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THE MILITARY RESPONSE TO THE NIXON DOCTRINE

DISSertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

William Charles Rennagel, B.S., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1977

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CHAPTER I

THE PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

This research begins from the premise that when the President gives policy direction, bureaucracies should respond. The focus of this dissertation is directed to the question, "Do the foreign policy bureaucracies, specifically those within the Department of Defense (DoD), pay attention and respond to the policy statements of the President?" This study attempts to answer this question by the examination of the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine by the Department of Defense and the Armed Services. In this context, the analysis is directed toward an evaluation of how responsive the Defense establishment has been in responding to the foreign policy of the Administration, and not with whether the Nixon Doctrine meshes with the realities of the international environment. Internal consistency, rather than external consistency, is the stipulated focus.¹

If the Congress and the public are to hold the political leadership of an administration politically accountable for its decisions

¹Internal consistency, in this context, relates to a deductive process of matching the administration's stipulated foreign policy objectives -- the ends -- with the various defense programs -- the means -- which support these objectives. External consistency is concerned with the relationship of objectives and policies to the political realities of the international environment.
concerning national security policy, then it seems intuitive that the executive leadership must have the methods and resources to monitor the effectiveness of its subordinates as they implement policy. The implications of political accountability in the implementation and execution of foreign policy has been, and will continue to be, a critical issue in democratic societies (Lyons, 1961; Huntington, 1961A; Levitan, 1970; Finer, 1970; and Friedrick, 1971). Gene Lyons (1961, p. 54) has written, "In its broadest sense, the concept of civilian control over the military means military responsiveness to the policies of politically responsible government." President Eisenhower (1953) stated to Congress, "Basic decisions related to the military forces must be made by politically accountable civilian officials." The controversies associated with the Vietnam conflict, the Pentagon Papers (1971), and the Warpowers Act demonstrate the critical nature of this problem.

The Ends-Means Relationship

This research is an empirical examination of the force structure requested by the President in his policy statements before Congress and as implemented by the three Armed Services -- the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. As Colonel Bletz (1972, p. 83) acknowledges,

The President . . . occupies the central position in the formulation, direction, and execution of national security policy. In the final analysis, it is the President who constructs the politico-military equation and keeps it in balance in accordance with his personal evaluation of the many conflicting determinations in any given situation.
The research, then, is concerned with how well the defense establishment has responded to the President. It does not delve into the normative question of what is right or wrong about the Nixon Doctrine, or what it ought to be. Instead, the focus will be on the descriptive analytic aspects of presidential-bureaucratic interactions. Laswell (1951, p. 14) most aptly describes this approach as part of the policy science where "... we are concerned with explaining the policy-making and policy-executing process ... and providing interpretations which are relevant to the policy problems of a given period." Obviously, the policy-executing process is the focus of this research.

While presidential policy statements to the Congress do provide general guidance to the various executive departments and agencies as to the means necessary to achieve the envisaged foreign policy goals, we know that the translation of policy statements to policy execution and implementation is not a one-to-one correspondence (Ripley, et al, 1973). Essentially, there may be multiple problems in translating broad presidential guidance into operational requirements or, in Huntington's (1961A, pp. 123-135) terms, translating strategic decisions into structural issues, i.e., the military posture to support national strategy. Multiple barriers exist such as conflicting bureaucratic interests and inertia which can, and often do, intercede in translating presidential policy statements into desired policy outcomes. These barriers may substantially modify or negate both the express policy goals of the President, as well as the means necessary to achieve these goals. Morton Halperin (1974, p. 235) admits that,
Presidential decisions vary in specificity. They are often conveyed only in policy statements expressing a sentiment or orientation. The statements may indicate, in general, that certain kinds of actions should be taken but not say who should take care of them. Even if they do specify the actor, they seldom indicate when the action should be taken or the details of how it should be done. In fact, the instructions are often so vague as to leave all the actors free to continue as they have in the past.

However, the force posture guidance of the Nixon Doctrine (which will be elaborated in Chapter II) is not that vague; the chapters on "Maintaining Security" in the Foreign Policy Reports to Congress (1971, 1972, 1973) seem to be sufficiently detailed statements pertaining to the force structure demanded to implement and balance the diplomatic goals of the Administration. That is, the former President specifically stipulated policy actions or suggested priorities by geographic areas (e.g., the-one-and-one-half war strategy) and directions for service programs (e.g., the total force concept which focuses on upgrading the capabilities of the guards and reserves). The central question, then, is, "How well did the Armed Services implement the force guidelines of the Nixon Doctrine?" Or, in its larger context, "Were the means developed which supported the larger ends of the Nixon foreign policy?

Political Accountability

If the means under investigation do not meet the stipulated requirements of presidential policy statements, then there should be some concern about the responsiveness of bureaucracy and ultimately
about the responsibility of the President in his accountability to Congress and the public over the ends and means of foreign policy. There are three areas of literature which can be identified as they pertain to the issues of political accountability.

1. The first area is the traditional literature concerning political accountability. It is non-empirical and has an essentially normative basis (Levitan, 1970; Finer, 1971). In the specific area of national security policy this has led to debates concerning the type of professional officer corps required by the Armed Forces, desiring that they be both politically accountable and professionally trained in the specifics of combat (see Huntington, 1961A, Janowitz, 1960, and Lyons, 1961). Ultimately, this type of literature has led to larger and less conclusive debates on the military-industrial complex (C. Wright Mills, 1953).

2. The second area of literature has been characterized as the behavioral approach, and includes both organizational process and bureaucratic politics approaches that suggest empirically derived reasons why there may or may not be political accountability within the Executive Branch. For example, Halperin (1974, p. 51) writes,

Career officials in an organization believe that they are in a better position than others [presidentially appointed officials] to determine what capabilities they should have, and how they should best fulfill their mission. They attach high priority to controlling their own resources so that they can be used to support the essence of the organization. They wish to be in a position to spend money allocated to them in the way they choose, to station their manpower as they choose, and to implement policy in their own fashion. They resist efforts by senior, service officials to get control of their activities.
This concern is reflected in Allison's (1971) considerations of an organizational process model. For example, Halperin (1974, p. 54) suggests:

A President must have the information and analysis of options which the bureaucracies provide in order to anticipate problems and make educated choices. He must, in most cases, also have the cooperation of the bureaucracies to turn his decisions into governmental action. A bureaucracy can effectively diffuse a presidential decision by refusing to support it with influential members of Congress or to implement it faithfully.

While organizational process and bureaucratic politics models may provide various reasons why bureaucracies are unresponsive, they may be remiss in examining the larger implications of their findings. That is, the literature does not become concerned specifically with the question of whether the organization is responding to the public policy guidance of the President as stated before Congress (where it is hopefully debated and modified) and, consequently, to the larger unfocused political will of the American public.

