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VISCOUNT GLADSTONE AND BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH AFRICA 1910-1914

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Carol Anne Sainey, B.S. Ed., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1978

Reading Committee:  
Dr. Philip Poirier  
Dr. Clayton Roberts  
Dr. Charles Morley

Approved By

Department of History
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VITA

October 16, 1942 . . . .  Born - Lancaster, Ohio
1965 . . . . . . . . . .  B.S.Ed., Ohio University, Athens, Ohio
1967 . . . . . . . . . .  M.A., The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio
1970-1975 . . . . . .  Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Modern Britain, 1715 to the Present

Tudor and Stuart Britain, Professor R. Clayton Roberts

Modern Russia, Professor Charles Morley

Medieval England, Professor Franklin Pegues
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INTRODUCTION

The unification of South Africa in 1910 was the creation of the South Africans and the pride of the British who saw it as the logical outcome of their sensible and generous colonial policy. In fact British policy in South Africa over the previous century had been highly inconsistent and until this point only moderately successful. British influence in southern Africa began in the Cape in the early nineteenth century and the retention of the Cape for its strategic importance was the one consistent factor in British South African policy. Various British governments had tried to improve the position of the native population with only limited success in the Cape Colony, to reduce expenditures on and responsibility for South Africa's internal problems, to encourage federation of the various political entities and at the beginning of the twentieth century to ensure British supremacy in southern Africa.

The Boer War ensured British supremacy, but the succeeding Liberal Government preferred to ensure continued
British influence by restoring self-government and by encouraging unification. At the same time the British hoped to reduce the expense that a continued presence in South Africa would entail while maintaining the strategic importance of the Cape to the rest of the Empire by the continued loyalty of the South Africans. The British had never found a solution to South Africa's complex racial problems and with Union they were relieved of the responsibility. The British Government of 1910 felt that the South Africans should be allowed to find their own solution, hopefully a just and workable one, since they were the ones who would have to live with it. In 1910 the various goals of British policy were realized with the conciliation of the two white races, committed through unification to cooperation with and loyalty to the Empire. The price was white supremacy.

This paper examines British policy towards South Africa in the light of events and developments in the Union from 1910 until the outbreak of the First World War when that policy faced its first serious test. It centers on the administration of Herbert Gladstone, the first Governor General, and how he exercised his influence as the official and personal connection between Great Britain and South Africa.
CHAPTER ONE

The Union

The Treaty of Vereeniging of May 31, 1902 marked the end of the Boer War- a war that had cost the British 250 million pounds, over 44,000 casualties, and a serious loss of prestige and morale. It had taken the British three and a half years and what many considered barbaric methods to defeat the numerically much weaker Boer forces which, though they aroused much sympathy in Europe and America, received no outside aid. As A.P. Thornton points out the Transvaal and the Orange Free State were the last areas added to the British Empire "that were consciously fought for by a majority of the nation." After 1902 the Imperial idea suffered from a lack of moral and emotional content. Imperial policy, especially after the Liberal victory of 1906, was until 1914 about as shadowy and vague as in the 1870's.  

After the war the British were faced with the almost equally troublesome problem of transforming South Africa

2 Ibid., p. 149.
into a lasting and loyal possession. Native Africans and other non-Europeans outnumbered Europeans five to one, and Afrikaner Dutch outnumbered English in all the provinces except Natal. One Englishman who thought he knew what the future of South Africa should be was Alfred Milner. Made High Commissioner in 1897, he combined the office with that of Governor General of Transvaal and of the Orange River Colony, which he administered as crown colonies until 1905. In London he had the support of the Colonial Office and in South Africa of his kindergarten—a group of young Oxford graduates whom he appointed to high administrative positions. Milner envisioned an eventually self-governing white community with a British electoral majority. This would be made possible by large scale immigration from Britain and a denationalized Afrikaner minority. To this end he had fought for the provisions in the Treaty of Vereeniging which granted less than equal status to the Dutch language, specified no date for granting self-government, and postponed until after self-government the question of granting the franchise to the natives.

Milner's plans, however, were not fulfilled. Britons did not come in any great numbers to the cities and still

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3 For biographical information on Milner and other persons mentioned in this work consult the Appendix.
fewer came to settle on the land. Nor were the Afrikaners
denationalized. The war itself, the struggle against heavy
odds and the bitter events of the war's last year had
united the Afrikaners as never before. Proudly convinced
their cause had been just, they were determined not to
lose their cultural identity even though for the time
being they had lost their political autonomy. Writers and
journalists were using the Afrikaner language. Former Boer
generals were becoming politicians forming the Het Volk
(The People) Party in Transvaal, and the Orangia Unie in
the Orange Colony. Both advocated full self-government.

Louis Botha and Jan Christian Smuts, founders of the
Het Volk Party, were typical of the new Afrikaner politi-
cians. In 1906 Botha, a war hero and progressive farmer,
became the prime minister of Transvaal. Born in 1862, he
received almost no formal education. As a young man he
became a successful sheep farmer in Zululand and was
involved in politics there for a time during the inter-
tribal wars. He was one of the founders of the short-lived
New Republic. After its collapse, he went to the Trans-
vaal where he was elected to the Volksrand in 1898. He
tended towards those who wished to come to terms with the

5 The New Republic was established in 1894 in terri-
tory ceded by the Zulus to a group of Boers. In 1897 it became part of the South African Republic.
uitlanders. During the war he enjoyed rapid promotion and in 1900 became the Commanding General of the Transvaal Forces. In 1902 he took part in the arrangements that led to the peace conference and was one of the signers of the treaty. After the war Botha decided to make the best of the situation and with his friend Smuts began to work for the restoration of self-government to the Transvaal and the reconciliation of the two white races.

Smuts, Botha's best friend and political alter ego, was born in 1870. Unlike Botha, he had a brilliant college career first in South Africa and later at Cambridge. Settling in the Cape Colony in 1895, he combined journalism with politics. A supporter of Rhodes until the Jameson Raid, he moved to the South African Republic in 1897 and became State Attorney in 1898. He too joined the war effort and became an expert in guerilla warfare. Like Botha he urged peace in 1902 as the only realistic policy. These two complemented each other in many ways. Botha was the outgoing persuasive talker close to the Afrikaner farmers, while Smuts was the intellectual and philosopher with wide contacts in Great Britain as well as South Africa.

In 1905 Milner was replaced by Lord Selborne who, though he shared many of Milner's views and was assisted by the Kindergarten, had neither Milner's intelligence nor his dogmatic zeal. The first steps toward the
restoration of self-government were taken in 1905. The Lyttleton Constitution's grant to the Transvaal of representative but not responsible government was not enough for the Afrikaners nor for Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the leader of the British Liberal Party. He had been publicly advocating the wisdom and necessity of restoring self-government since 1900.\(^6\)

When a rejuvenated Liberal Party won its great victory at the polls in 1906, Campbell-Bannerman as prime minister had to decide whether to continue with the Lyttleton Constitution or to make a complete break with the Conservatives' South Africa policy. Selborne advised continuity and warned against such a "leap in the dark" as complete self-government. There were also warning voices at the Colonial Office. But the new Under-secretary for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, was not among them. Both he and Grey, the foreign secretary, encouraged Campbell-Bannerman to make an immediate grant of responsible government.\(^7\)

Smuts went to London in 1906 to plead his cause. The Afrikaners could not have chosen more wisely, and in spite of Selborne's warning that he was "an absolutely irreconcilable Afrikander Republican," Smuts made a most favorable


\(^7\) Ibid., p. 478.
impression on Campbell-Bannerman in offering Britain the
dreadful stigma of the Boers in exchange for their liberty. Smuts in turn, was greatly impressed by his meetings with
Campbell-Bannerman, and both he and Botha revered his
memory for the rest of their lives. Smuts always kept a
portrait of Campbell-Bannerman over his desk in his Trans-
vaal farmhouse. There was nothing really new about Campbell-Bannerman's
South Africa policy; it was basically the same one the
Liberals had advocated for their white-populated colonies
for the past half century. Self-government was granted to
Transvaal in 1906 and the Orange Free State in 1907. Milner
thought this was "sheer lunacy" and lamented that all he
had done to "make a good job of South Africa for the Brit-
ish people" was now rendered hopeless. Campbell-Bannerman
preferred to regard it as an act of faith.

Selborne had his own plan to ensure British political
and numerical supremacy in South Africa through the unifi-
cation of the four self-governing colonies. Union would
help stabilize the economy and thus make the country more
appealing to British immigrants. Selborne held talks with

8 Wilson, op. cit., p. 478-79.
9 Sir Keith Hancock, Smuts, vol. I (Cambridge,
the Kindergarten, and Lionel Curtis, one of the most gifted of that group, drafted a memorandum on unification later issued under Selborne's name. Economic rivalries would continue to produce inter-colonial disputes which the Imperial Government would have to settle. Union would allow white South Africans to formulate a common native policy, to become more secure against native uprisings and to secure a plentiful labour supply.\footnote{Wilson and Thompson, op. cit., p. 347.} This argument was calculated to appeal alike to the British imperialists and to what John Strachey calls the "second layer of imperialism" in South Africa, namely that of the Afrikaner imperialists in their exploitation of the native Africans.\footnote{John Strachey, The End of Empire (New York, Random House, 1960), p. 92-93.}

By 1908 the movement among Afrikaners for the unification had gained momentum and the role of the imperialists had become secondary. At an inter-colonial conference in May 1908 to settle railway and customs disputes, it was decided to hold a convention of representatives from the four colonies to draw up a constitution for a united South Africa. The thirty delegates to this National Convention, the leading British and Afrikaner politicians in South Africa, met from October 1908 to February 1909 first in Durban, later in Cape Town. A constitution on which they
unanimously agreed was submitted to the four colonial parliaments for amendments. In May 1909 the reassembled Convention reconsidered and accepted the amended constitution, again unanimously. The four parliaments gave their final approval, and in Natal it was submitted to a popular referendum. Representatives of the four colonies then went to London to confer with Lord Crewe, the Colonial Secretary. In the summer of 1909 the British Government introduced to Parliament the South Africa Bill, essentially as drafted by the National Convention. The few changes made by the Colonial Office had been accepted by the South African delegates to London.13

The movement for unification was not only a victory for Selborne and his fellow Imperialists, or so they thought; it was also a victory for the conciliation policy of Botha and Smuts. Conciliation was first of all to reconcile the Afrikaners to each other—those who had wanted to continue the war, the "bitter-enders," with those who had wanted peace, the "hands-uppers." In addition, Dutch and British Transvaalers were to be reconciled since their welfare now depended on cooperation. Furthermore, the four colonies

were to be reconciled by forming a Union of South Africa. Finally the conciliation policy aimed at resolving the relations between South Africa and Great Britain by securing self-government for South Africa within the Empire.¹⁴ Not all Afrikaners were at first as convinced of the soundness of conciliation as Botha and Smuts. Some feared it might destroy Afrikaner economic and cultural interests. However, with the restoration of self-government, the prospect of unification and the guarantee of equality for the English and Dutch languages, they began to see the chance to work through the system to protect their interests. Only a few people pointed out that conciliation was to be between the white races only and did not include South Africa's millions of non-Europeans.¹⁵ But the natives, Coloureds and Indians were no immediate threat to conciliation. They had no legal means to challenge it and their champions were few.

The South Africa Bill which the British Parliament began to debate in July 1909 provided for white supremacy and the virtual political exclusion of the non-European population of South Africa. Only in the Cape, where the

¹⁴ Wilson and Thompson, op. cit., p. 341.
¹⁵ The population of South Africa according to the 1911 census was as follows: Whites- 1,276,242; Natives- 4,019,006; Coloureds (a mixed population of partly European descent)- 525,943; Asiatics- 152,203 for a total of nearly six million. Thompson, Unification of South Africa, p. 486.
privilege had existed for fifty-five years, could the natives and Coloureds secure the vote by meeting property and literacy requirements. About 22,000 were on the rolls in 1909. Transvaal and the Orange Free State had absolute colour bars on political rights, and Natal, which in theory had a native franchise, in effect had a colour bar since about only 200 natives were registered voters. This was the situation that had existed in the four colonies and was simply to be carried over into the Union with the added provisions that the Cape franchise could be abolished by a two-thirds majority of both Houses of the Union Parliament sitting together on a third reading and that the native franchise could be extended outside the Cape by a simple majority in Parliament. While all members of Parliament were to be of European descent, four of the eight appointed senators were to be chosen for their acquaintance with and experience of "the reasonable wants and wishes of the coloured races of South Africa." 16

Thus the franchise question had been fairly well formulated in the four colonies and there was no great desire to change it with Union. With the restoration of responsible government in 1906, Britain had made no stipulations regarding the franchise question. The reason given was Article 8 of the Treaty of Vereeniging which

16 Wilson and Thompson, op. cit., p. 356.
stated that the question of granting the franchise to the natives would not be decided until after the introduction of self-government. This, of course, need not have prevented the British from asking for guarantees of political rights for the Coloureds and the Asiatics, since they were not mentioned in the Treaty, but they did not. If the British were not going to insist on political rights for non-Europeans while the Free State and Transvaal were still under their direct authority, and their not doing so certainly made conciliation easier, they were even less likely to interfere once they had granted self-government. As Nicholas Mansergh points out, if the British had made the grant of self-government with conditions or stipulations, they would have robbed it in their own eyes as well as in the South Africans' of its generosity and magnanimity. To press the South Africans on the franchise after the restoration of self-government would have been a contradiction, a blow to conciliation, and to the South Africans' way of thinking, a blatant example of "Downing Street interference." Unfortunately, on this issue where interference would have been most justified, it would have been least tolerated.

At the Convention some of the Cape delegates called for a uniform colour franchise. John X. Merriman, the Cape prime minister and a leading contender for the position of the first prime minister of the Union, was for retaining the existing arrangements into Union. Other delegates wanted uniformity with a Union-wide colour bar thus abolishing the Cape franchise. Still others proposed civilization tests. The Cape members were outnumbered without the support of Merriman and W.P. Schreiner, one of the most ardent advocates of native rights. Schreiner was ironically unable to attend the sessions of the Convention during which the franchise question was discussed because he was in Natal defending the leaders of the 1906 Zulu uprising. J.M. Hertzog, one of the leaders of the Orange Free State and a champion of Afrikaner nationalism, warned the delegates against giving the vote to even "civilized natives" because the pressure would then be on to continually lower the qualifications and eventually the native vote would swamp the European. General Christian de Wet, another Free Stater, predicted, and probably accurately, that if a native franchise were embodied in the constitution, only five per cent of the Orange Free State would support Union.

18 Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, p. 218.
19 Ibid., p. 219.
issue. He told the delegates their first duty was to unify the two white races. All the provinces except the Cape, he reminded them, were opposed to a native franchise or a civilization test since in any case only Europeans would be eligible to sit in Parliament.  

Henry de Villiers, Chief Justice of the Cape and President of the Convention, was in correspondence with Lord Selborne to ascertain the views of the Imperial Government. Selborne while urging a favorable consideration of native rights and indicating that the Imperial Government would favor an extension of the franchise, indicated that Britain would not oppose a retention of the status quo and the exclusion of non-Europeans from Parliament "as part of an otherwise satisfactory settlement of the native question." Selborne's letter was probably crucial. No matter what his intention, his actions did not improve the situation. Once the delegates knew what the Imperial Government would accept, they were less, if at all, concerned as to what the Imperial Government would have preferred. A committee of delegates studied the various proposals, but the solution which was a compromise of sorts, was probably the only one they could have all agreed to and the only one they could have defended in all four of the colonies.

20 Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, p. 218.  
21 Ibid., 220-221.
The draft South Africa Bill was taken to London by an official delegation that was committed to refusing any amendments on the franchise question without reconvening the Convention. At the same time Schreiner arrived in London with an unofficial delegation representing native and coloured interests. Its purpose was to convince the Imperial authorities to remove "the blot on the constitution" of South Africa and that to do so would not wreck the chances for Union because the trend for it was so strong the members of the Convention would not dream of destroying it on that account.22 The official delegation fearing that Schreiner's group might arouse public opinion to such an extent that the British Government might feel they had to act, tried to discredit the Schreiner mission in their talks with the Government, the Colonial Office and individual members of Parliament.23 Merriman and Botha publicly denounced the agitation by Schreiner and his group as unkind and harmful to the natives.24 The Times in predicting no serious opposition in Parliament to the South Africa Bill, held that it would be unwise for the Imperial Government by undue criticism to suggest that the South Africans were indifferent to their responsibilities concerning the natives.25 The Fortnightly Review agreed that

23 Thompson, op. cit., p. 402.
24 The Times, 12 July 1909, p. 9.
Schreiner's plea for Imperial intervention on the native franchise was eloquent and sincere but that the native vote and "every other purely local issue" had passed from beyond the control of the Imperial Government. While they foresaw the native question as ultimately more formidable than the Negro problem in the United States, they felt that for the present time it would prove manageable under the conditions on which the two white races were agreed.26

The British public did not take a great interest in the South Africa Bill and even the debates in Parliament were not well attended. The bill was introduced in the House of Lords on 27 July 1909 by Lord Crewe, the Colonial Secretary. The Lords were in general agreement on their dislike of the colour bar franchise and the prohibition of non-Europeans from Parliament. There were several attempts to move amendments on these provisions, but they were withdrawn for the sake of the whole bill. The Archbishop of Canterbury summed up the feelings of the House when he said there could be a danger in giving the vote to the natives who were not ready to exercise it. In South Africa the white man was a racial adult, the native a child. On that premise, he based his hope that "good may yet come out of what to many of us is an apparent evil."27

The debate in the House of Commons was longer and there was a concerted effort on the part of Sir Charles Dilke and some of the Labour members to amend the bill. However, it passed the House on 19 August without change.²⁸ Asquith noted that although the bill was passed quickly and without amendments, there was universal regret over the voting restrictions. The House had exercised restraint because they desired "this great experiment of the establishment of complete self-government in South Africa to start on the lines and in accordance with the ideas which our fellow citizens there have after long deliberation come to." He expressed the hope that those opinions on the native franchise voiced in the House would find sympathetic consideration in South Africa, but it could only be assured by the "fullest concession of local autonomy and the free and unfettered powers of self-government," the best safeguards of Imperial unity.²⁹

Speaker after speaker deplored the franchise provisions of the bill but at the same time warned against interference from Great Britain in the form of amendments which might jeopardize the whole bill. Ramsay Macdonald,

³⁸ The only proposed amendment to come to a vote was one to bar only the natives from Transvaal and the OFS from sitting in the Union Senate. It was defeated 155 to 55. Hansard, House of Commons, 5th series, vol. IX, 19 August 1909, col. 1603-04.
the leader of the Labour Party, on the other hand, predicted racial antipathy would become more marked in South Africa and throughout the Empire wherever mixed races existed. He feared that if they did not act, the colour bar would be permanent and the natives and coloureds would never sit in the South African Parliament. If the Imperial Government insisted upon amendments granting the natives political rights, there was a chance South Africa might accept them. In any case, Union was inevitable if only for geographic reasons. Sir Charles Dilke likewise warned them they were rendering the future of the natives and coloured races hopeless, and that they were foolishly "hoping and believing against themselves and their better reason that all things will go straight." 

The British press reflected the general optimism about the passage of the South Africa Bill. The Economist held that the bill was founded on an intimate knowledge of local circumstances and while it did not provide a permanent solution to the native question, it was hoped a tolerable compromise would be found and the native races would ultimately have reason to rejoice in the new constitution. The Nation realized that an equal franchise

31 Ibid., 16 August 1909, col. 974. Dilke also denied that Campbell-Bannerman, whose name everyone was invoking during the passage of the bill, would have approved of it.  
forced on the South Africans by the Imperial Government would not be accepted or if so, would not be administered fairly. The future of the non-white races in South Africa depended on the success of the Union. Only the labour press expressed doubts about the wisdom of Union and fears for the future of the natives.

The insistence upon granting political rights to the natives in violation of the Treaty of Vereeniging and the possible restoration of Imperial control that it might entail would have been unthinkable to the Liberal Government of 1909. The non-European population of South Africa, and to a lesser extent the English-speaking through their loss of political power, paid the price for Union. It was hoped in Great Britain that the payment would be temporary. The natives were certain to benefit economically if not politically from Union. At least the status quo was being maintained and only the most pessimistic held, publicly at any rate, that South Africa would not in time remove the franchise limitations and the colour bar. The British felt understandably, that if and when South Africa were to take a more liberal approach to the franchise question, it would be better if she did so of her own accord. It seemed almost an insult to the South Africans, and

33 The Nation, 5:596, 24 July 1909.
34 Labour Leader, 30 July 1909, p. 8.
especially the Afrikaners, to suggest they were any less humane, just and Christian in their intentions toward the natives than were the British. Moreover, there was ample evidence the South Africans were reasonable men. Were not former Boer leaders and generals now working for Union and Imperial cooperation? If that much conciliation and unity could come about in only eight years, there might be hope that the white and native races could in time achieve a greater degree of understanding. Furthermore, the Cape example of a native franchise in action with no resulting damage to the political system would, it was hoped, have a salutary effect.

Launched on a great wave of optimism in both Britain and South Africa, the Union was seen as a triumph of Liberal magnanimity and South African statesmanship. The "Convention spirit" with Botha and Smuts and other Afrikaner leaders on open and friendly terms with British leaders such as Dr. Jameson was surely a good omen. There was even in the general euphoria talk of a "best men government" of all parties and both white races to start the nation in the true spirit of conciliation. Although the "best men government" did not come about, the Convention spirit of cooperation and good feelings was still in evidence on 31 May 1910 when the South Africa Act went into effect, eight years to the day after the signing of the
Treaty of Vereeniging.

Britain's South Africa policy, such as it was, between 1910 and 1914 consisted of maintaining the friendship of the Afrikaners, overseeing the native protectorates, retaining Imperial troops in South Africa for "strategic purposes," keeping the Indian question from becoming an Imperial embarrassment and in general allowing their magnanimous grant of self-government to take its own course with as little interference as possible from the Imperial Government. Lewis Harcourt, who succeeded Crewe as Colonial Secretary, felt compelled in 1914 to remind the House of Commons, which was then expressing a desire to interfere in South African affairs, of something Campbell-Bannerman had once said- that self government was better than good government. 35 Although Harcourt insisted that British dominions had both, South Africa had the former if not always the latter during the early years of Union. In any clash between self government and good government, the grant of the former precluded in the minds of British Liberals- old or new- their doing anything about the latter. Liberalism had its limitations when applied to the administration of an Empire and resulted in what A.P. Thornton calls a greater absence of mind in governing the Empire than ever there had been in getting one together. 36

36 Thornton, op. cit., p. 154.
CHAPTER TWO
The Governor General

South Africa was unique among the dominions. Independent only eight years after a bitterly fought war, it had a large native population and an increasingly restless Indian community, plus the strong racial tensions that still existed, in spite of all the talk of conciliation, between the two white races. Thus the position of Governor General as the King's representative and the direct link between the South African and the Imperial authorities took on special significance among colonial appointments. The selection of the first South African Governor General in 1909 was probably second only in importance to that of the Viceroy of India.

The South Africans wanted a cabinet minister appointed. Botha, when sounded by Asquith, told the Prime Minister that South Africa wanted the best man in Asquith's cabinet. Asquith is supposed to have replied that he could not spare his best man. The two most frequently mentioned names in 1909 were Herbert Gladstone, the Home Secretary, and Sidney

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Buxton, the Postmaster General. Gladstone was the better known and the Afrikaners, as Smuts told Asquith, had great respect for the name of Gladstone.\textsuperscript{2} In speculating on the Gladstone appointment the South African press was not wholly favorable. The \textit{Johannesburg Star}, a pro-British paper, reported it was receiving some unfavorable comments from its readers based more on the iniquities of Gladstone's father and his own lack of distinction rather than any positive disqualification for the job.\textsuperscript{3} In Natal where there existed some of the most pronounced pro-British and Imperial sentiments in South Africa, there was strong criticism. The \textit{Natal Mercury} considered Gladstone the weakest member of the Government and the one the others would most like to be rid of. His personal and social charm would be inadequate to the task. The paper further speculated on rumors of the appointment of Churchill as Viceroy of India, and predicted that with Churchill in India and Gladstone in South Africa there would be a great loss of dignity in the two offices and a great weakening of the Empire.\textsuperscript{4} Another Natal paper \textit{The Advertiser} called it "an impossible appointment." It regretted that Selborne had not been asked to stay on and


\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Johannesburg Star}, 2 November 1909, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Natal Mercury}, 1 November 1909, p. 7.
proposed some sort of organized protest to the Imperial Government on Selborne’s behalf. If he did not want the post, it had other suggestions including the Duke of Connaught, the King’s brother.\footnote{The Advertiser, 1 November 1909, p. 6.}

The Cape Times, one of the most moderate and responsible papers in South Africa, deplored the agitation Natal was stirring up for Selborne, who did not wish to stay in South Africa anyway. The Times felt the prevailing sentiment in South Africa was that Gladstone should be given “a becoming welcome and a fair chance.”\footnote{Cape Times, 21 November 1909, p. 7.} The Transvaal Leader, which usually took a moderate view, approved of either Gladstone or Buxton. They did not want a Governor who would initiate his own policies regardless of the convictions and feelings of the South African people, but rather “a man of tact and judgement.” It hoped, however, Gladstone did not want to come to South Africa just to get away from the suffragettes.\footnote{Transvaal Leader, 2 November 1909, p. 6.}

The press in England also had mixed reactions. The Nation thought South Africa could rely on Gladstone’s good sense, experienced judgement and “constant amiability and sympathy of character.” Feeling that as Home Secretary he had been maligned by the suffragist party and that he had made as few mistakes as any man was likely to in such an “impossible task”, The Nation held that he had been a reformer at the Home Office.\footnote{The Nation, 6:519, 25 December 1909.} The Saturday Review, however,
thought his main qualification for service abroad was his conspicuous failure at home and his being his father's son which would "gratify Dutch sentiment and irritate the loyal English settlers who do not love this new Boer regime." The Labour Leader also thought Gladstone was a poor choice and was being sent abroad because of his failure at home.

Gladstone was appointed even though King Edward VII himself was initially opposed. The King regarding the Act of Union as premature, thought South Africa needed someone more competent. Asquith, in recommending Gladstone, pointed out that his famous name would weigh well with the Afrikaners and that moderate responsible English-speaking opinion would not object. The King reluctantly agreed that if Asquith could not find a better choice, he would approve even though he thought the appointment "a very bad one."

The choice of Gladstone was in fact a very good one—probably the best one possible from among the available candidates. It was generally accepted that a cabinet minister should be chosen, but it did not matter much if Asquith could not spare his best man. South Africa, for her own best interests, did not need him. The powers of the Governor General were constitutionally limited, corresponding roughly to those of the King whose representative

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he was. As the constitutional head of the government the Governor General was advised by his ministers and he in turn could give advice, but his ministers were responsible to Parliament and not to him. The Governor also played the role of intermediary between South Africa and the Imperial Government, which in practice meant the Colonial Office. While the Governor would be expected to weigh British and Imperial views in deciding any matter, he would have to avoid any semblance of coercion or interference from London. This called for great tact. Furthermore, a large portion of the Governor's duties were social. As a sort of stand-in for the King, the Governor bringing with him his honours, knighthoods and O.B.E.'s, provided along with his entourage something of a miniature court.

Herbert John Gladstone, the youngest son of William Gladstone was born in 1854. Educated at Eton and Oxford, he had a brief career as a lecturer at Oxford before entering politics in 1880. After unsuccessfully contesting the seat for Middlesex, he was returned to Parliament for Leeds, a seat reserved for his father's use and vacant when the elder Gladstone decided to sit for Midlothian. Herbert Gladstone represented Leeds (West Leeds after 1885) until

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his elevation to the peerage in 1910. For a time he was his father's private secretary and then in 1881-82 a Junior Lord of the Treasury attached to the Irish Office. In Ireland he became an ardent Home Ruler and spoke publicly on the subject. Knowing that his father was also in favour of Home Rule, he urged him to make his views public before the 1885 election but to no avail. In December 1885 he decided that Home Rule was only possible under a Liberal government headed by his father. Since the party and the Liberal press were in some doubt as to their leader's position on Home Rule, Herbert decided to enlighten them. Mixing his own personal views and opinions on Home Rule and other Liberals with his father's political plans, the interview he gave to the press caused an immediate sensation. His father apparently took it quite calmly and never reproached him for the episode.\footnote{Viscount Gladstone, After Thirty Years (London, Macmillan, 1928), p. 313.}

Lord Gladstone always believed he had done the right thing—perhaps no one else could have done it—and it led to the party's commitment to Home Rule. In the 1886 Government he became the Financial Secretary at the War Office under Campbell-Bannerman,\footnote{John Wilson, CB A Life of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, p. 163. William Gladstone recommended his son to Campbell-Bannerman as "competent and conformable."} in 1892 the Under-Secretary at the
Home Office under Asquith, and in 1894 the Commissioner of Public Works.

Appointed Chief Whip in 1889 at a low point in the party's fortunes, Gladstone helped to keep the party together during the Boer War and to engineer the electoral victory of 1906. Although Asquith had warned Campbell-Bannerman that Gladstone was inclined to be slack and lazy, he proved to be an energetic and competent Whip. While he was unable to reconcile Campbell-Bannerman and Rosebery or to do much about the 1900 election because of the poor state of Liberal organization, he was able to make an arrangement with Ramsay Macdonald and the Labour Representation Committee in 1903 that had far-reaching significance. Basically they agreed not to contest the same seats in some thirty constituencies in the next general election. Campbell-Bannerman was pleased with such a "useful arrangement" and congratulated his Chief Whip on the improved relations with Labour. Neither Gladstone nor anyone else could have predicted in 1903 the Liberal landslide of 1906 and that perhaps they would not have needed to make such a deal with Labour. Gladstone remained convinced the electoral pact had been a good idea and that the

15 Wilson, CB, p. 306.
16 Ibid., p. 396.
improved relations between Liberals and Labour contributed
greatly to the victory. 17

Gladstone became Home Secretary in 1903 although he
would have preferred the Admirality. 18 Beset by strikers
and suffragettes, he nonetheless managed to carry 22 bills
through Parliament the most important being the Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1906 and the Miners' Eight Hours Act
of 1908. He was working on prison reform when he left
office, and his successor Winston Churchill later took it
up in the House of Commons and received much praise and
publicity. Gladstone at once complained that Churchill had
merely taken up his schemes without giving him the proper
credit, thus making himself look good and Gladstone bad. 19
Churchill had in fact mentioned his predecessor in his
speech on prison reform, and he assured Gladstone he had
discovered the similarity of their reforms after he had
made his own plans. Gladstone, however, continued to feel
he had been misused. 20 He reacted in similar manner in
South Africa, bombarding the Colonial Office with letters

17 Philip Poirier, The Advent of the British Labour
18 Wilson, CB, p. 435. Gladstone was also under
consideration for Ireland, but CB noted that the Irish
leader "Redmond and friends" did not want him.
19 Randolph Churchill, editor, Winston Churchill,
Companion Volume II, Part 2, 1907-1911 (Boston, Houghton
20 Ibid., p. 1157-58.
and despatches whenever he thought he was not being given proper credit for his ideas and accomplishments.

Gladstone's friendship with Asquith as well as the Prime Minister's faith in his Home Secretary's administrative ability was somewhat shaken by an incident in 1908. There was to be an Eucharistic Congress in London in September 1908 concluding with a religious procession through the streets. While such public ceremonies on the part of the Roman Catholic Church were technically illegal, similar but smaller processions had been held in 1898 and 1901 without difficulty. The proposed procession was widely publicized causing militant Protestants to write to the Prime Minister and the King. The latter wanted Gladstone to forbid the whole thing, and while Gladstone hesitated, not sure if he could do so, the King became angrier. Gladstone was in Scotland and did not return to consult with Home Office officials or the police. Instead he telegraphed confusing advice and changed his opinion daily on the gravity of the situation. Asquith decided to act himself and the Catholic officials agreed to drop certain ceremonial aspects of the procession which then proceeded without incident. Gladstone had handled the whole episode

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21 As Governor General, Gladstone was highly critical of his ministers if they were absent from the capital when a crisis occurred.
badly and the King was eager to get rid of him. He told Asquith he might resign, but he probably was not serious about it because when the Prime Minister offered him the Lord Presidency of the Council, he refused it as an obvious demotion and decided to stay on. A year later when he was offered the Governor Generalship he did not consider it a demotion from being a cabinet minister.

What South Africa needed and what she got in Herbert Gladstone was a man of parliamentary experience who understood the workings of the cabinet system and the intricacies of party politics. Most South African politicians, especially those who formed the first Union Government, did not have this experience. In the next few years they benefited from a sympathetic and tactful Governor who did. In addition, most of the members of that first cabinet had little administrative experience and little idea of how to run their departments. Gladstone's experience at the War Office and the Home Office enabled him to give his ministers beneficial advice.

