INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in “sectioning” the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again – beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from “photographs” if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of “photographs” may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

University Microfilms International
300 North Zeib Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA
St. John's Road, Tyler's Green
High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR
TAQUI, Abdullah Saleh, 1940-
AESTHETIC VISION AND EDUCATION.
The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1977
Education, art

University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
AESTHETIC VISION AND EDUCATION

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Abdullah Saleh Taqui, B.A., P.G.C.E

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1977

Reading Committee:                     Approved By

Professor Kenneth Marantz                      K.A. Marantz
Professor Arthur Efland          Adviser
Professor James Scanlan         Art Education Department
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deep appreciation of all those who have in one way or another contributed to the conception or execution of the present work. In particular, I would like to mention Professor Arthur Efland of the Department of Art Education and Professor James Scanlan of the Department of Philosophy, whom I was honored to have as members of my reading committee; Professor Paul Klohr and Professor Hoyt Sherman, who have significantly contributed to my understanding of curriculum and art theory respectively; and my adviser, Dr. Kenneth Marantz, to whom I am especially indebted.
VITA

1940       Born in Kuwait.
1963       Obtains B.A. Degree (Honours), University of Durham.
1967       Begins work as supervisor of Art Education, Ministry of Education, Kuwait, with special interest in curriculum development.
1968       Obtains the Post-Graduate Certificate in Education, University of London.
1973       Begins studies at the Ohio State University.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Art Education.


Studies in Aesthetics. Professor James P. Scanlan.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART I: ANALYSIS OF AESTHETIC VISION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. CHARACTERIZATION OF AESTHETIC VISION</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic Vision and Thought</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic Vision and Ordinary Perception</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putative Criteria of Aesthetic Vision</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concluding Remarks</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. APPREHENSION AND EXPRESSION IN AESTHETIC VISION</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Symbolic Nature of Aesthetic Vision</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symbolic Characteristics of Aesthetic Vision</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE MODES OF AESTHETIC VISION</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic Discrimination</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aesthetic Transformation</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. AESTHETIC VISION AS KNOWLEDGE</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In search of Aesthetic Knowledge</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Validity of Aesthetic Knowledge</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# PART II: THE EDUCATION OF AESTHETIC VISION

## VI. VISUAL EDUCATION

- The Aims of Visual Education ........................................... 223
- The Scope of Visual Education ........................................... 233
- The Means of Visual Education .......................................... 245
- Incompatible Learning: Fetishism and Idolatory ..................... 278

## VII. VISUAL EDUCATION AND THE CURRICULUM.

### I. CURRICULAR JUSTIFICATION OF VISUAL EDUCATION

- The Desirability of Visual Education .................................. 289
- The Possibility of Visual Education ................................... 297
- Visual Education and the Need for Formal Schooling ................. 305
- Visual Education and the Organization of Curriculum Resources .. 307
- Visual Education and the Components of the Curriculum ............ 309

### II. VISUAL EDUCATION AND ASPECTS OF THE CURRICULUM

- Character, Development, and Organization of Content ............... 312
- Visual Education and the Problem of Instruction .................... 329
- Visual Education and the Integration of the Curriculum .......... 338
- Visual Education and the Subject Organization of the Curriculum 342

**LIST OF REFERENCES** ...................................................... 348
LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What urged me to undertake this study is a conviction that scientific thought does not place a limit upon human intellectual capacities, that in aesthetic vision we have a distinctive form of understanding which is just as valid and valuable as science, and that, in so far as education is concerned with the development of the intellectual capacities, the cultivation of aesthetic vision should be considered an important aspect of the educational enterprise. The purpose of this study, then, is not to develop my convictions regarding these matters, but to achieve a general conceptual grasp of aesthetic vision, both as an end in its own right and as a foundation for educational policy and practice. In pursuing this goal, I had to deal with a complex problem which brought me into close contact not only with the various manifestations of aesthetic vision, but also with different kinds of philosophical inquiry, including a consideration of the nature and scope of human value responses. Moreover, the complexity of this problem is such that I had to deal with both normative as well as critical issues. An appreciation of this complexity would,
therefore, seem essential for a proper understanding of the paper as a whole.

The argument is presented in two parts. In Part I an analysis of aesthetic vision is given in four chapters (Chapters II through V). In Part II a theory concerning the education of aesthetic vision is elaborated, using the account given in Part I as a philosophical foundation. This account, moreover, may be said to be logically prior to the educational theory presented in the second part, since before one can say what the education of aesthetic vision is one has to spell out what aesthetic vision itself means.

Chapter II presents a characterization of aesthetic vision as sensuous apprehension taken for its own sake. What is remarkable about a characterization of this nature is that it attempts to find, what Nelson Goodman called "a neat formula for sorting out experiences into aesthetic and nonaesthetic"\(^1\) or, again in Goodman's own words a "crisp criterion" of the aesthetic.\(^2\) According to Professor Goodman, such an attempt is simple-minded in view of the alleged failure of all previous attempts to do so. I personally am not so sure if all such attempts

\(^1\)Languages of Art, p. 252.

\(^2\)Loc. cit.
to which Goodman refers were actual failures. What seems
to me evident, however, is that his remarks in this respect
are totally misguided. It would seem that their apparent
plausibility depends on an erroneous assumption, namely,
that all works of art are basically aesthetic in character;
and since works of art are rightly considered to differ
widely, it was presumably assumed that the notion of the
aesthetic must therefore be elusive and hence incapable of
being encompassed by a neat formula or crisp criterion.
It would be instructive to see how works of art differ from
one another. But before we do so, let us find out what
precisely works of art have in common.

Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic which all
works of art have in common is that, ideally speaking, they
all are purposive objects contrived in such a way so as to
make them well adapted to serve the purposes for which they
are intended.\(^1\) Thus a hair-pin is a work of art, a sermon
is a work of art, a Mondrian is a work of art, a television
commercial is a work of art. In fact, any man-made object
contrived to serve a particular purpose or function in a
certain way may legitimately be called a work of art.\(^2\)
Since such objects are bound to involve concrete operations

\(^1\)It is important to note that not all objects which
serve a purpose are so contrived, and hence not all objects
which serve a purpose are works of art.

\(^2\)Cf. Coomaraswamy: "the thing made is a work of art."
See Christian and Oriental Philosophy of Art, p. 18."
and manipulative skills of some sort, this fact constitutes another thing which all works of art have in common. The fact that they all are judged by standards of functional efficacy is yet another thing which brings them all together. But apart from these three features which all works of art have in common, there is nothing else which could justify subsuming them all under the same category.

An analysis of the ways in which works of art differ from one another indicates the existence of two major groups: 1) **practical** and 2) **symbolic**. A typewriter or a tee-spoon, a bridge or a banjo, a sickle or a bicycle are all practical works of art, from a logical point of view, at any rate. On the other hand, a Mondrian, a dirge, a fairy-tale, a political speech, a television commercial are all symbolic works of art, in as much as their purpose is achieved by their power to affect or manipulate the mind, rather than by their adaptability to practical or physical needs. Symbolic works of art themselves may be divided into two groups: 1) **cognitive** and 2) **manipulative**. Cognitive works function by modifying awareness. If this modification takes the form of sensuous apprehension, then the work functions aesthetically. If it results in the apprehension of feelings expressed by the work then the work is emotionally expressive. If the cognitive content takes a vague or undifferentiated form, then the work is functioning allusively. The manipulative work, on the
other hand, does not function primarily by modifying aware-

ness but rather by manipulating the individual psychically.

Thus, it may have a motivating or persuasive effect, or it

may result in an actual change of mood.\(^1\) (See Figure 1.)

The point of this classification is to show that not

all works of art function aesthetically, by structuring

sensuous awareness (in the way, for example, a Cezanne or

a Mondrian does). For this reason the locution "aesthetic

experience" must not be indiscriminately applied to any

experience which an encounter with a work of art may give

rise to. Now, to say that any attempt to find a crisp

criterion of the kind of experience which a work function-
ing aesthetically provides is unlikely to succeed is

surely pessimistic, to say the least. It would, of course,

be another matter if what one is looking for is not a

criterion for the aesthetic itself but for all the kinds

of experiences which our encounter with works of art may

give rise to. For such a criterion would then be either

too vague to be of any value or applicable to some, but

not to all, the instances in question. But those writers

who seem to be dissatisfied with a characterization of the

aesthetic in terms of sensuous apprehension are, in fact,

\(^1\text{It is important to note the difference between a}

\text{cognitive work of art which results in an apprehension of}

\text{an emotion without actually affecting one's own mood and}

\text{a manipulative work of art which actually alters one's}

\text{own mood.}
Figure 1. Functional analysis of works of art.
looking for precisely this kind of criterion. Roger Scruton, \textsuperscript{1} who is evidently one of them, writes:

Philosophers who have wished to emphasize this sensuous quality have tended to stress the arts of painting and music, where what is pleasing is the sound or look of something. But to base one's theory of aesthetic interest on these cases alone is to risk making nonesense of the appreciation of literature. Indeed, any attempt to define aesthetic appreciation in sensuous terms will fail to explain the arts of poetry and narrative.

Surely what is amiss is not the attempt to define aesthetic appreciation in sensuous terms but, as I have already indicated, the assumption that all works of art function aesthetically, or that they all have a particular quality in common, to which the term "aesthetic" is applicable. That all works of art function like a Monet or a Mondrian, i.e., aesthetically, is simply not true. That all symbolic works of art, whether cognitive or manipulative, have a property in common is true, since they all involve stimulating rather than denotative symbol schemes. (See Chapter III.) But this property should not be confused with the aesthetic. (The term "aesthetic" was first introduced in aesthetic discourse by Alexander Gotlieb Baumgarten in a short treatise, published in 1750, to refer to the sensuous aspect of perception. He derived it from the Greek word \textit{aisthesis}, meaning "perception."\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1}See Baumgarten, A. G., \textit{Reflections on Poetry}, which is the English translation of this treatise, the original being in Latin.
Chapter III provides an account of sensuous apprehension as a symbolic process. The main issue here is what kind of function this symbolic process has. One thing seems to be certain, namely, that this function is not denotative, even though it must have a "cognitive" or "referential" aspect, i.e., a kind of signification. Thus, Charles Morris writes: "... a sign must in a sense "signify something." Thus a sign must have signification, but it need not denote anything."¹ This obscure function was later identified by Goodman² as "exemplification." He defines this mode of signification thus:

An object that is literally or metaphorically denoted by a predicate, and refers to that predicate or the corresponding property, may be said to exemplify that predicate or property.

And so, according to Goodman, all symbolization is "cognitive" or "referential" but while some symbols are denotational, others are exemplificational. Denotation is characteristic of the statements of science, while exemplification is characteristic of the works of art.

While it certainly makes sense to say that an object may exemplify a property which it actually possesses, it does seem arbitrary to suggest that an object may be said to exemplify something which it does not actually possess.

¹Signification and Significance, p. 67.
Thus, a painting may exemplify bright colors or sombre colors, in as much as these terms refer to properties which the painting actually possesses. But can we also say that a painting exemplifies dynamic balance or sadness, qualities which are purely psychic in nature and therefore cannot possibly be a part of an actual object? Goodman himself does not seem to find this problematic but I for one do find it to be so. However, even if we are willing to overlook this matter, the doctrine of exemplification is applicable only where the work affects us cognitively by articulating our awareness in one way or another. But the analysis of the various functions of art works, given above, clearly indicates that not all works function cognitively in this way. A dirge song does not so much affect your awareness as make you feel sad and wanting to cry. That is, it manipulates your mood and makes you disposed to act in a certain way. A novel may affect you by changing your attitude regarding certain moral issues. A television news commentary may affect you by making you prejudiced against certain groups both inside and outside the country. A commercial may affect you persuasively by making you disposed to act in a certain manner (e.g., consume something, or buy something). Now, the point of all these works is not cognitive at all, even though they may make use of cognition. Logically speaking, their point is to manipulate, to make the individual assume a certain attitude
or state of mind, or be disposed to act in a certain way. What are we going to do with them then? In response to this dilemma, we may take one of three possible courses. The first of these is to deny that such works may be legitimately referred to as works of art. But in view of the fact that the history of art quite clearly indicates that works of art may function in a non-cognitive way (for example, by inducing piety or encouraging morality), to assume that such effects are not among the legitimate functions of works of art is to deny legitimacy to so much of the world's artistic output. It would, therefore, seem very arbitrary to suggest that works whose point is to manipulate are not works of art properly so-called. The second of these possible courses which we may take is to admit that those manipulative works are in fact works of art but the doctrine of exemplification does not apply to them, in which case one has either to look for a third category (besides denotation and exemplification) or admit that exemplificationality lacks generality and hence adequacy. The third course open to us is to abandon the notion of exemplification as a major symbolic mode and look for a more suitable one. This is precisely what I did. Instead of exemplification, I used stimulation as the major mode to be contrasted with denotation. In this way exemplification becomes a sub-class of stimulation,
just as representation is a sub-class of denotation. (See Chapter III.)

I have made repeated reference in Chapter III to the notion of "symbol systems" which I used synonymously with other expressions such as "modes of apprehension," and "aesthetic traditions." Through this notion I endeavored to direct attention to the conceptual framework, or system of understanding, which makes aesthetic apprehension possible. The idea is that apprehension does not depend merely on the physical object or symbol but also demands knowledge of the appropriate conceptual scheme, which we learn through our contact with other human beings.\(^1\) Stated very simply, what this notion indicates is that aesthetic perception is concept-dependent, an idea which can be traced to Kant's dictum that "intuitions without concepts are blind."\(^2\)

In a lengthy article intended to be a discussion of the ontological basis of Roman Ingarden's aesthetics, Piotr Graff contrasts a "deterministic model of artistic communication" with a "stochastic model." According to the "deterministic model," which he claims to be the one Ingarden himself adopted, "definite signs have definite meanings accorded to them by pre-existing procedures."\(^3\)

---

\(^1\)See D. W. Hamlyn, Theory of Knowledge, p. 186.

\(^2\)See D. W. Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception, p. 133.

\(^3\)Piotr Graff, "The Ontological Basis of Roman Ingarden's Aesthetics: A Tentative Reconstruction." In Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics, p. 93.
According to the "stochastic model," on the other hand,

... an interpretation of a message ... does not consist in a subjugation to some unambiguous rule, and its result is not given in advance as something that need only be discovered by using some trained-in standard cognitive means.

... The meaning of an artistic message is essentially ambiguous; it must be subject to transformations, manipulations and choices, dependent on which of the set of possible solution of the interpretative problem is ... an optimal solution.1

Graff's "deterministic" and "stochastic" models seem to correspond pretty closely to Goodman's notions of "articulateness" and "density."2 But whereas Goodman's notions are meaningless without the notion of symbol system; where a symbol scheme is "correlated with a field of reference,"3 Graff seems to overlook or, at any rate, undermine such an idea, so as to give his notion of the "stochastic" model of interpretation, credence. In fact, his claim that Ingarden had a "deterministic" view of interpretation is probably based on Ingarden's statement that in aesthetic apprehension, "a proper attitude" of the perceiving subject is being assumed.4 In other words, it is this reference to "a proper attitude" which evidently

1Ibid., p. 94.
2See Goodman, op. cit., Chapters IV through VI.
suggests normative standards that seems to have made Graff view Ingarden's conception of aesthetic apprehension as "deterministic" in character. Graff's position, as I have indicated, overlooks or grossly undermines the fact that in aesthetic interpretation, normative standards are involved through the application of symbol systems and their fields of reference, which application is made possible by those "common frameworks" which were mentioned above.

Nevertheless, there are instances where aesthetic apprehension does take a stochastic form in that it becomes, as Graff put it, "subject to transformations, manipulations and choices." This is, for instance, how a great artist apprehends nature. I have, therefore, distinguished two forms which aesthetic apprehension may take:

interpretative (where assuming the "proper attitude" is crucial) and stochastic (where apprehension becomes free or unregulated).

Chapter IV offers an analytical description of the various modes of aesthetic vision. Aesthetic discrimination and transformation are identified as the basic processes of aesthetic vision. Some may find these categories reminiscent of Ingarden's "categorial structures" and "qualitative harmony structures." But the important

---

Ingarden: "In this whole perceptive process there is accomplished two kinds of formation of the qualities grasped: a. into categorial structures, b. into qualitative harmony structures." Ibid., p. 304.
difference is that Ingarden is not suggesting that aesthetic apprehension may take either of these two forms, which is what I am doing. Rather, what he is saying is that these two types of aesthetic formations occur in every individual process of aesthetic apprehension. What is more he is suggesting that the formation of the "categorial structures" is not to be viewed as significant in its own right, since, according to him, the value of the aesthetic experience inheres primarily in the apprehension of the "qualitative harmony structures." He thus writes:¹

The obtaining of an arranged harmony of qualities ... is, so to speak, the final aim of the whole aesthetic process, and, at least, of its creative phase. To the attainment of this aim there is subordinated ... the categorial forming of an aesthetic object ...

And he goes on to say: "This means that the categorial forming of an aesthetic object is carried out in such a way that a possibly rich and valuable harmony of qualities is obtained."

Harold Osborne also speaks of two different ways of seeing involved in apprehending every work of art. But he, differs from Ingarden in that he does not make one particular way necessarily subordinate to the other. He thus writes:²

¹Ibid., 307.
²The Art of Appreciation, p. 145.
We see a representational painting as an abstract configuration of forms but we also see through the forms to the reality which they represent.

He goes on to say:¹

A person who has not seen a picture as an abstract has not seen it as a picture; but one who sees a representational picture only as an abstract has missed much of its aesthetic content.

Of course, one may argue that Harold Osborne might have been thinking of a particular kind of work of art, something, let us say, like a Bonnard, which can be enjoyed both as a depiction and as a two-dimensional abstract design. This may well be so, and I have certainly no reason to dispute it. The point which I am trying to make, however, is this: the two different modes of aesthetic apprehension to which both Ingarden and Osborne refer should not be confused with the two basic modes of aesthetic vision which I describe in Chapter IV and which are seen as autonomous processes and hence dependent on two different types of symbol schemes.

There is another point which I would like to mention in connection with Chapter IV. Writers who have dealt with aesthetic transformation approached it merely as an aspect of visual depiction, not as an autonomous form of sensuous apprehension. This is, for instance, how

¹Ibid., p. 146.
E. H. Gombrich conceived of it in his book *Art and Illusion*. To him, it is a matter of creating an illusion of visible reality; hence the title of the book.

Chapter V deals with aesthetic vision from an epistemological standpoint. It investigates the question whether there is such a thing as aesthetic knowledge and the question relating to the validity of such knowledge. In writing this chapter I have profited a great deal from the writings of D. W. Hamlyn. Hamlyn himself does not posit the claim that there is such a thing as aesthetic knowledge. But his championship of Kant's notion that perception is concept-dependent, which is evident in all his writings, is certainly a major step in that direction. He also suggested the possibility of approaching the traditional disciplines as sources of specific forms of knowledge,\(^1\) indicating that this kind of epistemological inquiry is appropriate to the philosophy of the discipline under consideration.\(^2\) Furthermore, he cautioned against viewing the theory of knowledge as coextensive with the philosophy of science.\(^3\)

It is, however, regrettable that Professor Hamlyn failed to acknowledge that what is unique about "knowledge

---

\(^1\) One would assume that art is one of these disciplines.

\(^2\) *The Theory of Knowledge*, p. 6.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 7.
of" and "direct awareness" is something other than factual knowledge or logical relationships. For it is this fact alone that seems to explain why he persisted in reducing these forms of experience to "knowledge that." But whatever one may think of this reduction, the fact is that it gave encouragement to those who are eager to present art as a form of knowledge to try to do so by approaching it in terms of "knowledge that." Professor Hirst, who came out in 1973 with his "propositional theory of art," is a case in point. I find it hard to resist the feeling that the incentive behind Hirst's move is to increase the chances of aesthetic education in winning the political battle against its exclusion from the curriculum. If this is so, then one could say that in presenting his "propositional theory of art," Hirst's motive is more worthy than his insight.

Nevertheless, it was one of Hirst's remarks which had helped me see the fallacy of positing "direct awareness" (or gnosis) as a paradigm of knowledge. This remark is: "One knows all one knows when none of it is before one's mind."  

---

1Ibid., p. 105.


3See his Knowledge and the Curriculum, pp. 57-58.
Hirst, who thought of works of art as "statements," had to apply the notion of truth to them. Thus, he writes:\(^1\)

In the arts, whether we are talking about painting, poetry, opera, sculpture, the novel or ballet, the observable features are used as symbols, having meaning, can be seen as making artistic statements and judged true or false just as words and sentences can be used to make scientific statements.

Works of art, then, can according to this statement be "judged true or false." This, of course, would be true if they happen to be, as Hirst suggests, statements. But are they? In Chapter V I have given reasons to show that they are not, strictly speaking, statements; and hence the notion of truth is simply inapplicable to them. In this I had the support of Goodman who argues that "truth" as an epistemological notion is applicable only to the statements of science, but when it comes to works of art the measure is "cognitive efficacy."\(^2\) In so far as Goodman's locution appeals to efficacy, its application to works of art would seem very appropriate. But the qualifying term "cognitive" seems too restrictive. This is because, as I have already indicated, not all works of art function cognitively, even if they happen to be symbolic in character. (Thus,

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 152.

\(^2\)Languages of Art, Ch. VI, Sec. 7.
manipulative works of art, in so far as their effect aims at psychic manipulation are also symbolic, but their function is clearly not cognitive.) It would, therefore, seem more appropriate to speak of functional *efficacy*, because it would cover all the various functions which works of art may have, and not just cognitive functions.¹

I have avoided the controversy among contemporary aestheticians concerning the notions of expression and intention because this controversy does not affect the nature of my argument.² Among the most important questions concerning the problem of expression are the following: 1) What does it mean to say that a work of art expresses something? and 2) Does every work of art express something? With regard to the first question, my position is that all works of art which function cognitively express something which may be aesthetic, affective, or allusive in character. Thus, so far as I am concerned expression is not understood in terms of emotional significance alone; it may be that

¹Coomaraswamy uses the expression "functional efficacy," but not in the generic sense introduced here. In his case, its application is limited to those works which are adapted to be used in a practical way. In addition to "functional efficacy" he also uses the term "intelligibility" in connection with works of art whose function is cognitive in character. (See Christian and Oriental Philosophy of Art, p. 78.

²Those who are unfamiliar with the nature of this controversy are referred to "The Concept of Artistic Expression" by John Hospers and "The Intentional Fallacy" by William Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley (both appear in Problems in Aesthetics, edited by Morris Weitz).
but it may also be something else. But when I make specific reference to aesthetic expression, no reference to the emotional appeal of the work is intended. In this paper the locution "aesthetic expression" may either refer to the process of aesthetic symbolization, in which an aesthetic idea or concept is given a symbolic form, or to the aesthetic "meaning" of such a form. With regard to the second question, viz. "Does every work of art express something?" my answer is clearly "No," since, as I have just indicated, only those works of art which function cognitively express something, i.e., act as a symbolic form for it.

Concerning the problem of intention the fundamental question seems to be this: must one know the artist's intention in order to appreciate his work appropriately? In responding to this question, I would like to stress in the first place that, ideally at least, the artist is aware of the nature of the efficacy of his work. Secondly, no artist who deserves this name would present something unless he knows that it is in some sort of way effective. It would, therefore, make sense to speak of the purposive character of the work and the artist's awareness of it, and hence it would make sense to speak of the artist's intention and the extent to which he succeeded in realizing it in his work. This, however, does not mean that the
artist must always begin with a clear idea as to what effect he wishes his work to have; such a demand, if insisted upon, would virtually rule out the possibility of producing any work which is creative in character. It is, therefore, possible that the artist's awareness of the efficacy of his work may be delayed till the point when the work actually takes shape. This should not strike anyone as in some way paradoxical, since the relationship between the work's efficacy and its actual structure is not arbitrary, but must always be teleologically adapted to each other.

To return to our question as to whether or not knowledge of the intention of the artist is necessary for properly appreciating his work, the answer clearly depends on what we mean when we speak of the intention of the artist. If by that we mean to refer to the nature of the efficacy of his work, then there is no doubt that our awareness of it in the process of interpreting the work is absolutely essential. For without it our experience of the work can only be haphazard or idiosyncratic, and that could not possibly be called a proper way of appreciating it. On the other hand, if by the intention of the artist one merely refers to the thoughts and feelings or circumstances which the artist had while producing the work but which are not directly related to the efficacy of the work, then such knowledge is clearly irrelevant for
interpreting the work appropriately. To illustrate this, in order to appreciate a Mondrian properly one has to know the aesthetic concept of dynamic balance and that the Mondrian gives it proper application; and since this knowledge may be identified with the expressive intention of the artist, then it follows that knowledge of the intention of the artist is in fact necessary for appreciating his work. On the other hand, all other knowledge about the thoughts or feelings of the artist and the circumstances under which he lives and works is not necessary for that purpose. We may thus conclude that knowledge of the intention of the artist is relevant only when it constitutes knowledge of the concept to which his work gives proper application.

But how do we determine the nature of the concept to which the work gives proper application and which has been identified with the intention of the artist? The answer briefly is that we do so on the basis of the structure of the work itself. The objective world is differentiated, and different objects are differentiated in different ways. This means that what fits one set of objects does not fit another.

Chapters VI and VII, which constitute Part II of the dissertation, are devoted to the task of elaborating a theory concerning the education of aesthetic vision. They attempt to provide what D. W. Gotshalk called a "domain
interpretation"¹ or what Israel Scheffler called a "philosophy-of.² For Gotshalk fulfilling the requirements of a "domain interpretation" of aesthetic education implies (a) the characterization of the differentiating aim structure of aesthetic education, (b) the portrayal of what is involved in realizing this aim structure, and (c) the indication of the outcomes consistent with (a) and (b).

According to Scheffler, the role of a "philosophy-of" is to provide a general conceptual grasp of the form of thought in question and to articulate its general features. In other words, its role is to analyze the form of thought and to try to understand its point. A "philosophy-of" is, thus, of potential use to the educator in clarifying his objectives. But such contribution does not exhaust its role. For in it understanding merges with criticism and evaluation, with issues of justification and appraisal.³

These two papers virtually determined my task as far as the educational part of the dissertation is concerned. It would, therefore, seem that its success or failure


²"Philosophy and the Curriculum," in his Reason and Teaching, pp. 31-41.

³"Philosophy and the Curriculum," pp. 36-38.
depends on how well it satisfies the requirements stated in them.

I would like to mention at this point that these two articles and much of the contributions to educational theory written by philosophers must be approached only in general terms, since their specific proposals tend to be inadequate. This can be illustrated by referring to Harry S. Broudy's essay on aesthetic education which is entitled Enlightened Cherishing. In this essay Broudy distinguishes what he presumably considers to be three rival approaches to aesthetic education. One he calls the "performance" approach, another he calls the "appreciation" approach, and the third he calls the "perceptual" approach.\footnote{According to Broudy, the difference between the "appreciation" approach and the "perceptual" approach is that while the former focuses on talk about works of art, the latter is concerned primarily with percipience.} He seems to have confused the inadequacy of existing programs where the focus is placed on either "performance" (i.e., production) or "appreciation" (i.e., criticism) with what these are potentially capable of. This surely explains why he opted for the "perceptual" approach (which, in my account, is referred to as "aesthetic appreciation"). These three approaches to aesthetic education (appreciation, production, and criticism),
properly conceived, ought to be treated not as rival, but as complementary, means.¹

I shall now attempt to say something about the significance of undertaking the kind of investigation presented in this paper. Although this paper deals with various topics of a purely philosophical nature, as an educationist I shall look at it from a purely educational point of view. What, then, can be expected from this kind of research? A number of things immediately come to my mind. First, of all, there is the role which such an investigation can help in clarifying educational objectives which I have already referred to. In this way it can help reduce the state of confusion and indecision which might otherwise occur. Secondly, it is hoped that this kind of investigation will have a critical and reformative function with respect to educational practice, even though as Scheffler remarked, it is not an indispensable starting point for it.² Thirdly, it provides a second-order, or philosophical, perspective which the teaching role demands and which would otherwise be gained in a haphazard or inefficient manner, without guidance and without awareness of alternatives. "Lacking a systematic and critical introduction

¹For Broudy's account of the three approaches, see pp. 60-66, and Section IV where he gives a detailed account of the "perceptual" approach.

of philosophical considerations," Professor Scheffler writes, "dogmatic and incoherent philosophical attitudes are enabled to grow and proliferate."

To refer more specifically to this particular investigation, there are two tasks, a major one and a minor one, which I hope it will perform. The major task is that of affirming the cognitive nature of aesthetic vision thereby undermining the traditional view of education. Since it is generally believed that education is primarily concerned with the development of the intellectual powers, it would be impossible to hold on to the view that education is concerned chiefly with the development of "literacy and numeracy" (better known as "the three R's"); for the affirmation of the cognitive nature of aesthetic vision is bound to result in the abandonment of this limited view of man's mental, or intellectual, powers, which largely accounts for the widespread neglect of the arts, and imaginative activity in general. On the other hand, as long as education is seen as concerned, or ought to be, with something else, then the role of the arts and the imagination is bound to be regarded as incidental to the main business of education.

The second, or minor, task is to modify our conception of art education. The most obvious and, perhaps, the most

---

pertinent thing to be mentioned here is the fact that this affirmation of the cognitive nature of aesthetic vision will introduce the cognitive challenge into art education. Therapy, recreation, and what have you would have to be given no more than a peripheral status within the subject, so that content of an essentially cognitive nature could be introduced as the subject's main area of concern. Needless to say, the structuring of aesthetic vision is not the only thing that art education, as an autonomous domain, can contribute to cognitive development. (See Chapter VII.)

It is often remarked that to make any headway in aesthetics two qualities are required: methodological rigor and aesthetic sensitivity. In aesthetics, as in all forms of philosophical investigation, methodological rigor implies first and foremost logical thinking. Without logical ability there can be no systematic reflection on any aspect of experience. Logical laws govern thoughts—with at least—moral laws, ideally, govern actions. Clearly, logic is the backbone of philosophical investigation.

To the contemporary analysts, philosophical investigation is confined to conceptual analysis, that is, the examination of the logical features of various concepts that human beings employ in their thinking. Conceptual analysis, however, may also be directed toward the goal of
articulating, or delineating, ideas, so that they can be understood in a clear or unambiguous way. It is a well known fact that abstract statements of ideas and beliefs can be given different interpretation. For this reason they create the impression of agreement or disagreement where none really exists.

The nature of aesthetic inquiry demands at some point the application of what Ingarden called "eidetic analysis."\(^1\) This form of analysis, however, is not purely subjective, because what is analyzed in this way is grounded in the physical object perceived. But without developed capacities for aesthetic vision, the "eidetic method" is virtually useless. Aesthetic awareness is thus absolutely essential.

In addition to the ability to apply those techniques of investigation, the aesthetic investigator must have the ability to appraise ideas critically, and to produce plausible arguments for or against them. He may also have to make use of his ingenuity and imagination in constructing viable theories which are capable of explaining phenomena or directing actions.

As I see it, then, there is no one single method which must be consistently applied in an investigation like the

one I am undertaking. If what one means by methodological rigor is consistent adherence to one single method, then I would be the first to admit that it is not one of the virtues of the present work. Throughout, I have allowed the problem to determine the method, and not the other way round, so much so that at no time did I feel too self-conscious about the method or technique employed. Whatever else this work may or may not be, it is certainly not an exercise in method. Stated simply, my aim is to produce a piece of writing which is practically relevant, and not merely philosophically competent.
Part I

ANALYSIS OF AESTHETIC VISION
CHAPTER II
CHARACTERIZATION OF AESTHETIC VISION

The purpose of this chapter is to offer a general characterization of aesthetic vision. I shall attempt to delineate its relation both to thought and ordinary perceptual experience. I shall begin, however, by making reference to some examples of aesthetic vision which I consider paradigmatic. This, undoubtedly, would help identify the phenomenon with which I am concerned more clearly. In doing so, I shall be referring exclusively to artistic objects, that is to say objects created specially to express or evince particular aesthetic experiences. This, however, does not mean that such objects are necessary for the experience of aesthetic vision which, of course, can occur in relation to natural objects as well as other man-made objects, not specifically designed for aesthetic expression. But artistic objects have the advantage of being specifiable public objects to which one can refer either in the original or in reproduction. In other words, it would be much more convenient to refer to them than to natural or man-made objects which are public but not specific.
For my first case I shall consider a painting by Mondrian, let it be *The Apple Tree in Blossom* (c. 1912). This painting, like all the mature works of Mondrian, is so organized artistically that my attention is captivated by the relationship defined by the plastic structure of the painting as a whole. This is not so much because the individual elements of which the painting is composed are uninteresting in themselves, but chiefly because of the nature of the formal relationship that they aesthetically express. In fact even here the individual elements do attract my attention but the way the painting is structured makes it hard for me to dwell on them as individual elements, so that my attention oscillates between them and the contemplation of the formal relationship defined by the structure of the painting as a whole. This must happen so fast that I am scarcely aware of it. Instead, I am only fully aware of the tension or dynamic quality which this process creates within me but which I think of as a quality of the aesthetic object itself. This kind of aesthetic experience Mondrain called "dynamic balance" (or "equilibrium"). It is balanced because the attention is not focused on the particular elements or forms within this composition, but on the formal relationship which they, as a whole, express. It is dynamic because of that tension or dynamic quality which is also characteristic of this
experience and which distinguishes it from other forms of aesthetic balance (based on symmetry or repetition of a unit).

For my second paradigm case I shall consider another painting, this time by Kandinsky; namely, Improvisation 14 of 1910. This painting is very different from the Mondrain I have just examined. There I was presented with a visible structure through the contemplation of which I became aware of an aesthetic object characterized by dynamic balance. In the Kandinsky the aesthetic object involved cannot be apprehended by placing the physical features of the painting at the center of our attention. For in this way one only becomes aware of various areas of variegated pigment covering the surface of the canvas in a random fashion, an experience which is likely to be considered very unpleasant by aesthetically sensitive people. This is what occurs if one attends to the Kandinsky as one does in the case of the Mondrain. But this is not the only way one can respond to the world aesthetically.

When viewing the Kandinsky I do not try to apprehend the aesthetic qualities presented by the physical structure of the painting; instead, I try to perceive it imaginatively, so that, on the basis of what actually is present in the canvas, I become phenomenally aware of a three-dimensional world of visual experience. In other words,
I have to apprehend the Kandinsky pictorially, just as I would if presented with a painting by Monet. (See, for instance, Monet's *La Grenouillere* of 1869.) The only difference is that the visual experience with which we become acquainted in the case of the Kandinsky is no longer a recognizable fragment from our familiar world. Rather it is an apparition of a strange world where the laws governing the physical world (which the Monet so magically depicts) do not seem to apply at all. But this fact, strange though it may seem, is not the only thing peculiar about the world which the Kandinsky depicts; for not only is it so remarkably unfamiliar but it is, in effect, unponderable or indeterminate, not in the sense that it is vague or lacking in clarity and vividness, but in the sense that its spatial-temporal relationships are unstable. Everything seems to be in a constant state of transformation, which thus makes it assume an infinite character. In short, it is an evasive, elusive world, which strikes one as remotely but profoundly suggestive. This is very much different from the Mondrian where the aesthetic experience involved focuses on the formal relationship as the evaluating factor.

In addition to these two examples of aesthetic vision, I shall consider also a piece of sculpture by Picasso, which I likewise consider a paradigm example. This is Picasso's *Baboon and Young* of 1951. Unlike the majority of the works of this artist, this piece of sculpture is a
very convincing image of what it is supposed to be. But this fact, significant though it may seem, is not the most remarkable thing about this work. For as we get more acquainted with it, we discover to our immense surprise that the face of the mother baboon is nothing but a car, a toy car which Picasso stuck where the face of the baboon is supposed to be, just like that!

These three examples occupy a central position within the logical structure of aesthetic vision, but they are by no means unique. Many of our aesthetic encounters with the world are of a similar nature. Thus, the apprehension of formal relationships, which is typified by the first example, occurs whenever we notice that things either "go together" (as in the case of items of clothing, interior decoration) or actually enhance and intensify each other (as in the case of sensory properties, e.g., colors).

With regard to the second example, many of us recall seeing images, which may sometimes appear both detailed and vivid, in the forms of clouds, rocks, and other objects. And it is not uncommon to view a small puddle left after the rain at the edge of the sidewalk as a lake, with the grass reflected in it as the reflections of trees standing at its shore. A similar experience may occur involving the surface of the coffee or tea one is drinking from a cup. In his Concerning the Spiritual in Art, Kandinsky remarked
how ordinary objects can become mysterious and dramatic if their actual purpose is not revealed. In fact, the appearance of such objects can be transmuted if, while contemplating them, we somehow succeed in inhibiting the activities of both reason and understanding which determine how we normally apprehend them. Such transmutations sometimes occur spontaneously and our experience of them on such occasions tends to be predominantly affective in character, so much so that the affect will, as it were, float off and become detached from its sensory basis so that we recall in memory a pulse of feeling and through it manage to recollect the elusive experience to which it was attached. With regard to the third example, it is a "seeing as" experience, for which the "duck-rabbit" diagram of Wittgensteinian fame is a classic example. Wittgenstein is also responsible for another expression by which this kind of visual experience is known, namely "aspect perception."

1P. 71.


AESTHETIC VISION AND THOUGHT

Thought and sensation are supposed to be diametrically opposed to each other. Thought is considered to be pertaining to the mind or as a product of it, while sensation is considered to be pertaining to the external world or, at least, dependent on it. It would, therefore, be very appropriate to try to find out how aesthetic vision relates in general terms to these two diverse forms of human consciousness. Let us, to begin with, focus our attention on the affinities which aesthetic vision has with thought in general and the significant differentia which set them apart. First, both aesthetic vision and thought are intentional in character. Thus, just as I do not mistake an object existing externally in the physical world for my thought of it, I do not confuse my aesthetic experience of that object with its physical being. This does not mean, however, that I may not speak of my aesthetic apprehensions as objects; in so far as they are distinguishable from my own conceptions and feelings, they are objects. Thus, I am fully justified in speaking of them as aesthetic objects, as long as I am aware that their mode of being is different from the objects of the physical world in that they are intentional, that is to say, they pertain to the elements of consciousness. This, of course, does not mean that my perceptual experience of an object has no recognizable relationship with its physical ontological basis.
Secondly, my apprehensions in aesthetic vision are, like thought, objects of immediate knowledge. Unlike my knowledge of the inferences which I make about the world on the basis of both perception and deductive thinking, my knowledge of the contents of my thoughts and aesthetic apprehensions occurs on no basis. Further, the beliefs or inferences which I come to form about the physical world on the basis of perception and hypothetico-deductive thinking are corrigible, since both sense perception and reasoning can go wrong. This occurs, for instance, when I perceive an illusion which makes me form a false belief about the nature of the object concerned, or when I commit a logical error in my reasoning, which would cause my conclusions to be false even though the premises are true. Unlike these inferences or beliefs, both my thoughts, whatever their content may be, and my aesthetic apprehensions, whatever their phenomenal content may be, are incorrigible. Thus, I may be thinking of a false belief or experiencing a visual illusion, but my awareness of the belief or the illusion itself cannot be corrected. For instance, I cannot think of aesthetic apprehensions as having phenomenal properties which they, as I am aware of them, do not have. I may, of course, modify my aesthetic apprehensions, make them look different, but then I would not be dealing with the same apprehensions: whatever I may be aware of now does not have to correspond to what I was aware of before.
Thirdly, aesthetic apprehension is subject to the will in the way that thought is subject to the will. This clearly distinguishes thought and aesthetic vision from physical sensations such as pain or coolness and certain types of mental experiences such as dreams and the after-image which are not subject to the will. This should not be construed, however, as indicating that one cannot create the sort of situation which is likely to give rise to the experience of a dream or an after-image; this is, of course, possible. What I am suggesting here is that the occurrence of the dream or the after image, or the physical sensation, for that matter, is physiologically, not cognitively determined. In other words, it has nothing to do with the exercise of the cognitive powers and all that this entails. Moreover, not only the occurrence of such mental events is not voluntary but their character cannot be controlled intellectually, as one can in the case of thought and aesthetic vision. This clearly indicates that thought and aesthetic vision differ from physical sensations and other forms of non-voluntary experience in that they are not casually, but cognitively or symbolically, determined. This fact accounts for their essentially cognitive (or intellectual) character.

So far I have dealt with the features which place aesthetic vision firmly in the category of thought. I shall now attempt to indicate very briefly the significant
differentia which set them apart. Aesthetic vision differs from thought in general in that it is essentially sensuous, or qualitative, in character. Secondly, as a form of thought, aesthetic vision sui generis has the feature of "having parts." An aesthetic experience is, thus, spread out over a perceptual field. Finally, among the features which seem to be peculiar to the sensuous nature of aesthetic vision are vividness and precise duration.¹

AESTHETIC VISION AND ORDINARY PERCEPTION

I have said above that sensation and, hence, ordinary perception pertains to the given of experience, which would thus seem to be independent of thought. This, however, is not quite true. Apart from the fact that it is not a voluntary activity and so its content is not within the control of thought, ordinary perception shares the same features which, as we have seen, firmly place aesthetic vision in thought; namely, intentionality and immediate knowledge. In what follows I shall try to illuminate this link which ordinary perception has with thought and the processes of cognition by mentioning some instances which clearly illustrate this link. First, ordinary perception is selective. In our ordinary encounter with the world we do not attend to all the elements within our visual field but only to some elements for which the rest of the elements appear as

¹For a fuller account of these significant differentia, see Roger Scruton's book Art and the Imagination, pp. 110-111.
background. This phenomenon can only be accounted for by reference to the activity of our conceptually structured awareness with its class categories, as well as to our mental states. This tendency to perceive selectively is so fundamental and pervasive that any further comment aimed at drawing attention to it is hardly warranted. Secondly, ordinary perception involves the organization by the mind of the data of stimulation. An example for this would be the famous diagrams first used by the Gestalt psychologists where the elements presented in them are organized perceptually in certain ways. For instance, a group of symmetrically arranged dots perceptually constitute horizontal or vertical columns. The Gestalt psychologists themselves thought that this tendency to organize data in this way depended on the physiological structure of the brain itself. Whatever this claim may mean, it certainly indicates that this organization is not actually given in the structure of stimulation itself to be passively received through the senses. This becomes especially apparent whenever the elements permit more than one possible organization (as in the case of the symmetrically arranged dots which I have just mentioned). Some may wish to suggest here that perception which involves this kind of organization is not ordinary since it involves "seeing as" and not just seeing. Strictly speaking, this claim is, of course, true. But in view of the fact that in ordinary real-life perception one
often encounters this kind of organization, the distinction between seeing and seeing as, upon which that claim is based, would seem to present a merely stipulative definition of ordinary perception which cannot be justified by concrete experience. The fact that the Gestalt psychologists themselves thought of this tendency to organize the elements given in sensation as characteristic of perception in general adds further support to this argument.

Thirdly, ordinary perception integrates what is given in the structure of sensation. If I stand before the cage of a zoo animal to take a look at the animal, the iron bars of the cage would make it impossible for its entire body to appear directly before my eyes, and yet my perception of it is not fragmentary. One could thus say that perception always provides me with an integrated or complete perception of the object, not merely a collection of disconnected impressions of it. One significant outcome of this principle is the development of the recording of movement photographically by means of a series of still pictures separated from one another by a short interval of darkness, so that when the pictures are displayed within a certain range of speed a moving object is phenomenally experienced instead of a series of still pictures which is what is actually being presented.

