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The Ohio State University,
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1977
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE CONTEMPORARY ARTIST: LIMITS, POTENTIALS, AND EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
Joseph Robert LaChapelle, B. S., M. F. A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1977

Reading Committee:
George Ecker
Paul Klohr
Kenneth Marantz

Approved By

Advisor
Department of Art Education
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VITA

July 12, 1943............Born - Little Falls, Minnesota

1967....................B. S., Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan

1968-1970..............Teaching Associate, Division of Art, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1970....................M. F. A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1970-1971..............Instructor, Department of Art, Western Illinois University, Macomb, Illinois

1971-1973..............Instructor, Department of Art, Hampton Institute, Hampton, Virginia

1973-1975..............Teaching Associate, Department of Art Education, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1975-1976..............Assistant Gallery Director, The Ohio State University Galleries, Columbus, Ohio

1976-1977..............Teaching Associate, Department of Art Education, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Sociology of Organization. Professor George Ecker

Curriculum Theory. Professor Paul Klohr

Philosophy of Art Education. Professor Ross Norris
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Studio Education

This dissertation emerges from a state of conflict and indecision in studio education that has been evident now for almost two decades. The conflicting circumstances surrounding studio education have been publicized a number of times by a variety of people. Dan Flavin, in a diatribe recognized by Harold Rosenberg as "...a brilliant and cruel attack - it could not have been brilliant without being cruel," (Rosenberg, 1973:99) observes:

"...present collegiate, university and professional school programs are designed and conducted to convey as many immature students - not artists - as possible, even those incapacitated and disinclined, into an annoying, cloying, chaotic future of indetermination and inferiority as artists or peripherally remaindered persons." (Flavin, 1968:32)

In another brief look at studio education entitled "The University Art School: Limbo for Alienated Youth?" Amy Goldin presents her belief that studio education attracts socially alienated and/or intellectually undemanding students:

"The students' vague expectation that the expression of a self can, through art, be made 'meaningful' is an idea that many faculty members are willing to confirm and which college administrators find acceptable in principle." (Goldin, 1973:44)

Goldin further observes:

"A college art education systematically treats every student like an art major and every art major like a professional
artist. This idiocy appears to be a necessity because educators don't know what else to do." (Goldin, 1973:46)

Flavin, an artist, and Goldin, an art historian, are joined in their dismay of studio programs by Judith Adler, a sociologist. In an article entitled "Innovative Art and Obsolescent Artists," Adler mirrors Flavin's and Goldin's general concerns about studio education. (Adler, 1975:360-378) The final theme discussed in Adler's article is the lack of a pedagogical base for the education of artists. This section of the article constitutes some of the most extreme writing on the problems of studio education that I have ever encountered. But the extremes of Adler's comments present the problems of studio education in an unmistakable way. In summary, these problems are as follows:

1. Innovation in art, which Adler views as a market-induced function, creates an unpredictable situation which allows no role models to be developed for the student. Standards for practice seem to be eroded by continual change.

2. A predominant aspect of the teaching role thus becomes "market-predicting" in order to show students how to "make it" in the art market. The student is introduced to the "... legitimacy of conning and hustling as much as is necessary to support and develop one's work and career..." (Adler, 1975:376)

3. Art making can become, and often does in the absence of other standards, pseudo-therapeutic in nature with vague goals such as "preparation for life." The practice of art becomes
cathartic or meditative in nature.

4. The educational institution and faculty exist to dispense
materials and oversee equipment. (Adler, 1975:366-375)

Adler's explication of the nature of studio education is harsh
but introduces basic problems that occur to varying degrees in most
studio programs in higher education. Basic to the problems introduced
by Adler, Flavin and Goldin are the following:

1. Can a body of knowledge be identified that would form the
   foundation for the education of those who wish to produce
   fine art?

2. What social circumstances facilitate or impede the produc­
tion of art?

3. If such a body of knowledge that is necessary for the educa­
tion of the artist exists, then is the nature of that body
of knowledge, and the social circumstances for its optimal
practice, compatible with the nature and goals of higher
education? If such compatibility exists, and assuming that
institutions of higher education have differentiated natures
and goals, is such an educational program particularly com­
patible with specific types of institutions of higher educa­
tion?

Often the problems emerging from an examination of studio educa­
tion are sociological in nature in that they involve problems that
occur as groups, or individuals within groups, interact. Flavin con­
trasts the "real world" sociological milieu with the isolated world
of the academic. (Flavin, 1968:28) Goldin speaks of a life style
projected by the arts that is attractive to alienated youth, (Goldin, 1973:44) and Adler illustrates the alienation of students from faculty and faculty from the educational institution. (Adler, 1975:372-378) Even educational content takes on a sociological character as Harold Rosenberg observes:

"The basic substance of art has become the protracted discourse in words and materials echoed back and forth from artist to artist, work to work, art movement to art movement, on all aspects of contemporary civilization and the place of creation and the individual in it. (Rosenberg, 1973:102)

The recognition of such a social discourse and its impact on the concept art is echoed in Morris Weitz' "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics." In arguing against the existence of a classical definition, a set of necessary and sufficient properties, of the concept art, Weitz states:

"Art...is an open concept. New conditions (cases) have constantly arisen and will undoubtedly constantly arise; new art forms, new movements will emerge, which will demand decisions on the part of those interested, usually professional critics, as to whether the concept should be extended or not." (Weitz,1956:33)

The very meaning of art, then, is amendable to change by the act of art making and societies' reception of art objects or situations.

Art is not like science in that science is bound by physical laws:

"A symphony is obviously something new achieved by the human mind; but in calling it a symphony its composer demands recognition for it as something inherently excellent. The natural scientist and the engineer are not so free to satisfy themselves; no scientific theory is beautiful if it is false and no invention is truly ingenious if it is impracticable." (Polanyi, 1958:195)

But as Ernst Kris points out:

"...historical and social forces...shape the function of art in general and more specifically that of any given medium in any given historical setting, determining the frame of reference in
which creation is enacted. We have long come to realize that art is not produced in an empty space, that no artist is independent of predecessors and models, that he no less than the scientist and the philosopher is part of a specific tradition and works in a structured area of problems." (Kris, 1952:21)

What constitutes relevant content for the contemporary artist, then, is dependent upon historical and social forces as well as upon personal dynamics. What constitutes a basic fund of knowledge upon which to base studio education is quite dependent on events occurring in the professional art world beyond the walls of academia.

It is the aim of this dissertation to provide a theoretical framework through which the activities and circumstances surrounding artists may be examined in order to identify pertinent areas of concern that suggest implications for curriculum design. More specifically, this work addresses itself to the activities of, for lack of a better term, the visual artist (painters, sculptors, photographers, printmakers and so on) who work in a fine, or high art tradition. Distinguishing this artist from other visual artists is a primary task that will be undertaken in a later chapter.

Further, this work addresses the compatibility of the education of the fine art visual artist with the nature and goals of the modern university. Hopefully, the final product of this work will provide insights into more successful curriculum design, better faculty and student selection, and of most import, more effective preparation of young artists to join in what Harold Rosenberg describes as the "protracted discourse echoing from artist to artist." (Rosenberg, 1973:102)
Sociological Orientation

The basic direction of this work, then, is sociological in nature rather than either psychological or historical, although both psychological and historical sources are utilized. Guy Hubbard's dissertation *The Development of the Visual Arts in the Curricula of American Colleges and Universities* provides an excellent historical overview of 1) the history of art education from ancient times to its entry into American higher education; 2) the development of curriculums in higher education; and 3) identification of major problems and trends of art education in higher education.(Hubbard, 1963)

In addition to Hubbard’s work, we have witnessed the recent publication of works describing in depth the historical events surrounding some of the great educational experiments in the visual arts of this century, such as Black Mountain College, The Bauhaus and the Russian Vkhutemas. (Duberman, 1973; Wingler, 1969; Franciscono, 1971; Babichev and Sarabianov, 1974) And of course Nikolaus Pevsner’s *Academies of Art Past and Present* (1940) is recognized as a basic historical source on art education.

The existence of an adequate foundation for the history of the visual artist is paralleled by the work of Ernst Kris, which, if not an adequate psychological model of the artist, is at least an adequate foundation upon which to build. Kris, particularly in his work, *Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art*, employs a psychoanalytic approach grounded in ego psychology that provides exceptional insight into the psychological dynamics underlying the work of the visual artist. Not
the least of Kris' strengths is his recognition of the social and his-
torical forces that impinge upon the work of the artist.

A valid criticism, however, of the psychoanalytic approach to
the psychology of the artist is articulated by Silvano Arieti in
*Creativity: The Magic Synthesis* when he asserts that psychoanalytic
studies tend to concentrate on motivation and sublimation, and thus
leave the dynamics of creativity less than adequately understood.
(Arieti, 1976:28-33) Arieti, in seeking to outline the psychological
components of creativity and the process of change from thought to
product, begins to fill an important psychological gap in our under-
standing of art.¹

But while our understanding of the historical and psychological
forces surrounding the visual arts is expanding, our sociological un-
derstanding is not. The sociology of art literature generally seems
insistent on viewing the artist as alienated from society and as oc-
cupying an adversary role. A particularly cogent essay which out-
lines succinctly the sources of the theme of alienation and the lat-
ter's impact upon the sociology of art, is Renato Poggioli's "The
tends to epitomize his views:

"It should not be forgotten that his (the avant-garde artist's)
social protest manifests itself mainly on the level of form and
thus alienation from society becomes also alienation from tra-
dition. In contrast to the classical artist, who could draw on

¹There are of course those who argue with the significance of a
psychoanalytic approach to psychology. For the purposes of this dis-
sertation, the psychoanalytic approach grounded in ego psychology
seems to be of most value and relevance. See Arieti, 1976:14-28 for
a review of alternate approaches to the psychology of creativity.
tradition as a stable and recurrent series of public expressions, the modern artist works in chaos and in darkness and is overcome by the feeling of impending upheaval in language and style." (Poggioli, 1970:685-686)

Although cases of social and psychological alienation may be demonstrated - Van Gogh, for example, is a perennial favorite for writers such as Antonin Artaud who seek evidence of alienation (Poggioli, 1970:669) - the over-emphasis of the subject has distorted the reality of the situation. Furthermore, the theme of alienation is usually employed to condemn Western, middle class society or modern art by regarding the latter as a symptom of alienation and not much else:

"Modern Art, therefore, opposes the stylistic theory and practice which dominate the society and civilization it belongs to. Its chief function is to react against bourgeois taste." (Poggioli, 1970:680)

Judith Adler extends the general adversary/alienation theme specifically to studio education. (Adler, 1975:360-378) Her article, written from a sociological vantage point, explores the nature of work artists do, outlines social forces influencing their work, and demonstrates, within Adler's particular framework, basic problems inherent in studio education.

Although she leaves studio education problems for later discussion, Adler's emphasis on the importance of the "art market" is of relevance here. Adler seems to use a Marxist type of analysis which:

"...has emphasized the relationship of the artist to the means of production, to the class structure and to the markets. In general, the major thesis of Marxist analysis is that artistic production 'reflects' the system of economic and industrial production. The Marxist argument stresses the problems of the market for works of art. Taste is defined as a reflection of changes in the composition and character of the supporting strata for artists, the purchasers of artistic production who compose the market." (Bensman and Gerver, 1970:661)
The adversary/alienation theme is joined by an "art market" orientation which completes the foundation for a particular sociology of art viewpoint.

But the relationship of the visual artist to the "art market" throughout this entire century is problematic. For instance, the primary source of information for Adler's article was the faculty at the California Institute for the Arts, artists whose production is generally supported by the educational institution that employs them rather than by the "art market." Furthermore, the "art market" to which these artist/faculty members address themselves is: 1) only a particular part of a pluralistic art market and perhaps more importantly, 2) as much of an image as a reality. Adler's artists were addressing themselves to "success," a very complicated notion, as much as they were to economics.

An article by Daniel Fox, "Artists in the Modern State: The 19th Century Background," begins to present a more objective and hence more useful appraisal of the social reality surrounding artists, particularly the 19th century artist, who was the source of much of the adversary/alienation concept. (Fox, 1970:370-387) The following observation suggests a more realistic perspective of the artist's circumstances: "...starvation, (among artists) seems to have been a rare occurrence. Malnutrition was more prevalent among factory hands than on the Left Bank." (Fox, 1970:371)

Fox also observes that in general:

"The mythology about nineteenth-century artists helps produce guilt feelings that make many present-day government cultural
administrators zealous guardians of creative freedom. Perhaps a conviction of alienation spurred several artists to great achievement. But, although the best artists did not always get the rewards, most of them received sufficient patronage to live, paint and exist. Most talented painters eventually convinced experts, dealers, and government officials that they were not only aesthetically satisfying but also salable and worthy of support and encouragement from public funds." (Fox, 1970:372)

As the mythology of alienation dissipates, the view of the artist as a functional member of society begins to emerge. The interconnection between the artist and society is elucidated by John Fischer, and it is worthwhile to note that the relationship is not an adversary one:

"It is assumed that the artist is in some sense keenly aware of the social structure and modal personality of his culture, although of course he cannot necessarily or usually put his awareness into social science jargon or even commonplace words. It is not assumed that the artist's personality is a simple duplicate of the modal personality for the group; in fact in many societies artists appear to have rather unusual personalities. However, I do assume that all sane persons inevitably participate to a considerable extent in the modal personality of the group, and that the successful artist has a greater than average ability to express the modal personality of his public in his particular art medium.(Fischer, 1971:174)

Fischer's comments are general assumptions for all societies even though he recognizes the high degree of personal expression that exists in the visual arts and that is encouraged in contemporary Western society. Further, although artists may or may not have "unusual personalities," as Fischer suggests, their personality functioning, according to Kris, generally falls within normal limits and whatever psychological conflicts exist, it is the resolution of those conflicts that is striking rather than their existence:

"We have come to view psychological conflict not only as an unavoidable accessory to personality development, but also- within certain limits - as an essential ingredient and incentive. We are about to study ego development in Kris' book not only in relation to typical conflicts, but also as far as the ego's
capacities and functions emerge from conflict and acquire autonomy." (Kris, 1952:20-21)

In comparing the art work of artists and psychotics, Kris finds that like a dream, unconscious elements are present in both cases, but the artist's work manifests ego control and material generally meaningful beyond that of the individual's preoccupations. (Kris, 1952:116)

Between Fischer and Kris, then, an image of the visual artist as an individual with appropriate behavioral controls existing within, and participating in, a given society begins to emerge. And as one begins to regard the avant-garde art forms in particular not as evidence of alienation but as positive cultural artifacts, the coherence of the artist and his society becomes more evident.

And with this starting point established, one can begin to discern the formal social systems that artists have developed or formed an attachment to, in order to support their work. This most obvious move has been to the university campus, where the experimentation and convention testing in the arts exist alongside that of other disciplines. Only the recurrent image of the artist as a neurotic loner, malnourished and living in a garret somewhere, has prevented us from grasping the complexity of the social structures that have evolved around the art process in our society.

Sociological Theory

Having alluded to the general weakness present in a great deal of the sociology of art literature, the question then becomes how to
approach the subject. It would seem that the answer lies in the observation that as the image of the artist as a neurotic loner dissipates, replaced by the image of the artist as existing within complex social structures, the focus shifts from the artist's alienation to the nature of those relevant social systems.

The task, then, becomes to walk gingerly in the sociological pasture of models to establish a theoretical framework for the inquiry. As Robert Merton indicates in "Structural Analysis in Sociology," sociology is beset by a multitude of sociological theory. (Merton, 1975:21-52) But Merton states that this multiplicity:

"...with its diversity, competition, and clash of doctrine, seems preferable to the therapy sometimes proposed for handling the acute crisis, namely, the prescription of a single theoretical perspective that promises to provide full and exclusive access to the sociological truth...No one paradigm has ever begun to demonstrate its unique cogency for investigating the entire range of sociologically interesting questions." (Merton, 1975:28)

Merton eventually argues against expecting a unitary sociological theory and against Thomas Kuhn's view that major fields of science are and must be dominated by one single paradigm which then falls in the face of new evidence and a stronger paradigm. (Merton, 1975:43-52; Kuhn, 1962)

Merton points specifically to two values that arise from a plurality of paradigms: 1) a plurality of paradigms impels investigation into a variety of problems and 2) the focus of research is directed to a variety of phenomena. (Merton, 1975:48-49) Finally, Merton observes:

"Though often obscured by polemics, the cognitive problems of co-existing paradigms call for discovering the capabilities and limitations of each. This involves identifying the kinds and
range of problems each is good for (and noting those for which it is incompetent or irrelevant), thus providing for potential awareness of the respects in which they are complementary or contradictory." (Merton, 1975:50)

While accepting the possibility that an inquiry into the nature of the social structures to which the artist has become attached or that evolve around him, might necessitate a pluralistic sociological approach, it is also necessary to limit the scope of this inquiry. The latter may be initiated by noting that Peter Blau views bureaucratization and professionalization as two alternative modes of organization that rest on different types of authority—professional and bureaucratic. (Blau, 1974:246)

Bureaucratic authority "...rests on the legitimate power of command vested in an official position..." while professional authority rests "...on the certified superior competence of the expert, who prompts others voluntarily to follow his directives..." (Blau, 1974:246) Although bureaucracies and professions have common characteristics and organizations increasingly tend to incorporate both professional and bureaucratic characteristics, the hierarchical structure of a bureaucracy, especially with its attendant emphasis on management, is not necessary for a profession. (Blau, 1974:48-49,246)

Since some artists are "experts" in that only they or similarly trained individuals can produce high quality art and since they also prompt a voluntary public participation in their activities, it would seem reasonable that the structure of professions serve as a focus for the study of organization relevant to the artist. But a note of caution should be interjected here.
It is not being claimed that the artist is a professional in the same sense as are the traditionally accepted professions of medicine, law, the ministry and university education. Rather the claim is that by viewing some of the organizational efforts of artists as a professionalizing process, a greater insight is achieved into the nature of the process and resultant organization than by viewing such organizing as part of a bureaucratizing process.

Taking professional organization as a focal point, some theoretical positions become of particular value:

1. Within the framework of his Compliance Theory, Amitai Etzioni views professions as a type of normative organization. (Etzioni, 1970:103-126,117) Normative organizations are those in which the major source of control over most participants is normative power. "Normative power in turn "...is based on the manipulation of esteem, prestige and ritualistic symbols (pure normative power)...or on allocation and manipulation of acceptance and positive response." (Etzioni, 1975:6)

Normative organization is contrasted to both coercive organization, where coercion is the major means of control, and utilitarian organization, in which remuneration is the major means of control. (Etzioni, 1975:27-39) Although professions are primarily normative organizations, they are not typical in that remuneration plays an important role. Two observations by Etzioni that are relevant to professions stand out: a. Organizations vary in the degree to which participants are "embraced" and Etzioni labels these variations
scope and pervasiveness. Scope is defined as "...the number of activities in which...participants are jointly involved," (Etzioni, 1975:264) while pervasiveness "...is determined by the number of activities in or outside the organization for which the organization sets norms." (Etzioni, 1975:267) The scope of normative organizations can range from broad to narrow, but the range of pervasiveness is high. Professions, as normative organizations, tend to be narrow in scope but high in pervasiveness.

b. Professionals are neither specialists (people in charge of one kind of activity) nor segmentalists (people in charge of a multifunctioning subunit) but rather they are generalists, those who tend to make final decisions. (Etzioni, 1975:314) Etzioni further observes that "...people who have the psychological syndromes of generalists are more likely to be charismatics than segmentalists or specialists." (Etzioni, 1975:315) A profession, which is composed of generalists who "...draw their ascribed charisma from their special knowledge or skill...", (Etzioni, 1975:311) is a type of organization in which charisma can be functional.

The narrowness of scope in professions coupled with a pervasiveness of influence beyond actual organizational goals, seem to be useful concepts when applied to artists' organizations. But particularly apropos is Etzioni's concept of
charisma. Compliance in normative organizations, such as professions, rests principally upon the internalization of directives that are accepted as legitimate, and charisma may foster such legitimation. (Etzioni, 1975:40) Etzioni modifies Max Weber's conceptualization of charisma and suggests that personal charisma may originate in organizational positions, and that it is not necessarily incompatible with established organizational structure. (Etzioni, 1975:334) Charisma, which Etzioni defines as "...the ability of an actor to exercise diffuse influence over the normative orientation of other actors," (Etzioni, 1975:334) is an integral part of the compliance mechanisms of art organizations which results in some members acquiring highly personalized power. Such power can help legitimize and hence foster the internalization of organizational directives. Ideology can also function as a means of fostering internalization of directives. While ideology as a concept is shrouded in ambiguity, Etzioni notes that normative power is greatest in labor unions with strong ideological platforms. (Etzioni, 1975:61-62) Such ideological unions, since they typically do not provide members with much utilitarian support, emphasize instead modification of the group's position in the existing social order. As will be demonstrated later, most organizational efforts of visual artists, while encompassing utilitarian purposes, are based on a strong normative foundation that allows for the impact of charisma. Such organization
also lends itself to the acceptance of ideological belief patterns.

2. Building upon the concept of professional as a generalist, i.e., one who makes final decisions, March and Simon's **Decision-Making Theory** seems relevant. (March and Simon, 1970:93-102) March and Simon have evolved a theoretical perspective that focuses upon the "decision-maker" and "problem-solver," and their central thesis is that the basic features of organizational structure derive from the characteristics of problem-solving and rational choice. The concept of **performance programs** is of critical importance to March and Simon's conceptualization and refers to a highly complex and organized set of behaviors by organizational members in response to organizational demands. (March and Simon, 1970:96-101) Performance programs limit choices and the "...greater the programming of individual activities in the organization, the greater the predictability of those activities." (March and Simon, 1970:96) Critical to **Decision-Making Theory** is the distinction between a **satisfactory** alternative and an **optimal** alternative:

"Most human decision-making, whether individual or organizational, is concerned with the discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional cases is it concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal alternatives. To optimize requires processes several orders of magnitude more complex than those required to satisfy." (March and Simon, 1970:95)

**Decision-Making Theory** seems particularly relevant given the contemporary, cultural milieu that encourages its artists
toward high degrees of personal expression, minimal adherence to tradition, and toward problem-solving.

3. Although Decision-Making Theory and Compliance Theory provide insight into organizational structure which results from the dynamics of decision-making and from the dynamics of normative compliance, their joint consideration does not promote an adequate organizational picture. One of the most obvious occurrences within the visual arts in this century is the growth of forms of differentiation. Increasingly, differences as suggested by the terms fine art, commercial art, folk art, amateur art, decorative art and so on, are being articulated and related to functional differences, such as the nature of the activity required to produce objects and the function of those art objects for society. The realization of such basic differences as described above, results in an increasingly restricted social interaction among groups and an increasingly recurrent social interaction and communication among individuals and groups sharing similar value orientations. However, as Peter Blau points out:

"Since value orientations are more likely to be shared within groups than by members of different groups, we must still ask what produces the social connections among diverse groups." (Blau, 1975:230)

On the one hand we have the problem of understanding the dynamics of increasing differentiation and on the other, the problem of how such differentiated groups relate to, and exist within, a broader social system. Open-Systems Theory,
as proposed by Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, is of particular value not only in focusing on the relationship between the organization and its environment, but also in proposing that organizations move toward differentiation. (Katz and Kahn, 1970:149-158) A basic assumption of Open-Systems Theory is that an organization is dependent upon its environment. This dependency is also recognized by Talcott Parsons, who Katz and Kahn argue, has used an open-systems perspective for studying social systems. (Katz and Kahn, 1966:8-9) Parsons views social structure as rooted in, and ultimately governed by, phenomena that are analytically distinct from social life. For Parsons, the Cultural System, which he defines as consisting of "...patterns of meaning, e.g., of values, of norms of organized knowledge and beliefs and of expressive 'form'," determines the Social System. (Parsons, 1961:34) Institutionalized values and norms comprise the social system and are reflected in differentiated subsystems whereas the values and norms of the cultural system are derived from abstract meanings and beliefs. (Parsons, 1975:110, footnote 2; Katz and Kahn, 1966:96-97)

In addition to focusing on environmental impact, Open-Systems Theory also provides a means for studying organizational change and those processes that facilitate organizational stability. Furthermore, Open-Systems Theory provides a means to integrate the "...so-called macro-approach of the sociologist and the micro-approach of the psychologist...", (Katz
and Kahn, 1966:9) for the study of social organization.

Even though Katz and Kahn do not deal with the dynamics of professions specifically, it is assumed that Open-Systems Theory is applicable not only to bureaucratic structures but also to professional structure. The choice of the preceding theoretical frameworks was based in part upon the relevance and compatibility of these frameworks with organization other than bureaucratic. Most organizational literature deals with bureaucratic organization and concepts such as organization, complex organization, and formal organization tend to become synonymous with bureaucracy. (Blau, 1968:297-304)

For example, although Etzioni defines organization, in agreement with Talcott Parsons, as "...social units oriented to the realization of specific goals," (Etzioni, 1975:xi and footnote 2) he continues in Complex Organizations to explain that "...organization stands for 'complex bureaucratic organization.'" (Etzioni, 1975:xi, footnote 1) Furthermore, Etzioni avoids the use of the concept formal organization except to refer to a specific subunit of organization. (Etzioni, 1975:xi, footnote 1)

On the other hand, Peter Blau prefers the concept "formal organization," to that of "complex organization," defining formal organization as follows:

"The defining criterion...is the existence of procedures for mobilizing and coordinating the efforts of various, usually specialized, subgroups with the pursuit of joint objectives." (Blau, 1974:29)

For Blau, bureaucracy "...is used in sociology...to refer to...administrative aspects of organization." (Blau, 1974:29)
The term formal organization, however, is often used, as it is by Roethlisberger and Dickson, to refer to "...the pattern of human interrelations, as defined by the systems, rules, policies, and regulations of the company..." (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1970:57) In the preceding conceptualizations, formal organization is contrasted with informal organization which generally refers to social organization within an organization not represented by the organization's formal structure. (Blau, 1974:32-33; Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1970:57-59)

There appears, then, to be no contradiction inherent in viewing professions as social units and in meeting both Blau's and Etzioni's general definition of organization. Furthermore, it seems reasonable to assume that professions are complex organizations. Professions will be viewed in this work, then, as nonbureaucratic complex organizations on the assumption that such a posture does not contradict Etzioni's general framework but rather reflects a different focus of attention.

More specifically the preceding theoretical frameworks were selected because of their general recognition of how organizational structure is affected by the following:

1. Decision-making;
2. Voluntary membership;
3. Ideology and charisma;
4. Environmental forces;
5. Narrowness of the scope of organizational activities;
6. Pervasiveness of influence beyond organizational activities.
and vice versa.

This initial selection does not include those theoretical frameworks that tend to concentrate upon management within a hierarchical organizational structure such as Max Weber's *Bureaucracy*, (Weber, 1970:5-23) since professions exhibit little hierarchical or managerial development. (Blau, 1974:246-248)

**Sequence**

Chapter I serves as a general introduction to: the problem area underlying this work; the rationale for concentrating on the sociological aspects of studio education; and the general sociological theory used throughout this dissertation.

Chapter II provides a survey of the sociological research regarding the concepts of professions and professionalization. Although the survey is brief, it does provide insight into the different methodological approaches to the subject. This study views professions and highly professionalized occupations as forms of complex organization.

Chapter III outlines the approach to the study of complex organization that will be utilized.

Chapter IV, by recognizing the limitations to the professionalization process, endeavors to locate the generating traits of professional organization. Integral to a professional's task is the possession of specialized knowledge and the value of that knowledge to society. Chapter IV also examines knowledge and values in relationship to the generating characteristics of professional organization.
Chapter V develops a model of a profession and seeks to differentiate that model from both the academic disciplines and semi-professions.

Chapter VI has a number of functions:

1. The population of artists relevant to this study is identified as well as the core characteristics of their tasks.

2. The relationship between the artists and the fine art tradition, intellectuals, the public and the university is discussed.

3. It is argued that the population of artists is professionalized to a degree, and the extent of that professionalization is demonstrated by its comparison to the model of a profession developed in Chapter V.

4. Limits to, and potential for, further professionalization by the population of artists is discussed.

Finally, Chapter VII serves as a summary and develops a theoretical framework which contains implications and areas of concern for educational organizations and curriculum development for the relevant population of artists.
CHAPTER IX

PROFESSION AND PROFESSIONALIZATION: MODES OF INQUIRY

Introduction

The literature on professions is both voluminous and of diverse quality. This chapter seeks to survey some of the approaches to the study of professions that are most frequently cited as sources in other literature. It should become clear as this chapter progresses, that often the differences between the conceptions of a profession are related either to the source of information and/or to the direction that the inquiries take.