The present examination of the policy process parallels and extends the empirical and case study literature written in connection with the allocation of resources in the Department of Defense — commonly referred to as budgetary studies and "rational choice" models, and fills a void in this literature. Most of these studies pertain to the bureaucratic political processes internal to the defense establishment and not to the more important aspects of program implementation that are necessary to meet the foreign policy goals stipulated by the President (see Crecine, 1970; Crecine and Fischer, 1973; also Wildavsky, 1964). That is, there has been insufficient attention directed toward
the impact of bureaucratic outcomes as they pertain to publicly stipulated preferred foreign policy ends and means.

Further, a bureaucratic politics model or an organizational behavior model views the mechanisms of DoD resource allocations too narrowly. The focus on the internal bargaining arrangements among the services over resources and missions is an important consideration in understanding the decision techniques within DoD. But the lack of a substantive orientation on the final product, the force structure or force deployments stipulated to accomplish national strategy, does not meet the larger need for ends-means analyses. Thus, even though the entire rationale for the force structure is to support the foreign policy goals of the United States as declared to the Congress, there is little utility to the public in these types of studies without achieving closure relating ends to means. In this regard, Rosenau (1971, p. 25) is most persuasive when he argues,

... most of the research into foreign policy phenomenon is problem oriented and consists of data and conclusions derived either from descriptive case histories or from broader assessments in which the variance [i.e., the range] of the variable is limited to the problem being considered.

3. Policy analysis is a third area of relevant literature with a somewhat more broad focus than the behavioral analysis of organizational process since there is a concern with the substance of policy. As pointed out elsewhere (Ripley, et al, 1973A, p. 5), "...explaining political process without explaining -- and evaluating -- the result is indeed a sterile enterprise." Policy analysis examines the
sequence of policy statements, policy-oriented action, and policy outcomes. Ripley, Moreland, and Sinnreich (1973, pp. 30-31) point out,

Policy statements are rarely used as a focus for analysis in comparison with actions and results. The explicit adoption of the statement-action-results configuration makes the statement an integral (but not the only) portion of the policy response and highlights its usefulness for explaining and interpreting subsequent actions and results.

The present effort is an attempt to apply policy analysis techniques to foreign policy ends-means relationships; a design perspective approach will be used to elaborate this relationship between statement and action.
CHAPTER II

THE NIXON DOCTRINE: A DESIGN PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

The Nixon Doctrine is a broad statement of the foreign policy goals of the United States in the 1970s. Theoretically, it portrays a balanced politico-military equation, implying a rational matching of the means necessary for executing foreign policy against the goals or ends of that policy. Further, the Nixon Doctrine gives guidance to the bureaucracy on the Administration's objectives and policies which are necessary for the implementation of programs related to the stipulated goals of the Administration. This dissertation will focus exclusively on the diplomatic/military aspects of the Nixon Doctrine (excluding strategic forces and nuclear weapons), selecting from the former President's foreign policy statements, which announced Administration objectives and policies, a series of defense program requirements which must be met if the various bureaucracies are to be considered responsive to the doctrine. From these programs will come a series of operational indicators by which it is possible to judge the efficacy of the bureaucratic response.
The Nixon Doctrine: Philosophy and Principles

The Nixon Doctrine suggests a conservative break with the liberal-idealistic tradition of United States foreign policy. Robert Pranger (1972, pp. 2-3), a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, argues that the Nixon Doctrine is the beginning of a break with the "creative containment strategy" prevalent in U.S. foreign relations from the late 1940s through the late 1960s. This strategy of "creative containment" was based on three objectives: (1) maintaining a balance of global power; (2) maintaining a stable world order; and (3) allowing self-determination to nations. These objectives were based on the assumptions of the indivisibility of peace through collective security arrangements, eventually by collective defense, and the idealism and legal principles inherent in American political thought and tradition. These assumptions were articulated in a worldwide containment strategy from the Truman to Johnson administrations that seemed to rely on military means across a broad spectrum of possible conflicts and worldwide strength through multiple alliance relationships.

Pranger (1972, p. 18) writes that the Nixon Doctrine "... challenges the notion that American national interests should continue along the lines of creative containment ..." This break with the past comes as a result of the changes occurring in the international system; specifically, as Nixon (1972, pp. 4-5) pointed out, the economic growth of Europe and Japan, the Sino-Soviet rift, the expansion of Soviet global power, and the emer-
gence of Third World countries created a more diverse and heterogeneous international environment which has reduced America's ability to control events on a global scale. Consequently, the U.S. would, according to Nixon, focus on the interests where our power could make a difference.

The world, in Pranger's terms, had become increasingly indeterminate to U.S. solutions. Pranger (1972, p. 16) observes:

The issue would no longer be one of American policy constructing a desirable world for its own interests, but one of exploring, with others, the possibility of a 'global structure of peace' that could accommodate everyone's interests.

Commensurate with this concept was the growing recognition that there was little efficacy in and substantial public opinion against the use of military power in determining the outcome of local or guerrilla wars or wars that were perceived as not protecting vital national interests (Osgood, 1973, p. 78). What Pranger essentially argues is that the previous rationale for the procurement and deployment of military forces was to maintain capabilities for a broad spectrum of potential conflicts, and this rationale was not a coherent strategy for the U.S. in the 1970s. Pranger further contends that the Nixon Doctrine was an attempt to structure the military forces so as to meet specific objectives that were considered essential to the national interests. For example, under the Nixon Doctrine, these specific objectives would include protecting the United States from aggression, protecting vital allies and maintaining freedom of the seas. As Jones (1973, p. 16) points out:
. . . the direction of future change was fairly clear [post-Vietnam]: a restricted view of American commitments, the reduction or withdrawal of the American forces which guaranteed the fulfillment of these commitments, and a shifting of the focus of policy away from Eastern Asia and the Third World generally and toward the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Japan. The result was less likely to be a revival of isolationism than a rearrangement of overseas policy to emphasize these areas which, for reasons of military and economic security, were considered vital to American well-being.

This chapter will articulate the changes to U.S. foreign policy that were brought about by the Nixon Doctrine. This discussion will elucidate the goals of the Nixon Doctrine and then link the stated objectives and policies which are desired from the goals. A design perspective will be used to elaborate the relationships between the ends — goals/objectives of the Nixon Doctrine — and the means of U.S. foreign policy — the stipulated operational indicators which are available to assess organizational behavior.

Ends-Means Analysis: A Design Perspective

This research considers the Nixon Doctrine to be a significant break with earlier foreign policy. While the degree of this break may be debated, the Nixon Doctrine seems to be unique in its public articulation of the ends and means of U.S. foreign policy. The Nixon Doctrine employs the traditional foreign policy formulation process by establishing a hierarchy of mechanisms such that there is a flow from the ultimate ends of foreign policy — the national interest of the nation, however defined — to the means necessary to achieve these ends. This hierarchy is usually developed in the
following manner. Allison (1973, p. 22) argues that in this rational approach, "[a]t each stage, the ends determine the means."

