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1977
THE EFFECT OF FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON
ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE IN FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Barbara Anne Lee, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1977

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

For the past decade, higher education in the United States has experi­
enced turmoil and significant change. National and international polit­
tical decisions found reaction on college campuses, as did changes in pat­
terns of college attendance, in the stability of the national economy, and in the nature of the job market. Added to these external political
and economic issues are internal conflicts over student rights and faculty
personnel policies, retrenchment activities necessitated by tightening
budgets, and concern over the growing power of centralized state control­
ing agencies. Although it is likely that no two institutions have re­
sponded to these issues in exactly the same way, it would be difficult
to find an institution of higher education in this country which has not
undergone significant change because of them.1

A number of higher education institutions, both two- and four-year,
have responded to environmental and internal change forces in a rather
untraditional way; their faculties have organized into academic unions
which negotiate with administrators and other governance agents and
agencies over a wide range of economic, academic, and other issues. As
of May 31, 1976, over 100,000 faculty were represented by bargaining

1David Riesman and Verne A. Stadtman, eds., Academic Transformations
agents on 461 campuses in the United States. In addition to the segment of higher education which is unionized, a number of colleges and universities have conducted unionization elections in which "no agent" received a majority of votes, while on other campuses, initial steps are being taken toward elections of bargaining agents. Thus, unionization activity in various forms is evident on numerous campuses of American institutions of higher education.

Many factors are involved in a faculty's desire to unionize, and the number, importance, and mix of factors are often unique to a specific campus. Nevertheless, attempts to ascertain the "causes" of collective bargaining are legion, and several of these have reappeared in enough analyses to lend them some credence. These "causes" might be grouped under the rubrics of economic (declining enrollments coupled with inflation, tightening academic job market), structural (increased institutional size and complexity, creeping bureaucratization and statewide coordination), legal (enabling legislation), and the social and political upheaval of the 1960's (student protest, shifting power

---


4During the 1975-76 academic year, 59 campuses rejected unionization attempts. Unionization activities are well under way at the University of Massachusetts, the California state colleges system, Kent State University, and several other institutions throughout the country (cf. Sernas).
alliances, and rapid change in traditional academic and governance policies. Factors which appear to be relevant include the increasing propensity for other professional groups, such as teachers and airline pilots, to unionize, the need for higher education to compete for resources with other social organizations and programs designed to attack problems of health and poverty, and conflict in former teachers colleges (which have added liberal arts programs and have become comprehensive colleges) between the older teaching-oriented faculty and the younger, predominantly untenured, research-oriented liberal arts faculty. Other relevant factors appear to be a weak or non-existent faculty governance structure on many of the campuses which have subsequently organized and formed formal governance mechanisms. Added to these relevant factors are those incidents, traditions, and policies of a specific campus which incite its faculty to organize and negotiate collectively.

Although there seems to be some agreement on the factors related to collective bargaining in higher education, the effects of a unionized faculty and its impact upon academic governance are less clear. While


both faculty and administrators often feel that collective bargaining increases faculty power at the expense of administrators, two writers have reported an increase in administrative power on unionized campuses. Confusion and speculation abound concerning the relationships between academic senates and unions, with few conclusive trends evident. The role of the department head is receiving some attention as questions of inclusion or exclusion from the bargaining unit, status as faculty member or administrator, and role in personnel decisions add to the complexity of the position. Many writers have noted a "leveling" of status differences between senior and junior faculty, part-time and full-time faculty, and among various academic departments where a status "pecking order" once prevailed. Concern is also expressed about changes in the


12Cf. Kemerer and Baldridge; Mortimer and Lozier.
nature of administration on unionized campuses, with increased specification and regulation of at what level and by whom decisions are made, competing and overlapping jurisdictions among various constituent groups, and increasing centralization of many decisions once made at lower administrative levels. 13

Several writers have noted the paradox of imposing the industrial model of unionization upon the traditional governance patterns of many universities. Professors, they note, have enjoyed considerable autonomy in their teaching, research, and other professional activities, unregulated and unregimented by specific working hours and other standardized work routines. Epstein likens the professor to "an independent professional enjoying the autonomy associated with self-employment," 14 albeit the professor is employed by a college or university. The equalizing tendencies of unions do not seem to be conducive to traditional academic governance, for industrial models of management do not allow employees "to act as quasi-independent practitioners who share managerial authority." 15 Ladd and Lipset note that the union's traditional emphasis on egalitarianism is counter to the academic profession's focus on creativity and specialization, and its concomitant respect for high achievement. 16

13 James P. Begin, Faculty Bargaining: A Conceptual Discussion (New Brunswick, N.J.: Institute of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers, the State University, 1973a), E0074993. Cf. also Hedgepeth; Kemerer and Baldridge.


15 Ibid., p. 143.

16 Ladd and Lipset, p. 97.
These statements assume a degree of faculty autonomy often found in major universities and prestigious colleges. Other writers, however, point out that faculties in other types of institutions of higher education, while aspiring to shared authority and professional autonomy, have not traditionally enjoyed these privileges.  

The occurrence of collective bargaining on academic campuses raises a multitude of questions concerning the power of various individuals and groups to make or influence decisions. Does unionization of an institution's faculty result in shifts of power within its governance structure? Are these shifts upward, downward, horizontal, or some of each? If a group has no actual power to make a decision, what is its influence over the decision-making individual or group? In addition to shifts in both formal power and informal influence, unionization may result in shifts in the structure of the institution's academic governance system, in the nature and amount of participation of individuals in decision making, in the arrangement and hierarchy of various decision-making groups, and in the levels at which final decisions are made.

One national survey of all unionized institutions of higher education exists which provides some of the types of structural data noted above, but which cannot account for contextual factors (such as specific campus issues or the climate of negotiations) on a particular campus.  


18Kemerer and Baldridge, p. 10.
Attempts have been made to address a few of these contextual factors in scattered case studies and reports of informal observations of governance activities on unionized campuses, but these studies, for the most part, are isolated, atheoretical attempts to describe a campus situation. In other words, while some studies may describe contextual factors surrounding unionization, they often neglect to determine their effect upon the structure of academic governance. In sum, academic collective bargaining is still poorly understood, feared by some and maligned by others as it gains momentum with each new academic year.

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of unionized faculty upon the governance of institutions of higher education. Particular emphasis will be placed upon structural changes in an institution's governance system subsequent to unionization in terms of the levels at which decisions are made, the structure of the groups making these decisions, and the finality of these decisions. Attention will also be given to the power of various individuals and groups within the governance structure, the effect of unionization upon the distribution of power, and the elements of the exchange process of power.

---


20Since this study examines the effect of unionization upon academic governance, the phrase "collective bargaining in higher education" will refer only to unionization of faculty, not classified personnel.
Additional elements inherent in the structure of the governance system which will be examined include the scope of decision-making authority of each major group, the effect of unionization upon the roles of individuals in decision-making positions (such as deans or vice-presidents), the amount and breadth of faculty and administrative participation in decision making, the effect of unionization upon bureaucratization of academic governance, and the uses of traditional labor mechanisms such as grievance processing and binding arbitration.

The power dimension of this study will examine both power to make final decisions, and influence to affect the outcome of a decision made by another individual or group. Thus, the study of the formal governance structure with its hierarchy of committees, administrative prerogatives, and levels of decision finality will be supplemented with an analysis of the informal relations among individuals and groups in decision-making roles. Some of these informal mechanisms of influence might be "understandings" between group leaders to confer before an important decision, interlocking leadership of different governance groups, ex-officio membership of union leaders in academic senates, etc. Since power will be viewed as an exchange process, changes in the source of power and type of exchange will be analyzed.

Significance of the Problem

Collective bargaining has existed in four-year colleges and universities only since 1969, when the City University of New York system signed an agreement with its instructional staff. The subsequent years have

21 Hedgepeth, p. 691.
seen unionization spread to several statewide colleges and university systems, numerous comprehensive colleges, and a number of private liberal arts colleges. Current unionization activities on campuses across the country indicate that this trend will continue for some time, and that academic collective bargaining is becoming a factor which must be dealt with, if not welcomed, on an increasing number of campuses.

Knowledge about and understanding of the impact of collective bargaining on academic governance is minimal,22 both because of its newness, and because of the particular nature of academic governance prior to unionization. Efforts to impose the industrial model of adversary relations on systems of governance based, to a degree at least, on the concept of "shared authority" or collegiality,23 have resulted in confusion and mistrust between faculty and administration. Most writing on collective bargaining, particularly in the early 1970's, chronicled the problems encountered by administrators unfamiliar with the conduct of labor negotiations,24 warned against the dilution of quality and prestige of "the academy" when unions take over,25 or provided collections of brief articles giving quasi-legal descriptions of bargaining unit formation, structure of bargaining, and administration of the contract.26

22Kemerer and Baldridge, p. vii.
As mentioned earlier, a few case studies of individual institutions have been published which stress the importance of contextual effects, state coordinating agency prerogatives, and governance structure prior to collective bargaining. 27 One national study surveyed all unionized institutions in 1974. This study sampled presidents and union heads at unionized institutions, asking their perceptions of factors causing collective bargaining, effects of collective bargaining on decision making within the institution, and likely consequences of collective bargaining. 28 Because community colleges represent over half of the sample, it is difficult to discern governance patterns and changes in four-year institutions; and, although broad in scope, the data collected are limited to structural factors.

Because of collective bargaining's newness and growth and the lack of research data on the consequences for academic governance of a unionized faculty, misinformation abounds. Expectations range from one extreme of severe distrust of unionism to the opposite extreme of unmitigated optimism of faculty members that a union will immediately enfranchise the faculty for all institutional decision making. For example, administrators worry about losing power to both faculty and state coordinating boards, leaving themselves as powerless mediators. 29 Both administrators

27 Cf. Begin, Faculty Bargaining; Hedgepeth.
28 Kemerer and Baldridge, pp. 196-233.
and faculty are concerned that "outsiders" will take over academia as labor experts are brought in by both sides to negotiate contracts. Students see their newly-acquired voice in academic governance slipping from them as they are denied access to the bargaining table.

In addition to reducing these uncertainties about faculty collective bargaining, research on the effects of collective bargaining is an important tool for training both faculty and administrators who will become involved in collective bargaining. Because many educators have had little or no labor management experience or training, the entire process of adversarial negotiations is a foreign one. Both parties must understand the implications for governance, and the precedents which will be set, by each provision of the contract. All parties, but especially the institution's personnel administrators, must understand in operational terms what each contract clause signifies.

By examining governance structures and power relationships within those structures, a new conceptualization of the exchange process of academic collective bargaining may be developed. It may be found that exchange occurs both on an individual and on a group level, and that this


31Jack H. Schuster, "The Search for New Models in Faculty Bargaining," in Schuster, pp. 79-98; Cf. also Garbarino.

exchange is formalized in a manner previously unknown in academic settings. This formalization of relationships may show Blau's theory of social exchange to be inappropriate to explain collective exchange on unionized campuses. The results of the study may be helpful in evaluating the usefulness of the social exchange theory to describe the power relations within unionized academic governance structures.

Assumptions and Rationale for the Study

It has been noted that collective bargaining is a "competitive exchange process," and that power can be conceptualized as a social exchange process. Industrial models tend to regard collective bargaining in terms of economic exchange, for labor usually bargains on economic items and those issues related to working conditions and fringe benefits. But the length of training which the professional undergoes and the level of expectations created by professional norms and values influence the kind of resources involved in the exchange process of academic governance. The emphasis upon individual autonomy of a professional is not compatible with the union model of group authority and egalitarianism. If the unionized professional no longer has the resource of individual autonomy to exchange in the governance process, then the elements of the exchange process of power relationships within academic governance structures may change.

33 The Blau theory of social exchange will be described in Chapter 2.

34 Hedgepeth, p. 701.

Collective bargaining has been described as a "power relationship and a process of power accommodation, the essence of which is compromise and concession-making on matters over which there is conflict . . . ."36 This conceptualization of academic governance asserts a style of relationships between faculty and administration which is based on political strategies and the weight of either bureaucratic power (on the part of the administration) or the power of numbers in group action (on the part of faculty), rather than being based on collegial, shared values of the "community of scholars." The components of the exchange process within academic governance have shifted both in their source and in the manner in which these elements are injected into the governance mechanism.

Research on the implications of a unionized faculty for academic governance would be useful to faculties who are in the process of organizing and choosing bargaining agents. The effect a faculty union will have on an academic senate is a vital consideration when evaluating governance systems.37 The advisability of constructing system-wide or campus bargaining units may also be evaluated on the basis of research encompassed by the present study.


Numerous questions are debated when faculties unionize concerning the separation of "academic" and "economic" decision making, the advisability of cooperating with "management" rather than insisting upon a more traditional adversarial bargaining stance, and the degree of flexibility which either side will allow in the interpretation of contractual language. Further research on these issues and others will help to explain both the processes and the effects of faculty collective bargaining on college and university campuses. The problem has only begun to be explored; additional information may not make academic collective bargaining less controversial, but, for administrators and faculty alike, it should help them know and understand the likely consequences of this dynamic process.

**Definition of Terms**

Unionization and collective bargaining have introduced many new terms into academic vocabularies. The following definitions will be used throughout the study:

**Collective Bargaining** -- the process of negotiation and agreement between the management of an organization and of the organization's employee union on the terms under which employees will work. In the context of this study, it is assumed that these negotiations take place between representatives of a faculty/professional union and representatives of either the institution's administration, trustees, or a higher-level governing authority.³⁸

³⁸Epstein, p. 144.
Union -- a formally-elected bargaining agent, chosen to represent faculty and other academic professionals in negotiating professional working conditions.  

Contract -- the formalized agreement between management and the union. Its provisions are enforceable by law.

Binding Arbitration -- the consultation of a neutral third party to settle a dispute over interpretation and application of a contract when union and management representatives cannot agree. Both parties are bound by the decision of the arbitrator.

Enabling Legislation -- the passage of laws which permit employees to organize and bargain collectively. These laws often specify the range of negotiable items and prescribe union and management behavior.

Scope of Bargaining -- the issues about which the union is permitted to bargain. Some issues are mandated by law as being within bargaining

---

39 Garbarino, p. 17.
40 Naples in Schuster, p. 15.
scope, while others are permitted but not mandated.\textsuperscript{43}

\textit{Agency Shop} -- a form of compulsory union membership permitted by the National Labor Relations Act. If an employee represented by the bargaining agent does not wish to belong to the union, he or she is required to pay a "service fee" which is normally equal to the dues paid by union members.\textsuperscript{44}

Other terms are related to the governance relationships within colleges and universities. For the purposes of this study, these terms will be defined in the following way:

\textbf{Governance} -- the process of making and implementing decisions on policies, programs, and goals of an academic institution.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Governance Structure} -- the organizational pattern of individuals and groups having decision roles in the operation of a college or university. Structure includes the number, composition, and hierarchical level of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{43}Daniel R. Sharpe, "Collective Bargaining by University and College Faculties under the National Labor Relations Act," \textit{Ohio State Law Journal} 36 (1975):90.
\item \textsuperscript{44}Garbarino, p. 105.
\end{itemize}
groups, the amount of influence of these groups upon the final decision, and the formal relationships within and between groups and levels. 46

**Governance System** -- the sum of all formal and informal relationships which lead to policy decisions and implementation within and beyond the governance structure.

**Power** -- the ability to make decisions which bind others to certain actions or conditions. 47

**Influence** -- the capacity to help formulate or shape the issues prior to decision making.

46 This definition is an adaptation of a concept advanced by Helsabeck concerning decision-making systems. Helsabeck distinguishes between decision-making structures and systems by attributing formal powers and processes to the structure, while the system comprehends both the structure and all informal, external, tangential factors affecting the decision-making structure. [Robert E. Helsabeck, "The Compound System: A Conceptual Framework for Effective Decisionmaking in Colleges" (Berkeley: Center for Research and Development in Higher Education, 1973), ED082686.]

CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Although few studies exist describing the effects of collective bargaining on the governance of four-year colleges and universities, literature does exist related to certain aspects of governance, collective bargaining, and power. The following chapter will discuss research and other writing related to five areas: models of governance in higher education; structure of academic decision making; theories of power, and of professional power in particular; the advent and proliferation of collective bargaining in educational organizations; and accounts of collective bargaining in higher education.

Models of Governance in Higher Education

Attempts to define academic governance often prove futile because of the shifting balances of power among constituencies, differential participation of individuals within the governance system, unclear jurisdictions between groups or hierarchical levels in the institution, and other factors related to this process. Foote, Mayer and Associates provide a very general definition of governance as "a complex set of relations, powers, and influences embedded in a broader, more general campus culture."¹ Baldridge writes that governance is "the process by which the university's

destiny is shaped; it is the complex of structures and processes that determines the critical decisions and sets the long-range policies.\(^2\) While an improvement, the latter definition still gives no clear idea of who is involved in academic governance, where the sources of power might be, and which groups make what decisions. Clark and Youn clarify these issues somewhat by declaring that "the control structure of the American university is a federation of collegial groups that is bureaucratically ordered and supervised by laymen."\(^3\) Although Clark and Youn have identified a control model, many would argue that academic governance deals with issues far broader in scope than those of institutional control.

The difficulty in specifically defining academic governance has given rise to several models of the process in an attempt to capture both the process and its constituent elements. Three such models will be examined: the bureaucratic model, the collegial model, and the political model. The governance system represented by academic collective bargaining has not been sufficiently conceptualized, and such models as do exist are speculative. However, the three models to be discussed lay a foundation for further understanding of some of the causes of collective bargaining and the dynamics of the adversary process.


The Bureaucratic Model. The dominant model of governance of all formal organizations, regardless of their relation to education, has been Weber's theory of bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{4} The model cites such characteristics as an organized hierarchy of roles, delegation of responsibility based upon position, salaries as the primary form of reward, and expertise as the basis for hiring. Stroup lists eight elements of higher education organizations which point to their bureaucratic nature. He states that competence is the criterion for appointment, officials are appointed rather than elected, salaries are fixed and paid directly by the organization, rank is recognized and respected, the individual's career is predominant and no other work is done, the individual's lifestyle is centered around the organization, a tenure system provides job security, and personal property is separated from organizational property (in Baldridge, p. 10).

Baldridge agrees that Weber's bureaucratic model describes certain aspects of the governance of colleges and universities, particularly in its organizational complexity, its formal communication channels, existence of policies and rules and routinization of standard activities (pp. 10-11). But Baldridge criticizes the bureaucratic model for four shortcomings which he considers essential to an understanding of academic governance. First, he asserts, Weber's model only explains the legitimate, formalized power structures; it ignores any power or influence based on expertise, appeals to emotion, or nonlegitimate threats.

Secondly, Weber's model accounts for an organization's formal structure, but not for the processes that give it dynamism. Thirdly, bureaucracy deals only with a college's formal structure at one point in time; no attempt is made to discover processes or products of change. And fourthly, the bureaucratic model does not account for the process of policy formulation (p. 11). Blau also agrees that higher education institutions are somewhat bureaucratic, but notes that there is no direct supervision of the faculty's work, and no detailed operating rules governing the performance of academic responsibilities.\(^5\)

Millett also attacks the bureaucratic model for its emphasis upon the absolute power of individuals in higher organizational ranks. He denies that colleges and universities are organized in a "hierarchy of authority," but that governance patterns represent a "community of authority."\(^6\) This emphasis upon community and shared authority is the basis for the next model of academic governance to be examined.

**The Collegial Model.** Most writers agree that academic and professional norms and values are the basis for the shared authority of a collegial governance system.\(^7\) Blau defines a professional as having undergone

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extensive training in a basic area of abstract knowledge, embracing the service ideal, enjoying professional autonomy, control over licensure, and commitment to the profession. The concept of professional autonomy implies control over decisions which affect the faculty member's work, in recognition of the faculty member's professional expertise. Clark Kerr notes that faculty have considerable influence over academic and personnel decisions, and that "faculty control and influence in these areas are essential to the proper conduct of academic life." Millett makes the point even more strongly, stating "There is no other justification for the existence of a college or university except to enable the faculty to carry on its instructional and research activities" (p. 65). The centrality of the faculty's function becomes the justification for a collegial governance system.

Probably the best-known description of the collegial model is the concept of the "community of scholars." Early writing on the subject of academic governance attributes shared values and purposes to the university faculty. Brown describes faculty as "a cohesive, ongoing, policy-making body which helps to sustain the standards, values, and personality of an institution . . . a unifying mechanism for bringing all knowledge, understanding, insights, and values to bear . . ." Other writers

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8Blau, pp. 11-12.


assert the primacy of faculty participation in governance, but admit some
diffusion of purposes and unevenness in concern for faculty governance
among faculties in colleges and universities.12 Although the different
segments of an institution are specialized and fractionalized, coordin­
ation is achieved "not through a structure of superordination and sub­
ordination of persons and groups but through a dynamic of consensus"
(Millett, p. 235). Power is shared between faculty and administration,
with conflict arising only when attempts are made to impose a hierarchy
upon the community (p. 243).

Several writers note the tendency for collegiality to move toward
oligarchy. Mortimer and McConnell explain that, because shared author­
ity to make decisions usually results in a complex committee structure,
faculty members who are experienced and skillful in working with these
committees often gain considerable power by monopolizing powerful com­
mittees and preventing newcomers with unorthodox ideas from being
heard.13 Oligarchy also is said to contribute to faculty apathy.14

In addition to fostering oligarchy, the collegial model is viewed
as incomplete for several different reasons. Baldridge writes that it is
more normative than descriptive, is a more accurate depiction of depart­
mental than institutional governance, and allows no possibility of

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12Cf. John J. Corson, Governance of Colleges and Universities (New

13Kenneth P. Mortimer and T. R. McConnell, "Faculty Participation
in University Governance," in Kruytbosch and Messinger, p. 117.

14Foote, Mayer and Associates, pp. 32-33. Cf. also T. R. McConnell,
"Faculty Government," in Power and Authority, ed. Harold L. Hodgkinson
conflict (p. 13). Ikenberry notes that the collegial model depends heav­ily on voluntary compliance, and that the traditional freedoms of an academic institution require a "workable consensus about means, ends, and basic value assumptions," a consensus which Ikenberry states is weak at best. 

McConnell, too, notes the gradual disappearance of collegial governance from American campuses, stating that increasing size and com­plexity of institutions, coupled with increasing specialization and sub­sequent lack of communication, have signalled the near demise of the col­legium. In institutions in which governance is still at least nominally collegial, he writes, oligarchies establish special relationships with the administration, and may not always speak or act in the faculty interest.

It would seem that, if the collegial model were ever an accurate depiction of governance in America's colleges and universities during the last decade, external factors have forced change on these institutions--change which has resulted in increased size, complexity, and bureaucratization. Rather than a community, the college becomes a collection of diffuse groups with specialized interests and divergent goals. Burton Clark writes:

> With these sizes, these purposes, and these duties, the university campus becomes an extremely complicated social arrangement of the relations of men at work. The formal structure in itself is bound to be full of overlap, gap, and contradiction. It becomes somewhat like a confed­eration of tribes that have wandered into the same camp­ground . . . We can no longer describe it as a community.

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16McConnell, "Faculty Government," p. 100.

The fractionalization, overlap, and confusion over purposes, roles, and goals noted by Clark not only epitomize the inappropriateness of the collegial model to describe contemporary academic governance, but lay the foundation for yet a third conceptualization of the process of academic governance.

The Political Model. The serious deficiencies of the collegial model, coupled with the politicization of the campuses during the late 1960's, have resulted in a model of academic governance which includes the diverse groups mentioned above by Clark. The considerable impact of this politicization upon the governance of these campuses is evidenced in a comment concerning Berkeley in the late 1960's:

... we have imperceptibly slumped into a posture in which the demands of external interests—strongly reinforced by economic lures, rewards of prestige and status, and other powerful resources ... have increasingly dominated the ethos of the university and shaped the direction of its educational activities. 18

Recognizing these social and political factors as elements to be dealt with in a descriptive governance model, we turn to Baldridge's political model of academic governance.

Baldridge shaped his political model from three sources of sociological theory: conflict theory, community power theories, and theory describing groups (p. 15). He hypothesized that numerous groups compete for influence over the shaping of policy and its implementation, and that the resolution of these competing claims, to a great extent, influences the outcome of the policy process (p. 20).

The model contains five stages with a feedback loop from the last stage to the first three. First, social context factors influence the formation of divergent interest groups. Secondly, these groups articulate their interests and thirdly, apply pressure to those in policy-making positions. In the fourth stage, policy is made, which represents an official commitment to certain goals and values. Finally, policy is executed, with the possibility of new conflicts feeding back into the first three stages (see Figure 1).

Baldridge includes the role of professional expertise as an element of power and influence within the "decision network" (p. 206). His model makes no claim to be democratic; it focuses upon the diffuseness of power throughout the university, and does not attempt to hypothesize that that power is distributed equally, either horizontally or vertically, within the structure of the university. Another pair of writers argue that universities are inherently undemocratic, and for good reason, for they are "far from being committed to the belief that any idea, opinion, or theory is as worthy as any other of a place in the university . . . ," for faculty are constantly required to make qualitative judgments on individuals and their ideas. Despite this denial of the existence of democracy or egalitarianism on the college and university campus, Baldridge comments that "the political franchise in the university will [probably] follow the same democratizing trend that is has followed in the larger society" (p. 207). Although the political model seems to come closer

19Ibid., p. 80.
20Ibid.
What are the social conditions which promote the formation of divergent values and interest groups?

How do the interest groups bring pressure to bear?

How are the multiple pressures translated into official policy?

Policy: an official commitment to certain goals and values

Policy Execution

Feedback Processes: The Generation of New Political Conflicts

Figure 1. Political Model of Academic Governance. [J. Victor Baldridge, Power and Conflict in the University (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1971), p. 22.]
to describing the processes and dynamics of academic governance, these processes are to a great extent informal and unstructured. Baldridge places particular emphasis upon the idea that "because the social structure of the university is loose, ambiguous, shifting, and poorly defined, the power structure of the university is also loose, ambiguous, shifting, and poorly defined" (p. 107). It is precisely this looseness, this ambiguity of power loci that, as has been noted earlier, contributed to the advent of collective bargaining on college campuses.

Structure of Academic Decision Making

Although governance models attempted to describe the actors and their relationships within the academic governance process, they neglected the structural elements of governance in their emphasis on behavioral aspects of academic decision making. Although variations in governance systems of individual institutions have frustrated attempts to build structural governance models, research has been done on structures of academic decision making, with particular emphasis upon the variation of these structures both within and between institutions. Several individuals writing on governance in higher education have attempted to conceptualize academic governance as a system of shared authority where the locus of decision making is influenced by the type of decision being addressed as well as by the type of institution and the particular policies of an individual institution.

Variable Zones of Authority. A decade ago, a joint AAHE/NEA Task Force published a study of faculty participation in the governance of
Although firmly espousing the value of collegiality and the need for considerable faculty participation in academic governance, their report was more descriptive of extant conditions than prescriptive. The Task Force developed a model of academic governance which they labelled the "Five Zones of Authority." It was possible that within one institution, decisions might be made in one of five ways, depending upon the type of decision to be made, the amount of authority of the faculty in general, and the policies of the particular institution.

Decisions may be made by:

1. Administrative dominance--unilateral
2. Administrative primacy--faculty merely advises
3. Shared authority--joint decision
4. Faculty primacy--administration merely advises
5. Faculty dominance--unilateral.22

The Task Force noted that, when examined on an institutional level, decisions at 50% of the institutions were made by administrative primacy, at 25% of the institutions by shared authority, and at 25% of the institutions by administrative dominance.23 Decisions at institutions which they labelled "emerging institutions" (former teachers colleges recently elevated to university status) were characterized by administrative primacy, where decisions at multiversities were made either by shared authority or faculty primacy.24

This somewhat rough categorization of decision


22Ibid., pp. 15-16.

23Ibid., p. 16.

24Ibid., p. 17.
mechanisms provided a basis for further study of decision mechanisms in academic governance.

**Decision-Making Loci.** A second study focusing on a variable locus of decision making was conducted by Mortimer, Gunne and Leslie. The two-part study first assessed the "correlates of variability in governance dynamics" in three public four-year colleges and three public community colleges in Pennsylvania.\(^{25}\) The second dimension of the study examined faculty perception of the legitimacy of the decision structures, procedures, policies, and decisions actually made. The interaction among three independent variables (institution type, individual institution, and issue to be decided) and their effect upon the dependent variable of governance patterns was measured. The researchers attempted to identify the locus of each stage in the process of making a particular decision, from the initiation stage through consultation, recommendation, choice among alternatives, and veto actions.\(^{26}\) An attempt was made to control for variation in faculty involvement in decision making (which would have confounded perceptions of decision legitimacy) by studying decisions which seemed to have comparable salience for all faculty, such as faculty appointments, promotion, tenure, and curriculum matters.\(^{27}\) Using the five zones of authority developed by the AAHE/NEA Task Force described above, the


\(^{26}\) Ibid., pp. 276-277.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., p. 278.
writers found that certain issues fell into specific zones which varied somewhat by institution type, but that issue effect was clearly predomi­nant. The writers used Peabody's conceptualization of the differences between formal and functional authority to describe tension in the shared authority governance system. Professors whose professional identification and specialized training connote functional authority vie with administrators whose hierarchical roles represent formal authority for decision-making authority and autonomy. This competition for decision-making rights combines with the variability of decision locus discussed by the writers to produce a shifting, often inconsistent pattern of decision making within academic governance structures.

The Compound System. A third study of decision-making structure within academic governance by Helsabeck links structure to organizational effectiveness. The concept of informal power, or influence, in decision making is introduced in Helsabeck's description of decision-making structure as "the written and unwritten constitution . . . the formal and informal pattern of decisionmaking prerogatives of members of a political system." The two components of an academic decision-making structure, Helsabeck writes, are dimensions of participation (a continuum from


29Mortimer, Gunne, and Leslie, p. 276.

democratic to oligarchic) and a perpendicular dimension of centricity of
the decision makers (a continuum from a single corporate body to a
federated system) (Figure 2). Additional variables in the model include
decision structure variance (type of decision, level of decision-making
unit, participation of the constituencies involved in the decision),
decision structure clarity (agreement between the system and the decision
makers on the decision-making process), and decision structure legitimacy
(both within the decision unit and between units) (pp. 7-8). Helsabeck
calls this variable and interactive decision-making structure a "compound
system," where decision making may be both corporate and federated, de­
dpending upon the type of decision (p. 21):

Helsabeck used this model by studying decision making in four small
liberal arts colleges. As a result of these studies, to the structural,
organizational variables described above he added three contextual vari­
ables: faculty political culture, external threats to the governance
system, and membership expectations (p. 45). He emphasized that these
non-structural variables greatly influenced the academic governance pro­
cess, and that changes in decision-making structure alone might not re­
sult in qualitative change in the effectiveness of governance in institu­
tions of higher education.

- Models of academic governance and systems of academic decision making
were designed to describe the relationships among groups, roles, and hier­
archical levels in institutions of higher education. Both attempted to
describe relationships which were flexible, dynamic, and somewhat ambigu­
ous in terms of formal power loci. It remained for collective bargaining
to formalize these relations, divide decisional jurisdiction, and reduce
much of the ambiguity of decision-making structure by binding all parties
to the decisions in a legal document, enforceable by the courts.

Models of collective bargaining have been developed for industry,
but few attempts have been made to capture the dynamics of academic col-
lective bargaining in a systems model. Rather than attempt to conceptu-
alize collective bargaining in light of the models of governance pre-
viously discussed, an examination of power as an exchange process, the
nature of academic power, and its effect upon academic decision making
will provide further background to the process of collective bargaining
in colleges and universities, and its effect upon academic governance.

Power Theories and Academic Governance

Power relations within institutions of higher education are a func-
tion of the institution's structure, the nature of the participants with-
in the institution (both professionals and clients), the goals of the
institution, and the institution's past governance history. Most of
the research on power in academic institutions has focused on large pres-
tigious research universities or high quality private institutions where
faculty enjoy considerable power. A brief synthesis of this research will
be helpful as a backdrop to the rising expectations and subsequent mili-
tancy of faculty in institutions other than those of high prestige, and
will highlight some of the discrepancies between theoretical, ascribed
power and actual practice which catalyzed the collective bargaining move-
ment of the past few years.

31Cf. Sanford M. Dornbusch and W. Richard Scott, Evaluation and the
Exercise of Authority (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975); cf. also Begin,
Faculty Governance.
Conceptualizations of Power. Before attempting to define academic power, a brief look at the concept of power as a social phenomenon is useful. Max Weber's definition of power has greatly influenced social scientific power theories in his assertion that power involves "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests." To this very basic definition, Emerson adds a dimension of dependence, asserting that power and dependence are opposite ends of the same continuum. Emerson ties power to an individual's ability to satisfy a goal for the dependent individual, and to the existence of other means to satisfy that goal outside of the power relationship. These two definitions conceptualize power as an interaction between at least two persons which involves the ability of one individual to prevail somehow over the other. It also prepares the way for Blau's treatment of power as a process of social exchange.

Blau discusses the concept of power and relates it more closely to organizational structure and role expectations. He conceptualizes power as an exchange process between the source of a good or service and the individual dependent upon that source for the satisfaction of his need.


34 Ibid., p. 32.

The exchange process is explained when one measures the benefits which the individual receives from the organization or individual power source in relation to the investments one must make in order to remain an organizational member (pp. 29-30). Most importantly for a discussion of collective bargaining, Blau stresses the interrelation between power and rewards, and the expectations of organizational members to receive these rewards. Expectations are formed by the previous distribution of rewards and the present rate of reward distribution to an individual's reference group (p. 144). These expectations affect satisfaction of individuals and influence their reactions to rewards given in the future (p. 147).

Power Theories Applied to Universities. A pause at this point seems to be in order to relate the previous discussion of power in the abstract to the specific context of the university. If the lack of power indicates dependence, according to Emerson, then power of faculty would require a lack of dependence upon the organization, or university. Ecker found that high expertise (symbolized by the doctoral degree and number of publications, among other measures) increased the power of faculty members.36 He also stressed the importance of discretion for faculty members to determine work patterns, participate in decision making, and to be evaluated by their peers.37 High expertise and discretion reduce faculty members' dependence upon the organization and/or higher administration.


37 Ibid., pp. 55-56.
and increase their power.

The Blau conceptualization of power is even more relevant to a university than the first two theories discussed. The norms and values which professionals acquire as part of their specialized training raise the expectations of professionals for the rewards for which they will exchange their expertise and organizational commitment. Blau ties professional expectations to the motivations to undergo professional training, saying that the expectation of superior rewards is the primary incentive to "make the greater investments needed to become a professional" (p. 161). If the professionals' expectations are met, then there is little dependence upon the organization or its officials, and the professionals maintain their power. However, Blau warns that superior rewards only obtain when demand for professional services is high. When this demand declines, rewards decline, and the professionals receive "unfair returns for their investments" (p. 161). If rewards are scarce and professional services are not in demand, the professionals lose power and become dependent upon either the organization or its administration for rewards. This decline in demand for services, and resulting dependence have relevance to a later discussion of faculty militancy. Blau's linking of length of training to reward expectations helps to explain the normative commitment of faculty members to academic values and the belief among faculty members that their advanced, specialized training entitles them to autonomy and discretion in their academic pursuits. It may be noted at this point that, although a faculty member wields power as an individual, collective faculty power is less of a factor in traditional academic governance. While minimizing the effects of collective
action, Kerr comments that "individual faculty influence ... has been quite substantial, even determinative."\(^{38}\)

**Uncertainty and Power.** Another organizational theorist, Michel Crozier, examines power in relation to predictability and uncertainty. If one’s task and behavior are predictable, there is no uncertainty for that individual to control. Crozier writes that, "as long as the requirements of action create situations of uncertainty, the individuals who have to face them have power over those who are affected by the results of their choice."\(^{39}\) In relation to the handling of uncertainty, Crozier sees as a component of power an individual’s manipulation of or simple access to information.\(^{40}\) Both of these components may be applied to this examination of power in universities. If a faculty member has high expertise, (s)he may choose to deliver knowledge or organize research in any way (s)he chooses. If this expertise is valued (if the reward is superior, according to Blau), then the faculty member is handling uncertainty for the university. Other examples of a faculty member's control of uncertainty might be in recruiting students, making curriculum decisions in one's area of expertise, and attracting outside funds. And if few other academics have access to or can manipulate the specialized knowledge (which Crozier calls "information"), then the faculty member is powerful. Because higher administration often does not have this expert knowledge,

\(^{38}\)Kerr, p. 23.


\(^{40}\)Ibid., p. 163.
and because they value this knowledge, the faculty member acquires power. But what happens when higher authorities have several sources of this knowledge? They will devalue the individual who possesses it because they have ample knowledge sources. Then the individual faculty member, according to Crozier, would lose power because there is more certainty about the knowledge to which (s)he has access.

Thompson synthesizes the work of Crozier and other sociologists in his writings on power and dependence relationships within and between organizations. Thompson characterizes an organization as an open system whose central problem is coping with uncertainty, and adds that an organization seeks to manage its dependence by reducing the amount of uncertainty which it faces. Thompson adds that individuals who deal with uncertainties for the organization normally exercise discretion in their jobs, and that the jobs of professionals are often characterized by high discretion, much variability, and often, considerable power.

Thompson's work laid the foundation for subsequent studies of power relationships in organizations. The work of Hickson et al. on power in industrial organizations can be applied, with care, to power relationships within universities. The authors suggest that the power of organizational subunits rests on their ability to cope with uncertainty for other subunits, the substitutability of their skills or activities, and their

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42Ibid., p. 148.
43Ibid., pp. 111, 162.
centrality to the organization. We have discussed the manner in which a faculty member's expert knowledge and access to specialized information may control uncertainty for the university—as long as that knowledge is in short supply and in demand. If there are few individuals who possess knowledge or skills which are highly valued, then the individuals possessing this knowledge or skill are not very substitutable. And since the historical purpose and function of a university is to provide teaching, research, and service to its client population (Millett, p. 33), the faculty members who perform these activities are central to the university. As long as knowledge is scarce, uncertainty exists; as long as few individuals have a valued skill or information, substitutability is low, and faculty members enjoy considerable professional and individual power. But if demand for expertise decreases, if number of experts increases, then the power of the faculty member is diminished.

Evaluation and Power. A look at yet another theory of power links professional norms and expectations with power. Dornbusch and Scott explain that to be legitimate, power, or authority, must be both authorized (delegated and approved by higher levels) and endorsed (supported by the norms of subordinates). Their main focus, however, is upon the evaluation process as the mechanism of control over the performance of organizational tasks. They suggest that the ability to allocate tasks, to set


45The concept of "centrality" of faculty is problematic because of the fragmentation and decentralization characteristic of colleges and universities. Although a professor may exercise autonomy within a department or discipline, that autonomy does not necessarily become translated into power at the organizational level.
criteria by which task performance will be measured, to sample behavior while the task is performed, and to appraise that behavior are the bases of power in an organization. They stress that power is a function of the individual's "ability and willingness to sanction another" and does not mandate a successful control attempt. It has been mentioned that faculty members expect to, and often demand the right to, evaluate and be evaluated by their professional peers. This control over the evaluation process, according to Dornbusch and Scott, is the basis of the power (or authority, as they assume that this power is both authorized and endorsed) of faculty members. If control over evaluation is the basis of power in universities, then how do power relationships change if evaluation procedures are modified, or if individuals outside the organization or at higher organizational levels fix the criteria for evaluation? It seems apparent that a loss of control over the evaluation process would severely threaten the autonomy enjoyed by academics.

If we use Blau's exchange theory as a framework for examining the power of faculty in academic governance, we see that, theoretically, the faculty receives decision-making power in exchange for its expertise, specialization, and access to important information. The collegial governance model discussed earlier operates upon this basis, as evidenced by the writings of Kerr and Millett in particular. But other writers note that this exchange process is no longer an accurate reflection of governance on most campuses, and that on some campuses, the exchange of

46Dornbusch and Scott, pp. 198, 201.
expertise for power never occurred at all. For example, some authors use the problem of oligarchic faculty power to explain ineffective, unresponsive, weak academic senates, with resulting faculty apathy and administrative domination. Clark also blames faculty indifference and self-absorption for the decline of faculty involvement in the resolution of institutional problems, citing the faculty's "trained incapacity to see these problems and to consider them important."

**Professional Expectations and Faculty Power.** But other writers place the blame for decline in faculty power on structural, organizational factors. Lunsford explains the overlapping and diffuse jurisdictions of academic governance, stating that the lack of a clear delineation of specific responsibilities between administration and faculty leads to ambiguity and confusion in academic governance. This ambiguity, coupled with the various external factors reducing faculty power (such as the declining job market and state and federal influence on higher education), clashes head-on with traditional faculty expectations for autonomy. As Blau has noted, when rising professional expectations are met with decreasing demands and rewards for professional services, militancy may ensue. The professionals' "inability to obtain a fair deal in terms of social norms owing to forces beyond their control is a punishing

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47 Platt and Parsons in Kruytbosch and Messinger, p. 143.


49 Clark in Kruytbosch and Messinger, p. 21.

experience, to which they are likely to react with bitterness and perhaps belligerence" (p. 161). External pressures combine with internal ambiguities to politicize the governance process, and the lack of structured responsibilities and power are a threat to the professionals' security.

Corwin, in a national study of teacher militancy, found that militancy is a reaction to inconsistencies among a teacher's decision-making authority, the teacher's actual power, and the number of administrative constraints imposed on the teacher. These inconsistencies arise from differences between organizational structure and actual procedure, for administrative constraints could effectively negate any structural authority the teacher might enjoy. Corwin stated that in public schools without collective negotiations, teacher participation in decision making is usually at the discretion and pleasure of the administration, a privilege which can be reduced or revoked at whim. Even on the most prestigious campuses, the amount and scope of faculty participation in governance is rarely formalized between the administration and the faculty, and faculty senates and other policy groups are often merely "advisory." In the days of high demand, stable growth and change, and substantial individual faculty power, the ambiguous role of the faculty in academic governance was less of a threat.

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52 Ibid., p. 63.
Informal Power and Influence. Because the governance structures of most institutions are not formalized by contract, the question of informal power, or influence, arises. Platt and Parsons distinguish between power and influence by stating that power is the ability to make "actual formal or binding decisions," whereas influence is the ability to help "formulate or shape the issues prior to decision." Their research on academic decision making in colleges and universities of three structural (quality) types showed that in the higher quality, more prestigious institutions, senior faculty had a great deal of influence over academic decision making, while administration had little influence or power. In less prestigious institutions, however, faculty had little influence and even less power over decision making, while many decisions were made by administrative ruling. The researchers used six different types of decisions (including curriculum and program changes, hiring of faculty, and policy changes) and five measures of the influence of various individuals and groups (standing departmental committees, chairperson, senior faculty, etc.), resulting in consistent differences in degree of power and influence between institutional types as reported above.

Data such as these of Platt and Parsons begin to explain the differential movement toward collective bargaining among higher education institutions of various types. External pressures on colleges tend to cause centralization of decision-making power to the administration.

54 Platt and Parsons in Kruytbosch and Messinger, p. 152.
55 Ibid., pp. 159-160.
this centralization is made possible by the informal, shifting, ambiguous nature of governance processes, as Baldridge has noted (p. 107). Professional expectations for power which have risen during the period of growth and expansion of the late 1950's and early 1960's clash with new constraints and lowered job security, the result of declining student enrollments and a correspondingly unfavorable job market. Militancy results from these inconsistencies, and many faculty members see collective bargaining as a mechanism for formalizing governance relationships and responsibilities, ensuring faculty authority over academic and personnel matters, and providing a measure of legalized job security previously uncodified.

**Background on Collective Bargaining in Higher Education**

At this point, the discussion of theory and models gives way to more speculative and retrospective writings, for the relative unfamiliarity of collective bargaining to those studying higher education has retarded both research and theory building. A brief look at the beginnings of collective bargaining in higher education, and some of the problems faced by the "pioneers"—both faculty and administrative—involved in those early negotiations will accomplish two goals. First, understanding the developmental process of unionization in higher education will help to clarify the effect of collective bargaining on academic governance. Secondly, early experiences with collective bargaining in higher education have had considerable impact upon the literature related

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57 Corwin in Cistone, p. 135.
Development of Faculty Unionization. Most authorities attribute the origin of collective bargaining in education to the New York City public school teachers, who first negotiated collectively in 1961. Although community colleges organized earlier, the first union contract with the instructional staff of a four-year college was the City University of New York agreement in 1969. Enabling legislation in New York (the Taylor Law) permitting public employees to bargain collectively is generally seen as the impetus for the early initiation of collective bargaining in that state's educational system. Public institutions in several other industrial states with enabling legislation for public sector bargaining soon followed CUNY's example; public institutions in New Jersey, Michigan, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania unionized in the early 1970's. A 1970 National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision allowed faculty at private institutions to bargain collectively as long as the institution's annual budget was at least one million dollars. Administrators watched the rapid unionization of neighboring institutions and worried about the "domino effect" of this new and seemingly contagious


process of academic governance. 62

Factors Shaping Faculty Unionization. Among the many problems faced by early negotiators on both sides were two of particular consequence for academic governance: the scope of the negotiations and the composition of the bargaining unit. The ways in which preliminary negotiations and contracts defined both scope of bargaining and unit composition set precedents, both legal and procedural, for later divisions of authority in campus governance systems and for the number of constituencies participating in the academic governance process.

In public institutions, the scope of bargaining may be limited by the provisions of the enabling legislation. 63 However, most laws give wide latitude in the permissible items for negotiations by allowing employees to bargain collectively over wages, working conditions, or other terms and conditions of employment. Since state labor laws are formulated for all public employees, no special provisions are included relevant to educational institutions. 64 Little agreement has been reached regarding what issues are legitimate faculty concerns as "conditions of employment" because of the nature of professional values and the

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62 Collective Bargaining in Postsecondary Educational Institutions, p. 3.

63 For example, until recently, Massachusetts law refused to permit public employees to negotiate salary and other economic issues (Schuster, p. 88).

expectations of professional autonomy.65

Private institutions, which fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRB, are given only slightly more guidance concerning scope of bargaining. The language of the National Labor Relations Act is equally as vague as many state laws, but NLRB decisions on "other conditions of employment" have established precedents which the Board might be expected to follow in the future.66 Generally, procedural policies on merit pay, workload, personnel appointments, evaluations and promotions, and grievance procedures are considered to be within the scope of bargaining.67 Issues of management rights and specific exclusions help to narrow the bargaining scope, but traditional norms of faculty participation in management decisions tend to blur the boundaries established by statutes.68

Statutes are even less helpful concerning the composition of the bargaining unit which the union will represent. The NLRA requires that the unit be "appropriate."69 Questions arise concerning the geographical scope of the bargaining unit (single or multi-campus units), the number of professional groups to be represented (for example, professors,

65Ikenberry, "Roles and Structures," p. 15.

66Sharpe, pp. 92-94.


librarians, counselors) and the types of institutions (universities, community colleges) to be grouped into one bargaining unit.70 One of the most energetically contested issues in determination of the bargaining unit has been the question of including or excluding department chairpersons.71 Numerous NLRB decisions have attempted to determine whether or not the chairperson is a supervisor according to the legal definition of

... having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend ... promote, discharge, assign, reward ... or effectively to recommend such action ... if ... the exercise of such authority ... requires the use of independent judgment.72

A number of different resolutions to this problem have been made, depending on whether the chairperson was appointed or elected, whether the chairperson's decisions were based on departmental consensus or individual judgment, and the chairperson's power over faculty appointments, salaries, and teaching assignments. The Board finally acknowledged, in concluding its decision in the 1972 Adelphi University case, that authority structures in institutions of higher education do not "square with the traditional authority structures with which this Act was designed to cope ..." and that "a genuine system of collegiality would tend to

70Kenneth Kahn, "Faculty Bargaining Units," in Vladeck and Vladeck, p. 204.


confound us.\textsuperscript{73} Similar problems surrounded the question of including part-time faculty, research associates, librarians, counselors, and student personnel workers in the union with regular faculty members.\textsuperscript{74}

Added to the complexities of enabling legislation, unit determination, scope of bargaining, and status of department chairpersons is the faculty's need to select the specific organization by whom they will be represented. Most faculty unions in higher education are affiliated with one of three national educational organizations: The American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the National Education Association (NEA), or the American Federation of Teachers (AFT). Faculty unions on several campuses have chosen to remain independent of national affiliation, but they are a decided minority.\textsuperscript{75} Although each of the three national organizations has had a somewhat different history and clientele,\textsuperscript{76} researchers tend to discount national affiliation of a faculty bargaining unit as significantly influencing either contract provisions or changes.


\textsuperscript{74}Sharpe, pp. 80-84.

\textsuperscript{75}A 1976 survey of bargaining unit affiliations indicated that among four-year institutions, AAUP represents 37 campuses, AFT represents 27, NEA represents 50, coalitions of two of the three organizations represent a total of 46, and independent unions represent faculty on twelve campuses. [Howard B. Means and Philip W. Semas, eds. Faculty Collective Bargaining (Washington, D.C.: Editorial Projects for Education, 1976), pp. 45-51.]

In governance structure after a contract is signed. However, faculty voting patterns seem to indicate that the "image" of the national organization with which the campus union affiliates reflects the faculty’s desire either to be seen as academic professionals (thereby tending to affiliate with AAUP) or their desire to gain a strong state-level lobbyist with the appropriations bodies in the legislature and governor’s office (usually selecting the state AFT or NEA affiliate). Thus, national affiliation of the bargaining agent seems to be more critical to the election of the agent than to the contract negotiated by that agent, or its effect on the role of faculty in academic governance.