The concept "professional" has both an ordinary and a more complex sociological usage. The ordinary use of language, as indicated by Gilbert Ryle, (Ryle, 1953:24-40) means "common," "current," "colloquial" and "vernacular" as contrasted with "esoteric," "technical" and "notational" in its more complex usage.

The ordinary use of the concept "professional" a vernacular term which individuals use publically with a certain amount of tacit agreement as to its meaning, tends to fall victim to simplification and generalization. For example, one speaks of the "professional football player" or the "professional driver" to differentiate between those who are paid for an activity and those who are not. One may
also speak of a "professional gossip," a pejorative term, denoting that considerable time is spent on a particular activity. Whatever the case, the reasons for deeming the activity "professional" tend to be simplistic and such simplicity leads to the application of the term to more and more activities, until there ensues a seemingly endless list of "professional" activities.

The decision of an individual to use the term "profession" in an ordinary manner, involves a much less complicated process of discriminating among characteristics than that which is involved in using the term optimally as does the sociologist. The ordinary and satisfactory use of "profession" tends to erode and disguise differences between activities whereas the sociological and optimal sense of profession tends to illuminate and explain such differences. The sociological use of the concepts of professional and professionalization shifts the focus of inquiry away from the vernacular concept of "profession" toward that of a social group - the profession, and a social process - professionalization.

The concepts of profession and professionalization, although related, are dependent upon two separate modes of inquiry. To inquire about the nature of a profession is generally to ask for a definition and an identification of the "quintessential," "core" or "trait" characteristics that make an occupation a profession. These core or trait characteristics, then, describe what Max Weber referred to as "ideal types," (Blau, 1974:45-49) recognizing that no individual

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1 See March and Simon, 1970:95 for an extended discussion of satisfactory and optimal standards.
social organization is completely like another and that social organizations only approximate their "ideal types" or perhaps more contemporarily their "models."

In contrast, professionalization does not refer to an occupation's status as a profession but rather the extent to which an occupation exhibits characteristics of the professionalization process. The question, then, is rephrased in dynamic terms and in terms to suggest that professions resemble social movements. The following discussion focuses upon the value and limitations of each approach, beginning with the search for the core characteristics of a profession.

The Concept of Profession

In order to distinguish between a profession and a nonprofession, criteria for such a distinction must exist. Ernst Greenwood, among others, attempted to formulate a categorical system or taxonomy by reviewing the sociological and related literature on professions that listed such distinguishing criteria. The following is a summary of Greenwood's classification: (Greenwood, 1957:45-55)

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Since a profession only approximates an "ideal type" or model, a sense of the degree of variance is also implied in a search for the core characteristics of a profession. However, to seek out such characteristics introduces a dichotomy between profession and nonprofession that is not present in the professionalization process.

1. A profession depends upon a body of theory derived from an extensive fund of knowledge.

The distinction between a professional and a nonprofessional is not one of superior skill, since nonprofessional occupations often involve a higher order of skill than do professions. The skills that characterize a profession, however, unlike those of nonprofessions, are related to a body of theory, a system of abstract propositions which tend to guide practice and increase the effectiveness of that practice. Theory serves practice in that it provides the rationale for procedures in concrete situations. Education for a profession tends to involve considerable preparation both in relevant theory, a feature virtually absent in the training of the nonprofessional, and in skill.

2. The client is subordinate to professional authority.

Extensive education for the practitioner in the systematic theory of the profession highlights the layman's comparative ignorance. Lacking the requisite theoretical background, the client cannot diagnose his needs nor discriminate among the range of possible solutions. The client is not even considered competent to evaluate the caliber of the professional service rendered. The client thus assumes an attitude of trust toward the professional, acceding to professional judgment in those areas or specific spheres in which the practitioner has been educated.
3. A profession has authority, either formal or informal, sanctioned by the community.

The recognition by a community, either formally or informally, of a profession's authority within certain spheres confers upon the profession certain powers and privileges. For example, professions are permitted extensive control over training centers, especially the accrediting process, and over the admission process into the profession. Confidentiality privileges are determined by the profession and standards for professional performance are evaluated by other professionals. The powers and privileges granted a profession are suggestive of a monopoly, which is an objective of occupations striving for professional status. The existence of such professional monopolies, however, is related to the benefit the community perceives it will accrue in granting or recognizing such a monopoly.

4. A profession has a code of ethics which regulates behavior and, in particular, demands the support of colleagues.

Since a monopoly can be abused, as can trust, the profession promises a commitment to the social welfare of the community in the form of formal, published, ethical statements and through informal actions. Although self-regulatory codes exist in many occupations, they tend in professions to be more explicit, systematic and binding, possessing more altruistic overtones and a greater public service orientation. The ethical codes tend to delineate client-professional and
colleaguial-colleaguial relationships. For example, the professional is supposed to assume emotional neutrality toward the client, render his services upon request, even at the sacrifice of personal convenience, and always at the same level of competence. The ethics governing colleaguial relationships demand behavior that is cooperative, egalitarian and supportive. Knowledge must be shared, competition for clients minimized and professional colleagues must support each other vis-a-vis the client and community.

5. A profession has a culture with its own values, norms and symbols concomitant with formal organization for training recruits, conducting practice and regulating performance. Every profession exists in relationship to formal and informal organizations. Among the formal organizations are institutionalized settings where the professional and client meet, educational and research centers which supply new practitioners and expand the fund of knowledge, and organizations that promote group interests, such as professional associations. Professionals also function within informal groups based upon a variety of affinities, such as specialties within the profession, family, religious or ethnic backgrounds and residential and work settings. The interactions of social roles required by these formal and informal groups generate a professional culture. Greenwood believes that the existence of a professional culture with its attendant values, norms and symbols, more than any other attribute, differentiates the
professions from other occupations. To succeed within a chosen profession, a recruit must make an effective adjustment to the professional culture. The development of a professional, then, is not simply an educational task but an acculturation process as well.

Although complete theoretical and methodological consensus among sociologists on the definition of a profession is not a reality, and although there are limits to the value of such a definition, especially for the more general study of all occupations, W.J. Goode does discern a high degree of consensus among sociologists on the distinguishing characteristics of professions. Goode writes:

"If one extracts from the most commonly cited definitions all items which characterize a profession...a commendable unanimity is disclosed; there are not contradictions and the only differences are those of omission...subtracting the derivative traits such as high prestige, power and income from those which are sociologically causal the two remaining core characteristics are a prolonged specialized training in a body of abstract knowledge and a collectivity or service orientation." (Goode, 1960:903)

Bernard Barber, although somewhat more cautious than Goode about the degree of sociological consensus on the definition issue, lists four essential attributes of a profession:

"...a high degree of generalized and systematic knowledge; primary orientation to the community interest rather than to individual self interest; a high degree of self control of behavior through codes of ethics internalized in the process of work socialization and through voluntary associations organized and operated by work specialists themselves; and a system of work achievements and thus ends in themselves, not means to some end of individual self interest." (Barber, 1963:671)

Both Goode and Barber indicate a tendency toward a unitary conceptualization of a profession and project the view that a sociological definition of the concept profession should limit itself, as
far as possible, to the differentia specifica of professional behavior. Thus Goode and Barber dismiss such concepts as socialization structure, process, and life style in that such concepts are not differentia specifica since they apply to all occupations. Such a view is antithetical to Greenwood's assertion that the existence of a professional culture is the most effective means of differentiating the professions from other occupations.

The professional culture, as recognized by Greenwood, is also de-emphasized by Talcott Parsons in the listing of his core criteria for a profession:

"First among these criteria is the requirement of formal technical training accompanied by some institutionalized mode of validating both the adequacy of the training and the competence of trained individuals. Among other things, the training must lead to some order of mastery of a generalized cultural tradition, and do so in a manner giving prominence to an intellectual component - that is, it must give primacy to the valuation of cognitive rationality as applied to a particular field. The second criterion is that not only must the cultural tradition be mastered, in the sense of being understood, but skills in some form of its use must also be developed. The third and final core criterion is that a full-fledged profession must have some institutional means of making sure that such competence will be put to socially responsible uses."

(Parsons, 1968:536)

But while Greenwood's recognition of professional culture as it relates to, and is a result of, practice within a community is de-emphasized by Parsons, another sense of professional culture is introduced. By ascribing prominence to the value of "cognitive rationality" for a profession, Parsons places the university-research institution at the center of the professional culture, viewing the

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intellectual disciplines as professions although of a different type than the "applied" professions such as law and medicine.

Depicting the university-research institutions as the center of a sense of profession that also includes the intellectual disciplines suggests that significantly different norms and values exist within Parsons' concept of professions than within Greenwood's concept in which the norms and values of a profession are generated by a profession/community interface. For example, "cognitive rationality," as Parsons employs the concept, is an obvious value of the university-research milieu but that value is less important, it would seem, within the general society. A number of important issues evolve from the above: the relationship of the disciplines to professions, the role of the university in professions, and certainly the effect of public practice on the nature of professions, all of which will be discussed in subsequent sections.

It should be noted here, however, that part of the difference between Greenwood and Parsons occurs as a result of the source of their information. Greenwood, in pursuing a conceptual analysis of the concept profession, relies heavily on historical material, whereas Parsons is more sensitive to both the change in the traditional professions in recent decades and the nature of the university as it has evolved into a formal organization. The discrepancies between

5Shils, in writing about the tasks and functions of intellectuals, deals with this point. Shils writes: "There is in every society a minority of persons who, more than the ordinary run of their fellow men, are inquiring, and desirous of being in frequent communion with symbols which are more general than the immediate concrete situations of every day life..." Edward Shils, The Intellectuals and the Powers, Chicago(The University of Chicago Press)1972:3)
Greenwood and Parsons reflect different starting points and a basic problem in the construction of "ideal types," i.e., where do you begin?

The attempt to define the concept profession in ideal-typical terms is methodologically tenable but such a conceptual analysis is limited in several respects:

1. As was mentioned previously, the search for the elements, traits or attributes of a profession must begin somewhere, and thus the established professions of medicine, law, the ministry and university teaching, often as historical entities, become the source for the ideal-type. Such a dependence upon the established professions, in addition to relying upon an historical entity that perhaps no longer exists, can lead to an acceptance of a public image of those professions that is generated and enhanced by public relations efforts. Does the role of ethics protect the client from malpractice by the professional, a point the Hippocratic Oath tries to project, or does the role of ethics, just as equally, protect the profession from questions of monopoly and the realities of community interests.

The established professions have changed as the United States has developed from a rurally populated society of seventy years ago to a predominantly urban society. The late 19th and early 20th Century image of the physician or lawyer as an entrepreneur whose influence over small communities tended to be considerable, is no longer accurate when attending to
professions. The work conditions and influence of the established professions have changed significantly in contemporary times, leaving the flavor of that past era to inhabit codes of ethics, and other more self-serving literature about the established professions which may confuse the image of the contemporary professional as much as it clarifies.

2. The attempt to distinguish a profession from a nonprofession may result in an unnecessary dichotomy that hinders rather than assists the study of occupations in general. Such a dichotomy, while concentrating upon the issue of whether a profession has "made it" or not, i.e., has achieved the status of a profession, often ignores the process of professionalization, particularly the strategies used to secure higher occupational status.

3. The differences that exist between established professions tend to be de-emphasized in the search for a definition of a profession. Differences or deviations from the sociological model or "ideal type" may be noted along with the observation that such deviations occur in somewhat different areas from profession to profession.

The Concept of Professionalization

The last two points in particular, the lack of focus upon the process of professionalization and upon the differences within

professional institutions in terms of the concept of professionalization, assuming that many, if not all occupations may be placed somewhere on a continuum between the ideal-type 'profession' at one end and completely unorganized occupational categories, or 'non-professions,' at the other end. Professionalization is a process, then, that may affect any occupation to a greater or lesser degree." (Vollmer and Mills, 1966:2)

Greenwood, Goode and Barber, while writing about the essential characteristics of a profession, also recognize and stress to different degrees the concept that occupations exist somewhere along a continuum of professionalization. (Greenwood, 1957:46; Goode, 1960:903; Barber, 1963:673) Barber views his four essential attributes - a high degree of generalized and systematic knowledge; a high degree of self-control; a primary orientation to community interest; and a sense of achievement within the work itself - as defining such a scale of professionalism.

Another more extensive scale of professionalism emerges from Wilbert Moore's suggestion that:

"...professionalism should properly be regarded as a scale rather than a cluster of attributes and thus that attributes commonly noted have differing values...This approach does not
exactly simplify the task of identification;...since each of the scale points we are about to suggest has its own subset of scale values." (Moore, 1970:5)

The following is a summary of Moore's scale of professionalism:

(Moore, 1970:5-16)

1. A profession is a full-time occupation, but the principal value of this specification, which does not distinguish the professional from the majority of participants in the labor force, is that it differentiates the professional from the amateur.

2. A qualification that distinguishes the professional from others in the labor force is the commitment to a calling, a commitment that involves acceptance of appropriate norms and standards, and identification with professional peers and the profession as a collectivity.

3. Members of such a collectivity are known by various signs and symbols that evolve from formalized organization. Such organization presupposes a common commitment by members of an occupation to protect and enhance the occupation's interests.

4. The foundation of the occupation of a fund of esoteric but useful knowledge and skills necessitates specialized training or education of exceptional duration and perhaps exceptional difficulty.

5. The "usefulness" of the occupation's practice and the limitations on who can practice, evolve a service orientation. The service orientation has three subsets of related norms that evolve rules of competence, rules of conscientious
performance and rules of loyalty or service.

6. The professional enjoys autonomy, restrained by responsibility, as a result of the prior five steps, but particularly because of his specialization in an esoteric area.

It should be apparent that Moore's scale of professionalism is reminiscent of Greenwood's essential attributes, except that Moore's scale also implies a procedure for professionalization beginning with the existence of a full-time occupation and ending with a high degree of occupational autonomy. The binding tie of the professionalization literature to the literature that isolates the essential attributes of a profession, aside from periodically sharing authors, is the acceptance of a sense of profession that separates the latter from other occupations.

Implicit for both approaches is the existence of an ideal type, or at least a sense of profession toward which occupations progress. Ever recognizing, as does P. Abrams, that "...if professions emerge they may also recede - scribes, pharisees, and alchemists are cases in point," (Abrams, 1965:240) such a view implies a sense of profession from which to recede.

Turner and Hodge espouse the idea that such a tie to an ideal type of profession limits the more general inquiry into the nature of occupations. (Turner and Hodge, 1970:19-50) They attempted to formulate a framework for the analysis of occupations in general rather than for professional or professionalizing occupations alone and observed that:

"It is extremely difficult to identify differentia specifica of professions. In so far as it is possible to discern differentia
specifically, they appear to distinguish between one so-called profession and another, rather than between the categories of professional and nonprofessional occupations." (Turner and Hodge, 1970:33)

But before taking up their analysis of occupations, Turner and Hodge suggest how a theoretical orientation for the study of professions, semi-professions and professionalization might be developed by concentrating upon four main areas of analysis, which would constitute a scale of professionalization. The four areas concern:

1. the degree of substantive theory and technique in the practicing of professional or semi-professional activities;
2. the degree of monopoly over claimed professional or semi-professional activities;
3. the degree of external recognition of a profession or semi-profession;
4. the degree of organization of a profession or semi-profession." (Turner and Hodge, 1970:26)

Having suggested the preceding means of analysis, Turner and Hodge find the scope of the four areas of concern too restrictive and expand the latter into a list of activities by which occupational organization in general can be studied.

Activities relating directly to occupation:

1. The development of substantive theory.
2. The development of practical technique.
3. The transmission of substantive theory.
4. The transmission of practical techniques.
5. The provision of materials and equipment.
6. The regulation of market conditions.
7. The regulation of working conditions.
8. The identification of practitioners and recognition of qualifications for practice.
9. The promotion of standards of practice.
10. The promotion of internal relations between members.
11. The promotion of public recognition. (Turner and Hodge, 1970:37)

Turner and Hodge, and the nature of their inquiry, represent a renewed interest in the theories of the division of labor as expressed by both Spencer and Durkheim, and in so doing raise questions about occupations in terms of the creation, management and control of resources, and in turn, reject the efficacy of studying professions or professionalization alone.

Harries-Jenkins, in recognizing that increasing numbers of professionals are employed in large-scale organizations, contrasts such professionals, whom he refers to as ascriptive professionals, to the independent free practitioner who functions in a purely entrepreneurial role. The ascriptive professional is:

"...a work practitioner, whose task commitment is performed in a monopolistic organization which determines his status, evaluates his ability according to organizational requirements, and delineates, through a process of selection and designation, the precise area within which he will carry out his activities." (Harries-Jenkins, 1970:55)

The ascriptive professional is a member of two institutions: the profession and the organization and each of these attempts to control his occupational activities.

"To examine the activities of professions in these systems, is to examine, as Kornhauser comments, "the relation between two institutions, not merely between organizations and individuals."

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In dealing with ascriptive professionals, Harries-Jenkins proposes that professionalization be defined in terms of six constituent elements: structural, contextual, activity, ideological, educational and behavioral and further differentiates each of these to produce a list of sub-elements as follows:

"The Elements of Professionalization

1. Structural element
   a. Specialization: the exclusive nature of group activity
   b. Centralization: the locus of the authority - sanctions mechanism
   c. Standardization: the control of non-occupational behavior

2. Contextual element
   a. Spatio-temporal element
   b. Size of the occupational group
   c. Resources of the occupational group
   d. Group relationships

3. Activity element
   a. The goals of the occupational group
   b. The roles of individual members

4. Educational elements
   a. Occupational intelligence requirements
   b. Basis of systematic theory
   c. Institutionalized educational process
   d. Length of training
   e. Cost of training

5. Ideological element
   a. Personality involvement
   b. Sense of group identity
   c. Group culture
   d. Status
   e. Socialization process

6. Behavioural element
   a. Code of conduct

While such a list as the preceding is ostensibly for the purpose of studying professionalization, its value for studying occupations in general cannot be stressed too highly.
The survey of the literature on professions and professionalization thus far has tended to mirror a sequence of developments in the 20th Century that affect professions and occupations in general, and that have prompted a series of changing sociological questions. In 1957, Greenwood argued that Social Work was indeed a profession although admittedly low within a hierarchy of professions, a thesis quite contrary to Abraham Flexner's 1915 views on the same subject. (Greenwood, 1957:54-55; Flexner, 1915:901-911) The difference in views, with forty-two years between them, illustrates both the growing organization of occupations and the relationship of many occupations with academic disciplines that are centered in a higher education that has changed appreciably.

The most basic question that occurs for an occupation like Social Work is as follows: Has the nature of the occupation changed sufficiently, i.e., does it now exhibit the essential attributes of a profession, through its relationship to higher education and its development of a formal organization, to be labeled a profession? The intent to answer such a question reflects both the desire for status and autonomy, and perhaps monopoly, that are granted by society to professions, and the fact that the answer has implications for the education of practitioners.

Not everyone, however, is uniformly enthusiastic about the professionalization of an occupation, a point Herbert Bisno addressed in his 1956 article, "How Social Will Social Work Be?" (Bisno, 1956:12-18) when he spoke of the possible loss of a social-action heritage in exchange for greater public status. The questioning of
professionalization occurs contemporarily in the protest of racial minorities within the social work occupation against the licensing of social workers, the latter being viewed as a barrier to practice.

As more and more occupations address the question of their status as professions, and in light of models such as Greenwood's, declare that they are, the basic sociological question shifts since such new "professions" do not emerge in exactly the same manner as did the traditional ones. The question becomes - to what degree is an occupation professionalized? - thus reflecting the proliferation of "professional"-like occupations that have developed within or become part of higher education. Barber, Goode, Vollmer and Hills, and Moore address this issue of professionalization, although the issue is both implicit and explicit in the literature that deals with the essential attributes of a profession. It should be noted, however, that as the focus shifts from the search for essential attributes to a primary emphasis on the dynamics of occupational change, the uniqueness of the tasks performed by occupations is de-emphasized.

All research focusing on certain problems invariably exclude other problems from view. The proliferation of concerns with the dynamics and nature of occupations in general, as represented by Turner and Hodge and to a lesser degree by Harries-Jenkins, considerably de-emphasizes the uniqueness of the traditional professions. This seems logical in an age in which occupations in general exhibit greater degrees of organization and recognizable, complex, sub-cultures, and in which the traditional professions are not only undergoing great change, but often appear as self-supporting systems that
perpetuate class distinctions, racism and sexism.\footnote{See: H. Jamous and B. Pelcille, "Professions or Self-Perpetuating Systems?," 

The writing of Harries-Jenkins illustrates one possible source for the change in the image of traditional professionals, such as the physician, by recognizing the burgeoning employment of not only traditional professionals, but also of a growing list of seemingly highly professionalized occupations within complex organizations such as hospitals, schools, the military and government agencies to mention a few. Harries-Jenkins poses the question of the probability of change occurring to both the profession/occupation and to the organization when the above employment relationship exists.

The sociological questions relating to professions seem to parallel changes in the professions and occupations in general, along with a growing interest in the breadth or generality of inquiry. But the question of whether professions are indeed a different type of occupation has not been dispelled and is reflected in the writing of Talcott Parsons. Parsons, to a seemingly greater degree than other writers, not only recognizes the change surrounding professions in the 20th Century, but suggests reasons for such a change as well as limitations to professionalization. He makes the following observation:

"Thus the occupational complex we call the professions is organized about that element of the modern cultural system ordinarily called the intellectual disciplines - the humanities, and the sciences, both natural and social - and about their general significance in both modern societies and the cultural systems which they articulate... As this relationship between the intellectual disciplines and society has become institutionalized, it
has come to center in the two complexes of universities and research institutions." (Parsons, 1968:536)

And as was quoted previously in Parsons' criteria for a profession, universities give primacy to the intellectual component of knowledge, and Parsons labels this, with a certain redundancy some argue, "cognitive rationality." In relating both the professions and intellectual disciplines to the university, itself primarily a research institution, (Hindi, 1971:288-290) there is a tacit acknowledgement of the dominance of a sense of scientific research upon education and upon what we view as knowledge in the 20th Century. The union of the university system with practice was originated by the field of medicine, effecting a scientific approach to medicine, which, may be argued, has resulted in a more systematic, predictable and thus successful practice. The influence of scientific research is further demonstrated by Parsons' elimination of the ministry from his list of accepted professions since:

"...in the modern world, the element of intellectual training is central. Only relatively 'primitive' fundamentalist groups regard direct inspiration as adequate qualification for clerical functions. Although the clergy includes more specifically professional roles, particularly that of theologian, the central clerical role must be regarded as marginal to the professional system...Clerical leadership and authority are grounded not so much in competence in specifically intellectual matters as in the diffuse religious and moral authority of the religious tradition as such. It is the charisma of clerical office which is the primary focus of the legitimation of the authority and influence of the clergy rather than the exercise of competence in a sector of the system of intellectual disciplines." (Parsons, 1968:537-538)

Parsons' emphasis upon the primacy of cognitive rationality and upon the recognition of the 20th Century development of an institution to perpetuate cognitive rationality as a value, i.e., the university
and research institute, forms the foundation of a sense of profession that is two-dimensional:

"First is the profession of learning itself. This is organized in terms of two primary functions; contributing further to learning through research and scholarship, and transmitting the learning to others... second is the 'applied' branch of the professions. Its historic focuses, as represented by the two fields of law and medicine, have been the regulation of order in society and caring for the health of society's individual members. However, the modern list of applied professions includes a much wider range of fields, the boundaries of which are somewhat uncertain...Very broadly, we may distinguish these two main branches of the modern professional system in terms of the cultural primacy of the interests served by the academic branch, and of the social primacy of the applied branch."

(Parsons, 1968:537)

Thus Parsons proposes that the value of cognitive rationality as a tool, i.e., the use of the intellect for problem-solving, is that it ties the professions intimately to the intellectual disciplines, and thereby separates the professions from other occupations in a significant way. The most obvious outward manifestation of this separation is the distinction between those occupations that are centered at the university and those that are not. It is important to recognize here that higher education itself is divided into various types of institutions, each with its own goals and values.

Parsons' emphasis upon the university implies the recognition that such institutions are generally dominated by the value of research and that they educate students, both undergraduate and graduate, primarily to enter the intellectual disciplines, (Mayhew, 1971:25-26) a point that generates rather strong conflict among educators. Although education for many occupations does take place in higher education, education at the university level is particularly oriented toward the intellectual disciplines, the professions, and more recently, toward
a broad range of so-called semi-professions such as nursing and non-university educators. Parsons also suggests a further role for the professions:

"It is my view that the professional complex, though obviously still incomplete in its development, has already become the most important single component in the structure of modern societies. It has displaced first the 'state,' in the relatively early modern sense of that term, and more recently, the 'capitalistic' organization of the economy. The massive emergence of the professional complex, not the special status of capitalistic or socialistic modes of organization, is the crucial structural development in the twentieth-century society." (Parsons, 1968: 545)

In suggesting such an expanded social role for the professions, Parsons contemporarily reflects views similar to those that Durkheim envisioned for occupations in general at the turn of the century, and further evokes an image of a profession as a highly complex organization in its attempts to fulfill such a role. (Durkheim, 1932-28)

Summary

Much of the sociological literature on professions and professionalization is concerned with three major themes: the essential characteristics of a "true" profession; the process by which an occupation becomes, and is recognized as, a profession; and conflict between the two principal trends in our society: bureaucratization and professionalization. The latter problem is dealt with only briefly in this dissertation in a later section in which a profession's relationship to semi- and ascriptive professions is defined.

Contained within the second theme that deals with professionalization, is the Turner and Hodge approach which stresses the value of
extending the study of professionalization to the general study of occupations. (See: 37-39) While recognizing the validity of Turner and Hodge's approach, the direction of their research is also beyond the scope of this work. However, Turner and Hodge point to a logical sociological direction to pursue if empirical research on professions and occupations is to be undertaken. (Turner and Hodge, 1970:25) Although a survey of the literature on professions would seem to indicate a growing tendency to drop the distinction between professions and occupations, as represented by the work of Turner and Hodge, and a growing tendency to study professionals within bureaucracies, as represented by the work of Harries-Jenkins, both directions stray from the central focus of this work which is to arrive at a functional sense of profession.

W.J. Goode, J. Ben-David, and T. Leggatt have all remarked on the general consistency that exists in the literature on professions and professionalization in terms of the identification of distinguishing characteristics. (Goode, 1960:903; Ben-David, 1963:251; T. Leggatt, 1970:155-156) Despite such consistency of observation, Goode proposes that the generating traits of professional organization be separated from derivative traits. (Goode, 1960:903; See also:30) The following chapter, then, will involve a discussion on the approach of this dissertation to the concept of organization and Chapter IV will then provide an attempt to delineate the generating traits for professional organization proceeding from Goode's insights.
CHAPTER III

PROFESSIONS AND OCCUPATIONS AS COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS

It was previously stated that professions would be viewed in this work as examples of nonbureaucratic complex organization. (Chapter I: 21) It is the purpose of this chapter, then, to develop a framework by which the dynamics of such organization can be studied. Particularly critical is the integrative function of such organization, since if we proceed from the observations begun in Chapter I, it is clear that the managerial roles which coordinate bureaucratic organization, are de-emphasized in professional organization. (Chapter I:13)

In *The Division of Labor in Society*, published in 1893, Durkheim proposed that the modern industrial society had lost or was losing a general consensus on norms and values, and in response was becoming integrated in terms of the division of labor. In the preface to the second edition of *The Division of Labor in Society*, published in 1902, Durkheim stated more explicitly the need for occupational groups to organize:

"A nation can be maintained only if, between the state and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life...occupational groups are suited to fill this role, and that is their destiny." (Durkheim, 1932: 28)
Durkheim's general observations have obviously been substantiated to a degree by such contemporary manifestations of occupational organization as the strong social activist role of the United Auto Workers and the position of the National Dairy Association as the largest single contributor to national political campaigns in 1976.

The degree to which occupations have become organized varies considerably, with some occupations exhibiting no formal organizational characteristics at all. But the scope of this section is oriented toward that end of the occupational continuum as described by Vollmer and Mills where occupations are not only highly organized, formally and informally, but where professions seem to be distinguishable from other occupations.