Figure 1

Traditional Structure of the Foreign Policy Formulation Process

The term "national interests" can have many diverse meanings and usually refers to issues of national security, government maintenance, economic development, and social welfare (see Hopkins and Mansbach, 1973, pp. 5-6). In the context of the Nixon Doctrine, there is an implied national interest of providing for the national security. Interests require additional supporting mechanisms which are the foreign policy goals of the Administration. Goals are defined as a particular type of preferred situation defined in the
international context which is sought by a nation. Goals are derived from various national interests and are specifications designed to achieve particular states of affairs in the international environment. The selection of goals, as a means of securing the national interest, is primarily a subjective evaluation of the various internal and external threats to a country plus the fiscal and resource limitations that constrain choice. While the decision-makers in a country may identify many possible goals, the multiple constraints that act upon these individuals and the nation force the ranking of these goals into priorities (see Marshall, 1968, pp. 27-34). Further, these responses are conditioned by the ideology, the philosophy, and the operating principles of the foreign policy decision-makers who interpret and evaluate the facts and threats of a situation in periods of uncertainty and risk.

Objectives are usually stated as intentions to move from a present state of affairs to another more favorable state of affairs (Hopkins and Mansbach, 1973, pp. 60-64). These objectives flow from the stipulated goals. Policies connote specific undertakings to support a particular objective. It is what a nation does in order to secure a particular objective. As Burgess (1971, p. 4) points out, "the distinction between policies and objectives is that between means and ends (emphasis added)." In terms of this research, policies will be defined as specific actions required of the military services as they support the foreign policy objectives of the nation.
A design perspective approach to foreign policy analysis (as suggested by Burgess, 1973A) makes explicit this relationship between objectives and policies in attaining various goals. The concept of the design perspective offers an analytic technique which meshes with this concern over ends/means relationships. The design perspective offers a method of elucidating a policy framework which focuses on choice for the decision-maker. Burgess (1973A, p. 23) argues, "...the policymaker is concerned with setting priorities, establishing alternatives, and making choices that will serve whatever social purpose [goals/objectives] is controlling at the time of the decision."1

The design perspective hierarchy parallels the traditional foreign policy hierarchy as it extends from the most abstract notions of purpose -- in this case the national goals articulated by the Nixon Doctrine -- to the most concrete manifestations of purpose -- the courses of action requiring the allocation of time, effort, and resources by the Armed Services (adapted from Burgess, 1973A, p. 44).

Burgess (1973A, p. 46) uses the following diagram (reproduced here) to show a design perspective as it was applied in the Latin-American desk in the Department of State.

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1Burgess (1973A, p. 14) defines this orientation as Mission Research -- "... when the research focuses on variables subjected to social control and whose manipulation can 'change things' and hence guide social intervention."
U.S. National Interests

U.S. national interests are those broad areas of national concern to which the U.S. has devoted effort and resources. They reflect the aims and purposes of the nation. Interests are preserved or advanced but they are not, like goals or objectives, achieved. The list of U.S. interests is the starting point for the CASP analysis in all Latin American countries and provides a basis for comparisons between countries or in the same country at different points in time.

Goals

Goals refer to conditions achievable in a time frame extending beyond FY 3. They represent conditions that, if realized, would advance or preserve U.S. interests. The U.S. will seldom be the sole contributor to the achievement of a goal. Goals will often relate to conditions toward which the host country, third countries, international institutions, and/or private investors direct their efforts as well.

Objectives

Objectives are conditions which are likely to be achieved in a fiscal year through the conduct of one or more U.S. courses of action. Achieved objectives represent progress toward the attainment of one or more specific goals.

Course of Action (COA)

A course of action is a broad initiative or step to be carried out by an agency or agencies in order to accomplish or to contribute to the achievement of a primary objective. Courses of action may be broken down into discrete program elements or projects in each agency's subsequent program budget. It is the collection of related activities to which the phrase "course of action" refers.

Figure 2

The CASP Conceptual Hierarchy
An important feature of a design perspective is in its ability to identify and stipulate specific courses of action necessary to support foreign policy. It also presents a method of evaluating both the outcome of a program as well as a system to monitor the compliance of the various bureaucracies. This research will use the latter approach since it presents a method of evaluation such that the policy-maker can analyze the bureaucratic policy actions against the stipulated policy statements. In other words, the design perspective is an attempt to match policy statements to policy actions. Defense programs are the principal focus since they are the "actionables" (Burgess, 1973A) which can be manipulated by decision-makers to achieve the goals of the Administration.

As used in the context of this chapter (see Table II), the goal statements from the Nixon Doctrine are specified in the upper left-hand corner of the page. The specific objectives supporting these goals are identified in the left-hand column. On each page, as the design perspective is elaborated, there is only one objective listed to a page. The center column specifies particular defense policies articulated by Nixon, while the right-hand column shows the courses of action required by the Armed Services to support the specific defense policies. Elaboration by a design perspective avoids much of the confusion found in the policy statements of the Nixon Doctrine by drawing statements together in some rational manner. Further, this design perspective, as presented in Table II, shows the specific policy statements made by the former
President or his key politically appointed advisers. It is these policy statements which underpin the articulation of the Nixon Doctrine and which also provide guidance to the Armed Services in supporting the goals and objectives of the doctrine.

From a national security perspective, measuring the performance and efficiency of defense programs as they contribute to the Administration's defense posture should only be an accounting problem. However, only rudimentary mechanisms are available to investigate bureaucratic policy action. This relationship of ends to means, of statement to action, has rarely been addressed in the fashion proposed in this paper.

In essence, the concept of a design perspective develops the logical consequences that flow from the former President's Foreign Policy Reports to Congress. Bobrow (1972, p. 223) argues that this type of approach, "... must specify a real world goal in terms of some act of performance requirements." With the proposed design perspective, it should be possible to establish accurate program accounting and feedback systems that might ensure more political control over the Services in their defense budget. It suggests that a mechanism is available to provide social control over the Department of Defense in meeting the foreign policy requirements of the President. Finally, it is in this context that members of the Brookings Institution (Shultz, et al, 1972, p. 39) have written:
There is no precise or automatic relationship between new conceptions of foreign policy objectives and obligations in the size of the defense budget. A redefinition of U.S. foreign policy interests is likely to change force requirements, but there are important qualifications. First, it takes time . . . a great deal of organizational inertia would have to be overcome.