Other issues arose in the early 1970's which have affected the structure of academic governance at unionized colleges and universities. Questions of the scope of authority on campuses with co-existing faculty senates and unions have not yet been resolved. The concept of bi-level bargaining, where a faculty union negotiates with the state management team over general issues and with campus administration concerning local issues is beginning to interest various observers. More abstract


80 Collective Bargaining in Postsecondary Educational Institutions, p. 27.
questions arise concerning the possible shift in the source and effect of faculty power, and the possibility of homogenization of faculty status. But on a broader scale, the early developments in academic collective bargaining have raised questions such as "What is a university? What is the community of scholars? Can concepts of collegiality and faculty governance become facts, or are they fiction?" Rather than delimiting professional autonomy and formalizing "ideal" governance structures, early developments in collective bargaining highlighted the tension between professional autonomy and a codified, structured system of power relationships. It is basically this question to which the literature on governance and collective bargaining in higher education speaks.

Analyses of Collective Bargaining in Higher Education

As noted earlier, little research or theory exists on either the causes, processes, or effects of collective bargaining in higher education. In particular, only a few studies have examined the effects of collective bargaining on structures of academic governance or the power of individuals or groups within that structure. As a result, the writing on academic collective bargaining consists primarily of accounts of personal experience with collective negotiations or grievance processing, discussions of the viability of collegiality under an "industrial governance model," demographic studies, case studies, legalistic guidebooks to negotiations, and speculations as to the likely consequences of

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81 Mortimer and Lozier, p. 71; cf. also Kemerer and Baldridge.
82 Vladeck and Vladeck, p. xxiv.
collective bargaining.

**Individual Reactions to Faculty Collective Bargaining.** Early writing on faculty collective bargaining in higher education tended to either explain the bargaining process, to speculate on the causes for collective bargaining, or to warn against the dangers for collegiality posed by unionization. Writers tended to see collective negotiations and collegiality as polarities, and stressed the inappropriateness of the industrial model for a governance structure which relied on cooperative problem solving. Other writers attacked collective bargaining as creating adversary relationships among former colleagues if every office or unit assumed only its delineated responsibility (called the "That's your problem" syndrome). Some predicted that collective bargaining would weaken institutions academically as various pressure groups battled for power.

The insights and experiences of college presidents and other high-level administrators compose another segment of the collective bargaining literature. These narratives are non-empirical, personal accounts of events in the writer's college, with minimal attempts to collect or

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analyze data. An interesting balance to these laments for lost collegiality is provided by writings of a few union leaders and labor organization lawyers who maintain that faculty power had eroded to such an extent that unionization was the sole method of regaining decision authority.

Another segment of academic collective bargaining literature consists of legal or quasi-legal handbooks, or collections of articles which explain enabling legislation, union elections and bargaining unit determination, the bargaining process, and contract administration. Other editors collect articles which treat both procedural and philosophical concerns related to collective bargaining. It appears that the bulk of this early literature was reactive, nonempirical, and philosophical, as writers responded to the numerous formal and informal power

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88 Cf. Carlton and Goodwin; Tice; Vladeck and Vladeck.

89 Cf. E. D. Duryea, Robert S. Fisk and Associates, Faculty Unions and Collective Bargaining (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973); cf. also Carr and VanEyk; Hughes, Underbrink and Gordon.
changes which accompanied the initiation of collective bargaining.90

**Early Research Efforts.** Some early survey research on academic collective bargaining followed one of three routes. A few writers examined causal factors in unionization of campuses, or attempted to track the spread of collective bargaining and to chart the relative readiness of various institutions to unionize.91 A second group of studies measured demographic characteristics of professors involved in the unionization of campuses. These studies tended to point to young, male, non-Protestant, middle class, liberals as the primary impetus behind unionization.92 Other somewhat related studies assessed faculty attitudes toward unionization, academic governance, and faculty power, the most extensive of which was the Ladd and Lipset study for the Carnegie Commission. Ladd and Lipset correlated sociological variables such as social class, ideology, deprivation, and voting patterns in union elections with attitudes of faculty collected in two national surveys of a stratified random sample of professors in four-year institutions.93 Other researchers

90 Their writing reflects to some degree the "period of professional insecurity" noted by Kuhn in his description of the initial stages of paradigm shifts in fields whose theories and assumptions had been, to that point, relatively stable. [Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 67-68.]


correlated individual faculty member characteristics, institutional characteristics, and nature of campus issue with attitudes toward collective bargaining. They tended to find that the single most important variable in attitude toward unionization was the faculty member's perception of "the severity of potential institutional bargaining issues," and that institution type had an important, but less significant, effect.

Case Studies of Unionized Governance. One methodology used by a number of researchers to study the process and effects of academic collective bargaining was the individual case study. Baldridge notes that the case study methodology is especially appropriate where little data exist on a topic, if the research is basically exploratory, and if change and dynamic processes are important (p. 33). To be sure, those conditions applied to the early efforts to study collective bargaining: the wide variation in institutional policies, past history of faculty participation in governance, and the legal and political environment facing the institution or system made cross-institutional comparisons difficult, further endorsing the in-depth case study approach. An early study by Doh chronicled the development of the Senate Professional Association of the State University of New York System. Later, Doh and Johnson surveyed faculty and administrators one year after the first negotiated agreement between


95 Ibid., pp. 251-252.

State and the union. The study examined faculty satisfaction with decision making and governance structures before and after contract negotiations, and discovered attitude changes on the part of union leaders and faculty negotiators who became "more adversary, more hard-nosed, and less collegial." Another system-wide case study by Walters describes the Massachusetts state college system and its attempts to include faculty, administrators, and students in the governance process. Because state law had, at first, disallowed bargaining over financial matters, negotiations related specifically to governance and personnel matters. Walters stressed the attempts of the system to design a governance structure that "was the institution's, not the union's," and praised the early efforts to involve students as active members of governance groups.

Begin studied the impact of faculty governance on twenty-six unionized institutions, doing in-depth case studies at some and surveying others. He found, in general, that faculty senates which had preexisted unions were healthy and not significantly threatened by the attempts of unions to encroach upon their educational policy functions.


98 Ibid., p. 72.


100 Ibid., p. 20.
but that unions seemed to be assuming jurisdiction over personnel and economic matters. Begin was particularly interested in the relationships among senate and union leaders and members of the administration, finding four levels of relationships (in increasing level of formality). First, relations might be informal, where senate and union leaders would be allowed to speak at each others' meetings, such as at Rutgers University. In other institutions, the same individuals exercised leadership in both the senate and union. A third level of relations involved establishing mechanisms for defining senate and union jurisdictions, such as creating a senate committee to coordinate with the union. A fourth level of senate/union relations was the inclusion of new governance systems in the contract, structuring joint senate and union participation in institutional governance. Begin noted that formal and informal power relationships on the campuses he studied depended to a great degree on the extent of faculty power in governance before collective bargaining, the responsiveness of traditional governance mechanisms to campus problems, attitudes of both the administration and the bargaining agent toward the role of the senate, the nature of the bargaining relationship, and the structure of external forces affecting the institution. Again, it seems that contextual and unique institutional factors have accounted for much of the effect of collective bargaining on an institution's governance structure.

102 Ibid., pp. 587-588.
103 Ibid., p. 592.
Katz reiterated the relevance of unique and contextual effects for assessing the impact of collective bargaining upon governance structures. In his case study of Temple University, Katz explained how rapid enrollment growth and demand for new programs changed Temple from a relatively small, private baccalaureate liberal arts institution to a large (40,000 students), state-assisted doctoral-granting multiversity in a little over a decade.¹⁰⁴ He pointed out the split between older, tenured, conservative faculty from the "old" Temple University and the large number of young, research-oriented new faculty brought in with the rapid enrollment growth. Katz commented that "much of the freedom traditionally associated with academic life is actually a product of plentiful resources," and that scarcity of resources results in the diminution of academic freedom with the intrusion of external forces demanding accountability.¹⁰⁵ Katz saw the move to unionize as politically motivated and as a response to external pressures, and advocated the uniting of faculty with other professionals, such as social workers and teachers, to challenge those external pressures and to promote their joint interests.¹⁰⁶ Katz's analysis reflects a more extensive and open power struggle, while Begin's study emphasized cooperation and a good measure of collegiality.

A final case study to be discussed examines the consequences of unionization activities at State University College At Cortland (New York). Hedgepeth interviewed a number of faculty members and

¹⁰⁵Ibid., pp. 39-40.
¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 44.
administrators who worked closely with bargaining and the union. He found that unionization depressed salary levels, and seemed to cause a loss of confidence in the peer evaluation process. Adversary relationships between faculty and administration worsened with collective bargaining, communication suffered, and procedures became more formalized. He noted that bargaining was perceived as a "competitive exchange relationship" and concluded that the "opportunity costs of collective bargaining seemed very high in terms of personal relations, effective administration, program development, and the role of the participants themselves."

**Structural Studies of Unionized Academic Governance.** The latest general approach to studying collective bargaining in higher education has been structural studies of the effect of collective bargaining on academic governance. Mortimer has, with various research associates, completed several studies of academic collective bargaining both on a national level and within the state of Pennsylvania. His 1972 study with Lozier examined thirty-one collective bargaining contracts and generated a profile of trends in the development of collective bargaining. The writers noted a "homogenization" of faculty status and power, a levelling of institutional differences within state systems, a tendency for unions to expand into areas of traditional senate jurisdiction, and a redefinition of tenure as primarily a mechanism for job security.

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107 Hedgepeth, pp. 698-699.
108 Ibid., pp. 700-701.
109 Mortimer and Lozier, pp. 71-72.
In a study with Johnson, Mortimer examined the relationship between legislatures and collective negotiations, particularly in the problems involved when legislatures decrease a higher education budget after a contract is negotiated with faculty, frequently necessitating severe cuts in the universities' nonpersonnel budget areas. Mortimer's research findings also suggest society's perception of higher education as a public utility, that is, a commodity which should be provided to the public at a regulated cost, and which must be externally supervised or regulated to protect the public from the vested interests of the internally politicized faculty and administration. The pattern of Mortimer's research results emphasizes the increasing loss of faculty and administrative power to external groups such as legislatures and state governing boards because of increasing dependence of institutions on these groups and the public at large for resources.

A recent study combined structural survey and case study methodologies. Kemerer and Baldridge distributed instruments requesting data on collective bargaining and methods of academic decision making to presidents and union heads at all institutions unionized as of July, 1974. They compiled data on respondent opinions of the causes and effects of, and assessed respondents' attitudes toward collective bargaining. They also examined the amount and scope of union and senate influence over governance issues. A second dimension of their research

110Mortimer and Johnson, p. 38.

examined union contracts, external and internal conditions, and governance activities at seven unionized institutions. The data from these case studies was used to supplement, clarify, or further explicate the data collected from the national survey.\textsuperscript{112}

The findings of the Kemerer and Baldridge study support several trends noted earlier. The writers stress the critical importance of the institution's unique history and policies, external factors such as higher coordinating agencies, scope of the union both geographically and in personnel composition, legal structuring of collective negotiations, and faculty expectations for their own influence (pp. 5-6). They, too, note a democratizing of status and power among faculty of different ranks, and see a trend toward standardization and quantification of evaluation procedures for promotion and tenure (pp. 125-133). They discuss the impact of unions on senates in this study, and in a later analysis question the stability of coexisting and "dual track bargaining," where unions negotiate procedural matters but allow senates to decide on substantive issues of academic policy.\textsuperscript{113} They tend to see greater gains among faculties at institutions with formerly low or nonexistent faculty influence in institutional decision making, but see, paradoxically, an increase in administrative power as formalization of relationships tends to centralize much of the final decision making to higher administrative levels (p. 9).

\textsuperscript{112}Kemerer and Baldridge. Subsequent references will be noted parenthetically.

\textsuperscript{113}Baldridge and Kemerer, p. 399.
A recent study by Garbarino for the Carnegie Commission examines academic collective bargaining as an historical and economic phenomenon, and reports on the generalized effects of faculty collective bargaining on academic governance. Garbarino views various structural arrangements for academic governance as a continuum. At the beginning of the continuum is individual bargaining, where the faculty member "negotiates" for his or her own salary and participates in institutional affairs on an informal, ad hoc basis. Next are what Garbarino calls "organic internal organizations," such as faculty senates. The next segment of the continuum deals with independent internal organizations, such as faculty organizations which are supported by their own (not institutional) funds. At the end of the continuum are external organizations; it is here that faculty unions are positioned, for they are seen as the opposite of individual relationships with the administration. 114

Garbarino discusses the possible impact of faculty unions on academic senates, suggesting three types of relationships between the two bodies. Senates and unions may evidence a cooperative relationship (which Garbarino states is the most prevalent across the country), a competitive relationship (exacerbated by administrative favoritism of senates and/or union desire to increase its scope of power), or a cooptative relationship, where the functions of a faculty senate and faculty union reside within one organization. 115

114 Garbarino, pp. 29-30.

115 Ibid., pp. 143-148.
Although Garbarino's study is basically a resource handbook of historical, demographic and comparative data on academic collective bargaining, he devotes some attention to the effects of faculty unionism on governance. He notes a formalization of administrative procedures, especially in grievance procedures. He cites arbitration as an intrusive factor in institutional decision making, and predicts that change will be more rapid in unionized institutions than in those without unions. He also sees a gradual weakening of academic senates as unions usurp traditional senate prerogatives and as administrators find negotiation a more expeditious method of decision making than collegial debate.¹¹⁶

Despite the variations in attitude, approach, and methods of gathering information, those individuals writing about collective bargaining in higher education tend to agree on a few general points. First, collective bargaining is a dynamic process, heavily influenced by environmental, organizational, and personal factors, which often create or exacerbate an adversary relationship between faculty and administration that does not fit traditional models of collegial governance. Secondly, collective negotiations change the distribution of power, both formal and informal, on campuses and often change the functions and jurisdictions of academic governance groups. And thirdly, formalization of relations between faculty and administrators and the increase in the impact of external agencies upon academic governance structures, while in part responsible for unionization, also tend to limit the kind of power and autonomy once enjoyed by many faculty members as professionals.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 255-256.
Researchers are just beginning to discover some of the effects of collective bargaining upon both the formal structure of academic governance and upon the informal power relations within that structure. Our understanding of academic collective bargaining has expanded exponentially since 1969, and the literature and research reflect this increasing sophistication. But much research remains to be done, both across institutions to discover similarities and within single campuses to increase our understanding of the interaction of the many variables involved in this complex process.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

This study combines quantitative and case study research methodologies in an effort to achieve some breadth and depth in determining the effect of collective bargaining on academic governance structures. First, secondary analysis of data gathered in 1974 is used to test the effects of several structural variables (such as institution type, age of faculty senate, and the number of campuses represented by the union) upon perceptions of the influence of various groups on decision making. Statistical analysis of variance is employed to reveal general trends about the nature of academic governance structures of unionized four-year institutions.

Although survey data are useful in gathering information on some generalized effects of faculty collective bargaining on academic governance, numerous researchers stress the importance of considering unique characteristics of individual institutions before attempting to discover causes and effects of unionism and changes in governance structures.1 Institutional history, past governance practices, type of control, institution type, size of the institution, and breadth of program offerings

are a few of the contextual factors which often have relevance to governance structures, whether or not the institution is unionized. Therefore, a second methodological approach, the comparative case study, was used to further investigate the tendencies and variables identified by the survey data. Institutions to be visited were selected on the basis of criteria from two sources: data from the quantitative study, and document analysis (such as union contracts).

The comparative case study methodology provides data gathered from particular unionized institutions describing variables which were influenced by, or which had influence upon, a unionized faculty. In addition to the factors noted above, this methodology allows a closer look at unique contextual factors such as informal decision-making power, interlocking senate and union leadership, administrative strategies for coping with unionization, and other variables which were not gathered in the survey.

Quantitative Analysis

This portion of the study utilized survey data collected by Kemerer and Baldridge in 1974 related to the governance of unionized institutions. Secondary analysis of a portion of this data is carried out in an attempt to make a more precise determination of the importance of several variables related to collective bargaining in their effect upon academic governance structures.

Population and Sample. The population and sample of the Kemerer and Baldridge survey consisted of presidents and union chairpersons at 329 two- and four-year colleges and universities, which represented the total
number of unionized colleges and universities in the United States as of July, 1974. The present study is a reanalysis of data from a portion of that population. Data were gathered from both presidents and union heads at three types of four-year institutions: multiversities, public colleges, and liberal arts colleges.

The institutional category system used by Kemerer and Baldridge in their 1974 study, and used throughout the present study, was developed by the Carnegie Commission. Their primary purpose in developing this system was to create categories which were "relatively homogeneous with respect to the functions of the institutions as well as with respect to characteristics of students and faculty members." The system divided institutions into five main categories, and into a number of sub-categories within these main categories, for a total of eighteen separate categories. The main categories were doctoral-granting institutions, comprehensive colleges and universities, liberal arts colleges, two-year colleges, and professional and/or specialized institutions.

For the purposes of their study, Kemerer and Baldridge used institutions in four categories which, although the Carnegie classification system was used, they called multiversities, public colleges and universities,

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4Ibid., pp. 3-5.
liberal arts colleges, and two-year colleges. For secondary data analysis, and for selection of institutions visited during the second portion of this study, the same institutional classification system was used, with deletion of all data pertaining to two-year colleges.

**Instrumentation.** The original questionnaire utilized by Kemerer and Baldridge appears as Appendix B. It was a survey instrument designed to elicit perceptions of respondents concerning the causes and effects of academic collective bargaining by use of a Likert-type scale. Presidents and union heads responded to the same questions, and presidents also received an extra section concerning system coordination, institutional background, and the institution's financial situation.

**Data Analysis.** Relationships were tested between the eight clusters of dependent variables and five independent variables identified in the hypotheses (and described in Appendix A). Analysis of variance was used to test the effect of each independent variable on the appropriate dependent variable, and also to test the effect of the interaction of these independent variables upon each dependent variable. For hypotheses which contained a single independent variable, simple correlations were used.

Because the data collected in this study involved numerous comparisons between variables (such as responses of presidents and union heads,

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5Kemerer and Baldridge, p. 41.

6Because of differences in history, structure, function, and program offerings between community colleges and the majority of four-year institutions, the study was limited to collective bargaining in four-year institutions.
or power of senates and unions), analysis of variance was chosen to describe the relationships between independent variables in their effects upon the dependent variables. Analysis of variance allows a researcher to analyze interactive effects of variables as well as their individual effect upon a dependent variable. This technique tests variance of the means between two or more groups, and also within two or more groups. Although this test is based on the assumption that groups are random samples from the same population, the analysis of variance technique is robust, meaning that assumptions of population homogeneity and random distribution may be violated (provided the departure from normal is not excessive).

The analysis of variance technique used for this study uses decomposition of the variation or sum of squares corrected for the mean (SS). The relative magnitude of SS will become greater for each variable as the variance between the independent variables increases, and the variation of means within one variable decreases. Thus, when the sum of squares for each independent variable, and for the interaction among all independent variables, is compared to the total sum of squares (the total variance to be accounted for within the dependent variable), the percent SS for each variable is equivalent to the amount of variance explained.

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8. Ibid., p. 207.
10. Ibid.
by that variable.

Subprogram "ANOVA" of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences was used to derive these statistics. A breakdown of each variable provided mean values and standard deviations for responses at each level of the independent variable. The effect of each independent variable upon the dependent variable was expressed as percent sum of squares (PSS), and a significance level of .05 was chosen to ascertain if results were significantly different from chance. In all but one case, the data were run exactly as they appeared in the data set. For Hypothesis #11, however, the variable of age of union (from one to eight years) was collapsed into six categories to compensate for unequal distribution among cells.

Hypotheses. The Kemerer and Baldridge study formulated neither hypotheses nor research questions; their conceptual framework for the study was "that academic governance is a decision-making process largely in the political arena and that collective bargaining is a logical extension of long-existing political processes." Although secondary data analysis disallows the construction of original hypotheses, the data being analyzed did allow an examination of the effects of several variables related to academic governance. (A complete list of variables to be examined appears as Appendix A).

Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between institution type, position of respondent, and amount of perceived senate and union influence over decisions made in academic, personnel, economic, and planning areas.

11Ibid., pp. 410-416.

12Kemerer and Baldridge, p. x.
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between position, institution type, and agreement on the impact of collective bargaining on three areas of administrative concern (i.e., greater influence of outsiders, increase in number of specialists in administrative positions, increased administrative power).

Hypothesis 3: There is a relationship between position and length of time that a faculty senate has existed (age of senate) in the impact of collective bargaining on three areas of administrative concern (greater influence of outsiders, increase in number of specialists in administrative positions, increased administrative power).

Hypothesis 4: There is a relationship between position, geographical range (campus-wide or system-wide) of bargaining unit, and perceived effects of collective bargaining on three areas of administrative concern (greater influence of outsiders, increase in number of specialists in administrative positions, increased administrative power).

Hypothesis 5: Agreement by position will be significantly greater than agreement by institution type regarding the perceived impact of collective bargaining on five areas of faculty concern (i.e., increased faculty voice in academic policy making, more equitable personnel decision making, more democratic decision making, reduction in the differences between junior and senior faculty in salary matters, and safeguarding of academic freedom).

Hypothesis 6: There is a relationship between position, age of senate, geographical range of union, and perceptions of the effect of collective bargaining on five areas of faculty concern (increased faculty voice in academic policy making, more equitable personnel decision making, more democratic decision making, reduction in the differences between junior and senior faculty in salary matters, and safeguarding of academic freedom).
Hypothesis 7: There is a significant difference by position in attitudes toward students' role in academic governance.

Hypothesis 8: There is a relationship between position and response to the statement, "Faculty collective bargaining will help improve the quality of educational services on this campus."

Hypothesis 9: A significantly greater number of union heads than presidents will agree with the statement, "The recent growth of faculty collective bargaining is beneficial and should be encouraged in higher education."

Hypothesis 10: There is a relationship between age of senate and perceived senate influence over personnel matters.

Hypothesis 11: There is a relationship between age of union, institution type, and amount of perceived union influence over academic matters.

Hypothesis 12: There is a relationship between age of senate, institution type, and amount of perceived union influence over academic matters.

Hypothesis 13: There is a relationship between position, age of senate, and the perceived strength of governance structures prior to collective bargaining.

Hypothesis 14: Unionization increases bureaucratization in academic governance.

Case Study Analysis

The second portion of this study supplemented the quantitative data supplied by the Kemerer and Baldridge study with descriptive data. In this segment, the investigator took the variables identified by the secondary data analysis, both significant and non-significant, and gathered in-depth information concerning both these variables and others identified in the literature.
In \textit{ex post facto} field-based research, the investigator is not able to manipulate the independent variables, but is able to draw inferences about relations among variables.\textsuperscript{13} On-site field research, such as a case study, provides an opportunity to study complex interactions among variables in a realistic setting, and is useful to both the testing of theory and the solution of practical problems.\textsuperscript{14} Van Dalen notes that a particularly useful aspect of field studies is their ability to supplement survey data, as in the present study.\textsuperscript{15} In this way, the inability of a survey instrument to measure contextual factors and unique institutional characteristics is compensated for somewhat by the greater depth provided by case studies.

In the methodology used by this study, the causal-comparative method, the investigator examined the occurrence of a phenomenon in several settings and attempted to discover possible causes by studying independent variables.\textsuperscript{16} The causal-comparative method is not a true case study, for it focuses upon selected independent variables and their interrelated effect upon the phenomenon in question (in this study, the structure and power distribution of academic governance systems). This causal-comparative methodology was used to collect data from faculty

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., pp. 402-403.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 211.
and administrators on governance structures, formal and informal power changes, and relevant contextual factors affecting governance in several unionized institutions.

Population and Sample. The population for this segment of the study was the 90 unionized institutions used as a sample for the quantitative portion. After examination of the data, two institutions from each of the three institution types were selected. Because it would be nearly impossible to separate factors unique to a specific institution from factors more representative of the institutional category, it was necessary to visit more than one institution in each category. The decision to visit two institutions in each category was an attempt to assure that data would be acquired which were representative of an institutional category as well as reflective of two unique institutions. Criteria for selection of institutions included:

1. Statistical results of the Kemerer and Baldridge data collected from that institution, including the age of the union, the relative amount and scope of influence of the union, amount of response agreement between presidents and union heads, and the presence of a senate at the particular institution.

2. Contract content, including specificity of clauses regarding faculty evaluation, provisions regarding senate existence and function, procedures regarding tenure, grievance and arbitration provisions.

3. Availability of the institution for research purposes (e.g. proximity, willingness of individuals to be interviewed, etc.)

After studying the statistical results of the institutions in the modified Kemerer and Baldridge study, it was decided to limit site visitations to two states: Pennsylvania and New Jersey. These states were selected for several reasons. First, most of the faculty unionization at four-year institutions has occurred in the northeast (notably in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey).\textsuperscript{17} Secondly, both states are highly industrialized, and acquired public employee bargaining laws within less than two years of each other (New Jersey in 1968; Pennsylvania in 1970). Thirdly, it was felt that the similarities in the industrial orientations of both states would help to reduce geographic location as a major source of variation for the institutions to be selected.\textsuperscript{18} It was decided to choose an institution from each category (multiversity, public college, and private liberal arts college) for each state.

Because of the small number of unionized multiversities, it became clear that New Jersey's Rutgers University and Pennsylvania's Temple University were nearly the only choices for this category. But their choice was not by default, for there are several similarities between the two. Both were private universities which only recently (post-World War II) have become state-related. Both had pre-existing faculty senates,\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17}Leslie, p. 17.

and both chose AAUP as their bargaining agent. Both had had an administrative turnover at about the time that the bargaining unit was certified. Thus, the selection of Rutgers and Temple was supported by factors other than lack of alternative choices.

The selection of the public colleges was less obvious. In both states, this category was filled primarily by former state teachers' colleges which had expanded during the late 1960's to multipurpose institutions. New Jersey had eight institutions from which to choose; Pennsylvania had fourteen such institutions. Because it was impossible to determine individual differences between these institutions without actually visiting them all, the investigator chose the institution in each system for its range of program offerings and because each was among the earliest members of its respective state college system. It was recognized, and weighed from that point on in all data collection, that neither of these particular institutions, Trenton State College in New Jersey and East Stroudsburg State College in Pennsylvania, should be considered a "typical" example of a state college in either state. Attempts were made, on a very general level, to ascertain where the particular college "fit," in relation to its corresponding institutions, in the militancy-collegiality continuum of faculty-administrative relations within each state college system.

The private liberal arts colleges presented fewer selection problems. Although few private liberal arts colleges are unionized, this category

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allowed more flexibility in the selection process because geographic location of the school was not a factor. Because the National Labor Relations Board (a Federal agency) has jurisdiction over labor relations in private colleges, private colleges are not subject to state public employee legislation, although the existence of public sector bargaining is an important contextual factor in the tendency for private college faculties to unionize. Therefore, the two private colleges were selected on the basis of their bargaining unit's national affiliation, and their similar functions and program offerings. Monmouth College, whose faculty bargaining unit is affiliated with NEA, is located on the New Jersey coast. At Rider College, located in Trenton, New Jersey, the faculty is represented by AAUP. Both colleges offer baccalaureate degrees in liberal arts, business and education, and have limited masters degree programs in business and education.

In order to gather case study data on unique institutional factors relevant to collective bargaining and governance, the investigator decided to conduct on-site structured interviews. Zelditch calls this technique "informant interviewing," where the individual being questioned is "reporting information presumed factually correct about others rather than about himself; and his information about events is about events in their absence." In addition to being the "observer's observer" for


events which have already taken place, the informant can provide meaning
and context for the events reported, and the use of several informants
can provide a check on the validity of the information being gathered.22
Naturally, it was always necessary to account for respondent bias, either
in reporting opinions, in a respondent's tendency to answer questions in
the way he or she felt the investigator wished, and in selective reten-
tion of incidents occurring some time in the past.23 Other confounding
influences were the effect of unintentional interviewer cues and biases
in asking questions and recording responses. In addition, learning took
place between the conducting of the first and the sixtieth interview,
introducing subtle changes in emphasis or expectations in questioning.24
Dexter notes that "interviewing is a social relationship and the inter-
viewer is a part of that relationship," and that the interviewer must
have the "capacity to catch the interviewee's meanings, to perceive the
framework within which he is talking . . . ."25

In addition to the need to acquire factual information from individu-
als who had witnessed these events, it was necessary to understand the
institution in the context of its external relationships, most impor-
tantly, with the state agency responsible for public education. (Because

22Ibid., p. 224.

23Eugene J. Webb, Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz, and Lee
Sechrest, Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social

24Ibid., pp. 21-23.

25Lewis A Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston, Ill.: North-
of a peculiar New Jersey law, to be discussed later, both private
ingstitutions had the same relationships with the state on program mat-
ters as did the public institutions). Site visits were an efficient and
effective way to elicit a wide variety of data about the institution.

After selecting the six institutions and having analyzed their res-
spective faculty union contracts, it was necessary to acquire the names
of individuals from whom data would be collected. In order to gain as
broad a picture as possible of the effect of faculty collective bargaining
on academic governance, data were gathered from both faculty and adminis-
trators. At each institution, the academic vice president, one dean, two
department chairpersons, a union leader (usually its president), a faculty
senate leader (again, normally the president), and several tenured and
untenured faculty were contacted and asked to participate in the study.
The investigator contacted the academic vice president at each institu-
tion, explaining the research project and requesting the names of indivi-
duals corresponding to the above categories. (A sample of this letter
appears in Appendix D). Upon receiving the names of these individuals,
a letter was sent to each person, describing the study and enclosing a
copy of the structured interview instrument to further explain the nature
of the interview (see Appendix D). Appointments for interviews were
confirmed with sixty individuals at the six institutions, although in
some cases, fewer or more than ten individuals at each institution were
interviewed (see Appendix D). For example, at one of the smaller insti-
tutions, faculty senate and union leadership positions involved the same
individual, while at the two multiversities, administrators who special-
ized in labor negotiations were included among those interviewed.
However, at least one individual from each category listed above was interviewed at each institution.

Interviews lasted from thirty minutes to over two hours, depending upon the schedules of both parties. Each participant was informed that the institution would be identified in the dissertation (but the individual's name and position would not be identified), and that the interviewer would not report to the academic vice president concerning the cooperation of each individual interviewed.

Interviews were conducted during the second and third weeks of May, 1977. In addition to answers to the structured interview instrument, information from documents was acquired. For example, the institution's library provided resources describing the history of the institution, and college catalogs listed program and degree offerings. This research was conducted in an attempt to discover changes in size, function and mission over the last two or three decades. Faculty handbooks were obtained for institutions whose bargaining contract was supplemented by faculty handbook policies.

**Instrumentation.** A semi-structured interview schedule was constructed for the purpose of collecting data on the effects of unionization on both formal and informal structures of academic governance (see Appendix C). Information requested in the schedule included decision-making structure (variability, structure and amount of participation, level of decision finality), organizational variables (authority structure, formal relationships between groups, salary schedule), union and contract variables (union composition, scope of bargaining, legislative requirements for bargaining, nature of arbitration), and informal relations...
(senate and union leadership characteristics, dynamics of negotiations sessions, conferring and advising practices among groups). Several questions were open-ended, allowing the respondent to structure his or her answer as institutional conditions dictated.

To cut down on the length of the original interview instrument (ten pages), certain sections were used for certain respondents, yet retaining overlap in several areas to allow comparison of responses from faculty and administrators. For example, questions on department-level decisions were reserved for faculty and chairpersons, while questions on governance at the institutional level and overlapping jurisdictions were asked of administrators and faculty senate or union leaders. Questions concerning relationships between faculty and administrators and representativeness of senates and unions were asked of all participants.

Data Analysis. In organizing and presenting the data for each institution (Chapters 5, 6, and 7), the several sources and kinds of data were synthesized into a structure which would allow description of each unique institution, yet would still permit comparisons between institutions within the same category and, to a more limited extent, across categories. A table was constructed to compare contract content within each of the three institution types. A description of the most important similarities and differences in contract content supplemented the table. Techniques of contract analysis similar to those employed by Goodwin and Andes were used. Contract articles were examined for the

following areas: governance, academic policies, leave and other benefits, salaries, working conditions, and general contract items. Contract provisions for each of the two institutions were summarized and placed side-by-side for quick inspection of differences in complexity as well as in content. The next two major sections of these chapters were devoted to each of the two institutions. Background information on the institution included its history, changes over time in enrollment, mission, program offerings, and administrative leadership. A brief description of the unionization process at each institution was also included.

The next area of data analysis examined present faculty governance structure, describing how decisions are made in the four areas of academic, personnel, economic, and long range planning matters (identified as dependent variables in Hypothesis 1). A third area examined the loci of power and influence, both within and outside of the formal governance structure. Data in this section included faculty and administrative perceptions concerning the relative strengths of the union and the faculty senate. A final component of data analysis for each institution described what seemed to be the general effects of faculty unionization on academic governance at each institution.

Following these two major sections, comparisons were made between the two institutions in terms of their previous governance structures, the strength of their unions and senates, and the effects of the unions upon academic governance. An attempt was made to account for the presence of unexpected variables, such as the simultaneous arrival of a faculty union and a new president. The confounding effects of state level decision making were also weighed for the four public institutions.
In collecting and analyzing data from interviews and documents, every effort was made to record objectively, to check out information by asking more than one source, by carefully following the structured interview schedule, and by using the same basic outline to analyze the data collected. Glaser and Strauss note that in qualitative research, "there is no clear-cut line between data collection and analysis . . . there is no sharp division between implicit coding and either data collection or data analysis." Thus, data collection and analysis were simultaneously analytic and synthetic, a dynamic process of necessity because of its immersion in the context of the phenomenon being studied.

The final chapter attempted to draw together the effects of bargaining across institution types so that findings and conclusions could be proffered, and limited generalizations could be made. Significant findings from the Kemerer and Baldridge data were related to these generalized findings. Contextual factors which seemed to have a considerable impact upon the effect of faculty bargaining on governance were identified. Finally, suggestions for constructing new, more precise hypotheses were developed, along with recommendations for further research.

Limitations

The major limitations to this study find their source in two areas. First, the study of academic institutions is complicated by the numerous .

problems inherent in studying social organizations. The researcher cannot manipulate or control variables, so that research must be \textit{ex post facto}. The study of organizational behavior is complicated by the difficulty in determining how much of organizational behavior is really individual behavior. Results of organizational studies are difficult to interpret because the researcher must study the dependent variable retrospectively, and cannot be sure that the independent variables selected for testing are causal. And because organizational behavior must be observed, analyzed and interpreted according to human perceptions, individual differences of respondents may color the observations used for analysis.

The second area of limitations lies in the particular methodologies used for this study. The methodology represented by the Kemerer and Baldridge survey limits the kind of data which can be collected to factual information which can be quantified. The survey instrument can measure structure and formal relationships, but is unable to determine informal relationships which may operate in conjunction with or in opposition to the formal governance structure. The present study is further limited by the assumptions and decisions made by Kemerer and Baldridge in designing their questionnaire, for secondary analysis must guard against using data for purposes other than those for which they were collected.

Features of the comparative case study methodology also limit the study. The research benefits which a case study provides in its ability to focus on unique organizational attributes in depth also preclude generalizing to other similar institutions, or across institutional types.
Also, because institutions were chosen for study on the bases of particular criteria, there is no way of determining whether or not an institution is representative of, or even similar to, other institutions of its type. Particular weaknesses of respondent and interviewer bias, as discussed earlier, also limit the validity of the study.

A lesser, though cogent, limitation to this study is the dearth of theory and research about the effect of collective bargaining on academic governance. This void almost requires studies to be exploratory and descriptive, building rather than testing theory. It was the plan of this study that by combining the benefits of two methodologies and interpreting findings with care, the process of collective bargaining and its effects upon academic governance would be better conceptualized.
CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS OF QUANTITATIVE DATA

Quantitative data were derived from the Kemerer and Baldridge study. The rationale for reanalysis was twofold. First, the study surveyed unionized two-year as well as four-year institutions. The resulting book, while differentiating between the two institution types in a portion of the data analysis, took a broad perspective on collective bargaining in higher education because of the breadth of the population and the number of topics covered. The data collected from four-year institutions invited a more comprehensive analysis than the original investigators could provide. The present secondary data analysis was an attempt to look more closely at a portion of the data collected by Kemerer and Baldridge and in particular, those data which relate to decision making in four-year colleges and universities.

An equally compelling reason for reanalysis of the survey data was its potential for identifying variables which were significant and merit further study by case study methods. Because of the aforementioned lack of research and theory related to faculty collective bargaining and its effect upon academic governance, field researchers have few sources to guide their selection of variables to study and hypotheses to test. Reanalysis of the survey data provided by Kemerer and Baldridge had the potential to yield one of two different, but equally useful results. First, statistical analysis might identify highly significant variables
which merited further study or secondly, statistical tests might reveal few highly significant variables within or across institution types, suggesting that individual campus situations were unique and that the phenomenon of academic collective bargaining does not lend itself to generalizations or predictions. Regardless of the outcome of the analysis, it was seen as a useful guide to developing the field-based case study portion of the study.

Fourteen hypotheses were generated by selection of variables which appeared to be relevant to academic governance from the Kemerer and Baldridge questionnaire. The hypotheses clustered in several categories; the greatest number were concerned with the relative influence of academic senates and unions on academic, economic, personnel and planning matters (Hypotheses 1, 10, 11, and 12). Another cluster examined the effect of faculty unionization on several dependent variables labelled "administrative concerns" (i.e., greater administrative power, influence of outsiders, or an increase in the number of specialized administrators: Hypotheses 2, 3, 4). A third cluster treated the effect of collective bargaining on "faculty concerns" (i.e., reduction of differences between junior and senior faculty in salary matters, more equitable personnel decision making, increased faculty voice in academic policy making, the relative democracy of decision making, and the safeguarding of academic freedom: Hypotheses 5 and 6). Three single hypotheses examined the effect of unionization on student power in governance and on increasing bureaucratization of decision making, and also probed respondents' perceptions of the relative strength of governance systems existing prior to faculty unionization (Hypotheses 7, 13, and 14). A
final pair of hypotheses requested perceptions of the validity of the assumption that collective bargaining had benefitted higher education in general (Hypotheses 8 and 9).

As a check on the relevance of reporting the results of testing these fourteen hypotheses, results were checked against similar data treatments by Kemerer and Baldridge. The original investigators presented data for four of the areas discussed in this chapter, but listed mean responses only, and differentiated among four-year institutional categories in only two of the tables. Hypotheses for the secondary data analysis tested the effects of more variables (such as ages of senate and union) than did the Kemerer and Baldridge study, and also tested for significance and percent sum of squares of all independent variables and their interactions. Consequently, there was little overlap between the data presentation of Kemerer and Baldridge and the forthcoming discussion in this chapter.

SENATE AND UNION INFLUENCE ON GOVERNANCE

Much of the writing concerning the effects of faculty bargaining on governance has predicted that unions would seriously weaken, if not eliminate, academic senates. Williams stated that faculty unions threaten the "character and purpose of the faculty senate" because they seek exclusive representation of the faculty on all issues. The AAHE-NEA Task Force preferred senates to bargaining agents because senates were more

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likely to reflect "the professional values and competence of the faculty," while unions tended to "standardize" policy making and implementation.\(^2\)

Some writers have predicted that the faculty union would encroach upon senate powers, particularly in the areas of academic decision making and in setting promotion and tenure policies.\(^3\) But others disagreed, saying that unions need not interfere with traditional senate roles, but may, instead, play both a complementary and a defensive role for the faculty senate.\(^4\)

**Comparisons of Senates and Unions in Four Governance Areas**

Reanalysis of the survey data attempted to compare the influence of senates and unions on four areas of academic governance. Hypothesis 1 examined the effect of position and institution type on perceptions of senate and union influence on academic, personnel, economic, and planning matters. The Kemerer and Baldridge presentation of these data lists mean response by position and institution type, but does not analyze variance or significance.\(^5\) Grouping the nine dependent variables of


Hypothesis 1 into four categories of "academic," "personnel," "economic," and "planning" matters helped to clarify areas of influence for each organization.  

**Academic Matters.** For this category, respondents were asked to indicate how much influence the senate and the union had on admissions policy, curriculum, and degree requirements, rating influence on a scale from "low" (1.0) to "high" (5.0). In amount of influence over academic matters, the senate was clearly favored by both presidents and union chairpersons (Table 1). Senates tended to have the most influence in matters of curriculum decisions, and nearly as much influence on degree requirements. They had less influence over admissions policy, although they were still perceived to be more influential than the union in this area. This drop may be more indicative of centralized, administratively-determined admissions policy-making than of senate weakness in setting admissions policy. Also, especially for the liberal arts colleges, the lack of senate influence over admissions policy may be more indicative of declining enrollments (and consequent relaxing of admissions standards) than of a senate's inability to control admissions policy.

Unions were perceived to have less influence over academic matters, although the pattern of most influence over curriculum and least over admissions policy paralleled the senate results (Table 2). Union chair-

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6 Items related to these four areas of decision making appear in Appendix B on pages 337 and 338. "Academic matters" consist of #34, 36, 48 for senate influence, and #35, 37, 49 for union influence. "Personnel matters" include items #42 and 44 for senate influence, #43 and 45 for union influence. "Economic matters" are items #46 and 48 for senate influence, and #47 and 49 for union influence. Finally, "planning matters" include items #40 and 50 for senate influence, #41 and 51 for union influence.
Table 1. Hypothesis 1a: Effect of position and institution type on perceptions of senate influence on academic matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>Admissions Policy</th>
<th>Curriculum</th>
<th>Degree Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiversity College</td>
<td>4.11 (2.15)</td>
<td>3.11 (1.69)</td>
<td>3.61 (1.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive College</td>
<td>3.16 (1.76)</td>
<td>2.69 (1.77)</td>
<td>2.94 (1.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Arts College</td>
<td>3.18 (1.89)</td>
<td>2.78 (1.48)</td>
<td>2.96 (1.64)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY
1.0 = low influence
5.0 = high influence

Two-way analysis of variance

Percent sum of squares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Admissions Policy</th>
<th>Curriculum</th>
<th>Degree Requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Position</td>
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<td>.030*</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Institution</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the .05 level
Table 2. Hypothesis 1b: Effect of position and institution type on perceptions of union influence on academic matters

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>ADMISSIONS POLICY</th>
<th>CURRICULUM</th>
<th>DEGREE REQUIREMENTS</th>
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</thead>
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<td></td>
<td>Position</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X (s.d.)</td>
<td>X (s.d.)</td>
<td>X (s.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiversity</td>
<td>2.22 (2.73)</td>
<td>2.78 (2.44)</td>
<td>2.50 (2.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive</td>
<td>1.53 (1.29)</td>
<td>1.71 (1.45)</td>
<td>1.62 (1.36)</td>
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<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Arts</td>
<td>1.27 (0.47)</td>
<td>2.00 (1.62)</td>
<td>1.68 (1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.58 (1.47)</td>
<td>1.92 (1.66)</td>
<td>2.03 (1.68)</td>
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</tbody>
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TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

PERCENT SUM OF SQUARES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ADMISSIONS POLICY</th>
<th>CURRICULUM</th>
<th>DEGREE REQUIREMENTS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Position</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Institution</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.001</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
persons tended to attribute more influence to the union than did presidents, as presidents had attributed more influence to senates than had chairpersons. Only in multiversities did unions receive a score slightly above the midpoint of 2.5 on the 1 - 5 scale; this score was for chairpersons' perceptions of union influence over curriculum.

There was no pattern of significance resulting from the analyses of variance. It was evident that the independent variables of position and institution type explained very little of the variance in senate and union influence over academic matters. Only one independent variable was significant (the effect of position on senate influence in curriculum decisions), and even that variable only accounted for three percent of the variance in the dependent variable. Institution type made slightly more of a difference when examining union influence over academic matters, but was not significant for any of the analyses of variance. Thus, senates were perceived as somewhat more influential than unions in academic matters, but neither institution type nor the position of the individual responding were important in explaining the differences in perceived influence.

**Personnel Matters.** To acquire data on personnel decisions, the questionnaire asked respondents to indicate the amount of senate and union influence on faculty hiring policies and faculty promotions and tenure policies, rating influence on a scale from "low" (1.0) to "high" (5.0). Results of analyses of senate and union influences on personnel matters were somewhat clearer than those concerning academic matters (Tables 3 and 4). The highest mean scores were for union influence on promotion and tenure decisions (3.75) and faculty hiring (3.08) as
Table 3. Hypothesis 1c: Effect of position and institution type on perceptions of senate influence on personnel matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>FACULTY HIRING</th>
<th></th>
<th>PROMOTION &amp; TENURE</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td></td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X (s.d.)</td>
<td>X (s.d.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>X (s.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiversity</td>
<td>2.67 (2.55)</td>
<td>2.00 (1.23)</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>4.00 (2.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive College</td>
<td>2.96 (1.67)</td>
<td>2.31 (1.77)</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>3.39 (1.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Arts College</td>
<td>3.18 (1.94)</td>
<td>1.86 (1.35)</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>3.73 (1.68)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.96 (1.82)</td>
<td>2.17 (1.62)</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>1.79 (1.48)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE**

**PERCENT SUM OF SQUARES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FACULTY HIRING</th>
<th></th>
<th>PROMOTION &amp; TENURE</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Position</td>
<td>.049**</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>By Institution</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.011</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

**Significant at the .01 level**
Table 4. Hypothesis 1d: Effect of position and institution type on perceptions of union influence on personnel matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>FACULTY HIRING</th>
<th>PROMOTION &amp; TENURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>X (s.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiversity</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>2.33 (2.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>2.61 (1.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive College</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>1.91 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>2.46 (1.70)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY**

1.0 = low influence
5.0 = high influence

**Table 4.**

**TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE**

**PERCENT SUM OF SQUARES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACULTY HIRING</th>
<th>PROMOTION &amp; TENURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Position</td>
<td>.035*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Institution</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the .05 level
perceived by chairpersons. Presidents tended to perceive senates as having more influence than unions on personnel matters, although means for presidents concerning senate influence were lower than means for chairpersons concerning union influence. For three of the four analyses, differences by position were significant. Interestingly, there was little agreement among presidents of multiversities on either senate or union influence over personnel matters, for standard deviations were large (approximately 2.6 out of a 5 point scale), indicating a broad range of responses from multiversity presidents.

Differences in senate and union influence over personnel matters by institution type followed no pattern. For example, senates scored highest in influence over faculty hiring at multiversities, but their influence on promotion and tenure matters at multiversities was lowest. Mean scores for union influence on personnel matters were extremely close, although unions were perceived as having more influence over promotion and tenure than over faculty hiring. The relatively low scores (under 3.0) for both organizations for influence on faculty hiring may indicate that another area, such as the department or the dean, has substantially more influence in these matters. In any event, those differences in influence that were identified were differences by position of respondent. Even though position was significant in three of the four analyses, the most variance explained by position was five percent, and institutional differences accounted for less than one percent of the variance. Because of the mixed results from these analyses of variance, one cannot say with any confidence that either senates or
unions predominate in influencing personnel decisions at four-year institutions.

**Economic Matters.** Data concerning influence on economic matters were acquired by asking respondents to indicate the amount of influence wielded by the senate and the union over faculty salaries, and fringe benefits and faculty working conditions (i.e., student-teacher ratio, class load). Respondents rated influence on a scale from "low" (1.0) to "high" (5.0). Perceptions of relative senate and union influence on economic matters were much closer than for the previous areas of academic governance, although there were a few interesting differences (Tables 5 and 6). For all three institution types and for both presidents and chairpersons, unions had considerably more influence in this area than did senates. Differences were greater for the variable of faculty salaries, where mean values for amount of union influence were, for two of the three institution types, 2.5 units higher than means for senate influence. Means for union influence over working conditions were somewhat higher than means for senate influence, but the differences for this variable did not approach the perceptions of differential influence in salary matters. The lower mean scores for working conditions may again indicate a locus of influence outside both the union and the senate spheres, such as within departments (whose faculty may be union members, but who do not involve the union qua union in scheduling and class load decisions).

Presidents and chairpersons tended to agree on the relative influence of senates and unions, but, as with the previous two variables, presidents gave senates higher mean scores than chairpersons did, while
Table 5. Hypothesis le: Effect of position and institution type on perceptions of senate influence on economic matters

| Institution Type | SALARIES | | | WORKING CONDITIONS | | |
|------------------|----------|---|---|---------------------|---|
|                  | President | Chairperson | $\bar{x}$ | President | Chairperson | $\bar{x}$ |
|                  | $X$ (s.d.) | $X$ (s.d.) | $X$ (s.d.) | $X$ (s.d.) | $X$ (s.d.) | $X$ (s.d.) |
| Multiversity     | 2.44 (2.60) | 2.11 (2.20) | 2.28 (2.35) | 2.33 (2.60) | 2.44 (1.59) | 2.39 (2.09) |
| Comprehensive College | 2.00 (1.63) | 2.02 (1.83) | 2.01 (1.72) | 2.61 (1.59) | 2.14 (1.78) | 2.40 (1.69) |
| Liberal Arts College | 2.54 (1.81) | 1.86 (1.46) | 2.16 (1.62) | 3.18 (1.72) | 2.00 (1.30) | 2.52 (1.58) |
| $\bar{x}$         | 2.15 (1.79) | 2.00 (1.78) | | 2.67 (1.76) | 2.15 (1.64) | |

**KEY**

$1.0 = $\text{low influence}$

$5.0 = $\text{high influence}$

**Two-Way Analysis of Variance**

**Percent Sum of Squares**

|                  | SALARIES | | | WORKING CONDITIONS | | |
|------------------|----------|---|---|---------------------|---|
| By Position      | .002     | | | .023 |
| By Institution   | .003     | | | .002 |
| Interaction      | .006     | | | .012 |
Table 6. Hypothesis 1f: Effect of position and institution type on perceptions of union influence on economic matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Chairperson</th>
<th>Working Conditions</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Chairperson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$\bar{x}$ (s.d.)</td>
<td>$\bar{x}$ (s.d.)</td>
<td>$\bar{x}$ (s.d.)</td>
<td>$\bar{x}$ (s.d.)</td>
<td>$\bar{x}$ (s.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiversity</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>4.56 (2.13)</td>
<td>5.00 (0.00)</td>
<td>4.78 (1.48)</td>
<td>2.44 (2.79)</td>
<td>3.44 (1.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>4.02 (1.30)</td>
<td>4.43 (1.23)</td>
<td>4.21 (1.28)</td>
<td>2.80 (1.44)</td>
<td>3.48 (1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>4.64 (0.50)</td>
<td>4.64 (0.63)</td>
<td>4.64 (0.57)</td>
<td>3.64 (1.43)</td>
<td>3.79 (1.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>4.19 (1.35)</td>
<td>4.55 (1.05)</td>
<td>2.88 (1.68)</td>
<td>3.54 (1.47)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Two-Way Analysis of Variance**

**Percent Sum of Squares**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SALARIES</th>
<th>WORKING CONDITIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Position</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.038*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Institution</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the .05 level
chairpersons attributed more influence to unions than did presidents. The difference here was that both groups consistently rated unions higher in influence than senates for this variable. Although both groups tended to see relative influence in approximately the same way, the one difference that was significant was between the perceptions of presidents and chairpersons on amount of union influence over faculty working conditions. Even though the "position" variable was significant, it only accounted for four percent of the total variance in amount of union influence over faculty working conditions.