Since self-government and unification were part of the Liberals' colonial policy, what more stalwart Liberal could there be to represent that policy than an old friend

of Campbell-Bannerman and the son of William Gladstone, both of whom the Afrikaners revered. And if Gladstone were known to be not especially innovative or brilliant, so much the better for South Africa since he would be less likely to interfere in domestic matters or to overstep his constitutional powers. While Gladstone did sometimes complain to the Colonial Office about the limitations upon him, and on several occasions came close to violating those limitations, one can only guess at the difficulties a more energetic and brilliant type, such as Lloyd George Churchill, might have created. Even Selborne would have been a poor choice. Acting as High Commissioner over the crown colonies was a far different matter from being the Governor of a self-governing Dominion. It is doubtful if Selborne, who was always a little too imperially-minded, could have made the change.  

Gladstone welcomed the chance to go to South Africa. It was a change from "those well-worn and too familiar subjects of party politics at home." He had first visited South Africa in 1877 with his brother who was suffering

23 Selborne who supposedly accepted the idea of conciliation warned Gladstone about the Afrikaners, "There is no doubt the great vice of the Afrikaner is double-dealing and want of straightforwardness." This attitude would have been most dangerous in a Governor General. HG Add. Ms. 46003, Selborne to Gladstone, 10 June 1910.
from lung disease. It was the beginning of his lifelong interest in South Africa and his admiration of the Boers for their "passionate love of freedom and their tenacity in methods of mind and habits of life." 25 His family in writing to him in 1909 expressed pleasure over his appointment and saw it as a great opportunity and a compliment, although his brother Henry was a little surprised that he was going to South Africa rather than India. 26 Gladstone was less pleased with his having to take a title. It was felt that since knighthoods were to be granted and a limited number of peers to be created, the Governor should take precedence. 27 After some hesitation Gladstone finally decided on Viscount Gladstone of Lanark.

Before his departure for South Africa in May 1910 he received many good wishes and much advice. Shortly before leaving England Gladstone and his wife met with the King who by now, perhaps recovered from his initial dislike of the appointment, was quite friendly. He pointed out to Gladstone the need for a certain amount of ceremonial at official functions. 28 On the voyage out Gladstone and his party were informed of the King's death—an event

25 Gladstone, After Thirty Years, p. 206.
26 HG Add. Ms. 46045, Henry to Herbert Gladstone, 7 October 1909.
27 Only one peerage was ever created in South Africa. Chief Justice de Villiers became Baron de Villiers of Wynburg in 1910.
that cast a shadow over all the Union festivities including the Governor's arrival at Cape Town on 17 May.

 Upon his arrival Gladstone had an important constitutional decision to make before 31 May- the selection of the first Union prime minister. Elections for the first parliament were scheduled for September, and parliament was to be opened with great ceremony, and hopefully by a member of the Royal Family, in November 1910. Meanwhile after the Union came into existence on 31 May and until after the elections were held, there had to be a prime minister and a cabinet to govern the new nation. Thus it fell to the Governor General to select the first prime minister who in turn would chose his own cabinet. Since whomever Gladstone chose might have an advantage in the forthcoming elections, his decision was of great importance. By the same token, it would be unwise to choose someone with absolutely no chance of winning those elections. He recieved much advice on the subject before and after his arrival.

 Although several names were mentioned, there were in fact only two serious candidates- Louis Botha, prime minister of the Transvaal and John X. Merriman, prime minister of the Cape Colony. Gladstone was given a free hand in his selection, but the Imperial Government preferred
Botha. In 1907 Botha had attended the Colonial Conference in London, and the British had made rather a fuss over him. He had also gone to England in connection with the passage of the Act of Union and had established personal friendships with several cabinet members including Asquith, Crewe and Churchill, although apparently not with Gladstone.29

Botha most likely would have been the King's preference. He had rated highly with Edward VII since the Culliman Diamond episode in 1907. Discovered in 1905 in the Transvaal the huge diamond originally weighed 3,025 carats. Botha decided Transvaal should present the diamond to the King "as an expression of the sentiment of loyalty and affection on the part of the people of the Transvaal towards His Majesty's person and throne." Smuts and Botha defended the action as an example of racial conciliation. Some Afrikaners, however, thought they were "laying on the loyalty butter too thick."30 Others saw it as a typical example of Afrikaner "slimness."31 In any case, it helped advance the image of Botha as a romantic hero, the Boer general turned conciliator and peacemaker.

31 Ibid. Slimness is a hard term to define. It usually means astute, crafty or wily. Afrikaners generally admired it and thought of it as cleverness while the English saw it as double-dealing.
There was nothing very romantic or heroic about Merriman. Lord Crewe, when Colonial Secretary, warned Gladstone that Merriman could be "very cranky" and was generally regarded as an "enfant terrible" and should be treated as such. Merriman wanted Gladstone to come out to South Africa a month or so early so he could have plenty of time to consider his choice. Assessing the two men, Gladstone was aware of Merriman's well known liberal views, his reputation as a forceful speaker, his cultured personality and his forty years experience in South African politics. Nevertheless, there must have been something very attractive to the British mind about Botha- as if selecting him were a further indication of their magnanimous intentions towards South Africa. Richard Soloman, the Agent General for the Transvaal in London, in briefing Gladstone on South African affairs as early as February indicated his preference for Botha. Sir Francis Hopwood, at the Colonial Office, was writing in January and February to Gladstone, and at the same time to Botha, on South African affairs almost as if Botha had already been chosen.

33 HG Add. Ms. 46097, Notes on an Interview with Sir Richard Soloman, 15 February 1910.
34 HG Add. Ms. 46004, Hopwood to Gladstone, 9 and 28 January, 7 February, and 28 March 1910.
The advice Gladstone received once he was in South Africa was not much different. On 19 May he began holding a series of interviews with South African political leaders to ascertain their preferences. De Villiers, the Chief Justice, wanted the most stable government possible; Merriman lacked tact and would not command much confidence in the country. While Transvaal and Natal were solidly for Botha, he had areas of strong support in the Cape and the Orange Free State as well. De Villiers hoped, however, that Merriman's abilities would not be wasted and that he would join a Botha ministry since he would be a most awkward and troublesome critic out of it.35 There was some speculation that de Villiers himself might be a candidate, and some of the English might have desired it. But de Villiers had never been a political figure, and he was not interested in becoming prime minister.36

In his talk with Merriman, which Gladstone described as pleasant and which lasted almost two hours, Merriman ranged over a broad array of subjects but never once mentioned his own position.37 Merriman too thought the

35 HG Add. Ms. 46097, Notes on an Interview with de Villiers, 19 May 1910.
37 HG Add. Ms. 46097, Notes on an Interview with Merriman, 19 May 1910.
meeting was pleasant, but that Gladstone had talked "round about the affairs of the country with a most engaging absence of knowledge and even of information." Botha, on the other hand, did not avoid the issue. He plainly told Gladstone he would ask Merriman to join his ministry if he were asked to form one, and he would do everything he could to make Gladstone's term a success.

Dr. Jameson as leader of the Progressive Party in the Cape and the unofficial leader of the English section in South Africa was consulted, and he too was for Botha. By 1910 Jameson had lived down the Jameson Raid and had become so respectable that he cherished a few hopes of his own in regard to the first Union ministry. Not that Jameson aspired to the premiership, nor did Gladstone ever seriously consider him. He would not have been able to win the general election where the Afrikaner vote would outnumber the English. Conciliation might have made progress and Jameson might be on friendly terms with Botha and Smuts, but it is doubtful if most Afrikaners would have tolerated the renegade of 1895 as their first prime minister. What Jameson did have in mind was his so-called "best men

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40 HG Add. Ms. 46097, Notes on Interview with Jameson, 19 May 1910.
government", a coalition of former parties from which new parties would then emerge on economic rather than racial lines.\(^4\) Jameson approached Botha with the plan in 1909. Botha toyed with it, consulted his friends about it in vain, and finally denounced it in 1910. But some of the English were still hopeful, and if Botha should have a change of heart, they would have a better chance of forming a government with him than with Merriman, who had denounced the plan from the start.\(^4\)

Merriman's friends from the Cape, Malan and Sauer, seemed to anticipate that Botha would be chosen and voiced no objection, both indicating they would serve in a Botha ministry and hoping Merriman would join it too.\(^4\) Leaders of the Orange Free State who likewise had publicly indicated support for Merriman, because they felt that Botha was becoming too pro-British, in talks with Gladstone said they felt Botha would command the greater confidence among the voters.\(^4\) Gladstone most enjoyed his interview with Smuts

\(^{41}\) The absence of national political parties in South Africa made Gladstone's task more difficult. Despite Jameson's wish for new party alignments, he helped form the Unionist Party in May 1910 combining previous pro-British parties. Likewise the South African Party was formed in June 1910 from older Afrikaner parties of the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and the Cape.

\(^{42}\) Engelenburg, op. cit., p. 191.

\(^{43}\) HG Add. Ms. 46097, Notes on Interview with Malan and Sauer, 19 May 1910.

\(^{44}\) HG Add. Ms. 46097, Notes on Interview with Hertzog and Fischer, 18-19 May 1910.
"the cleverest man of the lot" and the only one with any clear views on the immediate future. 

Gladstone sent for Botha who to no one's great surprise did not form a "best men government" but rather one which fairly represented all four colonies. Merriman although invited to join the cabinet, declined. Later in explaining his reasons to his friend Steyn of the Orange Free State, he declared a subordinate position in the cabinet would be a miserable one, especially since he was not in sympathy with some of the other members. He admitted he had no great respect for Botha's political knowledge, and while he admired him personally, he was sure they would differ politically. Merriman never again held high political office. He proved to be, as de Villiers had predicted, a troublesome critic of the Government while sitting as a private member in the Union House of Assembly on the government side.

45 HG Add. Ms. 45996, Gladstone to Crewe, 22 May 1910.
46 Both Merriman and Botha had their supporters in England. The Economist (70:543, 12 March 1910) hoped Merriman would be chosen because "his philosophy is sound, his economics are in the best Gladstonian tradition, and he is honest." Even after Botha had been appointed, they continued to believe that Merriman would have been the better choice and one writer spoke of "Gladstone's first blunder" in choosing Botha. (The Economist, 71:24, 2 July 1910). The Spectator (104:4909, 4 June 1910) said Botha's appointment was "universally admired" but it lamented the failure of the "best men government" idea.
47 Laurence, op. cit., p. 319.
In spite of his assertions that he was given a free hand in the selection of the prime minister, Gladstone had been given plenty advice on the subject, most of it tending to favor Botha. He was probably inclined towards Botha even before he discussed it with the South Africans. In any case, Botha was the choice expected in London as shown by Lord Crewe's remarking in June 1910, that he thought it strange that Merriman could ever have expected the premiership. 48

The only other remote possibility for the first prime minister was ex-President Steyn of the Orange Free State. Steyn was a national hero, but since the war he had been an invalid. After 1910 his health was a matter of growing concern although his mind remained active and alert. This enigmatic figure, a symbol of Afrikaner nationalism, hovered in the background of South African politics throughout the early years of Union. He preferred Merriman for prime minister, but he actually considered accepting the position himself if it were offered to him. He consulted his doctors on the advisability of emerging from his retirement, but he was told it would be unwise. 49 No doubt he would have been in the running if his health had permitted. It is just as well that it did not. He did not approve of the lengths Botha was willing to go for the sake of conciliation,

48 HG Add. Ms. 45996, Crewe to Gladstone, 17 June 1910.
but Botha was always eager to secure Steyn's advice and approval. The few times Steyn and Gladstone met they got on very well. In 1912 during the split between Botha and Hertzog and the extreme Afrikaner nationalists, Steyn took Hertzog's side. During the 1914 rebellion he remained silent, refusing to denounce the rebels.

The Union Day ceremonies went off well, and Gladstone was pleased by the large crowds and the warm welcome, even though the event was less festive than it might have been because of the King's death. The death posed another problem. The State Opening of the first Union Parliament scheduled for November was to have been opened by the Prince of Wales, now George V. There had always been some opposition to a royal visit as making the affair seem too "Imperial." Merriman, for instance, felt that Gladstone as the King's representative should open Parliament himself. Botha, on the other hand, wanted the King or no one; and Natal had the quaint idea of inviting Lord Rosebery. The Colonial Office decided to retain the royal visit but to send the Duke of Connaught, the King's uncle. Gladstone did not like this at all and pointed out there was not much enthusiasm for a royal uncle, who had been to South Africa only several years earlier and who had been a little "too English."#50 Botha and his cabinet asked Gladstone to

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50 HG Add. Ms. 45996, Gladstone to Crewe, 5 June 1910.
to sound out the Colonial Office on the possibility of
the King's coming, since he as Prince of Wales was the
one originally slated to open Parliament. Gladstone was in
favor of this or, failing the King, the new Prince of
Wales. If no one came and he opened Parliament himself,
people might resent the loss of "social events, jubilant
ceremonies and the spending and making of money." The
Opposition having nothing else to complain about would
take this up and say Afrikaner prejudice was keeping the
royal party away. Others might say Gladstone wanted all the
power and glory for himself.51

The cabinet finally agreed to the Connaught visit,
but they insisted the party must come after the elections.
They feared that if the Duke arrived while the election
campaign was in progress, his personality "would not be
strong enough to counter electioneering attempts against
him."52 Aware of all the trouble the proposed visit was
causing, the Colonial Office decided to limit the Duke's
visit to merely the State Opening and the official cere­
monies. That very nearly succeeded, but just before the
plans were completed, the King and the Duke met and the
King insisted the Duke make a limited tour of South Africa
and a visit to Rhodesia as well.53

51 HG Add. Ms. 46097, Interview with Botha, 2 June 1910.
52 HG Add. Ms. 46097, Interview with Botha, 4 June 1910.
53 HG Add. Ms. 46004, Hopwood to Gladstone, 8 July 1910.
In due course the Connaughts came and all passed off without incident. In fact, as Gladstone informed Lewis Harcourt, the new Colonial Secretary, the visit had been "inwardly and outwardly a great success." The importance of the crown was growing in South Africa and would continue to do so as the authority of Parliament over the Dominions decreased. The Duke and Duchess had worked nobly during their visit to strengthen and make popular the idea of the sovereign and to further the "personal sense of Union." 54

Gladstone, however, did not abandon his idea of having the King visit South Africa. He raised the question repeatedly with the Colonial Office during his term of office. In 1912 while on a visit to England, Gladstone and Harcourt talked the matter over. Harcourt pointed out that such a long expedition would bring on complications. If the King went to South Africa, he would then be expected to visit the other Dominions. He agreed with Gladstone that South Africa had a stronger claim than the others and that he would reconsider it. 55

Botha, who was almost as persistent on this matter as Gladstone, was disappointed that Gladstone had been unable to secure a promise of a royal visit. In 1912 and 1913

54 HG Add. Ms. 45997, Gladstone to Harcourt, 14 December 1910.
55 HG Add. Ms. 45999, Notes on a Talk with Harcourt, 28 September 1912.
Botha was faced with a cabinet crisis and a split in his party in a dispute with the extreme nationalists over the whole question of imperialism and South Africa's relationship with Great Britain. Thus a visit by the King might have only made matters worse with the Afrikaner nationalists. The Imperial Government decided in 1912 that the King should not be absent from the country for such a long period of time as a visit to South Africa would entail, and the matter was dropped. 56

Gladstone revived it a year later on the pretext of having the King preside at the opening of the new government buildings in Pretoria scheduled for 1915. Having had a year to think about it, he felt all the more strongly that a royal visit would be of value. A visit by the King could only strengthen Botha's hand and "consolidate the best kind of Imperial feeling in his party." Furthermore, it might soften and weaken the anti-Imperial sentiments of the extremists. As to the Labour Party, while it contained revolutionary elements, Gladstone believed it to be loyal to the King, and his presence would strengthen the best elements in it. A few fine phrases from the King would do wonders in regard to the Indian question and would also have an excellent effect on the natives whose loyalty and

56 HG Add. Ms. 45999, Harcourt to Gladstone, 13 December 1912.
good will were so important to South Africa. Harcourt remained adamant. The King could not come and the Prince of Wales was too young and immature. He refused to reconsider the matter. Though not successful, Gladstone was certainly persistent enough. The over-all effect on South Africa would probably have been favorable. The King had been to India, so his absence from England could have been justified.

Several matters arose during Gladstone's term regarding his exact constitutional role and position for which there were no precedents. The questions at times seem trivial, but they were not trivial to Gladstone. They did have a significance for setting a precedent for future governors. Gladstone always had a definite opinion and he would besiege Harcourt and the Colonial Office until he usually got his way.

Early in his term he decided he would like to attend the sessions of the South African Parliament. Harcourt assured him he would bring the subject up informally at the forthcoming Imperial Conference (June 1911), but he doubted if it would win unanimous approval. At the same time Harcourt felt it necessary to instruct Gladstone not to attend any debates during the next session. Gladstone's position as the King's representative would seem to preclude

57 HG Add. Ms. 46000, Gladstone to Harcourt, 20 November 1913.
any appearance at Parliament, and his presence there could be taken as an attempt to influence opinion.\(^{58}\) Gladstone reluctantly agreed that without a general acceptance of the idea by the Dominion governments, it would not work.\(^{59}\)

He brought the matter up again a year later because, as he said, his views had "matured and strengthened in his mind." Apart from his ministers, with whom he had close personal contact, it was "hard to weigh these people up." He diligently read the debates, but it was not the same thing as hearing them. Perhaps the other governors did not care much about their parliaments and, in any case, how could debates in the other Dominions be as important or as significant as those in South Africa?\(^{60}\) While Harcourt was not very impressed with such arguments, he agreed to discuss the question with Gladstone during the forthcoming visit to England. After their talk in September, Gladstone agreed not to press the matter further.\(^{61}\)

Clearly Gladstone missed the color and drama of parliamentary debates which he could no longer take part in or witness. He certainly missed some exciting debates especially during the 1913 and 1914 sessions. At the same time, however, the matters under discussion such as the role of South Africa in the Empire, the serious disturbances

\(^{58}\) HG Add. Ms. 45997, Harcourt to Gladstone, 13 Feb. 1911.  
\(^{59}\) HG Add. Ms. 45997, Gladstone to Harcourt, 8 March 1911.  
\(^{60}\) HG Add. Ms. 45998, Gladstone to Harcourt, 21 Feb. 1912.  
\(^{61}\) HG Add. Ms. 45999, Talk with Harcourt, 28 Sept. 1912.
involving the Indians and the labour disputes of 1913 and 1914 all involved controversial actions taken by the Governor General and his ministers. Thus any appearance in Parliament by Gladstone would have been open to serious misinterpretations.

Part of Gladstone's responsibility as Governor was to assent to bills passed by the Union Parliament unless he chose to reserve them for consideration by the Imperial Government. Crewe instructed him in April 1910 that "bills vitally affecting Imperial interests" such as those concerning the Indians were to be reserved. This in practice caused little difficulty, but the ordinary legislation, strictly South African in nature, which Gladstone would as a matter of course assent to, did cause some problems. Since South Africa had two legal languages, English and Dutch, and all bills were printed in both, which version did the Governor sign?

Selborne was the first to raise the issue in 1911 by informing Harcourt and the Colonial Office that Gladstone was recklessly signing English and Dutch versions. "If this is true, then he is sowing dragons teeth and you may feel quite confident of very grave future trouble." Selborne insisted that at the National Convention in 1909 the
delegates, including the Dutch, had agreed the Governor should sign only the version he understood i.e. the English. 62

Gladstone admitted he did indeed sign alternate versions but not recklessly as his "superior predecessor" asserted and that if he had acted with "Selbornian wisdom" there would have been a row by now. Certain sections of the population were very touchy on the matter of equality between the two languages, and he intended to continue the practice. Perhaps the Dutch would gradually acquiesce to his signing only the English version. He had thus far signed the English versions of important or complicated bills, or those concerned mainly with British interests or those where he thought the drafting of the Dutch bills might be faulty. He signed Dutch versions when Dutch interests seemed most involved. He had tried to aim at some sort of balance, and no one had complained so far. 63 De Villiers, who had been president of the National Convention remembered there had been some discussion on the matter but no resolution had been passed nor formal agreement made. 64

63 HG Add. Ms. 45997, Gladstone to Harcourt, 18 April 1911.
64 HG Add. Ms. 46070, de Villiers to Gladstone, 25 April 1911.
Harcourt and the Colonial Office did not care which version Gladstone signed, and the Colonial Secretary tried to calm the perturbed Gladstone by telling him not to worry over Selborne's fusses. "He has a small and not very effective mind and his swans are generally geese." Harcourt assured Gladstone that as far as he and the Colonial Office were concerned, Gladstone should continue to use his own discretion as to the manner of signing bills.\(^{65}\)

Another constitutional difficulty of sorts arose over the question of whether Gladstone should be allowed a leave of absence to return to England. He displayed his usual persistence, even threatening to resign, before he finally got his way. Lady Gladstone was ordered home for several months by her doctors in 1912, and Gladstone proposed to bring her back to South Africa after spending four or five weeks in England himself. He planned to stay in South Africa until the parliamentary session was over and things were quiet. Harcourt saw "grave difficulty amounting indeed to impossibility." Gladstone would just have to regard himself as being under the same limitations as the Viceroy of India. Harcourt did, however, suggest Gladstone talk it over with his ministers and see what they thought of his being out of the country and of de Villiers' acting in

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\(^{65}\) HG Add. Ms. 45997, Harcourt to Gladstone, 19 September 1911.
his place. Since Botha had no objection to Gladstone's proposed leave of absence, Harcourt consulted Asquith, who did not feel a trip home was possible as long as Gladstone retained the Governor Generalship. But Harcourt, bombarded by letters from Gladstone, finally consented although the Colonial Office still had many serious reservations.

Gladstone left South Africa in August and returned in October. De Villiers discharged the duties of the Governor General in Gladstone's absence. Gladstone obviously enjoyed this visit to England, and as we have seen, the meeting with Harcourt proved to be quite beneficial. On the surface there seems to have been little reason why the Governor General should not be allowed at least one absence from South Africa during his five year term provided things were quiet. Gladstone's ministers were often away in Europe on holidays. Since the Governor's position corresponded roughly to that of the King's and the King was sometimes absent from England, it seems the Governor should have been permitted the same privilege. As Gladstone pointed out, he was not prohibited by statute, as was the Viceroy of India, from leaving the country. The major difficulty, of course,

66 HG Add. Ms. 45997, Harcourt to Gladstone, 19 September 1911.
67 HG Add. Ms. 45998, Harcourt to Gladstone, 16 January 1912.
68 There were rumors in the British press that Gladstone was coming home to rejoin the cabinet, The Times, 8 Aug. 1912, p.7.
was that events tended to develop suddenly and rapidly in South Africa, "bolts-out-of-the-blue" Gladstone liked to call them. If the Governor were out of the country when a crisis developed and if it took him some time to return, the consequences in South Africa could be serious. As far as Gladstone was concerned, it was probably just as well he had his holiday in 1912. The next two years were to be the most difficult of his term.

A large portion of the Governor's duties were purely social—making public appearances at dinners and parties, visiting institutions, receiving deputations and making countless speeches. Gladstone sometimes found this aspect of his work rather tiresome, and because of the vast distances of South Africa, it involved considerable traveling, usually by train. Gladstone, who had a sense of just the right amount of ritual and ceremonial for the occasion—enough to please the traditionalists and not too much to offend the Afrikaner farmers, could look suitably dignified and imposing in his Governor's uniform. Thus he and Lady Gladstone added some excitement to the South African social scene even if they were not exactly glittering. Lady Gladstone, although absent from South Africa for several rather long periods, appears to have been quite popular.
Sometimes, however, the Governor unintentionally alienated people, usually the English, who thought they were being slighted. Early in his term Gladstone visited the Orange Free State to see Steyn. The English in and around Bloemfontein thought he was overdoing it with the Afrikaners and gave him a decidedly cool reception with few people other than the city officials showing up. In July 1912 both Gladstone and Botha were invited to attend a ceremony honoring the memory of Cecil Rhodes in Cape Town. Neither one attended because neither had been invited until they had already made other plans. The English press thought Gladstone tactless and thoughtless, but he remained unperturbed. Most people soon realized that any blundering had been on the part of the organizers of the event.\(^{69}\) Such incidents as these were few. Usually Gladstone and his party were greeted by large crowds, including the one in Bloemfontein the second time he visited it.\(^{70}\)

It was not in establishing constitutional precedents or in his public appearances but rather in his role as the link between South Africa and the Imperial Government that Gladstone did his most important and valuable work as Governor General. He kept the Colonial Office fully informed of events in South Africa sending them in addition to his

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\(^{69}\) Transvaal Leader, 8 August 1912, p. 6.  
\(^{70}\) Mallet, \textit{Herbert Gladstone}, p. 239.
official despatches, accounts of parliamentary debates, descriptions of the political scene and clippings from the South African press. His personal friendship with both Crewe and Harcourt enabled him in his private correspondence to make personal observations and comments that were most useful and enlightening to the Colonial Secretary. His relationship with his ministers was most cordial and especially close with Botha and Smuts. The Colonial Office for its part, heartily wishing to avoid any hint of "Downing Street interference", might instruct Gladstone as to how it would like his ministers to proceed on some given matter, such as the Indian question, but it would usually permit Gladstone to handle it in his own way, realizing that only he knew how far he could press his ministers on such occasions and how much he could appeal to their loyalty to the Empire.
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CHAPTER THREE

The Imperial Connection: "South Africa First"

Imperialism had never had pleasant connotations for the Afrikaners, and Botha and Smuts had been among those who had denounced it most strongly. However, after 1910 the Union demanded close cooperation with Great Britain. In the opinion of some Afrikaners, Botha and Smuts began to play the imperialist game all too well.

What did imperialism mean to South Africans in 1910? To many of the English-speaking it meant close ties with the mother country and unswerving loyalty to the King and Empire. They were proud of South Africa's independence but some placed the concerns of the Empire first and held to a concept of dual British and South African citizenship. The progressive Afrikaners, on the other hand, found imperialism tolerable if it meant cooperation and loyalty. Partnership in the Empire was accepted in exchange for self-government. To the other Afrikaners, heavily concentrated in the Orange Free State and championed by J.M. Hertzog protege of Steyn and Minister of Justice in Botha's first cabinet, imperialism was anathema. They thought conciliation had gone too
far and that Botha and Smuts were in danger of becoming imperialists themselves.

Were these criticisms of Botha and Smuts justified? Could South African concerns and interests always be put first no matter how they might conflict with those of Great Britain and the rest of the Empire? These questions became central issues in South African politics during the 1910-14 period. And it is not surprising that the Afrikaners, who could not be expected to regard Great Britain as the mother country, raised them. Since Britain had entrusted them with self-government, they felt that South African interests should determine policy and legislation; undue consideration of Imperial interests could lead to interference from Downing Street. Thus a policy of "South Africa first", while it became one of the main tenets of Hertzogism, was also accepted by a great many other South Africans both Dutch and English-speaking. While the Imperial connection was being challenged, Gladstone remained aloof from the quarrel and retained the respect and friendship of the participants. He more than anyone in South Africa represented the Imperial tie, but he was not accused, even by the most radical, of placing the interests of Britain and the Empire before those of South Africa.

In any case, there were limitations on South Africa's independence. As a self-governing dominion within the British
Empire she could not maintain a foreign policy separate from or in conflict with that of the Empire, nor could she determine her own domestic policy without the watchful supervision and benign approval of the Colonial Office. In case of a clash of interests the Imperial Government could still ensure the supremacy of Imperial interests over purely South African ones by instructing the Governor General to reserve dominion legislation which could then only become law with the approval of the monarch and the Privy Council. If the governor had already signed the legislation, the Imperial Government could still disallow it within a year. Such extreme measures would have been greatly resented by any of the dominion governments and were highly unlikely by 1910, but such action was still within the prerogative of the Imperial Government.

South Africa's interests, according to Hertzog and his followers, must always come first on all questions. Those who denied the "South Africa first" doctrine were "foreign adventurers", those who accepted it were good South Africans. The Afrikaners- by this he meant all South Africans who accepted his doctrines- must become boss in South Africa, he told a Transvaal audience in October, 1912.¹ "South Africa first" became one of the main

¹ Transvaal Leader, 7 October 1912, p. 7.
ingredients of Hertzog's speeches to the chagrin of the Johannesburg press and the embarrassment of the Botha Government. Eventually these speeches led to his expulsion from the cabinet in December 1912. According to Hertzog's account of his last days in the cabinet, he had asked his colleagues if any of them disagreed with the principle that the interests of South Africa must come first even if they were in conflict with those of the rest of the Empire. He had offered to resign if the rest of the cabinet thought differently, but according to Hertzog, they could find no fault with his policy other than his having voiced it in public. Botha who called Hertzog's version of this episode "incomplete, one-sided and in some respects inaccurate", held that the question of South Africa's interests taking precedence over those of the Empire need never have been raised since the true interests of the nation were not nor ever need be in conflict with those of the British Empire from whom they derived their free constitution and the only effect of posing such a question was to create suspicion and distrust. Botha agreed that the interests of South Africa were supreme, but he valued and appreciated the Imperial connection. He refused to admit, publicly at any rate, that the interests of South Africa and the

2 Transvaal Leader, 20 December 1912, p. 7.
3 Transvaal Leader, 21 December 1912, p. 9.
Empire could conflict when at that very moment an agreement on the Indian immigration question was being delayed because of what South Africa thought was in her best interests and what Great Britain thought was in the best interests of the whole Empire. And that was only one example. There were conflicting interests involving the native question, South African defense and such seemingly local issues as labour disputes.

The danger existed not in discussing the "South Africa first" issue and its possible challenge to the Imperial connection but in maintaining that either one or the other must always prevail or in refusing to admit their relative interests could ever conflict. Botha's reluctance to discuss the question probably did as much to create suspicion and distrust as Hertzog's constant references to it. Compromises were made with the Colonial Office and because Great Britain wanted South Africa to have the fullest possible exercise of self-government and because she wanted the South African experiment to be a success, South African interests usually prevailed. In reaching those compromises, however, Imperial concerns did have to be taken into account. Botha understood and accepted this and as Prime Minister should have clarified the issue. However, he was afraid of losing the English
vote if he openly agreed with Hertzog, or the Afrikaner if he completely repudiated the "South Africa first" theory. Thus he made it possible for the Hertzogites to accuse him of being an Imperialist and the Imperialists to charge that Hertzog was the real spokesman for the Government and the South African Party.

If South Africa's interests were to predominate, what were her responsibilities to the Empire and what was to be her role in maintaining and defending the Empire? The suggestions made at the 1911 Imperial Conference to unify and strengthen the Empire at the expense of dominion autonomy were not regarded favorably by the South African delegation. The conference was followed soon after by the coronation of George V and Botha attended and enjoyed both. Merely to attend an Imperial Conference could be seen as an act of cooperation with the Imperial authorities but it did not necessarily make one an Imperialist; nor did it mean one was placing Imperial interests before those of South Africa.

The 1911 Conference was the first to be called "Imperial." The earlier ones meeting periodically since 1887, were called Colonial Conferences, a description to which the dominions now objected. For the first time a British prime minister acted as its president. Asquith was present at eight of the twelve sessions, the rest of
the time the Conference was under the leadership of Harcourt whom the delegates agreed did an outstanding job. 4

The Conference was rather ignored in South Africa by both the Dutch and English press. The English newspapers held that it was not accomplishing anything positive and preferred to concentrate on the more glittering coronation festivities. Harcourt told Parliament, however, that it was the "greatest step forward in the direction of Imperial cooperation in the history of Britain and the colonies." 5

The dominion ministers were pleased with the Imperial Government's decision to hold discussions with them on Imperial defense and foreign policy. They were less pleased with the proposals put forward by Sir Joseph Ward of New Zealand to establish an Imperial Parliament of 297 members and an Imperial Council of State. Botha and Laurier of Canada at once saw that such an arrangement would curb dominion independence. Botha criticized the Ward proposal for its impracticality. Who would appoint the Council? To whom would it be responsible? What authority would it have? If it had real power it would encroach upon the

dominions, and if it had no authority, it would be a "meddlesome nuisance." Botha admitted such an arrange-
ment might evolve, but so far the policy of decentrali-
zation had made the Empire a success, and as far as South
Africa was concerned it was her liberty which bound her
to the mother country. 6

Ward got no support. 7 He had not presented his case
well or even studied it thoroughly, and there was a
general- and correct- feeling that Lionel Curtis and the
Round Table group were behind it. Botha was especially
displeased with the Imperial Parliament of 297; 77 seats
were alloted to the dominions, but only 7 to South Africa.
He informed Smuts that they had destroyed Ward's ideas
"root and branch." 8 Botha's chief ally was Laurier of
Canada whom Botha had met at the 1907 Conference and with
whom he was eager to renew his friendship. They spent a
weekend at Harcourt's estate at Nuneham and discovered
they had similar problems at home with their respective

6 Parliamentary Papers, 1911, Vol. LIV, Cd. 5745,
p. 69-70.
7 Asquith informed the Conference that in his opinion
Ward's proposed Imperial Parliament and Council of State
would destroy the authority of the government of Great
Britain in matters of foreign policy, the declaration of
war and the maintenance of peace. Such authority could not
be shared and such proposals would be "absolutely fatal to
our present of representative government." Cd. 5745, p. 71.
8 W.K. Hancock and Jean van der Poel, Selections from
the Smuts Papers, vol. III (Cambridge, University Press,
1966), p. 36.
English oppositions, and with their own parties divided over the pronouncements of young nationalists who wanted no cooperation with the English. "When one hears Laurier say all this, one sees our own position in South Africa so clearly in it," Botha wrote Smuts. Botha and the South African delegation made the strongest impression on Laurier. He appreciated Botha's high abilities as a statesman, but he felt it was Botha's character and sincerity that rallied men to him.