But this dissertation is not specifically concerned with the overall size of the defense budget but its distributions to defense programs which support the President's policies. Gross increases or decreases in a defense budget hide the important implications of organizational responsiveness. By the use of a design perspective, it is hoped that a better analysis of defense program changes can yield insight into the responsiveness of the Services in meeting the requirements as specified by the former President.

The Nixon Doctrine: Goals

There are two goals which are articulated in the Nixon Doctrine and which support the interests of security and well-being. The first, which will not be discussed in detail, is the goal of defending the physical and territorial integrity of the United States and its possessions. This area of concern includes the allocation of limited resources to national security (the protection and survival of the U.S.), social welfare, and economic development. This goal implies both deterrence or defense against strategic
nuclear attack as well as internal security from economic depriv–
tion, want, riots, etc.

The second goal is the protection of U.S. interests abroad —
political, economic, and military. The primary rationale in the
procurement and deployment of U.S. general purpose forces is to
contribute to this protection. Roland Paul (1973, p. 198) writes:

... equally important in determining the size of our
peacetime defense forces is a perception of American
security interests abroad combined with an assessment
of the threat against those interests and the degree
to which we are willing to risk the unforeseeable.

It is this specific goal which will be analyzed in evaluating the
organizational response to the Nixon Doctrine. Of course, general
purpose forces can defend the territorial United States, but their
use would have to be in the peripheral areas since direct invasion
is a practical impossibility.

Protecting U.S. interests abroad is primarily conducted
through U.S. commitments to other nations and includes the
diplomatic-military techniques of deterrence, defense, and
compellence.\(^2\) Again, this involvement is open to value judgments
which lead to operational decisions about the means necessary to
support these endeavors. As the former President (Nixon, 1971,
p. 197) stated to Congress:

\(^2\)Deterrence, defense and compellence have exclusive, indepen–
dent meanings. Deterrence is a psychological concept that threatens
future punishment if an adversary carries out some specific act.
Defense is the act of responding to that adversary if the deterrent
threat has failed. It is the physical application of force. Com–
pellence is a physical act that attempts to alter the adversary's
present behavior — to undo what he has done or that he is attempt–
ing to do (see Schelling, 1960; George and Smoke, 1974).
It is essential that the United States maintain a military force sufficient to protect our interests and meet our commitments. Were we to do less, there would be no chance of creating a stable world structure.

It is from this intent that the strategies of partnership, negotiation, and strength are derived. Specifically, the U.S. government's capacity to protect American interests abroad, both public and private, provides incentives for bargaining between adversaries, thus supporting the strategy of negotiation. It also furthers the concept of partnership between allies as it symbolizes our commitment and preserves national power. This protection of foreign interests is designed to secure, through the support of and reliance on identified allies, an international environment congenial to the U.S.

This strategy of partnership, negotiation, and strength reflects a realistic assessment of America's impact on the world as well as the impact of the world on U.S. choices and interests. The concept of defending allies, then, becomes, to a large extent, reliant on our allies' ability to defend themselves. U.S. commitment is seen to be a partnership where each party recognizes the necessity of contributing its own particular strength. This assumes that if the allies do not have the "will" to provide for their own defense, then U.S. contributions can have little impact. Operationally, this involves a restructuring of U.S. commitments toward those areas and allies where American influence can have a measured and effective impact and where our interests are the greatest. This reinforces the focus on major power relationships
and a corresponding reduction in initiatives and actions toward Third World countries (see Pierre, 1972, p. 702; Schelling, et al., 1973, p. 85).

The Nixon Doctrine: Objectives

Four primary objectives flow from the specific goal of protecting U.S. interests abroad. They are: (1) to keep treaty commitments; (2) to provide military strength to support diplomacy; (3) to provide security assistance to allies; and (4) to provide a nuclear shield if a nuclear power threatens an allied nation (Nixon, 1971, pp. 12-14). It has been stipulated that nuclear weapons and security assistance, except as they impact on U.S. force requirements, will be ignored in order to concentrate on conventional forces. Figure I illustrates the remaining areas of concern from a design perspective. Each of these objectives relates to the national goal of protecting U.S. interests abroad. The President makes repeated allusion to this interpretation when he asserts that the primary role of these forces is to deter and, if necessary, cope with external aggression (Nixon, 1971, p. 181). By keeping treaty commitments, particularly with nations where the U.S. maintains a major interest, the Nixon Doctrine hopes to deter aggression and to defend if deterrence fails (e.g., NATO, Japan, Korea). By providing security assistance, the Nixon Doctrine hopes that the recipient countries can provide their own deterrence from external aggression. If deterrence fails, the
Protect U.S. Interests Abroad

- Keep Treaty Commitments
- Provide Security Assistance
- Provide Military Strength to Support Diplomacy

Figure 3

Stipulated Objectives of the Nixon Doctrine which Support U.S. Interests Abroad

U.S. will provide economic and military assistance as its interests dictate. In specific instances, U.S. forces may intervene to aid in the defense of these allies (e.g., Israel). By providing military strength to support diplomacy, the Nixon Doctrine hopes to provide U.S. foreign policy with the traditional instruments of coercion while providing a degree of flexibility to meet unforeseen contingencies (e.g., the Mayaguez Incident). The former President (Nixon, 1971, p. 81) has stated the U.S. will "... maintain balanced and mobile ground, sea, and air forces capable of meeting challenges to our worldwide commitments."

The Nixon Doctrine: Policies and Commitments

Each of the objectives stipulated in the Nixon Doctrine has stated or implied policies that impact directly on DoD programs and the Armed Services. These policies, grouped by objectives, are presented in Table I. While this table may not include the entire
Table 1
Policies Suggested by the Nixon Doctrine
(Aggregated by Objective)

| Keep Treaty Commitments                  | Maintain Cohesive NATO                  |
|                                         | Maintain Specific Asian Commitments     |
|                                         | Provide/Upgrade Supplemental Alliance Forces - |
|                                         | Power Projection                        |
|                                         | Improve Strategic Mobility              |
|                                         | Improve Readiness of Guards and Reserves|

| Provide Security Assistance               | Strengthen Military Capabilities of Specific |
|                                         | Allied Countries                         |
|                                         | Improve Logistical Responsiveness to Allies|
|                                         | During Conflict                          |
|                                         | Reduce U.S. Presence                     |

| Provide Military Strength to Support Diplomacy | Improve Ability to Respond                |
|                                              | Improve Visibility of Deployed Forces     |

range of policies selected by the Administration, they are extracted from the policy statements made by either the President in his annual Foreign Policy Report to Congress or the Secretary of Defense in the annual Defense Posture Statement. They are representative of the policies that provide the military instrument which supports the Nixon Doctrine.