Although not statistically significant, differences in respondents' perceptions by institution type were interesting. Presidents of liberal arts colleges reported the most senate influence in economic matters, while union chairpersons in multiversities reported the greatest senate influence for this variable. But it was for union influence in economic matters that results were the most interesting. All nine multiversity chairpersons gave unions a "5" rating (the strongest influence possible) in liberal arts on salary; the standard deviation was 0.0. But chairpersons in liberal arts colleges reported the highest union influence over working conditions, leaving public colleges somewhere in between. Presidents of liberal arts colleges rated unions higher in both economic variables than did their counterparts at other institution types. In sum, all respondents agreed that unions prevailed in economic matters, but there were some minor differences by position and institution type. Neither independent variable was successful in accounting for any measurable percentage of the variance in the dependent variable.
Planning Matters. For this category, respondents were asked to indicate how much influence the senate and the union had in long-range planning and in determining budgets, rating influence on a scale from "low" (1.0) to "high" (5.0). These variables were both called "planning" because both require information and some forecasting skill. Also, especially under a union contract, salaries are not allocated in the departmental budget, leaving budget allocation decisions more reflective of organizational planning concerns rather than either personnel or faculty welfare matters. In most cases, both presidents and chairpersons tended to see senates having more influence over both planning areas than did unions (Tables 7 and 8). Senates were perceived by both groups as having more influence over long-range planning than over budgets. The perceptions of fairly low influence over budgets may, as with the earlier dependent variables, indicate that budget decisions are made by groups other than either the union or the senate.

Differences in perceptions by both position and institution type were again interesting, but of little significance. In one test (senate influence on planning), differences between positions were significant, accounting for approximately six percent of the variance. Chairpersons at liberal arts colleges reported the least union influence in both areas of planning. Presidents of liberal arts colleges saw senates as having the most influence in both planning areas. No discernible patterns were evident among institution types, with differences between respondents' positions being larger than differences among institution types. These inconclusive results for influence on planning matters, as suggested before, may most clearly indicate that responsibility and
Table 7: Hypothesis 1g: Effect of position and institution type on perceptions of senate influence on planning matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>BUDGETS</th>
<th></th>
<th>PLANNING</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>X (s.d.)</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>2.44 (2.56)</td>
<td>1.56 (1.13)</td>
<td>2.00 (1.97)</td>
<td>3.11 (2.37)</td>
<td>3.33 (1.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>2.33 (1.62)</td>
<td>2.21 (1.84)</td>
<td>2.28 (1.72)</td>
<td>3.57 (1.43)</td>
<td>2.88 (1.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>2.33 (1.62)</td>
<td>2.21 (1.84)</td>
<td>2.28 (1.72)</td>
<td>3.57 (1.43)</td>
<td>2.88 (1.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>2.09 (1.64)</td>
<td>1.50 (0.76)</td>
<td>2.20 (1.44)</td>
<td>4.00 (1.61)</td>
<td>2.21 (1.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>2.46 (1.76)</td>
<td>1.97 (1.60)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.58 (1.59)</td>
<td>2.80 (1.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key**
1.0 = low influence
5.0 = high influence

**Two-Way Analysis of Variance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENT SUM OF SQUARES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BUDGETS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant at the .01 level**
Table 8. Hypothesis lh: Effect of position and institution type on perceptions of union influence on planning matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>BUDGETS</th>
<th>PLANNING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>X (s.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presidents</td>
<td>Chairpersons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiversity</td>
<td>1.89 (2.67)</td>
<td>2.11 (2.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive College</td>
<td>1.69 (1.06)</td>
<td>2.10 (1.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Arts College</td>
<td>2.18 (0.98)</td>
<td>1.57 (0.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.80 (1.35)</td>
<td>1.98 (1.49)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY**

1.0 = low influence  
5.0 = high influence

**TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE**

**PERCENT SUM OF SQUARES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>BUDGETS</th>
<th>PLANNING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Position</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Institution</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

104
influence in planning matters still rests with the administration, or with individuals or groups not closely related to either senates or unions.

The first hypothesis examined the perceptions of presidents and chairpersons on relative amounts of senate and union influence in four areas of academic governance: academic, personnel, economic, and planning matters. Clear tendencies were evident in two of the four areas, with senates being perceived as having more influence in academic, and unions in economic matters. These results were predictable, especially for the higher union influence over economic matters. In separating the effects of position and institution type, it was evident that the respondent's position had a much greater influence on perceptions of the influence of either senates or unions, for this variable showed the only significant effects. No clear patterns of influence over either personnel matters or planning matters were evident, and means for each of these categories were lower than those for the academic and economic categories. This result may indicate ambiguity in the locus of decision responsibility and influence for these variables, or it may indicate that other individuals or groups influence decisions in these areas.

**Influence of Age on Senate and Union Influence**

Three hypotheses, 10, 11, and 12, examined the effect of the ages of senates and unions upon their relative influence. Although researchers have not yet attempted to study the relationship between a senate or union's age and the strength of its influence over various aspects of governance, it was hypothesized that greater age would imply greater senate or union influence in selected governance matters.
Influence of Senate Age on Senate Influence over Personnel Matters.

Hypothesis 10 predicted a relationship between senate age and perceived amount of senate influence in personal matters (faculty hiring and promotion and tenure). Simple correlation was used to test this hypothesis, with consistent, but surprising results (Table 9). For both dependent variables in the area of personnel matters, senate age had a moderate negative relationship to senate influence in personal matters. This result was somewhat unexpected, for it was assumed that new senates (less than four years old) would have been implemented at about the same time that the union was certified, and that the new senate would have had to compete with the new union for influence in several areas, including personnel matters. It was surmised that older, established senates would have had more influence on hiring and promotion and tenure, whereas data results show the opposite to be true. But when these results were considered in light of the results of the tests of Hypothesis 1, an explanation for the negative correlation was suggested. Senates were seen by all respondents as having fairly low amounts of influence in personnel matters. A possible explanation for these depressed results was that other groups (such as academic departments or deans) might have controlled faculty hiring and promotion and tenure policies. In many cases, those institutions with the newest senates are institutions whose faculty have historically had little influence in academic governance, such as at former teachers' colleges.\(^7\) Thus, a new senate may have little influence within departments, while, on campuses which have

Table 9. Hypothesis 10: Effect of age of senate on perceptions of senate influence on personnel matters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FACULTY HIRING</th>
<th>PROMOTION &amp; TENURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>r</td>
<td>-0.35</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slope</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>1.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r^2$</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance</td>
<td>0.00002</td>
<td>0.00005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

older senates, faculty have a history of, or have developed, greater influence in faculty hiring and promotion/tenure procedures within their departments.

Age of the senate was not a significant factor in explaining the variance in senate influence over personnel matters, for the $r^2$ values were between 11 and 12 percent. Again, the low general influence of senates in personnel matters was hardly modified when the effect of the age of the senate was examined.

Effect of Union Age on Influence over Academic Matters. Research on union contract content has shown a tendency for unions to increase the scope of bargaining from issues of economics and working conditions to areas more traditional to senate jurisdictions, including teaching loads, curricular policy-making, and matters related to faculty by-laws and handbooks. It was thus surmised that each year, the union would

---

attempt to increase the scope of its power, and older unions would probably be perceived as more influential than new unions in academic policy matters.

Hypothesis 11 examined the effects of union age and institution type on perceptions of union influence in academic matters. It was thus assumed that mean scores for union influence would increase with increasing union age.

Results of the analysis of variance were not statistically significant, meaning that differences were extremely small both by age of union and among institution types (Table 10). Because of the spread of a relatively small number of cases over a period of eight years, several cells had only one case, and one cell was empty. This uneven distribution of data resulted in less reliable means, and probably helped to account for the erratic results within an institution type across the categories of union age. The clearest trend of increasing union influence over academic matters was in multiversities, where their influence increased substantially as their age increased. However, standard deviations for these means were either zero (where the cell \( n = 1 \)) or quite large (averaging above 3.0 on a 5-point scale), alerting the investigator that this test was not a valid measurement or explanation of differences in union influence on academic matters.

Results for both public colleges and liberal arts colleges were interesting, for, in most cases, new unions (1-2 years old) were perceived as having more influence on academic matters than were older unions. This response pattern may again reflect the relative lack of faculty influence in decision making at both of these institution types.
Table 10. Hypothesis 11: Effect of age of union and institution type on perceptions of union influence on academic matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>ADMISSIONS POLICY</th>
<th>CURRICULUM</th>
<th>DEGREE REQUIREMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AGE OF UNION</td>
<td>AGE OF UNION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiversity</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(2.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive College</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.43)</td>
<td>(1.39)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Arts College</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(2.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.62)</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.07)</td>
<td>(1.26)</td>
<td>(1.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY**
- 1.0 = low influence
- 5.0 = high influence

**TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENT SUM OF SQUARES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BY INSTITUTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BY AGE OF UNION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEGREE REQUIREMENTS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and the stronger union influence in this case does not deprive other faculty groups of their influence, but increases the influence of faculty in general. However, it appeared that as unions persist over time, other groups at these types of institutions assume the authority for academic decision making. Finally, the greater initial influence may indicate attribution to the union of more influence than it actually had when a few more years provided more perspective on the union's role in policy making in academic matters. Whatever the explanation may be, it was clear that neither presidents nor chairpersons tended to perceive unions as "encroaching" into areas where decision making had historically been, or attempted to be, collegial rather than adversary.

Influence of Senate Age on Union Influence over Academic Matters.

Because the strength of the union's influence in academic matters is often related to the strength of the senate, Hypothesis 12 tested the effect of the age of the senate on perceived union influence in academic matters. It was assumed that there would be a positive relationship between senate influence and senate age, resulting in decreasing union influence with increasing senate age. Although no cells were empty, several cells contained only one or two cases, and thus the data are less reliable because of their uneven distribution (Table 11).

There was no clear pattern of increase or decrease in union influence on academic matters with increasing senate age. One pattern of sorts emerged which, at first glance, seemed unexplainable. Union

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Table 11. Hypothesis 12: Effect of age of senate and institution type on perceptions of union influence on academic matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>ADMISSIONS POLICIES</th>
<th>CURRICULUM</th>
<th>DEGREE REQUIREMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age of Senate</td>
<td>Age of Senate</td>
<td>Age of Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1-4 5-8 9-12 12+</td>
<td>1-4 5-8 9-12 12+</td>
<td>1-4 5-8 9-12 12+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.) (s.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiversity</td>
<td>1.00 4.00 1.00 2.80 2.50</td>
<td>1.00 3.67 1.00 2.90 2.50</td>
<td>1.00 3.67 1.00 2.90 2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00) (4.36) (0.00) (2.39) (2.53)</td>
<td>(0.00) (4.62) (0.00) (2.47) (2.60)</td>
<td>(0.00) (4.62) (0.00) (2.47) (2.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive</td>
<td>1.46 1.71 1.64 1.46 1.62</td>
<td>1.83 1.96 3.43 1.55 2.24</td>
<td>1.83 1.75 2.43 1.38 1.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>(1.32) (1.38) (1.45) (1.39) (1.36)</td>
<td>(1.52) (1.35) (1.87) (1.39) (1.66)</td>
<td>(1.71) (1.48) (1.95) (1.39) (1.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Arts</td>
<td>1.80 1.43 1.50 1.57 1.68</td>
<td>2.00 1.57 1.00 1.71 1.64</td>
<td>1.80 1.28 1.00 1.71 1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College</td>
<td>(1.30) (0.79) (0.71) (1.13) (1.28)</td>
<td>(1.41) (0.98) (0.00) (1.11) (1.04)</td>
<td>(1.09) (0.76) (0.00) (1.11) (1.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.48 1.84 1.59 1.93 1.81 2.03 3.00 2.03 1.77 1.82 2.18 1.97</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.26) (1.72) (1.32) (1.80)</td>
<td>(1.45) (1.70) (1.94) (1.83)</td>
<td>(1.56) (1.78) (1.86) (1.85)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY**

1.0 = low influence
5.0 = high influence

**TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENT SUM OF SQUARES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADMISSIONS POLICIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Institution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Age of Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the .05 level
influence increased with age of the senate up to the eighth year of a senate's existence, then tended to decrease with increasing senate age. This strange "peak" in union influence was unusual unless one considered the conditions on college campuses between 1966 and 1970 (since the data were collected in 1974, this period would cover the last four years of the 1960's). During these years, numerous campuses were undergoing student protest and faculty activism for a greater voice in academic governance. Senates which formed at this time tended to be broadly representative, and to include students, faculty, and administrators.\(^{10}\)

If those senates formed between 1966 and 1970 retained their original composition in 1974, this factor might be relevant to the union's being perceived as having greater influence over academic matters because of internal political struggles among the diverse constituencies within the senate. Multiversities tended to show this "abnormal" influence pattern to a greater degree than either comprehensive colleges or liberal arts colleges; it was in the multiversities where much of the student unrest occurred, and many senates were re-formed on campuses of large universities during the late 1960's.\(^{11}\)

Aside from the unusual "jump" for senates aged 5-8, results of this analysis of variance were inconclusive. In only one test was a variable significant: the effect of institution type on union influence on academic policy making. However, even this variable only accounted for approximately five percent of the variance in the dependent variable.


\(^{11}\)Ibid., p. 26.
Extremely large standard deviations (nearing 2.0, with one exceeding 4.0) also cast doubt on the usefulness of the data for this particular hypothesis. Because of uneven case distribution and lack of information on the effect of the composition of the senate on union influence in academic matters, the results of testing Hypothesis 12 were not conclusive.

Results of statistical testing of data related to union and senate influence in academic governance were, for the most part, inconclusive. Each seemed to have its sphere of influence (for the senate, academic matters, and for the union economic matters). Age of the senate and union did not have a strong relationship to their influence, particularly in academic and personnel matters. Other variables whose effect is unknown, such as composition of the senate, may have a greater influence than the variables chosen for study. And, as is always likely in social science research, differential perceptions of respondents (especially by hierarchical position) tend to account for a significant, if not large, portion of the variance in the dependent variable.

EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON ISSUES RELATED TO ADMINISTRATION

Many writers dealing with faculty bargaining have discussed the effects of unionization on the role of college and university administrators. While some writers maintained that administrators lose power when faculties unionize,12 others felt that a negotiated contract

clarifies governance relationships and actually increases the power of administrators. Other writers have evinced concern that specialists will usurp the traditional generalists in academic administration as experts in labor negotiations and attorneys replace scholars at high administrative levels. Still others noted an increase in the influence of outside agencies, such as state governing or coordinating boards, upon internal governance matters and administrative decision making.

Three questions on the Kemerer and Baldridge survey solicited opinions of presidents and chairpersons on the effects of collective bargaining on administrative power. Here, the Kemerer and Baldridge presentation listed mean responses by position and institution type of respondent. No tests of variance or significance were reported (p. 169). First, respondents were asked to agree or disagree with the statement that faculty bargaining would increase the power of the administration at the expense of the faculty. Secondly, they were asked if they felt that faculty bargaining would increase the influence on campus decision making of outside agencies (such as courts, state agencies, or arbitrators). Thirdly, respondents were asked whether or not collective bargaining would cause specialists (such as lawyers and management experts)

---


to replace generalists in campus administration. Agreement was measured on a scale from strong agreement (1.0) to strong disagreement (5.0). Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 tested the effects of several independent variables upon the responses to these three questions.

Effects of Position and Institution Type on Administration in Unionized Institutions

Hypothesis 2 tested the effects of position and institution type on perceptions of the effect of faculty bargaining on changes in campus administration. As in the responses to questions concerning governance matters, differences in position accounted for more of the variance than did differences in institution type (Table 12). For the second and third questions, presidents tended to agree, although they tended to be neutral or to disagree slightly that collective bargaining would increase administrative power. Results for this question by position were significant, and accounted for fifteen percent of the variance in agreement. Chairpersons disagreed more strongly that faculty bargaining would increase administrative power. In fact, their "strongest" disagreement, and the responses with the smallest standard deviations, were to this question of administrative power.

Both groups of respondents agreed that bargaining would increase the influence of outside agencies, although presidents tended to agree more strongly than did chairpersons. Differences by position were significant, but only accounted for eight percent of the variance. Perceptions of presidents and chairpersons on the need for specialists in administration

16See Appendix B, pp.338-339, questions #54, 65, and 66.
Table 12. Hypothesis 2: Effect of position and institution type on perceptions of effect of faculty collective bargaining on three areas of administrative concern.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>INCREASED POWER</th>
<th>OUTSIDE INFLUENCE</th>
<th>SPECIALISTS NEEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiversity</td>
<td>3.12 (1.25)</td>
<td>4.22 (0.67)</td>
<td>3.71 (1.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensive College</td>
<td>3.55 (1.26)</td>
<td>4.33 (0.75)</td>
<td>3.91 (1.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Arts College</td>
<td>3.36 (1.43)</td>
<td>4.43 (0.76)</td>
<td>3.96 (1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>3.47 (1.28)</td>
<td>4.34 (0.74)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Two-Way Analysis of Variance**

**Percent Sum of Squares**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INCREASED POWER</th>
<th>OUTSIDE INFLUENCE</th>
<th>SPECIALISTS NEEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Position</td>
<td>.150**</td>
<td>.077**</td>
<td>.127**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Institution</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant at the .01 level**
tended to differ less, although differences were still significant. Al-
though significant, this variable accounted for only thirteen percent of
the variance in responses.

Differences between responses by institution type were not signifi-
cant and formed no discernible pattern of agreement or disagreement.
Standard deviations for means, both by position and by institution type,
were fairly low; all were less than 1.5 on a scale of 5.0. These
standard deviations indicated considerable agreement on the effect of
faculty collective bargaining on three areas of administrative concern,
some agreement that each of these three changes in administration
would occur, but that they would not have a substantial impact upon the
nature of administration.

Effects of Position and Senate Age on Administration in Unionized
Institutions

Hypothesis 3 tested the effects of position and age of senate on
responses to the same three questions examined by Hypotheses 2 (in-
creased administrative power, increased influence of outsiders, and
replacement of generalists by specialists). For reasons similar to
those discussed earlier, it was assumed that older senates would be more
powerful than newer ones, would tend to reduce administrative power,
and, because senates which were older might tend to dominate campus
decision making, administrative specialists to deal with militant unions
might not be needed. It was also surmised that older senates might be
more successful in protecting local campus autonomy against external
usurpation of decision making.
Differences in perception by respondents' position were highly significant for all three questions, with presidents tending to agree with all questions while chairpersons tended to be neutral or to slightly disagree (Table 13). For the question on increased administrative power, position accounted for approximately sixteen percent of response variance. For responses to the question of increased influence of outsiders, position accounted for approximately eleven percent of the variance. And for the question of specialists replacing generalists, position accounted for over seventeen percent of the variance.

There was no discernible pattern of responses by age of senate. The variable was not significant, and a visual inspection of means by senate age categories revealed a varying response pattern. Standard deviations for means within age categories, reflecting the lack of a relationship between senate age and respondents' perceptions. Apparently, one's role was a significant determinant in shaping one's perceptions of the effect of faculty bargaining on administrative concerns.

**Effect of Position and Range of Unit on Administration in Unionized Institutions**

In a third attempt to discover variables which affected responses to questions on the effect of faculty bargaining on administrative concerns, Hypothesis 4 focused on position and the geographical range of the bargaining unit (single campus or a system-wide unit). It was assumed that whether or not the administration at a campus had some control over what was negotiated (as they would with a single campus unit) would affect perceptions of bargaining's effects on the nature of their jobs.
Table 13. Hypothesis 3: Effect of position and age of senate on perceptions of effect of faculty collective bargaining on three areas of administrative concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INCREASED POWER</th>
<th>OUTSIDE INFLUENCE</th>
<th>SPECIALISTS NEEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Position</strong></td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Age of Senate</td>
<td>Age of Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td></td>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>5-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.50 (1.25)</td>
<td>3.47 (1.22)</td>
<td>3.75 (1.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.17 (0.92)</td>
<td>2.30 (0.98)</td>
<td>1.88 (0.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.23 (0.83)</td>
<td>3.06 (0.87)</td>
<td>2.89 (1.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.38 (0.87)</td>
<td>2.44 (0.92)</td>
<td>2.78 (1.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.61 (1.02)</td>
<td>2.66 (0.99)</td>
<td>2.41 (1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Key</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.0 = strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.0 = strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERCENT SUM OF SQUARES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Position</td>
<td>.158**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Age of Senate</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant at the .01 level
For all three questions, position of the respondent was a significant at the .01 level, with variance percentages of sixteen, seven, and twelve percent for the three questions respectively (Table 14). Presidents tended to agree or be neutral to each question, while union chairpersons tended to disagree with all three questions. Greatest disagreement for both chairpersons and presidents was to the first question on the tendency for faculty bargaining to increase administrative power. Both groups tended to agree that influence of outside agencies would increase under collective bargaining.

Differences by geographical range of the bargaining unit were significant only for the question concerning an increase in administrative power as a result of faculty bargaining. Respondents from single campus units tended to agree more with this idea than did those from system-wide units, although the amount of variance accounted for was only four percent. However, for two of the three questions, the interaction of the two independent variables was significant. For the question of increasing administrative power, presidents of institutions with single campus units tended to agree most strongly, while chairpersons from institutions with system-wide bargaining units tended to disagree most strongly. For the question of specialists replacing generalists in campus administration, presidents at institutions with single campus units tended to agree most strongly. Here, however, it was chairpersons at institutions with single campus units who disagreed most strongly. The interaction for the first question was predictable, for administrators on campuses which have system-wide units tend
Table 14. Hypothesis 4: Effect of position and range of bargaining unit on perceptions of effect of faculty collective bargaining on three areas of administrative concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bargaining Unit Range</th>
<th>INCREASED POWER</th>
<th>OUTSIDE INFLUENCE</th>
<th>SPECIALISTS NEEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>President (s.d.)</td>
<td>Chairperson (s.d.)</td>
<td>X (s.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campus</td>
<td>2.91 (1.38) 4.30 (0.70)</td>
<td>3.70 (1.25)</td>
<td>2.04 (0.88) 2.73 (1.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>3.76 (1.13) 4.35 (0.77)</td>
<td>4.01 (1.03)</td>
<td>1.83 (0.74) 2.29 (0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>3.47 (1.28) 4.33 (0.74)</td>
<td>1.90 (0.79) 2.50 (1.08)</td>
<td>2.25 (0.91) 2.95 (0.88)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY**

1.0 = strongly agree
5.0 = strongly disagree

TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENT SUM OF SQUARES</th>
<th>INCREASED POWER</th>
<th>OUTSIDE INFLUENCE</th>
<th>SPECIALISTS NEEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Position</td>
<td>.162**</td>
<td>.074**</td>
<td>.122**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Range</td>
<td>.036*</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.029*</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.026*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
to have less power. The interactive effect for the third question was less clear, for it showed more of a difference between positions and a small difference by type of bargaining unit. Despite the significant interactive effects for both questions, interaction explained less than three percent of the variance in either case.

Effect of Faculty Unions on Administrative Role in Governance

The results of testing Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 again emphasized the differences in perceptions of persons in different roles; differences which overpowered the effects of all other variables selected for testing. It was clear that, in the minds of presidents at least, faculty bargaining had changed the nature of administration, mostly because of the addition of external decision-makers and the need for specialized legal and management skills. Union chairpersons were less inclined to agree with these projections, although there was some agreement on an increase in the influence of outside agencies. It was evident that the presidents felt less powerful on campuses with system-wide bargaining units, which was a predictable response. (Negotiations with a system-wide bargaining unit are usually done at the governor's level, not by campus administrators.) This lack of power in negotiations was reflected in both presidents' and chairpersons' responses concerning administrative power and questioning the ability of generalists to function without specialized help and outside interference. Despite the lack of dramatic trends in


their responses, both groups saw faculty bargaining as bringing change and increased complexity to academic administration.

EFFECT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON FACULTY ROLE IN GOVERNANCE

While faculty collective bargaining was perceived to have brought change to administrative tasks and responsibilities, its impact upon the role of faculty members, both in their dealings with administrators and in their relationships with their peers, was another important area of investigation. Researchers have noted a leveling of status differences, particularly in work load and salary matters, between fulltime and part-time, senior and junior, and teaching and non-teaching staff. Others have found that decision making is more democratic, and that faculty members have the potential for greater power in the governance system, although this increase in power tends to occur more at institutions where faculty have not traditionally enjoyed a formal role in institutional decision making. Procedures involved in personnel decision making in unionized institutions have become standardized, researchers have reported, with more specific criteria and structured grievance procedures eliminating much of the former potential for arbitrary or inequitable personnel decisions.

19 Mortimer and Lozier, p. 71
20 Clark and Youn, p. 13
Hypotheses 5 and 6 examined the effect of faculty collective bargaining in five areas which affect faculty in governance matters vis-à-vis both administrators and their peers. Respondents' agreement with five statements related to faculty role in governance was measured, with strong agreement equalling 1.0, and strong disagreement equalling 5.0. Respondents were asked if bargaining resulted in a reduction of differences between junior and senior faculty on issues such as salary and work load; and if bargaining increased the voice of the average faculty member in academic policy matters. They were also asked if bargaining resulted in more democratic decision making by allowing junior faculty a greater role; and if bargaining had resulted in more equitable personnel decision making. Finally, respondents were asked if faculty bargaining helped to safeguard faculty rights and academic freedom. Hypotheses 5 and 6 tested the effects of several independent variables on the perceptions of faculty bargaining's effect on these components of faculty role in governance.

Effect of Position and Institution Type on Faculty Role in Governance

Hypothesis 5 predicted an effect by position and institution type on respondents' perceptions of bargaining's effect upon faculty role. For all five areas of faculty role, differences between position were significant, but there were not significant differences by institution type (Table 15). For all five areas, chairpersons tended to agree with each statement, while presidents leaned toward neutrality or disagreement with all five statements. The area in which presidents were most in

\[22\] See Appendix B, pp. 338 - 339, questions #60, 62, 63, 64, and 71.
Table 15. Hypothesis 5: Effect of position and institution type on perceptions of effect of faculty collective bargaining on five areas of faculty concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution Type</th>
<th>MULTIVERSITY</th>
<th>COMPREHENSIVE COLLEGE</th>
<th>LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGE</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Pres. Chair</td>
<td>Pres. Chair</td>
<td>Pres. Chair</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Voice</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>2.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase Average</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(0.80)</td>
<td>(1.27)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDUCE IR/RS</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
<td>(1.73)</td>
<td>(2.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Differences</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Pres. Chair</td>
<td>Pres. Chair</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECORATIZATION DECISION MAKING</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIABLE PERSONNEL DECISION MAKING</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Pres. Chair</td>
<td>Pres. Chair</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFEGUARD ACADEMIC FREEDOM</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Pres. Chair</td>
<td>Pres. Chair</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two-Way Analysis of Variance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENT SUM OF SQUARES</th>
<th>REDUCE IR/RS FACULTY DIFFERENCES</th>
<th>INCREASE AVERAGE FACULTY VOICE</th>
<th>DEMOCRATIZE DECISION MAKING</th>
<th>EQUITABLE PERSONNEL DECISION MAKING</th>
<th>SAFEGUARD ACADEMIC FREEDOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Position</td>
<td>.044**</td>
<td>.255**</td>
<td>.264**</td>
<td>.375**</td>
<td>.584**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Institution</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
agreement with chairpersons (although they still differed significantly) was in bargaining's effect of reducing power differences between junior and senior faculty members in economic matters (salary and work load).

Chairpersons tended to be in greatest agreement with the statement that faculty bargaining would safeguard academic freedom. Presidents disagreed with this statement, but their greatest disagreement was with the statement that faculty bargaining would increase the voice of the average faculty member in academic policy matters.

Because differences by position were so evident, position explained a good deal of the variance for several of the dependent variables. Although only four percent of the variance was accounted for by position when examining responses concerning differences between junior and senior faculty in economic matters, position accounted for twenty-seven percent of the variance for responses concerning increase in the voice of the average faculty member in academic policy making. For responses concerning the democratization of decision making, position accounted for over twenty-eight percent of the variance; for more equitable decision making in personnel matters, about thirty-eight percent of the variance was attributed to position. Differences for the last area (safeguarding of academic freedom) were striking, for position accounted for over fifty-eight percent of the variance. It was evident that union chairpersons were considerably more optimistic than were presidents about the salutary effect of collection bargaining on a faculty member's power and role.

Although institutional differences were not significant, a few interesting patterns emerged. Presidents of comprehensive colleges tended to
disagree the most strongly with the statements on faculty role, ranking highest of the three institution types on four out of the five areas. Chairpersons of unions at liberal arts colleges tended to agree the most strongly with the faculty role statements, ranking lowest of the three institution types on all but the statement concerning reduction of junior/senior faculty differences in economic matters. Despite these response patterns, it was evident that on matters of faculty role and how it may change when a faculty unionizes, a respondent tended to answer from a role position rather than from an institutional perspective.

Effect of Position, Senate Age and Range of Unit on Faculty Role in Governance

Hypothesis 6 examined the same five areas of faculty role as did Hypothesis 5, but used different predictive independent variables. Hypothesis 6 predicted a relationship between position, age of senate, and range of bargaining unit (single campus or system-wide unit) in their effect upon the five areas of faculty role concerns. It had been originally hypothesized that the age of an institution's senate would affect perceptions of faculty's role in governance (although Hypothesis 3 had subsequently shown that no relationship existed between age of the faculty senate and administrative power). The type of bargaining unit might influence perceptions of faculty power, for a faculty would probably have less of an impact on a system-wide union, and vice versa, than if the bargaining unit were only on one campus, controlled solely by members of that campus's faculty. As always, it was assumed that the position from which the respondent replied would affect perceptions of how faculty bargaining has affected faculty role.
No overall patterns were evident from the three-way analysis of variance (Table 16). Even on the broadest scale of differences in general amount of agreement or disagreement, presidents occasionally agreed more strongly with a statement than did chairpersons, although the trend was in the opposite direction. For each of the five role statements, effect of the respondent's position was significant, for presidents tended to differ more from chairpersons than they did from each other. As mentioned earlier, presidents tended to disagree with statements on faculty role improvements under unionization; the two areas of greatest disagreement were the statement concerning the increase in average faculty influence and the statement that collective bargaining safeguards academic freedom. Perceptions of chairpersons were diametrically opposed to those of presidents, citing safeguarding of academic freedom with the greatest amount of agreement among them. They also strongly supported the statement that faculty bargaining resulted in more equitable personnel decision making.

Differences in respondents' perceptions by age of their institution's senates were less dramatic, for only one area revealed a significant effect of the senate's age: the statement that collective bargaining safeguards academic freedom. An interesting pattern emerged, especially within the responses of presidents, by category of senate age. Disagreement with all statements was fairly high among presidents of institutions with new senates, then decreased as faculty senate age increased from four to twelve years. After twelve years, the presidents tended to disagree with each statement at a level slightly lower than that among presidents with new senates. No such pattern was found in the data for
Table 16. Hypothesis 6: Effect of position, age of senate and range of bargaining unit on perceptions of effect of faculty bargaining on five areas of faculty concern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REDUCE JR/SR FACULTY DIFFERENCES</th>
<th>INCREASE AVERAGE FACULTY VOICE</th>
<th>DEMOCRATIZE DECISION MAKING</th>
<th>EQUITABLE PERSONNEL DECISION MAKING</th>
<th>SAFEGUARD ACADEMIC FREEDOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age of Senate</td>
<td>Age of Senate</td>
<td>Age of Senate</td>
<td>Age of Senate</td>
<td>Age of Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>5-8</td>
<td>9-12</td>
<td>12+</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargaining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PRESIDENT

- **Campus**
  - 2.50  2.50  2.00  2.67  2.30
  - (1.27)(1.64)(0.00)(1.21)(1.36)
  - 3.60  3.79  3.09  2.65  3.73
  - (0.82)(1.01)(1.41)(0.57)(0.79)
- **System**
  - 3.57  2.92  2.50  2.67  2.31
  - (1.08)(1.13)(1.33)(1.03)(1.03)
  - 3.78  3.56  2.50  3.11  3.40
  - (0.70)(1.11)(1.33)(1.01)(0.96)
- **X**
  - 3.33  2.79  2.37  2.90
  - (1.28)(1.13)(0.86)(0.96)
  - 3.61  3.47  2.63  3.27
  - (0.70)(1.07)(1.30)(0.96)

### CHAIRPERSON

- **Campus**
  - 3.00  2.29  2.75  2.63  2.57
  - (1.50)(1.11)(1.50)(1.90)(1.10)
  - 2.30  2.16  2.50  2.38  2.37
  - (1.09)(1.10)(1.21)(0.53)(0.70)
- **System**
  - 2.13  2.10  1.80  2.57  2.21
  - (0.53)(0.42)(1.45)(1.13)(0.86)
  - 2.50  1.80  2.60  2.16  2.15
  - (0.35)(0.79)(0.85)(1.07)(0.90)
- **X**
  - 2.46  2.18  2.22  2.60
  - (1.20)(0.95)(1.09)(0.90)
  - 2.38  1.96  2.56  2.27
  - (0.96)(0.66)(1.24)(0.80)

### THREE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

#### PERCENT SUM OF SQUARES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REDUCE JR/SR FACULTY DIFFERENCES</th>
<th>INCREASE AVERAGE FACULTY VOICE</th>
<th>DEMOCRATIZE DECISION MAKING</th>
<th>EQUITABLE PERSONNEL DECISION MAKING</th>
<th>SAFEGUARD ACADEMIC FREEDOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Position</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.249</td>
<td>.326</td>
<td>.721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Age of Senate</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Unit Range</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interactions:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position &amp; Senate Age</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position &amp; Unit Range</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate Age &amp; Union Range</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td></td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position, Senate Age,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Unit Range</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at the .05 level
**Significant at the .01 level
chairpersons. Senate age was not an important variable to that group's pattern.

Differences in responses by bargaining unit range showed a pattern for presidents, but none for union chairpersons. Presidents of institutions with system-wide bargaining units tended to disagree more with statements concerning increased faculty role in decision making than did presidents who dealt with single campus bargaining units. Perhaps this perception is a result of the presidents' closer relationship to negotiations and contract administration with a single campus unit, and the increased and localized conflict which that produces. It also may be a confirmation of the idea that, at least in the opinion of presidents, faculty do not make extensive gains when they are part of a large system-wide bargaining unit. Chairpersons of unions which belonged to system-wide bargaining units had a slight tendency to agree more strongly than did their counterparts from institutions with campus bargaining units. Obviously, chairpersons within system-wide units did not feel as though they had received fewer benefits than their counterparts; the differences of opinion were among the presidents.

For two of the five areas concerning faculty role, interactions between position and age of senate were significant. For the question concerning democratization of decision making, position and senate age accounted for five percent of the variance, while for the statement concerning more equitable personnel decision making, they accounted for over four percent. The interaction of position and bargaining unit range was significant for the statement concerning reduction of differences between junior and senior faculty in matters pertaining to work
load and salaries, accounting for four percent of the variance. Although interactions were significant (but did not explain much of the variance), the effect of person alone was dramatic. For the five areas of faculty concern, person accounted for four percent, twenty-five percent, twenty-eight percent, thirty-two percent, and fifty-three percent of their respective variances. Evidently, interaction with the variables of senate age and bargaining unit range had an inflationary effect upon the variable of position, but, since neither of the other two variables was significant by itself (except in the case of the statement on safeguarding academic freedom where there was not significant interaction), the interactive effects did not greatly increase the perceived substantial effect of the position of the respondent.

**Effect of Unionization on Faculty Role in Governance**

The results of these two tests of perceptions of how faculty bargaining affected faculty role and power were inconclusive. The position of the respondent accounted, in most of the five areas, for so much of the variance that effects of unmeasured variables may have been masked. It was interesting to note that chairpersons did not tend to "strongly agree" with the idea of improvement in any of the five areas of faculty role examined by the two hypotheses. For the most part, standard deviations within this group were fairly small (over three-quarters were well under 1.0), indicating relative agreement among the chairpersons that collective bargaining had improved, but not substantially changed, faculty role in academic governance. The consensus, either by position, senate age, or bargaining unit range, seemed to be that collective
bargaining does result in some changes for the faculty's role in governance, but that these changes were institution-specific, having little to do with type of institution, range of bargaining unit, or age of senate. The results of tests of these two hypothesis dramatize the need for more research on the impact of contextual factors as well as structural effects of collective bargaining on academic governance.

EFFECT OF FACULTY BARGAINING ON STUDENT ROLE IN ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE

It has been suggested that faculty collective bargaining tends to disenfranchise students in governance matters. Because bargaining is bilateral, students have neither voice nor votes in contract decisions, and few union contracts in higher education mention students rights, responsibilities, or benefits. Hypothesis 7 predicted that responses to two questions concerning student role in governance would be affected by the position of the respondent. Amount of agreement (1 = strong agreement, 5 = strong disagreement) was analyzed for two statements. The first suggested that faculty bargaining would decrease the influence of students in decision making, while the second stated that if faculties bargain collectively, then students should have that right as well.


25See Appendix B, pp. 338-339, questions #55 and 69.
A one-way analysis of variance tested the significance of the effect of the respondent's position on agreement with these two statements.

Position was significant for responses concerning decrease in student influence on decision making (accounting for fifteen percent of the variance), but it was not significant for responses concerning student bargaining (Table 17). Presidents tended to agree that students had lost influence over decision making, while chairpersons tended to disagree. This response was predictable, considering that chairpersons would be expected to have a more pro-union attitude, and thus see less harm done to students by unionization. Presidents disagreed with the idea that students should bargain. Interestingly, chairpersons tended to be neutral on that issue for their responses clustered around the 3.0 mark. Although some chairpersons apparently favored student bargaining, (since the standard deviation was greater than 1.0), it is possible that many chairpersons did not want another pressure group competing with their own. And should the students decide to strike, the effects might be more crippling to the institution than if faculty walked off the job.

Regardless of the reasons, there was little support for student unionization among either presidents or union chairpersons. It may have been that the relative neutrality of response to both questions indicated that neither saw students as playing a major role in academic governance. This view may have been more a reflection of the relatively calmer campus atmosphere of 1974, contrasted with earlier student activism. It

26For example, a student strike might result in some loss of state and federal funds for public institutions, as well as a possible loss of tuition monies for both public and private institutions.
Table 17. Hypothesis 7: Effect of position on attitudes toward influence of faculty collective bargaining on student role.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Decreases Student Influence</th>
<th>Students Should Bargain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>$\bar{X} = 2.47$ (1.06)</td>
<td>$\bar{X} = 3.30$ (1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>$\bar{X} = 3.31$ (0.93)</td>
<td>$\bar{X} = 2.94$ (1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{X}$</td>
<td>$\bar{X} = 2.88$ (1.08)</td>
<td>$\bar{X} = 3.13$ (1.35)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY
1.0 = strongly agree
5.0 = strongly disagree

ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

Percent Sum of Squares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Decreases Student Influence</th>
<th>Students Should Bargain</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>.151**</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>.849</td>
<td>.981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant at the .01 level
may be that faculty bargaining will have little effect on student influence on campus decision making because students already have minimal influence. Again, a contextual, institution-specific factor which merits investigation was clouding the results of data analysis.

**BENEFITS OF FACULTY BARGAINING**

Reactions to the benefits and/or dangers of faculty bargaining range from enthusiastic endorsement\(^2^7\) to serious apprehensions concerning the viability of collegiality and shared authority on a unionized campus.\(^2^8\) Two items in the Kemerer and Baldridge study requested respondents' opinions on the effect of faculty bargaining on quality of the campus's educational services, and whether or not faculty bargaining was beneficial and should be encouraged in higher education.\(^2^9\) Hypotheses 8 and 9 predicted that position would have an effect upon responses to these two questions evaluating the benefits of collective bargaining.

For both Hypotheses 8 and 9, position was significant (Tables 18 and 19). For Hypothesis 8, presidents tended to disagree that collective bargaining improved the quality of educational services on their campuses. This response may have reflected an attitude that faculty were spending

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\(^{29}\) See Appendix B, pp. 338-339, items #59 and 67.
Table 18. Hypothesis 8: Effect of position on attitudes toward influence of faculty collective bargaining on academic quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>$\bar{X}$</th>
<th>(s.d.)</th>
<th><strong>KEY</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>(0.95)</td>
<td>1.0 = strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
<td>5.0 = strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{X}$</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent Sum of Squares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant at the .01 level**

Table 19. Hypothesis 9: Effect of position on attitudes toward benefits of faculty collective bargaining

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>$\bar{X}$</th>
<th>(s.d.)</th>
<th><strong>KEY</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>(1.20)</td>
<td>1.0 = strongly agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>5.0 = strongly disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{X}$</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent Sum of Squares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Significant at the .01 level**
more time on governance-related matters and less on instruction and research. Chairpersons tended to agree that bargaining improved the quality of educational services. This response may have mirrored the union stance that well-paid, satisfied faculty deliver better quality educational services than do dissatisfied faculty. For this hypothesis, position accounted for thirty-six percent of the variance in responses.

There was even less agreement between presidents and chairpersons concerning the benefits of collective bargaining to higher education. Differences between groups were highly significant, accounting for forty-eight percent of the variance in response. Presidents tended to disagree that faculty bargaining was beneficial and should be encouraged in higher education, although the standard deviation of their responses was moderately high (1.2). Conversely, chairpersons tended to agree among themselves (s.d. = 0.61) that collective bargaining was beneficial and should be encouraged. Again, these results were not surprising, although one might have expected more agreement among the presidents on the negative aspects of faculty bargaining. It was evident from the size of the standard deviation that several presidents felt more favorably disposed toward faculty bargaining than the mean indicates. Presidential attitude toward faculty bargaining would appear to be an important contextual factor in analyzing the effect of bargaining upon governance structures and power relationships between faculty and administrators.
PERCEPTIONS OF PRE-UNION GOVERNANCE

Research has shown that weak or non-existent faculty governance has contributed to faculty decisions to unionize. The Kemerer and Baldridge study asked presidents and chairpersons if a weak existing faculty governance structure had contributed to unionization on their campuses. Hypothesis 13 predicted an effect by position and age of senate on responses to this query. (The Kemerer and Baldridge presentation shows data by respondent's position and institution type, but does not examine the effect of the age of the senate). Although neither variable had a significant effect, some interesting response patterns were evident.

Responses for both groups tended to cluster between the values of "some" and "moderate" degrees of importance in evaluating the weakness of faculty governance systems as causal factors in unionization (Table 20). For all but one level of age of senate, chairpersons attributed more blame to weak governance structures than did presidents. Response values were fairly close between groups, although standard deviations were relatively large (some nearing 2.0). It was evident that individual experience with weak governance structures varied, for respondents did not cluster by position. Apparently, senate age has little correlation with strength or weakness of a faculty governance system. These results suggested again that individual institutional

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31 See Appendix B, p. 336, item #22.
factors were critical to understanding causes and effects of faculty bargaining.

Table 20. Hypothesis 13. Effect of position and age of senate on perceptions of strength of governance system before faculty unionization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE OF SENATE</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>(s.d.)</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>(s.d.)</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>(s.d.)</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>(s.d.)</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>(s.d.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>President</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>2.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.62)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.56</td>
<td>(1.01)</td>
<td>2.27</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
<td>2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>(1.05)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.28)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.78)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY
1.0 = strongly agree
5.0 = strongly disagree

TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

Percent Sum of Squares

By Position .022
By Senate Age .014
Interaction .017

EFFECT OF FACULTY BARGAINING ON BUREAUCRATIZATION

It has been written on numerous occasions that faculty bargaining and a union contract create rigid bureaucratic practices where collegiality once prevailed.\textsuperscript{32} Two items from the Kemerer and Baldridge study

\textsuperscript{32}Cf. Kemerer and Baldridge, p. 223; Garbarino, p. 155.
examined this assumption. Hypothesis 14 predicted that respondent's position would have an effect upon perceptions of the bureaucratizing of relations between faculty and administrators. Presidents and chairpersons were asked to agree or disagree with the contentions that 1) bargaining formalizes relationships between faculty and administration and 2) bargaining results in greater specificity of employment rules and regulations.\(^{33}\)

Differences by position were not significant for either item, for responses of both groups were quite close (Table 21). Presidents tended to agree slightly more than did chairpersons that formalization and specificity of rules resulted from collective bargaining. Variation within groups was quite small, with no standard deviation higher than 0.73. Mean values for each group for both questions were quite close. Although each group may have a different attitude toward the need for or desirability of bureaucratic procedures between faculty and administration, they both agreed that bureaucratization has resulted from faculty bargaining.

**GENERAL IMPACT OF FACULTY BARGAINING**

**ON ACADEMIC GOVERNANCE**

Although the position of the respondent appeared to make the most significant difference in perceptions of faculty bargaining's effect upon academic governance, the data did reveal several important tendencies and effects of particular variables. The very lack of significant

\(^{33}\)See Appendix B, p. 338, items #52 and 53.
Table 21. Hypothesis 14: Effect of position on perceptions of influence of faculty collective bargaining on bureaucratization of governance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>FORMALIZE RELATIONSHIPS</th>
<th>GREATER SPECIFICITY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>X (s.d.)</td>
<td>X (s.d.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>1.48 (0.58)</td>
<td>1.34 (0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>1.57 (0.73)</td>
<td>1.51 (0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.53 (0.66)</td>
<td>1.42 (0.63)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY
1.0 = strongly agree
5.0 = strongly disagree

ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE

Percent Sum of Squares

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FORMALIZE RELATIONSHIPS</th>
<th>GREATER SPECIFICITY OF RULES AND REGULATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Between Groups</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Groups</td>
<td>.996</td>
<td>.982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

effects across the population was significant, for lack of a firm response pattern suggested that additional variables and influences had a stronger effect on the results than did the measured variables.

Senate and Union Influence on Governance. For the hypotheses dealing with differences between senate and union influence, the clearest result was that presidents and union chairpersons disagreed in their perceptions of the relative strength of these two groups. Few differences between institution types were found. This finding may mean
that role incumbency was a stronger factor than the nature of the institution which housed that role. Or it may merely reveal that governance matters at individual campuses are influenced by factors more compelling than type of institution.

Although responses differed by position, it was evident that all respondents attributed more influence in academic matters to senates than they did to unions. This response is consistent with research conducted by Begin, who found that senate jurisdiction in educational policy matters had remained intact, despite unionization. Senate influence in academic matters was not significantly affected either by increasing senate age or increasing union age, although union influence tended to increase slightly with increasing union age. The data seemed to indicate that changes in influence, at least in academic policy matters, may not be a zero-sum gain or loss; that unions may increase their influence in academic matters without substantially weakening the influence of the senate.

Data analysis also indicated that unions had more influence over economic matters than did senates. This result was not surprising, since both salaries and working conditions, the two variables used to define "economic" matters, are often included in union contracts.

Tendencies for influence in personnel and planning matters were less clear. Neither senates nor unions seemed to wield much influence in planning, indicating that, where planning occurred, it was probably done

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35 Cf. Goodwin and Andes.
either by the administration or by a group not identified with either the senate or the union. No tendencies were evident for influence of either senates or unions in personnel matters, for responses differed only by position of respondent. This instability of response patterns might indicate changing patterns of influence in personnel matters. Begin noted that unions seemed to be gaining influence in promotion and tenure procedures and faculty welfare matters such as sabbatical leaves, especially at institutions where senates had not previously dealt with such matters.  

The variation between perceptions of respondents and lack of patterns in areas of influence for senates and unions indicated that idiosyncratic factors at campuses were more relevant than structural factors, such as the age of the senate or the union. Responses also indicated that academic governance includes individuals and groups other than senates and unions, and that studies of power and influence relationships on campuses must take these additional actors into account.

**Effect of Faculty Bargaining on Administration.** Data concerning the effect of bargaining on administrative matters showed tendencies similar to those for senates and unions. Only differences by respondent's position were significant, and even the range of the bargaining unit made less of a difference than the position of the individual responding. There were few differences by institution type, indicating again that this variable may be nearly irrelevant to changes in governance structure which accompany collective bargaining. Differences by respondents' position were not surprising when one considered that perceived

36 Begin, "Faculty Governance," p. 586.
amount of an individual's or group's power is a subjective measure and that role differences would be reflected in perceptual differences.

