been conducted on moral learning and development. For example, studies can be classified according to the measurement approach used (Loevinger, 1974), by the particular psychological theory represented (Kohlberg, 1972, and Graham, 1972), or by the particular dimensions or theoretical attributes of the theory emphasized (Kay, 1969). Several of these general approaches for describing and categorizing moral development research are described in the following sections.

Psychological or theoretical perspective

Moral development research can be categorized by the psychological theory or theoretical perspective followed by the researcher.
Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) described three psychological theories that undergird different approaches to the study and understanding of moral behavior. These psychological theories are: 1) the naturalistic theory of development, 2) the associationistic-learning or environmental-contingency theory of development, and 3) the cognitive developmental or interactional theory of development. In the naturalistic approach, "the environment affects development by providing necessary nourishment for the naturally growing organism" (p. 455), and cognitive development basically represents an unfolding of pre-patterned stages. The associationistic psychologists, on the other hand, cast the environment in the role of "stimulus input" where the organism emits output and the structure of behavior is the result of the association of discrete stimuli. In the associationistic approach cognitive development is the result of guided learning and teaching which allows for the association of various stimuli.

The cognitive-developmental school takes a dialectic approach to development, in which "... a core of universal ideas are redefined and reorganized as their implications are played out in experience and as they are confronted by their opposites in argument and discourse" (Kohlberg and Mayer, p. 456). Individuals are viewed as if they are philosophers. Mature thought
emerges from a reorganization of internal psychological structures resulting from this organism environment interaction. Cognitive development, for theorists of this persuasion, is a change in cognitive structure—a change in rules for processing information or connecting events. Another way to describe this interaction is to think of the process of cognitive development as representing a continuous and on-going dialogue between the person's cognitive structure and the structure of the environment. The cognitive structure shapes the way the input and influence of environment is perceived and processed.

A sufficient degree of dynamic tension between the cognitive and environmental structures can lead to cognitive restructuring. It is this so-called qualitative advancement in the restructuring of cognitive thought that represents cognitive development in the individual. It is this process of restructuring that is of interest to the cognitive-developmental theorists.

In the maturational or naturalistic approach to development, in contrast to the cognitive-developmental approach, the role of experience is different. For the maturationists movement to the next stage or level of cognitive functioning occurs naturally regardless of experience. Experience serves basically to integrate the concerns or issues of the present state or level of
development. In the cognitive-developmental approach, experience is much more essential to stage progression or development. Experience provides the necessary stimulant or dialectic for further development. Without that experience continued development would not occur as naturally as the maturational psychologists suggest.

A basic difference between the cognitive-developmental and psychoanalytic theories is the assumption about stages of development. Psychoanalytical theory assumes that personality stages are basically maturational and involve an unfolding of innate stages. "In contrast," Kohlberg (1973) noted, "cognitive-developmental theory assumes that stages are the result of continuous interaction between the organism and the environment, rather than the unfolding of something inborn in the organism" (p. 353). Kohlberg (1973) describes his theory of moral development as a cognitive-developmental theory of stages.

Social learning or environmental learning theories generally describe moral development as a process of socialization. Socialization refers to the process of conforming to cultural norms and to the internalization of rules. A highly socialized individual is someone who adheres closely to the prevailing norms or rules of society or the community group in which that individual
interacts. The concept of socialization is used by learning theorists but not by cognitive-developmentalists. These two psychological approaches also can be distinguished by the degree of emphasis placed on the structure of thinking. Cognitive-developmental theory is a structural theory. It focuses on the structure or the form of thinking and reasoning. The environmental theories, with their emphasis on socialization, are basically concerned with the content of thought—the particular rules or values that the individual internalizes—not the structure of the stage reasoning used. Another way to describe this distinction is to consider "what" a person says as the content of thought—a concern of the environmentalists—and the "why" or the way a person organizes and expresses ideas the structure of thought—a concern of the cognitive-developmentalists (Kohlberg, 1973).

Graham (1972) also attributed the three main and distinctive influences on thinking about moral learning and moral development to psychoanalytic, learning, and cognitive development theory. Psychoanalytic and learning theory assume that basic motivation is essentially deterministic, while cognitive-developmental theory take basic motivation for granted. Each of these theories emphasize different influences on the process of development. Psychoanalytic theory, for example,
emphasize feelings (i.e., feelings of guilt or shame), the relationship between parent and child, and the importance of early experience in the study of moral development. Learning theory emphasizes behavior and the influence of the patterns of reward and punishment on the development of conscience. The cognitive-developmental theories, on the other hand, emphasize cognition, a natural process of development, and the role of the environment in facilitating or impeding that development. Cognitive-development theorists believe that moral development progresses through a series of clearly differentiated stages.

Research approaches and models

Beside comparing the various theoretical concepts and assumptions that distinguish between the psychological approaches to understanding moral development, another way to categorize approaches to moral development is by the type of research conducted. Kay (1969) suggested two different classifications for studies conducted on moral development.

Research

One such distinction divides research into four categories—1) simple stages of development, 2) moral sanctions, 3) moral judgment, and 4) psycho-social development. In the first category, as an example, is
Swainson (1945) who described three basic stages of moral development. Each of these simple stages is roughly equivalent to a child's general development from infancy to elementary school age to secondary school age.

Other researchers (Kay, 1969 and Bull, 1969) have identified different levels of development in the use of sanctions or in the motivation for the use of sanctions. Different moral sanctions, while operating throughout the life of a person, appear to be more predominant at certain ages than others. For example, Kay (1969) noted that at early pre-moral stages of development the use of sanctions was motivated by authoritarian or ego-idealist considerations. At a more advanced stage of development the autonomous, altruistic, rational, independent, and responsible considerations were described as the basis for improving a sanction.

The third type of research focuses on moral judgment or on the cognitive aspects of moral development. Piaget's (1939) research, which describes several stages of moral judgment, is an example. The four stages of development, identified by Piaget, are the egocentric stage, the authoritarian stage, the stage of reciprocity, and the stage of equity. Judgments made at each stage are the result of different perspectives and influences. At the egocentric stage the child views the environment as an extension of himself. The child is not cooperative
at this stage and children do not behave in ways that can be called moral. It is prudent, perhaps, for the child to cooperate but the reasons for cooperation are not based on moral beliefs. At the authoritarian stage, the child submits to authority. Rules and regulations are seen as originating outside the child. There is an obligation to obey them. At the reciprocal stage, rules are not seen by the child as absolute. Society begins to take on status, but within a legal framework. Out of this sense of reciprocity emerges the stage of equity. This final stage is represented by altruistic concerns, with relationships based on concern and compassion, and not on a legal relationship. Rules which result from consensus and agreement are not applied rigidly. Situational factors are taken into consideration, too, at this stage (Kay, 1969).

Researchers like Peck and Havighurst (1960), who emphasized psycho-social development represent a fourth research approach to the study of moral development. They identified various characters or personality types that represented different levels of development.

Models

Identifying models of development is a second way to classify moral development research. Kay (1965)
suggested six possible models to study development. He briefly described these models in the following way:

Firstly, the model of intellectual growth. This enables us to understand moral development as a sequential process similar in form to the pattern of ever increasing conceptual understanding. . . . Secondly, there is the attitudinal model in which moral growth is deemed to be a process of developing moral attitudes. . . . There is, thirdly, the evolutionary model (in which the moral development of the races appears to be repeated in the moral development of each individual). Fourthly, there is the ethical model which focuses attention on a series of emerging sanctions. The fifth model is essentially sociological. Finally, there is the psychological model . . . which explains moral conduct in terms of a sequence of maturing forms of psycho-social development. (pp. 220-221)

Loevinger (1974), in a paper presented at a 1974 conference sponsored by the Educational Testing Service, also attempted to classify research according to general models. She identified basically three models of moral development— an IQ model, a profile model, and a stage and sequence model. The IQ model measures moral growth in terms of the achievement of certain specified adult norms. A test of moral knowledge is an example of this model. The profile model involves the identification of factors that contribute to moral maturity. The work of Hogan (1974), who identified five independent elements of moral maturity, represents research of this type. Some of the elements that Hogan identified, which
are discussed in another section, have developmental or maturational dimensions, but these elements do not occur in any fixed order or sequence. On the other hand, the stage-sequence model of development, which is the approach used by Piaget (1965) and by Kohlberg (1958), assumed that there is a cognitive structure that serves as a frame of reference for thoughts and perceptions. These structures represent different stages. These stages appear in a fixed or sequential order of development. In other words, one cannot reach stage three without first passing through stage two.

One can see that the particular theoretical or psychological perspective of the moral development researcher or model builder largely determines and influences the type of research selected or the particular constructs and concepts emphasized in the theory. The maturational theorists view the process of moral development as an unfolding of innate patterns of development. They are content to chart the various ages or time frames when different aspects of that development occurs. The cognitive-developmental perspective focuses almost exclusive attention on the structural aspects of cognitive thinking. The cognitive-developmentalists propose essentially a uni-variate and sequential order of development in moral thinking that moves through various stages. Like the maturationalists,
the cognitive-developmentalists view development as a natural process, but the role of the environment in transacting with the individual and helping to stimulate that development is much more important in the cognitive-developmental perspective. Environment plays an even more important role in the learning theory perspective of moral development. Environmental constraints, particularly reward and punishment, are important conditioners for learning and for controlling moral behavior. Moral behavior, not just moral judgment, is particularly important.

No one approach or perspective is able to account for all aspects of moral development. Researchers just have to be clear about their own theoretical biases and persuasions when they identify important issues for further study. This researcher happened to be in a context where both moral judgment and moral behavior were important. However, it is the process of moral reasoning that students use that is of primary interest and, thus, the cognitive theory of moral development is the most relevant to this study. That perspective along with other models of moral development are reviewed in the following section.
Major Models of Moral Development

Research on moral development has been diverse, as the opening section to this chapter indicated, and has represented the particular theoretical orientation of the researcher. Some of that research is reviewed in this section. The research models included in this section were selected to be representative of certain types of research, but primarily they were selected for inclusion because each model has attempted to document important aspects or dimensions of moral development. And, the general focus has been on moral development and the process of that development.

Piaget (1965) and Kohlberg (1973) represent those moral development theorists who are concerned with moral reasoning and the cognitive aspects of moral development. A brief review of Piaget's two-stage theory of cognitive development is included in this section because Kohlberg's work represents basically an elaboration on and further empirical support for the cognitive stage theory of moral development presented by Piaget. Kohlberg's model identifies three general levels of moral development, with two separate stages of development within each level. Kohlberg's stage development model is reviewed in some depth in this section because the cognitive development model is the basic theoretical foundation and perspective for this research endeavor.
Research on moral development has been particularly vigorous in England, perhaps because the British have long been concerned about moral issues and principles and about moral education. Included in this section is a summary of some of the research conducted by Kay (1965), Bull (1969), the Williams (1972), and Wilson (1973), all of whom conducted their research in England or one of the neighboring countries. Kay (1965) believes that morality consists of various stages of development. These stages, though, represent differences in the dominant attitudes expressed. Bull (1969) also supports the general notion of stage development, and he is interested in the development of moral judgment. However, in his view that process of development does not necessarily occur in a sequential ordering of stages as postulated by cognitive stage theorists. The Williams (1972) also are interested in moral judgment. They identified four general modes of moral thinking. The selection by an individual of a particular mode of moral reasoning is situational. These various modes of moral thought are not mutually exclusive. A person might use one mode of thinking in one situation and another mode at another time. Wilson (1973), the last of the British researchers reviewed, is more interested in the assessment of moral development than in developing a strong theory of moral development. He identifies the various
attributes or components of moral maturity, particularly morally mature behavior and does not exclusively focus on moral thinking.

The behavioral or learning theory approach to moral development is represented by the work of Aronfreed (1968). His theory is included in this section because he is one of the few learning theorists who has devoted considerable research to the question of moral development. In his perspective moral learning was primarily the result of the process of socialization. Control over behavior, as the individual matures in age and experience, is a movement from external to internal control.

Peck and Havighurst (1960) studied a small sample of American youth over a continuing period of time and in considerable depth. Their methodology employed an inductive-deductive approach which is discussed in this section. Peck and Havighurst approach the study of moral development almost as one approaches a personality or character study. They identify certain character types, each representing a different set of moral values or "levels of conscience." It is early family experience that determines, for the most part, the particular character type that develops. Moral development is not defined in their model as the development of moral reasoning or cognitive stages.
Hogan (1973), like Peck and Havighurst, considers moral development to be one aspect of a person's overall character structure. In Hogan's model moral development proceeds along several different dimensions, sometimes simultaneously. Hogan believes that each dimension is important to describe moral maturity. Peck and Havighurst's (1960) and Hogan's (1973) research and models of moral development are included because 1) they represent a different approach to moral development research, and 2) more than just the cognitive dimensions are considered in their models.

**Cognitive-developmental theorists**

Jean Piaget

Rest (1974a) credited Piaget with being one of the first to approach moral development from a cognitive development perspective. Because of Piaget's important influence, particularly on the cognitive-developmental psychologists, several of his major ideas are discussed in this section. For Piaget, though, his research on moral judgment was really just a diversion from his continuing investigation into the patterns of intellectual growth of children. Piaget (1965) recognized that his work in the area of moral development was just a beginning.
It is my sincere hope that it may supply a scaffolding which those living with children in observing their spontaneous reactions can use in erecting the actual edifice. In a sense, child morality throws light on adult morality. If we want to form men and women, nothing will fit us so well for the task as to study the laws that govern their formation. (p. 9)

Piaget chose as a context for his study a game of marbles as it was played by children ages four to 13 in two Swiss communities. He focused on the "rules of the game"—how children of different ages applied the rules and what form or character those rules took in their games. In this way he was able to examine the relationship that existed among the children, as they played a game of marbles, free of adult influence or interference. He also analyzed the children's attitude toward authority.

Attitudes toward rules, as well as toward authority, were a major aspect of Piaget's thinking about morality. He believed that "all morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual acquires for these rules" (p. 13). A game like marbles, with its elaborate set of rules, provided Piaget with an ideal opportunity to collect data and further develop his ideas and theories about moral development.

However, it was not easy to follow Piaget's analysis because he vacillated in this book, The Moral
The Judgment of the Child (1965), between reporting the results of his empirical study and describing his theories about the nature of justice. His work was also a mixture of psychological analysis of the individual and a broader sociological perspective on the analysis of a child's interaction with his peers. But as Rest (1974) has pointed out, Piaget's research demonstrated that there was a difference in thinking between younger and older children.

**Two major stages of morality.** Basically, Piaget postulated two major stages of morality. The earlier and more punitive stage he refers to as heteronomy. It is based on an almost blind obedience to adult authority. A second stage of morality is autonomy. Piaget uses different terms to describe these two stages. The earlier stage he often refers to as "morality of constraint" or "moral realism" and the more advanced stage as the "morality of cooperation."

In discussing Piaget's work, Kay (1969) wrote:

... In studying children's attitudes toward rules of the game he /Piaget/, was led to conclude that there was first a morality of cooperation. In the early stages of moral development he found that children began by regarding these rules not only as obligatory, but also as inviolable. At this point the coercive rules, it seems, reflect parental authority. ... Later, as a result of social interaction and cooperation it is seen that rules are not absolute.
... In general then the process is clear. Autonomy follows upon heteronomy; the rule of a game appears to the child no longer as an external law sacred, in so far as it has been laid down by adults; but as the outcome of a free decision and worthy of respect in the measure that it enlisted mutual consent. (p. 41)

As Kay also pointed out, at the heteronomous stage moral judgments are based on objective rules that exist outside of the individual while at the autonomous state moral judgment was a subjective judgment that was regulated by internal values.

Lichona (1976) listed nine dimensions on which these two stages differ.

1. Absolutism of moral perspective, as opposed to awareness of differing viewpoints
2. Conception of rules as unchangeable, as opposed to a view of rules as flexible
3. Belief in inevitable punishment, 'immanent justice,' for wrongdoing, as opposed to a naturalistic conception of punishment
4. 'Objective responsibility' in judging blame, as opposed to consideration of the actor's intentions
5. Definition of moral wrongness in terms of what is forbidden or punished, as opposed to what violates the spirit of cooperation
6. Belief in arbitrary or expiatory punishment, as opposed to belief in restitution or reciprocity-based punishment
7. Approval of authority's punishment of peer aggression, as opposed to approval of eye-for-an-eye retaliation by the victim
8. Approval of arbitrary, unequal distribution of good or rewards by authority, as opposed to insistence on equal distribution
9. Definition of duty as obedience to authority, as opposed to allegiance to the principle of equality or concern for the welfare of others. (p. 220)
Concept of justice. One of the other key concepts that Piaget discusses in his book, which also is a central notion in Kohlberg's theory of moral development, is the concept of justice. Piaget distinguishes between justice that can be described as "distributive" and justice that can be described as "retributive."

"Retributive justice" is based on two types of relationships—one centered on authority and the other in a social relationship based on mutual respect.

The function of punishment, which also seemed to be a developmental concept, is related to Piaget's concepts of justice and to retributive justice. Piaget described two types of punishment—expiatory and recipriatory. In "expiatory punishment," according to Piaget, "there is no relation between the content of the guilty act and the nature of its punishment. . . . All that matters is that a due proportion should be kept between the suffering inflicted and the gravity of the misdeed" (p. 205). The function of this type of punishment is to maintain the authority relationship and to re-establish a sense of duty or obligation.

Punishment also can focus on the consequence of an act and it can help to establish or re-establish relations among the parties involved. This is punishment by reciprocity. Such an attitude toward punishment
emerges when rules begin to be internalized. Some examples of this type of punishment are:

1. exclusion--momentary or permanent--from the social group
2. natural consequences arising directly from the misdeed
3. deprived a person of the thing that was misused
4. capturing the idea of reciprocity by doing to the person exactly what he has done to someone else
5. restitution by paying for or replacing a broken or stolen object
6. some form of censure to make a person realize that he has broken a bond of relationship or solidarity

As the feeling of equality grows in the child, retributive justice gives way to what Piaget described as "distributive justice" (equalitarian justice). Piaget believes that equality emerges, not so much as a reaction to adult restraint, but through children's growing interaction with peers.

The relation between child and adult as such does not allow for equality. And since equalitarianism is born of the contact of children with one another, its development must at least keep pace with the progress of cooperation between them. (p. 275)

Conclusions from Piaget's research. Kay (1969) briefly summarized some of the conclusions that can be drawn from Piaget's study.

There is firstly the changing attitude of children to the rules which govern their conduct and upon which they base moral judgments. Secondly it is possible to see that this changing attitude reflects the changing social relations of children.
This growth can then thirdly be understood as a sequence of qualitatively different moralities. And finally, it can be viewed as a growth from heteronomous to autonomous conduct. (p. 150)

What Piaget seems to have established is that children first are subject to and accept external controls, without question. Authority, particularly in the role of parents, determines what is moral or just for the child. Later the child is able to establish more freedom and make a self-determination of what is moral.

Subsequent research by others has tended to support some of Piaget's general conclusions about moral judgment. Lichona (1976) reviewed some of this research. He concluded that, "Moral judgment, as depicted by Piaget, is indisputably developmental; it changes with age and experience" (p. 239). Kay (1969) noted that almost all developmental psychologists would agree with Piaget's general proposition that as a child matures, his basis of moral judgments change.

He begins with a morality of constraints in which moral judgments are based on authority and a rigid interpretation of rules and regulations, and passes finally to a morality of cooperation in which judgments are based on social considerations and a flexible interpretation of what had previously been inflexible rules. (p. 150)

Not all researchers agree with Piaget's basic assumptions, however. Lichona (1976) pointed out that "while
Piaget's analysis of the cognitive basis of moral judgment is well founded, his speculations about its affective side are on shaky grounds" (p. 240). He also noted that research seemed to indicate that moral judgment matures more slowly than Piaget's theory suggested.

However, I believe that Piaget has made a valuable and major contribution to the study of morality. First, he established quite clearly that morality has a definite cognitive or judgmental component. This in itself has spawned much further research. Second, his results clearly established that there are developmental trends among children in their attitudes toward rules, in their concepts of punishment, and in their attitudes toward authority. For example, there is movement away from the external authority relationship as the determinant of morality to social relationships, with a willingness to accept one's peers and the individual situation, as major determinants for making moral judgments. Finally, his method of inquiry is a particularly unique contribution to the study of moral judgment. It permits a naturalistic observation of and interaction with children at play. It establishes "interogatory" as a useful and appropriate research method to study moral judgments.

Piaget's work has shed light on some very useful insights on the nature of children's moral judgment and of child morality. It has been and continues to be an
important foundation to the research that has been conducted in the area of moral development, particularly moral judgment. Its major limitation, from my perspective, is that it does not extend beyond the early teenage years. It has left open the question of whether children, as they mature first as adolescents, then as young adults and finally as adults, continue to develop in their morality and moral judgment. Of course, Piaget was the first to admit that his work was incomplete. Others since then have attempted to fill this void.

Lawrence Kohlberg

Introduction. Kohlberg's theory and research on moral development represents the cognitive-developmental approach. Kohlberg has made an extensive contribution to stage theory and to moral development by extending the work of Piaget to an older age group. It seems important to review his assumptions and research in more depth than some of the others who have studied moral development because of this contribution and because the concept of moral judgment development is the foundation of this study. Kohlberg's developmental approach to moral reasoning has heavily influenced the approach taken in this study, and for that reason, also, I have elaborated on his ideas.
Kohlberg, in his largely intuitive and theoretical model of moral development, has built on the ideas of Dewey (1939) and Piaget (1965). Dewey had conceptualized three levels of moral development (pre-moral, conventional, and autonomous). It was Dewey's belief that value and moral considerations were an important concern of the educational curriculum and that development was a legitimate aim of education. As described earlier, Piaget contributed a unique research approach to the study of moral development and he promoted his own ideas about the cognitive development of moral judgment. Kohlberg further described and delineated the qualitative differences in stages of moral growth suggested by Dewey and Piaget and significantly expanded on the classification of autonomy as the highest stage of moral development by including in his definition a stage of principles reasoning.

**Concept of cognitive stage development.** In the cognitive-developmental approach moral judgment is described as proceeding through various stages of development. A stage is a cognitive concept that has these characteristics.

a. Stages imply distinct or qualitative differences in structures (modes of thinking) which still serve the same basic function (e.g., intelligence), at various points in development.
b. These different structures form an invariant sequence, order or succession in individual development. While cultural factors may speed up, slow down or stop development, they do not change its sequence.

c. Each of these different and sequential modes of thought forms a 'structured whole.' A given stage-response on a task does not just represent a specific response determined by knowledge and familiarity with that task or tasks similar to it; rather, it represents an underlying thought-organization. The implication is that various aspects of stage structure should appear as a consistent cluster of responses in development.

d. Stages are hierarchical integrations. As noted, stages form an order of increasingly differentiated and integrated structures to fulfill a common function. Accordingly, higher stages displace (or, rather, reintegrate) the structures found. (Kohlberg, 1973c, p. 3)

To develop morally is to proceed or move through each stage, starting with the least differentiated stage, and moving through them one by one. A person cannot move from a stage two level of moral reasoning to a stage four level of moral reasoning, for instance, without first passing through stage two. This order of progression never varies according to the theory of cognitive-development. Not everyone will move at the same route through these stages, and not everyone will advance to the highest level of moral development. In fact, Kohlberg's (1969) research suggested that only about 25 percent of the adult population will reach the most mature
levels of moral development. Each step in the process of stage development was described by Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971) as a:

... better cognitive organization than the one that went before, one which takes account of everything present in the previous stage, but making new distinctions and organizing them into a more comprehensive a more equilibrated structure. (p. 1969)

Stages represent structured ways of thinking. When determining what that structure is and, thus, describing what stage of moral reasoning is used or reflected by a person's responses, one has to study the judgments that are made—the "why's," not the "what's" or the "content" of the stage.

Cognitive-development stages are stages of structure, not of content. These stages tell us how the child thinks concerning good and bad, truth, love, sex, and so forth. They do not tell us what is on the adolescent's mind, but only how he thinks about what is on his mind. (Kohlberg and Gilligan, 1971, p. 1076)

This distinction between the "content" and the "structure" of a stage of moral reasoning is an important distinction. Because Kohlberg's approach emphasizes the structural aspects of moral thinking, it is clearly a cognitive theory. It is a theory concerned with identifying the qualitatively different modes of moral reasoning or moral judgment. As such, it is appropriately labeled a cognitive-development theory. It also can best be
described as a theory about the development of moral judgment or moral reasoning. In that sense, it is not really a comprehensive theory of moral development (Rest, 1973).

The so-called "content" of each stage of moral development represents the various values that a person holds. The content of each stage, Kohlberg believes, may be culturally or socially determined and are not universal as the various structural aspects of the stage are. Some researchers (Bull, 1969) have criticized Kohlberg for failing to consider the importance of different value positions that persons might hold in his theory and in his research. Kohlberg, on the other hand, believes that the structural aspects are the important considerations that must be taken into account by a theory of moral development.

A stage can also be characterized as an equilibrium point. The cognitive-development view perceives that growth in moral reasoning occurs as the result of the continuous interaction between the person and the environment. "Development is continually directed toward increasing equilibrium and each stage is a more equilibrated state of functioning than the previous one" (Turiel, in press). A stage, then, is not an inborn tendency or a reflection of cultural laws. It is an actual restructuring of the way a person perceives and
and integrates perceptions (Kohlberg and Gilligan, 1971). Each new stage is a more equilibrated means of interacting with the environment. It is a more adequate way of understanding a moral problem.

**Description of six stages of moral judgment.** From his research, Kohlberg (1958, 1971b) defined six stages of moral development as seen in Table 1. Consistent with the concept of stage development, each of these six stages represents a qualitatively different way of reasoning or exercising moral judgment about a moral issue.

**The concepts of role-taking and justice.** While Kohlberg has often written and spoken broadly about his ideas on moral development, or more aptly moral judgment, he actually has focused his attention and interest primarily on two concepts which make up his basic theory of moral development. The two basic concepts or themes, reflected in the process of stage development, are the concept of justice and the concept of empathy or role-taking. It is the increasing differentiations in the concepts of justice and in role-taking (some places in his work defined as "social perspective") that distinguishes between the various stages of moral development. Kohlberg (1971d) stated,
Table 1

Stages of Moral Development

I. Preconventional Level

At this level the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. The physical consequences of action determine its goodness or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the market place. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.

II. Conventional Level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good boy--nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by intention--"he means well" becomes important for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."
Table 1—Continued

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake.

III. Postconventional, Autonomous, or Principled Level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:

Stage 5: The social contract, legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding elements of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons. (Kohlberg 1971, "From is to Ought," pp. 164-165)
The concept of role-taking and justice provides concrete meaning to the assumption that moral principles are neither external rules taken inward nor natural tendencies of a biological organism, but rather the interactional emergents of social interaction. (p. 53)

The relationship between these two concepts—role-taking and justice—was further enumerated by Kohlberg (1971):

1. Psychologically, both welfare concerns (role-taking, empathy, or sympathy) and concerns are present at birth of morality and at every succeeding stage.
2. Both welfare and justice concerns take on more differentiated, integrated, and universal forms at each step of development.
3. However, at the highest stage of development, only justice takes on the character of a principle, that it becomes something that is obligatory over law and other considerations, including welfare.
4. 'Principles' other than justice may be tried out by those seeking to transcend either conventional or contractual-consensual (stage 5) morality but they do not work because either A, they do not resolve moral conflicts, or B, they resolve them in ways that seem intuitively wrong.
5. The intuitive feeling of many philosophers that justice is the only satisfactory principle corresponds to the fact that it is the only one that 'does justice to' the viable core of lower stages of morality.
6. This becomes most evident in situations of civil disobedience for which justice, but not other moral principles, provides a rationale which represents and can cope with the stage 5 contractual legalistic argument that civil disobedience is wrong. (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 66)

These principles of justice are the key organizing definition for stages 5 and 6. Kohlberg (1971d) describes
the core element in stage 5 as "rational legislative perspective which reduces obligations to rule-utilitarianism considerations on the one hand, and social contract on the other," (p. 62). But, as Kohlberg points out, that perspective cannot resolve the problem where it is morally right to violate the law. Kohlberg believed that only the stage 6 concept of justice is adequate to resolve this conflict "by recognizing that civil disobedience is justified if and only if it prevents a legally condoned injustice" (Kohlberg, 1971d, p. 63). The principle of welfare, the utilitarian principle which considers everyone's happiness equally, will not resolve competing welfare claims. At stage 6, justice reduces to a single element, the principle of distributive justice--treat every person equally regardless of the person--resolves this conflict.

Role-taking ability or the ability to view a situation from another perspective also is an important pre-condition or phase of moral development. Role-taking, too, moves through different developmental levels.

Essentially each of our stages defines (or is defined by) a new cognitive-structural mode of role-taking in conflict situations.

... When we move from role-taking to the resolution of conflicting roles, we are at the 'principle of justice.' A moral conflict is a conflict between competing claims of men: you versus me, you versus him. The pre-condition for moral conflict is man's capacity for role-taking between the expectations of one
person and another. Where such conflicts arise, the principles we use to resolve them are principles of justice. (Kohlberg, 1971d, p. 51)

Without role-taking, one would not be able to experience a moral conflict. Kohlberg reports that welfare concerns—the concern for other people—is the content of that concern. "The moral question," he wrote, "is who's role do I take?" or "who's claim do I favor?" (Kohlberg, 1971b, p. 220).

Research on development of moral reasoning and further refinements in concept of stages. For his doctoral dissertation, Kohlberg (1958) tested his assumptions about moral development that he had conceptualized from the earlier work by Dewey and Piaget on the developmental nature of moral thinking and choice on 75 boys between the ages of 10 and 16. To test their modes of moral thinking, Kohlberg devised a scoring system to analyze responses to a series of hypothetical moral dilemmas. One such dilemma concerned a woman with cancer. The story went like this:

There was a woman who had very bad cancer, and there was no treatment known to medicine that could save her. Her doctor knew that she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like ether or morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crying with pain, and, in her calm periods, she would
ask the doctor to give her enough either to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and she was going to die in a few months anyway. (Kohlberg, 1958)

Kohlberg told each subject a series of such stories, each story involved a conflict in values that would create a moral dilemma for the interviewee. Each story was followed by a series of questions that focused on an issue. The individual's reasoning used to resolve the conflict was then rated and served to determine the stage of moral reasoning. This was the same basic research process that Piaget (1965) had used to study children's moral judgment. If one wants to know how individuals made moral judgments, one has to give them an opportunity to make moral judgments and to observe the moral reasoning used in each judgment.

Kohlberg collected longitudinal data on his original sample for 15 more years. From this on-going process of data collection, he revised and refined his stage conceptions and scoring system.

When Kohlberg's original sample of boys was followed into adulthood and results of these later interviews were analyzed by Kramer (1968) for his dissertation study, Kramer found some 20 per cent of the sample had regressed to a more primitive stage 2 form of reasoning. Others (Haan, Block, and Smith, 1968) also discovered a similar phenomenon in their study of "protestors" at Berkeley.
To discover that part of the sample had regressed obviously posed a problem for the theory which postulated an invariant and sequential ordering of stages, as Turiel (1973) pointed out. After gaining experience with his scoring system and collecting more data, Kohlberg revised some of his initial definitions and scoring. This group of "regressors" was later described to be in a transitional phase between conventional and principled reasoning.

Kohlberg also further differentiated stage 4 and stage 5 into A and B sub-stages. The B sub-stage is a higher order of reasoning than the A sub-stage but still retains the basic orientation of that stage. For example, a 4B sub-stage is oriented toward what is behind the rules or law. But as Kohlberg (1969) wrote,

While stage 4B reflects a clear advance over 4A in rationality of conceptions of rules and in moral autonomy or internality of decisions processes with regard to them, the basic orientation is still 'conventional.' (p. 27)

A key argument in Kohlberg's theory is the idea of the "universality of stages." This means that a particular pattern of stage development occurs in all cultures and is not just an American phenomenon. Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971) reported on a cross-cultural study of middle class urban boys in the United States, Taiwan, and Mexico.
At age ten in each country, the order of use of each stage is the same as the order of its difficulty or maturity. In the United States, by age sixteen the order is the reverse, from the highest to the lowest, except that stage 6 is still little used. The results in Mexico and Taiwan are the same, except that development is a little slower. The most conspicuous feature is that at the age of sixteen, stage 5 thinking is much more salient in the United States than in Mexico or Taiwan. Nevertheless, it is present in the other countries so we know that this is not purely an American democratic construct. (p. 1069)

Stage 3 was the most frequently used stage at age 13 for all three groups. For American boys at age 16 the pattern was referred so that the frequency of stage usage for that age was stage 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1. A similar, but not quite so clearly distinct pattern was evident for the 13 year olds in Taiwan and Mexico. There the pattern was that the 3-4 or conventional stage ranks first followed by stage 2 and stage 1 thinking. Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) reported that a study in two isolated villages, one in Turkey and the other in Yucatan, showed a similar pattern in moral thinking. They found increasing usage of stage 3 and stage 4 thinking and a decrease in stage 1 and stage 2 thinking with age.

In some cultures, the degree of development is not quite as rapid as it is in this culture. But, the sequence of development appears to be the same, thus, providing strong support for the assumption that moral judgment proceeds sequentially through ordered stages of
development. This general finding has support, too, in the longitudinal follow-up that Kohlberg conducted with his original sample. Other researchers (Haan, et al., 1968; Kramer, 1968; Gilligan, 1974; and Rest, 1974) have generally found evidence to support this cognitive-development view of moral development.

**Summary of cognitive development theory of moral reasoning.** The important idea in the cognitive-developmental theory of moral development is that moral judgment increases in complexity—in the degree of differentiation and integration—as one develops intellectually. This process of development in moral thinking represents a movement in sequence through different stages of moral thinking. Each stage represents a qualitatively different orientation, perspective, or ability for role-taking (empathy) and toward determining what is just. The structure, rather than the content of moral thinking at each stage is the focus of attention and analysis in the cognitive-developmental approach to moral development. Each level of structure or stage represents a point of equilibrium, a point where the interaction between the individual and environment has stabilized, at least for the time being.

Development from the pre-conventional to the conventional stage appears to occur naturally for most people,
as long as there is no serious social deprivation or deficient cognitive development, in a rather routine way. The movement to the post-conventional or principled stage of moral reasoning, however, occurs less frequently with many in the adult population remaining at the conventional level of thinking—a level of thinking that is anchored in the rules, norms, and laws of society. This conventional thinking is so typical within the societal structure that stabilization at this level for many people may be the obvious result of socialization. Because principled thinking is not as evident, it apparently takes a stronger combination of events to stimulate development of moral reasoning to this more mature level.

**British researchers**

William Kay

Kay's assumptions about moral growth developed primarily through his own observations, study, and review of the research conducted between 1925 and 1965. Like Piaget and Kohlberg, Kay (1965) also concludes that there is a developmental and sequential process to moral growth.

... as one progresses through the research conclusions, it becomes more and more apparent that the weight of evidence lies on the side of those who claim to be able to discern a clear pattern of sequential developmental moral growth. (p. 68)
Kay also believes that a model of moral maturity that is developmental in nature has advantages because it "enables us to see more clearly that while each child needs help to reach the highest level of morality, the most effective help is that which is appropriate to his level of development" (p. 244). But, he is concerned by the exclusive focus on moral judgment taken by Piaget and by Kohlberg. He believes that such a narrow focus is too limiting to provide much understanding of moral maturity or to be of much assistance to those involved with moral education.

Kay (1975) identifies three different aspects that contribute to the overall process of reaching moral maturity. First, there are certain pre-conditions, such as a sense of identity and self-acceptance, which are necessary if moral growth was to be possible. Second, there is a set of moral traits, such as mature moral judgment, the ability to delay gratification, and moral flexibility, that also are important to moral maturity. Finally, certain essential attitudes must exist before a person can be considered morally mature.

According to Kay (1969), there are two different types of attitudes. First, there are the "displacing attitudes" such as prudential attitudes, authoritarian attitudes, social and personal attitudes, which mark different levels of moral maturity. The second type of
attitudes are the primary attitudes of moral autonomy, moral rationality, moral altruism, and moral responsibility.

For the moment it should be sufficient to say that altruism is essentially that attitude which reveals a concern for people rather than things and places the need of others equal to one's own. Rationality is the willingness to discuss reasonably the moral requirement imposed on man. Responsibility is at least the willingness to accept culpability for one's own actions. And moral independence marks the degree to which one is willing either to depend upon another for moral support or to reach moral decisions alone. (Kay, 1969, p. 243)

In contrast to the cognitive approach to moral development, Kay (1969) believes that an attitudinal model can answer the inadequacies which he sees as inherent in cognitive models of moral development.

In its simplest form, morality can now be considered as a series of stages in development, each level of which is characterized by a dominant attitude. At the level of authoritative morality, for example, a positive attitude to authority figures dominate. Later, at the level of social morality a positive attitude to one's peers dominates. Thus at every stage this complex of attitudes precipitates one which dominates and so induces conduct of a specific kind. . . . in essence, there appears to be a series of displacing attitudes. They rearrange themselves according to circumstances, but at any one moment a dominant attitude dictates the quality of conduct. Now these it will be observed can also be understood in terms of a developmental scheme. (p. 241)

However, like the cognitive or intellectual models of moral development, Kay also considers his attitudinal
model to be developmental in character. In other words, he believes there is a sequence of attitudes that one adopts, each one displacing the former on the way to more mature moral attitudes.

Kay's position on moral development includes a notion of stages of development. But these stages are not the tight structure of the cognitive-developmental perspective. Rather, they are more like pre-conditions or phases of development that one must pass through on the way to full moral maturity. For example,

It follows that these stages are essential to moral development. It may be that one cannot reach moral maturity without passing through a prudential, an authoritarian, a reciprocal, and a social stage. This is not just because each system of morality contains valuable elements for society but because progress is hindered if each stage is not negotiated. . . . (Kay, 1969, p. 252)

Kay incorporates in his model of moral development more dimensions than many other researchers. He supports a developmental approach to morality, but his primary focus is on the traits and attitudes which mark or identify a morally mature individual. He offers little, however, in the way of answers as to why some people have these traits and attitudes and others do not. And, as with many of the other researchers to be described in this section, Kay focuses his attention on primary and secondary school children. He did not focus on later
adolescents or on adults in his study of moral development.

Norman Bull

Bull is another of the English researchers and educators who is very much interested in morality and moral education. In 1969 he conducted a study in which he tested 360 children ranging in age from seven to 17 in the southwest region of England. Personal interviews, visual projective tests to depict various moral situations, and written tests were used. From this study, Bull described four broad stages or levels of moral judgment that were characteristic of the children in his sample.

1. **Anonomy (pre-morality)** - This stage is characterized by purely instinctive behavior. Behavior is influenced or modified only by the pain and pleasure that are experienced.

2. **Heteronomy (external morality)** - At this stage the child is dominated by rules imposed by others such as parents, teachers, clergy and policemen. Controls on behavior are the sanctions of reward and punishment.

3. **Socionomy (external-internal morality)** - At this stage the external morality of the previous stage becomes increasingly internalized. Controls on behavior are no longer solely those of reward and punishment. Social praise and social blame increasingly serve as controls. There also is growing awareness of others and a feeling of responsibility toward them at this stage.

4. **Autonomy (internal morality)** - This is the highest stage of moral development in Bull's schema. At this stage an individual has his own inner ideals of
conduct. Sanctions are the individual's own—self-praise and self-blame—and not dependent on fear of authority or fear of public opinion. Further progression in the internalization of rules learned during the stage of heteronomy also mark this stage.

Unlike the strict sequential order of stage development proposed by some researchers (Piaget, 1965 and Kohlberg, 1958), Bull does not consider a stage as something that a person passes through and leaves behind. He believes that all four stages do survive and pass into adult life. There may be a variance of stages within the individual. They may overlap or they may merge together.

At one time he may be guided by impulse; another by fear of the law; at another, by respect for public opinion; at another, by his own inner principles of behavior.

The more morally mature the individual, the more he will be guided by general and interiorized attitudes—that is by his own autonomy and achieve it in all areas of moral concern. (p. 28)

Bull (1969) is critical of Piaget's unitary theory of development. He believes that Piaget ignored important individual variables like sex and socio-economic status. Bull also objects to Piaget's view that the stage of heteronomy, with its adult constraint, is harmful to the eventual development of moral autonomy. Instead, Bull believes that this is a vital stage of moral development.
It is only through learning that he 'must' that the child can ever come to know that he 'ought.' It is only through imposed discipline that he can come to know that he can come to achieve self-discipline. (Bull, 1969, p. 30)

Also Piaget characterized the process of maturation, according to Bull (1969), as sequential stages of change defined in terms of age changes. Bull believes this places an overemphasis on age changes and ignores individual factors that may advance or retard maturation.