Fourthly, in ordinary perception compensation often takes place phenomenally. The most dramatic example I can
think of is the way a large poster or projected image would, if viewed closely from its lower end, appear lopsided at first but would shortly afterwards appear quite normal. But in most cases we are not even aware of this kind of compensation. For instance, an object which is partially exposed to sunlight objectively displays considerable changes in color and in general appearance, but in ordinary perception this is rarely noticed. Fifthly, in ordinary perception one usually fails to notice the intervening elements which partially block or obscure the object one wants to see; in other words, one responds to them as "noise" so that they become excluded from one's perceptions. Thus, when looking at the caged animals in the zoo, one only perceives the animal, which is the object of one's interest, but not the black iron bars which thus become excluded as 'noise' from one's perception of the animal as it moves about in its cage or stays motionless. Likewise, movie films which get scratched through frequent use, faulty equipment, or improper handling, when run through the projector the scratches appear quite conspicuous if one looks for them, but when one attends to the content of the film these scratches become hardly visible.

Finally, ordinary perception sometimes phenomenally modifies the world. One remarkable experience occurred to me once while I was taking a stroll in one of London's fashionable streets. The street was fairly wide and I was
looking at the other side when before one of the stately buildings that stood there I saw a very well-kept lawn which appeared both neatly mowed and rich and even in color. Now, as everyone knows the English are very particular about keeping their lawns in a good state, particularly when it comes to their stately buildings. But this fact, even though I was fully aware of it at the time, did not prevent me from becoming impressed by what I saw, and so it lingered on in my mind as I walked past it. That stroll took place during my lunch break and so on my way back I took another look at that lawn and to my deep surprise I discovered that it was not a lawn at all, but only a well-carpentered fence that was freshly painted vivid green! What I now remember very well is how this discovery made me feel very uncomfortable; indeed, it was somewhat nauseating. What happened in this perceptual experience, which most modern Anglo-American philosophers, following Ryle's lead, would hasten to call a clear case of misperceiving, (since the asserted belief in it was clearly false), is that my conceptual understanding told me a number of things about the nature of the situation encountered, my memory presented me with a number of facts about London, the English, and their passion for both elegance and gardening, and my reason told me what would, or would not, be appropriate given all that, and so my imagination had to comply with all this by
creating the perceptual intuition appropriate to a well-kept lawn. ¹

The examples given above clearly illustrate how much ordinary perception is dependent on the mental processes of cognition, including reasoning, understanding, and the imagination. To speak of it as the "given" of experience is still justifiable, as we shall see, but this should in no way detract from acknowledging its essentially cognitive character. That imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception, for instance, is demonstrated by my last example given above, where a freshly painted wooden fence was perceived as a well kept lawn. If imagining involves going beyond what is actually given, then surely that experience is an instance of it. The fact that it was a "mis-perception" does not make it atypical as far as the perceptual processes involved in it are concerned, since they are exactly the same as those which are involved in perceptual experiences where the asserted beliefs are true. For as in normal perception, there was, in the first place, no conscious attempt on my part to see the green fence as a lawn, and so there is no question of my having adopted an extraordinary attitude which would exclude the experience from

¹It is important to stress that the change encountered here is a change in appearance, and not merely in identity, which does not necessarily entail change in appearance. Thus, what I may consider a box, at one time, I may consider as stool at another, depending on how I am using the object. Identity, therefore, is not so much a function of appearance as of use.
the category of ordinary perception. Secondly, the experience was perfectly rational in character; the intuition of the well kept lawn was a very appropriate hypothesis after all: it might well have been there. And so there is no question of my having a fanciful or autistic experience which is only arbitrarily associated with the empirical facts of the situation. Thirdly, to claim that the perceptual process in it was not consumated, since there was no sufficient amount of reality testing which would have revealed the actual identity of the object concerned cannot be justified, since there was no feeling of perceptual uncertainty which would indicate the need for deliberate reality-testing. Perception would lose its efficiency (and therefore its biological value) if deliberate and exhaustive reality-testing is made before belief is admitted or appropriate action performed. In other words, ordinary perception would no longer be ordinary. In any case, the insistence on reality-testing only serves to emphasize the mental nature of ordinary perception. We must, therefore, concede that imagination is, in fact, an ingredient in perception itself.

That reason and understanding are both involved in ordinary perception is even more evident. Even the perception of a simple thing like a flower or a wallpaper pattern cannot be achieved without their active participation. For without the control which they exert over the
imagination, its activity would easily run wild and the sensuous experience would thus become boundless and unfamiliar. That we normally tend to perceive such objects as determinate and having determinate properties is solely due to the role which both reason and understanding play in the process of perception.

But if ordinary perception is dependent on the mental processes of cognition, how is it possible to refer to it as the "given" of experience? The answer simply is that perception in the ordinary sense is our only means of establishing appropriate contact with the physical world and so without it having an objective validity, our survival as living organisms dependent on their ability to interact successfully with this world would practically be impossible. Thus, if it is true to say that perception depends on reason, understanding, and the imagination, it is not also true that it is up to me to see when approaching the traffic lights green instead of red, or a wall instead of a bridge. Normally I see these things because they happen to be out there, not because I choose to see them. In other words, that I see green light rather than red, or a wall rather than a bridge is not a matter which is subject to my will, in the same way my thoughts are subject to my will. Also, while it is true to say that the appearance of people and things tends to be modified depending on how
we feel about them (when a young man for instance says that his sweetheart is the most beautiful of all the girls he knows, he actually means it), it is certainly not true that it is likely that I would be able, simply by thinking of it, to change green into red, or round into square. That I perceive green instead of red, or round and not square is because such matters, by their very nature, are not within the control of my thought. This surely indicates that perception as we normally know it, is connected to the "given" of experience.

In concluding my remarks about the nature of ordinary perception, I would like to mention that the claim that perception is dependent upon the mental processes of cognition is by no means original. Its dissemination in modern philosophical writings is largely inspired by the works of Immanuel Kant, particularly his *Critique of Judgment* which was first published in 1790.

In my attempt to emphasize the dependence of ordinary perception on the mental processes of cognition above, my intention was to indicate that the fact that aesthetic vision is cognitive in character cannot be considered a satisfactory criterion upon which the distinction between aesthetic vision and ordinary visual experience can be made, since the latter, in some of its aspects at any rate, is also cognitive and, therefore, cannot be considered as
consisting of pure sense impressions "given" in the structure of stimulation. I believe the criterion upon which a distinction between aesthetic vision and ordinary visual perception can be made is something to do with the nature of the sensuous content of aesthetic vision. I do not, of course, mean to refer to the very fact of its being sensuous; for not only it would then be undistinguishable from ordinary visual perception, but it would also lose its aesthetic character, since the aesthetic is a species of thought, but sheer sense impressions are not. In other words, aesthetic vision is not aesthetic by virtue of its sensuous (or concrete) nature alone; the sensuous, in itself, is not aesthetic. Aesthetic vision, far from being a passive reception of sheer impressions, is a cognitive process in which the powers of awareness are given full play. This point is so important that no attempt to give a satisfactory characterization of aesthetic vision can do without it. It is the crux of the whole matter as we shall see presently.

PUTATIVE CRITERIA OF AESTHETIC VISION

Because ordinary visual perception essentially involves belief in the actual existence of the object perceived, some writers thought that this feature may serve to distinguish ordinary seeing from its aesthetic counterpart.
It is, of course, true that in ordinary perception attention is focused on the biological import of the experience and so its experiential import is closely connected with the provision of appropriate beliefs about the elements of the environment. In other words, in ordinary visual perception what I am aware of is the actual identity of the object and what I may or may not expect from it, something which is, of course, essential for maintaining an adaptive relationship between behavior and the environment. Although such awareness is dependent on the sensory information which my eyes pick up from the external world, my attention is not focused on the sensuous aspect of things but only their "meaning" (or their biological significance). Thus, one could quite rightly say that in this kind of perceptual awareness, the sensuous aspect of things become transparent; that is to say, awareness transcends, or goes beyond, the sensuous aspect.\(^1\) In aesthetic vision, on the other hand, exactly the reverse is true, so that the sensuous aspect permeates awareness and the biological significance of the actual object occupies only a

---

\(^1\)Cf. J. J. Gibson: "As a general rule [i.e., in ordinary perception] the individual explores, samples, or scans the sea of energy around him for what this ... stimulation will specify about its ... sources. There are special cases, of course; the human individual can visually scan a picture for its design, but what he is generally in search of is meaning." See *The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems*, p. 250.
peripheral place in consciousness. It is also true that in aesthetic experience, the aesthetic content of awareness (the "aesthetic object," to use Ingarden's expression) is distinct from its physical ontological foundation, and so they are not identical. But none of all this means that when I attend aesthetically to, let us say, a fine glass object held in my hand, so that its sensuous aspect fills my awareness, I become no longer aware of the actual existence of the glass held in my hand or the biological significance that goes with it. For if that were true, why do I keep holding it in my hand like that when I can use it to gesture my admiration? Or if the object of my aesthetic attention happens to be a well-proportioned female dancer whose graceful movements permeate my awareness, her concrete, physical being does not vanish or become a mere figment of my imagination. That she is in the flesh out there, or indeed that she is desirable never completely eludes me, however engrossed in her art I might be.

This attempt to base the distinction between ordinary perception and its aesthetic counterpart on the belief in the existence in the physical world of the object perceived and the psychic involvement which it tends to bring recalls Kant's characterization of aesthetic experience in terms of "disinterestedness," as well as Edward Bullough's principle of "psychical distance" which also was intended
as a viable criterion of the aesthetic. Kant's characterization of the aesthetic does not seem to have arisen directly out of a curiosity in the nature of the aesthetic experience, but out of his interest in the way the activities of the mind relate to the phenomenal world. More specifically, he was trying to identify and explicate the various forms of "judgments" which are involved in the way the mind interprets the world. This resulted in his identification of three different types of "judgment," or ways of interpreting or apprehending the world; namely, judgment of "pure reason," judgment of "practical reason," and aesthetic judgment. Kant wanted to show that both the judgment of "pure reason" (i.e., cognitive judgment) and the judgment of "practical reason" (i.e., moral judgment) are teleological in character, but the aesthetic is not.  

Concerning this point Kerrane has this to say:  

A judgment of "Pure reason" tends toward scientific explanation, relating a phenomenon to its supposed causes. A judgment of "Practical Reason" tends toward moral evaluation, relating a phenomenon to its hypothetical effects. Both of these judgments are "teleological"; that is, they interpret a given phenomenon by predicating it in terms of something beyond itself. But Kant argues that it is possible to form judgment which is "aesthetic" rather than teleological - a judgment in which the phenomenon is considered in, of, by, and for itself.  

---

1See Kevin Kerrane, "Nineteenth Background of Modern Aesthetic Criticism," in The Quest for the Imagination, ed. O. B. Hardison, p. 8.  

2Loc. cit.
According to Kant, then, an aesthetic or "disinterested" perceptual experience differs from an ordinary perceptual experience (whether of the investigative or practical type) in that the former is taken for its own sake. In other words, in aesthetic experience sensuous apprehension is considered as intrinsically valuable. As it stands, this view of the aesthetic is undoubtedly plausible, particularly if we remember that, according to Kant, in this kind of apprehension the cognitive powers are active. Those who are unhappy with it seem to miss its point. Thus, instead of approaching it as purely concerned with the logic of aesthetic experience, its distinctive character, that is, they tend to check it against their actual encounters with the aesthetic, which is not always "disinterested," in the sense that no cognitive or practical purpose is being involved. (Thus, a critic when he looks at aesthetic works of art is also interested in achieving a conceptual grasp of what he experiences aesthetically, and, if what he is looking at happens to be the well proportioned dancer mentioned above, he may also have a practical interest in what he sees.)

The principle of "psychical distance" which, according to Edward Bullough himself, "may claim to be considered one of the essential characteristics of the 'aesthetic consciousness'" is established "by putting the phenomenon,
so to speak, out of gear with our practical, actual self; by allowing it to stand outside the context of our personal needs and ends ...\(^1\) This principle seems to be based on the author's concrete involvement with aesthetic experience rather than on mere theoretical speculation. In this respect it is different from Kant's theory of aesthetic experience which, in so far as it is intended to cohere with Kant's critical philosophy as a whole, rather than as a disinterested inquiry into the nature of the aesthetic itself, untied to previously established assumptions, its origins, as it has already been indicated, are to be found in Kant's search for a kind of "judgment" which, unlike that of "pure" or "practical" reason, is not teleological.

Unlike the criticism which was directed to Kant's doctrine concerning the disinterestedness of aesthetic experience, which does not seem to be justifiable, Bullough's principle was more fairly assessed by its critics. The charge which is brought up against it is that the "psychical distance" which Bullough refers to cannot be confirmed by most people whose encounter with the aesthetic is not entirely free from some kind of psychic involvement. Moreover, such involvement may actually determine the nature of the aesthetic qualities

experienced, something which has been commented upon by different writers. Ingarden, for instance, suggested that the apprehension of emotional qualities "brings about a change in the painting's aspects or looks."¹ This kind of effect which our psychic involvement has on the form of the sensuous experience apprehended is what Harold Newton Lee seems to have had in mind when he refers to "derived aesthetic value."²

If Bullough's principle of "psychical distance" can be justly criticized for not allowing for this kind of situation where psychic involvement can be seen to play an active role in formulating the sensuous experience itself, this does not mean that its value as a criterion of the aesthetic is slight. What Bullough is saying, after all, is that when perception assumes the aesthetic mode, our sensuous awareness is not obscured by the distracting effects of our personal feelings and anxieties or our needs and ends. In other words, in aesthetic experience sensuous apprehension tends to be pure in character. If this is what "psychical distance" is meant to indicate, then its significance as a viable criterion of the aesthetic should not be ignored.


²See his work Perception and Aesthetic Value, where he has a whole chapter devoted to this topic.
If my interpretation of Kant's doctrine of "disinterestedness" and Bullough's principle of "psychical distance" is correct, then it would be quite clear that what both intended to say is something other than what their critics seem to suggest. Thus, it would seem that what Kant is saying is that in the aesthetic attitude sensuous apprehension is taken for its own sake, rather than that in this attitude the percipient's interest is confined to what is apprehended sensuously. Likewise, it would seem that what Bullough is saying is that when the aesthetic attitude is maintained sensuous apprehension is not obscured by distracting effects of our personal feelings and anxieties, or our needs and ends, which normally overshadow ordinary perceptual experience, and not that all traces of psychic involvement are absent.

Dissatisfaction with these attempts to characterize aesthetic vision have given rise to alternative views. Among these alternatives views is the one that says that what is distinctive about the aesthetic experience is its expressive quality. In aesthetic vision expressiveness, in so far as it is considered something distinct from the sensuous image itself, is usually identified with the emotional impact which this image may have. But since the emotional impact is not constitutive of the image itself, but only a concomitant aspect, or a by-product, of it, then it could not be regarded as logically distinctive of it.
Among the more viable of these alternative views is the one which bases the criterion of the aesthetic on the notion of the imagination. The claim here is not so much that aesthetic vision involves the imagination, while other forms of sensuous experience do not. As the faculty that mediates sensuous apprehension, the imagination is active in every form of experience where there is a sensuous element. Rather, what is claimed is that in aesthetic vision a transformation affecting the appearance of the object takes place. What Wittgenstein called "seeing as" or "aspect" perception is often taken as a paradigm for this mode of imaginative awareness.\(^1\) When one sees a rain puddle as a lake one knows that a change affecting the appearance of the actual object has taken place, so that the new "emergent" form (or "aspect" in the language of Wittgenstein) is not what is actually given. In other words, the "emergent" form or "aspect" is not "asserted," that is to say, taken for real in the physical sense of the term, but is apprehended instead as "unasserted thought."\(^2\)

Consequently, "seeing as" is taken to be a form of thought which goes beyond what is believed or what is

---


actually given. Its "unasserted" character would, thus serve to distinguish it from misperception, where what is phenomenally experienced is not actually given, even though it may be appropriate in character. Further, in "seeing as," the "emergent" form or "aspect" is grounded in the actual object perceived, which thus serves as its physical foundation; and so the relationship between the phenomenally experienced object and its physical foundation is not arbitrary but rational. This rationality of "seeing as" would thus serve to distinguish it from autistic vision, where the relationship between what is experienced phenomenally and the empirical situation is arbitrary. To illustrate this, the rain puddle which was perceived as a lake is a good example for "seeing as" as Wittgenstein intended it; the experience in which I took a green fence for a lawn is a good example for misperception, as here defined; and the tree full of angels which William Blake said he did see would be a good example for autistic vision, where what is experienced phenomenally has no basis in the empirical situation.

Taking the change in appearance which is attributed to the imagination as a basis for creating a distinction between ordinary visual perception and aesthetic vision is, of course, not without its merits. For besides stressing the cognitive or mental character of aesthetic vision, it also focuses attention on its sensuous character
which, as I have indicated, is its distinctive feature. Nevertheless, not all instances of imaginative experience are of the kind which can be described as aesthetic. For instance, in autistic vision, where what is phenomenally experienced is not distinguished from what is physically present, the imaginative powers may be in full swing. But the experience in autistic vision differs from a "seeing as" experience in that the former is irrational, whereas the latter clearly is (since we do not confuse its content with what is physically present in the environment). Now, if we are to think of aesthetic vision as cognitive or symbolic, and hence rational, in character, then it is important to distinguish it from such experiences as those encountered in autistic vision which are manifestly irrational.

I would like to conclude this discussion of the putative criteria of the aesthetic with a consideration of the satisfaction or pleasure which an aesthetic experience may provide. According to the Kantian tradition, aesthetic satisfaction or pleasure is consequent upon, but not constitutive of, sensuous apprehension. It is, therefore, to be distinguished from the pleasure of smelling a rose or eating a succulent bunch of grapes (assuming one does care for such things); for in this kind of pleasure the centrality of sensuous apprehension in awareness, which is the source of the pleasure involved in aesthetic
experience, is clearly missing. In aesthetic vision, then, the feeling of satisfaction or pleasure is dependent on sensuous apprehension. Thus, it becomes evident that such feeling cannot be considered a criterion of the aesthetic and, hence, a basis upon which the distinction between aesthetic vision and ordinary visual perception may be made.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
What characterizes aesthetic vision is sensuous apprehension taken for its own sake; what characterizes ordinary visual perception is perceptual belief which makes adaptive behavior possible. A visual experience is aesthetic if its sensuous content becomes the focus of awareness. Unasserted thought, disinterestedness, psychic distance, emotional impact, change in appearance, and pleasure may, of course, be identified, either singly or in combination, in individual aesthetic experience, not as distinctive features but merely as symptoms. If sensuous apprehension becomes the focus of awareness the experience is, logically speaking, aesthetic—no matter what else may be present or absent.
CHAPTER III

APPREHENSION AND EXPRESSION
IN AESTHETIC VISION

In the previous chapter I have argued that the essence of aesthetic vision is sensuous apprehension. In this chapter I shall deal with sensuous apprehension as a symbolic process. I shall argue that works of art and other objects of aesthetic interest are there to be apprehended and that aesthetic expression serves primarily the purpose of structuring aesthetic vision. I shall begin by indicating in appropriate detail the sense in which works of art and other objects of aesthetic interest are properly considered symbolic. I shall then attempt to identify the syntactical and semantical features that pertain to aesthetic symbolic functions generically considered.

THE SYMBOLIC NATURE OF AESTHETIC VISION

That aesthetic vision is symbolic can be readily demonstrated by considering it both as a process and as a product. As a process aesthetic vision is not passive apprehension of what is directly given to the senses, but a dynamic process in which the powers and equipment of the
mind are actively involved. For in aesthetic vision sense impressions are structured in certain ways which go beyond the scope of ordinary sense perception. Before there can be aesthetic vision, there has to be ordinary sense perception, but it is no more than a basis for the further psychic acts which are built upon it in the process of aesthetic vision. Thus, upon perceiving the object in the ordinary way one has to determine, on the basis of the information so received, the particular mode of aesthetic perception which is appropriate for it. This is because different works of art and other objects of aesthetic interest are apprehended in aesthetic experience differently. In some cases the appropriate mode would involve sensory discrimination of the actual properties of the object, while in other cases one may either engage in discerning the formal-relational qualities of the object, which are sometimes referred to as "emergent" qualities to distinguish them from those sensory qualities just mentioned which are actually given in the structure of stimulation itself. Still in other cases one has to engage in a radically different process where the properties of the symbol are not discriminated or discerned but become transformed in the imagination so that one does not only experience change in one's awareness of the object, but the categorial nature of the object itself is transformed in perception.
I shall give a full exposition of the various modes of aesthetic vision in the next chapter. What I wish to indicate here is that in aesthetic life, as Ernst Cassirer said, "we experience a radical transformation,"¹ involving those particular cognitive skills which are usually referred to as the powers of perception or simply the imagination. If this is true then one has to concede that aesthetic vision is a deliberate act of cognition rather than passive contemplation of the immediately given. Awareness of the dynamic character of the process of aesthetic vision has prompted some to refer to it as interpretative process where one is essentially dealing with qualitative problem solving. I believe this is to be true even when the act of aesthetic vision appears to be effortless or spontaneous. Such effortlessness or spontaneity, when it does occur, in no way indicates that the cognitive skills referred to above are not involved; it could only mean that the individual is not aware of them.

It is important to point out here that these skills are not instinctive, a gift of nature, so to speak, but like all other cognitive skills they must be cultivated. In other words, their acquisition depends on learning. This, of course, does not mean that there could be no

¹An Essay on Man, p. 160.
genetic differences affecting one's capacity to acquire these skills which would enable us to say that some persons have a greater knack for aesthetic vision than others. For to deny that would certainly be erroneous. But it would also be erroneous to deny that every human being is organismically capable of displaying at least a rudimentary acquaintance with the skills concerned, since such a capacity is part and parcel of what it means to be a human being. It is of course possible to condition one individual or a whole group of individuals to believe that it is not within their capacity to experience aesthetic vision to the extent that this individual or group would resist any attempt to get them involved in an experience of this kind, but this could not be considered as adequate evidence against the universality of the skills concerned, since it only means that those individuals have been spiritually emasculated, so to speak, a state of affairs which by no means is impossible. (It is possible to dehumanize the human, to make him function well below the level of which he is organismically capable.)

It is also important to emphasize the cognitive or intellectual nature of the learning that is involved in the acquisition of the skills upon which aesthetic vision depends. For it is not a question of developing preferential attitudes toward works of art and other objects of aesthetic interest, which attitudes are purely personal
and therefore have no universal or objective validity. The fact that here, too, learning is involved should not make us overlook the radical difference between the two types of learning. In the case of the development of preferential attitudes, learning is not mediated by cognitive skills or the conceptual elements of the understanding. One simply finds oneself, either gradually or all of a sudden, in favor of something toward which one previously was indifferent or experienced actual dislike. This occurs on a purely subjective basis, usually involving an association, which could either be conscious or unconscious, linking together the object of learning with something else toward which the individual already has a favorable attitude. This is how most people come to like a certain brand of beer or a presidential candidate, for that matter.

In the case of learning the skills upon which aesthetic vision depends the situation, as I have said above, is radically different. For although this kind of learning may also involve a feeling of approval, it is not constitutive of the content of learning itself. Thus, in an act of aesthetic vision one may exercise a particular cognitive skill without experiencing at the same time any feelings of approval at all. Indeed, one may even experience negative feelings while effectively exercising such a skill, as for instance when one considers the exercise
of the skill to be in conflict with one's views about what one's appropriate conduct ought to be like. What needs to be stressed here is that in the case of the learning that is involved in aesthetic vision what constitutes the content of learning is not a preferential attitude or a feeling of approval but the skills and concepts themselves and the ability to give them appropriate application. Such skills or concepts, moreover, are not subjective or arbitrary, for their universality and objective validity is guaranteed by the fact that their existence depends on the structure of the world and the structure of the human intelligence.

One final point which must be included in this account of the symbolic nature of the process of aesthetic vision is that the exercise of the cognitive skills that goes on in this process is voluntary in nature. This makes aesthetic vision a different kind of psychic experience from dreams and hallucinations whose occurrence is essentially autonomous, that is to say, not subject to the will. It also clarifies what it means for a mental experience to be cognitive or symbolic; for such an experience does not occur as an autonomous "revelation" independent of the will. There can be, of course, inspired or spontaneous moments in aesthetic vision, but these as a rule occur within the context of the "aesthetic attitude" which is
what the deliberate exercise of the cognitive powers involved in aesthetic vision is called in the aesthetic literature. If the experience occurs independently of this attitude, that is to say, if its occurrence does not take place while those powers are deployed, then the experience in question is a hallucinatory or a visionary experience. As such it is an autonomous or "revelational" experience which is not subject to the will and, therefore, cannot be considered as an outcome of a symbolic act of interpretation. I clearly remember one occasion when I had such a visionary experience. One summer afternoon I was sitting by the window in my third-floor apartment totally absorbed in my thoughts when all of a sudden I witnessed a magnificent vision whose radiance and beauty was so overwhelming that I was incapable of ascertaining its identity. It lasted only for a moment or . . , and when it disappeared I could only see in its place the top of the tree which had always been there. And as I kept looking at it I could see no trace of the apparitional experience which I had experienced a little while ago other than the deep impression which it left in my mind.

A visionary experience of this kind cannot be considered a symbolic or cognitive experience even if a work of art is actually in view, but toward which one is not adopting the appropriate cognitive attitude. This is exactly the kind of situation which Kandinsky encountered
in that famous event which he narrates in *Rueckblicke*.

Here is Kandinsky's own account of it:

... I was once enchanted by an unexpected view
in my studio. It was the hour of approaching
dusk. I came home with my paintbox after making
a study, still dreaming and wrapped up in the
work I had completed, when suddenly I saw an
indescribably beautiful picture drenched with
an inner glowing. At first I hesitated, then
I rushed toward this mysterious picture, of
which I saw nothing but forms and colors, and
whose content was incomprehensible. Immediately
I found the key to the puzzle: it was a picture
I had painted, leaning against the wall, standing
on its side. The next day I attempted to get
the same effect by daylight. I was only half
successful: even on its side I always recognized
the objects ...

Kandinsky's frustrated attempt to revive his visionary
experience of the painting was due to the fact that he was
trying to do so in a symbolic act of aesthetic vision,
something which was beyond the expressive scope of that
particular painting.

So far I have dealt with the process of aesthetic
vision arguing that it is a symbolic process involving the
cognitive powers. I shall now deal with aesthetic vision
as a product which goes beyond what is immediately given.
By that I do not mean that in aesthetic vision the aes­
thetic symbol stands for something other than itself which

---

1 *Rueckblicke*, English tr. by Hilla Rebay. In Robert
L. Herbert, *Modern Artists on Art*, p. 32.

2 It did not, however, take Kandinsky much longer
before he was able to fashion the appropriate symbols for
expressing the kind of imagery which was hitherto en­
countered only in visionary experience. This apparently
occurred around 1909.
acts as its referent. What I do mean is that the object which acts as an aesthetic symbol is apprehended in the process of aesthetic vision in such a way so that what one experiences is radically different from our normal sensory experience of objects existing as material things. There is then a modification which affects the way the object appears which can only be attributed to the symbolic process of aesthetic vision.

This modification which affects the way things appear when experienced in aesthetic vision varies in character from one type of aesthetic experience to another. In some cases it is radical in character, while in others it may seem arguable. Thus, in a painting like the Kandinsky mentioned in Chapter II, the modification which apprehending it in aesthetic vision involves is indeed of the most radical kind. For not only does one experience change in appearance, but one also becomes no longer aware of the physical character of the painting. One's experience becomes of a purely intentional nature so that one does not view it as an appearance of an object existing in the physical world. In other cases the transformation that is experienced is not so drastic so that its very occurrence may seem doubtful. This would be encountered in the kind of situation where the process of aesthetic vision involves the discrimination of a particular sensory quality which the symbol shows forth or exemplifies. For in this kind of situation one
may wonder how there could be any change of appearance involved. But since here too we come to notice a property and bring it to the center of our awareness, we may justifiably speak of change in appearance to have taken place. For what else could it be meant by saying that we "come to notice"? If we notice something as a result of the process of aesthetic vision, then we could reasonably suggest that change in appearance does in fact take place.

Besides the change in appearance which one experiences in the process of aesthetic vision, there is another sense in which it could be said that the product of aesthetic vision as a symbolic process goes beyond what is immediately given. For among the elements of what one experiences in aesthetic vision one must not overlook the emotions and allusions which account for that personal or subjective aspect which many consider so valuable. Now, no one, I think, would like to argue that these elements, viz. emotions and allusions, are immediately given in the aesthetic symbol as a material object. Later on in this chapter I shall be dealing with the various ways in which these elements are involved in our experience of aesthetic vision. Still, I would like to make here a few general remarks about the nature of their involvement. With regard to emotions, two basic types have been identified. First, there is the emotion that mediates visual apprehension. Second, there is the emotion that is experienced as the expressive import
of the aesthetic symbol. Within this type one may also distinguish between symbolically expressed emotion, on the one hand, and emotion that occurs as a reaction to the sensuous image apprehended in aesthetic vision. As for the allusions which may also occur in the experience of aesthetic vision, one may wish to distinguish between those allusions that suggest a particular object without presenting a clear depiction of it, on the one hand, and those allusions which are vaguely suggestive, so that one does not become conscious of any particular object or event.

There is yet a third sense in which aesthetic vision taken as a product may be said to go beyond what is immediately given. One of the platitudinous assumptions to be found in aesthetic writings is the claim that in aesthetic apprehensions one is not so much concerned with determining the identity of the object as with obtaining a full perception of it. This assumption, even though it is true, has made many writers jump to the conclusion that in aesthetic experience what matters is the acquaintance with the particularity or uniqueness of the object, not with any universal property which it may have. And, indeed, it was on this basis they thought the distinction between art and science ought to be made. This, however, is an erroneous conclusion; not because the claim that in aesthetic experience one attends to the looks of things is to be questioned, for it is undeniably true. It is erroneous because in aesthetic
experience, too, concern with general concepts or universals is essential, except that here apprehension of the universal presuppose awareness of the particularity of the object. Thus, by attending to the particularity of the Mondrian I come to realize that it shows forth dynamic balance. Now, dynamic balance, which can only be apprehended through attending to the particularity of the Mondrian, is itself not a particular quality, but a universal or general idea in the full sense of this expression. Its presence may be encountered in different objects (works of art included) whose difference in terms of particularity could not be denied. I should emphasize at this point the fact that we are dealing here with an aesthetic concept, not a theoretical or scientific one: it is an intuitive quality that characterizes the looks of things, not an inference about them. But even when the concept in question is not aesthetic, but a categorial or inferential one, it is still essential for aesthetic experience. Thus, as a result of attending to the particularity which the Kandinsky referred to in Chapter II depicts, one becomes aware, by way of inference, of the unstable character of the image. This awareness, however, is crucial to the appreciation of the character and impact of the work, despite the fact that it is not aesthetic (i.e., intuitive, qualitative).

It is essential, therefore, to point out that in an act of aesthetic vision, the individual does not merely
apprehend a sensuous or intuitive experience that is unique and particular, but always an experience of a certain kind. Perhaps those writers referred to above ought to be reminded of Kant's famous saying that "thoughts without content (sc. intuition) are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."\(^1\) An aesthetic experience which amounts to no more than an awareness of particularity is, indeed, meaningless or "blind", to use Kant's expression. What I wish to conclude here, then, is that in aesthetic experience, by apprehending the object in terms of a general concept, we do in fact go beyond what is immediately given to our senses.

My argument so far can be summed up by saying that aesthetic vision is a cognitive process which takes one beyond what is immediately given in the object perceived. I would like now to point out the important conclusion to which this claim is bound to lead us; namely, that the object of aesthetic vision must be an intelligible object, and that the process of aesthetic vision is an act of interpreting that object. It also follows that an artistic object which is not intelligible could not possibly have any aesthetic value, since this value clearly depends on the interpretation to which the object lends itself. The artist who says that his work is not intelligible in the

sense intended here or whose work does not show any signs of intelligibility is not to be taken seriously. The fact that he manages to survive in our midst should not be taken as evidence to the contrary.

Moreover, in so far as an art object, or any object for that matter, is not intelligible, it could not be considered symbolic. For to be a symbol presupposes that the object must be intelligible. This is, indeed, why the process of aesthetic vision, like any other symbolic process, is said to be cognitively active or dynamic rather than passive or static. It is cognitively active because in it one is conscious of a problem-solving situation which is to be interpreted. This is why it is possible to create a distinction between a genuine act of aesthetic vision and passive contemplation of the world. Now, I do not wish to indicate that while responding passively to the concrete body of the world the cognitive powers, including the imagination, remain dormant, for this is clearly not the case. I am only suggesting that in passive contemplation one does not become aware of the interpretative nature of one's response, whereas in the case of a genuine aesthetic experience one clearly does. I should also add here that it makes no difference whether an act of aesthetic vision occurs spontaneously or in a deliberate way; for even if it occurs spontaneously one is still aware of the interpretative nature of the experience.
In aesthetic vision, then, one engages in a deliberate cognitive act of providing an intelligible object with an appropriate interpretation. To put it another way, the object of aesthetic vision is structured in such a way so as to stimulate the mind in a purposive way which results in the apprehension of a sensuous experience of a particular kind which goes beyond what is immediately given. One could therefore say that in an act of aesthetic vision the physical object itself and the aesthetic image which it gives rise to are objectively related to each other and that the process of aesthetic apprehension is, for this reason, a rational process.

But what precisely are we to understand by this reference to the objectivity and rationality of aesthetic vision? Evidently, to say that the relationship between the physical object and the aesthetic image based on it is objective does not mean that in aesthetic vision one apprehends what is immediately given in sensation, since that would not amount to an act of aesthetic vision at all. It does not mean that in aesthetic vision one must follow certain pre-established rules which objectively determine how each element must be interpreted, for this is clearly not the case. It does not mean that every individual interprets the object in exactly the same way, for this is not the case, either. What it means is that this process of interpretation which takes place in the act of aesthetic vision does
not involve an arbitrary relationship between the aesthetic image and its physical foundation. One does not apprehend dynamic balance when contemplating a Kandinsky, or a spatially unstable and categorically unponderable image when confronting a Mondrian. Rather, one perceives different aesthetically expressive objects in different ways. In doing so, one is guided by the expressive features of the object itself so that it would be quite accurate to say that the phenomenally experienced image is grounded in the aesthetically expressive object which thus serves as the physical foundation of that image.

I have referred above to the process of aesthetic vision as a rational process, because it is essentially a cognitive act in which the powers of the mind are engaged in an active and disciplined way. While it is true to say that this obtains in every act of aesthetic vision, irrespective of whether the object involved in it is a work of art or an element of nature, the disciplined activity of the process of aesthetic vision is more obvious in the case of the interpretation of works of art which are designed to express particular aesthetic qualities with the maximum amount of efficiency. I am here referring, of course, to those works of art which are considered successful by virtue of their efficacy as aesthetically expressive artifacts. For in this kind of aesthetically efficient work of art, one encounters a perfect fit between the work
and the phenomenally apprehended image. On such occasions, when this kind of a perfect fit obtains, one experiences an envigorating feeling of intellectual excitement over the intelligence inherent in the object itself and one's ability to give it an appropriate interpretation. In all this nothing is perhaps more compelling than becoming aware of the appropriateness of the way the object and its interpretation seem to belong to each other. For nothing in the object seems to be neglected or overlooked, nothing is coerced or exaggerated, in the interpretation given to it. This situation is so reminiscent of truth that the two things are sometimes considered identical.

If the interpretation is not grounded in the work of art in this way, if, that is, some of its artistic or expressive features are neglected or overlooked, or if they are exaggerated or coerced, then the work of art is not functioning as an efficient symbol and a sense of fit would, therefore, be lacking. This state of affairs occurs either because the interpreter is incompetent, or because the work of art itself as an expressive symbol is inefficient, or because the interpreter is responding to the work of art not as an expressively efficient artifact or symbol but simply as he would to an element of nature. Objects of nature (and all man-made objects which are not designed to serve primarily as aesthetic symbols) may, of course, also be apprehended aesthetically, but in their case the object
so apprehended rarely serves as an efficient symbol. This in no way, however, depreciates the value of the aesthetic experience of such objects. In fact it is usually more dynamic because the constructive activities of the mind are driven in such situations into heightened activity. One not only decides where to look and what to look for, but one also engages in manipulative and creative acts which result in exaggerating some of the elements of the object while suppressing others, bringing disparate elements together as if they belonged to the same object, grasping certain effects that one was never aware of before, and so on. This is not how works of art are (or ought to be) perceived as symbols designed to give efficient expression to an aesthetic quality or concept; for there would not be then any significant difference between them and the object of nature and other man-made objects not intended to function as aesthetic symbols. If there is a special advantage for works of art as objects of aesthetic vision, then they must be efficient in the sense indicated above. For without this efficacy other objects which are not works of art would be just as effective, if not in fact even more so. That is why the great artistic revolutions often find their inspiration in nature, not in art. (By "nature," of course, I do not mean natural objects only, but all objects which are not works of art designed to serve as aesthetically expressive symbols.) Consider, for instance, how
highly Cezanne, whose revolutionary achievement is beyond any doubt, thought of the value of studying nature. In his last years (which are among the most intense in his entire career), he practically had his mind firmly set on the idea that no advancement in art is possible independently of this study, as his letters and conversations of this period clearly testify.\(^1\) That this is so is largely, I believe, due to the fact that works of art, as efficient symbols, are semantically limited by what their syntactical features permit. In other words, works of art are, in this sense, restrictive in comparison to nature by virtue of their cognitive efficacy.

The rationality of aesthetic vision also manifests itself in the coherence or unity of the phenomenally experienced image. For in this image or "aesthetic object," as Ingarden called it, one does not detect any traces of confusion or haphazardness. It stands out distinctly against all accidental elements, whether originating in the same object which gives it expression or coming as inter-

\(^{1}\) In a letter to Emile Bernard, dated 26th May 1904, Cezanne wrote: "I must always come back to this: painters must devote themselves to the study of nature." In another letter to Emile Bernard, dated 23rd December 1904: "Your need to find a moral, an intellectual point of support ... will surely lead you, in front of nature, to your means of expression." And to his son, dated 13th October 1906, the year he died: "I simply must produce after nature. - Sketches, pictures, if I were to do any, would be merely constructions after nature, based on method, sensation, and developments suggested by the model, but I always say the same thing." See Wadley, Cezanne and his Art, pp. 107, 108, and 112.
ference from its surroundings. Such elements are excluded from the image as extraneous or as "noise" if they happen to originate in the expressive object itself. Not only does the image or "aesthetic object" stand out in this way against elements that are extraneous to it, but internally it displays a unified whole where the constituent parts are interrelated in an orderly, or logical, way.

The objectivity or rationality that one encounters in aesthetic vision, however, does not exclude either subjectivity or vagueness. Every authentic aesthetic experience has its private or idiosyncratic, and sometimes even its vague or indeterminate, aspects. To say that the aesthetic experience must be grounded in the artistic structure of the work of art itself does not mean that all the elements of the experience must also be so grounded, even though the rationality of the experience clearly depends on this condition. This becomes apparent when we come to think of all those emotional reactions, allusions, and even imagery of a non-visual nature which may in fact be experienced in an aesthetic encounter, but which are definitely not grounded in the artistic structure of the work of art itself, since their origin is in the personality and history of the interpreter himself.

Let us now take a closer look at these non-objective elements. The emotion which one may experience in connection with aesthetic vision, logically speaking, could
either be symbolically expressed, in which case it is objectively grounded in the artistic structure of the work of art itself and therefore it is said to be cognitive in character, or it could occur merely as a subjective reaction to whatever is so expressed by the work, in which case it is a natural emotion, not cognitive or symbolic, of the kind we experience in our normal interaction with the physical world. When referring to the emotions which are expressed in connection with visual apprehension and which are subjective in character, I have in mind this latter type of emotion which occurs as a natural reaction toward what is symbolically expressed. I believe that in aesthetic vision many of the emotions experienced fall within this category; they are natural emotional reactions to the sensuous experience which is expressed symbolically by the work of art.

Allusions in aesthetic vision always involve vagueness. Now, there are two types of vagueness which can be identified. The first is what I call qualitative vagueness. In a situation which involves vagueness of this type, a certain sensuous quality is encountered which appears to be of an indeterminate character, as for instance when one sees a color without being able to ascertain its hue in an exact way, so that one is left with the conclusion that the color in question has more than one aspect which somehow intermingle with one another. The second type of vagueness
is what I call categorial vagueness. In this type the
vagueness encountered concerns the categorial nature or
identity of the object perceived. Within this type, two
different sub-types are identifiable. One involves the
kind of situation where the symbolic element suggests a
particular object without giving it explicit expression.
For instance, one looks at a particular character in a
symbol scheme which suggests something in particular, let
us say a house or a horse, without giving it explicit
expression, so that one could say about it that it does
represent a horse in an actual or definite manner. In the
other sub-type of categorial vagueness, the interpreter is
faced with a situation where the symbolic element is sug­
gestive in a persistent or profound way without ever
succeeding in determining just what it is that is being
suggested.

The occurrence of non-visual imagery in aesthetic
vision seems to me rare in comparison with the occurrence
of visual imagery in connection with musical and literary
appreciation. It would, therefore, suffice if I limit my
treatment of this phenomenon to its manifestation in those
forms of aesthetic experience, since I am concerned with
it only generically. One reads a poem or listens to the
music and finds out that on occasion a visual image is
experienced in addition to the sound and impact of the music
or the poem. To the extent that this imagery is idiosyn-
cratic in character, it could not be claimed reasonably that it is grounded in the artistic structure of the music or the poem.

That these subjective elements which we may experience in connection with aesthetic vision often assume a deep significance is not to be doubted. Their presence in the aesthetic experience, however, is legitimate only when they constitute concomitant aspects of its sensuous core which is, as I have indicated, grounded in the structure of the work of art itself and which, therefore, accounts for the rationality of the experience. For unless the aesthetic experience is grounded in the work in this way, it would not be possible to speak of it as cognitive or rational at all, even if it happens to be predominantly sensuous in character. Psychic experiences such as dreams, drug-induced hallucinations, visionary (or mystical) experiences, as well as instances of autistic vision which result from certain types of serious mental disorders usually involve sensuous content which may affect us very deeply, but they differ significantly from an authentic aesthetic experience in that they are irrational in character. As an illustration let us take the example of the drug-induced hallucination or "psychedelic" experience as it is sometimes called. First of all, a work of art, as a symbolically expressive entity, does not function in the same way a dose of a hallucinogenic drug does, even though the experiential
content in the two types of mental experience may reveal some basic similarities as I have indicated. The work of art, as a symbolically expressive object, affects us cognitively by engendering the activities of the perceptual powers. The drug dose, on the other hand, affects us causally by, presumably, modifying the chemistry of the nervous system. Secondly, the drug induced experience, whatever one may wish to think of it, is a disorganized and a haphazard experience, whereas in aesthetic experience one finds coherence and unity which, as I have said, are indicative of its rational character.