Social functions were at their height during the summer of 1911 and Botha and his wife were as popular as they had been in 1907. Even though Botha complained to Smuts about the seemingly endless dinners, receptions and church services, of having to wear "very stiff and damned uncomfortable uniforms" and of the high cost of London, one suspects he enjoyed it all. He found the coronation especially impressive. The English, he told Smuts, "understand how to make this sort of thing beautiful, tactful, and brilliant and orderly too." Delighted with the gracious treatment he had received from the King on down, for which he gave Harcourt much credit, and pleased with the progress the Conference had made in

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9 Hancock and Van der Poel, _op. cit._, vol. III, p. 36.
securing cooperation among the various peoples of the Empire, he was nonetheless glad in July to get away to Kissigen for a rest.\textsuperscript{11} Botha's obvious enjoyment of his activities in England and his conciliatory remarks there were a dark omen to some South Africans who had been listening to Hertzog's anti-imperialism speeches.\textsuperscript{12}

One topic touched upon briefly at the 1911 Conference, with no conclusive results, was that of the dominions' naval policies. All the dominions had in some way approached the problem, especially since the German naval scare of 1909. Australia, Canada and New Zealand at one time all toyed with the idea of building their own fleets or of contributing Dreadnoughts to the Imperial navy. Policies changed with governments, and a proposed dominion navy could sink with a ministry. South Africa made a yearly cash contribution of about 85,000 pounds, and the Botha government was in no hurry to increase the amount. The question was debated each year in Parliament and kept alive the rest of the year in the columns of the \textit{Cape Times} and the \textit{Transvaal Leader}. Anti-imperialists

\textsuperscript{11} Hancock and Van der Poel, \textit{op. cit.}, vol. III, p. 36.

\textsuperscript{12} Botha was something of a hero in the British press. The \textit{Liberal Magazine} (19, 402, June 1911) called his participation in the Imperial Conference an impressive object lesson in what could be done when the Liberal principle of Home Rule was fearlessly applied.
either wanted to continue the rather small subsidy, to
decrease it or to abolish it in favor of South Africa's
building her own navy. Whether or not that navy would
then be at the disposal of the Imperial Government in
time of war, was another matter for debate. The Cape
and Natal, probably because they were coastal states,
were always more concerned about naval defense and the
strongest support in Parliament for the British navy
always came from those two provinces. The amount the
Union Government was paying for its naval defense was
simply the sum the Cape and Natal had contributed before
1910.

The naval debate was introduced yearly in the House of
Assembly by Col. Percy Silburn of Durban, an Independent
and something of an authority on naval history,
Silburn thought it fitting for himself to introduce the
resolution for an increased contribution on the theory
that the issue could then be free of party strife and
racial antagonisms. Of course it never was, especially
in the 1912 and 1913 sessions when the activities and

13 Botha half in jest had suggested to the British at the Imperial Conference that South Africa might build
a line of steamers to carry the mail between South Africa
and Europe which could be armed in war. "Merely putting
the question made their hair stand on end," he told Smuts.
Hancock and van der Poel, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 36.
speeches of Hertzog and his followers were the center of attention. One of the strongest supporters of an increased contribution was that staunch anti-imperialist John X. Merriman who being a strict economist must have seen that an increased contribution, even a fairly sizable one, would be less costly than South Africa's constructing her own fleet. According to Silburn, the contribution should be put on a business footing and a certain percentage of South Africa's revenue from the oceanic trade would be a sound basis. The self-governing Union should not look like a charity case of the Empire dependent on Great Britain for her defense. Silburn did not wish to see South Africa build her own "tin pot navy" as Merriman called it, but rather rest her defense in the Royal Navy which she must help strengthen. Silburn and Merriman saw an increased contribution as a good insurance policy; South Africa was simply not paying for enough insurance.14

Merriman and Silburn kept their flagwaving to a minimum. Others did not. Calling for debate free from party strife, Sir Thomas Smartt would usually stress in glowing terms their obligation to the great British Empire which had done so much for them. Great Britain could never

15 Ibid., col. 630-31.
ask, their pride and self respect should make them wish to press the offer.\textsuperscript{15} For those who supported the increased contribution there was no conflict between South African and Imperial interests on this question. The Union and the Empire needed protection by a stronger Imperial navy to which South Africa should, for her own sake, contribute her fair share.

While most argued about whether to increase the subsidy some backveld members thought 85,000 pounds too much. C.G. Fichardt, one of Hertzog's followers and occasionally an embarrassment to him because of his fanaticism, wondered if Great Britain had done as much for South Africa as she could have; in any case, what she had done had been for business reasons. To Fichardt, South Africa's interests came first and before laying out money for the British navy they had better take care of their own people, thousands of whom could not afford to send their children to school and who were sinking below the level of the natives.\textsuperscript{16} Several members, including Sauer the then Minister of Native Affairs, echoed Fichardt's opinion that if Great Britain wanted an Empire she ought to pay for the luxury herself. Claiming to foresee dangers in South Africa's negotiating with Great

Britain the terms of an increased subsidy. Hertzog, who was no longer a member of the Government, denounced the "detrimental principle" of going to England in order to form its policies rather than doing so at home and warned they would end up with a "government of South Africa not directed by, from or in South Africa but by, from and in England."  

The Government's official policy, insofar as it had one, was to increase the contribution gradually. In the meantime, they held they were rendering a service to the Empire with the creation of the South African Defense Forces, which would render British troops in South Africa superflous and thus save Great Britain money. As Botha saw it, the Imperial Government must remain responsible for the external policy of the Empire and did not expect South Africa "to do everything in these waters." The 1913 naval debate was fairly typical of an annual occurrence. In the end Silburn's motion would be withdrawn in favor of the Prime Minister's calling for further talks with the Imperial Government. Talks were begun in 1913 but little progress had been made by 1914.

17 SA House of Assembly, 4 March 1913, col. 691-92.
18 Ibid., col. 626-28.
19 Steyn also opposed the naval contribution, and while he could not participate in the parliamentary debate, his views were well known to his many friends and admirers. He urged Smuts in January 1911 to "break on the head that symbol of extreme jingo imperialism, namely a contribution to the fleet." Hancock and van der Poel, vol. III, p. 22-3.
The South African Defense Forces, however, were in readiness by 1914 and in January put on a show of strength during an attempted general strike. When the Union came into existence, there were some 11,500 British troops in South Africa and by 1914 most of them were still there. Gladstone made repeated requests that the Imperial troops remain or that their withdrawal be gradual and only partial. They were there to safeguard the Union until it could form its own forces, and to keep an eye on the native protectorates. It was not envisioned that they should be used to keep order among the white population or to act in labour disputes. After Imperial troops were used in a miners' strike on the Rand in July 1913, increasing demands were made in England that the troops should be withdrawn from South Africa.  

The British Government's argument was that they were merely helping South Africa until she had her own troops, their traditional policy with the dominions.

20 The Economist in particular objected to retaining Imperial troops in South Africa at the expense of the British taxpayer. It wondered (72:558, 18 March 1911) how the Union Government could afford to send Botha to the Imperial Conference and the coronation if it could not afford to pay for its own defense. When the troops were used in the July 1913 strike, The Economist (77:53, 12 July 1913) cited it as proof the troops should never have been in South Africa in the first place and that their removal would make an appreciable difference in the army estimates.
Furthermore, South Africa was a strategic location in case of trouble in Egypt or India. Moving the troops elsewhere would not necessarily bring about a reduction in the army estimates as some members of the House of Commons seemed to think. There was, however, a growing feeling that South Africa should at least be asked to contribute to the support of the troops stationed on her soil. To Englishmen, the natives seemed peaceful enough and not at all the threat to the white population that they had been 25 years before. In any case, if the white population needed protection, a much smaller force would be more practical.

The forces created by the Defense Act of 1913 were largely of a citizen volunteer type with only a small standing army. Smuts, the author of the defense scheme, publicly maintained that they were rendering a great service to the British army, navy and Empire by now making it possible for Britain to withdraw her troops when he knew perfectly well she had no intention of doing so. Union forces were to be liable for service anywhere "inside South Africa but not necessarily within the boundaries of the Union." Smuts told Gladstone privately

22 Ibid., vol. XXII, 14 March 1911, col. 2367.
that "South Africa" was intended as a geographical description which they purposely did not define, but which could mean all of Africa south of the equator.\textsuperscript{24}

It was understood that British troops were available to South Africa if she needed them, but were South African troops likewise at the disposal of the Empire? Smuts tried to reassure the South African Parliament by telling them "in no case will a person who is trained under this bill be required to go further than the border of South Africa." The Imperial authorities had been consulted on all stages in the preparation of the bill, and there was general agreement that it would be unwise to legislate any further at that time. They must leave it to the "wisdom and good sense of the people of South Africa in the future when the British Empire, of which we form a part, is in need of assistance."\textsuperscript{25} Since any threat to the Union or the Empire in that part of the continent would be most likely to come from German Southwest Africa, and since the Defense Act left the provision for service anywhere in South Africa vague enough to include possible action in German territory, the Government could for the time avoid making any precise policy statement. However, South Africa's participation in a general European war and her

\textsuperscript{24} HG Add. Ms. 46008, Smuts to Gladstone, 16 November 1911.
option of remaining neutral were debated in the press and became a part of the "South Africa first" issue.

While Botha was attending the 1911 Imperial Conference, Volkstem, the paper of the moderate Transvaal Afrikaners and usually a reliable guide to Government opinion, printed a series of articles on optional neutrality. Volkstem maintained that the dominions did indeed have this option, that the Imperial Government thought so as well (it cited the Conference's failure to accept the Ward proposals as proof), and that under certain circumstances the neutrality of one or more of the dominions might be beneficial to the Empire. The paper insisted that the whole argument was academic and that it should not be viewed suspiciously or as an excuse for "sowing the seed of racial hatred." ²⁶ The rest of the press soon entered the debate. The Friend was in agreement with Volkstem's articles. The Cape Times along with the English Johannesburg-Pretoria papers called optional neutrality absurd and voiced dismay that none of the Afrikaner leaders had repudiated it. ²⁷

Botha upon his return to South Africa expressed regret that the Volkstem articles had ever been published

²⁶ Transvaal Leader, 15 July 1911, p. 4 reprinted from Volkstem.
²⁷ Transvaal Leader, 22 July 1911, p. 9 reprinted from the Cape Times.
because of the distrust that had been created there and in England, even though he believed the paper had never intended to advocate neutrality but merely to hold an academic discussion of the dominions' constitutional position. Botha tried to clarify the issue in a speech to his constituency at Losberg in September 1911 by stating that a dominion could not remain neutral without tearing itself assunder from the British Empire. If South Africa were to remain neutral, all English citizens in the country would have to be disarmed. The British would be unable to use their telegraph stations or the docks at Simonstown, and the Governor General would not be able to give any information to the British Government without betraying South African neutrality. On the other

28 Even Lord Selborne got into the argument—Gladstone had the good sense not to—by writing the Transvaal Leader (22 July 1911 p. 9) of his astonishment over the Volkstem articles. Selborne warned that the only way a dominion could remain neutral if Great Britain were at war, would be for it to sever its connection with the Empire in peace. He foresaw no circumstances in which it would be in Britain's interest for South Africa to remain neutral, nor would it be in South Africa's interest since no other part of the Empire was so dependent on British command of the seas.

29 In England, The Times (15 July 1911, p. 10) thought the Volkstem argument was so loosely worded it was almost impossible to discuss it. It called the idea of the dominions being independent states in time of war an "absolute innovation in constitutional terminology."
hand, only the government of each self-governing dominion could decide if its ships and troops would be sent outside its own territory. South Africa, according to Botha, was in no position to lend aid outside the Union, but with the new defense forces being created they would be able to defend themselves and thus relieve Britain of having to do it for them. He was sure both English and Afrikaner would defend South Africa to the last.\(^{30}\)

Botha's statements on neutrality were constitutionally correct, and considering South Africa's military position at the time, perfectly sound. However, his reluctance to discuss the matter was unfortunate. As with other questions involving a possible conflict between South African and Imperial interests, he would have preferred to remain silent. It was only natural that South Africans should wonder what their country's position would be during a European war in which Great Britain was involved. They understandably had no desire to become embroiled in European politics, but as part of the British Empire could they avoid it? The \textit{Volkstem} and others were confusing the option of neutrality, which South Africa did not have, with that of passive belligerency. Selborne and Botha were correct in that South Africa could not

\(^{30}\textit{Johannesburg Star}, 26\text{ September 1911, p. 10.}\)
legally remain neutral during a war involving the Empire unless she were prepared to break with the Empire. A declaration of neutrality would be one of secession. There was a small minority who might have ascribed to that, but no one was publicly advocating it at the time. A state of passive belligerency would be legal and in fact was the only one necessitated by her dominion status. It would still allow scope for a "South Africa first" philosophy since all that passive belligerency required was that one recognized a state of war existed and was prepared, if need be, to defend South Africa. She could not be forced into becoming an active belligerent. Great Britain could so request, but only the South African government and parliament could decide if they would aid the mother country. It would require a careful weighing in the balance of South African and Imperial interests, and it might be in South Africa's best interests to become an active participant. Botha's dictum "such questions should never be raised" probably caused as much suspicion, doubt and confusion as the Volkstem's original articles. Even in 1914 his speech to Parliament advocating invasion of German Southwest Africa and South Africa's active participation in the war, he spoke of the nation's

31 This is in effect what happened in 1914 when Great Britain asked South Africa to invade German Southwest Africa primarily to gain control of the wireless stations. The Union Parliament by a vote of 92 to 12 agreed.
solidarity with and loyalty to the Empire and their moral obligation as a faithful ally to make a contribution of their own to the security and welfare of the Empire rather than stressing what seemingly would have been more appealing, at least to the Afrikaners, namely South Africa's own interests. South Africa had long talked about "gaps in the Union map". German Southwest Africa was one of those gaps, and it was too valuable strategically to suppose it would be left undisturbed during the war. Botha was faced with a dilemma. He was, of course, reluctant to admit publicly South Africa's aggressive designs on German territory while he was branding Germany as the aggressor in Belgium, and he was also unwilling to admit that South Africa's interests and reasons for entering the war might be different and separate from those of the rest of the Empire. By not stressing South African interests, however, he seemed to place Imperial interests first, and some 12,000 Afrikaners openly rebelled against participating in "England's war."

CHAPTER FOUR

The Imperial Connection: The Challenge From Hertzogism

A "South Africa first" policy was not the only ingredient of Hertzogism, that political phenomenon which came to fruition during the years 1910 to 1914. In addition to extolling the interests of South Africa, Hertzog openly denounced the Government's policy of conciliation of the two white races and advocated what he called a "two streams" policy. This was a sort of separate but equal South African nationalism in which each would preserve its own language, history and culture while proclaiming a common love for South Africa. In insisting upon equality in language and education he would allow for no compromises; and he had definite ideas as to what made a good South African and what were the proper uses of the Imperial connection. These ideas, or more specifically the way he expressed them, made Hertzog one of the most disruptive forces in South African politics in the early years of Union. His activities brought about a schism among
the Afrikaners; there was a serious cabinet crisis in 1912 and a split in the South African Party in 1913. Most of Hertzog's followers were from the Orange Free State, and though not numerous during these early years, they represented a section of the population that had either not accepted the tie with England or had accepted it with misgivings. They regarded the activities of the Imperial Government and the Botha ministry with increasing suspicion.

Hertzog had already achieved some notoriety with the English-speaking section before 1910 and had become a favorite target of the English press. As Minister of Education in the Orange Free State after the restoration of self-government in 1907, he was responsible for an education act which enforced compulsory teaching of both English and Dutch for all schoolchildren. The English press coined the term Hertzogism and used it interchangeably with racialism. This was not only unfair, it was incorrect. In 1910 Hertzog was not yet a racialist, and if he became one later on, some of his English critics were in part to blame. Before an audience, Hertzog often became emotional and lost control over what he intended to say. Translated into English and reported in the press, his speeches often sounded more radical than they were. To the English and eventually to the moderate Afrikaners
he came to be regarded as a fanatic, but to the more militant Afrikaner nationalists, and to the Free Staters in particular, he became the leading defender of their language and heritage.

In any case, Hertzog had become enough of a political liability that Botha did not want him in his first cabinet. He sent Smuts to offer Hertzog a judgeship on the Court of Appeals, but Hertzog refused it. F.S. Malan then suggested that only seven of the cabinet posts be filled before the election with Hertzog to be named to one of the remaining three later on. Hertzog found this deceptive and would have no part of it. He was determined to serve in the cabinet in order to look after the interests of his people and of the country. Botha fearing loss of support in the Orange Free State if Hertzog were not included, but still unwilling to deal with him directly, sent Smuts to inform him he would be Minister of Justice. Hertzogism was a useful election cry for the opposition; in fact it was about the only cry they had, and was probably responsible for the loss of several seats the Government had considered safe.

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2 In the first general election held in September 1910, Botha and another cabinet minister were defeated by Unionist candidates who had made much of the dangers of Hertzogism. Botha was so disillusioned that he considered resigning at once, but Gladstone convinced him to find another seat.
As Minister of Justice Hertzog was a poor administrator. Gladstone frequently called his attention to poor conditions in the prisons and to long delays in legal matters, particularly in capital cases. In Gladstone's opinion there was an "inexcusable negligence" on the part of the Justice Department, and Hertzog instead of attending to his office was too often "all over the place making all his tiresome speeches on language and immigration." As a result of a cabinet shake-up in June 1912 Hertzog was given the additional post of Native Affairs. On the face of it, it would not appear to have been a wise choice, but Gladstone oddly enough saw no harm in it. While he knew it might not be too palatable to native opinion, he had enough faith in Hertzog's "humanity and sense of duty" to believe he would refrain from any drastic reversals of policy. As it happened, Hertzog was not at Native Affairs long enough, nor did he devote enough time to it, for the appointment to have any serious consequences.

Hertzog's views on education and language, well known throughout South Africa, were uncompromising,
stressing absolute equality. The Free State would set the example making bilingual instruction compulsory rather than leaving it to the discretion of the parents. Hertzog told audiences that language was the most important factor in national character and just as they had fought for language equality at the National Convention, they must now safeguard it.

The Orange Free State Education Act was challenged in the Union Parliament as being incompatible with the principles of liberty in the new constitution. The English who so vociferously decried the Free State act could not foresee that it was compulsory bilingualism which would also insure the survival of English. Botha, fearful of losing support from one side or the other, finally appointed a select committee which recommended not compulsory bilingualism but rather instruction in the mother tongue for younger children and the language of the parents' choice for the older. The Government and Parliament accepted the committee's report, but since the

5 Smuts as Minister of Education was responsible for the 1907 Transvaal Education Act. It was considered by its author to be a model of conciliation calling for compulsory education on the primary level, religious instruction and language instruction. The study of English was obligatory for all children, but Dutch was to be optional. Instruction in the mother tongue was to be the rule for the younger students. Its critics said it insured the supremacy of English as the permanent language of business and culture in Transvaal. Hancock, Smuts, vol. I p. 240.

6 Johannesburg Star, 7 November 1912, p. 10.
provinces still had jurisdiction over education, it was put into effect only in the Transvaal.\(^7\) The English who strongly opposed Dutch were as shortsighted as Hertzog who wanted bilingualism at once.\(^8\) Hertzog wanted equality for both languages to insure their survival, but his constant speeches on the subject only exacerbated the differences between the two races. In public Hertzog usually spoke in Dutch or Afrikanns, as did the majority of the Afrikaners, even though most of them were fluent in English. A few of Hertzog's followers in Parliament, however, always spoke in English for the benefit of the English-speaking section at whom their sarcasm was usually directed.

Not only did Hertzog wish to preserve the two languages but all else pertaining to the two nationalities. They should be, he felt, in a kind of friendly competition. They were like two streams flowing along side by side; each stream had a right to its existence and they should not try unnecessarily to mix the waters. Their pride in South Africa would be their common meeting

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\(^7\) Hancock, Smuts, vol. I, p. 349-50.

\(^8\) Not only were the English-speaking South Africans worried about the survival of their language; similar fears had been expressed in England even before Union. The Fortnightly Review (n.s. 86:199, August 1909), a supporter of unification, was nonetheless disturbed that English was not to be the sole official language and feared Dutch might "take over."
point. While Hertzog was preaching his "two streams policy", Botha was telling audiences that they had a great future as a united people and that slowly but surely they would become one nationality. In fact, both men were saying essentially the same thing. Botha had no more desire than Hertzog to see the Afrikaner language, culture and tradition disappear. When Botha spoke of one nationality, he meant political nationality or unity with cultural diversity, as in Switzerland. This was also Hertzog's goal though perhaps his metaphor of the two streams was not such a good one, implying as it did separateness on all levels of national life. After his expulsion from the cabinet, he clarified his position somewhat on nationalism when he said it was his hope that someday, "the man of Dutch speech and the man of English speech will say to each other 'your language is my language, your great men are my great men, your history my history because we are both South Africans'."

Unfortunately Hertzog usually expressed his opinions in ways guaranteed to anger the English. He wanted to make the Afrikaner "boss" in South Africa. An Afrikaner was defined in Hertzogian terms as anyone whose first

9 Johannesburg Star, 7 November 1912, p. 10.
10 Transvaal Leader, 7 December 1912, p. 7.
11 Transvaal Leader, 8 March 1913, p. 10.
loyalty and love was for South Africa. It was their duty, he told his audiences, to prevent the interests of South Africa from being entrusted to "foreign adventurers" and aliens. The true Afrikaners, both English and Dutch-speaking, must make common cause against the foreigners "chiefly English speaking" who had come to South Africa. Their time was past and like bastard sheep they were out of the flock. Sir Thomas Smartt, he said in a speech in October 1912, was no more of an Afrikaner than he had been on his arrival in the country twenty years before, and others in the Unionist Party never would be in a hundred years.\(^{11}\) The English press denounced Hertzog's remarks as racialist, egotistic and reckless.\(^{13}\) The whole Unionist Party felt insulted.\(^{14}\) Botha who was in Natal cultivating the independent vote was completely taken by surprise and wrote to Smuts, "whatever I say and do I get only one

\begin{itemize}
  \item [12] Transvaal Leader, 7 October 1912, p. 7.
  \item [13] Ibid., p. 6.
  \item [14] Smartt at the Unionist Party Congress in Johannesburg in November 1912 denounced Hertzog's test for being a good Afrikaner i.e. an exclusive love for South Africa, and admitted that if that were the qualification, then indeed he was not a good Afrikaner. Smartt said he was second to none in his love for South Africa, but they were part of an Empire and its interests must be combined with that love. Transvaal Leader, 20 November 1912, p. 6.
\end{itemize}
answer, 'we are regarded as foreigners'....I have no idea why Hertzog goes so far.'15

It was Hertzog's repudiation of the Government's conciliation policy that finally drove Botha to lose all patience with him. Botha was trying to appeal to the largest number of voters with an idea that seemingly no right-thinking peace loving South African could reject. As we have seen, conciliation was to restore harmony between the white races and between South Africa and Great Britain; beyond that it was extremely vague. The extremists on either side did not accept it; they suspected there would not be full reciprocity. In a famous speech at de Wildt (Transvaal) in December 1912 Hertzog proclaimed, "I am not one of those who always talk of conciliation and loyalty; they are idle words which deceive no one. I have always said I do not know what conciliation means."16 Once out of the cabinet he was even more scornful and insisted that he had done as much as anyone to promote the union of hearts among the people and the development of a pure South African patriotism, if that were what conciliation meant.17 But he did not think it meant that at all. "The beautiful, splendid flag of conciliation

15 Hancock and Van der Poel, op. cit., vol. III, p. 112.
17 Transvaal Leader, 30 December 1912, p. 7.
always flying from Botha's platform" implied peace at any price, and he could not pay it. He believed that many of the Dutch-speaking section already felt "there had been too much buying of good will at the expense of one section."¹⁸ No doubt many English, who since Union had been denied political power on a national level, felt the same way.

The de Wildt speech, one of a series of Saturday speeches that Hertzog made from October to December, finally brought about his removal from the cabinet. In addition to his denunciation of conciliation, his remarks about the British Empire at de Wildt brought on a cabinet crisis. In pleading for an end to flagwaving, Hertzog said that neither he nor his people would "stand back before any man in their loyalty to the British Empire," but Great Britain was not the mother country of the Dutch population. They had seen that the British flag was synonymous with free institutions and liberty, and they had proven themselves worthy of self-government. Imperialism, on the other hand, was important only when it was useful to South Africa, its land and its people. When it was not, he had respect for it only from a great distance, and as a South African he had little to do with it. If imperialism were contrary to the interests of South Africa and

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¹⁸ Transvaal Leader, 13 January 1913, p. 8.
its people, he would be its enemy. This was little more than Hertzog's old doctrine of "South Africa first" but it caused an immediate sensation. Hertzog did not say that the Empire was good only so long as it was convenient for South Africa but that this was so of imperialism. Botha and others in the cabinet inferred that Hertzog was challenging the validity of the Imperial connection. Botha said, and here he used a metaphor as unfortunate as any Hertzog ever chose, that Hertzog wanted to use the Empire like a lemon, to suck it dry and then throw it away.

Hertzog, even after his removal, protested that his de wildt speech had been misunderstood and that in fact he had great respect for the Empire, its great men and its great traditions, but there was no need to wave the flag all the time. If the day ever came, he told a Pretoria rally in December 1912, when the British Empire had need of men to stand by it, they would be in their places even though many others might not. While this speech was noticably milder than those that preceded or followed

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20 Transvaal Leader, 20 December 1912, p. 7, reprinted from Die Week. Hertzog in an interview in Die Week, a pro-Hertzog paper, emphatically denied that he had ever said or implied that they should use the Empire for all they could get out of it and then cast it aside.
21 Transvaal Leader, 30 December 1912, p. 7.
it, it was not basically inconsistent with the others.\textsuperscript{22} Hertzog disliked imperialism while he respected the Empire and even advocated loyalty to it, but only so long as South African interests were always placed first.

The de Wildt speech of 7 December and the affront to conciliation was too much for Botha. The supposed insult to the Empire was too much for Col. George Leuchars of Natal, the Minister of Public Works, who resigned on 14 December after failing to secure an apology from Hertzog.\textsuperscript{23} After several unsuccessful attempts to get Hertzog to resign, the cabinet decided he could stay on if he signed a public statement, drafted by Smuts, in which he regretted having spoken as he had promising not to do so again without first consulting the Prime Minister. Hertzog refused, and Botha on Gladstone's advice resigned. He was at once requested to form a new government with the understanding that Hertzog was to be excluded. Hertzog was now "at large", free to say what he chose about the Government's policies, not that being a cabinet minister had inhibited him, free to rally his supporters and free to form his own political party if he chose to break completely with Botha.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} After the Pretoria speech there were some short-lived hopes that Hertzog might be reinstated. The Friend (7 January 1913, p. 4) hoped he would be returned to Native Affairs in place of Sauer who was regarded as a negrophile in the Orange Free State.
\item \textsuperscript{23} CO. 551/51/59118, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 16 Dec. 1912.
\end{itemize}
The English-speaking press which had always been critical of Hertzog and increasingly critical of Botha as long as Hertzog remained in the cabinet, now tried to make Leuchars the hero for precipitating the crisis. The Star and the Leader had a field day reporting rumors that Abraham Fischer, Hertzog's fellow Free Stater, was also leaving the cabinet, that Hertzog and Merriman were teaming up to form a government, and that Gladstone was considering sending for Smartt. The Leader even tried to revive hopes of and support for a "best men government." The Afrikaner press was more subdued. The Friend blamed Hertzog's English critics for exacerbating the situation. Both the Friend and Volkstem praised Hertzog's past services and expressed hopes he would remain a member of the South African Party. The press in England also had plenty to say about South Africa's domestic problems. The Tory press which had never liked Hertzog compared his speeches to those heard at United Irish League meetings and his intense sense of personal conviction and righteousness to that of a religious fanatic. While

25 Transvaal Leader, 16 December 1912, p. 7.
26 Bloemfontein Friend, 16 December 1912, p. 5.
27 Transvaal Leader, 18 December 1912, p. 7 reprinted from Volkstem.
29 Round Table, 3:368, March 1913.
there was praise for Botha's courage and straightforwardness, there was also much speculation about the future.\textsuperscript{30}

There had always been great sympathy in England for a "best men government". The \textit{Nation} suggested Merriman or Sauer as possible leaders of a coalition government.\textsuperscript{31}

The \textit{Saturday Review} hoped Smartt would be included in any coalition, and that if Botha were unable to form a cabinet, Smartt would become Prime Minister.\textsuperscript{32} There was general agreement that the break between Botha and Hertzog was permanent and that it was for the best.\textsuperscript{33}

The Hertzog controversy did not end with his expulsion from the cabinet. It preoccupied the country and Parliament for most of the 1913 session. There had been a general uneasiness in South African politics and within the cabinet in particular since an earlier crisis in May 1912, which had been a kind of first act to the drama played out in December. This episode known as the Hull-Sauer

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} The \textit{Spectator}, 109:1046, 21 December 1912.
\item \textsuperscript{31} The \textit{Nation}, 12:515, 21 December 1912. Unlike the others the \textit{Nation} thought that Hertzog was an able, if extreme, minister, but in any case better than Leuchars.
\item \textsuperscript{32} The \textit{Saturday Review}, 114:758, 21 December 1912. While the \textit{Saturday Review} realized it might be too soon for a British prime minister in South Africa, a coalition with the Unionists in it would pave the way for their assuming power in a year or two.
\item \textsuperscript{33} The \textit{Times}, 16 December 1912, p. 10.
\end{itemize}
crisis did not have the far reaching consequences of the Hertzog case, but it did reveal certain weaknesses in the cabinet and in the ministers' rather poor understanding of the workings of the cabinet system.

The Hull-Sauer controversy was in part a conflict of personalities. Hull, the Transvaaler and friend of Botha popular in England, was a fairly competent Treasurer. Sauer of the Cape an old friend of Merriman and a champion of native rights, was the Minister of Railways. He was responsible for preparing the railway budget and legislation, which he did in 1912 without consulting the cabinet or Hull until a few days before the legislation was to be submitted to Parliament. Hull, protesting such methods resigned. Sauer had clearly violated accepted cabinet procedure, and the cabinet was in general agreement that Hull "was right on the merits of the case."

Gladstone urged Botha not to associate himself with Sauer's bad administrative policies but to "hold fast to the basic principles of financial administration and cabinet responsibility", and to issue a carefully worded statement on the crisis taking care not to give the impression that he parted with Hull and kept Sauer

34 The Saturday Review (109:225, 19 February 1910) once referred to Hull as "that delightful pseudo Briton."
because he agreed with one and not the other. An acrimonious debate between Hull and Sauer took place in the House of Assembly when Hull was permitted to make a statement concerning his resignation. Details of several cabinet meetings were revealed, much to the delight of the Opposition who sided with Hull. Sauer confessed that the whole cabinet had operated on a "watertight compartment system." Ironically, Sauer was the minister with the most previous experience and should have better understood correct procedure. Botha hoped he would follow Hull's example and resign. When he did not, Botha allowed him to remain in the cabinet, simply moving him from Railways to Agriculture.

Sauer was probably the more capable minister, but Botha's poor handling of the situation set an unfortunate precedent. Gladstone prepared a memo for Botha in which he emphasized the collective responsibility of the cabinet and the responsibility of the prime minister to see that correct procedure was carried out. If the Hull-Sauer crisis had been handled less clumsily, the Hertzog crisis,

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36 HG Add. Ms. 45598, Gladstone to Harcourt, 15 May 1912.
37 The Round Table (2:748, September 1912) supported Hull and felt his resignation and the resulting shuffle of cabinet posts, including Smuts' combining finance and defense and Hertzog's taking over native affairs, left the cabinet seriously weakened.
38 HG Add. Ms. 46006, Gladstone to Botha, Note on Cabinet Policy, 12 June 1912.
while it would nonetheless have occurred because a split between Botha and Hertzog was probably inevitable, might not have been so serious or so prolonged. Sauer was allowed to remain in the cabinet because Botha feared losing the support of Merriman and the other Cape ministers, Burton and Malan, if he were dismissed. If he had lost their support, it most likely would have been only temporary since they were not likely to go over to the Unionists or the Socialists, much less form a party of their own. Since Sauer was allowed to remain after the cabinet had agreed he had been wrong, Hertzog thus assumed that he could defy the Prime Minister, ignore the principle of cabinet solidarity and do and say what he chose. Furthermore, Hertzog knew that Botha feared losing the Free State's support even more than that of the Cape.