Although Bull is critical of Piaget, whom he believed ignored important data and variables in his study, Bull still supports the general concept of stages of moral judgment. And since Bull does not cite any of the research that was conducted at about this time by Kohlberg, he apparently has independently supported Kohlberg's findings of different levels of moral judgment. The basic difference between Bull and Piaget and Kohlberg is in their conclusion that stages are sequential in their order of appearance with Bull arguing that each stage can be represented to a greater or lesser degree in each adult. In this respect, Bull comes closest to the view held by Hogan (1973) who suggests that moral maturity has several different dimensions that may be present in an individual to a greater or lesser degree. Hogan's research is described in more detail later in this section.
Norman and Sheila Williams

The Williams (1972) take a somewhat different view on moral thinking. It is their belief that the basic modes of moral thought, which are similar to those identified by Peck and Havighurst (1960), are present at an early age. Each of these modes is subject to its own parallel developmental sequence, which appears to be a process of generalization. By generalization, the authors mean that in young children modes of thinking start out as very specific. As similar situations link them together, that mode of thought is applied in a more general way. Since these modes of thinking may exist together, the authors report that by the time a person has reached a final stage of maturity "the individual has a number of different and simultaneous existing modes of thought which relate to a given situation" (p. 101). For example, one might refrain from stealing for a variety of reasons—the consequences to the owner of the property, going to prison if caught, or feeling ashamed or because authority is against stealing.

The Williams interviewed 790 children of different ages in England, about simple moral concepts like good, bad, lying, and stealing. For a concept like stealing, they asked the children whether this was right or wrong and why was it right or wrong. They did not use hypothetical stories as others (Kohlberg, 1958) have done
to collect data. From these interviews, they describe 13 different types of responses. Some examples of the responses are: 1) amoral, uncontrollable responses, 2) authoritarian responses, 3) conforming responses, 4) legalistic responses, 5) empathic responses, and 6) expedient responses. The authors then grouped these 13 responses into four categories that are based upon two identifiable dimensions. One dimension is self-orientation versus other-orientation, and the second dimension is based on whether the consequences or effects of the act or some absolute criterion are used to make a moral judgment. The following matrix illustrates this relationship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Considering</th>
<th>Obeying</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Expedient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guilt-avoiding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shame-avoiding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Empathic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theoretical-generalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rational-utilitarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Adapted from N. & S. Williams, 1972, p. 96)

In addition to an amoral or uncontrolled, impulse-governed response, four modes of moral thinking were identified:

**Self-considering** - A situation was evaluated in terms of its consequences to self
Self-obeying - The problem was not evaluated but was referred to an internalized or introjected rule or criterion
Other-obeying - The problem was not evaluated but was referred to external authority
Other-considering - The problem was evaluated in terms of consequences for other people

(Adapted from N. & S. Williams, 1972, pp. 95-96)

What is unique about their presentation of these modes of thought is the idea that these modes might differ depending on the topics, issues or concepts involved, although a person might have a slight preponderance for one mode of thinking over another. They believed that there are parallel developmental sequences in moral thinking and that moral judgments can vary depending on the situation.

This broad view certainly serves to keep their theory of moral development from being criticized as uni-dimensional and unable to handle complex findings. On the other hand, they have little to say about why different topics suggest different modes of thinking, and why there are some different patterns of responses. Like so many other studies in this area, the sample selected for study represents a younger age group and do not examine college age modes of thinking continue to develop in later adolescence or whether some modes may drop out or become less utilized while other new modes develop or are utilized more frequently.
John Wilson

Wilson, another prominent English researcher, focuses his interest on the assessment of morality and on the identification of the moral components of the morally educated person. Wilson (1973b) believes that the non-normative research approach followed by Piaget, Kohlberg, and some of the other researchers who have studied moral development, socialization, or character traits has limitations. Since these researchers use the traits or dimensions that they are interested in studying in the content of the stories designed to assess a person's morality, the results are necessary slanted in favor of the researchers' own biases. Instead, Wilson suggests that more open-ended research approach be used.

Wilson (1973b) broadly defines morality to include judgments, principles, actions, and feelings. He believes that any definition of morality must be tied to what people actually do. Generally, he is interested in what concepts a person has, what principles a person believes that he ought to follow, what feelings and emotions a person has, the knowledge that person has of another person's emotions or knowledge of relevant facts, and whether a person actually acts in accordance with his decision.

Wilson constructed, almost on an a priori basis, a list of moral components that could be attributed to
the morally educated person. Roughly, his categories are divided into those components related to different kinds of knowing, those components concerned with doing, and those components concerned with feeling (Wilson, 1973a). By using these components, by observing a subject's behavior, and by asking a subject what his reasons or intentions were, Wilson constructed an operational definition of the morally educated person. He selected odd-sounding letters for his definitions of the moral components, so as to avoid vague and global terms. Wilson used the first letters of classical Greek words to give names to these components. Here are some examples:

a) PHIL - refers to the degree to which one can identify with other people, in the sense of being such that other people's feelings and instincts actually count or weigh with one, or are accepted as of equal validity to one's own.

b) EMP - refers to awareness or insight into own and other people's feelings; i.e., the ability to know what those feelings are and describe them correctly.

c) GIG - refers to the mastery of factual knowledge. To make correct moral decisions, PHIL and EMP are not sufficient: one also needs to have a reasonable idea of what consequences one's actions will have, and this is not entirely a matter of EMP.
d) **DIK** - refers to the rational formulation of EMP and GIG, on the basis of PHIL, into a set of rules or moral principles to which the individual commits himself.

e) **PHRON** - refers to the rational formulation of rules and principles relating to one's own life and interests.

f) **KRAT** - refers to the ability to translate DIK or PHRON principles into action: to live up to one's moral or prudential principles.

The morally educated person can be described as someone who can empathize with others, has insight into his and other's feelings, can perceive the consequences of his actions, and can formulate rules or principles that he can commit himself to and act upon. Wilson (1973b) cautions that these component titles are not intended to represent any psychological entities or innate abilities. Individuals are scored only on whether they have these abilities or not. The status of each component is clarified by asking the question "Is it true of S that . . .?" (p. 64)

While Wilson has a strong interest in assessment, his primary purpose for developing a list of components is to see what can be done through the schools to increase the use of these components in the children. His research differs from that of Piaget and Kohlberg, who attempted to determine what the morality of a person was and why. Wilson (1973b) has referred to that research approach.
as non-normative research and his own research as normative.

The morally educated S must be an improvement on the morally uneducated S: this is part of the meaning of 'morally educated.' The researcher must therefore begin by establishing the norms of his (normative) research: that is, what it means to be 'morally educated,' or educated in the area of morality. (p. ix)

Wilson's approach to assessment is promising but because this study is basically concerned with the morality of students in the discipline setting, it has followed the non-normative approach used by Kohlberg and others.

Learning theorist

Justin Aronfreed

Aronfreed's (1968) ideas about moral conduct contrast sharply with the cognitive or moral judgment theorists such as Kohlberg or Piaget. Control over moral conduct and behavior are described by Aronfreed (1971) primarily in terms of a process of socialization which leads to such control or social learning. The extensive emphasis on moral judgment presented by the cognitive-developmental theorists is seen as much too narrow.

Moral judgments may be both a discernible and a powerful determinant of some forms of conduct. But it can hardly be supposed that moral decision-making processes enter extensively into very much social behavior. Certainly, moral thought cannot contain the conceptual resources that are needed for an understanding of the total spectrum of the processes through which socialization occurs. It might better be thought of as a singular
and complex function that must be subordinated theoretically to a less specific and constrained view of the mechanics that govern internalized control of behavior. (Aronfreed, 1971, pp. 186-187)

Aronfreed (1971) also wonders if the progression in what he calls "verbal expression of conscience" does not reflect a much more general shift in cognitive capacity rather than reflecting any inherently moral stages of development.

Aronfreed's orientation to moral behavior is organized around those factors that control behavior—external or internal. The value system that serves as a control device, Aronfreed describes as "conscience" (Aronfreed, 1971). These value systems are the result of the past history of social reinforcement. Differences in control over behavior, Aronfreed (1971) believes, can be seen as a function of internal or external orientation. His model, while not neglecting the importance of cognitive factors, is centered on the history of reinforcement. Response patterns are determined by their effect on reducing such aversive and affective states as fear, anxiety or guilt.

Aronfreed (1968) believes that the Piaget's and Kohlberg's studies on the cognitive differences in judging transgressions can be considered on a continuum of internal versus external orientation toward consequences.
when they are asked to assign appropriate punishments they may judge transgressions either in terms of their visibly harmful consequences or in terms of the intentions of the transgressor. They may advocate retribution in the resolution of transgression, or they may suggest that the transgressor take the initiative through restitution. . . . (p. 42)

Aronfreed distinguishes four types of reactions to transgressions: 1) self-criticism, 2) separation, 3) confession, and 4) reactions oriented toward external punishment. Self-criticism can be regarded as an internally oriented reaction, an apology as an externally oriented response.

Control over behavior can be described, as Aronfreed (1968) frequently noted in Conduct and Conscience, as a continuum of internal versus external orientation of control. Cognitive factors, that other researchers such as Piaget or Kohlberg attribute great importance to, are seen as mediating influences on the evaluative control exercised over conduct. Cognitive structure serves as a filtering function for such aversive states as guilt or fear of punishment or other affective components, such as anxiety, for example. Cognitive operations also function as important mediators of internalized control over behavior. Aronfreed (1968) clearly recognizes the importance of such cognitive operations in this mediating capacity.
The representational and evaluative functions of conscience vary in concreteness and abstraction of their reference to the external outcome of conduct, and also in the directness with which they translate such outcomes into their value for the individual. A complete analysis of the concept of internalization can therefore be made only by taking into account the cognitive determinants of conduct as well as its dependence on external consequences. (p. 34)

So, while Aronfreed views cognitive process as not in developmental terms, he clearly considers cognition to be an important influence, particularly in bridging or filtering the effects of social or external learning cues and internal factors. But cognitive functions are not the only influence in this evaluation process.

However, an evaluative structure is not merely a cognitive scheme for the environmental coding of information. It is the quality and magnitude of the affectivity that becomes associated with particular classifications which permit the structure to enter into the operations of value and to exercise some control over behavior. (Aronfreed, 1968, p. 278)

Reward and punishment are two obvious social stimuli that help to externally maintain conduct. External stimuli, Aronfreed believes, would always continue to influence even internalized control over conduct because external stimuli directly affect the behavior itself, "but also through their specification of the conditions under which particular forms of conduct will maintain their acquired intrinsic value" (Aronfreed,
1968, p. 32). Generalization, discrimination, and other learning factors shape or determine the role of this external stimulus in the later acquisition of moral behavior or control over conduct.

External rewards and punishment, the product of social experience, are the important variables in Aronfreed's model, which perhaps can best be described as a moral learning model in which a person's previous experiences play a very important role. The relationship between internal and external control over behavior in this model is a compensating one, according to Aronfreed. Potential external outcomes of behavior engage internal evaluative dispositions. The degree to which such internal dispositions come into play depend on the extent to which such dispositions have already been established by previous direct experiences in similar situation.

It seems clear that these dispositions are more extensively brought into play when the values of potential external rewards and punishment is not in itself so great as to completely determine . . . behavior. . . . The promise of reward and the threat of punishment obtain their effects through dispositions which socialization has given to the child. (Aronfreed, 1968, p. 300)

In summary, Aronfreed believes that control over behavior is exercised through the process of socialization. That control can be either externally or internally oriented, although external stimuli or cues seem to be an
important determinant of behavior in almost every circumstance. As a person grows and matures, there is a shift in control from an external orientation to an internal orientation. Moral judgment serves a mediating role in control over behavior. Aronfreed rejects an evolutionary view of moral development, which presupposes an evolution from lower to higher stages of moral judgment, where socialization serves only as a catalyst for developmental changes in the structure of moral thought. Instead, he emphasizes the role of aversive stimulation and anxiety with cognitive mediating processes, in the internalization of control over behavior (Aronfreed, 1971).

**Character or personality studies**

Robert Peck and Robert Havighurst

Certain approaches to the study of moral values have taken the form of character or personality analysis. Such was the approach pursued by Peck and Havighurst in their study conducted in the middle 1940's, which was published under the title, *The Psychology of Character Development* (1960). Their study was part of an extensive longitudinal study that had been conducted by teams of researchers on two groups of children— one group born in 1926 and the other in 1933 in the small mid-western
community of Prairie City. Several other well-known studies—Elmtown's Youth by Hollingstead and Social Class in America by Warner, Meeker, and Ellis, among others, have been published on data collected from this same sample.

Collecting data from the 1926 group, Havighurst and Taba (1945) published an earlier work, Adolescent Character and Personality, that examined factors related to moral reputation. In a subsequent study by Peck and Havighurst a special group of 34 children were selected for intensive study. This study made use of interviews, essays, projective techniques, etc. that were qualitatively analyzed by members of the research team during weekly case conferences. Data also included standardized IQ scores from interest inventories as well as sociometric scores on character and personality traits.

The authors utilized both inductive and deductive analysis in their study. Drawing on their prior experiences and readings, particularly those of the so-called neo-freudians, they developed certain character typologies which they defined as "amoral," "expedient," "conforming," "irrational-conscientious," and "rational-altruistic." But Peck and Havighurst soon discovered that approaching the problem from a purely inductive or from a strictly deductive approach would not suffice.
In terms of methodology, this was not a purely inductive process, the discovering of regularities in the data with no use of prior hypotheses. Rather, it was a deductive-inductive approach. It postulated certain hypotheses about the psychological components of moral character, then tested these against the case data to see if the theory fitted the observed facts. Where significant patterns were found, taking all cases together, this was interpreted as general substantiation of the theory. Beyond this, where unforeseen relationships emerged, it might be said that the new patterns represented inductive discoveries. (p. 206)

They defend this mixed approach to analysis by pointing out "that an exploratory study of this nature is the only way such a complex aspect of human conduct can be studied. Perhaps, by their nature, the important aspects of moral conduct can never be validly measured in a laboratory setting, or with the simplified logic of controlled experiment" (p. 206).

The five character types were derived by the authors from their previous research and from extensive reading. Their identification of these character typologies were strongly influenced by Fromm's (1947) Man for Himself. This set of character types was intended, as the authors wrote,

... to: (1) be defined and labeled in terms of the control system the individual uses to adapt his search for satisfaction to the requirements of the social world; (2) include all possible modes of adaptation; (3) be defined in terms of motivation (so long as it achieves behavioral expression); (4) represent both operational
patterns of behavior, and the stage of psycholo-social development to which each pattern presumably is most appropriate. (p. 4)

Unlike the stage theories of Piaget and Kohlberg, which postulated invariant stages of development, Peck and Havighurst considered these character types to be components of character. They choose to describe each of these types, however, as if they were ideal types. The first type, amoral, represented the absence of any self-imposed control. The other four types, according to the authors, "represented the four reasons why a person may behave according to the moral standards of his society" (p. 4).

They defined each of these types in the following manner:

1. Amoral - This type corresponds to what is often called clinically the psychopathic personality. Such a person follows his whims and impulses, without regard for how this affects other people. He considers himself the center of the universe and sees other people or objects as means to direct self-gratification. There are no internalized moral principles, no conscience or super ego.

2. Expedient - A person of this type is primarily self-centered, and considers other people's welfare and reactions only in order to gain his personal ends. He tends to get what he wants with a minimum of giving in return. He behaves so long as it suits his purpose. . . . Like the amoral, he regards himself as the only person who is really important; but he is more aware of the advantages of conforming to social requirements in the short run, in order to achieve long-run advantages.
3. **Conforming** - This kind of person has one general, internalized principle: to do what others do, and what they say one "should" do. He wants to and does conform to all the rules of his group. He wants to do what others do, and his only anxiety is for possible disapproval. He follows a system of literal rules, specific for each occasion, with no necessary over-all consistency as to the degree of morality in different situations. This type of person acts out of "shame" (rather than "guilt") that others might find out that a moral rule was violated. It differs from the Expedient approach in that social conformity is accepted as good for its own sake. A Conformist may frequently ignore changes for personal advantage, if they require departure from prescribed rules of conduct. Individuals of this type frequently define "right" as acting by the rules. If this sometimes hurts others, he feels no moral responsibility, no guilt. This individual also has no abstract principles of honesty, loyalty, responsibility, etc.

4. **Irrational-Conscientious** - This is the person who judges a given act according to his own internal standards of right and wrong. Anxiety resulting from failure to live up to his own idea of what is moral is called guilt.

The irrational component can appear when preconceived principles are rigidly applied, somewhat in the manner of the conformist. Such individuals may not see that the rules, which they have internalized, are man made. An act is seen as "good" or "bad" because of its positive or negative effects on others.

5. **Rational-Altruistic** - This is considered the highest level of moral maturity. Such a person not only has a stable set of moral principles by which he judges and directs his own action. The results of an act are objectively assessed in each situation and approved on the grounds of whether or not it serves others as well as himself. It is called "rational" because each new action is realistically assessed in terms
of previous experience and "altruistic" because the welfare of others as well as self is considered. There is no irrational feeling of guilt or anxiety. He feels guilty if he errs, but the response is to take steps to rectify the error. Actions are justified by their moral effect, not by rationalization or defensive perceptions. (Adapted from Peck and Havighurst, 1960, pp. 5-9)

Results of investigation. As they compared personality factors with maturity of character, what did Peck and Havighurst discover? For one thing, they found that the character types seemed to reflect an ascending scale of psychological and moral maturity. Among the developmental trends that appeared were: increasing ego strength, increasingly internalized moral principles or conscience, and a greater capacity for love. For instance, they identified four qualitatively different types of "conscience" as one moved from the amoral to the rational-altruistic character type. At the most primitive level are those who act in very repressive ways. Their world is regulated by "don't."

The second type of conscience, according to Peck and Havighurst (1960),

... is largely of role-conformity, with the main weight of authority still residing in the people around one. Its one central principles is a willing, sometimes anxious desire to do whatever the respected others require. (p. 170)
A third type of conscience is based on what the authors describe as "a firmly organized body of internalized moral rules which maintain their own autonomy" (p. 170). At this third level, there is no questioning or rationally testing of these moral rules. The fourth type of conscience is the one found in rational-altruistic subjects. "It is a firm set of internalized moral principles which are accessible to rational questioning and testimony" (Peck and Havighurst, 1960, p. 171).

The development of conscience from the highly regulated and repressive to a mature and internalized set of moral rules supports a consistent finding of other researchers that moral growth represents a movement from external to internal standards and from dependence on a set of external rules and values to a more autonomous and self-directed level of moral functioning. Another aspect of their findings is what Peck and Havighurst describe as "consistency of character through time." They found that the patterns of motives and actions that individuals have at age 10 persist through adolescence. As they point out,

This persistence is observable in two ways. The adequacy of an individual's moral motives and behavior, relative to his own age group, tends to stay about the same relative level as he develops through later childhood and adolescence. . . . . . . most individuals tend to maintain the same attitudes and motives through the years, in major aspects of morality. The child who
is deeply friendly and affectionate at ten, for instance, is most likely to show the same warmth, trustful feelings for people at sixteen and seventeen... In short, if character be defined in terms of powerful, emotion-laden attitudes, as well as action patterns that tend to become habituated, the evidence indicates that there is indeed such a theory as individual character, and that it tends to persist through the years. (p. 165)

According to these researchers, character type starts to develop early along a certain path, and as the person grows that type is strengthened. The family influence often remains the same which serves to reinforce that particular type of character development. For example, the Expedient child does not move firmly into a conforming pattern, but just learns more and better ways of being expedient.

Only the "mature" adolescent, according to these researchers, is still growing psychologically and is open to still further growth. Peck and Havighurst indicated that the majority of their research population appear to be fixated at immature levels of development and seem to remain permanently stuck with childlike ways of viewing and meeting life. Those who show a significant degree of rational altruism, the authors report, "are almost the only ones who are able to question life intelligently, question their own preconceptions, and thus be able to grow in moral wisdom and meet unforeseen situations with effective morality" (p. 169).
In summary, we can see that the authors approached their study of character much like a study of personality. They assumed a "motivational view" of character development. Character reflects a way of integrating internal demands with external reality. Character consists of five types or motivational patterns that represent different development periods, as illustrated below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character Type</th>
<th>Developmental Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amoral</td>
<td>Infancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expedient</td>
<td>Early Childhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conforming</td>
<td>Later Childhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrational-Conscientious</td>
<td>Adolescence and Adulthood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rational-Altruistic</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

At first Peck and Havighurst viewed these as distinct character types but later changed their opinion and considered that each of these types exists within everyone to a lesser or greater degree. Initially, in their inductive step, they attempted to associate over 30 characters or personality traits with these five types. They were unable to do this directly, but through factor analysis, six principle vectors were identified. But the principal findings of their study were: 1) the consistency of character through time, and 2) the important influence of family up-bringing on character type.
Robert Hogan

Hogan, like Peck and Havighurst (1960), views moral development in terms of character structure. He believes that moral development should be considered within the larger framework of personality. Two basic developmental, yet independent structures that comprise a general framework of personality are "role structures" and "character structures." Role structure is largely the product of peer group experience, Hogan reported. It comprises rules, self-images, and life-style, and represents one's perceptions and beliefs about how to act in specific situations. Character structure, on the other hand, represents the more private and personal self. ".../it/ develops in response to the demands of parents and family and depends primarily on the unconscious accommodation that one has made to their expectations" (Hogan, 1975, p. 166). Hogan considers character structure to be the central core of personality that reflected early experience and interaction with the family. Character structure is apt to be reflected individually through attitude statements. Role structure, on the other hand, is often reflected through overt behavior. Moral character is defined not by the behavior but by a person's reasons for engaging in the behavior.

To fully understand or describe each person's character, one must consider five different dimensions--
moral knowledge, socialization, empathy, autonomy, and another dimension which Hogan alternately describes as moral positivism (rationality) or moral intuitionism or as an "ethic of conscience" or "ethic of responsibility" (Hogan, 1975). As Hogan (1973) described it, "Morality is a natural phenomenon, an adaptive response to evolutionary pressures . . ." (p. 218). The dimension of "moral knowledge" represents knowledge of social rules. It is a function of intelligence and serves three important functions.

First, it allows one to moralize, to pass moral judgments, to judge actions as praise or blame worthy. Second, moral knowledge provides the foundations for prudential actions; that is, actions in accordance with social norms are usually in one's best interest. Third, moral knowledge affords the possibility for self-control. (Hogan, 1975, p. 158)

Socialization represents the degree that rules and regulations are internalized and are seen as obligatory and binding.

The internalization of social rules brings about qualitative transformation in character structure—for the first time the child becomes capable of true (i.e., rule governed and non-egocentric) social interaction. (Hogan, 1975, p. 160)

Hogan describes empathy, a third dimension, as "the capacity and disposition to regulate one's actions, in accordance with the expectations of others. . . ." (p. 160). It represents the ability to see the implications of
behavior and the ability to adopt alternative perspectives. In contrast to socialization, which Hogan suggested is a response to parents' demands, empathy seems related to role-taking and a product of the peer group experience.

Another dimension of moral development is judgmental that represents the way a person responds to rules. The person who adopts the position that rules have instrumental value for regulating society and that the right thing for a person to do is determined by the norms and conventions of society is described as a "moral positivist." "... laws are justified in terms of the degree to which they promote the common good" (Hogan, 1973, p. 159). "Moral intuition or the 'ethics of conscience,' on the other end of this continuum," is a judgment based on the idea that there are higher laws, unrelated to human legislation, which may be discovered by intuition and reason" (Hogan, 1973, p. 274). Or, as Hogan (1975) has written elsewhere, "the person perceives the right thing for him or her to do personally without great regard for established norms and conventions" (p. 159).

Autonomy is the final dimension of moral development. It represents a basic transformation in the structure of character, according to Hogan, and is the
capacity to make decisions independent of the influence of peer group pressures or authority.

Socialization and empathy leave a person committed to the status quo. The development of autonomy, however, gives a person the capacity for pro-social non compliance with social rules; it is the source of constructive social change at the individual level. (Hogan, 1975, p. 162)

The ideal endpoint of moral development in Hogan's model is to reach the optimal placement on each of these five dimensions. That optimum placement represents moral maturity. It is possible to have too much or too little of each of these dimensions. For example, a person with an excess of empathy or role-taking, might be too concerned with the expectations of others that he or she would be indecisive, equivocating or morally oversensitive. With too little empathy, a person would lack sympathy, sensitivity, and concern.

These dimensions, particularly socialization, empathy, and autonomy are considered by Hogan to be adaptive responses to evolutionary norms. They represented the resolution of a dialectic—a resolution of critical paradoxes, polarities, or discontinuities in nature. Socialization, empathy, and autonomy are transitions points in moral development. The appearance of each of those three dimensions is followed by qualitative changes in the dynamics of social behavior. The outcome of the distinct development of socialization, empathy,
and autonomy defines a person's unique character structure in Hogan's model.

To summarize, one can see that Hogan's model can be described as a developmental model comprised of several dimensions. Three of these dimensions—socialization, empathy, and autonomy—represent the developmental resolution of particular dichotomies or contrasts of competing forces and influences in a person's life. Unlike the cognitive stage development approach, these dimensions do not imply successful transitions through earlier levels.

The Level of Sophistication in Moral Development Research

Research in the area of moral development has not advanced as far as many people think or would wish. First, as the review of the general approaches and models for the study of moral development indicated, most of these studies have involved children or the early adolescent, not the older adolescent or young adult. Wilson (1974) in his introduction to *Values and Moral Development in Higher Education* pointed out this deficiency. "Nobody, I take it, believes that a person's moral development should grind to a halt at the age of 15 or 16; and it seems important, however, difficult, to investigate this particular area as sensibly as possible" (p. 1).
Rest (1973) described five phases of cognitive developmental research. Phase I was basically descriptive research. At this phase, contrasts in response between different groups, such as different age groups, were usually the focus of the research. In phase II research basically replicated earlier research or extended it to different samples and different cultures. Research that moved beyond the descriptive level and began to test different hypotheses or implications of cognitive-developmental theory characterized the third phase. Research in this phase might involve experimental studies of developmental changes or correlational studies using different indices of morality. Phase IV represented a new cycle, according to Rest. Included in this phase, for instance, were efforts to reconceptualize or elaborate on some of the characteristics of the different stages of moral development. This phase may involve longitudinal studies, efforts to improve assessment techniques, and further testing of moral development hypotheses.

Rest (1973) described recent research on moral judgment using Kohlberg's typology of states as now representing phase IV and research using Piaget's characteristics as phase III. Bull's (1969) descriptive research represented phase I and Wilson's (1967) research
was not yet at phase I according to Rest. But, Wilson (1974) cautioned against rushing too quickly into quantification. He wanted to be sure that researchers were clear in their aims. Understood the evidence from the social sciences, and could integrate that with what went on in practice.

We find ourselves therefore in what we might call the pre-experimental stage of investigation. This is a very important stage, and we must not be in too much of a hurry to pass through it. Too much educational research has rushed too quickly into statistics and quantification. A good deal of hard thinking and discussion is required before we can begin even to formulate sensible and productive experiments. . . . (pp. 1-2)

A fifth phase, a futuristic phase that would utilize the accomplishments of phase IV, also was proposed by Rest. Because of improved assessment techniques, for example, the results of moral judgment research would be used to generate educational programs.

The usefulness of moral judgment research to education would hopefully furnish the researcher in turn with 'field sites' where he could not only receive subjects for testing, but also observe people making judgments in more naturalistic situations. Theory and research can provide conceptual tools for analyzing the classroom situation, and the classroom situation can provide a testing ground for theory and research as well as new leads for study. (Rest, 1973, p. 27)

Rest also believed that this phase would focus more on specific developmental periods rather than be spread throughout the whole range of moral development.
Studies on change and the conditions for stage transition would also be part of this future phase of research.

I agree with Wilson's earlier comment that there is a need for caution before moving too quickly to the stage of quantification. We do need to know more about what we are doing and why, and quantification of data may not help all that much. But, at the same time, research efforts are moving forward. There is an important need to integrate theory and practice. This study is an attempt to do just that. It has resemblances to several of the different phases of research that Rest described. It is basically a descriptive study, like those categorized in phase I. It also serves some of the same purposes as phase III—to test different implications of cognitive-developmental theory. But, primarily it represents what I hope will be characteristic of phase V research. It is one of the few studies designed around a naturalistic situation. It focuses on a more limited developmental range typical of college students. This research may generate useful educational programs as well.

Moral development theory has provided a conceptual tool for analyzing the discipline setting. The discipline setting provides the "field site," and an opportunity to test out some theoretical assumptions. But, as Rest (1973) so poignantly noted, the cognitive-developmentalist must spend more initial effort in
describing organizational response patterns than those who are studying behavioristic variables such as antecedent-consequent relationships. A large portion of this study has required that very effort—to describe the various response patterns of students involved in campus discipline problems.

Several different models and approaches to the study of moral development were reviewed in this chapter. The selection of one of these models—the cognitive-developmental model of moral development—as the major model of interest is discussed in the following section.

**Theoretical Focus of This Study**

While there have been many approaches to the study of moral development, the cognitive-developmental model of moral development, exemplified by the work of Kohlberg, was selected as the major theoretical foundation underlying this study. That model was selected for several reasons. One of the major contributions that Kohlberg has made to the growing body of moral development literature has been his focus on adolescent and adult moral development. Many of the other studies focused only on children enrolled in primary and secondary schools. Since this study was centered on the moral development of college students, Kohlberg's description of that phase of development most characteristic of
that age range was an important consideration in the selection of that model.

The cognitive-developmental perspective actually is concerned with the development of moral judgment on moral reasoning. The cognitive aspect of development is the central variable. And, while that sole emphasis on cognitive development can be a criticism of this model, the focus on moral judgment is actually another reason why the cognitive-developmental model was selected. In the context of campus discipline, it is the behavior that brought the student into the discipline process. But, from that point on it was the judgments, reasons, explanations, and other cognitive attributes that are the behavior of present concern. Further, concern for cognitive development or the development of moral judgment is perceived within an educational institution as a very legitimate interest. Student personnel workers do not have to defend their interest in this domain to the rest of the academic community.

Finally, Kohlberg's theory of moral stage development was selected as the organizing theoretical perspective for this study because this theory has been both logically constructed and empirically supported. The assumptions are clearly stated so that predictions can be generated. The theory fully describes the various stages of moral development. Its internal consistency
and conceptual logic make it a very functional theory and, thus, attractive to this researcher.

Moral judgment is the key concept in the stage-development theory of moral development. Reasons why moral judgment was selected as the major variable of interest are reviewed in the following section.

Moral Judgment as the Variable of Interest

In the review of the various models of moral development presented earlier in this chapter several different variables were identified or singled out by those researchers concerned with moral development. These different variables or dimensions included: moral attitudes (Kay, 1975), moral autonomy (Bull, 1969 and Hogan, 1973); behavior (Wilson, 1973a and Aronfreed, 1958); reaction to criticism (Aronfreed, 1968); character type (Peck and Havighurst, 1960); moral knowledge (Wilson, 1973b and Hogan, 1975); empathy (Hogan, 1975 and Wilson, 1973); moral intuition (Hogan, 1973); and moral judgment (Hogan, 1973; Piaget, 1965; Kohlberg, 1958; Bull, 1969; and Aronfreed, 1968). The ultimate concern for anyone working with moral issues, moral education, or moral development, of course, is the actual behavior of the individual in different situations. In this study it is a question of selecting a variable or the variables most related to moral behavior and to the
general context and focus of the study. Ultimately, this researcher also is concerned about the future behavior of the students involved in discipline cases. The level of moral judgment, given the context of this study with a high dependence on the verbal reports of individual students, was selected as the most appropriate variable to study for several reasons.

First, moral judgment has been shown to have a strong relationship to actual behavior. In a study of cheating, Kohlberg (1969) found that a measure of moral judgment was the best predictor of actual behavior. Principled subjects were less likely to cheat than conventional or pre-conventional subjects. Krebs (1971), in a contrived cheating study, also found that 75% of the conventional and pre-conventional students cheated on at least one of four experimental cheating tests. In comparison only 20% of the stage 5 students cheated. It is Kohlberg's interpretation of these results that situational forces are a greater determinant to moral behavior at the conventional levels than at the principled level when there are distinct and concrete ways of defining right and wrong. But, when the situation is ambiguous, moral judgment can be the most powerful predictor of action. The cognitive aspects of moral judgment define the situation for the individual and, thus, play a strong causal role in behavior (Kohlberg, 1972).
Kohlberg (1975c) made several points regarding the importance of emphasizing the role of moral judgment among the various factors, including effect, that contribute to moral behavior.

1. Moral judgment, while only one factor in moral behavior, is the single most important factor or influential factor yet discovered in moral behavior.

2. While other factors influence moral behavior, moral judgment is the only distinctively moral factor in moral behavior.

3. Moral judgment change is long-range or inevitable, a higher stage is never lost. In contrast, moral behavior as such is largely situational and reversible or "loseable" in new situations. (p. 50)

Even behaviorists, such as Aronfreed (1968), who place such importance on the reinforcement contingencies that control behavior, recognize the important mediating role that cognitive factors play. It seems that, as Kohlberg suggested above, of all the variables that can be identified that relate to moral behavior, the one that has been most clearly isolated is the cognitive factor of moral judgment.

Most often in the discipline situation responding to the discipline violation takes place after the discipline incident has already occurred. The behavioral episode has passed and one is left to respond to self-reports that the student makes in his or her own behalf. These self-reports are frequently in the form of judgments—
judgments as to why the incident occurred, judgments about the likelihood of future recurrences, judgments about the seriousness of the incident, and, of course, the many implicit cognitive and moral judgments that a student might make about the incident. It seems to this researcher that the moral judgment variable is a particularly useful and obviously a closely related variable to the discipline incident itself. Also, because of the research that has been conducted on moral judgment, this variable itself has been described by Kohlberg (1958, 1971, and 1973) and Rest (1973 and 1974) as progressing through different developmental stages. This developmental property of the moral judgment variable makes its selection as the variable of interest congruent with the overall developmental objective behind this research.

The Relationship of Moral Judgment to Other Variables

Once the decision was made to select moral judgment as the preeminent variable in this study, it was important to determine whether any other variables, such as sex, socio-economic status, or intelligence have any association with measures of moral judgment and, hence, help explain some of the variance in moral development scores. The answer to this question was mixed.
Intelligence and moral judgment

Since moral judgment, which was the concept most often used by the cognitive-developmental theorists to define moral development, has obviously a strong cognitive component, it was expected that intelligence would be associated with moral judgment. That seems to be the case, but it depended on the type of intelligence measure employed. Kohlberg (1971d and 1975c) and Rest (1975b) reported correlations between IQ and maturity of moral judgment in the .30's or .40's. Correlations of this magnitude would account for only 10 to 15 per cent of the variance. But, Kohlberg (1975a) believed that traditional IQ measures were less apt to tap the cognitive factors at work.

Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning; a person's logical stage puts a certain ceiling on the moral stage he can attain. . . . While logical development is necessary for moral development and sets limits to it, most individuals are higher in logical stage than they are in moral stage. As an example, over 50% of late adolescents and adults are capable of full formal reasoning, but only 15% of these adults (all formal operational) display principled (Stages 5 and 6) moral reasoning. (p. 671)

Kohlberg suggested that other measures of cognitive capacity, such as the measures of cognitive ability employed in Piaget's approach, might reflect a greater degree of relationship.
Such a possibility was tested by Tomlinson-Keasey and Keasey (1974). For two specific age groups—12 and 19—they examined the relationship between cognitive development as measured by three Piagetian measures of formal operational thinking and responses to six of Kohlberg's moral dilemmas. They reported positive correlations of .60 and .58 between these two measures, which led them to state: "these findings clearly indicate that a substantial relationship does exist between cognitive and moral development that is independent of age and its many correlates" (p. 43).

Graham (1972), after he reviewed several studies of moral development, was led to conclude that among the variables of intelligence, sex, religion, and social class that intelligence has shown the strongest relationship with moral development. He cited some correlations that were over .50, but did not indicate what method of assessing intelligence was used. Graham believed that this positive relationship existed because those with higher intelligence levels were better able to judge the probable results of their behavior and had greater command of abstract and conceptual tools on which to judge this behavior or assess the consequences.
Even though there was a relationship between cognitive maturity and moral maturity, this relationship was not one-to-one.

A certain level of cognitive maturity is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a given level of moral judgment. In other words, all morally advanced children are bright but not all bright children are morally advanced (or, all intellectually dull children are morally retarded but not all bright children are morally advanced). Moral maturity requires cognitive maturity but it also requires further features of development. (Kohlberg, 1971'd, pp. 45-46)

Higher levels of moral judgment require the ability to use abstract concepts. In that sense a strong relationship between cognitive ability and moral reasoning should exist. However, just because someone has a high level of intelligence does not mean that person has or will use a high level of moral judgment.

**Social class and moral judgment**

Several researchers have reported a relationship between moral judgment and social class (Peck and Havighurst, 1960; Kohlberg, 1971; Kohlberg and Gilligan, 1974; and Kay, 1975). Graham (1972) reviewed several studies that showed evidence of a relationship between social class and level of moral development. He explained this relationship by stating: "It is probable that this is mediated by wider use of 'reasoning' techniques in discipline together with a higher general level of intelligence and subtler use of language"
Several of Kohlberg's studies (1971d and 1973a) revealed class differences, with middle class children having higher levels of moral maturity. Kohlberg attributed this fact to a greater opportunity for middle class children for role-taking, which enabled them to develop a capacity to take on the perspective of another person.

The main experiential determinant of moral development seems to be the amount and variety of social experience, the opportunity to take a number of roles and to encounter other perspectives. Thus middle-class and popular children progress farther and faster than do lower-class children and social isolates. (Kohlberg, 1974, p. 169)

Kay (1975) conducted a sociological study of the influence of society, home, and school on moral maturity. Kay reported a strong relationship between social status and moral maturity because the child rearing practices, attitudes, and economic status of middle-class homes were themselves associated with the traits associated with moral maturity. One such trait that Kay described in his study was the ability to delay gratification and to be more future oriented—a characteristic found more often in middle-class homes. He believed that factors such as these led to the relationship between social status and moral maturity.

Rest (1975b) on the other hand, in his work with the Defining Issues Test tended to discount the influence of
socio-economics status (SES). Using a measure of SES provided by the Duncan scale (Reiss, 1961), Rest found that this measure, which was based on father's education, was not significantly correlated with a measure of moral reasoning provided by his instrument. Most other researchers (Graham, 1972), however, who have studied the possible relationship between social class and moral reasoning have found that a relationship existed. The social stimulation that existed for middle-class families, differences in child rearing practices, etc. were reasons given for this relationship. No one has been willing to directly attribute lower levels of moral reasoning or moral maturity to social class by itself as a causal factor.

Sex and moral judgment

Sex differences in moral judgment scores have proved to be a more perplexing variable. Some researchers have found that differences do exist and others have not found that to be the case. Graham (1972), after he reviewed different studies on moral development, found little evidence that a relationship existed between these two variables. Turiel (1976) conducted a comparative analysis of moral judgment in males and females. He found the rate of development for males and females inconclusive. At certain ages there were differences, but he believed that environmental setting not sex was the factor related to the rate of development. Bull (1969) also found a
similar discrepancy. In his study he found that differences in sex varied according to the social class, which led him to conclude that socio-economic class had a greater significance particularly for boys. He attributed this to a greater reliance on environmental influences by boys than by girls. Rest (1975a), in a two-year longitudinal study using the Defining Issues Test, found that there were no male-female differences in the increase in the level of moral thinking over a two-year period.

Kohlberg and Kramer (1968) and Haan, Smith and Block (1968) did find sex differences in the distribution of stages scores. What these researchers found was that more boys than girls advanced to stage 4 reasoning following high school. This led Kohlberg and Kramer to draw this conclusion:

... while girls are moving from high school or college to motherhood, sizeable portions of them are remaining at stage 3, while their male age mates are dropping stage 3 in favor of the stage above it. Stage 3 personal concordance morality is a functional morality for housewives and mothers; it is not for businessmen and professions. (p. 108)

This rather strong statement, made before Kohlberg revised his scoring system, actually pointed once again to the importance of environmental factors and influences on moral reasoning.
Summary of relationship of other variables and moral maturity

Some variables do seem to be associated with moral judgment, but the studies reviewed report conflicting results. The only variable that does not have significant conflicting evidence is the relationship between cognitive maturity and moral maturity. Even so this relationship is not very strong when typical IQ measures are involved, but is more strongly related when a Piaget type of cognitive measure is employed. Those researchers particularly interested in moral judgment acknowledge the fact that a certain level of cognitive ability must exist for a person to use higher forms of moral reasoning.

Many of the studies reviewed do indicate a relationship between social class and moral judgment, depending on how social class is assessed. Environmental and family influences are given as primary reasons why social class has this relationship to moral judgment. Sex apparently is only a factor in moral judgment in certain situations or at certain age ranges, but research has been so mixed that no definitive statements can be drawn, except that perhaps more males than females show high levels of moral judgment.