Defense commitments denote specific undertakings in support of a particular policy. These defense commitments tend to represent fixed points in the application of the specific policy (Burgess,
1971). As the Design Perspective in Table II shows, there are multiple defense commitments which support each specific policy. As the Design Perspective stipulates, each of the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine is differentiated by the specific policies which support that objective. In turn, each of these policies is differentiated by specific defense commitments which support these policies. Finally, the defense commitments are further structured by examining defense programs which support these defense commitments. For example, on the first page of Table II, we see, in the upper left-hand corner, the specific goal which is to keep treaty commitments. The specific objective on this page is IA, to maintain a cohesive NATO. In the center column on this page, defense commitments relate to the specific policy of maintaining a cohesive NATO. These are: (1) to maintain deployed forces in NATO (IA1); (2) improve the combat power of these deployed forces (IA2); and (3) enhance the ability to reinforce these forces in NATO (IA3).

The defense programs in the right-hand column are specific service programs which are required to meet these defense commitments. In Chapter IV, these defense programs will be further broken down into operational indicators used to measure service responsiveness.

Defense Program Guidelines

Before the specific analysis of defense programs that relate to the stipulated defense commitments, it is necessary to understand the guidelines for conventional force requirements declared by the
Table 2
Design Perspectives of the Nixon Doctrine

I. TREATY COMMITMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICIES</th>
<th>DEFENSE COMMITMENT</th>
<th>DEFENSE PROGRAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IA.</td>
<td>Maintain Cohesive NATO</td>
<td>General Purpose Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IA1. Maintain deployed forces in NATO</td>
<td>IA1a. Maintain Army - USACUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IA2. Improve combat power of deployed forces</td>
<td>IA1b. Maintain Navy - 6th Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IA3. Enhance ability to reinforce</td>
<td>IA1c. Maintain Air Force-USAFE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**POLICY STATEMENTS**

... forces able to deter and defend below the threshold of general nuclear war ... this means strong and credible deployment of modernized NATO conventional forces ... capable of rapid mobilization and reinforcement ... (Nixon, 1971, p. 36).

... it [U.S. forces in Europe] links European defense to a common strategy and to the nuclear power of the United States (Nixon, 1971, p. 37).

... and in the seas on Europe's flanks--we are doing what is necessary to encourage our European allies to take a greater share of the collective responsibility (Nixon, 1971, p. 37).

I [Nixon] reaffirmed our support for the Alliance's present defense strategy, and our intentions to retain our present strength in Europe and to strengthen our NATO-committed forces (Nixon, 1971, p. 231).
I. KEEP TREATY COMMITMENTS (CONT.)

POLICIES

IA. Maintain Cohesive NATO

POLICY STATEMENTS

... the United States would maintain and improve its forces in Europe and not reduce them without reciprocal action by our adversaries (Nixon, 1971, p. 36).

Accurately or inaccurately, our allies would interpret a substantial withdrawal of American forces as a substantial withdrawal of America's commitment (Nixon, 1971, p. 37).

Our armies (in Europe) are not ends in themselves, or merely tokens of a commitment. They have a function to perform: to aid in deterrence and to defend if deterrence fails (Nixon, 1971, p. 33).

Our capabilities... must rest on our allies' strength, strong U.S. overseas forces, and the availability of credible reinforcements (Nixon, 1971, pp. 178-179).


... a strong and credible deployment of modernized NATO conventional forces... capable of rapid mobilization and reinforcement and of sustaining a successful forward defense against conventional attack (Nixon, 1971, p. 34).

... maintain and improve... forces in Europe and not reduce them without reciprocal action by our adversaries (Nixon, 1971, p. 36).

With adequate lift, this force [USAREUR] could be immediately augmented by redeployment of the U.S. dual-based units, and subsequently, by substantial additional augmentation (Laird, 1971, p. 82)

... smaller U.S. active forces, with greater emphasis to be given to their readiness and effectiveness, including modernization (Laird, 1971, p. 15).

... increased reliance on National Guard and Reserve forces (Laird, 1971, p. 15).

[maintain] a strong NATO deterrent in Western Europe, including its northern and southern flanks, against a wide range of possible Soviet and Pact initiatives... including conflict at sea (Laird, 1971, p. 19). (also see p. 23).
Table 2
Design Perspectives of the Nixon Doctrine (continued)

I. KEEP TREATY COMMITMENTS

POLICIES

1B. Maintain Specific Asian commitments

POLICY STATEMENTS

A Pacific power ourselves, our security and economic interests are inextricably involved with the future of Asia (Nixon, 1971, p. 91).

There is . . . still a need for a strong American role . . . however . . . a more restrained American approach. . . (Nixon, 1971, p. 94).


. . . we can meet our collective security objectives while placing greater reliance on our allies for their own defense (Nixon, 1971, p. 181).

It is our objective . . . to support and assist our friends and allies in Asia in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine (Richardson, 1973, p. 29).

Of continuing importance in the Pacific is our security relationship with Japan (Richardson, 1973, p. 25).

. . . the presence of some U.S. forces in the ROK will remain imperative (Richardson, 1973, p. 25).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DEFENSE COMMITMENT</th>
<th>DEFENSE PROGRAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1B1. Reduce American ground force presence in Asia</td>
<td>1B1a. Reduce army forces deployed forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B2. Reduce units alerted/ equipped for Asian contingencies</td>
<td>1B1b. Reduce/Eliminate H1's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B3. Rely on air and sea power</td>
<td>1B1c. Equip army units for mid-intensity ground war Tac Air Sqdns deployed forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1B4. Provide timely assistance</td>
<td>1B3a. Maintain naval carrier (CV) strength - 7th Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1B3b. Maintain tac air sqdns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1B4a. Maintain sufficient airlift - See Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1A3d. Improve airlift</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2
Design Perspectives of the Nixon Doctrine (continued)

I. KEEP TREATY COMMITMENTS (CONT.)

POLICIES

IB. Maintain Specific Asian Commitments

POLICY STATEMENTS

With regard to U.S. force capabilities in Asia, we do not plan for the long run to maintain separate large U.S. ground combat forces specifically oriented just to this theater, but we do intend to maintain a strong air, naval, and support capabilities (Laird, 1971, p. 77).

Under our revised strategy and the Nixon Doctrine, we would be increasingly striving to keep employment of our own ground forces to a minimum while keeping open the option to provide local ground combat forces with the required air, sea, and logistics support (Laird, 1971, p. 83).

In deterring sub-theater or localized warfare, we must be prepared to provide help as appropriate. This help would consist essentially of backup logistical support and sea and air combat support. In some special cases, it could include ground combat support as well (Laird, 1971, p. 22).