At the beginning of this chapter I have indicated that the human capacity for aesthetic vision is not a gift of nature but has to be acquired through learning. There I dealt with this capacity in terms of the development of cognitive powers or skills only, without any reference to the object of cognition itself, which is of course the other side of the coin. For the development of the skills does not occur independently of the object of cognition. One learns a skill to do something. In the domain of aesthetic vision this "something" stands for the various aesthetic traditions (or "modes of seeing," "symbol systems," "conceptual frameworks," call them what you will) which constitute the experiential counterpart of those skills or powers of perception upon which the capacity for aesthetic vision depends. In my view, these are cultural traditions which
one comes to learn in much the same way one learns a public language. Pierre Boulez, one of the outstanding figures of the contemporary musical world, once said in a television interview that a landscape painter learns more about landscape painting by looking at landscapes by other painters than by looking at nature. (Of course, Boulez was thinking not of the "learning that," but the "learning how," of landscape painting.) Although his statement may appear somewhat paradoxical (especially when we think of the historical fact, referred to above, that breakthroughs in art often occur as a result of taking a fresh look at nature), it certainly is true. But Boulez, of course, was not speaking of learning to make a breakthrough. His reference, in fact, is directed to the learning of the genre, or "language," of landscape painting. In other words, his reference is to how a particular cultural tradition is learned by a novice, not to the invention of a new tradition, which is what a breakthrough may indicate. And so it is perfectly true that when it comes to learning an established tradition, then one has to approach it directly.

In fact Boulez would still have been right if he went so far as to suggest that his landscape painter (or anyone else, for that matter) would learn to see nature aesthetically more by looking at landscape paintings than by looking at nature herself. For we not only need to learn an aesthetic tradition in order to practice artistic production,
but also in order to be able to apprehend the world, including works of art, aesthetically. Thus, different traditions or modes of aesthetic vision would involve seeing the world aesthetically in different ways. The process of learning these traditions or modes evidently is a cognitive process which may become a lifelong enterprise, since it is capable of being expanded and refined. This is more evident in the case of the creative artist, the success of whose career really depends on his ability to bring about this expansion and refinement. I shall be coming to this point soon. In the meantime I would like to emphasize the tradition-bound or conventional nature of aesthetic vision, particularly when it involves works of art designed to express a particular effect. A work of art of this nature is not a self-sufficient or autonomous entity. Unless it can be seen to belong to some tradition or other it would virtually be incomprehensible. The artist who claims that the intelligibility of his work does not depend on any tradition or "symbol system" simply does not have anything significant to offer.

Now, to return to the point about the expansion and refinement of the modes of aesthetic vision. My claim that the creative artist is more capable of this than the rest of us is because his involvement in aesthetic vision is not confined to aesthetic appreciation but it also includes aesthetic expression through the creation of appropriate
symbols. Through his symbolic activity, the artist not only enhances his aesthetic vision but he learns to structure it accumulatively. This is, roughly speaking, how it happens. Through his exploratory activity, the artist spots out in nature certain aesthetic possibilities which he then attempts to give them an exact expression in an appropriate medium. He does not, therefore, content himself with the mere recognition of those possibilities and resume his visual explorations. Not only will that make no difference concerning other people's ability to notice those possibilities, but his own apprehension of them is bound to remain imperfect or primitive. In order to make his apprehension of it more precise or articulate, he must give them an exact plastic expression in an appropriate medium. That is to say, he must create for them an efficient symbol capable of giving them a precise expression. This is why, for instance, Mondrian spoke of dynamic balance, his major concern as an artist, as having a "veiled" presence in nature. This is, in fact, as exact a description of this matter as anyone can give. Nature itself is not a symbol; it is only potentially symbolic. This is, indeed, why we need art.

The process of giving an aesthetic quality or concept exact plastic expression is a complex one and usually takes place over a period of many years and goes through different phases involving different strategies and procedures.
Consider for instance how Mondrian went about his major artistic concern of giving dynamic balance an exact plastic expression during the height of its abstractionistic phases between the years 1912 and 1913. He would contemplate the trees of the streets of Paris looking for strong suggestion of dynamic balance and then he would proceed to make pencil drawings of these trees emphasizing in them those elements which are expressive of dynamic balance by virtue of their formal-relational structure. He would then make a new set of drawings, based on the ones he directly abstracted from nature, emphasizing further those elements which define the plastic relationship expressive of dynamic balance. Finally, he would paint a canvas, based on this new set of drawing, in which the expression appears in its most explicit and articulate form. The process, of course, does not end there. Mondrian would resume his visual explorations in the forms of nature and compare what he saw there with what his paintings expressed and, on the basis of the feedback which he got, he would continue his search, entering into new phases and adopting new procedures.

But how could nature assume this important role in the creative process where it directs the efforts of the artist bringing him nearer to the achievement of his goal? There

---

1See Michel Seupher, Piet Mondrian: Life and Work.
are in fact two reasons: one concerns the character of natural forms when approached as symbols, and the other concerns the nature of the artist's vision. With respect to the first of these, I have already said that nature is not a symbol; it is only potentially symbolic. By that I wish to refer to the fact that a symbol, if efficient, that is to say, if genuinely symbolic, is bound to be geared to a specific mode of apprehension and a specific effect. Nature, on the other hand, lacks this specificity, even though it may seem teleologically adapted to the cognitive powers of the mind. Indeed, it is in terms of this lack of specificity that Mondrian's remark about the "veiled" presence of dynamic balance in the forms of nature ought to be understood. With respect to the other reason mentioned, namely, the one which concerns the artist's vision, it should be made clear that not only does the artist's ability to create a plastic symbol capable of giving exact expression to the aesthetic concept or quality with which he is concerned become more skilled, thus increasing the efficacy of the symbols which he creates, but, as he pursues his goal, his vision, or his apprehension of the concept or quality in question, also develops, becoming sharper and more articulated. This is characteristic of the development of creative artists of the stature of Cezanne, Kandinsky, and Mondrián. What I am suggesting here is that when an artist takes a look at the forms of
nature, what he sees is a reflection of his vision in its latest development, which he then considers to be his new expressive goal. And so the cycle continues, leaving behind a line of development which constitutes his creative career. That the artist's apprehension of the aesthetic concept or quality does develop in this way is indicative of the cognitive nature of aesthetic vision. It is as much an intellectual achievement as anything else.

One important conclusion which we may draw from this analysis of the creative process is that aesthetic expression serves the cognitive purpose of structuring vision. In other words, aesthetic symbolization aims primarily at the development of aesthetic vision, not self-expression or communication. Self-expression, in so far as it may be involved in the process, can only be a concomitant aspect of it. To think of the artistic efforts of such artists as Cezanne or Mondrian as attempts at mere self-expression is to grossly misunderstand them. Also, since the artist, as I have just said, resorts to symbolic expression in order to sharpen and articulate his vision, it would be absurd to think of the goal of his activity purely in terms of communication. Just as a speculative thinker learns to articulate his thoughts by means of giving them symbolic expression in words, so does the artist who is concerned with aesthetic vision learns to articulate his aesthetic apprehension through plastic expression.
To summarize, I have claimed that aesthetic vision is symbolic in character for the following reasons. First, it involves the cognitive powers. Secondly, it takes us beyond what is immediately given. Thirdly, unlike other psychic phenomena, such as drug-induced hallucinations, it is objectively grounded in the expressive features of the physical object which acts as symbol for it. Fourthly, it is rational in so far as it entails the identification of the appropriate modes of interpretation (or "symbol systems") which one learns in much the same way as one learns a language. This rationality also manifests itself in the "fit" which obtains between the work of art, as an efficiently expressive symbol, and its interpretation, as well as in the coherence and unity of the aesthetic image (or "aesthetic object") itself. Finally, both appreciation and symbolization in aesthetic vision serve primarily a cognitive purpose; namely, the structuring of aesthetic vision.

SYMBOLIC CHARACTERISTICS OF AESTHETIC VISION

The first thing we ought to point out about the symbolization of aesthetic vision is that it is not denotational. A symbol is said to denote its meaning if it stands for it or acts as a vehicle for it. "The cat is on the mat," as a symbolic expression, denotes a situation observable in
the external world. Thus, when one person says to another, who happens to be looking for a particular cat, "The cat is on the mat," the latter would apprehend this as a definite message concerning the whereabouts of the cat and would therefore respond to it in a manner appropriate to that situation. We are here dealing with the kind of symbolic expression where the symbol is used as a vehicle to convey a particular message or assertion of some sort or other on the basis of conventionally established rules governing the use of the various symbolic elements within any given symbol system, or language, of this nature.

Now let us see how the situation differs in the case of an aesthetic symbolic expression, say, a Mondrian painting. Apart from the fact that both expressions have one important feature in common, viz., intelligibility, the situation in the case of the Mondrian is radically different. In the first place, the Mondrian, as an aesthetic symbol, does not denote anything; it only expresses or evinces something. What it expresses or evinces, as an aesthetic symbol, is what Mondrian himself called "dynamic balance." It is, of course, possible to think of the Mondrian as denoting something. Thus, one may view The Apple Tree in Blossom, discussed in Chapter II, as denoting a particular kind of tree, but this would not be a significant interpretation of the painting, if it is to be viewed as an efficient symbol; for one would then interpret it as pri-
marily expressive of dynamic balance, even though its title indicates that it is an apple tree in blossom. If the interpreter, however, fails to identify the appropriate mode of apprehension, or "symbol system," which would enable him to recognize the expressive features of the painting, then his interpretation would naturally be inappropriate. This holds even when the painting in question is, unlike the Mondrian, clearly representational in nature. Take, for instance, Monet's La Grenouillère of 1869. Because of its clear representational nature, this picture denotes various objects which are easily recognizable. But if we are to apprehend the painting as an aesthetic symbol, then this would assume only a minor significance; for the important thing here is the aesthetic image constituted imaginatively on the basis of the artistic structure of the painting. Also, if one fails to apprehend the picture in this manner, but views it solely as a denotative symbol, then the interpretation would not be appropriate, as it overlooks the expressive effects of which it is capable if responded to in the appropriate manner (that is to say, if the appropriate mode of interpretation was successfully identified and applied). Thus, we may conclude that aesthetically expressive works of art, irrespective of whether they are abstract or representational, are essentially not denotative in character.
I have said above that a denotational symbolic expression acts as a vehicle for its meaning. By its very nature this relationship is fairly arbitrary, since the meaning does not depend on the structure of the symbol except by way of association. Thus, not only can the elements of the symbolic expression be exchanged by other ones from within the same language or symbol system itself but it is also translatable into a totally different language or symbol system, without introducing any changes in the meaning of the symbolic expression or scheme.¹ None of this, however, is possible in the case of the aesthetic symbol. Of course, it is possible to point out to a group of artifacts made by different artists, and even belonging to different ages, and say about them that despite their external diversity, inwardly they are the same. Thus, a 15th-Century Persian miniature, a Cubist painting by Picasso, and an abstract painting by Mondrian may all express dynamic balance, even though each has its individual qualities which it does not share with the rest. This identity of the expressive content may persuade us to think of them as having the same value, but it would not justify any claims concerning the possibility of replacing some of their elements by others or translating them into entirely different symbol systems.

That the symbol in a denotational scheme acts merely as a vehicle for its meaning also manifests itself in the

¹Cf. Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, p. 94.
detachment between the symbol and its meaning which obtains in the act of apprehension. For in such a scheme what one attends to as meaning has no substantive link to the symbol itself. Thus, when you talk over the telephone with the airline representative about your flight arrangements, her speech, taken in itself as a sound pattern, and the message which it conveys are detached from each other, since no substantive continuity between them can be identified. This kind of detachment, however, does not occur in the case of an aesthetic symbol scheme. No matter how far we may transcend what is immediately given in the physical structure of the symbol in an act of aesthetic apprehension, the phenomenally experienced image at no point appears detached from the sensuous pattern of the symbol itself.

There is, therefore, always this substantive continuity between them. This is, roughly, what L. A. Reid intends when he speaks of "embodied" meaning as distinct from "expressed" meaning. He argues that meaning in the case of an aesthetic symbol is not "meaning expressed" but "meaning embodied," since it is not separable from it.¹

Besides acting as a vehicle for its meaning, a denotational symbol scheme, I also indicated, is apprehended on the basis of conventionally established rules. Without a

body of rules to guide us in the process of interpretation, it would be impossible to determine what such a symbolic scheme signifies. Thus, the actual process of interpreting or, rather, decoding, the denotational symbol scheme itself is not the object of apprehension; the object of apprehension, or meaning, of the symbolic scheme is the assertion which we come to know through this process, but which is not in any way identical with it. In fact the process of decoding the denotational symbolic scheme is so passive that one hardly pays any attention to it. Now, if we turn to the aesthetic symbol scheme, we shall find ourselves face to face with a radically different situation. First, whereas what constitutes the meaning in the case of the denotational symbol scheme is an assertion of some kind, apprehending an aesthetic symbolic scheme does not focus around any assertions at all. What constitutes meaning in an aesthetic symbol scheme is the sensuous image which it is capable of expressing in an act of aesthetic vision. We may, of course, make assertions about that image but this would be aesthetic description rather than aesthetic apprehension. In other words, it could not be taken as constitutive of the aesthetic import of the symbol. Also, the process of interpreting the aesthetic symbol may necessitate the making of some assertions which would act as interpretative cues, but such assertions should not be confused with the import of the aesthetic symbol itself.
Secondly, whereas the process of decoding the denotational symbolic scheme itself is a passive process hardly noticed by the interpreter, the interpretation of the aesthetic symbol, on the contrary, is a dynamic process which constitutes the very heart of its meaning; for in it lies the whole point of both aesthetic expression and aesthetic interpretation.

Thirdly, whereas the process of decoding the denotational symbolic scheme depends on rule guidance, aesthetic interpretation depends instead on the cognitive powers. Among these the powers of perception or the imagination as they are sometimes referred to, play the predominant part. Thus, I come to apprehend an aesthetic symbol scheme by exercising my powers of perception or imagination in the appropriate manner. These powers, however, have to be developed, just like all other cognitive or intellectual skills. But this does not place them in the same position as the conventionally established rules that guide the process of decoding in denotational symbol schemes. An example will readily make my point clear. Suppose I am that person who is looking for his cat and someone tells me where the cat is but in a language which I do not understand, would it be possible for me to grasp his message and respond to it in the appropriate manner, as I would if he said it in a language I understand? The answer is, of course, no. No matter how I contemplate the pattern and sensory proper-
ties of his utterance, I would have no idea as to the exact content of what he is trying to tell me. Maybe he is trying to tell me that he saw my cat in the middle of the road flattened by the wheels of the passing cars with its guts scattered all around. Maybe he is telling me that my cat is on the mat, safe and secure. I have no way to tell. Now, it is conceivable that, instead of trying to get to his message, I respond to his utterance affectively, so that it strikes me as sympathetic or indifferent, irritating or strangely appealing, friendly or hostile. It is also conceivable that I respond to his utterance aesthetically, so that my attention becomes directed primarily to its sensuous form and texture, just I would if I listen to a piece of music, where interest is focused in the structure of the sound itself. But then I would not be responding to his utterance as a denotational symbol scheme, even though it would become significant to me. For an appropriate response to a denotational symbol scheme must attend to an assertive message, a claim about something, which the symbol is intended to convey. Now, this would not be possible without knowing what the symbol stands for and what the rules governing its use are. In the interpretation of aesthetic symbol schemes, on the other hand, there is no need for rule guidance; not because they are self-evident, but because they do not denote anything. One has to know what the symbol denotes, or stands for, only
when it in fact denotes, or stands for, something. The aesthetic symbol does not, however, denote or stand for anything, and so how could there be any need for rule guidance? The aesthetic symbol, as a matter of fact, is used in an entirely different way from the denotational symbol. Rather than serving as a vehicle for its meaning, the aesthetic symbol provides us with an opportunity to exercise our perceptual powers, stretching them to capacity and sustaining them in enhanced activity. This point is very crucial, since neither the aesthetic symbol itself nor the process of symbolization, considered generically, can be understood adequately without it. I shall, therefore, conclude this section with an account of the unique way in which the aesthetic symbol is used in the operations of the mind.

When we respond to an object aesthetically, the object of our cognizance is not to determine what it purports or signifies, even though this may occur prior to the aesthetic response. In fact, in so far as our response is aesthetic, we are not even concerned about determining the categorial identity of the object. In other words, we do not even want to know what it is; we are not interested in finding out anything about it. There are those whose response to a work of art, be it a Rembrandt or a Monet, does not go beyond identifying the various objects represented in it. That is, they only want to know what it is a picture of.
This is, of course, not an aesthetic response, even though it may involve works of art of great aesthetic merit. We may, thus, conclude that what determines whether a response is aesthetic is not the object involved in it but the nature of the response itself. When we respond to an object aesthetically, what we are after is sensuous apprehension, taken for its own sake. It is, then, as an element in this process of sensuous apprehension that we ought to examine the way the aesthetic symbol is used in the operations of the mind. For its primary purpose is to facilitate sensuous apprehension. My analysis, therefore, will center around this process. However, the fact that this paper is concerned with aesthetic vision will mean that I shall have to restrict myself to this area of aesthetic apprehension only. Let us then find out what there is to be said about this process.

Aesthetic vision is not an autonomous experience like a dream or a hallucinatory experience. It is a perceptual experience involving a physical object or symbol. But it is not a form of simple perception either. It results from a complex of cognitive activities. First of all, one has to identify the appropriate mode of perception on the basis of the symbol's expressive features. In other words, one has to contemplate the symbol in a particular way, determined on the basis of its artistically significant properties only, since any work of art is bound to contain
features that are purely incidental or idiosyncratic in nature, thus having no artistic or expressive value. For it is on the basis of the artistically expressive features alone our sensuous apprehension of it is constituted. However, to be able to determine the appropriate mode of perception or "symbol system," both reason and the understanding are involved. Thus, to think of the process of aesthetic vision as having nothing to do with either reason or understanding is clearly incorrect. But the most prominent among the cognitive powers involved in this process, of course, are the higher powers of perception or the imagination. All sense perception, as Kant long ago indicated, involves the activities of the imagination. But nowhere is this more true than in the aesthetic modes of perceiving. In fact, we could say that the role which the modes of aesthetic perception play in the apprehension of an aesthetic symbol scheme corresponds to the role of rule guidance in the interpretation of a denotational symbol scheme. Thus, one apprehends a Mondrian not by searching for the appropriate rules which would determine what the various elements contained in its expressive structure stand for, as one does when confronted with a denotational symbol scheme, but by identifying and successfully deploying the appropriate mode of aesthetic vision.

It is clear, then, that in apprehending aesthetic symbol schemes one relies on the modes of aesthetic perception,
not on any system of rules. But in what important respects do these modes differ from the rules whereby one apprehends a denotational symbol scheme, especially when both of them are considered conventional? The difference between them inheres in the fact that whereas the modes operate on the basis of perception or imagination, the rules operate on the basis of association. Also, the fact that we refer to both of them as conventional does not mean that they are conventional in the same sense. Thus, we may refer to the modes of aesthetic vision as conventional because they emerge and develop as systems of understanding and their use, therefore, necessarily involves some acquaintance with these systems. On the other hand, the reason why we call the rules used in denotational symbol systems conventional is because the relationship between the symbol and what it denotes, according to these rules, is totally arbitrary; in other words the association would not result without them. There is nothing in the internal structure of the denotative symbol which objectively indicates that it ought to be understood in this or that way. This is unlike the situation in the case of the aesthetic symbol where, as we have seen, the identification of the appropriate mode of seeing is determined solely on the basis of its effective artistic features.

The role of emotion in the process of aesthetic apprehension should also be mentioned here. Recent writers
on the subjects have shown interest in it, partly to discredit the cognition-emotion dichotomy. But the main impetus behind it is the tendency of feeling to probe ahead of perceptual awareness in the process of aesthetic perception. Thus, Nelson Goodman writes: "Emotion in aesthetic experience is a means of discerning what properties a work has and expresses."\(^1\) This idea, however, can be traced to Kant who according to his interpreters, argued that the feeling which we experience in the process of aesthetic apprehension occurs in the event of the free exercise of our powers of awareness upon an object adapted to give them full play. Essentially it is the feeling that one experiences in the act of discovery. Thus, in the words of one interpreter: "The subject feels that the form of the object is adapted to his understanding, i.e., that he could conceptually determine the pattern which is contained therein."\(^2\) According to this interpreter, Kant's view of feeling in the act of aesthetic apprehension may be construed, on the bases of some passages in the *Critique of Judgment* as purporting "that our affects are all that could give us an awareness of the successful functioning of our mental abilities before they produce knowledge in

\(^1\) *Languages of Art*, P. 248.

the form of determinate judgments."¹ If this is so - and I have no reason to doubt it - then the process of aesthetic apprehension must be viewed as a complex process in which all elements of mental life are involved.

I have said above that the process of apprehending the aesthetic symbol scheme follows the dictates of the effective features which it possesses physically. I now say that the direction of this process moves toward creating a perfect fit between the symbol and the interpretation given to it. To put it differently, the symbol is approached as specially adapted for creating a definite effect, so that no interpretation is accepted which does not seem to agree with what its expressive features dictate. But this does not mean that the interpretation is predetermined, in the sense that the meaning of a denotative symbol is predetermined; for then we would have to have rule-guidance which, as we have seen, does not exist. We simply respond to the aesthetic symbol as an interpretative problem and search for the interpretation that fits. One may wish, therefore, to think of aesthetic apprehension as an interpretative symbolic process where the meaning is not predetermined but is constituted in the process of interpretation itself.

The interpretative character, however, does not make out of the process of aesthetic apprehension an

ambiguous and arbitrary enterprise. Let us not forget that
an aesthetic symbol, after all, is shaped in a purposeful
manner with the intention of realizing a certain effect.
This means that its effective features are geared to one
mode of apprehension rather than another. Thus, the pos­
sibility of finding a work of art which can'be apprehended,
equally effectively, in more than one way is very remote,
especially if these have to be contradictory. To produce
a Kandinsky which can be viewed equally effectively as a
Mondrian, or vice versa will mean that one has to face an
artistic problem of unsurmountable difficulty. Moreover,
an aesthetic symbol does not emerge as an isolated event;
for its creation also conforms to a particular aesthetic
tradition, or "symbol system," according to which both
aesthetic expression and aesthetic interpretation proceed.
Thus, even if someone succeeds in perceiving a Kandinsky
in the manner appropriate for a Mondrian, his interpreta-
tion, even if it achieves a perfect fit, will have to be
declared inappropriate as an interpretation of the Kandin-
sky, precisely because it does not conform with the symbol
system to which the Kandinsky belongs. In fact, his
arbitrary way of looking at the Kandinsky cannot even be
given symbolic status; for it approaches a symbol in the
same way one approaches nature. When we are contemplating
nature we do not have to be concerned about which particular
mode or system we ought to use. For here we are dealing
with a stochastic situation where we are free to interpret what is before us in the manner we please.

But if natural objects offer a broader and less restricted scope for aesthetic apprehension than the teleologically adapted objects of art, the latter are more efficient. The efficacy of the forms of art, however, depends on how successful they are artistically. Thus, works of art which are successful artistically are more efficient than those which are not, even though aesthetically they may be less impressive. But a work of art which is aesthetically impressive but artistically weak can only be mediocre. Great works of art are considered great not only because they happen to be aesthetically impressive but also because of their artistic or expressive efficacy. Works of art, then, have this advantage over the forms of nature because they are teleologically adapted to the effects they express. If they are not capable of expressing anything aesthetically, then they are not aesthetically significant works of art; if they do so inefficiently, then they are inefficient works of art.

It is possible, however, for an efficient work of art to be ambiguous. In such a case the ambiguity is intentional. Thus, in the large collages of the American artist Robert Rauschenberg, we could either look at the canvas as a whole, which has the structure of a Cubist painting, and apprehend it as expressive of dynamic balance; or we could
attend to the individual collaged elements (many of which are photographic in character, depicting three-dimensional space). If we apprehend the dynamic balance expressed by the canvas as a whole, then the collaged details will lose their inherent interest and are perceived as flat elements serving as integral parts of the structure which expresses dynamic balance; if we attend to the individual collaged elements, then we would perceive them as depictions expressive of three-dimensional space, which are inherently interesting. But no one really should be overly impressed by this, since the ambiguity which we encounter here, although dramatic, does not involve the same structure throughout. For when we are contemplating the collaged elements we are not attending to the canvas as a whole. It is, really, like looking at two different pictures. What would really be difficult to do is to execute an ambiguous artifact where the object perceived remains the same. The challenge, in other words, is to make, say, an efficient Kandinsky which can be apprehended, equally efficiently, as a Mondrian. This is, indeed, an artistic problem of extreme difficulty.

What I wish to indicate is that aesthetic symbol schemes (works of art, that is) are not ambiguous, unless they are intentionally so, in which case they are not open to arbitrary or unrestricted interpretation. If they are unintentionally ambiguous, then they are bad works of art,
if they can be called that at all. For a work of art is, by its very logic, teleological in nature. In other words, it makes no sense to speak of a work of art as having no purpose or totally ineffective. Thus, our interpretation, if it is to be appropriate, must be grounded in the effective features of the work itself, and while this does not occur in a purely causal manner, it is not arbitrary or haphazard either. But an interpretation which claims to be an appropriate reading of the work must be more than that. Not only should it be grounded in the expressive features of the work, but it should also conform to the aesthetic tradition, or symbol system to which the work belongs. An appropriate reading of the work should make one feel that one is apprehending the work in the manner it is meant to be apprehended. Otherwise it would not be a process of interpretation, or reading, of a work of art produced by a human agent other than oneself. Rather, it would be an act of expression in its own right, even though the object perceived itself is brought into being by someone else. Expression does not necessarily involve physical manipulation, and while it evolves on the basis of the effective features of a material object, its realization does not depend on the material identity of this object. Thus, a Sunday painter may wish to represent objects in the way he sees them, but because of his lack of artistic or technical skill, he finds that his works
fail to measure up to his goals. This naturally makes him feel very unhappy. It is possible, however, that someone whose capacities for aesthetic perception are well developed would see in the work of this Sunday painter some kind of aesthetic merit which would make him value the work positively. Now, it is true that what this person apprehended must be grounded in the features of the painting itself, even though the Sunday painter himself may not be aware of the fact. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that it is an instance of symbolic interpretation, since it totally ignored what the symbol is intended to be. And so if this individual who is aesthetically sophisticated also happens to be well versed in semiotic theory, he would judge the work of the Sunday painter as a bad symbol, but at the same time he would consider it an interesting object. He would say that it is a bad symbol because it does badly what it is intended to do; he would say that it is an interesting object because its inherent interest is not intended to be expressed by the symbol. Moreover, he would have absolutely no doubt as to who should take the credit for the aesthetic merit which he spotted in the painting. For so long as the Sunday painter is not aware of it, this merit cannot be attributed to him. In other words, in so far as his painting is seen as expressive of something which he does not acknowledge, it cannot be reasonably claimed that he is its author, even though he is the one who mixed
the paints and applied them on the surface of the canvas. Creation is apprehension, not a mere act of manipulation.

It is important, therefore, to distinguish between two types of aesthetic apprehension: interpretative and stochastic. In interpretative apprehension we approach the object as an efficient symbol, teleologically adapted to its meaning. In stochastic apprehension, on the other hand, we approach the object as only potentially expressive or symbolic. The former is appropriate for apprehending highly efficient symbols, like the paintings of Kandinsky or Mondrian. Whereas the latter is appropriate for apprehending the forms of nature and less efficient works where the ambiguity which inevitably results permits a freer apprehension. It should also be pointed out here that the ability to contemplate the world freely is characteristic of the creative mind. I have already mentioned Cezanne's obsessive encounter with nature. But this manner of seeing is often extended beyond natural forms to include some highly unexpected objects wrought by the hands of man. Thus, Picasso's encounter with African sculpture around 1907 proved to be a decisive factor in the development of the Cubist style.\(^1\) Picasso must have been impressed by the way these statues indicate that a representation does not have to be an imitation; it can maintain its autonomy as

\(^1\)Cf. Paul Waldo Schwartz, *Cubism*, pp. 22-23.
a real object existing in its own right, not merely as an imitation of such objects. Among the other examples which can be given in this respect are Kandinsky encounter with the Upper Bavarian folk-art known locally as *Hinterglasmalerei* (or glass-painting) and Mondrian's encounter with a mediocre Dutch painter called Bart Van der Leek. Kandinsky became acquainted with the glass-paintings at the beginning of his Murnau period (1908-1914), shortly after he moved to the Bavarian town which gave this historically important period its name. Impressed by their naive style, their rich, bright colors, and their spiritual subject-matter, Kandinsky must have had a strong tendency to apprehend them in a quasi-visionary manner, something which no respectable artistic tradition known in Europe at the time would have sanctioned. Mondrian's encounter with the work of Van der Leek happened in 1916 when the two painters met each other at the Hague. According to Mondrian's own account of it, Van der Leek, "who, even though his works were still representational, painted in flat areas of pure colour." And he adds: "My technique, which was more or less Cubist, hence still more or less pictorial in nature, was influenced by his exact technique."
All these encounters were remarkable in that they were crucial events which to some extent determined the development of the artists concerned. But they also share another remarkable feature: none of the objects encountered belonged to any formally established artistic tradition known in Europe at the time. Picasso did not know how those African sculptures were interpreted by the people for whom they were made or what their role was in the cultural and spiritual life of those people. The same thing can be said about Kandinsky's encounter with the glass paintings of Upper Bavaria. Kandinsky, who tended to present to his visitors the image of the aristocrat, could not possibly have identified himself with the peasants and mountain folk of that part of the world in which he was technically a foreigner anyway. He was scarcely more acquainted with the meaning which the glass-paintings had within the cultural setting to which they belonged than Picasso was with the meaning which those sculptures had within the context of the cultural setting for which they were made. As for Mondrian's encounter with the work of Bart Van der Leck, it should be emphasized that this painter, whose work does not deserve to be taken seriously (Mondrian himself certainly did not), was doing what you might say (with tongue in cheek, of course) "his own thing." He belonged to no tradition and no tradition belonged to him. Mondrian looked at his work as Cezanne looked at nature. His remark
about the influence which Van der Leck's work exerted on his is therefore misleading, since the way Mondrian apprehended it could not have fallen within Van der Leck's scheme of things. In short, the responses of these highly creative artists to the objects encountered were not interpretative in the sense indicated above, since they did not involve an established tradition, or symbol system, to which the objects belonged, either because they were unknown to them or, as in the case of Van der Leck's work, because they were non-existent. As such, they belong to a stochastic mode of apprehension. But there is nothing unusual about that, for this is how people with a developed capacity for aesthetic vision contemplate aesthetically all objects which are not efficient works of art belonging to established or familiar traditions. The way Picasso, Kandinsky, and Mondrian apprehended the objects involved in those encounters is stochastic in a strong sense of the term; for not only did they overlook the appropriate mode of apprehension, tradition, or symbol system, but they, in effect, initiated new ones.

It is obvious from what has just been said that the stochastic approach to aesthetic apprehension results in a more creative response than the interpretative one. But it should be emphasized that such a high level of creative functioning is impossible without first obtaining great proficiency in applying the interpretative approach. In
other words, one has to learn to perceive efficient symbols (i.e., works of art) through their appropriate aesthetic modes, traditions, or symbol systems, however you may wish to call them, before one can apply the stochastic approach effectively.

It should also be emphasized that interpretative apprehension, where the aesthetically expressive symbol scheme or work of art is perceived through the appropriate symbol system, should not be construed as unduly restrictive. For its purpose is nothing but to ensure that the efficacy of the symbol is fully accounted for, so that the interpretation achieved presents maximum meaning and takes the form of an optimal solution. Ignorance of the appropriate symbol system, or, to put it plainly, not knowing how to look at the symbol, is bound to result in misunderstanding, to say the least. This is, incidentally, typical of how most people react when they are presented with highly innovative works of art. They would look at them as they are not intended to be looked at, and so the result is bound to be disappointing to them. But as they learn to look at them properly, i.e., acquire the appropriate symbol system, the same works which previously appeared so queer and trivial are now perceived as normal and significant. However, while knowledge of the appropriate symbol system, or mode of apprehension, is lacking, one can only have an inadequate experience of the work, which one typically attributes
to the work itself, rather than as an outcome of one's own lack of understanding. This is, presumably, what went in Schoenberg's mind when he said in a defensive gesture: "My music is not modern [i.e., meaningless]; it is only badly played."

The way the creative work of Kandinsky was received by the public would, I think, provide a good illustration of how important is the role of the symbol system in aesthetic interpretation. When Kandinsky's creative work first appeared (c. 1909), the public's reaction fell within three different groups. First, there were the traditionalists who demanded that the artist's work should be faithful to the standards of the classical tradition as it was then expounded by the academies. These saw in Kandinsky's work the bogus manipulations of a charlatan, if not the capricious expression of a madman, and said so. Secondly, there were those who, having been reared on the legacy of Impressionism, felt that the artist should avoid the lifeless style of the academies but at the same time he should not let his work be outrageously modern. These wished that Kandinsky would go back to his impressionistic style of a few years back which they genuinely admired. Finally, there were the progressives who have been talking with great enthusiasm about the work which Picasso and the Fauves were doing in Paris, and so, unlike the other two groups, they sanctioned the use of pure colors and distorted form in
paintings, which was still to be representational. Thus, when these looked at Kandinsky's creative work, they approved—but for the wrong reasons. For in it they saw what their beloved Mattisse and his Fauvist friends were doing three or four years previously. In other words, they looked at it merely as an attempt on the part of Kandinsky to participate in this newly won freedom from local color and natural form. Thus, they only saw in it a technical (or artistic) value, not an aesthetic value. This is of course a legitimate way to look at Kandinsky's creative work, but it is not symbolically appropriate. For Kandinsky was not trying to free painting from the imitation of nature as the progressives understood it. Rather, his goal was to effect in his painting a transmutation of nature, so that one gets the impression of facing a new world, belonging to an entirely different mode of being, whose unfamiliarity is overwhelmingly mysterious but deeply engaging. In other words, these progressives in their apprehension of Kandinsky's work failed to obtain maximum meaning or arrive at an optimal solution. Thus, Kandinsky's creative work was misunderstood not only by his antagonists but also by his very friends, owing to the fact that they all lacked knowledge of the mode of apprehension or symbol system appropriate to it.

The significance of the symbol system in aesthetic apprehension, then, inheres in the fact that it prevents
misunderstanding and ensures that we take things for what they are intended to be, so that in our commerce with genuine works of art (identifiable by virtue of their symbolic efficacy or purposiveness), we obtain maximum meaning and arrive at optimal solutions. It should, however, be emphasized at this point that the acquisition of the appropriate symbol system cannot be achieved by knowing what the intentions of the artist are, even though the account which we may obtain in this way is quite accurate (which, of course, need not be the case, since such an account requires the ability to undertake a theoretical analysis which demands certain cognitive skills which the artist may not have). For the acquisition of an aesthetic symbol system involves the acquisition of certain perceptual skills and the conceptual schemes that go with them, which have to be developed through the appropriate means and not simply by obtaining knowledge concerning the intentions of the artist, no matter how reliable it may be. (This is, indeed, why we have here a case for aesthetic education as a distinctive domain concerned with the acquisition of certain cognitive skills and structures that fall outside the scope of theoretical analysis.)

I shall end this account of the process of aesthetic apprehension by a brief discussion of the experiential product of this process. To distinguish this product from the aesthetic symbol scheme (or work of art) itself, I shall
refer to it as the "aesthetic object," a locution which was introduced by the late Polish thinker Roman Ingarden.\footnote{See his article "Aesthetic Experience and Aesthetic Object."}

In his analysis of the aesthetic object, Ingarden claimed it to be purely intentional in nature. All aesthetic objects, admittedly, must be to some extent intentional, that is, having qualities which cannot be attributed to the physical properties of the symbol scheme itself. Such qualities are said to exist mentally only. Now, I believe that there are many instances where the appropriate apprehension of the aesthetic symbol scheme should result in the constitution of a purely intentional object, where the measure of success is total lack of awareness of the symbol scheme as a physical object, even though one happens to be staring at it very intensely. This is how, for example, Monet's _La Grenouillere_ should be apprehended in aesthetic vision.

So long as the interpreter is aware of the pigmented canvas, his apprehension of it is lacking in maturity, if not downright inappropriate. What must be perceived is the reflected light in the ripples of the water, not a pigmented canvas. When one does succeed in seeing the reflected light in the ripples of the water while, at the same time, remaining totally oblivious of the pigmented canvas, then the content of one's awareness is purely intentional in nature. Kandinsky's creative work also demands that we
should approach it in the same way. But there are many examples where the aesthetic object which results from an appropriate apprehension of the work is not, and should not, be purely intentional in character. Thus, when we contemplate aesthetically the sight of an apple tree in blossom, to use an example from Ingarden himself, the product of our contemplation is not something which we would call purely intentional. The same thing would be true if the object we contemplate aesthetically is Mondrian's *Apple Tree in Blossom* which I mentioned in Chapter II. The product of our successful apprehension here is certainly more intentional in character; for we could now claim without any hesitation that the aesthetic object which we entertain experientially here, viz., dynamic balance, is essentially intentional in character, but we would not go so far as to suggest that it is purely intentional. The reason is that this intentional object is perceived in this case as a quality embodies in the physical object itself, thus appearing as an aspect of it. But so long as we are aware of the aesthetic object as a residing quality within the physical object or forming an aspect of it, then we cannot speak of it as purely intentional in nature. Indeed, there are those who would dispute calling it intentional at all. As they see it, it is a quality of the

1Ibid., p. 289.
object itself, even though it may not be so obvious, in which case the difference between it and the object's more evident qualities is that the latter are more easily discernable. But putting it in this way is not really very different from saying that an aesthetic quality such as dynamic balance is intentional in character; for what we seem to mean in both cases is that the quality is "emergent" or not immediately given.

Concerning the structure of the aesthetic object, I would like to direct attention to Harry S. Broudy's essay *Enlightened Cherishing*. In this essay he gives what appears to be a neat analysis of the structure of the aesthetic object or "aesthetic image," as he calls it, where he distinguishes three different dimensions for the aesthetic object or image. These are the sensory, the formal, and the expressive dimensions. Since I do not consider the emotion encountered in aesthetic apprehension (Broudy's "expressive dimension") an integral part of the aesthetic object or image itself, let me show how I would conceive of the presence of emotion in aesthetic apprehension. I have already mentioned how emotion can have a cognitive function in the process of aesthetic vision itself. But when people refer to the emotions encountered in aesthetic apprehension they are usually thinking of the kind of emotion which is experienced as a product of that process rather than a part of its cognitive equipment. I have elsewhere in this
chapter explained that this kind of emotion could either be expressed symbolically by the aesthetic image or object, in which case it is cognitive in character; or it could take the form of a subjective reaction to the apprehended image, in which case it is a non-cognitive or natural emotion. I would like to add here that the way to tell which is which is by noting if the emotion is subjectively felt or not. If it is subjectively felt, so that the emotion experienced becomes one's own, then this emotion is non-cognitive or natural in character; if not, then it is cognitive. Thus, my experience of a painting in aesthetic vision may appear overwhelming. In order to be able to tell whether this is a cognitive emotion symbolically expressed by the painting or merely a subjective reaction on my part, I have to apply this simple test. If this emotion is something I happen to be undergoing myself, then the emotion is a natural or subjective reaction on my part; if, on the other hand, my apprehension of the emotion does not involve my having it, then the emotion is a cognitive emotion which is symbolically expressed by the painting.

With regard to the question of validity, the aesthetic object which arises as a product of the process of aesthetic apprehension is assessed on the basis of the degree to which it fits the symbol scheme which serves as its physical foundation. Of course, the aesthetic object could be more or less impressive, more or less original, solemn or
frivolous, and so on, but none of this has anything to do with the question concerning its validity. Indeed, the situation is similar in the case of verbal or denotational symbol schemes; for there, too, how impressive or how original the statement is has nothing to do with its validity, since the latter is assessed on the basis of its truth alone. Thus, the concept of fit, as it applies to aesthetic symbol schemes corresponds to the concept of truth as it applies to denotational symbol schemes, which involve an assertion of some sort. It should be, therefore, emphasized that, whereas an assertion, a statement, can be true or false, an aesthetic object cannot be viewed from the point of view of truth or falsity. These simply do not apply. What we should consider when assessing the validity of an aesthetic object is whether it fits its symbol, whether the two things are well adapted to each other.

Concerning the value of the aesthetic object, it should be pointed out that this value is intuitively apprehended in the aesthetic object itself and not merely designated by it, as in the case of symbol schemes expressing an assertion or statement. Thus, the apprehension of an aesthetic object is the apprehension of a value. This is why aesthetic apprehension is considered an appropriate means for value education, because in it we are not concerned with a mere claim that X or Y is a value; that is to say, not with mere designation of a value, but with actually apprehending or having it.
I shall bring this section to a close by saying what the gist of its argument is. The aesthetic symbol does not function as a vehicle for thought; it does not denote, stand for, refer, or represent, its meaning. It functions as an interpretative problem, not as a coded message. Aesthetic meaning is, thus, the outcome of a dynamic act of cognition, not a process of association.

CONCLUSION

As a creator and interpreter of symbols, man makes use of two radically different types of symbols. One type he uses as a vehicle for his thought. The other type he uses as a stimulus, directly affecting his thought, his feelings, and his disposition. This is a function which goes beyond the scope of the denotational symbol which only serves as a vehicle. This does not, however, mean that the vehicular or denotational symbol does not provide stimulation. What it means is that this kind of symbol does not function directly as a means of stimulation. Rather, its primary function is to convey or express meaning which can, of course, stimulate. But what we are considering here is the function of the symbol itself, that is to say, the way it is used in the operations of the mind. We must, therefore, conclude that we are dealing here with not one but two different kinds of symbolic usage, where the symbol is used either as a vehicle or as a stimulus.
Although no one, I think, would deny that there is a need for creating symbols to convey or represent thought, there are undoubtedly those who may wish to challenge the idea that there is a comparable need for creating special symbols to act primarily as means of providing direct stimulation. They would argue that, although man cannot function normally without receiving constant stimulation, there is no need to create special symbols in order to provide it, since the whole world serves as a continuous source of stimulation, let alone the artificial means which man has at his disposal and which operate causally (not cognitively, as symbols do), a fact which means that their effect is guaranteed for everyone, since no cognitive skill could stand in the way. It is, of course, true that the world, or nature, affords constant stimulation, but it does not mean that this stimulation is sufficient. The fact that man, throughout history, has resorted to artificial means for additional stimulation (from magic to LSD) is a case in point. This is especially true when it comes to man's need to stimulate his cognitive powers, to give them full play, stretching them to capacity and sustaining them in enhanced activity. For then nature itself would prove to be inadequate. This is because nature is not teleologically adapted for this purpose. As for the use of the artificial means mentioned above, since their function is causal, they could not be considered appropriate at all.
Man, therefore, has a need for cognitive stimulation of a purposive kind which can only be provided by means of creating special symbols which are capable of providing it. Such symbols are generally known as works of art.