Gladstone's role in both the May and December crisis, while always within constitutional limits, was an important and at times even a crucial one. He prevented Botha on several occasions from committing serious errors. Botha wanted to call an election after the Hull-Sauer episode, but Gladstone persuaded him it would be unnecessary and unjustified to put the whole country to the trouble and expense of an election because of the personal incompatibility of two ministers. However, Botha did

39 HG Add. Ms. 46006, Interview with Botha, 13 June 1912.
not seem to profit much by the May experience, and when
the December crisis came, he was once more at a loss as
to how to proceed. Fischer delayed the reconstruction
of the ministry in December while he consulted Steyn on
the wisdom of his remaining in the cabinet. In the mean­
time the administration of the Government was in limbo
because the ministers had the curious idea that until the
new cabinet was formed and accepted, all functions of the
governement rested in the Governor General. Sauer tried
to point out to his colleagues that the Executive Council
was not dissolved with the resignation of a government
and that they should carry on with their official duties.
Gladstone finally had to intervene and inform his ministers
that they held office until he should tell them he had no
further need of their services. Business was resumed.

While giving advice behind the scenes, Gladstone was
drawn into the Hertzog controversy more than the Colonial
Office wished. Hertzog gave an interview to one of the
Dutch papers Die Week in which he revealed the proceedings

40 It would, of course, not have been proper for
Gladstone to make any public comments on the crisis or
on Hertzog's speeches. The closest he came was in telling
a Bloemfontein audience in an after dinner speech
(December 1912) that loyalty to the Empire and loyalty
to South Africa were identical and inseparable.
C.O. 551/51/132512/13, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 26 December
1912.

41 Ibid.
of three cabinet meetings leading up to the crisis. The
details were soon in all the papers. Not only did these
revelations show Botha and the cabinet in a rather bad
light; they were against all established practices
regarding cabinet secrecy. Gladstone was horrified and
telegraphed the Colonial Office which replied that
Hertzog's violation of the secrecy practice could have
been due to ignorance and inexperience and that the
Governor should stay out of the crisis as much as possible.
On the other hand, the Governor had a constitutional
right to object when ministers revealed secrets of the
cabinet or the Executive Council. Gladstone was afraid
that denunciation of Hertzog's conduct by a minister would
not carry sufficient weight and unless he, as representative
of the crown, intervened, it might happen again. His memo
on cabinet secrecy was circulated to all ministers and
was made required reading for all future Executive
Councillers, but it was not published for fear it might
be misconstrued as an attack by the Governor on Hertzog.
Gladstone pointed out that British ministers were bound
by their oaths as Privy Councillers not to disclose
matters that had taken place in cabinet meetings without

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42 Transvaal Leader, 20 December 1912, p. 7.
43 C.O. 551/31/40274, 20 December 1912, minuting by Harcourt and Lambert.
the express consent of the crown or Council and that every
decision of the cabinet was to be binding on all members.
If one dissented and made it known publicly, he should
then resign. These essentials, and here the South African
consitution was no different from the British, were at
the root of the cabinet system and necessary for a
dignified government.\textsuperscript{45}

Gladstone's opinion of Hertzog, as we have noted, was
rather ambivalent. At times he sympathized with him out
of dislike for Hertzog's English critics, especially those
of the Johannesburg-Pretoria press, but he had a low
opinion of his performance as a minister. He felt that
Hertzog should have remembered that his antagonists were
also extremists and that his "irrational and egotistical
counter-attacks" would finally alienate the rest of the
British section. The Union Government was essentially
Dutch, and the British, a decade after winning the war,
had lost political power and were unlikely to regain it.
Gladstone wondered why Hertzog could not see that such
a situation was exasperating to a certain section of
the British population and that his speeches had worried
and eventually alarmed that much larger British section
who were responsible for the policy which had allowed

\textsuperscript{45} HG Add. Ms. 46006 Gladstone to Botha, Memo on
Cabinet Practice, 21 December 1912.
the Dutch to secure political control. At the same time, Gladstone confided to Harcourt that he did not feel that Botha had handled the crisis well. Botha was too easy-going and anxious to avoid trouble. He suspected that Hertzog was justified in saying he had been shut out without the previous warnings and admonitions one might expect.

In December the cabinet was still operating on the "watertight compartment system" that had led to the crisis of the previous May. Botha knew the dangers involved in such a procedure and yet he apparently did not warn Hertzog his speeches were not to the liking of his colleagues. According to Hertzog, Botha did not challenge his statements until the Leuchars resignation forced him to do so. This is believable considering Botha's fears of losing support in the Orange Free State and of splitting his party and his reluctance to deal with Hertzog directly if he could avoid it or if he could persuade Smuts or Fischer to do it for him.

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46 HG Add. Ms. 46007, Gladstone to Botha, 12 Jan. 1913.  
47 HG Add. Ms. 45999, Gladstone to Harcourt, 12 Jan. 1913.  
48 As early as 1911 (June) Botha had talked of challenging Hertzog. He wrote to Smuts from Kissigen: "I have always treated Hertzog fairly and openly and why he treats me like this I do not know....You and I will now have to take a stand somewhere- that is certain, for it seems clear that there is an underhand collusion against our principles and moderate policy. I am ready to go out of the Government at any time and take the bull by the horns as a private member....before it is too late." Hancock and Van der Poel, op. cit., vol. III, p. 45.
At the party caucus in January 1913, where it was hoped the Hertzog matter could be thrashed out before Parliament met, only three members supported Hertzog. The party agreed to say nothing about the recent cabinet crisis in the House until the Opposition brought it up. Meanwhile, Hertzog, whom Gladstone described as being in a "great state of mental irritation and excitement", was trying to force Botha into a debate. Gladstone advised Botha to "sit tight" and make Hertzog speak first since the prime minister should always have the last word. While the full scale debate on the crisis did not come until April, Hertzog and his followers contented themselves with making disparaging remarks about the Government and on several occasions voting against it. Ironically, it was Hull who finally forced the issue. He had grown very unfriendly towards the Government and had supported Hertzog in the party caucus. He criticized the Prime Minister for not having made, as a matter of constitutional propriety, a statement at the beginning of the session on the crisis and on the policy of the new cabinet while jeering at the Opposition for their reticence and lack of curiosity.

49 HG Add. Ms. 45999, Gladstone to Harcourt, 12 February 1913.
Hertzog's most vocal supporters, who numbered about five, were extremely hostile towards the Government. Their speeches were marked by a narrow provincialism. There were complaints that the Free State had been ignored, that they had less new railways than other provinces, and that their minister had been summarily dismissed for the sake of Natal's feelings.\footnote{SA House of Assembly, vol. III, 9 April 1913, col. 1451-52.} They charged that the only thing holding the ministry together was the ministers' mutual distrust and their desire to keep Hertzog out of the cabinet. They expressed no confidence in Botha and called upon him to resign in the interests of the country and the party.\footnote{Ibid., 11 April 1913, col. 1530.}

Botha in answering his critics made his first public comment on the situation since his brief announcement in December. Hertzog's speeches, he told the House, had made a large section of the population feel they were not wanted. Party discipline must be maintained and they must all stand together considering their small number compared to that of the natives, always a strong argument with those many members who feared the "black peril." Botha denied that an election was necessary.\footnote{Ibid., 11 April 1913, col. 1543-44.}
Hertzog retaliated with his most vitriolic speech to date. He compared Botha to the tsar of Russia sending those who disagreed with him to Siberia. The Prime Minister, he told the House, was afraid to call for an election because he was no longer sure of his support in the country. Botha could accept imperialism even if it were wrong for South Africa, but that was not the policy on which the Government had been elected. Conciliation had been ridiculed by the Opposition, by Botha's own party and by a large proportion of the people outside, and since January the Government had covered itself with contempt by not passing or even introducing any legislation of significance. This last charge was true enough, but it was the result of the ongoing debate over the cabinet crisis kept alive by Hertzog and his friends, rather than the Government's being demoralized by his dismissal from it, as he seemed to suggest. Hertzog insisted he was still a loyal party member and vowed he would continue to sit on the Government benches in order to do his duty to the party and to safeguard its interests.

The Opposition in the House showed remarkably little concern for the details of the controversy, while outside their press was showing all its usual curiosity. During

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55 Ibid., col. 1559.
the debate the Unionists contented themselves with an occasional call for elections and preferred to sit back and watch the extraordinary spectacle. Smuts, as had been his custom since the crisis had begun, ignored the whole thing and talked about the budget. The debate dragged on for almost three weeks. Most of the speakers while complaining that the debate was wasting time and regretting that the matter had ever been brought up in Parliament, then proceeded to go over the relative merits of the question again saying very much the same things as the previous speakers.

On 29 April Creswell, the leader of the Labour Party, proposed a motion of no confidence in the Government. He had consulted neither the Unionists nor the Hertzogites. Both were suddenly placed in an awkward position. The Unionists did not like voting with the Labour Party and still less with Hertzog in order to turn Botha out, but there was little else they could do. They were already being criticized for not behaving like an opposition, and the Hertzog faction would have charged them with collusion with the Government if they had not supported the no confidence motion. Botha considered suggesting to Smartt that both the Government and the Opposition walk out en masse when the vote came up. Fortunately Gladstone was able to convince him that such a tactic would only enable
Hertzog to boast that the Government could not face a division.\textsuperscript{56} Hertzog's followers were also in a quandry. After their recent speeches and actions they could not vote for the Government, and their absence would make them look ridiculous. Thus they were forced into an unholy alliance with the English and the socialists to try and prove Hertzog's claim that Botha did not have the confidence of the country.

The no confidence debate was like a replay of the budget debate. Smartt was the only Unionist to speak and he did so late at night. The vote (42 to 68) was a victory for the Government even though the Labour Party, the Unionists (except for four who walked out) and the Hertzog group, including Hull, voted for the motion.\textsuperscript{57} In the month or so remaining of the 1913 session Hertzog and his friends continued their estrangement from the Government, but by then the House was tired of the whole matter.

The split became an open break at the party conference in December 1913 when General de Wet proposed that Steyn replace Botha as party leader with the right to nominate a new prime minister. The resolution was defeated, and de Wet led the malcontents out of the conference. In Bloemfontein in January 1914, Hertzog and his followers

\textsuperscript{56} C.O. 551/39/17026, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 30 April 1913.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
formed the National Party based on solid Hertzogian principles. In the meantime, Hertzog had broken publicly with his old Free State friend and colleague Abraham Fischer. The latter remained in the cabinet until his death in November 1913 doing good work for South Africa and the Empire in his efforts to find a solution to the Indian problem. Eventually circumstances in the 1930's would make Smuts and Hertzog political allies again, but Botha and Hertzog were never reconciled before Botha's death in 1919.

The immediate consequences of the schism in the Afrikaner ranks was the rebellion of 1914 when some 12,000 Afrikaners led by Boer generals de Wet, de la Rey and Beyers opposed South Africa's active participation in the war and her decision to invade German Southwest Africa. The rebels saw it as the right moment to break

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58 Fischer maintained that he remained in the cabinet to pave the way for Hertzog's return and to avoid a split in the party. When some of Fischer's constituents began to manifest some discontent with his position, Hertzog in an open letter in the press reminded him that he had tried in December 1912 to dissuade Fischer from staying on. Hertzog insisted that he had done his utmost to convince Fischer that remaining in the cabinet would be a "fatal step". Now that his warnings had proven correct he told Fischer, "all your personal troubles are your own fault and you are blaming everyone but yourself." Fischer was shocked by Hertzog's remarks but tried to make allowances for the state of mind Hertzog was in and had been in for some months. *Transvaal Leader*, 9 May 1913, p. 7.
the Imperial connection and restore the South African republics. Hertzog and Steyn while not actively participating in the rebellion, did not condemn it, in spite of Botha's repeated pleas to Steyn to intercede. The uprising was put down by the Afrikaner members of the Defense Forces; Botha was careful not to involve the English. The rebels were treated fairly and by the end of 1916 those who had been imprisoned were released. The bitterness remained, and in 1919 Hertzog led a delegation to Versailles in an unsuccessful plea for the restoration of independence to the Orange Free State and Transvaal, in accordance with Wilson's policy of self determination.

Hertzog with his essentially nineteenth century concept of an Empire of colonies ruled from Whitehall, feared that acceptance of the Imperial connection would mean a subsidiary position for South Africa; hence his insistence that South Africa's interests must always come first. Botha in his desire for self-government willingly accepted the Imperial connection and South Africa's partnership in the Empire. Hertzogism represented a threat to the Imperial connection not because of the questions it raised about it, which Botha could have turned to his advantage if he had been willing to discuss
them openly, but because Hertzog's outlook was provincial and racial. He saw things from an Orange Free State point of view and people as either English or Afrikaner. Botha, on the other hand, saw most things in a political context; people were either supporters (i.e. voters) or non-supporters, and he was constantly trying to appeal to as many of them as possible. That Botha's commitment to the Empire was sincere was demonstrated by his actions in 1914. But his prior words and actions, his poor handling of the Hertzog crisis, and his reluctance to discuss the Imperial connection had left some South Africans confused and doubting his sincerity. While Hertzog alleged that Botha was becoming an imperialist, his old friends and comrades de Wet and de la Rey approached him with their plan for rebellion in August 1914 thinking that he, like they, had only been paying lip service to the Empire and had been awaiting the time when it was in trouble to restore Afrikaner independence. 59

The Native Question

During the years immediately preceding and following Union, white South Africa's relationship with the vastly larger native population was not referred to as a race problem but simply as the native question. The racial problem, according to the Government, existed between the English and Dutch-speaking South Africans and it was they who needed to be reconciled. During the 1910-14 period the native question did not play a direct or significant role in politics. Referring to the native problem as a question presupposed there was an answer, and to most white South Africans it was the obvious one of white supremacy. Unlike the Indian question which became an Imperial issue and which the South Africans were reluctantly persuaded to consider, the Imperial Government did not pressure South Africa to modify its native policy. The few pieces of legislation passed during this period specifically effecting the natives received little public attention. South African politicians rarely mentioned the natives in their public speeches except in reference to
the "Black peril", or unless they did not mind being
considered "negrophiles." During this period there were
no attempts to alter the native franchise, either to
extend it throughout the Union or to remove it in the
Cape.¹

While hoping South Africa would develop a more en­
lightened native policy, the Imperial Government intended
to use its control over the three native protectorates of
Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland as a bargaining
tool. The South Africa Act stated that the King and Privy
Council could upon request by both Houses of the Union
Parliament transfer the government of the protectorates
to the Union. During the debates on the South Africa Bill
the British Government made it clear that it was in no
hurry to release the protectorates.² A liberalized fran­
chise in the Union would be proof South Africa intended

¹ Smuts made clear his and the Government's opinion
on the native franchise in an election speech in August
1910. He said civilization had been built up in their
country by the white race, "the guardians of liberty,
justice and progress." The franchise was the last argument,
their final protection, more powerful than the rifle or
the sword. If their children decided to extend political
rights to the natives, that would be their business. At
the present time, he thought it would be one of the most
dangerous things they could do. Hancock, Smuts, vol. I
p. 319-20.

² The British Labour Party in opposing the South Africa
Act feared the protectorates would be transferred too
soon and without consulting the natives. Labour Leader,
to treat the natives fairly and would justify transferring one or more of the protectorates; unjust treatment of the natives would be adequate reason to refuse. Gladstone, as High Commissioner of the native protectorates, made numerous tours of the territories and came round to the view of the Colonial Office that the Union Government should be discouraged from any bid to incorporate them. Because of the geographic location and size of the protectorates, the South African Government from the outset of Union had expressed a desire "to fill in the gaps in the Union map" by incorporating not only the protectorates but Southern Rhodesia as well. The latter was under the jurisdiction of the British South Africa Company and the High Commissioner.

There was something of an unofficial understanding that the Union Government would ask for Swaziland first. It was the best developed of the three with fertile arable land, some gold and tin deposits and large areas farmed by Europeans on concessions granted by Swazi chiefs in the nineteenth century. Gladstone at first accepted the transfer as inevitable. While Botha informed him in May

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3 The British persisted in believing, or wishful thinking, that the franchise would be extended to the natives. One writer in Nineteenth Century (66:243, July 1909) held that those who would find it odious to elect a black man to the Union Parliament were provincial and narrow minded; it was not the Imperial way of looking at things.
1910 that the Government did not intend to ask for any of the protectorates at once, Gladstone still predicted the transfer of Swaziland would take place in about three years. In 1911 he warned Selborne of what he might hear on the subject from the South African delegation to the Imperial Conference. Botha had recently told him "in general terms" the Government felt it was time to take over Swaziland. It would most likely be incorporated into Transvaal, which according to Gladstone would be the best course since the natives would be protected, the Europeans would obtain the vote and the economy of Swaziland would benefit. Botha had also assured him they were in no hurry about Basutoland and Bechuanaland. Selborne was less optimistic; in his opinion the longer the Imperial Government held on to the protectorates the better. An early transfer of Swaziland would upset all the natives living in the protectorates.

After Harcourt expressed some concern over Gladstone's calm assumption that all three protectorates might be

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4 HG Add. Ms. 45996, Gladstone to Crewe, 29 May 1910.
5 HG Add. Ms. 46003, Gladstone to Selborne, 9 June 1911.
6 HG Add. Ms. 46003, Selborne to Gladstone, 5 July 1911. Selborne took a continuous interest in the High Commissioner's office sending Gladstone numerous plans to reform the office, to establish a commission to handle the transfer of the protectorates and to suggest candidates for the High Commissioner's service, all of which Gladstone successfully resisted.
transferred to the Union by 1915, Gladstone modified his views on the subject. He informed Harcourt in October 1911 that he now agreed the Imperial Government must hold on to the protectorates as long as possible. During their talks in July 1912 Gladstone and Harcourt agreed that ideally five more years should elapse before the transfer of Swaziland. The Imperial Government needed time to consider all the conditions and ramifications of such a move. They hoped if Botha were told South Africa could not have Swaziland before August 1914, he would be agreeable and not raise the question before then. Botha was eager to discuss the protectorates soon after Gladstone's return to South Africa. He indicated the Union might not want Bechuanaland and Basutololand for another twenty years, and he seemed agreeable to the August 1914 date for Swaziland. Harcourt urged Gladstone to stand firm and, if possible, to postpone the date beyond August 1914.

The staff of the High Commissioner's office prepared a memo for Gladstone on the feasibility of a Swaziland transfer in 1914. The memo recommended that the request by South Africa and the actual transfer take place in the same year since a long transitional period would be

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7 HG Add. Ms. 45998, Gladstone to Harcourt, 8 October 1911.
8 HG Add. Ms. 45999, Notes on Talk with Harcourt, 28 September 1912.
9 HG Add. Ms. 45999, Harcourt to Gladstone, 13 December 1912.
unsettling to the natives. The Imperial Government had been preparing the Swazis for an eventual change and no trouble was expected from them. Any change would be likely to upset the Basutos and Bechuanas, and some assurances from the Union Government that it did not intend to ask for them for some time would be helpful in allaying their fears. The memo concluded that much needed to be done in Swaziland which could only be done effectively by the Union Government.10

In March 1913 Botha vaguely mentioned the protectorates in the House of Assembly. Gladstone at once wrote for reassurances that there had been no change in policy. He reminded Botha that he had said South Africa might not want Basutoland and Bechuanaland for another twenty years. While he had not taken that date literally, he had understood it to mean a considerable period of time and had thus informed Harcourt, who would now question the information Gladstone had given him. The transfer of all three protectorates at once, which Botha had seemed to hint at, would cause dangerous unrest among the natives and serious complications with the Imperial Parliament.11 Botha explained he had been speaking generally on the native

10 HG Add. Ms. 46005, Rodwell to Gladstone, Memo on the Transfer of Swaziland, 24 November 1912.
11 HG Add. Ms. 46007, Gladstone to Botha, 3 March 1913.
question. However, the Government's native policy could never be fully realized until all the protectorates had been incorporated. Because he suspected the British South Africa Company was interested in Bechuanaland and that Southern Rhodesia was eventually planning to absorb it, he felt they would have to ask for it at the same time as Swaziland. While Gladstone was rather alarmed by such statements, the Colonial Office dismissed them as mere political manoeuvres and did not take them seriously.

Gladstone still expecting the Union Government to ask for one or all the protectorates during his term as Governor besieged the Colonial Office and the Resident Commissioners with suggestions for developing the areas in order to justify the natives' continued ownership of the land. Bechuanaland with its 120,000 square miles and scattered population was the least developed and, as Gladstone saw it, presented a special challenge to the Imperial Government. If they did not develop it, it would be foolish and unkind to the natives to allow them to believe the

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12 HG Add. Ms. 46007, Botha to Gladstone, 12 March 1913.
13 In November 1913 Botha made a speech at Nylstrom where Hertzog had made his "foreign adventurers" speech the year before. Botha mentioned the future absorption of Southern Rhodesia. He later told Gladstone he had wanted to draw attention to the subject in South Africa and in England. While admitting to many difficulties in the way to union with South Africa, he believed it must eventually come about. HG Add. Ms. 46007, Botha to Gladstone, 7 November 1913.
land would always be theirs.\textsuperscript{14} While the Colonial Office assured Gladstone they had no intention of allowing either South Africa or Rhodesia to absorb Bechuanaland in the near future, Harcourt did not think Gladstone's development plan was feasible. According to a 1906 survey there was not much land worth developing. Even if there were "it would be difficult to justify expenditures from Imperial funds to pay for improvements in a country which is ultimately to be taken over by the Union Government." Furthermore, if the Imperial Government did start improving and developing Bechuanaland, they would be tempting South Africa to request it that much sooner.\textsuperscript{15}

The same held true for Basutoland, the only protectorate Botha never threatened to ask for before ten years. This "sleepy hollow", as Gladstone called it, with half of its land uninhabitable and its native population scattered over vast distances, was quiet and well managed under its Resident Commissioner, Herbert Sloley. While admitting Sloley was a great success with the natives and the chiefs, Gladstone felt that in administration and agriculture there was too much "ingrained Sloliness." During his tours of inspection Gladstone found the lack

\textsuperscript{14} HG Add. Ms. 46003, Gladstone to Panzera, 22 November 1913.
\textsuperscript{15} HG Add. Ms. 45999, Harcourt to Gladstone, 2 January 1913.
of progress was worse than he had thought. Reforms in road construction, agriculture, forestry, veterinary medicine and industrial development had never been considered. Once again he urged development of the areas in order to assure "the prolongation of our direct responsibility", and once again the Colonial Office showed little interest.16

The Union Government did not request the transfer of any of the protectorates during Gladstone's administration. In fact Botha's statements on the protectorates during this period so inconsistent that one wonders if he ever seriously intended to ask for any of them. The Government's native policy was at best vague. Their argument was that no real solution to the problem could be found until the protectorates had been included in the Union. The Union probably did want Swaziland because of its good land and its mineral deposits, and because a successful negotiation of a transfer by 1914 would have greatly enhanced the Government's prestige. Even if Swaziland had been transferred, they might still have used the exclusion of Beuanaaland, Basutoland and even Southern

16 HG Add., Ms. 46074., Gladstone to Sir John Anderson (Colonial Office), 21 December 1912. Gladstone had a sort of three-year plan to make Basutoland "a model native community" calling for extending cultivated areas, planting trees, constructing roads and bridges and developing technical training for the natives.
Rhodesia as an excuse for not tackling the native question. With the transfer of Swaziland the Imperial Government would have expected some positive results before transferring the others. As long as the protectorates remained under Imperial control, the Union Government could proclaim their intention to develop a just and workable native policy without having to do much about it. The Colonial Office seems to have understood this better than Gladstone did. On the other hand, the Imperial Government, as we have seen, used the eventual transfer of the protectorates as a rationale for not developing the native areas.

There was little expressed concern for the welfare of the natives on either side. The Imperial Government naturally assumed the natives were better off under their authority—something they could not admit to publicly without offending the South Africans. However, in all the discussions about the protectorates the major concern seems to have been who should have control of the areas. Even Gladstone in presenting his development schemes almost never mentioned the natives or how the reforms might benefit them other than to justify their continued ownership of the land, which should have needed no justification.

White South Africa's answer to the native question was beginning to appear in legislation establishing land
segregation and an industrial colour bar. While such laws had existed in the four colonies, their legalization on a nationwide basis weakened the legal status of the natives and should have been indicative of the sort of treatment the protectorate natives could expect.

The Natives Land Act of 1913, according to Gladstone, was "an honest and interesting attempt to secure a reasonable separation of natives and Europeans" by creating districts to be assigned to the natives and prohibiting each race from buying land from or settling in the territory of the other. A commission was set up to study the problem and determine the division lines. Since the commission's report was still incomplete in 1914, Gladstone would not speculate on how the act might work. In the meantime the status quo was to be maintained unless the Government so designated in individual cases. The Supreme Court ruled that the Act was not constitutional in the Cape since it might be used to deprive the Cape natives of their franchise. In addition, the Orange Free State was virtually exempt from the operation of the Act because the Free Staters did not want any more native areas in their province. The 1913 Act also tried to deal with the problem of native squatters on farms owned by white

17 C.O. 551/58/2539, Gov, Gen. to Col. Sec., 30 June 1914.
absentee landlords and land speculators or companies, especially in Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Neigh­boring land sometimes remained undeveloped because of the presence of the natives. The act brought about an exodus of natives from white farms often under conditions of extreme hardship.  

Laws existed in all four colonies prior to Union regulating the breach of contracts and the criminal liability of the natives in such cases. In addition, there were usually some regulations, amounting to an outright colour bar in Transvaal, prohibiting the natives from holding skilled jobs. What had begun as a safety measure to protect the untrained natives, later became a way to protect the higher paying skilled jobs for the Europeans. This practice was carried over into the Union. The Mines and Works Act of 1911 provided that persons operating or attending machinery must have certificates of competence. In the Orange Free State and Transvaal only Europeans could obtain such certificates.

19 Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. VIII, p. 678-79. The commission's report was issued in 1916, but a bill embodying its recommendations had to be withdrawn because of opposition in Parliament. The Govern­ment then decided to let local committees handle the problem. The land alloted to the natives was not sufficient, but it was not until 1936 that more was made available.

The portfolio of native affairs, which should have been regarded as one of the most important in the cabinet and the one calling for the most stability in office, was held by four different ministers between 1910 and 1914. From the beginning, Gladstone believed the prime minister should always be the Minister of Native Affairs not only to insure continuity but also to demonstrate to the natives that the Government regarded native affairs as of the utmost importance. In addition, it would help the natives to identify with the Government since they would always know who the prime minister was and would appreciate his being their official chief. 21 Botha, however, thought Native Affairs a "particularly thankless office" and one in which he did not wish to jeopardize his reputation. 22 He finally took the position in 1913 after Sauer's death and held it until his own in 1919. But he displayed only a passing interest in it and during most of the period Malan was the acting minister. Smuts, who at one time or another held almost every position in the cabinet, would not touch Native Affairs. The only ministers who wanted the post were Burton and Sauer, who were accused of being negrophiles, and Hertzog, who was interested in protecting

22 HG Add. Ms. 46004, Stanley to Gladstone, 7 January 1913. Stanley was the Governor General's personal secretary and was reporting a conversation with Smuts.
the interests of the Orange Free State and not those of the natives.

Burton, the first Minister of Native Affairs, accepted the charge of negrophile if it meant treating the natives with "justice, reasonable sympathy and as human beings with human feelings." He did not approve of "undue pampering" of the natives. White supremacy and their "enduring satisfactory control over the native people" could never be maintained by violence, repression or unfair discrimination. The white man would lose his hold on the natives if ever they lost their faith in his scrupulous fairness and implacable justice.23 In the cabinet shuffle that followed the Hull- Sauer crisis, Burton was shifted to Railways and Hertzog became Minister of Native Affairs. While Gladstone was not unduly concerned about the possible consequences of such an appointment, Botha later revealed that the native legislation Hertzog had been working on in December 1912 would have ruined the Government.24 Sauer who followed Hertzog at Native Affairs was called a "white kaffir" by some Afrikaners. The Transvaal Leader expressed disgust with the appointment of Sauer. While admitting he knew a great deal about native affairs, the Leader deplored his Cape ideas

24 HG Add. Ms. 45006, Gladstone's notes on an interview with Botha, 8 December 1912.
so detested by Transvaal and Free State nationalists. Nonetheless, it was Sauer who introduced the Natives Land Bill to Parliament, even though he did so with regret and against his better judgement. Native Affairs was indeed a "thankless office" and no minister who held it, even one sympathetic to the natives' position, could hope to do much more than maintain the status quo.