Levels of Moral Reasoning Among College Students

Research reported earlier in this chapter for the most part involved young children of elementary school
age or in some cases children of secondary school age. Studies conducted on the moral development of college age or older adults has been minimal and of very recent origin. It was not until Kohlberg initiated his research in 1958 that a significant extension in the age range of participants in such research efforts took place. In fact, Kohlberg's dissertation study involved students no older than 16. However, that early sample was followed longitudinally and data was collected on these students into their 20's (Kramer, 1968). After Rest (1973) developed his objective instrument for assessing the stage of moral development, it was easier for researchers interested in the cognitive development approach to moral reasoning to gathering data and to assess the level of moral reasoning on larger samples of people. This made studies of groups of college students or "change" studies more feasible. In the past few years more studies have appeared assessing the moral reasoning of college students. Some of those studies are briefly described in the following paragraphs to provide some understanding of whether any unique dimensions of moral reasoning exist at the late adolescent and early adult states, and to provide some comparative information about the level of moral reasoning found among college students.
Because many of the early moral development studies involved younger children, there was uncertainty as to whether there were any particularly distinctive features of moral development at the adult level. Kohlberg and Kramer (1969) initially believed that adult moral development was only a continuous development toward more stability and consistency in moral reasoning.

... adult moral development was primarily a matter of dropping out of childish modes of thought rather than the formation of new or higher modes of thought ... the major change in moral thought past high school is a significant increase or stabilization of conventional morality of a Stage 4 variety, at the expense of pre-conventional stages of thought. (Kohlberg, 1973, p. 106)

Later, however, after a reconceptualization of some aspects of the theory and a reformulation of the scoring system, the data from the longitudinal study was reanalyzed and the notion that adult moral development represented only further stability in moral thinking was rejected by Kohlberg (1973).

Initially, it was believed also that the early college years marked a period of regression in moral thinking. In the longitudinal study by Kramer (1968), he found a downward shift in level of moral reasoning of many who were at stage 4 during late high school to a stage 2 level of moral thinking during the early...
college years. Then, several years later these same individuals had advanced to stage 5. A similar phenomenon was reported by Haan, Smith, and Block (1968) in their study of college students in the San Francisco Bay area. It was this phenomenon of regression, which was in direct conflict to the notion of an invariant sequence of stage progression, that led Kohlberg to reconceptualize his scoring system and reanalyze his data.

Work by Turiel (in press), who interviewed groups of high school students and college undergraduates, helped to formulate the idea that there was a period of transitional moral thinking that occurred among some college students that could better account for this regression in moral thinking reported by Haan et al. and by Kramer. In his study, Turiel found that a number of subjects made ambiguous judgments that were characterized by inconsistency, conflict, and internal contradiction. Students in these situations seemed to deny morality and to typically state that:

(1) all values are relative and arbitrary,
(2) one should not judge what another person should do, (3) it is up to every individual to make his own decisions, and (4) terms like duty, good, should, or moral have no meaning. (p. 13)

Turiel did find that on some issues students did take a moral position. He believed that this simultaneous denial of morality and the presence of some moral
assertions was characteristic of the transition process in which some partial rejection of stage 4 conceptions does take place. According to Turiel, these students were engaged in

(a) self-questioning that represents an awareness of, and concern with, what is morally and logically inadequate in stage 4, which has its basis in (b) the emergence of incompletely understood stage 5 moral values and conceptions. (pp. 13-14)

Rest (1975a) also found support in his research for a transitional stage.

Once this period of transition was established, Kohlberg and other cognitive-developmental researchers took this into account in their scoring procedures. Kohlberg (1973 and 1974) labeled this transition period as stage 4½. Rest (1974d) classified this period as an "A" stage, an anti-authoritarian stage, in his scoring system.

Recent research now appears to support the conclusion that there is a distinctive form of adult moral thinking that is represented by more than just stabilization of conventional thinking. It is represented by a movement toward post-conventional or principled thinking. Stage 5 thinking comes to represent adult moral thinking. When Kohlberg (1973) rescored the data from his longitudinal study, he found that none of his subjects displayed true stage 5 thinking under the age of 23. Although Haan et al. have not rescored the data from their 1968
study. (In that study they reported that about 4 per cent of their college sample was at a stage 6 level of reasoning and 25 per cent at stage 5.) Undoubtedly, if that data were rescored, those percentages would drop.

Using another developmental measure, the percentage of principled thinking displayed in responses to six hypothetical dilemmas, other researchers (Rest, 1974) have collected data on the level of moral thinking used by college students. Rest, Cooper, Maranz, and Anderson (1974) administered the DIT to four groups of students—junior high, senior high, college, and graduate students. They found that a clear differentiation between these groups based on their P score (the amount of stage 5 and stage 6 reasoning used) could be made. The mean P score for the college group was 54.9 per cent and for the graduate school group 65.1 per cent. They found that stage 3 and stage 4 mean scores were lower in the college and graduate school groups than for the junior and senior high student groups. This difference suggested that as these students advanced in age and education, the amount of principled thinking used to make moral judgments increased and the reliance on conventional thinking decreased.

In his scoring manual for the DIT, Rest (1974) summarized 11 studies that used the DIT with college
students. The average P scores for the samples involved in these studies ranged from a low of 24.5 per cent at a southern U.S. college to a high of 54.0 per cent for college seniors at a liberal arts college in the midwest. Most of the studies cited in the manual had P scores in the 40 to 50 per cent range for undergraduate students. At the Ohio State University, only a few studies have involved the use of the DIT. As part of her master's thesis research, Straub (1974) administered the DIT to a small number of students (14). The average P score for this group of college students was 22 (expressed as a raw score rather than as a per cent). In an informal study by this researcher, information was collected by use of the DIT on the moral reasoning of students who participated in the Ohio State University student judicial system. The average raw P score for the 72 students who completed this instrument was 25 (41.8 per cent). No research was identified that studied students involved in campus discipline problems from a perspective of their level of moral reasoning.

To summarize briefly, results from other studies indicate that the predominant mode of thinking among college students in general is conventional reasoning of a stage 3 or stage 4 type. A smaller number of students enter a period of transition from a conventional
to a principled form of moral reasoning. During this phase, their moral reasoning may appear relativistic, inconsistent, or possibly anti-authoritarian. An even smaller number of college students actually reach a level of consistent principled thinking (stage 5 or 6). Either students stabilize their conventional or principled forms of reasoning or their thinking about moral issues and values is in a process of change.

This suggests that the college experience may be a very critical period in time for the development of moral reasoning. Either a student will continue to hold to a conventional level of reasoning, with the college experience elaborating or solidifying that level of reasoning—a phase referred to by Kohlberg (1973b) "horizontal decolage,"—or the impact of the college experience will be such that a student's conventional form of reasoning may be sufficiently jarred that the student begins to question previously unquestioned beliefs and expands the range or level of moral reasoning invoked when confronted with a moral issue. Students who enter this transitional phase may struggle some before they establish a more mature set of moral principles.

If a major shift in the structure of moral reasoning is to occur, the college setting has the potential power to stimulate this shift.
Summary

This chapter has reviewed several models and research efforts related to the study of moral development. The first section in this chapter indicated how the particular theoretical persuasion of the researcher determined the selection of variables or constructs employed in each of these models. Rest (1973) and Wilson (1971) pointed out that moral development research was still in its infancy. Many of the models reviewed were developed on data based on elementary and secondary school children, less was known about the process of moral development during the adolescent and young adult years.

What has been identified as distinctively adult forms of moral reasoning suggests that only a small percentage of the adult population, probably no more than 20 per cent at best, reach what Kohlberg (1969) described as the post-conventional or principled stage of reasoning. Most adults which would include the college age population as well, reflect in their moral reasoning a conventional orientation based on the rules, regulations, and other norms of society. A few students do reach the point where such conventional reasoning is rejected. At that transitional phase, their thinking about moral issues is very situational, relative,
or anti-authoritarian. This fact suggests that the college experience serves, at least for some students, as a significant influence on the development of moral maturity.

Research focusing specifically on the relationship between moral development and college student discipline has been non-existent. Only a few studies, all of which used a contrived cheating situation, seemed to have relevance. In those studies, the results indicated that individuals at the higher, principled stages of moral reasoning were less apt to engage in cheating than those at the conventional level.

The concept of moral development included several dimensions or different variables. It was pointed out in this chapter why specific interest has focused on one particular dimension—moral judgment—which Kohlberg (1975) believed was the most important variable in explaining moral behavior. The concept of moral judgment, it was noted, was the major dimension used in the cognitive development model of moral development. In that model moral judgment was viewed as a reflection of particular stages of moral reasoning. Each stage was arranged in a hierarchical sequence and development in moral reasoning advanced sequentially through each stage. Stages were defined as cognitive structure or as ways of thinking or reasoning. Drawing on the
implications of this stage-sequence model of moral judgment, it can be assumed that differences in levels or stages of moral reasoning would be evident among college students as well. Those differences might very well be evident also among college students involved in discipline problems, which would then lend credence to the idea that college discipline can be considered within a developmental context as proposed in Chapter I.

How such a process can be analyzed for its developmental potential is discussed in the following chapter. The next chapter describes the qualitative approach followed to identify different levels of responses or reasoning that students used in the discipline interview process and how those different levels will be compared to the moral judgment variable described above.
CHAPTER III

DESIGN AND PROCEDURES

Deciding on an appropriate approach and methodology from which to pursue this developmental study was not easy. A study too empirically stringent would probably produce results with little utility for practice. On the other hand, a totally descriptive study would be too general. This statement by Smith (1974) expressed the dilemma:

... if our object is to know a country better, we may begin with a single spot (perhaps the capital of the country) and examine it minutely, expanding our own efforts slowly from the focal center. But it may also serve some purpose to do an aerial inspection of the country as a whole surveying its boundaries, and learning in general what geographical configuration mark it off and distinguish it from other countries. If ... our gaze is forever fixed on a portion of it, we may in one sense know the country quite well, but in another sense know it only poorly. (p. 39)

A middle position, somewhere between the two approaches suggested by Smith but using some aspects of both, was desired and accomplished in the following manner.
This study did focus on one spot—on one setting— the discipline interview. It held to one basic concept or dimension around which this study was organized—that dimension was moral development. But, it was necessary to approach this research with enough generality that some feeling for the totality of the situation and the wholeness of the individual could be estimated. To accomplish this objective, this research was organized to be primarily qualitative in its inception and in the analysis. As the previous review of the literature indicated, renewed interest in the study of moral development has occurred only recently. The territory is still very much underexplored. Many of the moral development studies did not include within the population or sample anyone over the age of 16, and the application of developmental concepts to the discipline setting have not been explored. Therefore, there is a need still to keep the focus general enough to have a sense of the "country as a whole" as student responses during the discipline interview setting were analyzed.

Included in this chapter are a description of the population, the development of the interview format, the procedures used to collect and analyze the data, and the instruments used in this study.
The Population

The population of this study consisted of 55 students who were accused of violating the Ohio State University Code of Student Rights and Responsibilities during the 1975-1976 academic year and who were seen for a discipline interview. In that given year approximately 360 students were charged with some violation of the Code, but less than one-half that number required a discipline interview through the Office of Judicial Programs. Given the requirements of the Ohio State University Human Subjects Committee and this researcher's agreement with that committee (see Appendix A), only students who acknowledged in writing their informed consent were eligible to participate in this study.

The sample of students who participated in the study consisted of 45 (82 per cent) males and 10 (18 per cent) females. Eight of the students (15 per cent) were Black. The average age of students participating was just a little over the age of 20, and the mean ACT composite score, which was collected on all participants for whom a score was available, was 21.42. As a comparison, the average ACT composite score for all entering freshmen at the Ohio State University last year was 20.24, with a standard deviation of 5.95. It is difficult to compare this average score with other
norms because the students in this population took these tests, depending on their class rank, over a five-year period. But, as a rough, general comparison, an ACT score of 21 for last year's entering freshman class nationally would have been at the 63rd percentile. Included in this group were 30 underclassmen (freshmen and sophomores), 21 upperclassmen (juniors and seniors), and two graduate or professional students. No one was deliberately excluded from this study because of the nature of their discipline violation. The type of violations included petit and grand theft, vandalism, drug violations, academic misconduct, destruction of property, and other assorted violations.

**Development of the Structured Interview Format and Questions**

As Rest (1973) and Kohlberg (1958) had decided in their approach to the study of moral development, it was important to sample or to "capture" student's thinking on certain issues or questions considered to be important during the discipline interview process. The study had to be constructed in such a way that students were placed in a situation where they could demonstrate the structure of their moral reasoning. Asking certain standard questions designed to tap just this form of reasoning was necessary. This section describes the process of developing and administering those questions.
Pilot study

At first a list of questions that seemed germane to a discipline interview setting and which were related in some way to the moral domain was generated. This set of questions was administered to a small group of students (8) in the form that this interviewer intended to use. In addition, this set of questions was shared with professional colleagues familiar with this research area and methodology and their critique was elicited. Based on the ease by which students in the pilot study were able to interpret and respond to the structured set of questions, the type of response data that these questions elicited, and the critiques from colleagues, these questions were refined and some were eliminated. The pilot study phase also was used to determine how much time was needed for students to complete both the interview and the instrument used to collect information on their stage or level of moral reasoning. This pilot study phase was completed by the summer quarter 1974. A final set of 18 questions and the interview formal were established to collect the necessary response data from the students.

Data gathering procedures

Student safeguards

Because the student was in a situation where discipline action might be levied, certain safeguards and
controls for the student's well-being were incorporated into the design of this study. First, those subjects who denied their guilt or who were contesting certain facts so that a formal adversarial hearing might be in order were eliminated from this study. Those subjects apparently were not in a position to respond freely or adequately to some of the questions. This meant that the students who participated in the study had admitted their guilt to a violation of university rules.

Careful precautions were taken to explain to students the general nature of this study and what the results would be used for to be sure that they were fully and completely informed before they gave their consent to participate in this study. Students were informed in advance of the discipline interview about the study and their participation was elicited (see Appendix B, "Instructions"). Students were also informed that the interviewer would not be the person to make the final decision in their case.

Instructions to the student

The following instructions were then given verbally to the subject by the interviewer:

As part of the research, I am interested in learning more about the judgments students make concerning the incident in which they are involved and the discipline process as they are currently experiencing it or will experience in the future. Information that you
give will be maintained separately from the discipline information that is collected, and the results of the study as they are reported and are stored in a data format, will not be personally identifiable. I would like your cooperation and hope that you will be willing to participate. I want you to understand that you are free to decline and should not feel compelled in any way to participate. If you have the time, I would hope that you would favorably consider participating, but if not, I understand. Would you like to be a subject?

At that point, if the student responded "yes" but indicated that time was a problem, then either another appointment was scheduled or the subject was asked to take the "Discipline Interview Questionnaire" (see Appendix C) home to complete and return to the office.

Each student who agreed to participate in the study was asked to respond to a series of 18 questions that had been developed during the pilot phase of this study.

Discipline interview questions

1. The "Discipline Interview Questionnaire" was administered in one of two ways. Some students were asked these questions orally in a structured interview, following the fact finding part of the discipline interview, and their responses were taped for later transcribing. Some students had the opportunity to respond to these questions in writing, outside the interview setting. This distinction in administration of the
questions was dictated by confines of the interview with all subjects. In some situations, when more than one student was scheduled for an interview at the same time, in order to keep one person's responses from biasing those of the other, students were provided an opportunity to respond in separate settings.

2: Selecting interview issues to be included on the questionnaire was determined by their potential as important determinants of the level of moral maturity of the students involved in discipline situations. The content areas included such topics as: motives; the ethical consideration of what was wrong with the behavior; personal responsibility; consequences of the behavior; judgment of the fairness and the seriousness of the rules alleged to have been violated; judgment of the seriousness of their own behavior; obligations and duty; punishment; and a self-report of what they learned. These issues are often raised during the course of a discipline interview situation. Intuitive observations over the past several years suggested that the students' own reflection on these issues frequently varied. Certain issues (i.e., punishment, right/wrong, duty, and the issue of fairness) were identified by Kohlberg (1971b) as important moral topics.
3. Each question was followed with one probe, which asked the student "why." Asking the "why" question forced the student to reveal the thinking process that went into the responses that they made to the question. It was this process of reasoning that was important in determining the form of reasoning used and the perspective or focus toward which that reasoning process was directed. The list of questions asked each student follows:

(1) How do you account for what happened?

(2) Are there any other underlying factors involved: (If yes, describe)

(3) Who is responsible for what happened? Why?

(4) In your own mind is there anything "wrong" with what you did? Why do you say that?

(5) What factors would you most like to have considered by the person or group that decides on what discipline action is appropriate?

(6) What do you see as some of the consequences that resulted from your action?

(7) What will prevent this from happening again?

(8) In your own mind, what function do rules or regulations serve?

(9) Do you consider the rule or regulation you have been charged with violating a fair one?
(10) Generally, how do you view other violations of rules or regulations of this type, as: very serious, serious, not so serious, minor. Why?

(11) How do you evaluate your own violation of this particular rule? As: very serious, serious, not so serious, minor. Why?

(12) Do you have any sense or feeling of obligation because of what happened?

(13) What function do you see that punishment serves?

(14) Do you believe that you should receive some sort of punishment or discipline? Why?

(15) What would you consider to be a just or fair way to resolve this matter and why?

(16) A discipline decision would most likely fall into one of the following categories. Which do you consider most appropriate in your situation and why?

- [ ] suspended or dismissed from school for a period of time
- [ ] placed on probation for a specified period of time
- [ ] receive a written letter of warning
- [ ] make restitution and/or receive a monetary fine
- [ ] no disciplinary action taken

State your reasons for the above choice.
(17) How do you feel about what you have done?

(18) In your own words, can you describe what you have learned as a result of all that has happened to you?

Instrumentation for Measuring Moral Development

Collecting and then subsequently analyzing student responses to the structured discipline interview questions provided a qualitative way of probing and looking for patterns in the form and content of the responses. An underlying assumption throughout this study was that any patterns that emerge also could be a reflection of the level of moral reasoning used by the student in interpreting and responding to questions that are often raised during the process of the discipline interview. Therefore, it was helpful to have another measure, one that had been standardized, against which the results of the qualitative analysis could be compared. Two basic approaches to assessing the cognitive development of moral judgment have been developed—Kohlberg's (1958) interview format and Rest's (1974) objective measure. Since the qualitative analysis for this study was centered on an interview format, it did not seem reasonable to ask students to participate in another extended interview process during which they would be asked to respond to a series of moral dilemmas, which is the process used in Kohlberg's scoring system. Further,
this researcher was not interested in adding another burdensome scoring process to the one already at hand. The use of hypothetical dilemmas, when the student was confronting a more immediate dilemma, was not necessary.

The second method to measure moral reasoning involved administering an instrument called the Defining Issues Test (DIT; see Appendix D). This instrument can be completed in about 35 minutes. It provides an objective measure of moral reasoning based on the student's responses on the instrument, and it is based on the same assumptions of cognitive stage development described by Piaget and Kohlberg that were discussed in Chapter IX. How the instrument was constructed, the type of measurements it provides, and an explanation of why this particular instrument was selected are described in the following sections.

**Selecting a measure of moral development**

An objective measure of moral development

Based on the same stage typology of moral development first proposed by Kohlberg (1958), Rest and his colleagues at the University of Minnesota developed an objective instrument known as The Defining Issues Test (DIT) to assess moral development. This assessment technique differed from that followed by Kohlberg. In
the assessment procedure first developed by Kohlberg in his 1958 dissertation, a subject reacts to hypothetical moral dilemmas—indicating what ought to be done and the justification for that action. In the Kohlberg assessment technique, the interviewer elicits and probes the subjects' views. The responses are then analyzed and scored according to a scoring system developed by Kohlberg (1958) to determine the subjects' stage of moral development.

The approach underlying the DIT is based on this same notion that individuals use different conceptual frameworks to interpret or view moral dilemmas. According to Rest (1973), "Each moral judgment stage has distinctive ways of defining the relevant elements of a social problem and the most important issues in making a decision about what to do" (p. 1). In the Defining Issues Test, a person reads a moral dilemma. That story is followed by 12 "issues" or considerations bearing upon that situation. Each issue statement represents a stage characteristic of Kohlberg's typology (Rest, 1974). For example, there is a statement reflecting stage 2 thinking, stage 3 thinking, and so on.

The DIT is comprised of six such stories, and on each story the student rated each of the 12 issues on the Likert scale of importance ("most," "much," "little,"
"no"). Next a person ranks their first four choices of the most important issues. These ranks are given weighted values so that by summing these values across all six stories, an overall measure of reasoning can be obtained. Thus, the DIT provides an objective measure of moral judgment development.

Advantage of defining issues test

Rest's objective assessment of moral judgment through the use of the Defining Issues Test has advantages over the more subjective approach taken by Kohlberg. As Rest (1973b) pointed out, there were some major deficiencies in the Kohlberg scoring system.

(1) The aspects of scoring have not been as clearly defined, as Piaget did with his eleven dichotomies. Kohlberg has taken on an immensely more complicated set of categories, and is still involved in revising the scoring system.

(2) Since his information gathering procedures are not focused on a specific set of scoring decision, the information that is generated is often not detailed and precise enough for a scorer to make decisions about the very complicated differentiations involved in the scoring system.

(3) As the basic categories of Kohlberg's scoring system are clarified and pinpointed, there remains the task of providing a detailed rationale for claiming that the higher stages are more adequate than the lower stages.

(4) A presentation of results needs to be made not only in terms of stages, but also on whatever the level of abstraction that is used in scoring. For instance, information about the scoring categories is needed on inter-judge reliability,
test-re-test stability, age trends, clustering of scoring categories by stage, etc. . . .

(5) As yet Kohlberg has not provided a completely satisfactory method of unitizing responses, or adding and scaling them into stage scores. There are unjustified assumptions about the quality of intervals between stages in Kohlberg's 'moral maturity.' And classifying subjects according to 'predominant stage' is an ambiguous and dubious procedure (given the fact that there are many different sets of responses which can lead to classifying a subject as, say, a stage 4 subject, and given the fact that on the average a majority of responses are not at a subject's predominant stage).

(6) The present set of 10 hypothetical dilemmas do not cover all of the important issues or problems of moral philosophy (e.g., Problems of distributive justice are cited, and they cannot be said to be a representative sample of moral problems that most people face). Scores based on some other sample stories have special tendencies to pull out different stage scores. (pp. 34-35)

The DIT was devised to answer most of the complaints about Kohlberg's approach to the assessment of moral development, and for the purposes of this study, it represents the most useful instrument available.

Relationship of DIT to Kohlberg's assessment approach

While the DIT was only recently developed and is still undergoing refinements, a series of studies have been conducted using the DIT. Rest reported in the Manual for The Defining Issues Test (1974) that . . . . varied and replicated research studies on several thousand subjects
have shown that the DIT compared very favorably with other assessments of moral judgment development in the power and reliability of results. (preface)

Since Rest based his work on Kohlberg's typology of moral development, it is appropriate to consider if there is a relationship between the DIT and Kohlberg's measure of moral maturity. Rest (1975) reported a correlation of .68 between the DIT and a small sample (47) on which Kohlberg stage scores were available. While this correlation is not high enough to judge the DIT and the Kohlberg scale equivalent tests, "this correlation is the highest correlation of Kohlberg's measure with any other measure that we are aware of for a sample of at least this size" (Rest; 1975, p. 12).

Rest expected a correlation between these two measures because they were based on the same theoretical approach. But, as he pointed out, there were some major differences in the assessment approaches that would prevent the correlations from being higher. Kohlberg's assessment asked the person interviewed to spontaneously generate a solution, whereas the DIT asked them to evaluate various considerations. Also the DIT was a "recognition task," not a "production task," as Rest (1975) has pointed out.

... Kohlberg's method of assessment asks a subject to generate spontaneously a solution de novo to a moral dilemma, whereas the Defining Issues Test asks a subject to evaluate various considerations that are provided. Recognition is
usually an easier task than Production,
and the Defining Issues Test is likely
to detect in subjects the higher forms
of thinking earlier than Kohlberg's
test. (Rest, 1975, p. 747)

Relation of DIT to theory of cognitive stage development

Since the DIT is based on a theory of cognitive
development, one can expect that a relationship also
exists between the DIT measure of moral development and
IQ. Such was the case. Rest (1974) reported correla­
tions in the .30's and .40's. But, these correlations
are not as high as correlations with other measures, such
as measures of comprehension. This seems to support
Rest's contention that people pick higher stage issues
because they appreciate the greater adequacy of the
conceptual framework and not because they sound more
complex or because they do not understand them. So,
while there is some correlation between DIT scores and
intelligence test score, higher correlations on compre­
hension tests indicate that it is more important that
an individual have some cognitive understanding of what
they are responding to in the way of issues.

Importance of cognitive understanding is related to
the ability of people to "fake" on the DIT. Faking can
make a difference according to a study by McGeorge (1973)
but only in one direction. In that study the DIT was
administered twice--once in a "fake good" condition and
once in a "fake bad" condition. The results indicated that one could successfully "fake bad," but could not "fake good." These results seem to be consistent with the general theory of cognitive stage theory which would predict that a person can understand the lower stage reasoning and, thus, be able to "fake bad," but, because they could not comprehend successfully stage reasoning above their own level, the reverse was not true.

Selecting the appropriate development measure from the Defining Issues Test

The Defining Issues Test provides several different types of measures of moral judgment. By assigning weighted values to each of the four issues which the subject ranks in order of priority following each of the six stories, various scores can be calculated from this instrument.

Stage score

One such score is known as "stage type." By summarizing the scores from each of the stories, a "stage score" can be computed for each subject. This "stage score" is based on the moral typology of six levels of moral judgment used by Kohlberg (1958) and it can be used to "type" a subject according to their particular stage of moral development by one of several processes of analysis.
"Stage typing" can be determined by one of three methods—1) the stage of "exceptional use," 2) the stage of "predominant use," or 3) the stage with the highest "substantial use." The measure of exceptional use utilizes standard scores (Z score) to determine if any one of the six possible stages is used frequently enough to receive a Z score of +1.0 or higher. The highest score above +1.0 for a particular stage identifies that stage as the stage of "exceptional use" for that individual. If the highest Z score above the +1.0 cut-off, for example, occurs at stage 4, that person is classified as at a stage 4 level of moral reasoning. Rest (1973), in his instructions for the use of the DIT, warned prospective researchers to expect that about 25 per cent of the people completing the DIT would not have any standardized score above +1.0, and, thus, could not be classified as any particular "stage type." Individuals in this category have responses so mixed across the various stages that they cannot be typed.

The "predominant stage" classification method simply identifies that stage which receives the most responses. If stage 4 receives the most responses, according to the weighted averages on the rankings for each of the six stories in the DIT, that person is classified as stage 4 in his level of moral reasoning.
Another way to measure stage type is by identifying the stage with the highest substantial usage. This method of classification reflects the point where stage usage starts to rise substantially or when stage usage reaches a particular minimum. As Rest (mimeo) suggested, "maybe the peaks of the curves are not as important for development markers as the ascending slopes" (p. 37).

From a sample of 160 students, Rest (1975) developed a system for determining that point. Rest in a telephone conversation with this researcher provided the cut-off scores based on the raw score on the DIT to determine the stage of highest substantial usage. A P score (sum of stage 5 and stage 6 responses) of 27 or greater classified a person at a "principled" level of moral reasoning. If the P score was not greater than 27, the raw score for that person on stage 4 is to be checked. If that value was 15 or greater at stage 4, that person was classified at a stage 4 level of moral reasoning. If the stage 4 value is not at least 15, then the score for stage 3 is checked. A cut-off score of 10 for stage 3 is used to classify that person at stage 3.

Principled morality (P) score

A second measure of moral judgment, one that has proven to be a more reliable measure than the "stage type" measure, is to determine the "Principled"
morality score (P) for each subject. The P score, as it is known, is interpreted as "the relative importance attributed to principled moral considerations in making a moral decision" (Rest, 1974, p. 494). It is arrived at by summing the values for the principled stage scores (stages 5A, 5B, and 6). The P score also can be converted into a percentage score by dividing it by 60, the total value of scores on the DIT. The "P score," unlike the "stage score," is a continuous variable, which makes it a suitable measure to correlate with other measures that are of interest to a researcher.

Comparison of reliability of stage and principled morality score

The P score was found to be a more reliable measure of moral reasoning than the "stage type" measures.

Rest et al. (1974) report that in a study using four criterion groups (junior high, senior high, college juniors and seniors, and seminary graduate students and doctoral students in moral philosophy) that the P score did clearly differentiate between these groups. The key point made by this comparison these researchers noted,

... is that it is reasonable to assume prima facie that moral philosophy students are more advanced in their moral thinking than junior high school subjects, and therefore, a developmental test should differentiate these groups (and the groups in between). (p. 498)
As Rest (mimeo) stated, "Assuming that chronological age is at least a rough index of development, then the higher the age, the greater should be the usage of more advanced stages" (p. 43). The DIT indices did show age trends of increased use of higher stages with more advanced groups as expected. Of the various measures on the DIT used in this study, however, the P index gave higher statistically significant differences among groups than did the stage-type indices according to the results of this study.

In another comparison, the DIT was correlated with an independent measure of comprehension to determine if comprehension indicates whether high-stage usage goes along with understanding (Rest, 1975). Comprehension did correlate (.63) with the DIT, but the P score again produced more significant data trends according to Rest than did the stage-type index. In his review of several validity studies, Rest (mimeo) stated that "In every case the rank index was superior to the stage-type index" (p. 51). Thus, while the DIT produces several different developmental measures, the data collected so far indicates that the P score, which is a measure of principled thinking, is the most reliable of the DIT measures.

The choice--the P score

Because of the stronger reliability data and discriminating power of the P score and its statistical
usefulness as a continuous variable, the P score was selected as the developmental measure of moral judgment to be used in this study. This measure was used both descriptively to assess the general level of moral development of the sample and as the variable against which the results of the qualitative analysis are compared.

Administration of the Defining Issues Test (DIT)

This instrument was mailed to students in advance of their discipline interview, along with a description of the research study and a request for the student to participate in the study (see Appendix B for a copy of the letter). It accompanied the discipline interview letter, which requested the student to come in for an interview. This instrument took about 35 minutes to complete and students who were willing to participate in this study were asked to complete it before the interview, the purpose of the study was explained verbally, and, as previously indicated, those students who were willing to participate signed a written consent form (see Appendix E). At that time the completed DIT was collected. The instrument itself, however, was not scored until later when the entire discipline process for the student was completed. This researcher had no knowledge of the student's level of moral development
while the discipline process was still pending, or before the responses to the questions were analyzed.

Method of Data Analysis

This section describes the approach taken to analyze the student responses to the discipline interview questions and the statistical method used to compare the results of that analysis with the measure of moral development provided by the Defining Issues Test.

Qualitative analysis

Students either provided written responses to the 18 discipline interview questions or they responded orally to the questions that were asked by the interviewer. Those oral responses were taped and later transcribed so that for each participant in the study there was a set of responses to each of the 18 questions.

One of the primary assumptions behind this study, drawing on the general application of moral development theory, is that one might expect to find in the responses that students make during the discipline process evidence of developmental differences in the level of moral reasoning. The intent of this study was not to specifically test out hypotheses from specific theories of moral development, such as Kohlberg's theory or Hogan's theory, or anyone else's theory, but to draw on the
general idea that there are different levels or stages of moral maturity or moral judgment, which these theories presume. This suggests the strong possibility that differences in the responses made by students, if those differences can be detected, might reflect qualitatively different structures in the form of reasoning used to process and respond to these questions.

These differences might appear in the form or structure of the responses or they might appear in the content of responses from which differences in structure could be inferred. The only way to determine if there were any differences was to proceed through all this accumulated data inductively attempting to identify patterns or organizations in the responses that might suggest developmental differences. This was a cumbersome process, one which took almost a year to complete.

Several different steps and phases were involved in this inductive and qualitative analysis before the patterns in responses could be sufficiently well identified and labeled that further comparisons with other variables, such as the P score on the DIT could take place. However, there was an initial decision to be made before the inductive analysis could proceed. The decision was whether to conduct the analysis on a case by case--student by student basis--or on a question by question basis across all cases. For example, either all 18
questions could be examined for each individual student in order to arrive at some assessment or judgment of an overall pattern of response, level of moral reasoning, or some other global score for that student before proceeding to the next student, or question number 1 could be analyzed separately from the other questions and so on, proceeding through each question for each of the 55 students participating in this study. Either approach was equally valid and probably would have proved equally fruitful. From an organizational perspective, it was easier to focus energy and attention on each question and to systematically analyze every question looking for the nuances, for example, in response to such questions as: What do you see wrong with what you did?

Another reason that the question by question approach was selected had to do with the application or utility of asking such questions during the discipline process. Some of the discipline interview questions might have more potency than others for detecting developmental levels in moral reasoning. If so, that would be helpful information to other practitioners. Most people in a discipline role would not have the time or inclination to administer a pre-assessment instrument such as the DIT. However, if there were four or five questions that could be interspersed during the discipline interview that would
provide some reasonable cues to the student's level or moral reasoning, this would be very useful information to have. For these reasons, then, the question by question approach was selected as the point of entry for the qualitative analysis.

Even though energy was focused on the question by question process, it was no easy task to tease out differences, to categorize and group responses, and to finally end up with a general scoring and coding network which would enable the qualitative process to be converted into quantifiable numbers for further analysis. There were five different phases through which this qualitative analysis progressed. Phase 1 involved making note of intuitive thoughts and ideas about patterns of responses that students made to the questions as they were given orally. Pauses, reflections, difficulty with interpretation of the questions, important points that stood out to the interviewer were noted on separate sheets of paper. This process also took place while the taped interviews were transcribed. This researcher personally transcribed more than half of the taped protocols, and as ideas and thoughts or reactions occurred while listening to the tapes, these were noted.

Phase 2 was a little more systematic; it involved cursory reading of responses to the questions, starting with question number 1. Question number 1 was read for
each student and notations were made about similarities or differences that were noted during the reading of the responses to this, and then question number 2 and so on. Even though this phase involved only a quick reading of the responses, it still took time to work through all that data since responses to one question for eight to 12 students was all that could be productively handled in one sitting.

Phase 3 of the analysis proceeded even more systematically. The results of the first two steps led to only random and not very well organized comments about the pattern of students' responses. At the suggestion of this researcher's committee, the extreme ends of the sample, based on their scores on the DIT, were pulled out from the group and the low's and the high's (the top and the bottom half dozen cases) were analyzed on this question by question basis. The result of this phase was the development of an initial scoring system based on the pattern or organization of responses that appeared to be important.

Phase 4 of the analysis process involved taking the rough scoring system developed on a smaller number of cases and applying it to the total population of 55 students. The scoring system for each question was put on stencil and 55 copies reproduced for each question so that they each could be analyzed separately. Then
the entire group was scored, checking off those organizational or structural patterns in reasoning that seemed to fit the scoring system and noting those that did not. This process helped to focus much more specifically on the qualitative differences that seemed to this researcher to be present in the responses. As this scoring process proceeded, however, note was taken of those response patterns that did not seem to fit, redundant scoring categories were noted, and so were those response categories that appeared to require further delineation.

Phase 5 involved the almost total revision of the scoring system developed and used during stage 4. The initial scoring system, after it had been applied to the total group, proved to be helpful but not completely adequate. After this second scoring system was developed, the total group was scored, again on a question by question basis (see Appendix F for the final version of the scoring system). This second scoring system seemed much more satisfactory than the first although again there were a few unanswered questions, some responses and patterns seemed to defy classification, and some feeling of uneasiness about some aspects of the scoring system remained. This process of refinement of the scoring system could have conceivably continued for many more rounds, but at this
point it was important to draw this stage of the analysis to a close.

Quantitative analysis

The five phases described above completed the qualitative analysis and led to the identification of different patterns of reasoning used by students in the discipline setting. But one final and major step remained. It was assumed that some of these differences identified during the qualitative analysis were related to the student's level of moral judgment measured in this study by the P score on the DIT. To test out that assumption, some sort of measure of association or relationship between the qualitative analysis and the P score was necessary. First, that meant that those qualitative responses had to be converted to some quantitative measure. The best way to do this was to treat each of the separate qualitative scoring responses as a separate variable. In all, this meant that there were over 270 variables to be compared with the P score. To convert to a quantitative system, a simple coding system using the numbers zero (0) and one (1) were used. For each variable that had received a check (✓) mark during the qualitative analysis to indicate that the student had made a similar response on that particular question was scored a 1. If there was no response equivalent to that variable, it was coded 0.
Second, some method of statistical analysis was necessary to use to compare the converted qualitative data with the P score. For the purposes of this study, the important need was to determine whether any significant association existed between the pattern of verbal responses that were identified and classified during the qualitative phases of the study and the P score. This initially suggested that a basic correlational approach using a Pearson correlation coefficient to determine the degree, direction, and significance of the association between each of the variables and the P score would suffice. However, the extremely large number of variables and the fact that some variables might be correlated with each other (inter-correlations) made just a straight forward correlational analysis too cumbersome to be the sole measure of association.

Instead, a multiple regression analysis, which would accommodate the many variables involved in this study (for some individual questions that involved over 20 variables) was selected as the principle statistical treatment.

Multiple regression can serve either as a descriptive tool or as an inferential tool. In this study, since no random sample was involved, its usefulness as a descriptive tool to study the relationship between the various variables was an attractive feature in the
selection of this particular statistical measure. Nei, Hall, Jenkins, Steinbrenner, and Bent (1975) wrote that "multiple regression is a general statistical technique through which one can analyze the relationship between dependent or a criterion variable and a set of independent or prediction variables" (p. 321).

Multiple regression also provided not only the means to examine the individual relationship of a variable to the P score, but it can also be used to evaluate the contribution of a set of variables. In this complex situation the structural relationships between the various variables can also be analyzed. For these reasons the multiple regression analysis technique was selected as the most appropriate of the techniques available to handle the many variables generated from the qualitative analysis.

Summary

Chapter II presented the rationale for using an inductive-deductive approach in this study. This chapter presented a description of the sample of students who participated in this study and a description of the steps taken to identify the important questions to ask during the discipline interview. The process of collecting and also analyzing the data was considered in detail in this chapter. The data analysis involved both a qualitative
phase, which required several levels of analysis, and a comparative phase during which the qualitative data was compared by means of multiple regression with the moral judgment variable the P score.

The following chapter presents the results of that qualitative analysis.
CHAPTER IV

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

This study was designed as a conceptual study which utilized an inductive-deductive method of analysis. The assumption drawn from the cognitive-developmental theory of moral development was that some of the identifiable differences in student responses made during a discipline interview could be attributed to qualitative differences in the students' stage of moral development. This general assumption was explored during a question by question analysis of each student's response to a series of structured interview questions. This inductive phase of the analysis was an effort, first, to identify different patterns or clusters of responses given by students during an interview and, second, to determine if these patterns and clusters were related to differences in level of moral reasoning. This chapter presents the findings of this endeavor to discover the important developmental differences in moral reasoning displayed by students involved in campus discipline problems.

The initial section to this chapter describes the sample of students who participated in this study
according to the demographic data that was collected for each student. The inter-relationship between these demographic variables and the level of moral reasoning is explored. The second section presents the results of the inductive analysis of the student response. In that section the patterns of responses are identified.

**Characteristics of the Discipline Group**

Fifty-five students agreed to participate in this study. Fifty-four of them completed the Defining Issues Test so that a moral development score was available for all students in the group but that one. To review briefly the descriptive information presented in Chapter III, this group of students, who were involved in discipline problems, was comprised of 10 (18 per cent) women and 45 (82 per cent) men. Fifteen per cent (8) were non-white.

The overwhelming majority of students were 42 (78 per cent) white males. The average age for this group was 20.53 years. Participants were distributed by class rank in the following manner: 32 (58.2 per cent) freshmen and sophomores; 21 (38.2 per cent) juniors and seniors; and 2 (3.6 per cent) graduate and professional students. This distribution of mostly underclass white male students is typical of what maybe generally found to be the case for on-campus discipline problems.
Discipline incidents are often associated with the level of general maturity so that one can expect more freshmen or sophomores to be involved in discipline problems than upper class students. Also more men than women are usually found to be involved in discipline problems, particularly those problems that involve destruction of property or are the result of alcohol abuse.

Additional information was collected on each student including father's occupation, entering ACT Composite test score, and level of moral reasoning as measured by the Defining Issues Test (DIT). Father's occupation was used by Duncan (Reiss, 1961) as a measure of socio-economics status (SES). Each student was asked to provide information about his father's or head of household's occupation. This information was accepted at face value since there was no way to independently evaluate or collect this information. Duncan developed an occupation code for each occupation or occupational group based on the results of the 1950 census data. His scale reflected occupation, income level, and education. The average score on this scale for all occupations was 37. There were four students who did not provide information on father's occupation and the average score on Duncan's scale for all occupations was substituted for these missing data. Based on the
information provided by the 51 students who did furnish this information, the mean score for this group on the Duncan scale of socio-economic status was 54.10 with a standard deviation of 25.05. This SES information indicates that the students who participated in this study are from homes that are above the national standard on this measure of socio-economic status. No college norms are available on which to compare this information, but it is not unlikely that on the average students who go to college are from homes that represent the upper range of socio-economic status in this society.