Peter Blau conceptualizes organization as the following:

"Whenever groups of men associate with one another, social organization develops among them, but not every collectivity has a formal organization. The defining criterion of a formal organization - or an organization, for short - is the existence of procedures for mobilizing and coordinating the efforts of various, usually specialized, subgroups in pursuit of joint objectives." (Blau, 1968:298)

Given this definition by Blau, however, he further warns:

"...although the defining characteristic of an organization is that a collectivity is formally organized, what makes it of scientific interest is that the developing social structure inevitably does not coincide completely with established norms." (Blau, 1968:298)

Although Blau introduces the concept social organization in relation to coordination, specialization, "joint objectives" and the limitations of viewing an organization as formal structure alone, his

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1 Turner and Hodge, 1970:33-50. Turner and Hodge attempt to provide a conceptual scheme to study occupations which allows for the variety or lack of formal structure evident in organization.
definition is actually quite broad. However, when other more explicit conceptualizations are introduced, such as one by Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, a problem becomes evident. Katz and Kahn also conceive of social organization as a type or subclass of social systems possessing the following components:

1. Organizations possess a maintenance structure as well as production and production-supportive structures. The maintenance subsystems operate to give them (organizations) some degree of permanence.
2. Organizations have an elaborated formal role pattern, in which the division of labor results in a functional specificity of roles. Thus social organizations, more than other groups, utilize roles as such, divorcing them from surplus elements of traditionalism, personal obligations, and charisma.
3. There is a clear authority structure in the organization which reflects the way in which the control and managerial function is exercised.
4. As part of the managerial structure there are well-developed regulatory mechanisms and adaptive structures.
5. There is an explicit formulation of ideology to provide system norms which buttress the authority structure. (Katz and Kahn, 1966:47)

Another definition of social organization is provided by Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch:

"An organization is defined as a system of interrelated behavior of people who are performing a task that has been differentiated into several distinct subsystems, each system performing a portion of the task, and the efforts of each being integrated to achieve effective performance of the system." (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967:3)

A significant difference that seems to exist between the Katz and Kahn conceptualization of social organization and the Lawrence and Lorsch definition, is the former's listing of the existence of a clear authority structure which is related both to control and management of the organization. Traditional sociological conceptions of organization that are represented by scientific management (Taylor,
1911), administrative management (Gulick and Urwick, 1937) and bureaucracy (Weber, 1947), give primacy to the idea of management or administration as the rational coordinating subsystem of organization.2

Although the informal aspects of organization were recognized almost simultaneously by Chester Barnard (1938) and by Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939), the result was a managerial focus upon the improvement of production through "human relations."3 The limitations of management to coordinate efficiently became evident through the work of Merton (1940) who stressed the possibility of bureaucratic rule systems becoming ends unto themselves as opposed to means of integration, and through Selznick (1949) who documented the impact of environmental pressure upon the organization.4 Lawrence and Lorsch state the problem succinctly:

"Although coordination is undoubtedly an important part of the top manager's job, there is considerable evidence that many organizational systems develop integration devices in addition to the conventional hierarchy." (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967:12)


In addition, Lawrence and Lorsch hypothesize that:

"When the environment requires both a high degree of subsystem differentiation and a high degree of integration, integrative devices will tend to emerge." (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967:12)

The Lawrence and Lorsch quotes suggest that given a demand for a high degree of differentiation, integration will tend to occur although not necessarily through the efforts of management. The question then exists as to how such integration comes about, and introduces the broader question of the primacy of the managerial or administrative structure for understanding organization. These questions can be approached by returning to another conceptualization of organization as developed by Talcott Parsons.

Parsons has suggested that there are three levels in the hierarchical structure of organization: the technical (the suborganization for accomplishing the organization's core tasks), the managerial (the suborganization that controls and services the technical level and mediates the organization's external affairs) and the institutional (the social environment in which the organization is embedded). (Parsons, 1960:60-65) Parsons further indicates that the existence of the managerial level is due to the increase of complex technical functions, or in Lawrence and Lorsch's term - differentiation. (Parsons, 1960:62)

John Meyer and Brian Rowan, in an unpublished study of educational organizations, observe the following relationships among the technical, managerial and institutional levels:

"The most fundamental observation in research on organizations is that rule and behavior - formal and informal - are often separate or inconsistent. This is the same observation we have been making about schooling organizations. It is time to stop
being surprised at it.

The surprise arises because researchers take a limited view of formal organizations. They see formal structure as created to actually coordinate production (in the case of market organizations) and conformity (in the case of political bureaucracy). Thus they are surprised when formal structure and activity are loosely linked.

It is true that production requires some coordination, and political structure some conformity. But it is also true that the myth, or social account, of production and conformity are critical. Much of the value of what we purchase lies in intangibles. Much of the value of social control and order inheres in the faith that is generated.

Put differently, organizations must have the confidence of their environments, not simply be in rational exchange with them. They must be, that is, legitimate, and must contain legitimate accounts or explanations for the order and products they produce. The formal structure of an organization is in good part social myth, and functions as a myth whatever its actual implementation.” (Meyer and Rowan, 1975:36-37)

While Meyer and Rowan's paper was primarily related to the study of educational organizations, the preceding quote addresses what they discern as a general weakness in the overall study of organizations. That weakness relates to a rational, functional view of organization that does not sufficiently recognize the basically contrived nature of social organization. In particular, the structure of some organizations, such as educational ones, is more related to the expectations of their social environment, or institutional level, to use Parsons' concept, than to either the core activity or rational administrative decisions.

Meyer and Rowan state the matter more specifically as a proposition:

"Educational organizations are internally coordinated and legitimated by their environmental categories, not primarily by their own activity. Those which are in closer correspondence with environmental categories survive and prosper more internally (market positions held constant) than those which are distinctive..." (Meyer and Rowan, 1975:34)
In general, then, Meyer and Rowan point to the primacy of the social environment for understanding organizational structure under certain circumstances, which basically seems to reflect a centrally important social role for the organization in a community or nation.

Another observation of Meyer and Rowan's is that the core activity of educational organization is loosely coupled to the administration:

"The more bureaucratically organized the educational system, the less actual control is exercised over instruction and the more the logic of confidence prevails. In such systems, more control is exercised over formal educational categories and definitions." (Meyer and Rowan, 1975:34)

However, Meyer and Rowan also propose the following:

"Loosely coupled educational organizations respond more effectively to environmental pressures. Instruction adapts more quickly to the informal pressures of parents and the desires of teachers. Programs adapt more quickly to institutional changes in environmental categories." (Meyer and Rowan, 1975:34)

In summary, then, the core activity or technical level of an organization, to use Parsons' concept, also adapts to environmental change without necessarily relying upon administrative cooperation or help. The organizational image as developed here is obviously different from that of a Weberian ideal bureaucracy in which management is the key to organizational structure, and the differences between the two tend to center on two of Parsons' organizational levels; the technical and the institutional.

James Thompson, in evolving a strategy for studying organizations, follows Parsons' reasoning and expects differences in technical functions or technologies to cause significant differences among organizations. (Thompson, 1967:12) Similarly, Thompson assumes that
differences in the institutional structures in which organizations exist should create significant variations among organizations. And since the three levels (technical, managerial and institutional) are interdependent, differences at any one level would promote differences at the other two levels. (Thompson, 1967:12) It would seem that Thompson's view coincides with Meyer and Rowan's observations of environmental influence and reinforces the differences between technical and institutional functions as the source of variation among organizations. Thompson further notes:

"...that technologies and environments are major sources of uncertainty for organizations, and that differences in those dimensions will result in differences in organizations." (Thompson, 1967:13)

Thompson's observation of the effect of uncertainty upon organization is echoed by Lawrence and Lorsch who hypothesize:

"The greater the uncertainty of the relevant subenvironment, the more formalized the structure of the subsystem." (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967:6)

The corollary of the preceding hypothesis would suggest that the greater the uncertainty an organization deals with, the less formalized a structure it would have. Weber's ideal type bureaucracy represents an extreme model of rational, formal organization in which the core problem is to eliminate uncertainty, thus making every organizational action a positive, functional contribution to overall efficiency.

All organizational action, in an ideal bureaucracy, is appropriate and all outcomes, therefore, are predictable. Ideal types, however, do not exist and in fact, some organizations, because of both
their core activity and social roles, always deal with high levels of uncertainty. The educational organizations studied by Meyer and Rowan are a case in point. Educational organizations exist within a milieu in which they must deal with uncertain core technology, i.e., instruction, and with an uncertain environment that changes demands and expectations. It is small wonder, then, that the organization and functioning of educational organizations and those of an industrial manufacturing concern appear quite different from one another.

To conceptualize the central problem of organization as a matter of coping with uncertainty, is to accept an open-systems framework. While reviewing strategies for studying organizations, Thompson found that:

"...Gouldner (1959) was able to discern fundamental models underlying most of the literature. He labeled these the 'rational' and the 'natural-system' models of organizations, and these labels are indeed descriptive of the results. To Gouldner's important distinction we wish to add the notion that the rational model results from a closed-system strategy for studying organizations and that the natural-system model flows from an open-system strategy." (Thompson, 1967:3-4)

Thompson goes on to illustrate the closed-system (rational) strategy as represented by the concepts of scientific management, (Taylor, 1911) administrative management, (Gulick and Urwick, 1937) and bureaucracy (Weber, 1947). (Thompson, 1967:4-8) The open-system strategy (natural-system) is illustrated by the study of informal organization (Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939; Barnardi, 1938) and by the study of environmental impact (Selznick, 1949). (Thompson, 1967:4-8) After a further discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches to the study of organizations, Thompson states:
"We will conceive of complex organizations as open-systems; hence, indeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but at the same time as subject to criteria of rationality and hence needing determinateness and certainty." (Thompson, 1967:10)

Thompson, while declaring that organizations are open-systems, reinforces the need for rationality. However, Thompson's concept of rationality does not refer to rational administrative or managerial decisions alone, but also to technical rationality which is evaluated by two criteria: instrumental (whether specific actions do produce the desired outcome) and economic (whether the results are obtained with a minimum of resources). Although technical rationality is not in itself sufficient for organizational rationality, by stressing technical rationality, Thompson again indicates that: "...clearly, technology is an important variable in understanding the actions of complex organizations."5

Katz and Kahn, in The Social Psychology of Organizations, concur with the conceptualization of complex organization as a special type of open-system and the following is a summary of the common characteristics of open-systems as outlined in their work: (Katz and Kahn, 1966:19-26)

1. Importation of Energy. Open-systems import some form of energy from the external environment. Energy in the most basic sense allows work to be accomplished, and for social organizations, this means drawing renewed supplies of energy from other institutions, from people, or from the material

5Thompson, 1967:15; also see 14-24 for a discussion of Thompson's concept of organizational rationality.
2. Through-put. Open-systems transform the energy available to them. Organizations reorganize input in order to create new products, process materials, train or educate people, or provide a service.

3. Out-put. Open-systems export some product into the environment - be it an idea, an automobile or a student.

4. Systems as Cycles of Events. The product exported to the environment furnishes the sources of energy for the repetition of the cycle of events. In order to speak of an organization there must be a pattern of activities with a sense of cyclic character. The basic method for the identification of social structures, such as social organizations, is to follow the chain of events from the import of energy through its transformation to the point of closure of the cycle.

5. Negative Entropy. Open-systems, in order to survive, stop the entropic process; i.e., by importing more energy than is immediately needed, such systems can store energy with which to survive periods of crisis. Social organizations will seek to improve their survival position and to acquire energy reserves in order to provide a comfortable margin of operation.

6. Information input, negative feedback, and the coding process. Inputs are informative in character, furnishing signals to the organization about the environment and about its own functioning in relation to the environment. Information
feedback of a negative type enables the system to correct deviations. However, reception of inputs into a system is selective and information is coded. A system can receive only that information to which it is adapted and which it can decode.

7. The Steady State and Dynamic Homeostasis. Open-systems exist in a steady state which is not to be equated with either a motionless or a true equilibrium. Any internal or external factor disrupting the system is countered by forces seeking to restore the system as closely as possible to its previous state, i.e., to maintain a steady state. The tendency is to preserve the character of the system just as homeostatic processes in the human body function to preserve an evenness of physiological functioning.

8. Differentiation and Elaboration. Open-systems move in the direction of differentiation and elaboration, with a greater specialization of function.

9. Equifinality. According to this principle, a system can reach the final state from differing conditions and by a variety of paths.

Although all open-systems share the preceding nine properties, such properties are insufficient for adequate description of specific open-systems. Social systems, for example, have structure, but the latter relates to events rather than to physical parts, thus making structure inseparable from the functioning of the system. This aspect of social structure suggests that social systems are basically
contrived systems, held together essentially by psychological bonds anchored in the attitudes, perceptions, beliefs, motivations and expectations of human beings.6

More specifically, Katz and Kahn view the contrived nature of social systems as holding great importance for maintenance inputs which sustain the system. For example, the patterning of human behavior helps maintain a social system which is brought about by environmental demands, shared values and expectations, and rule enforcement. Rule enforcement is achieved by role behavior; both are sanctioned by norms; and the latter are justified by values. Thus roles, norms and values provide three interrelated bases for the integration of social systems and social organizations.7

Summary

Although it is recognized that the degree of organization among occupations varies considerably, it seems evident that the degree of organization of professions is extensive, as is the degree of organization of those occupations that are considered highly professionalized. It is a basic assumption of this study that those occupations addressed here and professions in general are complex organizations because of their highly differentiated nature and formal structure.

6See: Katz and Kahn, 1966:30-37 for the contrived nature of social systems.

7See: Katz and Kahn, 1966:47-57 for an elaboration on roles, norms and values.
This assumption seems to be supported by Peter Blau's conceptualization of organization as a collectivity: "...a concrete system of interacting human individuals, or persons in roles," with formal organization differentiated from other collectivities by the existence of procedures for coordinating subgroups in the pursuit of joint objectives. (Blau, 1968:298) The assumption is further supported by Lawrence and Lorsch's definition:

"An organization is defined as a system of interrelated behavior of people who are performing a task that has been differentiated into several distinct subsystems, each system performing a portion of the task, and efforts of each being integrated to achieve effective performance of the system." (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967:3)

In formulating a set of assumptions about organization, the following premises seem to be supported by the preceding discussion on the nature of organization:

1. Complex organizations are a **special type** of open-system, exhibiting a degree of permanence through cyclic activity, moving toward greater differentiation, and seeking to maintain the basic character of the system.

2. The nature of the core activity and its attendant core technology, and the value of the core activity to the broader social institutions or environment provide the main focus for the study of complex organizations. This seems especially appropriate when uncertainty within both the core activity and environment has limited the formation of formal structure, particularly on the managerial level.
3. While noting the traditional integrative function of the managerial level and the relationship of authority to that function, it seems more worthwhile to study the integrative process itself and the relationship of authority to that process.

4. Since complex organizations are contrived social systems, it seems necessary to examine the relationship of ideology, existent within and external to the organization, to integration and authority. Rationality is not merely a tool, but a value as well, and as such has varying degrees of impact upon integration and authority.

Although organization, as formulated above, tends to be complex and to provide a myriad of questions, it is hoped that the preceding assumptions will provide a framework by which the generating traits of professional organization may be studied with efficacy. And assuming that the preceding has provided such a focus, the next chapter will seek to delineate the specific generating traits of professional organization.
CHAPTER IV

LIMITS OF PROFESSIONALIZATION: KNOWING AND VALUING

Introduction

Proceeding from the observations of the last chapter, two areas, the nature of the core activity and the value of that activity for the surrounding social institutions, provide a focus into the nature of professional organization. By exploring the nature of both areas, an attempt will be made in this chapter to locate the elements that generate the necessity of professional organization.

Harold Wilensky has observed that specialization in itself is no basis for professional authority. (Wilensky, 1964:139) Although the job of the professional is indeed specialized and requires the competency to apply a particular core technology, there appears to be something unique about the range of knowledge upon which the core technology is based. This unique range of knowledge seems to allow the practitioner to establish an exclusive jurisdiction over a core technology. The range of such an optimal knowledge base can be identified by the degree of success an occupation has in establishing claim to exclusive jurisdiction over a set of tasks. Wilensky states the matter succinctly:

"Any occupation wishing to exercise professional authority must find a technical base for it, assert an exclusive jurisdiction,
link both skill and jurisdiction to standards of training, and convince the public that its services are uniquely trustworthy."

(Wilensky, 1964:138)

In discussing barriers to professionalization, Wilensky asserts that the threat to an occupation’s claim to exclusive jurisdiction over a core technology is a major barrier to professionalization.

One such threat to exclusive jurisdiction derives from the technology of the occupation which is based upon knowledge that is too narrow or precise in range:

"When we are able to break a skill down into component elements, prescribe sequences of tasks in a performance, leaving little to the judgment and understanding of the worker, we have a job that can be taught to most people, often in a short time — indeed, a job which is ripe for elimination through programming on a computer. We also have a system of procedures which by its very accessibility is open to critical examination and debate by all comers — and is therefore vulnerable to quick displacement."

(Wilensky, 1964:149)

On the other hand, occupations based on knowledge that is too broad or vague also have trouble establishing exclusive jurisdiction.

The field of mental health which includes practitioners from the areas of social work, psychology and psychiatry, each proposing they can provide adequate, competent treatment, is an example of practice dependent upon too broad a knowledge base for exclusive jurisdiction to exist. Not only does a multiplicity of theoretical approaches to treatment exist here, but the various educational milieus for practitioners differ grossly in educational techniques, areas of concern and methodological approaches. 1 It is interesting to note that mental

1William J. McGlothlin, The Professional Schools, New York (Center for Applied Research in Education, Inc.) 1964; See Table 1, p. 38 and Fig. 2, p. 46 for a comparison between areas for proportion of curriculum devoted to Arts and Sciences, to professional science, and to application; and for time spent in the college of arts and science, in professional school and in internship and residency.
health is the one area in which medicine attempted to secure an exclusive jurisdiction and failed - an observation that may indicate consequences for the expansion of a profession beyond its optimal knowledge base.

It should also be noted that when mental health practitioners share a common theoretical foundation, such as ego psychology, conflict generated by the source of education is reduced and competency of practice is more easily agreed upon. It could be assumed that a common theoretical foundation provides the means for attributing treatment success or failure to practice based upon concepts understandable to colleagues. Successful practice could then be repeated by the originator and others, and failure avoided.

A research-established knowledge base, formal training and community acceptance and support thus become the underpinnings of successful practice, a conceptualization echoed in Parsons’ writings on the professions. However, such a conceptualization is complicated by two factors: how human beings know and communicate knowledge and the value of what we know to others. The question of how human beings know shall be addressed first.

Knowing

The following section and the subsequent chapters of this work rely very heavily upon the conceptualization of knowing by Michael Polanyi. Although other epistemologies exist, it is Polanyi’s effort to probe beyond the conception of a wholly explicit truth that
renders his work of critical value to this dissertation.  

Polanyi's major discovery, the structure of tacit knowing, provides a means by which differences can be distinguished among applied knowledge, intellectual or scientific knowledge, knowledge of humans, and knowledge of inanimate material, all areas critical to the understanding of professional activity. Since a comparison of epistemological theories is a major task in itself, it will be assumed here that the use of Polanyi's work provides the most effective insight into the area of professional knowing.

Michael Polanyi, by observing that "there are things that we know but cannot tell," (Polanyi, 1962:601) conceptualizes knowing in the following manner:

"...there are two kinds of knowing which invariably enter jointly into any act of knowing a comprehensive entity. There is (1) knowing a thing by attending to it, in the way we attend to an entity as a whole and (2) knowing a thing by relying on our awareness of it for the purpose of attending to an entity to which it contributes. The latter knowledge can said to be tacit..." (Polanyi, 1962:601)

Polanyi calls "knowing by attending to" a focal knowing, while "knowing by relying on" is subsidiary knowing, and he expands upon the concept of "tacit" as follows:

"What is subsidiarily known is tacitly known; but it seems appropriate to extend the meaning of 'tacit knowing' to include the integration of subsidiary to focal knowing. The structure of tacit knowing is then the structure of the integrative process, and knowing is tacit to the extent to which it has such structure. So if...all knowing ultimately relies on a tacit process of knowing, we shall say that ultimately, all knowledge has the structure of tacit knowledge." (Polanyi, 1962:602)

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The tacit nature of knowing is further illustrated by Polanyi in recalling the experiments of Lazarus and McCleary, and Eriksen and Kuethe, demonstrating "subception." Lazarus and McCleary, in 1949, presented subjects with a large number of nonsense syllables, and after being shown certain syllables the subjects were given an electric shock. The subject, after a period of time, showed symptoms of anticipating the shock at the sight of the "shock syllables" and yet upon questioning, could not identify them. The experiment was repeated by Eriksen and Kuethe in 1953 with similar results.

The subjects in both experiments had learned to connect the sight of something with the electric shock. But the connection remained tacit, it seems, because the subjects focused on the electric shock and were subsidiarily aware of the syllables. The subjects were aware of the "shock syllables" because of attending to something else, namely the electric shock.

"Such is the functional relation between the two terms of tacit knowing: We know the first term (subsidiary knowledge) only by relying on our awareness of it for attending to the second (focal knowledge)." (Polanyi, 1958:10)

Recognizing knowing as having two interrelated components, focal and subsidiary, and that all knowledge is ultimately related to tacit knowing, Polanyi makes the following observations:

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Although both focal and subsidiary knowing contribute to how we know, both are in a sense mutually exclusive. To focus upon the elements of a skill completely is to impair the integration of those elements. For example, we tend to know concurrently the elements that constitute bicycling as well as knowing bicycling in a whole manner, i.e., either you can or cannot bicycle. But focusing upon the elements involved beyond a certain degree is dysfunctional to the mastery of bicycling since such focusing impairs the necessary integration needed to coordinate those elements.

In medical education it is recognized that textbooks of diagnostics which concentrate upon the symptom complex of a disease are inadequate. The focused learning from the text must be supplemented with practice, which places those symptoms in unique situations, i.e., with the human patient, before adequate knowledge of diagnosing occurs.

In so doing, the medical practitioner acquires knowledge by tacitly understanding the individual variances each patient presents that could not be learned from textbooks alone nor solely from verbal communication. It is also interesting to note that Polanyi feels that subsidiary knowing precedes, and is necessary for, focal knowing:

"Knowing is a process in two stages, the subsidiary and the focal, and these two can be defined only within the tacit act, which relies on the first for attending to the second." (Polanyi, 1962:616)

Immanuel Kant, in the introduction to The Critique of Pure Reason, wrote of the two stems of human knowledge: sensibility
and understanding. The following quote by Kant, taken from Philip C. Jones' discussion of the significance of The Critique of Pure Reason, seems to cohere with Polanyi's views:

"Whatever the process and means may be by which knowledge reaches its objects there is one that reaches them directly, and forms the ultimate material of all thought, viz., intuition (Anschauung)... This faculty of receiving representations (Vorstellungen)... is called sensibility (Sinnlichkeit)... These intuitions become thought through the understanding (Verstand), and hence arise conceptions (Begriffe). All thought therefore must, directly or indirectly, go back to intuitions, i.e., to our sensibility, because in no other way can objects be given to us." (Jones, 1964:138)

Educators' acceptance of Polanyi's observations that focal and subsidiary knowing are both necessary for complete knowing, that focal and subsidiary knowing are under certain circumstances exclusive of one another, and that subsidiary knowing (or Kant's sensibility) generally precedes and is necessary for focal knowing (or Kant's understanding), seems to have implications for the structure and nature of educational sequences.

2. While all focused knowing is conscious "...subsidiary awareness must range from a conscious level down to levels altogether inaccessible to consciousness..." (Polanyi, 1962:603)

3. As was suggested by the Kant quote, our body is related to knowing, according to Polanyi, in that:

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"Our body is the ultimate instrument of all our external knowledge, whether intellectual or practical. In all our waking moments we are relying on our awareness of contacts of our body with things outside for attending to these things. Our own body is the only thing in the world we normally never experience as an object, but experience always in terms of the world to which we are attending from our body. It is by making this intelligent use of our body that we feel it to be our body, and not a thing outside." (Polanyi, 1966:15-15)

"But our awareness of our body for attending to things outside it suggests a wider generalization of the feeling we have of our body. Whenever we use certain things for attending from them to other things, in the way in which we always use our own body, these things change their appearance. They appear to us now in terms of the entities to which we are attending from them, just as we feel our own body in terms of the things outside to which we are attending from our body. In this sense we can say that when we make a thing function as the proximal (focal) term of tacit knowing, we incorporate it in our own body - or extend our body to include it - so that we come to dwell on it." (Polanyi, 1966:16)

Tacit knowing appears to be an act of indwelling and:

"Therefore, since all understanding is tacit knowing, all understanding is achieved by indwelling." (Polanyi, 1962:606)

Two major consequences are derived from the preceding observation:

a. "The idea developed by Dilthey and Lipps, that we know human beings and works of art only by indwelling can thus be justified. But we can see now also that these authors were mistaken in distinguishing indwelling from observation as practiced in the natural sciences. The difference is only a matter of degree: Indwelling is less deep when observing a star than when understanding men or works of art."  

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5Polanyi, 1962:606; See also: H.A. Hodges, trans., Wilhelm Dilthey, New York (Oxford University Press) 1944:121-129; T. Lipps, Aesthetik, Hamburg, 1903. Dilthey taught that knowing the mind of another person occurs by reliving the other's mental process, or "dwelling" in the mind of the other. Lipps taught that aesthetic appreciation was possible by similarly "dwelling" in the mind of the arts' creator. Thus both conceived of the act of empathy.
Polanyi, while recognizing that all understanding is achieved by indwelling, also emphasizes that understanding of men and of art is achieved by greater degrees of indwelling. This recognition seems to have significance for those human occupations that by necessity demand a high degree of understanding of human beings. Furthermore, Polanyi establishes a connection between such "person" professions as medicine, law mental health, and education and art in that each relies heavily on indwelling.

b. **Interiorization** is the result of the indwelling process wherein we identify with the teachings in question.

Polanyi illustrates a case of interiorization this way:

"To rely on a theory for understanding is to interiorize it. For we are attending from the theory to things seen in its light; and are aware of the theory, while using it, in terms of the spectacle that serves to explain. This is why mathematical theory can be learned only by practicing its application; its true knowledge lies in our ability to use it." (Polanyi, 1966:17)

Polanyi's statement that the true value of theory is in our ability to use it and that all understanding is related to indwelling, i.e., to tacit knowing, brings him face to face with what he considers to be a false ideal of science: the claim to objectivity. For Polanyi all knowing is rooted in an act of personal judgment and the fallacy of modern anti-metaphysical philosophies such as pragmatism, operationalism, positivism and
logical positivism is obvious. 6

The structure of Polanyi's arguments is too extensive to be reproduced here, and so the three following quotes are presented to serve as an introduction to his conclusions.

"I think I can show that the process of formalizing all knowledge to the exclusion of any tacit knowing is self-defeating. For, in order that we may formalize the relations that constitute a comprehensive entity, for example, the relations that constitute a frog, this entity, i.e., the frog, must be first identified informally by tacit knowing; and, indeed, the meaning of a mathematical theory of the frog lies in its continued bearing on this still tacitly known frog. Moreover, the act of bringing a mathematical theory to bear on its subject is itself a tacit integration of the kind we have recognized in the use of a denotative word for designating its object. And we have seen also that a true knowledge of a theory can be established only after it has been interiorized and extensively used to interpret experience. Therefore: a mathematical theory can be constructed only by relying on prior tacit knowing and can function as a theory only within an act of tacit knowing, which consists in our attending from it to the previously established experience on which it bears." (Polanyi, 1966:20-21)

"It is commonplace that all research must start from a problem. Research can be successful only if the problem is good; it can be original only if the problem is original. But how can one see a problem, any problem, let alone a good and original problem? For to see a problem is to see something that is hidden. It is to have an intimation of the coherence of hitherto not comprehended particulars. The problem is good if this intimation is true; it is original if no one else can see the possibilities of the comprehension that we are anticipating. To see a problem that will lead to a great discovery is not just to see something hidden, but to see something of which the rest of humanity cannot have even an inkling." (Polanyi, 1966:21-22)

"Since we have no explicit knowledge of these unknown things there can also be no explicit justification of a scientific truth. But as we can know a problem and feel sure that it is pointing to something hidden behind it, we can be aware also of

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the hidden implications of a scientific discovery, and feel confident that they will prove right. We feel sure of this, because in contemplating the discovery we are looking at it not only in itself but more significantly, as a clue to a reality of which it is a manifestation. The pursuit of discovery is conducted from the start in these terms; all the time we are guided by sensing the presence of a hidden reality toward which our clues are pointing; and the discovery which terminates and satisfies this pursuit is still sustained by the same vision. It claims to have made contact with reality; a reality which being real, may yet reveal itself to future eyes in an indefinite range of unexpected manifestations." (Polanyi, 1966:23-24)

Beyond the implications for education that may be drawn from the process of knowing, the value of Polanyi's work lies in what he considers our liberation from objectivism: "...to realize that we can voice our ultimate convictions only from within our convictions." (Polanyi, 1958:267) The ultimate weakness of objectivism is the implied message that we can be relieved of personal responsibility for our beliefs by holding to objective criteria of validity.