Black Peril, the danger posed to white women by the natives, was the most sensitive and emotion-charged aspect of the native question. In rape cases the death penalty was usually ordered. As High Commissioner, Gladstone had the authority to review cases, commute sentences and grant reprieves and pardons in the protectorates and Southern Rhodesia if he felt there had been a miscarriage of justice. Such a case occurred in Umtali, Southern Rhodesia, in 1910. A native was accused of having entered the house where he was employed and of having assaulted and raped the mistress while her husband was absent. The jury found him guilty and decided on the death penalty,

26 C.G. 5517 3d/9762, Gov. Gen. to Col Sec., 5 March 1913.
27 Stanley told Gladstone that Smuts had indicated Sauer had been given Native Affairs because "the spectacle of Mr. Sauer riding for a fall was one which the Prime Minister was prepared to to contemplate with equanimity," Smuts disapproved of the appointment and saw it as a greater source of weakness for the Government than the elimination of Hertzog. HG Add.MS. 46004, Stanley to Gladstone, 7 January 1913.
but Gladstone issued a reprieve. There was a public outcry in Rhodesia and the Union. Gladstone was more harshly criticized in the South African press than at any other time during his term of office, and there were cries of Imperial interference and charges that he was trying to stir up racial feelings. Since the British South Africans were the loudest in their denunciations, there is reason to believe, as Gladstone did, that the agitation was largely politically motivated. These events occurring while Gladstone was still a relative newcomer gave those who had opposed his appointment an opportunity to demonstrate against him and demand his recall. Selborne as High Commissioner had commuted a death sentence and issued a pardon in a similar case in 1906. In 1908 he had commuted a sentence and ordered the case to be reheard in five years. No serious agitation had resulted even though the judge had publicly disagreed with Selborne's decision in 1908.28

Gladstone issued a public statement in which he agreed with the policy of dealing firmly and when necessary in an exemplary manner with natives who were guilty of criminally assaulting white women. While such cases had not been frequent in Southern Rhodesia in recent years,

28 HC Add. Ms. 45997, Gladstone to Harcourt, 22 January 1911.
nor were they on the increase, the Rhodeians had the right to a full and frank explanation of his action. The accused man was an illiterate native whose statement made through an interpreter was used as an admission of guilt. There was reason to believe the prisoner had not completely understood the charge made against him. Furthermore, there was some conflict between the evidence of the complainant and that of the doctor. After reading all the evidence, Gladstone wondered if rape had actually been committed. The judge admitted privately he would have preferred a verdict of assault with intent to rape.29 Gladstone did not think it had been a premeditated attempt but rather the native had entered the house in search of food or drink. Several witnesses had seen him drunk earlier in the evening, and the complainant agreed her assailant had been drunk. Gladstone decided upon a penalty of life imprisonment.30

Gladstone's frankness dispelled some of the criticism. Support sometimes came from unexpected sources. The Star was relieved to know Gladstone had not acted out of "ignorant and cruel sentimentalism."31 The Pretoria News

29 In England the Saturday Review (111:129, 4 February 1911) could not see why a verdict of assault with intent to rape should alter the death sentence. It feared Gladstone had set a dangerous precedent and that no white woman would be safe in Rhodesia in the future.
30 Transvaal Leader, 28 January 1911, p. 9.
strongly pro-Empire and staunchly opposed to Gladstone’s appointment as Governor, called his explanation lucid and acceptable and deplored the indiscreet attacks being made on him.\textsuperscript{32} The \textit{Friend} also believed justice rather than sentiment had guided Gladstone’s actions and his decision was justified due to irregularities in the judicial proceedings. The \textit{Friend} warned “it would be suoversive of all justice, and in this country of the peace and safety of the European population, if juries were to be swayed in their verdicts by popular or personal feelings.” They could rule the native with a strong hand but they must be just.\textsuperscript{33} Surprisingly it was the \textit{Cape Times} that led the attack on Gladstone accusing him of acting as if he were a court of appellate jurisdiction and of interpreting the powers of the High Commissioner in a “dangerously extravagant sense.”\textsuperscript{34}

Botha and Smuts scorned the criticism and assured Gladstone the episode would strengthen his position.\textsuperscript{35}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{32} \textit{Pretoria News}, 28 January 1911, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{The Friend}, 28 January 1911, p.6.
\item \textsuperscript{34} \textit{Cape Times}, 28 January 1911, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{35} The press in England also took notice of the furor. The \textit{Times} 30 January 1911 p. 10) hoped the agitation against Gladstone would soon cease and people would realize he had acted on the facts and not out of any disregard of the law or the special conditions in South Africa. The \textit{Labour Leader} (10 February 1911, p. 7) deplored the extent of racial bias revealed by the outcry and feared it boded ill for the natives. Gladstone who had been “unmistakenly reactionary” at the Home Office was apparently not reactionary enough to suit South African standards.
\end{itemize}
Nevertheless, the agitation continued in Rhodesia. Harcourt when asked in the House of Commons if Gladstone had been following instructions from the Colonial Office, replied that the Governor had acted on his own authority in the Umtali case. The British Government had complete confidence in Gladstone and they had no intention of reviewing or altering the decision.36 The Cape Times was still not satisfied. It called Harcourt's defense of Gladstone "a Whitehall gloss" and deplored the Colonial Secretary's extraordinary ideas on the relations between colonial governors and the Imperial Government which allowed the former to use their prerogative of mercy without comment or action from the latter.37

There were an increased number of Black Peril cases reported in the press after the Umtali case. There is no evidence there was any real increase in rapes or attempted rapes, but certain sections of the press, mostly those papers that had disagreed with Gladstone's action, reported every episode with big headlines and sensational details. Gladstone confided his belief to Harcourt that

37 Cape Times, 10 February 1911, p. 6. It was the Times that had the extraordinary ideas on the subject. Gladstone had a constitutional right to act as he did in the Umtali case. In such cases within the Union he would have to act on the advice of his Executive Council. In the protectorates and Southern Rhodesia he acted on his own authority as High Commissioner as Selborne had done.
much of the problem stemmed from the widespread practice of using native boys as house servants and allowing them to enter all the rooms. The women sometimes became quite careless. Such things did not happen on Dutch farms; their women would not tolerate it and hired only girls as house servants.38

Gladstone was interested in establishing a small but strong Black Peril commission to study the nature and extent of the problem in the Union, the protectorates and Southern Rhodesia. When he suggested it to his ministers, they seemed agreeable but cautioned against doing it too quickly after the Umtali case. Burton, who was then Minister of Native Affairs, saw no exceptional danger. He feared a commission might make things look worse than they actually were and give the impression the Government was acting out of panic. Furthermore, selecting a commission that would be acceptable to all sides would be nearly impossible.39 Gladstone for the time bowed to Burton's sound judgement based on long and sympathetic experience with native affairs. But as usual, he was reluctant to drop a pet scheme, and he renewed the idea with Botha a year later. The Unionists alleging an increase in Black Peril cases were also calling for a commission. Gladstone was disturbed by the great discrepancies in the

38 HG Add. Ms. 45997, Gladstone to Harcourt, 8 February 1911.
39 HG Add. Ms. 46071, Burton to Gladstone, 2 July 1911.
law and the practices of the four provinces with judges often issuing widely varying sentences. A full and judicial inquiry would facilitate the eventual consolidation of the law. 40 Gladstone's arguments were to no avail. A Black Peril commission was not established. 41

Meanwhile Gladstone was able to dispel many of the doubts and hostilities that had arisen over the Umtali episode by a visit to Southern Rhodesia in September 1911. Harcourt was not convinced of the wisdom of such a trip and advised against it. 42 The Rhodesians greatly admired Gladstone's courageous appearance and his frank explanation without seeming to lecture them. He was greeted by large and spontaneously enthusiastic crowds. 43 The Rhodesian tour was a personal triumph for Gladstone. 44 The Umtali case ceased to be an issue, and little more was heard about it although there continued to be Black Peril scares in the press. The Umtali prisoner was

40 HG Add. Ms.46006, Gladstone to Botha, 2 May 1912.
41 HG Add. Ms. 45997, Harcourt to Gladstone, 3 August 1911. Harcourt agreed a Black Peril commission would be useful, but how could they exclude the rape of native women by white men from such a study. The Union Government was even less willing to investigate that aspect of the problem. 42 Ibid.
44 The trip was also praised in England. The Nation (10:827, 9 September 1911) held that "the responsible statesman who in a moment of popular passion will stand resolutely for the better mind of the country will get his reward." The Times (7 September 1911, p.9) praised Gladstone's good sense and good judgement: such qualities were indespensible in solving South Africa's problems.
eventually given ten years penal servitude by Buxton, Gladstone's successor.\textsuperscript{45} The hopes so optimistically voiced in 1909 that self-government and union would give South Africa the self confidence and security to develop a more enlightened native policy were no closer to realization in 1914. White supremacy continued to be the only acceptable answer to the native question for the European population of South Africa. It was to be maintained by segregation and the denial of political and economic rights to the natives. The Imperial Government despite its supposed belief in equality and justice for all British subjects, was still unwilling to interfere in the native question. Although the Colonial Office did not like the Natives Land Act of 1913, for example, Harcourt felt he could not instruct Gladstone not to sign it or to reserve it for study by the Imperial Government without insulting Botha and the Union Government and turning South African opinion further against the natives.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{45} HG Add. Ms. 46118, Unpublished Autobiography, 1928, f. 212.\textsuperscript{46} C.O. 551/68/22808, Lambert's Memo on the Meeting with the Natives Land Act Deputation, 22 June 1913. Harcourt and Lambert met with a delegation wanting the Imperial Government to set up a commission to look into their allegations that the Act was causing great hardship and a virtual state of slavery. Harcourt refused. The Act was not the final solution. Botha had promised further legislation but they must not be asked to guarantee his promises.
Gladstone's opinions on the solution to the native question after four years in the country were not that much different from those of his ministers. He was in favor of giving the native "a fair payment for actual work done." Since South Africa's prosperity rested on the labour of millions of natives, its only secure basis was "justice to all classes, black as well as white." He also advocated educating the natives in public affairs and in giving them some political responsibilities through the Representative Councils in the native territories. However, segregation was necessary to insure "a reasonable separation of the races" and, more importantly, to prevent the dangers and evils of mixed cohabitation. Gladstone felt that all forces necessary should be employed to strengthen public opinion in South Africa against the fusion of the races. Once the threat of anything so repellent as intermixture was removed, Gladstone hoped the practical difficulties in the way of a scientific and equitable treatment of the social and economic aspects of the native question would not be as formidable as they seemed. 

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48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
African affairs at the Colonial Office, had a more pessimistic outlook. Commenting on a March 1913 despatch from Gladstone, Lambert observed that the Natives Land Act and other such legislation were merely stop-gap measures. It was nonsense to talk about a solution to the native question. The only solution would be the complete elimination of either the black or the white population. The optimism of 1909 was beginning to wear a little thin.

50 C.O. 551/38/9762, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 5 March 1913, minuting by Lambert.
In 1910 there were approximately 152,000 Indians living in South Africa mostly in Natal and Transvaal. Although the laws varied in the four provinces, the Indians were generally restricted in their movements, denied political rights, taxed for holding occupations which put them in competition with Europeans, taxed in Natal for remaining in South Africa after their indentures expired, and whenever possible segregated from the white community. While the Imperial Government had been aware of the grievances of the South African Indians for some time, these grievances assumed major significance from 1910 to 1914 as the Colonial Office sought to keep the Indian question from becoming an Imperial embarrassment. The Union Government was reluctant to make any concessions, while the Colonial Office pressed for a compromise in order to calm the growing discontent in India. Gladstone, acting as an intermediary, at last convinced the South Africans they could render the Empire a great service by remedying some
of the Indians' grievances without subordinating their own best interests.

The settlement of 1914 so labouriously and hesitantly arrived at often reflected little credit on the participants, with the possible exception of the South African Indians themselves. The South Africans, for the most part, were interested in the Indians as a source of cheap labour and not as citizens of their "white man's country." Nor was the Indian Government, despite its repeated protests, solely concerned with the grievances of those Indians, who were often its least desirable citizens, residing in South Africa. Growing discontent with British rule in India made outspoken criticism of South Africa's treatment of the Indians a useful political tool and made attempts to force South Africa to remedy the situation a way of increasing the Indian government's popularity with its own people. The Imperial Government while publicly maintaining the fiction that His Majesty's subjects were equal in all parts of the Empire, was saved from practicing equality by alluding to South Africa's self-governing status. They merely insisted on the form rather than the substance of equality and just treatment. The Indian question occupied much of Gladstone's time and a great deal of space in his official despatches and private letters to Crewe and
Harcourt. He was, in many ways, highly suitable as the intermediary between the Imperial Government and South Africa. While he approved of more liberal treatment of those Indians already in South Africa, he agreed with his ministers that no more should be allowed to enter the country where the racial picture was already complicated enough. At the same time, he understood and sympathized with the Imperial Government's attitude that the pretense of equality and the lack of overt discrimination was more important than the reality.

The first Indians arrived in Natal in 1860 as indentured labourers for the sugar plantations. British colonies had been solving their labour shortage problems with indentured labour from India since the abolition of slavery. Natal's labour shortage became critical in the 1850's. After negotiations with the Colonial Office and the Indian Government, arrangements were arrived at which satisfied the latter that Natal intended to provide adequate protection for the Indians and that they would not become virtual slaves. The Indians were to complete five years of indentured service after which they were as free to dispose of their services as any other labourer. After five more years they were eligible for a free passage back to India or, if the Governor assented, a grant of
crown land equal to the cost (about ten pounds) of the return passage.

While the planters enthusiastically supported indentured immigration, most other white citizens of Natal did not. Over the years the number of Indians grew as the steady stream of immigration continued and few chose to return to India. By 1894 the Indian population had already surpassed the white, 43,000 to 40,000. \(^1\) No further land grants were made to Indians after 1891. The ex-indentured Indians usually engaged in work similar to what they had done under contract—farming, or as unskilled labour, or in domestic service—and so represented no economic threat to the white population. However, the small steady number of free Indians entering Natal and engaging in retail trade were soon competing with European traders. These free Indian immigrants, called "Arabs" by the white community, represented a more self confident and politically aware element in the Natal Indian community. They only needed a champion and inspired leader to help them channel their growing discontent into effective forms of protest. He arrived in 1893 in the person of a young lawyer named Mohandas Gandhi.

While neither Gandhi nor his fellow Indians could have foreseen the significance of his arrival, another event occurred in 1893, the importance of which could escape no one. Natal was granted self-government and with it the right to pass legislation unfavorable to Indians with very little interference from the Imperial Government. From 1895 to 1897 a series of laws were passed which hampered the Indians' movements and made a travesty of their supposed status as free men and of their equality as British subjects. In an attempt to induce ex-indentured Indians to return home, those who chose to remain in South Africa were to be taxed 3 pounds annually. In 1897 the Natal legislature passed and the Imperial Government assented to a 25 pound property qualification and a knowledge of a European language as requirements for immigration to Natal. The law was so administered that most Europeans were judged suitable for entry while most free Indians were not. A franchise law prohibited the vote to "all those who (not being of European origin) are natives or descendants in the male line of natives of countries which have not hitherto possessed elective institutions." Further legislation made it increasingly difficult for Indians to obtain trading licenses and to purchase alcohol.

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2 Huttenback, op. cit., p. 76.
None of this legislation was disallowed by the Imperial Government, which was reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of a self-governing colony and which was satisfied as long as the Indians were not mentioned by name in the immigration and franchise acts. While the Indian Government protested such legislation, it was primarily concerned with the welfare of the indentured Indians. In any case, India could neither interfere with Natal as a self-governing colony nor at this time greatly influence public opinion in Natal.

The position of the Indians in the other South African colonies was no better. The Cape, always the most liberal-minded on racial questions, nonetheless limited the vote to those who could write in a European language—a test usually not applied to Europeans—and meet a 75 pound property qualification.\(^3\) In the two Boer republics the position was decidedly worse. Indians were virtually excluded from entering the Orange Free State, and those few who did were prohibited from owning land or engaging in trade. Transvaal prohibited Indians from becoming citizens, or from owning property except in designated

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\(^3\) The situation in the Cape never became so complicated as it did elsewhere there being only 8,400 Indians in the Cape in 1904. Nor did the Cape Indians become as organized or as willing to protest against their grievances as those in Natal and Transvaal, for which Gandhi sometimes chided them. Huttenback, op. cit., p.218.
streets and wards and made it increasingly difficult for them to acquire trading licenses. In addition, all Indians entering Transvaal had to pay a 3 pound registration fee.\(^4\)

The British Government rather hypocritically protested the treatment of Indians as British subjects in the Dutch republics, while allowing similar treatment to continue in their own colonies.

During the Boer War most Transvaal Indians fled to Natal, the Cape or even India. After the war they came back confidently expecting better treatment under the British. They were to be disappointed. The British attitude towards the Indians differed little from the Afrikaner. Gandhi, who till this point had confined his activities and protests mainly to Natal, now concentrated his attentions on conditions in Transvaal.\(^5\) In 1906 the Transvaal Assembly passed an ordinance, referred to as the Black Ordinance by the Indians, which restricted further Indian immigration into Transvaal through language

\(^4\) Huttenback, op. cit., p. 118.

\(^5\) Gandhi formed the first South African Indian political organization, the Natal Indian Congress, in 1893. From then on he wrote innumerable letters to the press, government officials and the Colonial Office protesting conditions in Natal. Meanwhile he remained a loyal British subject and during the Boer War organized an Indian ambulance corps in Natal. M.K. Gandhi, Satyagraha in South Africa (Stanford, Academic Reprints, 1954), Chapter IX.
requirements and required all Indians resident in Transvaal to carry certificates of registration, with fingerprints, to be produced on request by any official or policeman. The Imperial Government disallowed it, but the hated ordinance became law in January 1907 after Transvaal attained self-government. However, the Indians did not register and by the November 1907 deadline only about 500 had complied with the law. Numbers of resisters including Gandhi went to jail, Smuts, the Colonial Secretary, met with Gandhi in January 1908 and a compromise of sorts was reached. The Indians would register voluntarily, and Gandhi himself had no objection to fingerprinting although he warned that others might. He duly registered and was assaulted by some members of the Indian community who saw the compromise as an admission of defeat. The rest of the registration proceeded peacefully, over 9,000 Indians complying and only about 70 refusing to give their fingerprints.

This cooperation by the Indian community rested on a misunderstanding. Gandhi believed that in exchange for the voluntary registration, Smuts had agreed to repeal the Black Law. Smuts insisted he had never given such a pledge, and there is no evidence in their correspondence

to support Gandhi's claim. Nor is it likely that in their private meetings Smuts would have made such a definite promise to repeal the law. However, he may have indicated a willingness to consider the matter which Gandhi misunderstood. 7

Meanwhile, Gandhi had formulated a new philosophy of protest which he called *satyagraha* derived from the Indian words meaning truth and force. It was to be a form of non-violent protest. The satyagrahi in his opposition to wrong and his refusal to cooperate with those trying to implement it, had to be willing to go to jail, suffer physical abuse and even death if necessary. The philosophy had already been tested in the Indians' refusal to submit to forced registration. Once Gandhi was convinced Smuts had broken his word, *satyagraha* was resumed. In August 1908 some 3,000 Indians gathered in Johannesburg and burned their registration certificates. 8 Other Indians, including Gandhi, illegally crossed the Transvaal border and were arrested and jailed, which had been their goal. The authorities were baffled by the Indian community's refusal to obey the law en masse and their willing and even cheerful acceptance of the penalty.

While the official delegation from the National Convention met with the Imperial authorities in the summer of 1909 to lay the groundwork for the Union of South Africa, Gandhi and a close friend met as an unofficial two-man delegation representing the Transvaal Indians with the officials of the Colonial Office in an attempt to secure concessions. They had no more success than a similar group from Natal or Schreiner's native delegation. Gandhi had remained in close contact with the Natal situation even though he had focused his attention on the Transvaal Indians since 1906. The situation had worsened in Natal since the war with further restrictions on the entry of free Indians and attempts to prohibit Asiatics from holding trading licenses. The Indian Government was finally convinced of the need to end indentured labour to Natal. The Colonial Office fearful of wrecking the chances for Union, persuaded India to delay such a step and meanwhile assured the South African Indians that life would be better under the Union Government where a more benevolent spirit was sure to prevail.9

With the advent of Union, the Indian problem became more centralized. It was now a national problem and, due

9 Huttenback, _op. cit._, p. 262.
to events in South Africa and India, even more of an Imperial problem. The Colonial Office urged the Union Government to consolidate the legislation on Indian immigration. Crewe extolled the virtues of the Australian system (essentially the same one Natal had adopted) of effectively checking unwanted immigrants by the action of the immigration officers. A specifically stated proscription by an act of Parliament by the inhabitants of one part of the Empire against those of another part would be open to grave objections. The Colonial Office assured Gladstone that they fully recognized "the right of a self-governing community to choose the elements which constitute it" and that it was not their desire to press the Union Government to admit immigrants whom the people were resolved to exclude. They simply asked that the exclusion be done in such a way as not to cause the Imperial Government "unnecessary humiliation." \(^{10}\)

While the Natal planters favored the continuation of indentured immigration, there was little support for it elsewhere. Since relatively few ex-indentured Indians returned home in spite the 3 pound tax and other restrictions, the problem of how to have a continuing supply of

Indian labour and at the same time to limit the free Indian population seemed insoluble. Furthermore, a sizable number of ex-indentured Indians legally or illegally migrated to the Cape and the Transvaal where they were not welcome. "Natal's problems grow the more Asiatics she gets," Gladstone told the Colonial Office. He suggested that India take the initiative and stop indentured immigration to Natal, not as a threat to force reforms from the Union Government, but as an action in the best interest of all parties. The Colonial Office agreed, and in December 1910 India announced that indentured immigration would cease the following July.

With the end of indentured immigration and the Union Government's preparations for an immigration bill, hopes were high that this troublesome issue would be resolved at last. But the Government's 1911 Immigration Bill was probably doomed from the start. It called for immigration officials to dictate to all newcomers at least fifty

13 Public opinion in Great Britain generally approved of India's decision (The Times, 3 January 1911, p.9) and saw it as a hopeful sign that the problem could be solved without undue Imperial interference (The Economist, 72:3, 7 January 1911). But the Saturday Review (111:3, 7 January 1911), deplored it as an "act of reprisal" on India's part and feared it would have harmful consequences for the Empire.
words of a European language of the official's choosing. If the immigrant could not write to the official's satisfaction, he would be deemed undesirable. The movement from province to province by the Indians already legally in the Union was to be left to the jurisdiction of the provincial governments. Meanwhile the Union Government was working on a plan to allow a small number of educated Indians (about twelve) to enter the country each year.\(^{14}\)

There was opposition to the bill from all sides. While no one objected to Indians being given the so-called education test, some feared it would also be applied to keep out Eastern European Jews, political refugees, or anyone whom the immigration officials happened to be prejudiced against. The Labour members of Parliament believed that needed artisans would be prohibited from entering the country, and their spokesman Creswell questioned whether the Government really wanted any immigrants.\(^{15}\)

Merriman and Smuts tried to emphasize the Imperial significance of the bill. However, as Merriman was quick to point out, The Imperialists in the House were as critical of the bill as anyone in their wanting to bar all future immigration from India and to restrict seriously the

movement of those Indians already in South Africa.\footnote{SA House of Assembly, vol. I, 28 February 1911, col. 1457.} Smuts tried to reassure everyone. The Imperial Government had suggested the education test and it would only be used as a weapon to keep out those who would not be good for South Africa. The new Indian immigrants allowed to enter each year to minister to the needs of those already there would be so few in number as to make no noticeable difference.\footnote{Ibid., 13 March 1911, col. 1735-36.}

As early as mid-March, Gladstone saw that the bill was in trouble.\footnote{C. O. 551/10/10694, Gov. Gen. to Col Sec., 15 March 1911.} The Free State members remained adamant against any Indians, including educated ones, entering their province. In addition, adverse criticism in India had further weakened the position of the bill. Gladstone assured the Colonial Office the Union Government was anxious to settle the problem "on a reasonable basis", but they needed more time. Smuts did not plan to withdraw the bill at once but by not proceeding with it to show that the Government thought its passage to be impossible. Gandhi threatened to renew passive resistance if Indians were not allowed to enter the Orange Free State. He wanted
the bill dropped and a new one introduced that session. This, according to Gladstone, was not possible in the six or so weeks remaining in the 1911 session. Harcourt was skeptical that Smuts could prevent the resumption of Indian agitation or that he could bring in a better bill in 1912. Failure to proceed with the 1911 bill might only enhance Gandhi's prestige and lead him to think he could dictate to the Union Government. However, after talks with the India Office and the Viceroy, who admitted he had never expected the South Africans to pass a satisfactory bill, the Colonial Office agreed to the withdrawal of the bill in late April. Passive resistance was not renewed. After talks with Gandhi, Smuts remained convinced there was a good chance for a settlement during the next session.

The immigration question was discussed with no conclusive results at the Imperial Conference in 1911. Crewe, as the new Indian Secretary, tried to impress upon the dominion representatives India's importance and contributions to the Empire. The India Office and the Indian Government were trying to explain to the Indians that the

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20 C.O. 551/10/12316, Tel. Col. Sec. to Gov. Gen., 12 April 1911.
21 C.O. 551/16/12960, India Office to Colonial Office, 20 April 1911.
22 C.O. 551/10/15711, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 26 April 1911.
dominions must be allowed to regulate immigration and that they must not develop extravagant claims for entrance. He reminded the ministers that there were a few noisy and sometimes formidable groups who were opposed to British rule in India and who used the immigration issue to their own advantage. He warned that until better relations existed between the dominions and India, they were far from being a united Empire. The dominion representatives had heard it all before, and in any case they knew the Imperial Government could do little more than remonstrate. Even Crewe admitted that the idea that any British subject could live, travel or settle anywhere in the Empire he chose, was an impossible one. He further conceded that perhaps Britain had underestimated the difficulties the dominions faced with large-scale immigration of coloured races, since they had never had to face the problem

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24 As The Times (12 September 1910, p.9) pointed out, equating British citizenship with the old Roman concept of equal status in all parts of the Empire, was no longer valid or practical because of the self-governing colonies' right to "build up its population on what materials it chose." White men were sometimes excluded from parts of the Empire usually as individuals and not as a race, but the principle was the same. It reminded Indians that their seeming inequality was not due to their inferior status as British subjects but merely to the facts of race which many of them recognized as strongly.
themselves.\textsuperscript{25} The supporters of the South African Indian cause in England (the South African British Indian Committee) protested in vain to the Colonial Office that the Imperial Conference had settled nothing and no one from the Indian side had been present.\textsuperscript{26}

Meanwhile in South Africa, passive resistance had almost ceased. Satyagraha had already gone on for four years and the movement needed money if it were to continue. The once substantial income from Gandhi's law practice had ceased with his full-time involvement in politics. Several white South African supporters provided funds and one presented them with a 1,100 acre farm near Johannesburg which Gandhi named Tolstoy Farm. Gandhi turned it into a communal farm for the families of those Indians who had been deported or imprisoned. There were usually about seventy-five residents. All were expected to work cultivating the fruit trees or vegetarian gardens or making sandals. Gandhi later wrote that without Tolstoy Farm they would not have been able to continue the struggle until 1914.\textsuperscript{27}

In the summer of 1911 the Union Government revised and modified its immigration bill and prepared to resubmit

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\item \textsuperscript{25} Parliamentary Papers, 1911, Vol. LIV, Cd. 5745, p. 395-96.
\item \textsuperscript{26} C.O. 551/22/24073, South African British Indian Committee to Colonial Office, 20 July 1911.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Gandhi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 258.
\end{itemize}
it to Parliament. Gladstone thought it was an improvement. It is hard to see why since it contained no significant changes. He did not expect it to get a cordial reception and asked the Colonial Office to understand the difficulties his ministers were facing and to approach the bill in a sympathetic spirit. Smuts revealed his optimism about the bill's chances in a conversation with Gladstone's secretary, Herbert Stanley. He had been in touch with Gandhi and was convinced the Indians would find the bill acceptable. In addition, Hertzog had voiced no objections to the limited entry of Indians into the Free State, thus giving Smuts hope that the other Free Staters would follow his example.

Nonetheless, things did not go well when the bill was introduced in Parliament in January 1912. Smuts hoped for a second reading at once, but the members objected that they needed more time to consider such an important measure. Smuts agreed to a delay, and the Immigrants Restriction Bill was not heard of again until the end of May when the Government was in the midst of the Hull-Sauer crisis. As the bill was reminiscent of the previous

28 HG Add. Ms. 45998, Gladstone to Harcourt, 23 October 1911.
29 HG Add. Ms. 46004, Stanley to Gladstone, 26 October 1911.
year's, so were the speeches. Many Free State members far from being docile, arose to oppose the entry of any Indians, no matter how educated or cultivated. Soon the Free State would be as overrun with Asiatics as Cape Town, which according to one speaker would soon cease to be the seat of Parliament because members would refuse to spend half the year amidst so many Asiatics. Pichardt preaching his "south Africa first" doctrine held that India's approval of the bill meant that it could not be in South Africa's best interests and that this was reason enough for opposing it.

The bill was not withdrawn this time. It was merely left in limbo at the second reading stage when the session ended in June. Even the prospect of prolonging the session did not reduce parliamentary opposition to the bill. Nevertheless, Gladstone remained hopeful until the end that his ministers could force the bill through. He blamed the "organized obstruction" in the House for the failure of

30 As in 1911 Theo Schreiner, brother of William, was a virtual voice in the wilderness calling for better treatment of the South African Indians. He advocated the abolition of Natal's 3 pound tax and better treatment of Indian traders who if they were driving white competitors into bankruptcy, it was because Europeans preferred to deal with them. SA House of Assembly, vol. II, 22 June 1912 col. 3964-65.
31 Ibid., 3 June 1912, col. 3143.
32 Ibid., col. 3607-09.
the bill rather than the Government's own dilatory methods. While Gladstone criticized Smuts for having been "unduly sanguine" about his ability to pass an unpopular bill, his main worry as the session drew to an end seems to have been that a prolonged session and the cabinet crisis would delay his trip to Natal and consequently his voyage to England.

Once again the India Office expressed regret that the Union Government had failed to pass an immigration bill or remedy any of the Indians' grievances. Harcourt whose patience was wearing thin, agreed they had something to complain about since the South Africans had more or less promised this bill would pass. Lambert, however, felt that Smuts had only agreed to persist with the bill. He had warned them in November 1911 it might fail and his sense of obligation had diminished over the months. The Union ministers briefly considered a special session of Parliament in November 1912 to deal with the immigration question. They soon dropped the idea in favor of introducing a new bill early in 1913.

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34 HG Add. Ms. 46006, Gladstone to Botha, 12 June 1912.
35 C.O. 551/34/20520, India Office to Colonial Office 2 July 1912, minuting by Harcourt and Lambert.
Meanwhile, the Imperial Government came in for some criticism in the British House of Lords for South Africa's failure to act on the Indian question. Lord Ampthill, the president of the British South African Indian Committee, frequently spoke for his favorite cause, much to the Government's dismay. He reminded the Lords he had refrained from mentioning the Indian question for some time on the understanding that a settlement was near. The South Africans had once again failed to keep their word. He scorned the same "old stupid and rotten answer' about not interfering with a self-governing colony. If they could not come to an agreement with their dominions, the Empire no longer existed.37 Ampthill was more correct than he knew. The Empire might still exist but it would not work by the old rules. As The Spectator pointed out, the Imperial Government was caught in the middle in trying to implement the "two equally excellent principles" of guaranteeing the rights and welfare of all its subjects and of ensuring the reality of self-government for the dominions. While the South Africans should not provoke a storm of anger in India, the Empire could not be run on the theory that "nothing must be done that could conceivably offend Indian sentiment."38 Lord Emmott, the Under-secretary for

38 The Spectator, 109:850, 23 November 1912.
the Colonies, came to the defense of the Government and the South Africans. The Colonial Office did intervene when it was useful, but they would not be forced into a position of constant nagging. Emmott was convinced the South African ministers were anxious to pass an immigration bill, but a backlog of other legislation had made it impossible.\(^39\) The Colonial Office might complain in private about the Union's methods and intentions, but they always defended them in public.

During Ampthill's outburst, Professor G.K. Gokhale, a highly respected Indian leader was present at the debate. Gokhale was introduced to Emmott and warned him that feeling in India was bitter. Britain could expect reprisals to be taken against any South Africans who emigrated to India. Emmott thought this a rather strange threat since he neither knew of, nor could imagine any South African wanting to go to India.\(^40\)

The Indians, never altogether pleased with the abortive 1912 bill, now placed their hopes in the good that might result from Gokhale's visit to South Africa. Gandhi for some time had been urging Gokhale to study the South African situation first hand and to report his observations

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\(^{39}\) House of Lords, vol. XII, 17 July 1912, col. 572-3.  
to the Indian Government. The India Office and the Colonial Office approved of the idea, and the South African Indians prepared a grand welcome for their important visitor. The Union Government cooperated fully in permitting Gokhale to address meetings in town halls and railway stations, and in short treating him as any other distinguished foreign visitor. He visited all four provinces and near the end of his six week stay met with Gladstone and the Union ministers.

Gandhi did not go with Gokhale to his meeting with the Union ministers lest his presence prevent them from speaking frankly. The interview lasted over two hours; afterwards Gokhale told Gandhi he (Gandhi) would be able to return to India in a year since everything had been settled. Gokhale assured him the ministers had agreed to repeal the Transvaal Black Law, to have no racial bar to the immigration act and to abolish the Natal 3 pound tax. Gandhi was rather skeptical, but he accepted the promises made to Gokhale as proof of the justness of their demands.

41 Gandhi, _op. cit._, p. 260.
42 Merriman had written to Smuts in October warning that the Gokhale visit would probably be an embarrassing mistake because the South Africans would treat him "as a mere coloured person." He advised Smuts, as was his custom, to bear in mind Gokhale's important position in India and to set the proper tone for the visit by making him the guest of the Government. They must not appear rude or churlish. As it happened, Gokhale had nothing to complain of, as far as hospitality was concerned. Hancock and Van der Poel, _op. cit._, vol. III, p. 115.
and as a reason for redoubling their fighting spirit if the need arose.\textsuperscript{43}

Gokhale's visit was to have far greater significance than anyone knew at the time. The Indians' belief that the Union ministers had promised to abolish the 3 pound tax was shattered when the 1913 Immigration Bill was presented to Parliament. Once again the Indian community felt betrayed by ministers who had failed to keep their word. But again as in 1908, it was almost certainly a misunderstanding. The Union ministers who had good reason to remember the dispute between Gandhi and Smuts in 1908 would have been reluctant to promise Gokhale anything they could not deliver. They no doubt assured him they would try to abolish the 3 pound tax. In fact Botha had already indicated to Gladstone a willingness to do so. However, they would have known that any definite pledge would be subject to criticism from all sides and to charges of bad faith if they could not make good. They were all too "slim" to make such a mistake. Gladstone, who was in close contact with his ministers on all aspects of the Indian question, knew nothing of it. On 16 November, the day before Gokhale sailed for India, he met Gladstone and indicated Botha had made "satisfactory assurances" about the three pound tax. Gladstone certainly never understood it to mean that

\textsuperscript{43} Gandhi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 367-68.
Gokhale had been given a definite promise. Gokhale further assured Gladstone he had satisfactory promises of support for the new bill from the Opposition members, even those who had been most opposed to it in the past. Gok­hale, it appears, was entirely too optimistic about the success of his mission. It is true, he had made a favorable impression on the South African Government, but once he had gone back to India, they felt less committed again to finding a solution. However, the Gokhale mission was still a success as far as the Indians were concerned. Gandhi later wrote that it had a two-fold benefit. It had made the 3 pound tax one of the targets of their struggle and it made Gokhale something of an authority in India on the South African situation. The Gokhale visit marked the end of one phase of the South African Indian problem. With the events of 1913 and 1914 it ceased to be merely an Imperial embarrassment and became in Gladstone’s words "a veritable Imperial imbroglio."

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44 C.O. 551/30/38782, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 16 November 1912.
45 Gandhi, op. cit., p.276.
Preparation of a new immigration bill was delayed by the cabinet crisis and by Fischer's being put in charge of the bill as the new Minister of the Interior. In February, Gladstone was urging Botha to submit a bill to Parliament, but Fischer, under fire from his Free State colleagues for having remained in the cabinet, had not even submitted a draft bill. ¹ Neither Gladstone nor the Indians liked the bill once they saw it. The 3 pound tax was not to be abolished. Indians were to be barred from entering the Orange Free State. The dictation test could be administered in any European language including Yiddish, thus disarming most of the former Jewish opposition to the bill. In addition to the language test, immigrants could be prohibited on economic grounds or because of unsuitable habits and/or living standards. Fischer assured Gladstone British Indians would not have to be discriminated against by name, but Gladstone did not see how it could be avoided.²

¹ HG Add. Ms. 45999, Gladstone to Harcourt, 12 February 1913.