... we cannot expect U.S. military forces to cope with the entire spectrum of threats facing allies or potential allies throughout the world (Nixon, 1970, p. 127).
### Table 2
Design Perspectives of the Nixon Doctrine (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEEP TREATY COMMITMENTS</th>
<th>DEFENSE COMMITMENT</th>
<th>DEFENSE PROGRAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IC1. Provide and Upgrade Supplemental Alliance Forces</td>
<td>IC1. Provide SEA CONTROL - interposition and sea conflict</td>
<td>IC1a. Naval forces to prevent Soviet intervention in allied countries (Carrier surface attack, and attack submarine forces)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICY STATEMENTS</td>
<td>IC2. Provide SEA CONTROL - LOC protection</td>
<td>IC2b. Air ASW groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IC3. Maintain/Upgrade ground support aviation</td>
<td>IC2c. Attack Submarine ASW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IC4. Maintain ability to respond</td>
<td>IC3a. Tac Air F-15's A10's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IC5. Provide means to project power</td>
<td>IC3b. Develop rapid tac air deployment package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IC4a. Enhance airlift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IC4b. Improve readiness of reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IC4c. Rapid deployment of Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IC5a. Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Upgrade assault lift capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>IC5b. Carrier availability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The primary role of our general purpose forces is to deter and, if necessary, cope with external aggression. If aggression occurs, the use of our forces will be determined by our interests, the needs of our allies, and their defense capabilities, which we are seeking to improve (Nixon, 1971, p. 181).

A realistic deterrent against conventional attack requires a substantial forward defense capability (Nixon, 1971, p. 180).

The United States has certain interests in defending certain land areas abroad as well as essential air and sea lanes of communication (Nixon, 1970, p. 128).

Maintaining strong U.S. active forces with rapid deployment capabilities, and responsive Reserve forces, are both important factors in providing a realistic deterrent posture for the future (Laird, 1971, p. 64).

The ability of naval forces to operate at sea near potential trouble spots also provides a special capability for response and flexible presence (Laird, 1971, p. 107).

... maintain active and reserve forces which have the flexibility and readiness to respond effectively to theater conventional situations (Richardson, 1973, p. 28).
Table 2
Design Perspectives of the Nixon Doctrine (continued)

I. KEEP TREATY COMMITMENTS (CONT.)

POLICIES

IC. Provide and Upgrade Supplemental Alliance Forces

POLICY STATEMENTS

Our deterrent posture is based, in part, on our capability to deploy and support our forces abroad rapidly. This, in turn, requires that we and our allies be able to defend the air and sea approaches to various theaters in time of conflict (Richardson, 1973, p. 26).

To protect our interests, we must insure free use of international air space and free access to the world's oceans (Laird, 1971, p. 22).

. . . we intend to maintain sufficient U.S. strength and to mesh this strength with that of other nations in a new order of partnership (Laird, 1971, p. 26).

Under the Nixon Doctrine, we have, we will maintain, on we will use as necessary sea and air resources to supplement the efforts and the armed forces of our friends and allies who are determined to resist aggression . . . (Laird, 1971, p. 34).

Our naval forces form an essential part of our asset for realistic deterrence across abroad spectrum of possibilities. Since the United States has been and remains a maritime nation, a strong navy is essential (Laird, 1971, p. 81).
### Table 2

**Design Perspectives of the Nixon Doctrine (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. KEEP TREATY COMMITMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLICY</td>
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<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID. Improve Strategic Mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICY STATEMENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... maintain balanced and mobile ground, sea, and air forces capable of meeting challenges to our worldwide interests (Nixon, 1971, p. 181).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our capabilities ... rest on ... the availability of credible reinforcements (Nixon, 1971, p. 179).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... I believe that we should expand our airlift so as to enhance our ... reinforcement capability (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 95).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We have no present plans to expand our sealift capability (Schlesinger, 1975, p. III-33).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... ten brigades (army) are earmarked in our plans for early deployment in the event of a major contingency, and they are expected to have 80% of their full equipment allowances by the end of 1971 (Leird, 1971, p. 102).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our deterrent posture is based, in part, on our capability to deploy and support our forces abroad rapidly. This, in turn, requires that we and our allies be able to defend the air and sea approaches to various theaters in time of conflict (Richardson, 1973, p. 26).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2

Design Perspectives of the Nixon Doctrine (continued)

1. KEEP TREATY COMMITMENTS

POLICIES

I6. Improve Readiness of Guards and Reserves

POLICY STATEMENTS

Maintaining strong U.S. active forces with rapid deployment capabilities, and responsive Reserve forces, are both important factors in providing a realistic deterrent posture for the future (Laird, 1971, p. 84).

To improve reserve readiness, we must recognize the importance of two interrelated factors, manning levels and the availability of equipment (Laird, 1971, p. 100)

... improve [reserves] readiness with various types of association between Reserve component units and Active Army forces (Laird, 1971, p. 103).

... [expand] the use of the associated unit concept [to tactical air force reserve units] which has proved quite successful in the airlift forces (Laird, 1971, p. 104).

... increased importance for our National Guards and Reserves (Laird, 1971, p. 5).
### Table 2
Design Perspectives of the Nixon Doctrine (continued)

II. PROVIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY STATEMENTS</th>
<th>DEFENSE COMMITMENT</th>
<th>DEFENSE PROGRAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IIA.</strong> Improve Logistical Responsiveness During Conflict</td>
<td>11A1. Provide timely assistance</td>
<td>11A1a. See defense program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11A2. Maintain adequate war reserves</td>
<td>Maintain sufficient airlift</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2

**Design Perspectives of the Nixon Doctrine (continued)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II. PROVIDE SECURITY ASSISTANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLICIES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11B. Reduce U.S. Presence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### POLICY STATEMENTS

An effective security assistance program will lessen the need for and the likelihood of the engagement of American forces in future local conflicts (Nixon, 1971, p. 184).

An effective security assistance program can allow an increasing replacement of U.S. forces--particularly ground combat forces--with local forces (Laird, 1971, p. 35).

... insure our ability to sustain our deployed forces and those of our allies through control of the air and sea lanes (Laird, 1971, p. 77).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IIIB. Reduce U.S. worldwide commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IIIBa. Deployed troop strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIBb. Reduce number of U.S bases overseas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Defense Commitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defense Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IIIBa. Deployed troop strength Asia Middle East Mediterranean IIIBb. Reduce number of U.S bases overseas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2
Design Perspectives of the Nixon Doctrine (continued)

