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THE MARITAL STABILITY OF CUBAN IMMIGRANTS: 1970

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1977

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This work is dedicated to Lauriece. Her financial and moral support made it possible.
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Mrs. Jean Stouder typed the manuscript with skill and patience and Mrs. Miriam Morris read it and made a number of editorial changes. The work was supported by Pre-Doctoral Fellowship 1F31 MH050 76-01 of the National Institute of Mental Health, by the Disaster Research Center and The Department of Sociology of the Ohio State University, and by the Ohio State University. I am grateful to these persons and institutions.

All matters of fact and opinion and all remaining shortcomings of the text are my own.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The immigration of Cubans to the United States has greatly affected their family life. The participation of immigrant women in the labor force (Table 1-1), for instance, represents an important break with their homeland experience [Aguirre, 1976]. Their employment has made the sexes more nearly equal; women make more decisions, and their husbands help them in housework more often than in the past [Richmond, 1973].

The change in kinship networks may be no less important in affecting family relationships [Joyner, 1972]. That parents are more involved in child care and household tasks has been attributed to the lesser availability of extended family members in the household and, only secondarily, to the employment of mothers outside the home and to the altered status of the family [Gibboney, 1961].

Against the background of such transformations, this study analyzes how immigration has affected the marital stability of Cubans. It is organized as follows:

Chapter II reviews American sociology since the turn of the century on how migration affects the family.

Chapter III reviews the association of socio-economic status and marital stability in relation to the present context.
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<td>1970&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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Chapter IV compares the Cuban immigration with that from other Latin American countries.

Chapter V gives characteristics of the sample, the variables, and the concepts and methods used in the analysis.

Chapter VI develops a typology of immigrant-marriages from three variables: year of first marriage, place of first marriage, year of immigration.

Chapter VII presents multiple regression models of marital stability for males and females in each type.

Chapter VIII presents a summary of the study and suggestions for research.

From its very inception American sociology conceived the effects of migration on the individual and family and on the community and society as disruptive and disequilibrating. This view of migration generated a number of hypotheses, but these have not received substantial testing so that advance in the field has been meager. This theme is traced in the following chapter as some more recent studies are reviewed.
CHAPTER II

MIGRATION AND FAMILY: A REVIEW

A concern with the description and analysis of social change evinced in the many traditional-modern society ideal-type dichotomies found in classical sociological thought constituted an important justification in the emergence of sociology as a discipline. The impact on social organization and social integration in the West of demographic, economic, and technological transformations called forth an interpretation, which, as Nisbet suggests, was reactionary and antimodern in its inceptions.

The disappearance of extended families as political and self-sufficient economic entities and the lessened importance of the kin group and of the neighborhood in social life encouraged in men like Sorokin and Zimmerman the most dire predictions. The problems of social control in modern societies were conceived by the founders of the discipline as inextricably linked to mobility, both social and geographical. In their view, traditional society was small in population and territory, suspicious of strangers, reverent of age, religion, and custom, sharply segmented by sex, and fundamentally dependent on the family and extended kin to establish social control and maintain a homogeneous culture. The larger demographic and spatial characteristics of modern society, with its urbanity, political origins, complex system of stratification and
division of labor, its cultural and racial heterogeneity, were seen as beset by the problem of regulation or social control. In modern society,

The individual will be less likely to understand his place in the whole and the function of the group in the institutional system. To paraphrase Cooley, the whole will not commonly live in his thought. He will be less likely to see himself in terms of the perspectives of others, to share their notions of right and wrong, and to be bound by a strong feeling of "we-ness." He will have difficulty in feeling any imperious moral obligation to the whole. The disjunction between consciousness and understanding of the role-incumbents and the nature and expanse of the whole as it exists will undermine their motivation, particularly their moral steadfastness, lead to the withdrawal of commitment, permit deviation, and gradually allow disorganization of the parts of the social system [Hinkle, forthcoming].

Mobility was identified as one of the causes of social disorganization. H. P. Fairchild and E. A. Ross's well known vitriol against migrants to the United States gained them notoriety even during their lifetime [Weinberg, 1972: 149-176]. C. H. Cooley thought of the effect of geographical mobility and of social mobility in general, as social displacement. It created for the individual a feeling of moral isolation and demoralization as he lost the moorings of his ancestral ground. Cooley perceived migrants as suffering from "widespread maladjustment and strain." Migration rendered young men and women

...subject to unusual stress and temptation without the usual safeguards of association and public

opinion. Loneliness drives them into questionable companionship, and organized vice of several kinds exists by exploiting them. It is well known that urban prostitutes are recruited largely from girls who have left country homes to work in the city [Cooley, 1966:184].

The relaxation of moral sentiment regarding marriage by migrations and other sorts of displacement is easily traced in statistics, in cities--peopled by migration--and in the industrial and commercial classes most affected by economic change [Cooley, 1972:369].

According to Cooley, primary group associations, characterized by enduring intimate face-to-face, noninstrumental and unspecialized affective interaction, were lost in part by migration. The individual and social disorganization this loss engendered would be at the center of all subsequent thought on the problem.

For example, Thomas and Znaniecki's celebrated study [1920] explained Polish family disorganization in America by the absence of the extended family and the peasant community in which primary group ties had existed in Poland, and by the effect of American law on Polish family life.

Those changes, it was thought, made marriage vulnerable to the vagaries of individual attitudes and impulses [Thomas and Znaniecki, 1920, Vol. 5, p. 222]. To a much greater extent than previously, family disruption among the immigrants was caused by personality and temperamental incompatibilities. Having lost traditional moral guidelines, immigrants developed an inordinately high

\[^{2}\text{Blumer [1946] offers a critical evaluation of Thomas and Znaniecki's work on the Poles. For other works on W. I. Thomas, see Janowitz, 1966:310-311.}\]
interest in sexual experimentation, with disastrous effects on their family life. The economic uncertainties plaguing the immigrants also generated family instability. Often the husband could not adequately provide for his family, but this very economic instability induced some immigrants to search for economic opportunities detrimental to their family life. That extended kin often interfered in the life of the immigrant family, even though their domination no longer was appropriate, Thomas and Znaniecki [1920, Vol. 5, pp. 266-267] saw as another factor exacerbating the problem.

The loss of primary group ties to explain the ills of the immigrant family is nowhere clearer than in Thomas and Znaniecki's discussion of how the American legal system encouraged marital instability among the Poles.

There is no use in trying to make an immigrant accept [permanently] the formal idea of contract and admit the principle that by marrying he has undertaken certain life-long obligations, for obligation is significant to him only as long as it is a part of the organization of the primary social group to which he belongs. American law treats him and his wife as isolated individuals, not as primary-group members and between isolated individuals the normal connection in his consciousness is not that of a contract, binding even against one's will, but that of a free association dissoluble at any moment at the will of either [1920, Vol. 5:269].

Thomas, and later Park and Burgess, viewed the effects of migration positively in a long-range historical perspective, for the cultural contact it engendered was a source of social achievement. In the short run, however, which was emphasized in their writings, 

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3 For the views of W. I. Thomas on the effects of internal migration see Thomas, 1967:Chapter 3.
migration was perceived nominalistically [Jones, 1957] and negatively. It caused personality maladjustment and social disorganization.

Park's notion of migration and the marginal man [1967], later developed by Stonequist [1937], was evidently influenced by Simmel's deep ambivalence concerning the effects of modernism on the individual. It is, moreover, a continuation of the older theme of social and cultural breakdown.

The individual is free for new adventures, but he is more or less without direction and control . . . . The effect of mobility and migration is to secularize relations which were formerly sacred. One may describe the process, in its dual aspects, perhaps, as the secularization of society and the individuation of the person [Park, 1967:200-201].

The migrant, free from the strictures and limitations of his original group and culture, did not yet partake of the new surrounding him. His marginality was determined by the differences in culture between the country of destination--America--and his country of origin.

In Park's formulation, marginality was a social psychological experience undergone by immigrants. His classic cycle--contact, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation--postulated the eventual disappearance of marginality. The cycle has been sharply criticized [Price, 1969:214-217], and the theory of obstacles that made it untestable exposed [Lyman, 1972:27-70]. In the critical evaluation of the concept of marginality itself, Riesman's [1954:153-178; see also Antonovsky, 1956] argument that it is both open and secret in most of us is the most notable.

Park's collaboration with Burgess and McKenzie in urban ecology [1925] was as important as the notions on how migration
affected intergroup relations and personality in shaping subsequent sociological thought on the effects of migration. Of lasting value in the field of urban ecology [Stein, 1965; Timms, 1971], it had the undesirable effect of exaggerating the link between migration and the ecology of social disorganization by focusing on an extraordinary and singular case—Chicago. Stein put it thus:

Chicago grew as follows: 1860, 112,172; 1900, 1,698,575; 1910, 2,185,283; 1920, 2,701,705; 1930, 3,376,438. Cold figures alone cannot suggest what it must mean to people living in a city when the population swells at a rate of about one-half million per decade for three consecutive decades. Small wonder that the Chicago sociologists focused on the absence of established institutional patterns in so many regions of the city, stressing that the neighborhoods grew and changed hands so rapidly that sometimes the only constant feature appeared to be mobility. If to this is added the fact that much of the incoming population consisted of foreigners arriving in the heavy wave of migration to America during the first quarter of this century, while most of the rest were farmers as unaccustomed to city ways as their foreign-born neighbors, it then becomes clear why "disorganization" accompanied "mobility" [Stein, 1965:16].

Other writers extrapolated from Cooley in their analysis of the American family. The lower incidence of divorce in rural areas was thought to result from the wider personal acquaintance and greater daily interaction, which allowed public opinion to regulate marital and familial behavior. Primary group pressures could function in rural settings but not in cities [Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1964:624, Burgess, 1948:20; Zimmerman and Cervantes, 1956:101-102]. The "loss of the family's functions" associated with the decline of rural society was used to explain the demise of the old types of
social relations [Sorokin, 1945:Chapter V]. In Ogburn's formulation, the nuclear family became one of the most important remaining primary groups available to modern man. In his view, the great coherence and stability of the family system of the past had been due to:

1. Its functioning as the unit of economic production—it allowed all members to perform almost equally important tasks for the furtherance of the common welfare.

2. Its functioning as a source of social status and prestige—the individual was known primarily as a member of a family, not as an individual. "Most families stayed for generations on the same pieces of land in or near a small community and hence had an opportunity to establish reputations. . . The family name was a badge and had to be guarded at all cost and at all times" [Ogburn, 1938:139].

3. Its functioning for the education of the new generations.

4. Its functioning for the physical protection of the person.

5. Its functioning for the provision of recreation.

With the displacement of these functions onto new institutions, the nuclear family still provided affection for family members, and produced and reared children [Ogburn, 1938; 1933]. This view of the modern family as the most important remaining primary group in modern urban-industrial America remains prominent in the thought of Burgess et al. [1963] and Parsons [1959]. It has not escaped subsequent critical reassessment. The causal association assumed between industrialization and the small nuclear family was spurious [Greenfield, 1961]. The emergence of modern nuclear family patterns was not linear; rather, the weakening of parental control
over marriage climaxed during the middle and late eighteenth century [Smith, 1973]. Before 1850 the American patterns of mate selection and parent-child and husband-wife relations were similar to those of today [Furstenberg, 1966]. Nor is industrialization necessarily a cause of divorce [Cole and Powers, 1973]; heretofore unexpected levels of marital discord and conflict existed in early America [Lantz, 1976; Sennett, 1974]. In short, a longer historical view challenged the notion that the family lost its functions with the growth of urbanization and industrialization. According to Aries, the French demographic historian, the family had never been as important as in industrialized Europe [Wrong, 1963].

More specifically, however, a number of ways were identified in which migration to the city affected family life.

**Differential Association** -- Because of the city's social and cultural heterogeneity, family members could become acquainted with and internalize different and conflicting moral standards and behavior patterns. Incompatibility within the family could result.

The several members of a family may differ from each other in the intimacy, frequency, and length of their contacts or in the types of behavior contacted. These differences in contacts may result in the disruption of either the inner unity or the structural form of the family, or both [Locke, 1940:489; see also Burgess et al., 1963:376; Ogburn, 1938:142].

**Unfulfilled Family Obligations** -- Spatial movement in itself, quite apart from the increased cultural and social heterogeneity it engendered, could disorganize the family. Extended absence could "cause a breakdown of psychological and social relationship among the members . . . Mere separation tends to lead to psychological withdrawal
of the members from each other and to the disruption of the interlocking roles" [Locke, 1940:491-492]. Under these conditions intergenerational conflict would become endemic and relations within the family strained. "Areas of mobility are also the regions in which are found juvenile delinquency, boy's gangs, crime, wife desertion, divorce, abandoned children, vice" [Park et al., 1925:153].

**Loss of Satisfactory Social Relations** -- The migration of the family to a new community could disorganize it, since it disconnected the family "from the social matrix of which it [has] been a part and detaches it from the extrafamilial social attachments which gave it support in the former location" [Locke, 1940:490]. To the extent that such detachments took place and could not be substituted by other attachments in the new location, the person would feel lost, homesick, and depressed.

**Loss of Control of the Mate-Selection Process** -- Mobility gave greater freedom to family members, releasing the individual from the supervision of his kin and neighborhood. "The automobile has increased the opportunity for casual contacts [with members of the opposite sex]. It has facilitated nonmarital sex relationships" [Burgess et al., 1963:368-369].

**Deterioration of Living Conditions** -- Migration to the city meant in many instances poor and crowded housing, lack of space, of fresh air and sunlight, . . . "noise, dirt, and darkness are plentiful. Overcrowding fosters ill-health, encourages immorality through lack of privacy, and creates a psychology of hopelessness" [Baker, 1953: 8-9; see also Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1955:256-260]. "The total effects
of forces of city life, like mobility and promiscuity, upon the
neighborhood and upon our traditional culture seems [sic] to be subver-
sive and disorganizing" [Burgess, 1923:95].

**Loss of Economic Continuity** -- Geographical mobility disrupted
the cultural and occupational training of new generations in the
economic skills in which the family excelled, its stock of specialized
knowledge of particular occupations. Intergenerational discontinuity
was the consequence [Faris, 1947].

The possibility that migration could be beneficial to the
family was most explicitly, if briefly, recognized by Burgess [1948;
1963:377-380]. Recreational trips presented opportunities for joint
participation by family members. From a short separation the departed
member came to appreciate family life more, and those who stayed
home developed an interest in his experiences. Long separations could
be beneficial to family unity if the couple communicated frequently,
established neither new interests nor new social relations, and per-
ceived the separation as justified in the interest of the family.
Couples chronically unfit for each other temperamentally could also
benefit from long separations.

In some instances, the constant mobility of isolated families
would not disorganize them. "Trailer" and "hotel" families that
established no meaningful social relations in the community were
immune to the effects of mobility. "Since these families are con-
stantly on the move, they do not remain in any one place long enough
to make vital and sustained contacts with divergent patterns of
behavior" [Burgess et al., 1963:379]. And families unadjusted to
one community could adapt to another one, thus improving their chances for a happy corporate life.

In the main, however, in spite of the contradictory findings of Nimkoff [1943] on occupational mobility and marriage, the research that was done [e.g., Mowrer, 1929; 1938; 1964; Bossard and Dillon, 1935; Lind, 1925; Albig, 1933; Schneid, 1937; Sullenger, 1950; Lichtenberger, 1909; Toby, 1957] both was guided by and supported the prevailing assumptions that migration had mainly bad effects.

Cowgill [1960:136] concluded in his evaluation of this body of work that its findings rested largely upon inferences drawn from ecological correlation and the dramatic portrayal of certain depressed types of migrants, neither one of which demonstrated an inevitable or causal relationship. The ecological studies merely demonstrated that social pathologies occurred more frequently in the areas manifesting high mobility; they did not show that the same people who were mobile were demoralized.

This intellectual heritage had a lasting influence on how the effect of migration on the family is seen [Mowrer, 1948:380-384; Groves and Groves, 1947:431; Matras, 1975:363; Nimkoff, 1947:490-491; Christensen, 1950:32-43; Frazier, 1937].

But the theoretical assumption of widespread marital and familial disorganization was not supported by the actual experience of the immigrants themselves. Thomas and Znaniecki's findings on the Poles were later rejected on conceptual and methodological grounds [Thomas, 1959; Rooney, 1957]; Thomas himself doubted whether his earlier conclusions were correct [Bressler, 1952:546-565].
Neither case studies of immigrant family life nor census data on nativity groups supported the conventional thesis. According to an analysis of 1920 census data by Grove and Ogburn [1928:371-374], divorce was relatively uncommon among the foreign-born. One possible explanation might have been that at that time divorce was mainly a middle-class practice, with desertion its lower-class counterpart. But Kephart [1952] showed that in Philadelphia both divorce and desertion were less frequent among foreign-born than among native-born. Bayer [1965:131] concluded from an analysis of the 1960 census:

In general, regardless of age, residence, or socio-economic status, the foreign born are less likely to be separated or divorced and are more likely to be extended family members, marry at a later age, and have larger families than are the natives.

Similar findings are reported by Carter and Glick [Table 2-1; see also Bernard, 1967], and by Lingner [1971:2] in his analysis of internal migration.

Migrants of both sexes were less likely to be single in 1960 than nonmigrants . . . . First marriage rates during the period 1955-1960 were higher for migrants than nonmigrants of both sexes.

Much earlier, the family of Northern and Western European immigrants acted as a corporate body in saving the capital essential for buying farms and equipment in the Western territories. Family and friendship ties facilitated the western expansion through the communication of information and the financial assistance they provided [Hansen, 1947:53-76].