Although responses differed significantly by position, all respondents felt that bargaining did not increase administrative power at the expense of the faculty. This response is consistent with Epstein, who felt that faculty bargaining tended to reduce the authority of campus administrators, but that state-level agents, not faculties, appropriated this power. Other writers, however, felt that the administration might take advantage of the structured nature of negotiations relationships to acquire power. Responses of presidents at institutions with system-wide bargaining units tended especially to confirm Epsteins' view.

Responses indicated that faculty bargaining would increase the influence of "outsiders" and result in more specialists replacing generalist-administrators. Although the literature confirms this, data results could not separate the effect of unionization on centralization of decision making from other causes of state- or system-level control (such as decreasing budgets for higher education). All responses in this area showed evidence of considerable changes facing administrators in unionized colleges and universities.

Effect of Bargaining on Faculty Role in Governance. Bargaining seemed, for the most part, to increase faculty power in academic governance. The greatest change appeared to be in reducing differences

37 Leo D. Epstein, Governing the University (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), p. 144


39 See notes 14 and 15.
between junior and senior faculty in matters of salary and work load policies. This response confirmed an earlier finding by Mortimer and Johnson that unionization tended to "homogenize" differences among faculty.\textsuperscript{40} The data revealed differences only between respondents' perceptions of changes in faculty role. Senate age and the range of the bargaining unit (campus- or system-wide) seemingly had no relevance to changes in faculty role and power. Faculty members appeared to have made some gains under collective bargaining, but response patterns were so ambiguous that no tendencies could be discovered.

**Faculty Bargaining and Student Power.** Faculty bargaining did not appear to affect student role in governance in a substantial way, according to response data. It was not clear whether this response indicated stable student power, or whether students had so little power before unionization that they had very little to lose. Most research on faculty unionization is silent on bargaining's effects on students, although one union contract reportedly gave students a legal, structured role in institutional decision making.\textsuperscript{41}

**Benefits of Faculty Bargaining.** Although numerous essays have speculated on the benefits and drawbacks of faculty bargaining,\textsuperscript{42} research has not attempted to measure the effect of faculty unionization on the quality of education provided by an institution. Questions of 

\textsuperscript{40}Mortimer and Johnson, p. 71.

\textsuperscript{41}Cf. Schuster, pp. 79-98.

educational quality in higher education have been debated long before faculties considered unionization; thus, it is not surprising that attempts to examine quality in regard to unionization are not prevalent.

Perceptions of Pre-Union Governance. Although literature has cited weak or nonexistent faculty senates as significant factors in faculty decisions to unionize, response data did not tend to support this contention. It was evident that conditions differed at individual campuses, for no tendencies were evident. Even the age of the senate seemingly did not greatly influence perceptions of respondents about its effectiveness, and whether or not senate effectiveness was related to unionization apparently had no relationship to the age of the senate.

Faculty Unionization and Bureaucratization. Response data strongly confirmed earlier writings which stated that bureaucratization increased with the advent of faculty unionization. It was evident that faculty bargaining does create formal governance structures, does require explicit rules and regulations, and does result in formalized relationships between faculty and administration. Whether or not this is beneficial, whether it contributes to strong or weak senates, whether it affects and how it affects faculty and administrative power was unclear when measured across the entire population of unionized institutions. Changes in process were evident; changes in substantive power and influence were more difficult to measure.

Implications for Case Studies

Although reanalysis of the Kemerer and Baldridge data did not provide a set of explicit criteria to guide the case studies, the findings did prove helpful. It was very clear that caution would have to be used
in interpreting results by accounting for the role from which the individual spoke. It was also evident that the study would not be able to lean on differences in institution type as major sources of variation in results of these studies. Response data are also at issue with the assumption that an academic senate which had pre-dated the union would have more overall influence than a newly-formed senate. Age of the union seemed to have little effect upon its influence, although the manner in which union influence was measured did not differentiate between decision-making power and informal influence weakening the validity of the results.

It was also clear that the nature of administration had changed as a result of faculty bargaining, with outsiders influencing decision making and labor or personnel specialists replacing generalist-educators in top administrative positions. Data also showed that bargaining did reduce rank during the field studies. Because of the disagreement concerning increases in faculty participation and power, these variables would be carefully assessed during the field studies.

The finding of the data reanalysis which was of most value to the subsequent field studies was the strong implication that independent, unique factors on individual campuses had a great influence on the structure and strength of faculty governance systems. Bargaining unit range was a variable to considered, but also important might be nature of enabling legislation, the history of the institution, especially with reference to recent changes in size, mission, and program offerings. Another seemingly evident factor, which the Kemerer and Baldridge study would not measure, was the structure and effectiveness of the faculty
governance system prior to collective bargaining. Additional relevant variables, though difficult to measure, might be administrative (especially presidential) attitudes toward faculty bargaining, previous informal power of faculty in academic decision making, collegial "understandings" between faculty and administrators, and composition of the faculty itself by age, rank, and discipline.

In reflecting upon the above list of variables, it became evident that on-site studies are essential to an evaluation of the effect of faculty bargaining on academic governance. While quantitative studies are useful in describing general trends and conditions, they cannot go into the depth required to begin to understand the complex interactions between and among variables. Reanalysis of the Kemerer and Baldridge data was useful as a general guide to important variables. However, that list of variables had to be broadened and lengthened to allow for more of the contextual variables relevant to the field studies. Through the lack of conclusive findings, the data reinforced the assertion that faculty bargaining is a complex, interactive social phenomenon which is not easily quantified, categorized, or explained.
CHAPTER FIVE
EFFECT OF FACULTY UNIONIZATION ON GOVERNANCE
AT TWO MULTIVERSITIES

For the most part, the institutions which the Carnegie Commission calls "Research Universities" and which Kemerer and Baldridge classify as "multiversities" have been slow to unionize. The population for the 1974 Kemerer and Baldridge survey of all unionized institutions included only twelve multiversities.\(^1\) Since their study, unionization has been rejected at a number of large universities, such as the University of Colorado, the University of Massachusetts, and Michigan State University.\(^2\)

With this seeming inertia against unionization among the larger and more prestigious institutions of higher education, the impetus to organize must have been particularly strong for the faculties at these twelve multiversities.

This study of two multiversities, Rutgers University and Temple University, paid particular attention to those factors which encouraged unionization, and sought to measure their effects on governance subsequent to unionization. Since both institutions are state-related, and both are

\(^1\)Frank R. Kemerer and J. Victor Baldridge; Unions on Campus (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975), p. 56.

located in states with rather large state college systems (New Jersey has eight state colleges, Pennsylvania has fourteen), a defensive move to avoid becoming part of the state college faculty bargaining unit seemed a cogent reason. Interviews with faculty and administrators at each institution provided additional reasons for the somewhat unusual decision to organize. Although this study was one of effects, not causes, of faculty unionization, the seeming disinclination of most multiversity faculties to unionize made the causes of unionization central to its effects upon academic governance.

Before describing faculty unionization at each institution and discussing specific issues and outcomes, analysis of the contract content for each institution was necessary, for this document was the instrument which defined formal relationships between faculty and administration. Table 22 displays a brief analysis and comparison of contract content for both Temple and Rutgers Universities by general topic area.

**CONTRACT ANALYSIS**

In examining both the Rutgers and Temple contracts, one immediately noticed their brevity (Rutgers' contract had 30 pages, Temple's had 39). This brevity was due less to terseness or fine print than it was to the items not covered by the contract, and also to items which were governed either by University regulations, the Faculty Handbook, or Board of

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Table 22. Contract Analysis: Rutgers University and Temple University

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bargaining Agent</th>
<th>UNIVERSITY</th>
<th>UNIVERSITY</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit Composition</strong></td>
<td>Faculty-half time or greater, teaching assistants, graduate assistants, library staff, research staff, extension staff</td>
<td>Full-time faculty, department chairpersons, full-time librarians, non-faculty academic support staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academic Freedom</strong></td>
<td>Recognize principles adopted by Trustees</td>
<td>No mention in contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affirmative Action</strong></td>
<td>Statement on nondiscrimination; protects bargaining unit members on basis of union membership and/or activity</td>
<td>Agree to implement Affirmative Action plan; protects members of bargaining unit on basis of union membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grievance Procedures</strong></td>
<td>Advocates informal resolution; used only for procedures in promotion, tenure, and reappointment. 4 steps--dean→Committee of Review→University Appeals Comm.→President Appeal to Senate, then to Board of Governors  Grievance for non-personnel matters--4 steps--dean→campus provost→senior academic vice president→advisory arbitration</td>
<td>Advocates informal resolution; used for &quot;contract interpretation&quot; 3 steps--chairperson→dean→academic vice president Then to external arbitration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arbitration Procedures</strong></td>
<td>Contained in grievance article--is advisory. Costs to be shared equally</td>
<td>Temple and AAUP select arbitrator or refer to American Arbitr. Assoc. Decision of arbitrator binding; costs shared equally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appointment, Reappointment, Nonrenewal</strong></td>
<td>Included in promotion article</td>
<td>Termination of service must be for &quot;adequate cause&quot;; time limits for written notification. Short paragraph on retrenchment procedures</td>
</tr>
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Table 22 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promotion and Tenure</th>
<th>Rutgers University</th>
<th>Temple University</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promotion: candidate submits documents; other documents may be added. Dept. makes decision, sends to dean. Includes time limits for decisions; allows candidate to have written reasons for non-reappointment. No mention of tenure procedures.</td>
<td>Promotion: procedures are in 1973 Faculty Handbook. After exhausting internal appeals, may use grievance procedures &amp; arbitration (for due process only). Tenure: Follow Board of Trustees Tenure Statement of 9/70. No tenure quotas. Must use all internal appeals before appeal to Tenure Appeals Comm.—jointly appointed by Temple &amp; AAUP. Decision of Comm. final &amp; binding—it upholds Temple</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

| Retrenchment | Used only for financial exigency & program termination. Joint committee must review all proposals and recommend or disagree. | Included in "termination of service" article. Short paragraph describing re-hiring procedures. |

| Faculty Governance | No mention in contract | No mention in contract |

| Selection of Department Chairpersons | No mention in contract | Dept. nominates candidate; dean may veto & appoint acting chairperson for 1 year. Term is five years |

| Salaries | Faculty: initial merit increments and lump sum payment; 7% increase for 1976-77; Merit awards & procedures, merit not grievable. Promotional salary adjustments. Graduate Assistants: promotion procedures Appendix: Salary schedules for faculty & graduate assistants, 1975-76; 76-77 | Across-the-board increases for 1976; establishes minimum salaries for faculty, librarians & academic professionals; 5% raise for promotion Merit increases—establishes merit fund, department merit committee, college merit comm., & Univ. merit comm. Procedures at each level. No grievance or arbitration for merit decisions Salary Inequity adjustments—establishes fund joint committee. Miscellaneous: summer compensation, matching offers, overload pay, compensation of dept. chairpersons |

Appendix: Salary schedules for faculty & graduate assistants, 1975-76; 76-77
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fringe Benefits</th>
<th>Prescription drug program; establishes joint committee to study &quot;flexible fringe benefits&quot;</th>
<th>Blue Cross/Blue Shield, major medical, dental benefits, life insurance, disability insurance, sick leave payment, maternity leave, leave of absence, liability insurance, early retirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leaves of Absence</td>
<td>Pregnancy leave, leaves of absence without pay, exemptions from probationary period.</td>
<td>Included in fringe benefits article</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workload</td>
<td>Requires that workload be &quot;consistent with departmental practice.&quot; Inconsistencies grievable through step 3.</td>
<td>Must be &quot;reasonable, fair, and consistent with current practices&quot; for faculty, librarians and academic professionals—35 hr. wk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Responsibilities</td>
<td>Article is actually workload statement</td>
<td>Included in &quot;Rights of Temple&quot;—no abridgment of faculty rights &amp; responsibilities to participate in formation of educational policy—refers to Univ., school &amp; college constitutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Rights</td>
<td>No mention in contract</td>
<td>Retains rights to all functions not abridged by contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Rights</td>
<td>Release time for 1 AAUP member, assigned a teaching assist. May transact business on Univ. property, use Univ. buildings, facilities, duplicating equip. at cost. Union may post notices; include AAUP material in pre-employment packets.</td>
<td>Union may use Univ. rooms, post notices, use campus mail; may have salary &amp; fringe benefits information for all union members. May use duplicating equip. at cost. Union service to be credited as University service. Complete University budget placed in Library.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Files</td>
<td>Faculty has access to all materials in official file, may add materials. Lists contents of file. Access to all but outside confidential letters of recommendation.</td>
<td>Contents of file; faculty member has access to all but pre-employment material. Peer evaluations will have identification removed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dues Deduction</td>
<td>Voluntary -- checkoff</td>
<td>Voluntary -- checkoff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 22 (continued)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RUTGERS UNIVERSITY</th>
<th>TEMPLE UNIVERSITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **No Strike/No Lockout** | No mention in contract | AAUP agrees not to sanction strike or work stoppage  
                          |                    | Temple agrees not to lock out unit members |
| **Meet & Discuss**   | No mention in contract | Temple & AAUP meet at least once per semester. May sign Memoranda of Agreement |
Trustees rulings. As a result, the contracts for these institutions revealed almost as much about the institution's governance system by what they excluded as by what was included. For example, neither contract named the bodies which make academic policy, nor did they specifically endorse a faculty senate (although Temple's contract referred to a Senate subcommittee in one article). It was evident that governance structures which existed before unionization have not been eliminated or modified by contract, although modifications may have occurred de facto.

The contracts of these two institutions were similar in a number of ways. The most obvious similarity was, of course, that both bargaining units were affiliated with AAUP, a similarity which may have accounted for other contractual similarities which were discovered. Both contracts included full-time faculty and department chairpersons within the unit, as well as librarians and academic professionals (non-teaching research or support staff). The Rutgers unit included graduate assistants; Temple excluded teaching assistants and faculty of the Medical, Dental and Law Schools. Probably the most important similarity was the inclusion of the department chairperson within the bargaining unit.

Another important similarity between the two contracts was the grievance procedure and use of arbitration. Both institutions split their grievance procedure into two parts: one for personnel decisions (no arbitration) and one for contract interpretation (external arbitration). Arbitration could be used only for violations of due process in promotion decisions. Neither contract allowed arbitration in tenure decisions, but constructed elaborate internal appeals procedures, most of which had substantial faculty representation through joint University-AAUP committees.
Neither contract listed tenure procedures; Temple referred readers to a Trustees Statement and Faculty Handbook, while Rutgers referred readers to the "Promotion and Reappointment Packet," but did not mention tenure procedures specifically.

Neither contract developed elaborate mechanisms for retrenchment procedures. No mention was made of order-of-layoff, although Temple did require re-hiring in inverse layoff order. Rutgers set up a joint committee to review all retrenchment proposals. Each union may have been attempting to preserve institutional flexibility, or to protect themselves against retrenchment by refusing to negotiate (and thus legitimize) the process to be used.

Both contracts had lengthy articles concerning salary. Both mandated immediate across-the-board payments, then percentage increments for the second academic year. Both included merit award provisions and procedures for determining merit awards. Each contract provided for evaluation at the department, school/college, and university levels. Both contracts disallowed grievance procedures for merit decisions. Both contracts mentioned fringe benefits. Temple's list was lengthy, while Rutgers, which was constrained by state law governing fringe benefits for all public employees, mentioned fringe benefits only generally.

Both contracts had similar provisions for union rights and faculty access to personnel files. Both also included dues checkoff, Affirmative

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4To simplify discussion, the term "joint committee" shall refer to a group of faculty and/or administrators, half of whose membership is appointed or elected by the bargaining unit and half appointed by the university.
Action statements, and very general statements on faculty workload but included no minimum number of hours.

While most contractual provisions in the Rutgers and Temple contracts were similar, the few which differed were interesting, and may provide partial explanations for differences in impact upon faculty governance which were found in this study. The omission from the Temple contract of a statement on academic freedom was curious, but possibly rather unimportant. A more important difference was Temple's article outlining procedures for selection of department chairpersons, while the Rutgers contract did not mention this process. (This difference may have related more directly to past practices at each institution than to significance of the selection process.) The Rutgers contract established a complex salary schedule with steps for seniority and rank; Temple's contract merely listed salary minima.

Two additional differences between the contracts may have been related to differences in the Pennsylvania and New Jersey Public Employee bargaining legislation. New Jersey's law forbids strikes, but Pennsylvania's does not. Thus, the Temple contract contained a "no strike/no lockout" article which the Rutgers contract lacked. The Temple contract also contained a "meet and discuss" article requiring regular consultation; the Rutgers University contract did not. (Pennsylvania Act 195 requires continuing consultation, while New Jersey law encourages employers to meet with employees at times other than negotiations sessions, but does not require it.)\(^5\) Lastly, the Temple contract included

\(^5\)Cf. Section 702, Article 7 of Pennsylvania Public Employee Law, Act 195, effective July 23, 1970; Article 7 of New Jersey Public Law 1941 (Chapter 34:13A), effective July 1, 1968.
a statement reserving to management all rights not abridged by the contract. Rutgers' contract did not mention management rights.

In sum, the two contracts were markedly similar, with most inclusions and exclusions being identical. The Rutgers contract was simpler, shorter and more focused on economic and procedural matters, while Temple's contract added personnel and academically-related matters. With these essentially similar contracts as a foundation, analyses of governance at each institution and the effect of bargaining on faculty role in governance, were conducted.

INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES OF GOVERNANCE:

RUTGERS; THE STATE UNIVERSITY

Background to Governance and Faculty Bargaining

Rutgers University is a complex multi-dimensional state university whose particular history and unique present-day structure make it an institution which could only be called atypical for a state university. Although the modern Rutgers is a state-supported land grant university with its main campus in New Brunswick, and regional campuses in Newark and Camden, New Jersey, it is here that the similarities end. Some portions of Rutgers' unique history had relevance to factors surrounding the faculty decision to unionize.

History and Change at Rutgers. Incorporated by royal charter on November 10, 1766 as Queens College, a men's college, Rutgers remained a private institution until 1945. Although it acted as the land grant institution for the state of New Jersey and included Douglass College (a women's college) under its umbrella, Rutgers remained relatively
small, "politically and socially neutral" until the early 1960's. During the late 1950's, Rutgers also became more closely linked to the state's system of higher education when the 1955 University Reorganization Act established a Board of Governors (most appointed by the Governor) to oversee directly the affairs of the university. (This legislation gave Rutgers two governing boards: the original Board of Trustees which now was responsible for oversight of the endowment funds and a few ceremonial functions, and the powerful, politically-related Board of Governors.)

Rapid enrollment increases during the 1960's and the governing board's desire to transform Rutgers into a research university caused goal redefinition, an ambitious capital expansion program (over 200 million dollars in five years), and extensive creation and expansion of undergraduate and, in particular, graduate and professional programs. For example, enrollment increased from 6,754 in 1959 to 35,256 in 1970 (pp. 272-275), and stood at approximately 40,000 at the time of this study. At the same time, university departments were recruiting "visible" scholars to add prestige and attract graduate students and research funds to the expanding university (p. 273).

In 1969, Rutgers acquired a portion of an abandoned Army post across town from the New Brunswick campus and initiated an Urban University program focusing on contemporary problems and the recruitment of minority students. Rutgers, by early 1970, was a complex multiversity. The New

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Brunswick "campus" was in four locations [Douglass College, Rutgers College, the University Heights Science Center (Busch Campus), and Livingston College], and two branches at Newark and Camden encompassed undergraduate liberal arts, graduate and professional programs. Adding to this geographical complexity was the "Federated College Plan," an attempt to bring some semblance of order out of the complexity and dispersion of people, programs, and authority at the New Brunswick campus. In order to keep undergraduate programs small and somewhat autonomous, each faculty member had two appointments. The faculty member received an appointment in the undergraduate college where he or she taught (i.e., Douglass College, Rutgers College, or Livingston College) and also held an appointment in a New Brunswick-wide disciplinary unit. Each college had its own dean, departments, and budget, but each college department belonged to a disciplinary department, overseen by a New Brunswick disciplinary chairperson (p. 282). Although the Federated College Plan was initiated to clarify jurisdictions and authority, it led to confusion and disagreement over matters such as the "locus of tenure" (college department or New Brunswick department), primary lines of authority, and accountability for decision making.

One final historical factor was relevant to a discussion of faculty governance at Rutgers University. Rutgers had always enjoyed considerable autonomy, first as a private institution and subsequently under the 1956 University Reorganization Act which gave the institution a substantial amount of independence from state control. However, the State Department of Higher Education was created in 1966 to coordinate long range planning and policy formation for all state-supported institutions of higher
education, including eight state teachers colleges, fourteen two-year 
county colleges, several professional schools, and Rutgers. Increasing 
centralization of higher education planning and tightening state budgets 
forced Rutgers into competition for resources, both programmatic and fi-
nancial, with these other state-supported institutions (p. 284). This 
was also the era of student protest, and campus unrest added to the al-
ready-substantial pressures engendered by the Federated College Plan and 
the plans of the new Chancellor of Higher Education.

Faculty Unionization. The faculty at Rutgers University certified 
AAUP as their bargaining agent in February, 1970, making Rutgers one of 
the first four-year institutions to become organized. Numerous reasons 
were given by writers and faculty alike for the faculty's decision to 
organize. The changes in structural complexity (Federated College Plan), 
creation of the State Department of Higher Education, and an ever-
increasing need to compete for state funds have been described above and 
could all be considered as contributory factors to faculty organization. 
Carr and Van Eyck maintained that the Rutgers faculty wanted more formal-
ized shared authority, salary increases, more generous sabbatical poli-
cies, and protection against retrenchment. They described the contract 
as "largely concerned with providing means for deciding substantive is-
sues and policies on campus," leaving by-laws, regulations and policies 
intact. Garbarino saw the move to unionize at Rutgers as a defensive

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7James P. Begin, "The Impact of the Faculty Grievance Process at 
Rutgers University: A Research Summary," (New Brunswick, N.J.: Institute 
of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers, the State University, January, 

8Robert K. Carr and Daniel K. Van Eyck, Collective Bargaining Comes to 
strategy to avoid being included in a comprehensive statewide bargaining unit with the state colleges. 9 Another writer concurred, saying that, although a "prestige faculty" may be reluctant to unionize, it might do so to "protect its economic interests against the claims of unionized professors at other state institutions of higher education." 10 A member of the Rutgers faculty stated unequivocally that unionization was a defensive action against possible inclusion in a statewide bargaining unit, and disinclination to be unionized by a non-AAUP organization. 11

Another factor relevant to the unionization process at Rutgers was the lack of competition among unions for representation rights, as has occurred on so many campuses. The AAUP was the only bargaining agent on the ballot at Rutgers, apparently signifying the faculty's determination to retain its professorial image. Determining the composition of the bargaining unit was relatively painless as well. Carr and Van Eyck noted the Rutgers administration's agreement with the faculty that all individuals eligible for membership in the national AAUP (including department chairpersons) should be included in the bargaining unit. 12 This cooperation in selection of an agent, determination of unit composition, and the apparent lack of organized or formal administrative resistance to faculty

9 Garbarino, p. 131.


12 Carr and Van Eyck, p. 68.
organization may have reinforced the idea that the faculty union at Rutgers was a tool for economic, rather than academic, policy making.

The structure of the Rutgers contract dramatized the conflict between faculty desire to behave collegially and, at the same time, to protect itself. The contract was brief and simple, primarily emphasizing salaries and grievance procedures. What was especially important is what was not contractual. Rutgers’ President Edward Bloustein wrote that "for the most part, [the contract] leaves the selection, appointment and promotion of faculty, as well as the development of all aspects of educational policy, to the traditional academic governance structures, regulated by University regulations outside the purview of the contract."\textsuperscript{13}

AAUP and the Rutgers administration agreed on "continuous problem solving," the results of which were implemented as university policy rather than through the contract.\textsuperscript{14} An interesting, and perhaps telling contractual decision between the first (1972-1975) and the second (1975-1977) contracts was to include teaching assistants in the faculty bargaining unit and to provide them with a separate salary scale and grievance process. This maneuver may have been a defensive reaction to the organization of teaching assistants at the University of Wisconsin in 1970, and their subsequent attempts to influence academic policy making. Including teaching assistants within the bargaining unit, Garbarino argued,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13}Edward J. Bloustein, "Collective Bargaining and University Governance," Speech made at the annual meeting of the Association of American Colleges, January 15, 1973, p. 2.
  \item \textsuperscript{14}Carr and VanEyk, p. 198.
\end{itemize}
"internalizes the potential conflict of interest and makes its resolution depend on the internal politics of the organization."

Unionization at Rutgers seemed to comprehend a wide range of causes, both political and economic. The primary motivation seemed to be to defend traditional faculty governance prerogatives which were vulnerable to both external pressures (State Department, the legislature's fiscal decisions), and internal conflict (potential problems with teaching assistants, attempts at centralization by implementing the Federated College Plan). It appeared that the faculty were primarily trying to preserve an already collegial governance system against encroachments from two fronts.

Effects of Faculty Bargaining on Academic Governance

In considering the impact of faculty bargaining at Rutgers, it was important to remember that Rutgers' governance system had historically been highly decentralized. Because the four New Brunswick campuses were separated both geographically and functionally, the majority of the decision making occurred at the college, rather than at the university level. One faculty member called academic units prior to collective bargaining "ungoverned," noting that bargaining had begun to build a more central governance structure which was more participative.

Structure of Faculty Governance. Before examining specific areas of governance, it was necessary to determine the number and function of the faculty governance groups at Rutgers University. Because of the

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contractual emphasis on salary, working conditions, and due process, no new governance committees were created by the bargaining contract. However, the Senate was reorganized two months after the unit certification election, removing the university president as the presiding officer, although retaining administrative (and student) membership on the Senate. Every faculty member reported that the Senate was an advisory body, and that its only real decision authority was the university calendar. Although an administrator maintained that the Senate's power had increased with its reorganization (and Bloustein confirmed this posture in a 1973 speech), apparently the range of matters on which it advised had broadened, but its actual power had not. Most faculty interviewed saw the Senate as weak and ineffective, more because faculty senators did not prepare for important decisions than because the Senate was repressed by either the administration or the union. Many respondents felt that the Senate had greater power than it chose to exercise, mainly because of internal disagreements, power struggles among faculty, and general faculty disinclination to use the Senate as a tool for faculty governance.

Another faculty governance committee whose role changed after unionization was the college-level Committee of Review. This body consisted entirely of faculty, half appointed by the college dean and half elected by the faculty. (The size of the committee membership depended on the size of the college). A holdover committee from the pre-bargaining process of appeal in promotion and tenure decisions, the Committee of Review
was now the second step of the Faculty Personnel Grievance Procedure.\textsuperscript{17} Prebargaining grievance procedures had been informal and uneven, although the process was detailed in the university rules and regulations.\textsuperscript{18} This committee had been advisory to the dean, with no formal power. The Committee of Review now examined faculty evaluations for adherence to procedural form and due process. Its role had become more formalized, more rationalized, and of greater importance to the grievance process for personnel matters.

Beyond these functional changes in two prebargaining committees, the formal governance structure had not changed at Rutgers University. All faculty and most administrators were questioned about the locus of decision making for academic, personnel, economic, and planning matters. Their answers revealed that departments and colleges had, for the most part, retained their prebargaining roles in governance.

**Academic Policy Decisions.** Academic policy was made at the departmental level. Although new courses had to be approved at the college level by a faculty committee, approval was usually routine. Admissions policy was set by the College, but graduate departments had additional requirements for admission to programs. It was noted by one informant that admissions policy was slowly being centralized, very likely as a result of enrollment drops. Schools (professional) or colleges (undergraduate) set degree requirements. But the major locus of academic

\textsuperscript{17}"Agreement Between Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey and Rutgers Council of the American Association of University Professors Chapters, July 1, 1975-June 30, 1977" (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers, the State University, 1975), mimeo, p. 10.

decision making was at the department level. Faculty informants seemed satisfied with academic policy making at the departmental and college/school levels, but criticized academic policy making at the institutional level. They felt that too little academic planning was done at the central administrative level, but also criticized some New Brunswick chairpersons (disciplinary) for trying to usurp college autonomy in curricular decision making. The State Department of Higher Education must approve all new programs, but for most curricular policy made within or between existing programs, departments and colleges were quite autonomous.

Personnel Decision Making. The locus of power for decision making in personnel matters was less clear than for academic policy. Prior to collective bargaining, deans and the provost carried the greatest responsibility for promotion and tenure decisions, albeit with considerable collegial participation of departments. The process for making promotion and tenure decisions had changed, becoming more complex and formalized. (This increased complexity was in part a result of the Federated College Plan.) Evaluations and recommendations began with a joint recommendation from tenured faculty and the department chairperson, and passed to one or more of the following, depending on the college and campus in which the department was located: dean, New Brunswick chairperson, section chairperson, and appointments and promotions committee. The appropriate individuals and/or groups sent their recommendations to the Campus Provost, from whence they were sent to the Assistant Vice President for Academic Affairs and thence to the Promotion Review Committee (known as the

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19A "section" is every tenured faculty member who has an appointment in a particular University unit who votes on tenure decisions.
Summit Committee because it consisted entirely of central-level administrators), chaired by the Vice President for Academic Affairs. From the Summit Committee, recommendations went to the Board of Governors for confirmation.

According to the majority of individuals interviewed (both faculty and administrative), unionization shifted the real locus of decision-making power for promotion and tenure to the Summit Committee. The procedures used for promotion and tenure evaluation had not been substantially altered by unionization, but documentation and communication of decisions had been greatly changed. The Office of the Academic Vice President created forms upon which all evaluation matters had to be recorded, and prescribed procedural guidelines which all individuals involved in the decision making chain were required to follow.

There was general agreement that the locus of decision making in personnel matters had shifted upward to the Summit Committee, and that faculty bargaining had rationalized and standardized evaluation procedures within departments and colleges. There was some feeling among college deans that colleges and departments were making better promotion and tenure decisions because criteria were clearer and were applied more consistently.²⁰

**Economic Decisions.** Decisions with respect to economic policy (exclusive of salary) were made at the departmental level. Questions of faculty workload, scheduling, and class size were decided at the departmental level, with a somewhat pro forma approval at the dean's level.

²⁰Begin, "Due Process and Collegiality," p. 35.
Matters of salary were negotiated between AAUP and the campus administration, for the State was not directly involved in wage negotiations at Rutgers. Of course, legislative appropriations might affect the size of the salary increases, but, except for maintaining liaison with the State's Office of Employee Relations and the governor, Rutgers administration bargained independently of state-level public employment offices. Thus, decision power related to conditions of employment was shared between the union and the departments within their respective colleges.

Planning Decisions. It was more difficult to acquire information on the locus of planning decisions at Rutgers. Following the pattern of including departmental budgets under the planning rubric (since this discussion considered department budgets to be exclusive of faculty salaries), most respondents agreed that the dean controlled departmental budgets, while the provost controlled college budgets. Many respondents saw the dean's major role as budget allocation, with some chairpersons having an impact both on the size and the manner of the allocation of a department's budget. Respondents agreed that the union had no role in this process.

Answers on the locus of long range planning decisions were vague and somewhat confusing. Several faculty informants indicated that the dean and a faculty advisory committee took care of long range planning for the college. A number of faculty members criticized the central administration for ineffective or lack of long range planning, especially in

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21Garbarino, pp. 130-131.
academic policy matters. Two administrators reported that the central administration was attempting to decentralize day-to-day decision making to campus provosts so that the central level could focus on policy making and planning.

**Formal Power Relationships.** Because decision-making power was located at several levels of the academic governance structure, it was evident that there was potential for power both from the formal structure and through informal means. Most subjects agreed that power relationships had remained essentially unchanged since unionization, with the exception of the salary negotiations and the grievance process.

Within the governance structure, the majority of decision-making power related to faculty concerns (curriculum, workload, initial peer evaluation) remained within the department. Several faculty members concurred that the emphasis on accountability brought by the grievance process had given departments more influence in personnel recommendations, for deans and provosts no longer were able to disregard departmental opinion in the structured evaluation procedure of which the departmental recommendation was the first step. Power in curricular decision making had not been affected by unionization. A highly centralized State Department of Higher Education controlled program approval, but did so irrespective of Rutgers' unionized status. The Federated College Plan, with its overlapping disciplinary/college jurisdictions, caused some power struggles within the formal organizational structure, but, again, unionization was not a factor in these struggles. Whatever power did not accrue to departments rested with the colleges and schools in matters of long range planning, budget allocation, some academic policy making, and
review of departmental decisions on curriculum and faculty evaluations.

The only university-wide formal governance body was the University Senate. The perceived weakness of the Senate has been discussed; it was the perception of a few of the informants (both faculty and administrative) that the faculty deliberately kept the Senate weak so that major governance would remain decentralized to the colleges. Others felt that faculty apathy caused the Senate's weakness, while still others blamed its impotence on its advisory role. But most subjects admitted that the Senate could wield considerably more power than its members or its critics were inclined to credit it with.

Informal Power Relations. One item which appeared on every subject's interview instrument asked if it were possible to influence decision making by informal, rather than structural, means. Every respondent agreed that personal influence could affect decision making, although responses varied in how often or how easily this could be done. One faculty member (non-union) insisted that decisions were made almost exclusively by "a faculty member and an administrator sitting and talking ... more real influence is transferred there than in most committees or adversarial bodies." Even faculty who were union activists admitted that much influence in decision making was informal, but maintained that faculty had more of an opportunity now than prior to unionization to influence decision making through the mechanisms of the union and via the grievance procedure.

Most informants felt that informal relationships between the union and the administration were "adversarial but reasonably good." Begin called the union-administration bargaining relationship "relatively
good,\footnote{Begin, "Due Process and Collegiality," p. 36.} while several administrators felt that informal relations varied with the issue, the year, and the status of negotiations.

Relationships between the Senate and the administration were seen as slightly more cooperative than union-administration relations. Several conflicting reasons were given for this relationship, however. One faculty member stated that the Senate was "a pawn of the administration" because faculty didn't prepare for Senate discussion and the Senate leadership was poor. Another faculty member felt that the Senate tended to be somewhat adversarial in its relations with the administration, often defeating administrative proposals. Most felt that, irrespective of the quality of the Senate's relationships with the administration, the Senate exerted very little influence over campus issues.

Informal relationships between the Senate and the union were generally felt to be neutral. For the most part, respondents did not feel that the union attempted to encroach upon senate responsibilities. Many union leaders were senators, so leadership of the two groups was overlapping, although there was no formal mechanism to ensure this overlap. There were no formal attempts on the parts of Senate and union leaders to discuss campus issues, unless the Senate began to discuss an issue related to working conditions. Several administrators noted differences in the orientations of faculty leaders in Senate and union leadership positions. They felt that leaders of the Senate were "scholar-gentlemen," solid academicians whose primary rewards--and interests--were scholarly and intellectual. They felt that the union leadership was made up of
faculty who could not receive or were not interested in scholarly recognition. Both groups were dominated by senior faculty members, and neither group was felt to be representative of the "average" faculty member at Rutgers.

The AAUP made one attempt to enlarge the scope of mandatory negotiations by filing a Petition for Scope of Negotiations Determination and an Unfair Practice Charge before the New Jersey Public Employment Commission. In its Decision and Order the PERC reaffirmed the legality of coexisting unions and senates, stating that "there is no reason why the systems of collegiality and collective negotiations may not function harmoniously. Neither system need impose upon the other . . . ."23 From discussions with both faculty and administrators at Rutgers, it appeared that each governance body operated almost completely independently of the other.

Perceptions of Faculty Governance

It may be that informal relationships were felt to be neutral or cooperative between AAUP and the Senate because neither was seen as a powerful governance group. Most respondents maintained that governance occurred at the departmental or college levels, not in either the Senate or the union. Neither body was seen as either effective or representative, and the majority of the faculty apparently did not wish either body to become stronger. The largest change, according to the perceptions of

23 Public Employment Relations Commission of New Jersey, Decision and Order no. 76-13 (mimeo), p. 6.
Every respondent, regardless of union loyalty or hierarchical position, had been in the grievance process. This change had formalized faculty-administrative relations, created more strictly-enforced rules and regulations, and standardized the faculty evaluation process. But the faculty in departments and colleges were still essentially in control of the greatest amount of decision making at Rutgers University.

**Contextual Factors Related to Faculty Governance.** Although much time was spent gathering data on structural and informal factors in academic governance, contextual factors which related to faculty governance and collective bargaining were also noted. Several of these factors were relevant to the status of the present governance system at Rutgers, and merited discussion.

The most obvious factor unique to Rutgers was the strength of its prebargaining faculty governance system. Colleges were nearly autonomous, resulting in very powerful deans and campus provosts, and substantially powerful chairpersons. One source maintained that "only two items held the university together: the academic calendar and graduation."

According to several sources, the former president had encouraged and facilitated this decentralization, but had reserved most university-wide decision making to himself or his central staff, rather than including faculty in decisions affecting the university as a whole. According to one administrator, the administrative style of the former president was an "iconoclastic, individualistic, chaps-not-charts" approach under which communication was sketchy, faculty participation on an institutional level was minimal, and accountability for decisions was unknown. A new administration arrived shortly after the union election, and was
reported to be "more responsive" and accountable, more devoted to infor-
formation and data in decision making and management, than was the former
administration. Several individuals maintained that the faculty's in-
ability to participate in institutional decision making brought the union
to Rutgers. Because of the "new" administration's more participatory
stance, it was impossible to separate completely the union's influence
on academic governance from the influence of the new administration. It
was also impossible to predict what changes, if any, a new administration
might have made in the faculty governance system had the faculty not
been unionized. But, since all informants felt that unionization had had
little effect upon the structure of faculty governance, the confounding
presence of a new administration was less serious than it might have been.

The considerable influence of the State Department of Higher
Education and its desire to centralize planning and program coordination
have been mentioned as causes contributing to unionization. The
Chancellor was seen as a threat to the autonomy of colleges and depart-
ments, an individual who, as one administrator expressed it, "wanted to
throw a lasso around disorganized Rutgers." If unionization was, in part,
a defensive reaction against State control (and possible amalgamation
with the State colleges), then State policies and decisions may continue
to have a considerable effect upon faculty governance at Rutgers. Be-
cause the majority of its Board of Governors are political appointees,
Rutgers can no longer remain isolated and autonomous, whether or not
its faculty are unionized.

Effect of Faculty Bargaining on Governance. Most respondents agreed
that the AAUP had had minimal impact upon either the formal governance
structure or informal power and influence relations within and beyond the university. Collegial decision making at the departmental and college levels was still the norm, except for a few items related to long range planning and policy making for the institution. Respondents tended to cite individual personalities and styles (especially for administrators), the character and history of the institution, and economic factors as having a greater impact on faculty governance than did unionization. Indeed, one faculty member rejected the allegation that AAUP was a union, admitting that it negotiated for salaries, but denying that it influenced any decisions beyond salaries. Although faculty bargaining has had no major impact upon faculty governance, respondents admitted that it has brought several changes to Rutgers.

One administrator felt that faculty bargaining had removed power from deans and department chairpersons. First, the evaluation process had become more complex, placing the real locus of decision power at the vice-presidential level. And secondly, this administrator maintained that deans and chairpersons would not make a personnel decision without consulting either the university attorney or the Director of Employment Relations. This hesitancy to decide and dependence upon Personnel staff shifted responsibility for developing fundamental personnel policies (especially when one considers the importance of precedental decisions in employment relations) to the Personnel staff rather than keeping policy making in the hands of academicians.

The second concern resulting from faculty bargaining was its tendency to standardize and rationalize processes. One faculty member remarked that "an intellectual climate requires flexibility," and that
"collective bargaining reduces flexibility" in decision making. He added that this rigidity required talented, creative administrators who would find ways to maintain flexibility despite rigid procedural rules and formalized relationships.

Rutgers' President Bloustein explained the changes brought to faculty governance, by unions and by other external forces, as a change "from a social context in which rights and obligations arose out of status to one in which rights and obligations arise out of consensual agreements." In other words, relationships which were once based on professional status were now based upon contracts and legal agreements. The faculty at Rutgers University apparently decided that their status as academic professionals was no longer enough protection against encroachment resulting from federal regulations (such as Affirmative Action), State centralization of higher education management, the Federated College Plan, shrinking resources and concomitant threats of retrenchment, a declining job market, and numerous other forces. To date, unionization seemingly has had little effect upon faculty governance per se, but has substantially affected the procedures of administering the institution. Perhaps the faculty member who said that "Rutgers is a prestigious research university that should not be unionized" was accurate, at least with respect to the effect that the union has had on internal governance. Because unionization occurred substantially as a defense against external threats to the faculty's autonomy, the success of that mechanism as protection against external

24Bloustein, p. 12.
penetration of the university's boundaries has yet to be determined.

TEMPLE UNIVERSITY

Background to Governance and Faculty Bargaining

Temple University, located in the heart of North Philadelphia and surrounded by urban ghetto, has undergone several transformations in its nine decades of existence. Although Temple has grown in size, complexity, and diversity of purpose, its original mission has remained to educate the children of the city's working class residents. Throughout its existence, Temple has oriented its programs to the needs of its Philadelphia constituency, and it is very much an urban university today.

History and Change at Temple University. Russell H. Conwell, as Baptist minister and lecturer whose "Acres of Diamonds" speech brought fame to Conwell and millions of dollars to Temple, founded Temple High School in 1884. Conwell intended that the school should tutor young men in the evenings for college entrance, for Philadelphia had no evening schools. The High School grew quickly, and in 1887, Temple College received its charter, with Conwell as its first president. (The College became a university in 1907.) The earliest colleges to be founded within the University were Liberal Arts, Nursing, Theology, Pharmacy, Law, and a Teachers College. Continued growth during the twentieth century


dramatized Temple's efforts to respond to the educational needs of Philadelphia's citizens. For example, during World War II, Temple offered one hundred different special training courses for war industry workers.  

Founded and maintained as a private university, Temple became a "state related" university when, in November of 1965, the Commonwealth System of Higher Education was created by the Pennsylvania General Assembly. The state contributes between 33 and 38 percent of Temple's budget, and appoints one third of the membership of Temple's Board of Trustees. Enrollment increases occurring during the last two decades have stabilized at 36,000, and, although 88 percent of Temple's students are Pennsylvania residents, the university's expansion of its graduate programs and recruitment of research-oriented faculty during the 1960's has changed Temple from a primarily local to a regional institution.  

Continued pressure from its urban surroundings has encouraged program growth at Temple. Just under one third of its enrollment is in continuing education; yet the university also has a research-oriented, somewhat traditional academic program, with ten schools and colleges offering the baccalaureate degree, 79 areas granting the masters degree, and doctoral programs in 61 areas. Full-time faculty number around 1,500, while


the addition of part-time and adjunct faculty doubles that figure. Two suburban and one center-city campus have added geographical complexity to the programmatic complexity which characterizes Temple University.

Changes over the past decade in Temple's administrative leadership had relevance to the forthcoming discussion of faculty bargaining. The previous president, acting as provost from 1962-1967, served as president from 1967-1972. These years were a period of campus and urban turmoil, with Temple part of both crises. Several faculty informants reported that the previous president seemed paralyzed by these external pressures, and withdrew from consulting with faculty on necessary academic decisions. Several faculty members who had taught during this president's tenure explained that many decisions were not made at all, and those which were made were seen by many of the faculty as autocratic and unilateral. Under faculty pressure, the president resigned in 1972, and the individual who was provost at that time assumed the presidency. The new president had considerable faculty support, and most respondents concurred that his administrative style was collegial and consensual.

Temple's growth and history were unusual for a large research university, especially because of its close urban ties. Many of the historical and social factors just discussed had relevance to the organization of the faculty by the AAUP, and the union's subsequent effects upon academic governance at Temple.

Faculty Unionization. The roots of faculty unionization were in the joint urban-campus unrest of the late 1960's. Katz reported that the first collective attempt to unionize the Temple faculty were initiated by a group of young, radical, mostly untenured faculty who met to
discuss and plan protest activities and other forms of political action. With the passage of Act 195 in October, 1970 (the Public Employment Relations Law), this group saw unionization as a mechanism for political influence, somewhat removed from university governance concerns. Along with the climate of campus radicalism and the new freedom for public employees to unionize, the faculty were faced with pressures for accountability from the legislature, a president who made decisions either unilaterally or not at all, and a restive urban environment.

The original group of activists became affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers, and began an authorization card drive (the preliminary step to a vote to select a bargaining agent) in the fall of 1971. The leadership of the Faculty Senate, while endorsing collective bargaining, favored keeping the faculty bargaining association independent of any national affiliation, and began its own authorization card drive for the Faculty Collective Bargaining Committee (FCBA). The local AAUP chapter also joined the authorization activities.

After a Pennsylvania Labor Board hearing decided upon the composition of the bargaining unit, the first election was held in October, 1972. The results were a close three-way finish between the AFT, AAUP, and FCBA (which had since become affiliated with the National Education Association). In the subsequent run-off election, AAUP defeated the

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30 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
31 Ibid., p. 31.
AFT by a 3:2 margin. One faculty analyst felt that faculty were "cross-pressured" between commitments to professionalism and their discipline on the one hand, and feeling both underpaid and insecure as tenure became harder to acquire. A report of research conducted on faculty voting attitudes after Temple's elections stated that Temple faculty ranked lack of responsiveness of internal agents (such as the President or Board of Trustees) to faculty needs and welfare as the most important factor in their decision to unionize and their choice of a bargaining agent.

The first contract negotiated between Temple and the AAUP included a grievance procedure, an internal tenure appeals procedure, and items related to salary and conditions of work. Promotion and tenure procedures are set forth in the Faculty Handbook, and were not a part of the contract. Changes between the first and second contracts were minimal, resulting in a contract which was fairly short and simply written, and tended to leave the specification of procedures in certain areas (for example, in the selection of department chairpersons) to the discretion of the individual departments. Administrators explained that the contract was deliberately kept simple to allow flexibility for both the union and the administration in decision making. Only "insiders" were present during negotiations sessions, and Temple, like Rutgers, was allowed to negotiate essentially independently of State control or interference.

33Ibid.
34Katz in Schuster, pp. 34, 37.
35Lozier and Mortimer, p. 6.
In examining the effects of the AAUP on governance at Temple, it was important to understand the nature of faculty governance prior to unionization. A brief examination of additions and changes in governance groups gave a more complete picture of changes occurring in faculty governance since 1972, whether or not they were felt to be spurred by unionization.

Structure of Faculty Governance. In order to better understand the functional divisions of responsibility for decision making at Temple, it was necessary to determine the number and composition of governance groups, especially those groups whose functions and composition had changed as a result of unionization. The major faculty governance body at Temple, the Faculty Senate, had not changed in function or composition since unionization. More precisely, two faculty senates operated at Temple. The first, called the University Senate, was made up of all faculty with "presidential" (tenure track) appointments. A Representative Senate, on which membership was proportional to the number of faculty in each college, conducted most of the routine business of the Senate and voted on policy matters. The Senate's power consisted of "consultation, review, ratification and recommendation . . . the Senate and its committees shall be understood to be acting as advisor to the administration and the Board of Trustees." 36 The president, vice presidents and deans were ex-officio members of the Senate.

Most policy which the Representative Senate (hereafter referred to as the Senate) considered was initiated by the Senate Steering Committee, which consisted of the four Senate officers and one senator from each of the fourteen colleges and schools within Temple. The Steering Committee selected the nominating committee for Senate offices, appointed all Senate subcommittees, set the Senate agenda, and established and appointed ad hoc committees. Important subcommittees of the Senate were the Personnel Committee and the Admissions Committee, but even more important was the Educational Programs and Policy Committee (EPPC). The EPPC consisted of the four Senate officers, three deans, the Academic Vice President and three administrators selected by him, six senators and six students, who reviewed all curricular and program changes, approving them before they were implemented.

The role of one of the Senate subcommittees, the Personnel Committee, was altered by unionization. The Personnel Committee, before unionization, was the "final faculty determinant of the rights of a faculty member in cases of dismissal, denial of tenure, or other grievances . . . ."37 In this system, the recommendation of the Personnel Committee was sent to the president, who made the final decision in the case. As explained in the contract analysis section of this chapter, the current grievance procedure required a Tenure Appeals Committee to make the final decision after the grievance was processed through AAUP and university channels. Both systems were functional and either might be used. Thus, unionization had probably reduced the use and power of the Personnel Committee.

37Ibid., p. 54.
Each college and school had a collegial assembly, as described in the Faculty Handbook. The composition and functions of this group were not measurably altered by unionization. A college-level merit committee was added since unionization, however. This committee set criteria and procedures for awarding merit increases to faculty members, a procedure mandated by the contract. Each college also had a curriculum committee which monitored and approved curricular and program changes. A college-level personnel committee received departmental recommendations for promotion and tenure decisions and added its recommendation before sending all recommendations on to the dean. Individual colleges also created other college-level committees, at the discretion of the dean and department faculty. All respondents felt that college-level committees, with the exception of the new merit committee, were essentially unchanged by unionization.

Several university-wide governance committees were created as a result of faculty unionization at Temple. The aforementioned Tenure Appeals Committee, a joint AAUP-Temple committee, consisted of nine members. (One faculty member stated that, although the contract stipulated that Temple appoint half the members and AAUP appoint the other half of the committee, in practice the Academic Vice President asked AAUP to appoint the entire committee). Several individuals maintained that the Tenure Appeals Committee had only had to consider five cases, three of which were "won" by Temple. (It should be noted that the appeals process for tenure decisions excluded the Trustees, for a faculty committee made the final decision).
A second important university-wide committee was the AAUP Grievance Committee. Although not described in either the contract or the Faculty Handbook, the Grievance Committee consisted of AAUP members who advised the Academic Vice President on decisions at Step 3 of the non-personnel grievance procedure. Since the signing of the first contract in 1972, no grievance has gone to binding arbitration. All have been settled at Step 3.