111. PROVIDE MILITARY STRENGTH TO SUPPORT DIPLOMACY

POLICIES

IIIA. Improve Ability to Respond

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY STATEMENTS</th>
<th>DEFENSE COMMITMENT</th>
<th>DEFENSE PROGRAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other deployed forces also contribute to stability and deterrence. In this context naval forces are particularly important (Laird, 1971, p. 85).</td>
<td>IIIA1. Improve reaction time of deployment</td>
<td>See programs IA3d, IC4c, ID1a, and ID1b: Readiness of Army Navy and Air Force, particularly airlift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This requires us to maintain balanced and mobile ground, sea, and air forces capable of meeting challenges to our worldwide interests (Nixon, 1971, p. 184).</td>
<td>IIIA3. Improve readiness of active forces</td>
<td>IIIA3a. Army Units See IA3d IIIA3b. Navy See IC1a IIIA3c. Air Force See IC1c See programs IA3d, IC1a, IA3c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 2
Design Perspectives of the Nixon Doctrine (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III. PROVIDE MILITARY STRENGTH TO SUPPORT DIPLOMACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLICIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIB. Improve Visibility of Deployed Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY STATEMENTS</th>
<th>DEFENSE COMMITMENTS</th>
<th>DEFENSE PROGRAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IIIB1. Show US flag in foreign posts</td>
<td>IIIBla. Maintain large surface Navy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IIIB1b. Provide Base Rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IIIB1c. Visiting Rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
former President. Nixon (1971, pp. 178-179) pointed out:

Our [conventional] capabilities . . . must rest on our allies' strength, strong U.S. overseas forces, and the availability of credible reinforcements. We could not hide deficiencies from a potential enemy; weakness in conventional forces invites conventional attack.

This guidance for conventional forces can be related to the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) categories which, for this analysis, are General Purpose Forces, Airlift and Sealift, and Guards and Reserves. The programs and subprograms may be related in the PPB system to the aforementioned commitments. These general purpose forces consist of the conventional combat capabilities of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Within limited ranges, these forces can contribute to deterrence, defense, and compellence. Former President Nixon (1971, pp. 177-178) recognized the growing threat from a possible conventional war with the Soviets when he wrote:

With this shift in strategic realities [SALT and MAD], our potential adversaries may be tempted by the use of the threat of force below what they consider the level of general nuclear war. General purpose forces, therefore, play a larger role in deterring attacks than at any time since the nuclear era began.

These conventional forces contribute, if trained and deployed in sufficient quality and quantity, to deterrence of a Soviet option for a conventional attack on NATO. Finally, these forces can be used in a compellent role for minor, and perhaps major, contingencies. By maintaining conventional forces in the Continental United States (CONUS), flexibility is added to the diplomatic/military strategies that are adopted by an administration.
General purpose forces, when stationed abroad, are a credible guarantee of America's commitment. As the Congressional Quarterly (1970, p. 21) points out:

The stationing of U.S. forces abroad is a clear indication of U.S. commitments to the defense of foreign nations. Senate Foreign Relations Chairman, J. W. Fulbright, described troops stationed abroad as, . . . a de facto commitment to use those forces in the event of an outbreak in hostilities.

For the purposes of this research, "forces stationed abroad" would include only those forces organized for combat operations (i.e., units structured for combat operations); Military Advisory Assistance Groups (MAAGs) will not be considered since their role is training and not combat; they are not usually perceived as a commitment to combat. The Congressional Quarterly (1970, p. 22) gives the following deployment of U.S. combat forces as of September 1969.

Changes in these deployments are critical under the Nixon Doctrine since the Nixon Doctrine has a principle focus in NATO and a secondary focus in Northeast Asia. Other deployments, according to the Nixon Doctrine, are to be substantially reduced.

A final consideration for general purpose forces in underpinning the guidance of the Nixon Doctrine is their own mobility. This mobility should not be confused with the specific Defense program of Strategic Mobility. In this case, naval and air force units have a clear superiority over army ground units. The ability to signal intentions to opponents is enhanced by the mobility of a carrier task force or by the deployment of several squadrons of tactical air force fighters to a region or a country where the U.S.
### Table 3

**U.S. Force Deployments, 1969**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Troop Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asia and Pacific</strong></td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Vietnam</td>
<td>508,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>49,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nationalist China</td>
<td>10,000 (primarily MAAG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>738,000 men</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western Europe</strong></td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>228,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>82,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>320,000 men</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Middle East and Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>10,000 (primarily MAAG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forces at Sea</strong></td>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
<td>95,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mediterranean</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>120,000 men</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
has national interests as a means of supporting U.S. diplomacy. For example, the deployment of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea during the Jordanian crisis of 1970 suggested an intention to become involved if Syria did not pull back from its combat operations in Jordan. Here, the positioning of our forces was designed to deter the Syrians from accomplishing their objective. The compellent was never invoked.

**Program Requirements by Service**

Since the intention of this research is to examine Service responsiveness to the policy requirements of the President, it is first necessary to group these requirements as they are levied on the Services. These Service programs can be "factored" by compatible mission requirements to aid analysis. For example, the U.S. Army meets its NATO obligations (i.e., to maintain a cohesive NATO) by the forward deployment of active army units to Germany and Italy, by maintaining responsive active and reserve units in CONUS, and by increasing the combat power of these units by preparing them to fight in a mid-intensity war. The programs for each Service can be "factored" in a similar manner. The following table shows the Program-Mission breakout for each Service.

---

3 Thus, the paper can focus on the problem of achieving mission requirement (macro-analysis) rather than analyzing each individual program (micro-analysis). In this area of military capabilities, macro-level data is more available in published sources than micro-data. This problem becomes meaningful if one wants to disseminate the logic of the design perspective rather than achieving precision in evaluating service responsiveness.
Table 4

Program-Missions by Service

ARMY

NATO Mission
IA1a  Maintain USAEUR
IA3a  Upgrade readiness of active CONUS Army units
IC4c  Upgrade rapid deployment capability
IB1c  Orient equipment/training to mid-intensity war

Guards/Reserves Mission
IA3f  Upgrade readiness of Guards/Reserves
IE1a  Decrease mobilization time for Guards/Reserves
IE2a  Modernize Guards/Reserves equipment

Asian Mission
IB1a  Reduce units trained/equipped for Asian contingencies
IB1b  Reduce Headquarters units stationed in Asia
IIB1a  Reduce Asian presence of stationed Army units
IIIA2a  Reduce forward deployment of Army units in Asia

NAVY

NATO/Mediterranean Mission
IA1b  Maintain combat power/effectiveness of 6th Fleet
IA3b  Maintain combat power/effectiveness of 2nd Fleet
IIIA2c  Maintain Carrier Task Force availability

Pacific/Indian Ocean Mission
IB3a  Maintain combat power/effectiveness of 7th Fleet
IB3a  Maintain combat power/effectiveness of 3rd Fleet
IIIA2c  Maintain Carrier Task Force availability

Power Projection Mission
IC2b  Maintain carrier and surface ASW capability
IIB1b  Maintain logistic bases and forward deployment
IIIB1b  Maintain Base Rights agreements
IIIA2b  Upgrade Marine FMF/MAF capabilities
ID3b  Add Seabased assault capabilities FDL's and LHA's