Most students who enter the Ohio State University are required to take one of the national college entrance exams such as the American College Test (ACT). Information of this type is collected at the time of admission to the university and is stored on the student data base. Scores on the ACT were available for 48 students in this group. The composite score, which reflects both quantitative and verbal ability on the ACT, was selected as a measure that could gauge the general intellectual capacity of the students participating in this study. The ACT composite scores ranged from 07 to 29. The mean composite score on the ACT for these 48 students was 21.42 with a standard deviation of 5.04. No direct comparison to other norms could be made with these scores because they represent test scores taken over a two- to eight-year
period. However, in general, as indicated in Chapter III, these scores compare favorably to the average scores nationally and at the Ohio State University. This suggests that these students, who were involved in a discipline incident, are no less able intellectually than the average college student at the Ohio State University.

**Measures of moral maturity**

Several measures of moral maturity were available from the DIT. The $P$ score, which is a continuous variable that represents the amount of stage 5 and stage 6 thinking employed by the student in responding to the six moral dilemma stories, was selected as the principal moral development measure for this study. The reasons for selecting this particular measure from the DIT were discussed previously in Chapter III. However, two other measures can be computed from the results of the DIT, and this information as well as the $P$ scores are presented in this section to provide further descriptive information about this group of students. Those two additional measures are the stage scores—1) stage of exceptional usage, and 2) stage of highest substantial usage.

The average $P$ score for the 54 students who completed the DIT was 21.333 with a standard deviation
of 7.48. This score is interpreted as the "relative importance attributed to principled moral considerations in making a moral decision" (Rest, 1974, pp. 2-2). This score also can be expressed as a percentage by dividing the raw score by 60. The percentage of principled thinking for this group was 35.5 per cent. However, not all the results from the DIT were usable. Rest (1974) recommended that when inconsistencies appear between the ratings and rankings on more than two of the stories that the results be discarded. Also, there is another scale ("M" score) built into the instrument which can indicate when the individual taking this instrument is responding to high-sounding but meaningless statements. Rest (1974) indicated that results on this test, which show a score higher than the cut-off on that particular scale, should be viewed with suspicion. In this particular group nine students had high "M" scores on this scale, which indicates that they were responding to lofty-sounding statements. These scores were discarded from later comparisons of the results of the qualitative analysis with the P score. Also discarded from further consideration were the scores of the five students who showed marked inconsistencies in their responses. After these scores were eliminated, the average P score for this smaller group of students whose responses to the DIT could not be questioned was 20.93
(34.9 per cent) with a standard deviation of 7.37. By discarding the unreliable responses, the average P score for the remaining groups was slightly lower than for the total group.

It was pointed out in Chapter II that the studies conducted on college students which used the DIT as a measure of moral development have reported that the average P score on the DIT for college undergraduates ranged between 40 and 50 per cent. Scores of college seniors were in the 50 to 60 per cent range (Rest, 1974). The average P score for this group was below that found in most of these other studies on which the scores on the DIT were reported. These scores, however, are comparable with those reported a small sample of students at the Ohio State University in an English class which had an average pre-treatment score of 36 per cent (Straub, 1974). Scores lower than average, however, are not unexpected. Kohlberg and some of his colleagues at Harvard who conducted contrived cheating studies reported that "conventional" studies were more apt to cheat than "principled" students (Kohlberg, 1975, and Krebs, 1973). Students who display a conventional level of reasoning would have lower P scores than students who were at the principled stage of reasoning.
Indexing moral reasoning by stage of exceptional usage gives an indication of what stage received exceptionally high usage (a z score above +1.0). Rest (1974) indicated that one can expect that approximately 20 per cent of the respondents cannot be typed by this measure. In this study a stage of exceptional usage score was available for 34 students or approximately 75.3 per cent of the total group. Approximately 25 per cent of this group could not be typed according to stage of exceptional usage, a slightly higher percentage of "non-types" than Rest reported. For the total group the average score for the stage of exceptional usage was 3.56 with a standard deviation of 1.24. A rank of 3 represents stage 4 and a rank of 4 represents the A (4½) or transitional stage so a score of 3.56 for the entire group would fall between stage 4 and stage 4½. When the inconsistent scores and marginal scores were removed from consideration, the stage of exceptional usage score for remaining 36 scores (only four test results were eliminated by this process which means that most of the unreliable responses were also in the "non-type" category) was 3.55, with a standard deviation of 1.26. The distribution of these stage scores can best be seen in Table 2.
Table 2

Distribution of Students According to Stage of Exceptional Usage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One-half of the scores, based on this measure of indexing, fall at stage 4, with the other scores more evenly distributed over the other stages.

Stage of moral reasoning also can be indexed by using the stage of highest substantial usage. This index is based on the point where stage usage starts to rise substantially rather than at the point were stage usage peaks. This method of indexing identifies three stages—stage 3 (1), stage 4 (2), and the principled stage (3). The average score for the stage of highest substantial usage for the total group was 2.13 with a standard deviation of .621. When the questionable scores were eliminated, the average score for this smaller "OK group" was 2.15 with a standard deviation of .54. For this smaller group the distribution of scores was: stage 3, three (7.7 per cent) students; at stage 4, 27 (69.2 per cent) students; and at the principled stage, nine (23.1 per cent) students. Using this measure to index the
level of moral reasoning according to stage type indicates that the majority of students who participated in this study were at the conventional stage 4 level of reasoning.

The mean P score, the relative importance attached to principled thinking, was 35 per cent. Depending on which stage type index was used, the percentage of principled thinking (stage 5 or 6) ranged from 21 to 23 per cent. Further comparisons will make use of only the P score measure of moral maturity.

Relationship of demographic variables to the P score

In Chapter II it was reported that correlations in the .30's and .40's were found between certain measures of intelligence and moral maturity scores on the DIT (Rest, 1974). A relationship between social class and moral maturity has been reported by some researchers (Graham, 1972, and Gilligan and Kohlberg, 1971). The relationship of sex to moral maturity has not been clearly established, and Turiel (in press) has reported conflicting results when the influence of sex has been studied. Because of these previous findings, the relationship of these particular variables plus the variables of class rank, age, and race were all compared to the P score by using a multiple regression analysis. The results of that analysis appears in Table 3.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACT Composite</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>4.833&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.833&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>1.666</td>
<td>3.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.099</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>1.268</td>
<td>2.642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>0.484</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0.949</td>
<td>2.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class Rank</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>1.972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SES</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>1.715</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Significant at the .05 level.
The ACT composite score, sex, age, race, class rank, and SES all show a positive correlation with the P score, and together these six variables explain 27.6 per cent of the variance in the P score. However, only the ACT composite score with a correlation of 0.362 with the P score is significant ($F_{1,32} = 4.833, P < .05$). Socio-economic status (SES) also shows a fairly strong and positive relationship (0.217) to the P score, but because that variable is also correlated strongly with the ACT score (0.317), it was suppressed during the regression analysis and only contributed an additional 1.5 per cent toward explaining the variability in the P score.

The strong relationship between the ACT score and the P score supports previous findings that indicate a strong cognitive ability factor operating with higher levels moral reasoning. The relationship between socio-economic status and moral development also is evident, although the relationship is not strong enough to reach a satisfactory level of significance. The next highest correlation, as might be expected, is between class rank and P score (0.164). Upperclass and graduate students scored higher on the DIT than did the freshmen and sophomore students. The women in this study scored slightly higher on the DIT than did the men, and older students also scored higher on the DIT, but neither
variable was significantly correlated with the $P$ score. A very slight relationship between race and $P$ score exists.

Together these six variables explain 27 per cent of the variability in the $P$ score. The ACT composite score, socio-economic status (SES), and class rank in that order have the strongest association with the $P$ score.

**Relationship of discipline violation to $P$ score**

Violations of the Code of Student Rights and Responsibilities were categorized into six groupings: 1) academic misconduct, 2) theft/ destruction of property, 3) person related (e.g., assault, hazing), 4) drugs, 5) general misuse of documents (forgery, altered ID, etc.), and 6) miscellaneous. The relationship between these categories and the $P$ score was tested by means of a one- way analysis of variance. The results of that analysis appear in Table 4. A significant relationship was not found ($P > .05$) between these six categories and the $P$ score.
Table 4

One-Way Analysis of Variance of Mean P Scores by Category of Discipline Violation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>308.2266</td>
<td>66.6453</td>
<td>1.240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1641.2109</td>
<td>49.7337</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1949.4375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p > .05.

Analysis of Student Responses to the Structured Interview Questions

Each student was asked to respond either orally or in writing to 18 questions. Questions 1 and 2 were combined during the inductive analysis, each of the other questions were analyzed separately. This section reports the final results of that process of inductive analysis. The general patterns or clustering of responses that were identified during this process, which differentiated among the students, are also described in this section. The final scoring system that was used for the last phase of the qualitative analysis to classify the responses to each question appears in Appendix F.

Interview questions

A description of the findings for each question follows.
How do you account for what happened? Are there any other underlying factors?

These first two questions that initiated the research part of the discipline interview were deliberately left open-ended and relatively unstructured. They were designed to permit each student to define his or her own "gestalt" as to how to account for the incident. In analyzing the various responses that students gave to these two questions, two general response dimensions were identified. One dimension was the specific focus that students chose to respond to the questions and the other dimension was the level or type of explanation used.

The focus of the response. The responses were classified in one of four ways. Some students focused on the incident itself and either described what happened or why it happened. Other students, rather than talking about the incident jumped immediately into a discussion of "right" or "wrong." The third response category identified those students who focused not on the incident per se, but on the reasons why or how they were caught. The final response category included those students who could not account for what happened. For example, student #24, when asked this question, simply responded, "I can't. I honestly can't."
Given the nature of these questions, students had to select for themselves a way to orient or anchor their response. Some had difficulty and could not offer a response and others focused on the incident itself. A third focus was on the issue of right or wrong, and the fourth focus was on getting caught and why they had to see the interviewer. While these categories were readily identified, there is no specific reason to believe that these different categories reflect different levels of moral maturity. Instead, these categories may reflect response style patterns which these students brought with them into the interview process. Whether, in fact, there is a relationship between the focus selected and the level of moral maturity will be examined in the next chapter.

Levels of explanation used. The more important dimension which seems to have developmental attributes is the level or type of explanation that students use to account for their behavior. Five such levels were identified. At the least sophisticated level of explanation were those students who offered basically a narrative or descriptive explanation of what happened as opposed to an analytic or judgmental response. At this level of explanation, students simply accounted for what happened as if it were part of an on-going
stream of events or activities that they engaged in during the incident. Very little evidence of self-processing of those events was evident in their responses. Sometimes their responses were quite long as they gave complete descriptions of time, place, and what happened.

At the next two response levels, students offered some judgment or analysis to account for the incident, but their responses also indicated little personal control over what happened. At these levels, students either accounted for their behavior by explaining that it was a spur of the moment or spontaneous act or that it was not intentional. For example, student #1 accounted for his behavior in this way. "It was an impulse. I just went along with everyone else." Student #2 offered a similar explanation. "It was purely spontaneous. It just happened." The nonintentional response level was represented by the response of the student in case #13. "I didn't mean to break the door."

The final two response levels identified represent those students who analyzed the situation in some depth and offered some judgments or reasons to account for what happened. Grouped at level four were those students who indicated some degree of personal control over their behavior, but who also attempted to justify, rationalize, or explain away the behavior in question.
Reaction to pressure, personal problems, the influence of alcohol, a personal shortcoming such as exercising poor judgment, or lack of information about the rules or consequences were all cited as reasons for the incident. As an example, the explanation of student #8, "I was worried about grades. I was feeling pretty miserable," was coded as a reaction to pressure. Student #10 blamed the influence of alcohol. "I wouldn't have done it if I had been in my right mind."

The fifth level or category of explanation included those responses which indicated that the behavior was clearly intentional and directed toward some immediate objective. When asked to account for forging a food validation label to be used in one of the campus dining commons, student #14 replies, "... a challenge. I had only $10 so I figured I try to supplement a few free meals." Student #19 accounted for her falsification on an admission application by stating, "I wanted a clean slate and I wanted to start over."

**Summary.** These two questions were deliberately framed as open-ended questions to which students had few cues around which to organize their responses. The range of student responses to these questions varied considerably. Student responses reflected
differences in the frame of reference or the focus of their responses, and in qualitatively different levels of explanation. Some students only described "what" happened while others described "why" it happened.

The dichotomy between the purely narrative response of "what" and the judgmental response "why" appears to be an important difference. Students who view life's happenings and the incident involving them as only one more incident in a sequence of on-going events in their lives do not stop the flow of action to analyze it. Their opportunity to learn from what happens to them or to draw any conclusions from an incident such as the one that got them into trouble is limited. Those students who attempt to analyze what happened and why at least have a starting point to enable them to change their behavior or to learn from their experience. The ability to change one's life also is more likely for those students who at least perceive that they are the "actors" in the incident and in control of what happened. Those nonplused students who perceive the incident as one of those spur of the moment, non-intentional incidents are less likely to be in a position to bring about change in their lives.
Who is responsible for what happened? Why?

This question was designed to study the degree of personal responsibility that students assume for their behavior. Two basic distinctions in the responses given by students were evident. In one category were those students who avoided personal responsibility, did not acknowledge it, or who shifted some of the responsibility to others. In the second category were students who by their response indicated some degree of personal acceptance of responsibility. In this second category, however, the degree to which that responsibility was accepted varied greatly. Illustrations of these differences are presented in the following columns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibility generally avoided because:</th>
<th>Responsibility accepted because:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- behavior was spur of the moment or on impulse</td>
<td>- you are supposed to be responsible for your behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- in a group situation responsibility placed on someone else</td>
<td>- at fault or to blame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- personal responsibility disowned. It was ignorance or it was poor judgment that was responsible</td>
<td>- should have acted differently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- person responsible but so are others or there were other influences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the person committed the act, no other elaboration given</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- person places self clearly in control of own behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- a general statement, principle, or guideline determines responsibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Willingness to accept responsibility for one's behavior can be considered a mark of a mature individual. In responding to this question many students found it difficult to see or to place themselves in charge of their behavior. In the first column above are examples of the patterns of responses made by students who did not accept personal responsibility for their behavior. They refused to place themselves in the driver's seat. Student #5's response is a good example of someone who disowned personal responsibility. "It was our ignorance that was responsible. . . ." That response is easily contrasted with this response by the student who stated, "I was the one who wanted to use it. I was the one who thought it up. . . ." This second statement was from a student (case #3) who clearly put herself in charge of committing the incident and in charge of the events leading up to it.

As one descends the different response categories in column 2 above, each new level of response reflects greater personal acceptance or understanding of the concept of responsibility. Not all students who accepted responsibility for their behavior did it as directly and as forthrightly as student #3. As an example, this student was willing to qualify his role in a discipline incident by stating that "the situation kind of encouraged the thing to happen . . . I
was high." Another student used what this researcher classified as an obligatory or compulsory attitude toward responsibility. "You are supposed to be responsible for your behavior." In this second example, the student's response indicates no clear sense of personal understanding or personal acceptance of responsibility, but it does recognize that one should be responsible for what one does.

Another popular response was to equate responsibility with fault or blame. This was the situation for student #20. This student accepted responsibility but with this thrust, "I am to blame." Another student responded, "Since I control myself, I am at fault." These responses suggest both an element of self-deprecation and an assumption that if fault or blame were not at issue, neither would be the question of responsibility. A higher level response to this question is illustrated by the response of student #55. This student stated, "I see it's wrong and I think responsibility for anything I do lies within myself." A response of the type was classified as a higher level response because it is more general than the specific reference to a concrete situation. At this level students also offer a general principle for settling the question of responsibility. More importantly,
responsible is accepted on a personally understood level, not just out of obligation.

**Summary.** The analysis of the responses to this question resulted in some clear delineations between the types of responses that students make. A major distinction is between those who avoid taking personal responsibility for their behavior and those who are willing to accept some responsibility. Among those who accept responsibility, there are further differences that can be distinguished by the degree of acceptance and by the ability to offer general principles to determine responsibility. These distinctions appear to represent different levels of personal maturity as evidenced by personal willingness to attribute responsibility for action to self.

In your own mind is there anything wrong with what you did? What do you see wrong and why?

The issue of right or wrong is at the heart of most moral considerations. How individuals reason or justify their decisions in support of their contention of right or wrong was the key dimension used by Kohlberg (1958) to assess level of moral reasoning. Students participating in this study also were asked to express whether they considered their behavior to be wrong and if so, what they considered wrong with it, and why it was
wrong. In analyzing the various responses given to this question, seven general forms of reasoning were identified. Some of these seven categories were further subdivided to accommodate the different levels and patterns of reasoning used.

**Simple acknowledgment.** One rather basic and undifferentiated form of reasoning used by some students was to simply acknowledge that the behavior was wrong but without offering reasons to support their response. As an example, some students simply reported that, "It was wrong," or "It wasn't right." Other students who used this form of reasoning simply acknowledged the fact that they were the ones who did commit the act. For those students, wrong appears to be associated with committing the act—"I did it" or "I stole the book"—but judgments offered to support reasons why it was wrong, outside the reference to the behavior, were not evident. A third sub-category of response was developed to categorize those who attached labels to the behavior, such as "lying is wrong" or "cheating is wrong," but, as in the other sub-categories, no other elaboration was given. Another variation of this form of reasoning was expressed by those students who made the basic acknowledgment that their behavior was wrong, but then attempted to offer some qualifications about the extent or nature
of their involvement. References to intent or to the amount of property destroyed, for example, were included in their responses.

These four sub-categories all seem to be variations of the same basic form of reasoning—a form that provides very little elaboration in the reasoning given. In fact, the absence of any reasons why the behavior was wrong other than to simply acknowledge that it was wrong or that the behavior did occur is what distinguishes this form of reasoning from other forms of reasoning given in response to this question.

**Reference to laws or rules.** Making a reference to the law, a university rule, or to the fact that the behavior was illegal was a frequent standard used by some students to indicate why their behavior was wrong. Two distinct levels of reasoning, both making reference to this external standard, were evident. Some students stated simply that their behavior was wrong because it was against the law; but, as in the first form of reasoning (simple acknowledgment) students whose responses were classified at this level did not elaborate further on this response. Other students who used this same legal or rule oriented frame of reference gave not only more complete responses but stated some purpose or function that the law or rule served. Student #13 gave this
response, which is an example of this second and more mature form of reasoning.

It is wrong to destroy property. In order to maintain order in society, you must respect people's property. If there wasn't a law, you'd have to have laws like that.

In this response, student #13 used law as a central reference for his response, but the law in this case served an instrumental role to protect property.

In moral development stage theory, references to rules and laws were cited as examples of conventional stage 3 or stage 4 thinking. This conventional form of reasoning was reflected in responses to this question, too, because some students clearly make a reference to laws and to rules in their responses. But some students, who used this particular form of reasoning, made responses that were more complete and that indicated an instrumental purpose for the law or rule. Students whose responses reflected this more differentiated form of reasoning were rated at a different level within this general category than those who made just a simple reference to the law to indicate why their behavior was wrong.

Personal fault, personal discomfort. Two other forms of reasoning, combined here for discussion purposes, were identified. Both forms focused on the individual. In the first form of reasoning, fault, blame, or failure to meet personal expectations were
offered as reasons why the behavior was wrong. One student responded that "it was a stupid thing to do," another student indicated that "I should have known better." Responses of this type seemed to point to personal failure to maintain control or to some personal short-coming as a basis for making a judgment about right or wrong.

Another form of reasoning that also used the self as a frame of reference identified the personal and aversive feelings that resulted from the incident. "It embarrassed me" or "I'm ashamed" were examples of some of the responses given to this question. Each of these two forms of reasoning used the self as a key focus, but whether these two forms reflect different levels of moral reasoning remains an open question. It may be that responses of this type are better indicators of personality variables than they are of forms of moral reasoning. On the one hand, there are those individuals who make self-depreciating statements and, on the other hand, are those individuals who respond to the affect or guilt-oriented feelings that were generated by their behavior.

No right to do it. Another form of reasoning that was identified also focused on self, but was classified as a higher level response because for the first time the
issue of "right" was raised. However, in this form of reasoning, the issue of right was basically one-sided—the rights of the other individual affected by the behavior were not acknowledged. One student, who was involved in a theft incident when asked this question, responded: "I didn't have a right to take it." Other illustrations of this level of reasoning include student #1 who replied, "It wasn't my property," and student #5 who responded, "took something that wasn't ours."

Responses classified at this level begin to reflect some intuitive notions about fairness and personal rights. But a full comprehension or articulation of why their behavior was wrong and clear statements about the rights of others were missing.

Consequences to others. Another identified form of reasoning about right and wrong took into account the effect of the behavior on others. This form of reasoning was expressed in three different ways. Responses labeled as type I expressed the idea of direct effect of the behavior on others as illustrated by student #10's response, "It hurts someone else." Another student who was guilty of discharging a fire extinguisher during some rowdy behavior in one of the residence halls pointed to "the safety of others if there had been a
fire," as a consequence of his actions. Not all student responses that were classified at this level stated that their behavior did, in fact, affect someone else, but if a reference was made to others, then that response was classified at this level. Several students who violated the campus drug policy pointed out that their act "was a victimless crime." Even though these students did not believe that what they did was wrong, the fact that others were not affected was the criteria used to judge right and wrong.

A second level of reasoning in this category focused on the relationship between the people involved or affected by the incident. Student #33, who was involved in an incident of academic misconduct, stated that this behavior was wrong "because extra material gave me an unfair advantage over other students." Also those individuals who recognized the rights of others and those responses, such as given by student #33 that indicated that a reciprocal relationship or balance between individuals had been altered by their behavior, were classified at this level.

Type III reasoning included student responses that indicated an ability to generalize from the specific concrete situation to the more general situation. Responses that recognized what the consequences would be if everyone engaged in such behavior also were
included at this level. Student #4, who was caught removing mattresses from his residence hall to take to his off-campus apartment, gave a response of this latter type. "If everyone took a mattress, there would be none left."

This general form of reasoning which recognized the effect of behavior on others was classified as the most mature form of reasoning given by students to this question. Kohlberg (1969) and Rest (1973) have described stage 5 reasoning, one of the stages of principled thinking, as that stage based on the idea of a social contract. This stage of reasoning takes into consideration the rights of others and reciprocal relationship between people. Those students in this study who cited as reasons why their behavior was either wrong or not wrong the effect or consequences of that behavior, which included a recognition of the rights of others or of an equitable relationship with others, indicated that they were capable of responding with this more mature form of reasoning. Thus, their responses were classified in this general category.

**Personally relative or situational standards.** One other form of reasoning was identified. Some students gave responses in which right or wrong was situationally defined. Right or wrong was defined relative either to
the specific situation or to the personal feelings of the individual. Such statements as: "I enjoy it;"
"In one instance it can be wrong and then in another instance not;" and "each person should be own judge of right and wrong" were examples of this type of reasoning. Relative standards rather than the use of either general principles or concrete definitions to determine right or wrong exemplify this form of reasoning. Rest (1974) and Gilligan and Kohlberg (1971) reported that judgments made on this basis of relative standards represent a transitional (stage 4½) form of thinking. At this phase of moral development, students reject conventional forms of reasoning but have not yet established a firm set of principles from which to define right and wrong, so judgments were relative to the immediate situation. In this study some students also demonstrated a preference for this type of thought. They refused to be pinned down and were evasive in their responses indicating, "it depends." As this form of judgment appeared, it was coded in this category.

**Summary.** Distinct forms of reasoning were evident in the responses given by students to this question. One form of reasoning, the least mature pattern of response, only simply acknowledged that the behavior was right or wrong or that the incident had occurred.
A second form of reasoning, split into two levels, made direct reference to laws or to rules to define right or wrong. Some students who used this pattern of thought gave more adequate or complete responses, and, thus, their responses were classified at the higher level because the instrumental purpose for the rule or law was identified.

Other differences in judgments given by students included: reference to personal fault or blame, reference to such personal feelings as embarrassment to define right and wrong, and the recognition of individual rights and that their behavior had consequences for others. Finally, a relative or situational form of thinking in which students refused to be pinned down to a specific statement about right or wrong was identified.

This question addressed a major dimension of morality—the sense of right and wrong. Some very different patterns of reasoning were delineated during the analysis. Some of these differences reflect primarily differences in response content, but other patterns of reasoning seem to indicate qualitatively different levels or forms of moral reasoning. If these different forms of reasoning are related to stage of moral development, a significant relationship between these responses and the P score appear in the multiple
regression analysis. This relationship will be discussed in Chapter V.

What factors would you ... like to have considered ... on what disciplinary action is appropriate? (Please state)

Students were given the opportunity to identify those factors or issues which they wishes to have considered or judged during the process of reaching a decision on an appropriate disciplinary sanction. Students could identify as many factors as they wanted.

Since Rest (1974) used an issue oriented approach as the basis for his assessment of moral judgment, the choice of issues selected by students in their response to this question was identified as a possible indication of their level of moral maturity. Through careful analysis of the responses made to this question, four general frames of reference were identified as the primary response patterns expressed by students. Each frame of reference had a different focus. One focus was on the incident, another focus an evaluation of the person involved, a third focus on the desire to be treated fairly, and the fourth focus was on the potential effect or consequence of any disciplinary action.

**Evaluate the incident.** Some students focused their attention on the incident and what happened as the basic perspective that they wanted considered in the disciplinary
decision. There were three different elements or subcategories identified that represented this perspective. One element focused on how others were or were not affected by this incident. A second element focused on the degree of seriousness that the student attached to this incident. Another response category indicated a willingness to let others be the judge. Students who focused on the incident and on what happened tended to down-play the potential seriousness of their act. It was this effort to minimize or point out how matters might have been worse that students wanted considered in the disciplinary decision that distinguished this form of reasoning from the other two. An example of this perspective appears in the response of student #3 who had forged an ID card and who stated, "only made one, made one for myself. I didn't think it was all that serious." Student #41 emphasized the fact that "no one was hurt" by his behavior. Generally, the perspective taken by students whose responses were classified within this form of reasoning was the incident itself.

*Evaluate me.* A second perspective focused on the student. An assessment of that person's motivation, character, or the student's feelings that result from his or her involvement in the incident were further sub-divided into three levels of reasoning, each using
this perspective. Responses related to motivation either indicated that the incident was a reaction or a result of some pressure, that the incident was not deliberate or that, in fact, the incident was committed for some specific purpose. Student #14's response was an example of someone who had a deliberate purpose in mind when he forged a food validation label for use in the dining commons. He pointed to his desire "to make up for last quarter's meals" that were missed and to the fact "I didn't have too much cash" as reasons that he wanted considered in the disciplinary decision.

Students also wanted their individual academic record and their general character taken into consideration when a disciplinary decision was made. If the incident was a first offense, that was pointed out. A third way in which the individual singled himself or herself out for evaluation were statements about attitudes which the person had about the incident. These responses included statements to the fact that students were aware that what they did was wrong or that they had learned a lesson. If they had cooperated with the police or with any administrative investigation, that fact also was mentioned.

Each of these three sub-categories described above had different content themes expressed by students in
their response to this question, but the common thread uniting these categories was the focus on the individual student. Student responses included in this category expressed some personal attribute to be considered in arriving at the discipline decision.

**Equal treatment.** A third focus expressed in the responses was to impose a sanction consistent with what others who had committed similar violations received. Only a few responses were of this type, but this response seemed to reflect a different perspective and form of reasoning, so it was classified during the analysis as a major and distinct perspective.

**Consequences of imposing a sanction.** The final perspective focused on what it meant to the individual student if a sanction were imposed. Students pointed to the possible effect on their future goals and on their educational plans if they were to receive a major sanction like suspension. Some students, who were also involved in criminal proceedings, pointed to the effect that any additional sanction through the university would have on their lives. Responses that focused directly on the sanction and its possible consequences to the individual student were classified together under this perspective.
Summary. By analyzing each student's response, distinct response patterns were identified. These responses were categorized according to the specific focus or perspective used, which may not necessarily represent morally more adequate ways of reasoning. It may be that these different perspectives essentially represent different content issues rather than structurally different ways of reasoning. Students identified different issues or factors upon which to be judged, and it is these different content issues that may reflect different levels of moral reasoning. Further comparison of these responses with the P score should answer the question of whether these four frames of reference are indicative of the student's level of moral reasoning and whether the individual criteria to be used to determine a sanction are related to moral reasoning.

What do you see as some of the consequences that resulted from your action?

A mature moral judgment based on moral principles would take into consideration the interests of other people affected by that behavior. To demonstrate that level of reasoning, the person making the judgment must be able to report how decisions, choices, or actions affect others. This particular question was intended to assess how students perceive the consequences that did
result from their behavior. One assumption drawn from cognitive developmental theory was that the morally mature individual would be more likely to perceive that behavior affects others. By analyzing the various responses that students made to this question, seven primary modes of moral reasoning were identified.

**Consequences are not acknowledged or elaborated upon.** Included in this category were those individuals who did not answer this question, those who argued against creating any personal consequences by imposing a sanction, those who recognized that "getting caught" was a consequence but did not offer any further elaboration, and those students who would not commit themselves and stated that "it depends." The central characteristic of this form of reasoning was the absence of specific statements about what the consequences were.

**Avoid repetition.** For some students to be more careful next time was the extent of their response. Such responses as, "be more careful next time," "won't do that again," and "to think more next time" were response patterns included within this mode of reasoning. The focus was on what the student would do differently in the future, but no direct statement about consequences was implied. The assumption, reading between the lines, was that the student recognized the possible punitive
aspects of getting caught, which would cause them to be more careful next time. However, no specific references in the content of the response to the consequences were made.

**Consequences to self.** Students who used this form of reasoning focused on the personal consequences that occurred or might occur to them from this incident. Consequences mentioned included possible disciplinary sanctions that might affect educational or employment goals and self-imposed or self-generated consequences, such as feelings of guilt, depression, or embarrassment.

**Personal change.** A fourth mode of reasoning also focused on the individual student, but this time the consequences were perceived in more favorable ways. Some students indicated that they had a change in attitude since the incident or that in the future they would do things differently. Responses which indicated that the student had reevaluated the incident and now considered it more serious than previously thought also were included in this category. Responses in this category reflected a different qualitative level of reasoning than those responses scored as the category labeled avoid repetition. Responses included under avoid repetition expressed the need to be more careful in the future but not the need to make a change in behavior or
attitude. It was this latter form of reasoning—change in behavior or attitude—that was the basic focus of responses included in this category.

**Influence on social milieu.** Responses by several students pointed out that one consequence that resulted from this incident was the effect that this incident and the fact that they were caught had on those living around them. This obviously was an indirect consequence of the incident, but a response of this type did reflect a conscious recognition of the effect on others and not just on the person who committed the incident.

**Right or wrong.** Several students reported that one of the consequences was to recognize that their behavior was in fact "wrong." This response by student #47 is typical of responses in this category. "It is wrong to take someone else's..." Responses that indicated judgments about right and wrong were classified together.

**Effect on others.** One final mode of reasoning included those responses which recognized that the behavior had an effect on others. Responses included in this category reported either the direct effect of the incident on others or the more indirect effect on someone like a parent. When students responded, as did student #14, that the behavior did not really affect anyone else,
that form of reasoning was included within this category because the student at least considered the possible effect of his behavior on others.

**Summary.** Several different modes of reasoning were identified as a result of the analysis of this question. It was assumed that the morally mature individuals would be more likely to see the potential or actual effect of their behavior on others. Surprisingly, however, only a few students considered any other consequences except to themselves. In campus discipline a frequent goal is to try to help students recognize how their behavior does impact on others. The data from this question indicates that very few students responded with that level of perceptual awareness, possibly because so many students in this study were at a conventional level of moral reasoning.

What will prevent this from happening again? Why do you say that?

One pragmatic concern for those working with college discipline is to prevent further recurrence of a discipline incident. In most situations that is not a problem as the frequency of repetition by the same offender is usually quite small. To prevent repetition, though, does require that an individual be in a position to exercise control over behavior. One frequent
student development goal for campus discipline is to encourage students to exercise their own self-discipline and not to depend on discipline by others as a control over behavior. This question was designed to assess how students viewed the issue of prevention and what reasons or judgments they offer. Do they, in fact, see themselves as the responsible agent in this situation?

Responses to this question did vary and four general response patterns were identified. Some students admitted that they did not know what would prevent this from happening again, and these responses were classified together. Another group mentioned that possible punishment or other negative consequences would deter the behavior. A third response category included those student responses that identified internal or self-controls that would prevent this from happening again. A fourth category consisted of those student responses that indicated that some external change in the social environment would prevent it from happening again.

Non-committal. Some students gave very tentative or hesitant responses to this question, or they indicated directly that they did not know what would prevent this from happening again. Some examples of this level of reasoning were given by student #4 who stated, "I really couldn't say," and by student #12 who
responded, "What are the answers? There are no set answers."

Avoiders. The "avoiders" was the label selected to identify reasoning which focused on the consequences that did or that might happen. The thought of going to jail or getting kicked out of school seemed sufficient to these students to prevent any future problems. The flavor of this form of thinking was best captures by this succinct response from student #8. "I don't want to go through this bull shit again." The common element in the responses grouped in this category was the focus on avoiding any more negative or potentially negative consequences by engaging in similar behavior in the future.

Self-prevention (internal orientation). Self-control or the self will prevent future misconduct were given an important role by some students in their responses to this question. Different expressions of this major theme were identified and these sub-categories were labeled "controllers," "knowers," and "changers."

Controllers. Some students indicated that they looked directly to self to control any possible problems of this nature. The self was identified by the brief response, "me," "myself," "will power," or "I won't let that happen." The controlling agent was the individual. No other factor was necessary to prevent a recurrence.
Knowers. The "knowers" included those students who indicated that knowledge of right and wrong or recently acquired knowledge of the rules would suffice to keep them out of further difficulty. Examples of responses of this type included, "Now I know the rules," "Now I understand," and "I know it was wrong."

Changers. A third category of response with a focus on the individual reflected a greater degree of active control over behavior. Students who indicated that they would change their drinking behavior, or would think before acting, or that they would be more careful next time, for example, expressed a form of reasoning included in this category.

Change social environment (external control). Change was also the focus for response patterns included in this category. But, unlike the previous category, change was in the social situation that contributed to the incident. For example, a student who had forged an ID card indicated that now that he had his own ID there would be no need for him to have to forge one in the future. A student involved in an academic misconduct incident suggested that the faculty should give more warnings about cheating and about the consequences; a student who had assaulted another student after class indicated that he had changed academic departments.
Each of these examples represented a mode of thinking which emphasized a change in external factors that might have influenced or caused the incident. When that pattern of response was absent, they were included within this form of reasoning.

**Summary.** The analysis of responses to this question indicate that those students who do express specific ideas about prevention focus their thinking either on the personal consequences if they do engage in misconduct again, on means of self-control, or on changes in the social setting that would make such behavior in the future highly unlikely. Those who express the idea of self-control were further classified into "controllers," "knowers," and "changers" sub-types. These three labels were selected for these sub-categories because they identified the particular aspect of self that students reported would prevent any repetition.

Students who now have a strong image of the consequences that are attached to "wrong-doing" may not find in the future that reference to consequences will, in fact, be a sufficient deterrent to future misconduct. One can speculate that as time passes concern for the problems and hassles encountered during the discipline or criminal process will diminish. Students who express this idea may well be motivated by threat or fear of
punishment. Such thinking has generally been characteristic of lower stage moral reasoning.

Those students who focus on some dimension of self at least have placed themselves in a position where they can see themselves exercising and accepting control over their own behavior. This is no guarantee that future temptations will not lead to further misconduct, a question that this study was not designed to answer. However, it seems logical to conclude that students who look toward self to control future behavior are focusing their thinking in an appropriate direction. Since the "controllers" mention the self, without elaborating on how or why, to prevent future misconduct, their level of self-processing may not be sufficient to withstand any strong temptations in the future. Their very brief explanations may be indicative that the complexity of their thinking is not highly developed.

Some students may rightly have identified external problems that, if changed, would discourage or at least reduce the likelihood of future misconduct. However, this focus does not reflect any personal insight and the students who use this response fail to recognize that other students who may be in a similar situation may choose to behave differently.

Clearly, the four major response categories that were identified differ in basic content and perspective.
It remains to be seen in the subsequent analysis described in Chapter V whether those differences are related to level of moral reasoning. It is anticipated that those who specifically focus on consequences as the factor that will prevent future misconduct will have a lower P score on the DIT.

In your own mind, what function do rules or regulations serve?

Attitude toward rules was an important aspect of Piaget's (1965) delineation of the two major stages of moral reasoning. Hogan (1974) also focused on rules in his definition of morality. Student perceptions and judgments about the function of rules and regulations was, thus, expected to yield differences in responses that could be attributed to different levels of moral reasoning. The analysis of student responses to this question did identify three basic differences in level and form of response.

One level of response identified those students who were not able to acknowledge that rules had a function. Rules were seen as important and necessary, but specific reasons or functions for rules were not expressed. The second level of reasoning was represented by those student responses which indicated some rule functions. This second form of reasoning was further divided based on four distinctly articulated functions. A third level
of reasoning, like level one, did not indicate that rules had specific or concrete functions; however, the responses classified at this level expressed more than the requirement that rules must exist. Instead student responses classified at this level expressed the idea that rules can be changed or modified.

The variation in functions that were described by those students who did articulate specific functions suggested different patterns and perspectives in their reasoning. These different functions are:

**Rules do something to the person.** Some students attributed power to rules. An example of this form of reasoning is evident in this response by student #6, "Rules can get you kicked out of school."

**Rules serve as guides.** Rules also were described as guides or guidelines to the individual about how to behave or about what was right or wrong. In this category were included responses that indicated that rules served as external referents to the individual. But there was not the strong feeling of power associated with the rule that was suggested in the preceding category.

**Rules serve to protect.** Some students pointed out that rules function to protect people and property, or protect individual rights. This protective function
was described as a very necessary and important function.

**Rules serve to control.** Rules also functioned to control. This idea was expressed in two ways. One control function of rules was to prevent chaos, to keep order, or to regulate. A broader perspective on the control function of rules was expressed by students who indicated that the function of rules was to make things better or to keep relationships in tact. In the first form of control the idea of regulation was expressed; in the second form rules function to maintain existing or established organizations or relationships.

**Summary.** Only one category was established for those responses that expressed directly various rule functions. Those specific functions were sub-divided into four distinct categories. For those students who were not able to articulate a function, their responses were included in a separate category. Apparently these students were only able to accept the necessity to have rules and were unable to provide specific reasons why or to state functions.

Some of the expressed rule functions also suggested different levels of moral reasoning. At the level where rules were seen as having autonomous power, this form of reasoning was not as advanced as the reasoning which
indicated instrumental roles for rules, such as protecting individuals or property or maintaining relationships.

Student attitudes or perceptions toward rules in general did vary both in content or perspective and in the general level of reasoning that was expressed. Since cognitive-development theory has postulated that different attitudes toward rules are associated with the level of moral development, it is expected that these rule functions will be associated with the P score.

Do you consider the rule or regulation you have been charged with violating a fair one?

Issues of fairness are important dimensions of moral thinking. Perceptions about what is fair or not fair can be expected to vary depending on the circumstances and the individual. The individual variation in perceptions do reflect the cognitive judgments that a person makes, and, therefore, student responses to this question were expected to give some indication of that student's level of moral reasoning. Student perception about the fairness of a given rule or regulation may also influence the reasons that students give for breaking a regulation. As Haan et al. (1968) discovered in their study of the Berkeley protester's, "sitting in" for some students was a principled thing to do. It was perceived as morally right.
Of concern in this study were the reasons that students gave for why they considered the rule to be either fair or not fair. On what basis were judgments of fairness made? The analysis of the responses to this question proved interesting. Three major frames of reference or response style were identified. In one category were placed those student responses that indicated that the student had difficulty responding to this question, as if the question of fairness had never been previously entertained. Some students elected to focus their response on their behavior. Judgments about fairness were made by judging their behavior. Within this general frame of reference several different response patterns were identified. In the third category were placed those responses in which students focused on the rule and not on their individual behavior. Within this category, too, several different forms of reasoning were expressed.

The general perspectives and their forms of reasoning expressed by students which were identified include:

Concept of fairness is difficult to understand. Some students had a difficult time responding to this question. It was as if they had never been confronted by such a question. One student responded to this question with, "it's difficult to say" and another student with, "I
don't know." Those responses which could be classified as relative or situational were classified in this category also. The student who responded, "it depends," fits that particular relative mode of thought.

**Judging fairness on basis of behavior or application of rule.** Some students selected concrete standards that focused either on what they did or on how the rule was applied to them as the basis for judging the fairness of the rule. This perspective was differentiated into three different patterns of responses with each pattern organized around that incident and that student's behavior or motivation.