As a stimulative symbol, the aesthetically expressive work of art stimulates by giving man's powers of perception full play, thereby structuring his aesthetic experience. It is symbolic, then, by virtue of the fact that it has to be apprehended or read. It should, however, be emphasized at this point that not all works of art function in this way. That is, not all works of art function by structuring perception aesthetically. There are, thus, works of art which are created to arouse and articulate emotion, as music is supposed to do. There are others which are intended to motivate or persuade us to react in a certain manner. (Martial music, for instance, is supposed to raise the morale of the listener and make him feel more brave, while a T.V. commercial is intended to persuade the viewer to buy the product it promotes.) There are still others which are created to be strangely or embarrassingly suggestive. To think of every work of art as purely, or even primarily, aesthetic in character is therefore a serious error which is often overlooked. All stimulative symbols are works of art, but not all works of art are aesthetic in character.

There is another point which should also be mentioned here. I have remarked above that a denotational symbol may
indirectly stimulate through its meaning. This means that the stimulation occurs as a result of apprehending what it purports. Thus, if you happen to be a competent physicist you may derive a great deal of stimulation from reading Einstein's 1905 paper—the one which made him so famous. But this stimulation depends entirely on grasping what it purports, i.e., what it claims to be the case. The stimulation which occurs, therefore, is a by-product of the nature and magnitude of what it says. In other words, if that which it says happens to be absurd or insignificant, your reaction to the paper would not be the same. What I am trying to say is that it is the significance which the thesis (denoted or expressed by the paper) assumes in the mind that really accounts for the stimulation experienced. Thus, the appropriate question to ask about the denotation symbol is not "How does it stimulate?" but rather "What does it purport?" (since the former question would be appropriate in relation to the stimulative symbol only). The point I want to make here is that a genuinely denotational symbol does not stimulate directly.

Now, unlike the Einstein paper, the Churchillian speech, which urges the British people to go out and kill the Germans, does not really aim at saying anything; for its purpose is simply to persuade the hearer, to make him react in a certain manner. Thus, although Mr. Churchill is apparently saying something, the significance of his
speech does not inhere in what it purports, or says, but solely in how it affects the people for whom it is intended. This is the exact reverse of the stimulation which obtains in the case of the Einstein paper. Thus, whereas the paper is genuinely denotational, the speech is in fact stimulative in character (i.e., a work of art), even though both of them have the same external form. Nothing, then, depends on the external character of the symbol, but only on how it is used in the operations of the mind.

There are, in fact, symbols which are expressed in a medium normally used for stimulative symbolization, but their function indicates that they are essentially denotational. Thus, Jean-Paul Sartre, we are told, wrote his literary works in order to argue a philosophical point. If this is really so, then it would follow that apprehending the argument expressed by these works would constitute the proper response to them. It is, of course, possible that Sartre's intention is not so much to express his philosophical views as to propagate them persuasively, in which case the play or novel would be functioning stimulatively in the manner appropriate for a work of art. (It is by virtue of its persuasiveness alone that a T.V. commercial is considered a work of art.)

Just as a denotational symbol may involve some stimulation, it is also possible for a stimulative symbol to
involve an assertion, or statement, of some sort. The reader is invited to identify his own examples.
In the previous chapter I have given an account of the nature of the process of aesthetic vision. In this chapter I shall attempt to explicate the various modes which are involved in this process, distinguishing their species and examining the different forms which these may take. My purpose, then, is not merely to put forward the claim that the process of aesthetic apprehension may assume different forms depending on the kind of symbol one is dealing with, for such a claim, important though it undoubtedly is, would hardly surprise anyone. Ernst Cassirer, in his *Essay on Man*, has already suggested that aesthetic vision "exhibits a much greater variety and belongs to a much more complex order than our ordinary perception."¹ In recent years Harold Osborne, in his book *The Art of Appreciation*, has emphasized that different works of art demand to be perceived differently. However, no attempts, to my knowledge, have been made to articulate the process of aesthetic vision in terms of the various modes which it may involve. In this chapter I shall present such an attempt. The

¹*Essay on Man*, p. 144.
degree of its success will depend on how far it manages to be systematic and comprehensive.

Obviously, our concern with the various modes of aesthetic vision means that we shall have to deal with the operations of the imagination. For it is these operations which mediate all sensuous experience, regardless of what its character may be. This use of the term "imagination," then, does not confine it to the manifestations of the creative imagination only, but extends it well beyond these so as to include irrational manifestations (as in dreams and autistic vision), as well as rational manifestations (as in the forms of aesthetic vision and ordinary sensory experience). (Among the forms of ordinary sensory experience, I include, besides veridical perception, both optical illusions and misperceptions.) For whenever experience assumes a sensuous aspect, the activity of the imagination, as the power which mediates sensuous apprehension, must be acknowledged. The fact that in ordinary sensory experience sensuous apprehension assumes a peripheral status (since most of our attention is focused on the factual nature of the things perceived) does not really make any difference. Without the sensuous image, which is made accessible through the activity of the imagination, our ability to determine the identity of the objects of the environment would be lost. The reason why the sensuous image as encountered in ordinary sensory perception assumes a peripheral status is
because it does not form the object of this kind of perceptual activity, not because the activity of the imagination is absent. It is, then, with these pervasive operations of the imagination that we have to deal in an attempt to articulate the process of aesthetic apprehension in terms of the various modes which it may take. Which brings us to our main question: How are these operations involved in the process of aesthetic vision?

I have indicated in the previous chapter that aesthetic vision is a rational process, partly because its relationship to its physical foundation must not be arbitrary or haphazard, but should always be objectively grounded in that foundation. This may take the form of a contemplative activity involving the actual structure of the object or symbol, making delicate discriminations and discerning subtle relationships. When aesthetic apprehension takes this form, our attention is directed primarily to the intrinsic structure of perception, to its "stuff," so to speak. But this is not the only form which aesthetic apprehension may have. For the structure of the physical object or symbol involved may be so constituted that a radically different mode of apprehension would be appropriate. When this happens to be the case, instead of attending to the object or symbol in a contemplative or discriminatory manner, their appearance is transformed through the activity of the creative imagination. In this case our interest in the
aesthetic image focuses on its categorial nature, that is to say, in its vital or existential aspects. Aesthetic vision, thus, may take one of these two basic forms. The former I shall call sensuous discrimination; the latter, transformation. All the various modes of aesthetic apprehension can be reduced to either one of them.

This classification of the various modes of aesthetic vision into discriminatory and transformational processes may recall recent controversy among rival groups of psychologists over the nature of perceptual learning. One group saw perceptual learning in terms of increased specificity within perception which occurs as a result of attending to certain variables contained in the structure of stimulation which were hitherto unnoticed. The other group argued that perceptual learning is a process of integration in which what is given in the structure of stimulation must be supplemented by the perceiver himself, thus giving him a constructive role in the process of perception. As I said, these were two rival groups who attempted to discredit each other's position and defend their own. The idea that they were dealing with two different types of perceptual experience demanding different explanations, not two rival theories concerning the one and the same kind of situation which have to be mutually exclusive, never seems to have crossed their minds. As I see it, all sensuous apprehension is mediated by the operations of the imagination. In
aesthetic vision and ordinary sensory perception this could involve either a process of sensuous discrimination or a process of sensuous transformation (or evolution). In other words, these two processes are seen as specific forms within the same generic structure, not rival views claiming to be generically viable.

I have attempted to point out the futility of this controversy because a dogmatic adherence to either position is bound to obscure the plausibility of my approach to discrimination and transformation as the basic modes of aesthetic vision. Thus, those who adhere dogmatically to the specificity theory would attempt to undermine this approach on the basis that all perception depends on discrimination, and so, they would argue, my positing transformation as an alternative category is unjustifiable.

That all perception involves discrimination is, strictly speaking, true. Thus, before aesthetic transformation could take place, the expressive, or syntactical, features of the symbol must first be discriminated, if the process of transformation is to be rational at all. For in order that this process may be rational it must be grounded in those expressive, or syntactical, features of the symbol itself. This, of course, means that it has to be discriminated. But the discrimination which takes place here does not constitute an interpretation of the symbol, but
only an initial process necessary for determining how the symbol should be apprehended. The process of transformation, which constitutes the proper interpretation of the symbol, occurs when this initial process is completed, and therefore no continuity between the two processes is maintained. Moreover, aesthetic interest is focused on it, not on the initial discriminatory process, and the product of the experience is its product, not that of the initial process. In the aesthetic apprehension which falls within the discriminatory category, however, the situation is radically different. For here the discrimination concerned is not merely an initial procedure which suggests to the interpreter how the symbol should be apprehended, but the interpretation proper, in which all aesthetic interest is concentrated. It should, therefore, be emphasized that the difference between this kind of discrimination and the initial discrimination is not difference in degree but in their logical type, and so to lump them together is, as I see it, indicative of conceptual confusion.

As for those who adhere dogmatically to the rival view which posits that all perception is a constructive act involving a process of supplementation, they would take the opposite position and seek to undermine my treatment of discrimination as a basic process of aesthetic vision existing in its own right. According to them, the idea that aesthetic vision can be understood in terms of a discriminatory
process alone would seem to make of it a mere process of disclosure, thus grossly denying its constructive character and the fact that it is essentially an intellectual achievement. This, too, is, strictly speaking, true and I certainly do not wish to challenge it. In fact there are instances where the process of discrimination occurs in conjunction with a preliminary process of modification affecting the appearance of the object. Thus, some elements are emphasized, others suppressed, and still others ignored as irrelevant "noise". This happens when the object involved in the process of discrimination is either a natural object not teleologically adapted for this process or an inefficient work of art. But this kind of modification, or transformation, of the appearance of the object should not be confused with the interpretation of the work, for it is only a preparatory stage which paves the way for the interpretation proper to take place. Its place in the process of discrimination is, thus, comparable to that of the initial discrimination which is involved in the process of transformation. It would, therefore, seem rash to ignore the fact that in aesthetic vision there are times when we assume a purely contemplative mode in which attention is directed to the actual features of the symbol or object of aesthetic interest and interpretation takes the form of a discriminatory process. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that in aesthetic vision discrimination and
intellectual, or cognitive, construction are incompatible. Would it not be more reasonable to suggest, as Kant did, that sensuous intuition without a concept is blind, and a concept without sensuous intuition is empty?

It therefore seems to me perfectly reasonable to suggest that the process of sensuous apprehension in aesthetic vision may assume either a discriminatory mode, where interpretation is a matter of making delicate discriminations and discerning subtle relationships; or, alternatively, it may assume a transformational mode, in which case the appearance of the symbol or object is modified phenomenally in an act of creative imagination. The basis for selecting the appropriate mode depends on the actual structure of the symbol itself, a fact which, as I have said before, partly accounts for the rationality of the process of aesthetic apprehension. In what follows, then, I shall attempt to articulate the process of aesthetic vision on the basis of these two basic modes: aesthetic discrimination and aesthetic transformation.

AESTHETIC DISCRIMINATION

Before going into a detailed examination of the species of this mode, a brief account of its general character would, I think, be appropriate. What are then the salient features of this mode? In the first place, in this mode of aesthetic vision, aesthetic interest inheres in the intrinsic structure of the sensuous experience which it gives rise to, not
in its categorial significance. In other words, what interests us in it is its qualitative aspect, not the existential situation which it confronts us with; it is an interest in a world of pure sensations, not of objects and events. Secondly, the sensuous experience itself depends on the features of the symbol, and as our apprehension of them becomes more sensitive, it gains in specificity and differentiation. Thirdly, the sensuous experience which we perceive in this way is apprehended as an aspect of the symbol itself, and so it could not be considered as of a purely intentional character. Fourthly, apprehension of the qualitative nature of the symbol is mediated by the activity of the understanding and its conceptual structures. These conceptual structures are not genetically transmitted but must be acquired through direct experience. If this seems to be rather paradoxical, then clearly there is nothing one can do about it. Perhaps the world of experience is not always capable of being interpreted in a logically tidy manner. Finally, two different species belonging to this mode can be identified: sensory discrimination and formal discrimination.

**Sensory Discrimination**

In my account of sensory discrimination I shall first discuss the various forms which it may take, then I shall attempt to draw some conclusions regarding its nature and significance in the aesthetic life. One form which sensory
discrimination may take involves sensitive contemplation of the structure of the symbol in an attempt to apprehend the fine nuances contained in it. Thus, a painting may at first appear to us rather dull because of its lack of contrast in its colors and forms, but upon careful examination we begin to notice subtle differences affecting its forms and colors. This kind of discrimination is concept-dependent. To notice that one shade of white leans on the blue side while another leans on the yellow side is not merely a matter of attention; for without the appropriate conceptual structures it would be impossible. Thus, two people may be paying equal amount of attention to the same object, let us say two sheets of white paper displaying the qualitative difference just mentioned, i.e., one has the yellow or warm tinge while the other has the blue or cool tinge, but one of them may succeed in detecting the difference while the other may fail to do so entirely, thus insisting that the two sheets of white paper have no appreciable difference in their chromatic quality, even though he may recognize other differences which the two sheets of paper may have. This can only be explained, I think, by reference to conceptual structures. The fact that it is possible for the one who denied the difference to come to notice it subsequently lends support to this claim. Before one can apprehend nuances of this kind, then,
one has to have the intellectual capacity to do so. You don't just open your eyes and see it.

Of course, the difference in quality does not have to be very subtle to arouse interest. Just now I am contemplating a sheet of my note pad partially covered by a sheet of the typing paper I am using for this paper. Until this moment the quality of the color of my note pad never seemed to attract my attention, but as it is now appearing in direct contrast with the color of the typing paper, it has suddenly assumed a strange, even dramatic, appeal. As I now see it, it is like the color of the moist sand of the beach seen in the diffused light of a misty day. It is what you get when you add to white paint a tinge of yellow, black, and green and then mix them together until you achieve an even tone, noting that the yellow should be more than the black, and the latter more than the green. It is within the power of every one to rediscover the world in this way and expand one's sensory awareness of its immense richness and variety. To facilitate this process of expanding sensory awareness in this way, the method of creating direct contrasts is bound to be fruitful. To make use of this method all one has to do is to view something in relationship to something else acting as a background. This form of contrast, then, is essentially concerned with bringing out, or showing forth, a particular quality. It should, therefore, not be confused with the other type of
contrast which aims at creating a balanced relationship or unity and which I shall have occasion to consider in connection with formal, or relational, discrimination.

Another form of sensory discrimination which can be identified here is when the purpose of the symbol is to show forth, or exemplify, a particular sensory quality, rather than to initiate a process of discriminatory vision where sensuous experience becomes more differentiated. For in this form no expansion of vision, of the kind encountered in the previous form, takes place; and so one does not come to notice any qualitative differences in either the form or color of the symbol in the process of apprehension. In this form the process of apprehension is a matter of recognizing what particular quality or qualities the symbol exemplifies (or shows forth). It is, in other words, a matter of applying the appropriate concept. Thus, a symbol may exemplify, let us say, cool colors, and another sombre color, in which case the process of interpretation is a matter of noting or recognizing that this is so. Put in purely nominalistic terms, this means that the interpreter has to come up with the appropriate label (e.g., "sombre," or "cool"). The important thing to note here is that interpretation here is not a process whereby perception becomes more differentiated but simply a matter of discerning whatever qualities the symbol may be showing forth.
The ability to discern visual properties in this way depends, as I have already indicated, on the extent to which the visual awareness of the individual is conceptually structured. It is, as I have said, a matter of identifying the concept to which the symbol, through its publicly observable features, gives appropriate application. This could occur either in the manner which I described above (where the interpreter comes up with the appropriate label) or by noting that two (or more) particular objects show forth the same quality. Thus, one could point to a neck-tie and say that its color-scheme shows forth the same quality as that of the living-room in his apartment, without having to identify the appropriate label by referring to it as, for instance, sombre or cool. A more suitable, but perhaps rather dull, example is when you place two objects side by side and point out that their color is identical or that it is identical in some specifiable respects (e.g., hue or intensity).

According to Nelson Goodman, a symbol scheme of this kind must not only possess the quality but it should also "refer" to it, i.e., show it forth, express it.¹ There are two different ways the artist can employ in order to ensure

¹"To have without symbolizing is merely to possess ..." See Languages of Art, p. 53.
that his symbol scheme not only possesses the quality in question but also "refers" to (i.e., expresses) it. In the first of these methods the artist presents the quality within an artistic structure which gives it prominence. In other words he makes use of the method of contrast which I described above. In the second method he simply presents in his symbolic scheme several elements which possess the quality in question. Thus, if he is out to express, say, the quality of colors which we refer to as "sombre," then he could either present a sombre color in a composition in which the function of all the other elements in it is to show forth or point to this color; or, alternatively, he could compose the entire picture of colors that are sombre in quality. The latter method is, of course, the less artistically demanding of the two; for all one has to have is the ability to identify those particular situations which give proper application to the concept in question.

A third form which sensory discrimination may take affects the perspicuity of the sensuous experience. If you stand under a tree and contemplate a few of its leaves as they appear against the even color of the sky, then you may well be impressed by the clarity of your perception of those leaves. The clarity of the apprehended image is so intense and dynamic that the experience often assumes an unmistakable dramatic quality. This is by no means a rare or exclusive encounter with the concrete body of the world.
Many of us, undoubtedly, have been impressed by the perspicuity which the outlines of cast shadows of our bodies and other objects, or the bare branches of trees seen in the diffused light of an overcast sky, or the outline of buildings, trees, and figures seen against the sky at sunset, or even a piece of jewelry placed inside its velvet-covered box. In all these and similar instances what seems to impress us most is the distinctness which our perception of the object or one of its features assumes. Sensory discrimination as encountered in this form, then, aims at the achievement of this kind of distinctness or perspicuity.

But what are the determining factors behind the apprehension of this kind of perspicuity? Surely it is not purely a matter of attention; for not every time we contemplate the world attentively our perception of it assumes the intensity and lucidity we are dealing with here. It seems to me that there are three determining factors involved in this experience in addition to attentiveness. The first is absence of all irrelevant details from the object or element perceived. The bare branches of the tree, seen from below, appear dark and even in color against the silvery tone of the sky, and so one perceives no further details relating to their texture, color, or shape. The second of these determining factors is the absence of all distracting elements which may stand in the way of achieving perspicuity. The few leaves singled out for aesthetic
contemplation against the even color of the sky in the example mentioned above satisfy this condition. The fact that they are only a few and seen against the even, uninterrupted color of the sky makes them accessible to perception without any distraction or interference from extraneous elements competing with them for attention. The third determining factor involved in the apprehension of the perspicuity with which we are concerned here is the presentation of the object against a background which would provide favorable contrast. Thus, the jeweler who displays his silver jewelry on a piece of dark blue velvet knows what he is doing. For the color, texture, and other properties of this material direct attention to their counterparts in the piece of jewelry, thereby enhancing its appearance.

At the end of this account of the forms which sensory discrimination may take I would like to mention that sometimes what is discriminated may involve a deliberate act of abstraction, in which case we may refer to it as an "emergent" form. This is what happens when we, for instance, attend to the shape of the space between objects rather than to the objects themselves. This way of attending to the world goes contrary to the normal way of perceiving the world where attention is invariably directed to discrete objects, which assume the status of "figure" while their surrounding spaces are overlooked as mere "ground." In aesthetic discrimination the situation, however, is
different, because we are not interested in a world of
discrete, real objects but only in sensuous form, or pure
sensation. This is, indeed, how one can tell whether one's
perception of the world is aesthetic or not. If one can
afford to ignore the discrete objects by attending to the
shape of the spaces between them, one's interest may well
be aesthetic; if not, then it is not likely to be so.

Another example of "emergent" discrimination occurs when
we attend to the outlines of things as the focus of our
perceptual experience, and so instead of having a sensation
of pattern or shape we have linear sensations only, related
to one or more objects in the environment. Other examples
of "emergent" discrimination, which include the discrimina-
tion of rhythm, harmony, and balance, are relational in
character and will, therefore, be dealt with in my account
of formal discrimination. What I would like to say here
is that the production of these "emergent" forms pertains
to the activity of the rational imagination.

Sensory discrimination, we may conclude, takes its
place in the aesthetic life by making our awareness of the
concrete body of the world more differentiated and distinct,
thereby revealing to us the richness and variety which it
possesses. Like all modes of aesthetic apprehension, it
involves the powers of the imagination and the conceptual
structures of the understanding. But its products, unlike
those of the other modes, cannot be claimed to be products
of the human intellect. For this reason, they do not appear in the works of man, whether symbolic or otherwise, in isolation but in conjunction with something else in which the value of the work also resides.

**Formal Discrimination**

While contemplating the branches of a tree I may respond to the particularity of the individual leaves and so respond to their shapes, color, or texture and how each one of them may reveal appreciable differences along these lines which set it apart from all the rest. But I may also respond to the general pattern of the branch and notice that the way the individual leaves spread in space around their branch creates a dynamic relationship in which the individual leaves seem to relate to one another in a harmonious manner which suggests their having a common fate, as you might say. In other words, the way these leaves relate to each other in space has an unmistakably rhythmic quality. Now, the question is: how does this quality differ from the sensory qualities we have been dealing with in the previous subsection? First of all, it does not pertain to the particular character of the sensuous experience in the same way its particular shape, color, or texture does. It is a quality which one may apprehend in other branches of the tree, involving different leaves having different particular features including those affecting their spatial
distribution. In other words, it does not inhere in any-thing pertaining to the particularity of the branch itself where it was discerned. Indeed, this rhythmic quality is discernable not only in branches of trees but in all visible things, irrespective of what their particular features are. For this reason we speak of rhythm as a formal quality, not as a particular quality, because it affects the form, i.e., the overall structure or organization, of the sensuous experience rather than its particular character.

Before attempting any further investigation of the nature of formal discrimination I would like to mention two more examples. The first of these concerns the equilibrated color relationship. This relationship obtains when two colors appearing side by side enhance each other. It should be distinguished not only from cases where the two colors appearing in this way clash with, or cancel, each other, but also from cases where one of the two colors is subordinated to the other, so that its function is merely to bring it out or direct attention to it. When one color serves merely to bring out another in this way we may refer to the result as a color contrast, which is exactly what we would say about the situation where the two colors actually enhance each other. But whereas the latter creates a balanced relationship, thus justifying the designation "simultaneous" or "complementary" contrast, the former does
not create such a balanced relationship and cannot be designated in that manner. It is, therefore, an imperfect form of contrast in comparison to the other one where the two colors do enhance each other and create a balanced relationship.

The other example which I would like to mention here concerns form balance. In a symbol scheme where this kind of balance is experienced, one does not attend to any of the particular features in it but only to their plastic relationship which encompasses the entire symbol scheme. This kind of form balance should be distinguished from other kinds of form balance where one element in the composition is given predominance over all the other elements contained in it, so that their role in the composition is merely to bring it out or direct attention to it. (This is, for instance, how paintings were composed in the Renaissance tradition, which Mondrian referred to in his writings as the "culture of the particular form.")

In all these examples of aesthetic experience our concern is not with its particular character but with its internal structure or organization as indicated by the way the individual parts relate to each other. This mode of aesthetic apprehension is incompatible with the one where our interest is directed to particular sensory qualities belonging to this or that feature of the object perceived. In other words, one cannot see relationally and at the
same time attend to this or that particular quality; one can either attend to the equilibrated relationship or to the particular quality.

Having determined the general character of formal discrimination, I shall now examine it analytically. First of all, let us take a closer look at the disregard for the particularity of the symbol scheme or object perceived. In ordinary sensory experience one is after particular objects and qualities because one simply cannot cope with the physical world otherwise; it is the kind of perception which makes adaptive behavior possible. It is hardly surprising, then, that the two eyes function in a synchronized way by focusing on the same object or element. Thus, when one looks at a point of a pencil held before one's face, both eyes would converge on that point, and when the point of the pencil appears to the right or left, the eyes would focus in that direction, too. Now, when one is engaged in formal-relational perception, the eyes do not react in this manner. Thus, instead of focusing on the same point, they tend to take a synoptic view of the entire structure of the symbol scheme or object. And so it is possible to determine whether one is engaged in formal apprehension or not by monitoring the way the eyes react. If it was found that one's eyes focus on the same point while looking at the object, then one could not be viewing it synoptically. If, on the other hand, they were found to embrace the
entire structure of the object, then one's vision is of the type we are dealing with here.

Closely connected with this issue concerning the disregard for the particularity of the symbol scheme or object is the indifference which one experiences in formal-relational apprehension toward the figurative or categorial character of the symbol scheme or object perceived. When one apprehends appropriately a painting designed to be seen synoptically, or relationally, what is figure and what is ground, categorically speaking, does not matter at all. Thus, in Cezanne's *Boy in the Red Vest* (1894-5), which is structured in such a way so as to be apprehended synoptically, the face of the boy does not assume, in aesthetic vision, greater significance than the folds of the curtain or the edge of the chair at the lower left corner of the canvas. And to focus attention on any of the individual parts, such as the hat or the hands, would constitute gross misapprehension. Likewise, it would be inappropriate to try to apprehend depth in the painting so that some parts would be seen to recede while other to come forward. One should, instead, seek only a pure equilibrated sensuous relationship structured two-dimensionally. This analysis, if it is to be applied to Cezanne's more complex paintings (particularly his large canvases with bathers), has certainly to be qualified. For Cezanne's aesthetic aims are more complex in nature than this analysis suggests,
even though it is still applicable. But besides realizing aesthetically an equilibrium of pure sensation, Cezanne also wanted to reproduce nature, just as Monet did, but in the same picture. In other words, Cezanne wanted these large canvases to function in a complex manner, combining a depiction with a formal construction so as to be apprehended simultaneously in the same picture. But did he succeed in doing this? Well, only in a sort of way. For we are not meant to look at the individual figures directly as we would if we encountered them in real life. If we try to do so then all we see is a group of very clumsy, highly distorted, life-less figures, very much unlike what you would see in a Veronese or a Rubens painting. But if you do not attempt to see them directly but instead try to apprehend the painting synoptically, and so experience it as an equilibrium of pure form, then at the back of your mind you would sense the bathers, but this time as perfectly natural, that is, without the clumsiness or distortion which they reveal if apprehended directly. The important thing to note here is that we do not see the two aspects of the painting in the same sense. We see the equilibrated relationship in a strong sense of the term, but the categorial, or figurative, elements only in a weak sense of the term. This is why in my reference to them I used the word "sense" and not "see." It is like being absorbed with your work at the office and at the same time thinking,
no matter how faintly, of something else which is waiting for you when you get back home, if you see what I mean.

This sort of indifference to the figurative or categorial character of the symbol scheme or object which we encountered in Cezanne’s painting Boy in the Red Vest, is characteristic of all paintings structured to be apprehended relationally, such as Picasso’s Cubist painting Ma Jolie (Woman with a Guitar), 1911-12 and Mondrian’s Apple Tree in Blossom painted about the same time. For not only are the categorial aspects of these paintings unimportant but we do not, in fact, respond to those aspects at all. In both of these paintings we cannot separate, for instance, figure from ground, and so we can only infer what the categorial character of the image is supposed to be from the titles of these paintings.

An important aspect of this lack of interest in the categorial or figurative aspect experienced here is the significant absence of psychic involvement on the part of the interpreter. Thus, a figure painted in the formal-relational manner, where synoptic apprehension is called for, cannot be responded to erotically, for instance, in a direct way, unless one abandons the synoptic mode of seeing. We could, therefore, say that the figure undergoes a definite process of denaturalization, so that it loses its vital appeal entirely. And so it is hardly surprising that people who succeed in viewing natural objects
synoptically often remark that when this does occur the real world is totally forgotten.

The reason why one tends to forget the real world when synoptic vision is involved is that on such occasions one is not really apprehending the real world at all but only a pure sensation. In other words, one becomes aware of a sensation, which ontologically speaking, is intentional in character, not an objective world of discrete things and events. The other day while walking across Campus, my attention was captured by a remarkable instance of color balance of the type which painters might refer to as a "discord" (in which a simultaneous contrast is created by placing two colors whose order of brilliance appears in a reversed form, e.g., the blue appearing more pure and illuminous than, say, yellow or green). That particular discord which I saw was made of a large oval of dull green surrounded by an expanse of blue which harmonized with it beautifully. The blue was in motion and so the discovery of its categorial identity did not surprise me—it belonged to somebody's jeans. But I was surprised to find out that the green belonged to a suspended leaf of a tree only a few yards away from me. I was also surprised by the fact that, after its categorial identity became known to me, its appearance changed. Not only did it appear much larger in area, but it did also appear uniform or even in character without, that is, its characteristic texture. What happened
here is that sensations received from two different sources were joined together, so that one of them (the sensation received from the leaf) was interpreted in terms of the other.

I have mentioned this personal experience because it clearly indicates that in synoptic, or relational, aesthetic perception one is dealing with pure sensation rather than with objective reality. But aesthetic vision in general, as has already been pointed out, diverges in this respect from the so-called veridical mode of perception upon which adaptive behavior depends. In ordinary or veridical perception it would matter a great deal if objects are perceived as they are not in actual fact. But the situation in aesthetic vision is radically different; for what is crucial is the intrinsic structure of the sensuous experience itself, irrespective of its value as a source of information about the outside world.

But if synoptic, or relational, aesthetic vision is not concerned with the apprehension of the real world, how can we speak of it as a form of discrimination? Would it not be more appropriate to refer to it as a form of enrichment, or projection, whose relationship to the objective world is purely arbitrary? Let us deal with the first question first. Speaking of discrimination in connection with synoptic or relational aesthetic vision would, indeed, be impossible if the qualities which are to be discriminated
in its case were particular qualities which inhere in the object perceived as its physical properties. But, since the qualities which are apprehended in aesthetic vision are not of this kind but, as indicated above, belong entirely to the structure of sensation and so are purely intentional in character, it is still possible to speak of discrimination in their case if it can be shown that they have a definite relationship to the actual structure of the object perceived, so that it would be possible to say that they are "grounded" in the physical object, rather than merely projected into it arbitrarily. Which brings us to the second question. That the sensuous experience encountered in synoptic vision is grounded in the physical features of the object itself is clearly demonstrated when we come to think of the actual process of creating the symbol schemes (i.e., works of art) appropriate for this mode of seeing. For no competent artist would deny that modification affecting the physical aspect of his work results in corresponding modification in the phenomenally experienced aesthetic object. Indeed, the ability to discriminate formal relationships would be impossible without sensitivity to this relationship between the actual and the phenomenal. We may, thus, conclude that the sensuous experience encountered in synoptic vision cannot be construed merely as an instance of projection, or enrichment, arbitrarily related to the actual object with which it is associated. While it would be
totally incorrect to speak of it as an actual property belonging to the physical object itself, it would be perfectly justifiable, however, to refer to it as an aspect of that object, i.e., discernable in our phenomenal experience of it.

Let us now consider how the discrimination of relational qualities such as rhythm or form and color balance is made possible. So far it was only suggested that this occurs on the basis of the physical properties of the work of art or natural object which acts as their physical foundation. But this remark by itself does not constitute a satisfactory explanation, since not everyone can stand before a Cezanne or a Mondrian and apprehend it relationally. The fact is that one can only do so through the deployment of the appropriate structures of the understanding which of course have to be acquired. I am suggesting that discrimination of formal qualities such as rhythm or form and color balance depends on concepts. Without the intermediary role of the appropriate concepts the mature works of Cezanne and Mondrian would be incomprehensible. If one's sensuous experience of them assumes a coherent formal structure it is because of the involvement of the structures of the understanding which are given appropriate application in those works. This should really surprise nobody. For how else could experience assume a coherent form? J. J. Gibson in his book *The Senses Considered as Perceptual*
Systems, suggested that perceptual discrimination involves "change of attention",¹ "the observer learns to look for the critical features, to listen for the distinctive variations, to smell or taste the characteristics of substances (perfume or wine) and to finger the textures of things (wood or silk)."² And so as he sees it, perceptual discrimination is nothing but "an education of attention to the information in available stimulation".² But he did not tell us what this education itself entails. In other words, he did not say how one comes to recognize features that are "critical" or "distinctive". As I see it, such ability involves the conceptual structures of the understanding. This is not, however, an original, or even obscure, position. In fact, it is a position which Kant expressed in his famous saying, already referred to in this paper, which purports that perceptual experience without concepts is blind. Gibson's views are not so much wrong as incomplete. However, it may be argued that Gibson was not referring specifically to the discrimination of formal qualities such as rhythm and form or color balance, which in any case

¹The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, p. 52.
²Ibid., p. 270.
he would dismiss as "perceptual luxury," but Kant was not referring to such higher-order qualities either.2

If the claim that the discrimination of formal qualities is mediated by concepts appears to be so controversial, it is largely because of the perfectly justifiable belief that sensuous experience is by its very nature particular, not universal, in character. And since concepts are by their very nature universal in nature, it was validly concluded that sensuous experience could not possibly be thought of as a concept. This conclusion, however, is not only valid but it is also true. But to say that the sensuous experience itself is a concept and, on the other hand, that it is structured or articulated by a concept are, of course, two different things. What is being claimed by Kant (which also happens to be the position adopted in this paper) is that "intuitive" or perceptual experiences are not themselves concepts but only that they are structured or articulated by concepts. In other words, it is the concept which makes the sensuous experience assume its distinctive shape. Thus, the three paintings by Cezanne, Picasso, and Mondrian which I mentioned above, each has its particular character which sets it apart from the others, but

1Ibid., p. 250.

2See D. W. Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception, for his account on Kant's views on perception, pp. 132-3. Also, his article "Objectivity," in Education and the Development of Reason, edited by Dearden, Hirst, and Peters, p. 251.
they all express the same formal quality, viz., dynamic balance. Now, dynamic balance itself is not particular, since it does not take the form of a property contained in the physical structure of the paintings themselves. Rather, it is a quality which we abstract from the properties or features contained in that structure. It is an abstracted quality, not a particular quality belonging to the physical structure as one of its features or properties. It would, therefore, seem that those who are reluctant or unwilling to admit that formal discrimination involves concepts are not aware of this distinction between the sensuous experience: itself, which is admittedly particular in nature, and the formal concept, or abstraction, which structures it.

It seems to me that what I have said so far establishes without any reasonable doubt the actual involvement of concepts in formal discrimination. The question which I must now attempt to answer is this: Are these concepts distinctively aesthetic in character? Are they, in other words, different from the concepts which structure scientific thought and the concepts which structure our apprehension of the phenomenal world? I believe that there are distinctively aesthetic concepts which can be shown to be different from the other two categories of concepts.

The concepts that structure sensuous experience in formal discrimination differ from the concepts of scientific thought, first, in that they are apprehended
intuitively by way of abstraction, while those of scientific thought are inferred reflectively by way of hypothetico-deductive thinking. The concept of dynamic balance which may be encountered in formal discrimination is apprehended intuitively as a quality which the sensuous experience itself has. A scientific concept, on the other hand, is not apprehended in this manner. Thus, a scientific concept like "edible" is not apprehended intuitively by contemplating edible things, that is, in the same way we apprehend the quality of dynamic balance in the paintings of Cezanne and Mondrian. Rather, we apprehend it through the reflective process which we call inference. Secondly, scientific or inferential concepts articulate our understanding of the world, while aesthetic concepts our vision of the world. To say that someone has the scientific concept "edible" means that he is able to tell an edible thing when he sees one, and also that he can give a formal account of it, i.e., a definition. To say, however, that someone has the aesthetic concept of dynamic balance means that this person has the intellectual ability to see the world in terms of that concept or to identify those physical situations (works of art included) which lend themselves well to that mode of seeing. If he happens to be artistically competent he may also be able to fashion a physical situation which can express dynamic balance with marked efficacy, i.e., give it proper application. As for the ability to
provide a formal account of dynamic balance expressed verbally, that would certainly be quite unnecessary as evidence for his possessing the concept in question. Indeed, there are undoubtedly those who would question the possibility of giving such an account on the basis that it is bound to be meaningless, since what it is an account of is intentional in character and therefore not accessible to direct observation. It is possible, however, to give an account of dynamic balance in terms of its physical foundation (e.g., a Cezanne or a Mondrian). Thirdly, it follows from what has just been said that language does not assume in relation to aesthetic concepts the same significance which it has in relation to the concepts of science, whose application is virtually impossible without language. This lack of relevance which language has in relationship to aesthetic concepts usually has adverse effects in a culture which values only those forms of knowledge which can be put in writing; for it is often taken as a sign of lack of discipline, coherence, or intellectual respectability within the aesthetic enterprise itself. Needless to say, this criticism is quite unfair. Aesthetic concepts operate at the intuitive level of experience, and they do not describe anything, and so why should verbal statements in their case be considered so important?

Both aesthetic and scientific concepts belong to the structures of the understanding, but whereas scientific
concepts make beliefs and hence propositional knowledge possible, aesthetic concepts make discriminative vision possible.

To turn now to the other category of concepts, viz., categorial concepts. These are in some respects closer to the perceptual world than the abstract concepts of science, but they, too, are inferential in character. I do not apprehend that a bicycle is a bicycle intuitively by contemplating its appearance; I have to infer it conceptually. That is to say, its identity as a bicycle is not intuitively given. Indeed, my intuitive awareness of it may be very primitive or rudimentary, because a categorial concept is not concerned with the sensuous aspect of things, but only with their identity. The same thing is true of the more simple elements of the categorial world. When I point to an object and say about it that it is red or round, or that it is a line, I am not concerned with my intuitive experience of these categorial elements but only with their identity, that is, with what they are and not with their sensuous or qualitative aspects. Thus, I can identify a red object as being red in color without noticing its particular chromatic quality. Likewise, I can identify that a particular drawing is made with lines without apprehending them sensuously as lines. Which means that I can have the categorial concept of line without having the aesthetic concept
of what it would be like for a sensuous experience to be linear in quality.

Clearly, then, aesthetic concepts are to be distinguished from categorial concepts. Aesthetic concepts are concerned with the sensuous quality of what is perceived; categorial concepts are concerned with its identity. We can, thus, have a concept of the sensuous quality distinctive of our experience of a Mondrian in aesthetic vision, and we can also have a concept of the Mondrian as a categorial object. These two types of concepts, however, are definitely not identical in nature.

Summary and Comments
Aesthetic discrimination then may take two different forms: sensory and formal. In sensory discrimination we are concerned with particular qualities belonging to the physical object as its properties. The purpose of sensory discrimination is to make our sensuous experience of the concrete body of the world more differentiated and intense. In formal discrimination our goal is to articulate the appearance of the world in terms of the qualitative structures of the understanding so that what is apprehended is essentially a product of the human intellect. Moreover, both sensory discrimination and formal discrimination, it was argued, involve concepts which correspond to their particular nature, and which are logically different from
both scientific and categorial concepts. The main difference between the concepts upon which sensory and formal discrimination depend and these inheres in the fact that the former are qualitative abstractions, while scientific and categorial concepts are conceptual inferences. (See Figure I.) One may wish, however, to reject this generic use of the term "concept" for whatever reasons one may have. But that does not really matter. What is important here is to note that we are dealing with two different categories of cognitive structures which the human understanding consists of: conceptual inference and qualitative abstraction. Both of them must be acknowledged.

It also seems to me important that the difference between sensory and formal concepts should be emphasized. Sensory concepts are concerned with qualities which exist in the object as properties or features. One could, therefore, speak of their symbolic expression as an instance of exemplification. Formal concepts, on the contrary, are purely intentional in character, and so it would be incorrect to think of them as belonging to the actual properties of the object, or of their symbolic expression as an instance of exemplification. While it would be true to say that a Mondrian exemplifies other Mondrians, it would be erroneous to say that it exemplifies dynamic balance, because it is an actual entity while the latter is not. An element may be said to exemplify another element if, and
THE STRUCTURES
OF THE UNDERSTANDING

CONCEPTUAL INFERENCE

Scientific Categorial

QUALITATIVE ABSTRACTION

Formal Sensory

Figure 2. The cognitive structures of the understanding.
only if, what is exemplified is a property or attribute of
the exemplifying element.

AESTHETIC TRANSFORMATION

Normally our perceptual experience of the physical world
is concerned primarily with the categorial identity of the
objects contained in it. This means that we perceive the
world in terms of how we conceive it to be, rather than on
the basis of the impinging stimulation alone. Seeing is,
thus, believing. There are occasions when perceptual in­
terest seems to be concerned not so much with the identity
of things perceived as with their sensuous character. But
even on such occasion, in which perception takes the form
usually referred to as "veridical perception," our sensuous
apprehension of the world is largely dependent on our con­
ception of it, or what we consider its actual character to
be like. In other words, in ordinary sense perception, in­
cluding its veridical varient, the operations of the imagi­
nation (which is, as was mentioned above, the faculty of
the mind which mediates sensuous apprehension) are subject
to the constraints which are placed upon them by our con­
ception of the facts of the physical world. For it is this
alone which explains why the physical world appears to have
a definite form and stable relationships. It is by virtue
of this conception which we have of the nature of the world
that a flower has the definite form which it appears to
have, or a mountain appears bigger than a mouse.
There are times, however, when we are not concerned in our perceptual efforts with what the object actually looks like but rather with what it might look like if our conception of its actual nature is overlooked. When our perceptual response to the actual objects of the world takes this form, then the operations of the imagination would be free from the constraints which our conception of the factual nature of the object places on it in ordinary perception, and the result would be the production of a sensuous experience which is fundamentally different with respect to its categorial nature and mode of being from the forms of the physical world encountered in ordinary or veridical perception. On such occasions perception is said to belong to the imaginative mode, which acquaints us with the subtle world of pure sensuous experience whose figural character is not dependent on the forms of the physical world and our conception of them. Characteristic of the imaginative mode is the process of transformation which affects the appearance of the physical object or symbol.

Analysis of Aesthetic Transformation
If you scribble a few lines on a sheet of paper, or if you examine the scribbles which a two-year old child draws over the walls (and other things, too) in his parents' apartment, then you would be able to attend to them as real
marks on the sheet of paper or wall, having a definite character and belonging to the physical mode of being. In this way you become aware of the scribbles as physical objects existing in real time and space. This is what you get when your perceptual experience assumes the ordinary form known as veridical perception. But it is also possible that you do not notice the scribbles as actual elements existing in the physical world, but respond to them instead imaginatively, so that what you would then perceive is different both in its sensuous character and its mode of being. Thus, in veridical perception the scribbles, in the first place, are two-dimensional in character and appear on the same plane, while in the experience encountered in the imaginative mode the elements perceived appear three-dimensional in character and are variously distributed in space. Secondly, in the veridical mode of perception we encounter stable elements existing in a stable world, so that we can tell, for instance, that one particular mark differs in certain respects from another (e.g., bigger or smaller) or that they relate to each other in space in a particular way (e.g., close to, or far from, each other). Moreover, nothing seems to be uncertain with respect to the identity of the objects perceived; we know that they are pencil or crayon marks having certain specifiable properties. Nothing, that is, appears mysterious or of undisclosed identity. The situation is not so when
it comes to the experience which we encounter when the imaginative mode is assumed. Not only does the experience appear to have an unstable or indeterminate spatial character, but also we are not so sure as to the identity of the elements contained in it, so that we do not even know whether to refer to them as inanimate objects or as beings. Thirdly, in our ordinary perception of the scribbles we become aware of a physical situation belonging to the material mode of being. In the experience encountered in the imaginative mode we are no longer dealing with a physical situation; for what we experience is decidedly immaterial in nature and, therefore, could not possibly belong to the material mode of being. The veridical mode and the imaginative mode are incompatible, or mutually exclusive, logically speaking at any rate. For to say that one is perceiving veridically means, logically speaking, that one is apprehending the actual facts of the situation perceived, whereas to say that one is assuming the imaginative mode logically means that the object of one's perceptual efforts is something other than the actual facts of the situation involved in the perceptual process. Thus, in the example mentioned above, the object of the veridical experience is the apprehension of the actual pencil or crayon marks which constitute the form and substance of the scribbles. The object of the perceptual experience when the imaginative mode is maintained
can be achieved only if the actual facts of the situation become completely evaded. This does not mean that in the imaginative mode one is not attending to the physical object; for clearly this is not true. What it means is that on such occasions the object is not attended to as a factual situation contained in the physical world. In other words, it is a question of how the impinging stimulation whose source is in the object is being used, or processed, in the operations of the mind. If it is processed as a source of information about the character and properties of the object as an element in the physical world, then we happen to be dealing with ordinary or veridical perception. If, on the other hand, the impinging stimulation is processed imaginatively in order to generate pure sensuous experiences, independent from the actual forms of the physical world, then one is dealing with the imaginative mode of perception.