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While the Colonial Office thought the bill was an improvement over its predecessors, Gladstone foresaw the possibility of another failure and asked the Colonial Office to make it clear to India that South Africa's intentions were good and that they must refrain from raising objections unless they were absolutely vital.\(^3\)

Gandhi saw the Government's failure to include the removal of the Natal 3 pound tax in its new bill as reason for renewing and widening the satyagraha struggle. Since the ex-indentured labourers in Natal were the most effected, they were invited for the first time to join the movement. Tolstoy Farm was closed temporarily and its inhabitants relocated at the more strategically located Phoenix Farm in Natal. While the Indians were preparing to demonstrate against the bill, a new grievance was unexpectedly added. It had nothing to do with the 1913 bill but with a court decision in March 1913. A justice of the Cape Supreme Court ruled that all marriages not performed according to Christian rites and registered by a registrar of marriages were illegal. Previous court cases had determined that only one wife of a polygamous union could enter South Africa. The effect of this new judgement, according to Gandhi, was to nullify all marriages celebrated by the

\(^3\) C.O. 551/37/6633, Tel. Gov.Gen. to Col. Sec., 22 February 1913.
Hindu, Muslim or Zoroastrian rites, and to reduce their wives to the rank of concubine and their children to bastards. Gandhi wanted the Union Government to amend its bill to recognize the validity of Indian marriages. The Government refused, and the Indian women were invited to join the struggle.4

The Immigrants Restriction Bill did not come up for a second reading until 30 April due to the House's preoccupation with the Hertzog controversy and the no confidence debate. Although Fischer was in charge of piloting the bill, Smuts still took an active interest in its progress. Fischer's words and actions took some courage considering his uncertain position in the Orange Free State and his growing estrangement from his old friend Hertzog. He admitted he would rather "call a spade a spade" and state clearly whom they wished to bar from South Africa. However, he recognized their obligation to the British Empire, whose tradition it was "to have legislation that took away no one's right whatever their race or colour."5 The hypocrisy of such a statement could not have escaped many of his listeners. The Imperial Government had convinced the Union Government, whose job it now was to convince

4 Gandhi, op. cit., p. 277-78.
Parliament, that such hypocrisy was in the best interests of both South Africa and the Empire.

The bill had its usual critics, and its prospects were far from bright. It was argued that the Government had too much power—there was no appeal from the Immigration Boards. Natal was blamed for starting the whole problem with its system of indentured labour. The Free State's exempt status was greatly resented. How could what was bad for the Free State be good for anyone else? Transvaal had only to repeal the Black Law of 1907 and the whole problem would be solved. Fichardt called the bill a "miserable measure designed to please those who lived somewhere in the neighborhood of Downing Street." 6

The Colonial Office was eager to get any bill passed. While they felt it could be improved by some modifications, they agreed it was not worth the risk of losing the entire bill. 7 In May, the Colonial Office instructed Gladstone to tell his ministers that they wanted to see the bill passed without further delay even though it would not satisfy all the Indian community. 8 The telegram was shown to Government and Opposition leaders and it had the desired effect. There was no division on the second reading and it

was safely passed through the committee stage "amid general cheering." Whether the cheering expressed satisfaction with the bill or relief at the conclusion of "this tedious troublesome business", Gladstone felt it was best not to enquire.9

The bill did not remove the 3 pound tax and it left the marriage question more confused than ever.10 At Gladstone's request, the Colonial Office asked India to use its influence on Gandhi and his followers. Any resumption of passive resistance would convince the South Africans the Indians had forfeited any claims to considerate treatment. According to Gladstone, most women and children were already exempt from the 3 pound tax, and any concessions on the marriage question would be of a sentimental rather than practical value.11 There was a last minute attempt to legally exempt women from the 3 pond tax (the Natal Indian Amendment Bill), but it was dropped with

10 C.C. 551/39/17025, Gov. Gen. to Col Sec., 30 April 1913. The 1913 Act said the monogamous wife of a duly registered marriage having all the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in the Union, would be allowed to enter. Indian marriages were seldom registered in the manner of European and few could be considered monogamous. Fischer had said that one wife would be allowed to enter no matter which wife she was, as long as she really was the wife of a domiciled Indian. The Act made no such provision and the question remained controversial.
the prorogation of Parliament. Gladstone had signed the Immigration Act two days before, and neither he nor the Government were in a mood to grant further concessions that year.\(^\text{12}\) The ministers were clearly annoyed that the Indians were still not satisfied. Gladstone felt the Government had gone as far as it could in meeting the Indians' demands. He blamed Gandhi's threatening statements for the failure to pass the Natal Bill although he knew the Government was reluctant to alienate Natal opinion and fearful the Opposition would insist on exempting everyone from the tax if they had persisted with the bill.\(^\text{13}\)

Attempts to forestall a renewal of passive resistance failed. When the Colonial Office asked the Indian Government to use its influence with Gandhi, the Viceroy, Charles Hardinge, refused. He thought it would be "dangerously open to misconstruction" if the Indian Government were to enter into direct communication with the Indian leaders in South Africa. Hardinge suggested the Colonial Office ought to discuss the matter with Gokhale who was in London.\(^\text{14}\) Harcourt met Gokhale, but doubted if he could be of any help since Gokhale's openly discouraging passive resistance might diminish the moderating influence he had

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\(^\text{13}\) C.O. 551/41/23199, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 18 June 1913.
\(^\text{14}\) C.O. 551/49/22782, India Office to Colonial Office, 3 July 1913, contains Viceroy's telegram of 18 June 1913.
on the South African Indians. The Colonial Office was prepared to wait until Fischer came to London before discussing further concessions. In the meantime the Colonial Office would wait and see how the act worked, and they advised the India Office, which had been hoping the King would refuse to sign it, to do the same.\textsuperscript{15}

Lord Ampthill took up the cudgels again in the House of Lords calling South Africa's treatment of the Indians a worse scandal than Chinese slavery. He criticized the Colonial Office for not offering guidance and advice, Harcourt for not wanting to be bothered with the problem, the Union Government for not keeping its promise to Gokhale and the Imperial Government for not assuring that it did.\textsuperscript{16} Ironically, it fell to Lord Crewe, the India Secretary, to defend Gladstone and his ministers. They had to work against "a vast amount of personal and racial prejudice" in South Africa. He admitted the 1913 Act was not a final settlement and India would rightfully

\textsuperscript{15} C.O. 551/49/26748, Colonial Office to India Office, 3 August 1913. Gokhale and the India Office suggested sending a commission to South Africa to study the working of the new act. The Colonial Office and Gladstone were strongly opposed to what the South Africans would certainly have regarded as blatant interference by the Imperial Government.

\textsuperscript{16} Hansard, House of Lords, 5th series, vol. XIV, 30 July 1913, col. 1515-17.
continue to urge more concessions. 17 The British press which had written much in the past about the South Africans' right of self-government while urging the Indians to be patient, now began to sympathize with the Indians. The Times, which was typical in this case, believed the Indians had "substantial grievances" against the new Immigration Act in addition to the old disabilities and discriminations which were "quite unnecessary to protect the white population." 18

The new act went into effect in August 1913, and the administration of it immediately produced a new crisis. Immigrants prohibited by the immigration officers could only appeal to the Appeals Board an not to a court of law, which had been one of the Indians' major complaints. At the first meeting of the Appeals Board the chairman publicly read the instructions he had from the Government that all Asians were to be deemed undesirable on economic grounds. This in itself was no surprise. Everyone knew the Indians were to be kept out this way, but the Imperial Government had given assurances it would not be stated publicly. At this time, the British, the South Africans and even the Indians were still concerned with preserving

17 Hansard, Lords, vol. XIV, 30 July 1913, col. 1525.
18 The Times, 5 August 1913, p. 8.
appearances. Gladstone was especially upset. He wanted to know if it had been a departmental blunder or merely the thoughtlessness of one particular official. He was in an awkward position because he had assured the Imperial Government and India that this already unpopular law would be mitigated by wise and tactful administration.19 This incident produced an unusual coolness between Gladstone and Botha. The latter did not think that any "reasonable person" could contend there had been a breach of understanding or even a blunder. Botha obviously thought Gladstone was making too much of the episode. If he asked the magistrate to retract his statement or to deny he had the authority to make it, "they might as well tear up the Act."20 Nevertheless, the incident did not occur again. After reading the Gladstone-Botha correspondence on the subject, Harcourt agreed Botha had behaved rather badly, but he encouraged Gladstone not to prolong the controversy.21

Harcourt held further talks with Gokhale and Fischer. At the same time he refused to meet an Indian delegation wishing to protest the Immigration Act because he feared he would have been rude to them in strongly defending the Union Government.22 Gladstone, who was displeased

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20 Ibid., Botha to Gladstone, 17 September 1913.
22 HG Add. Ms. 46000, Harcourt to Gladstone, 20 August 1913.
with all his ministers, warned the Colonial Secretary that Fischer was well meaning but weak and a little too slim.  

He complained his ministers were not keeping him fully informed. Even his secretary, Stanley, was unable to discover more than it would be impossible to satisfy Gandhi on all points and there was little hope of avoiding passive resistance. Gladstone assured the Colonial Office he would continue to use what influence he had with the Government, but he feared the Indians' attitudes were so inconsiderate and their demands so exorbitant that a conciliatory response from the Government was not likely.

Passive resistance was resumed in September when a group of men and women, including Gandhi's wife, illegally entered Transvaal. They were sent back to Natal. When they repeated the act, they were arrested and sentenced to from one to three months of hard labour. Women from Transvaal entered Natal to encourage the Natal miners to join the struggle. The women's subsequent arrest and imprisonment had the desired effect. Three thousand miners and 1,500 rail workers went on strike protesting the 3 pound tax. Gandhi visited the Natal coalfields in mid-October and

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23 HG Add. Ms. 46000, Gladstone to Harcourt, 11 September 1913.
and urged the workers to remain on strike until the tax was removed.25

Meanwhile the Government took no further action. According to Gladstone this had a disconcerting effect on Gandhi, who reportedly complained it was the Government's duty to arrest the strikers and provide them with food and shelter in the form of jail sentences. Smuts believed governmental restraint would lead to the collapse of the strike in Transvaal and Natal. Gandhi was allowed to remain free, Smuts reasoning that once he was imprisoned he would disclaim any responsibility for his army of strikers. The Government was more interested in arresting the Indians' European supporters before they could leave for India, where they planned to secure funds for the strikers.26

Gandhi was finally arrested on 6 November on a march into Transvaal. He was released on 50 pounds bail. Two days later he was rearrested and again released on bail rejoining his fellow marchers before they had gone three miles. Their goal was Tolstoy Farm.27 When arrested for the third time on 9 November, Gandhi was sentenced to nine

25 C.O. 551/44/39025 Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 23 October 1913. Gladstone was in an optimistic mood again continually disputing Gandhi's strike figures which he said were exaggerated. Gladstone saw signs that the strike was weakening as the Natal Indians tired of Gandhi's leadership.  
27 Gandhi, op. cit., p. 303-06.
months hard labour. The strike had spread to the sugar plantations, and the Government had finally lost all patience. Smuts was still making no promises on the 3 pound tax, but he hoped events would educate Natal opinion to the necessity of its removal.28

With charges of brutality and uncivilized conduct being made against the Union Government in the British press, all traces of estrangement with his ministers disappeared and Gladstone again came to their defense.29 He thought the demonstrations had been engineered in India—a view he persisted in over the next several months. He admitted his ministers should have abolished the 3 pound tax and they had made some administrative errors, but they had been forebearing almost to the point of weakness because of their concern for the Imperial viewpoint.30 It was quite a change from his opinion two months before.

When the Indians who had marched into Transvaal were returned to Natal and refused to work, the Government came

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28 The Natal Mercury (6 November 1913, p. 6) advocated the abolition of the 3 pound tax which should have been done when India stopped indentured immigration. The Indians' methods might lose them some European support, but the Government should still tackle the question.

29 The Labour Leader (20 November 1913, p. 7) accused the Union Government of committing and the Imperial Government of condoning slavery, barbarism and murder in the treatment of the South African Indians.

30 HG Add. Ms. 46000, Gladstone to Harcourt, 19 November 1913.
up with the ingenious idea of declaring the mine compounds out-stations of the Dundee and Newcastle jails. Work in the mines was made part of the Indians' sentences. At once there were allegations of cruelty, floggings and shootings. Since the Government was not making an effort to collect the 3 pound tax, Gladstone could not understand why the Indians were making such an issue of it. He warned the Government not to give way to what was obviously a conspiracy against law and order, or there would be trouble from the syndicalists and the natives. Gladstone's correspondence with his ministers during this period bears no evidence of his assurances to the Colonial Office that he would continually urge his ministers to remove the outstanding Indian grievances.

Meanwhile, Hardinge, the Viceroy of India, took the highly unusual step of telegraphing Gladstone to protest the reported floggings and the use of mines as jails. Hardinge urged Gladstone and his ministers to "use methods common to civilized countries" in dealing with strikers and reminded Gladstone of the deplorable effect the situation could have on the Empire. It is difficult to see how Hardinge thought he could help the Imperial position by interfering. Gladstone wisely did not show Botha

the Viceroy's telegram. Instead he replied to Hardinge defending his ministers' use of force as no more than necessary to put down open defiance of the law.  

Harcourt, trying to be helpful, suggested that perhaps an independent witness such as an Anglo-Indian official could better establish the facts of the situation. He hesitated to suggest it to the Union ministers who might regard it as outside interference. The Colonial Office promised South Africa any assistance needed if they decided to accept Harcourt's proposal. Gladstone, as Harcourt might have expected, denied there was any "situation" to be studied. The arrival of an official from India would have an unpredictable effect on public opinion and on the ministers' authority. Then Gladstone made an amazing suggestion. He would resign if Harcourt thought it would help. "I cannot say what effect such a step might have here...it might help the India Office and the Indian Government and might introduce a more serious understanding of the situation here."  

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32 C.O. 551/45/42487, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 19 November 1913, contains Hardinge's telegram to Gladstone of 18 November and Gladstone's reply of 19 November 1913.  
33 The Times whose sympathies were now with the Indians had been making the same suggestion for the past six weeks. The Times, 19 November 1913, p. 7.  
34 HG Add. Ms. 46000, Harcourt to Gladstone, 22 November 1913.  
35 HG Add. Ms. 46000, Gladstone to Harcourt, 23 November 1913.
Was Gladstone serious about resigning? He had already decided to leave South Africa the following June, although his ministers did not yet know it. Little would have been gained by his leaving six months sooner. It was probably a bluff—a page out of Botha's book, who was always threatening to resign when the going got rough. On the same day he offered to resign, he wrote a long letter to Botha who had just witnessed the defection of Hertzog, de Wet and others from his party. He encouraged Botha to develop "a great South African policy which would appeal to all the best minds in the country" and outlined a five-step program, listing the settlement of the Indian problem fourth. The tone of the letter was optimistic and encouraging and not that of a man contemplating immediate resignation. Harcourt sent the necessary reassurances and requests that Gladstone on no account resign. Such a step, according to Harcourt, would put the Imperial Government in an impossible position.

While Gladstone remained opposed to having an outsider look into the allegations of ill-treatment, he began to doubt whether all the stories were falsehoods and exaggerations. He urged Smuts who was going to Natal to talk

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36 HG Add. Ms. 46007, Gladstone to Botha, 23 November 1913.
37 HG Add. Ms. 46000, Harcourt to Gladstone, 24 November 1913.
to all Indians who had complaints. He was sure his minis-
ters had acted correctly, but it was possible subordinates
had acted illegally. Gladstone even suggested a small
commission of enquiry, but Smuts preferred to make his
own investigations first. 38 Just as Gladstone seemed to
be mellowing towards the Indians, Hardinge entered the
picture again with near disastrous results. On 26 November
at Madras, the Viceroy publicly denounced the methods of
the South African Government and announced his approval
of passive resistance:

Recently your compatriots in South Africa have
taken matters into their own hands by organizing
a passive resistance to laws which they considered
invidious and unjust, an opinion which we watching
their struggle from afar cannot but share. They
violated those laws in the full knowledge of the
penalties involved, being ready with all courage
and patience to endure the penalties. In all this
they have the deep burning sympathy of India, also
of those who like myself, without being Indians
sympathize with the people of the country. The most
recent developments have taken a most serious turn.
We have seen the widest publicity given to allega-
tions that passive resistance has been dealt with
by measures which would not be tolerated for a
moment in any country claiming to be civilized....
I feel that if the South African Government wishes
to justify itself in the eyes of India and the
world the only course open to it is to appoint a
strong and impartial committee on which Indian
interests will be represented and to conduct a
most searching inquiry. 39

38 C.O. 551/45/40943, Tel. Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec.,
26 November 1913.
The Madras speech greatly increased Hardinge's popularity in India. The Colonial Office and the Union Government were stunned. Gladstone could hardly believe it had been reported correctly. Fortunately he realized the seriousness of the situation and urged caution. He reminded his ministers of the gravity of the situation in India and that Hardinge had been badly wounded the year before in an assassination attempt. The Imperial Government was in no way responsible for the Viceroy's "wild utterances." He suggested the South Africans would make a better impression on the minds of all reasonable men if they made a quiet and dignified response to the Viceroy's

40 Charles Hardinge, *My Indian Years* (London, John Murray, 1948), p. 91-2. Hardinge said his Madras speech, which was cheered with frenzy, had a magical effect. The agitation in India ceased and the people had confidence in him and their government. He felt it was his speech and the subsequent aroused public opinion which forced the South Africans to appoint a commission.

41 The British press which had come to sympathize with the Indian cause nonetheless had mixed opinions about the wisdom of the Viceroy's speech. The Times (28 November 1913, p. 9) felt the Viceroy had done well to make himself the champion of Indian feelings and wrongs. The Nation (14:734, 29 November 1913) thought the Viceroy's remarks "brave and manly" but felt that the Imperial Government should not have left it to Hardinge to say them. The Spectator (111:897, 29 November 1913), on the other hand, called Hardinge's remarks "injudicious" and feared the Union ministers would respond in like manner and soon all would be hurling insults at each other across the Indian Ocean. But it was The Economist that best understood the complexities of the situation when it stated that the Viceroy undoubtedly spoke for India but the speech was a "constitutional impropriety of the first order" and Hardinge in acting like a "prancing proconsul" might play havoc with the whole Empire.
unconstitutional interference. With Harcourt his tone was entirely different. If the Imperial Government supported Hardinge, he would resign. Worried that the publication of his formal despatches would make it appear he had made no effort to find a solution, he took credit for passage of the 1913 Act and claimed he had been making further progress with his ministers when "this stupid provocitative action by the Viceroy" nullified all his efforts.

Harcourt protested Hardinge's speech to Crewe. At the Colonial Secretary's request the British cabinet reminded the Viceroy that the Imperial Government was the only authorized channel of communication between India and South Africa. It was feared that any stronger action, such as publicly siding with South Africa (which Harcourt did in his private correspondence with Gladstone) or demanding an apology from Hardinge, would lead to his resignation and/or a serious outburst in India.

The Union ministers made no public comment on Hardinge's speech but proceeded with plans for a Commission of Enquiry. Sir William Soloman, one of South Africa's most respected jurists, was chosen to head it. The two

42 HG Add. Ms. 46007, Gladstone to Botha, 27 November 1913.
43 HG Add. Ms. 46000, Gladstone to Harcourt, 27 November 1913.
44 HG Add. Ms. 46001, Harcourt to Gladstone, 8 December 1913.
other members more or less represented interests in Natal and Transvaal. Gladstone and the cabinet still had doubts about including an Indian official on the Commission, even though the Colonial Office continued to press for it. Thus Gladstone was surprised to learn that Solomon and his colleagues had no objections. The Commission further surprised the Government by recommending Gandhi's immediate release from prison.

By mid-December the strike appeared to be dissipating and some of the mines were no longer being used as jails. However, the Indians were not entirely pleased with the Commission. Gladstone suspected they were afraid they would not be able to prove the allegations made against the Government and so were trying to discredit the Commission beforehand. If the Indians did not accept the Commission or refused to give evidence before it, he pessimistically predicted a resumption of the strike. Rumors had reached Gladstone that Gokhale was encouraging the Indians to boycott the Commission. On the contrary, Gokhale had sent Gandhi a long cable urging him to cooperate with the

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45 The South African press was severely critical of Hardinge's speech but divided over its support for the Commission. That section which had already advocated the abolition of the Natal tax, such as the Mercury, supported it. The Afrikaner press, however, felt South African interests might be jeopardized. The Friend (3 December 1913 p. 6) was vehement against an "outside inquiry" and felt it would be better to leave the Empire than to turn the country over to "alien and coloured races."

Commission and to abandon any plans for new marches.\footnote{Gandhi, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 324.} It was to no avail. Gandhi and thousands of his followers had taken a vow not to appear before the Commission unless its membership were expanded to include the noted South African councillors and Indian sympathizers, Sir James Rose-Innes and William Schreiner and the release of all the Satyagrahi from jail. Smuts would not agree to the demands, and Gandhi would not break his vow in spite of the pleas of Hardinge and Gokhale. At this point Botha was ready to rearrest Gandhi and the other leaders who were "so irritating one could take them by the throat."\footnote{Hancock and Van der Poel, \textit{Smuts Papers}, vol. III, p. 564.} Not even the appointment to the Commission of Sir Benjamen Robertson, a well-known and well-liked Indian official, could persuade the Satyagrahi to change their minds.

Gandhi set 15 January as the date on which Indians would again seek jail sentences and begin a new march from Natal to Johannesburg. From now on Smuts insisted that all proposals and agreements between them be put in writing to avoid repeating past mistakes. Throughout December Gandhi continued to suggest ways of improving the Commission, the planters selecting one member and the Indians another or reducing the Commission to a single member,
The Government, however, thought such changes would destroy the Commission's judicial aspect and might lead to Soloman's resignation. Soloman had accepted the appointment "against personal inclinations" out of a sense of duty. He was increasingly worried that if the Indians refused to give evidence, the report would be too one-sided. Gladstone and Smuts persuaded him to stay on pointing out it would be a great coup for Gandhi to be able to break up the Commission. Its sittings were delayed until 19 January in order to give Robertson time to study the situation.

For a time the Indian question receded into the background while a general railway strike, which had erupted on 7 January 1914, occupied public attention. Gandhi called off his plans to resume passive resistance. He would not directly or indirectly help the railway strikers whose struggle was "entirely different and differently conceived." This action was greatly appreciated by the Union Government and according to Gandhi, "left an invisible but potent impression everywhere." It proved to be an extremely wise political move. It eased tensions between the Indian community and the Government and enabled the

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50 C.O. 551/46/2387, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 31 December 1913.
51 Gandhi, op. cit., p. 326.
latter to grant concessions since it could not be said they were doing so under duress.

By mid-January the Government was prepared to deal with all strikers with utmost severity. While they probably would not have deported Indians as readily as they did the European leaders of the general strike because of the serious Imperial complications that would have ensued, they might have tried anything at that point if the Indians had resumed their strike. Instead, Smuts and Gandhi reached a compromise. The Indians would not appear before the Commission but they would help Robertson prepare his evidence. They would take no further action on the allegations of ill-treatment during the strike and the Government would not take evidence thereon unless new charges were made. Two shooting episodes, however, would be investigated. Subject to the Commission's report, Smuts was willing to introduce legislation on the marriage question.

52 The Union Government and the Colonial Office did consider repatriation. It was heartily supported by Lambert at the Colonial Office who felt that if India were to suggest repatriation, it would "take the wind out of the wire pullers in South Africa." From the Imperial point of view it would be a good thing to reduce the number of Indians in South Africa as long as the Imperial Government were not asked to pay for it. Hartman Just disagreed. By suggesting repatriation India would be admitting the situation was hopeless. It might help Smuts, but South Africa might try to use it to deport not only illegally domiciled Indians but those born in South Africa as well. C.O. 551/46, Colonial Office minute Lambert to Just, 23 December 1913.
and the 3 pound tax. Gandhi in turn assured Smuts if he were satisfied on these points and the laws were justly administered, the solution would be final and he would return to India. Gladstone's spirits rose at the possibility, and he thought the chances for a solution better than at any time during his administration.  

The Commission met throughout January and February with some Indians giving evidence. The report issued in March not surprisingly recommended the repeal of the 3 pound tax and the recognition of one wife and the children of domiciled Indians. A feeling of cautious optimism prevailed.  

Gladstone and the Colonial Office found the report satisfactory and were loud in their praise of Robertson's services. Gladstone fearing Hardinge would get credit for suggesting the Commission, reminded Harcourt he had mentioned the idea himself in November 1913.

When Gandhi and Robertson saw the draft legislation based on the Commission's recommendations, their most

53 CO. 551/54/2770, Tel. Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 22 January 1914.
54 The British press greeted the Commission's report and the Union Government's seeming willingness to act on it with relief. The Guardian (14 March 1914, p. 8) believed a workable solution was at hand even though South African opinion was not likely to change greatly. The Times (15 March 1914, p. 8) likewise urged the Indian leaders to realize they could not have all they desired and to accept an "honourable compromise."
56 HG Add. Ms. 46002, Gladstone to Harcourt, 19 March 1914.
serious objection was the failure to waive payment of arrears in the 3 pound tax. At Gladstone's insistence this was remedied and those Indians who had refused to pay the tax were released from jail. The Indian Relief Bill received a substantial majority on its second reading, but from then on the Government did not have an easy time advancing it. While the Unionists were generally friendly, the Orange Free State and Natal members put up strong opposition. Smuts successfully appealed to the latter's "Imperial patriotism", and the crucial Transvaalers put party loyalty and discipline before prejudice. The final vote was 77 to 15. The bill passed the Senate without amendment, and Smuts' prediction that Gladstone would go home with the act "in his pocket" came true. In addition, Smuts and Gandhi reached agreement on several administrative points. A relieved Colonial Office was lavish in its praise of Smuts for his great generosity and courage, of the Union Government and Parliament and the Commission for rendering a great Imperial service and of Gladstone for his constant interest and activity in finding a solution.

59 C.O. 551/58/27620, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 10 June 1914, minuting by Colonial Office staff.
Having arrived at a settlement, Gandhi prepared to return to India, and few Europeans were sorry to see him go. Gladstone saw his departure from South Africa as the removal of a "frightful source of potential trouble." Herbert Stanley saw Gandhi board the train at the Cape Town station "enswathed in a garland of roses and still wearing the scanty garb of penitence." He had spoken modestly of his own efforts in the settlement and most generously of others. Stanley concluded he was a most remarkable man, but he was glad to see him leave the country. Gandhi left optimistic about the future of the Indians in South Africa. But the settlement of 1914 was more illusory than real. The fundamental difficulties involved in Europeans and Indians living in close contact had not been resolved and would reappear. However, at the time all parties were satisfied with what they believed they had accomplished. The Indians had won some concessions. The Union Government had settled a troublesome matter with a minimum of Imperial interference and without sacrificing its own best interests. The Imperial Government had emerged with its empire and its imperial philosophy, to all appearances, still reasonably intact.

61 HG Add. Ms. 46004, Stanley to Gladstone, 1 July 1914.
62 The Government was also glad to see Gandhi go, as Smuts told Robertson, "the saint has left our shores, I sincerely hope forever." Hancock, Smuts, vol.I, p. 345.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Labour Unrest 1913-1914

When the miners' strike began in May 1913, the Government took little notice. They were, in any case, unprepared to deal with any sort of labour disputes; the only machinery for avoiding a strike was the Transvaal's Industrial Disputes Prevention Act of 1909. It provided that either side in a dispute could appeal to the Ministry of Mines for the appointment of a board representing both sides to study the issue. While neither side was bound by the board's recommendations, they were expected to delay any strike or lockout until one month after the board reported. It worked as long as everyone abided by the rules, but the Government had no way of enforcing it.

The Union was sadly lacking in labour legislation. Conditions varied from province to province but in general there was either only limited legislation or none at all on workmen's compensation, safety regulations, payment of wages and the legal status of trade unions. While the major trades were organized into unions and labour was represented in Parliament by the South African Labour
Party, trade unions were not recognized as parties in a dispute. The mines were run in the interests of the shareholders. Their owners were unpopular with the men, who saw them as symbols of an autocratic and oppressive system. While wages were generally good, from 300 to 1,000 pounds a year, the men were a restless class moving from mine to mine and often separated from their homes and families. Adding to the mutual distrust and bad feeling between owners and workers was the growing awareness of the dangers of miner's phthisis. Approximately 32% of the miners had this incapacitating and often fatal lung disease incurred by miners after years of breathing gold dust, and all underground miners were likely to get it eventually. Parliament passed a Miner's Phthisis Act in 1912, but the workers complained it provided inadequate safeguards and compensations.

While the workers may have been oppressed by the owners, they in turn oppressed the native workers to whom they gave no thought when preparing lists of grievances. Natives were recruited from the protectorates for terms of six months to one year. Gladstone felt they were well-treated by the mine authorities. Nevertheless, they were prohibited from holding skilled jobs and they were much more likely to develop phthisis. They were, of course,
excluded from all considerations of a minimum wage. Housed in compounds at the mines, they were free when not working to circulate on the Rand, subject to the Pass Laws at night. They often fell victim to the more undesirable elements of the Johannesburg population, and native criminality was on the increase. At the time of the 1913 strike there were approximately 200,000 natives and 23,000 whites working in the Rand mines.

A spirit of solidarity between workers of all trades was born out of the 1913 strike and union membership increased markedly. The labour leaders believed in the efficacy of the general strike, but they were not the radical revolutionaries Gladstone thought them. Nevertheless, there was a great amount of "combustible material" on the Rand, and the Government—especially the Mines Department—should have been aware of the rapidly degenerating situation. If they had, they might not have felt the need to act so drastically and unconstitutionally.

1 Gladstone strongly advocated the closed compound system as practised at Kimberley as more rational and more humane than the one on the Rand. The natives remained in the compounds for their entire contract. All their needs were provided for and they were protected from those outside who would take advantage of their ignorance and weakness. C.O. 551/58/2823, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec. 11 July 1914.


3 A Federation of Trade Unions had been established in 1911 by J.T. Bain. The Federation took an active and aggressive part in the 1913 and 1914 strikes.
later to insure the safety of the Union.

On 26 May 1913 the men at the New Kleinfontein mine went on strike protesting the manager's notice of immediate new hours for some of the workers. The Industrial Disputes Act required one month's notice before any change in hours or conditions could go into effect. The management fearing trouble agreed the new hours would not be effective until July. The workers were not satisfied. They formed a strike committee and demanded reinstatement of the men previously laid off and the elimination of Saturday afternoon work. On 28 May the mine owners were ready to meet the first demand, but the workers continued to meet calling for an eight hour day "bank to bank." This could have only been met by an act of Parliament. While the owners agreed work could start earlier on Saturdays, thus eliminating afternoon work, they insisted eight hours must be worked at the face on all other working days. Since company officials refused to meet with the strike committee, the recognition of trade unions became an additional issue. On 10 June three-fourths of the men voted to continue the strike. At first, mine officials did not attempt to hire new workers. The strikers warned that if and when "blackleg workers" were brought in, it

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would be a signal for workers all over the country to join in the struggle. A general strike seemed possible.\(^5\)

While the press carried the latest details of the strike, the Government took little notice of the unfolding events on the Rand. Ministers were still in Cape Town congratulating each other for having passed the Natives Land Act and the Immigration Act. With the end of the parliamentary session they scattered for their respective holidays. Gladstone left for Natal telling Harcourt he hoped he would not have to trouble him with letters and telegrams for some time to come.\(^6\) As usual Smuts was the first to recognize the seriousness of the situation. After meeting with both sides on 22 June, he limited the supply of liquor to the area and restricted the number and size of public meetings.\(^7\)

The strike committee called a public meeting at Beoni for 29 June. The Government agreed to the meeting, and the strikers promised there would be no violence. Well advertised in the press, the meeting drew about 8,000 people. Three speakers addressed the crowd at once. Two resolutions were passed. The first censured the Government for attempting to limit free speech and free assemblage, and the second called for a general strike in the interests of

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\(^5\) Transvaal Leader, 29 May 1913, p. 7.
\(^6\) HG Add. Ms. 45999, Gladstone to Harcourt, 11 June 1913.
\(^7\) Transvaal Leader, 30 June 1913, p. 7.
all workers for the general betterment of working conditions. As the meeting drew to a close a band struck up "Dixie" and some of the demonstrators began to march in the direction of the Kleinfontein mine. The police and the South African Mounted Rifles, who had been observing the meeting, unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the march. When the marchers reached the mines they found more constables waiting for them. The leaders urged the men to keep their part of the bargain and go home quietly. The demonstrators were separated from the mine property by a line of mounted police, but they could see the natives and a few white workers inside whom they encouraged to come out. The crowd began to disperse in about half an hour and to make its way back to the town and railway stations. Violence had been avoided. 8

The strike began to spread the next day. Strikers from New Kleinfontein appeared at neighboring mines and persuaded other workers to join them. That night (30 June) Gladstone received urgent telegrams from Smuts and General Reginald Hart, the commander of the Imperial troops in South Africa, informing him 500 infantry had been sent to the East Rand and 500 more were in readiness. Hart had given the consent for the use of Imperial troops in

8 Transvaal Leader, 30 June 1913, p. 7.
Gladstone's absence and without consulting him. Gladstone, far from resenting Hart's action, supported it as the only possible one under the circumstances. The calling out of the troops was the first indication he had that the Government regarded the strike as serious. He left Durban the next morning by special train arriving in Pretoria on 2 July and meeting at once with Botha, Smuts and Malan, the Minister of Mines. Over 1,000 special constables had been sworn in and 500 Imperial troops guarded those mines where disturbances had not yet occurred. Seventeen mines and about 4,800 men were involved in the strike and attempts were being made to bring out the railway workers. Gladstone believed the strikers were going against their leaders and the principles of their unions. The general strike declared for 4 July had not been voted on except for sporadic ballots taken at some of the mines as the men were being encouraged to come out. The mineowners closed down the more unprofitable mines and hired new workers for those they decided to keep open.