Evidence from case studies of immigrant families leads to similar conclusions. Extended-family and friendship networks were the
### TABLE 2-1

PERCENT DIVORCED OR SEPARATED OF MARRIED PERSONS AGED 25 TO 64 YEARS, BY NATIVITY AND SEX, UNITED STATES, 1960

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nativity or Race</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
<th></th>
<th>Separated</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native white of native parentage</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negro</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign white stock</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

frame for building a chain immigration of Italians to this country [MacDonald and MacDonald, 1962]. Foreign-born Italian immigrant families were highly stable [Campisi, 1948; Femminella and Quadagno, 1976], as were the families of Jews [Young, 1928; Hertzberg, et al., 1968; Goldstein and Goldscheider, 1968:101-114; Sklare, 1971:73; Farber, Mindel, Larerwitz, 1976], of Poles [Lopata, 1976], of Japanese [Kitano and Kikumura, 1976; Petersen, 1971].

Undeniably, intergenerational conflict exists [Jacobsen, Berry, Olson, 1975] and reflects on-going processes of social change [Ryder, 1965]. To this day no comparative research has been done on intergenerational relations of nativity groups. Whether such conflict differs in the foreign stock from that of the native-born, and its different genesis, if any, are not known. The widespread belief [Nahirny and Fishman, 1965] that a ubiquitous and intense conflict existed between the first and second generations ignored what Campisi [1948] called "the process of accommodation" between them. Most parents did tolerate differences of opinions, beliefs, and behavior in their children. As they grew older, children learned to appreciate their parents' courage and strength of character. Compassion for the vicissitudes and the infirmities of old age, rather than dislike and contempt, dominated the second generation's outlook toward their parents. Research shows the view of intergenerational conflict deficient in a number of ways. Among Italian Americans, for example,

The extended family may play a greater role for the second-generation than for the first-generation individuals. It tends to become larger, to have closer physical proximity, and to be characterized by close and more extensive social ties [Palisi, 1966:50].
No large or significant differences in the social participation of Italian ethnic generations exist [Palisi, 1965; see also Lopreato, 1970:68-87].

The link between migration and family disorganization was, as suggested earlier, only one facet of a general theme, which included, among such other supposed adverse effects, the deterioration of mental health [Murphy, 1961; Brody, 1970] and an increase in crime [Nelli, 1969; Carter, 1949; Hart, 1896; Taft, 1936; Jonassen, 1949].

Searching critical evaluation of the social disorganization paradigm common in the 1920's and 1930's as the intellectual backdrop to the commonly held views of the negative effects of migration is offered by Mills [1943], Carey [1975:95-120], Blumer [1936], and Goode [1947].

Current Research on Migration

Two criteria, analytical and temporal, were used to determine whether specific works on migration were relevant to this study. The analytical criterion, as formulated by Riley [1964], denotes four types of partial analysis on the basis of the focus selected (Table 2-2). The three time focuses identify three other settings for research—conditions, characteristics, and consequences. The first stresses the general historical circumstances and the more immediate relevant sociocultural setting as these affect migration. The second, related to the time when migration takes place, is about the "actual or specific observable features of who did what?" [Dynes and Quarantelli, 1975:11]. How did they migrate? What happened at the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Analysis</th>
<th>Selective Focus of Model</th>
<th>Research Case</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>Individual-in-role</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual</td>
<td>Individual with reference to group context</td>
<td>Individuals characterized by properties of the groups to which they belong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Group (collectivity)</td>
<td>Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Group with reference to internal arrangement of parts</td>
<td>Group segments characterized by properties of individual members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

time of migration? The third, focusing on consequences, assess the effects of mobility.

The combination of these two axes yield the following matrix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contextual</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This schema was used as a heuristic device to select and order specific studies. Neither of the two axes of differentiation, however, generates necessarily exclusive categories, so important in the construction of typologies, and if only for this reason the matrix cannot withstand a rigorous logical examination. In some cases, a piece of research could not be unambiguously classified in one of the boxes; in others research papers fell in more than one box. The matrix is sufficiently precise for its purpose: to divide the literature into broad classes. In what follows I review writings on the consequences of migration, generally ignoring those on conditions and characteristics of migration. In the former research tradition are, for example, studies of residential location, density, and the life cycle of the family [Speare, 1970; Chevan, 1971; Long, 1972; Leslie
and Richardson, 1961; Wolpert, 1965, 1966; Lee, 1966]; geographical research on the determinants of regional and labor migration [Blanco, 1963; Denton, 1960; Duncan and Perruci, 1976; Marshall, Perruci and Duncan, 1976; Lansing and Mueller, 1967; Morrison, 1971; Anderson, 1955, 1956; Fleisher, 1963; Gallaway and Vedder, 1971; Levy and Wadycki, 1973]; research on "mental maps" and migration behavior of different sectors of the population [Fueller and Chapman, 1974; Morrill and Pitts, 1967]; on length of residence and migration [Toney, 1976; Land, 1969]; on ideological determinants of migrants [Brown and Belcher, 1966; Forman, 1959; McDonald, 1956]; on the effects of kinship on migration [Goode, 1970; Vogel, 1967; Choldin, 1973; Eames, 1967; Whyte, 1967; Sussman, 1958; Taeuber, 1951; Bieder, 1973; Schwarzweller, Brown, Mangalam, 1971; Tilly and Brown, 1967; Brown, Schwarzweller, Mangalam, 1963]. In the latter tradition, research on the process of migration itself, are, in the writer's view, quite rare. Obviously, much could be gained here by sustained participant observation and ethnomethodological efforts. In this vein, the social network notions used by Gutkind [1964, 1969] and by Jacobson [1970] are closest to the type of work I have in mind which is different from an inventory of reasons for migrating [Rossi, 1955], or of motivations of migrants [Usley, et al., 1963].

In order to specify the substantive focus of the works reviewed, two criteria were used. By restricting the review to analyses of how migration affected the family and marriage systems of the migrating collectivity, much was purposefully excluded. Thus,
the literature on the effects of migration to the sending and receiving social systems [Mangalam, 1968], or on the larger social system of which the sender, migrating, and receiving social system is a part [Tilly, 1965], is passed over, as well as writings dealing with the effects of migration on religion and such other social action subsystems as the polity and the economy.

4Examples of this research tradition are Price's [1970] analysis of the effect of the unbalanced sex ratio occasioned by male emigration on Saramaka marriage and family patterns; Stone's [1964] work on the effect of Puerto Rican emigration to the United States in the 1950's on the sex-age composition and declining fertility and male labor force participation of Puerto Rico; Caldwell's [1969] work on the effect of migrants' remissions of money to their villages in revolutionizing the economy of Ghana.

5In this research are the work of Fermi [1971] on the contribution of European refugee scholars, humanists, and artists to the sciences and humanities in the United States; Richmond's [1976] work on the impact of post-World War II immigration on Canadian population growth; Price and Zubrzycki's [1962] investigation on the Australian marriage market and the sex ratio of immigrants; Germani's [1963, 1970] analysis of the effect of immigration (mostly Italian and Spanish) on the economic, political, and other social institutions in Argentina. Of course, much of the literature on assimilation of immigrants is predominantly concerned with the effects of the migration to the receiving society, rather than with the effects of the migration on the migrating collectivity.

6In the field of Collective Behavior and Social Movements a long-standing debate centers on the differential propensity toward political extremism of migrants and nonmigrants. Recent findings suggest that political extremism, and political involvement, in general, is not positively associated with migration. Rather, Karl Marx's notion of spatial continuity as a precondition for the emergence of a class-for-itself seems supported. See Scott [1974], Tilly et al. [1975], Rude [1959]. Contradictory findings exist, however, at least for intra-city residential mobility [Chudacoff, 1972]. The effect of migration on raising the blood pressure of migrants to the city has been studied [Scotch, 1963; Alfred, 1970], albeit inconclusively in my opinion. Of course, ever since Sorokin, a large body of literature has dealt with the association of migration and social mobility [Blau and Duncan, 1967; Senior and Watkins, 1973; Adams, 1968; Zimmer, 1973]. Others have investigated the link between migration and religious sectarianism [Nelson and Whitt, 1972] and practice [Mol, 1965].
Effects of Migration on the Family
of the Migrating Collectivity

A number of group-level studies [Broel-Plateris, 1964; Fenelon, 1971; Stetson and Wright, 1975; Pang and Hanson, 1968] on differentials in interstate divorce rates have noted a moderate positive association between migration and family instability and assumed that certain high-mobility areas had a "frontier atmosphere." This milieu is viewed as being produced by independent, self-reliant, and adventurous people who migrate westward. One of the consequences of the migration of such people combined with the effects of new environments freed from traditional social restraints is a more reluctant attitude toward conformity than that found in the longer-established sections of the country. . . . A greater prevalence of divorce in these areas exists because of a greater leniency in attitudes toward such action [Fenelon, 1971:321].

The relative cost of divorce can be inferred from such characteristics of the areas as the proportion of Catholics, of rural residence, of foreign parentage, of white race, of various income categories, all of which would affect an overall permissive attitude toward divorce. In sum,

The strength and force with which social rules and sanctions, among which the social costs attached to divorce may be subsumed, are applied to individuals varies by the degree of social integration found in the system. The degree of integration, in turn, is related to the stability of the system. One factor contributing to stability is the absence of significant population change. A stable system is likely to be more integrated than a system that is undergoing change [Fenelon, 1971:322].

A common problem, however, of group studies of this kind is the lack of a clear time sequence from which causality could be
inferred. Divorced persons are highly mobile. However, in the absence of appropriate panel data, this fact is often ignored [Struening et al., 1969; Stetson and Wright, 1975]. Rather, the conventional view that migration disrupts the family is often affirmed on little more than faith. Moreover, the poor quality of data also affects works in which an attempt was made to revise this view. Indeed, it is the main problem of Thomas' classic work on migration differentials [1938, 1939; see also Folger and Rowan, 1954]. For example, migrants to Amsterdam were more often married than the non-migrant population, but it can not be shown, as Thomas herself acknowledged [1938:90], whether the marriages occurred before or after the migration.

Noting the dearth of demographic variables as predictors in group studies, in particular the states' age distribution and age at marriage, Weed re-examined the effect of migration on the geographical distribution of divorce rates using 1960 and 1970 census information. He used as indicators of migration:

1. percent born out of state, i.e., the percent of a state's 1960 population that was not living in state of birth;
2. percent state in-migrants, i.e., percent of a state's population five or more years of age in 1960 that had resided in a different state in 1955; and
3. percent county in-migrants, i.e., the percent of a state's population five or more years of age in 1960 that had resided in a different county in 1955 [Weed, 1974:366].

As control variables Weed used percent Negro, percent foreign-stock, percent of the population living in cities of 50,000 or more, median years of education of persons of aged 25 or more, median family income,
and percent Catholic. For his dependent variable controlled for age differences, he used an age-standardized divorce rate per 1,000 married females.

From this structural analysis Weed concluded, in effect, that while the concept of frontier may have some value, its importance has been vastly overemphasized.

The percent of females 15-19 ever married is the most important predictor of state divorce rates in both 1960 and 1970 . . . . Only percent born out of state of the three migration variables attains a statistically significant standardized partial regression coefficient, yet one which is less than half the size of the coefficient for females 15-19 ever married in both 1960 and 1970. [The other two migration indicators] receive the smallest beta weights in 1960 and next to the smallest in 1970, demonstrating the attenuation of the migration-divorce rate correlation when other pertinent variables are controlled [Weed, 1974:373].

At the individual level of analysis, a number of studies have focused on how migration affects relationships among family members—the number, types, and strengths of social ties between parents and their children, between siblings, and with other kin. Sussman's [1958, 1962] thesis that kin relations are an important source of aid to migrant families found support in the work, among others, of Schwarzweller and his colleagues [1967; 1971] on Kentucky mountain family migration and in the earlier findings of Blumberg and Bell [1958; see also Landis and Stoetzer, 1966] on Negro migration to Philadelphia.

Barring the extreme case of many Jewish refugees in Israel [Talmon-Garber, 1968], population movements have not necessarily isolated migrating nuclear families from their kin. Among the Irish
in 19th century London, migration had the opposite effect, making "family life all the more important as a source of an identity in a new and hostile world" [Lees, 1974]. The related problem, however, of whether migrating families become more isolated in their new environment is not settled [Winch, 1968; Edwards et al., 1973; Zimmer, 1955; Rose and Warshay, 1957].

In most instances, migration has been found to reduce face-to-face contact in families [Litwak, 1960; Reiss, 1962; Jitodai, 1963; Berardo, 1967] and, thus to increase reliance on other types of communication. But most studies on this topic reflect, at least partly, socially appropriate responses. Perhaps a direct questioning about the degree of love or affection felt for far-away relatives is not the best mode of research.

Litwak and others have maintained, I think against all logic, that the supposed loss of identity with the extended family is spurious, and can be explained by a number of intervening variables. Of these, distance is the major explanatory variable: the greater the distance, the smaller the probability of face-to-face contacts. However, as Hubert [1965] persuasively argued, the thesis that people would want more contact with kin as distance is reduced is neither logical nor supported empirically [Mann, 1973; Wilkening and Guerrero, 1972]. Distance is not a necessary and sufficient cause of less face-to-face interaction. Whether one speaks of types or strengths of kin relationships, i.e., the "relative precedence, or lack of precedence taken by [a] relationship over other relationships of its general sort, and over other obligations and commitments in the larger social

Perhaps better research at the individual level of analysis awaits conceptual clarification of the dimensions for study. The common assumption that kin contact and assistance under conditions of migration reflect affection ignores the institutionalized values of family loyalty so prevalent in the West. The possibility that kin members would visit and assist each other without having a great deal of mutual affection has gone unexplored.

The effect of distance on kin interaction, as Hubert suggests, is mediated by other contextual processes. One of these is the actual geographical location of the nuclear family, extent and type of transportation serving their area of residence, and its spatial relation to other kin. For most Americans, New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. have greater business and cultural attractions than some minor city in the Midwest, and these externalities encourage kin contacts. The extreme case here, of course, is the primate city of many nations in the facilitation of kinship visitation.

"Distance" has different cultural and historical meanings. To judge from studies of kin relations in England, 200 miles is a long trip, while in the United States it is of no consequence for most persons. Of course, the development of communication systems and the consequent reduction in cost and time consumed in travel make
the time of studies a central characteristic.

Another contextual dimension is the degree of geographical concentration of kin [Hubert, 1965]. Two types of geographical concentration should be distinguished: accidental proximity, when kin reside relatively close as a result of the impersonal labor market, and historical proximity, when kin are held by their roots in the area. Whether the latter type is characterized by stronger, more intense, and more diverse kin interaction, as Hubert suggests, is still uncertain.

Bott's [1956; 1971] is perhaps the most interesting contextual theory to explain the effects of migration on the nuclear family. The family's milieu is characteristically either "close-knit," in which most neighbors, co-workers, relatives from both sides of the family, and friends know each other well and participate somewhat in one another's social activities, or "loose-knit," in which persons so designated know one another imperfectly if at all. The looser the nuclear family's network, the less segregated its conjugal roles will be; the tighter the network, the more segregated.

When many of the people a person knows interact with one another . . . the person will get some emotional satisfaction from these external relationships and will be likely to demand correspondingly less of the spouse . . . . These couples . . . expected husbands and wives to have rigid division of labor. There was little stress on shared interests and joint recreation . . . and successful sexual relations were not considered essential to a happy marriage [quoted in Nelson, 1966:663].

Since migration generally disrupts such close networks by placing either rural or urban families in an area where they have few or no
kin or friends, it should decrease the segregation of conjugal roles. In the new setting the spouses have only themselves to depend on [Schokeid, 1971; Tharp et al., 1968; Talmon-Garber, 1968:63; Young and Willmott, 1957:145].

Jansen [1968:200-215] provided an explicit empirical test of Bott's hypothesis. He compared married migrants and nonmigrants in terms of the "number of tasks perform[ed] for or with the wife, jobs about the home, the degree to which married couples share social activities such as outings and interaction with each others' friends [and] . . . the degree to which the wife is involved in her husband's work" [Jansen, 1968:200], controlling for length of marriage. Migrants showed in all instances significantly higher scores on help given to wives; were more likely to do things with or for her, though not in marriages of all durations. Both migrant and nonmigrant husbands helped most during the first four years of marriage. No significant differences were found between migrants and nonmigrants in the number of jobs done about the house. Along the "social life" dimension, "migrants appeared to have a significantly higher score than residents, again indicating that they were more likely to do things together" [Jansen, 1968:205]. They discussed their work with wives more often than nonmigrants did, although the percentage of wives who helped their husbands in their work was not significantly different. In budgeting for the family, migrant couples shared much more often.

Jansen totaled scores for all conjugal roles in order to evaluate Bott's contextual hypothesis. To operationalize the over-
lap networks, husbands were asked whether their friends in different spheres, i.e., work, pub, school, neighborhood, knew each other. Generally, nonmigrants had more close-knit networks than migrants, but neither this difference nor any other between segregation scores of the two types of milieu was significant. Jansen [1971:212] concluded "there thus appears to be little evidence to support Bott's hypothesis either among migrants or resident couples." In general, while migrants do share conjugal roles more, the reasons are not clear. On the other hand, other findings [Blood, 1969:175; Nelson, 1966:666] support Bott's theoretical propositions.

Whether or not Bott "suggested that kinship interaction potentially threatens marital solidarity" [Blood, 1969:172], the effects of conjugal role segregation on marital satisfaction and stability are not at all clear. As Bott [1971:220] pointed out,

logically, one can point to factors that make for stability and instability in both joint and highly segregated relationships. Joint conjugal relationships might lead to conjugal stability because the emotional investment of both partners is so considerable; but on the other hand husband and wife expect so much of each other that disillusion and disappointment might drive them apart. In a highly segregated conjugal relationship the partners expect less of each other and would be less likely to part because of disillusionment, but on the other hand they get less from each other emotionally and might therefore leave each other more easily.