A third committee, again not described in university documents but nevertheless very active was the Liaison Committee. This committee was composed of the Senate officers and the Executive Committee of the AAUP. The body met formally to discuss issues of mutual interest (such as matters pertaining to working conditions). Members of the Liaison Committee conferred informally before meetings at which the Steering Committee, Senate or AAUP Executive Committee made policy decisions. Membership on the two executive bodies overlapped; for example, the chairperson of the Senate for the 1976-77 academic year was also a member of the AAUP Executive Committee, and was a member of the union negotiating team for the first contract.

From the foregoing discussion of the faculty governance structure, it seemed evident that unionization caused few changes in the formal governance structure at Temple University. While three new committees were created as a result of unionization, they neither replaced nor usurped functions, to any great extent, of committees predating bargaining. In two cases (the Tenure Appeals Committee and the Liaison Committee), the new committees offered alternative mechanisms for decision making.
Academic Policy Decisions. All respondents concurred that departmental and colleges had the major decision authority on curriculum. Individual faculty members or groups of faculty submitted curricular proposals to a college-level committee, which either rejected them or approved and sent them to the Dean. For curricular decisions which involved no extra or new funds, or involved only individuals within the college, the dean's decision was the last step. However, respondents agreed that if the proposal were adequately supported by the department, approval at higher levels was nearly automatic.

Admissions policy was developed by a Senate Admissions Committee. This process may be becoming centralized, for it was reported that the Admissions Committee had been "dormant," but that an ad hoc Senate subcommittee was examining student access policy. It was also reported that the Senate Educational Programs and Policy Committee "advised the administration" on admissions policy. Degree requirements were developed within each college or, for graduate degrees, by faculty through the Graduate School.

Several individuals stated that the union played no part in academic policy making. If active union leaders participated in academic policy making, it was as faculty, not as union members. In all, departments and colleges were seen as the locus of nearly all academic policy making.

Personnel Decision Making. Personnel matters were defined in Chapter 4 as faculty hiring and promotion and tenure decisions. Informants agreed that the department faculty had the greatest influence in deciding who would be hired. Approval for a new faculty line came from the Academic Vice President, through the Dean, to the faculty.
In one college, a college-wide screening committee as well as a departmental screening committee interviewed the candidate, and the committees made a joint decision. In another college, the departmental faculty had more autonomy over screening and selection.

The locus of decision making for promotion and tenure decisions was diffuse, depending on the particular college, the number of faculty already tenured or promoted compared with enrollment growth or decline, and the amount of peer support for a candidate. Several faculty informants maintained that promotion was more difficult to achieve than tenure; that tenure was nearly automatic but promotion was not. Both faculty and administrators agreed that if a department recommendation were strongly positive and if the Collegial Personnel Committee approved, then decision-makers at higher levels (Council of Deans, Academic Vice President, President, and Trustees) usually approved promotion or tenure. The contract forbids tenure quotas, and most faculty maintained that tenure was no more difficult to attain now than it had been during the late 1960's, the years of expansion. Again, the respondents did not feel that the union, as a union, played a role in initial personnel decision making, although it might eventually participate in an appeal of a personnel decision via the grievance process.

**Economic Decisions.** All economic matters as discussed in Chapter 4 were included in the contract (i.e., salaries, fringe benefits, and workload policies). A minimum salary scale by rank was included, and every fringe benefit was listed. The union exclusively represented the faculty on all salary and fringe benefit policy through the contract negotiations.
While an article entitled "Working Conditions" appeared in the contract, it consisted of one sentence, requiring teaching loads to be "reasonable, fair and consistent with current practices." Actual policy on teaching load was made at the college level, and differed by college, but was administered at the departmental level. Chairpersons and faculty, for the most part, determined teaching schedules, course load, and advising policies. Depending upon the college, the dean might eliminate classes or consolidate sections if enrollment were low, but for the most part, faculty members agreed, faculty and chairpersons determined faculty workload.

Planning Decisions. As defined in Chapter 4, planning included both departmental budgets and long range planning. Although practices differed by college, it was evident that the Vice President and the deans controlled budget size and method of allocation. For example, in some colleges, departments did not have budgets; all funds were dispersed at the college level.

A special effort to include faculty in the institutional budgeting process was initiated during the past year, resulting from a recommendation of the Committee on the Future (to be discussed shortly). Appointed by the Senate Steering Committee, the Faculty Budget Committee reviewed budgets for every university unit; deans and vice presidents presented and defended their budgets to this committee. While this practice may imply greater faculty participation in budget decisions in the

future, budget decisions still seemed to be clearly in the hands of the administration.

Locus of decision making for long range planning was more difficult to determine for two reasons: first, because most respondents felt that little planning was done and secondly, because some planning seemed to be occurring at several levels, but with little coordination. A few colleges established policy committees which discussed organizational and planning matters. The Council of Deans fulfilled a minor planning role, but was seen by faculty as more reactive than proactive. In one special planning effort, the President created a group called the Commission on the Future. The Commission included five faculty members and five students elected by their respective peers, and five administrators appointed by the President. This Commission was charged with the responsibility of projecting future program and resource needs for the University, and examining relationships between various governance groups and units within the university. Again, however, this mechanism for long-range planning was an ad hoc group, existing at the pleasure of the administration. There seemed to be no standing faculty group, either within or outside of the Senate or union, which was attempting to make or influence long range planning decisions.

**Formal Power Relationships.** As was the case with Rutgers, formal decision-making power existed at several levels within the governance structure of Temple University. Faculty within the departments and colleges controlled the majority of academic, personnel, and workload decisions. Even though some decisions, such as those pertaining to promotion and tenure, were decided *de jure* at higher organizational
levels, a strong college recommendation on any matter was usually ratified at higher levels. The ability of faculty to elect their own chairpersons also contributed to the formal power of the departments. It was clear that the colleges enjoyed a great deal of autonomy at Temple, and that departments also enjoyed much freedom to make their own decisions. The formal power for salary issues resided within the negotiation process between the union and the administration. The only area in which the administration reserved its formal power was in budget and planning decisions. Even though departments and colleges were asked to submit budget requests, they had little real influence below the central administrative level. A faculty member reported that the Council of Deans advised the Academic Vice President during the budget allocation process, and that much informal cooperation among deans made the "advisement" function more of an endorsement of each dean's budget request. Thus, of the decision-making areas described above, faculty in departments and colleges dominated decision making in three of the four.

The Senate was the only other formal governance body. Because the Senate was only able to advise rather than to make policy, its power was less than the power of individual departments or colleges. Senate power was seen by several faculty members as weak, a result of disinterest among faculty, difficulty in finding strong leadership for the Senate, and the length of time required for the Senate to reach a decision. Other faculty members maintained that the Senate had more power than it chose to exercise, allowing itself to become "bogged down" by discussions which focused on issues relating to only one area of the institution. Still others criticized the numerous Senate subcommittees whose
responsibilities were so broadly defined that jurisdictions between different committees were unclear. (Three different groups might have decision authority on the same issue, for there was no clarity in the division of responsibilities among them.) Faculty informants, both active and inactive in the union, agreed that the union had not affected the Senate's formal power. But in matters of informal power, the union had the potential for reducing the Senate's power.

Informal Power Relations. Because the formal decision-making power structure was somewhat unclear, particularly for institution-wide policy making, the loci of informal power relations became even more important to an understanding of governance at Temple University. Most informants when asked if it were still possible, despite the union, to influence decisions informally, responded positively. Although several faculty members maintained that the presence of the union lessened an individual's informal influence in decision making, all maintained that it "could still be done." Most also agreed that unionization had probably given junior faculty more of a voice in decision making, although they noted that very few untenured faculty participated in academic governance. While unionization had given faculty another vehicle for governance, they maintained, few faculty took advantage of either formal or informal mechanisms for influencing how decisions were made.

Most individuals, both faculty and administrators, agreed that unionization had not affected the Senate's formal power, nor the breadth of its influence in academic decision making. This retention of Senate power was attributed to two causes by those interviewed. First, the union was careful to "stay out of Senate business," restricting its
activities to matters which were almost exclusively economic. But secondly, and perhaps more importantly, leadership of the two groups overlapped to a great extent. Much informal conferring and giving of advice occurred among Senate and union leaders. Since both groups were dominated by senior, tenured faculty, friendship and colleague patterns were strong, resulting in Senate officials having much informal influence over union decisions, and vice versa.

A number of faculty expressed concern related to what they perceived as the relative ineffectiveness of the Senate, and predicted that the union might gain power at the Senate's expense if the union were able to deliver decisions more quickly. They felt that the close peer relationships among the Senate and union leadership maintained the balance of power between the two groups. However, a number of individuals, especially faculty, stated that the majority of faculty were indifferent to either Senate or union activities, preferring to devote their attention to their teaching and research.

Informal relations between the union and the administration were reported, by faculty and administrators alike, to be excellent, cordial, and cooperative. One faculty member admitted that union-administration relations were "probably more cooperative than the membership realizes," and attributed the lack of major conflict between the union and administration to the efforts of both sides to be flexible. Relations were so cordial that the chief negotiators for each team made a practice of discussing the contract, agreeing on its interpretation, and then making a joint visit to each college where they explained the contract, as a team, to deans and chairpersons. Administrators saw the union leadership
as sophisticated, and the relationships between the two sides was collegial rather than adversary. The use of internal, academically- oriented administrators (i.e., former faculty members) on the bargaining team was seen by administrators as contributing to the trust and harmony between the two groups.

Faculty members and administrators also saw informal relationships between the Senate and the administration as very cooperative. Some Senate members felt that the Board of Trustees was a greater adversary than the administration. Although administrators attended Senate meetings, faculty members reported that administrators spoke only when asked for information, and made no overt attempts to influence voting or discussion. Several faculty members indicated that relations between the previous president and the Senate had been poor, that lack of communication and refusal to act on Senate recommendations "almost destroyed the Senate." It was evident that relations between the Senate and the new administration had improved substantially.

It appeared that informal power relationships at Temple had not measurably changed since unionization. Academic and/or political "star" faculty still influenced decision making, although many were members of the leadership group of either the Senate or the union (or both). Individuals were influential in Senate or union decision making were senior faculty whose influence was more a result of individual characteristics than the structural power of a Senate or union office.
Perceptions of Faculty Governance

Although neither the AAUP nor the Senate was seen as a powerful governance body, individuals within these two organizations did influence decision making and were seen as powerful. It appeared that, as with Rutgers University, most faculty governance at Temple University occurred within departments and colleges. Faculty had considerable collective power at the college level. For example, it was reported by several individuals that eight deans were in the process of being "impeached" by their faculties because they made unilateral decisions and/or ignored the faculty's wishes in making policy.

Faculty support for the union, in terms of dues payment and meeting attendance, was not strong. Slightly over half of the faculty paid dues, but fewer than three percent attended union meetings. Several faculty members maintained that the growth in participatory democracy, not the union, had caused whatever increase was observed in faculty participation in academic governance. Several faculty informants maintained that, had the former administration been more open and cooperative with faculty on governance issues, no union would have been organized. It was the consensus that "things were fairly good" at Temple, and that if the union were not strong, it was because the faculty did not, just then, feel the need for a strong union.

Contextual Factors Related to Governance. It was evident that the passage of Act 195 enabling public employees to bargain was a major contributory cause of faculty unionization. The Temple faculty, already quite autonomous, desired to preserve that autonomy by contract. The possibility of being included in a statewide bargaining unit with the
state colleges was a potent threat to their autonomy, particularly since the administration of Temple was not seen as protective of faculty interests.

The history of a decade of extensive growth and broadening of institutional mission was followed by threats of budget cuts, declining enrollments, and retrenchment. Over half of Temple's faculty were untenured in the fall of 1972,\textsuperscript{39} when the run-off election was held between AAUP and AFT. These external threats to job security produced the defensive reaction of unionization.

Administrative style of the president had an important effect on governance, both before and after unionization. The present cordial relations between faculty and administration were attributed by many, both faculty and administrators, to a president who valued collegiality above administrative efficiency, and who encouraged and respected the faculty's role in determining institutional policy. Since the faculty played a major role both in forcing the resignation of the former president and in the selection of the current president, administrative style was obviously a critical factor in the quality of governance relationships.

\textbf{Effect of Faculty Bargaining on Governance.} Most of the individuals interviewed felt that the AAUP had made little, if any, impact upon faculty governance at Temple University. In its emphasis upon procedural due process in promotion and tenure decisions, the union contract strengthened the already-powerful departments and colleges (although at the same time making them more accountable for their decisions).

\textsuperscript{39}Katz in Schuster, p. 37.
The greatest impact of unionization seemed to be upon the role of the dean. Prior to unionization, deans had had more absolute power in salary and personnel decisions, and had appointed chairpersons. Unionization brought with it a salary scale and a college-level merit committee; thus, the dean's salary decisions were few. Faculty had the major role in peer evaluations and recommendations. The dean was only Step 2 in the grievance procedure, and his or her decision could be reversed by a faculty committee at Step 3. Deans could no longer appoint department chairpersons, for the process had become elective. In the College of Education, a faculty policy committee recommended policy to the dean on administrative reorganization of the college. The only vestige of the dean's power seemed to be the Council of Deans, an advisory group to the Academic Vice President.

No respondent felt that the Senate had been measurably affected by unionization, although a few faculty members felt that the union occasionally spurred the Senate to be more responsive to faculty concerns. Several faculty and administrators saw the union as a potential threat to the Senate, attributing the cooperative relationship between the two to the personalities of their respective leaderships.

All informants agreed that unionization tended to formalize procedures and to increase the numbers of rules and regulations. However, none of the individuals considered this result particularly significant to governance, and most agreed that bureaucratization was more a product of "the times" than of the union contract.

It was evident that the faculty at Temple had enjoyed considerable decentralized authority at the department and college levels before
unionization, and that unionization had had no major effect upon this power. The stronger Senate was seen as attributable to a more collegial president and individually-influential Senate leadership rather than to unionization. The union was seen as possessing more potential power than it chose to, or needed to, exercise, and thus was seen as having a relatively minimal effect upon faculty governance at Temple University.

GOVERNANCE AT TWO UNIONIZED MULTIVERSITIES

The foregoing analysis of faculty governance at two unionized universities revealed many more similarities than differences. Bargaining agents were identical, contracts were similar, and the conditions under which unionization occurred were very much alike. While the histories and functions of the two institutions were unique to each, the patterns of rapid growth, expansion of mission, and increasing complexity of the institutions were parallel. Recent changes in administrative leadership were similar, although Temple's faculty saw their president as more collegially-oriented, while the Rutgers faculty saw their president as attempting to centralize and consolidate institutional-level governance at the central administrative level. It was evident that few differences in the effect of faculty bargaining on governance were explained by either the structural or functional differences between the two institutions.

Recent research on governance at both Rutgers and Temple confirmed this study's perceptions that pre-union governance structures had remained intact, and that the unions were careful to allow the respective senates to handle academic decision making. James Begin explained that faculty bargaining has not essentially changed the governance structure
at Rutgers, nor contributed to State-level control, because "the parties have made a purposeful effort to preserve local governing mechanisms and thus local authority." Similar efforts to preserve traditional governance structures were found at Temple University by Johnson and Gershenfeld. They wrote that "the AAUP has sought preservation of traditional governance mechanisms while retaining its power to protect what it perceives as the collective bargaining rights of bargaining unit members." Research at each institution revealed that formal authority relations under collective bargaining were a function of the relationships between faculty and administrators, and among governance groups, that existed before unionization.

While governance at both institutions was almost completely decentralized, there appeared to be somewhat more faculty participation in institution-wide governance at Temple than was observed at Rutgers. This difference may have been partially due to the greater geographic decentralization of Rutgers, and to the historical emphasis on autonomy of departments and colleges at that institution. Also, the urban location and orientation of Temple University may have served as a unifying


42Johnson and Gershenfeld in Mortimer, p. 59; Begin in Mortimer, p. 30.
device at the institutional level. Individual administrative style of the institutions' respective presidents also made a contribution to these differences. The senates, and their inherent problems, were similar at both institutions, and were perceived as weak agents of university-wide governance. The most recent attempts at Temple to include faculty in university-wide decision making had been initiated by the President. The union seemingly had little impact upon policy making at the institutional level.

At both Rutgers and Temple, faculty and administrators alike felt that the most important result of faculty unionization was the grievance process. Although both institutions had had mechanisms for appeal of personnel decisions before unionization, these mechanisms had not been used often, and had not been applied consistently when they were used. Respondents at both institutions felt that the grievance procedure had resulted in clearer, fairer criteria for evaluation of faculty, more consistent application of these criteria, and better decisions in general. It was found at both institutions that deans had lost power because of the grievance procedure, for levels below and above the dean contributed to decisions which the dean used to have the power to make with relative autonomy.

Although unionization seemed to have had little effect upon faculty power (except to increase slightly power which faculty already held), administrators perceived a greater change in their own decision-making process. They consulted with faculty more before making decisions, and documented more carefully the reasons for choosing a certain alternative. They relied on labor management experts to advise on faculty personnel
decisions, adding vice-presidential positions in personnel relations at both Rutgers and Temple. Governance was more bureaucratized, more formalized, and more guided by rules and regulations. But administrators still felt that relations with faculty were positive, and that adversarial relationships occurred primarily during negotiations sessions.

Individuals at both institutions agreed that faculty bargaining had had little effect on student power and role in academic governance. They felt that not only had unionization not affected student power, but that the students possessed more power than they attempted to use. At both institutions, students were characterized by respondents as apathetic, unorganized, and concerned only with issues which affected them directly (such as tuition). A second reason for the perceived lack of impact of the union on student power could have been the relatively low profile of the union in academic decision making; on a campus with a stronger, more militant union and/or more militant students, the union might have had a greater impact on student power.

In their book on faculty unions, Kemerer and Baldridge label faculty union organizers as either "preservationists" or "the deprived." It appeared that faculty at both Rutgers and Temple were "preservationists," for governance, especially at the departmental and college levels, was heavily influenced by the faculty. Unilateral, arbitrary presidents at both institutions apparently were more of a causal factor in unionization than was dissatisfaction with governance structures.

43 Kemerer and Baldridge, pp. 64-65.
Informants at both institutions saw the centralizing attempts of both states' education coordinating agencies as threatening to faculty and campus autonomy. Attempts at collaboration between the administration and the union against state-level centralization were more evident at Temple than at Rutgers, but research on governance at both institutions has documented AAUP efforts to preserve local campus autonomy. These efforts to work together against a force mutually perceived as threatening have tended to ameliorate relationships between union leaders and administrators on these campuses.

At both institutions, the union's power was potential rather than significant at the time of this study. Individuals at both Rutgers and Temple predicted increasing competition between the senates and unions if the senates remained weak, retrenchment were necessary, or a severe crisis hit either institution (i.e., substantial enrollment drop, restrictive state-level decisions affecting programs or budgets, etc.). If faculty unions had not materially affected faculty governance at either Rutgers or Temple Universities, they had the potential to be extremely influential in academic governance. Organized primarily as defenses against external pressures and internal administrative decisions by fiat, unions were viewed as less necessary because relations between faculty and administrators were collegial. But unions did serve an "insuring" function so that, should it become necessary, the union would defend faculty prerogatives in academic governance from those who would centralize, retrench, or usurp them.

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44 Begin in Mortimer, p. 29; Johnson and Gershenfeld in Mortimer, p. 58.
CHAPTER SIX

EFFECT OF FACULTY UNIONIZATION ON GOVERNANCE
AT TWO STATE COLLEGES

The category of "comprehensive college" contains a somewhat heterogeneous collection of institutions. The Kemerer and Baldridge study grouped two institution types within this category: public colleges and comprehensive colleges. For the most part, institutions in this category were public, masters degree-granting colleges with liberal arts, business, and education programs. Many of the institutions were formerly state teachers colleges. But institutions in this category differed in size, selectivity, orientation of faculty to research, and financial health. With this diversity of types within one category, it was evident that generalizing within this category would be difficult. It was important to study institutions selected from this category, however, for comprehensive colleges made up over half of the Kemerer and Baldridge sample; data for fifty-eight of these institutions are included in the analysis reported in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.

Recent writings on academic collective bargaining have emphasized the lack of faculty role in governance at comprehensive colleges. Many of these institutions began as normal schools in the last half of the nineteenth century, changing to teachers colleges during the early

twentieth century. These institutions were normally governed by the same state education agencies which supervised public elementary and secondary education, permitting a pattern of "heavy dominance by trustees and administrators that was more characteristic of lower than higher education." Many of the administrators of teachers colleges were former public school teachers or superintendents, and administrative style was often autocratic.

During the late 1950's and the decade of the 1960's, expanding enrollments and increasing demand for public education encouraged many state teachers colleges to expand their programs and become either comprehensive colleges or regional universities. They added liberal arts and business schools, masters degree programs, and hired new faculty, many of whom had scholarly research orientations and high professional commitment to collegial governance. These three rapid changes in institutional mission, size and complexity, and faculty composition were almost guaranteed to produce conflict on campuses of the new state colleges. The addition of student unrest in the late 1960's made conditions on these campuses even more unstable.

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In addition to the numerous structural and functional changes undergone by these colleges, researchers have noted a "split" between the older, tenured, primarily education faculty and the younger, mostly untenured, liberal arts and business faculty. Aside from differences in age, rank, and discipline, the younger faculty arrived with an orientation to research, while many of the older faculty emphasized teaching. Newer faculty chafed under the restrictive administrators of these colleges, while external forces such as demand for accountability, increasing attempts by State Departments of Education to centralize decision making for higher education, and tightening budgets multiplied the pressures on these institutions. It was not surprising that, with the advent of public sector bargaining laws, faculty in many of these state systems chose to unionize.

Although the conditions described above are a composite of many individual campuses, the generalizations they employ are based on fact. The two state colleges chosen for this study, Trenton State College (New Jersey) and East Stroudsburg State College (Pennsylvania) reflect several of these conditions. Neither should be considered "typical" of its state system, nor could any member institution of a state college system be chosen as "typical" because of differences in campus practices, administrative style of its president, composition of faculty and student bodies, and even its location within the state. Both institutions were chosen because of their similarities in program offerings and because

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each was among the earliest members of its respective state college system. In order to separate effects which were a product of the individual institution from those more relevant to the system as a whole, numerous efforts were made to compare the institution studied to its counterparts within the state system.

Both institutions were first normal schools, then state teachers colleges, and now are comprehensive colleges. Both offer coursework in liberal arts, education, and business (Trenton State also has a nursing program), and both award masters degrees. With this closeness of structural and functional similarities, any differences in governance and the effect of faculty bargaining may be due more to contract differences, differences in state educational policies, or differences in individual institutional histories and practices. Table 23 displays a brief analysis and comparison of contract provisions for both Trenton and East Stroudsburg State Colleges.

**CONTRACT ANALYSIS**

With only a cursory inspection, it was evident that contracts for both state colleges were longer and more complex than the contracts analyzed in the previous chapter. It should be noted that both contracts were between the respective state and the state union (or confederation of local unions). The contracts are negotiated between the Governor's office and the state union leaders, leaving local campus administrators and union leadership with an indirect role in shaping the contract. While the New Jersey contract was fifteen pages shorter than
Table 23. Contract Analysis: Trenton State College and East Stroudsburg State College

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bargaining Agent</th>
<th>AFT</th>
<th>EAST STRoudsburg STATE COLLEGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit Composition</strong></td>
<td>Fulltime faculty, department chairpersons, non-managerial administrative staff, librarians, demonstration school teachers, professional academic support personnel</td>
<td>Full time &amp; part time faculty, department chairpersons, administrative faculty, librarians, nonteaching faculty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academic Freedom</strong></td>
<td>Applies to teaching, research, publishing Employee's responsibility to separate role as citizen and as institutional representative</td>
<td>Applies to teaching, research, publishing Employee's responsibility to separate role as citizen and as institutional representative. No censorship of library materials; Protection of privileged research information on students; Grade book belongs to faculty while on campus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affirmative Action</strong></td>
<td>Protects all employees against discrimination for union activity</td>
<td>Statement on non-discrimination; Protects union members against discrimination for union membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grievance Procedures &amp; Arbitration</strong></td>
<td>Used for contract interpretation and procedural violations only. May attempt to resolve informally. 3 steps: president→Chancellor→arbitration. Arbitration is binding for breach of contract, advisory for breach of policies, nonreappointment; promotion can only remain for advisory arbitration.</td>
<td>Used for all appeals except non-reappointment of non-tenured faculty. 3 steps: lowest managerial level→president →Secretary of Education; then union only may take to binding arbitration. Decision is final and binding; Union may be present at all times.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appointments, Reappointments, &amp; Nonrenewals</strong></td>
<td>Form for letter of appointment. Tenure governed under N.J. law; Time schedule for non-reappointment notices. Appointment and reappointment processes determined by each college—changes must be negotiated; depts. may set own criteria</td>
<td>Separate procedures for Academic &amp; Administrative Faculty; Faculty conduct search &amp; recommend to president; chairperson makes separate recommendation, president may veto. Timetable for nonrenewals by no. of years employed; procedures for supplying reasons for nonrenewals; grievance only through step</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion &amp; Tenure</td>
<td>TRENTO STATE COLLEGE</td>
<td>EAST STRoudSBURG STATE COLLEGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure not in contract—governed by law. Promotion: Faculty apply, provide documentation. Colleges and/or departments may set criteria. Broad structural changes in procedure must be negotiated. Number of promotions for each rank limited. College committee recommends to president. Procedural violations result in reprocessing of application.</td>
<td>Tenure: Continuing contracts unless &quot;just cause&quot;; 4-year probationary period. College wide tenure committee recommends to president. Tenure terminates at age 65. Convening of Statewide Tenure Commission to examine procedures and criteria. Promotions: Lists qualifications for academic &amp; administrative faculty, process begins at department—dept. submits recommendations to College Promotion Committee. College Promotion Committee recommends to president. Each College develops Statement on Promotion Policies &amp; Procedures—must be approved at state level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Department Chairpersons | Elected by department, appointed by president; 3-year term; president may veto & appoint acting chairperson. | Faculty and president confer, faculty elects. 2-year terms; president may veto and appoint acting chairperson. |

| Retrenchment | One-year notice for tenured faculty; College and union consult on retrenchment circumstances; faculty may retrain with College support. Retrenched faculty given priority for rehiring for 2 year period. | College and Union will discuss; first use attrition; order of retrenchment—seniority. Faculty may return to a former department. Timeline for retrenchment notices. Three-year furlough period. Retention of benefits and tenure for transfers. |

| Faculty Governance | No mention in contract—item under "Union-Board Relations" mandates union representative on each College-wide committee. | Curriculum Committee at each College |

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**Table 23 (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Faculty Evaluation</strong></th>
<th><strong>TRENTON STATE COLLEGE</strong></th>
<th><strong>EAST STROUDSBURG STATE COLLEGE</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No mention in contract</td>
<td>Department selects evaluation committee (excludes chairperson), determines evaluation procedures. Non-tenured faculty observed twice each term. Written critique; faculty member must sign, may rebut. Tenured faculty observed once each year, evaluated every 5 years. Evaluation procedures included for Administrative faculty.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Salaries** | One time across-the-board payment, 7% increase 1976-77; 5% increase 1977-78. Salary schedule set by State | Salary schedule by rank and step; salary agreements may use arbitration; timeline for wage negotiations; overload, summer pay; increments for chairpersons |
| Fringe Benefits | State Prescription Drug program; all state benefits as mandated by law; insurance. Lists holidays; tuition reimbursement | Blue Cross/Blue Shield, life insurance; holidays; personal leave and vacation (for 12 month contracts) |

| **Leaves of Absence** | Leave due to injury; general leaves of absence; sabbatical leaves | Sabbatical (limited by %); military leave; bereavement leave; jury duty; professional leave; educational leave; leave for union service; leaves without pay |

| **Workload** | Listed under "Faculty Responsibilities"—24 credit hours maximum per year, 15 per semester; 3 preparations maximum; 3 hours overload maximum | Academic faculty—24 credit hours per year; 3 preparations maximum; Librarians' work week; student teacher supervisors; office hours; travel expense reimbursement |

| **Faculty Responsibilities** | Primarily workload matters; processes for establishing assignment policies; ID cards, library use | No mention in contract |

<p>| <strong>Management Rights</strong> | Rights conferred by state and federal laws reserved to management. All rights reserved to management except as abridged by contract. | College retains right to manage, direct &amp; control; inherent managerial policy reserved to College |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Rights</th>
<th>TRENTON STATE COLLEGE</th>
<th>EAST STROUDSBURG STATE COLLEGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union receives Trustee meeting agendas</td>
<td>&quot;Meet and Discuss&quot; at state level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union may speak at Trustee meetings</td>
<td>&quot;Meet and Discuss&quot; at each College—president and union. College makes available to union all information related to negotiations matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>One union representative on each Master Plan advisory committee</td>
<td>Meeting room use; posting of notices; use of duplicating equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union may use meeting rooms, duplicating equipment, posting of announcements, use of campus mail</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Union officers receive priority in scheduling; union helps in setting academic calendar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Files</td>
<td>Contents of file; Faculty have access and right to respond to materials in file</td>
<td>College shall maintain one official personnel file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Faculty have access and can add materials</td>
<td>Faculty have access and can add materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dues Deduction</td>
<td>Voluntary—checkoff</td>
<td>Voluntary—checkoff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Strike/No Lockout</td>
<td>Union will not strike; State will not lockout</td>
<td>Union will not strike; College will not lockout</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet &amp; Discuss</td>
<td>Minimum three meetings per year at both State and local College levels</td>
<td>Listed under &quot;Union Rights&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Resolution of Issues</td>
<td>Memoranda of Agreement for local College permitted</td>
<td>No mention in contract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Exchange</td>
<td>Union will provide officer and membership lists to College and State; State and College will provide information related to negotiations, public information</td>
<td>Listed under &quot;Union Rights&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance of Agreement</td>
<td>Some contract provisions may require legislative action</td>
<td>Some contract provisions may require legislative action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>Grant compensation; safe conditions, Letters of Agreement (7)</td>
<td>Distinguished Faculty Awards; travel expenses; liability Indemnity; Independent study guidelines; summer employment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that of Pennsylvania, the range of items covered and the details of each were quite similar. Because New Jersey law forbids negotiations on tenure and fringe benefits (since they are governed by statute), these two items did not appear in the New Jersey contract, but did in Pennsylvania's contract.

One obvious difference between the two contracts was the union affiliation for each state union. New Jersey's state college faculty union is affiliated with the American Federation of Teachers (although an earlier contract was negotiated by an NEA affiliate).6 The Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties (APSCUF) is now independent, but was affiliated with the Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA), an NEA affiliate. But this difference in bargaining agent affiliation did not seem to result in extensive differences in contract content between the two unions.

Bargaining unit composition was similar for both contracts. Both included full-time faculty, department chairpersons, non-managerial administrative staff, librarians, and professional academic support personnel (i.e., counselors, researchers) within the unit. APSCUF also included a category called "Administrative Faculty" within the unit, which consisted of nonteaching faculty who were not considered supervisors.7 The New Jersey contract included demonstration school teachers


7Defined in Article 1354 of the Pennsylvania Employment Relations Act.
within its unit. Additional similarities were evident in academic freedom and affirmative action articles, election procedures for department chairpersons, and faculty workload definitions (explicit numbers of credit hours and course preparations, as well as maximum overload credit hours). Contracts were also similar in a number of "standard" faculty union contract provisions, such as management rights, personnel files, no strike/no lockout provisions, and maintenance of agreement articles.

But there were several noticeable differences between the contracts within articles treating promotion and tenure, grievance procedures, retrenchment, salaries, and faculty evaluations. The New Jersey contract treated promotion fairly briefly, allowing local colleges and departments to establish criteria and procedures for evaluation. (It has been noted that the New Jersey contract did not include tenure procedures.) The APSCUF contract stated similar evaluation procedures, beginning with the department, proceeding to a college-wide committee and then to the President, but included more external influence. Statewide Commissions on Promotion and Tenure were created by the contract to monitor and recommend procedures and criteria for local colleges, and each college had to have its Promotion Policies Plan approved by that Commission. The APSCUF contract also terminated tenure at age 65. The probationary period for tenure was three years for Pennsylvania; New Jersey's tenure law mandated a five year probationary period for non-tenured faculty. 8

Grievance procedures also differed for the two states. The New Jersey contract disallowed grievances for tenure decisions, while Pennsylvania allowed grievances for all decisions except nonrenewals of nontenured faculty. Both allowed arbitration: Pennsylvania's allowed binding arbitration for all decisions, while New Jersey's contract permitted binding arbitration for breach of contract, but only allowed advisory arbitration for matters related to nonreappointment or promotion.

Articles concerning retrenchment differed somewhat. Although both contracts required that the union be involved in planning for retrenchment, New Jersey's contract did not list order of retrenchment. The Pennsylvania contract listed seniority as the primary determinant of who would be retrenched. The New Jersey contract provided for faculty retraining with the college's financial assistance. Both provided a furlough period and preferred rehiring status for retrenched faculty.

Articles pertaining to salary were handled differently by each contract. While the New Jersey contract did not list a salary schedule, it did state amounts of percentage increments for the next two academic years. The Pennsylvania contract included a salary schedule by rank and step, but did not include percentages for future increases. It did set a system of arbitration and timelines if salary agreements were not reached each year.

The greatest dissimilarity between the two contracts was in the area of faculty evaluation. The subject was not mentioned in the New Jersey contract (except as related to promotion procedures). However, the Pennsylvania agreement included a lengthy, explicit procedure for review of both tenured and nontenured faculty, both academic and
administrative. It provided for regular classroom observations, written critiques, and conferences between evaluators and faculty. While initiated and developed by the departments, evaluations became part of the individual's permanent personnel file, and were used in promotion, tenure, and retention decisions. Tenured faculty were to be evaluated every five years.

Both contracts included continuing consultation ("Meet and Discuss") between the union and the administration, as well as requiring the administration to provide any information which the union might request relevant to conditions of employment. The New Jersey contract required that a union representative be appointed to every college-wide committee; the Pennsylvania contract only mentioned governance briefly in requiring a Curriculum Committee at each college. Other miscellaneous articles for each contract differed, but these differences were not relevant to academic governance.

The Pennsylvania and New Jersey state college contracts were similar in their length, their attention to detail, and the nature of items which were included. While the basic structures of the contracts were similar, several issues, such as salaries, retrenchment, and faculty evaluation were handled quite differently for each state. The Pennsylvania contract was longer, more detailed, and more "union-like" in its insistence upon careful delineation of procedures. The New Jersey contract gave more autonomy to local colleges and departments within them. In the Pennsylvania contract, considerable attempts to standardize promotion and tenure policies at the state level were evident.
Despite the structural and functional similarities and substantive differences evident between the contracts for the New Jersey and Pennsylvania state colleges, they meant little until put into practice at individual institutions. Interpretations of contract content might vary among colleges, depending on characteristics of the union and administrative leaders, the strength of other faculty governance groups, and unique institutional characteristics. It was necessary to examine both the history and the governance system at Trenton and East Stroudsburg State Colleges in order to determine if contractual similarities and differences were reflected in practice.

**INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES OF GOVERNANCE:**

**TRENTON STATE COLLEGE**

Background to Governance and Faculty Bargaining

Trenton State College is a medium-sized (11,000 students) public college located in a suburb of Trenton, the state capital of New Jersey. Although it now offers baccalaureate degrees in 31 disciplines, and three kinds of masters degrees, its beginnings were quite simple.

**History and Change at Trenton State.** The institution was founded as the New Jersey Normal School in 1855. Headed by a principal, the school offered a three-year program in elementary education. The curriculum expanded during the last half of the nineteenth century, and in 1929 the institution became State Teachers College and Normal School at Trenton.\(^9\) The institution moved to its present location in 1931.

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although enrollment did not increase substantially. For example, in 1955, enrollment was less than 1,000 students.\textsuperscript{10} The late 1950's and 1960's saw enormous growth and expansion at Trenton State. In 1967, the first liberal arts programs were offered at what, by then, had become Trenton State College.\textsuperscript{11}

The establishment of the State Department of Higher Education in 1966 helped to promote change within the state college system. Demands for increased state-supported education resulted in expansion of enrollments and program offerings, coordinated by the State Department of Higher Education (DHE). The state colleges were accustomed to centralization, for all curricular decisions, appointments, promotions, and presidential hirings had been done by the State Department of Education prior to 1966. Begin et al. wrote that no "traditional governing bodies" existed within the state colleges, and presidents had limited authority, especially over fiscal matters (p. 84).

The legislation which created the DHE also created separate governing boards for each state college. Concurrently, expanded enrollments and programs resulted in the increased faculty hiring discussed earlier, with the ensuing "split" between new and old faculty. Since the late 1950's, the New Jersey Education Association (NJEA) had acted as the informal lobbyist for salary increases. Centralization and the DHE decreased the influence of the NJEA, particularly in its attempts to achieve

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., p. 165.

\textsuperscript{11}All New Jersey state teachers colleges became state colleges in 1958, according to James P. Begin, Theodore Settle, and Paula Alexander, Academics on Strike. Subsequent references will be noted parenthetically.
salary parity for state college faculty and the higher-paid faculty at Rutgers (p. 85). This inability to gain results informally gave impetus to the faculty unionization drive which occurred shortly after legislation permitting public employee bargaining was approved in 1968 (p. 86).

In addition to rapid change at the state level for policy governing state colleges, conditions at Trenton State became nearly chaotic in the late 1960's. Because presidential turnover occurred nearly every two years during the 1960's, faculty acquired a great deal of informal decision-making power. Presidential leadership during that decade, according to several faculty members, was fragmented and sporadic. Liberal arts programs were added to the education curriculum and, in 1968, a faculty senate was established by order of DHE. A new president arrived at Trenton State in 1968, and, according to several faculty and administrative informants, immediately began to alienate both faculty and students. The new president was seen as a unilateral decision maker, a non-believer in collegiality. There was serious division on campus between faculty who supported the President and those who did not. In June of 1969, it was reported, fifty-four faculty (including 22 out of 25 chairpersons) and "every administrator except the Academic Vice President" petitioned the Board of Trustees to remove the President. By February of 1970, students and other faculty members joined the protest, and their combined influence forced the President's resignation.

The new president who arrived in 1971 was felt to be more collegially oriented than the former incumbent. During the instability of the late 1960's the new senate had quickly acquired power at Trenton State. It remained to be seen what effect the newly-signed (1971) contract
would have on the new president's administrative style, the senate's new influence, and academic governance in general.

Faculty Unionization. Incidents occurred both at the State level and on the Trenton campus which are relevant to unionization and its effect upon governance at Trenton State. Chapters of NJEA had existed on each state college campus prior to unionization. During the years that these institutions were primarily teachers colleges, membership in NJEA had been high, since most faculty had been public school teachers. But expanding curricula brought liberal arts faculty who did not join NJEA, and membership percentages dropped (p. 87).

Although faculty at state colleges were accustomed to centralized decision making, the reorganizations and reforms proposed by the Chancellor of the new DHE signalled significant change for faculty. The Chancellor urged faculty to complete terminal degrees and discussed lengthening the three-year tenure probationary period. Presidents, who had been appointed by the Commissioner of Education, resented the creation of DHE, and probably reinforced faculty opposition (Begin et al., p. 88).

Immediately after the 1968 Public Employment Relations Law was passed, NJEA began an authorization card drive. A hearing before the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) was necessary to settle dispute over determination of the bargaining unit. Although PERC recommended single campus units, the NJEA won on each of the state college campuses and formed a coalition of local units for negotiations purposes. The union was certified as the faculty's official bargaining agent in June of 1969, and began negotiating with the Board of Higher Education for salary parity with Rutgers. A court decision named the
governor's office as the official "employer," so negotiations had to begin again with this office. Salary increases were not negotiated, but were determined to be dependent upon funding of the State budget. Concurrently, the Chancellor was attempting to lengthen the tenure probationary period to five years.

Faculty discontent with lack of progress in salary and personnel policies enabled the AFT to unseat NJEA in February, 1973, as the bargaining unit representative. A PERC ruling also set the bargaining unit as statewide. A change in gubernatorial political parties complicated negotiations. During November of 1974, the AFT called a faculty strike when the State refused to negotiate until the State budget had been drawn up. The strike lasted eight days, and was supported by a 3-1 margin. The strike dispute was between the state AFT leadership and the governor's office, which insisted that the state was in a severe financial crisis and that funding was dependent upon state legislature actions. An agreement between the governor's office and the AFT leadership ended the strike, when the union agreed to return to work, the governor agreed to seek new revenue sources, and the State agreed not to penalize faculty for lost class time. It was reported by Begin et al. that faculty at Trenton State were the least supportive of the strike (p. 109). Two arrests of students were made at Trenton State, and a faculty member was injured on a picket line. [Begin et al. assert that the disruptions at

Trenton State were a result of historically poor relations between the AFT leadership on campus and the administration (p. 111).

The last decade saw extensive change at all the New Jersey state colleges, and at Trenton State in particular. Institutional size and mission expanded with student enrollment, the faculty became more heterogeneous, and an unpopular president was unseated. Considerable conflict resulted from actions of the Chancellor of the new Department of Higher Education. Finally, partisan politics and gubernatorial turnover complicated contract negotiations, while the numerous New Jersey employment laws restricted the scope of bargaining. It would seem that all this turmoil would have brought extensive change in the system of faculty governance at Trenton State. When the effects of collective bargaining were added to this list of primarily external factors, the potential for change seemed great indeed.

Effects of Faculty Bargaining on Academic Governance

It became evident that factors at both the state level and within the Trenton State campus heavily influenced the initiation and conduct of faculty collective bargaining. Because these external forces were so prevalent, an attempt was made to separate the effects of state politics and other external factors from internal factors which might have affected faculty governance. Because Trenton State was part of a statewide unit, an extra "layer" of external forces was relevant, that of the state union leadership, which was absent for both institutions discussed in the previous chapter. Because faculty bargaining was done at both state and local levels (the latter by local letters of agreement),
factors related to both state and local levels had to be considered.

Structures of Faculty Governance. As with the previous chapter, it was necessary to examine the existing governance committees for structural and functional changes related to collective bargaining. Information on governance committees which had been formed as a result of unionization was also sought.

The Constitution of the Faculty Senate at Trenton State was formally approved in November, 1969, and has remained essentially unchanged since unionization, according to both faculty and administrators. The Senate was truly a faculty senate, for its 45 members were all faculty members elected on a college-wide basis. The faculty had written the original Senate Constitution, and had the power to amend it. Among the functions of the Senate was the responsibility to "provide a forum for discussion and the formulation of policy" and to carry out policies in conjunction with the Board of Trustees, administration, and students. A nine-member Executive Board nominated Senate committees, coordinated relationships between the faculty and the administration, and determined jurisdictions among committees. Important Senate committees were the Academic Affairs Council, Faculty Affairs Council, the Master Planning Council, the Operations Council and the Student Affairs Council. One important clause from the Senate Constitution provided for joint Executive Board-administration consultation to resolve issues of faculty


15 Ibid., p. 3.
disagreement over administrative decisions. The powers which this con-
stitution gave the Senate were substantial, for many academic senates
may only advise, while this Senate was allowed to set policy and to use
joint consultation for unpopular administrative decisions. Especially
for an institution with no formal governance structure prior to this
time, the Senate appeared to be extremely powerful.

Although all college-wide committees were technically appointed by
the President, an administrator confirmed that the President almost al-
ways appointed all nominees submitted by the Senate. Several committees
which existed before the creation of the Senate were still in effect,
such as the Graduate Council, the Academic Policies Committee, and the
Promotions Committee, and several of the Senate Councils had been active
prior to the creation of the Senate. It was evident that, although there
had been no umbrella organization, such as a faculty senate, to coordinate
faculty governance, faculty were active at Trenton State in policy making
before the creation of the Senate in 1969. Both faculty and adminis-
trators agreed that faculty unionization had made little or no change in
the Senate or in the creation of new faculty committees. Although the
contract required that the union appoint one representative to each
college-wide committee, all respondents maintained that these represen-
tatives "acted like faculty," not like union members.

Academic Policy Decisions. For the most part, major academic policy
was made at the departmental and school levels at Trenton State. Changes
in a course were initiated by the department and reviewed by a school-
wide curriculum committee, which seldom rejected departmental proposals,
according to several faculty members. Curricular changes which affected
more than one school, or any new course, had to be submitted to the college-wide Academic Policies Committee and then to the Academic Vice President. Admissions policy was developed by a Senate Admissions Committee, then sent to the faculty, students and administration for revision and comment. Degree requirements were suggested by the faculty Academic Policies Committee and sent to the Student Senate, Faculty Senate, and the Academic Vice President. Except for the one union representative on these faculty committees, the union had no formal role in any academic policy making at Trenton State.

Several informants, both faculty and administrative, indicated that before the creation of DHE, all academic policy had been centralized. With the creation of both DHE and individual Boards of Trustees for each college, academic policy making became decentralized to the faculties at the state colleges.

**Personnel Decision Making.** The area of personnel decision making included both faculty hiring and promotion and tenure decisions. In matters of faculty hiring, faculty agreed that the department usually prevailed. All searching and screening was done by the department, and unless the dean had strong reservations, the department's choice was nearly always appointed. After concurrence with the department's choice, the dean's major role was negotiating with the Academic Vice President over rank and salary for the new employee.

Decision power in promotion and tenure matters was much less clear. For promotion evaluations, a departmental committee was elected by all department faculty and included the chairperson as an ex-officio member. Recommendations were forwarded to the dean and to a college-wide
Promotions Committee. (Although administrators and students joined faculty on this committee, only faculty were permitted to vote on candidates for promotion.) The College Promotions Committee was required to evaluate and submit to the President, in priority order, their list of promotion recommendations. The President made his recommendations to the Board of Trustees.16

The process for tenure evaluation was somewhat different, for tenure was considered an administrative decision at Trenton State College. Departmental committees consisting of only tenured faculty sent recommendations to the dean. When tenure recommendations were submitted to the President, the department chairperson was expected to defend the department's recommendations to the administration.17 The Vice President and college deans joined the President in hearing the chairpersons' defenses, but acted in an advisory role rather than voting on the decision.

New Jersey statute limits the numbers of promotions; no more than 50% of all state college faculty may be senior faculty (associate and full professors), and no more than 30% may be full professors. For this reason, faculty agreed that tenure was easier to obtain than promotion, since there were no tenure quotas. Although most respondents acknowledged that tenure and promotion criteria were stricter since unionization, they saw this change as a result of market forces, not of unionization.


17 Ibid., pp. 28-29.
Many of the faculty indicated that, in the past year, the President had been reluctant to grant tenure because all affirmative personnel decisions had to be "swallowed" by the local institutional budget. A faculty member mentioned that DHE was "talking about a 50% tenure ratio." De-tenuring was mentioned during several interviews as an unquestionable strike issue, one which was stronger than economic issues. Although the locus of power in both promotion and tenure seemed to be departmental and college recommendations and rankings, it appeared that financial stringency was slowly centralizing the real decision power to the President. With the exception of its participation in grievances related to personnel decisions, the union was not seen as participating as a union in personnel decision making.

Economic Decisions. Items in this category included faculty salaries and workload issues. As explained earlier, all salary increases were fixed by the State (and usually were identical to percentages for other State employees), while initial salary decisions were made by deans and the Academic Vice President. Matters relating to course scheduling, class assignments, and overload were decided between faculty and department chairpersons. The union had no influence over workload issues other than those in the contract, and, according to Begin et al., had less influence than it would have wanted to admit in salary negotiations (p. 92).

Planning Decisions. Historically, very little serious long range planning had occurred at Trenton State. The Senate Master Planning Council was the body empowered to plan, but did so on a small scale. Recently, the Academic Vice President initiated an Ad Hoc Forum for Futures Planning which included faculty and administrators. The
committee did a study of trends and projections for the college, to be used for long range planning decisions. Several schools also had informal planning groups, made up of faculty and the dean, which projected in five year increments, according to an administrator.

Departmental budgets, another component of planning, were not in faculty hands. Deans and the Academic Vice President allocated the college budget; then, the dean allocated monies to departments. One highly specialized, fairly small school did not allocate monies to departments, but used a centralized budgeting system.

As with the academic and personnel areas of decision making, the union had very little influence over planning matters. Administrators dominated both components of the planning area, with some faculty participation, but faculty participated "as faculty," not as union members.

Formal Power Relations. Although the President and Board of Trustees had retained the only legal right to make policy decisions, it was evident that faculty governance groups and departments enjoyed considerable formal decision-making power, supported by explicit policy in the Senate Constitution and the Faculty Handbook and, to a lesser degree, by the union contract. Other formal power relations included some formal meetings between the leadership of the Senate and the union. All faculty and most administrators agreed that the union "stayed away" from matters which were within the Senate's jurisdiction, and that formal conferring was done on matters related to working conditions. The formal faculty governance system seemed to be the real locus of much of the decision power at Trenton. Most informants considered the Senate moderately effective and did not hesitate to use the designated channels for faculty
Informal Power Relations. The question posed to both faculty and administrators concerning the possibility of influencing decision making by informal means received a qualified "yes." One faculty member felt that individuals who had known the current president when he was a dean at Trenton probably had some personal influence with him. A few faculty members felt that the union may have reduced somewhat an individual's ability to influence decision making informally. Several felt that many of the individuals who exercised personal influence were part of the Senate or union leadership (or both), so it was sometimes difficult to separate structural from personal influence in governance decisions.

Most informants, both faculty and administrative, felt that faculty had more rights and more power at Trenton State than did faculty at the other New Jersey state colleges. They attributed this fact to the combination of a collegial president and a faculty who insisted upon active participation in governance. Faculty members reported that since the early 1960's, the faculty had played a central role in campus decision making, albeit through small cliques of senior faculty. This power became legitimatized when the Senate was formed in 1969. Because the faculty was accustomed to making decisions and being listened to by the administration, the clash between the autocratic president who left in 1970 and the somewhat oligarchic, but strong faculty power structure was inevitable.