We may, thus, conclude from this discussion of the distinction between the veridical and imaginative mode of perception that in the former the sensuous experience is subjugated to the facts of the situation involved in the perceptual process, while in the latter case the opposite is true, that is, the physical situation is subordinated to the sensuous experience which thus becomes the actual goal of the perceptual process. Let us now take a closer look at the nature of the sensuous experience encountered
in the imaginative mode of perception and how it relates to its physical foundation.

If in the imaginative mode we are not dealing with the actual objects of the world and their physical attributes, would it be right to suggest that what we are dealing with is the appearance of those objects: Can we, in other words, identify the sensuous experience encountered in the imaginative mode with the appearance of the actual world? I believe we cannot. The reason is that we can only apprehend the appearance of an actual object when our perceptual experience assumes the veridical mode, and it is this appearance which mediates to us our apprehension of the objective character of the physical world. But the sensuous experience encountered when an actual object is apprehended in the imaginative mode is readily distinguishable from the way that object appears when perceived veridically. Thus—to go back to our example—the scribbles if viewed veridically, that is to say, in ordinary perception, we become aware of a sensuous experience which is radically different from the sensuous experience which we apprehend if the imaginative mode is assumed instead. And while the former serves as a basis for forming our conception of the actual character of the scribbles, the latter is totally useless as far as the formation of this conception is concerned. Thus, to think of the sensuous
experience which is produced by the imaginative mode as an appearance of the actual object is to confuse it with the sensuous experience encountered in ordinary or veridical perception. This, to say the least, is very misleading. That the two things are not the same can be readily understood from the fact that one's apprehension of the appearance of the world as encountered in ordinary perception can be erroneous, whereas it would not be appropriate to speak of the sensuous experience encountered in the imaginative mode in this way. Thus, in connection with the experience mentioned in Chapter II in which a green-painted fence appeared to me as a well-kept lawn clearly was a case of misperception, in which an erroneous, or misleading, appearance was encountered. Now, when the imaginative mode is assumed the sensuous experience encountered may undergo a constant state of transformation in which much variation may occur, but at no time would it be possible to refer to any of it as erroneous or misleading. This is because in the imaginative mode one is not concerned with the facts of the physical world, but only with pure, or immaterial, sensuous experience. It seems to me, therefore, that the term appearance is applicable only in the case of ordinary or veridical perception.
Could we then view the sensuous experience encountered in the imaginative mode as a higher-order aspect discernible under certain circumstances? I do not think this is possible either. This is because it would have then to be seen as appertaining to the actual situation or object involved, something which, as our example would clearly show is virtually impossible. The three-dimensional character which the sensuous experience has when the imaginative mode is assumed could not possibly be attributed to the physical situation which constitutes the scribbles and which is clearly two-dimensional in character. Nor could we attribute to it the other characteristics which the sensuous experience has and which include, as we have seen, its unstable character and its immaterial mode of being. (We can attribute dynamic balance to the Mondrain because we can perceive it as a higher-order quality appertaining to the pigmented canvas itself.)

But to say that the sensuous experience which we encounter when the perceptual process assumes the imaginative mode could not be viewed as an appearance or even higher-order property of the actual object involved does not mean that it should be dismissed as an illusion or sheer phantasy. We could only do so if it can be shown either (a) that we are taking it for what it is not or (b) that it is unreal. To deal with the first case first. When we assume the imaginative mode we do not misperceive the
object, since we do not confuse the sensuous image which we then experience with the way the object appears if perceived veridically; in other words, we know that we are not dealing with a veridical sensory experience of the actual situation involved. Thus, when my perception of the scribbles assume the imaginative mode I do not take the sensuous experience which I would then encounter to be identical with the way they would appear if my perception of them assumed the veridical mode instead. My experience would be illusionistic, under the first sense indicated, only if it happens to be a misperception. Since I do not confuse the form which my sensuous experience of the scribbles assumes in the imaginative mode with the way they would appear to me in ordinary perception, it would clearly be incorrect to refer to the former as an illusion.

According to the second sense of illusion indicated, we are not dealing with a misperception, where a given situation is taken for what it is not, but with a situation which we know to be unreal and which we, therefore, take to be absurd and inconsequential. The experience of a mirage would be a good example. When one drives a car on a desert road in the middle of the day when everything seems to be encompassed by the glare of the sun, one is likely to experience the phenomenon known as a mirage which one normally ignores as unreal and therefore does not stop
the car or change his direction, or start worrying about
the possible consequences of failing to do so. Rather,
one keeps heading toward it completely undisturbed, knowing
that the experience is absurd and inconsequential.
However, one would react in a completely different manner
if, instead of the mirage he detected a flock of sheep with
their bedouin shepherd trying to cross the road. For not
only one would then feel apprehensive but would react imme­
diately reducing his speed or slamming his break lever in
preparation for stopping the car until the sheep are safely
out of the way. This is because one would then be dealing
with a real situation which, unlike the mirage, cannot be
dismissed as absurd and inconsequential.

Now, to go back to the sensuous experience which we
encounter when the perceptual process assumes the imagi­
native mode. Can we say that it is unreal? It is, of
course, unreal if we mean by that that it is immaterial
in character. But would that make it in any sense absurd
and inconsequential, considering that when we have it we
are not concerned at all with the actual facts of the
physical world? The reason why the mirage is considered
unreal, in the example mentioned above, is that it does
not affect our judgment of the facts of the physical world
at a time when this judgment is of vital importance to us.
But in the case of the sensuous experience which we have
when perception assumes the imaginative mode we are consciously evading the facts of the physical world, and so we are dealing with a situation which could not be considered of a comparable nature. What is true about the one situation need not also be true about the other. In the sensuous experience encountered in the imaginative mode the value of the experience inheres in its sensuous character and the impact which this has on the mind, not in its survival value. In other words, here we are dealing with an altogether different kind of human enterprise. It seems to me that one has to concede that this experience cannot be considered reasonably as unreal in the sense indicated, that is, absurd and inconsequential. It is an experience which affects us spiritually and it may even affect us physically, albeit in an indirect way. Far from being dismissable as sheer phantasy, it is, unlike the sensory experience of the veridical mode (which we share with other members of the animal kingdom), something which perhaps only man knows; something, in other words, distinctively human.

Having distinguished the sensuous experience encountered in the imaginative mode from what it is not, let me now mention briefly what I consider its salient characteristics to be. First ontologically speaking, it is a purely intentional form of experience which cannot be
confused with the material object serving as its physical foundation. Secondly, because it is of a purely intentional nature it follows that it could not be corporeal in nature; its elements have figure and form but of an immaterial body. Thirdly, because they do not have a material body, their forms are not stable but exist in a state of perpetual transformation. In the physical world when a given situation appears to be ambiguous, the experience strikes us as absurd and we stop to check our sense impressions against the facts of the physical world through visual search and reality-testing. In this way ambiguity disappears and our perceptions assume a stable character. In the case of the sensuous experience which we have when the imaginative mode is being used, there are no such physical objects which would serve to stabilize the image in this way and so the ambiguity is apprehended as one of its authentic characteristics. Finally, while being intentional and immaterial, this experience is not a purely mental phenomenon. Not only one has to look at an object existing in the physical world in order to see it, but the experience has what might be awkwardly termed "out-there-ness" (even though it is impossible to locate it in actual space). Thus, if you close your eyes or turn them away, you would not have the experience; and while you see it you are aware of it as something which exists independently both
of your thoughts about it and your psychic states. In other words, it is something which you behold, not something you conceive.

But how could such an experience relate to its physical foundation? Surely this relationship could not be arbitrary or haphazard, since not all objects lend themselves equally well to this mode of perception. This is why the occurrence of the experience usually involves especially designed works of art (paintings and drawings) which are more likely to provoke the activity of the imaginative mode of perception by virtue of the way their artistic structures are organized. As a rule the artistic structure that lends itself well to this kind of aesthetic interpretation is lacking in visual coherence and it would appear to anyone who is used to well-balanced or symmetrically organized patterns as decidedly unpleasant. This is, for instance, how the scribbles of the two-year-old or a Kandinsky painting would appear to someone whose sensibility is nurtured on the harmonious, symmetrical patterns of a Persian carpet or the dynamically balanced paintings of Mondrain. But this does not mean that when we perceive the world imaginatively we ignore its actual properties; we certainly do not. But attending to the actual properties only forms, as I have already said, the initial or pre-interpretative stage of the perceptual process. What is important is
what comes afterwards which is a process of aesthetic transformation. In this process the sensuous material grasped in the initial stage is processed by the operations of the imagination creatively so that it undergoes a state of sensuous evolution culminating in the experience which is described above and which is, as we have seen, different from the original material both in its sensuous character and its mode of being. When the interpretative process reaches this stage all awareness of the actual structure of the object (e.g., scribbles on the wall, pigmented canvas) disappears, even though one is actually staring at it. This undoubtedly sounds paradoxical, but the fact is that the actual structure of the object when the imaginative mode is assumed totally vanishes from awareness. One of course knows that the object has not disappeared literally, but phenomenally it has. In actual fact, however, the structure of the object is actively involved in the interpretative process, albeit in a discreet way. For not only does it stimulate the operations of the imagination but it also guides and controls their creative activities.

To say that the actual structure of the object or symbol directs and controls the perceptual process when the imaginative mode is being assumed does not, however, mean that the role of the interpreter is purely receptive; for that would hardly warrant the reference to the creative
operations of the imagination. Not only has he to rely on his cognitive skills and conceptual equipment but also his past experience of the world is absolutely indispensable. This certainly means that different people experience the same object or symbol differently, but the divergence in experience does not affect the nature, or general character of the experience, but only its particularity. This, however, does not negate the validity of the experience as a public form of life, since what is significant about it is its general character as a distinctive mode of aesthetic vision which has, among its essential features, the unstability of its forms. When this unstability is viewed as a characteristic feature then particular variation would seem totally insignificant.

It should be emphasized that the experience encountered in the imaginative mode is a rational process, whose rationality manifests itself in different ways. It is rational, in the first place, because it is distinguishable from autistic vision (in which the products of the imagination are inextricably confused with the objects and events of the physical world), in that the imaginative is not confused with the material. To use the jargon of philosophical logic, in the aesthetic mode one does not "assert" what one sees. Secondly, it is rational because it is coherent. Thirdly, it is rational because both reason and the understanding are involved in it. It is
reason which determines that the object is intelligible in the first place, and it is reason which indicates which perceptual mode is appropriate. Furthermore, it is reason which assesses the contributions which the understanding makes. The understanding suggests cue-providing responses (e.g., "this is a sky," "that is water"). These cues, however, do not serve the purpose of identifying the elements of the situation (as they do in ordinary perception) but that of making them visible. The form which interpretation takes when the imaginative mode is assumed is not that of believing or assuming the identity of the element encountered to be this or that, but of seeing it as this or that. The role of reason, then is to determine how the object is to be seen; the role of the understanding is to assist in making the imaginative experience visible.

Restricted and Unrestricted Uses of the Imaginative Mode in Art

The symbolic uses of the imaginative mode fall within two categories: restricted and unrestricted. In the restricted uses the adoption of the imaginative mode culminates in the apprehension of an image which depicts discrete objects existing in the outside world or parts thereof. In the unrestricted uses the sensuous experience apprehended is free from any constraints imposed upon it by the objects of the outside world.
Among the restricted uses two different forms may be distinguished. In one of these forms the sensuous experience encountered depicts discrete objects from the outside world taking the reflected image in the mirror as a paradigm. Monet's *La Grenouillère* (1869), which depicts the reflections of light on the ripples of water, is a very good example to which I have referred at different places in this paper. I have chosen this painting rather than a Dutch or French *trompe l'oeil* still-life because it is so well adapted to the imaginative mode. Anyone with a pair of eyes in his head could stand before one of those still-lifes and recognize them for what they are intended to be instantly; just as he would if he sees a fruit-dish with peaches, bananas, and a bunch of grapes placed on the kitchen table in his own house. Not so when it comes to the Monet. One can, of course, stand before it and recognize it as a painting of a river scene. But this painting if experienced in this way, that is, as one ordinarily perceives natural objects and many representational paintings, it would appear very disappointing, because what one then sees is crude approximations to the forms of nature, very much unlike the highly convincing rendering displayed by those *trompe l'oeil* still-lifes referred to above. I suspect that this is exactly how most people would experience the Monet, unless they are given special aesthetic
training. The reason is that Monet's painting, as I have already indicated, is intended to be experienced imaginatively. In other words, one has to transform the appearance of the pigmented canvas imaginatively to see the depiction, which is extremely different from what appears when the paintings is perceived veridically, that is, as a physical object. If one succeeds in seeing this painting imaginatively, then one would realize how remarkable it is indeed. Cezanne, who was aware of the magnitude of Monet's achievement said: "[Monet is] Only an eye, but, my God, what an eye!"¹

¹Cezanne also known to have said: "Monet is the most prodigious eye since there have been painters." See Nicholas Wadley, Cezanne and his Art, p. 28.
(or double depiction, as one might wish to call it) are the "duck-rabbit" diagram of Wittgensteinian fame, the Necker cube, and Boring's so-called "My Wife and my Mother-in-Law" ambiguous figure. What is to be noted here is that the appearance of the symbolic element concerned undergoes change giving rise to an ambiguous depiction, and it is upon this ambiguity, rather than the intrinsic appeal of the particular forms encountered, the significance of the symbol depends. Thus, in the case of the "duck-rabbit" diagram, the symbol undergoes change in appearance depending on whether it is seen as a duck or as a rabbit, but the sensuous experiences which result are themselves not very impressive. The reason why this symbol is so interesting to us is because of the phenomenally experienced ambiguity which it involves. This form of ambiguous depiction should not be confused with a certain form of representation which does not involve the imaginative mode of seeing at all. In this form the representational symbol is an autonomous element having its own identity, rather than existing merely as a representational symbol, and so it is possible to see it either in its own right, as an autonomous object with its own identity, or as a representational symbol representing something else whose identity is distinguishable from its own. To this form belongs Picasso's Head of a Bull which, besides being a
representation of a head of an animal, can also be seen in its own right as a construction made of the handle-bar and saddle of a bicycle. This is a brilliant achievement which undoubtedly reflects the lesson of African sculpture to which Picasso paid a considerable amount of attention during the first decade of this century, and which tends to maintain the autonomy or coherence of the representational element. But it is important to emphasize here that in this kind of representation the symbolic element does not undergo any change in appearance which invariably occurs when the imaginative mode of perception is involved.

With regard to the unrestricted use which can be made of the imaginative mode, the important thing to note is that in it the operations of the creative imagination are not hindered by the constraints which the forms of the external world impose upon them. Here we are dealing with the pure world of the imagination where what is seen is purely intentional, purely immaterial, and in a state of perpetual transformation. It is the kind of world which we witness in the work of Kandinsky. This world is not a reflection of the material forms of the physical world, as seen in a mirror or a photograph. What we perceive in them cannot, therefore, be called "indirect" or "secondary" perception. It is a primary form of perception but not of the world of physical objects and events. It must be
viewed as an independent mode of being existing in its own right. Any allusions or reference to the world of external experience must be seen in terms of similarity, not imitation. The sensuous experience which we encounter is not a depiction or a representation of a phenomenon; it is the phenomenon. The apparent ambiguity of its forms is a manifestation of their perpetual state of metamorphosis. It is, therefore, useless to try to look for stability in these forms or even to attempt to grasp their identity. One can only behold them as one beholds a visionary experience, not only incapable of determining their identity but also indifferent. But this does not mean that the experience is bogus. Its spiritual and intellectual impact is profound and memorable. It is a primordial experience which affects us directly, without a need for any kind of sophistication. It is essentially the experience which we have when we find ourselves in the midst of an unfamiliar situation. Kandinsky's main claim to fame is to be found in the fact that he made out of the art of painting a medium through which the creative imagination can operate in a free, unimpeded way.

To deny legitimacy to the world of the imagination is to restrict the sphere of valid human experience. We have to acknowledge not only the material mode of being but also the imaginative (or intentional) mode of being;
because they both affect us, albeit in different ways. If the one affects our physical well-being; the other affects our spiritual well-being. The one nourishes our bodies; the other sustains our souls. Does it encourage gullibility and irrational belief? Well, only if the two worlds are confused with each other, as in certain forms of mental disturbance, when vision becomes autistic and belief irrational. But to someone who is not mentally disturbed the two words remain separate and are experienced as such. The charge that the imaginative life is maladaptive or that it encourages escapism has no rational basis.

Is it real? If it provides us with extra-physical stimulation— and no one would, I think, deny that— why should we deny it reality status? After all, the only reason why we deny phantasy and illusion reality status is because they do not matter to us. But we cannot claim that our imaginative life does not really matter or that it is absurd and inconsequential.

Human values of course may conflict, but this in itself should not be taken as a justification to throw some of them overboard. If we are convinced about the value of anything then let us pursue it. If we notice some conflict amongst our various pursuits, then let us attempt to reconcile them as best we can, without having to abandon some in order to preserve others. Let us seek imaginative
experience for what it is worth, and let us at the same
time seek whatever else may seem of value to us; each upon
its own merit.
CHAPTER V

AESTHETIC VISION AS KNOWLEDGE

In this chapter I shall examine aesthetic apprehension from an epistemological standpoint. I shall, first, deal with the question of whether there is involved in aesthetic vision any kind of knowledge and, if so, whether all or some of it is distinctively aesthetic in character. My next step would be to inquire into the validity of such knowledge, so as to determine whether objectivity of judgment is involved in it. It would then be appropriate to attempt to draw some general conclusions about its nature as a specific form of knowledge and the nature of knowledge in general.

IN SEARCH OF AESTHETIC KNOWLEDGE

Our major question here is simply this: is there any knowledge involved in the exercise of our aesthetic capacities? To put it differently, do I have to depend on any kind of knowledge when I, for instance, discern the rhythmic quality in the leaves of a branch taken from a bush, or when I scribble a few swift lines on a sheet of paper and then perceive them imaginatively? Aesthetic vision, as was characterized in Chapter II, is essentially
sensuous apprehension. Could we, then, say that the knowledge which is involved in it is the state of sensuous awareness with which we become directly acquainted in that process? Surely, this must be acknowledged as a form of knowledge. Indeed, according to D. W. Hamlyn, "there was a tendency in Plato and Aristotle to think of such awareness --the direct intuition of an object--as a paradigm of knowledge."\(^1\) But knowledge as we normally conceive of it is not simply "an occurrent, conscious experience or state of awareness," as Paul Hirst put it.\(^2\) As we normally conceive of it, knowledge refers to those complex ways of understanding experience which are acquired through learning, which involve those structures of the understanding which we usually refer to as concepts, and which can be given public expression through the use of appropriate symbol systems. The question which we will have to deal with then is this: can we justifiably claim that aesthetic vision constitutes one of these complex ways of understanding experience whose characteristic features are the ones just mentioned? From what has been said in the previous two chapters we could say unreluctantly that this is in fact so, as we shall presently see.

---


\(^2\)See his *Knowledge and the Curriculum*, p. 57.
What kind of knowledge do I have to be in possession of so as to be able to discern the rhythm evinced by the leaves of the branch from the bush, or to be able to perceive the scribbles on the sheet of paper imaginatively? In the first place, my sensory response to the physical situation involved has to be sufficiently sensitive so that what I become aware of is not restricted to noting the discrete objects contained in the situation, but also embraces the various sensory properties those objects possess either individually or collectively. Without this kind of sensitivity to the structure of the situation in question no aesthetic apprehension is at all possible. Secondly, I must have knowledge of the appropriate mode of apprehension which is culturally given and upon which the intelligibility of the situation depends. This mode of apprehension determines how I am disposed to apprehend the situation in question and it may involve specific types of cognitive skills or operations. I shall come back to this point in the next section of the chapter. Thirdly, I must have those structures of the understanding or concepts, in terms of which aesthetic experience is structured.

The structures which we make use of in aesthetic apprehension are not of the same kind. First, we have those qualitative abstractions discussed in Chapter IV which make aesthetic discrimination of sensory and formal qualities possible. Second, we have categorial concepts
or "schemata" (as E. H. Gombrich calls them). Third, we have inferential concepts which also have a role to play. Thus, in the case of the branch mentioned above, we have to be in possession of the formal concept, or qualitative abstraction, which we refer to as rhythm before we can discern the rhythmic quality manifested in the branch. The difference between those people who genuinely apprehend this quality in the branch and those who do not is that the former group is in possession of this concept while the latter is not. It is important to note at this point that we are dealing here with a distinctively aesthetic kind of concepts whose sole purpose is to structure vision. It must, therefore, be sharply distinguished from the concepts of beliefs and propositional knowledge.

In the case of the imaginative perception involved in the other example mentioned above, aesthetic concepts of the kind involved in the apprehension of the rhythmic quality of the branch are not crucial. But this does not mean that sensuous experiences of this kind are concept-free; no coherent experience can be like that, if we are to believe Kant's dictum that intuitions without concepts are blind. What, then, are those concepts which are employed in imaginative perception? The sensuous experience

---

1See E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion, where "schema" is used as a key concept throughout the book.
which I apprehend when I perceive the scribbles imaginatively appears to me as being of a certain sort. As Hamlyn says, "Knowledge of something is knowledge of the thing under a certain description."¹ Thus, I might see the scribbles as willow trees on a river bank, or as steep mountains with vast gaps in between, or maybe as immaterial beings engaged in some mysterious activity. Also, the world which I may perceive in this way may be unstable or elusive in character, thus giving me the impression that it is in a state of constant transformation. This means that imaginative perception involves two different kinds of concepts: categorial concepts (e.g., river-bank, immaterial beings) and inferential concepts relating to the nature of the world encountered (e.g., unstable, immaterial). These two groups of concepts correspond to the discrete objects of the physical world and the scientific concepts which we infer from it. I do not think of them as separate categories because they share the same logical features, even though they are applicable to two different modes of being, viz. the physical and the intentional.

It is evident, then, that aesthetic vision, whatever its mode may be does depend on having and applying concepts, some of which—as we have seen—are distinctively aesthetic, and on the common frameworks which makes this sort

of thing possible. In other words, we do have to be in possession of some kind of knowledge in order to exercise the capacities for aesthetic vision which we as human beings have. Hirst, of course, was right when he said that knowing is not an occurrent, conscious experience or state of awareness. But if the sensuous experience encountered in aesthetic vision is not itself admissible as knowledge, having it does depend on knowledge.

The notion of knowledge as an occurrent, conscious experience or state of awareness is also rejected by Hamlyn; not because he believes it to be free from concept use, but because, as he says, "the content of any such awareness could be expressed only in terms of what the subject knows about the object, what relevant facts he knows."

Thus, what a person knows when he has such an awareness, he concludes, is "knowledge that." Here I must disagree with Professor Hamlyn on a number of points. First, what one becomes aware of in this kind of experience is not confined to the categorial identity of the elements contained in the experience. Secondly, when one undergoes an experience of this kind, one is not so much concerned with the categorial identity of the elements contained in it as with their sensuous, or even affective, character. To identify

2. Loc. cit.
the content of such an experience with the categorial identity of its elements and hence with what is specifiable verbally is to overlook its essential character which is sensuous and therefore cannot be expressed in words. It would, thus, be quite inappropriate to ask someone who is having an experience of this sort to say what the categorial identities of the elements of his experience are. Thirdly, considering the essential nature of such an experience, it would be erroneous to suggest that its content could be expressed only in terms of the relevant facts which the subject knows about the object. I do not wish to suggest here that it is possible to talk about an experience of this sort without making explicit reference to the physical situation involved. What I want to suggest here is that such facts are virtually useless as a means of expressing that content, considering, as I say, its essentially sensuous or affective character. But this does not mean that it could not be expressed at all. Certainly the appropriate form of expression for it could only be achieved through the language of art. Thus, the rhythmic quality which I apprehended intuitively in the branch taken from the bush cannot be expressed by any facts which I may know about it, because as an aesthetic quality it cannot be reduced to a factual account which can be put in words. The situation would be quite different if, instead of trying to express its essential character through a factual
account of it, I make use of the means available to the artist. For it would then be feasible to give it adequate expression. The artistic symbol which I produce would express that rhythmic quality, giving it a new particular form, but its essential character would remain intact. The same thing is true of the scribbles which I perceived imaginatively; it is possible to give it adequate expression only through an artistic symbol scheme.

Hamlyn's claim that what a person knows when he has direct awareness of an object is "knowledge that" cannot, then, be justified on the basis of the argument which he produced, since what is considered of value in such awareness is something other than the facts which one may know about it, something which could not, therefore, be expressed in terms of factual knowledge at all. In the direct awareness which we encounter in aesthetic vision, the object of our knowledge is not the factual content of what is being perceived but rather our phenomenal experience of it. In the case of the branch from the bush, it is the rhythmic character of the experience which captivates our attention. Our apprehension of this quality, however, depends on our knowledge of the appropriate concept, viz. rhythm. Now, all concepts of this kind are aesthetic in character, because their application structures aesthetic experience; hence our knowledge of them must also be aesthetic in character. These concepts and our knowledge of them must
therefore be distinguished from the concepts of beliefs and from "knowledge that" which depends on them. We may thus conclude that in aesthetic vision we are dealing with a distinctive kind of knowledge which could not be reduced to "knowledge that." This knowledge is aesthetic knowledge.

But if one form of knowledge is irreducible to another, it is still possible that one of them may either presuppose, or imply, the other. Now, the question is: does aesthetic knowledge— as characterized above— either presuppose or imply "knowledge that"? Aesthetic knowledge, as characterized above, does not presuppose "knowledge that." It is a kind of knowledge which one acquires and applies intuitively, and it does not denote or designate anything. For this reason one may wish to refer to it as "prepredicative" knowledge. The situation is quite different, however, in the case of artistic knowledge. For to be able to apply an aesthetic concept in perception is one thing and to be able to express it artistically is another. I may be able to apprehend rhythm in the branch from the bush without at the same time being able to express it artistically. To do this I must know something else besides aesthetic knowledge. I must know something about technical processes and the way to handle tools and other forms of equipment, I must know something about the nature of materials, and I must know something about different conventional forms of artistic expression, and so on. Now,
all these forms of knowledge presuppose "knowledge that," even when the individual concerned is incapable of giving a formal account of it. For, as Professor Hamlyn put it, "he in some sense knows the principles involved."¹ These principles could, in theory, be formulated in terms of "knowledge that," whether or not they could be in practice. Aesthetic knowledge itself, then, does not presuppose "knowledge that" but its artistic expression clearly does.

As to whether or not aesthetic knowledge implies "knowledge that," the answer is certainly in the affirmative; aesthetic knowledge does imply "knowledge that."

When we apprehend something intuitively we become conscious of it as being of a certain sort. Now, if we attempt to say what it is that we become conscious of in this way, then the result will assume the form of "knowledge that." Thus, to go back to the examples of the branch from the bush, my apprehension of it in aesthetic vision appeared to me structured in a certain way, which made me refer to it as having a rhythmic quality. This kind of propositional knowledge or "knowledge that" is what is known as aesthetic criticism. It is knowledge about aesthetic knowledge. It has the same logical form as scientific knowledge, but it is distinguishable from it in that it is not concerned so

much with the factual features of the object perceived as
with its phenomenally experienced aesthetic qualities.
Its statements, therefore, cannot be judged purely on the
basis of the facts observable in the object as a physical
entity. For this reason some may wish to question its
validity as a form of knowledge. But, since what we are
concerned with in this chapter is aesthetic knowledge it­
self and not with knowledge about it, this issue is of no
importance to us here. What is important is merely to
indicate that aesthetic knowledge logically entails "knowl­
edge that," irrespective of the validity which it may have.
Thus, it is quite conceivable that one may give an account
of aesthetic knowledge in a propositional form. The ability
of the individual to do so, of course, depends on whether
or not he has the linguistic and analytical skills nec­
essary for undertaking this task. But the most important
of its ingredients is of course aesthetic knowledge itself;
without it aesthetic criticism is virtually impossible.
Thus, we could say that aesthetic knowledge presupposes
aesthetic criticism. It remains true to say that any
theoretical knowledge which one may have about one's aes­
thetic knowledge is logically extraneous to it; and so it
follows logically that one may be said to be in full pos­
session of one's aesthetic knowledge even though one
has absolutely no theoretical grasp of it. But in actual
experience aesthetic knowledge tends to give rise to theoretical understanding.

That aesthetic apprehension is self-sufficient as an intelligible form of experience is then, beyond any reasonable doubt; and so it would be wrong to suggest that its meaning depends on a theoretical grasp of it. The fact that the one entails the other does not in any way undermine its value as a form of human experience or its validity as a form of knowledge. What is crucial to aesthetic knowledge, however, is the ability to discern concrete instances which give adequate application to an aesthetic concept (e.g., rhythm, dynamic balance), rather than the ability to provide a verbal account of it.

THE VALIDITY OF AESTHETIC KNOWLEDGE

Traditionally knowledge is approached as involving statements expressing particular beliefs about the world and so validity is seen to depend entirely on the notion of truth. Since aesthetic knowledge is given public expression in works of art, its validity as a form of knowledge, according to this view, would seem to depend on whether or not works of art could, at least, be shown to be logically parallel to statements. It would seem, therefore, appropriate to attempt to find out in what respects works of art may be said to be analogous to the statements of
But it is important, I think, to draw attention to the fact that statements and works of art are not parallel expressions. While works of art are symbol schemes, statements, strictly speaking, are not. To overlook this difference is to confuse the symbol scheme with its meaning. A statement, strictly speaking, is what an assertive symbol scheme claims to be the case; not the symbol scheme itself. But from the standpoint of epistemology our concern is not so much with the nature of the symbols themselves as with the application which they give to the concepts we know. Thus, while the aesthetic symbol does give application to the aesthetic concept in question, the assertive symbol itself does not, and so we have to turn to the statement that it expresses, which does.

What both works of art and statements have in common is that they are manifestations of man's endeavor to understand experience. Intelligibility and appropriateness are their common goals. Their intelligibility is manifested in the way they give concepts public application, and their appropriateness inspires public agreement. But would that be sufficient justification for considering works of art

---

1 I make specific reference to the statements of science because they are considered paradigmatic for what a statement should be like.

to be statements? Surely, what characterizes the "language game" of stating is the notion of truth or falsity. Could it then be said that a work of art can be true or false when no truth-claim is contained in it? A work of art, as I indicated, may give an aesthetic concept public application; but it does so by evincing it, not by asserting it. A work of art, thus, may be good or bad, coherent or incoherent, interesting or dull, original or derivative, inspired or contrived, and so on, but none of this would justify referring to it as true or false, in any acceptable sense of these terms. A painting judged "good" is not "true" for that reason, and conversely, one that is judged "bad" is not for that reason to be declared "false."

In assessing the statements of science, our goal is to find out if the concepts employed are given proper application. If they are given proper application, we declare them true; if they are not, then we declare them to be false. This is because a statement of this sort is essentially a claim that something is or is not the case. If it does not make such a claim, then it is not a statement; and if one ignores the truth-claim which it conveys, then one is not responding to it as a statement. An aesthetically expressive work of art, on the other hand, does not express a truth-claim, and any such claim which may be associated with it must be regarded as extraneous to it,
not forming part of its logic, that is. Thus, when confronting an aesthetically expressive work of art it would be absurd to approach it as a truth-claim which can be judged true or false. In other words, it would be absurd to try to find out if a certain concept is given proper application or not; for in the absence of any such claim, that kind of procedure would not be justifiable. Rather, what one should do is to try to experience it in aesthetic vision, in order to find out how effective it is in structuring aesthetic vision. This is quite different from trying to see if it is true or false. It would, indeed, be very odd to respond to, say, a Mondrian painting by saying one did not believe it. The situation would be totally different, however, if someone says about it something which is obviously false, to which one, of course, could retort by saying one did not believe it. But our response would then be directed toward what he says, the statement which he makes, about the painting and not to the painting itself. That is, what we judge true or false is what he asserts, not the painting. A Mondrian, as an expression of dynamic balance, may be properly considered as giving that concept proper application; but the painting could not be considered, for this reason, an assertion of that fact.

Perhaps, the logical difference between statements and aesthetic symbols can best be shown by drawing attention
to the fact that we could respond to a statement by saying
that it is completely false, but we could not do the same
thing if what we are confronted with is an aesthetically
expressive symbol. Thus, a portrait painter who is sup­
posed to be painting a portrait of a particular person,
but instead of producing a picture which portrays that
person he produces one which reveals the likeness of some­
one else. Now, if he says that his picture is a portrait
of the person whom he was supposed to portray, we would
say that his statement is completely false, for that is
evidently the case. But we could not speak of the portrait
itself as being completely, or even partly, false.
Similarly, a student in an art class, who is given the
task of producing a painting which exemplifies cool colors
but produces a painting in different shades of orange in­
stead, has evidently failed to produce a satisfactory re­
sult, and so if he says that his painting exemplifies cool
colors, it would be quite proper for us to say that his
statement or claim is totally false, since we could see
in his painting not a single trace of cool colors. But can
we say that about his painting too? Obviously not, since
the painting itself does not involve what could warrant
such a judgment, viz. an assertion or truth-claim. Also,
a work of art which is intended to function as an aesthetic
symbol but which seems totally ineffective in structuring
aesthetic vision cannot be properly described as totally false.

We may, therefore, conclude that aesthetic symbols do not involve assertions which can be judged true or false. They could not, therefore, be properly considered statements. Their function is not to express truth-claims, but to structure aesthetic vision. The term "statement" can, of course, be used in relationship to works of art to mean something other than the meaning which is given to it in epistemological discourse, but this fact should not be permitted to confuse the issue with which we are concerned here. Thus, an artist may in fact refer to one of his paintings as a clear statement or as an exact statement, but "statement" here is used as a synonym for "execution," "realization," or "expression." In other words, what an artist means when he says about one of his paintings as a clear or exact statement, is that it expresses or realizes its value, whatever that may be, in a clear or exact way. It would be wrong, therefore, to take his words to mean that the painting is expressing a truth-claim in a clear or exact way. To suggest that his words imply success, coherence, or correspondence and, therefore, should be taken as making a reference to the notion of truth would be misleading; because it would invoke the notion of truth when no truth-claim is being expressed. To extend the notion of truth in this way is not only
erroneous but also pointless. Hobbs once wrote, "True and false are attributes of speech not of things, and where speech is not, there is neither truth nor falsehood."¹

But if aesthetic symbols are not statements and the notion of truth cannot, therefore, be considered as appropriate for assessing their validity, how are we to characterize them and what would serve as a suitable basis for agreement regarding their validity? In my account of aesthetic symbolization (see Chapter III), I characterized the aesthetic symbol as an interpretative problem, thus contrasting it with the "denotational symbol," which I characterized as a coded message. Now, a statement is a particular kind of coded message, one which expresses a claim that something is or is not the case. An interpretative problem, on the other hand, is there to stimulate the mind in a certain way. An aesthetic symbol is a particular kind of interpretative problem; its function is to structure aesthetic vision in the different modes of which the human individual is organismically capable.

The question which we ought to face now is: what could serve as a basis for judgment or agreement in determining the validity of these symbols whose purpose is to structure aesthetic vision, since truth is being ruled

¹See C. D. Hardie, Truth and Fallacy in Educational Theory, p. 50.
out as not applicable at all? Surely, one cannot speak of validity or of knowledge unless there is such a basis, or principle, to direct our judgment. I maintain that this basis, or principle, is nothing but **efficacy**. In assessing the validity of the statements of science we check what they claim to be the case against the facts of the observable world. In assessing the validity of an aesthetic symbol, or work of art, our concern is to assess how well is the symbol, or work, is adapted to do what it does; in other words, how effective it is in serving its purpose. Efficacy in relation to a work of art is, thus, seen as the counterpart of truth in relation to a statement. Neither can be substituted for the other, since each is effective only within a particular frame of reference.

The principle of efficacy is predicated on the demand that a work of art should always be purposive, either in a symbolic (i.e., cognitive), or in a practical, way. An aesthetic work of art functions symbolically, i.e., as an intelligible entity. In a judgment of efficacy which involves an aesthetic work of art, we are looking for purity and clarity of expression; or, to put it differently, for economy (or necessity) and coherence. This, of course, would not make sense at all, if the intelligibility of the work is not taken for granted. This kind of efficacy which is applicable to aesthetic works of art may, thus, be designated as **aesthetic efficacy**. Its presence is not
manifested only in judging the validity of aesthetic works of art but also in the very act of their creation. It would be instructive, therefore, to take a look at the principle of efficacy as it directs aesthetic creation. I shall take as an example the expression of dynamic balance in the history of modern art.

By emphasizing the spaces, or ground elements, in his paintings, Cezanne made it difficult for the eye to apprehend his paintings by isolating the figure elements from the ground elements, as in the case of ordinary perception; and in so doing he made it more likely for a holistic or synoptic sensuous experience to occur. In other words, emphasizing the ground elements increased the efficacy of his works as aesthetic symbols expressing dynamic balance. This effect can, for instance, be seen in his Boy in Red Vest, which has already been referred to in this paper, where the curtain in the background is given as much emphasis as the figure of the boy itself. Thus, it becomes apparent that in modifying his work the way he did, Cezanne was attempting to increase the efficacy of his work, so that it becomes better adapted for giving the experience of dynamic balance a clearer expression. It is this concern for achieving a particular effect which justifies the character which his work takes and which makes it intelligible. Similarly, the fragmentation of the figure and the use of a somewhat monochromatic color scheme in Cubism
increased the power of the painting to express dynamic balance. By means of these two artistic or technical devices, a figure-ground interpretation of the painting was made difficult, since the possibility for finding a coherent basis for such an interpretation is considerably reduced. In this way, a synoptic reading of the work is made to appear less arbitrary and more coherent than in a painting where the figures are presented intact or where the colors appear in sharp contrast. This effect can be seen in Picasso's *Ma Jolie (Woman with Guitar)* of 1911-12 or in Mondrian's *Apple Tree in Blossom* of about the same date. As in the case of Cezanne, these modifications which affected the structure of the symbol were not introduced arbitrarily but in order to realize a desired aesthetic effect, viz. dynamic balance. In other words, they were introduced in order to enhance the efficacy of the work to evince that particular aesthetic quality.

As in the case of the statements of science, we could speak of the attempt of these artists to give dynamic balance a clear expression in terms of giving concepts (in this case aesthetic concepts) proper application, so that the efficacy of the work is seen to depend on how well the aesthetic concept is given proper application. But in the case of the aesthetic symbol, this application may take various forms, not just one. This is because the aesthetic
concept to which it gives application is apprehended as an aspect of the particular aesthetic object which one experiences phenomenally. Thus, while both the Cézanne and the Mondrian mentioned above give the concept of dynamic balance proper application, artistically and aesthetically they are not the same. Also, the application of the concept in the case of the aesthetic work of art tends to be a matter of more or less. Thus, it is impossible to say just how much efficacy the work must have before it could be said that a concept is given proper application in it.

Nevertheless, when dealing with aesthetic symbols it is possible to speak of perfection. In fact, one could say that perfection is to efficacy what certainty is to truth. Moreover, the problem which certainty presents in relation to truth is very similar to that which perfection presents in relation to efficacy. To say that an aesthetic work of art is perfect means that it has achieved an optimal level of clarity and purity of expression, thus making it impossible for anyone to detect any defects or redundancies in it. It is, however, important to note that just as certainty is meaningless without the notion of truth, so is perfection meaningless without the notion of efficacy.

To say that in assessing the validity of aesthetic knowledge we should be concerned with efficacy rather than truth
offers only a partial solution to the problem. For we do
not only want to know how we ought to set about the pro-
blem, or what the proper approach to it should be, but we
also want to know how we can agree when it comes to decide
whether to acknowledge efficacy in relation to a given
symbol or deny it. In other words, we want to know what
would constitute a basis for agreement in this respect, so
that it would be possible for us to claim objectivity of
judgment. The question which we shall have to deal with
then is: Can there be public agreement on when to acknowl-
edge efficacy and when to deny it? But since agreement on
the efficacy of a work of art would seem to depend on
agreement in aesthetic perception, this question seems to
reduce to the question: is agreement in aesthetic per-
ception possible? That is, can we speak of objectivity
in relation to aesthetic perception or is it merely
arbitrary and idiosyncratic?

In view of the fact that aesthetic perception presupposes
a common framework, or symbol system, without which it would
be absurd to speak of modes of apprehension or aesthetic
traditions, the idea that aesthetic perception is merely
idiosyncratic or arbitrary must be dismissed outright.
It is only by virtue of this fact that some people feel
tempted to think of art as a language. For what would
c characterize a language other than the common framework of
concepts which makes public discourse possible? Such a common framework, or symbol system, however, is not genetically given but it must be acquired through contact with other human beings.\(^1\) If this is how aesthetic judgment occurs, then we must acknowledge that it is objective or, at least, that it has a conventional basis. But to say that aesthetic apprehension depends on a common framework does not mean that disagreement among people in their actual assessment of works of art cannot occur. What it means is that agreement, in principle, is possible by virtue of this common framework. In actual judgment disagreement could be the result of prejudice, or lack of coherence in the work itself; but it is more likely to be the result of lack of understanding (whether because of ignorance or mental confusion). Moreover, lack of understanding does not have to be total so that divergence in opinion may arise. Thus, the elderly lady who rejects modern artists from Cezanne to Picasso, because she couldn't care less about their drawing ability and use of color, may nevertheless be a humane and remarkably cultured person, who can play the 48 Preludes and Fugues, speak French, and appreciate Rembrandt. It would, therefore, be rash to assume that the judgment which she makes about the efforts of modern artists is ignorant or unprincipled. The truth is that her judgment of modern art is, in fact,

\(^{1}\text{See D. W. Hamlyn, }\textit{The Theory of Knowledge}, \text{ p. 186.}\)
rational. What is more is that she may have a high opinion of the place of art in human culture. Her feelings about modern painting may be thus the outcome of knowledge of, and concern for, art—not because of sheer prejudice or ignorance, as some of us might think. But does this undermine the view already expressed that aesthetic judgment is objectively or, at least, conventionally determined? Not at all. The lady in question, without knowing the fact, approaches the works of modern artists through the wrong system of concepts or framework; not because she is prejudiced against the appropriate system or framework, but because she has no knowledge of it. Her attitude is, therefore, not the result of sheer lack of understanding, but lack of understanding of the appropriate kind. Her judgment is thus not so much erroneous as inappropriate. Even so, it is, as I have suggested, both principled and rational. This is because from the point of view of the conceptual scheme or frame of reference which she was applying, it would seem very odd why anyone who is ostensibly depicting the forms of nature should resort to distorted drawing and unnatural color. Hers is a rational attitude, even though it is negative. Our judgment does not have to be correct in order to be rational. What makes a judgment rational depends on whether it is principled (i.e., not arbitrary) or not, or whether one has good.
reasons for it or not; not whether it is correct or not. Thus, there are those who say that, for instance, Cezanne or Picasso is all right without having any understanding to back their judgments. For this reason, their judgment must be considered irrational, even though it is positive. Ultimately, what is of value is understanding, not positive attitudes or judgments. Irrational judgments or attitudes result when people succumb to external pressure, or when they find it expedient to do so.