**Type I.** Fairness was defined only by the relatively simple response that indicated that the behavior had occurred and that that student had been involved. "It is fair, because I did it," was an example of that level of thinking. The general frame of reference used was the behavior; fairness was equated with the fact that the behavior did occur and that that person was guilty or did do it. Very little further elaboration was given, and the students who were classified at this level never offered any other criteria by which they judged fairness.

**Type II.** Responses grouped here were more complex in the reasoning used than those responses classified as Type I. Behavior was still the principal focus, but
judgments about fairness included references to the degree of involvement, intent, motivation, and judgments about degree of seriousness. In other words, different shades of meaning or judgments about the behavior also were offered. There was more depth to responses classified as Type II than just the plain statement, "I did it."

Type III. Stronger evidence that the student was attempting to evaluate what had happened was the basis for classifying responses at this level. Behavior was still a general frame of reference, but students began to offer some general, but usually external criteria as a basis for their response that the rule was either fair or not fair. "It's against the law" or "it's illegal" were given as reasons why the rule was fair. In other words, the rule was judged both by behavior and by prevailing laws. Those responses in which students indicated that they should have responded differently, and those responses in which students made reference to the effect of their behavior on others also were classified here because that perspective was on that incident and that student's particular situation or behavior.

Judging fairness by evaluating the rule. The specific behavior or incident was not always the major perspective taken in responses to this question.
Students offered judgments about the rule itself and suggested criteria on which they evaluated the fairness of the rule. Several different types of response patterns were identified within this general perspective.

Type I. This type of thinking, while focusing on the rule, usually accepted the need or importance of rules. "Have to have rule" and "must enforce rules" were examples of this pattern of thinking. In simple terms it was fair to have a rule. "How else could it be" was the attitude conveyed in these responses. The actual fairness of the rule was not at issue, but the necessity to have a rule was.

Type II. Student responses included in this type simply acknowledged that the rule was fair. No further explanation was given. During the analysis of responses, there seemed to be a qualitative distinction to be made between this type of response and other responses. The difference was that the student was implicitly communicating an intuitive feeling that the rule was fair, but the student was not able to articulate why. One basic difference between responses scored here and those scored as perspective I (concept of fairness is difficult to understand), described above, was the tentative nature of the responses classified as perspective I. Such
responses as "I don't know" and "it's difficult to say" were classified in perspective I.

Type III. At this level students began to examine the purpose of the rule to determine if it was fair. Students identified the fact that the rule protected others or regulated behavior, purposes which in themselves were judged by the student as fair so that the rule itself was judged as fair.

Type IV. Students made reference to a general hierarchy of rules which had some internal or personal importance to them, which served as a basis on which to judge fairness. For example, student #3, who had falsified some information, indicated in his response that "any time someone signs something . . . not only is a regulation broken, but a moral rule is broken which is also fair." This student looked at this rule in a more general way and recognized that the rule itself may be an effort to legislate some moral code or principle.

Summary. Three general perspectives or patterns in student responses to this question were identified during the inductive analysis. The perspective that focused on behavior and the perspective that focused on the rule may not differentiate more mature from less morally mature thinking. Intuitively or rationally it is hard to support
an argument that one perspective is necessarily a more mature form of reasoning. However, the various types of reasoning included within these two perspectives appear to represent different levels of moral reasoning.

Type I responses in both categories show little elaboration. The question of fairness is almost automatically accepted in responses classified in perspective II because the behavior did occur or because, in perspective III, it was necessary to have rules. Type III responses, on the other hand, indicate that the student is attempting to make some independent judgments about the issue of fairness. In the behavior perspective the student evaluated intent and motivation, whereas, in the rule perspective the student evaluated the purpose of the rule. In each case the reasoning appears to be more complex in that it is more differentiated. Thus, a strong likelihood exists that a positive relationship will be found between this type of thinking and the level of moral reasoning.

Generally, how do you view other violations of this same rule? How do you evaluate your own violation?

Comparison of ratings. Through two different questions, students were asked to evaluate a violation of rules. The first question asked students to evaluate
the rule as if they had learned about someone else violating that same rule. The second question asked students to evaluate their own violation of the rule. The purpose for asking these two questions was to determine how serious an incident of this type was to the student and whether there was a difference in evaluation when evaluating their own behavior rather than someone else's behavior. Comparison of responses to these two questions is presented in Table 5 below.

Table 5
Evaluation of Seriousness of Violation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Other Violations</th>
<th>Own Violations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very serious</td>
<td>9 (17.3%)</td>
<td>9 (16.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious</td>
<td>24 (46.2%)</td>
<td>23 (41.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so serious</td>
<td>6 (11.5%)</td>
<td>9 (14.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor</td>
<td>6 (11.5%)</td>
<td>14 (25.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No rating</td>
<td>7 (13.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>52 (100%)</td>
<td>55 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most students evaluated their own violation (41.8%) and violations of that same rule by others (46.2%) as serious. The major differences in evaluations between these two questions were among those students who rated the violation as minor or who gave no rating. The category "no rating" consisted of those students who responded that they "didn't know" or "it depends."
When students were asked to evaluate their own violation, more than twice as many (25.5%) selected the category minor than was the case when they were evaluating other violations (11.5%) of this same rule. When students had to evaluate violations other than their own, 13.5% of the students had a difficult time making an evaluation. This was not the case when students evaluated their own behavior. Except for the bottom two rating categories, however, there is little difference in evaluations of the seriousness of a rule violation whether students are evaluating their own violation or someone else's violation.

**Criteria used to determine seriousness.** Students also were here asked to provide the reasons why they selected a particular rating. These reasons were analyzed for commonalities in response. Several different patterns were identified that used different criteria or a different basis upon which to make judgments. Students used a similar criteria for their evaluations for both questions, so these questions were combined together.

One criteria focused on the fact that a rule or law was violated. As an example, one student responded: "law was broken and that is serious." Another student responded: "stealing is serious." No effort was made to evaluate the possibility that some laws or some
forms of behavior might be more serious than others. Instead, just the fact that a violation did occur was the basic criterion used for the evaluation.

A second criterion focused on the consequences of the act either to the student or to others. If the consequences were judged as serious or potentially serious, then the violation was deemed serious. In the case of a student who was accused of smoking marijuana on campus, for example, that student reported that the violation was not serious because no one else was affected by that behavior.

A third criterion used situational or more relative standards. Intent, the value of the property, how frequently that type of incident occurred, and past behavior were all suggested as reasons to support the ratings given. Like the second criterion, responses grouped in this category indicated that the student analyzed the situation in order to make judgments about the degree of seriousness. Each case would necessarily be different and no general standards were suggested by the responses categorized at this level.

The fourth criterion or pattern that was identified included those responses which indicated that the student used either some general standard or a hierarchy of personal values to judge the seriousness of the violation. Some examples of this form of
reasoning included this reply by student #8 who stated: "It is against property, not another person. It's not as important as a crime against a person."

Student #16 stated: "If someone attempts to hurt someone, it's always serious." Student #27 responded: "By the time you come to college you should be able to do some research. I think it's serious when you use someone else's work." Responses categorized at this fourth level indicated that a student had an internal value system of some sort upon which to judge his and other's actions. It was this expression of such a value system that could be generalized from one situation to another which differentiated this criterion from the others.

Summary. Students generally evaluated the degree of seriousness for these two questions as very serious, serious, or not so serious in the same proportions. It was only when students were asked to consider other violations that some students had a difficult time generalizing to situations other than their own. Apparently some students found the absence of a concrete frame of reference difficult to respond to. And it was only when considering their own violation did a dramatic increase in the rating of minor occur.

Students supported their evaluations with four different forms of reasoning. Some students used an
"either-or," "black-white" criteria (e.g., a rule was violated) to determine the degree of seriousness. A second form of reasoning focused on the consequences of the behavior. This focus established a criterion on which the degree of seriousness could be evaluated. Judgmental criterion that used relative or independently evaluated standards that might vary from situation to situation or from individual to individual were included in the third form of reasoning. And, finally, some student responses gave evidence that personal values serve as a basis for judging the seriousness.

Do you have any sense or feeling of obligation? (Please describe.)

Kohlberg in "From is to Ought" (1971) listed as one aspect of morality a sense of duty or obligation. Certain moral obligations take importance in the life of an individual. This question was designed to tap that dimension and to determine if expressions of obligation were in any way related to the student's level of moral reasoning. The analysis of student responses to this question produced a very interesting pattern of responses.

No obligation. Some students, in response to this question, indicated that they had no sense or feeling of obligation.
Obligation without elaboration. Some students reported that they did have a feeling of obligation but, except for this acknowledgment, they did not elaborate or describe what that sense of obligation was.

Obligation because of wrong-doing. A response pattern similar to the above obligation also acknowledged a sense or feeling of obligation. Although the nature of that obligation was expressed, this response pattern was differentiated from the one above because students did indicate why they felt obligated—their behavior was perceived as wrong. In other words, students indicated "yes" to this question because they had broken a rule or had done something wrong.

Obligation as guilt. Some students interpreted or equated obligation with guilt. Student responses which indicated a feeling of guilt were classified together in this category.

Obligation articulated. At this level of reasoning were grouped those student responses that indicated a sense or feeling of obligation and that articulate what that sense of obligation was. At this level obligation was expressed as an obligation to do something. Either that obligation was self-directed or other-directed.
Obligation to self. This form of obligation was internally directed and had a rather passive quality. It included such responses as: "to prove something to self," "to accept the consequences," "to behave," "to understand the seriousness," "to accept responsibility," and "to be cooperative." Responses of this type were internal actions for which that student was responsible.

Obligation of self to others. Another form of obligation required some external action on the part of the student, such as an obligation "to make things right," "to make restitution," or "to prevent the same thing from happening to others." At this level obligation was generally expressed as restoring the balance or status quo. This sense of obligation was not as inner directed as those responses which were classified as an obligation to self.

Summary. The concept of obligation itself may be a concept that requires a certain level of moral understanding before it is understood. The first three response categories were similar in that either students indicated that they had no sense or feeling of obligation or if they did acknowledge a sense of obligation, they did not articulate or describe what that obligation was. In another form or category of response, students
expressed their sense of obligation as a feeling of guilt. The fifth identified response pattern included those students who described the object or focus of their obligation. That sense of obligation was either a passive obligation to self or an obligation or responsibility to others.

It is difficult to state at this point whether the different concepts of obligation are related to the student's level of moral reasoning. It was expected that this concept might elicit qualitatively different response which would be an indication of different levels of moral reasoning. Some students did have difficulty answering this question and others, who did indicate that they had a sense of obligation, were not able to expound on that acknowledgment. If, as expected, the concept of obligation or description of types of obligation is related to level of moral development, these should turn out to be associated with the P score.

What function do you see that punishment serves?

In his research on the moral judgment of children, Piaget (1965) described two basic types of punishment or retributive justice. The purpose of punishment was either based on duty to authority or to rules or to reestablish a social relationship. Piaget referred to the one purpose as expiatory punishment and to the other
as punishment by reciprocity. Expiatory punishment was related to the morality of heteronomy in which moral law consisted of rules imposed by authority figures or superiors and punishment was arbitrarily imposed for breaking one's duty to obey those laws. Reciprocity, on the other hand, corresponded to a spirit of cooperation and mutual relationships among people that was associated with the morality of autonomy. Piaget's work demonstrated that these two purposes were an indication of different levels of moral judgment.

Kohlberg's (1969) later work indicated that moral development continued into the adult years and that punishment was viewed from different perspectives. If students who participated in this study were at different levels of moral reasoning, then it was expected that responses to this question would reflect those developmental differences. This seemed to be the case as the careful analysis of responses did indicate that there were basically five different response patterns students used to answer this question. In addition, eight distinct functions of punishment were identified.

**No function.** One response pattern included student responses that indicated either that punishment had no specific function in this situation or that punishment generally did not serve any purpose.
Retribution for breaking a rule. The idea of retribution as a function of punishment was apparent in some student responses. Responses classified under this heading indicated that punishment was a direct result or consequence for breaking a rule. Punishment was accepted automatically or unquestioningly by these students and no other purposes or reasons were stated.

Relative. The function of punishment also was described as dependent on the situation. Students who gave this response did not indicate any specific purpose or function for punishment. They did not want to be pinned down, and chose to offer what was characterized as a relative response—"it depends on the situation."

Situationally specific. A variation on the relative response above were those responses which indicated that the function of punishment was specific to this particular situation or violation. In the responses classified in this category, students did state one or more specific functions, but the focus was clearly on their own violation or incident. Responses were often prefaced by, "In this situation. . . ." Responses grouped under this heading were similar in that they did not make reference to the general situation.
General functions specified. The final response pattern that was identified included those responses which indicated a specific function or functions. The types of functions specified were categorized, too, into the following eight areas: deterrence/prevention, reminder (i.e., about the consequences or what happened was wrong), teach a lesson, compensate, example to others, regulate/protect, help/rehabilitate, and abstract forms or distinctions made between types of punishment. These responses indicated an ability to specify one or more general purposes for punishment. These different functions also appear to indicate different levels of moral reasoning. Some students indicated that the purpose of punishment was to compensate or to rectify a situation, which was the general notion of punishment by reciprocity described by Piaget (1965). Another student inferred that punishment had the power to teach someone a lesson. A very mature understanding of punishment, though, was expressed by student #51 who gave this response: "Depending on what it is, it can serve as retribution or rehabilitation. Punishment must have some rational relationship to the goal it seeks to bring." This student's response indicated a deeper and more complex form of reasoning about the nature and general purpose of punishment than the more conventional response that punishment served
to deter such behavior or that punishment helped to regulate behavior.

**Summary.** The concept of punishment itself, as Piaget noted, is a developmental concept. By developmental concept, I mean that at some levels a very punitive and retributive outlook on punishment is expressed. As individuals mature other punishment purposes are expressed. For this reason, it was expected that developmental differences in the students' level of moral reasoning also would be reflected in the types of responses given to this question. The analysis of student responses did indicate such differences in the levels of reasoning used and in the focus or content of the response. Some students, for example, reported that punishment had no function. Since punishment in general is a concept that reflects the attitudes of conventional morality, it may turn out that those who expressed this idea may, in fact, be at a higher level of moral reasoning than some students who indicated certain specific punishment functions.

The analysis also revealed that some students accepted the inevitability that punishment results whenever there has been a violation. For these students punishment was an accepted consequence. Any sophistication about the purpose or function that
punishment serves was missing from their responses. Another group of students was reluctant to make specific statements about the function of punishment unless the specific situation to which it applied was specified. Punishment for these students was best described as relative or situational.

When students did express specific functions, those functions represented a range of different functions. These different functions reflected basic differences in the level of understanding and descriptions of the function of punishment. The conventional view that punishment is a deterrent to subsequent misconduct was clearly expressed. Another level of moral reasoning also was expressed by those students who indicated that punishment had power to "teach a lesson" or "to correct behavior."

Punishment as compensation, as noted above, is an example of the reciprocity function of punishment and that concept also was expressed. A few students expressed abstract reasons about the nature of punishment. This abstract ability to conceptualize was another indication that the responses to this question were distributed over a general range of qualitative differences in the structure as well as in the content of the reasoning used. These differences support the idea that the different functions are an indication of
students' level of moral maturity. It is expected that the results of the regression analysis will support this finding.

Do you believe that you should receive some punishment? Why?

After students had a chance to articulate in the previous question what they believed to be the function of punishment, they were asked whether they should receive some punishment for their violation. Four types of responses were given to this question. There were those students who indicated a "yes" or "no" but gave no reasons why. There were other students who indicated that the decision on punishment should be left to the discretion of the person in authority. The other two types of response included those students who gave reasons why they should be punished and those students who gave reasons why they should not be punished or why punishment, if given, should be limited. The reasons that students gave for or against punishment were classified according to the following system:

Reasons for punishment

1. Punishment is the result of breaking rules or doing something wrong.

2. Punishment has an objective such as to "teach a person a lesson" or as a "reminder of the consequences."

3. If I am not punished, I will punish myself.
Reasons for no punishment or for limiting punishment

1. Have or will receive punishment—either externally through courts or internally through self-punishment.

2. Individual evaluation of seriousness of incident.

3. Personal evaluation of motivation or of self-understanding (i.e., intent, recognition that it was wrong, it will not happen again, and cooperative).

4. Purpose that punishment would serve.

Summary. The analysis of previous questions has indicated that some students give very simple yes-no responses to questions but refrain from giving reasons or elaborating on their responses. This pattern was true for this question as well. And, as in other questions, some students did not want to be pinned down by making any concrete or specific responses. The answer to this question was to place that decision in someone else's hands.

The reasons given for or against punishment were classified according to the basic content or focus of the response. The reasons given did not cover the full range or purposes that students identified in the previous question. However, responses to this question were indicative of qualitatively different levels of reasoning about punishment. Punishment is not necessarily what someone would wish for himself, and this
factor may have narrowed the range of reasons given in response to this question.

The reasons in support of punishment expressed the idea that punishment either was the direct result of committing a violation or that punishment had the power to correct an individual's behavior. Those students who gave reasons in support of punishment as retribution evidenced thinking about punishment that Piaget (1965) described as based on a morality of obedience to authority or to rules. This form of reasoning is not as mature as reasoning which focuses on reciprocity.

The idea that punishment might help to compensate for a violation, for example, was not suggested as a reason in support of punishment even though it was identified as one of the functions of punishment in the previous question. Students who presented reasons against punishment made some effort to analyze their own situation and to use some level of independent reasoning. Reasons given against punishment may represent the thinking of students at various stages of moral development.

What would you consider to be a just or fair way to resolve this?

Consideration of what is just or fair is an important element in most moral decisions. This question was
designed to elicit the students' perception of what they considered to be a fair or just outcome. A careful analysis of the responses to the question identified eight major perspectives that students used in their responses to this question. Although punishment was only one possible outcome that could be described by students as fair, the concept or idea of punishment was included frequently by students in their responses. The eight perspectives or modes of thinking about what was fair or just included:

**No statement.** The concept of fairness was not always an easy one for some students to address. This category included those students who did not respond, who indicated that they did not know, or who stated that they were willing to let someone else decide.

**No punishment.** The absence of punishment was identified as a particular response category. Responses included in this perspective were: "the situation doesn't warrant it," "learned a lesson," or "already punished." Punishment, in this mode the absence of punishment, was still a central focus in the consideration of fairness.
Punishment within limitations. Students using this perspective indicated that it was fair to receive a sanction as long as it was not too harsh. In other words, students indicated, for example, that a warning or probation was fair, but it was not fair if they were suspended. Student #4 stated: "There are not many ways to punish. I don't think I should be expelled for this..." Again, the idea of punishment in some form is still a central idea expressed by students.

Punishment. For some students a sanction was just, although several different types of reason were given why punishment was fair. The types of reasoning included:

No reason. Students did not always give a reason why they believed that it was fair to be punished. They simply stated that probation was fair or that a warning was fair.

It was wrong. Retribution for violating a rule was one directly expressed response. Student responses that stated that punishment would help them learn that what they did was wrong or that they had to pay (not in the sense of restitution, however) for what they did were included in this sub-category.
Deterrence. Students also suggested that receiving punishment would deter or enforce behavior. Probation was frequently suggested in the responses included in this category because it was something that could be held over the heads of students.

To compensate or apologize. Student responses classified under this perspective did not focus so exclusively on the concept of punishment but instead the responses indicated that some form of compensation was just. Student #12, who had damaged some property, in his answer to this question replied: "right off the bat, to pay for it," and student #13 responded: "... restitution for damages and all inconveniences involved."

To help a person realize the consequences. Responses that used this perspective focused on helping the student to recognize that they had done something rather than focusing on some type of punishment. For example, student #27 replied: "just talk to her and help her realize that she was making a mistake," and student #30 responded to this question with: "I think just having the person realize what he did is enough."
To make a record. Making a record could be considered a form of punishment, perhaps, but several students specifically focused on this outcome so it was categorized separately.

Suggest criteria. Rather than give a specific illustration or concrete example of what was fair, other students suggested more general criteria or processes to follow that they considered to be just or fair. For example, student #43 stated: "judge me as a person to see if I am credible and responsible," while student #45 replied: "Let those concerned work it out."

Summary

One of the intuitive reactions that students expressed when answering this question was surprise that they would even be asked what they thought might be a fair way to settle a discipline incident. From the hesitation and uncertainty of some students this was not a question that many of them had thought about before the discipline interview. In some respects this may have restricted the range of possible responses that might have resulted had students been given more time to respond. It was somewhat of a surprise that when students were given a free rein that the idea of punishment or escaping punishment was still very much on their minds.
The qualitative analysis identified eight different perspectives, which will be compared during the regression analysis with the level of moral reasoning. The frequent use of punishment as a frame of reference in responses to this question indicates that many students have not thought through for themselves alternatives to punishment as just remedies for a transgression of rules or regulations. This may speak also to how often the educational system has resorted to punishment to achieve rule compliance. And, it may reflect the fact that many participants in this study are at a conventional level of moral reasoning where punishment is considered a just way to respond to a rule violation.

A discipline decision would most likely fall into one of the following categories. Which do you consider most appropriate in your situation and why?

University discipline action that might be taken in a given situation ranges from suspension to warning to no action. Students are rarely asked what they might consider appropriate within this rather narrow range of choices. This particular question was included among the others, even though it does not focus on a moral issue or have real moral import, for several reasons. First, the choice of sanction does provide an indirect assessment of the level of seriousness by which
students evaluate their behavior. Frequently, students are just told what the outcome will be and not asked for an opinion. And, finally, since students were asked to justify their choice, this provided another sample of their reasoning about a discipline related question.

No one responded that they should be suspended or dismissed for their violation. Such an action is the most serious that could be taken and, although there were some major criminal offenses for which some students served a jail sentence, apparently this was not an acceptable response. The most frequently mentioned sanction was **Disciplinary Probation** with 25 (43.9 per cent) of the students indicating that this was an appropriate sanction. **Warning** was selected by 17 (29.8 per cent) students and restitution or fine by six (10.5 per cent) students. There were eight (14 per cent) students who indicated that no disciplinary action was necessary.

Students were asked to support their selection of a sanction. From the range of reasons given, seven response categories were established. Students had the option to identify more than one sanction, which seven students did. The general perspectives that were identified during the analysis of student responses are briefly described below.
Sanction automatic. This response conveyed the perspective that a sanction was considered to be inevitable. Students did not recognize that they had different choices. They just picked one and basically stated that they chose that sanction because they had done something wrong.

Sanction to make up for the violation. This perspective is similar to the one above, but more emphasis was placed on the fact that the student perceived the sanction as repayment or as the institution taking its due for the student's misconduct. This attitude, like the previous one, basically accepts the fact that a sanction must be imposed—it is retribution for wrong doing.

Sanction based on assessment of effect on student. Another perspective involved an assessment of what the impact of the sanction might be on the student. This general perspective was expressed in several different ways—1) a sanction would make no difference because the student had learned a lesson; 2) a sanction would serve as a reminder to keep their noses clean; 3) a sanction would have a harsh punitive effect; and 4) a sanction would or would not help that student. In each case the student expressed the point of view of "what will this mean to me?"
Sanction considered in light of other punishment. Some students also were arrested for the same incident. That fact was sometimes reflected in their statements as a reason why they selected that (usually milder) form of sanction. When references were made to other possible sanctions, those responses were classified in this category.

Sanction based on self-assessment. Another perspective involved statements about the student's intent, attitude, or past behavior. Students related the sanction to their own situation, their involvement in the incident, or the manner in which they responded after they were caught.

Sanction based on assessment of seriousness of incident. Students also evaluated what they did and made an assessment of how serious that was. Student responses that indicated that it was serious, that other do it, too, or that the offense was minor were included in this category. Those assessments were used as a basis for the sanction that was selected.

Sanction based on perception of university's expectations. Some students were conscious of the fact that the university might have certain criteria or expectations to be met. "That is what the
university would do" was an example of that form of reasoning. Students' responses grouped at this level reflected the fact that students were anticipating or guessing what the university might do or they had knowledge of what had happened to someone else in a similar situation.

**Summary.** Students selected sanctions that ranged from probation to less serious sanctions or no sanction at all. The reasons given for selection of a sanction were classified according to seven different perspectives represented by those responses. These seven perspectives reflected three major focuses—the unquestioned acceptance of a sanction, a self-perspective, and the incident itself. Some students accepted the fact that a sanction would result because it was inevitable, because it was necessary to make up for what they had done, or because that was what the university would do. Second, other students used a self-perspective and focused their response either on what effect a sanction would have on them or at what their own motivation or attitude had been during or after the incident. And, a third focus was on the evaluation of the seriousness of the incident.

While it was not surprising that no one believed that suspension for the violation was necessary, it was surprising that such a small percentage (14 per cent)
believed that some disciplinary sanction was not necessary. The remaining 86 per cent of the responses indicated an expectation that a sanction of some sort was appropriate. The fact that students opted for one of the regular university sanctions may reflect their understanding of the general pattern of discipline outcomes and also is parallel to the responses made to the previous question which indicated that a punishment of some sort was considered to be fair. Punishment as a logical consequence for violating a rule was the theme expressed in many of the responses.

How do you feel about what you have done?

One feeling that has been associated with or described as a "moral feeling" is the feeling of guilt. Psychoanalytic theory particularly has singled out feelings of guilt to indicate that a person has developed a strong conscience or super ego. Responses to this question indicated that some of those guilt-oriented feelings were present, but so were other feelings. The analysis of the responses to this question identified three different perspectives that were used by students. Each of these perspectives was further divided into types of feelings expressed. These perspectives and their sub-divisions are as follows.
Self looks at self. This perspective involved descriptions of feelings or statements about the student that resulted from his or her involvement in the incident. Three types of statements were identified.

"Conscience" oriented. "I'm ashamed or embarrassed," "I feel guilty," and "I feel sorry" were examples of the responses representing this type of statement.

Affective feelings. Student responses which reflected general feelings of affect, such as "I feel . . . sad, depressed, disappointed, angry, bad, mad" were classified together to represent another type of response that used the general perspective of self.

Self-critical. Another form of response that also focused on the self included self-critical statements, such as "I feel dumb," "I feel like a criminal," and "I doubt myself." Students who used this form of response focused on negative feelings about self that were generated from this incident.

Self looks at behavior. The second perspective represents students who evaluated their behavior and their role in that behavior. Five different categories of response were included in this perspective.
Right or wrong. One form of response was to indicate that the behavior was wrong or not right. Students who used this form of reasoning evaluated their behavior on this criterion.

Depersonalized. Another way to judge behavior was to make depersonalized statements about the behavior, such as: "It was dumb," "it was immature," or "it was stupid." Unlike the self-critical statements of the preceding perspective which used the more personal "I feel dumb," students who indicated "it" rather than "I" were classified under this perspective because the focus was on their behavior. Students did not view themselves as "dumb" but rather their behavior was considered to be "dumb."

Wish away. Another form of reasoning that was included within this perspective were those responses which indicated that the student "wished it didn't happen," or "... didn't intend to do it," and "I regret doing it." The perspective was still on the behavior, but students expressed the idea that they wished the whole thing had not happened.

Seriousness. Another mode of reasoning within this perspective was to make statements about the seriousness of the behavior. One example of this form
of reasoning was expressed by student #3 who responded: "I can see that it is serious but not really serious enough to press a lot of charges." The focus continues to be on the behavior but students made judgments about the behavior.

Self looks at consequences. Another general way in which students responded to this question was to focus on the consequences either to themselves or to others. Student #1 focused on the consequences to him. "It is sad to think about when I realize what it did to me. It will hurt me for a long time." Student #9 expressed a similar thought: "... and have put a black mark on my life." Student #27 focused on the consequences to others when he responded: "I don't think any real harm happened to anyone." Whether the focus is on self or others, the general perspective was organized around the consequences.

Summary

Responses to this question focused either on the student personally, on the student's behavior, or on the consequences of that behavior. The question asked for feelings, but so many other responses were made that only one category was designated to include the responses in which students focused on themselves and expressed feelings. In the other perspective students
basically expressed cognitive statements about their behavior, their role in the incident, or the consequences that did or did not result from the incident. Only some students were able to respond with what could be described as personal feelings. Specifically feelings of guilt or related feelings, such as feeling sorry or embarrassed about the incident were expressed by 16 students, some of whom also made other statements that were classified in one of the other perspectives.

Qualitatively the three major perspectives that were identified did not appear to represent different levels of reasoning or different structures of thought so much as they represented different content themes or focuses. Although these response patterns were differentiated by content, particularly in terms of affective and non-affective statements, these differences are not necessarily indicative of different levels of moral thinking. The individual sub-categories within these major perspectives, particularly the category that focused on personal consequences and the "conscience" oriented statements, represent a focus that more likely indicates a low to moderate level of moral development.
In your own words, can you describe what you have learned as a result of all that has happened to you?

From an educational standpoint, one hopes that the discipline process and experience will have some educational meaning. What one student learns from the experience, however, may not be what another student learns or reports to have learned. Because moral development is related to cognitive ability and because ability to analyze and process experience is important for self-development, students' reports on what they learned may be an indication of their level of moral maturity and potential ability to grow from this experience. And, what does the campus discipline experience teach or reinforce in the students' mind? To think before acting? To be more careful? To think of the other person? The analysis of student responses to this question identified six basic perspectives that students who reported that they had learned something used to respond to this question. These basic perspectives were further subdivided as necessary into different levels of response.

Consequences to self. The focus of this perspective was on what the student learned from the consequences of breaking a rule or of getting into trouble. Responses included within this perspective were: "I won't do it again," "if you do something wrong, you
are going to get caught," and "I realize the seriousness of an offense like this."

Rules, regulations, and authority. This general perspective included those student responses which focused on rules. Three different response levels within this perspective were identified.

Level I. At this level, responses indicated that rules are to be respected and obeyed. An unquestioned adherence or conformity to rules was implied. Student #9, for example, stated: "... need to respect police and university to do a job and can't let people get away with crime." Student #17 responded to this question with: "I know stealing is wrong and I will never the rest of my life disobey the law."

Level II. Strict conformity to rules was not as strongly implied at this level. Student responses still focused on the rules as can be seen by this statement by student #18: "... gained a different perspective on law, how it is enforced, and why it is needed." At this level students expressed their awareness of rules or that they had learned something about rules, such as "marijuana is illegal."
Level III. Student responses were still oriented around rules at this level, but the responses indicate some understanding of the purpose or function of the rule. The following response by student #32 was classified at this level because the perspective was on law, but the response suggested a higher level of thinking about the relationship of law to society or to the individual than would be true for responses classified at the two previous levels. "The legal aspects of society should be considered regardless of the circumstances, and compromising my legal integrity can never be justified."

University judicial process. Student responses that indicated the student had learned something about the university discipline system or the criminal justice system were classified together under this perspective. This perspective has some similarities to the previous perspective that focused on rules, but was differentiated from the above perspective because the responses focused on a system rather than on rules or laws.

Prevent repetition. This perspective focused on what the student might have done at the time or can do in the future to prevent this from happening. Responses which indicated: "... to be more careful," "...
get permission," not smoke pot," or "to control myself," were classified under this perspective.

**Consequences to others.** The first perspective focused on the consequences to the student. This perspective focused on the consequences to others. An example of this perspective is reflected in student #10's response, "I've learned how an incident like this can affect others."

**Self and personal learning.** Responses included within this perspective indicated that the student had attained some personal insight or had a change in attitude. Two levels or different focuses were identified and included within this perspective.

Level I. Students reported that they had learned something about other people and how others responded to this situation. Several students indicated that they learned who their real friends were or that people cared about them. These responses often reflected a feeling of surprise that a roommate or another student in the residence hall was sympathetic to the problem.

Level II. This level identified student responses which indicated that some personal learning had taken place. Student #8 replied: "I learned that I don't like a lot of pity." Student #11, who was involved in
a theft incident, stated: "... never know what your friends or you will do when there is an opportunity."

Summary. Six different perspectives were identified during the process of analysis. The first perspective focused on what happens if you do something wrong and get caught. Learning was reported basically in terms of the consequences and the possible seriousness of behavior. But one gets the distinct impression that seriousness is a consideration only because of the consequences. The second perspective focused on rules, which were expressed in three different ways. A rule orientation is characteristic of conventional thinking, and discipline up to the point in time in which students were responding to this question apparently helped to reinforce this perspective.

A third perspective indicated that students learned something about the university discipline process and how that works. The fourth perspective focused on what would have prevented the incident, generally by altering or repressing the behavior. Students did not indicate any understanding of why they acted that way in the first place, only what had to change to prevent it in the future. Perspectives five and six showed more depth of understanding about the incident. Perspective five represented student responses that articulated how the
behavior or how the incident in general affected others. The sixth and final perspective that was identified included those responses that focused on self-learning—on something that the student learned about himself.

Summary

In this chapter the results of the qualitative analysis of student responses to 18 questions were presented. The different perspectives, content themes, and general levels and patterns of reasoning that were identified were described for each question. Although each question was different and tapped different issues, such as responsibility, consequences, function of rules and punishment, and feelings of obligation, some general comments can be made about response patterns that appeared in more than one question.

The focus for most of the questions emphasized the need for students to make judgments about their behavior or some aspect of the discipline process. This was the intentional design of the interview format because it was the level of cognitive reasoning particularly on moral and discipline related issues that was of interest. However, some students had more difficulty than others responding to some of the questions. This was true particularly for some of the conceptually oriented questions, such as those that asked for statements
about the function of rules and the function of punishment. To provide adequate explanations of certain concepts required a level of reasoning ability or at least a prior exposure to the concepts that some of the students may not have or have had. Second, some students were less able to make judgments in general. Instead, they responded at a very basic level that provided an answer not supported by reasons, or they offered what was classified as descriptive rather than judgmental responses. In other words, some students were not particularly analytical in their responses, for whatever reason, even when the question specifically asked them to be, and their responses were not very complex.

One other general observation can be made about student responses that appeared to hold true for response patterns to many of the questions. Some students only responded to questions with very concrete or personally grounded responses. They did not provide the general statements or support their reasons with anything that would suggest an ability to generalize from the specific situation to the more general. Instead, they often responded only in terms of their specific violation even when asked "generally, what do you. . . . " Another variation of this general pattern included students who provided responses that were described as non-committal or relative, or, in other words, they were
situationally specific. These general patterns held for more than one or two questions and, perhaps, give some indication of a general level of reasoning or response style that was operating.

A few other differences were in evidence for several of the questions, such as: self—other orientation; degree of personal or active rather than passive control over behavior and actions; focus on consequences; an emphasis on laws and regulations; and an unquestioning attitude about the outcome that can best be summed up as "what will be will be." These differences, however, did not extend over as many of the questions and may more distinctly tap dimensions related to the question rather than broad reasoning or response style. Further analysis and comparison of these dimensions with the student's level of moral reasoning will determine if these differences can be attributed to the stage or level of moral reasoning. The next chapter will consider that relationship.
CHAPTER V

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF STATISTICAL COMPARISONS OF RESPONSE VARIABLES WITH P SCORE MEASURE OF MORAL JUDGMENT

This chapter presents the findings of various analyses which were conducted on selected questions in order to compare the results of the qualitative analysis with the P scores from the DIT. Not all of the 18 questions were selected for further analysis. There were two reasons for this. First, in line with the overall objective of this study, the basic assumption was that differences in student responses, once these were identified, also would reflect differences in level of moral maturity. To find support for this assumption does not necessarily mean that those differences will be found for each question or that it is necessary to establish that such differences do exist on all of the questions. What is important to demonstrate is that there are differences which are related to moral development. Primarily, however, there are some questions that focus on issues or concepts that are more related to the moral sphere than others. On an a priori basis those questions
would be expected to elicit responses more related to level of moral development than response to questions not so germane to moral issues. It was this second reason which led to the selection of 12 questions for further analysis.

Omitted from this analysis were questions #10 and #11, which asked for student views and evaluations of the rule violation; question #14, which asked students whether they believed that they should receive some punishment; question #16, which asked students to indicate which disciplinary sanction they considered to be most appropriate in their situation; and question #17, which asked students how they felt about what they did.

The principal method of analysis selected for this phase of the study was multiple regression. Multiple regression permits the comparison of the response variables identified during the qualitative analysis singularly and collectively with the P score—the selected measure of moral maturity. Additional statistical procedures employed during the quantitative phase of data analysis included the use of analysis of variance and Pearson correlation coefficients. The presentation of results in this chapter is ordered according to the amount of variance in the P scores explained by the various response variables identified
for each question in the qualitative analysis. The response variables for question #5, for example, explain 54.5 per cent of the variance in the P scores, which is the largest amount of variance accounted for in the multiple regression analysis employed for each question. Therefore, the results of the analysis of responses to that question are presented first. This procedure is followed throughout this chapter.

One further point needs to be made concerning the handling of the data reported in this chapter. During the qualitative phase of analysis, different dimensions—general or specific—that appeared to discriminate among students were identified and labeled. In some cases, major perspectives were identified and then, if sub-divisions or different levels within those major perspectives existed, they also were identified and labeled. Each of these dimensions, including the various sub-divisions were treated as a separate variable for the purpose of running the regression analysis. Two phases of the regression analysis were run—first, on every variable that was identified; and then, where appropriate, after consolidating or recombining these variables into major perspectives, on just those major perspectives. This second phase was an analysis conducted only on the major headings or perspectives. When all the individual variables
were included in the regression analysis—that is, when all the sub-levels were treated as separate variables—a greater amount of the variance is explained. This was true for each question, so that in this chapter only the results of the regression analysis using all of the identified variables are reported. Less of the total variance is explained when variables are consolidated because the variables tend to cancel each other out. At some levels within a given perspective a response might be negatively correlated with the P score and at another level it might be positively correlated. The net result, when such variables are combined, is to reduce the association of the consolidated variable with the P score.

Results of the Quantitative Analysis of Selected Interview Questions

The same format is followed in this chapter as in the previous chapter. The findings are reported in a question by question sequence starting with the question in which the results of the regression analysis explain the most variance. However, where the qualitative analysis involved all 55 students, the response analyses were run using just the P scores for 39 students who did not have questionable DIT scores.
What factors would you most like to have considered by the person or group that decides on what discipline action is appropriate?

Sixteen of the 20 response variables identified during the qualitative phase appear in the regression analysis. Table 6 indicates that together these 16 variables explain 54.6 per cent of the variance in the P scores. The variable with the strongest relationship (r = 0.370) with the P score is "equal treatment." The other variables for which the partial F tests are significant are: "reasons not bad," "know right from wrong," "effect on others," and "what I want."

Students who indicated that they wanted equal treatment were frequently involved with other students, and one of the factors that they wanted considered was to be treated the same as the others who were involved in that incident. This response of equal treatment (r = 0.370, p < .01) and the response which indicated that the effect of the incident on others (r = 0.194, p > .05) should be considered in any discipline decision are positively correlated with the P score, with equal treatment a significantly correlated variable. On the other hand, students who indicated that they "know right from wrong" or that the reason they did it was not bad (i.e., "I didn't do it to be cruel" and "I didn't do it to play games") gave responses
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D18 Equal treatment</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>5.859&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.859&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D9 Reasons not bad</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>-0.323</td>
<td>-0.296</td>
<td>4.033&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.186&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D10 Know right from wrong</td>
<td>0.555</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>-0.283</td>
<td>-0.285</td>
<td>4.269&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.194&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D11 Effect on others</td>
<td>0.620</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.528</td>
<td>4.241&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.317&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D12 Evaluate seriousness-2</td>
<td>0.641</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.027</td>
<td>0.126</td>
<td>-0.283</td>
<td>1.491</td>
<td>4.613&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D13 What I want</td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>0.457</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>2.691&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.489&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D14 Someone else judge it</td>
<td>0.690</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>-0.180</td>
<td>1.085</td>
<td>4.013&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D15 Other</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>-0.261</td>
<td>0.870</td>
<td>3.606&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D16 It was a reaction to...</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.211</td>
<td>1.152</td>
<td>3.349&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D17 Evaluate seriousness-1</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>3.017&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D18 My attitude</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>2.738&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D19 Kind of person I am</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>0.532</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>2.464&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D20 Non-categorized</td>
<td>0.734</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>-0.083</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>2.243&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D21 Learned a lesson</td>
<td>0.737</td>
<td>0.544</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.156</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>2.041&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D22 It wasn't intentional</td>
<td>0.738</td>
<td>0.545</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>1.836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D23 Effect of discipline on me</td>
<td>0.739</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.046</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>1.652</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Significant at the .05 level.

<sup>b</sup>Significant at the .01 level.
that are negatively correlated with the $P$ score. These negative correlations are significant at the .05 level.

Three major perspectives were identified during the qualitative phase—1) evaluate the incident, 2) evaluate the student, and 3) evaluate the effect of a discipline action on the student. Different levels and patterns of response were identified within each of these perspectives. When these levels were consolidated into just the three major perspectives, no significant relationships were found. The Pearson correlation coefficients between these three perspectives and the $P$ score were: 1) "evaluate the incident" $r = 0.091 \ (p > .05)$; 2) "evaluate the student" $r = 0.024 \ (p > .05)$; and 3) "evaluate the effect of discipline on the student" $r = -0.046 \ (p > .05)$. Although the major perspectives are not related to level of moral judgment, the different forms of reasoning that students used included within those perspectives is directly related to their level of moral judgment.