All faculty and administrative informants agreed that relationships between the Senate and the administration were cordial and cooperative. A faculty member active in the Senate explained that there was a close
relationship between the President and the Senate leadership, based upon mutual respect and friendship. Much informal consultation occurred between the administration and the Senate Executive Board, and this faculty member felt that the President "almost always" accepted a Senate recommendation. A few faculty members suggested that the union felt the Senate to be a tool of the administration because of the close cooperation between the interests represented. All respondents attributed the good relations to the personalities of the individuals involved in both the administration and the Senate Executive Board.

Relationships between the Senate and the union seemed to be cooperative, but somewhat cautious. As explained earlier, the union appeared not to have attempted to "encroach" upon Senate prerogatives. Matters of mutual interest were discussed either formally or informally in joint meetings of the Senate and union Executive Boards. Some overlap in Senate and union leadership existed. For example, the current union president had been active in the Senate, and a former Senate vice president was chairperson of the local negotiations committee for several years. One comment which arose in several interviews was that faculty did not support militant union leadership at Trenton State. Several active union members were members of the Senate, but respondents insisted that union members acted "like faculty," not like union representatives.

Relationships between the union and the administration at Trenton State were seen as fairly cooperative. (It was assumed that union attitudes toward management at the state level could have been independent from, and different from, the quality of local union-management
relationships at Trenton State.) The President and other top-level administrators met frequently and informally with union leaders to discuss interpretation and administration of the contract. Several faculty members explained that the "public face" of the union's stance regarding the administration was adversary, but private relationships were much more cooperative. A faculty member explained that too much obvious cooperation with the administration weakened the union; it had to "keep things stirred up" in order to justify its existence.

A brief description of the Faculty Association was relevant to an understanding of informal power relationships at Trenton State. Before unionization, the Faculty Association (affiliated with NJEA/NEA) negotiated informally with the campus administration for salaries and working conditions. The Association also attempted to assist faculty in filing grievances, although no formal grievance procedure existed before the contract, and decisions were made on an individual basis and with little consistency. The Faculty Association was the bargaining agent from 1970 until 1973, when it was overturned by the AFT affiliate. A fairly strong Faculty Association still existed at Trenton State, supported by many of the older faculty, many of whom were in the School of Education. One faculty member maintained that the Faculty Association was the "most powerful group on campus." Although little was said about conflict between the union and the Faculty Association, it was evident that this group could be a source of considerable informal power if it acted in a unified manner.

It seemed that both formal and informal power relations were clear and respected at Trenton State. Most faculty felt that the President
was very accessible and open to faculty concerns and suggestions. The formal powers of the Senate, union, and departments were respected and kept separated. This harmonious relationship was evidently due more to leadership styles of administration and a history of collegial participation on the part of at least a portion of the faculty, than to the presence of a union on the Trenton State campus.

**Perceptions of Faculty Governance**

The general view of faculty and administrators alike was that faculty role in governance was strong and thriving at Trenton State. They saw the Senate as active and powerful but the union as weak because of faculty disinterest. One faculty member explained that "the Senate is 45 people, but the union is only a few people." Informants felt that departmental autonomy had been unchanged by unionization (except to decrease the power of deans). Governance belonged very much to the faculty at Trenton State.

**Contextual Factors Related to Faculty Governance.** Several contextual factors, many of which were described above, helped to explain the relative strength of the faculty role in governance at Trenton State. Their strength was "relative" because no state college could consider itself autonomous of the considerable influence of the Department of Higher Education. But within its local campus purview, the faculty enjoyed extensive power and influence over academic governance matters.

Although the college had been administered by somewhat autocratic, "school superintendent" presidents through the late 1950's, considerable faculty power developed during the 1960's. That power had seemingly
been unchanged by unionization.

Secondly, the AFT did not have strong support on the Trenton State campus. Less than half of the faculty were members of the AFT, while many faculty were members of the Faculty Association. Still others, it was reported, could not reconcile their conceptions of professionalism with a faculty union. One faculty member described the faculty as "old and conservative," and not at all sympathetic to union militancy. An administrator maintained that unionization at Trenton State was clearly attributable to the unpopular former president, and that most faculty considered the union unnecessary.

Several administrators saw DHE as a threat to both faculty and administrative power. The Chancellor, one administrator explained, used "the budget and his hatchet men" to persuade colleges to accept or make unpopular decisions. Tenure was beginning to be examined at the State level, and several administrators predicted future conflict over promotion and tenure matters, resulting from DHE directives or budget cuts. Faculty evinced less concern over DHE power, but tended to explain any unpopular administrative decision as probably having been forced by DHE. This potential for centralizing of personnel decision making portends less faculty power in this area in the future.

Effect of Faculty Bargaining on Governance. As with several of the institutions studied, the major effect of faculty bargaining on academic governance seemed to be in the grievance process. Procedures for promotion and tenure evaluations and recommendations were made much clearer and were felt to be applied more consistently after unionization. Another change was that the contract required department chairpersons to
be elected rather than appointed. All three of these procedural changes resulted in greater faculty power.

Several faculty members maintained that unionization had reduced some of the dean's power. When the dean could appoint chairpersons, the dean had more implicit control over faculty decision making. Also, the dean could ignore or overrule departmental recommendations in promotion and tenure decisions. The contract reinforced the faculty's check on the dean's power by allowing both the department and the dean to be part of the grievance process, making the dean accountable for explaining his or her personnel decisions.

Both faculty and administrators felt that unionization had had less of an impact upon department chairpersons than on deans. Chairpersons were now accountable to their colleagues instead of to the dean, which, several faculty members felt, gave chairpersons more power with the dean and other administrators. Chairpersons did not feel that their being in the bargaining unit created problems in administering the department or in making decisions. Problems with faculty or other academic problems occurred and were handled without reference to the bargaining unit status of the chairperson.

In summary, faculty role in governance appeared to be thriving at Trenton State, but unionization had little effect, either positive or negative, on faculty power. The union was seen by several faculty members as unnecessary, both because of the strong governance system and the "Eisenhower-like" President who was a facilitator rather than a leader, according to one faculty member. The faculty informant explained that "there are so many avenues to the President that you don't
need a body to fight for you." A union leader agreed, saying that the positive relationships with administration were "destructive to unionization." The union leadership at Trenton State "walked a fine line between antagonizing the faculty as faculty and maintaining the union position." Another faculty member asserted that total faculty power was unchanged since unionization, but that the union tended to distribute power more evenly.

Several administrators felt that unionization had affected administrative power and method of decision making more than it had affected faculty role in governance. Deans lost power to faculty, and administrative decisions had to be justified and documented carefully. Administrators acknowledged an increase in the power of outside groups and agencies, but attributed this to public accountability demands rather than to unionization. An increase in the number of administrators was also attributed to increased demand for accountability rather than to faculty bargaining. Administrators did not see faculty unionization as an important factor in the scope of their power or in their methods of decision making.

It was important to remember throughout this study that Trenton State was not a typical New Jersey state college. All respondents agreed that faculty at Trenton were least militant of all state college faculty, attributing this to characteristics of the faculty, the administration, and the institution's history. Faculty at the two state colleges which opened in 1971 (Ramapo and Stockton State Colleges) were seen as much more militant than faculty at Trenton State. Although no formal faculty role in governance had existed at any of the state colleges prior to
1968-69 when senates were formed, faculty at Trenton State enjoyed a great deal of informal power in academic governance. They have retained this power irrespective of the union, primarily because of strong cooperation on the part of the administration. Were relations between the President and the faculty less cordial, the faculty union would very likely be much more involved in governance at Trenton State College.

EAST STROUDSBURG STATE COLLEGE

Background to Governance and Collective Bargaining

East Stroudsburg State College is a fairly small (4,000 students) comprehensive state college located in the Pocono Mountains of eastern Pennsylvania. Program offerings include baccalaureate degrees in arts and letters, science, social science, education, and health and physical education. Masters degrees are offered in social sciences, science, health and physical education, and education. The college is especially well-known for its teacher preparation program in physical education.

History and Change at East Stroudsburg. The college was founded in 1892 as the East Stroudsburg Normal School, a private institution. In 1927 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania gained control of the institution, changing its name and function to East Stroudsburg State Teachers College. During the late 1950's and early 1960's, East Stroudsburg experienced an enrollment growth similar to most higher education institutions during that era. It also expanded its program offerings. In 1960, the college became East Stroudsburg State College, a comprehensive college. In 1962 the college received permission to award the B.A. and the Master of Education degrees, indicating development of liberal arts.
and graduate curricula. In 1969, approval was granted to award the Master of Arts degree.

In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, all public educational institutions are coordinated by the State Department of Education. Although the Council of Higher Education is the supervisory, regulatory, and coordinating agency for the Pennsylvania state colleges, the Department of Education and, in particular, its chief officer, play an active role in planning for and governance of the state college system. Recent research on the role of the Department of Education in faculty collective bargaining and faculty governance has emphasized the influence of the Department, both before and after bargaining, on academic governance.

Prior to reorganization of the Department of Education in 1969, the State Department of Public Instruction (as it was then known) had little substantive influence over academic policy making in the state colleges, but much centralized administrative influence. (The official appellation for these colleges is "state-owned.") Governance at local colleges was "characterized by a high level of centralization and administrative dominance . . . Many presidents . . . had run their institutions for

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years in an autocratic and paternalistic fashion... There were few formal provisions for faculty participation in decision making."21 However, a legislative act in 1970, in an attempt to decentralize fiscal planning to individual institutions, created a Board of State College and University Directors. The role of this board was "to establish broad fiscal, personnel, and educational policies under which the state colleges shall operate."22 Shortly thereafter, a new Secretary of Education decided to redefine the historically regulatory role of the Department of Education as a leadership and planning agency for higher education. The Department gave itself a clear mandate to centralize and standardize much of the decision making pertaining to the state colleges.23

Because faculty senates did not exist at any of the state colleges until the late 1960's, and no other formal governance structures had existed for faculty, leadership style of the institution's president was an important determinant of the degree of faculty participation in governance. An attempt was made during this study to determine the length of tenure and administrative style of presidents at East Stroudsburg for the decade preceding faculty unionization.


23Gershenfeld and Mortimer, p. 91.
One man was president of East Stroudsburg from 1956-1968. Although few data were available concerning his leadership style, faculty interviews revealed that faculty had no governance power prior to unionization. The next president came from the physical education faculty, served three years as president, and returned to the faculty. The current president arrived in September, 1971, just before the first contract was signed. What little influence faculty had in governance matters at East Stroudsburg was informal, unpredictable, and at the pleasure of the administration.

Faculty Unionization. Faculty associations had existed at each state college campus prior to unionization, but their role was informal and they wielded little power as organizations. After passage of legislation allowing public employee bargaining (Pennsylvania Act 195, 1970), the coalition of faculty associations, called the Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties (APSCUF) and the Pennsylvania State Education Association, an NEA affiliate, joined forces to organize the state college faculties. Since the law required statewide units wherever possible, the unit was determined to represent faculty at all fourteen campuses. In the election of an agent, APSCUF received the majority, defeating AAUP and AFT. A report of faculty voting behavior in this election attributed differences in agent choice to differences among faculty orientations. Those who supported NEA were older, tenured, from education-oriented disciplines, more involved in teacher education, while those who voted for AAUP (35% of the vote) were in arts, humanities and social sciences, younger, with less teaching
experience in state colleges. The researchers concluded that these voting data reflected the "dichotomy that exists in former state teachers colleges between the 'old guard' teacher education faculty and the 'new breed' liberal arts oriented faculty." 

Although the first contract was negotiated between the governor's office and APSCUF, the Secretary of Education persuaded the governor to allow the Department of Education to play the major role in negotiations for the second contract. The Board of State College and University Directors had no role in negotiations, and the role of the Board of State College Presidents was minimal. Although each institution had an individual Board of Trustees, the campus Boards had no role whatsoever in negotiations. During contract negotiations in 1974, several issues were unresolved at the bargaining table (i.e., faculty evaluation and promotion and tenure policies). The Secretary of Education and APSCUF agreed to form joint committees to develop statewide guidelines for these issues; this agreement was incorporated into the contract. This mutual respect and trust was reflective of the desire of both the


25 Ibid.

26 Gershenfeld and Mortimer, p. 92.

27 Johnson and Gershenfeld, p. 52.

28 Gershenfeld and Mortimer, p. 100.

29 Ibid., p. 61.
Department of Education and the statewide union leadership to cooperate on centralized policy making. An intervention by the Secretary of Education circumvented a retrenchment plan developed by the Board of State College and University Directors. The intervention allowed the union to participate in local retrenchment proposals, but also forestalled a union attempt to evade retrenchment issues through job actions or negotiations. Johnson and Gershenfeld called these events "symbolic of the highly centralized balance of power between the campus and the state that has evolved since the adoption of collective bargaining." Statewide planning has been done between the Department of Education and the state union leadership, with minimal presidential, board, or local faculty participation.

It was evident that the State Department of Education has had a major impact upon academic governance at the Pennsylvania State Colleges. Although senates were created in the late 1960's, two institutions (including East Stroudsburg) abolished their senates as "arms of the administration" when the contract was signed. Department of Education agreements with state APSCUF leaders led to faculty association participation in campus level planning, particularly in the area of budget recommendations. This agreement resulted in a "noticeable expansion of faculty association participation in campus governance." This expansion of faculty participation in governance has been, for the most part, a direct effect of state-level agreements and policies between the union and the

30 Johnson and Gershenfeld, p. 55.
31 Ibid., p. 54.
Effects of Faculty Bargaining on Academic Governance

Although state-level agreements had an impact on each state college, the resulting system of faculty governance was affected by other factors as well. Local administrative reaction to faculty bargaining, characteristics of the local union leadership, and general support for the union on campus were all relevant components of the academic governance system which developed subsequent to unionization. Governance at East Stroudsburg, then, was affected strongly by both external and internal forces, forces which were often conflicting and countervailing.

Although a faculty senate was established in 1969, the union insisted that it be abolished after the contract was signed. According to a faculty member, the union leadership felt that a senate was incompatible with collective bargaining, undermined the exclusive representation of the bargaining agent, and acted as a "company union." Because the contract specified the creation of departmental- and college-level review committees for promotion and tenure and the creation of a college-level curriculum committee, any former faculty committees (which had existed informally) were either eliminated or replaced with union-appointed committees.

The college-wide mechanism which replaced the senate, although it performed a very different role, was the "Meet and Discuss" mechanism. The officers of the union met with the President and all the vice presidents on a regular basis, and more often if needed, to discuss and exchange information on any subject pertaining to "terms and conditions
of employment." Since the union interpreted employment conditions very broadly, topics on the agenda of Meet and Discuss sessions ranged from academic policy to budget planning, and from curriculum to facilities problems. Administrators were required by the contract both to meet with the union and to provide the union with all information which it requested relative to employment conditions. Meet and Discuss was the only formal mechanism for faculty influence on institutional decisions, for the President dealt only with the union, and in this structured manner. Although meetings were open to all faculty, visitors spoke only by invitation. General faculty meetings were seldom held, because the union did not permit discussion of matters included in the contract and/or covered in Meet and Discuss sessions.

Academic Policy Decisions. Power in the three areas of academic policy accrued primarily to the faculty. Although curricular changes originated at the departmental level, and then were sent to the dean of the appropriate school, all final decisions on curricular matters were made by a college-wide Curriculum Committee. The APSCUF president appointed this committee, which included a faculty representative from each of the five schools (Arts and Letters, Education, Health Sciences

32 The Agreement states, "The COMMONWEALTH/COLLEGE(S) shall make available to APSCUF . . . such accurate information, records, statistics, and financial data related to the bargaining unit . . . necessary for negotiations and/or the implementation of this Agreement." ("Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Association of Pennsylvania State Colleges and University Faculties and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," September 1, 1974, p. 8).
and Physical Education, Social Sciences, and Sciences) and the Academic Vice President, all of whom had a vote. Several faculty members explained the major function of this committee as settling territorial disputes between departments and schools. If no territory dispute were involved, the faculty agreed, the departmental proposal was almost always accepted. Although a dean could delay or block a departmental request, the major power locus was with the College Curriculum Committee.

Faculty and administrators agreed that the administration set admissions policy, but that admissions standards were not rigorous. A faculty committee set college-wide degree requirements, while departments determined requirements for their own majors.

Several administrators agreed that the faculty had gained considerable power in academic policy making since unionization. One administrator said that, at least in curricular matters at East Stroudsburg, "the union does what it wants."

**Personnel Decision Making.** This area included faculty hiring and promotion and tenure decisions. In matters of faculty hiring, departments were autonomous. The number of "slots" at each college was determined at the state level, and the president had some discretion in allocating an open "slot" to a department. Once the position was available, the department conducted search and screening procedures, and selected the candidate. Approval by the dean and president was nearly pro-forma, according to one administrator.

In promotion and tenure decisions, the faculty also held most of the power. After a candidate for promotion or tenure applied and submitted credentials for review, a departmental committee evaluated the
candidate and submitted its recommendation to the dean and concurrently to a college-wide promotions or tenure committee. The college-wide committee ranked candidates in priority order before submitting the list to the President. The academic vice president had no formal role in promotion or tenure decisions. He added his own recommendations, and sent them to the President. Several administrators indicated that the President adhered to the college committee's list in making personnel decisions.

Faculty members indicated that promotion was more difficult to attain than tenure because the state limited the number of full professors to thirty percent of the total faculty. Tenure was much easier to acquire, and was called "almost automatic" in a recent report of research on the Pennsylvania State Colleges.33

It was evident that faculty power had increased dramatically, since unionization, in personnel decisions. One faculty member stated that "peer review did not exist" before unionization, for the administration had complete power. Another faculty member indicated that criteria used for personnel decisions had been unclear or unknown before unionization, and that there had been no specific procedures for personnel evaluation and promotion or tenure decision making. In particular, the power of deans and the Academic Vice President was reduced, for their recommendations carried much more weight before the faculty union was formed.

33 Gershenfeld and Mortimer, p. 80.
Economic Decisions. Decisions on economic matters included salaries and workload matters. Salaries were negotiated on a statewide level, and generally conformed to increases for other state employees. Merit pay was not permitted by the contract, but a few awards for teaching excellence and academic service were provided for by the contract.

Workload matters were, for the most part, mandated by the contract. No faculty member could teach more than three different courses per semester. Scheduling and course assignments were handled jointly by the faculty and department chairperson. Although the dean had to approve final schedules, that approval was nearly always automatic.

Planning Decisions. Planning included departmental budget allocations and long-range planning methods. Deans controlled department budgets. Some deans allowed chairpersons to submit budget requests, while other deans allocated budgets somewhat unilaterally.

Apparently, little formal long-range planning was done, either by faculty or the administration at East Stroudsburg. A joint faculty-administration committee on long-range planning had existed, but one administrator criticized its lack of results. Some schools had their own long-range planning committees, usually initiated by the dean. An administrator explained that faculty did not want to engage in long-range planning because they feared retrenchment. It was possible, also, that the extreme centralization of budget decisions and personnel policies at the State level discouraged local campus efforts to shape their own futures.

Whatever planning occurred at East Stroudsburg, then, accrued to the administration. A union leader asserted that the union was
attempting to gain more power over budget decisions at the college level, through efforts by the union in Meet and Discuss sessions. It was evident that the administration was in danger of losing the only area of decision-making power which had been reserved exclusively to that level: the power to make budget decisions without consultation.

Formal Power Relations. The contract gave to the faculty at East Stroudsburg much formal power, especially in curriculum and personnel decisions. Faculty committees in both these areas were created and required by the contract. Although, by law, the President and Board of Trustees had final authority in all academic and personnel decision making, the formal faculty power prevailed.

The Meet and Discuss mechanism was also a significant union tool for faculty power in administrative decision making. No decisions could be made unilaterally or in secret, for the union had the right, and exercised this right, to have access to any information to which the administration had access.

APSCUF was the formal vehicle for faculty participation in campus governance. No administrator could discuss an issue with a faculty group (other than a union group) which related to what the union considered to be terms and conditions of employment. The union guarded its exclusive representation right very jealously at East Stroudsburg. If faculty were not active on union committees, they simply did not participate in academic governance at this college.

Informal Power Relations. Because the union kept a tight hold on governance at East Stroudsburg, there was little opportunity for faculty or administrators to influence decision making informally. Deans could
attempt to influence individuals on certain matters, but decision making was clearly and formally structured.

Faculty agreed that the union had made it much harder for faculty "stars" to influence decision making by informal means. The Physical Education program was well known, and several faculty maintained that some Physical Education faculty had somewhat greater influence because of their connections outside the college. Another faculty member said that the Board of Trustees had once been able to be influenced informally, and that this was no longer possible. It was evident that the President had very little informal influence in decisions made by faculty committees.

Relationships between the union and the administration were characterized by all informants as "adversarial." Several faculty members felt that the union leaders were more sophisticated about collective bargaining than was the administration. The contract did not allow administrators at the central level to hold faculty rank, widening the gap between management and employee. Perceptions of informants varied when asked if relationships between faculty and administration had improved or worsened since unionization. Some (both faculty and administration) felt that there was more distrust and that matters were more adversarial now, while others felt that relationships were more open and accountability was greater on both sides. A faculty member who felt that relationships were better attributed the change to a change in administration, not to unionization. A state-level union official indicated, during a telephone interview, that there had been "trouble" at East Stroudsburg before the contract was signed (and before the present administration had taken office), and that conflict on that campus was
"more than average, but not as bad as it could have been." A faculty member had mentioned some conflict between the senate and the pre-union faculty association. While the quality of the relationships between the union and the administration was somewhat unclear, it was evident that decision making was more open and faculty were better informed of the reasons behind certain decisions now that governance relationships had been formalized by contract.

Perceptions of Faculty Governance

It was apparent that most power loci, both formal and informal, resided with the faculty at East Stroudsburg State College. The union accounted for almost all of the faculty's power; no options were available for faculty participation outside the union structure. Lines of authority and areas of responsibility were clear and jealously guarded, both by the administration (budget) and by the union (Meet and Discuss). Unionization had enfranchised the faculty at the college, and the union leadership took full advantage of their mandate.

Contextual Factors Related to Faculty Bargaining. Several contextual factors, as described earlier, contributed to the considerable influence of the faculty union on governance at East Stroudsburg. Probably the most far-reaching factor was the cooperation at the State level between the union and the Department of Education. Several "deals" worked out at this level greatly affected local campus decisions. (For example, one faculty member described how, in return for a union agreement to extend the contract until 1979, the Department of Education agreed not to retrench the tenured faculty which it was about to let go.)
The union and Department of Education cooperated to create statewide promotion and tenure policies which all institutions would be required to follow. The Department also mandated faculty participation in campus planning and budget decisions. Thus, several faculty power gains not aided by the contract were aided by the Department of Education.

Faculty support for APSCUF at East Stroudsburg was moderately strong. Union membership was estimated by an administrator to be sixty percent of the faculty, although even union leaders admitted that the union was run by a small group of senior faculty, mainly from the liberal arts and social sciences disciplines. All informants agreed that there would be minimal support for a faculty strike, and that most faculty were uninvolved in campus issues. One faculty member summarized by remarking "It's amazing what APSCUF did without power."

Effect of Faculty Bargaining on Governance. The union and the faculty it represented essentially controlled all but budgetary decisions at East Stroudsburg. Governance procedures were formal and explicit, and little informal influence was possible outside of the formal mechanism.

One striking effect of faculty bargaining was the change in the role of the dean. Most of the deans' power had gone to the faculty, for deans no longer made final or quasi-final decisions on either personnel or curricular matters. Another factor contributing to the deans' loss of power was the relative newness of the position, for the first deanships were created in the 1960's when the institutions became comprehensive

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34 Johnson and Gershenfeld, p. 54.
Deans were not included in Meet and Discuss sessions, and had only an advisory role to the President on the Council of Academic Deans. They were not mentioned at all in the contract. One faculty member emphasized the dean's powerlessness by saying, "I would hate to be a dean on this campus." The only power reserved to the dean was in allocating departmental budgets, and the union was slowly weakening the dean's power in that area as well.

The role of department chairpersons had also been altered by unionization. In pre-union days, chairpersons had been appointed by the president, served at his pleasure, and wielded considerable power over their faculties. They had a greater vote in curricular and personnel matters, before unionization, than their faculty colleagues. A faculty member commented that chairpersons had had "the last vote," and "the power to direct others in activities beneficial to the department." That individual felt that decision making had been "diluted," and that the chairperson no longer played a leadership role in departmental matters.

Although union influence was considerable in campus decision making, several informants, both faculty and administrators, expressed concern at the erosion of local campus autonomy by the State. The close relationship at the State level between union and management was seen as a threat to local autonomy, and in the future, the union may find itself presiding over less and less total authority at the campus level. Johnson and Gershenfeld have suggested that "the future of campus autonomy under systemwide collective bargaining may well depend upon the ability of the

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35 Gershenfeld and Mortimer, p. 55.
local actors to work cooperatively to resolve local issues at the campus level." Now that the union has acquired virtual autonomy over campus governance, it may be in its interest to form a coalition with the administration to preserve local autonomy. Faculty role in governance was no longer in question at East Stroudsburg, but the extent to which governance would be allowed to remain at the campus level was a matter of some concern.

GOVERNANCE AT TWO UNIONIZED STATE COLLEGES

The analyses of governance at Trenton State and East Stroudsburg State Colleges exemplified the importance of individual as well as structural characteristics in examining the relationship of faculty collective bargaining to academic governance. Although these institutions were both former normal schools which converted to teachers colleges and then to comprehensive colleges, patterns of governance did not develop in a similar manner. Although both are part of state systems with similar public employee bargaining laws, their contracts differed in scope and complexity. Differences in bargaining unit affiliation may account for a portion of the differences in contracts, although both systems elected NEA affiliates initially, and both have since disaffiliated with NEA: New Jersey has affiliated with AFT, while Pennsylvania remains independent. But it was evident that differences other than bargaining agent wielded the major influence in governance at both Trenton State and East Stroudsburg.

36Johnson and Gershenfeld, p. 54.
Two factors which have been labelled "contextual" have been determined to be significant in analyzing changes in faculty role in governance. Although neither factor taken alone may have had a substantial impact upon governance at these state colleges, the combination of the unique histories of each institution with the centralizing activities of each state's central educational agency had considerable impact upon governance at both institutions.

Although faculty power in governance at both institutions was found to be substantial, different historical factors accounted for this power. Trenton State's faculty had played an active role in governance since the early 1960's. Collective bargaining only reaffirmed the power that the faculty claimed. Faculty at East Stroudsburg had never enjoyed significant decision-making power, either structural or informal. Faculty bargaining enfranchised these faculty members, and the resulting emphasis on unionism epitomized the newness of their power. Faculty at Trenton State were, in Kemerer and Baldridge's terms, "preservationists" of extant power, while faculty at East Stroudsburg were "the deprived" who sought to create a new power role.

Informants from both institutions saw the state education bureaucracy as a threat to campus autonomy and, potentially, to faculty power. But despite the similarity of this external threat, the unions reacted differently at each institution. At Trenton State, an administration sympathetic to and supportive of collegial decision making formed a quasi-coalition with the union to work to protect campus autonomy. The use of informal conferring and local letters of agreement, as well as both the union's and the administration's support of the faculty senate,
were examples of this "coalition." However, the Pennsylvania Department of Education made early, and successful, efforts to secure the cooperation of the state-level union leadership to work against local campus autonomy by extensive standardization of decision making. No informal coalitions between union and administration had been formed at East Stroudsburg, and little informal conferring went on. Jealous of its new power, the union was reluctant to align itself with the administration. The differences in governance styles which individuals at Trenton referred to as "faculty as faculty or faculty as union" did not exist at East Stroudsburg. At that institution, all academic governance was carried out by "faculty as union."

The effect of the union on established methods of governance was different at each institution. The Senate at Trenton State remained, after unionization, as the premier voice of the faculty, responsible for academic decision making, with a role in personnel decision making. The union at East Stroudsburg refused to allow the senate to exist, seeing it as a threat to union power. Administrators at Trenton State felt that the union had had little impact upon the President's role, while those at East Stroudsburg saw a radical shift in the President's ability to make decisions. Deans at both institutions were seen as having lost power, along with the academic vice president, although administrators at East Stroudsburg seemed to have lost more power as a result of unionization than did their counterparts at Trenton State.

At neither institution did students play an active role in governance matters. Students were seen as rather indifferent at both institutions, although they had more of a formal role at East Stroudsburg, where they
had voting memberships on a number of faculty committees. Informants at both institutions did not feel that faculty bargaining had affected the students' role in campus decision making.

There were differences between the institutions in perceptions of the administration's attitude toward faculty bargaining. At Trenton State, faculty felt that the President supported collegiality and was extremely open and accessible. They praised his efforts to work out problems informally, and felt that he respected both the Senate and the union as legitimate governance groups. At East Stroudsburg, faculty informants maintained that the administration resisted a strong faculty role in governance. They felt that the President was relatively unsophisticated in matters of dealing with the union, and that he would "prefer to be a benevolent despot." It was nearly impossible to ascertain a cause and effect relationship between presidential attitude toward faculty role in governance and faculty-administration relations, but it became evident that presidential attitude did influence the relative formality of faculty participation in governance matters.

Although faculty governing power was thriving at both institutions, the strength of the faculty was clearly related to unionization at East Stroudsburg, and only tangentially to unionization at Trenton. Because the Senate was strong at Trenton, a strong union was seen as unnecessary, and, in some quarters, undesirable. But the union had considerable latent power in its protective role of faculty autonomy. Were a new president to arrive who did not value collegiality at Trenton State, the union would very likely become quite strong. The union had substantial power at East Stroudsburg, and served as the only vehicle
for faculty governance. Despite the faculty power on both campuses, the centralizing forces of the State were clear. Although faculty had much autonomy, the total size of their domain was shrinking as both states centralized more decision making to the state level. It was evident that the next power struggle would occur beyond the boundaries of the local campus, and might result in coalitions of faculty and administrators who once were adversaries, not partners.
CHAPTER SEVEN

EFFECT OF FACULTY UNIONIZATION ON GOVERNANCE

AT TWO PRIVATE LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGES

The institutional category which Kemerer and Baldridge labelled "liberal arts colleges" is a rather heterogeneous category, for liberal arts colleges which have traditionally been regarded as somewhat exclusive, selective four-year baccalaureate-granting institutions were included with former business schools and with colleges which were once community colleges, such as the institutions described in this chapter. The Carnegie Commission report confessed that many institutions were placed in this category by default, because they fit no other category. Again, definitional problems complicated generalizations by category, since the category was inclusive of a variety of institutions.

Faculty unionization has been sporadic in the private liberal arts colleges. Because state public employee bargaining laws do not govern private sector bargaining, causes of unionization have been more related to intra-institution factors than to external factors such as state coordination and centralization. But liberal arts colleges were probably the first to feel the impact of declining enrollments, decreasing public inclination to support higher education (i.e., alumni contributions) and increasing bureaucratization of decision making caused by federal

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guidelines (such as Affirmative Action).

As private institutions, these colleges are under the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a federal agency created by the Wagner Act in 1935. As non-profit, service organizations, private colleges had been excluded from the labor relations law until 1970. In the Cornell decision, the NLRB established its jurisdiction over any private educational institution whose budget exceeded one million dollars, asserting that an operation of this size involved public commerce as well as service. This decision signaled the beginning of faculty collective bargaining in private institutions, and the NLRB found itself with the responsibility for unit determinations, settlement of disputes over the scope of bargaining, and the certification of bargaining agents for an "industry" with which it had no formal acquaintance: the educational organization whose "employees," for the most part, had training and experience equal to those of "management," and who claimed the right to participate in management decisions such as goal setting, personnel evaluation, and determination of the methods of production.

The NLRB evidenced its inexperience and uncertainty in dealing with higher education in its decisions concerning the status of the department chairperson. Faculty usually preferred to have the department chairperson included in the bargaining unit as a colleague, while the administration might prefer to consider the chairperson an administrator who acted as their representative to the faculty, carrying out administrative

policies and, in turn, recommending policy to the administration. The problem, as the NLRB defined it, was whether one could consider chairpersons supervisors, since the law specifically forbid the inclusion of supervisors in an employee bargaining unit. Questions of how the chairperson acquired that position (election or appointment), how much weight the chairperson's vote carried, or whether or not the chairperson exercised independent judgment in personnel matters were considered by the Board in its deliberations over the inclusion of chairpersons in employee bargaining units. 3

The Board was quite inconsistent in its decisions concerning bargaining unit status of the chairperson. It attempted to reach decisions on a case-by-case basis, and succeeded in making about the same number of negative as positive decisions concerning the chairperson's status. 4 Since the 1973 New York University decision, the Board has tended to include the chairperson in the unit wherever possible. 5 Although a precedent of sorts was finally established for chairpersons' inclusion, the Board's own words expressed its discomfort with the use of an industrial labor relations model for academic decision making. In the


4 For example, in the C.W. Post [189 NLRB 904 (1971)] and Adelphi University [195 NLRB 639 (1972)] cases, the NLRB denied bargaining unit status to chairpersons. But in the Fordham University [193 NLRB 134 (1971)] and the New York University [205 NLRB 4 (1973)] cases, the Board agreed that chairpersons should be included in the bargaining unit.

Adelphi University decision, the Board noted, "because authority vested in one's peers, acting as a group, simply would not conform to the pattern for which the supervisory exclusion of our Act was designed, a genuine system of collegiality would tend to confound us." It was evident that the private colleges were receiving few clear guidelines from the agency governing their labor relations.

Little has been written on the unionization of private liberal arts colleges. They enjoy neither the size nor the prestige of the multiversities. Their single-campus, independent status makes them less likely to be studied, as state colleges have been. However, twenty of the ninety institutions in the Kemerer and Baldridge study were private liberal arts colleges, and their governance patterns made an interesting addition to the present study.

The two institutions chosen for study were both located in New Jersey. Although the institutions differed in historical development, as will be discussed in subsequent sections, their curricula were similar. Both offered baccalaureate degrees in business administration, liberal arts and sciences, and education. Both had evening programs, and both offered masters' degrees in business administration, education, and in a few of the liberal arts and sciences departments. The institutions reported similar enrollments (Monmouth enrolled approximately 4,000 students,

6Adelphi University, 1972, in Decisions and Orders of the National Labor Relations Board, p. 639.

while Rider enrolled approximately 3,300). With these surface similarities, it was apparent that differences in academic governance patterns would be minimally affected by scope of program offerings or size of the institution.

Because the two institutions selected for study were affected by neither state public employment laws nor state education agencies (with one exception), the study focused on factors internal to the institutions, and external factors such as enrollment declines. The histories of each institution and the pre-union role of faculty in governance were examined in relation to contractual provisions. Since both institutions had experienced fairly recent structural and functional changes, an attempt was made to relate these changes to faculty bargaining and its effect upon governance. Before present faculty governance was examined, however, the contracts were analyzed for similarities and differences in philosophy, complexity, and scope (Table 24).

The New Jersey Statutes (Title 18A:68-6) include laws governing "Licensing to Confer Degrees Generally," which apply to both private and public educational institutions. The law states that "No . . . institution of learning . . . shall admit any such person to the grade of a degree . . . without first submitting the basis or conditions thereof to the board of higher education, and obtaining its approval thereof . . ." Interestingly, this law applies to every private institution of higher education in New Jersey except Princeton University, for the law states "Nothing contained in this section shall apply to any . . . institution of learning . . . which was established and conducted within this state on April 1, 1887." [New Jersey Statutes Annotated, Title 18A: Education (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1968), p. 163.] Princeton University was chartered as the College of New Jersey in 1746, and opened in 1747.
### Table 24. Contract Analysis: Monmouth College and Rider College

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bargaining Agent</th>
<th>NEA</th>
<th>AAUP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit Composition</strong></td>
<td>Full time faculty; librarians, instructors; (excludes department chairpersons &amp; part time faculty)</td>
<td>Full and part time faculty; professional library staff; professional athletic staff; (excludes department chairpersons, head librarian, athletic director)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Academic Freedom</strong></td>
<td>Freedom in teaching, research, and activities off campus; rights as a citizen exclude representing college</td>
<td>Rights and obligations of citizens; faculty should promote conditions of inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affirmative Action</strong></td>
<td>Repeats Board of Trustees statement re: hiring, salaries, termination. Protects all employees</td>
<td>Creates joint committee to update Affirmative Action Plan; allows grievances for affirmative action; protection of union members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Grievance Procedures** | Suggests informal resolution; provides time limits; creates Association Grievance Committee  
4 Steps: informal→chairperson→appeal to Dean of Faculty→arbitration | Excludes appointments, evaluations, promotion, tenure—except due process.  
4 Steps: chairperson→dean→Academic Vice President→arbitration |
| **Arbitration Procedures** | Used only for salary, benefits; noncontinuance not covered by Agreement, dismissals, financial exigency questions  
Mandates arbitrator’s qualifications; share costs equally | Arbitrator can only remand to Board of Trustees. Arbitrator may not grant promotion or tenure |
| **Appointments, Reappointments, & Nonrenewal** | Appointment: Department Qualifications Committee screens, must consult 2 upper-class students. Standard appointment form. Reappointment: Department Qual. Committee evaluates all nontenured faculty & those eligible for promotion. Gives recommendations to department chairperson, College Qual. Comm. and Dean of Faculty. | Appointment: Department and dean set criteria dept. screens, selects. Dean must support dept. unless unusual circumstances Dismissal: Tenured faculty—for "proper cause"  
Nontenured Reappointment: Department annually evaluates nontenured faculty, recommends on reappointment. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appointments, Reappointments, &amp; Nonrenewal (continued)</th>
<th>MONMOUTH COLLEGE</th>
<th>RIDER COLLEGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promotion &amp; Tenure</strong></td>
<td>Time limits for decisions; College Comm. submits recommendations to Dean of Faculty. President makes decisions. Review Panel (2 faculty, 2 Trustees) must review presidential decisions which deviate from list. No appeal for negative decisions by College or Dept. Committees.</td>
<td>Candidate supplies documentation; dept. recommendations may be majority &amp; minority. Candidate may respond to recommendations. Dean shall support well-documented recommendation. Time limitations for decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion: Department Committee→College Committee. College Committee may group recommendations but not order→give to Dean of Faculty. President makes promotion decisions. If promotes off the list→must explain to Committee. Association may appeal to Review Panel. Review Panel may set aside Presidential decision. Percentage of senior faculty not to exceed that &quot;generally recognized as desirable for private colleges&quot;. Tenure: Lists criteria; timeline for probationary period. Shorter probationary period if holder of doctorate. Tenure ratios result of accreditation requirements. Explanation of Tenure Deferred Due to Ratio (TDR). 3-year reappointment contracts for TDR; no preference for TDR individuals if tenure slot opens. Faculty Evaluation: related to dismissal. Dean of Faculty may request, department committee, dean and chairperson design areas of inquiry. Department may refuse to review &amp; give reasons to Dean of Faculty. Set performance goals, time limit for reviewed faculty member.</td>
<td>Each School has promotion and tenure committee: Academic Vice President, Assoc. Provost, 3 tenured faculty in bargaining unit from School, 1 tenured faculty member-at-large (elected by faculty). Faculty representative and department chairperson joint P &amp; T committee for deliberations on candidate. Procedure: Department establishes procedures for preparing recommendations. Candidate supplies documentation. Dept. sends recommendations to P &amp; T committee. Candidate may respond to recommendations of dept. &amp; dept. chairperson. P &amp; T Committee makes recommendations to Board of Trustees. P &amp; T Committee evaluates adequacy of documentation, not quality of scholarly achievements. AAUP &amp; candidate receive recommendation before Board of Trustees does→candidate may give Committee new information. Board evaluates documentation and recommendations. If negative Board decision, must give reasons to all parties. Candidate may appeal to Trustee Appeals Committee (3 Trustees). Decision of Appeals Committee is final. Lists requirements for tenure—terminal degree</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 24 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promotion &amp; Tenure (continued)</th>
<th>MONMOUTH COLLEGE</th>
<th>RIDER COLLEGE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majority decision of College Qualifications Committee re: dismissal Is final. Dismissal of tenured faculty—definition of &quot;just cause&quot;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedure: panel of 5 tenured faculty, elected by faculty, recommends to Dean. Dean makes decision. Can be arbitrated.</td>
<td>Forbids tenure quotas; lists requirements for promotion; timetable for process related to number of years of employment at Rider; timetable for tenure and promotion decisions. Rider will supply AAUP with all documents pertaining to promotion &amp; tenure on request, at cost.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Priority of reasons for reduction. Dean consults with department. Faculty member may appeal to Dean, then to Review Panel, then to arbitration. Two-year priority period for rehiring, or may accept severance pay of one year's salary</td>
<td>Order of layoff. Faculty and administration determine guidelines for reductions. Department makes recommendation, Executive Committee reviews recommendation, may remand to department for revision. If administration disagrees, must give written reasons. Reduction of tenured faculty is by seniority. Should attempt to transfer retrenched faculty. 3-year priority furlough for tenured faculty. Members of bargaining unit may not be terminated by reason of teaching of non-bargaining unit members (i.e. visiting). Procedure for determining seniority.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Called &quot;Committees of the Agreement&quot; Department Qualifications Committee; elected by full-time faculty; excludes department chairperson. Qualifications include service at Monmouth. Committee functions independently of department chairperson. Functions: evaluation for appointment, continuance, tenure &amp; promotion. Lists general criteria to be included in evaluation. Timetable for Committee decisions. All negative Committee decisions except for promotion may be appealed to College Comm.</td>
<td>Called &quot;Academic Governance&quot; School Executive Committee: 6 faculty elected by School faculty, distribution requirements by department. Functions: develop academic policy proposals. Shall not intrude on departmental responsibilities; may include majority &amp; minority reports. College Executive Committee: 7 members drawn from membership of School Executive Comms., chosen by School Exec. Comms. Distribution of membership by school size.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty Governance (continued)</td>
<td>MONMOUTH COLLEGE</td>
<td>RIDER COLLEGE</td>
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<td>College Qualifications Committee: 9 tenured faculty, 4 appointed, 5 elected by faculty at large. Limits on distribution by discipline; 2 year terms. Functions: Review recommendations and make its own recommendations to Dean of Faculty on continuance, tenure, &amp; promotion. Timetable for decisions. Secretarial assistance provided. Dean of Faculty and Chairperson of College Qualifications Comm. shall develop &quot;working relationship&quot;. Review Panel: 2 faculty members, 2 Trustees. May set aside Presidential decisions on personnel matters.</td>
<td>Functions: develop proposals on academic matters affecting 2 or more schools. Consult with Academic Vice President and deans. If administration disagrees with recommendations of College Exec. Comm., must give written reasons within 45 days. Exec. Comm. must respond within 45 days of receipt. Violation of timelines is tacit agreement.</td>
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<td>Department Chairpersons</td>
<td>No mention in contract</td>
<td>Shall be acceptable to both dean and faculty. Has rights and privileges of faculty. Indefinite terms, may be reviewed at request of dean or faculty. Dean and majority of faculty must agree to relieve chairperson. Faculty panel arbitrates disputes between dean and faculty majority. Academic Vice President makes final decision. AAUP may grieve Vice President's decision, may take to arbitration. Arbitrator may only remand to panel and Vice President. Individual who leaves chair may enter bargaining unit. Dean nominates candidate for chairperson; if faculty does not concur, dean must nominate second candidate; faculty chooses between the two. Dean may fill chairperson slot from outside the College.</td>
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<td>Faculty Evaluations</td>
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<td><strong>CONTRACT ANALYSIS</strong></td>
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| **Workload (continued)** | **Dean makes decision.**  
3 union officers receive 3-hour load reduction |
| Attendance required at faculty meetings & commencement  
Counseling during registration  
Travel reimbursement; research, consulting-  
contract research must be approved by President. Consulting must not interfere.  
Maximum of one course may be taught at another institution.  
Public appearances of faculty.  
Retirement at age 65 |  |
| **Faculty Responsibilities** | **Teaching responsibilities, reasonable committee work**  
Advise student organizations | **No mention in contract** |
| **Management Rights** | **College retains all rights except those abridged by Agreement. Agreement supersedes pre-existing procedures. Pre-existing agencies within College shall continue to function if in accord with Agreement.**  
May transact business, hold meetings, use visitors parking lot, duplicating equipment at cost, post notices (with copy to administration), use campus mail.  
Negotiations or grievance activities permitted during working hours.  
Union officers have scheduling priority. | **All rights remain with Board of Trustees except those abridged by Agreement**  
May have office space, hold meetings, post notices, use campus mail, duplicating equipment at cost.  
Agency shop agreement—non-members pay representation costs unless are conscientious objectors and file statement.  
Failure to pay AAUP is just cause for dismissal.  
Procedures for enforcement. |
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<tr>
<th>Personnel Files</th>
<th>MONMOUTH COLLEGE</th>
<th>RIDER COLLEGE</th>
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<td>Pre-employment file <strong>not accessible to faculty</strong> faculty may review personnel file, add items. May respond to material in file. Administration may maintain other files. Administration may review Association files.</td>
<td>Location, contents. Available to faculty for inspection. May obtain copies of contents. Pre-employment files <strong>not available to faculty or any committee for evaluation.</strong> Items may be deleted from file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dues Deduction</td>
<td>Voluntary--checkoff</td>
<td>Voluntary--checkoff</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Strike/No Lockout</td>
<td>Association will not strike or take work action; will attempt to terminate any breaches of this article.</td>
<td>AAUP will not strike or take other work action; Rider will not lock out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meet &amp; Discuss</td>
<td>No mention in contract</td>
<td>No mention in contract</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Contract Items</td>
<td>Requirements for each academic rank Faculty Improvement Fund (creativity grants &amp; mini-sabbaticals) Limitation of committee service for a faculty member No abridgement of student participation in departmental affairs Committee members immune from liability for statements and reports</td>
<td>Past practices, refers to College Bylaws. May be arbitrated. General work conditions (keys, offices, parking, dining facilities, secretarial services, equipment) Open classroom (trustees or faculty members may visit classes) Patent policy Outside employment Enforceability of Contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although bargaining agents differed for Rider (AAUP) and Monmouth (NEA) Colleges, the contracts were almost identical in most respects. There were of approximately the same length and the depth with which they treated certain issues was similar in many respects. The bargaining units were nearly identical, for both included faculty and librarians, and both excluded department chairpersons. The Monmouth contract excluded part-time faculty, while the Rider contract included them.

Grievance procedures in the two contracts were similar, for both consisted of four steps, the fourth being external arbitration. Both contracts disallowed grievances concerning appointments, tenure, promotion, and nonrenewal, except for violations of due process or contract procedures. The Rider contract limited arbitration to remanding actions back to the Board of Trustees, while Monmouth's stipulated that the arbitrator's decision was final.

Matters pertaining to appointments, reappointments and nonrenewals were similar. In both contracts, the department evaluated and selected faculty. Both contracts stated that faculty recommendations were to be supported by the administration, or reasons be given to the faculty. Promotion and tenure provisions were also similar, both in their content and in their length and complexity. Evaluations began at the department level, with departments submitting recommendations to a college-wide committee. The college committee consisted of only tenured faculty at Monmouth, while the committee at Rider included some administrators. Committees at both institutions sent their recommendations to the president. At Monmouth, negative decisions at the presidential level were
appealed to a joint faculty-trustee Review Panel, whose decision was final. At Rider, a three-member Trustees Appeal Committee heard appeals and made the final decision on promotion or tenure. The one major difference in the tenure processes at both colleges was Monmouth's practice of deferring tenure until the ratio of tenured faculty fell below approximately seventy-five percent.

Retrenchment procedures were similar in the Monmouth and Rider contracts. Both stipulated faculty participation in planning for retrenchment, listed order of layoff, and required a mandatory rehiring period after retrenchment. Other "faculty welfare" similarities included salary and fringe benefits (salary minima and complete listings of fringe benefits), and procedures for leaves of absence. Both contracts had long and explicit sections on faculty workload, listing maximum workloads, overload procedures, and precise scheduling regulations. Provisions for load reduction were also included in both contracts.

Other similarities include sections on academic freedom, affirmative action, and faculty responsibilities. Management rights were listed briefly, while union rights were listed explicitly, including an agency shop agreement at Rider College. Additional similar provisions were articles on personnel files, no strike/lockout (although the Monmouth contract did not mention lockouts) and dues deductions.

Contractual differences between Monmouth and Rider were interesting, and provided guidelines for the subsequent analyses of faculty governance at these two institutions. Although both contracts had articles related to faculty governance, the committees formed by each contract had different functions. At Monmouth, the committees created by
contract were solely for personnel decisions. Faculty participation in decisions on curriculum was not mentioned in the contract. The contractually-created committees in this article of the Rider contract were exclusively for academic policy making. (The article discussing promotion and tenure had provided for faculty participation in personnel decisions.) The Rider contract also required as part of the "governance process" that, in the event that the administration disagreed with faculty recommendations, written reasons be given within 45 days. Thus, the Rider contract mandated broader faculty participation in governance than did the Monmouth contract.

Another interesting difference between the two contracts related to selection of department chairpersons. Although chairpersons were appointed at both institutions, the Rider contract provided for extensive faculty participation in the process of selecting a chairperson. The faculty's role was considerable, and a decision which ignored faculty recommendations could be arbitrated. The Monmouth College contract did not mention the selection of department chairpersons.

The last difference between contracts pertained to review of tenured faculty. While the Monmouth contract did not discuss this topic, the Rider contract required a yearly review of all faculty. It was to be initiated at the department level, and became part of each faculty member's personnel file. Student evaluations were also used in evaluation of faculty.