We may thus conclude that the possibility of having a rational but negative judgment does not in any way undermine the objectivity of aesthetic apprehension, since it is always relative to a particular mode of apprehension, system of understanding, or conceptual scheme. The mode of apprehension which is appropriate to a Rembrandt is not appropriate to a Cezanne, and neither is appropriate to a Kandinsky. One, therefore, may wish to speak not of a language of art, but of languages of art.

If it is true that what we can apprehend in aesthetic vision is dependent upon those common frameworks or systems or concepts which we acquire through our contact with other human beings, and which must therefore be conventional in character, would it not also be true that our aesthetic perception itself would, like the frameworks or systems themselves, be purely conventional in character? To put
the question differently, is it open to us to develop and alter our concepts and hence our perceptions in any way we please? Since works of art as physical objects have a differentiated structure, and since our apprehension of them is grounded in this structure, the answer would have to be No. The truth is that public or interpersonal agreement in our aesthetic perceptions depends on what Wittgenstein called "perceptual criteria."¹ This means that one has to have an understanding of the sort of physical conditions in which an aesthetic concept is properly given application. These conditions must, therefore, be understood by all of us, i.e., they must be public. Thus, intersubjective agreement on the application of the aesthetic concept of dynamic balance, for example, demands that there should be an understanding of the physical situations which are so structured that the concept in question becomes applicable to them. Thus while aesthetic experience itself is not public, it is, nevertheless, linked to a public world through its organizing concept (e.g., dynamic balance).

Not only is it true to say that aesthetic perception is grounded in the physical structure of the work of art, but our ability to identify the appropriate system or mode

of apprehension also depends on it. This fact thus distinguishes aesthetic systems from denotational systems where apprehending the symbol occurs on a purely conventional basis. Since different works of art are structured differently, of all the modes known to us we select the one that would result in the most coherent interpretation. (This should be seen, incidentally, as a clear indication of the essentially rational nature of aesthetic apprehension.)

Why is aesthetic apprehension not simply a matter of convention? The answer, in the words of Professor Hamlyn, is "because it is not a matter of convention that human beings are what they are and have the perceptual apparatus they have; and it is not a matter of convention that the world is as it is and that things affect our senses in the way that they do."\(^1\) What Hamlyn wishes to suggest here is that it is the "form of life" which we all share as human beings that ultimately determines what we can and what we cannot conceive.

It would, thus, seem that agreement on aesthetic efficacy presupposes agreement in aesthetic perception; and agreement in aesthetic perception presupposes a common framework or accepted system of understanding, which is, itself, relative to our "form of life."

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 256.
CONCLUSION
If we can speak of knowledge in connection with aesthetic vision it is not because of the occurrent, direct state of awareness which one encounters in aesthetic experience. And it is certainly not because of the idiosyncratic or incidental aspects which every work of art has. If we can speak of knowledge in connection with aesthetic vision, it is because our ability to perceive aesthetically depends on having and applying aesthetic concepts by virtue of which aesthetic vision becomes structured in the ways that it does. It is then the conceptual structures which mediate aesthetic vision that make it justifiable to speak of aesthetic knowledge.

Aesthetic knowledge, like scientific knowledge, is not without its limitations. Thus, it may be said that when judging aesthetically expressive works of art, it may not always be possible to say which qualities precisely are being expressed by the works in question, or whether the qualities which we discern in them are actually intended by the artist; or, as was already indicated, how much efficacy a work must have so that it could be said that it gives proper application to the concept in question. Also, where the imaginative mode is involved, the particular form which the experience assumes is partly dependent on the past experiences of the interpreter. These and similar
remarks may induce some to charge that aesthetic knowledge is lacking in distinctness.¹ This charge, however, does not seem to be very fair. In the first place, the instances where one is not certain about the character of the work—does not know whether something is appropriate or not, applicable or not—usually involve works of low level of efficacy. When it comes, however, to works whose level of efficacy is high, like the works of Kandinsky or Mondrian, then this kind of uncertainty regarding the aesthetic character of the work is unlikely to be encountered. Secondly, in aesthetic vision, the charge against lack of distinctness may not be justifiable. First of all, in graphic works where the imaginative mode is given unrestricted use (as in the case of Kandinsky, for instance), the unstability of the image which may be mistaken as indicative of lack of distinctness is, in fact, an essential feature of the aesthetic character of the work, upon which its efficacy depends. Secondly, even if we acknowledge that this lack of distinctness is a characteristic feature of the aesthetic symbol, on the basis that its meaning is not predetermined, then it would still be possible to withhold a negative judgment, in view of the possibilities

¹According to Arnheim, it is because of this lack of distinctness that perception as a power of cognition appears to have that Alexander Baumgarten and others before him considered it inferior to the faculty of reasoning. See Rudolf Arnheim, Visual Thinking, p. 2.
for stochastic apprehension, which such a feature would create. Thirdly, in a statement purporting that something is or is not the case, distinctness is undeniably important; but in an aesthetic experience where we are not dealing with statements at all it could not be considered equally important, since nothing would seem to depend on it.

Traditionally, knowledge is defined as justified belief. Such a definition restricts the application of "knowledge" only to what can be expressed in a propositional form. Anything which cannot be expressed in this way must therefore be something other than knowledge. The theory of knowledge, in effect, was thought of as coextensive with the philosophy of science; sometimes in a very restricted sense of this term. But the truth is that science is not all that we may know. Scientific knowledge structures our beliefs. Aesthetic knowledge, on the other hand, structures our vision. To affirm the one and deny the other would seem to be arbitrary or, at any rate, uncritical.

Those who subscribe to the propositional view of knowledge, but at the same time are prepared to accept art as knowledge may wish to reduce aesthetic knowledge to "knowledge that" so that its admittance into the charmed circle of propositional knowledge would be made possible and its status as knowledge would consequently assume legitimacy. This is exactly what Professor Hirst tried
Such an attempt would seem quite unnecessary if we could show that the propositional view of knowledge is itself arbitrary. In this way it would be possible to admit aesthetic knowledge as an autonomous form under a generic conception of knowledge.

From the epistemological point of view, whether or not to call aesthetic knowledge "knowledge" is not all that important. Rather, what is important is to explicate the nature which such form of knowledge may have and to demonstrate its validity. If it was then found that it has some important features which it has in common with scientific knowledge, then it would, of course, be important that this should be made known with whatever implications it may have in relation to the notion of knowledge itself. But the problem as it concerns education has a strong political aspect. From the educational point of view it is extremely important that we should know whether there is such thing as aesthetic knowledge, because of the implications which this may have in determining educational policy. I have a strong feeling that it is this kind of consideration which induced Hirst to put forward his "propositional theory of art."

---

Part II

THE EDUCATION OF AESTHETIC VISION
CHAPTER VI

VISUAL EDUCATION

In the first part of my dissertation I have given an analytical account of aesthetic vision because it would serve as a philosophical foundation upon which a discussion of visual education can be based. For no such discussion would be satisfactory unless the logical and epistemological grounds are given adequate treatment. I have, further, elaborated a semiotic theory to account for the symbolic apprehension and expression of aesthetic vision. Thus, granted that my analysis is valid, it would seem perfectly reasonable to suggest that aesthetic vision can be expanded, intensified, and articulated through the process of learning. In other words, the case for the education of aesthetic vision seems on very firm ground. The purpose of this chapter is to give an exposition of visual education based on the analysis of aesthetic vision given in Part I, spelling out in appropriate detail the differentiating aim structure of visual education, its means or basic activities, the nature of learning involved in it, and those learning outcomes which I consider incompatible with it.
In all this I shall be attending to the normative as well as to the critical issues involved.

**THE AIMS OF VISUAL EDUCATION**

I have already suggested that aesthetic vision can be expanded, intensified, and articulated. I would now like to suggest that visual education primarily aims at doing just that; namely, to enable the student to expand his visual experience and to make him capable of responding to the world of visual experience in a more intense and articulate manner. Stated more simply, visual education aims at the development or structuring of aesthetic vision. My next step is to explicate in appropriate detail what precisely is meant by that. I shall begin by clarifying what I mean by expanding the visual experience of the student.

**Expanding Visual Experience**

By expanding the visual experience of the student I do not mean that he should be given an opportunity to see a great variety of visual phenomena. In itself this does not consist in anything like the expansion of visual experience. This is because the seeing that is involved in aesthetic vision is not a matter of nothing or observing visible things and events. Nevertheless, it is precisely this kind of vision that people refer to when they speak of seeing things and events. What is likely to occur when one is exposed to a great variety of visible things and
events is that one would come to note, recognize, or identify their categorial character, rather than undergo an expansion of vision. I do not, of course, wish to indicate here that this manner of seeing is either useless or not very significant. All I want to say is that mere visual stimulation, however varied, does not constitute an expansion of visual experience. Nor do I wish to suggest that sheer visual stimulation has nothing to do with expanding vision; for that would be totally false, because visual stimulation could contribute to it instrumentally (in much the same way technical or artistic skill does).

By expanding aesthetic vision I do not mean simply directing the student's attention to the concrete body of the world, where he could engage in passive contemplation of what is immediately given in sensation. For this, in itself, does not constitute an expansion of vision either, even though it is necessary for it (as indeed for all the modes of development which may affect aesthetic vision). The ability to attend to the concrete body of the world is only the starting point of the education of aesthetic vision.

For there to be an expansion of visual experience, one must transform, modify, or somehow structure what is immediately given in sensation, an activity which clearly goes beyond passive contemplation. This activity pertains
to that power of the mind which we call imagination. However, as it is generally used this term tends to be somewhat ambiguous. It seems to me, therefore, necessary to provide some clarification as to how I am using it here. By imagination I wish to refer specifically to the capacity of the mind to transform the appearance of visible things. I wish to refer to the ability to think in terms of imagery, to Kant's *Einbildungskraft*. This is a cognitive power or skill of which the human individual is organismically capable and which can be developed and consolidated through the educative process.

To expand the student's aesthetic vision, then, is to develop his capacity to perceive imaginatively, or creatively, if you wish. But now let us examine those kinds of activities which issue from this capacity at the concrete level. In other words, let us find out what sort of things someone whose capacity to perceive imaginatively is well developed can do. One thing such a person can do is to look at an object like the "duck-rabbit" diagram and be able to see it now as a rabbit, now as a duck. Similarly, he could look at Picasso's *Baboon with Young* (1951) and succeed in seeing the head of the baboon as either a convincing representation of the head of a baboon or as a toy car which is what the original structure was intended to be. He could also look at the random patterns of such
objects as clouds, mountains, or marble walls and succeed in experiencing images which could reveal the familiar forms of nature or totally unfamiliar forms belonging to an entirely different mode of being. In a similar way he could look at Monet's *La Grenouillère* (1869) where at first only dabs and dashes are perceived physically on the surface of the canvas and, by an act of imaginative perception, succeed in seeing those dabs and dashes as shimmering light on the surface of water. Also, he could look at a painting by Kandinsky from his Murnau period (c.1908-1914) and transmute it through the exercise of his imaginative capacity into an other-worldly experience, so drastically unfamiliar that his initial reaction is more likely to be that of mystifying bewilderment than of anything else.

In concluding my remarks about the expansion of aesthetic vision, I would like to stress two points that I think are relevant to it. First, that the aesthetic experience that is involved in it is not given in immediate sensation; it is always the result of the exercise of the imagination and the cognitive skills that are pertinent to it, which are responsible for transforming and elaborating what is immediately given in sensation. Second, that it is not something that occurs spontaneously as in autistic vision and drug-induced experiences. Not only the presence of a physical object is necessary, its configurational or plastic qualities play a crucial role in formulating the
aesthetic experience. In other words, it has to be a suitably adapted object to be able to play that role. It may well be said, as Kant foresaw, that, in aesthetic experience, the powers of the imagination and the external object are teleologically adapted to each other.

**Intensifying Visual Experience**

I have explained above that passive contemplation of the concrete body of the world does not, in itself, constitute an expansion of vision. However, this kind of passive contemplation, if it persists, could give rise to a more intense experience of what is given in sensation. What happens is that one becomes progressively more sensitive to the variables of stimulation. In other words, as contemplation persists, one's awareness of what is given in sensation becomes more precise and subtle. One begins, so to speak, to notice the trees, and maybe the branches and the leaves, and not just the wood. Unlike the case of visual expansion, the change which occurs in visual experience here does not affect its character but only the degree of intensity with which it is experienced. Things of course become more differentiated and one comes to see more in them, but their character itself remains essentially the same. There is no role for imaginative transformation; only growth in sensitivity, or discriminative ability, is crucial here. To take a classic example, the wine taster
notices things in the taste of wine which most of us are incapable of discriminating. What he perceives is already present in the taste of the wine but which happens to be too subtle or minute for most of us to notice. This should be seen as sharply distinct from the case of one who engages in imaginative perception where the product of his activity is always creative in nature, that is, not merely discriminatory.

Now, let me try to give some concrete examples to illustrate the sort of things that a student whose perceptual experience is intensified through training in sensory discrimination should be able to do. The discrimination of color provides a good example. A person whose ability to discriminate among colors is very limited will tend to respond to colors through their labels—this is "red" and that is "blue," and so forth. If such a person finds himself in a position where he has to classify actual colors he may well be shocked to realize for instance, that some colors can be classified under different labels. Thus, what is classifiable under the label "red" can also be classified under the label "orange" or "purple," and what can be classified under the label "blue" is also classifiable under either "purple" or "green." Now, someone whose ability to discriminate among colors is well developed will not simply go by labels. When it comes to telling differences among colors he would respond to the actual
sensory properties of the colored objects themselves. If he happens to be in a position where he has to obtain certain colors by mixing others, say, orange from yellow and red, or green from blue and yellow, he would not attempt to do so by mixing lemon yellow with crimson red in order to get a pure shade of orange, or by mixing ultramarine blue with cadmium yellow. He would immediately realize that these mixtures would not give him what he wants. Instead, he would, for the pure shade of orange, mix cadmium yellow with vermilion red, and for the pure shade of green he would mix prussian blue with lemon yellow. He does so because his visual experience is differentiated. Likewise, he would realize that colors that are classified under the more precise labels of the paint-box themselves vary along three dimensions, namely, hue, value, and intensity. Indeed, he would realize that some of the differences are so subtle or minute that just about anyone would be willing to swear that one given color is identical in one or every respect with another until they are placed side by side when their differences, along some or all the three dimensions, would become apparent.

It is important to emphasize that the basis of sensory discrimination is not the labels of language, however technical or sophisticated they may be, but the actual sensory properties of the objects concerned. Thus, to teach the student how to tell squares from triangles or
circles from squares would not constitute an intensification of his vision, nor would the mere ability to discriminate, say, red colors from green colors. This is because in all these cases one depends on the labels of language as much as on the sensory properties that are given in the physical object. The training of visual discrimination, or intensifying visual experience, as I called it above, cannot be brought about on the basis of applying linguistic labels, however, I repeat, technical or sophisticated these may be. It is true, however, that labels sometimes play a useful role in intensifying visual experience by directing attention to the sensory properties of the object to be discriminated and so facilitate its discrimination. For example, we are told that Eskimos have many words in their language corresponding to the English word "snow" but each one of them refers to snow seen under different aspects. What this boils down to is that sometime the existence of a label in a language actually draws attention to certain variables of stimulation.

Articulating Visual Experience

What is distinctive about the intensification of vision by means of sensory discrimination is that what is discriminated is given in the actual structure of stimulation in the form of features or properties. Such properties are not mental entities which one normally associates with
the structures of the understanding. In aesthetic experience, however, there are such things, sometimes known as "emergent" qualities, because unlike sensory qualities they do not have their existence in the actual properties of the physical object, even though this acts as a foundation for them. I shall now direct my attention to these aesthetic qualities which form part of the structures of the human understanding and their role in articulating aesthetic vision.

Someone whose aesthetic vision is articulated does not attend in his encounter with the visible world to sensory qualities only; he is also capable of responding to "emergent" or "formal" qualities, such as rhythm, balance, or harmony. Although such qualities could not possibly be known without knowledge of the sensory world and its properties, they could not (unlike those sensory properties) have any existence independently of the mind which is trained to apprehend them. In other words, our experience of them depends, or is based, upon the properties of the sensory world without sharing their "givenness." Our experience of them in the objects of the world (art objects included) is mediated by the structures, or concepts, of the understanding.

Perhaps I should now say a few things about those particular kinds of concepts or structures of the understanding which are involved in articulating aesthetic
experience. First, they are abstracted, not inferred, from what is given in sensation. In other words, they are intuitively apprehended in the visible world, not reflectively deduced from it. In this respect they are unlike the concepts of science. Second, their acquisition literally entails an articulation of vision, so that we become phenomenally aware of certain qualities (e.g., rhythm or balance) which did not constitute part of our perception before. Indeed, one way to tell whether a certain concept one acquired is an aesthetic one or not is by trying to find out whether its acquisition results in an appreciable change in one's perception. Third, aesthetic structures should not be confused with the categorial structures contained in our phenomenal experience.

Articulating visual experience, then, involves the acquisition of aesthetic concepts and their intuitive application in aesthetic vision. Let us now find out what this dimension of aesthetic vision involves at a more concrete level. Let us, in other words, attempt to give some examples of what kind of behavior someone whose ability to see in an aesthetically articulate manner is capable of doing. Perhaps the most characteristic response of which such a person is capable is to apprehend formal relationships, and "emergent" qualities (such as rhythm and balance), and not merely particular objects or particular elements belonging to them. Thus, if you invite such a
person into your living room, he would not comment on how expensive your television must have been, or how elegant the paintings you have on the wall are. He would, instead, say, for instance, that your T.V. set is rhythmically echoed by the frames of the paintings on the wall, or that the T.V. and the paintings are creating a dynamic spatial relationship—given of course that he intends flattery (for if he does not, he would make different comments, but they would still display the same logical features as in his flattering remarks). Similarly, if you take him to your greenhouse to show him your red, ripe tomatoes, he would not comment on your gardening skills; rather he would probably make a remark about how the red color of your tomatoes is enhanced by the green paint on the panels of the greenhouse, which covers them only partially because you ran out of paint and never bothered to finish the job afterwards.

THE SCOPE OF VISUAL EDUCATION

In my analysis of the differentiating aim structure of visual education, I have so far attempted to unravel the logical character of its various components or processes, namely expanding vision (or imaginative perception), intensifying vision (or sensory discrimination), and articulating vision (or formal discrimination). I shall now attempt to define the scope of this aim structure by attending to its boundaries, as it were.
The aesthetic experience, like all experience, has its concomitant aspects. Perhaps the most discussed of all of these is the arousal and expression of affect. There could hardly be an aesthetically significant visual experience which does not express or arouse in the per­cipient some kind of emotional quality which may even outlast the sensuous experience itself. A group of leaves of an oak tree, seen from below against the clear sky, may arouse within one an intense feeling which one finds at once both exhilarating and overawing. The sight of shimmering light on the surface of water can enchant and soothe us, while many will find the colorful leaves of autumn, bathed in the lingering brightness of sunlight, unmistakably nostalgic. Still many more will find the green bank of a river in midsummer gratifying and the greyness of an overcast sky in midwinter threatening. And, of course, there is nothing wrong with this kind of affective response to what one sees. Visual education, properly conceived, does allow for this kind of response, but since its primary aim is the development and exercise of the capacities of aesthetic vision outlined above, this can only be seen as one of its concomitant aspects, albeit a desirable one. The effective exercise of the capacities of aesthetic vision is seen by anyone who is capable of doing so as significant in its own right, and not as something which
is only instrumentally valuable. It seems to me that all
the writers who emphasized the value of emotion or pleasure
either failed to see the point of aesthetic vision or
grossly undermined it. The point of educating aesthetic
vision is to be found primarily in the development of the
individual's ability to exercise imaginative perception,
sensory discrimination, and formal articulation. If there
is a group of cognitive or intellectual capacities in
human beings that are worth developing in their own right,
then I could see no reason why these capacities should not
be seen as belonging to that group. There is no question
here of denying the place which feelings and emotions
occupy in human life. All I want to suggest is that their
involvement in aesthetic vision does not make them a pri-
mary aim, let alone a differentiating aim, of visual
education. Moreover, the cultivation of affect does not
necessitate the training of the capacities involved in
aesthetic vision. I have already mentioned that the in-
dividual's affective response may outlast the sensuous
experience itself. I now wish to suggest that it could
occur without any sensuous experience at all. Consider
how happy (or sad) I shall feel when I am done with writing
this paper. Whatever the case may be, my affective state
surely would have nothing to do with the sight or sound of
my typewriter, or any other object, for that matter.
Affective development and aesthetic development can both progress independently of each other.

It may be said that even though aesthetic education is significant in its own right, it could still benefit from its connection with affect. The argument here draws attention to the fact that people (including highly influential ones like principals, school-board members, legislators, and so on) are more likely to express their approval of giving emotional development a place on the curriculum than they would to aesthetic development. They would say that aesthetic development, if not maladaptive, does not have the central place which the emotions occupy in the conduct of human life, to mention one possible argument which they may give in order to make their position appear plausible. Whatever the nature of their argument may be, it is often the case that while it would be highly unreasonable to suggest that such people have only a limited access to the world of the emotions, it would not at all be unreasonable to suggest that their awareness of the world of aesthetic vision is, in fact, limited or nonexistent. Thus, it can be argued that by emphasizing the emotional or affective link in aesthetic education, it would appear more acceptable to such people. Such an emphasis on affect would, of course, be in order so long as one recognizes it for what it really is.
The much discussed connection between the development of creativity and visual education brings to our attention another of the concomitant aspects of the education of aesthetic vision. Of course not all of the manifestations of aesthetic vision serve this purpose or serve it to the same degree. But one could safely say that the development of imaginative perception provides us with an ideal technique for the development of creative abilities. I certainly cannot think of any one better. However, to say that imaginative perception is ideally suited for the development of creativity does not mean that its usefulness in education ought to be viewed as purely instrumental, no more than mathematics ought to be viewed as having only an instrumental value simply because it happens to be necessary for physics. Thus, the development of imaginative vision is a basic component of visual education because it expands aesthetic vision, not because it is ideally suited for the training of creative ability.

Another of these concomitant aspects of the development of aesthetic vision is its contributions to the acquisition of propositional knowledge. It should be obvious to everyone that the structuring of vision is a structuring of awareness or consciousness; and awareness or consciousness, as the phenomenologists have taught us, is always an awareness or consciousness of something. Thus, not only is
what one is aware of capable of being retained in memory but is also susceptible to rational analysis or reflective thought. Since memory and reflection are considered to be the sources of much of our knowledge and beliefs, it should not be hard to appreciate how the link between aesthetic vision and the development of knowledge and belief is established.

The forms of knowledge or beliefs which one could infer from the development of aesthetic vision vary considerably in character. Perhaps the most relevant of these from the standpoint of visual education is what might be termed critical knowledge. An example of critical knowledge would be when someone points to, for example, a well-dressed lady and says: "What that lady is wearing displays a well-developed sense of form; because what she is wearing goes well with the color of her hair and complexion." This person has expressed an art-critical belief which, if it turns out to be true, would exemplify art-critical knowledge. Another form of knowledge or belief which the structuring of aesthetic vision would involve belongs to the science of psychology. An example for it would be this statement: "The 'duck-rabbit' diagram can be seen both as a rabbit and as a duck alternatively, because one in each case deploys a different set and focuses attention on different parts of the design." A third form of knowledge to be dealt with involves social comment about the
nature and role of aesthetic vision. Thus one may say that the development of aesthetic vision will make it less likely for the human individual to experience the visible world in terms of insipid stereotypes, or that visual discrimination will promote human understanding because it will discredit the stereotyped view of the world. A fourth form is demonstrated by art-historical knowledge. An example for this would be: "The fragmentation of the figure in Cubism served the purpose of making the figure, which hitherto dominated European painting, lose its coherence so that it would not be possible for the viewer to look at the painting in figure-ground terms but only synoptically." Indeed, there is no limit for the variety of knowledge which concern for aesthetic vision could give rise to by way of recall or reflection on it.

This kind of propositional knowledge or belief which the development of aesthetic vision could give rise to may be seen as having a legitimate place within the context of visual education and, of course, there is nothing wrong with that. What is to be avoided, however, is the situation where this kind of propositional knowledge is viewed as the educationally valuable end of visual education, a situation, in other words where the role of visual education is seen as purely instrumental. This danger, if I may call it that, is especially persistent at times when the prevailing educational dogma demands that only propositional
knowledge and experience which can be expressed propositionally ought to have a prominent role in the curriculum. At such times one is tempted to emphasize the role of visual education in the development of propositional knowledge as a basis for granting it a place on the curriculum. Some even went so far as to posit a "propositional theory of art" (and by implication of aesthetic vision), as we have seen from our discussion of this matter in Chapter V. It should therefore be emphasized that whatever propositional knowledge one may infer from aesthetic vision should be viewed in proper perspective, namely, as a concomitant aspect of it which has nothing to do with its differentiating aim-structure.

Another of these concomitant aspects which are involved in the development of aesthetic vision is the formation of cultural attitudes. Any significant aesthetic experience generates within the percipient a feeling of approval or satisfaction which lingers on after the experience is over leaving memory traces which culminate in the formation of a positive attitude regarding that experience and the situations which are in some ways associated with it. Any culture fosters the formation of positive attitudes toward what it holds to be of value. And so it is not hard to see how the development of aesthetic vision can give rise to positive attitudes regarding the place of
aesthetic experience and its symbolic expression in works of art in the life of man. Indeed, such attitudes often seem to be considered valuable in their own right, and not because of the experience of which they are concomitant aspects. Thus, it is possible to find people expressing, not always without sincerity, deep sentiments of approval regarding the arts and other aspects of the human culture without themselves having any genuine experience of these things. Their attitudes can be explained solely on the basis of enculturation and social approval, without any need for supposing that they had an authentic encounter with the arts or anything else. I remember how in 1958 I was shocked when one of my teachers, for whom I had much respect and admiration, expressed a negative view of grand opera. To me, the well-enculturated schoolboy, that was a clear case of blasphemy, but somehow I managed to ignore it and continue my respect and admiration for him. A few years later I got better educated, and so the recall of that incident brought me a feeling of surprise and embarrassment. What brought me that feeling was not the remark of my much admired and respected teacher but my reaction to it. How could I have felt so much veneration for grand opera, something which I virtually knew nothing about? I now know the answer: it was the process of sheer conditioning and enculturation to which I was subjected both inside, and outside, school.
I was driven into this reminiscing by a deeply felt need to draw attention, not only to the concomitant nature of this kind of attitude, but especially to the fact that it could, as we have just seen, be totally bogus, in spite of the approval given to it by culture and society. To say that it is bogus does not mean, however, that it could not serve a useful function within the culture or the community that fosters it. What I intend to point out is that not all the attitudes of approval—cherishing, valuing—arise as a concomitant aspects of a significant experience (e.g., as in aesthetic vision), and that unless they do, they are of a bogus nature (pseudo-values).

The last of the concomitant aspects of aesthetic development which I would like to consider here is to be found in its links with psychotherapy. The exercise of aesthetic vision is considered to be of value in psychotherapy both in the diagnosis of psychological disorders and in their treatment. In the field of therapy proper, the treatment is said to arise either directly, as a result of an encounter with the experiences of aesthetic vision themselves, or indirectly, as a result of occupying the patient with something which will provide him with a sense of purpose and divert his attention from whatever aggravates his pathological condition.

No well-intentional, sane person would not like to see human beings free from psychic and emotional handicaps,
and so it would be unlikely to find any person of that description who would not want to reap the therapeutic benefits which the development of aesthetic vision can offer. However, many of the most persistent advocates of this form of therapy as an educational goal seem to me to blur the distinction between an educational institution and a therapeutic institution. I sometimes wonder if they will still react in the same way if their attention is drawn to that important distinction, where the function of the educational institution is viewed as the structuring of the understanding whereas that of the therapeutic institution is perceived as connected with curing mental disorders.

In discussing the scope of visual education my concern was exclusively with its concomitant aspects. Throughout I tried to distinguish them from the differentiating aim structure of visual education which I consider to be the expansion, intensification, and articulation of vision. I have also pointed out that, as concomitant aspects, they occupy a legitimate place in visual education. Rather than deny them this legitimacy, by interfering with their presence in visual education, one should exploit their benefits to the full as secondary or concomitant aspects of visual education.
One should not even hesitate to use them, if necessary, as the sugar coating on the pill. Many people, including those in influential positions, tend to be indifferent, if not actually hostile, toward granting visual education a prominent place on the curriculum, even though these very people entertain positive attitudes toward the arts and other manifestations of cultural life, because of the process of enculturation to which they have been subjected. Their negative or hostile attitude to the education of the capacities of aesthetic vision is the result of their lack of knowledge of these capacities; in other words because these capacities do not form part of their experience, unlike the effects of enculturation which do form part of their experience. There is an appropriate anecdote involving the late Louis Armstrong, the famous jazz musician. When an admirer once asked him what jazz was, so the story goes, he laughed in his characteristic manner and said: "If you have to ask, then I can't tell you." This anecdote illustrates the point I am trying to make, namely, there is a difference between having a favorable attitude toward something and having an experience of it. While it is true to say that the latter may concomitantly involve the former, the reverse is certainly not true. Nevertheless, having a favorable attitude toward something could have the same sort of desirable effect which the sugar coating on the pill has: it serves to reduce hostility. I believe that
the concomitant aspects of visual education can be effectively used in this manner.

In my comments so far I have argued that affect, attitude, creativity, inference, and therapy could have a legitimate and useful presence within the context of visual education. It remains, however, to be said most emphatically that this legitimacy and usefulness is dependent on their existence as concomitant aspects of exercising the processes of aesthetic vision. In other words, their occurrence must be the outcome of percipience.

THE MEANS OF VISUAL EDUCATION

My concern in the previous two sections was with the differentiating aim structure of visual education and its concomitant aspects. I have argued that visual education aims at the development of aesthetic vision in all its three aspects, namely the expansion, intensification, and articulation of visual experience. These three processes were, thus, presented as constituting amongst them the object of learning in visual education. In this section I shall endeavor to describe the appropriate means whereby the development of those processes, capacities, or skills can be effectively brought about. But before actually doing so it would be helpful to make some general remarks about the nature of aesthetic learning.
Let us, then, ask ourselves this question: what does aesthetic learning involve? One point which stands out very clearly in a consideration of this issue is that aesthetic learning always involves a modification of some kind in one's experience of the world. Thus, in a genuine aesthetic encounter with the world there is a conscious knowledge of the discrepancy between how one perceived the object before learning took place and how one perceived it when learning did take place. It should, therefore, be made perfectly clear that the kind of learning which we are dealing with here is different from the perceptual learning which psychologists, generally speaking, want to investigate. What seems to interest them is how the organism learns to respond to the world discriminatively through the use of his senses, how he separates figure from ground and how he develops meaningful categories which enable him to tell cats from cars, houses from horses, what is red from what is green, what is near from what is far, and so forth. This has nothing to do with aesthetic learning which is characterizable by the phenomenal change which one's perception of the world undergoes. So the acquisition of the cognitive skills and the concepts which go with them, which constitute aesthetic learning, involve appreciable changes in one's phenomenal experience of the world. Hence their designation as "aesthetic."
One could say that anyone whose capacities for seeing the world aesthetically are well-developed is capable of manipulating the visible qualities of the world in thought. To such a person the shape of the world would assume a dynamic nature; for he can see aesthetically in more than one way, depending on which of the skills of aesthetic vision he happens to deploy as well as on the structure of the object perceived. Thus, he may be contemplating the world imaginatively, or he may be discriminating the sensory richness and diversity of the concrete body of the world, or he may be concentrating on its formal-relational character.

Another important characteristic which one expects to encounter in someone whose capacities for aesthetic vision are well-developed is that he does not merely learn to cherish and value, or develop favorable attitudes without there being an appropriate experience involved. Instead, he is always aware of the experience which is the object of his cherishing and his valuing. Thus, he does not value or cherish masterpieces because they are supposed to be worthy of doing so, or because other people do so in relation to them, but because of his personal experience of them.

I shall end these remarks on the nature of the learning involved in the education of aesthetic vision by mentioning one of its characteristics which seems crucial for determining what the procedures of visual education ought to be. Aesthetic learning differs from the kind of learning which
one usually associates with schooling in that it is *appreciative* in character, while the former is *descriptive* or *inferential*. One, therefore, should not expect the means, methods, and procedures that are appropriate for the development of learning, say, in science or history to be also appropriate for the development of aesthetic learning. I shall now attempt to describe the procedures or activities that I consider appropriate for the development of *appreciative* learning, which is the concern of visual education.

**Aesthetic Appreciation**

Appreciative learning involves the successful exercise of the skills of aesthetic vision. In other words, one learns to experience the world through imaginative perception, sensory discrimination, or formal articulation. This process is called aesthetic appreciation or percipience.

Some writers have attempted to characterize aesthetic appreciation as mere contemplation of the particularity or concrete body of things, including works of art. This sort of characterization, however, is misleading. For although it is true that in aesthetic vision one is brought close to the particularity or the concrete body of things, this characterization gives the impression that what matters in aesthetic appreciation is our acquaintance with the particularity of things, and also that our involvement in it is passive or unproductive. My analysis of the character of aesthetic vision in the first section of this chapter
clearly shows that such an impression would be quite false. I do not feel I ought to say anything here about the active participation of the percipient in the act of aesthetic vision, for that would be repetitive. A few remarks on the relative value of becoming acquainted with the particularity of things, including works of art, however, would seem quite in order.

To get to the particularity of things is the starting point of aesthetic appreciation; without it there can be no such thing. But the value of the appreciative experience depends on what comes after that, namely the imaginative transformation, the sensory discrimination, or the formal articulation. It is this which lies at the heart of aesthetic appreciation, or percipience, properly so-called. Every one of those processes of aesthetic vision involves some form of modification affecting the particular appearance of the objects of the world, including works of art. The case of formal articulation would serve as a good example for explaining what I mean. When I contemplate the world formally, my attention is directed solely to those features which express formal or aesthetic qualities (e.g., rhythmic or linear qualities). My attention, therefore, is not indiscriminately directed toward those objects. Sometimes my attention joins together objects or parts of objects which are not categorically related in a significant way. Thus, I may be standing in a street and in an act of formal
perception join together the hair of a woman waiting to cross the road, the body of a car, and the wash hanging from a balcony on the other side of the road. Or I may join the outline of an object with the elements of its background. What happens in this case is not indiscriminate attention to the particularity of things, but an act of aesthetic abstraction in which my attention is directed only to those features of the concrete body of the world which either evince aesthetically valuable qualities or promise to do so. We may thus conclude that what is aesthetically significant in the act of appreciation is not the mere acquaintance with the particularity of the world but those features which we abstract from it.

This misleading impression which a characterization of aesthetic appreciation as mere acquaintance with the particularity of the world becomes most crucial when it comes to the appreciation of works of art. Unlike the objects of nature, aesthetic works of art are artifacts especially adapted for the purpose of expressing or evincing aesthetic qualities, and so one may naively assume that anything in them must have aesthetic significance. But is this so? I have already indicated that the abstraction involved in the appreciation of aesthetic form directs attention only to some of the features given in the concrete body of the object. I would like to add now that it does not merely determine what parts of the object one attends
to but, more significantly, it also determines what particular aspects of those parts must be attended to, so that the aesthetic value of the object may be achieved. Thus, to say that an art object may be especially designed to express aesthetic qualities does not mean that every perceptible feature or property should figure in one's perception of it. Any aesthetic work of art, no matter how perfect it may seem has among its features or properties some which are purely incidental to its aesthetic value. These include features or properties which pertain to the personality of the artist and his idiocyncracies as well as features or properties pertaining to the characteristic effects of the materials and technical processes he uses. To illustrate this in a more concrete way let us consider Mondrian's manneristic style of the nineteen-twenties and thirties, the sort of painting which most people would associate with his name. During this period, Mondrian produced one painting after another, most of them are monotonously similar. One may, therefore, be tempted to consider the particularities which these paintings consistently display as absolutely essential for the realization of their aesthetic worth. Indeed, Mondrian himself said so on many occasions. However, discerning perception, and the considerable literature which Mondrian himself wrote indicate quite clearly that what the aesthetic worth of these paintings consists in is the dynamic balance which they all
express most effectively. Now, this aesthetically valuable quality does not depend on the particularities which Mondrian's manneristic style consistently displays, such as the right-angle, the black lines, the three primaries, and the two-dimensional treatment of space. In other words, these particular features are not artistically, or technically, necessary for the expression of dynamic balance.

Mondrian, in fact, himself insisted that the particularities of an object have nothing to do with aesthetic worth. Ironically, it was his strong passion to emphasize this truth that he came to be involved with the particularities just mentioned. It was, in fact, his metaphysical belief, absolutely unfounded, that those features—the right-angle, the three primary colors, etc.—have the blessing of escaping the particularity which characterizes all remaining forms and colors which made him adopt them. For this reason I feel that these manneristic paintings served, and still do, a useful function, not as objects of aesthetic worth (like his historically important paintings which he produced roughly between 1910 and 1920), but simply as symbols of the new vision, characterized by dynamic balance, which his truly remarkable achievement helped bring about.

Not only must we not confuse those features of a work of art that are merely incidental to its aesthetic worth with those that are not, but it is also important to
recognize the latter for what they are, namely, as artistically or technically significant features of the work.

The aesthetic efficacy of the work of art depends on certain features which its artistic structure physically displays. These features are referred to as its artistic or technical features. Their existence is crucial to the expression of the aesthetic qualities of the work. In this respect they are distinguishable from the incidental features of the work which, as we have just seen, play absolutely no role in determining its aesthetic worth. Examples of these artistically or technically significant features and their properties can be given readily. To limit ourselves to the formal-relational tradition of modern art, these include: 1) Cézanne's interference with the formal laws of perspective (e.g., his tilting of the table top in some of his paintings) and his emphasis on the background in his paintings with individual figures (e.g., in Boy in the Red Vest) so as to discourage figure-ground interpretation. 2) The Cubists' fragmentation of the individual figure, not only to discourage a figure-ground interpretation but to undermine the coherence of the figure itself. 3) Their use of monochromatic tones (e.g., greys, grey-browns), in order to stress the plastic unity or plastic structure of the painting by discouraging figure-ground interpretation. 4) Their use of the collage technique, where real objects are introduced in the canvas.
to emphasize the character of the painting as a real object existing in its own right. 5) Mondrian's total abandonment of the figure-ground concept in painting. 6) His total abandonment of the pictorial concept of space. 7) His cancellation of subject-matter. All these are artistically or technically significant features of the aesthetic work of art, upon which its capacity to express aesthetic qualities depends. It is also important to emphasize at this point the distinction between the artistically or technically significant features of the work upon which the expression of its aesthetic qualities depends and the aesthetic qualities themselves. While the artistically significant features determine the aesthetic qualities of the work, they are not intrinsically significant, whereas aesthetic qualities clearly are. In other words, artistically significant features of the work do not constitute aesthetically valuable entities; in this respect they are like those incidental or idiosyncratic features discussed above. This means that the aesthetic qualities of a work of art are nowhere to be found in its physical features, irrespective of whether these are artistically significant or not. Aesthetic qualities are purely intentional in character; they are aspects of phenomenal experience, not the physical world. To view the material features of the work of art as constitutive of aesthetic value is, therefore, bound to spoil one's appreciation.
In aesthetic appreciation, then, one must be careful not to confuse features of the work that are incidental to its aesthetic worth with those which are crucial to it. Also, one should be careful not to confuse these features (which are crucial for the expression of aesthetic qualities) with the aesthetic qualities which determine the worth of the work as an aesthetically expressive object. I shall now go on to discuss another anomaly which could plague aesthetic appreciation; namely, that which involves an arbitrary response to the work of art or an object of aesthetic interest.

Since the validity of the aesthetic experience depends on its being grounded in the work of art or aesthetic symbol itself, then whatever value it may have must also be grounded in the expressive features of the work. And so unless one's experience of the aesthetic symbol meets this requirement, it would not be aesthetic at all, however significant its subjective appeal may seem and however highly regarded the object itself may be. There are, however, numerous cases where the nature of the response does not conform to this demand but happens to be purely arbitrary or idiosyncratic in character. In many cases the responses in question is not aesthetic at all. The encounter with a work of art or object of aesthetic interest is sometimes considered an appropriate occasion for emotional indulgence or for reminiscing or day-dreaming. The
function of the work of art in such cases is to trigger off the feeling, reminiscing, or day-dreaming process, as it were, and the individual comes to think of this indulgence as constitutive of the value of the work, even though its relationship to its artistic structure is purely arbitrary. There is of course nothing odd about experiencing feelings and emotions in an aesthetic encounter, but such feelings and emotions must ultimately depend on the artistic structure of the work, or at least be provoked by it (in which case it is an emotional reaction to the sensuous experience phenomenally realized on the basis of the artistic structure of the work). Unless the emotional experience involved in the aesthetic encounter is of this nature, it could not be considered appropriate.

Sometimes the experience which obtains from an encounter with a work of art or an object of aesthetic interest is characterized by a distinct feeling of deep admiration and approval or veneration and respect. This is perhaps typical of many people's response on a first encounter with a celebrated masterpiece, such as the Mona Lisa or the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. On an encounter with such masterpieces which are widely considered as symbols of human genius or artistic excellence, one tends to be overwhelmed by a feeling appropriate only to something very special. It is precisely this feeling which
appears to dominate one's experience in an encounter of this sort, while all other aspects of what one is conscious of assume only a marginal place. This kind of experience, however, is not an aesthetic experience at all. Now, this does not mean that such celebrated masterpieces have no aesthetic value; in fact they may well have (in many cases this is why they became celebrated in the first place). It only means that whatever the aesthetic value of these masterpieces may be, it is certainly not identical with those feelings of admiration and approval or reverence and respect which tend to predominate.

Finally, there are times when the response tends to be basically cognitive in character. In such cases one responds by making critical judgments about the work or object of aesthetic interest. But one does not have to entertain an aesthetic experience in order to be able to make critical remarks about aesthetic qualities; one can mention these remarks on the basis of his previous encounters with the aesthetic, or one may even utter them in a purely parrot fashion. Moreover, even if the person is making his remarks on the basis of his phenomenal experience, these remarks, in themselves, do not constitute aesthetic experiences. And so whenever their presence becomes predominant in one's response to a work of art or an object of aesthetic interest, then the response in
question is characterizable as a cognitive response, not an aesthetic one.