Subsequent research has not settled this issue either.

For some, marital solidarity and stability increase with the spouses' interest in the marital relation [Turner, 1971]. In her final report of E. W. Burgess's longitudinal study of married couples,
Dizard concluded that "decreasing husband-wife happiness and permanence is disproportionately common in those marriages which move toward a greater degree of role differentiation" [1968:73]. According to Noble, however, an analysis based on census information, with a lengthy but in my view unconvincing discussion, led to the assertion that loose-knit networks cause marital instability.

For families in loose-knit social networks, norms relating to family behavior are either unspecific or idiosyncratic and family roles are apparently less clearly defined. . . . The stability of such isolated families must be particularly vulnerable to any occurrence of internal conflict. Indeed, it is difficult to see why, in these circumstances, joint conjugal role relationships should not fairly frequently dissolve in a state of familial anomie [Noble, 1970:137].

Yet, in sixty-two primitive societies the incidence of divorce was less where the choice of marriage partners was dictated by the norms of community and consanguine endogamy [Ackerman, 1963]. These norms, of course, constitute a close-knit network milieu par excellence.

Taking an intermediate position, Blood argued that wives' marital satisfaction is greatest when a comfortable distance is maintained with kin; neither too infrequent and detached or too constant and intense.

Close-kin networks, like extended-family systems, may impede the development of marital solidarity. However, in contemporary urban society, kin relations are seldom intensive enough to eclipse marital relations . . . . Short of such extremes, sociability with kin and services received from kin are apparently consistent with marital solidarity [Blood, 1969:182-183].
Nelson reported that the proportion of wives satisfied that their husbands understood them is greater either when the wife's family orientation is companionate and her interaction is individualistic, or when her family orientation is traditional and her contacts are in a clique [Nelson, 1966:670-671]. As Nelson suggests, it may be that marital satisfaction and stability can be achieved in different ways. A clique of close neighbors and friends in a traditional moral milieu is often an alternative to a companionate family in an individualistic moral setting. Iro demonstrates in his analysis of elite divorce in Lagos that it is in situations of rapid social change, when these combinations are reversed, that marital instability soars. This is illustrated by the high incidence of divorce among Nigerians who married while studying abroad and, after returning to Nigeria, often reverted to the traditional conjugal roles and "modes of behavior which tend to impose subordinate status on their wives" [Iro, 1976:179]. The women rejected this, and divorce often resulted from the ensuing marital discord.

Summary

In spite of the recent expansion of demographic analysis into the field of family sociology under the pioneering influence of Paul Glick, the older and richly suggestive theoretical exegesis linking the areas of migration and family has not yet inspired research. The relative neglect of migration in demography is in part accountable for this. The dominant concern in family sociology has been to demonstrate the existence of extended kin relations under modern conditions of widespread physical mobility. Yet, as Coult suggests [1962; see also Tavuchis, 1976], this has not been paired with a
desire to show the effects of mobility.

Still ignored are important social and cultural processes mediating the effects of migration on the family, e.g., the importance of long-term separation, of the relative institutional completeness of migrant communities [Breton, 1964; Abu-Lughod, 1961; Johnston, 1967; Driedger, 1973], or of different migratory forces [Petersen, 1958] and their associated ideologies. "For some reason the old idea that mobility and marital instability go together has not yet received [sufficient] reappraisal" [Tilly, 1967:141].

This neglect has had two effects. The first is that as previously shown, a number of interesting insights generated by the older theory have gone untested. The second is that much current thinking continues to rediscover the older theoretical notions unencumbered and unaided by them. Many social scientists prefer to rewrite the past rather than gain from it. In this study some of these formulations are tested using a national sample of Cuban immigrants. Considerable research, however, exists on the association of marital stability and socioeconomic status, and this literature is reviewed in Chapter III.
CHAPTER III

THE MARITAL STABILITY OF SOCIAL CLASSES

Few sociological findings are better established than those indicating that in recent decades marriage tends to be more stable among the well-educated, well-paid, white collar workers than among the poorly educated, poorly paid, blue collar workers. Further corroboration of these relationships does not seem to be called for [Bernard, 1966: 421].

In this chapter marital stability is compared by social class to point out both what is known and what is only surmised about the relation. Contrary to the opinion of Bernard, among others, much is to be gained by studying the available material.

Belief in the greater marital stability of those socially and economically better off, though widespread in both the social sciences and popular mythology, is based on works flawed both conceptually and technically. The seeming empirical consistency is often based on an inadequate solution to technical problems or on the use of indicators that relate poorly to the concepts supposedly underlying them. In short, the generalization is not as clear-cut as one might wish. The phenomenon has proved to be obdurately resistant to conceptual integration, remaining to this day a set of facts in search of a theory.
Technical Research Problems

Methodological shortcomings have marred much of the research. Week's study [1943] of students' responses concerning their father's occupation and their parents' residence, religion, and marital status does not clearly support the hypothesis of a positive association of occupational status and marital stability, though Goode [1956: 45] so interprets it. The question on occupation was not answered by 8.1 percent of those from intact families but by 31.6 percent of those with divorced parents. The question was poorly phrased: "Where does your father work? What does he do?" Apparently, some students reported their father's current occupation—that is, after a divorce had occurred. Because the time since the divorce could not be determined, the father's occupation could reflect the effects of marital stability on occupational level as well as the reverse. Moreover, some of the religious categories showed inconclusive patterns, which were masked when the sample was aggregated.

Problems associated with aggregation show up also in other works. Ogburn [1974] was among the first to investigate statistically the positive association of education and marital stability. Using 1940 census data, he compared the proportions separated, widowed, and divorced of married persons living with their spouses, and he found that for both sexes divorce increased with education below the twelfth grade. The proportions separated and widowed, however, decreased with education. With the combination of the three indices of marital instability, though the hypothesis seemingly was supported, in fact the important differences between divorce and the other two were masked.
Using the same 1940 census data, Brunner [1948] confirmed Ogburn's findings. He defined marital instability by the absence of a living husband, thus including separations caused by either marital conflict or any other cause. Nevertheless, he found that those with a high school education were particularly vulnerable, especially among the youngest and oldest cohorts.

Goode [1951: 805] defined for each occupational category the "index of proneness to divorce" as the proportion not married or single divided by the proportion of married males with spouse present. Here, too, unstable marriages included not only those terminated by divorce but also by annulment, widowhood, separation, and desertion, as well as common-law unions. Bernard [1966] defined a stable marriage as one in which "the husband had been married only once and his wife is living with him" and focused on white-non-white differences. However, in the 10.2 percent of the "stable" marriages she analyzed the wife had married more than once. Moreover, as is all too typical, both the white and non-white categories included populations so diverse that one hardly knows to whom the findings apply [Chilman, 1966; Rainwater, 1966; Schermerhorn, 1966].

**Important Conceptual Problems**

One of a number of ecological analyses, Schroeder's [1938] study of divorce by enumeration district in Peoria, Illinois, used circuit court records for 1930-34. He found that divorce correlated with relief (.61), average rent (-.29), average property value (-.22), home ownership (-.50), and average annual income (-.32). With a control
for delinquency, however, the correlations shifted dramatically to, respectively, -.19, .24, .13, -.08, and .12. The very placement of the divorces is in doubt.

Because the addresses were not given in the court records these were sought by means of the City Directory. Addresses of 1,163 of those securing divorces during the period were determined as existing within the city limits. These were then spotted on a map and the divorce rate was calculated from the figures for population in the age group twenty-one to forty-four. . .

According to Goode [1956: 45], the use of the city directory insured that "any bias from losses would have been in the direction of over-representing the upper strata, [for] in the lower strata. . .there is more anonymous mobility." Nevertheless, since a high proportion of all divorced persons are mobile, most internal migration is over short distance, and most lower-class migrants are short-distance movers, it is impossible to guess the sample's class composition. Furthermore, it is unclear what year directory Schroeder used and, thus, whether the addresses were for the period before or after the divorce proceedings.

Another ecological analysis was Bossard and Dillon's [1935] study of the residence of divorced women by Philadelphia census tract in 1930. That divorced women were concentrated in low-income areas they attributed to their higher geographical mobility and their desire for anonymity and an independent residence. But, Goode argued, their rate of movement was not known. The ecological fallacy was not corrected by stipulating a rate of movement by the area's sub-populations. Moreover, the effect on divorce of lower income, only one of a host of
areal characteristics, cannot be specified in such an analysis.

Clearly, even valid results of ecological analyses are inapplicable at the individual level. Similarly, macro-societal studies [Gulden, 1939; Thomas, 1925; Ogburn and Thomas, 1922] of the effects of the business cycle on marriage, though often furnishing useful insights for research on individuals' experiences, cannot be used directly to elucidate the marital processes of specific couples.

Udry [1966: 204] noted that past researchers had available only figures from which to calculate the proportion of those ever married who were at the time of the census either divorced or separated. Differences in the rate of remarriage and time lag in remarriage [might] explain the differences in rates shown.

By introducing remarriage he showed a general support of a negative association between education and divorce (Figure 3). With remarriages omitted, however, the percentage of the category "ever married" who were divorced at the time of the census was negatively related to education for white males, positively related for white and non-white females, and showed a curvilinear pattern for non-white males, peaking at thirteen to fifteen years of school completed (Figure 4). Separation was generally inversely associated with education though by no means in perfectly linear pattern (Figure 5).

As Udry acknowledged, widowed persons, who if remarried were put in the stable category, may have been disproportionately non-white and poorly educated.

Death rates also vary by race, marital status, and socioeconomic status, and serve as another contaminant, removing from enumeration more Negroes, low-status persons, and divorced persons than their proportion in the population.
While these problems were alleviated by concentrating on the twenty-five to thirty-four age category, this focus, in turn, created other problems. Since education is positively associated with age at first marriage [Bauman, 1967], the time at risk of marriage termination is less among the better educated. Udry found no age category satisfactory to analyze marital stability.

Controlling for the length of marriage, Glick and Norton [1971] obtained findings similar to Udry's. They used 1960-66 retrospective marital histories of white male adults included in a 1967 national sample of 28,000 households. When they explored the association for women [1974] they found that marital stability increased with education except at the highest level: apparently graduate training for women creates vulnerabilities in their marriages.

Changes in marital stability by education during the 1960 decade indicate that

The proportion of upper-group men 35 to 44 with marriages disrupted by separation or divorce has been converging [and increasing] most toward the average proportion for all men in the age group, whereas the corresponding proportion for women with exactly four years of college has been diverging [and decreasing] from the average for all women in the age group [Carter and Glick, 1976: 403; also Glick, 1976: 6-7].

Those who did not complete high school showed the highest percent of divorce and separation in 1960 and 1970; marriages of persons with thirteen to fifteen years of education are also very unstable. Elsewhere Glick argued that certain psychological characteristics of persons, namely, determination and steadfastness, or certain social selection processes operate both in education and in marriage, so that
persons who fail in one fail in both. Again, while this "Glick effect" is often used in the literature to refer to the higher incidence of divorce in these educational categories, to date there has been no explication, clarification, and testing of the assumed psychological and social determinants at work.

The insubstitutability of social class indicators has been recognized.

There is a rough inverse correlation between class position and rate of divorce. As we move toward the lower strata, the divorce rate increases, but the relationship is different for different indices of class: occupational rank, income, education. Nevertheless, the general increase is observable [Goode, 1956: 44; see also Goode, 1962: 515].

It remains, however, unexplained.

Close to four decades of research on marital instability have uncovered important methodological principles. It makes a great deal of difference in the results whether the association is specified by age, sex, race and nativity, incidence versus prevalence, and whether one differentiates among separation, divorce, and widowhood. The indicator of socio-economic status also makes a difference. Income, which shows the strongest linear association with marital stability, has been used most often. However, as with occupation, no causal connection can be established between it and the marital stability using cross-sectional survey data.

Marital stability and income level tend to be interacting variables at all income levels, with each one generally elevating the other as either reaches a higher level or, vice versa, with each lowering the other as either reaches a lower level [Glick and Mills, 1974: 10].
In spite of such warnings in the literature [Peabody, 1975], correlation is sometimes mistaken for causality. Perhaps with cross-sectional data, education is the best SES indicator of the three now most commonly used. It is applicable to both sexes, is seldom affected by marital stability, and occurs prior to marriage in most instances [Hoffman and Holmes, 1976; Duncan and Duncan, 1969; Lane and Morgan, 1975: 50; Hoffman, 1977]. While the last point is undoubtedly less true in the United States since World War II, it is generally the case in most other societies.

**Theory Problems**

The known conditional associations between social class and marital stability represent a conceptual challenge until now unresolved [Ross and Sawhill, 1975: 36; Scanzoni, 1965]. The common practice—a scholars' agreement—of speaking generally about the "expected" associations, ignoring the instances in which they fail or offering ad hoc "solutions," is clearly unsatisfactory. The main question in the field today is how to synthesize these varied findings so as to account for the exceptions to as well as evidence that supports the hypothesis, yielding an explanation of historical as well as contemporary patterns.

Rodman [1971; see also Miller, 1965] has begun to build a theory of marital instability for the lower class, emphasizing structural and situational components of marital behavior. It is based on the notion that the man provides the household's economic resources. This axiom, at the basis of contemporary economic theory of marital stability,
becomes less relevant with the shift in marital and sexual roles and in economic behavior. In developed countries, greater emphasis is placed on companionship and females' work, and if need be the state protects and cares for dependent children. Man as economic agent may not be an important determinant of marital stability [Miao, 1974: 78]. Indeed, the argument has been made that excessive dedication to economic or professional pursuits endangers marriage [Glick, 1976: 7-8]. Evidence from Eskimo [Burch, 1970] and African [Cohen, 1970; Weissleder, 1974; Lloyd, 1968] societies, where the household is the unit of both economic production and consumption and where the productivity of both spouses is important for survival, shows the importance of economic factors in marital life and the process of renegotiation often terminating marriages as the person evaluates his marital contract in the light of marital experience.

As Goode pointed out, in intermediate societies divorce often becomes the prerogative of the rich, and it may be that the relation between individual economic status and divorce or separation is tied to type of economy--curvilinear in primitive societies, with poor and rich having more divorce and separation; positively related in intermediate societies for divorce and negatively related for separation; separation declining in advanced societies and divorce less and less associated with economic well-being.

Paired with the present acceptance of conflict and tension in marriage as natural and even useful [Sprey, 1969; Scanzoni, 1965] is the idea of social exchange as the mechanism whereby marital cooperation or conflict can be managed [Barry, 1970; Orden and Bradburn, 1968; Nye, White, Frideres, 1973].
The strength of the marital relationship would be a direct function of the attractions within and barriers around the marriage and an inverse function of such attractions and barriers from other relationships [Levinger, 1965: 19; see also Levinger, 1976].

The framework of social exchange assumes that persons attempt to maximize gain and minimize losses in their interaction with others. Presumably, individual interest is optimized by the choice or creation in marriage of a partner who can carry out his or her marital roles effectively, and who is willing to work [Nye and McLaughlin, 1976; Nye and Rerardo, 1973: 500-503].

Among the best known works on social exchange and marriage are by Scanzoni, who distinguishes economic, self-esteem, husband-wife companionship, and social-class backgrounds as important conceptual elements in the explanation of marital stability [1965]. He has presumably tested these [1968], although problems with high refusal rates, conventional responses, and the length of time between divorce and contact in the field affected the quality of the work. His elaborate and sophisticated discussion [1970: 182-197; 1971: 11-25] rests on the notion of sexual specialization. Exchange occurs between man as the provider of economic resources and woman as the provider of affection and sentiment. Marital stability results from mutually satisfying exchanges of this sort. In a later work the occupational achievement of males became, by the author's admission, the most important conceptual element [1972: 65].

In subsequent tests of the theory, however, Scanzoni [1971: 205, 260-261] concludes that increases in occupational status, education, and income "do not correspond with increases in positive evaluation of
satisfaction with] husband-wife primary relations" among blacks. Elsewhere, this contradictory result is replicated.

It does not seem to be the case that objective socioeconomic factors [education, SES, income] have much direct influence on socioeconomic elements. The major mediating element between the two sets of rewards appear to be that classic notion of "the definition of the situation." "Relative deprivation" is a more current way to conceptualize the same phenomenon, and future research ought to include measures to assess this [Scanzoni, 1975: 142].

Here, as in other parts of the review, one is faced with an ad hoc "solution" like relative deprivation, which is not an important or central part of the original theory and concerning which there are serious difficulties [Neff, 1975]. Originally, as used in Stouffer's The American Soldier, the concept of relative deprivation meant that what was experienced was felt by the individual to be both unjust and unexpected. In Scanzoni's work, however, it is unclear how this applies to blacks, or what reformulation of the concept he has in mind.

Ogburn [1947] recognized the importance of income as an intervening variable when studying the effect of education and occupation on marital stability, and this is by now widely acknowledged.

Little positive effect of education or occupation is found when the effects of income on stability are removed [Cutright, 1971: 291; see also Glick and Norton, 1971: 316].

In fact, a number of authors--Hillman [1953: 606-607] for white and non-white ever married men aged fourteen and older and Goode [1956: 54] for male heads of primary families aged twenty-five to forty-four in 1950; Bernard [1966: 423] for white and non-white ever married men
aged forty-five to fifty-four; Udry [1965] for white and non-white ever married males aged twenty-five to thirty-four; Carter and Glick [1970: 266] for white and non-white persons aged fourteen and older in 1960; Glick and Norton [1971: 314] for white men in their first marriage of less than five years--have found a strong and clear inverse association between divorce or separation and income.