The analysis of union contracts for faculty at Rider and Monmouth Colleges revealed similar philosophies and concerns on the part of faculty. Procedures for promotion and tenure, workload, and
retrenchment were lengthy and explicit. Faculty participation in gover-
nance was mandated by contract, although the contracts defined gover-
nance somewhat differently. Few references were made by either contract
to pre-existing regulations or resolutions concerning faculty rights.
With minimal emphasis on salaries and fringe benefits, and maximum expli-
cation of procedures for faculty participation in decision making, the
motivation for unionization of faculty at both institutions was evident.
Examinations of the histories and governance systems at both institutions
attempted to explain the findings of this contractual analysis, and to
determine if governance structures mandated by contract, when put into
practice, succeeded in enfranchising the faculties at Rider and Monmouth
Colleges.

**INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSES OF GOVERNANCE:**

**MONMOUTH COLLEGE**

**Background to Governance and Faculty Bargaining**

**History and Change at Monmouth.** Monmouth College is an independent,
non-sectarian, co-educational college on the New Jersey coast. The col-
lege was founded in 1933 as a private junior college and used a local
high school building during the evenings. In 1957, Monmouth College
moved to its present location on the grounds of Shadow Lawn, an estate
once occupied by Woodrow Wilson. A four-year baccalaureate program was
initiated in 1957, and the college began offering masters degree pro-
gams in 1967.

Monmouth experienced growth during the 1960's similar to most in-
stitutions of higher education around the country. In addition to the
increased birth rate which resulted in a greater number of college-age students, part of Monmouth's enrollment growth was attributed to the Vietnam War. Since the college was not overly selective in its admissions policies, faculty informants reported, a number of students enrolled at Monmouth to avoid being drafted. At its peak in the late 1960's, enrollment at Monmouth exceeded 6,000. But with the end of the war and other enrollment declines, Monmouth's enrollment dropped to approximately 3,000 undergraduate students and 1,000 graduate students.

The founder of Monmouth College remained as its leader for twenty-nine years, first as dean of the junior college, then as president of the four-year institution. The next president served from 1962-1971, and presided over Monmouth's growth period. During that decade, the physical plant more than tripled in value and the total assets of the college more than doubled. The current president assumed office in 1971, just after the signing of the agreement with the faculty union.

Interviews with both faculty and administrators at Monmouth revealed that the administrative styles of the presidents preceding the current president were seen as unilateral and somewhat arbitrary. Faculty had little or no role in decision making, unless they had personal influence over the president or other top level administrators. Expansion at Monmouth during the 1960's brought in many young faculty members with terminal degrees and expectations for collegial decision making. These expectations clashed with the unilateral practices of

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the former administration, resulting in conflict at Monmouth College.

At about the time that Monmouth was experiencing its greatest growth, a county community college was established in a nearby town. Monmouth had been the only local institution of higher education before the creation of Brookdale Community College, and, as such, had received a grant from the county each year in exchange for offering programs for local students. According to one faculty member, the former president struggled to keep Monmouth private during the mid-1960's when state education leaders were considering making Monmouth a state or county college. Instead, Brookdale was built, the grant from the county to Monmouth was discontinued, and Monmouth lost both students and faculty to the new college, whose tuition was lower and salaries higher than those at Monmouth College. It appeared that efforts to maintain Monmouth's independence may have encouraged competition which might eventually cause its demise.

Faculty Unionization. In interviews with faculty at Monmouth College, three factors were identified as being central to the move toward faculty unionization. No salary scale or minimum salary existed; furthermore, raises were inconsistent and arbitrarily determined. Secondly, there was no formal mechanism for faculty participation in promotion or tenure decisions. And thirdly, no grievance procedure existed.

Although a literature search failed to uncover written confirmation, informants described the unionization process at Monmouth as a time of serious conflict, both between the administration and the faculty, and between groups of faculty members. The Faculty
Association of Monmouth College (FAMCO) was certified by the NLRB in February, 1971, and affiliated with the New Jersey Education Association (NJEA). The first contract was signed in June of 1971, just as the new president took office. The contract's major impact was a codification of procedures which had not been systematic, particularly in decisions related to promotion and tenure matters, nonrenewals, and grievance procedures. The contract required equitable treatment of faculty, preventing the arbitrariness of former practice. The contract also "tightened" up the tenuring process. The tenure probationary period had been only three years before the contract was signed. The first contract lengthened the probationary period to five years, and the second contract raised it to seven years.

With the history of Monmouth College as background, and an understanding of some of the events surrounding faculty unionization, an attempt was made to determine the loci of decision-making power at Monmouth College. Interviews with faculty and administrators provided an understanding of the structure of governance at Monmouth, and attempted to discern informal power relationships within and beyond that structure.

Effect of Faculty Bargaining on Academic Governance

During the interview process at Monmouth College, it became clear that the change in administration which occurred just as the first contract was signed served to confound attempts to trace cause-and-effect relationships between faculty bargaining and changes in academic governance. However, an examination of the governance structure aided in
determining loci of decision power, and degree of faculty influence in the several areas of academic governance at Monmouth College.

**Structure of Faculty Governance.** Committees and groups which made decisions on policy and other governance matters were created two ways at Monmouth. The contract created several committees, mainly dealing with personnel decisions. The current president created several other committees, which dealt with academic policies. Since the contract was written before the President arrived, it was impossible to determine whether committees related to promotion and tenure would also have been established by the President.

Contractual committees were the Department Qualifications Committee, the College Qualifications Committee, and the Review Panel. As explained in the analysis of Monmouth’s contract, these committees evaluated and recommended individuals for promotion and tenure. Informants agreed that, although the President did not promote or tenure every individual so recommended by the College Qualifications Committee, he did not promote or tenure individuals who were not recommended by this committee. The college committee was by no means a rubber stamp for departmental decisions. For example, in 1975, the college-level committee supported fewer than half of the departmental recommendations submitted for promotion and tenure. When questioned about the use of the Review Panel, an administrator stated that the Panel had never been appealed to, for all personnel conflicts had been resolved below that level.

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Because contractual committees focused on personnel decisions, the committees which were not mentioned in the contract were oriented toward academic matters. The forum for all faculty decisions on policy matters was the Faculty Meeting, which functioned as a committee of the whole. In these meetings the faculty voted on agenda items presented by the Faculty Council. The Faculty Council consisted of one faculty member elected from each department and an equal number elected at large, resulting in thirty members. Although the Faculty Council did not vote on policy, it did make recommendations at the Faculty Meeting concerning agenda items. An executive committee, consisting of five officers, coordinated the activities of the Faculty Council.

The current President created the Educational Policies and Planning Committee to deal with college-wide academic policy and program planning. Faculty were elected at large to the EPPC, and chairpersons could be members of this committee. The EPPC made recommendations to the Faculty Council, which, in turn, submitted them to the faculty at the Faculty Meeting. A proposal to consolidate the two committees was in existence, and all faculty informants expressed dissatisfaction with the overlap between the Faculty Council and the EPPC.

One other committee existed at Monmouth College which included some faculty participation. Although department chairpersons were not bargaining unit members, they provided some faculty representation on the College Curriculum Committee. Consisting of the Academic Vice President, the undergraduate and the graduate deans, and the fifteen department chairpersons, the Curriculum Committee received curricular and program proposals from departments for approval or rejection.
Proposals for new programs had to be approved by the State Department of Higher Education, a process which, according to several informants, was lengthy and politically motivated.

Thus, the structure of college-wide decision making included faculty in both personnel and curricular decisions. With this structure as background, the locus of decision-making power in the four areas of academic, personnel, economic, and planning matters was examined. The degree of faculty participation in each area was noted, as well as differences in participation between "faculty as faculty" and "faculty as union."

**Academic Policy Decisions.** Faculty informants agreed that departments had de facto autonomy over curricular changes which did not require additional funds or infringe upon another department's territory. Curricular proposals were submitted to the College Curriculum Committee, which usually approved them. Decisions of the Curriculum Committee were final, except for program changes which had to be submitted to the State.

Changes in admissions policy and degree requirements were initiated by the EPPC and/or Faculty Council. The Faculty Meeting would then vote on proposed changes. Departments could propose changes in numbers of hours required for majors, and submit the change to the College Curriculum Committee. Within their own areas, then, departments had a fair amount of autonomy, although that autonomy could be checked by an administrative committee.

**Personnel Decision Making.** In decisions on faculty hiring, both faculty and administrative informants agreed that departments made the real decision. Decisions were made jointly by a department faculty and
its chairperson, then submitted to the Academic Vice President and the President. Departmental recommendations on appointments were seldom, if ever, overturned by the administration.

The faculty role in promotion and tenure decisions has already been described. The College Qualifications Committee had significant power to recommend individuals, but the President seldom acted positively on every recommendation of the College Committee. Problems of finances and a high rate of tenured faculty reduced the number of affirmative presidential decisions. Thus, although the faculty had considerable potential power in personnel decision making, economic and job market constraints reduced their power. It was evident, however, that faculty power in this area had increased considerably since unionization.

Economic Decisions. Salary and workload matters were, ostensibly, mandated by contract. In reality, the salary minima in the contract bore little resemblance to salaries at Monmouth, and faculty informants reported extensive inequities among faculty salaries. The contract provided for a percentage raise each year based on base salaries, continuing the inequities. No system of merit pay existed at the college.

Basic workload policies were contractual. Chairpersons and their faculty members consulted on scheduling and course assignment matters. All schedules and teaching assignments were approved by the Academic Vice President.

Most decisions concerning economic or "faculty welfare" matters were negotiated in the contract. The elaborate provisions for faculty rights in the article on workload constrained departmental decision making somewhat, since flexibility in assignments was reduced by the
limitations in assigning day and evening courses. Conflicts were worked out informally, although the department chairperson, within the provisions of the contract, made the final decision.

Planning Decisions. Decisions on planning matters included allocation of departmental budgets and long-range planning. Department chairpersons requested budgets from the Academic Vice President. The Vice President for Financial Affairs joined the Academic Vice President in allocating budgets to departments. Faculty had little influence in budget allocation matters, except in the initial request from the chairperson.

Faculty and administrative informants agreed that very little long-range planning existed at Monmouth on the part of either the faculty, the administration, or the board of trustees. One faculty member criticized the trustees for being only reactive, saying that the college should have been more responsive to the needs of its surrounding communities in order to increase enrollment. Since eighty percent of Monmouth's budget was dependent upon tuition, stable or increasing enrollment was critical to the continuation of the college. An administrator maintained that the union generated so much conflict that no one was thinking about where the college was going. Another faculty member saw planning as the responsibility of the faculty and the trustees, but said, "No one wants to make the hard decisions about the future of Monmouth College." It appeared that faculty could have played an important role in long-range planning, had they been willing to do so.

Formal Power Relations. Although the contract and subsequent administrative actions had provided the faculty with several mechanisms
for participation in governance, all final authority rested with the administration and trustees. Decisions of faculty committees on personnel and academic matters could be overturned by the administration. Although most faculty decisions were confirmed by the administration, the potential for administrative veto was always present.

Faculty and administrative informants agreed that the union "stayed away" from academic matters, leaving them to the EPPC and the Faculty Council. One faculty member indicated that the union had at one time attempted to "interfere" in an academic matter and had been "rebuked" by the Faculty Council. Territories were formally preserved, then, between the union concerns and the academic matters overseen by the Faculty Council.

Informal Power Relations. All faculty respondents agreed that decision making could be influenced by informal means, but that unionization had made informal influence much more difficult. It was much harder, for example, to give some faculty members preferential treatment now, they explained. One faculty member agreed that faculty could probably influence someone already in the decision-making structure, but that decisions were made through the structure, and little "end-running" was practiced. Informants maintained that most "star" faculty were on committees, and thus already part of the structure.

Both faculty and administrative informants agreed that relationships between the EPPC and the administration, and the Faculty Council and the administration, were cooperative. Faculty members maintained that administrators seldom interfered in Faculty Council or EPPC decisions. One faculty member said that the President would occasionally
accept policy recommendations approved by the Faculty Meeting even if he disagreed with the policy. Department chairpersons served on both of these faculty committees, but approached decisions from their faculty role, not as administrators.

Relationships between the faculty governance groups and the union were uncertain and somewhat inclined to mutual suspicion. It has been noted that the union had been "rebuked" for interference in Faculty Council matters. One faculty member maintained that the union had alienated many faculty members, a number of whom were on the Faculty Council. A few members of the Faculty Council and the EPPC were union members, but "acted as faculty, not as union members." No attempts, either formal or informal, were made by union officers or leaders of faculty governance groups to confer before important decisions. The union did submit a slate of candidates for both committees, but faculty did not vote along union or non-union lines. It seemed that there was little communication between the union and other faculty groups except on an individual basis, and not as part of the union "party line."

All informants reported that relationships between the union and the administration were adversarial, to the point of being antagonistic. One faculty member saw "paranoia on both sides," maintaining that relationships were "destructive" and "acrimonious." An administrator felt that the union had polarized faculty and administration and had blocked institutional progress. The union felt that administrative decisions were often arbitrary, and that the administration had too much power. No informal cooperation between the union and the administration was reported.
Several informants, both faculty and administrative, felt that the union was not representative of the majority of the faculty at Monmouth College. Although the majority of the faculty belonged to FAMCO (125 of a possible 163 full-time faculty were FAMCO members), several faculty members felt that most faculty were apathetic with regard to union efforts. Faculty attendance at union meetings was low (a maximum of 25 attended, it was reported), and many faculty disagreed with union positions. For example, the union decided to abolish the Department Qualifications Committee, saying that peers should be advocates, not judges. Many faculty disagreed with this position, for the elimination of the department committee would force the first evaluation of faculty up the hierarchy to the department chairperson, who was considered, by the contract, to be a member of the administration. One faculty member felt that the union represented "old-timers who have had a raw deal," but did not show interest in junior faculty, in planning for the college, or in issues beyond Monmouth College. Many faculty members felt that increased faculty participation was due more to a more collegially-oriented administration than to the efforts of the union. Although the faculty had gained the right of formal participation in college decision making, the source of this power gain was not clear.

Perceptions of Faculty Governance

The general view of faculty informants was that faculty role in governance at Monmouth College was weak, but existent. Administrative power was felt to be considerable, and there was some evidence of general distrust between faculty and administration, and little evidence of
attempts at informal problem solving or conferring was apparent. The role which faculty played in governance at Monmouth College seemed formal and limited.

**Contextual Factors Related to Faculty Governance.** Several external and internal factors were relevant to governance at Monmouth College. The most significant external factor was the continual enrollment decline. The combination of inflation, a lower total number of students attending colleges, and the competing community college nearby resulted in financial problems for Monmouth College. Faculty would not strike at Monmouth, it was reported, because they had "nowhere to go if they lost their jobs." Even though no centralized agency mandated decisions for Monmouth, the college's heavy dependence upon tuition monies limited expansion and innovation.

The lack of any public monies (except in support of small research projects) to provide some stability to the Monmouth budget resulted in considerable faculty uncertainty about the future of the college. Junior faculty were discouraged because promotion and tenure were becoming very difficult to attain. The contract under negotiation proposed the abolition of "tenure deferred due to ratio" (TDR), but a high tenure percentage at the college limited staffing flexibility. Many faculty evidenced considerable concern about the viability of the college during the next decade.

There was no tradition of formal faculty role in governance at Monmouth College. Although most faculty supported union efforts to include faculty in decision making, many were former public school teachers with little or no experience in or expectations for participation in
governance. This lack of collegial orientations was interpreted as apathy by the union.

**Effect of Faculty Bargaining on Governance.** Direct effects of faculty bargaining on academic governance focused on participation in promotion and tenure evaluations and the grievance procedure. The college-level faculty committee had considerable potential for power in recommendations on promotion and tenure. Their power seemed to be limited more by the economy than presidential disinclination to promote or tenure. The grievance procedure did not include faculty review committees, but did allow outside arbitration. However, the promotion and tenure appeal mechanism gave a joint faculty-trustee Review Panel the final decision power. Therefore, the contract did enfranchise the faculty in the area of peer evaluation.

The effect of bargaining on gains of the faculty in academic policy matters was unclear. Although the President created faculty committees to deal with academic policy matters after the contract was signed, it could not be determined whether unionization had encouraged formal faculty participation in academic policy making.

One clear effect of unionization was a reduction in the power of the department chairperson. Several faculty members maintained that, before unionization, many chairpersons had been extremely powerful, making promotion and tenure decisions with the Dean of Faculty and controlling scheduling and workload matters. Because they were appointed without faculty consultation, chairpersons had been formally answerable only to the Dean of Faculties. Department faculty have acquired some of the chairperson's pre-unionization power, for their recommendations on
promotion and tenure were arrived at independently of the chairperson's. Since the faculty elected the chairperson, whom the Dean then appointed, chairpersons were accountable to their faculty colleagues. Also, the contract stipulated that a college-level committee recommend candidates for promotion and tenure to the President. Thus, the chairpersons have lost decision-making power to this committee. Because scheduling discretion was limited by the contract, chairpersons lost power on yet another front.

Faculty unionization at Monmouth College also affected administrators at the vice-presidential and presidential levels. Some powers were shifted to the President (such as final decisions on promotion and tenure, which had been made by the Dean of Faculty before the contract was signed). Administrators were forced to treat all faculty equitably, and to carefully document decisions. And, because the administration did not want "outsiders dictating to the college," they made substantial efforts to resolve grievances internally so that arbitration would not be used. Unionization limited administrative options and forced compliance with contractual procedures. Despite its limiting effect on administrative procedures, it was not apparent that unionization had limited the formal power of either the President or the Academic Vice President.

It was evident that the motive behind faculty unionization at Monmouth College was enfranchisement of a "deprived" faculty. The contract clearly mandated faculty power gains in personnel decision making. The causes of faculty gains in academic policy making were unclear, for a new administration which proclaimed itself collegially-
oriented was a concurrent factor in changes in the governance structure. Faculty at Monmouth College had many more opportunities to participate in academic governance after the signing of the union contract. Whether or not unionization was the primary cause of their enfranchisement has yet to be determined.

RIDER COLLEGE

Background to Governance and Faculty Bargaining

History and Change at Rider. Founded in 1865, Trenton Business School was purchased in 1897 by Andrew Rider, and became Rider Business College. Although initially devoted to business curricula, Rider added a teacher education program during the early 1900's, changing its name to Rider College. The first four-year baccalaureate degree was awarded in the 1920's, and in 1957 liberal arts and science curricula were added. Three divisions of graduate studies were created in 1962: Business Administration, Education, and Liberal Arts and Science.11

In 1898, Franklin B. Moore became president and owner of Rider College, remaining as president until 1934, when his son Franklin F. Moore succeeded him. The younger Moore created the institution's first governing board and amended the corporation charter to a non-profit status.12 The report of a Middle States' evaluation team in 1955

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12 James P. Begin, Theodore Settle and Paula Alexander, Academics on Strike (New Brunswick, N.J.: Institute of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers, the State University, 1975), p. 15. Subsequent references will be noted parenthetically.
suggested that Rider add a liberal arts program and move to a larger campus. As mentioned earlier, a liberal arts program was approved in 1957, and Rider moved to a suburban campus in 1964 (Begin et al., pp. 15-16).

Because Rider College had been an undergraduate business school, most of its faculty during the 1960's did not hold terminal degrees. The college's arts and sciences programs were relatively new, and it was only during the late 1960's that the President became aware of AAUP standards for faculty participation in promotion and tenure decisions. In 1967 the President requested that the Board of Trustees approve the adoption of the 1940 AAUP Statement on Promotion and Tenure, to which the Trustees acquiesced, under the President's provision that the policies inherent in the Statement would not become effective until 1974 (Begin et al., pp. 17-18). Rider's history was one of relative stability for nearly ninety years, with extensive growth and change in function, size, and expectations for faculty during the last decade. This decade of change brought conflict to the Rider campus, and culminated in the unionization of its faculty.

Faculty Unionization. A study by Begin and his associates in 1975 cited four major areas of faculty dissatisfaction which led to the unionization of the Rider College faculty in 1973. Conflict arose over decisions concerning promotion and tenure, faculty evaluations, selection...

Information on events leading to faculty unionization at Rider College was taken from the Begin et al. work cited in note 12. Specific questions concerning the Begin work were put to one of the respondents, who corroborated the validity of Begin's information, stating that Begin et al.'s account of these causal and other relevant events was "essentially correct."
of administrators, and resource allocation (p. 18). To be brief, a new
president who took office in 1969 made his top priority that of upgrading
the quality of the Rider College faculty, stating that, by 1974, a termi­
nal degree would be required for tenure to be awarded. However, mem­
bers of the administration began applying the terminal degree standard
in personnel decisions as early as 1970. The giving of a terminal con­
tract in 1971 to a faculty member who had fulfilled all requirements for
tenure other than the terminal degree put the faculty in an uproar, and
the faculty senate unanimously recommended a positive tenure decision
for this professor to the Board of Trustees (pp. 23-24). The faculty
requested an investigation of the matter by the regional AAUP office.
The AAUP investigating team wrote a report highly critical of the ad­
ministration's policies related to promotion and tenure and, in partic­
ular, criticized the refusal of the administration to respect the recom­
mendations of peer evaluations and substituting unilateral personnel
decisions (p. 30). The President sought a court injunction to block
publication of the AAUP report, which was denied in March of 1973 (p. 31).
Polarization of faculty and administration was evident as a result of
this conflict, but three other issues were equally inflammatory.

In 1969, the new President formed an ad hoc faculty committee to
develop a faculty evaluation procedure. The President intended that
merit pay be tied to evaluation results, but was not able to develop
criteria which the faculty felt to be objective (p. 18). While the
President intended that department chairpersons make evaluations, and
that the dean evaluate the faculty member as well, the faculty pre­
ferred that the members of a department approve or revise the
chairperson's evaluation before it became final (pp. 40-41).

Conflict also arose over procedures used for selection of administrators. In 1970 the President appointed a joint administration-faculty-student search committee to screen candidates for the position of academic vice president. Although the committee eliminated the name of an internal candidate in July, that candidate was appointed to the academic vice presidency in December, 1970, upon the recommendation of the President. Faculty were incensed that collegial participation in decision making had been ignored, and felt that the search committee had been a sham (pp. 44-45).

The final area of conflict was over resource allocation. Although the President created a budget priorities committee in 1969, he refused to show the line item budget to that committee, and did not implement recommendations which this faculty committee offered concerning specific budget items. A formerly established faculty salaries committee had been pursuing informal salary negotiations with the President, and in late 1972, the President, in an attempt to play one committee against the other, refused to accede to a priorities committee recommendation for a small increase for evening school faculty (pp. 47-49, 52). With this amount of conflict over salaries and faculty participation in economic decisions, unionization was almost inevitable.

Conflict over all four of the issues described above peaked in early 1973. By July of that year, the AAUP was certified by the NLRB as the bargaining agent for faculty at Rider College (p. 55). Negotiations were slow and adversarial, for the faculty's emphasis on participation in governance was resisted by the administration. By October, 1974,
after thirteen months of negotiations, several points of the proposed contract were still under dispute. On October 16, 1974, the AAUP called a faculty strike over the administration's refusal to grant further concessions (pp. 64-65).

Faculty support for the strike was strong, with only fourteen of 200 faculty crossing picket lines, and eighteen of twenty-two chairpersons honoring the picket lines (p. 65). Issues of greatest importance included faculty evaluation, inclusion of chairpersons in the bargaining unit, agency shop, the wage package, and the administration's refusal to share budget information (p. 65). With the help of a state mediator, settlement was reached after eight days. Compromises were made on all items over which the impasse occurred, and the faculty at Rider College emerged from their strike with a contract which guaranteed their participation in academic policy making, promotion and tenure evaluations, selection of department chairpersons, and faculty evaluation, and a grievance procedure which enabled them to challenge administrative decisions as they had not before been able to (pp. 71-76).

Although the Rider College contract enfranchised the faculty in many important ways, it remained to be determined if this enfranchisement would be carried out in practice. Interviews with faculty and administrators at Rider College sought to locate power loci in academic, personnel, economic and planning decisions. The formal governance structure was studied, and an effort was made to identify informal power relationships within and beyond that structure. And finally, attempts were made to separate the effects of contextual factors from effects of unionization upon governance at Rider College.
Effects of Faculty Bargaining on Academic Governance

The events leading to unionization at Rider College made it evident that faculty participation in academic governance was a major issue in the faculty's decision to unionize. Examination of the present governance structure showed numerous changes which occurred as a result of the contract.

A faculty senate had existed prior to unionization, but was replaced by a more elaborate committee structure mandated by the contract. An administrator explained that the senate had concerned itself mainly with "terms and conditions of employment and resolutions against the President and Vice President," and that little academic policy making was done by the senate. The senate, he said, "withered away" because the old senate leadership became active in the union and worked through union channels.

As described in the contract analysis section of this chapter, the contract created school- and college-level executive committees which developed academic policy on curriculum, graduation requirements, student advising, and "other matters of an academic nature traditionally handled by the faculty."¹⁴ Faculty in each of the four schools elected a six-member School Executive Committee which met with the dean of each respective school to recommend academic policy for both that school and for the college as a whole. Members of the seven-member College Executive Committee were selected from their respective School Executive

Committees, with larger schools having proportionally greater representation. The contract specified that no executive committee was to "intrude into areas of professional competence traditionally the responsibility of the Departments and/or the individual faculty members."\textsuperscript{15}

The contract also mandated a Promotion and Tenure Committee for each school. Although promotion and tenure committees existed prior to the contract, their membership and processes for decision making changed as a result of the contract, according to an administrator. These committees were joint faculty-administration committees with flexible membership, including the department chairperson and an elected faculty representative from the department of a faculty member being considered for promotion or tenure. Thus, there were four promotion and tenure committees which made personnel recommendations directly to the Board of Trustees. The contract specified the function of these committees as "evaluating the adequacy of the departmental documentation,"\textsuperscript{16} rather than making substantive decisions on academic excellence.

The contract also created a Trustee Appeals Committee, which consisted of three regular trustees. No faculty members were included on this committee, which made the final and binding decision on promotion and tenure appeals. The contract forbid arbitration for promotion and tenure decisions.

These committees constituted the basic college-wide academic governance structure at Rider College. Other faculty committees acted on both a standing and ad hoc basis as advisory groups to the administration.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., p. 7.
on specific matters (such as the Research Committee and the Athletic Committee). Interviews with faculty and administrators helped to fix the loci of decision making in matters related to academic, personnel, economic and planning decisions.

Academic Policy Decisions. Both faculty and administrative informants agreed that departments had considerable power in curricular decision making. Changes in courses had to be submitted to the School Executive Committee, but were seldom rejected. Proposals involving new courses or changes affecting more than one school were examined by the College Executive Committee.

Admissions policies and degree requirements for schools were determined by the School Executive Committee and the dean. The College Executive Committee was responsible for college-wide admissions policies and basic degree requirements. However, because Rider's budget was dependent upon tuition, several faculty members felt that few admissions policies existed, or that any group had attempted to change admissions policies in recent memory.

Academic decision making was balanced between departments and faculty committees with administrative liaisons. Most faculty responded that they were satisfied with the structure of academic policy making at Rider. A few expressed concern that the entire faculty seldom was able to express its views on academic policy decisions addressed by the College Executive Committee, because meetings of the entire faculty could be called only by that committee. Even with this limitation, the faculty had considerable autonomy in academic policy making.
Personnel Decision Making. There was moderate agreement, and relative satisfaction, with the locus of decision-making power in personnel matters. The department usually prevailed in selection and appointment of a new faculty member. The department's ability to make a promotion or tenure recommendation which would not be overturned was somewhat less certain, but little dissatisfaction was expressed relative to personnel decisions beyond the department level.

Most faculty informants agreed that, if a departmental recommendation were strongly positive and well-documented, it would be supported by the School Promotion and Tenure Committee. The department chairperson or faculty representative from each candidate's department was asked to speak in the candidate's behalf during the Promotion and Tenure Committee deliberations. Most faculty expressed satisfaction with the manner in which these committees deliberated and reached decisions. Faculty members felt that promotion and tenure were still possible at Rider, although most departments were highly tenured. Faculty were particularly pleased that departmental recommendations were sent to the Board of Trustees along with those of chairpersons, deans, and the vice president, for this degree of influence had not existed before unionization.

Economic Decisions. Faculty salaries and workload decisions were included in this category. Salaries were negotiated between the administration and the AAUP, and most faculty were satisfied with their salaries. One faculty member maintained that raises were twice what they would have been without a union contract. The first contract also contained a
provision for reducing salary inequities.Merit pay was not included in the contract or in any system of salary determination.

Workload policies were specified with great care by the contract. Scheduling was done by the department chairperson, usually with considerable faculty consultation. Although the dean had the final veto power in scheduling and course assignment matters, administrators and faculty members alike maintained that that power was seldom or never exercised.

The faculty, both through the contract negotiations and within departments, had considerable influence in salary and workload matters. There was dissatisfaction on the part of some faculty members concerning the college budgeting process. Faculty maintained that, for the most part, the budget was still a secret, and an administrator remarked that the union's next target was the budgeting process.

Planning Decisions. Departmental budgets and long-range planning comprised this area of academic decision making. Most faculty maintained that the dean controlled departmental budget allocations, although chairpersons were asked to submit budget requests. Most faculty informants saw the dean's major function as resource allocation and management.

This study could not discover any mechanisms for long-range planning as a part of academic governance at Rider College. Faculty were not aware of efforts to plan beyond the next academic year. Conversations with administrators implied that some planning was being done at the administrative level, but no specific mechanisms were apparent for this

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17Begin et al., p. 71.
planning. Retrenchment procedures had not been used at Rider, nor was there much evident faculty concern about retrenchment.

Faculty had little influence in institutional-level planning decisions at Rider College. They had virtually no voice in budget decisions, and little or no obvious long-range planning was being done at the college. The faculty evidenced much more concern about the budget, but interviews with two administrators made it clear that the administration felt that budget decisions were management decisions and should be made by management, not by faculty.

Formal Power Relations. The Rider College-AAUP contract provided for considerable formal faculty participation in academic and personnel decision making. All informants felt that the structure for personnel decision making was working very well, that faculty recommendations were respected and usually followed, and that criteria were clear and fairly applied. Most informants were also pleased with the results of the School Executive Committees. Reactions to the College Executive Committee were less favorable, for several faculty members felt that the committee's responsibilities were ambiguous, decisions were too slow, and debate was too long. Others criticized the small size of the committee (seven members), wanting a broader spectrum of faculty participation in college-level policy making. Because these committees were mandated by the contract and supported by both the faculty and the administration, most of the decision making occurred within this formal structure.

Informal Power Relations. All faculty informants agreed that informal influence in campus decision making had decreased considerably since unionization. One faculty member explained that the college had
been the "private domain of its owner and president" prior to 1969, and that faculty members had relied on favors from a paternalistic administration. When "professional administrators," in the form of the current President and Academic Vice President, arrived, they were determined to "manage" the college and upgrade its quality. The informal system of influence and favoritism was destroyed by the new administration's emphasis on rationality and controlled management. The contract greatly reduced the ability of all administrators to make arbitrary, unilateral decisions, and also decreased an individual's ability to "end run" around the governance system and attempt to influence the administrators. One faculty member expressed the equalizing effect of unionization by saying, "No one can be singled out now--either for merit or for blame."

Faculty informants agreed that, until recently, relationships between the College Executive Committee and the administration had been cooperative. Membership on the College committee was divided fairly evenly between senior and junior faculty, and the committee had met regularly with the deans and the Academic Vice President. An administrator stated that the Executive Committee had recently requested meetings without the administration because they felt "intimidated" by the presence of administrators. Several faculty members felt that the members of this committee were afraid to "push" the administration, and, as a result, accomplished little. A faculty member warned that the next year was the Executive Committee's chance to prove its worth, and that a subsequent contract might have to replace the committee with some other structure, probably more closely tied to the union.
It was difficult to separate the Executive Committee from the union in order to assess the informal relationships between them. Two administrators asserted that, recently, the AAUP had begun to try to dominate the Executive Committee. A faculty member indicated that the AAUP and Executive Committee had met informally from time to time, and had an informal understanding of where each group's responsibilities lay. It was evident that the union was watching the Executive Committee very carefully. While encouraging its members to be more assertive against the "intimidating" administration, the union was also prepared to abolish its own creation and to replace it with a more militant, stronger advocate group for faculty interests.

Responses to questions regarding relationships between the union and the administration were mixed. Several informants indicated that the first contract had been vague, and that the first two years had been a testing period for both sides. Conflict arose over governance matters not covered in the contract, and numerous grievances were arbitrated. All informants agreed that relationships had improved and that some trust was beginning to develop between the union and the Academic Vice President. A faculty member characterized relationships as being "cautiously cooperative" because the structure mandated cooperation. It seemed as though the faculty and the Vice President were still studying each other and testing each other's ability to keep promises. A faculty member explained that conditions had improved because the second contract was much better than the first, union leaders were "not as hypersensitive" as they had been earlier, and "the administration had gained experience" in dealing with a unionized faculty.
A combination of an explicitly-structured governance system and low faculty-administration trust resulted in great emphasis on the formal relationships of academic governance at Rider. One faculty member indicated that the administration welcomed faculty unionization because it formalized lines of authority and decision making. It appeared that a cogent factor in the faculty's decision to unionize was dissatisfaction with the lack of formal procedures for any decision making, either by the faculty or by the administration. Both sides were careful to hold the other side to its contractual obligations, and this commitment to make the contract work built mutual respect, although not mutual trust, where distrust had been prior to unionization. The formal powers of the College Executive Committee were in question, but it remained evident that the faculty at Rider College had gained a substantial role in decision making as a result of their union contract.

Perceptions of Faculty Governance

It was the perception of both faculty and administrators that decision making at Rider College was less political and more democratic than before unionization. While the effectiveness of a segment of the faculty governance system was in question, the faculty had a clear, legally-enforceable right to make certain decisions at Rider College. Although conflict still existed at the college, an administrator explained, it related to matters of contract interpretation rather than large political issues. Power jurisdictions for departments, schools, college-wide committees, and the administration were clearly delineated, and formal decision-making policies, either incorporated in the
contract or as part of the Bylaws and Statutes of the college, were strictly adhered to.

**Contextual Factors Related to Faculty Governance.** As a private institution, Rider College escaped the influence of forces which affected governance at other unionized institutions examined by this study. The State Department of Higher Education had program approval for new degree programs, but otherwise, the State education bureaucracy had little power over Rider. While Rider's budget was directly dependent upon tuition income, the enrollment had not yet significantly declined at Rider, so faculty did not feel the direct threat to their jobs which faced faculty at other, less fortunate institutions. Since the union was a single campus bargaining unit, the campus union leadership could negotiate directly with the administration. Thus, most of the contextual factors in the Rider College study appeared to be internal matters.

The internal factor having probably the greatest influence on present-day faculty role in governance at Rider was the historical lack of formal faculty participation in academic governance. Proprietary, paternalistic presidents made unilateral decisions, and the faculty was unaccustomed to being consulted when decisions were made.

Growth and program diversification during the 1960's brought more faculty to Rider who were collegially-oriented, did some research, and expected to participate in governance. This change in institutional function was accompanied by a President whose ambition to quickly upgrade the faculty by making tenure contingent upon attainment of a terminal degree threatened the faculty. The amount of change over a relatively short period of time created extensive conflict on the campus.
The lack of trust between the faculty and administration was a third factor significant to the operationalizing of the academic governance system. Some of the dysfunctionality of the College Executive Committee was attributed to strained relations with the administration. The attitudes of faculty toward the administration seemingly prevented the establishment of informal union-administration relations such as those which existed on other campuses included in this study. The internal climate was one of caution and watchfulness on the part of both the faculty and its union, and the administration.

**Effect of Faculty Bargaining on Governance.** The contract between AAUP and Rider College dramatically changed governance procedures at Rider College. Where no faculty governance system had existed, with the exception of a senate, a structure was created to ensure the faculty a legitimate role in campus decision making. The grievance procedure was an important device for protecting this new structure, but the grievance procedure, in and of itself, was not the major change at Rider as it had been elsewhere.

One of the significant effects of faculty bargaining was a change in the roles of deans and department chairpersons. Although deans were now held more strictly accountable for the decisions they made, according to an administrator, they had the final say on fewer decisions. They were members of their School Promotion and Tenure Committee, but their vote was equal to a faculty member's vote. They met with their School Executive Committee, but the Committee had power in policy decisions which used to belong solely to the dean. The only "pure" power reserved to deans seemed to be budget allocations to departments.
The effect of unionization on the role of the department chairperson was less clear because of individual differences in the administrative styles of chairpersons. For individuals who had made unilateral decisions before unionization, that practice was no longer possible. The chairperson sat on the School Promotion and Tenure Committee, but had a vote no greater than any other member's. Faculty could now remove a chairperson if they wished (a procedure outlined in the contract), but before unionization this power did not exist. Chairpersons had enjoyed greater influence in salary decisions and scheduling decisions before the contract mandated salary scales and a structure for scheduling decisions. One faculty member called the chairperson more of a "conduit" between the faculty and the dean, for the chairperson's exercising of independent judgment had been reduced considerably. Although chairpersons were responsible for evaluating all faculty each year, these evaluations had little impact, for no classroom visits were made and evaluations were not used in promotion and tenure decisions. The powers which the contract gave the faculty were, to some degree, at the expense of the department chairperson.

Another effect of faculty bargaining upon governance was peculiar to Rider College, and its significance was rather unclear. The contract made no mention of the President whatsoever: he was not involved in promotion and tenure decisions, he was not a part of the grievance process, and he had no role in curricular decision making. The President was a member of the Board of Trustees, and probably was able to influence their vote in several areas, but he could be easily outvoted in any Trustee decision. The Academic Vice President was the final
administrative step in much of the decision making, and he had a voice in all faculty proposals which were submitted to the Board of Trustees. When asked the reason for excluding the President from the contract, an administrator replied that the intent was to "take him out of the middle of conflict," for it was "hard to sit at a conflict point and be a leader." Faculty informants, when asked about the President's role in academic governance, were unsure as to what role the President played. They perceived that the Academic Vice President controlled decision making at the administrative level. If conferring between the President and the Academic Vice President occurred, they were unaware of this practice.

Since the Rider contract created an "agency shop," and only three individuals had filed petitions as conscientious objectors, the vast majority of the faculty supported the union in terms of membership. Although only a small number of faculty were active in the union, all faculty informants interviewed supported the union and felt that it was the only alternative for the faculty because of their historical lack of decision-making power. All informants felt that unionization had "cleared the air" and, although little trust had been established, faculty and administration respected each other's power and attempted to operate within contractual guidelines. A few informants feared potential AAUP "encroachment" into academic decision making, especially if mechanisms for faculty governance which were independent of the union (for example, the College Executive Committee), did not assume strong leadership roles. Collegiality by contract was, so far, a qualified success at Rider College, with participants slowly becoming adjusted
to new powers, new constraints, and new roles in academic governance.

**GOVERNANCE AT TWO UNIONIZED LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGES**

The similarities in structure and function of these two liberal arts colleges were reflected in the similar effects of faculty bargaining in enfranchising faculties which had clearly been "deprived." Although the governance systems were somewhat different and internal conflict had arisen over different problems, the dramatic effect of unionization on the faculty's role was similar at Rider and Monmouth Colleges.

The histories of both institutions revealed faculties who had played no formal role, and an uneven informal role, in campus decision making. Because presidents of both institutions took a proprietary, paternalistic attitude toward "their" college, decisions were arbitrary, unilateral, and often capricious. Few external pressures, with the exception of declining enrollments, served to unify the faculty and administration against a common threat. Thus, when functional and structural change came to these colleges, conflict was contained internally and quickly became explosive.

The governance system at Rider reflected more of an influence from faculty unionization than did the governance system at Monmouth. Monmouth's Faculty Council and Educational Policy and Planning Committee existed independent of the contract, but the grievance procedure had given the faculty more "clout" to use these mechanisms to make decisions. No important institution-wide organizations survived the Rider faculty's unionization, to the dismay of some faculty. At Monmouth, a mechanism existed for regular faculty participation as a committee of the whole;
at Rider no such mechanism existed. While both institutions had faculty participation on college-wide promotion and tenure committees, Rider's committee included several administrators, while Monmouth's committee was composed only of faculty. At both institutions, faculty recommendations were respected by the President and/or Trustees, although promotion and tenure were much more difficult to acquire at Monmouth.

One difference related to peer review was evident. The union at Monmouth College had decided to eliminate department-level faculty peer review, leaving the first recommendation for promotion or tenure at the department chairperson's level. Many faculty did not support this plan, and it was not clear whether or not the Department Qualifications Committees would survive the next contract. Faculty at Rider were strong advocates of peer review in promotion and tenure decisions.

Unionization reduced the power of deans and department chairpersons at both colleges in promotion and tenure decisions. Ability to schedule and assign courses unilaterally was abolished by the contract. Curriculumal decisions were now in the faculty's hands. Department chairpersons were more accountable to their faculty colleagues than they had been before the contract was signed.

Faculty informants at both Rider and Monmouth agreed that faculty unionization had not affected students' role in decision making. At Rider, students were ex-officio members of all committees, but had no vote. They could also place signed letters in a faculty member's personnel file. At Monmouth, four students were voting members of the EPPC. Faculty at both colleges characterized students as apathetic, and reiterated that student role in decision making was independent of
unionization.

The informal cooperation between the union and the administration which existed at other institutions in this study did not exist at either Monmouth or Rider Colleges. The colleges were polarized as a result of conflict before unionization, during negotiations, and during the first few years of contract implementation. Although relationships under their second contracts were "improving," much distrust of the administration remained in faculty attitudes. Administrators seemed still to be resisting faculty participation in decisions which they considered to be "management prerogatives," such as the budget, even though they endorsed the faculty's role in curricular and other academic decisions. One administrator explained that, although "faculty should control program and degree requirements, in the management of the school . . . someone must be accountable for decisions. After all, faculty do nothing but teach here."

At both institutions, the faculty's right to participate formally in decision making was the direct result of unionization. Although top administrators had changed at each institution within a few years of unionization, faculty had had no structural rights to make decisions, and faculty committees existed at the pleasure of the President and Trustees. Although the unions protected faculty rights, they did not institutionalize trust and informal cooperation between faculty and administration. The absence of external forces which might have served to unite these two groups resulted in all conflict being generated over issues internal to the college. Unions were seen as potentially encroaching into academic matters because of relatively weak faculty
governance organizations. It was evident that the faculties at these two liberal arts colleges jealously guarded their new rights and responsibilities, and governance relationships were based upon formal power and lines of authority.
CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The multi-dimensional nature of academic governance makes the tracing of causes and effects of changes in governance procedures extremely complex, for a number of factors may be interacting, although their significance, interactive effects, and even their presence or absence may be difficult to detect. This study of the effect of faculty collective bargaining on governance in colleges and universities indicated that governance in a unionized institution of higher education is affected by much more than the content of the union contract. Institutional structure, especially in terms of program and degree offerings, size, complexity, type of support, and degree of state-level control over the institution, has an impact on governance. The structure of academic governance before collective bargaining helps to shape the governance system which emerges subsequent to unionization. Attitudes of administrators and faculty members toward both unionization and the legitimacy of the faculty's role in governance influence governance at a college or university. Informal power and influence relationships have an impact upon both the structure and function of any academic governance system, whether or not it is unionized. Governance on unionized campuses is also affected by the propensity for union leaders to use "traditional" labor devices such as grievances, arbitration and strikes. And finally, the history of each institution, particularly with reference to recent and rapid changes in structure, size and function, seems to play an
unquestionably significant role both in a faculty's decision to unionize and in the shape of the resulting governance system.

Although the data analyzed in this study were collected by several methods from institutions with differing structures, purposes, and types of control, several major findings are generalizable to all the institutions studied. This chapter will examine those major findings in relation to academic governance in general, and will note differential applicability of the findings where necessary. It will also list several findings generic to particular institution types. These findings produce conclusions and projections concerning the impact of bargaining on faculty role in governance and its implications for the short-range future of governance in unionized institutions.

It was noted in Chapter One that collective bargaining is an exchange process involving power and compromise. Blau's theory of power and social exchange will be reviewed as a framework for examining changes in governance relationships. Finally, evidence generated by the study and analysis of these data suggest several areas which merit further investigation.

Major Findings

The data analyzed by this study provided a broad range of findings concerning bargaining's effect upon faculty governance. Results in ten areas were generalizable across institution types and seemed worth noting. Several other findings were specific to one or two institution types. Not all the findings indicated extensive change in governance patterns, but all results were, to a degree at least, related to faculty
Faculty Participation in Governance. Unionization tends to strengthen faculty participation in institution-wide decision making. This change was found in all institutions, regardless of whether or not faculty had enjoyed a formal governance role before bargaining. At the two multiversities, decision making had been decentralized, and unionization tended to help strengthen faculty participation at the university level. Union contracts created mechanisms for college-wide governance at the two private colleges and one of the comprehensive colleges, and reinforced the active faculty senate at the other comprehensive college. Factors other than unionization, such as administrative encouragement of faculty participation, creation of ad hoc faculty policy committees, and a perceived increase in faculty desire for participative decision making, also contributed to this increase in faculty participation in institution-wide decision making. It is clear, however, that unionization legitimized and strengthened the faculty's role in decision making in an area previously dominated by the administration.

Influence of Pre-existing Governance System. While unionization has legitimated faculty participation in governance, this process has not necessarily resulted in dramatic change in governance patterns. In institutions where the pre-union faculty role in the governance system was strong, unionization has had little effect upon the structure or jurisdictions of extant faculty decision-making groups. However, unionization has enfranchised those faculties who had no formal role in governance, and contracts have created structures of committees and specific lines of authority. Multiversities at which faculty governance was
traditionally strong have tended to negotiate short, simple contracts which do not include many governance items, while contracts for comprehensive and private colleges tend to be much longer and more complex. The nature of the governance structure prior to unionization influences both the scope of the contracts which are negotiated and the structure of the governance system which follows unionization.

**Extent of Faculty Participation in Governance.** Although unionization legitimatized faculty participation in campus decision making, it did not tend to increase the number of faculty members participating in governance and, at at least one institution, actually decreased the number of faculty in decision-making roles. At many of the institutions studied, faculty members who had been active before unionization, either in a formal governance system or informally, tended to move into union leadership positions. Often, individuals held leadership positions in both the senate and the union. On campuses where the union abolished the senate, the potential for influence of the average faculty member in campus-wide decisions was lessened, for there was no mechanism for faculty participation except through the union. However, because of the disinclination of most faculty to participate in governance, as reported by faculty informants at each institution studied, there were opportunities for individuals to participate if they were willing to do so.

**Effect Upon Departmental Autonomy.** Although several writers have predicted that unionization would decrease departmental autonomy, this

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study showed that departments, and especially the faculty members within departments, gained power over decisions affecting their academic programs and their peers. Unionization did not change departmental autonomy over curriculum decisions, and usually strengthened the impact of departmental recommendations in promotion and tenure decisions. Budget constraints and system- and/or state-level centralization tended to restrict some departmental decisions, but these factors would very likely have been relevant irrespective of the unionized status of the faculty.

Effect on Role of the Chairperson. The study revealed that department chairpersons had lost the potential to make arbitrary and unilateral decisions, for they were now accountable to their faculty colleagues, who could remove them from office with relative ease. Most chairpersons indicated that they had always acted in a collegial and democratic fashion, and that unionization had not changed either the way in which they made decisions or the kinds of decisions they made. Because of more complex procedures for promotion and tenure decisions, added to paperwork involved with processing of faculty grievances, the burden of administration was probably heavier for chairpersons subsequent to unionization. The chairperson made very few "final" decisions as a result of bargaining, but the contract seemed to have had little effect on the day-to-day operations of an academic department.

Relationships Between Senates and Unions. Results of this study showed that the responsibilities of academic senates and unions seem to be separated, with senates addressing curricular matters and broad academic policy questions while unions focus on economic matters, working
conditions, and individual grievance adjudication. This situation appeared to be attributable to informal agreements between the leaders of the two groups, and its stability could be threatened by changes in the attitudes of the leaders or by external pressures (such as serious budget cuts or restrictive state-level personnel policies). Where senates were strong, unions appeared to be weak and were perceived by many faculty to be unnecessary. But unions appeared to have the ability to reinforce and protect the senate’s role in campus decision making. The relationship was fragile, and power balances, so dependent upon agreements between individuals in leadership positions, were in precarious equilibrium.

Effect on Power of Deans. This study clearly showed that deans lose power when faculties unionize. Although not all deans were arbitrary before faculty unionization, much of the dean’s power in pre-union days was informal, but nonetheless strong, for indifference and lack of accountability at higher administrative levels permitted the dean’s decisions to be unilateral, arbitrary, and final. Unionization removed the finality of many of the dean’s decisions, for the president and/or the trustees now had final accountability for personnel and budget decisions. Curricular decisions became the jurisdiction of the faculty, and the dean lost the right to select department chairpersons without consulting department faculty. For those deans who tended to make unilateral decisions, the signing of the contract made it very difficult for a dean

Although unionization destroyed senates at two of the six institutions studied, relationships between faculty senates and unions at the other campuses were fairly similar, and indicated that coexistence was possible and practicable.
to perpetrate any abuses which were possible before unionization.

**Presidential Attitude Toward Faculty Role in Governance.** Presidential attitude toward faculty role in governance was clearly an important factor both in the faculty's decision to unionize and in the nature of post-unionization relationships between administration and faculty. At all six institutions from which data were gathered, informants agreed that governance matters outranked salary in importance as a unionization issue, and at each of these campuses, the president who was in office just before unionization was seen by faculty informants as arbitrary, authoritarian, and disinclined to allow faculty participation in institutional-level decision making. New administrations which took office at five of the six campuses concurrently with the signing of the first contract were, for the most part, seen as more collegially-oriented. The considerable impact of presidential attitude toward faculty role in governance complicates an analysis of the effects of unionization. It is impossible to predict what changes a new president might have made in governance processes had the faculty not been unionized.