"The alternative to this, which I am seeking to establish here, is to restore to us once more the power for the deliberate holding of unproven beliefs. We should be able to profess now knowingly and openly those beliefs which could be tacitly taken for granted in the days before modern philosophic criticism reached its present incisiveness. Such powers may appear dangerous. But a dogmatic orthodoxy can be kept in check both internally and externally, while a creed inverted into a science is both blind and deceptive." (Polanyi, 1953:268)

Science - Technology

Science, which generally purports to be a method of knowing, is as Polanyi points out, a creed or belief system that affects our whole culture. The range of that effect is apparent in Harold Wilensky's observation that: "In modern societies, where science enjoys extraordinary prestige, occupations which shine with its light are in a good position to achieve professional authority." (Wilensky, 1964:138)
and in Geraldine Clifford's observation that:

"...the methods of science have become the norm against which are measured all kinds of standards of objectivity, verifiability, research, intelligence, and, yes, creativity. Failing to consider science as promising the really exciting thought, as being the reliably progressive social force, and as the most vital discipline, is to be a rebel or an existentialist or otherwise almost 'unamerican'... The scientist has become the culture-hero, the modern epic figure. And to feel somewhat fearful of him, to be ambivalent in your regard of him, is merely to repeat earlier experience with other culture-heroes." (Clifford, 1973: 333)

The transition from recognizing the broad social impact of science upon our society and upon how we "know," to that of seeing science as having power, is more than manageable, as Hans Morgenthau points out:

"The combination of esoteric knowledge and political power alters the function and character of the scientific elites. They no longer merely advise on the basis of expert knowledge, but they are also the champions of policies promoted with unrivaled authority and frequently determined by virtue of it. In the eyes both of the political authorities and the public at large, the scientific elites appear as the guardians of the arcana imperii, the secret remedies for public ills.

...Scientific knowledge is by its very nature esoteric knowledge; since it is inaccessible to the public at large, it is bound to be secret. The public finds itself in the same position vis-à-vis scientific advice as do the political authorities; unable to retrace the arguments underlying the scientific advice, it must take that advice on faith." (Morgenthau, 1964:1402)

The power and faith generated by science and accepted by our society seeps into every level of our culture and so influences our judgment that we often forget that the impact of science is there. And perhaps this is the problem with Talcott Parsons' conceptualization of profession. Parsons does not distinguish between professions and the intellectual disciplines nor between science and technology. It is not the "secretness" or esoteric nature of knowledge alone that
generates public faith, but rather esoteric knowledge, as implied by Morgenthau, that is controlled by others and appears to promise the "secret remedies for public ills."

The notion of "remedies" implies application of a technology while "public ills" connotes a general, serious and problematic situation. Simply put, it is implied that with the application of certain technology, a deep felt, widespread problem will be solved. However, science and technology are not identical, and it is not science that solves the "public ills," since science, in its broadest sense, is a procedure for generating knowledge. But science is not the only procedure, nor an especially efficient one, for some types of knowing. Michael Polanyi, in his book, *Personal Knowledge*, distinguishes between science and technology:

"The conceptual framework of applicable knowledge (technology) is different from that of pure knowledge. It is determined primarily in terms of the successful performances to which such knowledge is relevant. Take hammering...This performance implies the conception of a hammer, which defines a class of objects that are (actual or potential) hammers...The suitability of an object to serve as a hammer is an observable property, but it can be observed only within the framework defined by the performance it is supposed to serve." (Polanyi, 1958:175)

Technology is thus derived from an acknowledged purpose, while science, as unrelated to any such purpose, evolves from broader, intellectual concerns as Polanyi observes:

"The difference between scientific knowledge and an operational principle of technology is recognized by patent law, which draws a sharp distinction between a discovery, which makes an addition to our knowledge of nature and an invention, which establishes a new operational principle serving some acknowledged advantage. New inventions rely as a rule on known facts of experience, but it may happen that a new invention involves a new discovery. Yet the distinction between the two will still hold: only the invention will be granted protection by a patent, and not the discovery as such." (Polanyi, 1958:177)
T. R. Fyvel, in discussing the nature of intellectuals, defines an intellectual "...as a person who is fascinated by general ideas and wants them to be as interesting and influential as possible." (Fyvel, 1968:16) But influential is not to be equated with problem-solving, just as discovery is not to be equated with invention nor science with technology. One has only to look at the half century gap between Max Weber's writing of The Theory of Social Organization and Economic Organization, and the book's appearance in the United States, to observe the influence of intellectual achievement extending through time. The value of technology or of an invention, however, may disappear overnight as it is rendered useless by a technology that is more effective in accomplishing the task.

Fyvel further distinguishes between the intellectual and the "technical intelligentsia" in the same general manner that Polanyi distinguishes between science and technology, in that intellectuals add to knowledge as a primary task, as does the scientist, whereas the technical intelligentsia or "experts," as well as technologists, apply organized knowledge as a primary task. (Fyvel, 1968:16) It seems reasonable, however, to cease referring to science and scientists as significantly different from intellectuals, a view that I believe is shared by both Polanyi and Fyvel. It also seems necessary to expand the concept of technology beyond its generally recognized relationship to the physical sciences.

Jerome Wiesner, in distinguishing between science and technology states:
"In fact, even to equate technology and science is wrong. Science is the quest for more or less abstract knowledge, whereas technology is the application of organized knowledge." (Wiesner, 1966:11)

If we accept the intellectual's primary task, as is the scientist's, as the quest for abstract knowledge, then technology which is applied, organized knowledge need not necessarily emanate solely from science. Similarly, intellectuals themselves have certain methods, i.e., a technology, for accomplishing their core task. The technology of history is not necessarily the technology of chemistry but nevertheless it is a technology, a codified, systematic and unified approach (albeit to varying degrees) to the group task of an intellectual discipline.

The application of organized knowledge also evolves technologies that are different from those of the intellectual disciplines because the core tasks are different. To evolve educational theory involves a type of technology that is quite distinct from that necessary to educate students in a specific situation. Technology, in the broad sense that I am employing the concept, is related to the nature of the task requirements. And the task requirements of intellectuals and scientists are the same, whereas the task requirements of those who apply organized knowledge or conduct a practice based on organized knowledge are considerably different.

It also seems useful to distinguish between an intellectual discipline and a profession. To practice a profession is to apply a technology under different circumstances than that which is required in applying the technology of an intellectual discipline. For example, returning to a point Polanyi stresses when discussing technology and
science, an applied task (the professional's task) achieves much of its meaning and many of its limits from the immediate circumstances.

The researcher, as part of an intellectual discipline may seek a cure for cancer by choice and in a manner only indirectly related to treatment. But a medical practitioner as a professional is forced to seek a solution if cancer is present in his patient. Furthermore, the practitioner's choice of treatment for the patient's cancer depends upon what is accepted by the medical profession, upon the physical condition of the patient, and although we are hesitant to admit it, upon economic, regional and other social differences which affect treatment. The researcher/intellectual is bound by the limits of the problem, by choice, and in general seeks the optimal, or best solution to that problem, whereas the practitioner/professional must try to deal with problems in a satisfactory manner (not necessarily successfully) as presented to him within the framework of the problem that exists.

Another difference between the intellectual disciplines and a profession is the relatively private nature of the former and the relatively public nature of the latter. The "publicness" of a profession is contrasted by the "privateness" of intellectuals as observed by Edward Shils:

"There is in every society a minority of persons who more than the ordinary run of their fellow men, are inquiring and desirous of being in frequent communion with symbols which are more general than the immediate concrete situations of everyday life and remote in their reference in both time and space...This interior need to penetrate beyond the screen of immediate concrete experience marks the existence of the intellectuals in every society." (Shils, 1972:3)
While the intellectual's quest is externalized in written and oral form, the Shils statement evokes a sense of privacy and of separateness from the "concrete situations of everyday life" that is quite distinct from the professional's "publicness." As if to support Durkheim's observations on the organization of occupations, a social institution has evolved in the 20th Century to both support and isolate the intellectual in that quest for knowledge, i.e., the university.

If, however, the university does or can meet the needs of intellectuals as a group and support their core task, (Shils, 1972:111-116) this support can and often does conflict with the needs of professionals and students who wish to be professionals. This conflict centers around a tendency, as Lewis Mayhew recognizes, for the intellectual disciplines to structure courses and sequences of courses to educate students to participate in the discipline. (Mayhew, 1971:22-29) Professional students often find that these courses dealing with knowledge are either irrelevant or seemingly inapplicable to the professionals' core task. As Mayhew points out:

"The needs of a future professor of educational psychology and a future associate superintendent differ considerably. The one probably should be able to consume research findings without the ability to do research, while the other needs both skills. Similarly, the man who can show, out of vast professional experience, capacities needed by a superintendent is not the person who has spent his career learning and using the skills of rigorous scientific inquiry." (Mayhew, 1971:25)

But the university as a formal institution will be examined in greater detail in Chapter VI. The point being made here is that if significant differences do exist in the nature of knowing required for a profession's or a discipline's core activities, then common
educational experiences may not be adequate.

I have attempted to accomplish a number of tasks in this section. The distinction between science and applied science (technology) has been extended to apply, in a much broader way, to all intellectual activity and applied organized knowledge. Science, then, has become a technology (the means of accomplishing a core task) of a particular subgroup of intellectuals. Other groups of intellectuals, such as historians or social critics, have other, perhaps different, technologies with which to accomplish their core tasks, just as any application of some organized knowledge requires a technology.

The nature of the technology, then, is related to the nature of the core task, how that task is known, and the social circumstances in which the task occurs. For example, basic research into the structure of matter requires little social involvement (although support of such research is another matter) compared to a criminal legal question, which by its nature involves social as well as legal issues. The relative privateness of intellectual activities has been stressed in relation to the relative publicness of the activities of the professions. It is this publicness of an activity that serves as an introduction to the next section on the value of an activity.

The Value of Knowledge

The tasks individuals perform for one another are, of course, not equal in value, and the products of occupations are also not valued equally, either by individuals or by society. With this in mind, it is interesting to note that the four established professions -
medicine, law, theology and university teaching - contend with some
of the most basic problems of human existence: illness and death, in-
justice, moral conduct and existence after death, and ignorance.

It is also interesting to note that the 20th Century is no closer
to the eradication of those basic problems than society has ever been.
Injustice and ignorance still exist, every patient of a physician
eventually dies, and we still face death without much more factual
assurance than we ever had as to its consequences. William Goode, in
a very insightful article, "The Theoretical Limits of Professionaliza-
tion," (Goode, 1969:266-313) addresses the consequences of the value
to mankind of the tasks of the "person" professions:

"We have noted that the four great established professions of the
clergy, medicine, university teaching, and the law retained a
number of traits that have to do with the substance of their
problem...Specifically, I suggest that a category of occupations
is set apart by a primary variable upon which a considerable
number of structural consequences hinges: whether the professional
must symbolically or literally 'get inside of the client,' be-
come privy to his personal world in order to solve the problem
that is the mandate of the profession." (Goode, 1969:307)

The structural consequences to which Goode refers involve those
social institutions, formal and informal, that have evolved to les-
en both the client's and the practitioner's vulnerability. Ethical
codes specifying appropriate relations between clients and the pro-
fessional, methods of determining and regulating competency, and what
is perhaps a myth, that of professional sacrifice for the client, are
examples that tend to function to lessen client and practitioner
vulnerability.

And Goode's use of the phrase to "get inside of the client" as a
mandate of the task returns us to an observation that Polanyi made
about knowing. Michael Polanyi introduces a chapter of \textit{Personal Knowledge}, entitled "Knowing Life," with the following statement:

"Facts about living things are more highly personal than the facts of the inanimate world. Moreover, as we ascend to higher manifestations of life, we have to exercise evermore personal faculties - involving a more far-reaching participation of the knower - in order to understand life." (Polanyi, 1958:347)

To understand human beings, then, is a highly personal affair that demands a high degree of "getting inside the client" or in Polanyi's terms, indwelling:

"No one but ourselves can dwell in our body directly and know fully all its conscious operations; but our consciousness can be experienced also by others to the extent to which they can dwell in the external workings of our mind from the outside. They can do this fairly effectively for many tacit workings of our mind by dwelling in our physiognomy and behavior;...By contrast, our explicit thoughts can be known to others only by dwelling in our pronouncements, the making and understanding of which is founded on artificial conventions." (Polanyi, 1969:325)

Simply put, the type of knowing that is required for tasks that rely heavily upon one's understanding of human beings, is a much different type of knowing than is required for inanimate objects. In addition, the more necessary it is to understand individuals, the more one's personality must try to dwell in the personality of another. It should also be remembered that the task of applying knowledge about human beings to a specific problem is different from that of formulating or discovering knowledge about human beings.

Implied in the necessity of high degrees of indwelling for the accomplishment of certain activities, is the question of the availability of individuals who are amenable to such tasks. People differ in their abilities to know something which limits the availability of practitioners, and yet the "publicness" or universality of the
core problems of Goode's "person" professions, demands a great many practitioners. Limitations on the availability of practitioners obviously affect the value of their activity.

It is also implied in the Polanyi quote that the understanding of human beings is of a less precise nature than that of chemistry, for example. The more "personal" the facts of one's knowledge, the more limited communication is to others, and the less standardized is practice. To understand human beings, necessitates understanding the artificial conventions with which people surround themselves, such as language. The tasks of the person professions lend themselves both to scarcity of practitioners and to a high degree of uncertainty.

The relative degree of uncertainty in the task of a physician's treating a patient for cancer as compared with an engineer's designing a bridge is obvious and suggests something about esoteric knowing. While holding to Polanyi's observation that indwelling is necessary for all knowing, the degree of indwelling is substantially less for areas that depend upon focused esoteric knowledge, like basic chemical theory.

It may be argued, then, that the availability of individuals to learn basic chemical theory is greater since such focused knowing depends less upon prior circumstances. Intelligence, discipline and a certain foundational education is required to learn basic chemical theory but these things and more, the ability to tacitly understand the variances of human physiology, are necessary for the physician.
The value of knowing focused esoteric knowledge, such as is utilized in engineering or accounting, is diminished since more people can become practitioners in these areas, and since the dependence upon the focused nature of a knowledge base means that more people outside of the area can begin to understand the nature of the task. The more an area depends upon both focused and subsidiary knowing, the more that area begins to evoke a sense of secretness for the public that boarders on the mysterious.

The circumstances, then, of knowing and applying esoteric knowledge differ and the most significant discrepancy is in the area of indwelling. Although all esoteric knowledge, as Hans Morgenthau indicated, is "secret," the esoteric knowledge that serves as a foundation of the person professions evokes and has a history of mystery. J.A. Jackson observes:

"What...is significant, is that their occupational niche is defined around problems of universal or at least widely experienced social concern. In each case, they (the person professions) encompass specialized areas of knowledge which affect all individuals but where only a few can become expert. By virtue of their character, these areas of knowledge assume a mystery, a quality of the sacred whereby they take on a distinct mystique which distinguishes them from more mundane matters...His (the professional's) training thus represents an initiation into mysteries; the processes of initiation may be more or less institutionalized but one of the factors of an analysis may well be 'degree of contact with elements given a highly charged (sacred) place in the central value system of the society.'" (Jackson, 1970:7)

It is illuminating to take Parsons' conceptualization of profession and apply to it the kind of analysis that is suggested by Jackson. It is obvious that the practice of medicine has benefited from science. It is also obvious that science has an ideological impact upon our society. Jackson observes that professional status
and its subsequent recognition by society appear to correspond to the extent to which professional knowledge and techniques and general ideological beliefs are compatible. (Jackson, 1970:6)

The status and thus the value of medicine is great because its technology has a coherence with a valued ideology in our culture, i.e., science. Conversely, religion's attendant technology is at odds with the ideological value of science for our culture and thus, it would seem, that Parson banishes the ministry from his conceptualization of profession:

"Clerical leadership and authority are grounded not so much in competence in specific intellectual matters, as in the diffuse religious and moral authority of the religious tradition as such." (Parsons, 1968:538)

The Parsons quote is countered by Wilensky who suggests:

"We have perhaps made too much of the difference between an occupational mandate derived from science and sanctioned by law (medicine) and one derived from morality or religion and sanctioned by public opinion or by the supernatural (the priesthood). Science, as Durkheim noted, cannot combat popular opinion if it does not have sufficient authority and it can obtain this authority only from opinion itself." (Wilensky, 1964:140)

Wilensky, in support of Jackson's view of the relationship between knowledge and ideology, observes that both scientific and non-scientific systems of thought can serve as a technical base for professionalism. But he asserts that a claim for professionalism is most successful when society recognizes a strong, widespread consensus regarding the significance of the knowledge or doctrine to be applied. (Wilensky, 1964:138)

The significant point here is that the value of an activity is tied to the value of the authority sanctioning it. As Goode
indicates, the witch doctor may have very little medical knowledge by our standards, "...but by the canons of truth of his society he may have a great deal." (Goods, 1969:282)

In summary, the question of the value of an activity, and hence the motivation to partake in, and support an activity is contingent upon a number of variables. Sigmund Koch, in an essay, "Valuable Properties: Their Significance for Psychology, Axiology, and Science," indicates that goal directedness is the basis for virtually all motivational theory: (Koch, 1969:121-125)

"In the technical theories, the central assumption is that action is always initiated, directed, or sustained by an inferred internal state called variously a motive, drive, need, tension system, what not, and terminated by attainment of a situation which removes, diminishes, 'satisfies' or in any other fashion alleviates that state." (Koch, 1969:123)

The theorists to whom Koch refers, account for behavior that seems non-goal directed by positing notions of displacement and of irrelevant drives and by substituting other relationships for goals. While hardly denying the connection between motivation and goals or needs, Koch also proposes a relationship between preferences and what he refers to as the "value properties" of objects or situations. (Koch, 1969:121-131)

The issue here is not so much whether Koch is correct in his arguments, but rather that he demonstrates that the meeting of a need is complicated by preference in the manner in which the need is met. For instance, there is enormous variance, based on personal preference, as to what constitutes satisfaction of our basic sexual needs, including complete abstinence. Hence the value of any particular
sexual activity is variable. The value of an activity, then, is as much contingent upon how the need is met as it is upon the very act of meeting the need.

The value for, and hence the motivation of, a society and its individuals to support, accept and participate in the core activities of occupations and professions are not only variable by preference but by at least three other basic conditions:

1. The value of a core activity seems to increase given:
   a. The universality or publicness of the need;
   b. The enduring nature of the need;
   c. The basic relationship of the activity to human needs.

2. The limitations in the supply of practitioners tend to increase the value of the practitioners' activities, if those activities are connected to a demand. One of the major limitations in the supply of practitioners is the ability of people to know that which is necessary to accomplish the task.

3. The relative amount of uncertainty involved in the core activity would also seem to affect the value of that activity. Given a relatively high level of uncertainty surrounding core activities, that which lessens the uncertainty will be valued. However, the more certainty and thus predictability there are surrounding an activity, then the greater the possibility will be of having successful practice for greater numbers of people.

4. The value of a core activity increases when the technology of that activity has coherence with the ideological belief
systems of a given society.

Finally, it is necessary to distinguish between the uses of the term ideology, since the former relate to the value of ideology for a society. Harry Johnson, in "Ideology and the Social System," outlines four different usages of ideology that generally may be summarised in two basic concepts: (Johnson, 1968:76-78)

1. In one sense, ideology is a concept that refers to a pattern of beliefs and concepts, both factual and normative, which purports to explain complex social phenomena in order to simplify social choices.

2. In contrast to the above sense of ideology is the concept of ideology that refers to an extreme socio-political philosophy based on factitious or hypothetical ideational concepts.

The conflict between the two concepts of ideology is obvious and is also diminished by Edward Shils who asserts:

"Ideologies, like all complex cognitive patterns contain many propositions; even though ideologists strive for, and claim to possess, systematic integration, they are never completely successful in this regard. Hence, true propositions can coexist alongside false ones." (Shils, 1968:73)

Shils views ideology as one variant form of comprehensive patterns of cognitive and moral beliefs, the other forms being outlooks, creeds, programs and systems and movements of thought, which differ in their degree of:

"(a) explicitness of formulation; (b) intended systematic integration around a particular moral or cognitive belief; (c) acknowledged affinity with other past and contemporaneous patterns; (d) closure to novel elements or variations; (e) imperativeness of manifestation in conduct; (f) accompanying affect; (g) consensus demanded of those who accept them; (h) authoritiveness of promulgation; and (i) association with a corporate body intended to realize the pattern of beliefs." (Shils, 1968:66)
Ideology, as used in this work, refers to a pattern of beliefs and concepts, both factual and normative, which purports to explain complex social phenomena in order to simplify social choices. And Shils provides a method, outlined in points a-i above, to further distinguish among comprehensive patterns of beliefs in order to ascertain their relative social impact.

Limits of Professionalization

This chapter began with Harold Wilensky's observation that professions exercise an exclusive jurisdiction over an occupational activity and that such an exclusive jurisdiction is based on a range of knowledge that is neither too narrow nor too broad in scope. (Wilensky, 1964:148-149) This optimal range of knowledge is dependent upon the following:

1. The amenability of knowledge to allow for standardized practice. Standardization allows successful practice to be repeated by other practitioners. However, as the knowledge for a profession becomes more certain and understandable, and standardization increases, some tasks become routinized. Peter Blau defines routinized differentiation as the division of labor that entails "...the fragmentation of responsibilities into simple assignments with routine duties that require minimal skills." (Blau, 1974:234) Routinization maximizes the need for managerial coordination, and enhances the likelihood of the development of a centralized authority structure. The extreme example of routinization is the industrial
assembly line, but by viewing routinization as a continuum of increasingly complex tasks, it is possible to see tasks that are associated with professions, such as mass inoculations, as amenable to routinization. Tasks that lend themselves to routinization are based upon a narrow range of knowledge that can be fragmented.

2. Professional knowledge must be amenable to standardization in order to facilitate the repetition of successful practice but must not be amenable to routinization. Such knowledge, as has been discussed in this chapter, is defined in the following manner:

   a. It is esoteric or complex, thus limiting the number of potential practitioners and the client's ability to understand the nature of the practice.

   b. Referring back to Polanyi's concept of knowledge, it is dependent to a high degree on subsidiary knowing, and thus its comprehension requires a high degree of indwelling and internalization. While focused knowing can be routinized, routinization of subsidiary knowing is much more difficult. (Polanyi, 1962:601-602)

3. The dynamics of application of knowledge.

   a. The circumstances of a professional's task help define the appropriate application of knowledge. A core difference between an intellectual discipline and a profession is that the discipline, using March and Simon's concepts, seeks new knowledge for optimal explanation,
whereas professionals seek *satisfactory* solutions to the clients' needs. (See Introduction:17-18) The intellectual's desire, as outlined by Fyvel, to be as influential as possible, is dependent upon the optimal correctness of the intellectuals' explanation. (Fyvel, 1968:16)

b. The satisfaction of a client's needs is dependent upon the extent of the knowledge available to the practitioner, upon the application of the knowledge, and upon the values held by the client and society. The client must *prefer* the professional's service over other alternatives, and one alternative that limits the authority of a profession is abstaining from its service.

c. Applied professional knowledge, referring back again to Polanyi, is a highly personal knowledge. As Etzioni notes:

"Professional knowledge is charismatic because the typical layman cannot understand it and thus finds it 'extraordinary'; because the layman has to accept directives on nonrational grounds - hence the more educated a person is, the less charismatic professionals are in his eyes; and because professionals deal with problems of the meaning of man, nature, and God..." (Etzioni, 1975:351)

From an examination of the nature of a profession's optimal knowledge range, a simplified statement summarizes what I assume to be not only the core of the limits to professionalization but also the generating trait for a concept of profession:

The basic limitation of professionalization, and conversely the basic generating trait of a profession, is a *knowing that derives*
from applying a body of complex knowledge to solve universal, enduing human problems. Such knowing requires a high degree of subsidiary as well as focused knowing as well as a high degree of indwelling for understanding.

Other more specific limits to professionalization that are derived from the preceding are:

1. The amenability of knowledge to be applied to problems.
2. Society's ideological acceptance of an occupation's technology.
3. Society's willingness and power to:
   a. Support research to expand or develop a body of knowledge;
   b. Educate practitioners;
   c. Support the cost of practice.
4. Human limitations to learn, apply and sustain practice of a body of knowledge.

William Goode closes his discussion of the limits of professionalization with this observation:

"...it is clear that this last sub-category of professions, whose core is the four great, traditional person professions, has not expanded much to include many new professions in contrast with the higher-level-managerial and scientific-technical professions and semi-professions. In this much narrower sense, then, it is not entirely clear that the industrial occupational structure of the society is generally professionalizing. Relatively few professions are arising that require trust and autonomy and that can obtain it through transaction with the society." (Goode, 1969:308)

Finally, one element that Wilensky views as limiting professionalization that has not yet been discussed, is the bureaucratic organizational threat to professional autonomy. (Wilensky, 1964:146-148)

Although this subject will be discussed in greater detail in the
section on ascribed and semi-professions, a basic assumption of this work should be stated here.

As a body of knowledge that is relevant to a problem grows, aspects of such knowledge, particularly the focused aspects, can become more certain or amenable to fragmentation. As was previously mentioned, this application of fragmented knowledge can lead to routinization and subsequently to the need for greater managerial coordination.

Simply put, as changes occur in a knowledge base, some activities become more amenable to bureaucratic organization while still contributing to a professional service. The structure of the modern hospital or university is a case in point. When the need for bureaucratic organization over professional organization is clear, conflict is lessened. When such a demarcation is not evident, and to use Etzioni's framework, the worker has what appears to be a dual compliance, both normative and utilitarian, then conflict appears quite possible if not predictable. (Etzioni, 1975:55-67) Etzioni states that professions are not typical normative compliance organizations, since there is always a utilitarian nature to them, but that the normative compliance structure still dominates. (Etzioni, 1970:117) However, when neither the normative nor the utilitarian compliance structure dominates, conflict can occur:

"We would therefore expect organizations with dual compliance structures either to be ineffective or to develop special mechanisms for reducing waste of power resources." (Etzioni, 1975:55)

It is interesting to speculate that the loose coupling between the core activities and the administration in educational organizations,
as observed by Meyer and Rowan, might be an example of such an attempt to develop "special mechanisms." (Meyer and Rowan, 1975:36)
The point I would like to make here, however, is that bureaucratic organization of work that is related to professional tasks is not necessarily assumed to be a threat to professions.

Furthermore, the growth of what seem to be dual compliance structures, neither purely bureaucratic/utilitarian nor professional/normative in nature, is not assumed to be threatening to professions but rather is assumed to create a need for, as Meyer and Rowan put it, a new type of linking of activities. (Meyer and Rowan, 1975:39)

Again it is not bureaucratic organization that limits professionalization but rather the nature of an occupation's core activity in relation to social demands.
CHAPTER V

PROFESSIONS, INTELLECTUAL DISCIPLINES AND THE SEMI-PROFESSIONS: DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS

A Definition of Profession

The purpose of this chapter is to define the sense in which profession is used in the following chapters and the relationship of professions to intellectual disciplines and to the semi-professions. In defining the concept "profession," the activities that give rise to an overall image of profession will be concentrated upon recognizing that the actual activities of many members of a profession do not support such an image.¹

In other words, the examination of a criminal lawyer’s activities in waging a court battle to rectify injustice, provides more insight into the structure of the legal profession than does examining the activities of a very specialized tax lawyer. Both are lawyers but the activities of the former, i.e., the criminal lawyer, require professional organization to a much greater extent than the other. The activities of the surgeon who works in circumstances of high patient emotionality are more reflective of the structure of the

¹See: Moore, 1970:136-143 for a discussion of specialization within professions.
medical profession than the activities of the pathologist or radiologist. (Goode, 1969:298) The social structure of professions, then, is reflective of the activities of only part of the profession while the entire profession enjoys the resultant autonomy and status.

Furthermore, the elements of a profession that generate the latter's structure, represent an area in which client vulnerability is high and the human consequences of practice great. Goode employs basically the same approach in arguing that the person professions are significantly different from other seemingly highly professionalized occupations. (Goode, 1969:297-304)

I am in his debt for providing this insight, but it also seems critical to distinguish among those activities within the person professions that give rise to the organizational structure. It is argued here that the definition of profession as it evolves in this chapter, although referring to the activities of only part of the profession, accounts for the generation of professional organization structure.

It was stated in the Introduction and in Chapter III on complex organizations that professions would be examined as special cases of complex organization and further that complex organizations are special cases of open-systems. Within this framework, then, the definition of a profession will be approached as a complex organization that is structured to meet the demands of the core activities, to support the social value of that activity, and to facilitate interchange between the profession and its environment.