The natives were Gladstone's main worry. About 300,000 were in the area. If idle natives were allowed to mix with the "dangerous classes of Johannesburg" and a railway strike shortened their food supplies, there would be serious consequences. On 3 July Gladstone sanctioned the

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use of 400 more infantry and 600 cavalry arguing it was
better to send too many troops than too few. In defending
the use of Imperial troops he reminded the Colonial Secre-
tary that Selborne had mobilized 1,400 troops in a similar
situation in 1907. The troops were assigned to protect the
mines and defend public property while avoiding collision
with the strikers.10

On 4 July a large demonstration was held in Johannes-
burg's Market Square in violation of the Government's ban
on public meetings. Troops were in evidence to see that
order was maintained. A few of the leaders were allowed
to speak in order to tell the crowd of about 5,000 to go
home quietly. Instead, the speakers protested the abridge-
ment of free speech and the strikers had their meeting
after all. When the police tried to clear the square, a
rock throwing melee broke out. Three men were seriously
injured by flying stones.11 Gladstone felt it had been a
mistake to forbid the meeting but once having done so,
the Government should have taken steps earlier in the day
to prevent the concentration of large crowds in the square.
Once the strikers had assembled, appeals to disperse were
useless. The police were inexperienced in dealing with
large dangerous crowds. The Imperial troops, who did little

10 C.O. 551/41/25810, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec.,
3 July 1913.
11 Transvaal Leader, 5 July 1913, p. 7.
more than clatter across the square, angered the crowd even more.¹²

That night crowds roamed the streets of Johannesburg setting fire to the offices of The Star and a train station. Looting was widespread. Fire engines were not allowed to proceed to the fires. The station fire was probably set by hooligans rather than strikers. Police and troops fired into the crowds to disperse them, but due to the darkness and general confusion no one was sure how many had been injured. After The Star offices were set afire, other public buildings were guarded by dragoons.¹³ Meanwhile a group of railway workers in Pretoria marched on Government House. Gladstone agreed to meet a deputation, and for about ninety minutes they "amicably discussed the whole position" while the rest of the crowd waited quietly outside. The rail workers expressed strong support for the miners and Gladstone fully expected them to join the strike. While the men resented the use of Imperial troops, they were quite pleased with Gladstone's willingness to meet them.¹⁴

Gladstone emerged from his meeting with the railway workers convinced there was something sinister behind the

¹² HG Add. Ms. 46000, Gladstone to Harcourt, 13 July 1913.
¹³ Transvaal Leader, 5 July 1913, p. 7.
¹⁴ HG Add. Ms. 46000, Gladstone to Harcourt, 5 July 1913.
strike. His letters to Harcourt were written in great haste lest the trains stop running. He believed many of the strikers were armed and familiar with the uses of dynamite, and he feared there would be great loss of life. The Government had done little more than dispatch troops and seemed totally incapable of dealing with events. He had spent hours urging his ministers to be more resourceful and to make the public aware that they had a government working to suppress the disorder and arrive at a settlement. Smuts kept going off to his farm and five other ministers were absent. The cabinet and police had not even been aware of the march on Government House.

In perhaps overestimating his own coolness and steadiness in comparison to his ministers' failure to act, he claimed people came to him asking him to act and accepting his suggestions as if he were a responsible minister. He made plans to return the natives to the protectorates, to declare martial law and to send troops to Durban if the

15 HG Add. Ms. 46000, Gladstone to Harcourt, 7 July 1913. By 5 July a state of civil war existed in the Johannesburg-Pretoria area, according to Gladstone. Stone masons, engineers, carpenters, the Pretoria railway men, typographical workers and the Johannesburg tram workers in addition to 18,000 miners were on strike.

16 Malan, the Minister of Mines, came in for special criticism, “he sat doing nothing for days and seemed to have no sense of the urgency of the position.” Sauer could not control his tongue and nearly always said the wrong thing, Gladstone complained. HG Add. Ms. 46007, Gladstone to Botha, 10 July 1913.
strike should spread to the ports.\textsuperscript{17} There is no evidence Gladstone exceeded his constitutional authority during the strike, but he seems to have enjoyed acting as if he were in a position of real responsibility and power.\textsuperscript{18} In a typical Gladstonian change of mood he was soon praising Botha and Smuts for their courage in going to Johannesburg amid shootings and explosions to meet with the strikers and mineowners. While this meeting was going on there was severe rioting in the streets with police and troops firing into the crowds killing six people. An agreement was reached with the strike leaders calling for the men to go back to work and the New Kleinfontein workers to be reinstated. The rail workers voted not to strike, and the funerals of the strike victims occurred without incident.\textsuperscript{19}

Realizing the deployment of Imperial troops would be strongly criticized, Gladstone at once set about defending himself, his ministers and the action they had taken. He had long been of the opinion that the troops should remain in South Africa while the Imperial Government still had authority over the protectorates and Southern Rhodesia.

\textsuperscript{17} HG Add. Ms. 46099, Diary of the 1913 Strike, 5 July 1913, f. 97.

\textsuperscript{18} Hart reportedly suggested he and Gladstone take over the Government under a proclamation of martial law. Gladstone called Hart a "poor dear old fellow...hopelessly incompetent." But he seemed not far from making the same suggestion himself. HG Add. Ms. 46000, Gladstone to Harcourt, 7 July 1913.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
He agreed the Union Government should deal with its own internal problems, but in this case they had not acted soon enough and further delay would have been disastrous. He refused to discuss constitutional points or if the use of troops in 1907 had been more justified. Although Gladstone was widely criticized in labour circles for the use of Imperial troops, it is difficult to ascertain how much responsibility he bore in the matter. The first troops were called out before he was consulted because of the urgency of the situation and probably because Smuts knew he would raise no serious objections. When he later sanctioned the use of more troops - 2,900 in all - he was presumably acting on the advice of his ministers. Had he in fact convinced them that many troops were necessary with his dire predictions of wholesale destruction of life and property, anarachy, pillage and thousands of natives descending on Johannesburg and Pretoria? In any case, some Imperial troops probably were needed. The Union Government's forces were not prepared to take on such serious duties, the new Defense Act having gone into effect on

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21 The South African Federation of Trade Unions demanded the immediate recall of the Governor General on the grounds that he had authorized the use of Imperial troops in an attempt to suppress free speech and public assembly and which had resulted in the indiscriminate shooting of defenseless men, women and children. Transvaal Leader, 9 July 1913, p. 7.
1 July. They would have been several days arriving on the Rand, and in the meantime over 60 gold mines, some coal mines, power stations, municipal buildings, railways and some private houses (especially those of mineowners and officials) needed protection. Police forces had been called in from all parts of the Union leaving other areas short-staffed. Without the use of troops the loss of life and destruction of property might have been much greater. Gladstone and the Union Government most likely would have been blamed for not having taken adequate safeguards and using the troops available to them. While the Colonial Office had reservations about the use of troops, Harcourt defended Gladstone's action in the House of Commons on the ground that it was his duty to prevent anarchy and that he had acted on the advice of his ministers.\(^2\)

The British press was highly critical of the Union Government's actions during the strike. There was general agreement that the Government had been slow to realize the seriousness of the situation and then had overreacted. To \textit{The Nation}\(^2\) and \textit{The Economist}\(^4\), which had never approved of retaining Imperial troops in South Africa after Union, the use of troops on the Rand was further proof that they

\(^{2b}\)\textit{The Nation}, 13:553, 13 July 1913.
\(^{2c}\)\textit{The Economist}, 77:53, 12 July 1913.
should not be there at all. The socialist press demanded Gladstone's resignation. The *Labour Leader*, which constantly referred to the strike as "the massacre on the Rand", held that Gladstone's continued presence in South Africa could only be an irritant and a threat to South Africa and her continued loyalty to the Empire.\(^{25}\) *Justice* also wanted Gladstone recalled not so much for his responsibility in the use of the troops but because his weakness made him a tool of the mineowners.\(^{26}\) Both discounted the Governor's argument of the threat of a native uprising and printed long articles detailing the horrors of being a white miner in South Africa while hardly mentioning the plight of the native mine workers. Those who believed Gladstone's version of events sometimes gave him unexpected support while still remaining critical of the Union Government's slowness to act.\(^{27}\) The *Times*, however, not only supported Lord Gladstone but defended the use of troops "to protect society and repress civil disorders." The British Government, it reminded its readers, had granted South Africa self-government, and they must now let them use it as they saw fit.\(^{28}\)

As the men began going back to work, Gladstone returned to Durban still convinced there would be a general

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27 *Round Table*, 4173, December 1913.  
28 *The Times*, 11 July 1913, p. 7.
strike. The Federated Trades called for a special session of Parliament to legislate on a minimum wage, paid holidays, a permanent railway enquiry board, weekly rather than monthly wages and the recognition of trade unions. They set 23 July for the resumption of the strike unless their demands were met. Arrangements were made to send the natives home, and some Imperial troops were kept on duty "in the background" in case they were needed again. The strike was not resumed. Gladstone attributed the collapse of the strike plans to the Government's earlier use of troops and its determination to take a firm stand. The Government had in fact met most of the strikers' demands in agreeing to recognize unions, to compromise on the eight hour day (8½ hours bank to bank), to redress railway grievances by legislation and to set up two commissions to study the strike events and the workers' grievances. The Government was determined to make no further concessions and the workers, unwilling to lose what they had won, did not support the radical element of the Federated Trades. The strike threat was withdrawn and by 4 August Gladstone could inform Harcourt they were "out of the woods."
The future, however, still remained uncertain. The Government had taken a firm stand at last, but it was weakened by Burton's continued absence and Sauer's recent death. Hull and Hertzog in a bid for labour support appeared on the Rand criticizing the Government's poor handling of the strike and what they called its refusal to meet labour's reasonable demands.\(^{31}\) The Labour Party demanded an election and called for a boycott of the Government's commission to investigate the strike.\(^{32}\)

The Government had established a second commission to study the grievances of the state railway workers in the hope of avoiding another strike. All through the autumn there were rumors, denied by the Railway Department, that a retrenchment of over 1,000 men was being planned. By January 1914 about 70 men, all on 24 hour contracts, had been dismissed. The Railworkers Union and the Federated Trades demanded their reinstatement at their original

\(^{31}\) Transvaal Leader, 28 July 1913, p. 7.

\(^{32}\) The Commission issued its report in October. Neither the Strike Committee, the Miners' Association, nor the Federated Trades was represented or gave evidence. The Commission concluded that all parties bore some responsibility for the events of July. The mine officials had been "tactless and precipitate." Negotiations should have been carried on through a cabinet minister or an appointed intermediary with the Government thus enforcing the Trades Disputes Act. On the other hand, the strikers had shifted their ground and confused the issues. The use of Imperial troops had been justified. They had been patient and well disciplined and no more force than necessary had been used. Parliamentary Papers, 1914, vol. XLIX, Cd. 7112, Report of the Witwatersrand Disturbances Commission, p. 63-65.
pay and guarantees of no further retrenchments. Burton, the Minister of Railways, met with a delegation of workers on 6 January, but he would not agree to their demands. He thought the men and their leader H.L. Poutsma were in an unreasonable mood and determined to strike. Poutsma while cautioning his men against violence, urged them not to go to work on 8 January.  

Gladstone, as usual, imagined terrible possibilities of short supplies, power failures and natives running amok and terrorizing the white population. Smuts assured him the Government was prepared to mobilize the Defense Forces and to concentrate police and armed burghers-up to 15,000-around Johannesburg. Once again Gladstone felt his ministers had been found wanting. Burton and Botha had been out of town when the trouble began. The incompetence of the Mines Department had been repeated by the Railway. He was convinced South Africa's troubles were too much for the Government. Hart came to him "fire-eating and longing to get his troops out." Gladstone ordered him not to comply with a request for troops by the Government.  

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33 Transvaal Leader, 7 January 1914, p. 7.
34 HG Add. Ms. 46001, Gladstone to Harcourt, 7 January 1914.
white man if the mine natives got loose. He thought Poutsma ought to be deported, an interesting suggestion in light of later events, and one wonders if he mentioned it to Smuts.35

To Gladstone's immense surprise and relief the Government was prepared. Police units took possession of the chief rail centers and kept the trains running much as usual. The strike was not well supported from the start in the Cape or Natal and only sporadically in the Orange Free State. On 9 January Gladstone signed a proclamation calling out units of the Active Citizen Forces and Commando units in ten districts on the Rand. All arms sales were prohibited for a month. Poutsma and other strike leaders were arrested. Bain and the leaders of the Federated Trades were guarded by their followers. The Government fearing their arrest might lead to bloodshed let them remain at large a while longer.36 On 10 January Botha sent Gladstone a proclamation of martial law to be signed when Botha gave

35 HG Add. Ms. 46001, Gladstone to Harcourt, 7 January 1914. In spite of all his worries, Gladstone had not completely lost his sense of humor. January 7 was his birthday and he was giving a ball that night. Many guests were coming from Johannesburg and if the trains stopped running, he thought he might have to put them all up. In addition, since the special constables were being called out that afternoon, he was not certain how many men would be present. South Africa was certainly a "rum place." The birthday festivities passed off without incident.

the word. They discussed the use of Imperial troops, Botha insisting they must not be allowed to come into armed collision with strikers. Union forces could deal with mobs and violence. Gladstone was not convinced Union forces would be sufficient, but he did not tell Botha he had decided to use his own discretion if the crisis passed a certain stage.

That Gladstone was preoccupied with the use of the Imperial troops is evident from his letters to Harcourt and General Hart. In Hart he had a sympathetic listener. They were both fire-eaters on this subject and planned the possible uses of troops in an almost conspiratorial manner. If Union forces proved insufficient to protect lives and property, they could help by assigning troops to guard the mines and escort the natives back to the protectorates. He did not want Botha to know their plans because the Government should exhaust all its own efforts first. Gladstone promised to keep Hart informed, but any necessary preparations should be made as quietly as possible. Hart agreed that placing the troops at the mines would have a "good moral effect." He was less enthusiastic about using troops, especially infantry, to escort the natives back to the

37 HG Add. Ms. 46007, Botha to Gladstone, 10 January 1914.
38 HG Add. Ms. 46010, Gladstone to Hart, 10 January 1914.
Imperial troops were not used; they were not needed. Gladstone had little to do, other than signing several proclamations.

On 11 January, Botha suggested an immediate resignation of the Government. Gladstone, who had learned by now not to take such threats seriously, offered to send for Smartt or Merriman, both of whom would jump at the chance. After Gladstone predicted an election would result in fewer Unionists, more Labourites and Hertzogites, and a continued majority for the South African Party, Botha decided to stay on.

The call for a general strike on 14 January was met with a proclamation of martial law. Gladstone had little choice than to sign it, and in any case he heartily approved. He admitted martial law was drastic and revolutionary but they were dealing with an attempt at revolution. Whatever sympathy he may have felt for the men in the July strike was absent on this occasion. The strike was unjustified, the Government having shown a willingness to legislate on the men's grievances and the railways operating in the interests of the state could not be expected to keep workers whose services were no longer needed. On 15 January those strike leaders not previously arrested

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39 HG Add. Ms. 46010, Hart to Gladstone, 12 January 1914.
40 HG Add. Ms. 46001, Gladstone to Harcourt, 18 January 1914.
were surrounded in the Johannesburg Trades Hall and forced to surrender. General de la Rey and his forces had cannons trained on the building.\textsuperscript{41}

In spite of Gladstone's conspiracy theories, his letters and despatches reveal the strike was never a widespread or serious threat to the Union. The only reported violence was a few unsuccessful attempts to dynamite the rail lines. The strikers' attitudes may have been revolutionary but their actions were not. An appeal was made to the Supreme Court for the release of the arrested men, but since their arrests had taken place under martial law, it was to no avail. Harcourt felt the Government had done wonders with "an iron hand and the fear of God." While their views on martial law were rather extensive, he promised to stand by Gladstone and his ministers in the House of Commons.\textsuperscript{42}

Harcourt and the rest of the British public could assume from the reports in the press that the crisis was

\textsuperscript{41} C.O. 551/53/4109, Gov. Gen. to Col. Sec., 15 January 1914. Gladstone thought the arrival of the Commandoes from the backveld "with little to distinguish them from those who took the field in 1899" one of the most picturesque aspects of the strike. While there was no provision for their pay, they showed great eagerness in responding to the call. De la Rey wanted to call out the whole West Transvaal, and Smuts had some trouble in persuading him it was not necessary. Many old Boer generals were present but not de Wet who had thrown in his lot with Hertzog and refused to help Botha's government.

\textsuperscript{42} HG Add. Ms. 46001, Harcourt to Gladstone, 18 January 1914.
over and the strike at an end. The *Times* which had covered the strike from the beginning, felt that martial law was "absolutely justified" as a means of preventing irreparable harm to the country. It blamed the Union Government for some of labour's arrogance because Botha's party had supported Labour candidates against Unionists in 1910 and had been courting their support in Parliament ever since. The *Times*, which seems to have agreed with Gladstone's syndicalist theories, thought that perhaps a fight to the finish between the Government and Labour would not be such a bad idea. By 19 January when peace was restored and the strike leaders were under arrest, it was assumed the Government had won. The *Economist* thought the Union Government had profited from its mistakes of the previous summer. The *Spectator*, also convinced of a syndicalist threat, believed strong and thorough methods were "safest and kindest in the end." There was general agreement that it was best that Imperial troops had not been used again. While the *Manchester Guardian* had doubts about the wisdom of martial law and feared that the Union Government might come to regret it, it was reluctant to criticize until all the details of the situation in South Africa were known.

43 The *Times*, 15 January 1914, p. 7.
44 The *Economist*, 78:111, 17 January 1914.
45 The *Spectator*, 112:78, 17 January 1914.
46 The *Guardian*, 19 January 1914, p. 7.
The socialist press, however, had no hesitation about criticizing what the Labour Leader called "military despotism" in South Africa and warning of its happening in England next. Justice, in addition to its usual remarks about Gladstone's incompetence and weakness and the Government's lack of statesmanship and inability to prevent the strike in the first place, had some criticisms of the labour movement in South Africa which had shown by its collapse that it was not prepared to stage a general strike.

The Federated Trades called off the general strike on 22 January. Martial Law would remain in effect until Parliament passed an Indemnity Bill. The strike was over and its leaders were in jail. Those arrested on 9 January under the Peace Preservation Ordinance were subject to detention for only 21 days after which the Government would have to decide what to do with them. It decided to deport them.

On 27 January in what the Cape Times called "a masterpiece of secret organization" nine of the strike leaders, including Poutsma and Bain, were taken from the Johannesburg jail in a police van and put aboard a special train at a suitably remote hamlet. They were ironically described

47 Labour Leader, 22 January 1914, p. 7.  
48 Justice, 22 January 1914, p. 1.
to the unknowing railway officials as a theatrical company. Once they arrived in Durban they were put aboard a chartered ship bound for England. Although rumors about possible deportations had circulated for days, few South Africans knew anything about the Government's plan until the men were on the high seas. The Transvaal Leader printed on 8 January a rumor "freely going about Pretoria" that the Government intended to arrest Poutsma with a view to his deportation. The Cape Times similarly reported that it had been generally known on the Rand that the Government was planning to deport the strike leaders, but because of martial law none of the papers had been able to print such rumors.

If South Africans had heard only vague rumors about possible deportations, the Colonial Office had heard even less officially. Gladstone was their chief source of information, and he chose to keep them uninformed until the deportations were a fait accompli. He was quick to deny responsibility, "when the Government told me officially what had been done the men were practically on their way to the ship." The cabinet's official communication of

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49 Cape Times, 29 January 1914, p. 9.
50 Transvaal Leader, 8 January 1914, p. 7.
51 Cape Times, 29 January 1914, p. 7. In England both The Guardian and The Times of 28 January 1914 printed reports of possible deportations from South Africa, and the Guardian even had a correct list of names.
26 January listed the names of those to be deported and charged them with treasonable and seditious acts and utterances. To prevent them from fomenting further unrest and to deter their followers, it was necessary to make an example of them. Gladstone had known of the Government's intention unofficially for almost a fortnight. On January 12 or 13 Botha told him the cabinet was considering the deportation of the strike leaders. Gladstone warned him they must not deport those who were merely an inconvenience but only those who posed a real threat to the country by committing criminal acts or inciting others to do so. Botha agreed such a step would not be taken without "clear and urgent necessity." According to Gladstone, he was not consulted on the matter again until 26 January when Botha informed him the men would sail the next day. There had been no need to consult him and, in light of his constitutional position, it was best that he did not know the details of the plan before it was put into effect. The Government would understand from his remarks and their knowledge of him there would be no objection to deporting the spokesmen of "unadulterated revolutionary syndicalism." He had mentioned deportation to Harcourt as early as 7 January and, given his tendency to repeat favorite ideas

53 HG Add. Ms. 46002, Gladstone to Harcourt, 5 February 1914.
and schemes, he had probably spoken of it more than once since then. While he kept Harcourt informed by telegram, despatch and letter of all the events of the strike until 22 January, he did not communicate with him or the Colonial Office again until the deportees had left the country.

Since Gladstone's despatches and telegrams prior to 27 January showed the situation was under control and that in fact there had been no reason for such dramatic action, the Colonial Office was hard pressed to find something to publish. Harcourt agreed to stand by Gladstone and his ministers as promised. However, for Gladstone's sake, he and Asquith felt they should say Gladstone had warned his ministers of the gravity of such a step and of the possible effect on public opinion in Great Britain and elsewhere.\(^\text{54}\) Gladstone did not like the proposed statement. It seemed to imply he disapproved of the deportations. Meanwhile, in spite of Harcourt's pleas for a publishable despatch, he refused to justify or criticize his ministers, insisting they must be allowed to state their own case in the Union Parliament.\(^\text{55}\)

Public opinion in Great Britain which had deplored martial law or supported it grudgingly because of South

\(^{54}\) HG Add. Ms. 46002, Harcourt to Gladstone, 3 February 1914.

\(^{55}\) HG Add. Ms. 46002, Gladstone to Harcourt, 14 February 1914.
Africa's special conditions, found the deportations even harder to justify. However, there were some that were prepared to defend the deportations—namely the Saturday Review which had rarely had a good thing to say about South Africa or Botha since 1910. Now it praised Botha for his courageous belief that the safety of South Africa was more important than "the tribulations of a British government of Liberals who doubt the blessings of Home Rule the minute they see it in action."\(^{56}\) The Guardian deplored the deportations but admitted the Imperial Government could do nothing unless South Africa's actions infringed on the rest of the Empire. Since this did not appear to be the case and since self-government had been granted for good or ill, South Africa would have to learn from its own mistakes rather than from Imperial interference.\(^{57}\) Although The Nation could not see the need for either martial law or the deportations, it defended Gladstone believing he had no other choice than to follow the advice of his ministers. But it urged the Imperial Government if it ever again intended to exercise its right to disallow acts passed by dominion parliaments, to do so with South Africa's Indemnity Bill.\(^{58}\) The labour press was, of course, outraged. In addition to the recall of Gladstone, Justice

\(^{56}\) Saturday Review, 117:164, 7 February 1914.
\(^{57}\) The Guardian, 6 February 1914, p. 5.
\(^{58}\) The Nation, 14:817, 14 February 1914.
demanded the removal of Imperial troops and the withdrawal of the protection of the Imperial navy as a way of showing South Africa the British did not approve of the deportations. 59

Smuts' eagerly awaited speech occurred on February 4 and 5 on the second reading of the Indemnity Bill. The highly dramatic performance lasting over six hours was a real intellectual and physical tour de force. Since Parliament had not been in session since the events of July, he reviewed and defended the Government's actions in both strikes on the grounds that they had been fighting a revolutionary junta. The Government realizing the deportations would be criticized had deliberated the idea for days and days- perhaps explaining why it took them until 27 January to act. He insisted Gladstone was not responsible and repeated the agreed formula that the Governor had warned them of the gravity of such a step. The Government had decided on its "honours list" by reading the men's speeches and evaluating their roles in "this vast organization of conspiracy." 60 His argument rested on the inadequacy of the law to deal with the crime of seeking to overthrow society. An ordinary court would not have convicted them. Anyone born outside the Union who came there advocating

59 Justice, 5 February 1914, p. 1.
60 SA House of Assembly, vol. IV, 5 February 1914, col. 120-22.
anarchy should be declared an undesirable alien and liable for deportation. He appealed to their prejudices and fears in reminding them they were a small white community in a dark continent. Any division in the white population would be reflected in the native, whom he callously referred to as "this wild collection of savages." 61

The debate lasted for more than a month with speakers defending or attacking the Government in familiar arguments often quite unrelated to the topic under discussion. As usual Merriman's sharp wit provided a diverting contrast to the otherwise commonplace speeches. He thought the charge of conspiracy was based on remarkably slender evidence. Martial law was justified in light of the events of July, but the leaders could have been dealt with by bringing them before the House and giving them heavy sentences. It was not too late to bring them back and give them a trial. He thought it rather unpatriotic and ungenerous to send these undesirables to England, who had enough troubles of her own. 62 One would not think that whatever criticisms might be levelled at Smuts for the deportations, not placing the interests of South Africa first would not be one of them. Hertzog, however, managed to do so. He seemed to think England might take reprisals against South

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62 Ibid., 11 February 1914, col. 272-74.
Africa and might not even accept the men. The Indemnity Bill passed by a sizable majority with Merriman and Hertzog abstaining.

While the debate was still going on in South Africa, Harcourt had to answer questions in the House of Commons. Labour members called for Gladstone's resignation. They disputed the need for martial law, not to mention the deportations, seeing such abuse of civil liberties as sufficient justification to interfere in South African affairs. Harcourt ignored the illegality and the unconstitutionality of the Union's actions and defended them on the ground they had settled the problem without the use of Imperial troops. The British Government could not grant self-government and then when their prejudices were aroused, interfere as if they were dealing with a crown colony or a protectorate. Under martial law Gladstone ceased to have direct or personal responsibility for the action of the


64 The British Labour Party was holding its annual conference in Glasgow at this time and unanimously passed a resolution condemning the Union Government and calling for a full inquiry into the matter to determine Gladstone's responsibility and to see how to prevent such a thing from happening again anywhere in the Empire. British Labour Party, Report of the Annual Conference, 1914, p. 94.
military or the Executive. They would smash the Empire by meddling in the vital affairs of the dominions whenever their actions did not coincide with British ideals of legislation or administration.

While Harcourt handsomely defended the South Africans in public, he privately communicated to Gladstone his difficulties in the matter. He thought that in the light of his speech in the House of Commons the South Africans had no right to take offense at a slight reprimand. He thought the deportations had set a dangerous precedent for South Africa and the Empire. He had to deal with the deportation issue cautiously in public, not seeming to approve because of the Labour Party, nor to disapprove because of the Tories, nor to comment other than generally because of the dominions. In any case, whatever he said would probably be used someday against Irish Home Rule.

65 While Gladstone could not be held responsible for what his ministers did under martial law, if he had known what they intended to do before martial law was proclaimed, he could be held responsible. He thought it strange the Labour Party leaders Ramsay Macdonald and Keir Hardie had not pointed it out in debate. HG Add. Ms. 46002, Gladstone to Harcourt, 14 February 1914.


67 HG Add. Ms. 46002, Harcourt to Gladstone, 27 February 1914. In a somewhat lighter vein Harcourt envisioned "at some stage or other we shall be asked whether if Redmond deports Carson and all the Ulster Parliament to Lancashire under martial law, the House of Commons will be allowed to say anything on the matter or the British Government able and willing to take any action in regard to it."
Gradually the furor died down. The deportees who had become celebrities in British labour circles lost their novelty and became something of a burden to the British Labour Party. The protest against Gladstone lost momentum when his resignation for personal reasons was announced in February. South Africans for the most part approved of their Government's strong action. The South African press, unlike the British which had been able to comment freely on the strike events as they occurred, had been censored during part of the period of martial law. There was generally support for martial law but division over the deportations. The South African News held the Government had proven its case and praised the Imperial Government for upholding South Africa's rights and practising "sound and sane Imperialism." The Cape

68 Both Justice and Labour Leader enthusiastically welcomed the deportees to England sponsoring celebrations for them and printing details of their exploits. Poutsma wrote an article for the Contemporary Review (105:503, April 1914) in which he insisted he had been deported simply because he was Smuts' political opponent and not because he had ever said, written or done anything unconstitutional or seditious. While Smuts was the most able and ambitious member of an otherwise mediocre cabinet, he was also unscrupulous.

69 Punch (146:163, 4 March 1914) in a cartoon entitled "the Nine Old Men of the Sea" showed Ramsay Macdonald struggling to carry all nine deportees on his back and saying, "Well, it might have been worse. There might have been ten of 'em."

70 South African News, 2 March 1914, p. 4.
Times objected to the deportations as illegal and unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{71} The \textit{Friend} believed Smuts had exaggerated the deportees' ability to organize a conspiracy and expressed fears for the Empire if Britain did not uphold the principles of freedom that had made her great.\textsuperscript{72} On the other hand, the \textit{Transvaal Leader} thought it was better to risk making the men martyrs than to keep them in the country.\textsuperscript{73} The \textit{Star} held that it might be necessary to strain the law in order to protect the country from dangerous elements.\textsuperscript{74} Likewise, the \textit{Natal Mercury} hoped Parliament would make allowances for any "technical errors" the Government might have committed.\textsuperscript{75}

Eventually the deportees returned to South Africa. Smuts' masterstroke was in fact a political blunder and reflected no credit on its author or the Union Government. It was unfortunate that the resourceful Smuts could not have developed a more constitutional, if less dramatic, solution. The Union Government's willingness to strain the law was even more disturbing when advocated by Gladstone. In defending his ministers' action he told Harcourt, in one of his last words on the subject as Governor General,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{71} Cape Times, 13 February 1914, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{72} The Friend, 17 February 1914, p. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{73} Transvaal Leader, 13 February 1914, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{74} The Star, 6 February 1914, p. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{75} The Mercury, 6 February 1914, p. 6.
\end{itemize}
that "turning a blind eye to Magna Carta etc." had probably been the best solution for South Africa.\footnote{HG Add. Ms. 46002, Gladstone to Harcourt, 9 May 1914.}
Gladstone left South Africa in July 1914 a year before his term of office was due to expire. Although it was alleged in South Africa and in England that he was resigning because of disagreements with his ministers or because of criticism of his actions during the strikes, the decision to leave was due to personal reasons. Lady Gladstone had been in imperfect health since first coming to South Africa and the climate proved too rigorous; she was forced to spend six months of every year in England. Official duties kept Gladstone in South Africa, and after he had wangled one trip home out of Harcourt and Asquith there was no chance of his doing so again. He found the yearly separations irksome.

Gladstone first seriously broached the subject of early retirement in February 1913, informing Harcourt that because of his wife’s poor health it was becoming increasingly clear he would be unable to remain in South Africa for his full term. He admitted changing Governors at that time would be unwise. More importantly, whenever
he left, his successor should be appointed by a Liberal government. Harcourt and Asquith wanted Gladstone to stay as long as possible. Harcourt could not think of a successor nor envision the Government's defeat or dissolution before 1915.