Recently, moreover, the effect of income and other economic variables on marital stability has been studied with data from longitudinal surveys. In spite of efforts at theory construction and verification along Scanzoni's lines [Becker, 1973; 1974a; 1974b], the results of recent multivariate regression analyses by economists have been discouraging. The total amount of variance explained ($R^2$) by the elaborate models used so far is typically very small--.061 [Ross and Sawhill, 1975: 56]; .057 [Hoffman and Holmes, 1975: 56-57]; .07 [Cherlin, 1976a: Appendix 3]; .066 [Cherlin, 1976b]; .043 [Hampton, 1975: 166]; .137 [Johnson, 1975: 415]; .03 [Bane, 1975a]; .128 [Bane, 1975b]; .08 [Mott and Moore, 1977]. Consistently, for those above the poverty line [Lefcowitz, 1967] marital stability is a result not of the absolute amount of income, but of its stability and certainty. The husbands' repeated unemployment and underemployment, as well as excessive work hours and income, undermine the stability of marriage. Savings and such other indicators of family wealth as home ownership and lack of debts are positively related to marital stability. The wife's potential or actual income is negatively related to it. These findings had been known for some time [Terman, 1938: 169-171; Burgess and Cottrell, 1939; Groves, 1945; Baber, 1950; Simpson, 1960: 352-354;
Brim, Fairchild, Borgatta, 1961; Geismar and La Sorte, 1963; Kirkpatrick, 1963: 393; Levinger, 1966; Renne, 1970; Coombs and Zumeta, 1970; Furstenberg, 1974], although perhaps not with the methodological rigor with which they are established now. Carter and Glick [1976: 436] hypothesized that high-income black men and white women both experience "less social pressure than upper-level white men to avoid ending a marriage in divorce" (436) and "a great number of [available] life styles" (436), which explain their comparatively greater tendency to divorce. But the situational variables involved appear now as little understood as ever.

**Conclusion**

As Goode rightly argued, the association of social class and marital stability presupposes two historical conditions: the existence of a liberal legal system regulating marriage and the family, and the ability of most in the population to afford the court costs of a marital disruption. Elsewhere, Goode [1961: 417] also argued that the higher divorce rates of high school graduates in the United States constituted an exception to the general rule.

The relationship between education and proneness to divorce is not simple, in part because social pressures force most people to go through high school, so that they share a similar formal educational experience, when in fact their social experiences and backgrounds are heterogeneous.

A valid test of the hypothesis would thus require the solution to these three problems. I submit that on each of the counts the Cuban case is satisfactory. For at least forty years Cuba has had one of the most liberal legal systems regulating marriage and divorce in the world.
The cost of divorce was moderate, so that most persons could afford it. And there were real and significant educational differences in its population as well as the absence of an "expected" level of educational achievement for the whole of the population. On all of these grounds, then, the following data acquires theoretical importance. But first I contrast Cuban immigrants with other post World War II Latin American immigrants to the United States to establish the context for Cuban immigrants which follow.
CHAPTER IV

LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S.: 1945-1970

In this chapter I describe immigration to the United States from other parts of the Western Hemisphere since World War II. Discussed are changes in the numbers, national origins, and demographic characteristics of the immigrants.

Data and Methods

Annual immigration statistics for the United States, compiled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice (INS), were used. According to a recent evaluation, the lack of a uniform system to code and verify the information processed, as well as changes through the years in the definition of concepts used in INS annual reports, make it impossible to estimate their reliability [Keely, 1975; see also U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960: 48-55]. The validity of the category "immigrants," as used in the annual reports, is also difficult to assess since new arrivals are not distinguished from adjustment cases and thus cannot be accurately delineated. As a result of changes in legislation [Winnings, 1966], an immigrant visa can be obtained while the foreign-born person resides in the United States [Lindsey, 1972; U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1975]. Refugees have thus been able to adjust their
status from parolee to immigrant. Others, who marry American citizens, acquire the right to apply for immigrant visas. Close to 30 percent of all immigrants in the 1970s were adjustment cases [Keely, 1975].

Although the reliability of the data could not be fully assessed, I estimated the effect of immigration adjustments in distorting the reported characteristics of yearly Cuban arrivals. Since 1967, a high proportion of North American immigrants who took advantage of the adjustment provision in the law and changed their residence status were Cubans (Table 4-1). Thus, it is necessary to consider whether the INS data misrepresent the characteristics of new Cuban arrivals during the years under study.

Data on Cubans are collected by the Cuban Refugee Center (CRC) in Miami. Although the data are rough and are not available for some years, in my view they represent the best independent test of the accuracy of the INS statistics. Since the CRC gives financial assistance to new Cuban arrivals, most of whom apply for it, its records can be assumed to be the best available and are therefore used as "reality," i.e., as expected representation of the migrants' characteristics. The INS statistics on the migrants, matched by years, were compared, and the relation between the two data sets was tested with the formula:

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(f_o - f_e)^2}{f_e}$$

Indices of dissimilarity were computed. The CRC data, compiled by calendar years, were transformed to fiscal years through a linear interpolation. The INS data were adjusted to CRC age categories,
using the same technique (Table 4-2).

According to the comparison of CRC and INS percentages, Cuban arrivals were predominantly older adults. By 1973, the INS generally substantially under-represented older Cubans (61 years and over), as well as very young children. Conceivably there were fewer practical reasons to adjust the residence status of persons in these age brackets. In any case, their under-representation in INS statistics raised questions concerning the child-woman ratio and dependency ratios used elsewhere in this chapter to analyze the INS data. The comparison indicates that both indices understated the true incidence of dependency and the proportion of very young children among Cuban arrivals. Caution is thus warranted in interpreting these indices.

Dependency Ratios (DR-1) for the CRC and INS data shown in Table 4-2, are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CRC</th>
<th>INS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965-68</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>215.9</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where DR-1 equals:

\[
\frac{P - P_{19-60}}{P_{19-60}} \times 100
\]

This formula is based on slightly different age categories than the one eventually used for the INS data (see below).

The median ages for the CRC and INS data in Table 4-2 are:
### Table 4-1

**Aliens Who Were Adjusted to Permanent Resident Status in the United States by Country or Region of Birth - Year Ended June 30**

(Total Adjusted)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1,876</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>2,113</td>
<td>1,237</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>1,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
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Sources: Federal Reserve Board Compendium on Selected Indicators of Output and Turnover, Service Annual Reports.

a) Basic census data is used. The period 1965-1969 is used since CRC data could not be obtained otherwise.

b) Data included or limited.

c) In occupational categories were grouped into two categories as follows: Industry 1 - Professional, technical and kindred activities, administration of business enterprises, educational services, health services, and other services; Industry 2 - Agriculture and forestry, mining, construction, manufacturing, transportation, communication, wholesale and retail trade, finance, insurance, real estate, rental and leasing, and other services.
# Table 4-2 Cont'd

## Age and Occupational Characteristics of Cubans, for Selected Fiscal Years

(In Percentages)

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<td>Skilled</td>
<td>8.43</td>
<td>21.57</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-Skilled &amp; Unskilled</td>
<td>5.91</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural &amp; Fishery</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Occupation (students, children, housewives)</td>
<td>65.34</td>
<td>52.67</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Source and Footnoting, see preceding page.
### Table 4.3

**Goodness of Fit Between INS and CIT, for Specified Years**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obtained</td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Obtained</td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Obtained</td>
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<tr>
<td>0-9</td>
<td>751,528</td>
<td>168,616</td>
<td>12,291</td>
<td>13,618</td>
<td>16,384</td>
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<td>10-19</td>
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<td>14,207</td>
<td>2,979</td>
<td>2,976</td>
<td>3,037</td>
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<td>20-29</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>2,719</td>
<td>2,118</td>
<td>2,159</td>
<td>2,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>1,828</td>
<td>1,675</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>1,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>1,456</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td>1,466</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>1,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>1,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>1,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-79</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>1,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80+</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,459</td>
<td>1,483</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>1,574</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16,781</td>
<td>16,688</td>
<td>13,751</td>
<td>13,751</td>
<td>16,324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operational Categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obtained</td>
<td>Expected</td>
<td>Obtained</td>
<td>Expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional and Skilled</td>
<td>5,039</td>
<td>5,257</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>1,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Sales</td>
<td>2,725</td>
<td>2,725</td>
<td>1,705</td>
<td>1,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Workers</td>
<td>10,114</td>
<td>9,564</td>
<td>2,149</td>
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<tr>
<td>Janitorial and Unskilled</td>
<td>3,143</td>
<td>3,143</td>
<td>2,149</td>
<td>2,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>4,285</td>
<td>4,285</td>
<td>2,149</td>
<td>2,149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance and Fishery</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Secretary and Other</td>
<td>54,016</td>
<td>63,647</td>
<td>7,720</td>
<td>8,758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99,312</td>
<td>99,312</td>
<td>13,751</td>
<td>13,751</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** USCIS Refugee Center Consolidated Report on Overall Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service Annual Reports.

*For all calculations, degrees of freedom equal 6. The P values are very close to zero.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CRC</th>
<th>INS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965-1968</td>
<td>33.59</td>
<td>32.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>34.54</td>
<td>33.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>34.67</td>
<td>34.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>34.05</td>
<td>35.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>34.67</td>
<td>36.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>65.07</td>
<td>35.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The median, as a measure of central tendency, is quite appropriate to use in this instance except for 1973. However, extreme age categories are under-represented in the INS data (Table 4-2).

Limitations in the CRC data made it impossible to compute values of DR-2 and child-woman ratios to determine the extent of underestimation in the INS data.

In the two data sets (Table 4-2), the indices of dissimilarity in age are moderately high during most of the years. There is an enormous dissimilarity, however, between the two distributions in 1973. Using the INS data to describe newly-arrived Cubans is particularly inappropriate for at least this year and probably for the years after 1973.

**Comparing INS and CRC Frequency Distributions:**

**Goodness of Fit**

The CRC relative percentage distributions shown in Table 4-2 were applied to the appropriate INS annual totals to generate the "expected" frequencies shown in Table 4-3. These were then contrasted with the INS "obtained" frequencies and chi square goodness-of-fit tests performed [Hays, 1973: 717-736]. The null hypothesis of no

---

1 Median test: \( \chi^2 = 50.44; \) df = 1; \( p < .001 \)

2 See below.
difference in the obtained frequency distributions uses the expected
distributions as the norm. The alternative hypothesis is that the
obtained distributions do differ from the expected in some unspeci­
fied way. Table 4-3 shows the results. For all the years for which
the tests were made, the probabilities of all possible obtained
distribution results as deviant or more deviant from the expected
frequencies are extremely small. The null hypothesis that the INS
observed frequency distributions are exactly like the corresponding
expected distributions is thus categorically rejected. In formal
statistical terms, the use of INS data in the rest of this chapter to
characterize Cuban arrivals and contrast them with other immigrants
from the Western Hemisphere is unwarranted. As damaging, of course,
is the fact that the quality of INS data for other immigrant groups
is not known. It is only with reservation that the following analysis
is presented. In it, I use the only longitudinal data which exists to
date on the subject. I am painfully aware of their flaws.

The comparison of occupations revealed that professionals were
over-represented in the INS data. This is not surprising, since better-
educated immigrants are most able to cope with the bureaucracies of
their adopted society. In other respects the discrepancy in these
occupational distributions was moderate to low.

In the analysis the following indices were used:

Dependency Ratio (DR-1)

\[
\frac{P_{0-19} + P_{60+}}{P_{20-59}} \times 100
\]

where \( P \) is the population in the designated age categories.

Dependency Ratio (DR-2)
Child-Woman Ratio (CWR)

\[
\frac{P_{0-4}}{F_{20-49}} \times 1,000
\]

where \( F \) is the population of females. Because of limitations in the data, the more satisfactory lower limit of fifteen years of age for females could not be used in the denominator.

Sex Ratio

\[
\frac{M_{20-59}}{F_{20-59}} \times 100
\]

Findings

Of all immigrants to the United States, the proportion from the Western Hemisphere almost tripled between 1950 and 1974, rising 14.7 percent to 43.9 percent and peaking in 1965. There was a similar pattern in Canada [Boyd, 1976; Richmond, 1976].

Compared to South Americans, North American immigrants consistently accounted for the lion's share of the total. Canadian and Mexican immigration peaked in the mid-1950s and early 1960s (Table 4-4).

Changes occurred in the volume of each of the migrations. Total immigration from North and South America (Table 4-5), conforming closely to the trend for all immigration to the United States, showed
TABLE 4-4

IMMIGRATION FROM SPECIFIED AREAS AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES, 1950-1974

(Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>All Immigrants Total</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>South America</th>
<th>Contiguous Countries—Mexico and Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>249,187</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>205,717</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>265,520</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>170,434</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>208,177</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>237,790</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>321,625</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>326,867</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>253,265</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>260,686</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>265,398</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>271,344</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>283,763</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>306,260</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>292,248</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>296,697</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>323,040</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>361,972</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>18.1</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>454,448</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>358,579</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>373,326</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>370,478</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>384,685</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>400,063</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>394,861</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
an almost linear increase [Taeuber and Taeuber, 1958, Chap. 3]. Of North American countries, the immigration from Mexico, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Ecuador increased throughout the period. Canadian immigration decreased in absolute numbers and was at its lowest in 1974. The trend in immigration from Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama was curvilinear, peaking in the late 1950s through mid-1960s. Of South American countries, immigration from Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela was generally at its maximum during the same years, while Ecuador and Uruguay showed almost linear increases.

In conjunction with the increased immigration from the Western Hemisphere, changes took place in the national origins of the immigrants. The decline of Canadian immigration during the period was unique (Table 4-6). With Mexican immigration fluctuating after 1953 at about 35 percent of all immigrants from the region [Grebler et al., 1970, Chap. 4; Grebler, 1966; Barrett, 1966; Alvarez, 1966], the importance of Cuban and Dominican Republic immigration increased, even as movement from the West Indies, especially Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, peaked around 1970 [Mills, 1974]. Central American immigration remained unimportant throughout the period.

In South America, Colombia remained the most important source of immigrants between 1950 and 1974, while immigration from Ecuador showed the greatest increase (Table 4-7). Immigrants from Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela declined as a percentage of the total from the continent.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>Contiguous Countries</th>
<th>Caribbean Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All Immigrants</td>
<td>North America</td>
<td>South America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>3.78 1.23</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>2.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.60</td>
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<td>1.75</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.83</td>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>1.21</td>
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<td>1954</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>1.43</td>
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<td>1955</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>1.46</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>4.21</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>1.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>2.33</td>
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<td>1958</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>3.91</td>
<td>3.49</td>
<td>2.86</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>2.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>4.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>4.01</td>
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<td>5.93</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.82</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>8.05</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>4.62</td>
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<td>1967</td>
<td>7.29</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>4.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>23.53</td>
<td>5.59</td>
<td>8.31</td>
<td>5.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>4.88</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>5.03</td>
<td>5.26</td>
<td>5.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>5.23</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>5.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>5.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(422,003)</td>
<td>(7,636,430)</td>
<td>(2,742,971)</td>
<td>(385,919)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4-5**

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SPECIFIED AREAS AND EACH COUNTRY'S TOTAL MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES OVER 1950-1974 ENTERING IN EACH YEAR, SPECIFIED AREAS AND COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
## Table 4-5 (Cont’d)

Percentage distribution of specified areas and each country’s total migration to the United States over 1950-1974 entering in each year, specified areas and countries of the Western Hemisphere.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Central American Countries</th>
<th>South American Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
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</tr>
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### Table 4-6

**Immigration from Specified Countries as a Percent of Total Migration from North America to the United States, 1950-1974**

(Percent)

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<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
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<td>1973</td>
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<td>5.6</td>
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<td>26.1</td>
<td>21.4</td>
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</table>
Both in terms of absolute numbers and as a percent of total North American immigration, Cuban immigration to the United States was sizable even before the 1959 Revolution. Though seldom recognized as such, Cuba was the third most important source of immigration throughout the period.

**Regional Characteristics of Immigrants**

South American and North American immigrants differed markedly in their characteristics. Between most of 1950-74 South Americans were older than North Americans, though younger than the median of all immigrants to the United States (Figure 4-1). Moreover, South American immigration has been consistently dominated by females, approximating quite closely the sex ratio of all immigrants to the United States for the period. In contrast, North American immigration included a higher proportion of males, especially during the mid-1950s and early 1960s (Figure 4-2).

Throughout the period, South American immigrants to the United States showed consistently lower levels of dependency (DR-1), much lower than those from North America, and generally comparing favorably with those for all immigrants. For all three migration categories, there was a clear trend for the dependency ratios to rise (Figure 4-3).

The dependency patterns, however, were mixed when women were excluded as productive workers. In the three migration categories the number of dependents per 100 males (DR-2) of productive age was the lowest for North America between 1954-56 and 1961-62. Since 1964,
Figure 4-1. Median Age of immigrants to the United States. Regions of the Western Hemisphere and all immigrants: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-2. Sex Ratio of immigrants in the United States. Regions of the Western Hemisphere and all immigrants: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-3. Dependency Ratio of immigrants in the United States. Regions of the Western Hemisphere and all immigrants: 1950-1974.
however, and in spite of higher sex ratios, North America showed the highest dependency ratio. By this index South America was close to the ratio for all immigrants to the United States (Figure 4-4).