Definition: A profession is a type of complex organization based on normative compliance, that renders to the public the most
satisfactory solutions to universal and enduring human problems available at a given time. The work of a profession is based on knowing that derives from applying a body of complex knowledge. Such knowing requires a high degree of subsidiary, as well as focal knowing and requires a high degree of indwelling for understanding.

Subsidiary knowing is knowing a thing by relying on our awareness of it for the purpose of attending to an entity to which the thing contributes. (Polanyi, 1962:601)

Focal knowing is knowing a thing by attending to it as a whole. (Polanyi, 1962:601)

Indwelling refers to a process in the arena of human interaction whereby an attempt is made to understand or share the experience or meaning of another individual. Indwelling is: "...a utilization of a framework for unfolding our understanding in accordance with the indications and standards imposed by the framework." (Polanyi, 1969A:134)

Polanyi illustrates the relationship between subsidiary and focal knowing and indwelling by the following example:

"We know a person's mind by dwelling in his physiognomy and behavior (an act of subsidiary knowing); we lose sight of his mind by focusing our attention (focused knowing) on the bodily workings and thus convert them into mere objects." (Polanyi, 1969: 324)

The more that indwelling leads to an act of interiorization or coming to personally identify with that which is being observed, the more that professional organization is necessary. The more that problems of people can be objectified and treated as something separate from ourselves, the less that professional organization is necessary. The more a physician specializes in a highly restricted aspect
of treatment, the more restricted is the knowledge that is required
to carry out that treatment. In the latter instance, the physician's
practice is surrounded by more certainty since complicating vari-
ables tend to be screened out and treatment is rendered more to an
object than to a person, since less personal understanding of the
total patient is required.

The following is an extended list of characteristics of a pro-
fession that derive from the preceding definition. Since this list
is being presented in order to facilitate an argument that will be
developed in the following chapter, they are introduced briefly and
with minimal elaboration.

A. The core activity of a profession is dependent upon knowing
that is derived from applying a body of knowledge. The lat-
ter requires a high degree of subsidiary knowing as well as
indwelling, and affords the most satisfactory solutions to
universal, enduring human problems. The consequences of such
knowing are the following characteristics of a profession,
which vary in degree of applicability depending upon the
circumstances surrounding individual cases:

1. The practitioner determines a client's needs in terms of
their relevance to the profession. In cases of multiple
input from a variety of individuals who are contributing
to the solution of a problem, the professional makes the
final decisions. (Goode, 1969:278; Greenwood, 1957:47-48)
2. The personal, tacit nature of professional knowing allows for and enhances:
   a. A sense of "mystery" or "extraordinariness" about the formulation of potential solutions;
   b. The development of individual and group charisms.
3. Professional education demands a socialization process and is usually prolonged in nature in contrast to non-professional education. Professional education is primarily but not totally controlled by the profession.
4. A professional culture with appropriate norms, values and symbols exists to facilitate communication of new knowledge, the recognition of members, and to increase the professional's autonomy and group charisms. (Etsioni, 1975:351; Greenwood, 1957:52)
5. Since the knowledge base of a profession is bound to the circumstances of practice, expansion of that knowledge base is accomplished by specialized professionals within the profession who either evolve knowledge and/or translate intellectual knowledge into applicable form.2
6. Professional activities tend to be narrow in scope but professional values and norms tend to be highly pervasive throughout the practitioner's life. (Etsioni, 1975:272-275; Greenwood, 1957:53-54; Moore, 1970:7-9)

2 See subsequent discussion of relationship between a profession and an intellectual discipline, Chapter V:112-117.
B. Social systems, as institutionalized cultural values, norms and belief patterns, (Parsons, 1961:34) contribute to the following characteristics of a profession which may vary in applicability depending upon the circumstances surrounding individual cases:

1. In order to lessen the client's sense of vulnerability and to rationally attempt to limit professional autonomy:
   a. The image of a standardized education is demanded usually in the context of a university since the latter contributes further to legitimation. (Parsons, 1968:536; Moore, 1970:46-47)
   b. A formal or informal code of ethics exists to indicate social or professional sanctions against abuse by the practitioner. (Parsons, 1968:536; Goode, 1969:279)

2. Exclusive jurisdiction is granted by society in order to insure that such critical human problems are dealt with only by the occupation offering the most satisfactory solutions.

3. Formal and informal symbols are demanded in order to identify professionals. (See: Moore, 1970:217-224; Greenwood, 1957:52)

4. The means of practice must be in ideological agreement, or at least not extensively in conflict with, pervasive social belief patterns. (Wilensky, 1964:140; Jamous and
C. The interaction of professionals with clients does not necessarily need to be on a face-to-face, one-to-one basis (Goode, 1969:304) as long as the necessity of professional knowing still exists.

D. Since compliance within a profession is primarily of a normative type, members of a profession are controlled, according to Etzioni's framework, by the following methods:

1. Compliance and a member's orientation toward the profession increase as the levels of consensus, communication, and socialization increase, leading to greater organizational control over members. (Etzioni, 1975:231-254)

   a. Although organizations differ on the degree of general consensus they require of members, Etzioni views that degree of consensus as a measure of the organization's degree of integration as a collectivity. (Etzioni, 1975:232) Consensus occurs in the following spheres: on general values; organizational goals; means, policy and tactics; participation; performance obligations; and cognitive perspectives or concurrence on what is factual. (Etzioni, 1975:233-234)

   b. Etzioni notes two different types of organizational communication - instrumental and expressive - which are distinguished by the substance of the communication. Instrumental communication
distributes information and knowledge whereas expressive communication "changes or reinforces attitudes or norms." (Etzioni, 1975:242) Expressive communication is essential for the effective performance of normative organizations.

c. According to Etzioni, socialization is "the acquisition of the requisite orientations for satisfactory functioning in a role." (Etzioni, 1975:254)

d. The interaction of consensus, communication and socialization in a profession gives rise to what some authors have termed the "professional ideology."3

2. Professions also control members by means that are preventive in nature, i.e., by selection and socialization. Recruits into the professions are carefully selected and must endure a period during which assimilation into the professional role is observed. Etzioni notes that one study of medical students demonstrated that they underwent little change in their normative orientation during their medical socialization/training process. Etzioni believes this may be due to the selection process that chose those who were already highly socialized to the professional values. (Etzioni, 1975:251)

3. Exclusion and expulsion are the remaining sources of control, although their use appears rare. Typically, exclusion from a situation, such as removal of a doctor's hospital privileges, precedes any formal, or legal action leading to expulsion from the profession. (Ezioni, 1975:356)

E. The controls that a society maintains over a profession were listed in the preceding chapter on the "limits of professionalization." They are:

1. Society's ideological acceptance of a profession's technology.

2. Society's willingness and power to:
   a. Support research to expand or develop knowledge;
   b. Educate practitioners;
   c. Support the cost of practice;
   d. Protect a profession from competition.

3. The individual's willingness to accept the conditions of service.

F. As a type of organization that deals with problems, a profession can become dysfunctional to varying degrees and in a number of ways. Three key ways are as follows:

1. The profession or subgroup of the profession can function as a closed system, thereby cutting off environmental input. It is especially critical that the input and accumulation of knowledge not be halted so that a profession can maintain its exclusive jurisdiction and
continue in its ability to offer the most satisfactory service. The accumulation of knowledge, which necessitates the profession's functioning as an open-system, is key to the maintenance of the profession's characteristic structure.

2. It is obvious that the personal needs of the professional must not be detrimental to those of the client.

3. The professions have often been conceived of as a monopoly or as Gabriel Gyarmati K. labels them, a "closed mandarin system." (Gyarmati K., 1975:629) In his article, Gyarmati K. argues that a "doctrine of professions," based on myths and premises divorced from reality, exist to legitimate the professions as elitist social groups. (Gyarmati K., 1975:639-642) The fact that members or subgroups of professions function as a highly paid social elite, does not alter the assumption that professional organization springs from conditions that are necessary for competent practice.

However, if professional autonomy were to bow to professional monopoly, which again is analogous to creating a closed social system primarily for the benefit of the professionals, then the risk of social retribution would ensue. Moore notes that the American Medical Association's lobbying efforts against Medicare were a failure and that:
"...the blatant distortions in the propaganda campaign and the image-destroying revelation that organized medicine seemed indifferent to the extensity and quality of medical care, resulted in a major setback in the political power of the AMA." (Moore, 1970:165)

Corinne Gilb, in a study of the tactics of American professional associations, notes: "The established association cannot afford to stress narrowly and manifestly self-interest legislation." (Gilb, 1966:153) The assumption drawn from the preceding is that a profession's efforts to sustain or increase autonomy that have adverse consequences for the profession's practice or availability of practice, will eventually be opposed by either social or government forces, resulting as with Medicare, in increased non-professional supervision of practice.

Unanimity of Conceptualizations of Profession

There are obvious points of unanimity between the preceding conceptualization of professional organization and those of Greenwood, Goode, Moore, Parsons and Wilensky. (Greenwood, 1957:45-55; Goode, 1969:276-280; Moore, 1970:4-22; Parsons, 1968:53; Wilensky, 1964:138-141; See also Chapter II:34-44; Chapter IV:89-94) There are, however, some important differences that must be addressed:

1. Frederick Bates conceives of the term occupation as implying that:

"...a set of skills or a set of learned behavior has been incorporated into the personality of a given individual... An individual with a given occupation is presumed to know
the behavior necessary for performing certain kinds of work activities." (Bates, 1968:9)

In the preceding definition of occupation, which is the sense in which the term is employed in this work, one may have an occupation but not a job. Furthermore, particular jobs may call for only some of the skills that constitute a set for an occupation. (Bates, 1968:9) Occupation in this sense, relates to what a person knows as contrasted with the manner in which income is gained.

The same observations about an occupation apply to a profession in that the meaning of the concept derives from what an individual knows. It follows, then, that the term "full-time," aside from being vague and relating to time spent at a task, has nothing to do with either a definition of profession or of occupation. But Moore uses the phrase "full-time occupation," and Wilensky uses the term "full-time" to delineate necessary aspects of the concept profession. (Moore, 1970:6-7; Wilensky, 1964:142) Greenwood, on the other hand, relates profession to a "career" and uses career to refer to an "...absorption in the work (that) is not partial, but complete." (Greenwood, 1957:53)

The focus on a "full-time occupation" or a "career" obscures two elements that relate to professional knowing. First, the pervasiveness of professional norms and values tend to permeate the professional's life, since they are based upon normative compliance, often with a strong, ideological base. (Jamous and Pelcille, 1970:138-142) This often leads to
Greenwood's observation that:

"...the sharp demarcation between the work hours and the leisure hours disappears. To the professional person his work becomes his life." (Greenwood, 1957:3)

Within its context, the Greenwood quote seems to refer more to the narrow scope of professional life and its attendant pervasiveness, than to the number of hours spent practicing. Second, besides a high degree of pervasiveness and narrowness of scope, the necessary knowing required for the professional tends to exclude much involvement in other occupations or professions.

There are some obvious exceptions such as the professional/administrator, the professional/researcher, the professional/educator and the lawyer/politician. The question becomes what else can a professional do that is in minimal conflict with his professional activities. This point will not be elaborated upon any further here, other than to repeat that more meaningful questions, such as the degree of compatibility or conflict with other undertakings, can be applied to profession rather than raising the issue of its being a "full-time occupation" or a "career."

2. Some of the sociological literature on professions either directly or indirectly views contemporary professional organization as resulting from the dynamics of industrialization and/or the development of modern science. (See: Parsons, 1968:541) The roots of this approach can be found in Durkheim's observations on the increasing division of labor and the necessity
and value of occupational organization. (See: Chapter III:1; Durkheim, 1932:28)

While it is obvious that industrialization has greatly increased the division of labor, it is not apparent that the number of professions, in the sense that both Goode and I use the concept, has increased. (Goode, 1969:308) By concentrating on the division of labor that has occurred in modern times, it is too easy to focus upon the dynamics of specialization and consciously planned organization (such as labor unions), without also considering the value implications of work. The preceding describes the approach of Turner and Hodge, who even explicitly state their unease with such value questions. (Turner and Hodge, 1970:26-27) They then project a view of occupations and professions that appears to be tied to the late 19th and 20th centuries.

However, if one reads Wilbert Moore's excellent chapter on the evolution of the professional, one is struck by the high status that workers who deal with substantive human problems have always had. (Moore, 1970:23-50) And those substantive problems include not only matters of health and life but also "...other problems that bespeak of the social uncertainties of the human condition: personal love and hate, conflicts between kin group or villages." (Moore, 1970:37) Moore points out that high status accrues to those who deal with substantive human problems not simply because those individuals are specialized:
"The professional or quasi-professional is set apart, though perhaps primarily because he commands mysterious forces rather than matter-of-factly in terms of the training time required to acquire his awesome skill" (Moore, 1970:24)

"Mysterious," moreover, does not refer exclusively to religious matters, since very early in human history, religion, as the quest for immortality, was differentiated from magic, the manipulation of unseen forces for observable ends, and from technical knowledge. (Moore, 1970:29) The point here is that Durkheim observed a division of labor that had its roots in size, complexity, and the limits of individuals to assimilate and use an accumulated store of knowledge. (Moore, 1970:36) Moore, however, alludes to another division of labor based upon the value of the work undertaken, that is historically old and very universal:

In addition, Moore finds that rationality has always been part of professional or quasi-professional knowing:

"If Malinowski is correct — and we see no reason to doubt it — persons in a nonliterate society not only use the rational techniques available, but seek to improve upon them. (Moore, 1970:33)

For Moore, there is no contradiction inherent in combining the use of magic and rationality to solve substantive human problems. Rather, he suggests that given the limitations of technical (rational) knowledge to deal with substantive human problems, such as sickness, death, injustice and education, it

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is often the function of magic\(^5\) (not religion) to satisfy when rationality cannot.

And Parsons' argument is less than convincing that a dependence upon "cognitive rationality" (which I assume refers primarily to focused knowing) is the prime characteristic of contemporary professions. (Parsons, 1968:536) Moore is very careful to point out that professions and quasi-professions have always tended, where possible, to use the best rational techniques available to them and to improve upon existing ones. For Parsons to note that this is also true of the 20th Century and to imply that it is unique to that time is misleading. Also, Parsons' concentration on "cognitive rationality" tends to obscure the high degree of subsidiary knowing necessary for a profession.

Parsons, however, is quite correct in his observations on the value of science and cognitive rationality for advancements in medical treatment. Medicine of all the established professions is most amenable to benefit from science, but as knowledge accumulates in medicine, that which is known and certain is passed on for other workers to contend with, still leaving the physician to cope with the greatest amount of uncertainty surrounding treatment. This is obvious from the fact that the physician does not make every decision about

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\(^5\)Moore also points out that magic not deeply embedded in the religious system is subject to displacement by superior technique. (Moore, 1970:30) However, the limitations of technique to solve substantive problems remain as does the need to satisfy the public in order to maintain an exclusive jurisdiction.
performing tasks that were once performed by the clergy.
(Goode, 1969:271)

Parsons provides valuable insight into the development of the university/research center as a unique 20th century institution, and its expanding role and influence in our society. But Parsons' conceptualization explains the changing position of the intellectual disciplines in our society, rather than providing evidence for the substantive changes he perceived within the established professions of law, the ministry, medicine and university education.

3. The greatest difference between the definition of profession as employed in this work and other definitions, is their emphasis upon the differences between subsidiary and focal knowing. The difference between abstract and applied knowledge is recognized by the authors who were cited in Chapter III, and among them, Wilensky and Moore explicitly mention "tacit knowing" while Goode alludes to the resultant dynamics. (Wilensky, 1964:149; Moore, 1970:55; Goode, 1969:277-278,307) None of these authors, however, are adequately explicit, although Goode comes close.

**Professions and Intellectual Disciplines**

The difference between a profession and an intellectual discipline is twofold in nature. First, however, a basic assumption discussed in Chapter IV bears repeating. It is assumed that scientists are a subgroup of the broader category of intellectuals and are
differentiated from other intellectuals by their preference for a specific type of methodology. 6

A basic difference between professions, as defined in this work, and the intellectual disciplines evolves from the type of knowing that is primarily required for accomplishing the core activities of each. It is assumed here, as has been previously discussed, that the concept profession is related to the nature of applied knowledge. (Chapter IV: 75-79) Applied knowledge is utilized to deal satisfactorily with immediate problems. 7 (Polanyi, 1958:175) What constitutes success and what provides the practitioner with a focus for attention is crucially related to the immediate circumstances surrounding the problem.

In contrast, it is further assumed that the core task of the intellectual as an individual or as a collective (a discipline) is to expand knowledge by providing optimal explanations of phenomena. The search for optimal explanations can be delayed, but professional practice is, by its nature, an immediate response to a problem. The difference between applied knowledge and intellectual knowledge can also be approached from the recognition that the application of knowledge involves prescriptive decision-making from available, relevant alternatives whereas optimal explanation tries to be descriptive in nature. 8


7 For a discussion of satisfactory - optimal standards, see: March and Simon, 1970: 95.

treatment but reserves the final decisions for himself.

The viewpoint being developed here, is that the unique social position of the professional or quasi-professional appears to have existed as long as man has been a social creature; that there is always a movement toward better rational technique wherever possible and desirable; and that the professions are not a result of a modern division of labor. It should also be stressed that professions and quasi-professions have always, in the long run, been associated with the best formal education in order to maintain their position of providing the best possible service. (Moore, 1970:46)

Again, for Parsons to observe a relationship between the professions and the modern university is not unique, but rather predictable. (Parsons, 1968:536) Furthermore, Parsons' act of centering the professions at the university or research center creates a false impression. (Parsons, 1968:536) The universities and research centers are training centers and places where some of the expansion of the body of professional knowledge occurs, but the professions remain centered where their tasks occur, that is wherever their clients exist.

Finally, Parsons' banishment of the ministry from his concept of profession because of the lack of relevance of "cognitive rationality" for the ministry is extreme. While the loss of status for the ministry is obvious, such a loss can be reasonably explained by increased competition, not only from conflicting religious doctrines, but also from occupations
Furthermore, Polanyi's observation that the understanding required to know human beings is significantly different from that which is required to know inanimate material and nonhuman life, creates a distinction within the area of applied knowledge.\(^9\) (Chapter IV:71) However, applied science, such as engineering for instance, appears to be highly professionalized but does not in fact fit the definition used in this work. The following section will present the argument that the professionalization found in engineering can be viewed as an example of a semi-profession, thereby allowing the distinction between substantive human problems and other problems to remain.

A second area of difference between a professional and an intellectual discipline is that professional activity tends to be public while intellectual activity tends to be private. (Chapter IV:78-79) The significance here is that the publicness of professions tends to prompt the professional to attempt immediate, satisfactory solutions which may then place him in a vulnerable position.

For example, the physician called upon to deal with an untreatable cancer is in a much more vulnerable and emotionally laden situation than is the researcher who seeks a cure for the same cancer. While the researcher may indeed have intense feelings about the impact of the lack of success, it is postulated here that when more optimal solutions are sought, the circumstances surrounding the inquiry become more private. The publicness of professional practice is directly related to the rendering of satisfactory rather than optimal solutions.

Addressing some of the consequences of the above discussion through similar observations, both Wilensky and T. Leggatt remark that "...scientists such as physicists, chemists and biologists should not be considered professionals." (Leggatt, 1970:158; also see: Wilensky, 1964:141) Moore extends their observation of scientists to include scholars. (Moore, 1970:18) Both Moore and Leggatt observe that the scientist or scholar who teaches becomes a professional educator not, for example, a "professional" chemist or "professional" historian. (Leggatt, 1970:58; Moore, 1970:18)

However, both Leggatt and Moore continue their discussion of this issue to propose that a scientist or scholar who applies his knowledge becomes a professional. (Leggatt, 1970:158; Moore, 1970:18) I am in disagreement with this observation since such a use of professional is counterindicated by the extraordinary social position noted by Goode for the "person" professions (Goode, 1969:306-308) and by Moore's historical analysis of professional status. (Moore, 1970:23-50)

However, the relationship that exists among the intellectual disciplines is even more complicated than the preceding suggests. And that complication exists as a result of differentiation within the disciplines and professions and because of the multiple roles that individuals can assume. Although the image of the intellectual who seeks optimal explanations, and that of the professional who seeks satisfactory solutions are generally correct, the boundary between the two activities is not always that clear.

For instance, both images are complicated by the individual's assuming dual roles such as the professional/researcher and the
intellectual/educator. Both of these dual roles tend to create a connection between the professions and the disciplines through which data and new knowledge flow. Despite all the shortcomings inherent in his conceptualization of profession, Parsons provides an excellent discussion of the institutionalization of such dual roles and of the intellectual disciplines that exists primarily, although not exclusively, at the modern university. (Parsons, 1968:539-544)

I believe it is the image of the modern university, with the high value it places on rationality and its dual professional/research members and intellectuals that Parsons has mistaken for the whole, thereby ignoring the bulk of the professions and the latter's organization that exists beyond the confines of academia. But Parsons does provide insight into the power of this new entity over society in general. (Parsons, 1968:545-546)

The relationship, however, among the professional, the professional/researcher and the intellectual is hardly a tranquil one. Lewis Mayhew points out that tension exists between the profession in general and the roles of the disciplines and the professional/researcher. (Mayhew, 1971:19) For example, as medical schools devoted more time to research, resulting in an enormous increase in medical knowledge, several indices of national health from 1950 to 1967 showed a relative decline in the effectiveness of medical care. (Mayhew, 1971:27) Increases in relevant knowledge does not necessarily generate better practice.

Again, using medicine as an example, the knowledge for effective treatment of a problem may exist, but the cost of the treatment may be
too great for it to become generally available. Also knowledge may accumulate to such an extent that the practitioner is unable to absorb it in any meaningful way. Such developments lead to conflict between the professions and the disciplines.

The Semi-Professions

Amitai Etzioni, recognizing that some occupations had become highly professionalized and yet were not viewed as professions in the same sense as the established professions, designated these occupations, for lack of a better term, semi-professions, (Etzioni, 1969:v) He notes the following about the semi-professions:

"Their training is shorter, their status less legitimated, their right to privileged communication less established, there is less of a specialized body of knowledge, and they have less autonomy from supervision or societal control than the professions." (Etzioni, 1969:v)

In studying the occupational activities of nursing, the question arises as to why nursing cannot fulfill the requirements for a profession as evolved in this work. Etzioni discusses sociological factors that have decreased the status of their work such as their being predominantly female in a male dominated society and their being quite noticeably employees. (Etzioni, 1969:vi) Such factors are easily recognizable and their influence on status can more clearly be perceived than others that Etzioni mentions, such as shorter training and a more restricted knowledge base. (Etzioni, 1969:xii) Although the sociological circumstances of semi-professions are complicated, one factor seems to dominate all others and that is the semi-profession's relationship to a profession.
Continuing with nursing as an example, no matter what the length of training, nor how much knowledge a nurse brings to substantive human problems, the exclusive jurisdiction for healing lies with the medical profession, thus allowing the physician the right to make final decisions regarding treatment. Although recent organizational efforts by nurses have changed some of their working relationships, the basic nature of nursing, which is dependent upon the medical profession for guidance, has not changed, nor is it likely to. (Moore, 1970:175; Goode, 1969:288) It should be stressed that although nursing is highly professionalized, the uncertainty surrounding nursing's core activities is diminished considerably by virtue of the decisions made by the medical profession.

A semi-profession, then, is dominated by a profession which provides not only end decisions but a focus that indicates the kind of knowledge that is relevant for the semi-professions. Such a relationship can also exist between an intellectual discipline and an applied area. Often such a relationship is apparent between the natural sciences and an applied area and the knowledge provided by the discipline greatly increases the certainty surrounding the core activities.

The point to bear in mind is that such relationships have both organizational and educational implications. Etzioni notes that the semi-professions are much more amenable to bureaucratic control, (Etzioni, 1969:xiii-xvi) which Wilensky notes is true of many of the new "technical" professions, such as engineering. (Wilensky, 1964:146) These areas tend to create less knowledge than either a profession or a discipline and depend more on the latter areas for
approximate educational standards. (Etzioni, 1969:xii)

Summary

Given the general acceptance of highly professionalized occupations as professions, e.g., certified public accounting, veterinary medicine, and the many types of engineering, this work, with the last usage of semi-profession is open to the accusation of complicating an already complicated body of literature. The answer to such an accusation is to point out that all of the distinctions being made, not only among the usages of semi-professions, but also regarding professions and intellectual disciplines, have educational implications.

Central to these implications is the difference between the nature of knowing necessary for applied activities and the nature of knowing necessary for intellectual activities. Furthermore, educational implications are embedded in the recognition that to know life is significantly different than knowing non-life. Life must be known by more indwelling or knowing in accordance with standards imposed by life. (Polanyi, 1969A:134)

Knowing humans involves, often tacitly, the knowing of social, cultural and personal circumstances, since these and other factors determine the framework indwelling must use to create understanding. The value of the distinctions noted in this chapter is their focus upon gross differences in educational needs. For example, as Lewis Mayhew indicates, the educational conflict generated on the university campus by the clash between the attempt to provide for the needs of the professional and for the needs of those students who will join an
intellectual discipline, is very real. (Mayhew, 1971:7) Since the two types of knowing, professional and intellectual, are different, at times the educational experiences shared by the two groups turn out to be inadequate for either one or the other, or both.

This chapter has also sought to provide a conceptualization of profession that will provide a framework by which to examine the professionalization of the visual artist. The conceptualizations of the intellectual disciplines and semi-professions developed in this chapter provide a framework to examine intellectual influences on the visual artist as well as the prevasiveness of the visual arts' influence on other areas.
CHAPTER VI

PROFESSIONALIZATION OF THE VISUAL ARTIST

The basic purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent of the professionalization of the visual artist by utilizing the concept of profession as developed in Chapter V and the approach to complex organizations developed in Chapter I, section 3 and in Chapter III. The intent is to identify a particular type of visual artist by examining the nature of his core technology. The next chapter will be directed toward the education of this particular type of artist, with a discussion of the educational implications of professionalization. When the relevant group of artists has been identified, the reasons for, and limits of, organization will be analyzed, as well as the relationship of this type of artist to relevant intellectual disciplines, to related semi-proessions, and finally to the university as a formal organization.

Population Identification

Differentiation within what is broadly called the arts in the 20th Century is considerable. Such terms as literature, music, dance, cinema, theater and the visual arts denote broad distinctions based primarily on media. However, media distinctions can only introduce
gross differences among art activities and tend to obscure their com-
mon elements. For instance, all of the above mentioned areas have a
"fine art" manifestation, a term that refers to common attitudes that
cross media boundaries.

The aim of this chapter is not to concentrate upon media differen-
tiation, although media obviously influence decision-making, but
rather on those factors within one area, the visual arts, that give
rise to what March and Simon call a "performance program." Performance
program, in its broadest sense, refers to a highly complex and organ-
ized set of responses that deal with a recurring problem or task.
(March and Simon, 1970:95-101) The term performance program should not
connote rigidity but rather a framework through which decisions are
made relevant to a task.

The term visual arts has traditionally included the activities of
painting, sculpture and printmaking but has also recently come to in-
clude photography, works on videotape, certain performance activity and
some craft activity such as ceramics, weaving, and metal working. But
while the use of media in the visual arts proliferates, so also do the
performance programs as evidenced by the terms fine art, avant-garde,
amateur art, commercial art, folk art, and decorative art.

It is assumed here that while any of the preceding areas, such as
folk art, could use the visual art media listed above, such as sculp-
ture, these same areas refer to significantly different performance
programs within which art decisions are reached. The population of
visual artists relevant to this work will be identified by examining
those aspects of its performance program and subsequent
decision-making that differentiates this particular population from other visual art groups. This differentiation can best be indicated by the examination of two terms: fine art and the avant-garde.

High Culture and the Fine Arts

Fine art (or high art) is the art component of what is generally referred to as high culture. Although high culture is difficult to define, as is fine art, two essays by Edward Shils, "The High Culture of the Age" and "Mass Society and Its Culture," provide insight into the matter. (Shils, 1972:97-134 and 229-247) The following is a summary of some of the points Shils discusses from those essays.

Shils reserves the term high culture, which he seems to use interchangeably with "superior culture" or "refined culture," to refer to the highest level of aesthetic, intellectual and moral standards:

"Superior or refined culture is distinguished by the seriousness of its subject matter, i.e., the centrality of the problems with which it deals, the acute penetration and coherence of its perceptions, the subtlety and wealth of its expressed feeling." (Shils, 1972:232)

While still assuming the quality of contemporary production, high culture also contains traits and elements of the high culture of earlier periods. In contrast, Shils views mediocre culture as a poorer quality production with a much shorter life span. (Shils, 1972:233)

Two points worth emphasizing have been introduced here. First, fine art, as with high culture, is a continuation of a tradition as well as the production of new artifacts, and second, fine art as high culture seeks to produce and perpetuate optimal solutions to inquiry. High culture is then produced and protected in Shils' view, by
intellectuals, who also constitute the majority of the audience for high culture.