Some students identified more factors that they would like to see considered in the discipline decision than did other students. To check whether the number of responses made was related to level of moral reasoning, Pearson correlation coefficients were computed between number of responses made and the
number of different perspectives used and with the P scores. The number of response categories used has only a slight relationship ($r = 0.058, p > .05$) with the P score. A similar relationship is true, too, for the number of different perspectives used ($r = 0.109, p > .05$). Differences among students in their level of moral thinking as evidenced by their P scores did not have any significant bearing on the number of responses generated to this question.

The results of the multiple regression analysis presented in Table 6 supports the contention that the forms of reasoning identified during the qualitative analysis phase do reflect a general level of moral development. Approximately 55 per cent of the variance in the P scores is accounted for by those different response variables. It is the qualitative differences in modes of thinking not the quantitative differences in the number of responses given that is related to level of moral thinking.

In your own mind, is there anything wrong with what you did?

Eleven of the 16 variables identified during the previous phase of analysis appear in Table 7; these 11 variables included in the regression equation explain 51.8 per cent of the variance in the P scores. "Acknowledges-1" refers to those students who, when
Table 7

Multiple Regression Summary Table—In Your Own Mind is There Anything Wrong With What You Did?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C2 Acknowledges-1</td>
<td>0.431</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>0.185</td>
<td>-0.430</td>
<td>-0.320</td>
<td>8.424&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>8.424&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C7 Reference to rules, laws as instrumental</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>4.118&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>6.626&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4 Acknowledges-3</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.068</td>
<td>-0.339</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>3.595&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.934&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C13 Consequences-3, generalized</td>
<td>0.642</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>4.325&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.954&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C6 Unelaborated reference to rules, laws</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>0.472</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>-0.224</td>
<td>-0.189</td>
<td>3.757&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.901&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C12 Consequences-2, unfair advantage</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>1.270</td>
<td>5.170&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C16 Non-classified response</td>
<td>0.711</td>
<td>0.505</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td>-0.102</td>
<td>0.814</td>
<td>4.521&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C9 Reference to personal discomfort</td>
<td>0.714</td>
<td>0.509</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.063</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>3.893&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C10 No right to do it</td>
<td>0.716</td>
<td>0.512</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.180</td>
<td>3.386&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C5 Acknowledges-4, qualified</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.202</td>
<td>2.983&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C11 A direct consequence to others</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>2.635&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C8 Reference to personal fault</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.130</td>
<td>-0.022</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>2.330&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Significant at .05 level.

<sup>b</sup>Significant at .01 level.
asked to support their choice, made the very simple acknowledgment—"It was wrong" or "it wasn't right."

This very elementary form of reasoning is negatively correlated \( r = -0.43, p < .01 \) with the P score. Those students with lower P scores on the DIT are more apt to make this form of response than those with higher P scores. This negative relationship also exists for those who supported their choice with another form of acknowledgment ("acknowledges-3") in which they labeled their behavior which almost by definition was then considered wrong. "Acknowledges-3" is negatively correlated \( r = -0.339, p < .05 \) with the P score. Such statements as: "Lying is wrong" and "cheating is wrong" were included in this category. Both forms of response did not actually present a judgment but instead just reiterated the fact that the behavior was wrong without saying why.

Two different modes of thinking that made reference to rules and laws were identified during the previous phase of analysis. One mode of thinking recognizes laws as having some instrumental value or serving some purpose, and the other form of reasoning just makes an unelaborated reference to laws or rules, such as "It is against the law." Those responses which indicated that rules or laws do serve some instrumental purpose have a significant positive correlation \( r = 0.330, \)
£ < .05) with the P score and those responses that just make reference to rules or laws to define wrong have a negative correlation with P score (r = -0.224, £ < .10).

The fact that these two forms of reasoning about rules have significantly different relationships with level of moral reasoning is an important finding in this study. Reference to laws or regulations is one way in which conventional thinking has been defined, and that general form of reasoning, as was pointed out in the first section to this chapter, is the predominant form of reasoning among the students who participated in this study. Therefore, it would not surprising to find a positive relationship between this form of reasoning and the P score. That is the case with the responses that make reference to the reason or purpose for the rule. That form of reasoning, which goes beyond just making a reference to the law, is more developed and more mature than that of thinking which indicates that the behavior is wrong because it is against the law but no further elaboration is offered. Even though reference to rules or laws is a central frame of reference for conventional thinking, those students with lower P scores are more likely to make just a basic reference to the law without elaboration to support their reason why this behavior was wrong than are those students with higher P scores, who
elaborate enough in their responses to indicate what the purpose or the function of the law is.

There were three levels or types of thinking about right and wrong, which made reference to the consequences of the act (C11, C12, and C13). Table 7 indicates that each of these types of thinking has a positive relationship with the P score. However, only one of those response levels ("Consequences-3, generalized") which focuses on the consequence of what would happen if everyone engaged in that behavior, has a correlation \( r = 0.205, p = .105 \) with the P score that approaches significance. That variable is one of the five variables in Table 7 that makes a unique and significant contribution to the multiple correlation.

One additional analysis was conducted on the responses made to this question. Students were asked whether there was anything wrong with what they did. Responses were of one of three types—yes, no, or other if the response was not a direct yes or no response. A one-way analysis of variance was conducted on these responses to see if there were any significant changes in the mean P score variances among these three groups. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8.
### Table 8

One-Way Analysis of Variance of Mean Differences in P Score Among Students Who Responded "Yes," "No," or "Other"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Yes</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20.9091</td>
<td>7.0372</td>
<td>1.2250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 No</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25.0000</td>
<td>4.2426</td>
<td>3.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22.2500</td>
<td>10.1776</td>
<td>5.0888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21.2564</td>
<td>7.1625</td>
<td>1.1469</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Analysis of Variance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35.9570</td>
<td>17.9785</td>
<td>0.338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1913.4805</td>
<td>53.1522</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1949.4375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\( p > .05. \)

Thirty-three students responded "yes" when asked if they saw anything wrong with what they did. No significant differences were found between the three groups of students although the two students who responded "no" have a higher average P score than do students who responded "yes" or who were classified as "other."

**Summary**

The responses to this question accounted for 51.8 per cent of the P score variance, which indicates that this question elicited some significantly different
forms of reasoning that are related to level of moral reasoning. Five of the response variables (C2, C7, C4, C13, and C6) each made a significant contribution to explain the amount of variance in the P score. Together these five variables account for 47.2 per cent of the total variance. Students who simply acknowledged that the behavior was wrong (C2), acknowledged that it was wrong by labeling the behavior (C4), and students who made a basic reference to the law or to rules to define wrong (C6) gave responses that are related to lower levels of moral judgment as measured by the P score. Students who also made reference to rules but gave further elaboration (C7) and students who pointed to what would happen if everyone engaged in similar behavior as reasons why the behavior was wrong gave responses that are related to higher levels of moral judgment. Differences in the mean P score between students who considered their behavior as wrong and those who did not are not significant.

What function do rules serve?

With 49.4 per cent of the variance in the P score explained by the variables identified during the qualitative analysis, this question, which asked students to state the function of rules, was very powerful in its ability to elicit responses that differentiated among
students at different levels of moral maturity. The results of the multiple regression analysis presented in Table 9 indicate that the following statements about rule functions have a significant positive relationship with the P score: 1) rules make things work better \( (r = 0.36, p < .01) \); 2) rules protect self \( (r = 0.25, p < .10) \); 3) rules are guides to others \( (r = 0.29, p < .05) \); and 4) rules help \( (r = 0.25, p < .10) \). The partial F's for each of these functions are significant at the .05 level, and these four response variables account for 38.6 per cent of the total variance. One characteristic that each of these general functions has in common is the perspective that rules serve some instrumental or general purpose.

Students with the higher P scores gave responses which indicate that rules help to keep relationships between individuals intact, that rules help protect the individual's property, that rules serve as a guide to others by keeping things in order or running smoothly, and that rules can help by setting limits on the penalties imposed or by helping the majority govern. These responses can be contrasted with those responses given by students with lower P scores.

Although the partial F's are not significant, the following responses are negatively correlated with the P scores and some of these simple correlations are
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G10 Make things work better</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>5.410(\text{a})</td>
<td>5.410(\text{a})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7 Protect self</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>0.219</td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>3.980(\text{a})</td>
<td>4.920(\text{a})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6 Are guide to others</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.274</td>
<td>4.100(\text{a})</td>
<td>4.940(\text{b})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G12 Rules help</td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>0.083</td>
<td>0.253</td>
<td>0.268</td>
<td>4.470(\text{b})</td>
<td>5.200(\text{b})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4 Do something to you</td>
<td>0.647</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>-0.287</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
<td>1.800</td>
<td>4.620(\text{b})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5 Are guide to self</td>
<td>0.671</td>
<td>0.450</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>1.750</td>
<td>4.230(\text{b})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3 Necessary but can't say why</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>0.468</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>-0.128</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>1.020</td>
<td>3.770(\text{b})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2 It depends</td>
<td>0.693</td>
<td>0.480</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>0.120</td>
<td>0.680</td>
<td>3.350(\text{b})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9 Prevent chaos</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.530</td>
<td>2.990(\text{a})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G11 Can be changed</td>
<td>0.701</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>2.620(\text{a})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8 Protect rights of others</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>0.494</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
<td>-0.058</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>2.310(\text{a})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\text{a}\)Significant at .05 level.

\(\text{b}\)Significant at .01 level.
significant: 1) rules do something to you \( (r = -0.28, p < .05) \), 2) rules are a guide to self \( (r = -0.33, p < .05) \), and 3) rules are necessary but cannot say why \( (r = -0.12, p > .10) \). In the first response statement students focused on the potential consequence to them, such as getting kicked out of school if they broke a rule. When the rule functioned as a guide to self, students reported that the rule showed them how to behave or that what they did was wrong. Rather than the individual from an internal or self-perspective deciding what was wrong or how to behave, students with lower P scores were more apt to perceive that rules have that function. There is a tendency for those students with lower P scores to report that rules are necessary and that they must be obeyed but without indicating why the rule is necessary or why it must be obeyed.

The results presented in Table 9 indicate that there are some basic differences in student perceptions and understanding about the function of rules and that these differences can, in fact, help explain a large portion of the variance in the P score. Students with higher P scores perceive rules as having a different set of functions than do students with lower P scores.

One further possible relationship with P score remains to be tested. Is there any significant relationship between the number of stated functions and the P
score? This relationship was examined by correlating the number of functions expressed with the P score. A Pearson correlation coefficient, \( r = 0.44 \) \((p < .01)\) between the number of functions and the P score indicates that there is a strong relationship between the number of different functions students described in their response and the P score. Students with higher P scores report more different rule functions. Such a finding is consistent with the cognitive stage theory of development. Students at higher stages of moral reasoning can understand and use not only reasoning comparable to their own general stage but also that of lower stages as well. Students at lower stages of moral reasoning, however, are not able to effectively use higher stage reasons. Thus, the student with the lower P score does not have the range of possible responses to give to this question, because an understanding of different functions is related to a general level of moral development. This helps to account, for example, why students with lower P scores can report that rules are necessary or important but cannot give a reason why. The fact that rules can serve any number of instrumental purposes, such as protecting student rights or preventing chaos was not as apt to be recognized by students with low P scores.
What would you consider a fair way to resolve this and why?

To respond to this question, students had to address the issue of fairness and to make their own judgment as to what was a fair way to resolve this discipline situation. Eight major forms of reasoning and 16 different response patterns were identified during the qualitative phase. The results of the multiple regression analysis using all 16 response patterns appear in Table 10. Twelve of the 16 variables that were identified appear in the regression equation, and these variables account for 45.9 per cent of the variance in the P scores.

A very definite pattern or style of response is evident for the students with low P scores. The first four variables that appear in Table 10 all have negative correlations with the P score. Although the partial F test is not significant ($p > .05$) for the first variable in this table (Kl), there is a significant negative Pearson correlation coefficient ($r = -0.31$, $p < .05$) between that response variable and the P score. Students who had trouble responding to this question and to the issue of fairness have a significantly lower P score than do other students. Also the results of the regression analysis indicate that students who consider some type of punishment or sanction as fair
Table 10
Multiple Regression Summary Table—What Would You Consider a Fair Way to Resolve This and Why?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>K1 Don't know what is fair</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>-0.310</td>
<td>-0.371</td>
<td>3.931</td>
<td>3.931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K13 Punish, sanction suggested</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.114</td>
<td>-0.297</td>
<td>-0.400</td>
<td>5.195</td>
<td>4.786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K4 No sanction, not necessary</td>
<td>0.525</td>
<td>0.275</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>-0.284</td>
<td>3.145</td>
<td>4.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K10 Punish, no reason given</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>-0.356</td>
<td>3.978</td>
<td>4.599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K14 Help person realize consequences</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td>0.386</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>1.875</td>
<td>4.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K7 No sanction, general reasons suggested</td>
<td>0.640</td>
<td>0.410</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>1.290</td>
<td>3.702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K15 Just make a record</td>
<td>0.653</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.899</td>
<td>3.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K2 Trouble responding</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>0.166</td>
<td>0.893</td>
<td>2.982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K6 No sanction, already punished</td>
<td>0.675</td>
<td>0.456</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>2.697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K11 Punish because wrong</td>
<td>0.676</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>2.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K12 Punish to deter in future</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.458</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>2.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K16 Process used is fair</td>
<td>0.677</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>1.836</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant at .05 level.

Significant at .01 level.
have lower P scores. The second and fourth variables (K13 and K10) to appear in this table are response variations with punishment as the basic content theme. The variable "fair to punish, sanction suggested" (K13) includes the responses of students who stated that punishment was fair and who suggested some form of punishment such as a fine or on probation. Other than suggesting a sanction, no reason to support this response was given. The fourth variable (K10) to appear in the table represents the responses of those students who also indicated that punishment was fair. These students did not indicate any particular punishment nor did they give any reasons to support that response. Negative relationships for both response variables indicate that punishment is reported by students at lower levels of moral judgment as a fair resolution.

Another general response pattern is evident in the results of the multiple regression analysis (see Table 10). Three of the response variables (K4, K7, and K6) that appear in this table express the theme that a sanction is not necessary or that to impose a sanction is not fair. In this case, rather than describe what is fair, students responded by stating what is not fair. When that response pattern is supported by reasons why it is not fair (K7 and K6),
the relationships of that response pattern with the P score is positive ($K_7$, $r = 0.238$, $p < .10$; $K_6$, $r = 0.155$, $p > .10$). But, when the student simply responds that a sanction is not necessary or that the situation does not require a sanction ($K_4$), the association of that response pattern with the P score is negative ($r = -0.155$, $p > .10$). Although none of these three response variables reach a .05 level of significance, there is a definite trend indicated by these results. Students who do not elaborate on their responses and give justifications for their response have a lower moral judgment score.

One other response variable has a significant relationship with the P score. Students who indicated that what is fair is to help a person realize the consequences or to realize what was wrong with what they did gave a response which has a significant positive correlation with the P score ($r = 0.287$, $p < .05$). In most cases such an outcome is obtained by just talking with the student, as in a discipline interview, and does not require that a sanction be imposed.

In general, the results of this regression analysis suggest that students with lower P scores either have a difficult time with the issue of fairness and cannot state what they consider to be a fair way to resolve their current disciplinary
dilemma or they suggest that a sanction or punishment is fair. On the other hand, students with higher P scores suggest an alternative to traditional punishment as a fair resolution. At lower stages of moral reasoning, the idea of punishment or some form of sanction, fine, or other means of retribution is perceived as fair, but this is not necessarily the case with students at higher levels of moral reasoning.

With 45.9 per cent of the P score variance accounted for by 12 of the 16 variables identified by qualitative analysis, responses to this question are able to serve as an indicator of a student's general level of moral development.

Do you consider the rule or regulation you have been charged with violating a fair one? (Why or why not?)

Like the preceding question, the issue of fairness was raised in this question, but this time in relation to the rule itself. Seventeen possible response variables were identified by the qualitative analysis. Twelve of these variables appear in Table 11; these variables explain 42 per cent of the variance in the P score. The partial F tests are significant at the .05 level for only two of the variables (H16 and H6). Although the partial F (F = 3.772) for the first variable (H14) to appear in this table is not significant, the Pearson correlation coefficient between
Table 11

Multiple Regression Summary Table—Do You Consider the Rule or Regulation You Have Been Charged With Violating a Fair One?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H14 Rule fair, no reason</td>
<td>0.304</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>0.092</td>
<td>-0.304</td>
<td>-0.420</td>
<td>3.772</td>
<td>3.772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H17 Non-scorable responses</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.097</td>
<td>-0.304</td>
<td>-0.313</td>
<td>4.334&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.223&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6 Yes, but question sanction</td>
<td>0.509</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>-0.239</td>
<td>-0.329</td>
<td>3.256&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.074&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H8 Evaluate by reference to law</td>
<td>0.550</td>
<td>0.303</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>-0.160</td>
<td>-0.225</td>
<td>2.131</td>
<td>3.689&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3 Yes, because did it</td>
<td>0.585</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.242</td>
<td>2.012</td>
<td>3.442&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4 Yes, but question application</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>0.383</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.217</td>
<td>2.115</td>
<td>3.318&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2 Hard to say relative</td>
<td>0.635</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>1.052</td>
<td>2.999&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H10 Yes, but should behave differently</td>
<td>0.641</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>2.619&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H12 Not classified, behavior is reference</td>
<td>0.645</td>
<td>0.415</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.052</td>
<td>-0.067</td>
<td>0.212</td>
<td>2.291&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H9 Judge behavior as right/wrong</td>
<td>0.646</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.116</td>
<td>2.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H13 Rules necessary, no elaboration</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>1.774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H11 Judge by effect of behavior</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td>0.420</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>1.572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Significant at .05 level.
this variable and the P score \( r = -0.304, p < .05 \) is significant. Students who report that the rule that they are charged with violating is fair, but cannot say why have significantly lower P scores.

An interpretation of the second variable (H17) to appear in Table 11 is difficult to make. Some responses to this question were difficult to categorize. These were grouped together and labeled as non-scorable responses. As indicated by the results of the regression analysis, this category of apparently non-related responses does not turn out to have a significant negative correlation with the P score. Some common dimension among these responses, which was not identified during the qualitative phase, apparently exists and this accounts for the significant relationship with the P score.

Another response variable that can account for a unique and significant amount of the variance (6.9 percent; partial F = 3.256, p < .05) is the statement that although the rule is fair, students question the need for a sanction (H6). This form of reasoning in which students focused on not imposing a sanction or on mediating the type of sanction tends to be negatively associated \( r = -0.239, p > .10 \) with the P score. The issue of why the rule is or is not fair is not addressed by this response, just the concern over a
sanction. It is as if students who use this form of reasoning do not want their admission that the rule is fair to be interpreted as support for imposing a sanction.

Although these three variables are the only variables to appear in Table 11 that have either a significant partial F or a significant Pearson correlation coefficient, some other interesting trends are evident from the results of the regression analysis. The results in Table 11 indicate that those students who support their response that the rule is fair by reference to the law or rule (H8) tend to have lower P scores ($r = -0.16, p > .10$). Students who question the application of the rule (H4) and students who indicate that it is hard to decide if the rule is fair because that is relative (H2) made responses that have a slight positive correlation with the P score ($r = 0.14$ and $r = 0.15$).

During the qualitative phase of the analysis, two distinct dimensions in the focus of student responses were identified. Some students responded to this question by making judgments about the behavior and then deciding the question of fairness. Comments were made about intent or about the fact that they were the ones who did it so it must be fair. Other students focused directly on the rule, such as on the need to
have rules or on the purpose of the rule, and they used that standard to judge the question of fairness. When these two general factors were examined to determine if they are related to level of moral reasoning, no significant differences were found. The focus on evaluating the rule has a slight negative correlation with the P score \( r = -0.105, \ p > .10 \) and the focus of evaluating the behavior in relation to the rule has a very slight positive correlation \( r = 0.039, \ p > .10 \).

Do the number of reasons given to support a response or do the number of frames of references used make a difference? The answer to this is affirmative according to the results of another analysis. The number of identifiably different response patterns has a negative, although not significant relationship, with the P score \( r = -0.144, \ p > .10 \). The tendency is for students with higher P scores to give fewer distinguishably different responses. This same pattern holds true for the number of different perspectives used in the response. As indicated in the previous paragraph, there are two major dimensions or perspectives used by students—one oriented toward evaluating the rule and the other toward evaluating the behavior. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the number of dimensions used and the P score is significant at the .05 level \( r = -0.328, \ p < .05 \). This finding is surprising in
that one might predict that students with the higher P scores will give more responses or be able to use more different perspectives than those with lower P scores. In this situation that did not turn out to be the case. This outcome may be the result of having a significant non-scorable category, which was not considered as a different frame of reference, or it may be a function of the fact that for the most part the response patterns identified by qualitative analysis are associated with lower levels of moral reasoning.

One other statistical test was conducted on the responses to this question. Students indicated whether they considered the rule they were charged with violating as fair. Three different groups were identified—those who responded "yes," those who responded "no," and a third category of students who gave a response other than just "yes" or "no." A one-way analysis of variance between these groups exist. As Table 12 indicated, there is no significant difference between groups. Only four of the 38 students in the total group consider the rule that they were charged with violating as not fair. All the others consider the rule to be fair. Those who do not consider the rule fair have a lower mean P score (20.75) than those who consider the rule as fair (21.44). Such a response is encouraging for those charged with developing policy
and regulations since, in general, rules are perceived
by most students who evaluated them as fair.

Table 12

One-Way Analysis of Variance of Mean P Scores for
Students Who Responded "Yes," "No," or "Other"
to the Question "Was the Rule Violated Fair?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Yes</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21.4412</td>
<td>7.4638</td>
<td>1.2800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 No</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20.7500</td>
<td>5.5000</td>
<td>2.7500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21.3684</td>
<td>7.2239</td>
<td>1.1719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Variance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.7109</td>
<td>0.8555</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1929.1445</td>
<td>55.1184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1930.8555</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p > .10.

Finding no difference in the "yes-no" responses to
this question is consistent with cognitive development
theory which focuses on the structure or form of reason­
ing not on the content of the response. The content of
the response to this question--the "yes," "no," or
"other" response--has no significant relationship with
level of moral judgment. But as the findings of the
regression analysis reported in Table 11 indicate, some
of the individual response variables do have a
relationship with the P score. When put into a regression equation, 12 of these variables can account for 42 per cent of the variance in the P scores. Two variables (H17 and H6) make a unique contribution to account for the variance. Two of the simple correlations between response variables (H14 and H17) and the P score are significant. Judgments (structure) but not content of reasons (yes/no) are significant and so is the number of responses used a significant result.

In your own words, can you describe what you have learned as a result of all that has happened to you?

The last question asked in the interview turned out to be one of the most discriminating of the interview questions. Although the discipline process had not been concluded at the point this question was asked, this question did provide an opportunity to analyze the structure of the responses made. One hopes, of course, that some learning will result from a discipline process, but it was not certain that the response variables identified during the qualitative phase of analysis would have any relationship to moral development.

The result of the multiple regression analysis, which compared 12 individual response categories identified during the qualitative analysis with the P scores (see Table 13), do indicate that there are some
Table 13

Multiple Regression Summary Table—Can You Describe What You Have Learned as a Result of All That Has Happened to You?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L10 Something about others</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.439</td>
<td>0.463</td>
<td>8.816&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>8.816&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L2 Consequences if caught</td>
<td>0.549</td>
<td>0.301</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>-0.288</td>
<td>-0.410</td>
<td>5.590&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>7.750&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L4 Respect rules and authority</td>
<td>0.583</td>
<td>0.340</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>2.018</td>
<td>6.016&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L9 Consequences for others</td>
<td>0.610</td>
<td>0.372</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>-0.139</td>
<td>1.723</td>
<td>5.035&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L7 Something about system</td>
<td>0.623</td>
<td>0.388</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.455</td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>0.852</td>
<td>4.181&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L12 Non-categorized</td>
<td>0.631</td>
<td>0.398</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>3.521&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L5 To be aware of rules</td>
<td>0.636</td>
<td>0.405</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.138</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>3.014&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L3 Wish it hadn't happened</td>
<td>0.637</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.049</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>2.572&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L6 Function or purpose of rules</td>
<td>0.639</td>
<td>0.408</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>2.222&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Significant at .05 level.

<sup>b</sup>Significant at .01 level.
significant relationships between these response variables and the P score. A significant amount of the variance (40.8 per cent) in the P scores is explained by nine of the 12 response variables included in the regression equation. Two response variables (L10 and L2) stand out to highlight different perspectives used by students at different ends of the P score range.

Students who reported that they learned something about others, such as "who their friends are" or "that people care" (L10) gave responses that have a significant positive correlation ($r = 0.439, p < .01$) with the P score. Students who focused on the consequences that result from getting caught or on the consequences of breaking a rule (L2), on the other hand, gave responses that have a significant negative correlation ($r = -0.288, p < .05$) with the P scores. These two different response variables demonstrate a very important distinction in the form of reasoning and the perspective used by students with low and with high P scores. Students on the lower end of the P score range in this sample, when asked what they have learned, focused on the penalties, the sanction—the punitive aspects—that result from breaking a rule or from getting caught. Students who focus on another dimension that is only indirectly related to the incident
and who show more personal awareness (such as, who stood up for them and who was supportive) represent in their response a perspective that is more characteristic of higher stage reasoning as measured by the P score. Together these two variables account for 30 percent of the total variance.

One other variable (L12) that appears in Table 13 requires comment because it, too, has a significant correlation ($r = 0.361, \ p < .01$) with the P score. The partial F test did not reach the .05 level of significance ($F = .052, df = 6,32$) because this variable, labeled "non-categorized," has a significant intercorrelation ($r = .561$) with the first variable to appear in this table (L10). This high intercorrelation acts to suppress this response in the summary table even though the simple correlation coefficient is significant. In this catch-all sub-category were included such responses as: "racism should be put down at all costs" and "I got a fair shake," which logically did not appear to fit with any of the other forms of reasoning that were identified. Because these few responses were not categorized, they cannot be interpreted at this point except to say that students who made such responses also tended to respond that they learned something about other people. None of the other variables that appear in Table 13
contribute significantly to explain the amount of variance in the P score and the simple correlations with the P score are not significant.

These 12 individual response variables were grouped according to six major perspectives. These major perspectives, along with the Pearson correlation coefficients and their possibility of occurrence by chance, are reported in Table 14 below.

Table 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>r</th>
<th>P</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consequences to self</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules and regulations</td>
<td>+0.144</td>
<td>0.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University judicial system</td>
<td>+0.045</td>
<td>0.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing behavior</td>
<td>+0.070</td>
<td>0.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences to others</td>
<td>+0.040</td>
<td>0.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self and personal learning</td>
<td>+0.228</td>
<td>0.082</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When the individual response variables which were reported in Table 13 are consolidated into these major perspectives, the different degrees or direction of association between these variables and the P score cancel each other out so that the correlation coefficients between the major perspectives and the P score do not reach a .05 level of significance. Significance at the .10 level, however, is reached by two of the learning
perspectives. Those students who focus on the consequences expressed a learning perspective that is associated with the lower range of the principled thinking scores (P scores); whereas, when the perspective focuses on personal learning, that form of reasoning is associated with the higher range of principled thinking scores (P scores). This general finding suggests that the discipline experience for students at lower levels of moral reasoning emphasizes or reinforces, at least in the student's mind, the negative consequences that can happen from violating rules. Students whose P scores suggest a more mature level of moral reasoning focus on what they can personally learn about themselves and others as a result of the discipline experience. The discipline experience evidently is perceived quite differently by those at different developmental levels of moral thinking—an important distinction to be kept in mind by those handling campus discipline.

The number of major perspectives used and the total number of responses made to this question also were compared with the P scores by computing Pearson correlation coefficients to determine if any relationship exists between moral thinking and frequency of responses. No significant differences were found. For the number of major perspectives used in the
responses, the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.102, \( p > .10 \) and for the total number of responses the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.199 \( p > .10 \).

Do you have any sense or feeling of obligation because of what happened?

Student responses to this question were analyzed in three different ways. During the qualitative phase of the analysis, six response content areas were identified. Since these are mutually exclusive response categories, a one-way analysis of variance was used to determine if there is any overall difference in mean P score variance between the six response content areas. The second analysis involved a multiple regression analysis of one of the response categories. That response category included the student statements about the various ways in which students felt obligated. The third analysis was to compute a Pearson correlation coefficient between the number of ways students felt obligate and the P score to see if there is any relationship between level of moral reasoning and the number of different statements about obligation. The results of these three analyses are reported below.

P score differences according to response content

Each student's response was coded according to one of the following six basic response content areas
that were identified during the qualitative phase of the analysis:

1. "No"
2. "Yes" (without any further elaboration)
3. "Yes" (attributed to personal wrong-doing)
4. "Yes" (expressed as feeling of guilt)
5. "Yes" (with elaboration on what those feelings of obligation were)
6. "Uncertain" (expressed uncertainty or made equivocating responses, such as "it depends")

Response category 3 included those student responses which indicated that there was a feeling of obligation but rather than describe what those feelings were, the students indicated why they felt obligated. Category 4 included the responses of students who appeared to interchange the concept of obligation with the concept of guilt and responded to this question by stating "yes, I feel guilty."

Only in category 5 were descriptive statements of obligation included. The results of the one-way analysis of variance (see Table 15) indicate no overall difference between groups ($F = 1.17$, df = 5,33). The majority (32) of the student responses were in category 5—the category in which students described specific feelings of obligation. This category has the lowest mean $P$ score which implies a tendency for students at lower levels of moral reasoning to have more clearly delineated statements about their feelings of obligation, in fact, they may feel more obligated.
### Table 15

One-Way Analysis of Variance of Mean P Score Differences Among Students Who Expressed Different Statements About Feelings of Obligation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Standard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 No</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23.6667</td>
<td>7.0238</td>
<td>4.0552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Yes, Fault</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Yes, Guilty</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22.6667</td>
<td>4.7259</td>
<td>2.7285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Yes, Elaborated</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>20.4063</td>
<td>6.9832</td>
<td>1.2345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 It depends</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37.0000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21.2564</td>
<td>7.1625</td>
<td>1.1469</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Analysis of Variance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>294.3828</td>
<td>58.8766</td>
<td>1.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1655.0547</td>
<td>50.1532</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1949.4375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$P > .10$.

Comparison of types of obligation with P Score

The second method of analysis compared the 12 different response patterns included in category 5 with P score by means of a multiple regression analysis. These response patterns were the different obligatory statements that students expressed. The results of the regression analysis, which appear in Table 16, indicate that 9 of the 12 response variables account for 33.7 per cent of
Table 16

Multiple Regression Summary Table—Do You Have Any Sense or Feeling of Obligation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I5 Avoid repetition</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>-0.319</td>
<td>-0.281</td>
<td>4.203</td>
<td>4.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I11 Make things right, rectify</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.065</td>
<td>-0.277</td>
<td>-0.417</td>
<td>2.823</td>
<td>3.616a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I12 Prevent it from happening</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.085</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>3.989a</td>
<td>3.941a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I10 Others not elaborated</td>
<td>0.523</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td>-0.208</td>
<td>0.983</td>
<td>3.200a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I7 Accept responsibility</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>0.293</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>-0.152</td>
<td>0.923</td>
<td>2.739a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I9 Self not classified</td>
<td>0.553</td>
<td>0.306</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.189</td>
<td>0.589</td>
<td>2.352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I4 Accept consequence</td>
<td>0.564</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.095</td>
<td>-0.168</td>
<td>0.542</td>
<td>2.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I6 Understand seriousness</td>
<td>0.576</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>0.112</td>
<td>0.621</td>
<td>1.862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I13 Prove something to others</td>
<td>0.581</td>
<td>0.337</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>0.231</td>
<td>1.638</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at .05 level.
of the variance in the $P$ scores. Only one of the partial $F$'s (112) reached significance at a .05 level ($F = 3.989, df = 3,35$), and this response variable uniquely accounted for 8.5 per cent to the variance in $P$ scores. Although the partial $F$'s (15 and 111) for the first two steps in this summary table are not significant, the simple correlations between those variables and the $P$ scores are significant ($r = -0.319, p < .05$ and $r = -0.277, p < .05$). Both the response pattern "obligation to avoid repetition" (15) and the response pattern "obligation to make things right" or "to rectify the situation" (111) have a negative relationship with the $P$ scores. Students who reported that the sense or feeling of obligation for them was "to behave," "to do right," or "not to do it again," and those who reported that they felt obligated "to make restitution," "apologize," or "make it up to others" have significantly lower $P$ scores. None of the other simple correlations or partial $F$'s are significant.

These 12 response patterns reflected two general orientations toward the concept of obligation. One orientation was to direct the feelings of obligation internally toward the individual (e.g., to prove something to self, accept consequences, understand seriousness, and cooperate). The other orientation was an externally directed feeling of obligation (e.g.,
apologize, prove something to others, and prevent the same thing from happening to others). The 12 response patterns were grouped according to one of these two basic orientations and another multiple regression analysis was run using just these two general variables. Only 4 per cent of the variance was explained when these response patterns were collapsed into just these two orientations. The simple correlations have only a slight and not significant positive relationship with the P scores (the "self-oriented" correlation coefficient is 0.205, \( p > .10 \) and "other-oriented" correlation coefficient is 0.125, \( p > .10 \)).

Comparison of number of statements made with P score

Do the number of expressed feelings of obligation have any significant relationship with level of moral reasoning? To answer this question the number of identifiably different responses that students made was correlated by means of a Pearson correlation coefficient with the P score. The results of this analysis indicate a slight negative (\( r = -0.143 \)) but not significant (\( p > .10 \)) relationship between the number of responses made and the P scores. There is a tendency for students who expressed more statements of obligation to have a lower level of moral reasoning.
Summary

The inductive phase of the analysis which identified distinctly different patterns and forms or reasoning about obligation, has some support from the results of the quantitative analyses. The regression analysis did indicate that nine of the 12 forms of obligation that were expressed can account for a high percentage (33.7 per cent) of the variance in the P scores. Although only two of the simple correlations and one of the partial F's between these statements or categories of obligation and the P scores are significant, the general trend and pattern of responses is quite interesting.

The majority of students involved in campus discipline who participated in this study do express some feeling or sense of obligation although the ability to articulate in what way they feel obligated is not as apparent for all students. Interestingly enough, though, the three students who did not express any feeling of obligation have a higher average P score than do the students who articulated specific types of forms of obligation. This general trend was supported by the negative correlation between the number of statements of obligation that students made and their P scores. An inverse relationship between statements of obligation and level of moral reasoning
exists, although the relationship does not reach a satisfactory level of significance. Possibly those students whose level of moral reasoning can be described as conventional—a stage 3 or 4—have a stronger sense of obligation to themselves or to others to prevent it from happening, to cooperate, to rectify the situation, and by the other forms of obligation that were expressed when they are involved in a rule violation than do those students who are in a transition phase in their reasoning or who use more principled forms of reasoning. These results are not conclusive enough or sufficient to support a strong statement that a sense of moral obligation is most often an expression of conventional level of moral development than it is of a transitional or principled level of moral development. There is only a trend in that direction. But it is quite clear that this question elicited sufficient differences in responses that some important differences in level of moral reasoning were discernible from the statements students made in response to this question.

What do you see as some of the consequences that resulted from your action?

Is the ability to perceive consequences or the perception of certain types of consequences related to level of moral judgment? Fourteen types of consequences,
encompassing eight major perspectives, were identified during the qualitative phase of the analysis. A multiple regression analysis using the 14 consequence categories was employed to determine the nature of relationships between the types of consequences that students reported and the students' level of moral judgment. Ten of the 14 response variables identified during the qualitative phase appear in the multiple regression summary table (see Table 17). These 10 variables explain 32.6 per cent of the variance in the P scores. The response variables entered for the first five steps (E7, E11, E13, E10, and E6) of the regression account for 31.6 per cent of the variance. A review of the results of that regression analysis indicates that the qualitative analysis was successful in identifying meaningful differences in response patterns that are related to the student's level of moral reasoning.

Simple correlations between three of the response variables and the P score are significant. Students who reported that the consequences that resulted were "self-imposed" (E7) gave a response that is positively correlated with the P score ($r = 0.324, p < .05$). A self-imposed consequence is one that the student personally experiences and personally generates such as feeling guilty, depressed, or embarrassed. Responses which indicated "an example for other" (E11) as a
Table 17

Multiple Regression Summary Table—What Do You See as Some Consequences That Resulted From Your Action?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E7 Self-imposed consequences</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.376</td>
<td>4.096</td>
<td>4.096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E11 Example for others</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.201</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.366</td>
<td>4.095&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>4.277&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E13 Effect on others</td>
<td>0.506</td>
<td>0.256</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.289</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>2.437</td>
<td>3.784&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E10 Personal learning</td>
<td>0.588</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>2.559</td>
<td>3.612&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E6 Long range</td>
<td>0.562</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>2.864&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E4 Avoid repetition</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>2.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8 To be caught</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>0.323</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>1.974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3 It depends</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.051</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>1.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E9 Re-evaluate seriousness</td>
<td>0.570</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>-0.065</td>
<td>0.058</td>
<td>1.445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E1 No consequences</td>
<td>0.571</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.044</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>1.258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Significant at .05 level.
consequence \((r = 0.263, p < .05)\) and student responses which indicated that the student recognized that his behavior did affect others \((E13) (r = 0.289, p < .05)\) also are significantly and positively correlated with the P score. None of the other simple correlations between the response categories reported in the multiple regression summary table and the P score reach a satisfactory level of significance. Significant relationships between these three response variables and the P score, though, support a conclusion that there is a relationship between level of moral reasoning and the perception of certain types of consequences that result from a violation of university rules.

Further support for a relationship between level of moral reasoning and the perception of consequences in general or certain types of consequences in specific comes from the results of the analysis of the relationship between frequency of response and P score. A Pearson correlation coefficient was computed between the number of different major perspectives reflected by students in their responses to this question and their P scores; a second Pearson correlation coefficient was computed between the number of different consequences reported and the P score. Both the number of different perspectives represented in a student's response to this question \((r = 0.285,\)
and the number of consequences reported $(r = 0.345, p < .05)$ are related to the P score. The ability to perceive or at least report a range of consequences either to the self or to others is positively related to the level of moral judgment. Those students at higher levels of moral reasoning can and do report a greater variety and number of consequences that they perceive as the result of their violation of a university rule.

What will prevent this from happening again?

Through the process of the qualitative analysis four primary response dimensions, in which most of the student responses to this question were categorized, were identified. In one category were rated those responses which were non-committal, and in a second category were those responses which expressed knowledge of and avoidance of consequences as reasons why that behavior would not happen again. The third category included those responses in which students indicated a measure of self-control or self-action, such as: 1) controlling behavior, 2) changing behavior, or 3) personal knowledge of the rules as the factor that would prevent a similar occurrence in the future. Those responses that indicated that a change in the environment or external factors that contributed to
the incident would prevent the incident from happening again were grouped in a fourth category.

In the discussion of the qualitative results in the previous section the point was made that fear of punishment is often associated with a lower level of moral development and that students who, in their response, focused on the negative consequences as a deterrent might be expected to have lower P scores. On the other hand, those students who expressed a willingness to take some personal or active control over their behavior or who showed some personal insight might predictably have a higher level of moral judgment. When the response variables, identified during the qualitative analysis, were compared with the P scores by means of a multiple regression analysis, the results of that analysis indicated that some of the response patterns are related to the student's level of moral judgment.

The results of the multiple regression analysis, which appear in Table 18, indicate that 32 per cent of the variance in the P scores can be explained by seven of the 10 variables identified during the qualitative analysis. Two of the variables—external change in the environment (F4) \((F = 5.50, \ df = 1,36)\) and consequences of getting caught (F2) \((F = 3.556, \ df = 3,34)\) —account for a significant amount of the variance in
### Table 18

Multiple Regression Summary Table—What Will Prevent This From Happening Again?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F4 An external change</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>5.500&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5.500&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F10 Be more careful</td>
<td>0.414</td>
<td>0.171</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>2.529</td>
<td>3.609&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2 Consequences of getting caught</td>
<td>0.499</td>
<td>0.249</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>-0.281</td>
<td>-0.225</td>
<td>3.556&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.767&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F1 Non-committal</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.176</td>
<td>0.941</td>
<td>3.056&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9 Change self</td>
<td>0.539</td>
<td>0.291</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>0.143</td>
<td>0.932</td>
<td>2.626&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F7 Knowledge of rules</td>
<td>0.555</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.776</td>
<td>2.302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5 Non-classified</td>
<td>0.562</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.118</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>0.332</td>
<td>1.978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>Significant at .05 level.
P scores and the simple correlations between two variables and the P score also are significant (F4, \( r = 0.33 \), \( p < .05 \); F2, \( r = -0.281 \), \( p < .05 \)). The response "be more careful" (F10) as the basis to prevent a recurrence of this incident was a response pattern that the results of the regression analysis indicate has a positive correlation with the P score (\( r = 0.224 \), \( p < .10 \)). Students who indicate that in the future they will be more careful tend to give responses associated with higher levels of moral judgment.