Another difference between North and South American immigration is indicated by the child-woman ratio (CWR). This is usually treated as a measure of fertility, but I have used it as a measure of constraint on female participation in the labor force, a rough notion of the difficulties a woman must overcome in her family setting before she can work for income. North American immigrants had the highest levels of this index during much of 1954-66 and 1971-74. Those from South America compared favorably with all immigrants, with the lowest levels during the early 1950s and at the close of the period. As shown, the child-woman ratio for all three immigration categories suggested a quite low fertility (Figure 4-5). Clearly, the effect of international migration on fertility merits further research [Ware, 1975; La Sorte, 1976].

In their occupational background, South and North American immigrants differed considerably. The former included consistently higher percentages of professionals throughout the period, with a higher percentage also than all immigrants until 1968 (Figure 4-6).

In summary, two regions of immigration to the United States from the Western Hemisphere have been analyzed. In contrast to North American immigrants, those from South America were generally older and included a higher proportion of females. Their level of dependency was lower, and the constraint of infants on women who might
Figure 4-4. Dependency Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Regions of the Western Hemisphere and all immigrants: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-5. Child-Woman Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Regions of the Western Hemisphere and all immigrants: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-6. Percent Professional of immigrants to the United States. Regions of the Western Hemisphere and all immigrants: 1950-1974.
work for income was therefore less. Moreover, South Americans reported higher occupational levels.

**National Selectivity of Migration**

Are there also patterned variations in immigration characteristics by countries? Can the Cuban immigration, the most prominent politically motivated population movement during the period, be meaningfully distinguished from the rest? There is a sizable diversity in the characteristics of immigrants, both over time and across nationalities. The diversity, essentially a reflection of the complex differences among sending countries, was sharpened by the 1965 changes in U.S. immigration legislation for the area [Keely, 1971, 1974; Boyd, 1976].

**Age Differentials**

The patterns observed support the well established generalization that most who migrate are young [Meenan, 1954; Shaw, 1975; Li, 1970, 1972; Davie, 1936]. Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, and Costa Rica showed remarkable fluctuations in their trends through time. But up to 1965, with the exception of Venezuela and Cuba, the range of median ages was quite narrow, fluctuating between 18 and 26. After that date up to 1971, there was a transition marked by much wider fluctuations in age. With some caution, one might speculate that by the end of the period under study [1974], the range in the median age was narrowing again, though perhaps at a lower level than earlier (Figures 7, 8, and 9).

The Cuban case is unique in the region. It showed an almost linear increase in median ages, reaching 37.4 years in 1972. Although
Figure 4-7. Median Age of immigrants in the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-8. Median Age of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-9. Median Age of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
no research exists to support the speculation, older persons supposed found it more difficult than younger ones to adjust to life in present-day Cuba. Also, age-specific obligations are relevant: young men and women must complete military service as well as other occupational duties before they can hope to leave the island. A third factor might be that those with more money can more readily get permission to travel. The government's systematic dispossession of aspirant immigrants might encourage Cuban officials to give preferential treatment to those with more property, and they would generally be older. While all of these reasons are plausible, none has been studied to date.

**Sex Ratio**

In accord with Ravenstein's celebrated hypothesis [1885; 1889], among adults in their productive ages females predominated in the migration from most countries [Kim, 1974]. Argentina, however, had a much more balanced sex ratio in the years for which data are available (1958-1974), and Cuba reached one of 122 in 1962. Overall, Cuba's ratio has been slowly decreasing, fluctuating around 80 since 1971.

The Mexican sex ratio is unique for the region. Before 1963, it reached the highest level of any of the countries--close to 180 in 1956 and 1962. It plummeted to a low of 44 in 1965, and then increased steadily up to 1974, fluctuating around parity since 1972.

The 1965 U. S. immigration law generally accelerated the increase of females among migrants from the region. By 1970, however, the figures were very much as they had been before 1965, between 65
Figure 4-10. Sex Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-11. Sex Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-12. Sex Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
and 110. Panama, however, has been consistently low, close to 35, since 1965 (Figures 10, 11, and 12).

**Dependency Ratios**

The number of dependents per 100 adults in their productive ages (DR-1) showed low ratios for most countries throughout the periods for which data are available. Venezuela was the most consistent exception throughout 1959-74, as was Mexico after 1964. For most countries, the range of dependency ratios before 1965 was very narrow, fluctuating between 35 and 65. After 1965, the trends were mixed and the range widened considerably by 1974. Cuba showed a slow increase from a low of 43 in 1962 to a maximum of 80 in 1974 (Figures 13, 14, and 15).

The second dependency ratio (DR-2) is the number of dependents per 100 males in the productive ages. Since it treats women in the productive ages as dependents, the values are higher than those based on DR-1. Again, Venezuela consistently showed the highest dependency levels for the period, while for Cuba and Argentina they were consistently low. The immediate effect of the 1965 immigration law was to raise the dependency ratios of all countries, but by 1970 they were down considerably. Indeed, by 1974, the range was quite narrow, between 280 and 340 (Figures 16, 17 and 18).

**Child-Woman Ratio**

The national trends by this index were low. Venezuela was consistently higher than all other countries, and Mexico was higher than average after 1961. The ratios generally increased for a few years after the 1965 legislation, but by the close of the period
Figure 4-13. Dependency Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-14. Dependency Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-15. Dependency Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-16. Dependency Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-17. Dependency Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-18. Dependency Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
under study (1974) the scores were generally downward over a narrow range.

The Cuban score, which fell to a low of 9 in 1974, was strikingly dissimilar to that of all the other countries. None other, with the possible exception of Jamaica during 1966-70, had such a low ratio (Figures 19, 20, and 21).

Professional Status

The national trends in immigrants who reported themselves as professionals [Boyd, 1976] showed Brazil and Venezuela with very high percentages throughout 1949-74. Argentina, Colombia, and Cuba also had relatively high percentages prior to 1967 (Figures 22, 23, and 24). Mexico was lowest throughout, and the Dominican Republic was also very low. In general, the effect of the 1965 legislation was to temporarily depress the scores, at least up to 1968-69 [Rockett, 1976].

Summary

The similarities and dissimilarities of Cuban immigration vis-a-vis immigration to the United States from other parts of the Western Hemisphere have been shown in the previous pages.

Analysts of international migration [Becker, 1930a, 1930b; Petersen, 1958, 1968; Price, 1966; Mangalam, 1968; Jansen, 1968; Lee, 1969; Shaw, 1975] have often explained migration differentials in two social frameworks—the economic and the political. The economic conception of migration is centered on push-pull factors. As ideal types, push migration is primarily one of single young men, poorly educated and trained, and pull migration is largely one of young families and married older adults at a higher occupational level.
Figure 4-19. Child Woman Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-20. Child Woman Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Selected Countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-21. Child Woman Ratio of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-22. Percent professional of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-23. Percent professional of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
Figure 4-24. Percent professional of immigrants to the United States. Selected countries of the Western Hemisphere: 1950-1974.
In the theory of politically motivated movement, the state impels the individual or social sector. Petersen [1958] distinguished between impelled and forced migrations, according to the degree of residual choice the state permitted potential migrants. Forced migration is then a type of push migration with no economic selection of migrants at point of origin. Very often whole categories of a population leave in a mass exodus [Browning and Feindt, 1969; Beijer, 1969; David, 1969].

The INS data on the impelled migration of Cubans to the United States, however, are unsatisfactory for a test of the demographic and social effects of politically motivated population movements. Here, as in other instances in migration studies, a tedious and time-consuming evaluation of the data revealed them to be seriously inadequate for the testing of theory. Although the analysis showed the absence of children and a very low dependency level among Cuban refugees, thus contradicting the assumption of a mass exodus, this finding must be tempered by the realization that the INS statistics are inaccurate in many respects for the present purpose.

In general, however, it is safe to conclude that the Cuban immigration has been predominantly one of older white adults [Aguirre, 1976] in their late thirties [U. S. Department of Commerce, 1972; 1973]. The percentage of Cubans in professional occupations has shifted dramatically throughout the years, so that, depending on one's political persuasion, the migration can be characterized as an exodus of the privileged or an exodus of the working man. As shown previously (Figure 4-12), prior to 1966, the
Cuban immigration was similar to that from the so-called brain-drain migration countries (Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina). After that date, however, the decrease in the percentage of professionals was such as to approximate the low-line trends of the Dominican Republic and Mexico [Clark, 1975].

The notion of a mass exodus can be used only if one realizes the importance of internal dynamics affecting migratory behavior in the country of origin. The imagery associated so often with the concept, of an indiscriminate aggregate of persons leaving under threat, simply does not hold under closer scrutiny. Important criteria of social organization, e.g., race, age, sex, occupation, continue to provide clues about social behavior in this instance and thus make migration amenable to scientific study.

Problems of validity are presumably not serious for most other countries in the hemisphere. However, very few of them represent mainly one or the other ideal type of migration. Clearly, Argentinian immigration to the United States during the 1960's, for example, reflected the political upheavals experienced in that nation, as well as economic factors. In this context, the comparative analysis of the political and economic characteristics of sending countries [Duff and McCamant, 1976; Banks et al., 1975; Lewis and Hudson, 1975; United Nations, 1964] under similar legislative conditions of entry, and their effect on the characteristic of imigrants should be an important topic for future research.

The description of immigration to the United States from other countries in the Western Hemisphere illustrates that to specify
precisely the effects of the 1965 U. S. immigration legislation, one must understand both the determinants of migratory selection in each country of origin and the long-term trends of these differentials. In this chapter, the first has been ignored. The long-term trends of the differentials, moreover, strongly suggest that in most cases the effects of the law were transitory, though not in the same direction for all nations. The reason for this, however interesting it could prove from the perspective of international migration research and national policy, is outside the bounds of this study.

Comparative work in the area of marital stability of Latin American immigrants to the United States must recognize that Cubans, who are, on the average, much older than other nationalities, would have experienced more widowhood. Assuming similar cross-national average ages at marriage, they would have had, on the average, longer durations of marriage. The chances for first marriage to terminate either by separation or by divorce are greater.

The following chapter presents the methods used in the study of the marital stability of Cuban immigrants. Most of what is known about it so far comes from popular journal accounts [Volsky, 1977], and from observations by psychiatrists [Rumbant and Rumbant, 1976]. A different assessment of the problem is now in order.
CHAPTER V

MARITAL STABILITY OF CUBAN IMMIGRANTS:
DATA AND METHODS

The data used in the study came from the 5 percent public-use sample (PUS) of the 1970 U.S. Census, which presents information on individuals randomly selected from the enumerated population. The 1970 Census was the first based mainly on responses by mail. Of all households enumerated, 87 percent answered the questions by mail, at considerable savings to taxpayers. All respondents answered questions on fundamental demographic characteristics—name, relationship to the head of the household, sex, color/race, age and quarter-year of birth, and marital status. Other questions were asked either of 15 or of 5 percent of the households. The year of immigration and marital history were asked only of the 5 percent sample.

White, ever-married, Cuban-born, urban residents of continental United States who had immigrated between 1945 and 1970 comprised the sample, selected from a 1-in-100 portion of the 5 percent sample [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972: 194-198.]. The limitations to white race, foreign birth, urban residence, and continental United States were made because too few Cubans with other characteristics would be available for the multiple analysis. Moreover, the focus is on the marital experience of typical Cuban immigrants, most of whom are white [Aguirre, 1976] residents of continental cities [Prohias and Casal, 1976].
The 1945-1970 period of immigration provided an appropriate mix of immigrants before and after the 1959 Cuban revolution. Probably few additional cases would have been added by including immigration before World War II, and with the time span used any effects of the war on marital stability were held more or less constant.

Quality of the Data

Both the Bureau of the Census itself and others have often evaluated the accuracy of its counts of the population by race, age, and sex [Coale, 1955; Bogue, Misa, Dandekar, 1964; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1965; Siegel and Zelnick, 1966; Heer, 1968; Siegel, 1968; Pritzker and Rothwell, 1968; Farley, 1970; Sharp and Schnore, 1971; Siegel, Rives, and Robinson, 1975; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975; Bailar, 1975; Hill, 1975]. Although no similar critiques were made of data on immigrants, one can assume that the difficulties in enumerating the poor and the uneducated were encountered among immigrants as well [Wagenheim, 1975: 7].

There is no satisfactory evaluation of the 1970 count of Cubans in the United States. Prohias and Casal [1974: 15-26] corrected the census enumeration of Cuban-born residents on the mainland, using the registration forms that all aliens are required to fill out every January. They found a 9.3 percent underenumeration nationally, with important deviations by states, but in fact, what they attribute to the census were their own errors, based on their
assumptions that the growth of Cuban arrivals was linear, that death rates should be adjusted by their formula, and that an estimated 5 percent did not fill in the I-53 forms. The large variation in over- and underestimates of Cubans, from -41.2 percent in Nevada to +26.5 percent in New York, is difficult to accept as a fair assessment of the census's accuracy.

Information from the census generally precludes the longitudinal analysis of the sort needed to establish causality. Furthermore, variables useful in such research—e.g., kinship relations and geographical location, detailed marital history, previous socio-economic status, the dates of such events as divorces, separations, and widowhood—are not included in the census schedules. All the findings are therefore tentative.

Methods

The revised SPSS canned program was used [Nie, et al., 1975: 320-397, 409-421].

Multiple linear regression was used to identify the effects of each of the independent variables [Kerlinger and Pedhazur, 1973]. The independent variables were entered into the regression stepwise (forward). No statistical criteria was used to exclude predictors. All of the

I had initially planned to conduct a survey of Cubans in Dade County, Florida. I desisted after a number of the area's professionals in marketing, public relations, and social welfare were unanimously pessimistic about the outcome of the research. In their view, I would have faced insurmountable difficulties trying to convince adult Cubans to give me accurate information on their family and marital life. The usual problems of response biases [Phillips, 1973: 1-67] would be aggravated in a culture in which such matters are defined as strictly personal and intimate, to be shared only with close friends and spouses, and by the population's relative ignorance of the legitimate purposes of sociological research. Moreover, I did not have sufficient resources to undertake the survey adequately.
predictors have been used in past research on marital stability, and there is theoretical justification to leave them in the analysis. Unstandardized and beta coefficients are given for each independent variable to ascertain the relative importance of their effect on the dependent variable. $R^2$ measures the total variance explained by the variables included in the model. An attempt has been made to exclude from the analysis intercorrelated predictors with larger measurement error, so as to deal with the problem of multi-collinearity. All dichotomous predictors were scored zero and one.

**The Dependent Variable: Marital Stability**

Various indicators, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, have been used to measure marital stability [Barnes, 1951; 1967; Farley and Hermalin, 1971; Lefcowitz, 1967; Heiss, 1972]. But when one uses census data, most analysts agree that the best procedure is to divide persons who have ever married into two groups: those whose first marriages are and are not intact [Sweet, 1974: 328; Cutright, 1971; Bumpass and Sweet, 1972]. I have also distinguished between two types of marital instability: conflict, indicated by separation or divorce, the type investigated here, and non-conflict, the consequence of one partner's death and here excluded from analysis.

Marital stability was defined as a characteristic of (a) those married once (P75), including those in common-law marriages, with the spouse either present or absent for reason of employment, service in the armed forces, confinement in an institution, residence in group quarters

$^2$These designations are the codes of the variables used in PUS [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1972].
or in another place not the same as that of the spouse, but excluding separated or deserted persons and widows.

Whether the respondents had married once or more than once, and whether or not the first marriage ended in the death of the spouse were combined with present marital status, yielding a five-item marital stability scale:

1. Known to have divorced at least twice.
2. Known to have divorced and separated at least once.
3. Known to have divorced once.
4. Known to have separated once.
5. Stable--defined above.

Widowed persons who had married once and those known to have widowed at least once before, and married persons known to have widowed at least once before were excluded from the analysis (it cannot be determined from the census questions whether persons had married three or more times, but cases of more than two marriages are as rare among Cubans as they are in the general population).

Obviously the measure of marital stability refers exclusively to the legal status of marital unions [Spanier and Cole, 1976: 129]. Its relation to the prevalence of marital happiness, adjustment, and satisfaction is not known and, of course, cannot be established from the census. While they may be important, these other dimensions have been analyzed with what appear to be insurmountable conceptual and methodological problems [Kirkpatrick, 1955: 340-362; 1963: 375-407; Scott, 1958; Hawkins, 1966; Laws, 1971; Clayton, 1975;
In this study, only the personal socio-demographic dimensions of marriage has been studied. Others have dealt with the former, at least for the colonial period [Martinez Alier, 1972; 1974].

One should be careful also not to confuse the stability of family and of marriage [Jansen, 1952]. Clearly, family stability has increased during the last two hundred years as a result of increased life expectancy and of the effect of lowered fertility on the life cycle [Wells, 1971; Murdock, 1950]. Marital conflict, however, has shown a considerable and almost uninterrupted rise. The study is solely interested in the husband-wife dyad [Winch and Blumberg, 1971: 126-127; Sprey, 1966].

The measure of marital stability used here is not affected by intergroup variations in the proportion never marrying [Dixon, 1971],
but it may be flawed because persons who are separated because of marital conflict sometimes misreport their spouse's absence or the reason for it. Moreover, the census does not distinguish between legal and nonlegal separations, and it does not include any indication of whether the separation is permanent or revocable. Moreover, because the data are cross-sectional, one cannot determine whether persons now in marriages classified as stable had been separated from each other earlier [Chilman, 1966].

In some cases it is not possible to distinguish between conflict and non-conflict permanent separations. Especially among immigrants, non-conflict separations that result from the move gradually become viewed as permanent [Ogburn, 1944: 317, 321]. But by the measure used here these cases may be treated as stable marriages. This situation is probably rare among Cuban immigrants, however, since the migration policies of both the United States and the Cuban governments have encouraged the reunification of families. Some marital annulments, while supposedly excluded from the ever-married category, may have been miscoded in the census marital classifications.