Proceeding from the above, Shils notes that high culture is not today, nor has it ever been, the culture of an entire society. High culture is expected necessarily to be in a state of tension vis-a-vis the rest of society, and its products and statements are expected to arouse a certain measure of hostility in some members of society who perceive high culture as an entity which attacks the value of their thoughts. (Shils, 1972:105) Shils further notes that the transformation "...of the role of the intellectual from amateur pursuit of a rentier or landlord, or of a civil servant or courtier..." to that of a "professional" has greatly increased the production of high culture and its distribution. (Shils, 1972:111)

Furthermore, in the western world the number of individuals engaged in the production of high culture has increased greatly. The increased numbers of participating individuals, increased production, and the relative separateness of those individuals from the total society (Shils, 1972:116) provide the seeds of motivation and pressure for normative organization. As Blau indicates, size can be a critical factor for organization. (Blau, 1974:232-236) And as the number of participants in high culture increases, financial support for museums, periodicals, books and other necessary accoutrements for high culture is spread over a larger base.

Shils remarks that the greatest organizational change that has occurred with regard to high culture has been in the areas of financial support and administration of intellectual institutions. (Shils,
1972:112) As institutions such as museums proliferate and differentiate, more bureaucratic organization is required. But the greatest organizational impact on high culture has been in the form of the university which provides intellectuals with an income in exchange for teaching, channels research funds to their work, and in general, provides a setting in which high culture can be centered. (Shils, 1972: 112-116)

One last rather critical aspect of contemporary high culture requires introduction and is related to the nature of the modern university. There exists presently in our culture a sense of egalitarianism, and the indifference toward, and ignorance of, the masses and their culture that intellectuals exhibited in earlier ages, would be impossible today. Shils puts the matter succinctly when he remarks: "... modern society is democratic and the masses are on the minds of intellectuals..." (Shils, 1972:104) The result is an increased exchange of influence and participants between high culture and society in general, which is transpiring to a high degree at the university and eroding the boundaries of that which constitutes high culture.

The Avant-Garde

In order to differentiate fine art of the 20th Century from that of earlier centuries, the former has become "modern art" in the recognition that modern art has broken innumerable art-making conventions of the past. And the leading exploratory edge of modern art has been the avant-garde. Shils recognizes that an avant-garde, in the most general sense, is as necessary as it is inevitable if fine art or high
culture is to continue to attract individuals with creative capacities. (Shils, 1972:130) And while creativity involves a partial incorporation of the traditional, it also involves its partial rejection.

But the reason for the existence of the term "modern art" is its emphasis on the drastic replacement of art-making conventions by the explorations of the avant-garde. In the words of Leo Steinberg, the avant-garde seems to be:

"...constantly inviting us to applaud the destruction of values which we still cherish, while the positive cause, for the sake of which the sacrifices are made, is rarely made clear. So that the sacrifices appear to be acts of demolition, or dismantling without any motive,..." (Steinberg, 1973:216)

"...like Kierkegaard's God, the pictures seem arbitrary, cruel, irrational, demanding your faith, while it makes no promise of future rewards. In other words, it is in the nature of original contemporary art to present itself as a bad risk." (Steinberg, 1973:225)

While any form of high culture, whether science or scholarship, has its avant-garde, the avant-garde in the visual arts has assumed, in this century, an extreme adversary relationship with fine art or with any tradition. The conception of the avant-garde as nihilistic, in fact, has sprung from the extent to which the latter has attacked accepted conventions.

Furthermore, Shils adds a warning about the avant-garde's apparent preoccupation with innovation. The avant-garde is particularly disturbing in that it:

"...has also added to the disorder of political life and has aggravated the inevitably never perfectly harmonious relations between high culture and civil society." (Shils, 1972:131)

As Henry Geldzahler suggests, the history of modern art is also the history of the progressive loss of the arts' audience:

"Art has increasingly become the concern of the artist and the bafflement of the public. It is not the popular audience that was lost, not an audience made up of the great mass of the people, but an educated, enlightened, and enfranchised class of art connoisseurs, the aristocracy and church hierarchy of the pre-French revolutionary period." (Geldzahler, 1973:49)

Implied in the Geldzahler quote is the loss of a substantial part of the intellectual community as an audience for either avant-garde or modern art. Further it implies a split in the intellectual community as to what constitutes a continuation of the fine art tradition, a point to which we will soon return.

However, it is necessary to point out that the conventionalization or academization of the avant-garde is a continual process. Leo Steinberg states:

"This rapid domestication of the outrageous is the most characteristic feature of our artistic life and the time lag between shock received and thanks returned gets progressively shorter. At the present rate of taste adoption, it takes about seven years for a young artist with a streak of wildness in him to turn from enfant-terrible into older statesman - not so much because he changes, but because the challenge he throws to the public is so quickly met..." (Steinberg, 1973:210)

But the Steinberg statement must be qualified in that the "challenge is quickly met" by some, but hardly all of even the intellectual community. For example, Levi alludes to an almost insurmountable gap
between his sense of fine art and the nature of the avant-garde/modern art products. (Levi, 1974:5-29) Although initial contact with the avant-garde is no less shocking for Steinberg, he quickly meets the avant-garde challenge and finds value in its products. As Hilton Kramer observes:

"...all nihilist aesthetic programs are condemned by their very nature to remain confined to the subplot of vanguard history. Their protagonists may conduct guerilla raids on the main body of artistic endeavor,...but the insurgents are themselves powerless to produce art of the first importance without aligning their aspirations with these same traditions - an alignment that necessarily modifies their own intransigence." (Kramer, 1972:39)

But the avant-garde has not become an historical footnote, as might have been expected if Levi's nihilist image were correct, but rather it has become so much a part of a contemporary fine art tradition that the avant-garde has seemed almost to disappear. This disappearance has been remarked upon by many authors of late and Hilton Kramer tends to summarize a prevailing view as follows:

"If, then, the age of the avant-garde can definitely be said to have passed, as I believe it can, it is not because the will to innovation has abated its course - it has, if anything, accelerated its pace and grown more desperate- but because it no longer has any radical functions to perform." (Kramer, 1972:44)

The values and methods of the avant-garde have become so institutionalized within the fine art/high culture tradition, that the image of the avant-garde as a separate entity has faded away. However, this union has changed both parties, resulting in a significantly different sense of fine art in our time. The following section will examine more specifically the nature of the core tasks of the visual artist within what appears to be a new fine art tradition.
Characteristics of the Core Tasks Within the Avant-Garde/Fine Art Tradition (Contemporary Art)

This section provides more specific information as to the nature of the context (the performance programs) from which the avant-garde/fine art artist makes decisions. Since the term avant-garde/fine art is a bit awkward, the term contemporary art will be substituted. This substitution is consistent with the general way in which the term "contemporary art" is used in the art literature.

One of the consequences of the institutionalization of the avant-garde sensibility in the fine art tradition has been the turning inward of contemporary art. The latter tendency has already been noted in this chapter in the comments of Albert Levi who observed a strong narcissism in the avant-garde, and of Henry Geldzahler who noted that art was becoming a concern for the artist. (Levi, 1974:26-27; Geldzahler, 1973:49). The same basic theme is elaborated upon by Bensman and Gerver in "Art and Mass Society," (Bensman and Gerver, 1970:660-668) in which they note that contemporary art has developed an internal rationalization for its methods:

"The internal rationalization of art as an aesthetic system refers to art as pure art as a form. As a medium apart from other media, art develops rules, logics and an internal economy of its own. The development of all modern art in the last two centuries is the history of explication, expansion and development of 'inner logics' both for the field and for schools of art." (Bensman and Gerver, 1970:660)

The consequences of such internal rationalization and concomitant withdrawal of the artist from concern with social meaning are viewed by Bensman and Gerver as the following:
1. The major problems of art become primarily technical in nature and as a result, the artist focuses his attention upon methodological problems.

2. As the rationalization of each artistic medium develops, its methods, conventions and rules and language and logic become more elaborate. The education of the artist then requires a thorough, intensive and prolonged period of training, indoctrination, and practice.

3. Simultaneously, the appreciation of the artistic product increasingly requires a knowledge of those highly sophisticated criteria upon which the work is based. Since the art becomes more incomprehensible to the lay public, artistic interpreters such as critics, educators and art dealers become important channels through which art is exposed to, and perhaps accepted by, an untrained public.

4. The development of specific schools of art is not monolithic, but rather specific artists of any school will emphasize different tenets of the school, resulting in an abundance of artistic traditions existing in the contemporary art world side by side. (Bensman and Gerver, 1970:660-661)

Two other aspects of contemporary art-making which influence the artist's core technology are problem-solving and a strong history consciousness. The influence on art of a problem-solving attitude can be demonstrated by a change R.K. Elliott has observed in the concept of creativity. Elliott argues in his article, "Versions of Creativity," that the concept of creativity as used by our culture has undergone
alteration, (Elliott, 1971:139-152)

Since in our society, the creativeness perceived in an art object contributes significantly to the value that the object assumes, a change in the meaning of creative could suggest a change in what society values as art. Elliott first proposes what he believes to be the traditional concept of creativity in the western world, a summary of which is presented below: (Elliott, 1971:140-149)

A. The traditional concept of creativity in the western world is based upon the "mythical creation" of the world by God.¹

1. The closer the analogy between human activity and the mythical paradigm, the more creative the product. Thus there is a hierarchical sense to this concept of creativity.

2. A discoverer or clarifier of a physical truth is not creative since the truth already existed. In order to be creative, something which was previously non-existent must be brought into existence.

3. All art is creative because:
   a. It is "free activity" as opposed to that of the scientist who is bound by natural laws and reality.
   b. Art is viewed as the production of model worlds of another kind of reality (not bound by natural laws.)

¹Further elaboration of this concept and its power to influence can be found in Ernst Kris' Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art: 56-63; 64-84.
4. Nietzsche may be viewed as "demythologizing" this concept of creativity. Man alone becomes the originator and sustainer of values without needing the gods and thus man can surpass his previous humanity on to infinity, (godness?).

Elliott maintains that the traditional concept of creativity has become less powerful in the 20th Century and as a result a new concept of creativity has emerged to fill the vacuum. These two distinct concepts are often at odds with each other since neither dominates. The following is a summary of what Elliott postulates as the new concept of creativity: (Elliott, 1971:140-149)

B. Part I: Creativity is defined as the capacity to resolve problematic situations for which no adequate response is available in terms of existing knowledge.

Part II: Creativity is the formulation of novel ideas and their utilization toward some end, or it may be the production of novel ideas that someone else will use.

1. Part I is perceived as a special case of Part II but each part is distinct in that the second definition does not bind creativity to problem-solving. In this concept, the production of novel ideas is or may be creative.

2. In the new concept of creativity the expression of a truth can qualify as creative.

This change in the conceptual definition of creativity contains an implicit assumption that in the recent past and in the present, our society uses a modal personality against which creativity is judged. The culture-hero-epic figure of the past, a judaeo-christian god, has been replaced by a modern epic figure of the scientist.

Geraldine Clifford states:

"...the methods of science have become the norm against which are measured all kinds of standards of objectivity, verifiability, research, intelligence, and yes, creativity. Failing to consider science as promising the really exciting thought, as being the reliably progressive social force, and as the most vital of disciplines, is to be a rebel or an existentialist or otherwise almost 'unamerican'...The scientist has become the culture-hero, the modern epic figure. And to feel somewhat fearful of him, to be ambivalent in our regard of him, is merely to repeat earlier experiences with other culture heroes." (Clifford, 1973:333)

While all societies have mechanisms for problem-solving, our society has become problem-oriented and this in itself has helped institutionalize change as a characteristic of our culture. (Clifford, 1973:336) The scientist as a problem-solver becomes a natural source from which contemporary modal figures may develop. Perhaps all art has a problem-solving aspect to it, and our particular social values have pushed this characteristic onto center stage and focused the limelight upon it. But for people within our society, it must still appear that contemporary art has changed drastically from the art of the past.

John L. Fischer, in his article "Art Styles as Cultural Cognitive Maps," elaborates upon the power of modal figures or personalities to influence art. (Fischer, 1971:171-191) In so doing, Fischer, along with Elliott, begins to formulate a framework within which the
innovative, problem-oriented contemporary artist does not seem so alienated from his society. Scholars of the history of the visual arts have long postulated a connection between art forms and socio-cultural conditions. Overt content is readily observable, as in the religious iconography of the art of the middle ages, but Fischer believes that socio-cultural conditions also influence what he refers to as a latent content in art.

The following three sets of assumptions clarify Fischer's position on the connection between latent content in art and socio-cultural conditions: (Fischer, 1971:173-174)

1. In the expressive aspects of culture, such as the visual arts, a critical determinant of the art form is social fantasy, i.e., the artist's fantasies about social situations that provide him with security or pleasure. Fischer assumes that regardless of the overt content of visual art - whether a landscape, a natural object, or a geometrical pattern - there is always, or nearly always, simultaneously "...the expression of some fantasied social situation that will bear a definite relation to the real and desired social situations of the artist and his society." (Fischer, 1971:173)

2. Fischer contends that it is more essential to ask why people notice items A and B and ignore items C and D than to ask what is in the environment. Further it is better to ask: why have they chosen to work with wood and ignore clay even though both are available?, than to determine what materials exist in the environment. In this approach Fischer is
obviously concentrating on those elements that influence programs of decision-making.

3. Fischer assumes that the artist is in some sense keenly aware of the social structure and modal personality of his culture. He also assumes that the artist's personality is not a simple duplicate of the modal personality for the group, but rather may be at times unique and unusual. Fischer further suggests, however:

"...that all sane persons inevitably participate to a considerable extent in the modal personality of the group, and that the successful artist has a greater than average ability to express the modal personality of his public in his particular art medium." (Fischer, 1971:170)

Fischer's article concludes that there is empirical evidence that supports the validity of his assumptions. However, as with Ernst Kris in Chapter I, Fischer is quick to note that art making is a complex affair and he does not lay claim to the social factors identified in his article as the sole relevant elements in the creation of art styles.

"The question may be raised whether the artist should not be said to be depicting a wish rather than social reality. I would concede that the wish-fulfillment aspect of art is in some sense primary, but would at the same time urge that wish-fulfillment and reality are closely related, even in fantasy. For art to be effective as wish-fulfillment it must attain a certain degree of plausibility by at least making a rather close compromise with reality." (Fischer, 1971:189)

The preceding quote again promotes the idea of limitations to art-making. In order to be of value to both the maker and the audience, art is connected to reality. Thus the social nature of art is affirmed without denying art's private or psychological nature. There is, then, no necessary contradiction between either the creative value or social value of a problem-solving orientation in contemporary art.
Further, Ernst Kris provides some insight into the psychological roots of a problem-solving orientation and the value of change.

Kris believes that psychoanalytic theory grounded in ego psychology provides a set of constructs and general assumptions that provide a broad framework for the study of human behavior and which allows for the study of a large number of interdependent factors. As was stated in the Introduction, there is not complete unanimity as to the validity of psychoanalytic ego psychology but for the purposes of this work, the latter provides a valuable psychological framework from which to explain certain phenomena in contemporary art.

The following pages tend to rely heavily on the work of Kris which was published in his volume of essays, *Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art.* (Kris, 1952) Of central value for this dissertation is Kris' insistence that the psychological understanding of art hardly requires simpler assumptions than the psychological understanding of other human activities. Kris insists that the "reality" in which the artist creates must be considered and that this "reality" includes not only the individual but the artist's medium and the given historical and social factors.

Kris views psychological conflict not only as an unavoidable accessory to personality development, but also, within certain limits, as an essential ingredient and incentive. (Kris, 1952:20-21) He conceives of an individual's artistic endowments as significantly related to the ego's capacities to deal with conflict. Thus the roots of "talent" might be approached indirectly through studies of conflict resolution.
Silvano Aron, points out, however, that in general, psychoanalytic theories are theories of motivation rather than theories of the dynamics of creativity. (Aristi, 1976:29) This observation, though, does not decrease the value of Kris' observations since at this point we are seeking the psychological dynamics of a problem-solving orientation and the dynamics of change that are implicit in such an orientation.

A specific construct by Kris that seems directly related to the value of change relates to ego control of conflict. As a child grows older the distinction between self and environment gradually becomes more sharply defined. A reality testing function develops which helps the child distinguish more clearly between that which is internal and that which is external. In a young child, the world of make-believe is at first thinly separated from the real world, but the distinction becomes more durable as physiological maturation takes place.

A mechanism forms during this maturation process which allows the child to believe in the fantasy of his play while also recognizing the boundaries of that fantasy. The roots of an aesthetic illusion lie in the ability to believe in an imaginative situation while also being aware of its place in reality. Later the child becomes ready to accept, and at times prefers, the fantasies of others. Fantasies such as fairy tales become less dangerous for the child and a less forbidden means by which to deal with his emotions, since they are not products of his own imagination and are offered with the consent of adults. Thus, the maintenance of the aesthetic illusion promises safety since it is not our own fantasy that we follow.
While the cathartic effect of art, the release of unconscious tensions and the "purging" of the "soul," all pertain to an old concept, Kris feels that the process has two aspects. Not only are damned-up instinctual demands released in a safe way with the maintenance of the aesthetic illusion, but the ego's active re-establishment of control is also a source of pleasure. (Kris, 1952:63) It is critical to Kris' construct that the ego is able to relax its control of the id, which in psychoanalytic terminology is called controlled regression, and that the re-establishment of ego control is pleasurable.

The artist is perceived as an individual with the necessary ego strength to allow for a greater degree of self-regulated regression in which the ego's controls over instinctual material are lessened and the id material becomes conscious. The artist in a sense tames this id material by projecting it onto some object or situation in a controlled manner. The value of the art object to others is that it retains evidence of the regression and of the particular artist's unique re-establishment of control. (Kris, 1952:61-63)

Most members of a culture tend to organize visual material in very common, predictable ways while the artist organizes the visual materials in an individual and unexpected manner. Nonrepresentational art, for example, presents visual materials, which, if the object is not to be ordinary, have qualities of disorder, which are manifestations of undifferentiated material from the id, and a particular, relatively unexpected order imposed by the artist. The viewer then can unconsciously allow himself to drop his own highly controlled suppression of disorder momentarily, and because of the aesthetic
illusion, permit himself to take pleasure in both the disorder and the concomitant evidence of another human being's unique control of that disorder. (Kris, 1952:45-47)

It goes without saying that there is more to an art object than that which has been discussed here, and Kris himself places great emphasis on the idea that both social and historical forces also contribute to the evolution of an art object. The 20th Century, in particular, has witnessed the separation of art from past religious and social functions, and thus it is quite reasonable to expect that the more basic, unconscious roots of art would begin to dominate it. (Arieti, 1976:222-234)

If we subscribe to Kris' construct on the value and pleasure aspect of controlled regression, then change is not only inevitable but of considerable value to some individuals in our culture, as perhaps the earlier Steinberg quote would suggest. We cannot today, really appreciate the innovations and daring of Rembrandt. We view Rembrandt's manner of organizing a painting as an accepted and common endeavor even though we may still greatly admire the quality of his labors. The quality of Rembrandt remains but the shock of his innovations is gone.

At the present time, a Robert Morris room of felt, cotton and metal represents a confrontation to the ego's control structure. And this confrontation, in Kris' view, can be, if we permit it, a source of pleasure on an unconscious level for both the viewer and the artist. Change in art, then, can be a very basic source of pleasure for humans since it provides us with a safe way to deal with
suppressed emotions. (Kris, 1952:56-63)

There is another issue implicit in Kris' views on the sources of art, and that relates to the establishment of legitimate authority. The artist gains the authority to produce art from several sources and this authority increases the strength of the aesthetic illusion and thus the viewer's willingness to deal with the artist's work. The aesthetic illusion is an unconscious restatement that this activity is permissible to engage in. In the same way that an adult gives the young child permission to do something, other authorities tell the adult that it is permissible to deal with the art's content.

Art history represents one source of authority for the artist, since no object that we consider art is totally divorced from past art objects that have become in the words of Leo Steinberg: "...familiar, then normal and handsome, finally authoritative." (Steinberg, 1973:210) The "authoritativeness" of older art objects reaches out and declares the new art objects at least partially safe.

But the contemporary artist's relationship to art history has also become more complicated, as the following suggests. Harold Rosenberg observes that in all periods the sense of tradition governed, to degrees, the responses of artists and their audiences, but that history consciousness represents something distinct: (Rosenberg, 1964:25-36)

"Tradition is aware of the past as a single complex of forms extending through the present into the future. In contrast, the modern sense of history recognizes that the past is made up of diverse cultures which by action in our own time are being resolved into a future unity...Art becomes valuable through creating the values by which it is valued." (Rosenberg, 1964:25-26)
"For the artist, the replacement of tradition by historical consciousness compels a continual choosing among possibilities. The decision to follow one aesthetic hypothesis rather than another is a matter of professional life and death." (Rosenberg, 1964: 32-33)

History consciousness provides a general limit to the problem-solving aspect of contemporary art in that not all problems are original and have historical significance. Historical significance is of course difficult to predict and that which constitutes significance in history is open to change. But history consciousness limits the desire to act as an individual, since group action presents a greater likelihood of influencing history. The difficulty involved in finding originality in a problem reflects Polanyi's observation that the scientist tacitly seeks the most original problem to research.

The following quote by Polanyi could just as easily refer to contemporary art-making as to science, except for the end:

"The scientist's surmises or hunches are the spurs and pointers of his search. Since they involve high stakes, they are as hazardous as their prospects are fascinating. The time and money, the prestige and self-confidence, gambled away in disappointing guesses will soon exhaust a scientist's courage and standing. His gropings are weighty decisions. They are not random flights from the top of his head in just any direction. Choices made in the course of scientific inquiry are therefore responsible choices made by the scientist, but the object of his pursuit is not of his making. His acts stand under the judgment of the hidden reality he seeks to uncover." (Polanyi, 1975: 193-194)

Although the last part of the preceding quote binds the scientist to a pre-existent reality, Cyril Burt, in a summary of what he views as Polanyi's basic philosophical position, states:

"As I see it, however, the position (Polanyi's) is roughly this. Science, art, history, poetry, and religion each profess to deal, from its own particular angle with the whole of reality and the whole of human experience. But none of them can validly claim to
present a complete photographic portrayal, each necessarily involves a certain degree of simplification and an unavoidable element of distortion. Hence each is needed to supplement and rectify the defects of the others." (Burt, 1969:44)

The point being developed here is that art as personal expression has been over-emphasized while ignoring its other components. Fischer states that:

"...for art to be effective as wish-fulfillment, it must attain a certain degree of plausibility by at least making a rather close compromise with reality." (Fischer, 1971:189)

And such plausibility exists because of the internal rationalization of art that tends to clarify content, because of the artist's sense of reality, the modal structure of the society and of course because of the sense of history that pushes for significance in the art.

This section has introduced internal rationalization, a problem-solving orientation and an historical consciousness as key characteristics of the contemporary artist's core activities. Added to these characteristics, as would be implied in the term visual artist, are a strong preference to communicate visually and a strong desire for self-expression. The next section will demonstrate some of the social consequences of these characteristics.

**Contemporary Artists, Intellectuals and Audiences**

One of the most significant results of the institutionalization of the avant-garde tradition within the fine art tradition is the narrowing of the contemporary art audience. Shils notes a division among intellectuals and the avant-garde based on: 1) the ability and desire for some intellectuals to facilitate and accept change; and 2) the
tradition of some members of the avant-garde to seek self-segregation. (Shils, 1972:130)

Further, the impetus toward specialization tends to segregate intellectuals from one another and to lessen the coherence of the intellectual community. In general, Shils observes of the specialist that as a group they share: "...little of the inherited culture, and their views and tastes outside of (their) own specialty are too often like those of a much less educated person." (Shils, 1972:123; see also Hubbard, 1962:295-298) The strong, internal rationalization of contemporary art leads to, among other things, the kind of specialization to which Shils and Geldzahler refer.

Contemporary art becomes of value to a specialized audience, but not necessarily to the same audience that valued the previous conception of fine art that is embodied in historical art objects created before the turn of the century. This basic thesis is supported by Phil Virden, in an article, "The Social Determinants of Aesthetic Styles," which basically states that our society does not have one monolithic art audience but rather a set of art audiences with differing expectations. (Virden, 1972:175-185) Virden, in viewing art as a specialized type of communication, generalizes on the linguistic theories of Basil Bernstein.3

Bernstein suggests that speech and cognitive styles vary with modes of social interaction. To study art as communication rather than as speech, Virden uses a variance on Bernstein's criteria for

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testing the relative elaborateness or restrictiveness of speech codes, which distinguishes between those people who can and those who cannot tolerate categorical ambiguity, looseness, change or openness. A critical point to remember with both Bernstein and Virden is that they view social structures as influencing cognitive styles and cognitive styles as influencing expectations and values.

Together, Virden and Bernstein provide support that: 1) neither contemporary art nor traditional fine art communicates something of value to a large part of the population (hence the pervasiveness of the mass arts); 2) contemporary art communicates little of value to part of the educated (intellectual) community who instead turn to the historic fine arts; and 3) those attracted to contemporary art have a high tolerance for uncertainty as indicated by their tolerance for categorical ambiguity, change and openness. (Virden, 1972:181-183)

Virden, using Bernstein's model introduces another core characteristic of contemporary art-making: ambiguity. Ambiguity as a characteristic not only affects the artist, but, as the previous paragraph indicated, the audience as well. Of central importance here is that decision-making regarding the value inherent in art, whether by the artist or by the audience, is strongly affected by the pervasiveness of ambiguity.

The latter is the thesis explored in depth by James March and Johan Olsen in Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations. (March and Olsen, 1976) By ambiguity, March and Olsen mean: 1) ambiguity of intention which is characterized by inconsistent and ill-defined objectives; 2) ambiguity of understanding which refers to unclear connections
between organizational actions and consequences; 3) ambiguity of
history which refers to uncertainty about what happened and why; and
4) ambiguity of organization which refers to a pattern of participa-
tion that is uncertain and changing. (March and Olsen, 1976:12)

Although all organizations confront elements of ambiguity, the
authors point out that in some organizations ambiguity is a dominant
condition, particularly when organizations are young or when their
environments are changing. It should also be remembered from Chapter
III that the uncertainty, (and ambiguity creates uncertainty) sur-
rounding the core activity limits formal organization. (Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967:6) Further, the March and Olsen discussion of ambiguity
points to the functions of consensus formation, information and ex-
pressive communication, and socialization in normative organizations
as means of reducing ambiguity.

Finally, in what might seem a contradiction to the Geldzahler,
Shils and Virden contributions, contemporary art is by its nature more
public than the intellectual disciplines and many specialized, highly
professionalized areas such as engineering. Shils makes the observa-
tion that the audience for scholarly and scientific work tends to be
the intellectual community but that art has a lay public. (Shils,
1972:117)

An example of contemporary art's being thrust before the general
or lay public springs from a federal agency, The National Endowment
For the Arts, and its program of funding sculpture acquisitions for
public spaces. Only contemporary art is purchased through this pro-
gram which has been quite aggressive in the number of works purchased
and installed. Needless to say, the public manifestation of contemporary art continues to appear before the general public.

In summary, the specialization of contemporary art, its general separation from part of the intellectual community, and the restricted nature of its audience all have helped spur professional organization.

**The Professionalization of Art**

As discussed in Chapter II, professionalization is a process. This section will first examine this process in relation to contemporary art and then compare the latter's general position on that continuum to the model of a profession as developed in Chapter V.

Terry Clark, in studying the institutionalization of innovations in higher education, provides a model that seems helpful in examining the professionalization of contemporary art. (Clark, 1971:75-97) Clark terms the model I will be using an *Organic Growth Model* and notes that stages in the model parallel stages followed by emerging professions as described by Harold Wilensky. (Clark, 1971:76; Wilensky, 1964:141-146)

Institutionalization, as Clark defines it, is a process whereby specific cultural elements or cultural objects are adopted by actors in a social system. For his purposes, innovation refers to new forms of knowledge that result in organizational structural change. "The innovations considered here are neither simply new knowledge without structural change, nor structural change without new knowledge..." (Clark, 1971:75) Clark further states:

"Frequently an innovation develops into a profession or an intellectual discipline and aspects of institutionalization are best
analyzed by considering this possibility..." (Clark, 1971:75)

It is assumed, then, that the organic growth model can function as a framework by which to examine professionalization. The organic growth model is of particular value when applied to situations outside of higher education. And although the education of the fine art artist has existed in higher education since 1869 (Hubbard, 1962:283) the art academy was the primary place of education of the contemporary artist until just recently. (Hubbard, 1962:177)

The following is Clark's organic growth model with illustrations of points kept to a minimum since a basic development is sought. Footnotes will refer to sources for in-depth illustrations.