**Effect Upon Informal Influence.** Another area of interest in this study was the effect of faculty bargaining upon informal influence patterns, both within and outside the faculty governance structure. Two results were evident with respect to informal influence. First, individual influence relationships were weakened by unionization in areas where decision processes were stipulated by contract. For example, salary increases were standardized, not subject to attitudes of decision-makers toward individual faculty members. Because of the grievance system, decisions on promotion and tenure had to be defensible and documented, and
based on previously-specified criteria. Informal influence was still possible, and was practiced on a one-to-one basis between a faculty member and an administrator. But unionization required that the formal decision-making structure be used, and it was found to be nearly impossible to subvert that structure by personal influence.

Students and Faculty Bargaining. Writers have predicted that faculty bargaining would weaken students' power in governance and would dilute the quality of the faculty-student relationship if contracts specified minimum faculty responsibilities. Neither the reanalysis of the survey data nor the six case studies indicated a diminution of student power in governance. This finding may be more a result of the relatively minor governance role of students rather than of particular efforts by unions to safeguard student power. Relationships between faculty and students seemed to have remained fairly stable and appeared to be unrelated to unionization. Students were not a part of the bargaining process at any of these institutions, nor did they appear to be attempting to gain a voice at the bargaining table.

Increase in Bureaucratization. Although much disagreement exists concerning the effects of collective bargaining on faculty governance, all data analyzed confirmed the proposition that faculty unionization increases the number of rules and regulations, and is seen as having bureaucratizing influence on academic institutions. This finding is supported by the literature, for researchers cite the grievance procedure,

in particular, as being conducive to bureaucratization. With the possibility that decisions may be submitted to an external agent for binding arbitration, decisions must be documented carefully and extensive records must be kept. But unionization is not the only factor contributing to bureaucratization. Federal regulations require documentation of screening, selection and employment practices; public demand for accountability increases the need for systematic and careful decision making; and increasing centralization of higher education at the state level also has contributed to bureaucratization at colleges and universities, whether or not their faculties are unionized. It has become evident that much decision making in higher education is no longer a matter of individual discretion, but of compliance with regulations, contractual provisions, institutional policies, and past practices which have been determined, often by an outside arbitrator, to be precedental.

Generic Findings. Data collected in case studies of individual institutions revealed findings specific to certain institution types. Changes in faculty governance patterns were nearly unnoticeable at the multiversities, and the first priority of faculties at these institutions seemed to be combating interference by state-level agencies. Although comprehensive colleges were more subject to the will of state agencies than were multiversities, faculties at comprehensive colleges focused on internal governance matters, apparently having less concern

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about preserving local campus autonomy than did their multiversity colleagues. These differences were probably explained by the considerable differences in faculty participation before unionization at both of these institution types. Since structured faculty participation in governance at comprehensive colleges was relatively new, the faculty apparently was more interested in internal governance matters at these institutions.

A finding which was somewhat surprising concerned department chairpersons at the private liberal arts colleges. Because chairpersons were not bargaining unit members, it was speculated that their role, their relationship with faculty, and their methods of administering the department might show marked differences from the roles of chairpersons at institutions where bargaining units included chairpersons. However, chairpersons at both private institutions agreed that their bargaining unit status was nearly irrelevant, both to the manner in which they administered their department, and to the nature of the chairperson's relationships with his or her faculty colleagues.

The results of these findings showed that faculty unionization resulted in some change in governance structures, especially at institutions where faculty had not formally participated in governance. However, the effects of faculty bargaining seemed to cause more change for administrators than for faculty. Many faculty were relatively untouched by unionization, for departments were pre-eminent in curriculum decisions and a small group of activist faculty ran the union and the senate. A faculty member could easily teach class, conduct research, and carry out his or her other professional activities without feeling any direct
Impact of unionization except, perhaps, in a salary increase. Administrators have lost power at middle management levels (department chairpersons and deans) and have lost much of their previous discretionary decision-making prerogatives at higher administrative levels. They are constrained by the contract as well as other external forces to follow specific policies, to be accountable for decisions, and to defend decisions with which a faculty group disagrees. They may not discuss matters related to working conditions with any individuals except union leaders, and must work through the governance structure established by contract. While faculty may go about their professional duties nearly oblivious to the faculty union, no administrator has the right, or the opportunity, to ignore the presence of the faculty union.

Conclusions and Projections

The findings of both the survey data and the six case studies have created a pattern from which projections may be made related to future developments in unionized faculty governance. These conclusions and projections rest on the assumption that funds for higher education, both public and private, will continue to be limited, that state governing and coordinating agencies will continue to attempt to centralize policy making for higher education, and that public pressure for accountability will remain stable or will increase. Assuming the continuation of these external pressures, faculty unionization, which has been called a conservative, defensive act, will probably spread to

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other campuses and will remain in effect on campuses which are now unionized. With increasing unionization and continuing external pressure, conclusions and projections in at least eight areas related to faculty governance may be made.

Encroachment of Unions. Research results showed that unions and senates were coexisting somewhat peacefully, but this coexistence was unstable. Relying upon overlapping leadership and collegial friendship patterns, senate and union jurisdictions were not formally defined. Senates were strong on campuses where unions allowed them to exist and supported their role in decision making. Unions also served as a protective device to ensure senate viability, particularly on campuses where external forces were not seen as direct threats.

But a large budget cut, threatened retrenchment, a state-level decision to abolish tenure, or a number of other sweeping changes could easily disturb this mutually cooperative senate/union relationship. In the face of serious external interference, a union might assert its exclusive right to represent the faculty on matters related to conditions of employment, and could easily destroy the senate as an effective mechanism for faculty decision making. Responses of interview informants indicated that the union was "watching" the senate and other faculty governance groups, and would not hesitate to usurp the senate's decision authority if conditions were serious enough to warrant such a coup. Faculty members could prevent such a takeover by the union, but it is doubtful whether, faced with possible job loss or economic hardship, a faculty would think first to rescue its senate. 6 Few senates

are formally mentioned in union contracts; those which were could be written out of the next contract as easily as they had been included. Although union-senate relationships appear to be stable and cooperative, the potential for destruction of the senate by the union is significant.

Unions and Institution Budgets. Results of research at several unionized institutions revealed that unions were attempting to gain a voice in budgetary decision-making. Union leaders felt that faculty should be represented in allocation of institutional funds. It appears that unions will probably gain more of a voice in budget decisions, either by making this area part of a negotiated contract, or by using a mechanism such as "Meet and Discuss" sessions to force the administration to share budget information. At one of the six institutions studied, a faculty committee (non-union) already has a review role in the budget process (although it is not clear whether or not this committee has veto power over budget decisions). The tendency for unions to attempt to influence budget decisions in the near future is unmistakable.

Union-Administration Cooperation. In three of the four public institutions, evidence of cooperation was found between the union and the administration against external forces. With shrinking funds for higher education, state education agencies may increase their attempts

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7 Specifically, informants at Temple University, East Stroudsburg State College, and Rider College indicated that unions had made concerted efforts to enter the budgetary decision-making process.

8 In New Jersey, union-administration cooperation at Rutgers University and Trenton State College was evident; in Pennsylvania, the administration and the union at Temple University were found to be working together to defend against legislative and state education agency attempts to influence governance (see Chapters 5 and 6).
to centralize and standardize policy making, reducing local campus autonomy. Union leaders and administrators will probably continue to work cooperatively to retain a measure of local autonomy. This cooperation may, at times, become cooptation, as each side accommodates the needs of the other in an attempt to present a united front to external agents. This partial cooptation may reduce intra-institutional conflict, since external agents such as state education agencies and coordinating boards may be seen as more subversive of faculty governance power than is the administration.

**Effects of Retrenchment.** At the six institutions from which the case study data were collected, no retrenchment of tenured faculty had yet occurred. Union leaders expressed considerable concern about the results of any efforts to retrench tenured faculty, even though contracts at all six institutions contained at least a minimal retrenchment plan. They felt that any retrenchment actions resulting in lay-offs of tenured faculty would tear the institution apart and would destroy whatever trust had been established between faculty and administrators.

It is difficult to predict whether or not retrenchment of tenured faculty will occur at unionized institutions. Decreases in enrollment with concomitant drops in funding would seemingly necessitate retrenchment and, as was noted in earlier chapters, few junior faculty may be left to bear the brunt of reductions in force. Retrenchment of tenured faculty appears to be likely, assuming that present economic conditions for higher education will continue or will worsen. If retrenchment comes, it will be the biggest challenge that the union has faced. It is doubtful that, if the administration could convincingly prove financial
exigency, a union could prevent retrenchment of tenured faculty.

Professional Administrators. Data from this study and from earlier research have indicated that faculty bargaining tends to dichotomize, to polarize, faculty and administration.\(^9\) Many union contracts make faculty rank coterminous with bargaining unit membership, effectively excluding administrators from both.\(^10\) As more rules and formalized decision-making procedures become the norm, faculty members may see administration as inherently non-collegial, and may decide not to enter administration as they once did. Polarization of faculty and administrators may also inhibit administrators from returning to faculty status.

It has been suggested that technical knowledge is necessary to administer a union contract, and that specialists might replace general administrators as faculties organized.\(^11\) But case study data and related research tended to emphasize the polarizing effect of bargaining as leading to the development of the professional administrator. Mortimer refers to the emergence of the "technocratic administrators," a result which he attributes to the tendency of unionization to clarify and separate administrative and faculty roles, more formal standards of accountability, and the recognition that administrative and faculty values


\(^{10}\) This restriction applies from the level of the dean up through the president and includes all supervisory administrators. At multiversities, administrators with faculty rank were allowed to keep that rank, but were not members of the bargaining unit. However, at one of the comprehensive colleges and at both private liberal arts colleges, faculty either refused or were reluctant to permit administrators to hold faculty rank.

\(^{11}\) See Chapter Four, pp. 115-123.
may not always correspond. It was noted earlier in this chapter that faculty unionization had, so far, affected the administration to a greater extent than it had the faculty. This finding points to a change in the nature of administration in higher education, and to a professionally-trained "technocrat" rather than an academic colleague who is "first among equals."

Faculty Participation in Governance. Data from both the case studies and the Kemerer and Baldridge survey indicated that unionization does not tend to increase faculty participation in governance. It was asserted earlier that unions will probably acquire more power as financial pressures and state-level centralization efforts continue. Powerful unions tend to reduce or destroy faculty participation in non-union governance organizations. A continually-tightening job market may increase the average faculty member's disinclination to participate in governance activities. Thus, the combination of continuing external pressures, tendency for unions to gain power, and the widely-documented apathy of many faculty members in relation to governance activity will result in decreased faculty participation in governance.


Students and Faculty Unions. The lack of a student role in academic governance at most colleges and universities was documented by the six case studies and was supported by the survey data. Because students have little power, they appear to be relatively unaffected by faculty unionization. Many informants indicated that the potential for student power on campus was considerable, and that apathy and lack of organization undermined the students' role in governance. However, tightening job markets for college graduates and increasing tuition may incite students to demand a stronger role in campus decision making. Should this occur, the probability of conflict between faculty unions and students is considerable. As unions gain power over more areas of campus decision making, and if students become aggressive in seeking power, conflict will undoubtedly erupt.

Roles of Chairpersons and Deans. It has been stated that administrators at central levels will very likely become "professional" rather than "academic" administrators. Whether in or out of the bargaining unit, chairpersons' roles seemed to be relatively unchanged by unionization. It would seem that, based upon past evidence, chairpersons at institutions which are divided into schools or colleges with their own deans will probably remain faculty first, and administrators secondarily. At institutions at which the insulating organizational layer of the deanship is not present, the chairperson may become somewhat more of an administrator.

The role of the dean has changed and will very likely continue to change as faculty unions persist. At many unionized institutions, deans are primarily budget managers, facilitators of faculty governance.
activities, and implementers of faculty decisions. It would seem that deans will retain their budget management responsibilities, but may lose some of their influence on budget allocation decisions. They may become implementers rather than leaders, although individual characteristics of deans and informal relations between the dean and faculty will continue to determine, to a great extent, the amount of the dean's influence over decision making.

Faculty Bargaining, Power, and Exchange

It was suggested earlier\(^\text{14}\) that the Blau theory of power and social exchange might provide a useful framework for analysis of faculty bargaining and its effect upon academic governance. The Blau theory cites lengthy and specialized training as the source of professional expectations for autonomy, self-enforced professional norms and standards, and the formation of colleague groups which supervise and control the profession.\(^\text{15}\) Because professionals are guided by norms, rather than contracts, the exchange process is informal and entails unspecified obligations (p. 315). Because there is no contract mandating working conditions or behavior, Blau writes, relationships based on social exchange require trust; "the mutual trust between committed exchange partners encourages them to engage in a variety of transactions--to exchange advice, help, social support, and companionship--and these diffuse

\(^{14}\)See Chapter One, p. 12.

transactions give the partnership some intrinsic significance" (p. 315).

But when demand is low for professional expertise and external forces threaten to reduce professional autonomy and strain professional norms (p. 161), a relationship based upon trust is less secure than one formalized by contract. Rewards become extrinsic, social exchange relationships become power relationships (p. 315), and the mutually-reinforcing colleague group becomes formalized into superiors with reward power and subordinates who work to obtain rewards (pp. 22, 205).

This framework provides an effective tool to examine the effect of collective bargaining on faculty governance. This study and earlier research have demonstrated several ways in which social exchange relationships have become power relationships between faculty and administration. Individual bargaining power for salaries, favorable work assignments, or preferential personnel decisions has eroded; a group of professional peers and, ultimately, the president or trustees, have formal power and must follow contractual procedures. Special treatment for special situations may be disallowed by the contract (such as extending the contract of a visiting professor to allow a regular faculty member to go on leave). On many campuses, the union is the only legal spokesperson for all faculty; no minority viewpoints or individual objections are entertained. The source of the faculty's power is their group strength.


and while individual autonomy may remain, it can be easily superseded by the will of the majority. Data collected in this study indicated a measure of distrust on the part of faculty toward the administration, for the faculty believed that the administration did not always act in the interest of the faculty.18

The Blau theory is useful to help describe the effects of imposing a formalized, contractual relationship upon a system of social exchange relationships based upon trust and shared professional norms. It also helps to explain the militancy which results when job markets for faculty tighten and professional expertise is devalued. But the theory cannot predict where collective bargaining will occur, since many non-unionized institutions face the same financial constraints which encouraged unionization at other colleges and universities. Neither can the theory predict why collegial and trust relationships seem healthy at unionized institutions such as Temple University and Trenton State College, while relationships between faculty and administrators at other unionized institutions are characterized by distrust and mutual watchfulness. Thus, the Blau theory is useful as a framework for describing very general changes in the nature of relationships among faculty, and between faculty and administration. Its predictive ability, however, is less successful.

18 Although faculty distrust of administrative intent differed by institution, this distrust existed, to some extent, at all six institutions visited.
Implications and Suggestions for Future Study

Because collective bargaining is a dynamic social process, it is heavily dependent upon the characteristics of the individuals involved, the specific nature of the conflict, and the norms and values held by faculty and administrators prior to unionization. Because of the importance of these interrelating and variable factors, it is difficult to construct survey instruments which will measure or even identify important components of the phenomenon of faculty collective bargaining and its effect upon academic governance.

In order to understand better relevant variables in unionized governance systems, at least seven areas should be examined. Institutional history provides important background on past practices and reasons for faculty unionization. The effect of external agencies on institutional governance is critical to analysis of present governance practices. Research has shown that the attitude of the president toward faculty participation in governance just prior to unionization is important to understanding the current governance system at an institution. Informal union-senate and union-administration relationships add an important dimension to a study of the formal governance structure; this knowledge complements an assessment of loci of formal and informal decision making. Changes in roles of decision makers (such as deans) merit attention, as well as the arrival of a new administration with new ideas and its effect upon faculty role in governance. All of these variables confound any attempt to trace causality to unionization in any study of changes in academic governance structures or systems.
Research by individuals such as Begin in New Jersey and Mortimer in Pennsylvania has begun to describe systematically structural changes related to faculty bargaining and has examined the effect of state-level education agencies upon local autonomy and decision-making processes. But little research has been reported in the following areas:

1. Senate-union relationships, with special attention to overlap of leadership and friendship patterns among leaders of both these organizations.

2. Union-administration relationships, which would include a) informal cooperation during times between contracts and b) formalized cooperation (or cooperation) in defense against centralizing actions of state-level agencies.

3. Relationship between the state's enabling legislation, the content of contracts negotiated within the state, and the implementation and interpretation of those contracts.

4. Attitudes of presidents and other top administrators in dealing with both senates and unions.

5. Multiple loci of decision power within institutions.

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6. Trust relationships between faculty and administrators, and between unions and senates.

7. Changes in individual rights and autonomy of faculty members.

The projections described in an earlier section of this chapter could easily be transformed into hypotheses. Further study of these projections and hypotheses, however, would be substantially enhanced by analysis of variables in the seven areas described above.

The variables described above are not easily measured, irrespective of the methodology selected. Case studies provide useful data, but are time-consuming and expensive. Survey instruments are of limited utility, for they do not provide an opportunity to probe into areas which require intensive examination. Because survey instruments must be constructed on the basis of earlier research and the limited knowledge of the investigator, relevant variables which have not been identified earlier may be missed. The dynamics of individuals discussing a social process often produce serendipitous connections between variables which might not occur if structured surveys were used alone. It was evident that the many differences between institutional histories and characters, and the individual dynamics of each collective bargaining situation required site visitation, document study, and in-depth interviews to provide even a minimal understanding of the effect of faculty bargaining upon academic governance.

Summary

Institutions of higher education historically have been characterized by diversity, fragmentation, and ambiguous power and authority
relationships. Faculty collective bargaining is an attempt to institutionalize power relationships in order to protect academic values which were once protected by shared professional values and mutual trust. Traditional governance patterns, where they existed, worked because there was a "readily identifiable commonality of purpose among participants in the governance process, at least the appearance of participation satisfying to most... [and] loyalty to the process which causes participants to be loyal to the decisions reached." The coexistence of senates and unions at many institutions attests to the survival of the professional norms which characterized faculty role in governance, where it existed, before unionization.

There is little doubt that faculties have either gained or maintained a powerful role in institutional decision making as a result of unionization, and that it is ultimately the faculty who will support or destroy traditional governance mechanisms at unionized campuses. Now that these fundamental effects have been confirmed, attention should be turned to the quality of governance relationships at unionized institutions. This and other studies have indicated that the faculty and the administration have the capacity to build a governance system which, although it may not represent the optimal solution for either side, will be mutually satisfactory as a mechanism for addressing the problems of governing institutions of higher education.

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20 Platt and Parsons in Kruytbosch and Messinger, p. 141.

## APPENDIX A

### LIST OF INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT VARIABLES

#### Independent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Institution Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Multiversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Public college/university</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Liberal arts college</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Union head</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Geographical range of union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Single campus union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Multi-campus union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Age of Senate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of years in existence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Age of Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of years in existence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Senate and union influence over decisions made in four areas: (Hypothesis 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a.</td>
<td>Academic (also Hypotheses 11, 12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admissions policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curriculum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree requirements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b.</td>
<td>Personnel (also Hypothesis 10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty hiring policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty promotions and tenure policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty salaries and fringe benefits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faculty working conditions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department budgets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long range planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Level of Measurement

- Independent Variables: Nominal
- Dependent Variables: Ordinal (Low = 1, High = 5)
2. Three areas of administrative concern: (Hypotheses 2, 3, 4)
   a. Increase the power of the administration at the expense of the faculty
   b. Greater influence on campus decision makers by outside agencies
   c. Specialists such as lawyers and management specialists will replace generalists in campus administration

3. Five areas of faculty concern: (Hypotheses 5, 6)
   a. Reduction of differences between junior and senior faculty on issues such as salary, work load
   b. Increase in voice of average faculty member in academic policy matters
   c. Democratization of decision making
   d. More equitable personnel decision making
   e. Safeguarding of academic freedom

4. Student role in academic governance: (Hypothesis 7)
   a. Decrease of student influence in decision making
   b. Students should have the right to bargain collectively

5. Attitudes regarding quality: (Hypothesis 8)
   Agreement or disagreement with the statement: "Collective bargaining will help improve the quality of educational services on campus."

6. Attitude toward collective bargaining: (Hypothesis 9)
   Agreement or disagreement with the statement: "The recent growth of faculty collective bargaining is beneficial and should be encouraged in higher education."

7. Strength of governance structures prior to collective bargaining: (Hypothesis 13)
   Importance of weakness of existing faculty governance structures for promoting collective bargaining on campus.
8. Increase in bureaucratization:  
(Hypothesis 14)  
a. Formalization of relationships between faculty and administration  
b. Greater specificity of employment rules and regulations  

Ordinal (Strongly)  
Agree = 1  
Strongly  
Disagree = 5
MAILING LIST UPDATE

If the name, title, or address on the envelope is incorrect, please give correct information here. If they are correct, please leave blank.

Name: ____________________________________________

Title: ______________________________________________

Address: __________________________________________

SECTION ONE: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

We are interested in the amount of collective bargaining activity over wages and working conditions on your campus. (Please circle one answer for each employee group.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No organized bargaining group</th>
<th>Some negotiation with informal groups: no major effort to obtain informal collective bargaining</th>
<th>Informal negotiations and serious effort to obtain formal collective bargaining</th>
<th>Some formally elected groups which &quot;meet and confer&quot; (but do not negotiate contracts) with administration</th>
<th>Formally elected collective bargaining units negotiating contracts for majority of these employees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[50] Teaching faculty (excluding TA's)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[57] Teaching Assistants</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[53] Non-Teaching Professionals (Librarians, Counselors)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[50] Non-academic staff (secrearies, maintenance, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Is the teaching faculty at your campus represented by an exclusive bargaining agent that negotiates binding contracts?

1. No [Please skip to Section Two: Factors Affecting Faculty Bargaining]
2. Yes [Please answer the following questions]

(61) When was this bargaining unit voted in? (Check one)
1. Before 1968
2. 1968
3. 1969
4. 1970
5. 1971
6. 1972
7. 1973
8. 1974
What other employees besides teaching faculty does the bargaining unit include in its membership? (Circle Yes or No)

(62) 1. Yes 2. No Teaching Assistants
(63) 1. Yes 2. No Non-teaching professionals (librarians, counselors, researchers)
(64) 1. Yes 2. No Non-academic staff (secretaries, maintenance)
(65) 1. Yes 2. No Other (Please specify)

Affiliation of your faculty bargaining unit. (Check one)

(66) 1. AAUP
2. NEA or affiliate
3. AFT (AFL-CIO) or affiliate
4. State, county, or local organization not affiliated with above groups
5. Independent

Does your bargaining unit represent (Check one)

(67) 1. Only this specific campus
2. A number of colleges in your state system

What percent of the bargaining unit is presently either holding membership in your union, or paying dues or fees in lieu of membership? (Check one)

(68) 1. Under 30%
2. Between 30% and 50%
3. Between 51% and 75%
4. Over 75%

In your opinion, how has faculty collective bargaining affected the following areas of your institution?

[Check one for each area]

1. The power of the administration
2. The need for specialized administrative manpower (e.g., lawyers)
3. Formalization of relations between faculty and administration
4. Influence of faculty over administrative issues
5. Power of off-campus state central agencies
6. Influence of faculty senate or similar faculty bodies

SECTION TWO: FACTORS AFFECTING FACULTY BARGAINING

Regardless of whether you have faculty collective bargaining on your campus, please give your opinion about the importance of the following factors for promoting it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>On My Campus</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[75] DESIRE FOR HIGHER WAGES</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[76] JOB SECURITY</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Many colleges or universities have associations that deal with educational policy for the whole institution. Usually these are called "senates," "councils," or "assemblies." Sometimes the entire faculty acts as a body, but often there is some type of subgroup. Please answer these questions about this body on your campus. (We use the terminology "senate" but adjust title for your Institution.)

**SECTION THREE: SENATES**

(24) Do you have such a decision-making body?
1. Yes 2. No

(25) Did you ever have such an organization before?
1. Yes 2. No
If yes, why was it discontinued?

(26) Are you presently planning for such a body?
1. Yes 2. No

(27) If yes, when do you think it will start?
Within the year 1.  
Within 3 years 2.  
Longer 3. 

(Please go on to SECTION FOUR: INFLUENCE)
What faculty are on the Senate? (Check one that applies.)

(20) 1. All faculty
     2. Tenured faculty only
     3. Elected subgroup of faculty
     4. Appointed subgroup of faculty: Who appoints?
     5. Some other combination—please explain.

Are other groups on the Senate? (Circle Yes/No for each group.)

(22) Students 1. Yes 2. No
(23) Trustees 1. Yes 2. No
(24) Non-academic staff 1. Yes 2. No
(25) Administration 1. Yes 2. No

If you think the items checked above would not give a good idea of your senate's composition, please comment on it.

Approximately how long has the senate been on your campus?

(23) 1. 1-4 years
     2. 5-8 years
     3. 0-12 years
     4. Over 12 years

SECTION FOUR: INFLUENCE ON DECISIONS

How much influence does the faculty collective Bargaining Unit and Senate have on these issues, at your institution?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Not Applicable, Don't have one</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADMISSIONS POLICY</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargaining Unit</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>CURRICULUM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bargaining Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEGREE REQUIREMENTS</td>
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<td>Senate</td>
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<td>Collective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bargaining Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEPARTMENT BUDGETS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bargaining Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>FACULTY HIRING POLICIES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bargaining Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACULTY PROMOTIONS AND TENURE POLICIES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
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<td>Collective</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bargaining Unit</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACULTY SALARIES AND FRINGE BENEFITS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Collective</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargaining Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION FIVE: LIKELY CONSEQUENCES OF FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Whether you have collective bargaining on your campus or not, please indicate your opinion on these items:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHERE IT OCCURS, FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WILL:</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(52) formalize relationships between faculty and administration</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(53) result in greater specificity of employment rules and regulations</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(54) increase the power of the administration at the expense of the faculty</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(55) decrease the influence of students in decision making</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(56) improve the accountability and responsiveness of the institution to the community it serves</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(57) result in more conflict in the governance process</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(58) increase the effectiveness of institutional governance on your campus</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(59) help improve the quality of educational services on campus</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(60) reduce the difference between junior and senior faculty on issues such as salary, work load</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(61) undermine the influence of faculty senate or other established decision bodies</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(62) increase the voice of the average faculty member in academic policy matters</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(63) democratize decision making by allowing junior faculty to play a greater role</td>
<td>1 2 3 4 5</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### WHERE IT OCCURS, FACULTY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WILL:

1. **(64)** result in more equitable personnel decision making (e.g., who gets "tenure, who is laid off or" promoted)  
   
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **(65)** result in greater influence on campus decision making by outside agencies (e.g., arbitrators, courts, or state agencies)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3. **(66)** cause specialists such as lawyers and management specialists to replace generalists in campus administration  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SECTION SIX: OPINION ITEMS

1. **(67)** The recent growth of faculty collective bargaining is beneficial and should be encouraged in higher education.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **(68)** The strike is a legitimate tactic for faculties to use in bargaining.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. **(69)** If faculties bargain collectively, then students should have the right as well.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **(70)** I prefer binding arbitration as a strategy for settling disputes.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **(71)** Collective bargaining will help safeguard faculty rights and academic freedom.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. **(72)** Collective bargaining in public institutions will stimulate greater faculty concern about state and local politics.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SECTION SEVEN: BACKGROUND

Community: Where is your institution located? (Check one)

1. ______ Large city or its suburb (over 500,000)
2. ______ Medium city or its suburb (100,000 to 500,000)
3. ______ Small city or its suburb (35,000 to 100,000)
4. ______ Town (under 35,000)
5. ______ Primarily rural area

Financial Resources: For the 1972-73 fiscal year, estimate the percentage of your institution's total income that came from the following sources. Combined sources should total 100%.

[74, 75] ______ State funds
[76, 77] ______ Local district funds
[78, 79] ______ Federal funds: Research grants
[80, 81] ______ Federal funds: Program grants
[82, 83] ______ Foundations
[84, 85] ______ Alumni gifts and other gifts
[86, 87] ______ Endowment and investments
[88, 89] ______ Tuition and fees
[90, 91] ______ Church*

100% Total

*Church: If applicable, please estimate any "contributed" services or "deferred services" where clergy provide services otherwise counted as a budgeted salary item.

Enrollment/Application Ratio: Please write in the approximate numbers.

[22, 23, 24, 25] ______ Total number of new undergraduate students enrolled in 1972-73
[26, 27, 28, 29] ______ All complete undergraduate applications for admission 1972-73
SECTION EIGHT: INSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS TO SYSTEMS

(30) Is your institution part of a state or local system of colleges e.g., local community college system, state college network, complex university system? (Check one)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO:</th>
<th>YES: Member of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. We are a private institution.</td>
<td>3. Community college system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. We are public, but not part of a system.</td>
<td>4. State college system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. State university system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Combined college and university system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please answer the following questions: (Check one category beside each question.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence ratings</th>
<th>Uniform policies across system; all institutions must follow</th>
<th>System largely decides, but on campus by campus basis</th>
<th>Balanced situation: System has strong influence, but local campus has real input</th>
<th>System advises and is consulted, but local campus has strongest influence</th>
<th>Local campus officers largely decide; virtually independent of system</th>
<th>Not applicable to my campus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(31) Selecting president (or chancellor, etc.)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(32) Selecting dean of a major school/college</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(33) Selecting department head/chairman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(34) Setting promotion/tenure policies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(35) Setting faculty salary scales</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(36) Setting institutional overall budget</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(37) Capital expansion/plant planning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(38) Long-range program planning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(39) Starting/discontinuing academic department</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(40) Setting undergraduate admissions policies</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(41) Determining size of graduate programs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(42) Setting faculty work loads (number courses)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion Questions</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(43) Our system has a strong concern about per student costs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(44) System's cost accounting is flexible in adjusting to academic needs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>(45) Educational innovation is actually stimulated by system activities</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(46) The local campus administrator is virtually a powerless middleman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47) System interference is so strong most important decisions are made off campus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(48) System management is increasing all the time</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the past four years, how has your Institution's financial situation changed?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Considerably Worse</th>
<th>Slightly Worse</th>
<th>About the same</th>
<th>Slightly Improved</th>
<th>Considerably Improved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(40) General overall condition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(50) Rate of increase in faculty salaries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(51) Support of educational programs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(52) Student's financial support</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(53) Capital building programs</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From all sources (tuition, endowment, research grants, etc.), what was the TOTAL INCOME of your Institution in 1972-73?

(54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63) TOTAL

If your Institution has services contributed by clergy that do not show up in the above total income figure, please estimate the money value of those services in 1972-73.

(64) (Check) __ Question does not apply.

OR

(65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71) (Write in) __________ Estimate of total contributions

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!
APPENDIX C

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW INSTRUMENTS

SURVEY OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND GOVERNANCE

Faculty Questionnaire
(for senate and union leaders)

1. PERSONAL DATA

1. How long have you been employed at this institution?

2. Do you hold or have you held an administrative position at this institution?

3. Are you tenured?

4. What is the nature of your participation in academic governance?
   Are you
   a. A union member
   b. Active or inactive in the union
   c. A senate member
   d. Active or inactive in the senate
   e. A member of other important governance committees

II. INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL DECISIONS

1. What group or individual has greatest power in these decisions:
   a. Faculty appointments
   b. Promotion and tenure
   c. Adding a course or program
   d. Fringe benefits for faculty
   e. Budgets for departments
   f. Undergraduate admissions policy
   g. Degree requirements

   Are any of the above a change as a result of unionization?

2. How representative are your major governance groups? What is the amount of participation (number of those who participate vs. number who could participate), and what is the distribution of individuals who participate (age, rank, discipline):
   a. Union
   b. Senate
   c. Other Important governance groups (specify)
3. Do union leaders participate in senate decisions?
   a. Informally (how?)
   b. Formally (how?)

4. Are administrators members of the senate?

5. Do administrators participate actively in the senate?

6. Do administrators attempt to influence senate decisions? How?

7. Do governance groups attempt to influence outside agencies or boards by any of these methods?
   a. Lobbying
   b. Appeals to professional associations
   c. Appeals to accrediting agencies
   d. Appeals to state or higher level coordinating boards
   e. Use of media

8. What are the relationships between the administration and the following governance groups? (adversary, neutral, cooperative)
   a. Union
   b. Senate
   c. Other Important groups (specify)

9. What is the general level of influence on campus issues of the following:
   (considerable influence, some influence, little influence)
   a. Union
   b. Senate

III. MEMBERSHIP EXPECTATIONS

1. Are you generally satisfied with
   a. Your salary
   b. Your teaching load
   c. The institution's personnel policies
   d. The institution's academic policies
2. What are your possibilities for advancement?
   a. Poor
   b. Equivocal
   c. Good
   d. Don't know

3. How effective is your faculty governance system? Where is it weak? What are its strengths?

4. In general, how effective is the administration on your campus?

5. Since unionization, do you feel that more junior faculty are participating in governance? Are more faculty in general participating in governance?

6. Do you feel that decision making in general is more democratic now than prior to collective bargaining? Why?

7. How much support would one receive for a faculty strike over the following issues from the average faculty member?
   a. General Issues
   b. Over salary
   c. Over evaluation/promotion policies
   d. Over "academic" policies

IV. STRUCTURE OF DECISION MAKING

1. What is the students' role in decision making on your campus? Has it changed since unionization? How?

2. Is your governance structure more formalized now than prior to unionization?
3. Has there been a change in the nature of decisions, or the number of
decisions, made by faculty groups since unionization? Examples?

V. INTERNAL FACTORS

1. Is there a difference, since unionization, in the relationships between
faculty and administrators?

2. Do students have more, less, or the same power as before unionization?

3. Did you have academic or political "stars" prior to unionization?
Has this changed since unionization--any changes in their role or
power?

4. Is the senate more responsive now than prior to unionization? Are
decisions quicker, or is the senate more proactive? Why?

5. What kinds of issues elicit widespread interest among faculty--academic,
economic, personnel, other? Has this changed since unionization?

6. Do you feel that, in terms of personal influence over governance, you
have more, the same, or less since unionization? How about the average
faculty member?

7. Is it possible to influence decisions by personal, rather than structural
means? Has there been a change in an individual's ability to wield
personal influence since unionization?
SURVEY OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND GOVERNANCE

Faculty Questionnaire
(for faculty not active in governance)

1. PERSONAL DATA

1. How long have you been employed at this institution?

2. Do you hold or have you held an administrative position at this institution?

3. Are you tenured?

4. What is the nature of your participation in academic governance?
   Are you
   a. A union member
   b. Active or inactive in the union
   c. A senate member
   d. Active or inactive in the senate
   e. A member of other important governance committees

II. DEPARTMENTAL DECISIONS

1. Are departmental decisions "final" or advisory on:
   a. Curriculum
   b. Promotion and tenure
   c. Merit pay
   d. Class load, advising matters, office hours

2. In general, are departmental decisions made
   a. By the department as a whole
   b. By senior faculty
   c. By the chairperson
   d. By standing committees

3. What is your influence in departmental decisions?
   a. Less than my colleagues
   b. The same as my colleagues
   c. More than my colleagues
III. MEMBERSHIP EXPECTATIONS

1. Are you generally satisfied with
   a. Your salary
   b. Your teaching load
   c. The institution's personnel policies
   d. The institution's academic policies

2. What are your possibilities for advancement?
   a. Poor
   b. Equivocal
   c. Good
   d. Don't know

3. How effective is your faculty governance system?
   Where is it weak? What are its strengths?

4. In general, how effective is the administration on your campus?

5. Since unionization, do you feel that more junior faculty are participating in governance? Are more faculty in general participating in governance?

6. Do you feel that decision making in general is more democratic now than prior to collective bargaining? Why?

7. How much support would one receive for a faculty strike over the following issues from the average faculty member?
   a. General issues
   b. Salary
   c. Evaluation/promotion policies
   d. "Academic" policies
IV. INTERNAL FACTORS

1. Is there a difference, since unionization, in the relationships between faculty and administrators?

2. Do students have more, less, or the same power as before unionization?

3. Did you have academic or political "stars" prior to unionization? Has this changed since unionization—any changes in their role or power?

4. Is the senate more responsive now than prior to unionization? Are decisions quicker, or is the senate more proactive? Why?

5. What kinds of issues elicit widespread interest among faculty—academic, economic, personnel, other? Has this changed since unionization?

6. Do you feel that, in terms of personal influence over governance, you have more, the same, or less since unionization? How about the average faculty member?

7. Is it possible to influence decisions by personal, rather than structural means? Has there been a change in an individual’s ability to wield personal influence since unionization?
SURVEY OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND GOVERNANCE

Questionnaire for Chairpersons

I. DEPARTMENTAL DECISIONS

1. Are departmental decisions "final" or advisory on:
   a. Curriculum
   b. Promotion and tenure
   c. Merit pay
   d. Class load, advising matters, office hours

2. In general, are departmental decisions made:
   a. By the department as a whole
   b. By senior faculty
   c. By the chairperson
   d. By standing committees

3. What is your influence in departmental decisions?
   a. Less than my colleagues
   b. The same as my colleagues
   c. More than my colleagues

II. SCHOOL/COLLEGE LEVEL DECISIONS*

1. Do college-level decision bodies generally uphold departmental decisions?

2. What power at the school or college level exists with regard to:
   a. Curriculum
   b. Promotion and tenure
   c. Merit pay
   d. Workload, etc.
   e. Planning for the college

Do college-level decision-makers/groups have the final decision on these matters? or do they recommend to central administration? or rubber-stamp the decisions made by departments?

3. What is the dean's major responsibility and role?

* Optional section or question
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHAIRPERSONS

III. INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL DECISIONS

1. What group or individual has greatest power in these decisions:
   a. Faculty appointments
   b. Promotion and tenure
   c. Adding a course or program
   d. Fringe benefits for faculty
   e. Budgets for departments
   f. Undergraduate admissions policy
   g. Degree requirements

   Are any of the above a change as a result of unionization?

2. How representative are your major governance groups? What is the amount of participation (number of those who participate vs. number who could participate), and what is the distribution of individuals who participate (age, rank, discipline):
   a. Union
   b. Senate
   c. Other important governance groups (specify)

3. Do union leaders participate in senate decisions?
   a. Informally (how?)
   b. Formally (how?)

4. Are administrators members of the senate?

5. Do administrators participate actively in the senate?

6. Do administrators attempt to influence senate decisions? How?

7. What are the relationships between the administration and the following governance groups? (adversary, neutral, cooperative)
   a. Union
   b. Senate
   c. Other important groups (specify)

8. What is the general level of influence on campus issues of the following: (considerable influence, some influence, little influence)
   a. Union
   b. Senate
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHAIRPERSONS

IV. PROMOTION AND TENURE

1. Who really makes the final decision for promotion and tenure?

2. What is the nature of participation in these decisions?

3. Has the reduction in force or retrenchment process been used, to your knowledge? Was it "successful"?

4. Has there been a change in promotion and tenure review procedures since unionization?

5. Has there been a change in review criteria since unionization?

6. Do students have a role in faculty evaluation?

7. Is tenure harder to get now than prior to unionization? Has unionization been a cause of this? Why?

V. INTERNAL FACTORS

1. Is there a difference, since unionization, in the relationships between faculty and administration?

2. Do students have more, less, or the same power as before unionization?

3. Did you have academic or political "stars" prior to unionization? Has this changed since unionization—any changes in their role or power?

4. Is the senate more responsive now than prior to unionization? Are decisions quicker, or is the senate more proactive? Why?

5. What kinds of issues elicit widespread interest among faculty—academic, economic, personnel, other? Has this changed since unionization?
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHAIRPERSONS

6. Do you feel that, in terms of personal influence over governance, you have more, the same, or less since unionization? How about the average faculty member?

7. It is possible to influence decisions by personal, rather than structural means? Has there been a change in an individual's ability to wield personal influence since unionization?

8. How has the role of the department chairperson changed:
   a. What decisions do you make
   b. What and whose decisions do you administer
   c. How are grievances against the department head handled?
SURVEY OF ACADEMIC COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND GOVERNANCE

Questionnaire for Deans

I. COLLEGE-LEVEL DECISIONS

1. Do college-level decision bodies generally uphold departmental decisions?

2. What power at the college level exists with regard to:
   a. Curriculum
   b. Promotion and tenure
   c. Merit pay
   d. Workload, etc.
   e. Planning for the college

Do college-level decision-makers/groups have the final decision on these matters? or do they recommend to central administration? or rubber-stamp the decisions made by departments?

3. What is the dean’s major responsibility and role?

II. INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL DECISIONS

1. What group or individual has greatest power in these decisions:
   a. Faculty appointments
   b. Promotion and tenure
   c. Adding a course or program
   d. Fringe benefits for faculty
   e. Budgets for departments
   f. Undergraduate admissions policy
   g. Degree requirements

Are any of the above a change as a result of unionization?

2. How representative are your major governance groups? What is the amount of participation (number of those who participate vs. number who could participate), and what is the distribution of individuals who participate (age, rank, discipline):
   a. Union
   b. Senate
   c. Other important governance groups (specify)
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DEANS

3. Do union leaders participate in senate decisions?
   a. Informally (how?)
   b. Formally (how?)

4. Are administrators members of the senate?

5. Do administrators participate actively in the senate?

6. Do administrators attempt to influence senate decisions? How?

7. What are the relationships between the administration and the following governance groups? (adversary, neutral, cooperative)
   a. Union
   b. Senate
   c. Other important groups (specify)

8. What is the general level of influence on campus issues of the following: (considerable influence, some influence, little influence)
   a. Union
   b. Senate

III. EXTERNAL FACTORS

1. Do you have a higher level coordinating/governing board?
   a. System board
   b. State board
   c. Multicampus institution board

2. What is the influence of this board on:
   a. Wages
   b. Promotion policies
   c. Curriculum/academic policies
   d. Working conditions

3. How much competition for resources is there between your institution and
   a. Other institutions in your system
   b. Other similar institutions (not in your system)
   c. Other types of institutions
   d. Other areas (such as welfare) which needs funds you're competing for

*Optional question
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DEANS

IV. UNION CHARACTERISTICS

1. What percent of the faculty belong to the union?

2. What is the nature of the union leadership? (age, rank, discipline, of leaders)

3. Who does the negotiating for the union?

4. Are your grievance procedures used often? For what purpose?

5. Is the union seeking to expand its scope? To what areas?

6. Who administers the contract?

V. INTERNAL FACTORS

1. Is there a difference, since unionization, in the relationships between faculty and administration?

2. Do students have more, less, or the same power as before unionization?

3. Did you have academic or political "stars" prior to unionization? Has this changed since unionization—any changes in their role or power?

4. Is the senate more responsive now than prior to unionization? Are decisions quicker, or is the senate more proactive? Why?

5. What kinds of issues elicit widespread interest among faculty—academic, economic, personnel, other? Has this changed since unionization?

6. Do you feel that, in terms of personal influence over governance, you have more, the same, or less since unionization? How about the average faculty member?

7. Is it possible to influence decisions by personal, rather than structural means? Has there been a change in an individual's ability to wield personal influence since unionization?
1. What major changes in the governance structure of your institution have occurred since unionization?
   a. New committees
   b. Strengthening of old committees

2. Has decision making on personnel and fiscal matters shifted upward in the administrative hierarchy?

3. What is the effect of unionization on the power of the trustees? On the composition of the board of trustees?

4. How has unionization changed
   a. The way you make decisions
   b. The kinds of decisions you make

5. Do "outsiders" have more influence than before unionization on decision making (state boards, politicians, legislators, educational agency personnel, courts, arbitrators)?

6. How much influence do you personally have in negotiations?

7* How does binding arbitration—or its threat—affect your decisions?

8. Has the level of conflict changed since unionization?
   The nature of conflict?

*Optional question
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR VICE-PRESIDENT

9. How has unionization affected the power of the department as a unit?

10. How has the president's role changed since unionization? Has unionization changed his/her power?

11. Has unionization had any effect on the status of minorities and women on your campus?

12. Is it more difficult for an administrator to get a faculty appointment since unionization?

13. Is dual track governance (shared, but divided, authority between the senate and the union, with the union responsible for "economic" and the senate responsible for "academic" matters) possible at your institution?

14. How do you handle situations of overlapping claims to authority on your campus? Who decides?

15. Has the number of administrators increased since unionization? Has the nature of administration changed? How?
APPENDIX D

(LETTER TO PROVOSTS)

Dear ________:

I am a doctoral student in higher education administration at the Ohio State University, writing a dissertation on the effect of faculty collective bargaining on academic governance at four-year colleges. A few weeks ago I contacted your Personnel Office and requested a copy of your contract with (name of union), which they kindly sent me. After having carefully studied your contract, I would very much like to visit your campus to talk with you and some of the other individuals involved in the governance of (name of institution).

I will be in New Jersey in mid-May, and am planning to be in your area on _______. Would you be able to spend approximately thirty minutes with me on either of those days so that I might ask you some questions about the effect of faculty collective bargaining on academic governance at your institution? I would also like to spend one-half hour with one dean, two department chairpersons, and a few faculty members active on governance committees or in the union. If you could suggest individuals with whom I might talk, I would contact them to arrange an appointment.

The insights which you and your colleagues can provide on collective bargaining and academic governance are essential to my study, and I will appreciate your help in this effort. I will call you or your secretary next week, if you will agree to see me, to set an appointment time and to solicit your suggestions for individuals to contact. I look forward to talking with you.

Sincerely,

Barbara A. Lee

Barbara A. Lee
Vice President Name has indicated that you have agreed to spend thirty minutes with me when I visit Institution to conduct some of my dissertation research. I appreciate your kindness in giving me your perceptions of the effect of faculty collective bargaining on academic governance at ____________.

My dissertation focuses on the structure of decision-making in colleges and universities subsequent to the signing of a negotiated agreement with a certified faculty organization. It also seeks to identify contextual factors which may have an effect upon academic governance. Most of my questions are drawn from secondary data analysis of a 1974 national study of academic collective bargaining (Kemerer and Baldridge) and other studies of decision making and governance in higher education. I have enclosed a copy of the questions that I'll be asking you so that you will know what to expect from me. I will not quote individuals, either by name or position, in my dissertation, but will only generalize at the institutional level. Nevertheless, if there are questions which you do not wish to answer, I will respect that wish.

Your insights on governance and collective bargaining will be most helpful to me. I look forward to meeting you the week of May 16th.

Sincerely,

Barbara A. Lee

Barbara A. Lee

BAL/1
Enc.
POSITIONS OF INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED

**Rutgers University**

- Provost
- Associate Provost
- Dean, Graduate School
- Dean, Graduate School of Education
- Chairperson, Dept. of Slavic Languages
- Chairperson Dept. of History (New Brunswick-wide)
- Union leader ("militant faction")
- Union leader ("moderate faction")
- Senate leader (faculty)
- Tenured faculty member
- Untenured faculty member
- Vice President for University Personnel
- Director, Employee Relations
- University Counsel for Employment Relations
- Professor, Labor and Management Relations
- Professor of Higher Education

**Temple University**

- Vice President for Academic Administration
- Vice President for Personnel Resources
- Dean, College of Education
- Chairperson, Dept. of Educational Foundations
- President, Faculty Senate
- President, AAUP
- Tenured faculty member
- Untenured faculty member
- Former Dean, who was former union president
- Director of Personnel
Trenton State College

Vice President for Academic Affairs

Director, Division of Industrial and Engineering Technology (Dean)

Chairperson, Dept. of History

Chairperson, Dept. of Modern Languages

President, Faculty Senate

Union president

Untenured faculty member

Assistant to the Vice President for Academic Affairs

East Stroudsburg State College

President

Vice President for Academic Affairs

Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences

Chairperson, Professional Physical Education Dept.

Chairperson, Foreign Languages Dept.

Union president

Chairperson, "Meet and Discuss" team (also department chairperson)

Untenured faculty member—2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monmouth College</th>
<th>Rider College</th>
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<tr>
<td>Vice President for Academic Affairs and Dean of Faculty</td>
<td>Vice President for Academic Affairs and Provost</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dean, Undergraduate Studies</td>
<td>Dean, School of Business Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson, Department of Psychology (and member of administrative negotiating team)</td>
<td>Chairperson, Dept. of Finance and Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson, Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work</td>
<td>Chairperson, Department of Math and Physics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acting president of union</td>
<td>President of union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenured faculty member active in EPPC</td>
<td>Chairperson of College Executive Committee</td>
</tr>
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APPENDIX E

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY

RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS

PROPOSED USE OF HUMAN SUBJECTS: ACTION OF THE REVIEW COMMITTEE

The Behavioral & Social Sciences Review Committee has taken the following action:

X 1. Approve

2. Approve with Conditions

3. Disapprove

with regard to the employment of human subjects in the proposed research entitled: "The Effect of Collective Bargaining on Academic Governance in Four-Year Colleges and Universities"

Lonnie H. Wagstaff/Barbara A. Lee is listed as the principal investigator.

The conditions, if any, are attached and are signed by the committee chairperson and by the principal investigator. If disapproved, the reasons are attached and are signed by the committee chairperson.

It is the responsibility of the principal investigator to retain a copy of each signed consent form for at least four (4) years beyond the termination of the subject's participation in the proposed activity. Should the principal investigator leave the University, signed consent forms are to be transferred to the Human Subject Review Committee for the required retention period.

Date 10 June 1977

Signed (Chairperson)

PA-025
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"Agreement Between Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey and the Rutgers Council of the American Association of University Professors Chapters, July 1, 1975 - June 30, 1977." New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers, the State University, 1975 (mimeo).


Begin, James P. "Due Process and Collegiality under Faculty Grievance Mechanisms: The Case of Rutgers University." New Brunswick, N.J.: Institute of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers, the State University, 1977.


"One Man’s Dream." Philadelphia: Temple University Collection, Temple University, 1963 (mimeo).