The measure does not differentiate among various subtypes of conflict instability, in particular, between divorce and separation [Riley and Spreitzer, 1974: 67]. Moreover, the quasi-marital experience of persons in concubinages or free unions, a perhaps common experience in Latin American immigrant colonies [Hendricks, 1974: 94-99], is ignored.

The census data preclude the study of reverse flows and of first and repeat moves [Goldscheider, 1971: 48-75]. To the extent that
persons in stable and unstable marriages had different death rates, or
different rates of movement between the two countries, the results may
be confounded [Norton, 1973].

Background Predictors

These are the sex and education of the respondents, and the
characteristics of their first marriage.

Education (P17-18)

Education is given as the highest grade or year ever attended
by the respondent, up to six or more years in college. As an indicator
of socio-economic background, it is usually temporally prior to
marriage. While the order is sometimes ignored [Cutright, 1971], it
is, of course, important in studying with cross-sectional data whether
socio-economic background affects marital stability since the other
indicators most often used, occupation and income, are themselves
partly determined by marital stability and the causal direction is
unclear. Moreover, income is close to the least accurate variable in
survey research. The meaning given to occupations in both the census
and in social evaluation has shifted constantly [Camp, 1961: 82].
Occupation has the disadvantage also of requiring a much larger sample
than the one available, since a scale of occupational prestige
involving only eight or twelve major categories can hardly be applied
to the analysis of marital stability. What would be needed is a much
larger set of occupational categories, defined not only by occupa-
tional prestige, but by the conditions associated with the occupations--
geographical mobility, number of hours of work, contact with opposite sex, degree of supervision and moral control exercised by professional peers, and so on [Glen and Keir, 1971; Rosow and Rose, 1972].

Education is the only indicator that reflects pre-migration socio-economic status. I used the following educational categories, reflecting educational practices in Cuba before the revolution [Krumweide and Freeburger, 1962; Moncarz, 1970: 10-20].

<table>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>7-9</td>
<td>Upper elementary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-14</td>
<td>Bachillerato</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 and over</td>
<td>University</td>
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</table>

The Bachillerato was an advanced high school in which a student prepared for the university. In contrast to this academic educational progression, alternative paths of technical education were available, but since they were not distinguished in the census, they cannot be used here. While most of the respondents had finished their education prior to both the 1959 revolution and to their immigration, young immigrants require special attention in this respect.

Many adult immigrants, especially among those in the professions, attend school in this country so as to revalidate their academic credentials. It is conceivable that their marriage relations could have been affected by their propensity to go to school. In general, however, the pattern of professional revalidation is marked
only during the 1970's as the Florida legislature begins to recognize the political importance of Cubans in Florida politics, and as Cubans become convinced of the permanence of their stay in this country. Thus, the effect of this pattern is considered unimportant for the period of time the census information taps.

To this date, there are no satisfactory studies of social stratification in Cuba [Amaro and Mesa Lago, 1971: 341]. Before 1959 the lack of statistics and of trained social scientists seems accountable for the extant insightful personal impressions [Carvajal, 1950; Nelson, 1950; Raggi Ageo, 1950]. After that date, investigations of this type are considered affairs of state and, if available, go unpublished. It is assumed [Nelson, 1972] that, as in other developing societies, in Cuba socio-economic indicators like education, occupation, and income are more highly positively intercorrelated than is the case in developed nations, and this offers a justification for treating education as the sole pre-migration indicator of social status.

**Year of First Marriage**

This is constituted by subtracting the age at the time of the census (P9-11) from 1969 and then adding the age at first marriage (P77-78). If the respondent was born in the first quarter (P12), one year was added to the estimate [Robinson and Hastings, 1974: 31]. In the United States, the marriage cohorts formed in this way differed in their marital stability [Kephart, 1954; Monahan, 1940; Jacobson, 1950; Chester, 1971; Ferriss, 1970; Glick and Norton, 1971; Plateris, 1973].
Place of First Marriage

Comparing the year of immigration (P73-74) to the year of first marriage yielded the following locations: Cuba, indeterminately Cuba or United States (excluded from the analysis), United States. This reconstruction was based on the assumption that persons married in the country where they resided, which is probably true in most instances, and that the migration was by a direct and uninterrupted journey from Cuba to the United States. If any Cubans in transit to the United States married in countries where they temporarily resided (e.g., Mexico, Spain), the measure is inaccurate to that extent.

The direction of marital stability between the two places cannot be hypothesized a priori.

Age at First Marriage (P77-78)

<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>26 - 29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is inversely related to marital stability [Bumpass and Sweet, 1972; Weed, 1974; Rosenwaike, 1969; Monahan, 1953; Glick and Landau, 1950; Winch and Greer, 1965; Bauman, 1967; Schmitt, 1969; Krishnan, 1971; Lowrie, 1965; Lungwitz, 1964; Schoen and Nelson, 1974].

Number of Children Ever-Born (P20-21)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 to 12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This variable is available for women only. Whether it is positively associated with marital stability, according to the various studies, depends on the circumstances [Luckey and Bain, 1970; Renne, 1970; Miller, 1975; Chester, 1972; Heath, Roper, King, 1974; Plateris, 1970; Christensen, 1968; Rowntree, 1964: 157].

Premarital pregnancies are relevant to this study [Christensen and Meissner, 1953; Christensen, 1963; Furstenberg, 1976; Coombs, et al., 1970], but they cannot be estimated for the sample [Robinson and Hastings, 1974].

Sex (P6)

Male
Female

Migration Predictors

Year of Immigration

In the census, year of immigration after 1945 (P73-74) is given in a five-year period. I assume that length of residence was negatively associated with marital stability [Goldlust and Richmond, 1974]. Because of the international differences in marital stability, the greater the familiarity that Cuban immigrants gain with American society and customs over a longer stay, the greater the marital instability there probably was among them. That year of immigration was presented in five-year period's introduced a certain error. Had the PUS tapes presented the information by single years, it would have reduced the error in the estimated place of marriage. It may well be, however, that
this supposed improvement would have been factitious, for in many respondents' memories the single year would not have been more accurate than the range of ±2.5 years.

Residence in 1965 (P85-86)

This variable distinguishes among immigrants residing abroad, in Florida, and elsewhere in the United States in 1965.

Residential Continuity: 1965-1970

The combination of residence in 1965 and residence in 1970 (see below) yielded the following five categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residence In 1965</th>
<th>Residence In 1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abroad and Florida</td>
<td>Florida Central Cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad and Florida</td>
<td>Elsewhere in Florida</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere U.S.A.</td>
<td>Florida Central Cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abroad, Florida, Elsewhere U.S.A.</td>
<td>Florida, Elsewhere U.S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere U.S.A.</td>
<td>Elsewhere U.S.A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It taps the degree to which immigrants resided continuously in proximity to Cuban population concentrations.

Residence in 1970 (H7-8, H10, H11)

It distinguishes among immigrants residing in Florida's metropolitan central cities, elsewhere in Florida, and elsewhere in the United States. For a number of reasons, residence in areas of higher Cuban concentration should be positively related to marital stability [Zimmerman and Cervantes, 1960: 75-87; Ackerman, 1963; Whitehurst, 1968; Blood, 1969; Zubrzycki, 1966; Allardt, 1955; Karlsson, 1951].
Relatives in the Home (H83)

Yes
No

Research in the United States has shown a positive relation between marital stability and the absence of relatives in the home [Mercer, 1967]. In the present context, however, the association should be reversed. The marital relations of immigrants living with relatives presumably changed less, and familistic orientation should have contributed to a greater stability [Freeman and Showel, 1952].

Relatives residing with stable marriages form "complete extended domestic families;" those in unstable marriages form "incomplete extended domestic families" [Winch and Blumberg, 1971: 127]. The acute housing shortage in post-revolutionary Cuba has increased the prevalence of joint residence [Ward, 1977], and this may have been reflected in the residence patterns of immigrant Cubans.

Adaptation Predictors

The following predictors were discussed at length in Chapter III:

Person's Total Income (P56-58)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Range</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>≤ 1999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 - 3999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4000 - 5999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6000 - 7999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8000 +</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Home Ownership (H27)

Yes
No
Ratio of Family Income to Poverty Cut-Off (P59)

\[
\begin{align*}
\leq 0.99 & \\
1.00 - 1.24 & \\
1.25 - 1.99 & \\
2.00 - 2.99 & \\
3.00 & \\
\end{align*}
\]

Occupation (P27-29)

- Professional, technical and kindred workers; managers and administrators, except farmers
- Sales; clerical and kindred; farmers and farm managers
- Service workers, except private household workers
- Craftsmen; operatives, including transport
- Laborers, including farm; farm foremen; private household workers; workers not classified by occupation

Age (P9-11)

- 14 - 24
- 25 - 34
- 35 - 44
- 45 - 54
- 55+

Citizenship Status (P72)

- Naturalized or Born of Native Parents Residing Abroad
- Alien

It should be negatively associated with marital stability. It has often been used as an index of cultural assimilation of immigrants.

Physical Disability (P82-83)

- Totally or Partially Disabled
- Not Disabled
This predictor should be negatively associated with marital stability [Renne, 1971]. While the census schedule included the number of weeks each respondent worked during 1969, it was not possible to differentiate between immigrants who had problems getting work and those who were out of the country. It is for this reason that the health indicator was used as an index of stability of employment.
CHAPTER VI

TYPES OF IMMIGRANT MARRIAGES

The usual dimensions of marital stability have been gleaned from the literature. Some of these have appropriate indicators, and they constitute the elements of the model used in this study. The problem remains, however, of classifying the national sample of ever-married Cuban immigrants, for as a whole it is so heterogeneous that any conclusions would have obscure sociological and historical referents. In this chapter, thus, the sample is divided into eight immigrant-marriage types as a preliminary to the study of marital stability.

The types were devised from a combination of three variables: (a) year of marriage, (b) year of immigration, and (c) place of first marriage (Figure VI-1 on following page). The typology is constructed so as to reflect the importance which I attribute to the impact of the Cuban revolution of 1959 both on the stability of marriage and on the social and demographic characteristics of Cuban immigrants. The latter, as reflected in a series of demographic and social indicators of Cuban immigration to the United States since 1945, is discussed in Chapter IV of the dissertation.

The revolution began a period of rising marital instability. Cuba's rate increased from 8.3 divorces per 100 marriages in 1958 to
Year of First Marriage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1959 or Before</th>
<th>1960 or After</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Place of First Marriage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Cuba</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Year of Immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>VII</td>
<td>VIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(192)</td>
<td>(1411)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(169)</td>
<td>(95)</td>
<td>(155)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I. Pre-revolutionary immigrants first married in Cuba before the revolution

II. Post revolutionary immigrants first married in Cuba before the revolution

III. Pre-revolutionary immigrants first married in the United States before the revolution

IV. Post revolutionary immigrants first married in the United States before the revolutionary

V. Pre-revolutionary immigrants first married in Cuba after the revolution

VI. Post revolutionary immigrants first married in Cuba after the revolution

VII. Pre-revolutionary immigrants first married in the United States after the revolution

VIII. Post revolutionary immigrants first married in the United States after the revolution

Figure 6-1 -- Eight Immigrant-Marriage Types.
18.1 in 1968, with a peak of 20.3 in 1966 and 1967. In Havana Province, which most immigrants claim as their last residence in Cuba, the divorce rate was 30.1 in 1966 [Roberts and Hamour, 1970:80]. These data justify using the year of first marriage and the year of immigration to construct the typology.

The place of first marriage was also used in the typology because it helped specify the marital experience of the immigrants. In conjunction with the other two variables, it allowed the examination of diachronic and synchronic relations among the types. The place of first marriage denotes approximately the marital status of the immigrants when they entered the United States, whether as single persons, as married, or as formerly married. Among those who married in Cuba and then emigrated, it is true, some would have been divorced or separated by the time they left, but the lack of longitudinal information in the census makes it impossible to distinguish them from those who came with their marriage intact. While persons who first married in the United States were single at the time of their immigration, those who married in Cuba could have been married, divorced, or separated at the time of their immigration.

The lack of information had another unwelcome result, namely, that persons in Types IV and V could not be identified and had to be excluded from the analysis. Both types are logically and empirically valid, and tap patterns of repeated movement between the two countries. Type IV represents immigrants who came single, married in the United States, returned to Cuba before the revolution, and immigrated again during the post revolutionary period. Type V represents those who
temporarily went back to Cuba to marry after 1959 and then returned, maintaining their pre-revolutionary residence in this country. While Type IV is probably of minor importance, the absence of Type V is more serious, for research on other groups show that typically some immigrants return temporarily to their country of origin to find a spouse.

Since the types thus formed, I believe, have historical plausibility and distinguish the immigrants meaningfully, one ought to expect them to differ empirically along certain dimensions; that, indeed, they represent discrete populations along the dimensions set by the predictors of marital stability will be shown presently. To show how the types differ does not mean, necessarily, that they have been well chosen. Since the typology is an empirical classification of persons, there would exist significant differences between types which represented asymmetrical combinations of categories of the variables that form the typology. Differences between such types might well be significant in a statistical sense, though they would be of less substantive interest than those between types which controlled for two of the three variables in the typology with which more focused contrasts could be made. With the data available, six such pairs can be formed:

Comparisons by year of immigration:

1. I-II
2. VII-VIII

Missing relevant pairs: III-VI; V-VI

Comparisons by place of marriage:

3. I-III
4. VI-VIII

Missing relevant pairs: II-IV; V-VII
Comparisons by year of marriage:

5. II-VI
6. III-VII

Missing relevant pairs: I-V; IV-VIII

For each marriage type the mean, standard deviation, median, and absolute frequency on the predictors and on the marital stability indicator are presented in Table 1 of the Appendix, which provides the basis for the t-tests in Table 6-1 and for some of the discussion that follows.

Comparisons by Year of Immigration

Pre-revolutionary and post revolutionary immigrants first married in Cuba before the revolution differed in a number of respects. Pre-revolutionary immigrants (Type I) were wealthier than post revolutionary ones (Type II): a larger proportion owned homes, and they had larger personal and family incomes. As expected, more have been naturalized. More post revolutionary immigrants lived closer to the ethnic population in Florida, having experienced greater residential continuity during the 1965-1970 period. Moreover, they had more relatives in their homes. These results confirm common-sense observations of the Cuban immigration.

It is less obvious that post revolutionary immigrants married at older ages than pre-revolutionary ones, while the latter were older at the time of the census. This is probably less true at the end of the 1970's than in 1970, for many very old Cubans have immigrated since 1973; but it means the marriages of pre-revolutionary immigrants would
TABLE 6-1
DIFFERENCES OF EFFECTS OF SELECTED INDICATORS (t-values) AND TWO-TAIL ASSOCIATED PROBABILITIES FOR PAIRS OF IMMIGRANT-MARRIAGE TYPES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Differences in</th>
<th>Comparisons By Year of Immigration</th>
<th>Comparisons By Place of Marriage</th>
<th>Comparisons By Year of Marriage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I-II</td>
<td>VII-VIII</td>
<td>I-III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Stability</td>
<td>-2.94*</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.004&lt;sup&gt;xx&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>.532</td>
<td>.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>-1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.636</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td>.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Disability</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>-1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.617</td>
<td>.813</td>
<td>.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership</td>
<td>10.69</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>-.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income to Poverty Cut Off</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
<td>-.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td>.196</td>
<td>.494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>-1.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.954</td>
<td>.533</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person's Total Income</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>-2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-1.71</td>
<td>-.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.959</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at First Marriage</td>
<td>-1.71</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>-1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.144</td>
<td>.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence in 1970</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>-.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.212</td>
<td>.356</td>
<td>.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-4.71</td>
<td>-3.89</td>
<td>-5.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives in the Home</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>-1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.775</td>
<td>.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>8.75</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>5.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Residence: 1965-1970</td>
<td>4.23</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = t-value  
<sup>xx</sup> = Associated probability
would have lasted longer with a greater opportunity for them to dissolve. Note that the differences in the age at marriage were not due to differences in class membership in Cuba as measured by educational achievement. The educational and occupational characteristics of the two types were similar, though I had expected pre-revolutionary immigrants to have higher occupations with a lower education. It may be, however, that by 1970 the influx of poorly educated immigrants after the 1965 resumption of the flights from Cuba had lowered the initially very high education of the post revolutionary immigrants. The lack of differences in occupation, however, is more puzzling. The period of initial adjustment is often marked by a lowering of occupation, and it takes some time for the typical immigrants to regain his pre-migration occupational level. The similarity in occupation may be the result of post revolutionary immigrants' quick adjustment to the labor market. The occupational status of pre-revolutionary immigrants was only moderately high, and the newcomers could have caught up with them.

A comparison of pre-revolutionary and post revolutionary immigrants first married in the United States after the revolution shows similar findings with some differences. As expected, the former were wealthier: they owned more homes and had a higher personal income. They had become citizens in far greater proportion. Moreover, as with those who married in Cuba before the revolution, post revolutionary immigrants lived closer to Florida in 1970 and had greater continuity in their residences during 1965-1970. Their educational level was, as expected, higher.
It was unexpected, however, that the ratio of family income of post revolutionary immigrants to the poverty cut-off was higher, that they had married younger and were younger in 1970. There were relatively more females. The higher ratio of family income to the poverty cut-off seemingly resulted from a greater proportion of couples with both spouses employed. The number of relatives in the home was similar for the two types, and in view of the recent dates of the marriages there could be no income effect from teenage employment. Moreover, there were more females in Type VIII and many post revolutionary immigrant women were in the labor force.