Responses that suggested a self or internal orientation (F3) were classified both by general category and by the more distinctive sub-categories labeled as: "controllers," (FFB) and "changers" (FFC). Those students who emphatically stated "me," "myself," or "I" (controllers) generally without further elaboration as the reason why the behavior would not happen again gave a response pattern that was not associated (\( r = -0.003 \)) with the P score, and that response variable does not appear in the regression equation. The "knowers" included those students who indicated that they either now know the rules and policies (F7, "I understand") or that they know right from wrong (F8). Those response patterns which focused on knowing the rules (F7) have only a slight and not significant positive correlation with the P score (\( r = 0.12 \)).
Those responses which focused on knowing right from wrong (F8) were not associated with the P score and that response variable also was not included in the regression equation. The "changers" (FFC) included those students who indicated that they would either take some action to change their behavior or at least that they would be more careful next time. This response pattern has a positive correlation ($r = 0.224, p < .10$) with the P score. When these sub-categories were combined into one category in which the general pattern was look to self to prevent this incident, no relationship was found between that general pattern and the P score ($r = 0.087, p > .10$).

The important finding from the results of this analysis is the strong quantitative support found for the assumption that students who focus on the negative or punitive aspects that result from an act of misconduct (F2) have a significantly lower level of moral thinking as measured by the P score. Students who indicated some uncertainty about what would prevent this from happening (F1) gave responses that have only a slight and insignificant relationship with the P score. The analysis of the individual responses that were categorized as "controllers," "knowers," and "changers" was mixed. The general orientation toward self category showed no significant relationship with
the P score. The response patterns that focused on 1) change in external factors (F4), 2) change in self or personal factors (F9), or 3) on the consequences (F2) have a strong relationship with level of moral thinking. Students with higher P scores were more apt to make responses that focused on some active change process, and those students with lower P scores were more apt to focus on what would happen to them if they got caught doing it again as the basis for prevention.

What function do you see that punishment serves?

It was evident from the qualitative analysis that students have different ideas and perspectives about the function of punishment. Five general response patterns and eight distinct punishment functions were identified and described in the previous section. A multiple regression analysis, using 14 response variables (one non-classified response pattern was included), was run to determine if the different perspectives or functions of punishment which students reported are related to the student's level of moral reasoning. The results of this analysis (see Table 19) indicate that these 14 variables explain 31.3 per cent of the variance in the P scores. Two of the response variables (J1 and J7), entered in the first two steps of the regression equation, make a significant contribution to the multiple
Table 19

Multiple Regression Summary Table—What Function Do You See That Punishment Serves?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F</th>
<th>Total F</th>
<th>Total F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J1 Generally none</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>0.207</td>
<td>4.946a</td>
<td>4.946a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J7 Reminder</td>
<td>0.440</td>
<td>0.194</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>-0.319</td>
<td>-0.262</td>
<td>3.390a</td>
<td>4.328a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J13 Differentiates forms of punishment</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.178</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>1.328</td>
<td>3.354a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J14 Non-classified</td>
<td>0.497</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.132</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.778</td>
<td>2.694a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J11 Regulatory, protective</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.098</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>2.227</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J6 Deterence</td>
<td>0.507</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>-0.239</td>
<td>0.197</td>
<td>1.844</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J2 None in this situation</td>
<td>0.519</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>-0.279</td>
<td>0.516</td>
<td>1.630</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J10 Example to others</td>
<td>0.527</td>
<td>0.278</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>1.441</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J3 Retribution for breaking rule</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>-0.140</td>
<td>-0.135</td>
<td>0.508</td>
<td>1.316</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J9 Compensate</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.121</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>1.189</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J12 Help, rehabilitative</td>
<td>0.552</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>0.252</td>
<td>1.075</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J4 Relative, it depends</td>
<td>0.557</td>
<td>0.310</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.040</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.972</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J8 Teach a lesson</td>
<td>0.559</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J5 Specific to this situation</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>0.313</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.782</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aSignificant at .05 level.
correlation and between them explain 19.4 per cent of the variance.

The concept of punishment, as pointed out in the previous section, if it is based on duty to authority and rules, can reflect the attitude of conventional morality; certain other attitudes about punishment also may be associated with less mature forms of moral reasoning. A general review of the results presented in Table 19 provides fairly clear evidence that statements about the purpose of punishment do give an indication of students' level of moral reasoning. Students who reported that the function of punishment is to teach a lesson (J8) serve as an example to others (J10), or that punishment has no function per se but is just the result (retirbution) of breaking a rule (J3) gave responses that are negatively correlated with the P score. A further review of the results in Table 19 indicate that the responses that punishment serves as a reminder (J7) that the behavior is illegal or about the consequences has a significant negative correlation \( r = -0.319, \ p < .05 \) with the P score. On the other hand, when students who reported that punishment serves a positive purpose, such as to help or rehabilitate (J12), or protects the rights of others (J11), or who can make in their response a differentiation (J13) between various functions that punishment serves gave
responses, as indicated in Table 19, that are positively associated with level of moral reasoning. The response that punishment generally does not serve any purpose (J1) has a significant positive correlation (r = 0.343, p < .05) with the P score which lends support to the general contention that punishment for the most part is a concept that takes on concrete meaning or a specific function for those students at the pre-conventional or conventional level of reasoning—levels that would have lower P scores than for the post-conventional or principled level of moral judgment. Students with higher P scores are more likely to state that punishment generally has no function.

One further step in the analysis was performed to study the relationship between the functions of punishment and the P score. The number of identifiably different functions reported by students was tabulated and a Pearson correlation coefficient was computed between the number of functions expressed and the P score. The results of that analysis indicate that the more functions mentioned by a student the lower the P score (r = -0.213, p = .10). This negative relationship provides further support for the general idea that punishment is a concept which finds more meaning among students with less mature forms of moral reasoning than with students with higher levels of moral reasoning.
Although the amount of variance explained by the several response variables is less than the variance explained by the response variables analyzed in the preceding questions, this is the only question in which all the response variables that were identified during the qualitative analysis appear in the regression equation and are included in the multiple regression summary table. This indicates that the question about the function of punishment elicited distinctly different responses. Had the scoring system been a little more refined or precise, this might have been one of the most potent of the questions asked students.

**How do you account for what happened?**

Two general dimensions were identified during the qualitative analysis of student responses to this question. The first dimension identified the basic content area or focus for each student's response. Four different focuses—the incident, right/wrong, why or how they were caught, and the statement that the student cannot account for the behavior—were identified and each student's response was categorized in one of these four ways. When the response focus was compared with the $P$ score by means of a Pearson correlation coefficient, no relationship was found ($r = 0.027$, $p > .10$).
The second dimension identified five different levels of explanation made in response to this question. These levels, described more completely in the previous section, ranged from a simple descriptive explanation of what happened to a more complex response that offered judgments as to why the incident happened. Each of these levels of explanation appeared to be qualitatively different in both form and substance from each other, but the results of the multiple regression analysis (see Table 20) indicates that only 7.3 per cent of the variance can be explained by these five variables. Students who indicated that their behavior was spontaneous or unintentional (A3) and students who indicated that their behavior was intentional or deliberate (A6) to achieve some objective such as to obtain money gave responses that have a slight negative association with the P score \( r = -0.155, p > .10 \) and \( r = -0.115, p > .10 \). These relationships are not significant. The other three response variables (A4, A2, and A5) have slight positive associations with the P score. None of the five levels of explanation uniquely accounts for a significant amount of the variance in the P scores, nor as a group do these five variables contribute to a significant multiple correlation.
### Table 20

**Multiple Regression Summary Table—How Do You Account For What Happened?**

*Levels of Explanation*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A3 Spur of moment</td>
<td>0.155</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>-0.172</td>
<td>0.910</td>
<td>0.910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A6 Intentional, goal oriented</td>
<td>0.216</td>
<td>0.047</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>0.855</td>
<td>0.881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4 Not intentional</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>0.163</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2 Descriptive explanation</td>
<td>0.258</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.141</td>
<td>0.321</td>
<td>0.604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5 Causal or reactive</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>0.241</td>
<td>0.521</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 21

**Multiple Regression Summary Table—How Do You Account For What Happened?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A8 Reaction to pressure</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.236</td>
<td>0.334</td>
<td>2.186</td>
<td>2.186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A7 No rational control</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>2.917</td>
<td>2.608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2 Descriptive explanation</td>
<td>0.415</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>1.936</td>
<td>2.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A10 Seriousness or consequences</td>
<td>0.489</td>
<td>0.239</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.155</td>
<td>-0.195</td>
<td>1.223</td>
<td>1.932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1 Focus of response</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.046</td>
<td>1.399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although the different response levels that were identified during the qualitative analysis appeared to represent different structures of reasoning, these structures have no relationship to level of moral reasoning. Instead the open-ended nature of these questions apparently enable students to use a variety of self-determined cues for their responses which negated the identification of any possible relationship between general levels of explanation and level of moral thinking.

Because the anticipated relationship between the level of explanation used to account for what happened and the P score was not supported, two additional analyses were conducted. First, students who gave responses to this question that were categorized as level 4 offered some justification as to why the behavior occurred. These justifications were categorized and treated as additional response variables. When a second multiple regression analysis was employed with level 4, responses further delineated the amount of variance explained, increased to 24 per cent (see Table 21). A review of the results in Table 21 indicates that the addition of these variables (A8, A7, and A10) accounts for this increase. Students who reported that the incident occurred as a result of a reaction to pressure or problems (A8) gave responses
that are positively correlated with the P score 
\( r = 0.236, p < .10 \). Students, who indicated that the incident occurred because they did not think, were careless or because they were intoxicated (A7) also gave a response pattern that is positively associated with the P score \( r = 0.155, p \geq .10 \). Students who justified their behavior because they did not realize the seriousness (A10) gave a response that is negatively associated with the P score \( r = -0.155, p \geq .10 \). Even though the addition of these response variables to the regression equation increased the amount of variance in the P scores explained by the variables in the regression equation, none of the total or partial F's for the multiple correlations are significant.

The second additional analysis performed was to compare the number of levels of explanations used by students in their responses with the P score by computing a Pearson correlation coefficient. The results of that analysis indicate that students whose responses reflected the use of several levels of explanation have significantly lower P scores \( r = -0.304, p < .05 \). With students with lower P scores often using more than one level of explanation in their response, this helps explain why so little of variance was explained when a regression analysis was done on the five levels of explanation. Apparently, these levels of explanation
were either too broadly defined to permit the identification of response patterns related to level of moral judgment, or there is no inherent reason to even argue that these levels of explanation have anything to do with moral reasoning.

Who is responsible for what happened?

This was the final question selected for further analysis, and like the preceding question no significant differences were found in the relationships between the response variables and the P score. During the qualitative analysis some clear delineations were made between the types of responses that students made to this question. One major distinction was between those students who in their response avoided taking personal responsibility for their behavior and those who responded that they accepted at least some level of responsibility for their behavior. A one-way analysis of variance was computed to determine if there was any significant difference in the mean P scores between those who avoided responsibility and those who accepted responsibility. The results of this analysis presented in Table 22 indicate that, while the P score was slightly higher for those students who accepted some degree of responsibility than it was for those who did not, the difference between these groups is not significant.
Table 22

One-Way Analysis of Variance of Mean Differences in P Scores Between Students Who Avoid or Who Accept Responsibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Avoid</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.8000</td>
<td>12.1738</td>
<td>5.443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Accept</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21.3235</td>
<td>6.4089</td>
<td>1.0991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21.2564</td>
<td>7.1625</td>
<td>1.1469</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of Variance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sum of Squares</th>
<th>Mean Squares</th>
<th>F Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between groups</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.1797</td>
<td>1.1797</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within groups</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1948.2578</td>
<td>52.6556</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1949.4375</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p > .05.

Among those students who accepted responsibility, there were further delineations made in the degree of acceptance of responsibility. Seven different levels of acceptance of responsibility were identified, and the degree to which these seven variables account for the variance in the P scores was studied by means of a multiple regression analysis. The result of that analysis (see Table 23) indicates that only 5.5 per cent of the total variance in the P scores can be explained by these seven variables. None of the variables individually explain over 2 per cent of the variance.

Students who indicated in their response some general
## Table 23

Multiple Regression Summary Table—Who Is Responsible For What Happened?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Multiple R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>RSQ Change</th>
<th>Simple R</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Partial F Test</th>
<th>Total F Test</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B8 General statement about</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.534</td>
<td>0.534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responsibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5 Responsibility qualified</td>
<td>0.170</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.105</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>0.539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3 Self, at fault</td>
<td>0.209</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.014</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>-0.152</td>
<td>0.529</td>
<td>0.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6 Self, did it</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.088</td>
<td>-0.105</td>
<td>0.226</td>
<td>0.446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4 Self, should have thought</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.084</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.110</td>
<td>0.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2 Self, should be</td>
<td>0.232</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.041</td>
<td>-0.041</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7 Self, clearly in charge</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
principle or guideline for determining responsibility (B8), students who accepted their share of personal responsibility but also indicated that there were other influences (qualifiers, B5), and students who indicated that they were responsible because they should have thought (B4) gave responses that have some slight positive relationship with level of moral reasoning. Students who indicated that they were responsible because it was their fault (B3) or because they committed the violation (B6) gave responses which have a slight negative association with the P score. But in each case these variables are not significantly correlated with the P score.

Although it was assumed and so stated in the previous section that a mark of a mature individual is willingness to accept personal responsibility for one's behavior, the relationship between this definition of a mature individual and the level of moral maturity as measured by the P score on the DIT was not supported by the results of two statistical analyses conducted on the outcomes of the qualitative analysis. There is only a slight tendency for students with higher P scores to accept responsibility rather than to avoid accepting responsibility and only a tendency for certain levels or types of acceptance to be associated with the P score. Because some levels of acceptance
of responsibility have a slight negative association with the P score and others have a slight positive association, the effect of combining these into one major category—willingness to accept responsibility—is to cancel out any overall relationship with the P score and, thus, make the results of the one-way analysis of variance not significant.

Since several of the participants in this study were involved in a group violation, the lack of any significant findings in the results of analysis of responses to the question may be due to difficulty or ease in attributing responsibility when, in fact, more than one person was involved.

**Discussion**

A general profile of the students who participated in this study indicates that: 1) as a group the students have about the same intellectual aptitude as measured by the composite score on the ACT test as other Ohio State University students; 2) the socio-economic status of the group, based on head of household's occupation, is above the national average; 3) the degree or percentage of principled thinking used to respond to the questions on the DIT (P score) is somewhat below the percentage found in studies at other institutions; and 4) the majority of students who participated in this study are at a stage 4 of moral reasoning.
At the stage 4 level of moral reasoning, students can and do make moral judgments about right and wrong. Those judgments, however, are anchored in external definitions—in rules, laws, regulations, and in statements or opinions of people of power and authority. Many students (50 per cent) whose stage of moral reasoning could be typed were able to reason at the conventional or stage 4 level. Involvement in campus discipline, then, is not a question of inability to make moral judgments. An additional 20 per cent of the students reasoned at either stage 5 or 6 level. But the distribution of these stage scores does indicate that not as many of the participants were at a principled level of moral reasoning (stage 5 and 6) as were at a conventional level (stage 3 and 4) of moral reasoning.

The fact that not as many students at stage 5 or 6 were involved in a discipline problem does support statements made by Kohlberg (1975) that moral judgment is the single most important factor yet analyzed that can account for moral behavior. Obviously, the level of moral maturity does have some relationship to moral behavior. Without a control group, it is not possible to generalize beyond just pointing out that more students were at a conventional level of moral reasoning than at a principled level of moral reasoning.
Of all the demographic variables selected for comparison with the P score, only the ACT composite score has a significant relationship with that measure of moral judgment. Since ability to make moral judgments requires a certain level of cognitive development, such a finding is not surprising and is generally consistent with the results of studies reported in Chapter II, which indicated that such a relationship exists. At a large open enrollment institution, such as the Ohio State University where this study was conducted, a wide range of cognitive ability exists within the student population. Because cognitive ability and moral development are related, there will be students who have the ability to reason at a high level of moral judgment and there will be students who do not. At higher levels of cognitive ability, there will be some students whose development of moral judgment has not kept pace with their cognitive growth. At the lower end there will be students whose moral development will be limited by their cognitive development. As this study has indicated, there is likely to be a high proportion of students who are involved in campus discipline who reason at a stage 4 level or lower. For some of those students further development to a higher level of moral reasoning—a level where moral principles are used as the basis of moral judgment—
is not realistic; for others, the potential to advance to more mature ways of moral reasoning is present. But even for those students for whom advancement to higher levels of moral reasoning may not be that attainable, further stabilization or clarification (horizontal décolage) within that stage is certainly possible.

Fifteen per cent of the discipline group are in a transitional phase in their level of moral thinking. At this A stage or stage 4½, as determined by scores on the DIT, students are in the process of moving from a conventional level to a principled level of moral reasoning. Judgments based on obedience to authority or to peer group or society norms are often rejected, but students have difficulty in substituting in their place judgments based on moral principles. The result is often a mode of thinking that displays either an anti-authoritarian tone or one that is very relative or situational. The verbal responses given to the interview questions showed little evidence of anti-authoritarian thinking, but statements that indicated that judgments were based on very relative standards were apparent. Reluctance to generalize to other situations or to make concrete justifications also appeared in some of the responses. "It depends" was not an infrequent response. Given the very authoritarian nature of most discipline processes and actions, the absence of anti-authoritarian statements is quite
understandable in this situation. The pattern of relative thinking that some students displayed supports the idea of a transitional point between levels of moral thinking. It also means that students, during this period, need assistance in clarifying their responses and in establishing a sound basis for making moral judgments.

The relationship between the number of responses or the number of different levels or perspectives of thinking employed by students to respond to these questions and the P score differed according to the question asked. Sometimes no relationship was found. For some questions a positive relationship exists between responses and P score and for other questions a negative relationship exists. The frequency or number of different response patterns given to the questions about the consequences of behavior, the function of rules and about a fair way to resolve this incident is positively associated with the P score. Students with higher P scores made a greater number of distinctly different responses to these questions.

On the other hand, students with lower P scores used more levels of explanation to account for their behavior, made more responses about what was wrong or not wrong with their behavior, gave more different statements about the fairness of the rule they
violated and reported more functions for punishment than did students with higher P scores. Students who were more verbal, at least on certain questions, were not necessarily students with higher levels of moral reasoning as these mixed results indicate. Some questions stimulated students with higher levels of moral reasoning to provide a greater range of response patterns. Other questions stimulated students with lower levels of moral reasoning to give more varied responses.

Not all the individual response patterns proved to have significant relationships with level of moral reasoning. Whether this lack of significance is due to the lack of question potency to serve as a stimulus to elicit meaningful variations in responses, to the fact that certain questions only may have called for the reasoning of a certain level or type, or to the inability of the researcher to identify the subtleties in responses that might have indicated different levels of moral reasoning is difficult to state. What can be stated is that certain questions, when the response patterns were analyzed, had response patterns that explain larger percentages of the variance in the P score than do other questions. Those questions which elicited responses that explain a very high percentage of the variance in the P score are: "What factors would
you most like to have considered by the person or group that decides on what discipline action is appropriate?" (54.6 per cent); "In your own mind, is there anything 'wrong' with what you did?" (51.8 per cent); "In your own mind, what function do rules or regulations serve?" (49.4 per cent); "What would you consider to be a just or fair way to resolve this matter and why?" (45.9 per cent); "Do you consider the rule or regulation you have been charged with violating a fair one?" (42 per cent); and "In your own words, can you describe what you have learned as a result of all that has happened to you?" (40.8 per cent).

The Defining Issues Test, used as the base measure of level of moral thinking, is based on ranking issues used to support judgments to the test questions. A similar approach is involved when students participating in this study were asked to state the factors (or issues) that they would like to see used to make the discipline decision. That question, which is similar to DIT because it asks for identification of issues or factors, has the greatest amount of P score variance accounted for by the responses. The question that asked the basic moral question--what do you see wrong with what you did?--was the next most powerful question. Consideration of the function that rules have is also a potent question as are the two questions that raised the issue of
fairness—another important moral consideration. The last question in the interview sequence, which asked students to report on what they learned, also elicited responses that explain a high percentage of the variance. Responses to each of these six questions are able to help explain at least 40 per cent of the P score variance.

A smaller amount of the P score variance is explained by the responses to these questions: "Do you have any sense or feeling of obligation because of what happened?" (33.7 per cent); "What do you see as some of the consequences that resulted from your action?" (32.6 per cent); "What will prevent this from happening again?" (31.6 per cent); and "What function do you see that punishment serves?" (31.3 per cent). "How do you account for what happened?" (24 per cent) and the question on responsibility which elicited responses that explain only 5.5 per cent of the variance were the only questions of the 12 selected for analysis that have no significant multiple correlations. While there were some very distinct levels of explanation identified in the responses students made when asked to account for their behavior, these levels have only a slight relationship to levels of moral thinking. The question on responsibility was confounded to some extent because in some situations more than one
student was involved in the incident. That made attribution of responsibility not a clear choice to make.

Although each of the interview questions tapped different issues and content areas, some general statements can be made about the relation between some of these response patterns and level of moral thinking. Students who made just basic "yes" or "no" responses or by other minimal responses revealed little evidence of a reasoning process to support or justify their response are more apt to have lower P scores than students who gave responses that showed a depth of reasoning by the degree of elaboration offered in their responses. Students who focus on punishment, on disciplinary sanctions, or on the consequences that happened to them, also have lower P scores. Students who made reference to rules or laws without further elaborating the purpose of those rules or laws to define right or wrong, for example, have lower P scores than do students who also reference rules or laws to define right or wrong but give some indication of why that rule or law is necessary. Students who have difficulty in responding to questions that employ concepts that may themselves require a certain level of moral reasoning to understand the concept, such as the questions which raised the issue of fairness, have low P scores. Students who readily accept the need or appropriateness of punishment without questioning it also have low
P scores. On the other hand, students who can perceive that their behavior either directly or indirectly has consequences for others have higher P scores.

It appears from the results of this study that students whose level of moral judgment is not fully developed will focus frequently on what has or may happen to them in the way of punitive consequences and on the fact that punishment is the logical result of a rule infraction.

When one undertakes a major research study of this magnitude, there always is concern that the results will not prove to be fruitful or that the basic assumptions behind the design of the study will not be supported. Fortunately, the results of this study do lend strong credence and support to those assumptions and some of the findings have significant meaning for student personnel practice. First, the process of qualitative analysis demonstrated that by attending carefully to the individual responses that students make, it is possible to differentiate among the patterns of thought or judgment that students use and to establish meaningful categories to code those responses. Such distinctions were made among the responses to all 18 structured interview questions. These student responses, as the results indicate, can provide clues to a student's level of moral development,
which in turn can assist the interviewer to help the student better understand the situation and to grow from the experience.

Second, the results of the quantitative analysis demonstrated that the judgments that students make in a naturalistic setting, not just a hypothetical situation, such as the discipline interview process do have a relationship to that student's level of moral development. Not all students involved in campus discipline are at the same level of moral development, and these differences are apparent. That finding means that the application of moral cognitive-developmental theory does have a place in the practice of student personnel work.

When the responses to 12 questions were selected for further analysis, 10 of these questions had one or more multiple correlations between the response variables and the P scores that were significant. The results of the quantitative analysis also indicated that many of the scoring categories constructed from the student's verbal responses were indeed related to the stage of moral development. Knowledge of stage development theory creates a sensitivity to these individual differences and serves as a basis for practice. More specific recommendations for that practice are presented in the following chapter.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS, APPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Responsibility for campus discipline was a precursor to the modern day student personnel profession. Student personnel workers have continued to assert their claim for responsibility for this function, even in the face of some very tumultuous years of dissent, on educational grounds. Generally, this educational claim for responsibility has not been challenged, but in practice this function actually has been approached atheoretically. Yes, the administrative responsibilities associated with campus discipline and the court-imposed legal requirements for due process have been met, but a well-grounded understanding of the process of human development has not been adequately applied or adapted to the functional responsibility for college student discipline.

The purpose of this study was to determine if some of the assumptions of moral development theory were applicable to the discipline setting and could serve as a basis for practice. Several models of
moral development were described in Chapter II. A cognitive-developmental theory of moral development first proposed by Piaget (1965) and substantially elaborated upon by Kohlberg (1958 and 1972) was selected as the general model to be examined for its utility in the discipline setting. The selection of this theoretical perspective provided a conceptual framework for the study, for the design of the interview questions, and for the analysis of the responses to those questions.

The cognitive-developmental theory of moral development postulates six different levels or stages of moral reasoning. Each of these stages represents a more mature way of judging moral issues and resolving moral conflicts. The development of moral judgment progresses sequentially through each of these stages in an invariant sequence from a stage 1 level of pre-conventional thinking to a stage 6 level of principled thinking. The most mature form of moral reasoning is based on moral principles rather than on conventions such as laws, norms, or regulations of society or its institutions. However, only about 25 per cent of the adult population reaches this principled level of moral reasoning.

Moral development was selected as the human development dimension of interest because behavior
such as theft or destruction of property and academic misconduct, to name a few, raise underlying moral considerations. They also represent incidents that are encountered during the discipline process. Further, there has been a growing concern on a societal level and at an institutional level about moral behavior and about the commitment of educational institutions to the moral development of students.

Even with the restricted age range represented by the college student sample participating in this study, cognitive-developmental theory would predict that individual differences will exist, even among this group in level of moral reasoning. Those differences, if they exist, should appear in the judgments that students are asked to make during the discipline process. If students respond to their discipline incident and to questions raised during the discipline process in ways that reflect different levels of moral understanding those individual differences must be recognized. An understanding of the process of moral development and why these differences exist can serve as a cornerstone for practice and lend credence to the espoused professional commitment to student development.

By establishing the fact that there are differences in the structure and content of the judgments that students make during the discipline interview
and that these differences are related to the student's level of moral judgment, the value of conceptualizing the goals of the discipline process in developmental terms is demonstrated. To demonstrate that such a relationship exists, it was important first to establish what the level of moral reasoning of the participants was. That was accomplished by administering the Defining Issues Test, developed by Rest (1974), to each participant. Responses to that instrument provided an objective measure of each student's level of moral reasoning.

Second, it was necessary to gather data about the types of judgments that students can and do make about their discipline experience and about key concepts related to the discipline process. An 18-item questionnaire was developed and administered to each student to collect this information. Through an arduous process of inductive analysis, these responses were analyzed and the different perspectives and structural aspects of the responses were identified and classified.

The relationship between the responses that students gave and their level of moral reasoning was studied through a multiple regression analysis. The results of that analysis did establish that there were some significant relationships between certain response variables and the student's level of moral judgment.
The overall conclusion was inescapable—differences in level of moral judgment do exist among the students who participated in this study and those differences are reflected in the responses that students gave to the discipline interview questions. These findings support the supposition that moral development theory has definite application to the discipline setting.

Students do use different perspectives and display different levels of thought and judgment when asked to respond to selected questions. These patterns of thought were differentiated and some of those patterns did correlate significantly with the level of moral reasoning, as the results presented in Chapter IV indicate. It is possible to make meaningful distinctions in the responses that students make and to use those differences to differentiate between students at different levels of moral development. These differences can serve, therefore, as a quick means to assess the general level of a student's moral development.

As the overall results indicate, students respond to the discipline experience and their involvement in it in different ways. Some of these differences are related to the student's level of moral development. That there are differences in level of moral reasoning has important implications for practice. They are discussed in the following section.
Implications for practice

Student development, as an integrating concept for the practice of student personnel work, recognizes that students have individual and unique needs and that not all students develop at the same pace. Designing programs and services to meet those needs and to enhance or nourish the development of students is part of that practice. Responsibility for student development has been acknowledged in the area of college student discipline but the full implementation of the concept has been stymied for several reasons.

Campus discipline is a complex responsibility. Certain aspects of the discipline responsibility are an administrative problem and, at times, even a nuisance for the institution and for those who manage its programs. At other times, discipline presents a counseling problem that requires counseling skills and a counseling approach as Williamson (1949) suggested. The educational or student development dimensions of campus discipline have not been as directly addressed as have these administrative and counseling concerns.

Another reason why the educational dimension has not received recent attention is that when the doctrine of in loco parentis came under active attack and was eventually discarded, concern for the moral well-being of students was rejected as one aspect of the in loco
parentis role. Also the concept of student development, with its concern for the development of the whole person, is a difficult concept to grasp and to implement unless some narrower dimension of development is the focus. The selection or identification of an appropriate development dimension has not occurred as readily in the discipline area as it has in some of the other functional areas commonly associated with student personnel work. Knowledge of moral development theory among practitioners generally has been lacking, which is one reason why that concept has not been used.

What this study has proposed and the results have supported is that the concept of moral development is an important human development dimension that has a substantial bearing on the discipline process. Moral development, as one aspect of student development, can be a focus for programs, policies, and practice, not at the expense of administrative, legal, and counseling concerns, but rather as part of a broader educational commitment to make the discipline process a developmental experience for students. Some specific ways in which an understanding of moral development can be implemented are described in the following section.
One other important conclusion can be drawn from the results of this study. Students responded to questions that touched upon real happenings and real issues in their own lives. Both Kohlberg (1958) and Rest (1974) based their assessment of moral reasoning on responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas. Research based on naturalistic observations and real situations has been scarce. Finding that moral judgment made in the discipline setting do reveal developmental differences in the structure and in the content of the responses not only supports the application of moral development theory to this setting but also adds support to the concept that there are stages of moral development.

A brief summary of some of the more specific findings from this study follow.

Summary of findings

The levels of moral judgment, even with the rather restricted age range represented by this group of students, ranged from a stage 2 level of moral reasoning to a stage 6 level of moral reasoning. Most of these students (50 per cent), whose stage of moral reasoning could be typed, were at stage 4, a conventional "law and order" stage of moral reasoning. The average score of principled thinking (P score)
for all students who participated in this study was 35.5 per cent (a raw score of 21.33). Most other studies have reported the percentage of principled thinking in the 40 to 50 per cent range for an undergraduate sample.

Of all the variables correlated with the P score (ACT composite score, SES, Age, Class Rank, Sex, and Race) only the ACT score had a significant correlation with the P score. Students with high academic ability (not necessarily academic performance) as measured by the ACT test did score significantly higher on the DIT. Students from higher socio-economic backgrounds and the upperclass students also scored higher on the DIT measure of moral judgment, but these relationships were not statistically significant.

Practical Applications

Campus discipline and the interpretation of policy

As the results of this study have indicated not all students involved in a discipline incident are at the same general level of moral development. Those differences in the level of moral development are a significant factor in the students' ability to comprehend and to respond to certain concepts or issues that may come up during the discipline process. Although there have been many studies that have
described the general characteristics of discipline offenders, until this study was designed, the level of moral judgment has not been a focus for research in the discipline context. The fact that differences in moral judgment do exist, therefore, have just not been recognized and reflected in practice.

The recognition of these individual differences in level of moral judgment development is important. If there is not a reasonable match between the level of response given by a staff member, for example, and that student's level of moral understanding, there is no effective basis for communication and no effective way to stimulate change in the student's level of moral reasoning. To illustrate that point further, the student accused of theft, when confronted by the question "Do you see anything wrong with stealing a bike?," may respond in one of several ways. One student may report that stealing is wrong because it is serious and may lead to a jail sentence or to disciplinary action. A second student might point out that stealing is against the law, while a third student indicates that to steal a bike is wrong because the bike is the property of someone else and to take something without permission is wrong.

Each of these responses represents a different level of moral reasoning. The student who organizes
his thoughts around the personal consequences processes his experience at an entirely different level than does the student who thinks in terms of the rights of others. An understanding of this difference is very important in the discipline context for two reasons.

First, Rest (1971) has reported that students can comprehend all stages of moral development up to and including their own stage, but do not comprehend stages of moral reasoning more than one stage above their own. To respond to the student who is concerned only that stealing a bike will lead to jail or to disciplinary action with a strongly delivered statement about the property rights and responsibility to the student whose bike was stolen will not be understood. That student's level of moral judgment has not developed to the point where the student can fully comprehend and respond at a principled level of moral thought, which is two stages above his own level.

Now, the student who recognizes laws as the basis of morality may recognize that that form of reasoning is not as adequate as the principled response, which is only level above his own. One way in which development of more mature moral thought can be facilitated is to challenge less mature forms of moral judgment and to present or expose the student to more mature
levels of moral reasoning, so the second reason why an understanding of the fact that not all students involved in a campus discipline incident are at the same level of moral development is to permit the student personnel worker to function in the discipline context as a facilitator of student development.

To function as a facilitator in such a setting requires that the student personnel worker be able to match his level of response with that of the students if communication is to take place, and be able to recognize and challenge less mature ways of reasoning. If the discipline interview process can be structured in such a way that dialogue can take place and some moral issues raised, the staff person responsible for the interview creates an opportunity for the student to explore alternative forms and levels of reasoning and for the staff person to expose that student to examples of moral judgment at or slightly above the student's level of judgment. In the example of the student who referred to laws as the basis of morality, that means helping the student understand why a law or regulation is necessary, the purpose it serves, and helping the student recognize how the student's behavior affects others. This can be accomplished in a way that will encourage the student to entertain more mature ways of reasoning.
The necessity to match a response with a student's level of understanding is not restricted to just the discipline process. The interpretation of campus policies and regulations is but one of a number of situations where that same need exists. An administrative official could communicate a regulation to a group of students by simply stating the regulation and reminding the group that any violations will lead to disciplinary action. But that same official also could communicate the basis upon which the rule was developed and the purpose the rule or regulation is intended to serve. And, if the regulation is based on any contractual or legal obligations or on any moral principles, those can be expressed as well.

At the level of moral thinking common for most college students, threat of punishment if the policy is violated will be easily comprehended. Such an explanation or justification, though, for complying with the policy does not serve as a model or encourage morally mature reasoning. If an administrative response is limited to the threat of punishment, an opportunity to stimulate moral reasoning has been missed. Schulte and Teal (1975) made this point when they stated, "It seems unlikely that progress toward development of rationally autonomous morality will be made in the context of institutions which embody the
lower level attitudes toward rules, e.g., as mere punishment reward systems or as law-and-order maintaining devices only" (p. 231). When policies and regulations are described or presented to a group of students, a range of explanations encompassing several levels of moral reasoning may be necessary. If an opportunity for discussion or dialogue follows, students in the group will be exposed to different forms of reasoning even among the members of the group. That discussion format will create another vehicle for stimulating moral development.

Experience and moral development

Both Dewey (1909) and Kohlberg (1972) have pointed out that experience in confronting moral issues or moral questions is imperative if moral development is to occur. The explanation given by Kohlberg as to why some individuals have advanced to higher levels of moral development than others, when cognitive ability levels are the same, is the degree to which those individuals either in their home or school setting or by confronting some personal situation with major moral import have had experience with moral questions. Student personnel workers are frequent supporters of the active participation of students on committees and in other institutional decision-making or policy
recommending roles. Knowledge of moral development theory helps to form a foundation to justify that participation.

When students have the opportunity to participate in various types of group decisions or discussions, they are exposed to different levels of judgment and their own reasoning is a subject for discussion or reaction. When the groups are diverse in membership and include adult participants such as faculty and staff, there is a greater likelihood that some students will be exposed to a level of reasoning that exceeds their own. Obviously, not all groups or committees are involved with decisions or issues that have an underlying moral dimension, but some do. Judicial boards are one example. So are certain groups or committees that are making decisions or recommendations on the allocation of resources or on major policy decisions that will affect people in different ways. These formal structures are a ready means for discussion and dialogue. When appropriate, the moral considerations can be discussed and this provides another opportunity for students to have experience with moral issues.

Programs or classroom experiences utilizing moral discussions involving either hypothetical or real moral dilemmas are additional experiential
opportunities for students. The academic curriculum is replete with such opportunities. Special programs can be designed for use in residence halls or as part of leadership training experiences. Kohlberg (1975a) has indicated that moral development can be stimulated by the discussion method when there is:

1) Exposure to the next highest level of moral reasoning
2) Exposure to stimulus that poses conflict or contradiction in current modes of moral reasoning, and
2) An open atmosphere for dialogue in which conflicting moral views can be compared.

The student's social experience can play a major role in helping the student to actively organize his thinking to see moral issues in a new light. If the college experience is to have an impact on the moral development of students, there must be opportunities that will enable students to actively experience different levels of moral reasoning and to make moral judgments. In the sense that the student's social experience is a laboratory in which students can test their judgment, reflect on their behavior and engage in informal discussions with their peers, instructors or advisors, the development of more mature forms of moral thought can occur.

To some extent those informal interactive experiences do lead unintentionally to further moral development. But, if only approximately 25 per cent
of the adult population uses principled moral reasoning, the impact of the college experience can be substantially greater. By accepting a broader educational responsibility, particularly in the out-of-classroom environment of the student, the student personnel worker can have a much more intentional role as a facilitator of student development. The opportunity to interact with students either through formal structures such as committees or student government groups, for example, or informally as advisors or counselors already exists. A better grasp of moral development concepts and the more deliberate application of theory to practice is all that is required.

Williamson (1975) has echoed this same thought when he proposed that the student personnel worker must choose a strategy for helping students to develop their potentiality. Williamson preferred the personalized relationship with the student rather than the classroom as the place in which students can be engaged in rational dialogue and hypothesis testing as a means of teaching reasoning. "It is our duty as educators," stated Williamson (19750, "to introduce students to many new concepts of the nature of human development" (p. 365). The discipline process, which can be a very formidable and potentially ominous experience for students, is also a very personalized setting in which dialogue
around some very crucial moral issues can be developed. From the perspective of the moral development of the student, one objective for campus discipline is to raise the student's level of moral judgment and corresponding behavior to as high a level as possible—hopefully to a level based on moral principles.

**Moral development and professional development**

The two previous sections focused on stimulating the student's level of moral judgment and the importance of matching the response with the student's level of moral understanding. Hann et al. (1968) in their study of student activists pointed out that some of the administrative responses to the activists were clearly of a law-and-order, stage 4 level of reasoning, while some of the student activists were, in fact, using a principled level of moral reasoning. So concern for the moral development of students is not the only concern.

If student personnel practitioners are representative of the adult population, in general, only a certain percentage of the practitioners reason at a principled level of moral thought. The general level of moral development for some students will exceed the level of development of some educators and administrative staff members, which will restrict the ability of some
student personnel workers to appropriately match their level of response with the students and to function effectively as a facilitator. This makes the moral development of student personnel workers and paraprofessionals a matter of concern for professional and staff development.

One indirect and personal result of this research study has been a greater awareness and comprehension of moral issues on the part of this researcher because of exposure to moral development literature and concepts and because of personal dialogue with students and professional colleagues. The use of moral discussion and the introduction of moral development concepts in training programs, staff and professional development experiences, and in the graduate curriculum can lead to a higher level of moral reasoning and moral behavior in the profession and enable more individuals at both the professional and paraprofessional levels to actively and intentionally function in ways that can facilitate the moral development of college students.

In a paper specifically aimed at teachers in the role of moral educators, Kohlberg and Selman (1973) suggest that a teacher must be both a moral philosopher and a moral psychologist. As a moral philosopher, the teacher must consider the moral implications of his own action and as a moral psychologist, the teacher must
understand the child's patterns of thinking and how the moral meaning of the teacher's action is perceived by the child. That same double responsibility is just as important, if not more so, for student personnel workers. How students interpret the behavior of professionals in the field is partly a function of their level of moral development. And, if nothing else, the results of this study have clearly indicated that even as students struggle with their own disciplinary problem, they respond and make judgments that reflect their level of moral development.

Educators can foster moral development by being principled persons and by relating to students as persons.

First, since respect for persons, considerations of interests of others, fairness, and concern for truth are our own primary moral principles, it seems intuitively certain that these qualities should be exemplified in the educator's relations with students. Specifically, this means that students should be treated as persons and not merely occupants of the role of student learner. (Schulte and Teal, 1975, p. 233)

It is important that as a matter of professional concern and understanding that practitioners have some understanding of the process of moral development. This does not require a thorough understanding of cognitive-stage development theory, but rather an appreciation of the individual differences in level
of moral judgment that may exist among students and a concern for one's own moral development.

**Limitations of the Study and Recommendations for Future Research**

**Limitations**

This research was limited by several factors. First, the participants were limited to those volunteers who agreed to participate in the study. Because of the confidentiality of the process and the requirement for a consent form, there was no opportunity to determine if the moral development level of the nonparticipants differed significantly from that of the volunteer group. Since the participant group consisted entirely of volunteers and was not selected on a random basis, there also was no opportunity to compare directly the level of moral judgment of this group with a matched group who were not involved in a campus discipline incident. The report of results from this study were necessarily limited to just this group and this discipline setting and not generalized to a larger population of students.