There are other types of arbitrary response where one does in fact respond aesthetically but not in an appropriate fashion. This kind of situation obtains when one is trying, say, to perceive a Mondrian imaginatively, or a Kandinsky relationally; in other words, when one is attempting to use the wrong symbol system, as the semiotic theorist would say. This kind of situation would be considered arbitrary in the realm of aesthetic appreciation, as indeed it would be in any other enterprise where rationality is to be accounted for. (Just imagine someone who is trying to understand Albert Einstein's 1905 paper for its autobiographical or psychological interest, or as a demonstration of the rules of German grammar and syntax, thus totally ignoring its significance as a statement of the laws of Physics.) However, there are times when the aesthetic experience which occurs as a result of the deployment of the wrong symbol system does not seem to be inefficient. In such cases what happens is that one contemplates the object of aesthetic interest in a "high-handed" fashion, as it were, by ignoring important aspects of its surface or artistic features. Thus one may focus one's attention on a small detail in a Mondrian and perceive it imaginatively, or on a small detail in a Kandinsky and perceive it relationally. The trick seems to work because one
ignores the structural context of the detail in question. This method of "high-handed" aesthetic perception is also arbitrary, or idiosyncratic. When confronting aesthetically significant works of art or objects, one must pay due attention to the structural features of the work or object in their entirety, so as to see them in their proper perspective. For only then would one's aesthetic response be appropriate, objectively appropriate, if I may say so.

In what I have said about how one's response to aesthetically significant works of art and objects, my intention throughout was to emphasize the rationality of aesthetic appreciation, whereby the response is considered appropriate only if it happens to be fully grounded in the surface structure of the aesthetically significant work of art or object. It should, therefore, be perfectly clear that not every response involving an aesthetically significant work of art or object is an appropriate aesthetic response or even aesthetic at all. Such responses, as we have seen, are sometimes not aesthetic, but only emotional, reverential, or cognitive. Sometimes they are, in fact, aesthetic but not appropriately so. In each case the response involved is arbitrary or idiosyncratic, rather than rational or objective.

I shall now proceed to make some specific remarks about the role of works of fine art in aesthetic appreciation. As Boulez remarked, a landscape painter learns more
about landscape painting by looking at the landscapes painted by other artists than by looking at nature. This remark aptly highlights the positive role which masterpieces of fine art can play in the development of aesthetic awareness. The history of art confirms that so much so that tradition and innovation may seem as aspects of one and the same process. In view of what I said above about the nature of works of fine art as serving aesthetically the purpose of making explicit what other objects reveal in a veiled or an imperfect way, this may seem rather paradoxical. For if it is true that works of art are contrived to give a precise or unambiguous expression of aesthetic qualities, and if these qualities can be apprehended in non-artistic objects only imperfectly, then one would expect the former to be less likely capable of suggesting qualities which hitherto have been passed by unacknowledged than the latter. In other words, one would expect the less precise to be more suggestive or more ambiguous. A number of explanations, of course, could be given, but for me this one seems quite reasonable. Aesthetic knowledge, like all knowledge, is a human achievement; it is an aspect of the evolution of mind, not an aspect of nature, even though this is rightly seen to be teleologically involved in its formation. But whatever explanation one may wish to give for it, this claim remains unchallenged.
We turn to works of art in order to develop our capacity to respond to the world (including works of art themselves) in an aesthetic manner. We turn to works of art, in other words, in order to learn to perceive imaginatively, discriminate the sensory structure of stimulation, and engage in formal articulation, that is to say, the processes of aesthetic vision which I described in the first section of this chapter. It is crucial, however, that we should learn to distinguish those features of the work of art which are artistically significant from its purely incidental or idiosyncratic features. This last point is particularly important, since overlooking it could give rise to a situation where one looks at works of art as idols to be worshiped or venerated, not as specially adapted or designed objects for the expression of aesthetic qualities. We must learn to recognize these artistically significant features and respond to them appropriately, not in a coercive or "high-handed" fashion. If approached in this way, one would not think that an aesthetic experience can only be had in an encounter with a work of art. Likewise, one would not consider works of art, no matter how significant or celebrated they may be, as valuable by virtue of their material being.

I should not conclude this account of aesthetic appreciation without mentioning something about the role of the teacher in the development of aesthetic appreciation.
Three things could be mentioned in this connection. First, the teacher could point out to the student the aesthetically significant objects, whether they happen to be works of art or not. Thus, he could, for instance, show the student the view through the window and point out, say, the curvilinear rhythms of the branches of the trees or the rectilinear rhythms of the buildings behind them. Second, the teacher could provide the student with a cutout window on a sheet of cardboard and ask him to look for elements which harmonize well within the rectangular frame of the window, or he could ask the student to try to do the same thing in connection with a two-dimensional structure, such as the kind of pictures that one finds in magazines and books. He could change the nature of the problem and ask the student to look not for elements that formally harmonize together but for elements that are suited for imaginative perception. But this brings us to a consideration of the role of the two remaining means of developing aesthetic vision, namely, aesthetic criticism and artistic production. Let us examine these in order to find out how they can be effective in the development or structuring of aesthetic vision.

Aesthetic Criticism

The way aesthetic criticism figures in visual education is not as an end in itself, and so constitutive of aesthetic
learning, but only as a means to be used in one's attempt to facilitate aesthetic learning. Thus, to speak of aesthetic criticism as an aim of the education of aesthetic vision would be quite misleading. Let us then find out about the nature of aesthetic criticism and the ways in which it can be used effectively in structuring aesthetic vision.

Within the context of visual education, aesthetic criticism involves the use of ordinary language by the teacher and the student in referring directly or indirectly to aesthetic values and processes. This involves the use of words to refer not only to aesthetic concepts, but also to artistic and technical ones. Thus, whereas the words "rhythm" or "balance" refer to aesthetic concepts the acquisition of which articulates aesthetic perception, words or phrases like "foreground" and "background" or "picture-plane" relate to artistic concepts and are used to direct attention to certain aspects of the artistic structure of the work, while words like "collage" and "carving" relate to technical concepts and direct attention to the technical processes involved in the production of works of art.

Aesthetic criticism, then, functions in visual education as a means for structuring aesthetic vision by means of talk involving the use of appropriate concepts which include aesthetic concepts. The question which one might
want to ask here is: how is it possible for this kind of activity to develop aesthetic vision? How is it possible, let us say, to develop an awareness of rhythm through the use of the word "rhythm"? The answer is simply that one could not do that through language alone; one needs also to point out to some appropriate objects which adequately express the aesthetic quality which the word "rhythm" designates. Thus, aesthetic criticism, in this case, is effective in that it directs the attention of the learner to those features of the world, including works of art, which are expressive of the aesthetic quality in question. In other words, one aids the learner to acquire aesthetic knowledge by giving the word in question proper application. Another useful function which the employment of aesthetic concepts could have in the process of structuring aesthetic vision is one which does not involve the acquisition of the concept itself but only its application in an unusual or complex situation. Thus, a student who has acquired the aesthetic concept of dynamic balance may find no difficulty in applying it to structures which do not involve individual elements of particular interest (such as the abstractionistic paintings of Mondrian), but he may fail to recognize this aesthetic quality in a photograph or a fifteenth-century Persian miniature, where elements of particular interest are shown. This student, however, may come to
recognize in perception that these, too, offer appropriate application to the aesthetic concept referred to as "dynamic balance"—despite the presence of those elements.

However, one does not have to use critical statements involving aesthetic concepts in order to facilitate or further aesthetic vision. One can do so, as I indicated above, simply by using words referring to both artistic and technical concepts. To speak of "aesthetic criticism" does not imply necessarily use of aesthetic concepts; it only implies that the criticism in question has the development of aesthetic vision as its aim.

Aesthetic criticism does not have to be used directly in the development of aesthetic vision, through its role in the acquisition and application of aesthetic concepts. It could perform a very useful role in the evaluation of aesthetic learning. Such a role would be crucial for maintaining the efficiency of the educational process. Thus, the teacher can ask the student specific questions about the aesthetic qualities of particular works of art or about the artistic efforts of the student himself, and in the light of the answers given he can base his evaluation of the student's learning. Of course, the questions themselves do not have to be specific either; for what is important is only to ensure that the student's response is aesthetically relevant.
However, it must be stated here that the remark about the role of criticism in evaluation should not be allowed to pass without qualification. The critical statements which the student makes about the aesthetic qualities of works of art, including his own artistic efforts, cannot, in any way, be considered precise indices for the student's aesthetic learning properly conceived, even though they may be considered as precise indices for his ability to make critical statements. Needless to say, the two can hardly be considered the same. The student's aesthetically significant critical statements are valuable in so far as they enable the teacher to gain insight into the student's aesthetic experience and so be in a better position to pass judgment on it. These statements are also capable of enabling the student himself to assess the aesthetic validity of his experience through the teacher's comments on them. Thus, while it is true to say that the student's critical statements about his aesthetic experience do not, in any way, constitute aesthetic learning, they nonetheless serve as its symptoms in the process of evaluating it.

In concluding my remarks about the role of criticism in the development of aesthetic vision, I would like to emphasize that its purpose is not to develop critical ability, with all the desirable effects that it entails (conceptual understanding and verbal sophistication, in particular), as an end in its own right, but to draw the
attention of the student to what is of real aesthetic value as opposed to what is merely idiosyncratic or incidental, in an endeavor to structure his aesthetic vision which is the differentiating aim of visual education. Of course, critical ability itself needs to be developed, and so the teacher may well find himself aiming his pedagogical efforts at its realization. But the fruits of his efforts in this respect, assuming that he does succeed, do not constitute visual education, since they relate to it only instrumentally.

Artistic Production
Artistic production can be conceived of in different ways. One can conceive of it as a means for self-expression, as training of manipulative and technical skills, as a creative or productive activity, as a therapeutic activity, or, as in many high schools where concern for artistic sophistication is sought, as mere imitation of superficial or surface qualities of fashionable artistic styles. None of these approaches to artistic production should, however, be confused with the approach which I shall be examining here where artistic production is conceived of solely in terms of the services which it could render to the development of aesthetic vision. Like aesthetic criticism, artistic production serves the structuring of aesthetic vision both as an instructional technique and as a means for evaluating learning outcomes.
One can extend aesthetic vision to an appreciable degree by means of the processes of appreciative perception and criticism, but one's achievement would be limited if the methods of visual education are restricted to these two processes alone. Just as conceptual thought and understanding can be articulated through its symbolic expression in language, our understanding of aesthetic vision becomes articulated through artistic expression. This function of symbolic expression, in both conceptual thought and aesthetic vision, is often ignored. Instead one is more likely to hear people talk about symbolization only as a means of communicating one's thoughts or feelings to others, or simply as a means of recording them for future reference. However, the role of symbolic expression in articulating the products of the mind, whatever their particular nature may be, is so important that it would be quite proper to think of it as a stage or element in the process of intellectual formulation itself. The point I wish to make here is that one needs artistic expression in order to articulate aesthetic vision.

Artistic production is useful for the development of aesthetic vision in other ways too. I have mentioned above that it is very important in visual education to develop the student's ability to distinguish the artistically important features of a work of art from its purely incidental
or idiosyncratic ones, since only the former are essential for the expression of its aesthetic qualities. Now, nothing can develop the student's awareness of this fact than his own artistic efforts which aim at expressing aesthetic qualities. And of course the student does not have to be aiming at the expression of a specific aesthetic quality for this to be the case. In other words, artistic expression serves this very important function even when its aesthetic objectives are not predetermined. As his aesthetic vision becomes more structured, the student learns to distinguish the aesthetically expressive features from those that are not.

One more way in which artistic production can facilitate the development of aesthetic vision is by its unique capacity to increase the student's sensitivity to the physical foundation of his aesthetic experience. Through artistic expression the student would realize how minute alterations in the artistic structure may create significant changes in the phenomenally experienced aesthetic object. This would result in making the student's aesthetic vision truly dynamic.

As I have said above, artistic production does not only serve in visual education as an instructional means only, but also as a basis for evaluation. In some ways it performs this role in evaluation better than aesthetic criticism does; in others it is perhaps inferior to it.
Its superiority is of course to be found in the fact that artistic production, as a form of symbolization, uses a more appropriate symbol system for expressing aesthetic qualities than does aesthetic criticism which uses ordinary language, a symbolic medium which is incapable of giving them direct expression, but only of referring to them descriptively. Where artistic expression is inferior to criticism as a means of evaluation is when the teacher does not know which aesthetic qualities the student is attempting to express, or which aesthetic qualities the student thinks are adequately expressed in his work. This statement, however, needs some qualification. This problem does not arise if the aim of the evaluation is to enable the teacher to give appropriate feedback to the student; for he could do so without first knowing what the student himself is trying to do. The problem would only arise if the teacher is in a position where he wants to assess the learning outcome of the student.

This is, then, how artistic production can serve as a means in the education of aesthetic vision. Now, in order to give a more coherent picture of this conception of artistic production, I shall make some comments on the rival conceptions, mentioned at the beginning of this account, from the point of view of visual education as expounded in this chapter. First, let us consider the one
which emphasizes the training of technical and manipulative
skills as the proper aim of artistic production. In so
far as artistic expression is a means of structuring aes-
thetic vision, the development of technical and manipulative
skills is no doubt necessary. Without it artistic expres-
sion would only be primitive or ineffective. But such
training would then be instrumental to the achievement of
the ends of visual education. For this reason technical
or manipulative skills should on no account be considered
as adequate indices to the aesthetic merit of the student's
work. These two do not always go together.

Let us now consider the conception where the aim of
artistic production is seen as the development of artistic
sophistication, where the teacher's pedagogical efforts
are directed toward making the student reflect in his work
the superficial or surface features and traits of the fash-
ionable styles and techniques of the time. The results of
this approach, where the student literally apes surface
qualities under the label of this or that "ism" is some-
times viewed as a good example for how worthy the outcome
of instruction in art can be. This mode of artistic pro-
duction or activity (I don't call it "expression" because
it isn't) has nothing to do with the education of aesthetic
vision as expounded in this chapter. Formalism or mannerism
would be appropriate terms for it. For in this kind of
approach the surface structure of the work is considered intrinsically valuable, not, that is, as an artistic structure specially adapted for the expression of aesthetic qualities (or any other, for that matter).

A variant of this approach views the object of artistic activity as, literally, the production of the work of art, in much the same way as poultry farming is for the production of eggs. The students are regarded pretty much like the hens in the poultry farm; their activities are considered appropriate if, and only if, they culminate in the production of a work of art, and, as in the case of poultry farming, the higher the grade or quality of the product is considered to be, the better. This situation arises when people consider works of art to be intrinsically valuable. From the point of view of visual education the spotting of an aesthetically expressive work of art may mark the beginning of the educative activity, not its end. When the teacher recognizes the aesthetic value of the work of the student, his proper task in visual education is not to utter a few words of praise to the student and then snatch the work from his hands and hide it somewhere for safekeeping. His task, properly conceived, is to direct the student's attention to where the aesthetic merit of his work lies and, if appropriate, do the same thing in relation to the entire class. For there is absolutely no
guarantee that the student who produced the work (and maybe the entire class too) is aware of that aesthetic merit; and the point of aesthetic education, as we have seen, depends on making the student in possession of that kind of awareness. Thus, not only must the teacher point out the aesthetic significance of the work of the student, but he has to do everything possible which would help the student apprehend it himself, otherwise there is not much point in whatever else he may do.

An appropriate approach on the part of the teacher is, therefore, necessary. But one cannot solve the problem by merely giving the teacher a list of directives, spelling out what he should and what he should not do. Thus, one could ask the teacher, for example, to exhibit the student's work in the art-room, on the basis that this would provide an opportunity for the students to develop their aesthetic learning through looking at it and talking about it. But such a purpose would not be served by the teacher who places the work on the walls of the room where they could not be adequately viewed by the students. Such a directive would not be effectively utilized unless the teacher knows what kind of spot each work needs to be placed in, in order that it may be viewed appropriately. The teacher, in other words, has to know--be aware of--the nature of the aim structure of visual education. Unless that is ensured in
the first place, no directive, however precise or comprehensive it may be, would be of much help.

To conclude my account about this conception of artistic production, where the learning of the superficial traits of artistic styles or techniques is viewed as its proper aim, I would like, first, to emphasize that not only the teacher should be primarily concerned with aesthetic values, but that he should also be specifically concerned with developing the aesthetic vision of the student. Everything really depends on this—on what the student becomes aware of through the educational activities in which he participates. Secondly, it should be also emphasized that the production of an aesthetically expressive artifact in no way guarantees that the student who produced it is aware of its aesthetic significance. For not only could such an artifact exhibit aesthetic worth by accident rather than by design, but the student could consistently manage to produce aesthetically expressive artifacts simply by aping the characteristic surface features of established styles or techniques (sheer formalism or mannerism). This is why I have said on more than one occasion that the production of an expressive object does not guarantee aesthetic learning.

At the opposite side of the pole from this conception there is another which betrays some awareness of the pitfalls of the one I have just been considering. According
to this other conception, the aim of artistic production is to enable the student to express himself through the artistic medium in a personal way. Those who advocate this approach to artistic production are usually careful to point out the difference between self-expression in the sense of giving vent to feeling, which they reject, and self-expression in the sense referred to above; namely, expressing themselves artistically (i.e., symbolically). The aim, thus, is the expression through an artistic medium of the particularity of the student's personal experience. The personality of the student, in other words, is, strictly speaking, what is to be expressed, and the more unique, or original, or imaginative the form of its expression is, the better. And so one may conclude that, to the advocates of this conception of artistic production, ingenuity and the idiosyncratic character of the work are acclaimed as the worthy goals of the artistic activity.

As far as their conception of the goals of artistic production is concerned, let me say very briefly that neither ingenuity nor idiosyncracy have anything to do with the goals of visual education as expounded in this chapter. To gain insight into the inner experience of another human being through the contemplation of an artistic object expressive of it and the ingenuity of that object may have their important place in life but neither has anything to do with aesthetic vision as expounded in this paper. And
so if they must find a place in education—because of their significance in human life—there is absolutely no reason to believe that their proper place is in aesthetic education. For aesthetic education can proceed without having to be either ingenious or idiosyncratic; and should these qualities appear, they will have to be considered as incidental to the aesthetic efficacy of the expression. To do otherwise, would be totally incompatible with the aim structure of visual education, as it is here explicated.

In recent years the advocates of this approach to artistic production, have attempted to emphasize the role of teaching in facilitating artistic expression. One writer, Elliot W. Eisner, in his book *Educating Artistic Vision*, spoke of two types of objectives: instructional (or instrumental) objectives and expressive objectives. He based this distinction on the belief in "the need for skill in the act of expression."\(^1\) His view is roughly this: while it is the ingenuity and idiosyncracy of the expression which is of ultimate value in the act of artistic production, their expression through the art medium demand certain technical skills which the teacher can develop in the student through the use of instructional objectives involving specific learning activities. According to Eisner, then, instructional objectives relate to what he considers of

\(^{1}\)Eisner, *Educating Artistic Vision*, p. 156.
ultimate worth in the act of artistic expression only in an instrumental way. Thus, it should be apparent that the development of aesthetic vision either lies outside Eisner's scheme altogether, or, if it does not, it would have to be considered as having a technical or instrumental value only. If it lies outside his scheme, then we could safely conclude that this scheme has nothing to do with aesthetic vision and its development through learning. If it is present but regarded as having only technical or instrumental value, then we can say that Eisner has an impoverished aesthetic awareness, if it could be called that at all.

In visual education, one directs one's pedagogical or instructional effort for developing aesthetic vision, not so that this may be utilized in expressing the particularity of one's experience in a unique or imaginative way (as Eisner would put it), but because this is an end which is intrinsically valuable as an important aspect of human intelligence. To say that what is of value in the work of an artist like Mondrian is the unique or imaginative way in which he expresses himself would be totally misleading, since it would undermine its objective worth as an intellectual achievement, which depends on its aesthetic expression alone. To fail to recognize this and speak of formalism instead, would only be indicative of aesthetic blindness, which is really spiritual blindness. To deplore the exclusion of idiosyncracy and ingenuity from the
differentiating aim structure of visual education would, therefore, seem indicative of mental confusion; and is not called for anyway. For to point to their incidental relationship to the aim structure of visual education does not, in itself, either encourage or discourage their presence in visual education. Rather than feel threatened by placing the emphasis on aesthetic vision, one should deplore its neglect.

INCOMPATIBLE LEARNING: FETISHISM AND IDOLATORY

An aesthetic experience, like any genuine symbolic experience, will entail a valuational response in the individual, a feeling or attitude of approval, of acknowledgement of worth, of satisfaction, of joy. This feeling would linger after the sensuous experience goes, leaving behind it memory traces and a complex attitude in which satisfaction and approval mingle with respect and veneration. This complex attitude we refer to as valuing or cherishing and, in extreme cases, as reverence or love.

This is, however, not the only way in which valuing and value responses emerge. In what follows I shall discuss two forms of value responses the occurrence of which does not conform to the pattern I have outlined above. One of them I shall call fetishism, the other idolatory.

Fetishism obtains when the significance is arbitrarily associated with the object, that is to say, having no objective relationship to it; so that one could not say that
it is grounded in it. One could not really describe it as an aesthetic symbolic experience because the idiosyncratic nature of its significance, which makes it a private experience accessible only to the fetishist himself. Thus, a loyal daughter may cherish a hairpin which once belonged to her deceased mother, or a millionaire may treasure a dingy old one-dollar bill because it happens to be the first fast buck he ever made. In the same way, one may value Impressionist painting because one likes to be out of doors a lot, or one may express a predilection for the still-life paintings of Cezanne because apples happen to be one's favorite fruit. All these are examples of value responses where the significance experienced is arbitrary or idiosyncratic in character. In order to distinguish them from value responses which are involved in an authentic aesthetic experience I call them fetishistic value responses.

It is important to point out here that not all extra-aesthetic responses to works of art are fetishistic in character. Thus, a painting or a piece of music may, in principle at least, express, among other things, personal feelings and other idiosyncratic traits in a genuinely symbolic way. Apprehension of these would not, of course, constitute fetishism. Fetishism occurs only when the response in question is not grounded in the object or symbol itself, but stands in a purely arbitrary relationship to it.
The fetishist may or may not know the subjective nature of his value response at the time of its occurrence, but it is very likely that he would do so subsequently. Thus, our millionaire may undergo a spiritual experience which makes him realize the vanity and futility of his past worldly pursuits, so that his once cherished dingy dollar would appear utterly contemptible. In the same way the person who loved Impressionist paintings because of his attachment to open air places would shudder at the sight of a Pissarro reproduction in the magazine section of his favorite Sunday paper, after experiencing the psychological disorder known as agoraphobia. This clearly indicates that, unlike the case in authentic symbolization (including aesthetic symbolization) where the link between symbol and symbolized is rational or objective, in a fetishistic value response this relationship is purely idiosyncratic.

Now, let us take a look at the other form of arbitrary value response which I call idolatory. Just as an individual idiosyncratically attaches value to an object or symbol, so is it also possible for a value response to occur as a result of social conditioning or enculturation. In this form of arbitrary value response, one learns to value irrationally as a result of one's being subjected to the oppressive pressures of enculturation. The oppressive pressures of enculturation are, usually, not perceived by the affected individual who may even feel that his responses
are the outcome of making free choices. Thus, the college student who feels drawn to a Snoopy cartoon or to a painting by Frank Stella does not realize that he is subjected to the oppressive pressure of enculturation; on the contrary, he is usually pleased to realize that he is so drawn. This fact will be immediately apparent when one raises doubts in his presence about the validity of the Snoopy cartoon or the Stella painting; for on such occasions the student would feel threatened or subjected to oppression. If you press him for reasons why the cartoon or painting ought to be valued, he would feel totally confused and would wish that you leave him alone and go.

This student's value responses to the Snoopy cartoon and the Stella painting offer us a sample of this kind of irrational or arbitrary valuing which I consider idolatrous. So let us examine its nature more closely to see what it exactly involves. The idolator comes to attach a value response to an object or symbol not because he sees its point or finds it intelligible, as is the case of authentic symbolic responses, but he does so in a purely irrational way. Indeed, to say that "he does so" is misleading because his involvement, in fact, is totally passive, even though, as I have suggested above, he may be under the impression that he is making free choices. He just gets up in the morning, as it were, and finds himself having a favorable attitude toward this and a loathesome attitude
toward that. Why this should be so does not concern him in the least. For valuing to him does not depend on intelligibility; it is purely a question of attitude. In other words, the idolator is an irrational being, even though he may think of himself as an intellectually sophisticated person.

The objects or symbols involved in an idolatrous response need not themselves be inefficient; one can have such a response in relationship to Michelangelo's David or Beethoven's Ninth. It is the idolator's response which is inefficient or inappropriate. Also, while it is true to say that in so far as the individual's response to the aesthetic symbol is idolatrous, it is not aesthetic at all, it is not, however, true to say that the two things do not mix. Thus, it is possible that someone who is capable of apprehending an aesthetic value in a work of art fails to admit its presence in non-artistic objects or in artistic objects which are in some respects different. But if this does occur, the two would obviously make bad bed-fellows; for intelligibility and irrationality are enemies; neither tolerates the other.

The idolator is thus someone who is not concerned with the significance or value inherent in things, but seems to respond to them in a superficial or outward manner. In other words, he is not interested in the functional or cognitive efficacy of the symbol; that does not seem
important to him. Nevertheless, to say that the idolator
does not value things for their inherent worth does not,
in any way, mean that he does not value things instrument-
tally. He does that, as a matter of fact, very often,
but here, too, the ultimate value in view is outward.
Thus, he may value works of art, not because of his appre-
hension of their aesthetic worth, but solely because
valuing them is considered a prestigious thing to do.
In other words, he values them because of the social
prestige which they may thus bring him. But what is social
prestige if not, indeed, another outward matter.

The important point to make here, then, is that the
idolator does not value the symbol because of what he can
apprehend through it, or because of what it is inherently
capable of doing. His values are, thus, pseudo-values;
not authentic ones. This really involves a vast deviation
from the proper value response to symbols where valuing is
a concomitant outcome of intelligibility: one values what
one apprehends. But the idolator has no need for
intelligibility.

Someone at this point may want to ask: must we always
understand what we value? Is it really reasonable to expect
everyone to refrain from valuing anything unless he appre-
hends it? The answer to these questions is this: if we
are to be rational, then we must insist on the
intelligibility or functional efficacy of the symbol. This, of course, does not mean that everyone should apprehend the import of the symbol before he values it. Not at all. I value Einstein's relativity theory, even though I do not understand it; but I still consider myself a rational being, because I have reason to believe that it is intelligible and because those who do understand it confirm this belief. It is, therefore, consistent with the demands of rationality to value on the authority of others so long as the intelligibility of the symbol is acknowledged. But valuing a symbol on the authority of others (connoisseurs, experts) does not, and should not, change my apprehension of it. Thus, if the symbol in question is an abstract painting which I do not understand, I may still value it if it is judged by some connoisseur to be aesthetically significant. But valuing, in this case, does not involve liking. An irrational person likes what he values, but a rational person likes only what he apprehends.

Man differs from the brute by virtue of his consciousness. One man differs from another man by virtue of the quality of that consciousness (call it awareness, experience, anything you like). What gives rise to idiosyncratic interpretation (fetishism) and empty valuing (idolatory) in human life is the lack of concern for intelligibility. Thus an artist who is not concerned about intelligibility
in his "work" or is satisfied with idiosyncratic association
would, if given an audience, encourage fetishism and
idolatory. Also, the celebration of masterpieces without
adequately emphasizing their efficacy will encourage
fetishism and idolatory. Not only must we insist that
valuing should presuppose apprehension, but we must also
insist that it should be grounded in the symbol itself,
so that not to be related to it idiosyncratically.
Unintelligibility of the symbol and the idiosyncracy of
its interpretation, or idolatory and fetishism, run con­
trary to the ideals of rationality and freedom upon which
man's spiritual realization undoubtedly depends.

Unintelligibility and idiosyncracy in human experience
wherever they prevail can only be a sign of cultural deca­
dence, while ignoring them can only lead to tyranny and
oppression.
The predicament of visual education, and indeed aesthetic education in general is largely due, I think, to the fact that it lacks what D. W. Gotshalk would call a "domain interpretation" or a "philosophy-of" as Israel Scheffler would put it. People, and educationists in particular, are not so sure if visual education has any substantive content to warrant granting it a place on the curriculum. This is, of course, hardly their fault, since no one seems to be capable and willing to tell them what precisely is the nature of the substantive content of visual education which would provide it with a legitimate and, what is even more important, distinctive role in the development of the intellectual capacities which many of them consider to be at the heart of the process of education. And even when some of them, as the case may be, happen to have some
insight into the form of awareness, the cognitive powers, and substantive content which visual education involves and which I discussed in the previous chapter, they may not consider it sufficiently important to justify emphasis. This is, of course, the case only when we assume that those who do have some idea about the nature of visual education as was described in that chapter are favorably disposed towards it. But this need not, in fact, be the case. For while they would undoubtedly all agree regarding the significance of sensory discrimination or the intensification of aesthetic vision as it is also referred to there, some would want to take exception when it comes to the development of imaginative perception or formal articulation. The former, which they would rather call "autistic vision," is likely, they would charge, to weaken rational contact with the real world by promoting phantasy and superstitious beliefs, while the latter would seem to them as a mere luxury with no survival value whatsoever. In other words, imaginative perception and formal articulation are thus considered to involve a maladaptive attitude to the world, something which they feel ought to be kept outside the sphere of education.

But since this seems to be a serious accusation, let us examine it briefly to see if it has any validity at all. Does imaginative perception promote phantasy and
superstitious beliefs? This is, of course, an empirical issue which falls outside the scope of this paper, but one could still say something even here which may illuminate it. First of all, one may speak of phantasy only when the individual's ability to distinguish what is physical from what is not is severely impaired (as, for instance, in the case of schizophrenia). Unless this ability is affected in this way, so that the individual is no longer capable of distinguishing physical existence from imaginative existence, it is inappropriate to speak of phantasy or illusion. Second, it is wrong to confuse the physical or external with the real, just as it is wrong to confuse the imaginative with the fantastic or illusory. Thirdly, what is significant to human beings is not confined to that which has direct biological significance like, food, drink, or sex. Man is a spiritual being who cannot live by bread alone. It is clear, then, that such an accusation can only come from people whose materialistic dogmatism imposes upon them an impoverished view of both man and the world.

If the appropriate hunches which some people have about the nature of visual education do not always entail positive attitudes, such attitudes do not themselves always entail an appropriate conception of it. Thus, many of those who seem to favor visual education tend to think of it as a matter of self-expression which involves the
emotions rather than the intellect. Such a conception serves only to undermine the objective validity of whatever substantive content it can contribute to the process of education in a unique way.

Visual education, thus, seems to be abused by friend and foe alike, largely because of the apparent lack of an appropriate "domain interpretation" or a "philosophy-of" which would clarify its nature in a detailed and systematic way. To provide such a clarification must, therefore, be viewed as the most important component of any attempt to provide curricular justification for visual education. Chapter VI of this paper attempts to do just that. Whatever its merits may be, it is clearly a step in the right direction.

THE DESIRABILITY OF VISUAL EDUCATION

Having accounted in Chapter VI for the clarification of the nature of visual education, I shall now turn to the question of its desirability. My purpose is not only to refer to its special and more unique value possibilities described in Chapter VI but also to indicate some of its widest and most general possibilities.

The specific and general value possibilities of visual education, of course, all depend on the fact that it is primarily concerned with the development of aesthetic vision. Intellectually, the uniqueness of aesthetic vision
is not to be found in its sensuous or concrete character but in the dynamic or creative quality inherent in the active exercise of the cognitive powers or the operations of the understanding, however one may wish to put it. Whatever one becomes aware of in this process is not merely noted cognitively but performed imaginatively. It is what may be termed gnostic knowledge, which is to be contrasted with propositional knowledge which may not entail anything beyond the intellectually insipid ability to produce sentential structures. Thus, the human individual whose capacities to engage in aesthetic vision are not developed would not be able to enjoy the intellectual life of which he is organismically capable. He will be a spiritually deprived being, whose dull existence is filled with boredom and plagued by stereotypes.

Some writers have noted the link between the development of aesthetic vision and value education. This is, of course, a very important matter, for it is possible, as we have already seen, to develop value responses not by way of apprehension but through the process of socio-cultural conditioning or enculturation. Thus, a person who goes through the process of enculturation in the Western world is likely to find himself valuing or even cherishing masterpieces of fine art like Leonardo's Mona Lisa or, should this enculturation be more sophisticated,
Les Demoiselles d'Avignon by Picasso without necessarily ever having experienced it in appreciative perception. This situation is familiar to most people, no matter how high their intellectual caliber may be, simply because apprehension or aesthetic percipience is not necessary for a value response to arise. Such valuing, however, has no intellectual or spiritual validity, even though it may be socially significant. An intellectual or spiritually significant value response is always a concomitant response to apprehension or percipience. Value responses which occur in this way are unmistakably more vivid and persuasive. Visual education or the development of aesthetic vision, then, can serve this useful function in value education.

Inside the curriculum proper, visual education can perform some intellectually useful services in relationship to some of its components, notably the arts and many of the theoretically based subjects. These curricular services are most apparent in the case of art education. Many epistemologically inclined educationists find it hard to defend Art Education as a component of general education so long as its goals are variously construed by its practitioners as self-expression, development of technical or artistic skills, development of affect, development of sheer value responses (empty valuing), or therapy, not to mention recreation or the giving vent to pent up feelings.
Such epistemologically inclined writers feel, quite rightly I think, that none of these goals, by themselves, have anything to do with the development of human intellectual capacities which are widely regarded as the proper aim of schooling. Now, the incorporation of visual education, as defined in this paper, into Art Education would undoubtedly enormously enhance the prospects of this much neglected subject, not always unjustly, if I may say so. It will provide it with a unique role to perform in intellectual development through the education of aesthetic vision.

Visual education can also be meaningfully related to the other arts within the curriculum. This can be done either illustratively or structurally. In the illustrative use of aesthetic vision, one takes a self-contained or autonomous work rendered in a non-visual medium, let us say a story or a poem, and then makes an attempt to relate it associatively with some appropriate visual material which one creates oneself or selects from whatever visual material one finds at one's disposal. In the structural use of aesthetic vision, on the other hand, one uses materials in different media in order to create what used to be called a monumental work of art and what we now call a multi-media work of art. The aim here is not to enrich an independent work expressed in an auditory or verbal medium by visual material which would thus be illustratively related to it. Rather, the aim is to treat both the visual
and the non-visual material as integral elements within an autonomous or unified whole which comprises the multi-media work of art. This does not, however, mean that the expressive elements used must, in themselves, be lacking in autonomy or organic unity; for it is possible that the integral parts of the multi-media work, if taken individually, would be found satisfactory works of art in their own right, (perhaps even more satisfactory than the multi-media works in which they appear as integral parts). What it means is only this: the way they figure in the multi-media work as parts constitutive of it of necessity deprives them of their autonomous meaning. As in the case of the illustrative use, the elements used could, in part or in their entirety, be either specially created for the multi-media work or selected from the various materials one finds at one's disposal.

It is important to point out here that whether the relationship between the visual and the non-visual elements is illustrative or structural, its character could differ in yet another significant way. This is because this relationship could either be artistic or merely expressive. It is said to be artistic if the visual and non-visual elements share some of their artistic or structural features in common, as when one dances to music, where both the dance and the music share the same rhythm, even though they differ in other respects. The relationship is said
to be merely expressive when, for instance, in a film one finds that the music in the sound-track seems to express the mode of the scenery or events shown in it.

Besides the arts, visual education, as I have suggested, can also be illuminating in relationship to the theoretically based subjects in which one is concerned with the development of conceptual understanding and propositional knowledge. This can be shown to occur in two different ways. First, through aesthetic vision one becomes aware of certain states of affairs, some of them pertain directly to aesthetic qualities, while others do not pertain to aesthetic qualities but are only indirectly entailed by them. Thus, while contemplating one of Mondrian's manneristic paintings, one does not only become aware of the dynamic balance evinced by the composition, but on the basis of this awareness one also develops the belief that the painting evinces dynamic balance, so that one comes to acquire propositional knowledge about aesthetic phenomena inherent in the work. But on the basis of one's aesthetic experience of the work, one also becomes aware, for instance, of how the network of black lines help to pin the colored areas to the surface of the canvas and so prevent a pictorial interpretation of space. For without the lines these areas would tend to come foreward or go backward, something which if allowed to occur would cause
the composition to disintegrate. On the basis of this awareness one comes out with certain types of beliefs which do not pertain to the aesthetic qualities expressed by the work but rather to the nature of human perception. It is propositional knowledge that belongs, in other words, not to art criticism or aesthetics but to other areas of theoretical inquiry, which in this case happens to be the psychology of visual perception. As I had occasion to indicate elsewhere, it is impossible to impose limits for the types of propositional knowledge that can be derived in this way from aesthetic perception.

The other way in which the development of aesthetic vision can be of value to the theoretically based subjects within the curriculum can be readily understood if one compares the kind of propositional knowledge which is derived from aesthetic apprehension, and which I have discussed in the previous paragraph, with the kind of propositional knowledge which is introduced in sentential form and which is typical of how most people encounter this form of human knowledge. In such an encounter with propositional knowledge, one reads or hears the sentences and attempts to understand and possibly memorize them too. The point I want to make here is this. The knowledge which is based on aesthetic apprehension, whatever its logical character may be, could serve as a paradigm for the development of propositional knowledge in all areas of the
curriculum where concern for this form of knowledge is to be found. Let this form of knowledge depend on apprehen-
sion, not memorization. What a challenge!

The environmental benefits which could accrue from making the education of aesthetic vision a basic ingredient in the curriculum are scarcely less impressive. Just imagine what would happen if manufacturers knew that the consumers of their goods have a developed aesthetic awareness. Imagine, too, how knowledge of the existence of such awareness amongst their constituents would affect the decisions made by city councillors and other groups whose decisions have a direct bearing on the shapes of our cities and all the public aspects of our life. Surely, things would then be much more aesthetically intelligible, especially if the decision-makers themselves are also aesthetically aware.

Finally, let us not forget the positive effects which the cultivation of aesthetic vision could have on the moral and spiritual life of the community. Its potential for preventing leisure from being a time for boredom, indul-
gence, or delinquency rather than for cultural and spiritual fulfillment, its value in reducing prejudice and promoting tolerance and understanding among men by contravening the tendency to perceive the world, including people, in terms of stereotypes only, its therapeutic benefits, the role it plays in promoting moral refinement--have all been pointed
out by different writers with greater or lesser degree of persuasiveness. I personally would like to add that the development of aesthetic vision along the lines drawn in the previous chapter takes one a long way on the road of spiritual actualization. With this note I shall end my account of the desirability of visual education.

THE POSSIBILITY OF VISUAL EDUCATION

Experience has shown that the processes of aesthetic vision can be adequately developed in the average school child, that suitable programs for this purpose can be developed and organized, and that a teaching theory, taking account of the humanistic or liberal view of education and the new discoveries within the psychology of cognitive development and educational psychology in general has already been made available for the purposes of instruction in visual education. Nevertheless, there are some people who may want to raise doubts about the very possibility of visual education as a part of the general education curriculum. There are a number of arguments which may be advanced in an attempt to do this. I shall examine some of them here.

First, there is the argument which claims that the ability to perceive and express oneself aesthetically depends basically on talent, not learning. Its foundations, so the argument goes, is to be found in one's genetic constitution, and so all attempts to develop it through
instruction is bound to be futile. This argument, in fact, is so widespread that its inhibitive action in relationship to aesthetic development must have been very great. I have heard children say that, parents say that, teachers say that, and they all seem to believe it. Such an argument, surely, deserves close investigation.

For an argument or belief to be so widely held, there must, one feels, be some truth in it, at least. And, of course, there is. Aesthetic perception and expression, like any other human skill, be it intellectual or technical, does involve talent. This, it goes without saying, is also true of writing, reading, and arithmetic; they, too, involve talent. What is impressive or surprising about this argument, however, is not its truth but the powerful influence it seems to exert on people's attitudes in relationship to aesthetic ability. For not only does it seem to inhibit this ability in them without causing them to feel unhappy or embarrassed about it, as they would be if their writing, reading, or computing abilities were involved instead, but it also makes them regard aesthetic ability with awe as the mysterious realm of genius and lofty inspiration. This kind of attitude seems to make them consider themselves to be normal with regard to their lack of aesthetic ability. But, curiously enough, they never seem to think that someone in their midst may actually be blessed with what they
consider to be unique access to that realm of genius and divine or lofty inspiration!

Advocates of this argument do not, of course, deny the possibility that people in general are potentially capable of apprehending the aesthetic qualities expressed in the works of those who do possess that scarce faculty, namely talent, even though they are incapable of either apprehending aesthetic qualities, in the absence of these works, or of giving them expression through an appropriate medium. In other words, these advocates believe that aesthetic value can only be encountered in works of art of the kind one sees in the museums, not in any object one may find, including the art works of children or adults whom they consider untalented (i.e., people of any age who are not acclaimed as outstanding or peculiarly gifted artists). In short, they believe that aesthetic apprehension depends on specially designed objects called works of art which only specially talented people are capable of producing.

On the basis of this belief, viz. that aesthetic qualities are to be apprehended only in works of art which only specially talented and trained individuals are capable of producing, the advocates of this argument draw their conclusions for the curriculum. Thus, they propose that, as far as aesthetic vision is concerned, the curriculum should have two distinct aims: one affecting the student population as a whole, while the other affects only those students who
show special promise or aptitude on the basis of which full aesthetic ability can be developed through special training. This means that with regard to the student population as a whole, the curriculum can offer training in art appreciation, that is to say, appreciation of outstanding works of art; and whatever studio activity there may be should be specifically geared to this end. This, they suggest, should be accompanied with teaching about art works so as to give the student understanding of their broader cultural settings. In the case of the special group of talented students, the idea is to give them technical or artistic training which would enable them to exert control over the art medium so as to be able to use it expressively.

There are a number of points which I would like to raise very briefly about these proposals. First, these proposals seem to overlook the fact that aesthetic qualities have an objective validity which does not make them confined to their particular expression in given works of art. Thus, dynamic balance, as an aesthetic quality, is not to be found in a particular painting or in the work of one particular painter only. Indeed, the object which evinces or expresses it does not have to be a work of art at all. It is true, however, that works of art ideally should express aesthetic qualities with maximum efficiency, but this is not always the case. Sometimes one even finds that a natural or non-artistic object offers ideal expression for a certain
aesthetic quality. Secondly, the tendency to undermine the role of artistic activity in the development of aesthetic vision is totally rash. No doubt those who are responsible for it seem to have been misled by a false analogy. They looked around and found that in science education and in mathematical education the students are made knowledgeable about the work of the scientist and mathematician only, without being themselves expected, that is, to make any original contributions in the form of scientific theories or mathematical theorems, whereas in art education emphasis seems to be placed upon the production of works of art. This, they reckon, places art in a peculiar position. Are works of art less demanding intellectually than theories in science or theorems in mathematics? And so their proposal to limit the scope of art education to the appreciation of particular masterpieces and knowledge about their social, historical, and cultural background came as an attempt to normalize the situation of art education in the curriculum. I have said that the analogy here is false for two reasons. The first is that in visual education the artistic activity involved does not aim at extending the boundaries of man's aesthetic awareness, no more than the experiments which students undertake in the science laboratory aim at extending the boundaries of science. The other reason is that artistic expression, as I have indicated, facilitates aesthetic understanding in pretty much the same way verbal
expression facilitates conceptual understanding, and so to compare artistic production in aesthetic education with the production of theories or theorems in science and mathematics is totally misleading.