When Gladstone raised the issue again in July, the Colonial Office seemed more amenable and there were no pleas for him to stay on. Instead, Harcourt suggested Gladstone come home in order to assume the Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland to inaugurate Home Rule. Gladstone's name, capabilities and experience fitted him for the position. A month later Harcourt was still pressing Gladstone to accept the Irish appointment, "I cannot but feel that for you to put the crown on your father's Home Rule policy by establishing the new government in Ireland, as you have done in South Africa, would be a romantic and delightful incident." If Gladstone were coming home in 1914, the Irish

1 HG Add. Ms. 45999, Gladstone to Harcourt, 18 February 1913.
2 HG Add. Ms. 45999, Harcourt to Gladstone, 12 March 1913. Harcourt saw the only possibility of a change of government before 1915 in the King's committing the "incredible folly of listening to some unwise advisers and trying to force his ministers to dissolve before Home Rule passes under the Parliament Act." Such an action would create a republican party and make a Liberal victory a defeat of the King. The same people who had destroyed the House of Lords would if they continued "topple the monarchy on their silly heads."
3 HG Add. Ms. 46000, Harcourt to Gladstone, 5 August 1913.
appointment would prevent his enemies from saying he had been recalled or given up in despair. Harcourt mentioned the scheme to Lady Gladstone who apparently had no objections. 4 Gladstone, however, evinced no enthusiasm for the Irish appointment. Harcourt after several conversations with Asquith, informed Gladstone they did not wish to press the matter and that he should consider the suggestion withdrawn. 5

The British Government now willing to allow Gladstone to come home, proposed to appoint Sidney Buxton as his successor. Only Harcourt, Asquith, Buxton and Gladstone knew anything of the planned change and Gladstone was warned to keep silent about it. 6 In January 1914 the Colonial Office gave him permission to reveal his decision to his ministers since the official announcement was to be made in London in early February. Gladstone had apparently dropped some hints to Botha because, while he was saddened, he was not surprised to learn of Gladstone's decision. 7

The timing of the official announcement was unfortunate, and it was made worse by the simultaneous early

4 HG Add. Ms. 46000, Harcourt to Gladstone, 4 September 1913.
5 Ibid., 29 October 1913.
6 Ibid., 13 November 1913.
7 HG Add. Ms. 46007, Botha to Gladstone, 18 January 1914.
retirement of General Hart as the Commander of the Imperial Forces in South Africa. Hart's recall was a badly bungled affair and Gladstone was at least partially to blame. Hart, of course, had called out the Imperial troops in July 1913 at Smuts' request before consulting Gladstone and had come in for a great amount of criticism as a result. Even though Gladstone always maintained that conditions being what they were, Hart had acted correctly, he felt Hart was too eager to use the troops. As has been previously noted, Gladstone was equally adamant on the use of the troops. In any case, he did not have a high opinion of Hart's qualifications for the job. In December 1913 he told Harcourt he thought Hart's term was up that coming spring and that Harcourt ought to speak to the War Office about his successor if Hart were not to be kept on. When considering a successor his qualifications for acting as the High Commissioner, if the need arose, should be taken into account and Hart "with all his virtues" was not the man for acting in that capacity. "A younger man than Hart "

8 The British press was full of speculation about the reasons for Gladstone's resignation, which The Times (12 February 1914, p. 9) tried to quiet. It said it was well known that Lord Gladstone had been eager to resign for some time and for reasons which had nothing to do with recent events. But the Labour Party with "a fine disregard of Lord Gladstone's real relations with his ministers" seemed determined to make him the scapegoat for General Botha's drastic methods.
is wanted, with common sense and without fads and fussiness." Harcourt agreed that Hart was "not at all the man to be left with responsibilities in the protectorates for any length of time."  

On 22 February 1914 Hart was informed by a rather curt telegram from the War Office that there would be a change in the Commander of the Imperial Forces at the same time as the Governor General. The War Office decided to relieve him of his South African duties in April, to promote him to the rank of full general and to make him eligible for retirement after June 1914. Hart was dumbfounded and at once appealed to Gladstone to help him discover the "real reason" for his dismissal. He assumed he was being censured for his conduct in the July strike. Gladstone expressed complete surprise and insisted Harcourt had never said a word to him on the subject. He tried to reassure Hart by telling him that perhaps the War Office wanted to reduce the military establishment to that sufficient for the protectorates and coastal defense. If his own resignation had led to Hart's dismissal, he regretted it. Gladstone was occasionally absent-minded, but it is unlikely he had

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9 HG Add. Ms. 46001, Gladstone to Harcourt, 18 December 1913.
10 Ibid., Harcourt to Gladstone, 8 January 1914.
11 HG Add. Ms. 46010, Hart to Gladstone, 23 February 1914.
12 Ibid., Gladstone to Hart, 2 March 1914.
completely forgotten his correspondence with Harcourt on the subject of Hart's retirement.

Accepting Gladstone's sympathetic remarks at face value, Hart continued to confide in him. In his "dismissal by cablegram" there had been no words of appreciation for his many years of service. Hart saw it as a punishment and a disgrace. Gladstone complained to Harcourt that Hart deserved more considerate treatment. In a complete about-face he saw no reason why Hart should not stay on until Buxton arrived, even acting as High Commissioner for a short time since there was no trouble in the protectorates or Rhodesia.

Harcourt, understandably surprised, reminded Gladstone of his letter of 18 December on which he had acted. At last Gladstone began to realize what he had done, but he insisted he had spoken in the mistaken belief that Hart's term of office was up. He could hardly tell Hart he was being recalled because he was not thought fit to take over the High Commissionership, although Hart began to suspect as much. Instead, Gladstone encouraged Hart not to exaggerate the whole affair and to "put a best face on it."

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13 HG Add. Ms. 46010, Hart to Gladstone, 10 March 1914.
14 HG Add. Ms. 46002, Gladstone to Harcourt, 13 March 1914.
15 Ibid., Harcourt to Gladstone, 17 March 1914.
16 Ibid., Gladstone to Harcourt, 19 March 1914.
17 HG Add. Ms. 46010, Gladstone to Hart, 30 March 1914.
In the meantime, Merriman was making the situation worse by charging the Imperial Government with making Hart a scapegoat and removing both Hart and Gladstone at the bidding of the British Labour Party. \(^{18}\) Gladstone explained his decision to retire to Merriman and the latter, convinced or not, finally dropped the matter. \(^{19}\) Thus Gladstone must have been more than a little surprised to hear from Hart in December 1914, "you will be astonished to learn that I was told that you were the cause of my recall... because of a private communication to the Colonial Secretary stating that I was unfit to be the High Commissioner." Hart preferred not to believe it because Gladstone had been so upset by his recall, even going to the ship to see him off. \(^{20}\)

Gladstone flatly denied ever suggesting Hart's recall "directly or indirectly." He admitted mentioning Hart's successor because in 1913 he had thought Hart's time was up. He had not realized his mistake until January 1914, which would have given him time enough to remedy it since the War Office did not notify Hart until 22 February. \(^{21}\) Hart accepted this explanation until 1919 when he took

\(^{18}\) HG Add. Ms. 46077, Merriman to Gladstone, 20 March 1914.

\(^{19}\) Harcourt indicated in the House of Commons that Hart's leaving was being made to coincide with Gladstone's and briefly mentioned Hart's long and gallant service to his country. Commons, vol. LVIV, 4 March 1914, col. 410.

\(^{20}\) HG Add. Ms. 46010 Hart to Gladstone, 26 Dec. 1914.

\(^{21}\) Ibid., Gladstone to Hart, 3 January 1915.
up the matter again. In presumably his last word on the subject (it is the last letter to Hart in the Gladstone correspondence), Gladstone admitted having been unduly nervous about Rhodesia and the protectorates at the time and suggesting the need for younger men as Governor General (there is no hint of this in his correspondence) and as Commander of the Imperial troops. Since the entire responsibility for the episode rested on the Government of the day and not on him, and since he had said all he could say, he considered the matter closed.22

In spite of the unpleasant situation with Hart, Gladstone's last weeks in South Africa were quite enjoyable. The country seemed eager to put aside memories of the recent industrial disputes, and the parliamentary session ended on an optimistic note with the passage of the Indian Relief Act and Gandhi's subsequent return to India. When the time came, Gladstone was reluctant to leave and parted on the best of terms with his ministers and with the South Africans in general.23 No one in South Africa seemed to

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22 HG Add. Ms. 46010, Gladstone to Hart, 20 July 1919.
23 When Gladstone left South Africa in 1914 the press comments were quite different from those of November 1909. The Transvaal Leader (3 July 1914, p.6) referred to his "kindly, generous warm-hearted personality" and his attempts to reconcile the two white races, adding that perhaps he had done more for that cause than anyone in South Africa. The Johannesburg Star (3 July 1914, p. 6) called upon the nation to be grateful for the example he had set as the first Governor and for the important work he had done.
suspect what the future had in store, and the most dire prediction that even Gladstone could come up with was that some of the deportees might try to return to South Africa to celebrate the anniversary of the July strike.

He admitted later that had he known what was to occur in August 1914 he would never have left the country. He certainly had no idea that rebellion would break out in South Africa, and even after he heard of the defection of de la Rey and Beyers he was slow to blame them. De la Rey, who was something of a religious mystic, joined the proposed rebellion in the hope of restoring the Boer Republics but was accidently killed before the rebellion actually began. Gladstone found it hard to believe in his disloyalty to the Union and blamed his actions on his "misguided religious mania." 24

General Beyers' behavior was even more mystifying. Along with Smuts he was responsible for the creation of the South African Defense Forces, and he displayed cooperation and friendliness to the Government in spite of his known sympathies with Hertzog and de Wet. He wrote to Gladstone expressing his "thanks and deep sense of indebtedness for the manner in which you have at all times so closely identified yourself with the interests and welfare of the

24 HG Add. Ms. 46002, Gladstone to Harcourt, 15 September 1914.
forces under my command." He expressed regret for all South Africans that Gladstone was leaving so soon. Beyers sent a similar note to Lady Gladstone.\textsuperscript{25} Even at de la Rey's funeral Beyers pretended loyalty, and Gladstone later felt he had decided to hide his true feelings until the time was right. In preparing the South African forces Beyers, much to the Colonial Office's dismay, had studied the forces of Switzerland and Germany in 1913. Later speculation was rife that Beyers had made an agreement with Germany at that time. Gladstone was not willing to go that far although he admitted Beyers had been impressed with Germany and the Kaiser, who had shown him special attention.\textsuperscript{26} Gladstone still preferred to believe in the loyalty of the Dutch Afrikaners and remained convinced "these unfortunate events followed in sequence from the actions of the Progressives in and from 1910."\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{25} HG Add. Ms. 46078, Beyers to Gladstone, 9 July 1914.
\textsuperscript{26} Deneys Reitz, a friend of Smuts and the son of the President of the Union Senate, was with the Defense Forces called out in January 1914. He writes that on the way to Johannesburg there was "a great deal of mutinous talk." There were speeches calling for fighting Botha's government rather than the strikers. Beyers, whom Reitz admits never having liked, spoke to the group Reitz was in, making a "scarcely veiled attack on the Government, on Botha and Smuts and on the English." He apparently asked some of the men if they would support him if he arrested Botha and Smuts. They decided that he was joking but later Reitz was not so certain. Deneys Reitz \textit{Trekking On} (London, Faber, 1933), p. 64-65.
\textsuperscript{27} HG Add. Ms. 46118, Unpublished Autobiography, 1928, f. 199. The Progressives were the English-speaking voters.
Gladstone's official career was almost over. He never served in a government again. During the war he and Lady Gladstone were active on the War Refugees Committee. In early 1922 he returned to Liberal headquarters as Chief Whip where he remained until late 1924. While deploring Asquith's lack of enthusiasm, he welcomed Grey's return to active politics hoping he would attract voters by his high character and straightforwardness. While he worked to unite the Asquith and Lloyd George wings of the party, his task was made more difficult by his and Lloyd George's mutual dislike. Gladstone wanted the Lloyd George fund—he sometimes called it "tainted money" but he knew the party needed it—more than he did Lloyd George whom he referred to as "a prodigal coming home with a full purse and no sign of repentance." Lloyd George probably had even less respect for Gladstone calling him "the finest living embodiment of the liberal principle that talent is not hereditary." Gladstone was not able to do for the party what he had done some twenty years earlier as Chief Whip, and this time any semblance of unity was short-lived.

he remained generally pessimistic throughout his stay at Liberal headquarters and admitted in October 1924 that they were not prepared to fight an election.  

His later years were spent at Dane End, his country home, working on *After Thirty Years* a book vindicating his father's policies. He did not take an active role in the House of Lords, speaking only occasionally from 1916 to 1930 usually attacking the Government's Near East policy. He does not seem to have taken a great interest in South Africa once he left and did not remain in correspondence with any of his former ministers after 1915 with the exception of Smuts, with whom he maintained a close friendship until Gladstone's death in 1930.  

Gladstone once described Sir Benjamin Robertson, who was in South Africa to take part in the Indian Enquiry Commission, as "emphatic, opinionated, short-tempered, "

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31 Wilson, *Downfall*, p. 299.
32 Gladstone and his wife visited Bulgaria in 1927 and was surprised to receive a warm welcome and to discover that his father was regarded as something of a national hero. *Gladstone, After Thirty Years*, p. 153-54.
33 Gladstone was still warmly remembered in South Africa when he died as evidenced by the glowing tribute paid to him by the Natal Mercury, one of the papers which had been most opposed to him in 1909. The Mercury said his "unfailing courtesy and straight-forwardness" had won him respect from all sections of South Africa. He was an "excellent specimen of a plain well bred English gentleman" and his experience and sound judgement had been of great value in those early years of Union. *Natal Mercury*, 7 March 1930 p. 11.
and determined to do his job."\(^{34}\) He might just as well have been describing himself. He was always overshadowed by his more famous father, and there were many who said he owed his political career to being a Gladstone and never would have reached high office on his own merit. Gladstone himself had a rather modest view of his abilities, and perhaps, as The Guardian suggested at his death, this was his greatest handicap and "kept him from rising to the height of his own capacity and knowledge."\(^{35}\) In any case, South Africa brought out all his best and worst characteristics. He was conscientious, hard working and persistent. But he was incapable of understanding the subtleties of a mind like Gandhi's or even Smuts'. He was sometimes impatient with his ministers, suspicious of the motives of Hertzog, Steyn and most of the Unionist Party and press, and intolerant of the dissent and independence voiced by Schreiner and Merriman. His views on the native and Indian questions were not much different from those of his Afrikaner ministers. While he did not officially refer to South Africa as a "white man's country" or preach white supremacy, his constant references to the threat the natives posed to the white community smacks of "the lesser

\(^{34}\) HG Add. Ms. 46001, Gladstone to Harcourt, 22 January 1914.

\(^{35}\) The Guardian, 7 March 1930, p. 12.
breeds without the law." While his views on the Empire were as nebulous as anyone's, he was devoted to the idea of self-government for South Africa, even if it meant temporarily embarrassing the rest of the Empire or "turning a blind eye to Magna Carta." Thus he was admirably suited to carry out the British Government's policy of conciliating the Afrikaners and of ensuring that South Africa always had self-government, even if it did not always have good government. The policy seemed to pay off in 1914, but whether he or that policy was best suited for all South Africans or the Empire in the long run is less certain.
APPENDIX

Short Biographies of Persons Mentioned in this Work

AMPTHILL, Baron (Russell, Arthur Oliver) 1869-1935. Assistant secretary at the Colonial Office 1895-97; private secretary to Chamberlain 1897-1900; Governor of Madras 1900-06; acting Viceroy 1904; active in the House of Lords on behalf of Indians in South Africa 1906-14; opposed India Bills of 1919 and 1935 as not advanced enough.

ANDERSON, Sir John 1858-1918. Second-class clerk Colonial Office 1879; first-class clerk 1896; principal clerk 1897; secretary to the Colonial Conferences 1897 and 1902; Permanent under-secretary for the Colonies 1911-16; Governor and Commander in Chief of Ceylon 1916-18.

ASQUITH, Herbert Henry 1852-1928. Liberal MP for East Fife 1886-1918 and Paisley 1920-24; Home Secretary 1892-95; Chancellor of the Exchequer 1905-08; Prime Minister 1908-16; created Earl of Oxford and Asquith 1925; resigned Liberal leadership 1926.

BAIN, James Thompson 1869-1919. Born in Scotland and arrived in Transvaal as a mechanic 1880; helped establish Witwatersrand Employees' and Mechanics' Union 1890's; fought on Boer side during the war and afterwards worked in Premier Mine Johannesburg; leader of Miners' Strike 1907; helped form South African Federation of Trades Unions 1912; a leader of the 1913 and 1914 strikes; deported 1914; later returned to South Africa and was a leader of Amalgamated Society of Engineers; active in Johannesburg power strike 1919.
BEYERS, Christiaan 1869-1914. Active service attaining the rank of general 1899-1902; Speaker of Transvaal Parliament 1907-10; disappointed in failure to become Speaker of Union House of Assembly 1910; made Commandant General Union forces 1912; visited Europe and met Kaiser 1913; resigned his position and joined rebellion September 1914; drowned in Vaal River while being pursued by Government troops December 1914.

BOTHA, Louis 1862-1919. Commander General of Boer Forces 1900-02; signed Treaty of Vereeniging 1902; founded Het Volk Party 1905; Prime Minister of Transvaal 1907-10; member of National Convention 1908-09; founded South African Party 1910; Prime Minister of South Africa 1910-19; Minister of Agriculture 1910-13; Minister of Native Affairs 1913-19.

BURTON, Henry 1866-1935. Practiced law in Kimberley 1892-1902; strong supporter of Afrikaner Bond after Jameson Raid 1896; elected to Cape Parliament 1902; Cape Attorney General 1908-10; first Union minister of Native Affairs 1910-12; Minister of Railways 1912-20; Minister of Finance 1920-24; retired from public life 1924.

BUXTON, Sidney 1853-1934. Under-secretary for the Colonies 1892-95; Postmaster General 1905-10; President of the Board of Trade 1910-14; Governor General of South Africa 1914-20; President of the Africa Society 1920-34; author General Botha 1924; created Viscount 1914; made an Earl 1920.

CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, Sir Henry 1836-1908. Liberal MP for Stirling Burghs 1868-1908; financial secretary War Office 1871-74; and 1880-82; secretary to the Admiralty 1882-84; Chief Secretary for Ireland 1884-85; War Secretary 1886 and 1892-93; succeeded to Liberal leadership in House of Commons 1899; denounced British "methods of barbarism" in South Africa 1901; Prime Minister 1905-08.
CRESWELL, Col. Frederick Hugh 1866-1948. Active service 1899-1902; manager of Village Main Mine, Johannesburg 1902-10; a founder of the South African Labour Party and elected party leader 1910; served in Southwest Africa and East Africa 1914-18; joined forces with Hertzog 1923; Minister of Defense 1924-33; Minister of Labour 1924-25 and 1929-33; retired from public life 1933.

CREWE, Lord (Crewe-Milnes, Robert Offley) 1858-1945. Took seat in Lords 1885; Viceroy for Ireland 1892-95; took uncle's title Earl of Crewe 1894; President of the Council 1905-08; assumed Liberal leadership of the House of Lords 1908; Colonial Secretary 1908-10; Secretary for India 1910-15; President of the Board of Education 1916; left office with Asquith 1916; ambassador to France 1922-28; leader of the Independent Liberals in the House of Lords 1936-44.

CURTIS, Lionel 1872-1955. Secretary to Milner 1900-05; a founder of the Round Table 1907; Assistant Colonial Secretary to Transvaal 1908; delegate to the League of Nations 1919; adviser to Colonial Office on Irish affairs 1921-24; wrote Civitas Dei 1924-34.

DAVIDSON, Randall Thomas 1848-1930. Ordained 1875; resident chaplain to the Archbishop of Canterbury 1877-82; Dean of Windsor 1883-95; Bishop of Winchester 1895-1903; Archbishop of Canterbury 1903-28; retired 1928.

DE LA REY, General Jacobus 1847-1914. Elected to Transvaal Volksraad 1893; helped capture Jameson Raiders 1896; active service attaining rank of general 1899-1902; member of National Convention 1908-09; appointed Senator 1910; sympathized with proposed Afrikaner rebellion and was accidentally shot by police September 1914.

DE VILLIERS, Henry 1842-1914. Chief Justice of the Cape 1873-1910; President of the National Convention 1908-09; acting Governor General 1912 and 1914; Chief Justice of South Africa 1910-14; created Baron de Villiers 1910.
DE WET, General Christiaan Rudolph 1854-1922. Chief Commander of the Free State forces 1900-02; signed peace treaty 1902; went with Botha on mission to Europe 1902; delegate to National Convention 1908-09; resigned position on Defense Council in protest of Hertzog's dismissal from the cabinet 1913; participated in 1914 rebellion and was sentenced to six years imprisonment but was released in 1915.

DILKE, Sir Charles 1843-1911. Liberal MP for Chelsea 1868-1886; Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs 1880-82; President of Local Government Board 1882-85; involved in divorce case 1886; Liberal MP for Forest of Dean 1892-1911.

EMMOTT, Alfred 1858-1926. Mayor of Oldham 1891-99; Liberal MP for Oldham 1899-1911; created Baron Emmott of Oldham 1911; Under-secretary for Colonies 1911-14; First Commissioner of Public Works 1914-15; created and directed War Trade Department 1915-19; active in commercial interests and supported Asquith Liberals 1920-26.

FICHARDT, Charles Gustav 1870-1923. Mayor of Bloemfontein 1897; active service 1899-1902; elected to Union Parliament 1910; a supporter of Hertzog and a founder of the Nationalist Party 1914.

FISCHER, Abraham 1850-1913. Member of Orange Free State Volksrand 1878-96; member of republican delegation to Europe 1900-02; Chairman of Orangia Unie 1906-10; Prime Minister of Orange Free State 1907-10; Union Minister of lands 1910-13; Minister of Interior 1913.

GANDHI, Mohandas 1869-1948. Studied law in England 1888-91; arrived in South Africa 1893; worked for elimination of South African Indian grievances 1893-1914; returned to India 1915; organized Indian National Congress 1920; imprisoned and disbarred 1922; imprisoned 1930; represented Indian Congress in England 1931; resigned from Congress 1934; led Congress again 1940; worked for cooperation between Hindu and Muslim 1946; assassinated 1948.
GLADSTONE, Herbert John 1854-1930. Under-secretary Home Office 1892-94; First Commissioner of Works 1894-95; Chief Liberal Whip 1899-1905; Home Secretary 1905-10; created Viscount Gladstone of Lanark 1910; Governor General of South Africa 1910-14; Treasurer of War Refugees Committee 1914-18; Liberal Chief Whip 1922-24; After Thirty Years 1928.

GREY, Edward 1862-1933. Liberal MP Berwick on Tweed 1885-1916; Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs 1892-95; Foreign Secretary 1905-16; created Viscount Grey of Fallodon 1916; ambassador to Washington 1919-20; wrote his memoirs 1925; Chancellor of Oxford 1928.

GOKHALE, Gopal Krishna 1866-1915. Professor at Fergusson College, non-official member of Viceroy's Legislative Council and President of Indian Congress 1905; founded Servants of India Society 1905; member of Royal Commission on Public Service in India 1912; visited South Africa 1912.

HARCOURT Lewis 1863-1922. Commissioner of Works 1905-10; Colonial Secretary 1910-15; a founder of the London Museum 1911; Commissioner of Public Works 1915-16; created Viscount 1917; Chairman of Army Agriculture Committee 1917.

HARDINGE, Sir Charles 1858-1944. Diplomatic service 1881-1903; Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs 1903; Ambassador to Russia 1904-06; Permanent Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs 1906-10; Viceroy of India 1910-16; Baron Hardinge of Penshurst 1916; returned to Foreign Office 1916-20; Ambassador to France 1920-22; retired 1922.

HART, General Reginald 1848-1931. Director of military education in India 1888-96; service in Afghan War 1879; Egypt 1884; Indian service 1896-1902; made Lt. General 1908; Commander of Cape Colony Forces 1907-09; Commander in Chief of Imperial Forces in South Africa 1912-14; promoted to General 1914; Lt. Governor of Guernsey 1914-18.
HERTZOG, James Barry 1866-1942. Law practice in Pretoria 1893-95; Judge of Supreme Court Orange Republic 1895-99; active service attaining rank of General 1899-1902; OFS Minister of Education 1907-10; delegate to National Convention 1908-09; Union Minister of Justice 1910-12; Native Affairs 1912; founded National Party 1914; Prime Minister of South Africa 1924-39; founded with Smuts the United South African National Party 1932; opposed South Africa's entry into the war and retired from politics 1939.

HOPWOOD, Sir Francis 1860-1947. Member of Commission to South Africa 1906; Permanent Under-secretary for the Colonies 1907-10; returned to Colonial Office for the Imperial Conference 1911; Civil Lord of the Admiralty 1912-17; created Baron Southborough 1917; mission to India to study franchise reforms 1918; returned to business and accepted several directorships 1920's.

HULL, Henry Charles 1868-1932. Member of Reform Committee and imprisoned after Jameson Raid 1896; active service 1899-1902; Treasurer and member of Transvaal Legislative Assembly 1907-10; member of Union Parliament for Barberton 1910-15; Union Minister of Finance 1910-12.

JAMESON, Sir Leander Starr 1853-1917. Practiced medicine in the Cape 1880's and 1890's; led Jameson Raiders into Transvaal 1895; Prime Minister of Cape Colony 1904-08; delegate to National Convention 1908-09; leader of the Unionist Party 1910-12; President of the British South Africa Company 1913-17.

JUST, Sir Hartman 1854-1929. Principal clerk at the Colonial Office 1897-1907; Secretary to the Colonial Conference 1907; Assistant Under-secretary for the Colonies 1907-16.

LAMBERT, Sir Henry Charles 1868-1935. Entered the Colonial Office 1892; private secretary to Chamberlain for Select Committee on South Africa 1897; Principal clerk at the Colonial Office 1907; Assistant Under-secretary and secretary for the Imperial Conference 1916-21; Acting Under-secretary for the Colonies 1924-25; Senior Crown Agent for the Colonies 1921-32; retired 1932.
LAURIER, Sir Wilfred 1841-1919. Elected to Canadian Parliament 1874; Minister of Inland Revenues 1877; leader of Liberal Party 1887; Prime Minister of Canada 1896-1911; MP for Quebec East 1877-1919; refused to join war coalition government because he opposed conscription 1917.

LEUGHARS, Col. George 1858-1921. Active service 1899-1902; member of Natal Parliament 1899-1906; Natal Minister of Works and Native Affairs 1903-05; Union Minister of Industry and Commerce 1910-11 and Public Works 1912; resigned 1912; Officer Commanding Natal Troops 1914-15.

MACDONALD, James Ramsay 1866-1937. Joined Fabian Society 1886; ILP candidate for Parliament 1894; Secretary of Labour Representative Committee 1900; London County Council 1901-04; MP for Leicester 1906-18; Chairman of Labour Party 1911-14; Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 1924; Prime Minister 1929-35.

MALAN, Francois Stephanus 1871-1941. Delegate to National Convention 1908-09; member of South African delegation to Imperial Conference 1911; Union Minister of Education 1910-21; Minister of Mines 1912-24; Minister of Agriculture 1919-21; acting Minister of Native Affairs 1915-21; elected to South African Senate 1927; President of the Senate 1940-41.

MERRIMAN, John Xavier 1841-1926. Entered Cape politics 1864; in various Cape ministries 1875-84; Cape Treasurer General 1890-93 and 1898-1900; Cape Prime Minister 1908-10; delegate to National Convention 1908-09; private member of Union House of Assembly after 1910.

MILNER, Alfred 1854-1921. Governor of Cape Colony 1897-1901; Governor of Transvaal and Orange Colony 1901-05; High Commissioner of South Africa 1897-1905; made a Baron 1901 and a Viscount 1902; The Nation and the Empire 1913; member of War Cabinet 1916-18; War Secretary 1918; Colonial Secretary 1918-21.
POUTSMA, Kessel Jacob 1866-1933. Born in Holland 1866; joined Dutch socialist movement and established a socialist paper 1891; arrived in South Africa 1895; fought with Transvaal Boers under de Wet 1899-1902; accompanied Steyn to Europe 1902; engaged in journalism and commerce Bloemfontein 1903-12; organized rail workers and became secretary of the Railway and Habour Servants Union 1912; took an active role in 1913 and 1914 strikes; deported in 1914; later returned to South Africa and became an active party worker and organizer for Smuts 1920's.

REITZ, Deneys 1882-1944. Joined Boer forces 1899; practiced law in Orange Free State 1903-14; joined army in German Southwest Africa and later France 1914-18; elected to Union Parliament 1920; Minister of Native Affairs and Lands 1923-24; Commando 1931; Trekking On 1933.

ROBERTSON, Sir Benjamen 1864-1953. Deputy Commissioner and Magistrate of India's Central Provinces 1897-1902; Chief Secretary of the Central Provinces 1902-06; Secretary of the Indian Government's Commerce Department 1907-11; Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces 1912-20; represented India on the South African Indian Enquiry Commission 1914 and 1920; British Commissioner to Russia 1921; member of the Council of India 1922-27; retired 1927.

RODWELL, Sir Cecil Hunter 1874-1953. Appointed to the staff of the High Commissioner of South Africa 1900; secretary and accountant to the High Commissioner 1904-18; Governor of Fiji and High Commissioner of the West Pacific Islands 1918-25; Governor of British Guiana 1925-28; Governor of Southern Rhodesia 1928-34; a director of Consolidated Gold Fields of South Africa 1937-45.

ROSE-INNES, James 1855-1942. Elected to the Cape Parliament 1884; Attorney General 1890-93 and 1900-03; Chief Justice of Transvaal 1903-10; Union Supreme Court Judge 1910-14; Chief Justice of South Africa 1914-27; retired 1927.
SAUER, Jacobus 1850-1913. Elected to the Cape Parliament 1876; Cape Minister of Native Affairs 1881-84; Colonial Secretary 1890-93; led opposition to Rhodes in 1896; delegate to National Convention 1903-09; Union Minister of Railways 1910-12; Minister of Justice and of Native Affairs 1912-13.

SCHREINER, Theophiles Lyndall 1844-1920. Educated in England, University of London; teacher in the Cape Colony 1867-70; became diamond prospector and temperance advocate in 1870's; in part responsible for passage of Transvaal Liquor Ordinance of 1883; strongly pro-British during the war; member of South African House of Assembly 1910-20.

SCHREINER, William Philip 1857-1919. Began practicing law Cape Town 1882; Cape Attorney General 1896; Prime Minister 1898-1900; Union Senator 1910-14; High Commissioner for South Africa in London 1914-19.

SELBORNE, Lord (Palmer, William Waldgrave) 1859-1942. Under-secretary for the Colonies 1895-1900; First Lord of the Admiralty 1902-05; High Commissioner of South Africa 1905-10; active in House of Lords 1910-15; President of the Board of Agriculture 1915-16.


SLOLEY, Sir Herbert Cecil 1855-1937. Assistant Commissioner of Basutoland 1889; Government Secretary 1898; Resident Commissioner of Basutoland 1900-16; retired 1916.

SMARTT, Sir Thomas 1858-1929. Elected to Cape Parliament 1895; Colonial Secretary 1895; Commissioner of Public Works 1900 and 1904-08; delegate to National Convention 1908-09; leader of Unionist Party 1912; Minister of Agriculture 1921-24.
SMUTS, Jan Christian 1875-1950. Appointed Transvaal State Attorney 1898; active service attaining rank of general 1899-1902; Transvaal Minister of Education 1907-10; delegate to National Convention 1908-09; Union Minister of Defense 1910-19; Commander of Imperial Forces in East Africa 1916; represented South Africa in Imperial War Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio 1917-18; Prime Minister of South Africa 1919-24; joined with Hertzog 1934; Prime Minister 1939-48.


SOLOMAN, Sir William 1852-1930. Appointed to the bench in Kimberley 1887; Judge of Eastern District Court Grahamstown 1895; appointed to Transvaal Supreme Court 1902; Judge of Appellate Division Bloemfontein 1910; Chairman of Indian Enquiry Commission 1914; Chief Justice of South Africa 1927-29; retired 1929.

STANLEY, Sir Herbert James 1872-1955. Assistant private secretary to First Lord of Admiralty 1906-08; private secretary to Lord President of the Council 1908-10; secretary to Governor General of South Africa 1910-14; Imperial Resident Commissioner of North and South Rhodesia 1915-18; Imperial Secretary for South Africa 1918-24; Governor of Northern Rhodesia 1924-27; Governor of Ceylon 1927-31; High Commissioner for South Africa 1931-35; Governor of Southern Rhodesia 1935-41.

STEYN, Marthinus 1853-1916. President of Orange Free State 1896-1902; Vice President of National Convention 1908-09; in retirement and semi-invalid 1909-16.

WARD, Sir Joseph 1856-1930. Elected to New Zealand Parliament 1887; in various ministries 1891-99; Prime Minister 1906-12; represented New Zealand in Imperial War Cabinet 1917-18; delegate to Versailles 1919; Prime Minister and leader of National Party (revised Liberals) 1928-30.
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND MANUSCRIPT MATERIALS

Private Papers
Herbert Gladstone Papers at the British Museum

Public Record Office
Colonial Office Papers, Union of South Africa
(C.O. 551), 1910-1914.

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Parliamentary Papers
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Cd. 5745, 1911, vol. LIV, Imperial Conference, Minutes of Proceedings.

Cd. 5746, 1911, vol. LIV, Papers Laid Before the Imperial Conference.


NEWSPAPERS AND PERIODICALS

Great Britain

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The *Economist*

The *Fortnightly Review*

The *Guardian* (Manchester)

*Justice*

The *Labour Leader*

The *Liberal Magazine*

The *Nation*

The *National Review*

*National Union Gleanings*

*Nineteenth Century*

*Punch*

The *Round Table*

The *Saturday Review*

The *Spectator*

The *Times* (London)

South Africa

The *Advertiser* (Natal)

*Cape Times*

The *Friend* (Bloemfontein)

*Natal Mercury*

Pretoria *News*

*South African News* (Cape Town)
The Star (Johannesburg)

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Findlay, Sir John G. The Imperial Conference of 1911 From Within. London: Constable, 1912.


BIOGRAPHIES


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GENERAL WORKS