The initial design for this study was based on asking a wide range of questions covering several different moral issues so that a broad sampling of student responses could be collected. Eighteen questions generated a great deal of information, but some
responses to some questions were too brief to be useful in the analysis. Fewer questions with an opportunity to probe responses might have generated some different data. It certainly might have provided an opportunity to assign one global moral development score to each participant. With responses from 18 questions to be analyzed, the basis for analysis centered on a question-by-question analysis. The structure of certain questions might have elicited only a certain level of response, because that was all that was necessary to respond adequately. There was no direct way to determine if a student's highest level of moral reasoning was represented by their responses to the question.

The discipline experience for some students may represent a very coercive experience. Even with the most careful efforts to establish dialogue with students, what students report externally in response to the interview questions may have been only an approximation of their internal response system. Certainly, some students may have been motivated or inclined to give responses intended to satisfy the interviewer. But, cognitive stage-development theory assumes and research tends to support that individuals cannot understand or reason at more than one level above their own. This fact should prevent the
possibility that student responses reflect their effort to "fake-good," but, on the other hand, these responses might reflect a level of reasoning below that which these students normally use in other situations. Such a possibility exists for all research of this type. The fact that significant differences were found, however, does indicate that the moral judgment dimension under study was a very discriminating variable.

Recommendations for future research

The application of theoretical constructs and the growing empirical evidence that has accumulated about the process of human development have not fully found their way into practice. The use of qualitative research methods has not been strongly employed in the student personnel field either. As an applied field, a greater understanding and use of such concepts and research methods are necessary if student personnel practice is to be adequately grounded on a solid theoretical and empirical base. Future research should focus on the application of theory to practical situations, and it should utilize the systematic examination of every day activities and interactions that can assist with the elaboration of theory. More field-based research is needed.
This study involved only 55 participants. Similar studies are needed from discipline settings at other campuses and types of institutions to expand on the base of information collected from this study. Expanding the base of information will provide a wider inventory or description of the range of response patterns given by students at particular levels of moral development.

Future research also can focus more directly on a specific stage of development and the content of responses for that stage. In other words, in what ways do responses of the student of stage 4 differ from that of the student at stage 5? The process of stage transition or stage development is not well understood either. Is there a way to identify those in a position to move from one stage to another, or those who need further experiences of a certain type before development can occur? Another intriguing area for research is why some students apparently suspend moral judgment and act in immoral ways. Why does this happen?

If one aim of college student discipline is to help facilitate the moral development of students, then research also needs to be conducted on the effectiveness of planned intervention programs or strategies in the discipline setting designed to
enhance moral development. Moral judgment is only one of several aspects of moral development. Other dimensions of this process and different assessment techniques also need further study.

Qualitative analysis is an under-utilized research method. As this study has indicated, if used effectively, such research can generate very useful data. Research of this kind is needed in all areas of education, and most certainly it is needed within the student personnel field.
APPENDIX A

APPROVAL TO CONDUCT RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

PROPOSED USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS: ACTION OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE

The Behavioral Sciences Review Committee has taken the following action:

1. Approve
2. Approve with Conditions
3. Disapprove

with regard to the employment of human subjects in the proposed research entitled: Office Research on Students

Alexander F. Smith is listed as the principal investigator.

The conditions, if any, are attached and are signed by the committee chairperson and by the principal investigator. If disapproved, the reasons are attached and are signed by the committee chairperson and by the medical or other consultant, if any.

Signed ____________________ Signed ____________________
(medical or other consultant) (chairperson)

Date June 1, 1976
June 2, 1976

MEMO

TO: Alexander F. Smith, Principal Investigator

FROM: Neal F. Johnson, Chairman, Behavioral Sciences Review Committee

SUBJECT: Protocol 76B 223, OFFICE RESEARCH ON STUDENTS

The above protocol was approved by the Behavioral Sciences Review Committee at its meeting of June 1, 1976, with the following condition:

No member of the Disciplinary Committee will know before action is taken whether the person did or did not participate in the experiment.

If you agree to this condition, please sign in the space indicated below and return this memo to Room 205, Ohio State University Research Foundation, 1314 Kinnear Road, Campus, within one week. Upon receipt of your acknowledgment, we will forward the approval form from the Committee.

Date 6/4/76 Signature Alexander F. Smith Principal Investigator

Date 6/15/76 Signature Neal F. Johnson Chairman, Behavioral Sciences Review Committee
THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

PROPOSED USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS: ACTION OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE

The Behavioral & Social Sciences Review Committee has taken the following action:

1. Approve
2. Approve with Conditions
3. Disapprove

with regard to the employment of human subjects in the proposed research entitled: "Office Research on Students"

Alexander J. Smith
020 Wilce Ctr, 1873 Hilllkin Rd.

is listed as the principal investigator.

The conditions, if any, are attached and are signed by the committee chairperson and by the principal investigator. If disapproved, the reasons are attached and are signed by the committee chairperson.

It is the responsibility of the principal investigator to retain a copy of each signed consent form for at least four (4) years beyond the termination of the subject's participation in the proposed activity. Should the principal investigator leave the University, signed consent forms are to be transferred to the Human Subject Review Committee for the required retention period.

Date 17 June 1977 Signed

(Chairperson)

PA-025
Dear

This Office is cooperating in a doctoral dissertation research project designed to study moral judgement. The focus of this study is on how such judgements might relate to the discipline process. You are asked to participate in this study, which I have briefly described in the following paragraph.

The study is organized into two parts. Part one is a questionnaire entitled, "Opinions About Social Problems"; that questionnaire is attached. It asks for your opinions about several stories that illustrate social problems. Questions follow each story, and you are to rate and then rank the importance of these questions. Part two consists of a series of questions that are related to the discipline incident and to concepts that one might encounter during the discipline process. This second part will be administered in one of two ways--1) orally after the discipline interview is concluded, or 2) in written form, which will either be attached with this letter or which will be given to you after the discipline interview to be completed at home.

It is important to underscore the fact that your participation is voluntary for both parts of this study. These questionnaires are confidential and your identity will not be revealed in any publication, document, recording, computer data storage, or in any other way which relates to this research.

Your responses to items on these questionnaires will not be scored or interpreted until long after any discipline decision is made. Your answers, in other words, will not affect the discipline outcome. Your cooperation and assistance by participating in this study, though, may lead to improved judicial programming or to more effective individual response to those who may find themselves in a similar situation in the future. If you have any questions about this research, I or another staff member, will be happy to answer them during your interview. Your cooperation in this research endeavor will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,

Alexander P. Smith
Coordinator, Office of
Judicial Programs

cc:File
APPENDIX C

DISCIPLINE INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
Discipline Incident Questionnaire

NAME

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

This questionnaire is the second part of a study on the factors that contribute to discipline incidents and on the possible impact of the discipline process on individual students. Please answer every question as fully as possible.

1. How do you account for what happened?

2. Are there any other underlying factors involved? ______
   (If yes, describe.)

3. Who is responsible for what happened? ______
   Why?

4. In your own mind is there anything "wrong" with what you did?
   ______  Why do you say that?

5. What factors would you most like to have considered by the person or group that decides on what discipline action is appropriate? (Please state these below.)
   a)
   b)
   c)
   d)
   e)
6. What do you see as some of the consequences that resulted from your action?

7. What will prevent this from happening again?

8. In your own mind, what function do rules or regulations serve?

9. Do you consider the rule or regulation you have been charged with violating a fair one? __________ (Why or why not?)

10. Generally, how do you view other violations of rules or regulations of this type, as:

    ___ very serious
    ___ serious
    ___ not so serious
    ___ minor

    Why?

11. How do you evaluate your own violation of this particular rule? As: (check one)

    ___ very serious
    ___ serious
    ___ not so serious
    ___ minor

    Why?
12. Do you have any sense or feeling of obligation because of what happened? __________ (If yes, please describe what those are.)

13. What function do you see that punishment serves? (describe)

14. Do you believe that you should receive some sort of punishment or discipline? __________ Why?

15. What would you consider to be a just or fair way to resolve this matter and why?

16. A discipline decision would most likely fall into one of the following categories. Which do you consider most appropriate in your situation and why?

____ suspended or dismissed from school for a period of time
____ placed on probation for a specified period of time
____ receive a written letter of warning
____ make restitution and/or receive a monetary fine
____ no disciplinary action taken

State your reasons for the above choice:
17. How do you feel about what you have done?

18. In your own words, can you describe what you have learned as a result of all that has happened to you?

PLEASE CHECK EACH OF YOUR RESPONSES TO BE SURE THAT YOU HAVE ANSWERED EACH ONE AS COMPLETELY AND AS FULLY AS POSSIBLE.
APPENDIX D

DEFINING ISSUES TEST
OPINIONS ABOUT SOCIAL PROBLEMS

This questionnaire is aimed at understanding how people think about social problems. Different people often have different opinions about questions of right and wrong. There are no "right" answers in the way that there are right answers to math problems. We would like you to tell us what you think about several problem stories. The papers will be fed to a computer to find the average for the whole group, and no one will see your individual answers. Later, if you wish, there may be an opportunity to discuss some of these social problems.

Please give us the following information:

Name_____________________________________ female _____ male
Age_____ Class Standing_______ College _______________
Campus or Columbus Address__________________________

In this questionnaire you will be asked to give your opinions about several stories. Here is a story as an example:

"Frank Jones has been thinking about buying a car. He is married, has two small children and earns an average income. The car he buys will be his family's only car. It will be used mostly to get to work and drive around town, but sometimes for vacation trips also. In trying to decide what car to buy, Frank Jones realized that there were a lot of questions to consider. On the next page there is a list of some of these questions.

If you were Frank Jones, how important would each of these questions be in deciding what car to buy?"

Read the sample questions and responses for this example which appear on the next page. On the pages which follow the sample are six "problem stories", read each one and complete your responses to the questions that follow each story.
**Part A. (SAMPLE)**

On the left hand side of the page check one of the spaces by each question that could be considered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Great Much Importance</th>
<th>Some Importance</th>
<th>Little Importance</th>
<th>No Importance</th>
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</table>

1. Whether the car dealer was in the same block as where Frank lives.
2. Would a used car be more economical in the long run than a new car.
3. Whether the color was green, Frank's favorite color.
4. Whether the cubic inch displacement was at least 200.
5. Would a large, roomy car be better than a compact car.
6. Whether the front cornibilites were differential.

**PART B. (SAMPLE)**

From the list of questions above, select the most important one of the whole group. Put the number of the most important question on the top line below. Do likewise for your 2nd, 3rd, and 4th most important choices.

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<th>Most important</th>
<th>5</th>
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<tr>
<td>Second most important</td>
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<td>Third most important</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fourth most important</td>
<td>1</td>
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HEINZ AND THE DRUG

In Europe a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1000, which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and began to think about breaking into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should Heinz steal the drug? (Check one)

_____ Should steal it
_____ Can't decide
_____ Should not steal it
HEINZ STORY

On the left hand side of the page check one of the spaces by each question to indicate its importance.

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1. Whether a community's laws are going to be upheld.
2. Isn't it only natural for a loving husband to care so much for his wife that he'd steal?
3. Is Heinz willing to risk getting shot as a burglar or going to jail for the chance that stealing the drug might help?
4. Whether Heinz is a professional wrestler, or has considerable influence with professional wrestlers.
5. Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else.
6. Whether the druggist's rights to his invention have to be respected.
7. Whether the essence of living is more encompassing than the termination of dying, socially and individually.
8. What values are going to be the basis for governing how people act towards each other.
9. Whether the druggist is going to be allowed to hide behind a worthless law which only protects the rich anyhow.
10. Whether the law in this case is getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society.
11. Whether the druggist deserves to be robbed for being so greedy and cruel.
12. Would stealing in such a case bring about more total good for the whole society.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important
Second most important
Third most important
Fourth most important
At Harvard University a group of students, called the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) believe that the University should not have an army ROTC program. SDS students are against the war in Viet Nam, and the army training program helps send men to fight in Viet Nam. The SDS students demanded that Harvard end the army ROTC training program as a university course. This would mean that Harvard students could not get any training as part of their regular course work and not get credit for it towards their degrees.

Agreeing with the SDS students, the Harvard professors voted to end the ROTC program as a university course. But the President of the University stated that he wanted to keep the army program on campus as a course. The SDS students felt that the President was not going to pay attention to the faculty vote or to their demands.

So, one day last April, two hundred SDS students walked into the University's administration building, and told everyone else to get out. They said they were doing this to force Harvard to get rid of the army training program as a course.

Should the students have taken over the administration building?

(Check one)

___ Yes, they should take it over
___ Can't decide
___ No, they should not take it over
STUDENT TAKE-OVER

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1. Are the students doing this to really help other people or are they doing it just for kicks.
2. Do the students have any right to take over property that doesn’t belong to them?
3. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined and even expelled from school?
4. Would taking over the building in the long run benefit more people to a greater extent?
5. Whether the president stayed within the limits of his authority in ignoring the faculty vote.
6. Will the takeover anger the public and give all students a bad name.
7. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice.
8. Would allowing one student take-over encourage many other student take-overs.
9. Did the president bring this misunderstanding on himself by being so unreasonable and uncooperative.
10. Whether running the university ought to be in the hands of a few administrators or in the hands of all the people.
11. Are the students following principles which they believe are above the law.
12. Whether or not university decisions ought to be respected by students.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important _____
Second most important _____
Third most important _____
Fourth most important _____
A man had been sentenced to prison for 10 years. After one year, however, he escaped from prison, moved to a new area of the country, and took on the name of Thompson. For 8 years he worked hard, and gradually he saved enough money to buy his own business. He was fair to his customers, gave his employees top wages, and gave most of his own profits to charity. Then one day Mrs. Jones, an old neighbor, recognized him as the man who had escaped from prison 8 years before and whom the police had been looking for.

Should Mrs. Jones report Mr. Thompson to the police and have him sent back to prison? (check one)

____ Should report him
____ Can't decide
____ Should not report him
ESCAPED PRISONER

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1. Hasn't Mr. Thompson been good enough for such a long time to prove he isn't a bad person?

2. Everytime someone escapes punishment for a crime, doesn't that just encourage more crimes?

3. Wouldn't we be better off without prisons and the oppression of our legal system?

4. Has Mr. Thompson really paid his debt to society?

5. Would society be failing what Mr. Thompson should fairly expect?

6. What benefits would prisons be apart from society, especially for a charitable man?

7. How could anyone be so cruel and heartless as to send Mr. Thompson to prison?

8. Would it be fair to all the prisoners who has to serve out their full sentences if Mr. Thompson was let off?

9. Was Mrs. Jones a good friend of Thompson?

10. Wouldn't it be a citizen's duty to report an escaped criminal, regardless of the circumstances?

11. How would the will of the people and the public good best be served?

12. Would going to prison do any good for Mr. Thompson or protect anybody?

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important
Second most important
Third most important
Fourth most important
Fred, a senior in high school, wanted to publish a mimeographed newspaper for students so that he could express many of his opinions. He wanted to speak out against the war in Viet Nam and to speak out against some of the school’s rules, like the rule forbidding boys to wear long hair.

When Fred started his newspaper, he asked his principal for permission. The Principal said it would be all right if before every publication Fred would turn in all his articles for the principal’s approval. Fred agreed and turned in several articles for approval. The principal approved all of them and Fred published two issues of the paper in the next two weeks.

But the principal had not expected that Fred’s newspaper would receive so much attention. Students were so excited by the paper that they began to organize protests against the hair regulation and other school rules. Angry parents objected to Fred’s opinions. They phoned the principal telling him that the newspaper was unpatriotic and should not be published. As a result of the rising excitement, the principal ordered Fred to stop publishing. He gave as a reason that Fred’s activities were disruptive to the operation of the school.

Should the principal stop the newspaper? (Check one)

___ Should stop it
___ Can’t decide
___ Should not stop it
Is the principal more responsible to students or to parents?

Did the principal give his word that the newspaper could be published for a long time, or did he just promise to approve the newspaper one issue at a time?

Would the students start protesting even more if the principal stopped the newspaper?

When the welfare of the school is threatened, does the principal have the right to give orders to students?

Does the principal have the freedom of speech to say "no" in this case?

If the principal stopped the newspaper would he be preventing full discussion of important problems?

Whether the principal's order would make Fred lose faith in the principal.

Whether Fred was really loyal to his school and patriotic to his country.

What effect would stopping the paper have on the student's education in critical thinking and judgment?

Whether Fred was in any way violating the rights of others in publishing his own opinions.

Whether the principal should be influenced by some angry parents when it is the principal that knows best what is going on in the school.

Whether Fred was using the newspaper to stir up hatred and discontent.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

Most important
Second most important
Third most important
Fourth most important
Mr. Webster was the owner and manager of a gas station. He wanted to hire another mechanic to help him, but good mechanics were hard to find. The only person he found who seemed to be a good mechanic was Mr. Lee, but he was Chinese. While Mr. Webster himself didn't have anything against orientals, he was afraid to hire Mr. Lee because many of his customers didn't like orientals. His customers might take their business elsewhere if Mr. Lee was working in the gas station.

When Mr. Lee asked Mr. Webster if he could have the job, Mr. Webster said that he had already hired somebody else. But Mr. Webster really had not hired anybody, because he could not find anybody who was a good mechanic besides Mr. Lee.

What should Mr. Webster have done? (Check one)

___ Should have hired Mr. Lee
___ Can't decide
___ Should not have hired him
From the list of questions above, select the four most important:

1. Does the owner of a business have the right to make his own business decisions or not?
2. Whether there is a law that forbids racial discrimination in hiring for jobs.
3. Whether Mr. Webster is prejudiced against orientals himself or whether he means nothing personal in refusing the job.
4. Whether hiring a good mechanic or paying attention to his customers' wishes would be best for his business.
5. What individual differences ought to be relevant in deciding how society's roles are filled?
6. Whether the greedy and competitive capitalists system ought to be completely abandoned.
7. Do a majority of people in Mr. Webster's society feel like his customers or a majority against prejudice?
8. Whether hiring capable men like Mr. Lee would use talents that would otherwise be lost to society.
9. Would refusing the job to Mr. Lee be consistent with Mr. Webster's own moral beliefs?
10. Could Mr. Webster be so hard-hearted as to refuse the job, knowing how much it means to Mr. Lee?
11. Whether the Christian commandment to love your fellow man applies to this case.
12. If someone's in need, shouldn't he be helped regardless of what you get back from him?
A lady was dying of cancer which could not be cured and she had only about six months to live. She was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose of pain-killer like morphine would make her die sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her enough morphine to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway.

What should the doctor do? (Check One)

_____ He should give the lady an overdose that will make her die
_____ Can't decide
_____ Should not give the overdose
DOCTOR

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1. Whether the woman's family is in favor of giving her the overdose or not.
2. Is the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody else if giving an overdose would be the same as killing her.
3. Whether people would be much better off without society regimenting their lives and even their deaths.
4. Whether the doctor could make it appear like an accident.
5. Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don't want to live.
6. What is the value of death prior to society's perspective on personal values.
7. Whether the doctor has sympathy for the woman's suffering or cares more about what society might think.
8. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation.
9. Whether only God should decide when a person's life should end.
10. What values the doctor has set for himself in his own personal code of behavior.
11. Can society afford to let everybody end their lives when they want to.
12. Can society allow suicides or mercy killings and still protect the lives of individuals who want to live.

From the list of questions above, select the four most important

- Most important
- Second most important
- Third most important
- Fourth most important
APPENDIX E

STUDENT CONSENT FORM
I consent to serve as a subject in the research investigation entitled: "Developmental Issues and Themes in the Discipline Setting—Suggestions for Educational Practice (A Study of Moral Develop of College Students in Trouble)".

The nature and general purpose of the research procedure have been explained to me. This research is to be performed by or under the direction of Mr. Lex Smith, who is authorized to use the services of others in the performance of the research.

I also consent to the release from my educational records maintained in the Office of Records and in my College Office files my ACT scores, my current grade point average, and my estimated family income as reported by me at the time I entered college.

I understand that any further inquiries I make concerning this procedure will be answered. I understand my identity will not be revealed in any publication, document, recording, video-tape, photograph, computer data storage, or in any other way which relates to this research. Finally, I understand that I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue participation at any time.

Signed ____________________________
(Subject)

Date ____________________________ A.M.

Time ____________________________ P.M.

Interviewer
APPENDIX F

CODING SHEETS FOR THE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
### GENERAL CODING SHEET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Card Col.</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Variables</th>
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<td>3-5</td>
<td>8-10</td>
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</table>

1. Case # (2 digit #) 01-5X

2. Response designation—W=written; T=taped; or W(1) T(2)

3. Sex — M=1; F=2

4. Race — White (1) Negro (2) Other or Unknown (3)

5. Age at last birthday (Exact Value)

6. Class Rank — Fresh./Soph. = 1; Jr./Sr. = 2; Grad. = 3

7. College Code—use Univ. designation for college code (if use, Code numerically)

8. Father’s/Head of Household Occupation: enter SES code: _________or Code as: 1=low; 2=med.; 3=high (Exact Value)

9. Family Income Level Code
   
   (0=less than $3000; 1=3-5999
   2=6-7499; 3=75-8900
   4=9-11,999; 5=12-14999
   6=15-19,999; 7=$20,000 and over
   0=Consider to be Confidential
   9=Do not know or no answer)

   Scored: 1=low (0-3)
   2=med. (4-5)
   3=high (5-7)

10. Act Score: _______ Code:

11. Category of Violation

   Code: (1) academic misconduct
   (2) theft/destruction of property
   (3) person related (injury to, hazing, etc.)
   (4) drugs
   (5) general misuse of documents (forgery, altered ID, etc.)
   (6) Other
12. P score (3 decimal places) ____________________
13. Consistency Factor (1) M>1.0 (2) OK (3) Problem
14. Stage of exceptional usage__________
15. Stage of highest substantial usage__________
Scoring System #2

Questions 1 and 2. How do you account for what happened? Are there any other underlying factors?

1. Difficulty in interpreting or understanding question (e.g., asks to have repeated or further clarification)
   _______yes _______no

2. Response represents:
   _____a) a descriptive or narrative explanation of events only
   _____b) analysis or explanation of why incident occurred or why caught

3. Frame of reference:
   a) Locus of control
      _______internal _______external
   b) On degree of control over incident or events
      _____spontaneous or spur of moment
      _____not intentional (did not intend for it to happen)
      _____deliberate or intentional to obtain an objective or goal

4. Categories of justification or judgement given in terms of:
   _____a) reaction to pressure, personal problem, or emotional feeling
   _____b) influence of others
   _____c) under influence of alcohol or drugs
   _____d) personal flaw (e.g., negligent, indecisive, poor judgement)
   _____e) lack of information (didn't know rules, or how serious this was considered)
   _____f) reference to consequences or getting caught
   _____g) others

5. _______# of distinctly different categories used

6. Sophistication or qualitative level of reasoning used
   _______low _______medium _______high
Question #3. "Who is responsible for what happened? Why?"

1. Personal responsibility avoided, not acknowledged, or put off on someone else.
   - a) Behavior seen as spur of moment, impulse or just one of those things.
   - b) In group incident, responsibility pawned off more on others, and does not see self as responsible for own part in it; or finds someone else to attribute responsibility or fault to.

2. Personal responsibility accepted, but within different levels of direct responsibility.
   - a) Responsible because that is the way it is supposed to be or should be ("you are supposed to be responsible for your behavior").
   - b) Responsible because at fault, to blame, irresponsible, shouldn't have done it, I should have thought (person sort of backs into or more passively accepts responsibility).
   - c) Responsible, but qualify it to reflect that influenced by others, not completely in control).
   - d) Responsible, because did it ("stole book", "I did it", but no elaboration.)
   - e) Responsible, put self clearly and emphatically in charge of own behavior or circumstances leading up to incident.

3. # of different levels of responsibility expressed:
Scotin? System #2

Case #

Question #4 In your own mind is there anything wrong with what you did?

A) Response Content Yes (1); No (2); Other (3)

B) Right/Wrong Defined by

1. Simple acknowledgement

Type I Simple acknowledgement. ("It was wrong." "It wasn't right.")

Type II Committed act. ("I did it." "I stole book.")

Type III Labels act, which by definition then makes it wrong. ("Lying is wrong." "Cheating is wrong.")

Type IV But differentiates degree

qualified (value of property)

intent

2. Reference to Law or Rule.

Type I - Without elaboration ("It is against the law.")

Type II - Elaborates or see's law as instrumental.

3. Reference to personal faults or not meeting own expectations. ("It was a stupid thing to do." "I should have known better.")

4. Personal discomfort. ("It embarrassed me." "I'm ashamed.")

5. Acknowledge own rights or lack of them, but stops short of specifying rights for others. ("I didn't have a right to take it.")

6. Sees consequences to others:

Type I - direct effect on someone else ("Hurt another person." "It was a hazard.")

Type II - Relationship between people ("Took unfair advantage.")

Type III - Generalize from specific to what would happen if everyone did it.

7. general principles

8. relative or personal standard. ("It depends." "I enjoy it.") prefers to be pinned down.

9. Other.

C) # of different categories used.
Question #5. What factors would you...like to have considered...on what
disciplinary action is appropriate?

A. General Frame of Reference:

______1. What they did. The focus is on act—evaluation or
consequence of acts:

______a) Act did/did not affect others.
______b) Evaluation of seriousness

1) damage, amount of loss, property
    recovered, etc.

2) Norms of what others do.

______c) Other:

______2. Why it happened:

______a) Result of some emotion, feeling, pressure,
    external influence

______b) achieve some end or goal—either positive or
    negative (get money, pass course, etc.)

______c) Other:

______3. Personal perspective (evaluate the individual based on):

______a) General appraisal of person or character
    (academic record, 1st offense, good person,
    honest, etc.)

______b) Intent

______c) That know's right from wrong

______d) General feelings, usually apologetic (I'm sorry,
    It was stupid, I learned a lesson, It won't
    happen again.)

______e) Cooperated, made restitution

______f) Other:
4. Effect or consequences of imposing punishment on:
   a) goals, education
   b) already being punished or going through court
   c) Other:
Question #6. What do you see as Consequences...?

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<th>Rating Sheet</th>
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A. Consequences are not acknowledged or elaborated on.
   1. leaves blank or sees no consequence
   2. argues against a consequence
   3. "getting caught"
   4. "it depends", or "that is not for me to say"

B. Avoid repetition ("be more careful", "won't do that again", "to think more next time")

C. Consequences are to self (negative/punishment)
   1. Externally imposed
      a) immediate (disciplined, fail course, inconvenience)
      b) longer range (job, graduation)
   2. Self-imposed (feel guilty, depressed, embarrassed)

D. Perceptual/Cognitive/Behavioral reorganization or change
   1. Re-evaluates seriousness of act
   2. Personal learning, attitude change, to do something different

E. General affect of getting caught on others ("It hasn't been that loud since", "sensationalism")

F. Reference to Right/Wrong (or a moral statement)

G. Affect of act on others

H. Other:

# of different categories used:______
Rating Sheet

Question #7. What will prevent this from happening again?

1. Those who are unsure, don't know (may offer some other ideas, but seem non-committal).

i. Consequences of getting caught (punishment, bad feelings, don't want to go through that, etc.).

3. Look to self to prevent (internal orientation).
   a) "Controllers" ("me", "myself", "will power", "I won't let that happen", emphasis clearly on self, but little elaboration).
   b) "Knowers", know
      1) Rules and policies ("now, I know the rules", "now I understand", "knowledge of consequences").
      2) Right/Wrong ("I know it was wrong").
   c) "Changers"
      1) "changes behavior", "changes attitude", "thinks more", "drinks less" (generally take corrective, positive action, that also seems to speak to cure problem).
      2) "Be more careful", "watch myself" (generally seen to focus on avoiding problem, rather than actively confronting).

4. Look to change in environment, or setting to prevent (external orientation).

5. Other:

6. Number of different categories used.
Rating Sheet

Scoring System #3

Question #8. What function do rules serve?

A. No function expressed or no statement about why.
   1. No function.
   2. Can't say, it depends.
   3. Recognize existence of rules or necessity of, but can't say why (must have, must obey, must carry out will of others).

B. Do state some function.
   1. Rules do something to you, or consequences of breaking (get you kicked out).
   2. Guides (most use this word in statement, but get idea that rules aren't quite so rigid).
      a) to self (on how to behave or what is right or wrong).
      b) to others (to keep order, to keep things running smoothly).
   3. Protective
      a) self or property.
      b) rights of others, to prevent infringement on.
   4. Controlling
      a) prevent chaos, to keep order, to regulate (here get a sense that more rigid or set purpose).
      b) to make things work better, to keep relationships between people in tact (still a general idea of keeping things controlled, but less rigid and much more relationship order).
   5. Rules can't be changed or worked with (here rules don't seem to have a function directly—they don't act on people, people act on them).
   6. Other (non-scorable)
   7. # of different functions expressed.
Question #9 Do you consider the rule you were charged with violating a fair one?

1. Content of response: _______yes; _______no; _______other

2. Hard time giving a reason ("difficult to say", "it depends")

**Frames of Reference Used:**

A. Focus is on behavior or act to judge fairness, or on application of rule.

1. Level I - Fair because "did it", rule violated but no elaboration.

2. Level II - Evaluate what happened, but suggest that application or enforcement of the rule be qualified in some way. Responses in this category look at situation or degree of involvement, but rule itself seen as a fair one.

   a) direct application of rule to student in this situation
   b) intent, degree of seriousness, amount of loss or damage, why it happened, suggestions that the issue is not all black or white.
   c) careful about punishment or sanction. Don't want a statement that rule is fair to open door to any sanction.
   d) other

3. Level III - Evaluate what happened and suggest standards to evaluate.

   a) reference to external referent — "it's against the law, it's illegal, broke law, or if person in authority states it's fair.
   b) behavior evaluated in terms of right or wrong
   c) statement acknowledging that could have behaved differently
   d) evaluate incident in terms of the effect on others and whether it infringes or not on the rights of others (e.g. "took something that was not mine")

4. Other (not classified but focus still generally on evaluating act.

B. Focus is on evaluating the rule and not just the behavior.
Data Scored

1. Level I - Have to have rules, must enforce rules—unquestioned acceptance of rules without elaboration (i.e., if break a rule you must be punished, authority made rule, if didn't have rule everyone would do it)

2. Level II - Rule is fair, but unable to say why. (response implies an intuitive recognition about the fairness, but student unable to articulate a reason)

3. Level III - Look at purpose of rule, usually purpose such as to protect or regulate are stated.

4. Level IV - Rule is evaluated in terms of some hierarchy of personal values which serves as a basis for evaluation.

C. Non-scorable responses:

Frequency of Responses

Enter # of responses made — # of different scorable responses

Enter # of different frames of reference used (0,1,2, or 3)
Rating Sheet

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Question #10. Generally, how do you view other violations...?

_____1. Rating: _____very serious _____serious _____not so serious
_________minor _____no rating

_____2. Ability to generalize:

____ a) yes (offers criteria) _____b) yes, ("But it all depends")
____ c) no (can't answer or won't answer) _____d) no (responded only to this violation)

_____3. Criteria used to Judge:

____ a) Absolute or fixed standards

1. Rules or laws ("if break rule—that's serious")
2. All rules must be enforced
3. Process ("if goes to a Board it must be serious")
4. Set reference to specific rule or act (e.g., pot smoking is minor")

____ b) Relative, but no criteria given ("It depends on situation")

____ c) Relative (seems to require an evaluation of each incident) based on these criteria:

1. intent, reasons
2. value attached
3. premeditated
4. norms (others do or think)
5. affect or consequences to others
6. affect on person ("character")
7. unelaborated assessment of Right/Wrong
8. Other:
(Question #10 continued) -2-  

Cise #

___d) Relative hierarchy of values, rule violations, or principles are established that are applied to judge such as:

___4. Number of different evaluative criteria selected___.
2nd Revision

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Case #

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Question #11. How do you evaluate your own violation?

1. Rating

   ____ Very Serious   ____ Serious   ____ Not So Serious
   ____ Minor

2. Groupings of types of violations:

   A) Academic Misconduct
   B) Theft/destruction of property
   C) Against person (includes threat and hazing)
   D) Drugs
   E) Misuse of documents or phones
   F) Other

3. Able to articulate a reason why answered way did?

   ____ Yes   ____ No (includes very vague non-differentiated response and single reference to act—“I did it”)

4. Criteria for evaluation are:

   ____ A) Specific reference to rules/laws (“law was broken and that is serious”) or act or concept (“stealing is serious”) as fixed standard

   ____ B) Consequences to self:

   ____ C) Evaluation of seriousness of act based on such relative standards as:
       1. Intent; extent of loss/damage
       2. Value
       3. Affect on others
       4. Prior incidents/record
       5. Frequency of incident
       6. Other

   ____ D) Conflict with self-concept

   ____ E) Implicit standard or knowledge of right/wrong

   ____ F) How judged by others (normative)
(Question #11 continued) -2-  

Case #

G) General reference to principles or some hierarchy of rules or values (may overlap some of above categories, distinction is degree to which these seem to be general that might transcend this situation and also not so absolute as 4A):  

5. Number of evaluation criteria selected ________.
Question #12. Do you have any sense or feeling of obligation?

A. Content of responses is:

1) No

2) Yes (no elaboration)

3) Yes (general acknowledge because person sees a personal wrong-doing—"broke law", "my fault", it was wrong)

4) Yes (But question interpreted as "feeling"—feels guilty, feels better)

5) Yes (with elaboration) as follows:

a) Personal obligation that is self-oriented, under self-control and internally directed

1. to self (no elaboration)

2. prove something to self

3. accept consequences/punishment (comes across as passive acceptance)

4. avoid repetition ("to behave", "to do right", "not to do again")

5. understanding (why, seriousness)

6. accept responsibility

7. to be cooperative

8. other:

b) Personal obligation that self must carry out, but more externally or other oriented

1. others (not elaborated)

2. general idea to make things right, to rectify what happened, to bring things into balance ("restitution", "apology", "make it up to others")
(Question #12 Continued)  

---  

3. prevent the same thing from happening to others  
4. prove something to others, to Board  

B. How many ways obligation expressed?  

---
Question #13 What function do you see that punishment serves?

1. Can't see or describe any function
   a) generally states that can't see any function
   b) can't see a function in the student's particular situation (e.g. "no need for punishment", has a function but can't describe or articulate it)
   c) ancillary or retribution for breaking a rule (but again punishment is not described as having any specific function)

2. Relative — it depends on the situation

3. Function specific only to the student's situation (in this situation punishment serves to ...)

4. Student suggests one or more of following functions:
   a) deterrence/prevention
   b) reminder (about consequences, that what did was wrong, to make a person aware of what did or to think about incident)
   c) power to force or teach a person something, it does something to the person, teaches a lesson
   d) compensate or to make up in sense of restitution
   e) example to others
   f) regulating/protection
   g) helping/rehabilitative
   h) abstract conceptions about nature of punishment, such as making a distinction between retributive and distributive functions of punishment
   i) others

5. # of functions mentioned (in 2, 3 or 4)
Question #14. Do you believe you should receive some sort of punishment?

A. Content response to the question scored as:
   1. Yes
   2. Yes, but not strict
   3. No
   4. Other (It depends, I don't know)

B. No reason given

C. Left to discretion of person in authority

D. Reasons for punishment:
   1. Punishment is result of breaking rule or rule violation
      a) Level I - for breaking rule, doing something wrong, lying, etc. (1st person)
      b) Level II - more generally reported as outcome for anyone violating
   2. Punishment has an outcome, it will do something to the person ("teach a lesson", "reminder")
   3. Punish myself if you didn't
   4. Other

E. Reason(s) for no punishment or limiting punishment
   1. Already have or are receiving punishment
      a) External - through Court, etc.
      b) Self-punishment
   2. Personal evaluation of seriousness of incident (and whether consider it wrong)
3. Personal evaluation of self and motivation
   a) intent (not intentional, mistake)
   b) recognition that it was wrong
   c) won't happen again
   d) co-operated
   e) other

4. Purpose punishment would serve

5. Other

F.  # of different reasons given
Rating Sheet

2nd Revision

Question #15. What would you consider to be a just...way to resolve this?

1. Those who do not or will not make a specific statement on what is fair.
   a) Don't know or leave blank.
   b) Don't know (eventually suggest some outcome, but seem to have trouble responding)
   c) Those willing to leave to someone else to decide (i.e., the Courts, Board, person in authority).

2. What is fair is no sanction or punishment (generally nothing suggested as alternative, punishment and its absence used as frame of reference). Reasons:
   a) not necessary, situation doesn't warrant it.
   b) learned a lesson.
   c) already punished.
   d) other:

3. It is fair; to receive some punishment, as long as not too harsh or beyond a specified limit.

4. Fair if I compensate or apologize in some way for what I did.

5. Punishment is a specific punishment or outcome.
   a) no reason given as to why.
   b) because wrong, help to learn that wrong, to pay for what I did;
   c) to deter, enforce behavior, hold over head.
   d) other:

6. Fair is to help person to realize consequences or what was wrong.

7. Fair is to just make a record.

8. Suggest some criteria or procedure for determining what is fair.
Question #16: Asked to select appropriate sanction and why.

A. Sanction Selected:

1) Suspension
2) Probation or Warning
3) Restitution/Fine
4) No Action
5) Other:

B. A sanction selected, but gives no reasons

C. The following categories or perspectives are offered in support of a sanction:

1. Get the idea or suggestion that a sanction is the inevitable result of wrong-doing, or to leave in hands of a person in authority (there is no questioning of idea that a sanction should be imposed or any criteria for selecting sanction.

2. To make up for something that the person did. (Similar to #1 above but a reason is given, although still an unquestioning attitude is present)

3. Effort to assess what effect or outcome of sanction will be on self:
   a) No difference—because learned a lesson, won't do it again (get a generally feeling that person doesn't believe that a sanction is necessary)
   b) As a reminder, to help person keep nose clean or stay out of trouble
   c) Direct and probably punitive or negative affect that sanction will have on person
   d) Degree to which a sanction will help/not help a person

4. Reference to fact that already has been punished or will be receiving punishment, such as through the court

5. Personal criteria and involvement: (self-assessment)
   a) Intent
   b) Attitude—cooperated, turned self in
   c) Last offense


7. Criteria of University or authority to be met.

8. Other:
(Page #2, question #16, Continued)

D. # of different response categories used (under C)

E. # of different perspectives used (under C)
Rating Sheet
3rd Revision

Question # 17  How do you feel about what you have done?

_____ 1. Report "no feelings" or make no response.

_____ 2. Responses that reflect some affective feelings
   a) feelings that the student has about himself often those commonly
      associated with those of "conscience" or that have some moral
      overtones (e.g. "I'm ashamed or embarrassed","I feel bad","I feel
      guilty")
   b) more generally affect statements (e.g. "I feel sad, depressed, angry,
      disappointed, lousy, etc.")

_____ 3. Responses that refer to right or to wrong (e.g. I feel that it was wrong or
       that it wasn't right.)

_____ 4. Responses that seem to be basically descriptive or evaluative about act
       and person's role (self-evaluation)
   a) Level I - put-down statements about his or her involvement or character
      ("It was stupid", "it was dumb", "it was ignorant", "it was immature")
   b) Level II - general statement about act or behavior and the student's
      role (e.g. "wish it hadn't happened","didn't intend to do it","I
      regret doing it", "it didn't get me anywhere", I hope I can overcome it".)
   c) Other

_____ 5. Effect of act on self

_____ 6. Effect or consequences on others (e.g. hurt others, a victimless crime

    # of different scorable responses made
Question #18. "...What have you learned...?"

1. Indicates that they didn't learn anything.

2. Perspective focuses on consequences—what happens to self when break a rule (also it won't happen again, and learned a lesson)
   a) Level I - focuse on getting caught, breaking a rule and what that means
   b) Level II - "wish it hadn't happened, won't do it again, learned a lesson"

3. Perspective that focuses on rules, regulations and authority
   a) Level I - Rules/authority are to be respected, obeyed, or not to be broken (an unquestioned adherence is implied)
   b) Level II - to be aware of rules, to learn something about rules (don't get sense of strict adherence)
   c) Level III - still have a rule perspective, but response indicates the purpose or function of rule

4. Perspective that focuses on learning something about the judicial system or the University.

5. Perspective focuses on behavior and what might have been done differently at time or in future to avoid reoccurrence (e.g., "to be more careful, to not drink, get permission, not smoke pot, control self, etc.)

6. Perspective on consequences of behavior for others.

7. Perspective is self and personal learning. Shows some personal insight or a general change in attitude or self, but more general than a change just to keep it from happening again.
   a) Level I - Learn something about others (e.g., who friends are, people care)
   b) Level II - self insight, personal learning, attitude change

8. Other: (miscellaneous, non-categorized)
   # of different response categories used.
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