Thirdly, implicit in these proposals is the exaggerated significance attached to technical or artistic skills. This stress on technical competence, which depends on much training and practice, seems to me unwarranted when the aim is to develop aesthetic vision; for although it would still be desirable, this aim could be adequately reached without it. Finally, to suggest that the general education curriculum should give special attention to that small group of students which seem to have special promise or aptitude for developing aesthetic ability would, if permitted, run contrary to its explicit aim of catering for the intellectual needs of the average child.

Another argument which could be put forward against the possibility of visual education seems to have its origin in a misconception of human development. This argument states that aesthetic values are apprehended and expressed in the work of artists who have attained through the course of their involvement with their work a high level of artistic and intellectual maturity. This state of affairs, so the argument goes, makes it quite unrealistic to expect young children to relate meaningfully to aesthetic values which lie at the heart of visual education. One
could immediately reply to this charge by saying that the situation regarding science or mathematics as components of the curriculum is exactly the same; neither Newton nor Einstein were children when they made their scientific contributions, but this does not make them beyond the intellectual capacities of the school child who has reached that stage in his cognitive development where he is able to relate meaningfully with abstract ideas. But the main point which one has to keep in mind when encountering this particular argument about the impossibility of visual education is that, like the one discussed before, it fails to notice the difference between the sort of apprehension or understanding that takes place at the creative level and the apprehension or understanding that is encountered in the process of education. If this difference is kept in mind then this argument would lose all plausibility. In visual education we do not expect children to extend the boundaries of human aesthetic experience; such a demand would only be reasonable if made in relationship to professional artists. Our aim is only to transmit, in a dynamic or palpable way, the existing aesthetic knowledge of man. However, to say that the child in aesthetic education, as in science or mathematical education, is not involved at the creative level does not in any way mean that the nature of his actual involvement in the processes of aesthetic apprehension and expression could not be properly described
as creative, in the sense of using one's cognitive powers in a productive or dynamic way. For if we could not describe the activity of aesthetic vision as creative in this sense, there could hardly be anything for which this term would appear appropriate. What is meant by saying that the child's aesthetic involvement does not occur at the creative level is that it is not creative in the historical or cultural sense, but not in the psychological or cognitive sense.

A third argument which could be advanced against the possibility of visual education is based on a misconception of what visual education actually involves. According to this argument, visual education is expressive, not cognitive in aim, and accordingly it would simply be futile to try to teach the child what he alone knows. For what is to be expressed, so this argument goes, is the child's own state of mind and idiosyncracies. I have indicated in this paper that education in general is primarily concerned with the development of human intellectual capacities and that the role of visual education, in this process of intellectual development, is the structuring of aesthetic vision. Since I have already explicated this role with which visual education is primarily concerned, I shall not go into it again. All I need to say here is that even if one wishes to think of the aim of visual education as geared to the expression of the private feelings and idiosyncracies of
the child, there would still be a need for active teaching, assuming of course that the reference to expression entails artistic expression, that is to say, expression through an appropriate medium, and not merely giving vent to private feelings and desires. For to be able to express private feelings and other forms of idiosyncracies one needs to have technical or artistic competence in order to be able to exert control over the medium, something which undoubtedly requires training which usually involves teaching.

VISUAL EDUCATION AND THE NEED FOR FORMAL SCHOOLING
In the previous section I have attempted to defend the view that visual education is possible; in other words, that the capacities for aesthetic vision can be incorporated within the intellectual make-up of the average school child through the process of the curriculum. I shall now attempt to argue that this process is, in fact, appropriate for the purposive development of aesthetic vision. In other words, I shall argue that it is needed. To perceive a visual work of art or any object of aesthetic interest does not merely involve the physiological processes and equipment involved in the act of vision. One does not apprehend such an object aesthetically just by standing before it with ones eyes open. Sometimes this apprehension depends on the capacity to look imaginatively, sometimes it depends on the
percipient's ability to perceive the object in terms of those formal-relational concepts which I have described elsewhere, and sometimes this apprehension depends essentially on the percipient's sensitivity to minute changes in the sensory structure of the object involved.

These intellectual processes and equipment upon which aesthetic vision depends do not accrue through the physiological processes of maturation but must be acquired through learning. The question which we must now ask is: Can they be transmitted through the process of enculturation, like good manners, customs, or religious beliefs, without, that is, the intervention of formal schooling? The answer is simply, no. First of all, the process of enculturation is better suited for transmitting attitudes and value responses than cognitive content. Secondly, the process of enculturation by its very nature does not involve specialized or complex knowledge; for if it did, we would not call it enculturation (though we may call it indoctrination). Thirdly, in our culture, at any rate, familiarity with good manners, customs, or religious beliefs is by far greater than familiarity with aesthetic experience.

I shall have, then, to conclude that since active or sustained learning is necessary for the development of aesthetic vision and since the school is the main, if not the only, vehicle available for the promotion of cognitive learning, formal schooling is needed for the development
of aesthetic vision. In other words, visual education as a process of the curriculum is needed.

VISUAL EDUCATION AND THE ORGANIZATION OF CURRICULUM RESOURCES

The argument for the curricular justification of visual education, which has been presented so far, has indicated that visual education can undertake a unique role in the intellectual development of the school child, that this role can be shown to be desirable on cultural and spiritual grounds, that effective instruction aimed at the development of aesthetic vision through the general education curriculum process is possible, and finally that the availability of formal schooling is needed. I shall now address myself to this question: Can visual education be treated normally within the existing organization of the curriculum? Or to put it differently: How well can it be adapted to the existing setup and routines without jeopardizing its effectiveness? As any well-informed educationist knows, the existing curricular organization has its origins in the curriculum of the elementary school which arose in Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century. Reading, writing, and arithmetic, or what came to be known subsequently as the three R's (the third R stands for "reckoning" which the English are more likely now to term "sums"). The curricular organization which ensued with all its standardized routines and resources was intended to facilitate
instruction and evaluation in these subjects. And so this is how we came to have classrooms with blackboards on which one can write and from which one can read, chairs for the students to sit on and desks to write on, a high table for the teacher at which he may sit and direct the class. This is how we came to have 45-minute timetables. This is how we came to have exams at the end of the school-year—and so on, and so forth. One may, therefore, conclude that if instead of the three R's they had what in this paper is called visual education, things as far as the organization of the curriculum is concerned would have probably been very different. For, as Ralph Tyler taught us, organization in a rationally planned curriculum always follows the aims and content of education.\(^{1}\) This is why we ought to know, in a curricular justification of a field of instruction so vastly different from the subjects for which the existing organization was originally intended as visual education, whether it can be treated normally within the existing organizational framework.

The proper answer to this query cannot be given \textit{a priori}; only experience can tell. However since aesthetic perception involves concrete objects and since aesthetic expression involves the manipulation of concrete materials, it would seem obvious that effective instruction in visual

\(^{1}\text{Ralph W. Tyler, Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction.}\)
education demands a studio-setting. As everyone knows, most schools nowadays do have this facility. For this reason we could say that the introduction of visual education within the general education curriculum would not demand any material resources which do not already exist in the school. It would, however, make new demands on the human resources of the school, since no teacher can provide effective instruction in it without the necessary training. Many teachers, including those who have majored in Art Education, lack that training. We should not really feel disappointed about this. We can always take the appropriate measures to redress this state of affairs. Not only can we revise our teacher-training programs to allow the appropriate training for the education of aesthetic vision to take place, but we also can create in-service training programs for the benefit of those who are already teaching in the schools. No existing situation should be viewed as permanent.

VISUAL EDUCATION AND THE COMPONENTS OF THE CURRICULUM

My argument up to this point would not be of much help for someone who wants to know if the cultivation of aesthetic vision through the curriculum process would not adversely affect other intellectual abilities for which the curriculum caters, especially verbal ability and the ability which makes hypothetico-deductive thinking possible. Would not
the cultivation of aesthetic ability inhibit the development of these abilities which are widely considered to be the most important in the entire curriculum?

In replying to this query I would like, first of all, to say that the fact that the verbal and logical abilities are highly regarded by many people including the educators themselves does not necessarily make their judgment valid or accurate. The truth is that it is impossible to argue on rational or logical grounds alone that one intellectual capacity is superior to another. Secondly, according to recent work in neuropsychiatry, human consciousness is a function of two hemispheres of the brain: the left hemisphere, which deals with logical and discursive forms of thinking, is complemented by the right hemisphere, which deals with analogical, visual, and metaphorical thought.¹ If this is, in fact, true, then the development of aesthetic and logical abilities could be cultivated together without either of them having any adverse effects on the other. This view would become even more plausible if we bring into consideration the numerous occasions when these seemingly opposite abilities appear equally strongly in the same mind: Leonardo and Goethe are two prominent examples. Any individual who is aware of this and still

would want to banish the development of aesthetic vision from the curriculum on the basis that it may inhibit verbal ability or logical ability is manifestly unwise.

II

VISUAL EDUCATION AND ASPECTS OF THE CURRICULUM

In this part of the chapter I shall deal with the problems which the presence of visual education in the curriculum would create. In other words, if visual education is to be a part of the curriculum, how are we to set about it? First of all, what would the character of its content or learning experiences be like? How can they be developed, and how should they be organized? Secondly, what would the appropriate teaching methods be like? Are there any reliable pedagogical guidelines? Finally, should it be considered a major area within the curriculum or does it merely have the status of a desirable non-essential, as one writer put it, to be treated only in a peripheral way? Also, should its status remain the same throughout the K-12 duration of general education, or should its emphasis vary on the basis of the change that affects the child's thinking
at different stages of his cognitive development? In short, I shall be dealing with problems related to the nature, development, organization of content, pedagogical theory, and the integration of the curriculum.

CHARACTER, DEVELOPMENT, AND ORGANIZATION
OF CONTENT

It is futile to try to describe the appropriate content or learning experiences involved in visual education without making a reference first to the nature of its aims. Let us then keep in mind what the aims of visual education are before attempting to give an account of the nature of the content or learning experience involved in it. Visual education as an aspect of the process of education is primarily concerned with the apprehension, control, and evolution of the aesthetic qualities encountered in aesthetic vision. The assumption here is that, in aesthetic vision, there are qualities or values which are not peculiar to any object, qualities that have objective validity and that, for this reason, constitute the object of the visual education process or its learning experiences. Thus, it is not the paintings of Cezanne, the Cubists, and Mondrian that form the content, or the object of learning, in visual education. Rather, it is the aesthetic quality that these types of paintings express, viz. dynamic balance (as Mondrian called it), which constitutes an appropriate learning experience for visual education. One should, therefore, be able to
abstract this quality from the particularity of the individual object, whatever it may be, which expresses or evinces it. If the object which expresses dynamic balance is a painting, one should not only be able to distinguish it from the particularity of its expression in this painting, but must also be able to separate it from the particular artistic style and the idiosyncratically determined characteristics that are always involved. Thus, if the painting expressive of dynamic balance happens to be Boy in the Red Vest (1894-5, the Mellon Collection, Washington, D.C.), one should not think that the dynamic balance in it has anything to do with the fact that it is a painting of a certain size, or that it is a painting of a human figure, or the mental states which it may express in the face or the posture, or the fact that it is painted with oils on canvas, or indeed any other feature contained in its physical structure. Also, one should be able to separate the aesthetic quality of dynamic balance from the particularity of the artistic style or technique. Thus, in Cezanne one finds that the artist is not only concerned with the realization of the quality of dynamic balance, but also with the depiction of nature. Throughout his mature career he was trying to reconcile these two conflicting goals. A proper experience of a mature Cezanne is a complex experience where at one level of consciousness one becomes aware of the aesthetic quality of dynamic balance and at a lower or
peripheral level of consciousness one becomes aware of the
depiction. This is especially evident in relationship to
the landscapes and other thematically complex paintings of
bathers. This is by no means an arbitrary judgment. For,
it is true that in a mature Cezanne painting, one has to
contemplate it synoptically so as to attend to the relation­
ship described by the structure of the painting as a whole.
If not, then not only would one cease to apprehend the
aesthetic quality of dynamic balance, but more curiously,
the two-level or complex awareness will give way to an
apprehension of the particular forms represented which, now
that they are viewed individually, appear distorted or tech­
nically unskilled in their rendering and also very uncon­
vincing. This means that Cezanne's mature paintings are
aesthetically complex.

Interest in pictorial space is still to be found in
Cubism, so that one could say that the aesthetic complexity
of Cezanne's style is, in a much reduced extent of course,
still to be found in Cubism. It disappeared totally in the
work of Mondrian (around 1917).

Besides the stylistic features that pertain to the
nature of the aesthetic expression itself, there are others
that pertain to the technical execution. Thus, if one finds
in the Cezanne mentioned above, that the curtain which forms
the background of the picture is heavily emphasized, it is
not because Cezanne was a gross painter who failed to
realize that the human figure and its expressive features are more important than a plain looking curtain in the background. Cézanne did what he did in order to prevent the eye from concentrating its attention on the figure and its expressive features alone, and so he uses this artistic or technical means to encourage or impose a synoptic perception of the painting as a whole. The fragmentation of the figure and the monochromatic tendency in Cubism serves exactly the same purpose. So did the banishment of figurative elements in Mondrian. All these are artistic or technical devises serving aesthetic or perceptual ends.

Finally, there are certain stylistic features which do not pertain to the aesthetic values or qualities involved in the work of art, nor to the artistic or technical devices it employs, but simply to the private personality of the artist and its idiosyncratic traits. I have already mentioned Mondrian's criss-crossing black lines and his use of the primary colors as instances of these idiosyncratic features. I now cite as further instances Cézanne's tendency to contrast greens with oranges and the predominance in his work of color harmonies based on these two colors and blue, and also the Cubists' preference for still-lifes with musical instruments. All these have no aesthetic value in themselves, nor are they artistically significant so that one could say about them that they are
instrumentally involved in the expression or concretion, to use Ingarden’s term, of aesthetic qualities or values concerned. Whatever value they may have inheres in the fact that they are indicative of the uniqueness of the personality of the artist. When the object of aesthetic interest is not a man-made object such aesthetically non-significant features also exist and while they are purely incidental to the aesthetic worth of the object itself, they may still be appreciated as aspects of the particularity of the object, or its unique fingerprint so to speak.

To return now to our discussion of dynamic balance. Where, then, does aesthetic value inhere in the work of Cezanne, the Cubists, and Mondrian? Well, it is in the way in which this type of work is artistically structured so that the aesthetically trained eye does not focus on any particular form in the composition but instead contemplates the relationship described by the artistic structure of the painting as a whole. This means that not only one’s perception of the work is "balanced" or "equilibrated" owing to its synoptic character, but the eye’s natural tendency to focus on an individual element faces constant resistance, so to speak, since the artistic structure persists in maintaining the synoptic vision. This accounts for the dynamic character of the experience or the tension inherent in the constant demolition and
construction of the equilibrium. It is this experience which constitutes an aesthetically valuable quality and which would, thus, constitute an authentic learning experience of the kind one should look for in selecting content for visual education. It is an objectively valid experience which is not peculiar to any particular object, personality, or style.

The aim of the visual educator is to make the student capable of apprehending the aesthetic experience wherever it may appear, whether in artistic objects contrived to give it expression or in objects that are not so contrived, including natural objects. The ability is best cultivated if the student is asked to attempt to express the aesthetic learning experience in question artistically. The artistic expression of the aesthetic quality would thus become the instructional objective. The production of an art object which is expressive of the aesthetic experience in question does not, of course, guarantee aesthetic learning; it can only act as a symptom for it. But the effectiveness of artistic expression in aesthetic education is not limited to its usefulness as a more or less reliable indicator of aesthetic learning. It is especially valuable as a means which is ideally suited for furthering aesthetic learning, where its role in articulating aesthetic thought content is equivalent to the role of verbal expression in articulating discursive thought.
content. Moreover, artistic expression would make the student realize that the aesthetic experience which lies at the heart of aesthetic learning is something distinct from the particularity of the object which expresses it. He would, thus, realize that its effective expression does not depend on the artistic material used, nor on the spatial character of the work, or the technical process involved in making it. Above all, he would realize that whatever incidental or idiosyncratic traits or properties there may be present in the object play absolutely no role in determining its aesthetic significance.

Thus, in the case of the aesthetic quality of dynamic balance, the student would be in a position to realize that the effectiveness of the artistic object in expressing or evincing dynamic balance does not, in any way, depend on whether it is made of plywood, plaster, wire, or oil paints; or whether its spatial character is two- or three-dimensional; or whether it is static or kinetic; or whether it is a painting rendered with brushes and paints, a wire construction, or carved in wood, or a photograph taken with a Polaroid camera. Also he would realize that this effectiveness does not depend on the categorial character of the artistic object, and so it is immaterial whether the object is figurative or abstract. But what is even more important, from the point of view of aesthetic education, is that the student who is put in
a situation where he is expected to express the aesthetic quality of dynamic balance is more likely to realize that the experience of this aesthetic quality does not depend on the works of Cezanne, the Cubists, or Mondrian, that the object involved in its expression need not even be an artistic object at all, so that its expression may also involve either natural objects or man-made objects not especially contrived to be expressive of aesthetic qualities. The difference between artistic objects and non-artistic objects which are expressive of the aesthetic quality of dynamic balance is that, unlike the latter, the former are teleologically adapted to it.

Thus, through his attempt to express aesthetic qualities artistically, the student develops his apprehension of these qualities. What is equally important is that he would also learn to control such qualities, since modifying the artistic medium would entail changes affecting his aesthetic experience.

To summarize, the content or learning experience in visual education must involve an aesthetically valuable experience. Ideally the learning activity should not merely aim at enabling the student to apprehend this aesthetically valuable experience but it should also involve an attempt to express it artistically. This means that the approach to content in aesthetic education must be
analytical in character. In other words, in every learning experience, the attention of the student must be drawn to one specific aesthetic experience or quality. But this does not mean that each learning experience must be treated as a unique experience having no relationship whatsoever to other learning experiences in the instructional unit to which it belongs. Rather, individual learning experiences must be related in such a way within the instructional unit so as to satisfy the demands of both educational efficiency and comprehensiveness.

Educational efficiency and comprehensiveness are the two criteria upon which the sequential organization of content in visual education must be based. The criterion of educational efficiency aims at facilitating learning by ensuring continuity and the smooth transition from the simple to the more complex or from the fundamental to the more advanced. The criterion of comprehensiveness aims at maintaining the structural unity of the learning experiences included in each instructional unit. This concern with comprehensiveness or structural unity which must be met by the sequential organization of learning experiences would give the student an insight into the logical structure of the area of aesthetic experience involved in the sequence or unit. Thus, through the satisfaction of the comprehensiveness criterion in visual education the student would,
for example, recognize how different aesthetic experiences like rhythm, contrast, balance, and harmony are structurally related by virtue of their common concern with the apprehension of formal relationships. Or how color harmony and color contrast are logically related in that they are two different ways of creating color balance. (For in the case of harmony, unity or balance is based on similarity of the individual colors involved; while in the case of color contrast this unity or balance is achieved through the diversity of the individual colors involved.)

Educational efficiency can be furthered through sequential organization in a number of ways. First, sequential organization can be based on the principle of logical priority. Sometimes the acquisition of one learning experience presupposes the acquisition of another, which is thus considered logically prior to it. In visual education a good example would be found in the way appreciation of color relationships presupposes color discrimination. Thus, the ability to apprehend a color balance created by a contrast relationship involving, say, red and green presupposes the ability to discriminate minute changes in different shades of green and minute changes in different shades of red. And so if one wishes to develop the awareness of the student of color relationships, one has first to develop his sensory discrimination of color, because of its logical priority.
Secondly, sequential organization can be based on developmental factors. With respect of cognitive development, content involving concrete operations must precede formal operations, a principle which was stressed by Piaget but which many people would probably recognize as a matter of common sense. Thus, in the visual education program one would expect concern for conceptual understanding to be delayed until the student reaches the stage where he is capable of grasping theoretical material which has a bearing on aesthetic experience. This means that historical, sociological, or philosophical analysis of aesthetically expressive objects has to wait till the child reaches the stage of formal operations, which, according to Piaget, takes place between the ages of eleven and fifteen.

With respect to physical development, learning experiences which demand a great deal of muscular strength must also be postponed till the student reaches the appropriate stage of physical development when he can take part in this kind of learning activity.

Thirdly, sequential organization can be based on what may be called the simplicity-complexity principle.\textsuperscript{1}

According to this principle individual learning experiences

must be organized by virtue of their relative simplicity or complexity, thus proceeding from the simple to the more complex or difficult. In visual education, learning experiences aimed at developing in the student apprehension and control of dynamic balance, for instance, can be organized in terms of the relative difficulty or complexity of each one of them. Thus, one could begin by asking the student to arrange oblong pieces of black paper having roughly the same shape and size on an oblong sheet of paper so as to create an artistic structure expressive of dynamic balance. Artistically speaking, this is a simple problem, since all the shapes involved are oblong and involving no spatial or color complexity. When the student attains competence in providing appropriate solutions to this problem, the teacher could proceed to make it more difficult or complex along a number of lines. He could ask the student to vary the pieces of paper in size or shape or both. He could ask the student to vary the pieces of paper in color so that he could introduce other colors besides black (say brown, or brown and yellow). He could ask the student to vary the formal or plastic structure of his work by asking him to leave large, empty areas in the composition, or make the composition more asymmetrical, or alternatively introduce a diagonal axis. He could ask the student to vary the spatial character of the composition, by making a three dimensional construction or a
relief. Finally, he could ask the student to introduce figurative elements so as to make the elements of the composition categorically more complex, or he could ask the student to make the composition aesthetically more complex by attending to more than one aesthetic dimension (for example, besides dynamic balance the student is asked to attend to color relationships or linear sensations or both).

The manner in which the instructional content evolves can, of course, vary a great deal. It could be evolved on a purely logical basis, as the unit on the aesthetic perception of line presented below was evolved. It could be evolved around a particular material or a particular technical process, as in the case of the other unit mentioned below. It may be evolved around a given theme (e.g., "rainbow," "living things"). It could be evolved around the peculiar interests of the students themselves or their work. A teacher may even decide against giving the class a standardized treatment. Instead he may wish to allow each child to develop in his own way and at his own rate by giving him appropriate feedback. Thus, so far as the manner in which the instructional content is introduced or permitted to evolve, no one practice is, in itself, any better or, for that matter, any worse than the rest. What is crucial, however, is that the teacher must
understand the nature of the aesthetic experience he is attempting to teach. Without this understanding his ability to give effective instruction in visual education would be much impaired.

I shall conclude my discussion of the nature, development, and organization of content for visual education, by outlining two instructional units which I was fortunate to introduce in the state schools of Kuwait as part of my work as supervisor. The first one goes back to 1967, while the other was introduced in the school year 1971-72. The first of these two units sought to explore the graphic material in magazines. We started off by allowing the children to do anything they like with their magazines, their scissors, adhesives, and their paper, so as they could satisfy their initial curiosity in them. When this curiosity began to wear out, we introduced them to specific problems; for only then are they ready to listen and accept specific challenges.

The overwhelming majority of the problems fall within the aesthetic area of imaginative perception. In other words, some kind of an overall unity was maintained. Here is a list of some of the problems:

1. Parts of different images put together so as to form a complex new image of a fantastic or comic nature.

2. A cut-out object transferred to a new visual context in order to effect a change in the phenomenal size of the object.
3. A cut-out object transferred to a new context in order to effect a change in the representational significance of the object.

4. By moving a frame on a much larger picture, an attempt is made to project a new reading in the configuration enclosed within the frame. The new reading has to be of some view or object recognizable in the physical world.

5. By moving a sheet of paper with a relatively small window cut inside it, an attempt is made to project a totally unfamiliar image (not to be found in the physical world, or made of parts of objects found in it). The student is advised to place his magazine picture upside down.

6. Cut-out typographical elements are assembled together in such a way so as to make the eye respond to them as shapes or images.

7. Cut-out ground-material put in a new setting so as to make it appear as figure-material.

8. Using the sheet of paper with the small window in it, an attempt is made to frame partial figure- and ground-elements so as to make them appear as one integral image.

9. A real element (e.g., a piece of wallpaper, chewing-gum wrap) pasted on a picture so as to make it appear as part of the depiction.

10. Placing a detail taken from a magazine picture in a real context (i.e., non-pictorial space) so as to make it appear real (in other words, acquire a non-pictorial interpretation).

11. A pictorial element made to appear flat, by means of physically raising parts of it (so as to contradict a pictorial interpretation).

12. Placing a pictorial detail in a two-dimensional configuration so as to make it appear as a structurally related part in it, and so deprive it of its original pictorial character.

13. After cutting up a picture into thin strips, either vertically or horizontally, the student is asked to re-assemble them in the correct order
while at the same time making them overlap slightly, so as to effect some sort of distortion in the depicted image. (The teacher could show the students how this distortion can be defined mathematically through the use of grids.)

14. From the variety of images and typography material available in magazines, the pupil is asked to make or assemble his own visual magazine.

I hardly have to say that this list is by no means exhaustive. In making it I have not only confined myself to what has been actually attempted in Kuwait, but throughout my intention has been to indicate the various types of aesthetic experience that falls within the range of imaginative perception. Also we had to deal with a number of problems which clearly did not fall within that range but which were nevertheless included because they were suggested by the material and technical process used. (No. 14, for instance, is a straightforward design problem.) The students were, at every point, encouraged to introduce in the magazine collages any other materials they saw fit. Occasionally, they were even asked to abandon the use of magazines altogether.

The other study unit which I like to present here was concerned with the exploration of the aesthetic experience of line. Unlike the first one, which was evolved around the particular material and technical process used, this unit evolved around one particular type of aesthetic experience. Viewed analytically, the problem can be explored along three different dimensions: the concept of line,
its individual characteristics, and its formal characteristics. Here it is in brief outline:

The Concept of Line. When we speak of lines we may be thinking of any one of the following:

1. A drawn line.

2. An elongated flat shape or object (a length of wire, a tree-trunk, a train).

3. A narrow interval between two flat shapes or objects.

4. An outline.

5. A line suggested by dots, other lines, or objects scattered over an area.

6. A border-line separating two areas distinguished from each other by color, material, or surface quality.

The Individual Characteristics of Line. Individual lines may vary. This variation affects the following:

1. Shape (broad or narrow, regular or irregular, open or closed, straight or curved).

2. Structure (made of dots, made of short lines piled on top of each other, scratched out, made up of words or letters, built up of small pieces of paper, etc.).

3. Intensity.

4. Surface (which may have a distinctive visual or tactual quality).

5. Spatial quality (flat, three-dimensional, etc.).

6. Emotional character (calm, agitated, etc.).

7. Representational significance (a line could be a pictorial element, a symbol, or sign).

The Formal Characteristics of Line. A composition which is aesthetically linear in character is not simply one in which lines exist physically, but one which affords the perceiver linear sensations. It is therefore necessary to point out that:
1. A closed line is normally seen as a shape, not as a closed line.

2. A multiplicity of adjacent lines covering the surface of a shape is normally perceived as a quality of surface (texture).

3. A line drawn across a certain area will normally create a subdivision of that area and so, perceptually, it loses its identity as line.

An attempt was also made to teach the children to draw analytically from the environment (man-made and natural). This had the desirable effect of making them respond to linear qualities in everything they see around them.

VISUAL EDUCATION AND THE PROBLEM OF INSTRUCTION

It could hardly be disputed that the entire educational process is there in order to facilitate learning of the appropriate kind; and so long as this actually takes place, nothing else would seem to matter that much. Everyone, however, would agree, I think, that unless the teacher could undertake an active role in facilitating learning then his involvement in this process would not be considered crucial. Clearly the teacher must teach, and the visual educator is no exception. The purpose of this section is to investigate the role of the teacher in visual education.

To provide children with clearly written, well illustrated books on a series of related concepts dealing, say, with visual organization, with a question or two thrown at the end of each paragraph to stimulate thinking and arouse
curiosity is, of course, a good thing, but it is far from sufficient to enable the student to apprehend or control visual experience. Obviously, what is needed is not just to teach children about visual experience but to provide them with an opportunity which would make them apprehend it aesthetically. In other words an aesthetic problem must be involved in the learning activity of the student of which the teacher must be aware and with reference to which he ought to base his instructional feedback to the student and also his evaluation of the learning outcome. It is important, therefore, that the visual educator should pay close attention to the nature of the problems involved in the learning process if his pedagogical efforts are to be effective at all. In what follows I shall attempt to discuss three types of problems, of which only the third type is considered to be pedagogically effective.

The first type is what may be called the subjective problem or perhaps I should say pseudo-problem. This kind of problem does not objectively indicate what kind of response to it would be appropriate. This makes it possible for different people to evaluate the response the student makes differently, simply because there are no objective criteria contained in the problem. An example for this kind of pseudo-problem in visual education would be: "Make an art object containing interesting shapes or colors." The word "interesting" does not indicate objectively what
the criterion is which would help in determining whether a given form or color is interesting. The teacher, of course, may actually have a specific idea as to what he considers interesting forms and colors, but that is not to be found in the problem itself, and so he cannot assume that everyone else would have that same idea about what an interesting form or color is or is not like.

The second type of problem may be viewed as the exact opposite of the one just mentioned. Here not only does the problem itself specify the precise nature of the appropriate response, but it does so to the exclusion of any other qualities or traits that may also appear in it. This type of problem may be described as prescriptive in nature, because it actually prescribes or dictates what the appropriate response should precisely be. If the first type of problem leaves the learner wondering what to do in order to arrive at an appropriate response, thus leaving him entirely dependent on the judgment of the teacher, the second type of problem, the prescriptive one, demands that he should do only what the problem specifically prescribes, thus making it impossible for him to elicit an individual or a creative response of any sort.

Both types of problems, of course, have got some good points. Thus, it is quite possible for anyone to argue that the first type, for instance, may permit a student to make a highly personal response which may have some real merit.
Even if the teacher decides that it is not the sort of thing he wanted or that it is poor in quality, the student at least has the chance to do it, because there is nothing in the problem that restricts his freedom to do it. Similarly, one can argue in favor of the second type of problem by suggesting that it teaches the student how to obey orders, how to be patient, and to develop practical or manipulative skills, assuming, of course, that such things fall within one's value system. But both have some serious weaknesses that severely restrict their educational usefulness.

Let us, then, deal with these two types of problems critically to see what their weaknesses are. The first type of problem will, in the majority of cases, make the student dependent on the teacher's assessment of his work to the extent that he may even view his own work purely as a means for pleasing the teacher or getting good grades and so forth, rather than as something worth doing in its own right. Also, a student may respond in a certain way even though he personally does not approve of it, thus compromising his integrity. He may even start thinking that, normally, things in this world are done in an arbitrary fashion, without any regard for objective criteria or principles so as to maintain intelligibility and ensure validity. In other words, he may start thinking that his classroom experience typifies what is normal or acceptable in society. In a word, use of this type of problem may
prevent the student from getting the point behind taking part in educational activities, and it may also damage his character and distort his value system.

With regard to the second type of problem, its use would result in the student doing no thinking whatsoever; for the response which he could make is totally restricted by the problem. There is no concern here for giving the student an opportunity to think or judge for himself, or to respond in a personal manner. In this kind of situation, the student is not expected to understand anything and, of course, he is totally disrespected as a person. In other words, he is approached as a robot trained to do certain things without having to understand anything or judge anything.

What is characteristic about both types of problems is that their use involves no concern for understanding or for personal autonomy. (This criticism regarding the lack of concern for the personal autonomy of the student does, of course, apply to all teachers whose use of problems falls exclusively within the second type. With regard to teachers whose use of problems fall within the first type, only the ones who do not specify the criteria upon which they base their evaluation of the student's response can be duly accused of disregard for personal autonomy.) It so happens that concern for understanding and personal autonomy are centrally placed within the value gestalt upon which the
progressive or humanistic view of education is based. According to this view, educational practice must be shown to be justifiable on humane and rational grounds. Recently, because of the technological revolution which we are now witnessing, this view which originally was founded on ethical grounds has suddenly become defensible on socio-economic grounds, since the spread of automation will eventually lead to a situation where there just could not be a role in production for people who are trained to act in a passive manner, something which a machine can do much better.

Now, let me examine the third type of problem; namely, the objective, open-ended type which, as I have said earlier, is the only one that would seem appropriate for visual education. In this type of problem a criterion is set which determines whether or not a given response is appropriate without, however, presupposing that only one response is appropriate. This type of problem, thus, has two basic characteristics: 1) It is objective. 2) It is open-ended, or divergent. An example for it would be something like this: "Make a linear composition in which a line is created aesthetically by placing two shapes close to each other." Now, the criterion here is the creation of the aesthetic experience of line by means of drawing attention to the space between two shapes closely brought to each other. If the student succeeds in creating this
aesthetic experience artistically, the criterion set by the problem would thus be realized and the composition, irrespective of what other traits and qualities it may or may not have, would therefore be judged as an appropriate response to the problem. There is nothing personal or subjective about this kind of judgment, since we arrive at it objectively. Yet the student is left free to approach the problem in the manner he likes. He can decide for himself to use whatever materials he wants. He can choose the technical process he wants. He can decide on the spatial character he wishes his response to have (two-dimensional, relief, or three-dimensional). He can decide for himself how big or how small he wants it to be. He is free to determine the nature of shapes and relationships he wants; for example, he may want to use abstract shapes or representational shapes. Technically, therefore, the student enjoys considerable freedom. But that is not all. The student is also free to find his own creative level, and can attach to his work whatever subjective or emotional qualities he may wish to express. There is nothing that can stand in his way.

Let us now take an analytical look at the educational implications of using this type of problem, the objective, open-ended problem. The first thing that may attract our notice is that here the student is actively involved in the learning process, not just physically but also
intellectually and emotionally. He is encouraged to think, both intuitively and critically, and to make all sorts of decisions for himself. Secondly, the student is capable of evaluating his own response to the problem in the light of its objective criterion, without having to depend on the assistance of the teacher. This would naturally have desirable effects on both the personality of the student as well as on his value system. He will feel more confident in his own ability to decide for himself, and that of course, would boost his self-image and sense of autonomy. His character will be strengthened when he starts thinking that things should not be done arbitrarily but in accordance with certain justifiable principles. Thirdly, the student is encouraged to develop and express his individuality. He would also learn to accept himself, in terms of what he can or cannot do. For although he is expected to provide an appropriate response to the problem, by realizing the objective criterion contained in it (something which should be within the reach of all students), he would not judge his response as poor because it does not reveal the amount of artistic or technical ability or the creative level which responses by other students may reveal, since all this would not be stipulated by the problem. Finally, use of this type of problem puts much emphasis on the development of understanding by causing the student to explore the problem and to think and make decisions for himself. He would
eventually come to view the learning experience as something worth having for its own sake.

The teacher is not neglected either. Instead of having to devote much of his time and energy on monotonous tasks like having to attend constantly to questions asked by students who have no idea if they are on the right track or not, a situation which would not arise if the objective, open-ended problem is used, because students would know what to do and what counts for an appropriate response to the problem, as all this is built in the structure of the problem itself. The teacher, thus, would be able to pay greater attention to other things, such as providing greater stimulation or directing the student's attention to certain possibilities or implications, which his response to the problem may suggest, and other kinds of appropriate feedback which would be extremely helpful to the student. Thus, far from undermining his role, the situation that this type of problem creates in the classroom would enable the teacher to adopt a more vital role in the educational process and would free him from much of the monotony of classroom routines that make teaching to the resourceful and creative teacher such a tedious and unexciting occupation.

Stated in general terms, making use of the objective, open-ended problem in giving instruction in visual education would have the following advantages. All of them are basic to the progressive or humanistic view of education, which,
as I indicated above, would also seem nowadays to be defendable on socio-economic grounds. Here they are:

1. Educational activity is approached as being primarily concerned with the development of apprehension and control of aesthetic experience through exploratory behavior involving problem solving.

2. The student is actively involved in the educational process.

3. Attention is paid to individual differences, and the student is allowed to reflect his inner life of feelings and imagery in the responses that he makes.

4. The student is respected as a person, and encouraged to develop his personal autonomy.

5. The student is pressed to make creative or divergent responses, so much so that a situation may arise in which he begins to formulate his own problems.

6. The nature of his involvement in the educational situation that obtains through the use of this type of problem may be of value to the student in developing his value system in an objective or non-arbitrary way which can be justified by reference to general principles.

VISUAL EDUCATION AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE CURRICULUM

Among the basic virtues of a good curriculum is integration. Through integration one attempts to impose balance and organic unity within the curriculum. Balance and organic
unity, whatever else they may involve, demand that all the significant forms of human intellectual experience are represented in the curriculum and that none of its components are given undue emphasis. This is one of the basic principles of curriculum theory which no serious-minded educationist would wish to ignore. Nevertheless, when it comes to practice it is perhaps the most neglected principle in the entire technologically advanced world. One of the most obvious manifestations of this neglect is undoubtedly the peripheral status of visual education and aesthetic education in general.

A number of reasons could be given to account for this neglect of visual education as a component within the curriculum. One of these reasons, and perhaps the most important, states that visual education is epistemologically inferior to other subjects whose cognitive status is widely recognized, such as mathematics and natural science. The idea is that these subjects issue from reason or the intellect whereas aesthetic experience is something to do with passion or the emotions. Since education is by definition, so the argument goes, concerned with the development of reason and the intellect rather than passion and the emotions, it is only logical to find such subjects as science and mathematics given prominence in the curriculum, while visual education and aesthetic education in general are given peripheral status as desirable unessentials, as one
writer put it. If the central thesis of this dissertation is justifiable, then such an argument will no longer be considered credible.

Another reason given in an attempt to account for the neglect of aesthetic education, which is perhaps a variant of the one mentioned above, alleges that visual experience is connected with the activity of the hand not the head which must, therefore, be considered inferior. The fact that the work of the hands could presuppose much knowledge or intelligent activity is totally ignored.

A third reason, which seems to have puritanical or ascetic origins, states that aesthetic experience is of the senses not the spirit, and must therefore be considered incompatible with the restraint of the dignified soul. The fact that the spiritual does not exclude the sensuous is overlooked.

Often, however, the reason behind this neglect is purely practical. It is not so much the intrinsic value of aesthetic experience that is questioned as its instrumental value. Science and mathematics are valued because they could get you into a good college and, through it, into a good job. It is as simple as that.

It is important to mention at this point that none of these reasons which purport to account for the neglect of visual education and aesthetic education in general can
be defended on rational grounds. The last one of them, in fact, does not call for argumentation at all, only political action.

Another basic principle which curriculum integration must satisfy is the demand that the curriculum should reflect the intellectual changes through which the child passes during the course of his development. According to Piaget, the child passes through a number of stages in his cognitive development. Thus, from the sensory stage which dominate his first two years, the child passes to a pre-operational stage, then into the stage of concrete operations, and finally into the stage of formal operations. This means that in a well integrated K-12 curriculum different forms of intellectual operations are emphasized at different times in accordance with the cognitive stage in which the child happens to be. Thus, until the child reaches the stage of formal operations, which according to Piaget occurs between the ages of eleven and fifteen, the well integrated curriculum will emphasize aesthetic experience which, as a form of intellectual experience, makes use of concrete operations. Failure to do this would, therefore, seem unjustifiable.

There is also one more principle which curriculum integration must satisfy which demands that the inter-relationships between the various subjects which constitute the curriculum must be stressed in order to enhance the
organic unity of the curriculum as a whole. From the point of view of visual education, the most important point to be mentioned here is the relationship between visual education and Art Education. This I shall discuss separately in the next section.

VISUAL EDUCATION AND THE SUBJECT ORGANIZATION OF THE CURRICULUM

My purpose in this section is to show how visual education as a component within the curriculum would affect its organization. In other words, how is visual education to exist in the curriculum? Is it going to be treated as a separate subject or department, or is it going to be incorporated in one of the existing subjects? My own answer is that it should be incorporated in Art Education which is one of the established subjects on the curriculum of general education in many countries. This, of course, does not mean that aesthetic education is the only legitimate area with which Art Education ought to be concerned. For this reason I shall give a brief account of the other areas of inquiry which fall within the domain of Art Education. This would be essentially prescriptive in nature and, hence, it may not be acceptable to every one. Nevertheless, I shall give my reasons for it at the end of the account.
According to my conception of it, Art Education is concerned with four major areas of human development, namely, the technical, the expressive (or symbolic), the technological, and the theoretical. The area of expressive development can be divided into three distinct sub-areas, namely, the aesthetic, the affective, and the idiosyncratic. (See Figure 3.) Of the three sub-areas included within the expressive area of human development, the aesthetic, educationally speaking, is by far the most significant, largely because of its cognitive or intellectual character, but also because the other two may be seen as dependent on it.

Leaving the aesthetic out, let me briefly, as I said, examine these areas of human development with which Art Education, as a curricular department, ought to be concerned. First, let us deal with the technical area. The purpose of this area is to equip the student with technical and artistic skills. Technical skills are purely executive skills, and so are valuable in their own right. Through them one would be able to use various tools, to perform certain technical processes, and to make objects of utility. Artistic skills, on the other hand, are not seen as valuable in their own right; their value is purely instrumental. This is because they are intended to be used expressively. In other words, their value depends on their expressive use. And so one needs to have artistic
Figura 3. Els components de l'educació artística.
skills in order to express either aesthetically valuable qualities, affect (feelings and emotions), or the uniqueness of one's personality.

Secondly, we have the expressive area of human development. This area, as I have already stated, includes besides the aesthetic both the affective and the idiosyncratic. In the affective sub-area the aim is to enable the student to explore and articulate his affective experience and to gain insight into the inner world of feelings and emotions which occupies an important place in the life of man. As to the idiosyncratic the aim is to enable the student to express his uniqueness as a person and to be able to gain insight into the uniqueness of other persons through artistic expression.

Thirdly, we have the technological area which together with the aesthetic area of development, form the core of Art Education. The aim in this area is to develop the student's awareness, primarily through manipulative and executive activities involving materials, tools, technical processes, and objects (both natural and man-made), of the principles of design, which center around the notion of function, and also to develop his awareness of the properties of materials and the principles of structure.

Fourthly, we have the area of theoretical understanding which involves propositional knowledge to be acquired
through reading, discussion and reflection. Although this area can be treated independently of studio activities, I recommend that it should be dealt with within the context of studio activities. Otherwise, it might as well be treated as an aspect of cultural history or the history of civilization.

It should be emphasized at this point that only the aesthetic and the technological must be granted core status in this kind of Art Education program. This is because between them they constitute what is distinctive about this subject as a vehicle of intellectual development. The technical area is of course also distinctive but it is not considered an aspect of intellectual development. The affective and idiosyncratic are basically neither distinctive nor cognitive. This means that their status within the Art Education program must be peripheral.

Another thing which must be emphasized at this point is that these areas which are brought together as components of Art Education are not logically related. In this respect they are unlike the natural sciences, such as chemistry, biology, and physics, which have the same logical character within the scope of natural science. Nevertheless, there are sufficient reasons which would justify bringing them together within the umbrella of one subject. First, they all involve concrete manipulative activity. Secondly, they all (with the possible exception
of the theoretical component) require a studio setting (i.e., art or craft room). Thirdly, all of them reflected, in varying degrees, in the existing Art Education of many countries. Fourthly, their teaching can be integrated in an exemplary fashion. Finally, as different aspects of art, they are related to each other contingently, if not logically. This, incidentally, justifies the use of the designation "Art Education," as a label for the subject domain of which they are components.
LIST OF REFERENCES


Scheffler, Israel. "Philosophy and the Curriculum." In his Reason and Teaching, pp. 31-41.