A. Development and Functions of Professional Activities.

The first stage toward institutionalization tends to be the development of periodic meetings and the circulation of journals to promote social interaction. Especially important is that such social interaction is normative and promotes the development of group consensus and methods of communication and socialization. The history of modern art is replete with examples of this first stage in which social interaction bolstered the spirits of the innovators and followers; ideas were expanded and communicated beyond the initial group, and artists from other areas were drawn to the innovation. Historical art movements such as Cubism, Futurism, Constructivism, Dadaism, Surrealism, German Expressionism, De Stijl and Abstract Expressionism all exhibited signs of this first stage
B. Definition of Status.

The social interaction described in A tends to become clarified and regularized as the following conditions occur:

1. A means of support exists that allows increased time to be spent on the core activity and in social interaction. The most significant change in this regard concerning contemporary art has been the enormous expansion of higher education in this country and its provision of an income and an opportunity for artists to interact with one another. Higher education has enabled greater numbers of artists to become highly involved in contemporary art than was previously permitted by either income derived from the art market or from private patronage.

2. The organizations, in seeking to unite individuals from varying intellectual backgrounds and obtain legitimation from the intellectual community or society in general, tend to elevate their goals to near utopian ideals. The differences between similar activities are exaggerated and often lead to hostility. As social and intellectual support grows for the core activity, however, an important change occurs. Utopian ideals give way to narrower claims, fewer communications are directed beyond the

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4 See: H. H. Arnason, History of Modern Art, New York (Abrams/Prentice Hall, Inc.) 1971 for a general history of each of the preceding movements. Extensive in depth histories of the social interaction of each movement exist in many other resources.
profession and claims for indispensibility are minimized. The participants then turn toward conceptual and methodological problems as suggested by the core activity.

Two points need to be stressed here. First, the above mentioned entities of Cubism, etc., are generally referred to as art movements rather than simply as styles, in order to emphasize both the extensive social interaction that took place and the movements' pervasive influence. The preceding paragraph describes the professionalization process that these movements experienced.

For example, De Stijl progressed from informal to formal interaction with specific membership qualifications. Those qualifications generally referred to adherence to a common ideology, communicated and formalized in the magazine De Stijl. The participants in the De Stijl art movement considered it as having utopian significance for society. Ultimately there evolved a relaxation of the rigid theoretical-utopian stance, and a final dissolution of the formal group.5

In contrast, contemporary art/modern art as an entity is still going through the same process described in B.1 above. There is a juncture in the history of modern art when art movements begin to refer to differentiation within contemporary art rather than signifying the

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latest assault on a fine art tradition. General attitudes toward art-making explored by various art movements, became institutionalized in a new fine art tradition: contemporary art. From this point on, art movements will be approached as a form of differentiation within contemporary art, and the nature of contemporary art as an entity will be focused upon.

3. A point comes when a change in name helps to loosen ties with previous activity and to differentiate the emerging group. Such a change has occurred in this dissertation with the substitution of contemporary art for modern art and fine art.

4. A specialized vocabulary develops to allow for more precise communication, heighten the collective identity and provide an obvious means of determining membership in the group.

5. Defining the content of the roles and the patterned sets of rights and duties associated with the core activity is a central problem in early development. The task of defining appropriate content for the contemporary artist belongs to the artist as indicated by Harold Rosenberg. (Rosenberg, 1970:395) But the appropriateness of such content and its manifestation has become the role of the

6 Battcock anthology on the concept Minimal Art will be used as an example of the type of effort made to provide precision to contemporary art's extensive specialized vocabulary.
contemporary critic and sometimes artist/critics.

The critics find an outlet for their writing through such current periodicals as *Artforum, Arts Magazine, Art News, Art in America, Art International* and *October*. All the aforementioned magazines as well as new regional versions, engage in a substantive discourse on the significance of the content in art. Given the nature of the core characteristics of contemporary art and the resultant ambiguity about its value, a vigorous contemporary art press exists to define content.


Since replenishment of recruits is critical for the maintenance of all social organizations, institutionalization implies the establishment of educational settings. The greatest change in the education of the contemporary artist is the change from informal education and/or formal education at a "professional" school, to education at the college or university level of higher education.

As was previously mentioned, such a move provided a new economic base of support for contemporary art as well as a setting for relatively stable social interaction. Those remaining professional art schools, such as the Chicago Institute of Art, have adopted a studio curriculum similar to those found in colleges or universities. The typical contemporary artist of today has been educated in an institution of higher education. (Rosenberg, 1973:92-93)
Indications of the centrality of the university to the focus of this dissertation continue to be introduced, beginning with the observations of Talcott Parsons in Chapter II, of Edward Shils in this chapter, and ending finally with Clark's model. As Clark points out, the process of institutionalization of innovations at established institutions such as the university, and here we assume that contemporary art constitutes such an innovation, is dependent upon the innovativeness and penetrability of the university. (Clark, 1971:79) While the university provides income and social protection it also contributes values and norms to contemporary art. The university-contemporary art relationship will be examined after the following section.

This section has attempted to construct an image of the professionalization that has occurred in modern/contemporary art-making in this century. It is assumed, with Clark's model as a framework, that the extensiveness of such professionalization has been demonstrated. How extensive, is the question that will be addressed in the next section.

The Contemporary Artist as a Professional:

Limits and Potentials

It is assumed that the previous section, while outlining a professionalization process, also illustrated general reasons for, and methods of, organization.

1. The main basis of organization is normative, providing members with consensual support for their activities, a means for instrumental and expressive communication, and a means
for instrumental (educational) and expressive socialization. (Etzioni, 1975:231-254)

2. The main consequence of such organization, beyond more immediate personal or group results, is the institutionalization of a modern art/contemporary art aesthetic within a fine art tradition, to the exclusion of other modes of art-making. With the observation that the core characteristics of contemporary art have been institutionalized in the fine art tradition, a problem emerges. Institutionalization is not synonymous with organization. Peter Blau observes that:

"Social structures may emerge as the aggregate result of the diverse actions of individuals, each pursuing his own end (creative institutions), or they may reflect the joint endeavors of individuals pursuing commonly accepted ends (enacted institutions). (Blau, 1974:28)

It is the latter that Blau assumes to be organization. For Blau, then, organization refers to enacted institutionalization which exhibits:

"...the existence of procedures for mobilizing and coordinating the various, usually specialized subgroups in the pursuit of joint objectives." (Blau, 1974:29)

Blau's distinction between "enacted" and "creative" institutionalization illustrates why the sociology of organization has been primarily concerned with bureaucratic organization which by its nature is "enacted" and less concerned with professional organization which seems to develop "creatively."

In the area of contemporary art, the more certainty that surrounds the task, as in the exhibition of art for example, the greater the probability of enacted-form organizations such as museums or
galleries emerging. Or as the need for clarifying the core issues of art becomes clear, formally organized art periodicals emerge. Such demonstrations of formal organization supportive of professions are common as exemplified by hospitals, courts and so on.

The point at issue here is that although there is a similarity between social institutions and professions, the latter is a form of organization because of the concrete manifestations of the abstract norms, values, and belief patterns of institutions. The derivative traits of a profession listed in Chapter V are examples of such concrete manifestations.

Furthermore, professional organization, as Etzioni implies, is a subset of normative organization which suggests that more specific reasons for professional organization exist within the general reasons for normative organization. (Etzioni, 1970:117) Wilbert Moore provides an overview of the specific benefits that accrue to professionalization and the following is a summary of his main points: (Moore, 1970: 55-62)

1. Professionalization leads to the relative standardization of an activity which allows the public to be aware of the function of the activity and to form expectations about it.

2. The wealthier a country is the more of its labor force becomes involved with "service" activities. The economic climate of the United States fosters the development of "service industries" of which the professions are the most rapidly expanding subsection,
3. Professionalization can lead to autonomy which allows the profession control over the standards of the activity, would-be practitioners, recruits, and the distribution of products.

4. Professionalization has historically led to better quality service and better economic and social conditions for practitioners.

In general, the areas of concern for occupations that are professionalizing, as implied by Moore, are to: 1) differentiate core activity from similar activities; 2) develop and organize a body of knowledge; and 3) expand demand for the activity. (Moore, 1970:55-62) All of the above mentioned tasks are better accomplished collectively than individually.

Although the above section demonstrated a degree of professionalization of contemporary art, questions remain as to the extent of that professionalization, and the ability of contemporary art as an entity to promote further professionalization. It will be argued in the following outline that professional organization is necessary to facilitate contemporary art's core activity but that sufficient conditions for full professionalization have not been and perhaps cannot be met.

The nature of the core technology of the contemporary artist and the value of the products of that technology for the public, will be compared to the model of a profession developed in Chapter V. (96-105)

A. Core Technology of the Contemporary Artist.

The core technology of the contemporary artist has much in common with the core technology of the model of profession developed in Chapter V. It must be understood that this
commonality is with an art technology that has the following characteristics: predominantly visual; oriented toward problem-solving; exhibiting a strong sense of personal expression; standardized to a degree by a strong sense of internal rationalization; and possessing a history consciousness and a strong sense of ambiguity. In general, the strong sense of uncertainty that surrounds the core activity of contemporary art is the basis for its commonality with the model of a profession.

1. The act of art-making does not seem amenable to either routinization or fragmentation. Although technical aspects of product fabrication can be performed by others, such as in the case of Donald Judd's sculpture, end decisions are reserved by the artist. In this respect, the contemporary artist appears to be a generalist rather than a specialist in Etzioni's sense of the concepts. Etzioni observes the following about professionals:

"Although they are specialists in their field, they must have a comparatively more 'generalist' personality...in order to make end-decisions." (Etzioni, 1975:323)

2. A high degree of subsidiary knowing is necessary for both the artist and the audience. One knows an art object, whether as an artist or an audience, by relying on one's awareness of that object for the purpose of attending to an entity (its aesthetic value) to which that object contributes. (Polanyi, 1975:97-100) While art can
be known focally to a degree, it is an entity that primarily requires subsidiary knowing. Because of this, Polanyi presents the argument that art is an applied field:

"But the kinship of art to technology is important too. This becomes more clearly evident if we put these comparisons in terms of from-to integration. A scientific problem consists of subsidiaries anticipating an unknown focus. A technical problem consists of a desirable focus anticipating subsidiaries that will implement it. The scientist's quest has the structure of asking 'What do these words mean?,' while the engineer's (or artist's) quest has the structure of asking 'What words will express my meaning?'" (Polanyi, 1975:98)

Art as an applied field indicates that the artist seeks to produce objects that satisfy criteria, whereas scholars aspire to optimal explanations about art. Indeed there is a very strong sense of competition in contemporary art to produce the most satisfactory manifestation of a given set of criteria but no objects dominate art as do the optimal explanations of other fields, particularly the physical sciences.

3. A high degree of indwelling is required of the audience of contemporary art in order to understand the subsidiary nature of the work. Furthermore, Leo Steinberg, in "Contemporary Art and the Flight of Its Public," breaks down the artist-audience distinction, and demonstrates that artists also function as an audience when viewing other artists' work. (Steinberg, 1973:205-226) Although not all audience members will make art, all artists will
be audience members and thus engage in indwelling to understand the art work.

4. While the core characteristics of the technology on contemporary art examined thus far present a high degree of commonality with the model of a profession, the process of applying a body of complex knowledge introduces an area of divergence from the model. As Wilbert Moore indicates, a knowledge base in a profession leads to standardization and distinguishes a profession from an avocation which is based on customary activities modified by trial and error in individual practice. (Moore, 1970: 55)

As the institutionalization of contemporary art values in the fine art tradition would indicate, there is already a degree of unanimity regarding the task, but the organized knowledge base that facilitates the task is inadequate. While the western world has accumulated a great sum of knowledge, those elements of the latter that are of use to the artist, are still largely unknown.

The argument continues as to whether art can be taught, as witnessed by a recent article by Carter Ratcliff, "New York Fever." (Ratcliff, 1977:47-49) Ratcliff reiterates the notion that art cannot be taught, but something else must be taught instead. In general, Ratcliff perpetuates the image of the exceptionally
talented artist as requiring a social situation fraught with anxiety and the search for high risk. Every profession has its exceptionally talented individuals, and art is no exception. But the concentration on the circumstances that surround the exceptional person obscures the search for what can and cannot be taught about art. The issue here is that until basic research is undertaken to determine the kind of knowledge that is of use to the contemporary artist and the manner in which such knowledge can be communicated and under what circumstances, the under-organized knowledge base of contemporary art will remain a handicap for the practitioners.

B. The Value of Contemporary Art.

The value of art to individuals usually centers around the concept of imagination, where the artist's role is to be imaginative for others who lack such gifts. This thesis is developed by Polanyi in two essays, "Works of Art" and "Validity of Art." (Polanyi, 1975:82-107) The value of art can be approached through a quote by William James from Pragmatism published in 1907:

"...the progress of science has seemed to mean the enlargement of the material universe and diminution of Man's importance. The result is what one may call the growth of naturalistic or positivistic feeling. Man is no law-giver to nature; he is an absorber. She it is who stands firm, he it is who must accommodate himself." (James, 1955:24)

The James quote creates an image of man as in awe of that which exists, and ignores man's sizable ego that provides a
sense of nonacceptance of that which exists. A landscape painting is not merely a recording of nature, but also a recreation of nature in man's terms. Kris discusses the psychological dynamics of the artist's restructuring of reality or his creating alternate realities, and central to his thesis is man's ability, as a thinking creature, to escape the bounds of what is, if only symbolically through art. (Kris, 1952:47-63) It is assumed here that art fulfills a universal and enduring need but that contemporary art's ability to fulfill that need is limited and the attempt to meet such a need is beset by competition.\(^7\) The following is a summary of those limits.

1. Contemporary art does not exercise an exclusive jurisdiction over art-making since competition is provided by historical fine art, folk art and the mass arts.\(^8\)

2. While contemporary art does have an exclusive jurisdiction over new art being produced in the fine art tradition, the need for that art is not powerfully felt by its audience. Milton Albrecht, in "Art as an Institution," surveys two areas that are relevant here: 1) as was observed previously by Moore, sociologists in general do not regard art as serving primary needs, and as a consequence, the demand for art is limited; (Albrecht, \(^7\)See: Albrecht, 1970:1-28 for an introduction to the methods of study of the value of art.

1970:1-4) and 2) although most social institutions, such as art, serve multiple functions, (Albrecht, 1970:12) contemporary art, by its internal rationalization, limits the scope of its function.

3. The esteem of contemporary art within the public's view is lowered by conflict with part of the intellectual community; by public reaction to the personally expressive and ambiguous content of the art; and by the inarticulateness of artists in expressing the intent of their work.\(^9\)

In summary, parts A and B indicate a core technology that necessitates professional organization. But low public esteem and the task of meeting a relatively specialized set of needs decrease contemporary art's ability to become professionalized as described in Chapter V. The key characteristic that is missing is an exclusive jurisdiction over an area of substantive human problems. This observation generally concurs with Goode's observation that the paradigm person professions have not expanded, with the exception of the possible inclusion of mental health. (Goode, 1969:308) The relevance of the observation that contemporary art and many highly professionalized occupations are not professions, in the sense outlined in Chapter V, is that structural and social relationship differences occur.

The model of profession used in this work contains, as part of its organizational structure, mechanisms for formalizing client-

\(^{9}\)For an example of conflict generated by the latter observation see: "Winsor Knots," Robert Pincus-Witten, *Arts Magazine*, 51,10, June, 1977:127-134.
practitioner relationships, guaranteeing competence, and sanctions against practitioner abuse. These aspects are either non-existent or poorly developed in contemporary art. In addition, autonomy for the model of profession results from the possession of an exclusive jurisdiction over a set of activities. The lack of autonomy for an occupation complicates its relationship with other organizations. For example, the autonomy enjoyed by medicine creates a much different relationship between it and the university than the relationship between contemporary art and the university. Freedom to decide professional education issues is enjoyed by medicine, but such freedom is limited in contemporary art.

The basic barriers to further professionalization can be summarized by the following:

1. The core activity of contemporary art is founded on too broad a body of complex knowledge which allows for competition in performing the core activity and permits a lack of public understanding of the core activity's function and results.

2. The dominance of an avocation image coupled with the ambiguity surrounding contemporary art, inhibits moves for members to organize.

3. The lack of a demand for the core activity.

All of the preceding areas cause uncertainty for contemporary art and inhibit organization. But three characteristics of contemporary art supply a continual impetus toward greater professionalization: a fine art tradition; the publicness of contemporary art; and
contemporary art's institutionalization at the university. The consequences of these influences will be discussed in the next section, but first two further observations must be made with regard to contemporary art's professionalization.

1. It should be clear from this section, that contemporary art is not an intellectual discipline. Practice is the core activity of contemporary art, not explanation. The distinction between a profession and an intellectual discipline becomes quite relevant in relation to curriculum. Education that would be adequate for participation in a discipline would not be so for participation in a practice, and vice-versa. This represents, as Lewis Mayhew indicates, a continued source of conflict in higher education between the intellectual disciplines and the professions. (Mayhew, 1971: 22-29)

2. It should also be clear from this section, that contemporary art is not a semi-profession as Etzioni defines the term. (Etzioni, 1969:xiii-xvii) Contemporary art is not subordinate to any other profession. The point to remember about semi-professions is that, while highly professionalized, their work is more amenable to bureaucratic organization as is the work of Harries-Jenkins' ascriptive professional. (Harries-Jenkins, 1970:55) The relationship of semi-profession to a profession results in organizational changes surrounding the core activities of the semi-professional.
Publicness and the University

Contemporary art has been professionalized to a degree, and although there are evident barriers to further professionalization that cannot be minimized, three factors appear to be propelling contemporary art to further professionalization: 1) inheritance of the fine art tradition; 2) a sense of publicness; and 3) contemporary art’s institutionalization at the university.

As heir to the fine art tradition, contemporary art has inherited a role with prior expectations. Generally, as Shils points out, this role is synonymous with the role of high culture which is:

"...distinguished by the seriousness of its subject matter, i.e., the centrality of the problems with which it deals, the acute penetration and coherence of its perceptions, the subtlety and wealth of its expressed feeling." (Shils, 1972:232)

The disenchantment of some intellectuals, such as Albert Levi, with contemporary art can be taken as a reflection of contemporary art’s failure to meet the standards that Shils outlines. (Levi, 1974:5-29) However, contemporary art’s position as heir apparent to the fine art tradition prods it toward a closer approximation of Shils’ standards for high culture. The move toward high culture necessitates an increased intellectual sophistication which in turn supports greater professionalization.

The publicness of art is recognized by Shils as a characteristic that separates art from science or scholarship. (Shils, 1972:117) Contemporary art has exposure to the general public through museums, galleries, the popular press such as Time and Newsweek, as well as through the existence of contemporary art in public places.
Statistics on the growth of the availability of contemporary art are hard to obtain, but a program of the NEA serves as an example of that growth. The National Endowment For the Arts created a program in 1968 to help fund the purchase of contemporary art exclusively for public places. The NEA's program is a single example of a growing public exposure to contemporary art whether through a greatly expanded museum and gallery system or through the efforts of businesses and all levels of government. One of the most expanded areas of public contact with contemporary art is at the university.

The publicness of contemporary art leads to increased audience participation and demand, but it also increases the contemporary artist's public interaction. Dan Flavin, reiterating a theme introduced earlier this century by the Constructivists and by the faculty at the Bauhaus, hopes that:

"The romance of days of belabored feeling, of precious, pious, compulsively grimy studio-bound labor by haphazardly informed neurotic 'loners,' often verging on mental illness, relying desperately on intuitive good sense, is passing from art. The contemporary artist is becoming a public man, trusting his own intelligence, confirming his own informed ideas." (Flavin, 1968:32)

And as the artist becomes more public, he is expected to function as a professional.

Although it is recognized that differentiation within higher education has resulted in various formal organizations with distinct values, norms and tasks, this dissertation will concentrate on the university level institution. Most professional education is found at the university level since professional education is both an undergraduate and graduate pursuit. Colleges that provide education
for the student who will transfer to a professional program are forced to model their curriculums according to university/professional school standards.

As was previously indicated, the institutionalization of an innovation at the university benefits the innovation's members by providing a stable income, security, facilities for work, and a greater legitimacy. (Clark, 1971:83) Institutionalization implies a coherence with the core values of the university.

"The degree of development of an innovation's central conceptual schemes is one of its most important properties, since intellectual excellence is one of the most basic values to universities. Consequently, the more intellectually sophisticated the conceptual schemes of the innovation, the better it conforms with university values of excellence, and the more likely that it will be institutionalized." (Clark, 1971:84)

In support of Clark, Eric Larrabee notes that the studio area followed those that were more scholarly onto the campus:

"First to make the crossing were the poets, in good part because a number of them coincidentally were of a scholarly bent and happened to espouse a highly intellectualized doctrine. Other arts, at least in the democratizing institutions west of the Alleghenies, often masqueraded as crafts and were taught in terms of technical accomplishment, the studio or conservatory approach, which in some fields is still today the only avenue to professional competence. But in general...the arts were allowed to mingle with the established disciplines only after they had made themselves over into reasonable facsimiles of scholarship." (Larrabee, 1970:41)

Then, in order to become institutionalized at the campus, contemporary art had to promote the image of its intellectual seriousness. But its existence at the university also influences contemporary art, as Harold Rosenberg observes:

"My point was only that a new source of instruction for artists will affect their attitudes toward art, their handling of materials, and ultimately, the styles in which they choose to work.
Can there be any doubt that training in the university has contributed to the cool, impersonal wave in the art of the sixties? In the classroom - in contrast to the studio, which has tended to be dominated by metaphor - it is normal to formulate consciously what one is doing and to be able to explain it to others." (Rosenberg, 1973:93)

In general, Burton Clark notes that universities are professionalizing institutions in which the faculty move toward specialization and research:

"As work (academic work at the university) becomes professionalized - specialized around esoteric knowledge and technique - the organization of work must create room for expert judgment, and autonomy of decision-making and practice become the hallmark of an advanced profession." (Burton Clark, 1971:240)

The university atmosphere is a professionalizing one, and that along with the fine art tradition and a place in the public arena, impel contemporary art toward greater professionalization.

There is, however, conflict between a profession and the university. Etzioni classifies organizational goals in relationship to the organization's compliance method, and notes three general types of goals: order, economic and cultural. (Etzioni, 1975:104-105) Both universities and professions specialize in the service of cultural goals but while the university specializes in the creation and preservation of culture, professions specialize in the application of culture. (Etzioni, 1975:105) Etzioni, in noting a commonality of generalized goal structure between the university and professions, demonstrates what brings them together, while a difference in subcultural goals indicates an area of conflict.

Lewis Mayhew, in surveying professional education, notes the following recurrent problems in the area: (Mayhew, 1971:19)
1. Content of professional education. If the school becomes too academic it alienates the profession, whereas too extensive a practice orientation can alienate the faculty and university.

2. There is tension regarding the role of the professional school as innovator.

3. Selection of faculty is problematic. Key issues are whether faculty should be full-time, part-time faculty and practitioner combined, and the extent to which a faculty member should have a research function.

The latter point is amplified by Terry Clark who notes that innovators in a field are not always suited for academic existence, and that innovation and institutionalization are two different processes suited perhaps for two different types of individuals. (Clark, 1971:85) Faculty selection is a critical area for a professional school within a university and it is an area that generates considerable conflict. Clark, in a further observation, remarks that the role of researcher/administrator may be a key role that diminishes conflict. (Clark, 1971:85-86)

In general, then, the university is of benefit to contemporary art and impels greater professionalization, but conflict exists, and contemporary art with its low esteem and autonomy is vulnerable to organizational pressures.
Summary

This chapter has sought to: 1) identify and illustrate the core characteristics of contemporary art; 2) develop reasons for professionalization; and 3) examine the extent of that professionalization. In summary, a number of general areas of concern can be identified that must be dealt with if further professionalization is to occur. All of the following areas involve degrees of uncertainty that can reduce the ability of contemporary art to organize. The next chapter will examine those areas of concern that have educational implications.

The areas of general concern for further professionalization are:

A. Professional Culture
   1. Organization and development of the knowledge base.
   2. Expansion of expressive and informational communication.
   3. Organization of greater social interaction.

B. Professional Education
   1. Clarification of the relationship to relevant disciplines.
   2. Development of curriculum with closer relevance to core tasks.
   3. Selection standards for faculty.
   4. Development of a relationship to the profession off campus.

C. Audience Expansion
   1. Clearer articulation of intentions and content of contemporary art.
2. Articulation and communication of standards.

3. Seeking greater support of institutions with access to the public such as museums and government agencies.

4. Seeking greater support of institutions that can help legitimize contemporary art.
CHAPTER VII

EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROFESSIONALIZATION

Introduction

This chapter has two functions: 1) to provide a brief summary of the preceding chapters; and 2) to provide a theoretical framework which structures implications for the professional education of the contemporary artist. There is a high level of abstraction to this last chapter, with illustrations kept to a minimum, since the expansion of this chapter into curriculum design is beyond the scope of this study.

Furthermore, this chapter introduces many academic dilemmas, as well as educational problems, and as Peter Blau indicates;

"A dilemma has two horns, which distinguishes it from a problem. If the end is given and the question is only one of the means to achieve it, we have a problem, and if the means are not known or not at our disposal, we cannot solve the problem. But if the means are known and available, a problem can be solved, whereas a dilemma cannot be." (Blau, 1973:270)

Since dilemmas have no optimal solutions, the formulation of a satisfactory educational decision utilizing the following framework is dependent upon local conditions. This chapter attempts to delineate questions and issues that are requisite or critical to more concrete, organizational or curriculum decision-making. Some of the questions and issues to be presented emerge from the preceding chapters while
others reflect recurrent issues found in a general body of literature dealing with professional education. These questions are presented in the expectation that they will be applicable to all situations in which attempts are made to educate the visual artist at the university.

The propositions introduced here proceed in sequence from those that reflect the most general social relationships to issues of a narrower scope, and relate specifically to the university as a formal organization, to the contemporary art profession, and to the education of the visual artist at the university. The following are a set of assumptions that are supported by the discussion in the preceding chapters and serve as a foundation for the propositions that will be presented.

1. A profession or a highly professionalized occupation is an example of complex organization. Complex organization is defined as:

"...a system of interrelated behaviors of people who are performing a task that has been differentiated into several distinct subsystems, each subsystem performing a portion of the task, and the efforts of each being integrated to achieve effective performance of the system."

(Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967:3)

2. Professions and highly professionalized occupations utilize normative compliance as a means of membership control.

3. Professions and highly professionalized occupations are special cases of open-systems and are subject to rationality. Professionalized organizations are defined as:

"...open systems, hence indeterminate and faced with uncertainty, but at the same time as subject to criteria of rationality and hence needing determinateness and certainty."

(Thompson, 1967:10)
4. The greater the certainty surrounding the core activity, the more formalized the organizational structure can become.

5. The sociological research on complex organization, where relevant, is applicable to professional organization.

6. The high degree of subsidiary knowing involved in the core technology of contemporary art affects the educational process and structure.

7. The core technology of contemporary art which is characterized by high levels of ambiguity and personal expression, a problem-solving and history consciousness orientation, and a desire for visual communication, makes decision-making a major task of the artist.

Some Observations on Professional Education

Although contemporary artists have no common professional association, no single journal that represents them all, and no lobby in Washington to establish and protect privileges, this dissertation has, from its introduction, assumed that there is value inherent in viewing contemporary art as a highly professionalized occupation. That value relates to the recognition of a homogeneity of beliefs and practice within contemporary art and the implications of such a recognition for the education of the contemporary artist.