Differences between Types VII and VIII in age and in age at marriage are more difficult to explain. As in the previous context, pre-revolutionary immigrants were older than post revolutionary ones, but the younger ages at marriage in Type VIII reverses the earlier pattern. The reversal means, of course, that those in Type VIII married at an extraordinarily low age, with the mean and median under twenty-one years (See Table 1, Appendix), lower than their counterparts with a longer residence. The younger age at marriage should have been found in Type VII if it represented a greater acculturation to North American norms among those longer in the country.

Comparisons by Place of Marriage

Are there significant differences between immigrants that came single or married? Two contrasts can be studied: that of pre-revolutionary immigrants first married in Cuba and in the United States before the revolution (Types I and III), and post revolutionary immigrants first married in Cuba or the United States after the
revolution (Types VI and VIII). In the first context, those that came single and then married in the United States (Type III) had, in comparison to Type I, higher occupations and personal incomes. Immigrants of Type I had more relatives in the home, were older, and had married at younger ages and, thus, had a longer time in marriage. More were female, disabled, and naturalized. The types were quite similar in residential patterns, in education, the ratio of family income to the poverty cut-off, and home ownership.

As in the previous context, those that came single and married in the United States (Type VIII) had higher occupations and personal incomes. In this case, however, the higher socio-economic status was more marked than that of Type III, since they also owned more homes, higher education, and a greater ratio of family income to the poverty cut-off. Like pre-revolutionary immigrants first married in Cuba before the revolution (Type I), post revolutionary immigrants first married in Cuba after the revolution (Type VI) were older, had more relatives in the home, were more disabled, and included more females. There were two important reversals, however, from the previous context: those marrying in the United States (Type VIII) married at younger ages, had been naturalized more often and showed less residential continuity during 1965-1970 than those in Type VI.

Whether post revolutionary immigrants marrying after 1959 married in the United States or Cuba made a great deal of difference in their migration experience—the distinction in socio-economic status and the younger age at marriage of Type VIII, which reversed the pattern found in the first context, is marked.
Comparisons by Year of Marriage

Pre-revolutionary immigrants first married in the United States before and after the revolution (Types III and VII) and post revolutionary immigrants first married in Cuba before and after the revolution (Types II and VI) are contrasted here. Types III and VII are similar in a number of respects: sex, physical disability, ratio of family income to the poverty cut-off, personal income, age at marriage, residential patterns, relatives in the home. Type VII had a higher occupation and education and were younger; those in Type III had been naturalized more often and owned more homes. The second pair, however, showed marked contrasts. Persons in Type II were wealthier: they owned more homes, had higher personal and family incomes and higher occupation and education. They had been naturalized in greater proportion and were more disabled. Persons in Type VI had fewer relatives in the home, resided less often in Florida in 1970, showed less continuity in residential patterns during 1965-1970, and were older at marriage and younger at the time of the census.

Summary

This detailed presentation documents the validity of the types in distinguishing ever-married Cuban immigrants along the dimensions the research had identified as important predictors of marital stability. The marriage types representing the post revolutionary immigration (Types II, VI, VIII) differed both among themselves and from the corresponding pre-revolution immigration types (Types I, III, VII), distinguishing categories of ever-married Cuban immigrants empirically as well
The types also differed in their average marital stability. Predictably, the comparisons by year of immigration showed that the longer the residence in this country, the lower the average marital stability. Comparisons by the place of marriage, however, showed an important reversal: Among pre-revolutionary immigrants married before 1960, the marriages of those married at the time of immigration (Type I) were more stable than those of single immigrants who married in the United States (Type III). Among post revolutionary immigrants married after 1959, however, those who had been married by the time of their immigration (Type VI) showed a lower marital stability than those who came single and then married in the United States (Type VIII). As noted previously, those who married in Cuba could have been divorced or separated before their immigration, so that one cannot determine whether the reversal resulted from the social conditions created by the Cuban revolution or, rather, from the immigrants' experiences in the United States.

Since the marriages of earlier immigrants who came married were more stable than those of persons married in this country, it may be that having been married at the time of their immigration did not create the instability in the post revolutionary type but, rather, that marital instability resulted from the changed conditions in Cuba. Undoubtedly, however, the initial conditions which faced married immigrants differed for those coming before and after the revolution, both in the availability of complex immigrant communities in Florida and New York-New Jersey and the greater involvement of the Federal Government and general
American society in the immigrants' experiences. In brief, it is not possible to clarify the issue.

Comparisons by year of marriage show that the earlier the marriage the lower was its stability.

Once the validity of the types was established, a number of questions remained: What are the best explanations of marital stability among these types? What can be inferred from the comparisons of these models? How do the models differ by sex? The next chapter addresses these and related issues.
CHAPTER VII

THE STABILITY OF IMMIGRANT MARRIAGES

This chapter presents a series of hypotheses about marital stability and relates appropriate indicators to each major concept. It evaluates these hypotheses in terms of the results of linear multiple-regression models of marital stability for immigrant-marriage types and for each sex, extending the comparisons of types begun in the last chapter. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.

Conceptions of Marital Stability

There are several traditions of thought or "theories" about marital stability, its prediction and explanation. Some of the most prominent of these schools can be identified even though they do not constitute mutually exclusive or fully established formulations.

One popular formulation concerns marriage as social exchange through cost-reward ratios. The greater a person's resources, particularly economic resources, the greater value he or she will have as a marriage partner. The stability of the marriage will then depend on a calculation in which partner weighs the satisfactions or rewards received from the marriage as against the contributions or costs. When the ratio is unfavorable, marital instability presumably ensues, although it is not always made clear in the literature whether the
unfavorable ratio is a sufficient or a necessary condition, or whether it is merely one predictor among many others. In this study a person's total income, physical disability, and occupational status are used as indicators of individual resources, since I have no knowledge of the person's perception of the costs, or of the balance between them and satisfactions. The three indicators of individual resources approximate the "cost" part of the ratio.

Similarly, it is argued in the family literature that the corporate resources of a marriage increase its stability. Wealth in its various forms removes a number of irritants, and thus enables family members to enjoy valued experiences and, as Goode suggests with respect to the American upper class, blocks marriage dissolution. That the partners cannot separate corporate wealth quickly and would often lose by the breaking up of the marriage is often a sufficient discouragement. Here home ownership and the ratio of family income to poverty cut-off are used as indicators of corporate resources. The home is usually held jointly by married couples; the second indicator, as the sum of the family members' income in various forms, relates more directly to the family's economic milieu.

The independent importance of social-class origins for marital stability has long been recognized. A person's formal education suggests a difference in the ability to use abstract concepts and ideas in social relations, an ability assumed to be conducive to a viable marital relation. Social-class origins as indicated by formal education, moreover, is associated in the sample of Cuban immigrants with day-to-day practices and deeper ideologies affecting marriage, which varied by
social class in Cuba. An immigrant's education tells us not only from what stratum of Cuban society he came, but also whether females in his class worked outside of the home, what the conceptions were of family honor, family size, and a host of other class-related norms. Among post revolutionary immigrants it indicates how much the revolution affected his family holdings and, thus, the losses he experienced.

A second group of hypotheses about marital stability emphasize the contextual dimensions of marriage. Thomas and Znaniecki, for example, held that marital stability among immigrants increases to the extent that they are insulated from American culture. Naturalization status is used here to tap this notion of cultural integration. According to Bott, the segregation of marital roles by sex increases with connectedness or density of the marriage's social environment. High density, indicated by the continuation of social relations with relatives and other ethnic members, would suggest that the customary traditional differentiation of roles is being maintained among the immigrants. The persistence of this pattern supposedly would increase the marital stability of the immigrants since there would be less need of adjustment in the interaction of the couple. In this study, residential continuity of Cuban immigrants during 1965-1970 and the presence of relatives in the home are used as indicators.

Ever since Durkheim's work on suicide, analysts of family integration have argued that marriage by itself does not provide the person with sufficient regulation and social control [Lee, 1974; Bynder, 1969; Cashion, 1970; Simpson, 1965; Johnson, 1965]. Rather, marriage acquires its regulative functions with the birth of children. The
number of children, though it is available only for women, is used here to tap this idea.

Two other variables were used as controls: age at the time of the census and at the time of first marriage. The remainder of this chapter tests these ideas for each of the marriage types.

The different sets of predictors in the regression models presented in this chapter are those that maximize the usually conflicting goals of parsimony, $R^2$, and statistical significance. Initially, all predictors were entered into the regression equation and different versions were run until this satisfactory model was chosen. With each type this was done separately for males, females, and both sexes together. For females the equations were run twice to ensure comparable results with males, for whom there was no information on the number of children.

Multiple-Regression Models for Each Type and Sex

Pre-Revolutionary Immigrants First Married in Cuba Before the Revolution (Type I, Table 7-1)

The results of the multiple-regression show how important specification by sex is in the analysis of marital stability. The model for both sexes together (Column A in the table) is not adequate for either separately. For males (Column B), marital stability increases with:

1 The predictors are listed in descending order, following the relative sizes of their betas.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>A All Persons</th>
<th>B Males</th>
<th>C Females</th>
<th>D Females***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age at First Marriage</td>
<td>.24 17.94 .32</td>
<td>.46 27.89 .52</td>
<td>.19 5.88 .25</td>
<td>.21 7.55 .28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives in the Home</td>
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<td>-.64 11.20 -.31</td>
<td>-.27 1.68xx -.12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income to Poverty Cut Off Ratio</td>
<td>.15 7.30 .18</td>
<td>.20 7.35 .25</td>
<td>.23 8.89 .29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.20 4.78 .16</td>
<td>.34 7.06 .27</td>
<td>.30 5.53 .24</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
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<td>.43 6.68 .25</td>
<td>.20 4.48 .21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Disability</td>
<td>.61 3.33* .19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Person’s Total Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Children</td>
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<td>- .13 1.73xx -.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models</th>
<th>Varieties</th>
<th>All Persons</th>
<th>B Males</th>
<th>C Females</th>
<th>D Females***</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>.208</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>8.07</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>5.37</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
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<td>.717</td>
<td>.907</td>
<td>.693</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>2.27</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>2.22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>105</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b = unstandardized multiple-regression coefficient
F = F-value
\( R^2 \) = standardized multiple-regression coefficient

\( x \) = .25 \( p > .10 \)
\( xx \) = .10 \( p > .05 \; \text{all others } p < .05 \)
older age at first marriage  
having relatives in the home  
being naturalized  
not being disabled  
higher personal income

For females (Column C), marital stability is positively associated with:

younger age at the time of the census  
higher ratio of family income to poverty cut-off  
older age at first marriage  
having relatives in the home

By the unstandardized regression coefficients, age at first marriage and relatives in the home are over twice as important in explaining the marital stability of men as of women. For men, moreover, the greater their familiarity with American culture, and the more individual resources they have, the more stable their marriage.

In contrast, neither personal income nor physical disability nor citizenship is a significant predictor of marital stability for women. The women's model differs from the men's in the positive association of marital stability with a higher ratio of family income to poverty cut-off and with less education (Column D). Women's marital stability also increases with the number of children they have born, a datum not available for men. For both sexes the controls and having relatives in the home are important.

In Type I, in short, a theme begins which is more richly elaborated as we proceed--namely, that the marital stability of men increases with higher cultural-social origin and greater exchange values, what have been called the men's instrumental ability, while for women

\[ \text{Ibid.} \]
marital stability decreases with increasing instrumental ability and is enhanced by greater family corporate resources and integration.

Post Revolutionary Immigrants First
Married in Cuba Before the Revolution
(Type II, Table 7-2)

This type represents the bulk of the post revolutionary immigration. For males (Column B), marital stability increases with:

- older age at first marriage
- lesser residential continuity in 1965-1970
- higher personal income
- being physically disabled
- higher education

For women (Column C), marital stability is positively associated with:

- higher ratio of family income to the poverty cut-off
- smaller personal income
- lower occupational status
- older age at first marriage
- lesser residential continuity in 1965-1970
- younger age at the time of the census
- not being physically disabled

Females' marital stability is positively associated also with the number of children they had born (Column D).

Again, the results for the two sexes separately differ considerably from those of both together (Column A). For women, personal income is negatively associated with marital stability, for men positively (b's of .03 and -.17, respectively). The sexes also differ in that the ratio of family income to the poverty cut-off is the strongest predictor of marital stability for women and of no significance for the males. This is also true of occupation: a lower occupational status increases the

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
### TABLE 7-2

**SELECTED REGRESSION MODELS OF MARITAL STABILITY FOR IMMIGRANT MARRIAGE TYPE II AND FOR MALES AND FEMALES IN THE TYPE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income to Poverty Cut Off Ratio</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at First Marriage</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Residential Continuity: 1965-1970</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational Status</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person's Total Income</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Disability</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- \( b \) = unstandardized multiple-regression coefficient
- \( F = F \)-value
- \( B \) = standardized multiple-regression coefficient
- \( \text{xxx} = \text{model with number of children information included} \)
- \( xx = .25 \times p > .10 \)
- \( x = .10 \times p > .05 \); all others \( p < .05 \)
marital stability of women but is not a significant predictor for men. Similarly with education, which is positively associated with the marital stability of males but of no significance for women.

The models are similar in the direction and significance of age at first marriage and of residential continuity. For both sexes the association of the latter predictor with marital stability is in the opposite direction from that predicated on the thesis concerning social density.

As in Type I, in short, the marital stability of females is negatively associated with social exchange values and positively associated with corporate resources and family integration; for men it is positively associated with social origin and social exchange. The bifurcation by sex is stronger and clearer in this type.

Pre-Revolutionary Immigrants First Married in the United States Before the Revolution (Type III, Table 7-3)

The very small sample, combined with high multicollinearity among the predictors, made it impossible to interpret the results for males and females separately, but neither problem was so severe in the aggregate model (Column A).

Post Revolutionary Immigrants First Married in Cuba After the Revolution (Type VI)

Among the literally dozens of models tested, I found none that showed statistically significant associations with marital stability, whether for males and females separately or for both together. Apparently, the available predictors did not tap the characteristics affecting the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>A All Persons</th>
<th>B Males</th>
<th>C Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age at First Marriage</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Ownership</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>11.97</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>3.19(^x)</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives in the Home</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person's Total Income</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>1.70(^xx)</td>
<td>-.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income to Poverty Cut Off Ratio</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>1.74(^xx)</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Residential Continuity 1965-1970</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.40(^x)</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| R²                              | .567          | .716    | .637         |
| F                               | 4.37          | 10.13   | 4.38         |
| Standard Error                  | .730          | .593    | .562         |
| Constant                        | -1.51         | 1.66    | 3.66         |
| N                               | 27            | 16      | 11           |

b = unstandardized multiple regression coefficient  
F = F-value  
B = standardized multiple regression coefficient  

xxx = There is no D model in the type since high multicollinearity and small sample size rendered it misleading and mathematically incorrect. The B and C models are included in the table but are equally unsatisfactory and are not discussed in the text.

xx = .25>p> .10  
x = .10>p>.05; all others p<.05
stability of these immigrant marriages. Of course, the variation about the mean in the scale of marital stability differs considerably with the sets of predictors used in each type. The efficiency of the models for both sexes together varies from an $R^2$ of .039 for Type II to one of .567 for Type III, to a complete failure of all models to show a statistical or substantive importance in this type.

Overall, regression models are most efficient for persons who immigrated before 1960 and married in the United States before that date. The efficiency is lower for post revolutionary immigrants and, among them, is lowest for those who married in Cuba (Type II and VI), representing the bulk of the political immigration. That the regression models for these types are so inefficient implies two things:

1. The explanation of their marital stability must be sought in the pre-immigration experience, about which I had no information.

2. The immigration of married Cubans to the United States because of political persecution resulted in such drastic changes in their lives that the effects on marital stability of the structured social patterns noted in the family literature are suspended, at least temporarily.

To measure these drastic changes, one would need information on differences before and after the immigration---differences in occupational status and income, in relations with kin, in childrearing practices, in the position of women in the home. If, as one suspects, such information is crucial in understanding the marital stability of the two types, it might be the basis for future research.
Pre-Revolutionary Immigrants First Married in the United States After the Revolution (Type VII, Table 7-4)

The marital stability of males (Column B) in this type is positively associated with:

- older age at first marriage
- smaller ratio of family income to the poverty cut-off
- higher occupation
- younger age at the time of the census

For women (Column C), marital stability is positively associated with:

- older age at first marriage
- younger age at the time of the census
- smaller personal income
- owning a home
- lesser residential continuity in 1965-1970

But the number of children the women had given birth to was not a significant predictor of marital stability.

Results for the two sexes separately (Columns B and C) are similar in the importance of the controls. Corporate resources and social exchange, however, show the by now familiar reversal. For instance, family income is negatively associated with the marital stability of males, but home ownership, another indicator of corporate resources, is positively associated with women's marital stability. The models differ as expected with respect to social exchange: personal income is negatively associated with the marital stability of women, occupation positively associated with that of males.