The professionalization of contemporary art is at a stage similar to that of psychotherapy as described by Henry, Sims and Spray in The Fifth Profession (1971). Those authors, in an indepth study of psychiatry, clinical psychology, psychoanalysis and psychiatric social
work, suggest that the homogeneity of the four groups when practicing psychotherapy, outweighs the individual group differences and thus creates a rationale for a combined educational experience. (Henry, Sims, Spray, 1971:180-182) The Henry, Sims and Spray study found, as is the case with William Goode's essay (Goode, 1969:266-313) that a homogeneity of beliefs and practice gives rise to professionalization regardless of differences among the groups especially initial educational differences. Henry, Sims and Spray point out that their study indicates that both homogeneity and heterogeneity occur simultaneously as different segments or loosely organized groups within a profession pursue some common overall goal, although in different ways. (Henry, Sims, Spray, 1971:6-7)

But regardless of differences among the four mental health areas, Henry, Sims and Spray remark that:

"...the important issue lies in the proposition that the choices made during the professional training of these men and women are all decided so as to emphasize a limited number of elements that come to represent a common core of mental health ideology and practice...Through the processes of selective choice, of emphasizing certain experiences in particular subparts of professional training, some common threads of personal belief and conviction grow and develop into a remarkably similar set of professional beliefs and orientations as well as habits and viewpoints." (Henry, Sims, Spray, 1971:6)

The above quote describes an educational process not unlike that found in contemporary art, in that, among some individuals, a set of similar professional beliefs and practices develops from a diverse set of educational programs. Furthermore, the preceding quote and the

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1The degree of diversity or heterogeneity within professions is the subject of R. Bucher and A. Strauss' "Professions in Process," American Journal of Sociology, 66, 1961.
entire Henry, Sims and Spray study reinforce the importance of professional socialization, during and after formal education, in developing a homogeneity of beliefs and practices that serves as a basis for an identifiable profession.

In addition to reinforcing the basic importance of professional socialization, the Henry, Sims and Spray study makes a number of observations of relevance to this chapter. First, there tends to be a significant difference between the age at which a mental health practitioner becomes interested in his general field, e.g., medicine, and the age at which interest in psychotherapy occurs. For instance, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts show an interest in medicine at about 15 years of age, whereas an interest in psychotherapy does not occur until about 23 years of age. (Henry, Sims, Spray, 1971:90-91) Social workers, on the other hand, develop an interest in their field at about 22 years of age and an interest in psychotherapy about three years later. (Henry, Sims, Spray, 1971:91-92)

The point implied here is that when a particular role-model, such as the physician, is well known in the community, the age of initial occupational interest for recruits tends to be young. But when the role-model is not well known in the community, which is true of psychotherapy, the age of initial occupational interest is much higher, usually occurring after a period of formal higher education. (Henry, Sims, Spray, 1971:96-99) This view seems to be substantiated by the observation that as the visibility of mental health as an occupation increases, the average age of initial interest of recruits decreases. (Henry, Sims, Spray, 1971:98)
In general, the Henry, Sims and Spray study demonstrates a variance in age at which initial occupational interest occurs depending on the availability of role-models, and a variance in age between initial general interest in a field and initial specific interest in a particular core technology. Psychotherapy, like contemporary art and unlike medicine or law, is a relatively obscure occupation, not fully professionalized, whose core technology is not widely understood.

Because of the similarity between psychotherapy and contemporary art, it may be inferred from the Henry, Sims and Spray study that studio educators may expect the enrollment of: 1) older students who perhaps have had previous experiences in higher education; and 2) students with an uncertain understanding of the actual practice of contemporary art. The latter point is supported by Amy Goldin's observation that students are attracted to studio education because of the particular life style that they perceive to exist there, rather than because of a desire to practice art. (Goldin, 1973:44)

The preceding paragraph tends to suggest a flexible admission program into studio art in order to accommodate individuals possessing a variety of backgrounds, as well as an early introduction of the student not only to the core technology of contemporary art but also to the social milieu in which that art is produced.

The latter point relates to a curricular dilemma that occurs in all professional education: the balance between cognitive study and practice. And as Lewis Mayhew indicates, there is a growing emphasis in professional education on very early clinical or field work which
not only provides the student with a greater knowledge of the total profession, but also with a sense of the way in which theory enhances practice. (Mayhew, 1971:22-32)

Finally, the Henry, Sims and Spray study suggests, at its conclusion, the value of a unified education:

"In this context it is important to query the social utility of having four highly organized, well-equipped, self-sufficient training pathways, each of which produces psychotherapists. Of course, these separate pathways produce other professionals who are not psychotherapists, but the point here is that the kinds of people progressively drawn into psychotherapy are highly similar... Only the intervening years of expensive, highly complex training are different - different in ways that appear to have questionable relevance to the practice of psychotherapy..." (Henry, Sims, Spray, 1971:181)

Although contemporary artists have also arrived at a degree of homogeneity by a variety of educational circumstances, it is the assumption of this dissertation, as suggested by Henry, Sims and Spray, that there is value in an educational sequence that recognizes the nature of contemporary art and helps the student to become proficient in that area.

But there is also a body of literature on professional education that warns against excessive rigidity in professional curriculums for the sake of efficiency. The argument for flexibility within a professional curriculum is common to most literature on professional education and is summarized in a series of propositions by Edgar Schein from a Carnegie Commission on Higher Education Report on professional education: (Schein, 1972:60-70)

1. "More flexibility in the professional school curriculum, in the number of paths available through the school, in the number of electives available to students inside and outside the school, in the pacing and sequencing of courses, in the
required length of time needed to go through school, and in the degree or certification process used by the school." (Schein, 1972:60)

2. "New curricula and new career paths which are inter- or transdisciplinary and which may lead eventually to new professions that have new blends of knowledge and skill underlying them." (Schein, 1972:64)

By inter- or transdisciplinary, Schein means:

1. A curriculum that involves courses from two or more departments or disciplines.

2. A curriculum that involves several disciplines, all of which are located within a given school.

3. "Schools that are from the outset interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary in their orientations in that they set as their goal the development of a new discipline that represents an integration of the disciplines represented." (Schein, 1972:65)

The call for flexibility in professional education is a direct result of change impacting on the professional: change in work settings, in client and social needs, and most of all in the knowledge base of a profession. The rapid move toward obsolescence, which Judith Adler observed in contemporary art, is not such a dissimilar process to that found in other professions. (Adler, 1975:360-378) Each profession must cope with change, and a basic value of viewing complex organizations as open-systems is that open-systems theory provides a unique insight into that which induces or inhibits organizational change. (Katz and Kahn, 1966:390-451)

At its most basic level, Schein's proposal for flexibility and Henry, Sims and Spray's recognition of the value of a unified educational sequence leading to a common goal, emphasize the need to view students, professions, individual academic areas, and universities as
open-systems and as entities requiring a certain amount of closure from the environment in order to create stability. The following is a set of propositions relevant to studio education that recognizes the above dilemma.

A Theoretical Framework

A. Open-Systems

The university as a formal organization, the professionalized occupation of contemporary art, and the studio department within the university are special cases of open-systems and as such are in a process of exchange with their environments and one another. A major source of dysfunction for an open-system is to close off inputs from the environment. (Katz and Kahn, 1966:22) However, the openness of a system increases uncertainty and thus the system seeks to close itself in order to increase the level of certainty surrounding the core tasks.

"Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to seal off their core technologies from environmental influences." (Thompson, 1967:19)

"The greater the certainty of the relevant subenvironment, the more formalized the structure of that subsystem." (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967:6)

From the preceding propositions, it follows that a system will seek to close off its core task from environmental influence, thus increasing the certainty of the core task which leads to greater formal structure. A major organizational task for the academic subunit that seeks to educate
contemporary artists, is to reach a balance between the dilemma of being too closed or too open in relation to the relevant systems surrounding it.

Proposition:

A.1. The studio department as an open-system must recognize its interdependent relationship with the university, the professionalized occupation of contemporary art, and the environmental source of students.

Proposition:

A.2. The studio department will seek to close itself off from its relevant environments in order to increase the certainty surrounding the core task of education and to encourage the growth of organizational and curricular structure. However, change occurring in the studio department's environments requires flexibility in the organizational and curricular structure in order to respond to such change.

It is assumed here that Proposition A.2. relates to the establishment and maintenance of a steady state in which a cycle of events can exist. (Katz and Kahn, 1966:20-21) But an open-system can attempt to survive and maintain its structure at the expense of its original goals.

Proposition:

A.3. In order to maintain the studio department's commitment to the attainment of relevant goals, periodic reviews of curriculum and instruction by the
profession and the university are indicated.

Lewis Mayhew, however, argues for an autonomy of the professional school from both the profession and the university in order to function as an agent for positive change. (Mayhew, 1971:19) And organizations in general seek to limit the degree of subservience that is necessary to other organizations:

"Under norms of rationality, organizations seek to minimize the power of task-environment elements over them by maintaining alternatives." (Thompson, 1967:32)

"Organizations subject to rationality norms and competing for support seek prestige." (Thompson, 1967:33)

Academic or professional prestige is, as Burton Clark points out, a very powerful means to autonomy at the university. (B. Clark, 1971:243-249)

Proposition:

A.4. In order to retain a sense of autonomy, the studio department must seek alternatives to the support offered by the university and seek professional or academic prestige.

B. Studio Department Structure

Proceeding from the distinctions that exist among the intellectual disciplines, professionalized occupations and semi-professions, the academic subunit devoted to the education of the contemporary artist should be a separate entity, distinct from those areas, such as Art Education, Art History, Design and Commercial Art, whose core tasks are closely related to, but different from, those of studio education. However,
separateness is a relative term and rationality demands negotiation and cooperation with similar areas. Edgar Schein observes that:

"...we can identify three trends of maturing professions: 1) they become more convergent in their knowledge base and standards of practice, 2) they become more highly differentiated and specialized, and 3) they become more bureaucratized and rigid..." (Schein, 1972:43)

As Schein indicates, the very processes that lead to professional organization – convergence in its knowledge base and standards of practice, differentiation from similar activities, and organization – can also lead to a conservatism and inflexibility that resist innovation and input from other academic areas. (Schein, 1972:43-52)

Proposition:

B.1. Rationality indicates the need for an exchange of services and cooperation between similar academic areas. However, the first task of a studio department is the education of the contemporary artist.

Although an academic subunit, such as a studio department, has aspects of a formal organization, it also contains elements of a temporary system due to the cyclical change in student population and the temporary duration of courses. Recognition of the temporary systems nature of some of the activities of a studio department can also lead to the recognition of the value of a temporary systems theoretical framework for structuring academic activity.
Both Schein and Mayhew note that many universities have concluded that the existing academic system of courses, organized by semesters or quarters and tied together into a curriculum of some years' duration, does not produce optimal levels of professional learning. (Schein, 1972:129-139; Mayhew, 1971:46-51) Matthew Miles, in his description of the nature and types of temporary systems, also emphasizes the prescriptive use of temporary systems to increase institutional flexibility and to reduce the pervasiveness of traditional educational procedures of doubtful validity. (Miles, 1964:437-490) Both Miles' concept of temporary systems and Schein's call for "new learning modules" (Schein, 1972:129-132) recognize the necessity for structuring the professional educational experience in greater congruity with the nature of that which is being learned.

Miles differentiates temporary systems according to their anticipated duration, and the termination of a system may be: (Miles, 1964:440)

1. Identified chronologically and explicitly;
2. Linked to the occurrence of a specific event;
3. Contingent upon the achievement of a general state of affairs.

The functions of temporary systems as identified by Miles are: (Miles, 1964:441-445)

1. Compensation maintenance which relates to informal organization that functions to maintain a person in
the surrounding social system.

2. **Short-term task accomplishment.**

3. **The induction of change.**

The recurrent features of temporary systems, as identified by Miles, are: (Miles, 1964:452-480)

1. **Input characteristics:** time limits; initial goal definition; boundary maintenance operations; physical and social isolation; and size and territoriality.

2. **Process characteristics:** time use; goal redefinition; procedures; role definition and socialization; communication and power structures; sentiments; and norms.

3. **Output characteristics:** changes within the individual; relationship changes; and action decisions.

**Proposition:**

B.2. Temporary systems, as a structural device, permit a degree of closed system certainty while ensuring their discontinuation.

**Proposition:**

B.3. Temporary systems, as a structural element of an educational system, encourage:

1. Socialization when relevant;

2. Flexibility in time allocation;

3. Concentration on goals.

**Proposition:**

B.4. Temporary systems can span gaps among departmental areas, among university-wide academic areas, and
between the department and the external environment.

Meyer and Rowan indicate that in educational organization the formal structure is often the result of environmental de-
mand and is loosely coupled to the core activity of instruc-
tion. (Meyer and Rowan, 1975:36-39) It has been assumed that this would be a negative relationship, but as Karl Weick sug-
gests, the relationship may bestow some net advantage to the participants. (Weick, 1976:18)

There is a possibility, then, that formal organization can exist within the studio department to satisfy environmental concerns and be loosely connected to a system of formal courses and temporary systems in which the core educational activities take place. Such an arrangement could satisfy the needs for formal structure and flexibility.

Proposition:

B.5. The formal structure of the studio department exists as a buffer between environmental pressures and the core activity; is loosely coupled to the core activity, thereby permitting flexibility; and provides the minimal coordination that is necessary for the system's maintenance.

C. Size of the Studio Department

A common theme throughout the literature on professions and contemporary art is the necessity of a socialization pro-
cess. A further theme in the sociology of complex organization is that an organization moves toward expansion and

Peter Blau suggests that his research on the university demonstrates a relationship between socialization and size and differentiation. (Blau, 1973:262-270) Blau’s investigation demonstrates that:

1. Differentiation produces the small groups that are essential for the social integration of the individual.
2. Differentiation entails specialization which has inherent advantages other than economic, such as power and prestige acquisition.

Furthermore, Blau observes the following:

"The insufficient size of departments or other work groups, also inhibits social integration and effective performance, however, which tends to limit the division of labor in organizations. A colleague group must be small enough for all members to know one another well and for their frequent personal contacts to create the network of social relations that attains and sustains social integration." (Blau, 1973:266-267)

In relation to Blau’s observations, Lawrence and Lorsch hypothesize:

"Subsystems dealing with environments of moderate certainty will have members with more social interpersonal orientations, whereas subsystems coping with either very certain environments or very uncertain environments will have members with more task-oriented interpersonal orientations." (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967:7)

Together, the above quotes suggest that while organizations move toward greater differentiation, the latter must be limited in order to maintain a desirable level of social interaction.
**Proposition:**

*C.1.* While organizations move toward greater differentiation, the latter must be limited to maintain and promote social interaction among faculty, between students and faculty, and among students.

Schein notes that professions move toward bureaucratization and rigidity, and as such, represent a conservatism that can manifest itself in curriculum that is static and insensitive to changing priorities. (Schein, 1973:48-52) A basic curriculum issue in professional education is whether or not the repetition of an educational experience over an extended period of time is of value.

**Proposition:**

*C.2.* The certainty surrounding the core activity should be maintained at a level that promotes social interaction. The value of long-term repetition of faculty or student tasks that leads to a high degree of certainty surrounding the core activity, and the value of a continual alteration of tasks that prompts a low degree of certainty surrounding the core activity, should be evaluated.

**D. Faculty Roles**

Terry Clark's observation that the processes of innovation and institutionalization require different roles, prompts the assumption that the selection of faculty may require a different set of standards than those utilized to designate
innovators in the profession. (Clark, 1971:85) And Schein provides a broad set of standards for faculty selection by noting:

"...the kind of faculty needed in a new kind of professional school built around flexible, integrated models (or temporary systems) will be learning-centered and knowledgeable about learning principles, capable of working in team settings, interpersonally competent and positive towards people, concerned about the career development of students, and role-innovative." (Schein, 1972:143)

But in addition to the faculty needs that Schein describes above, the studio department has other faculty concerns. In view of the need for the development of contemporary art's knowledge base, especially in relation to education, it is anticipated that the role of researcher would be of value. It can also be assumed the the maintenance of a strong relationship with the profession indicates a reciprocal flow of personnel between the profession and the studio department.

Schein stresses the value of part-time or adjunct faculty to a professional school, noting that such a faculty member brings to the educational system "...things he has learned in the other systems he is a part of, with the result that each (system) benefits from a constant flow of new ideas." (Schein, 1972:145) But it must also be noted that studio education and its concern with contemporary art are relatively recent arrivals at the university. Under such circumstances, Clark suggests that the role of researcher/administrator is a prominent one in the institutionalization of an innovation such as contemporary art at the university. (Clark, 1971:85-86)
In the following propositions, the term **research** is used to refer to the generation of new knowledge that is relevant to contemporary art whereas the term **practitioner** refers to an individual who produces contemporary art. It is assumed that individuals can function in a variety of roles during a lifetime and may even hold them simultaneously.

**Proposition:**

D.1. A studio department would be expected to incorporate the following roles into permanent positions: practitioner/administrator or researcher/administrator; researcher/educator; practitioner/educator and educator.

**Proposition:**

D.2. A studio department, in order to maintain and increase coherence with the profession, would have temporary roles of varying durations to be filled by practitioners from outside of the university.

**Proposition:**

D.3. A studio department, in order to maintain and increase interaction with other academic areas, would have temporary or permanent roles, filled by university members from outside of the studio department.

The selection of faculty to fill the roles called for in D.1., D.2. and D.3. would obviously be a complex process. Schein has outlined some qualifications for a professional educator (see: and Chapter VI describes in broad terms the
characteristics of the contemporary artist. But that which constitutes good or satisfactory administration seems to be primarily dependent on local conditions such as department size, frequency of decision-making, academic or professional prestige, and type of intellectual discipline. 2

The backgrounds of such potential faculty might also be quite varied. For example, contemporary art critics come from a variety of art history, art making, and literature and poetry backgrounds. The preceding observation tends to parallel Henry, Sims and Spray's observation that the homogeneity found in psychotherapy is a result of extracurricular interests rather than formal education. (Henry, Sims, Spray, 1971:180-182) Since it is difficult to determine precisely which academic areas will produce knowledge relevant to studio education, and thus which educational backgrounds are beneficial for potential faculty members, I can only assume, as does Schein, that professional departments must opt for flexibility in faculty selection, and within the parameters prescribed by the university, seek faculty who can perform the necessary tasks within an institutional setting. (Schein, 1972:139-145)

Proposition:

D.4. Faculty roles, either permanent or temporary, must be filled by individuals whose ability to perform the

2For an extended discussion of this point see: "Administrative Practices in University Departments," Hassand Collen, Administrative Science Quarterly, 8,1, June 1963:44-60.
core task within the institutional setting can be demonstrated. Since faculty core tasks and institutional settings vary, employment criteria would also vary.

E. Students

The relationship of the structure of professional education to the university's distinction between undergraduate and graduate education is complex. For example, architecture usually is an extended (five-year) professionalized undergraduate program, whereas law is usually a graduate program. Medicine requires an undergraduate degree and its admission standards mandate a great many of the components of the undergraduate program.

Law and Social Work, however, while requiring an undergraduate degree, accept a much wider variance of undergraduate programs as sufficient preparation for their programs. But as Lewis Mayhew indicates, there is a general tendency in professional education to view the post undergraduate phase of education as the highly professionalized phase of education, thus making the master's degree the first professional degree. (Mayhew, 1971:53)

It is assumed in this dissertation, then, that an undergraduate studio program would concentrate on providing a general

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3See: McGlothlin, 1984:Table I, p.38 and Fig.2, p.46 for the amount and type of graduate and undergraduate education required by different professions.
studio education in order to aid the student in meeting the entrance requirements of the graduate studio program. Although a graduate studio program could realistically evaluate the entering student's knowledge and production of contemporary art, such an expectation is probably unrealistic for entrance into an undergraduate program.

The Henry, Sims and Spray study of psychotherapy implies that interest in relatively obscure occupations occurs at a later time in the individual's life, usually after a period of formal higher education. (Henry, Sims, Spray, 1971:96-99) Further, the same study implies a discrepancy in the time of initial interest in a general field and interest in a specific technology. Given the relative obscurity of contemporary art as an occupation, it seems reasonable to expect undergraduate students who will: 1) come from other academic backgrounds; 2) show an initial interest in art but not understand the nature of contemporary art; and 3) be faced with the decision to continue in the program once the reality of the nature of contemporary art becomes known to them.

There exists no method, presently, for determining the type of student who will perform competently in the area of contemporary art. Even the admission policies of the traditional professional schools, while successful in locating individuals who function successfully in the academic program, fail to predict the student's success as a practitioner. (Mayhew, 1971:9-10)
There appears to be no alternative but to admit students to the studio department who desire admission, as long as minimal university requirements have been met. However, given the very specialized nature of the core technology of contemporary art and the nature of the contemporary art world, it is imperative that the studio department begin, as soon as possible, to communicate to the student the nature of practice. Recent curriculum innovations in the traditional professional schools have emphasized the preceding point, and have also stressed interaction with the total profession. (Mayhew, 1971: 34)

Proposition:

E.1. The studio department should concentrate upon exit criteria for students rather than upon entrance criteria.

E.2. The undergraduate must meet exit criteria that fulfills satisfactory entrance requirements for a graduate program in contemporary art, in addition to his fulfilling general university exit criteria.

E.3. The undergraduate student's introduction to the normative structure of contemporary art is imperative as is early experience with the core technology of contemporary art.

Basic to the concept of a profession is a competency of practice that is determined not only by the professional school but also by the profession as a whole. Due to the incomplete
professionalized nature of contemporary art and its heterogeneity, competency in contemporary art refers not only to production of art, but also to the understanding of contemporary art's social structure. Only after this social structure is understood, can the student expect to maximize his participation in that structure.

**Proposition:**

E.4. The graduate student should display a competency in the production of contemporary art, and a knowledge of contemporary art's social structure that is recognized by the faculty and other representative professionals as adequate for participation in the professionalized occupation of contemporary art.

**Proposition:**

E.5. Since the nature of valuable educational experiences is not completely predictable for each person, individual student choice for some educational experiences should be permitted. These choices should extend to educational experiences inside the studio department, in areas related to the studio department, and within and away from the university.

In his book, *Creativity: The Magic Synthesis*, Silvano Arieti notes that *inactivity and aloneness are critical to the creative process.* (Arieti, 1976:373-374) Although the social interaction aspect of professionalization and education has been emphasized in this work, it must be clearly understood that the
actual production of contemporary art is, in most cases, a very private process. And yet, typically, studio departments expect students to produce art in groups and at a certain time of the day.

The observation that privacy and the time to work alone are necessary for students is in no way contradictory to the preceding propositions, but rather focuses attention upon what can and should be accomplished by group interaction. Inactivity must not be equated with non-productiveness. However, it must be further noted that self-discipline is also critical to the creation of art.

Proposition:

E.6. Students must be provided with opportunities and facilities to work in privacy, as well as allocated time in which to work that are realistic to the needs of both the students and the studio department.

Proposition:

E.7. The student must assume the responsibility to demonstrate his competency and growth in the technology of contemporary art.

F. Subsidiary Knowing

Michael Polanyi's concepts of focal and subsidiary knowing have been of central importance to this study, but it becomes difficult to formulate their educational implications into propositions. The major educational implication seems to be
that subsidiary knowing is much more demanding of experience whereas focal knowing involves more the cognitive processes.

"Take first the process of mastering a skill. Here the emphasis of our knowing lies in producing a result. The effort involved in acquiring knowledge and skillfully applying it may then be said to be guided by a purpose. When on the other hand, the emphasis of our knowing lies in recognizing or understanding a thing, the effort involved in acquiring such knowledge may be said to be guided by our attention. A biologist, a doctor, an art dealer, and a cloth merchant acquire their expert knowledge in part from textbooks, but these texts are of no use to them without the accompanying training of the eye, the ear, and the sense of touch." (Polanyi, 1975:42-43)

In more concrete terms, Lewis Mayhew states that the tendency for professional schools to emphasize early clinical or field experience gives the student a purpose which guides in the acquisition of skills and guides the student's attention toward further cognitive or theoretical understanding that is required. (Mayhew, 1971:54-55) Schein feels that professional education could be:

"...a cyclical activity that starts with concrete experience, is followed by a period of reflective observation, is then followed by a period of abstract conceptualization...and then closes with an effort at generalization which typically involves trying out new behavior which in turn produces new experience, thus setting the cycle in motion once again." (Schein, 1972:135)

Proposition:

F.1. The nature of subsidiary knowing and the nature of applied knowledge indicate that studio education has a heavier investment in experiential as opposed to cognitive learning.
Polanyi points out that:

"Education is latent knowledge, of which we are aware subsidiarily in our sense of intellectual power based on this knowledge." (Polanyi, 1958:103)

For Polanyi, education provides an interpretative framework through which experiences are assimilated. Polanyi stresses that education does not provide answers but rather a framework through which answers may be found. (Polanyi, 1958:103) There is a similarity between Polanyi's concept of education-as-a-framework and March and Simon's performance programs, (March and Simon, 1970:96-101) in that each provides a means of facilitating decision-making.

Proposition:

F.2. The subsidiary nature of contemporary art demands, as a core task for educators, the development of decision-making frameworks.

Polanyi also indicates that the process of education requires an act of affiliation by the student, through which the student comes to trust the reasonableness of that which is being taught him. (Polanyi, 1958:207) Most "facts" that we know consist of second-hand knowledge from sources we trust.

Focal knowledge is much more subject to impersonal verification and requires less of an affiliation and less trust, which is the antithesis of subsidiary knowing. This tenet of subsidiary knowing has ethical implications for the studio department's and the faculty's interaction with students. For example, Judith Adler's article contains examples of
"educational" situations in which faculty view their role as reassuring the student that whatever he does is art, and in which the faculty stress the legitimacy of "conning" and "hustling" over honesty. (Adler, 1975:372-378)

Proposition:

F.3. The experiential nature of subsidiary knowing increases the student's vulnerability to faculty abuse and misinformation, and therefore necessitates the development of an ethical relationship between faculty and students.

Summary

In summary, I wish to return to Durkheim's suggestion that the organization of occupations provides the individual with a sense of social belonging that is denied him by the growth of national governments and a society fragmented by differentiation. (Durkheim, 1932:28) The same theme is repeated by Talcott Parsons, but in addition Parsons promotes a leadership role for the professions in our society. (Parsons, 1968:545)

"We do not know what lies in store for the next phase of professionalization. I suggest, however, that the professional complex has already not only come into prominence but has even begun to dominate the contemporary scene in such a way as to render obsolescent the primacy of the old issues of political authoritarianism and capitalistic exploitation." (Parsons, 1968:546)

The centrality of professions to modern society suggests that the contemporary artist may again emerge from the garret to become a public person. But Kris remarks that artists are prone to re-enacting
biographical models of past artists. (Kris, 1952:82-84) In order, then, for the contemporary artist to become a modern professional he must reject a certain image of himself:

"There are the pathetic and ridiculous figures who live only for diary or obituary, whose sole purpose in life seems to be one day to become themselves biographical models; and there are those who need not emphasize the bond of heritage. They have renounced the conscious aspirations which haunt the others, and by virtue of their achievements they realize the old ideals of biographers in a new form." (Kris, 1952:84)
APPENDIX

CORRESPONDENCE
Dear Sirs:

I am a doctoral candidate at Ohio State University and am writing to request permission to include the following extended quotes from Michael Polanyi's book, *The Tacit Dimension*, 1966, in my dissertation which is to be completed in August, 1977. The dissertation is concerned with the education of the professional artist. All quotes will be footnoted giving appropriate credit to the author and source of publication.

The quotes are as follows:

1. page 10 - "Such is...[focal knowledge]." - 34 words
2. page 15-16 - "Our body is...[a thing outside]." - 95 words
3. page 16 - "But our awareness...[dwell on it]." - 133 words
4. page 17 - "To rely on...[to use it]." - 65 words
5. page 20-21 - "I think...[which it bears]." - 183 words
6. pages 21-22 - "It is a...[even an inkling]." - 134 words
7. pages 23-24 - "Since we have...[of unexpected manifestations]." - 170 words

I have found Polanyi's writing very valuable to my work and I appreciate your considering my request.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Joseph R. LaChapelle
Thank you for your letter of July 18.

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The quotes are as follows:

1. page 536 - "Thus the occupational ... and research institutions," - 74 words
2. pages 537-538 - "... in the modern ... of intellectual disciplines," - 118 words
3. page 537 - "First is the ... the applied branch," - 125 words
4. page 545 - "It is my ... twentieth-century society," - 81 words
5. page 538 - "Clerical leadership ... tradition as such," - 24 words

I have found Parsons' writing very valuable to my work and I appreciate your considering my request.

Sincerely,

Joseph R. LaChapelle

Joseph R. LaChapelle
July 28, 1977

Mr. Joseph R. LaChapelle
Art Education Department
Hopkins Hall, Room 340
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The quotes are as follows:

1. page 268 - "The alternative to ...blind and deceptive." - 87 words
2. page 175 - "The conceptual framework ...supposed to serve." - 80 words
3. page 177 - "The difference between ...discovery as such." - 94 words
4. page 347 - "Facts about living ...to understand life." - 45 words
5. page 195 - "A symphony is ...it is impracticable." - 59 words

I have found Polanyi's writing very valuable to my work and I appreciate your considering my request. Sincerely,

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