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4 Ibid.
## TABLE 7-4

**SELECTED REGRESSION MODELS OF MARITAL STABILITY FOR IMMIGRANT MARRIAGE TYPE VII AND FOR MALES AND FEMALES IN THE TYPE**

| Variables                                | Models                                | A | B | C
|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---|---
|                                          | All Persons                           | Males | Females | Males | Females |
|                                          | b | F | B | b | F | B | b | F | B |
| Age at First Marriage                    | .15 | 4.88 | .38 | .20 | 3.90 | .40 | .12 | 2.68 | .50 |
| Person's Total Income                    | -.11 | 9.80 | -.34 | .15 | 1.51 | .24 | .14 | 2.19 | .43 |
| Age                                      | .12 | 2.11 | .24 | .10 | 3.56 | .24 | .15 | 1.87 | .23 |
| Occupational Status                      | .07 | 3.50 | .19 | .15 | 1.51 | .24 | .14 | 2.19 | .43 |
| Homeownership                             | .14 | 1.79 | .13 | .15 | 1.87 | .23 | .05 | 1.62 | .22 |
| Ethnic Residential Continuity: 1965-1970 |                           |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |
| Family Income to Poverty Cut Off Ratio   | .14 | 5.53 | -.31 |     |     |     |     |     |     |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>R²</th>
<th>.137</th>
<th>.159</th>
<th>.218</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>1.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
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<td>.556</td>
<td>.313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.96</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b = unstandardized multiple-regression coefficient  
F = F-value  
B = standardized multiple-regression coefficient  

**Note:**  
- xxx = There is no D models in the type since the number of children predictor was not significant.  
- xx = .25 > p > .10  
- x = .10 > p > .05; all others p < .05
The discrepancy in the efficiency of the male (Column B) and female (Column C) models—$R^2$'s of .079 and .193, respectively—is large. For males, marital stability is positively associated with:

- lower occupational statuses
- owning a home
- having no relatives in the home

For females, marital stability is positively associated with:

- older age at first marriage
- younger age at the time of the census
- lower education
- having no relatives in the home
- higher ratio of family income to the poverty cut-off
- higher personal income

Number of children (Column D) is positively associated with the marital stability of women.

The two models are similar in the importance of relatives in the home. Controls are important only for women. As in the other types, lower education and a higher ratio of family income to the poverty cut-off are associated with higher marital stability for women, but the positive association for personal income with marital stability is quite different from the patterns so far observed.

Summary

As in other populations, age at first marriage is a very important predictor of marital stability among Cuban immigrants. That

---

5 Ibid.
Post Revolutionary Immigrants First Married in the United States After the Revolution (Type VIII, Table 7-5).

The discrepancy in the efficiency of the male (Column B) and female (Column C) models--$R^2$'s of .079 and .193, respectively--is large. For males, marital stability is positively associated with:

- lower occupational statuses
- owning a home
- having no relatives in the home

For females, marital stability is positively associated with:

- older age at first marriage
- younger age at the time of the census
- lower education
- having no relatives in the home
- higher ratio of family income to the poverty cut-off
- higher personal income

Number of children (Column D) is positively associated with the marital stability of women.

The two models are similar in the importance of relatives in the home. Controls are important only for women. As in the other types, lower education and a higher ratio of family income to the poverty cut-off are associated with higher marital stability for women, but the positive association for personal income with marital stability is quite different from the patterns so far observed.

**Summary**

As in other populations, age at first marriage is a very important predictor of marital stability among Cuban immigrants. That

---

5 Ibid.
TABLE 7-5
SELECTED REGRESSION MODELS OF MARRITAL STABILITY FOR IMMIGRANT MARRIAGE TYPE VIII AND FOR MALES AND FEMALES IN THE TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>All Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
</tr>
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<td>Homeownership</td>
<td>.14</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Ethnic Residential Continuity: 1966-1970</td>
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<td>Age at First Marriage</td>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
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<td>Number of Children</td>
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<tr>
<td>Family Income to Poverty Cut Off Ratio</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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</tr>
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<td>N</td>
<td>155</td>
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</table>

b = unstandardized multiple-regression coefficient  
F = F-value  
B = standardized multiple-regression coefficient  
xxx = model with number of children information included  
xx = .25>p>.10  
x = .10>p>.05; all others p<.05
children in the home are associated with greater marital stability
contradicts, of course, the widespread assumption that the immigrant
family is often torn asunder by the conflict implicit in the control of
acculturated children by immigrant parents. Since both of these findings
were established for widely different categories of married Cuban
immigrants, it is likely that they are accurate.

Indicators of social density were negatively associated with
the marital stability of the respondents in Types II, VII (females),
and VIII. Having relatives in the home and experiencing greater resi­
dential continuity in 1965-1970 decreased the marital stability of these
respondents. The second variable was affected by the comparatively
lenient Florida laws regulating divorce proceedings, but the fact that
both indicators were in the same direction implies that the continua­
tion in the new setting of the traditional differentiation of marital
roles by sex, aggravated by the presence of relatives and other ethnic
members, undermined the stability of marriage.

Indicators of individual and corporate resources and of social
origin showed different patterns for the two sexes, suggesting the
correctness of the notion of "instrumental ability" in the literature:
mariage stability is enhanced when husbands are successful in their
work and can thus fulfill the expectations of their wives and families;
women's marital stability, on the contrary, is enhanced by the success
of their husbands. That the women's own higher occupation and income
had an adverse effect on marital stability suggests the impact of
immigration on husband-wife relations. In short, the existence of a
institutional marriage type among the immigrants is indicated by these findings. In the institutional marriage,

Adherence to traditional role specifications, custom, and mores would be the factors which would be most significant to the success or happiness of the marriage. This is a tradition-oriented marriage in which modal roles exist, and are sex differentiated. The husband role is held to be the more instrumental, the wife role, the more expressive-integrative. In this marital type, since the wife is more accommodating and the husband more rigid in role needs, marital happiness is more a function of the husband's possession of the expected instrumental needs and capacities. Thus, the instrumental aspects of marriage predominate. Variables such as higher occupational statuses, income, and educational levels for husbands; husband-wife similarities in socio-economic status, age and religion, and religiosity might be expected to be significant for happiness in this marital type. It has been frequently suggested that this is the modal type and that those marriages which follow this model have the greater likelihood of achieving marital happiness [Hicks and Platt, 1973:61].

Under conditions of immigration, however, the husband's traditional responsibility to provide a satisfactory material base for his wife and children often cannot be fulfilled. Many men undergo a downward occupational mobility. They do not know the language, and their training may be in professions under strict professional or governmental supervision. With the loss of occupational status, the immigrant experiences a concomitant loss of social status. He is forced to work with his hands, an act associated with lower classes in his native land. And, in comparison to different consumption standards in his native country, he experiences a loss of income. The new environment, on the contrary, creates new and generally higher expectations in his wife and children, different ideas of what is possible and desirable,
as well as new opportunities. In the struggle to survive first and rise later his wife and teenage children must work outside of the home. Further aggravating his difficulties, the process of transition usually is compressed in time. Adaptations affecting marital institutions, which for the native population have occurred through decades, in the immigrant community take place suddenly and without preparation. There is no time to develop the normative system, the values and ideological justifications, which would make the changed conditions "normal."

That immigrant women join in the labor force begins from need and not from any abstract humanistic conception of liberation or of "growth of self" through work. But from the beginning it violates the customary division of labor and the couple's proper roles, rights, and responsibilities in the traditional marriage. Inevitably, this rejection of the old ways of doing and thinking is not accepted passively and without opposition. Customary rights are not yielded easily. Ingrained views of sexual propriety and of decency change slowly at best, and for some they never change at all. There is tragedy in the demands of immigrant men that their families and kin maintain old prerogatives and appropriate gestures of respect, in their continued effort at self-validation, in spite of new realities so foreign to those that once gave their claims credence.

It is in this light that the results of this study, faulty as in some respects they must be, acquire meaning. They reflect the heroic process of transition that all in immigrant marriages experience, the travails and hopes of immigrant men and women. The social organization
they reflect is a passing phase. That immigration liberates human thought and human action has become a cliche, but one that is appropriate here. For, as I see it, the transition is to a democratic form of marriage in which all participants recognize the social equality of men and women and even, in certain respects, of children.
CHAPTER VIII

IMMIGRATION AND MARITAL STABILITY

The revolution affected the economic bases of kinship units and the ideology of man–woman relations, but it brought no significant change in Cuba's laws regulating marriage and divorce. The new family code maintained the pre-1959 legal basis for divorce,\(^1\) and this is understandable in view of the content of Law 206, passed in 1934. Recent developments in the laws of divorce in the United States had been enacted in Cuba forty years earlier.

Under this law, two forms of divorce are recognized. The first is based on litigation to adjudicate the innocence or guilt of the two parties according to admissible proof that one of the grounds for divorce exists. The grounds are:

1. Adultery
2. Act by one spouse to corrupt or prostitute the other spouse or their children
3. Grave physical injury or abuse
4. Grave verbal injury or abuse, as in repeated insults
5. Life imprisonment of one spouse
6. Grave and irreparable wrong to the spouse and children
7. Habitual drunkenness
8. Habitual, vicious addiction to gambling
9. Voluntary uninterrupted abandonment of the home for more than six months

\(^1\)The relevant sources for this section are reviewed elsewhere [Aguirre, 1976].
10. Chronic unwillingness of either spouse to help maintain the home
11. Absence from the home for more than six months after proper juridical certification without informing spouse of one's whereabouts
12. Contagious veneral disease
13. Separation of the spouses for more than six months as the result of marital conflict
14. Chronic mental illness two years after proper juridical certification
15. Chronic incompatibility between the spouses, or chronic disputes between them so that normal conjugal life becomes impossible
16. Any vice or moral lack that damages the honor, the credit, and the good name of the other spouse
17. Addiction to drugs or similar substances
18. Bigamy

In the second form of divorce recognized by the law, the court grants the divorce, without specified grounds or litigation, if both spouses declare their desire for it. In this voluntary type, the court certifies the disruption that already exists. In contrast to other Latin American countries, then, Cuba's regulation of divorce is in no way restricted by the norms of the Catholic Church. Moreover, since pre-revolutionary times two types of marriage have existed, civil and religious. The law requires only the former, which in the mid-1950's cost thirty to forty pesos. Church weddings, which cost more, were prior to the revolution a symbol of middle and upper classes.

The revolution, however, did erode the economic foundation of extended family networks. Nuclear family units had been the norm in Cuba since the 1930's, as evidenced by the typical romantic choice of spouses, neolocality, and the absence of other relatives from the home of parents and their children. With the increasing rationalization of Cuban family law, women and illegitimate children obtained
equal legal protection during the republican period. The rate of
divorce rose and common-law marriages became less frequent. These
nuclear units were linked in extended family networks, as shown by the
importance in personal relations and social evaluation of the family
name, of which the moral worth was greatly stressed and the
continuity was valued by the importance given to male offspring. In
each generation children were given the initial last names of both
spouses, so that every person was linked through his name to two net-
works. Those with only one last name are assumed to be illegitimate
or, at best, the products of questionable unions.

Extended family networks cut across social classes, for
nuclear units comprising them generally lived in different parts of
the country and differed in their status. The networks resulted
essentially from the lack of a developed capitalism in which economic
opportunities were detached from particularistic social relations.
Rather, social advancement for the individual largely depended on the
extended family's social, political, and economic resources.

The control of government jobs, and the use of public resources
for personal gain, were routine in the pre-revolutionary epoch.
Nuclear units of the upper and upper-middle classes used their kin,
often through bribes, to control votes. This practice cannot be
explained, a la Banfield, by assuming a lack of high-minded civic
spirit. Where scarcity is general, people trust only those who share
their benefits, as Mauss pointed out in his classic work on exchange.
But this sharing cannot be based on an impersonal democratic ethos,
which carries far less weight in such circumstances than an informed
expectation of tangible personal gain.

Both intra- and inter-generational relations of nuclear units were dominated by mutual dependence, with varying degrees of subordination and superordination. The revolution, by changing the nation's economic and social system, destroyed this pattern. Upper and upper-middle classes had their properties confiscated, and most fled the country. The working classes, who by the Marxist dogma were granted an exalted place, constituted the bulk of the emigration after 1965. For them also, the revolutionary policies divided the Cuban extended family in ways never before experienced.

The ideology of man-woman relations has also been transformed. Initially, the revolutionary policies were concerned mainly with incorporating women into the labor force [Aguirre, 1976]. Then the cultural norms setting the appropriate roles and prerogatives of the two sexes were questioned. Discrimination against women in the labor force continues, and it is perhaps one of the hardest problems the revolution faces, though one of which people are more aware than ever in the past.

This is context of this study of immigrant marriage types, for to understand the experience of immigrants one must know something of their past, their origins. The ethnocentrism of American social science, only now beginning to be corrected, included an assumption that immigrants are like children, to be socialized into the American culture. But to examine acculturation from an presumed tabula rasa is to misunderstand the whole process.
The change in the relations of kin is most marked among the immigrants, for one suspects that in spite of communist dogma, kinship ties based on primarily economic incentives have been re-established in Cuba after an initial period of transition. The importance of sugar for the Cuban economy remains unchanged. The control of the government, if anything, has increased as an avenue of social mobility. By way of contrast, what marks the immigrant's experience in the United States, in a period of relative prosperity, is opportunities for social advancement outside the control of the kin. As a consequence, the kinship relations that are maintained increasingly reflect non-economic outcomes. They become selective and smaller in numbers, so that not every relative is included in the network of a nuclear family as was the case in Cuba.

The immigration has meant a great deal of accidental proximity of kin since most Cubans reside in South Florida. And this physical proximity is an important aspect of the transformation since it makes easier their interaction. Of course, the process of selectivity in kinship relations is more apparent among the married foreign-born children of the immigrants. Older Cubans trained in the old style of kinship often continue to obey its moral injunctions. Kinship relations continue to be very important sources of satisfaction for the immigrants, but underneath the apparent homogeneity great transformations are taking place.

An axiom of the older school in sociology is that the absence of primary relations with extended kin and in the community often occasioned by immigration endangered the stability and morals of the
immigrant family. But it is equally plausible to argue that in instances of rapid social change the reverse would be true. Immigrants must be freed from the old precepts so as to act in the new environment. A myriad of conceptions of appropriate behavior are no longer appropriate or even effective. They must be supplanted by others conceptions and practices more attuned to the new life. The existence of a too strong primary environment might block this process of adjustment.

The reverse is equally true, however, and the weak moral regulation of the nuclear family by community processes disrupts it. The existence of identifiable, purposeful institutions regulating the act of immigrants in accordance to a shared world view or moral system is of great importance. For instance, among the Japanese immigrants blame for shameful individual acts was, until recently, quickly apportioned by public meetings of concerned fellow immigrants, and by newspaper accounts. Successful immigrant religious colonies have had these institutions. Among Cubans, however, no such institutions exist. *Diario Las Americas*, the most important newspaper serving the community, does not publish the names of those obtaining divorce, and the same is true of other ethnic news media. And in spite of their love of organizations, Cubans have not formed voluntary associations dedicated to the study and amelioration of the problem of the immigrant family. Indeed, what impresses me about this is the silence which exists on the matter. It is such studied ignorance that belies its importance.
During the last decade, in fact, the lack of moral regulation is manifested, among other ways, in the great popularity of songs depicting and glorifying the passions of extramarital affairs of men and women. In short, the link between the behavior of the individual and the group's moral integrity is not made apparent in the case of shameful acts, even as the accomplishments of ethnic members in the professions, business, and the arts, receive wide acclaim.
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APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON PREDICTORS OF MARITAL STABILITY FOR EACH IMMIGRANT MARRIAGE TYPE
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of First Marriage</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1960</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of First Marriage</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Immigration</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital Stability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: Female</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Male</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Disability</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0: Disabled</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Not disabled</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
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<tr>
<td>Homeownership</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>0: No</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Yes</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Income to Poverty Ratio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Under poverty line</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: 1.00 - 1.24</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: 1.25 - 1.99</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: 2.00 - 2.99</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: 3.00+</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: Laborers, farm foremen, household workers, others</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Craftsmen, foremen, including transport</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Service workers except private household workers</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Sales, clerical and kindred workers, farmers and farm managers</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Professional, technical and kindred workers, engineers and administrators, except farm</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons Total Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: 0 - 1,999</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: 2,000 - 3,999</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: 4,000 - 5,999</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: 6,000 - 7,999</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: 8,000 and over</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: 0 - 6th grade</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: 7 - 9th grade</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: 10 - 11th grade</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: 12 - 13th grade</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
<td>15.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1 (Cont'd)

Means, standard deviations, medians and absolute frequencies of immigrant marriage types on selected indicators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of First Marriage</th>
<th>21950</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>21950</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>21950</th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>21950</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place of First Marriage</td>
<td>21950</td>
<td>21960</td>
<td>21950</td>
<td>21960</td>
<td>21950</td>
<td>21960</td>
<td>21950</td>
<td>21960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of Immigration</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>VII</td>
<td>VIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at First Marriage</td>
<td>14 - 17 yrs. old</td>
<td>18 - 21 yrs. old</td>
<td>22 - 25 yrs. old</td>
<td>26 - 29 yrs. old</td>
<td>30 and older</td>
<td>14 - 17 yrs. old</td>
<td>18 - 21 yrs. old</td>
<td>22 - 25 yrs. old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatives in the House</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>1: sister</td>
<td>1: children</td>
<td>0: 0</td>
<td>1: sister</td>
<td>1: children</td>
<td>0: 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>alien</td>
<td>naturalized</td>
<td>0: 0</td>
<td>1: 1</td>
<td>2: 2</td>
<td>3: 3</td>
<td>4: 4</td>
<td>5: 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Children</td>
<td>0: 0</td>
<td>1: 1</td>
<td>2: 2</td>
<td>3: 3</td>
<td>4: 4</td>
<td>5: 5</td>
<td>6: 6</td>
<td>7: 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*To transform the means of variables with intrinsic scaling, i.e., family income to poverty cut-off ratio, person's total income, education, age, and age at first marriage, multiply the width of the intrinsic category in question by the fraction of the mean you want transformed and add the result to the lower limit of the intrinsic width. Ex: age of type 1 * .02 * 10 + .2 * 5 = .2 * 45.2 years.

*This is available for women only.

m = mean
s = standard deviation
M = median