Naval Strategies-Visibility
IC1a  Maintain ability to provide interposition
IIB1a  Upgrade world wide visibility — surface ships
IC2c  Reduce numbers of attack submarines purchased
IIB1c  Develop extensive visiting rights
Table 4
Program—Missions by Service (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Activity Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3g</td>
<td>Upgrade readiness of Naval Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE2b</td>
<td>Modernize Naval Reserve -- modernize Marine Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sealift Mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3c</td>
<td>Maintain Sealift for Marine deployment forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID3a</td>
<td>Retire sea cargo lift by age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3b</td>
<td>Modernize amphibious lift capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIR FORCE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA1c</td>
<td>Maintain USAFE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA2c</td>
<td>Increase deployable combat power (prepositioned equipment and precision guided munitions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3c</td>
<td>Readiness of TAC (CONUS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC3a</td>
<td>Upgrade close air support F4's and A-10's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIA3c</td>
<td>Upgrade readiness TAC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC3b</td>
<td>Develop rapid deployment packages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA2c</td>
<td>Increase deployable combat power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB2b</td>
<td>Maintain forward deployed combat power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB3b</td>
<td>Maintain TAC air units forward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC3a</td>
<td>Upgrade close air support (particularly liaison with allies for supplemental forces as reinforcement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIA3c</td>
<td>Readiness TAC reinforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC3b</td>
<td>Develop rapid deployment package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards/Reserves Mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3h</td>
<td>Improve readiness Guards/Reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID1b</td>
<td>Increase aircraft utilization rates in crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE2c</td>
<td>Modernize equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift Mission</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3d</td>
<td>Improve airlift capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB4a</td>
<td>Maintain airlift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC4a</td>
<td>Maintain airlift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID1a</td>
<td>Increase airlift capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID1b</td>
<td>Increase aircraft utilization rates in crisis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The substance for analysis in Chapter IV is found in this table. The analysis in Chapter IV will relate these program-missions to operational indicators for measurement and then for analyzing organizational responsiveness.

**Defense Programs and the Design Perspective**

The defense programs are the means underpinning the Nixon Doctrine. This design perspective, as presented in Tables II and III, demonstrates the ends-means relationship stated by the Administration and the requirements of the Armed Services in meeting some of the national security goals of the nation. From this design perspective, the various defense program elements -- the "actionables" (Burgess, 1973A) -- which can be manipulated by the decision-makers, can be ascertained and ultimately measured to discover if the defense establishment is being responsive to the Executive. In essence, the goals and objectives of the Nixon Doctrine are the strategic issues of the Administration's foreign policy, while the structural issues are the defense programs necessary to fulfill the strategic requirements.

The ends to means relationship has rarely been addressed in the fashion proposed in this research. The concept of a design perspective develops the logical consequences that flow from the President's public policy statements to Congress. From this perspective, it should be possible to establish accurate program accounting and feedback systems, a type of control theory that would ensure more political control over the Armed Services and
their defense budgets. The evaluation of these defense programs is the substance of this dissertation. The analysis will be presented in Chapter IV.
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

An analysis of organizational response to the Nixon Doctrine requires testing of the empirical data on budget and force deployment programs requested by the Services. The questions of policy and programs formulated in the previous chapter suggest a simple design strategy aimed at program evaluation and not at the policy process itself. The analysis of the data presented here will use elementary, descriptive statistical techniques. This type of analysis also requires a statement of elaboration to suggest methods which reduce the confounding influences of exogenous variables to manageable proportions; or, at the least, present the reader with the opportunity to examine alternative explanations of the behavior described in this research. Finally, the totality of this analytic enterprise will be related to the initial discussions of the efficacy of using a design strategy in the evaluation of organizational response.

Quasi-Experimental Design: Philosophy

The utility of a quasi-experimental design in the evaluation of policy action to policy outcome has been suggested elsewhere (Campbell, 1972) as a viable analytic technique. It is suggested
here that an empirical evaluation of policy statement to bureaucratic action is also a viable use of the quasi-experimental design. Specifically, the use of a quasi-experimental design is offered as a technique to evaluate organizational responsiveness to the policy statements of the Nixon Doctrine. If we assume that Presidential policy statements give guidance and direction to the thrust of the nation's foreign policy, then we can suggest policy statements as a primary cause of organizational behavior. The entire concept of organizational accountability under the principles of democracy suggests that policy should guide action and that organizations are, to some degree, responsive to their leaders.

If policy statements guide action, then it can be suggested, at least temporally, that statements cause action. As Blalock (1961, p. 11) argues:

The concept of cause may be used in a narrow sense of a force coming from outside the system understudy. Presumably, an outside force acts upon the system and produces a response of some kind.

In this instance, the Armed Services can be stipulated as being the system under investigation while the Nixon Doctrine is suggested to be the outside force. What this research examines is the organizational response to this "outside force."

**The Quasi-Experimental Design: Conditions**

If the Nixon Doctrine is a postulated cause of change in the behavior of the Armed Services, then it is necessary to establish criteria which are available for evaluating the observed changes in
organizational action. This suggests a pre-test, post-test design.

An interrupted time-series design seems to be the most appropriate test in a non-experimental design in which there is no control over the independent and dependent variables. Caporaso (1973, pp. 18-19) states:

This design is appropriate to data distributed over time . . . and where there is theoretical reason to believe that some events should cause a change in the behavior of the series. Stated in more precise terms, this design involves (1) periodic measurement or observation of some variable at equally spaced points in time; (2) the occurrence of an event somewhere on the series; and (3) the assumption that the event occurred midway between two selected measurement points. Finally, this design involves a critical evaluation of results in the light of those hypotheses which pose the greatest threat to the hypothesized relationship.

The second condition is the easiest to meet. It is the occurrence of the Nixon Doctrine, as a possible cause of change, somewhere on the time series. While the elaboration of the Nixon Doctrine occurred over a substantial time frame, from the Guam Declaration (Nixon, 1969) through the last Foreign Policy Report to Congress (1973), its specific enunciation was quite limited in a temporal sense (the Guam Declaration, the 1970 Foreign Policy Report, and the FY 1971 Defense Posture Statement). These three foreign policy statements contained the principal thrust of Administration policy.

The first and third conditions require more detailed analysis. The third condition, the assumption that events occurred midway between two selected points, is stipulated to fall between two distinct administrations, each having distinct philosophies and
policies concerning foreign affairs. While this is inadequate in a temporal sense, it seems reasonable to examine the first term defense budgets of succeeding administrations as connected in a temporal sense, particularly since most foreign policy changes occurred between administrations and not within an administration. It is further assumed that most presidents make their major policy impact early in their administrations; thereafter, most defense program adjustments tend to be incremental (see Crecine and Fischer, 1973 for an elaboration of this thesis).

The first condition, that variables are measured at equally spaced points in time, is met by examining several dependent variables (budgets and deployments) by Services. The suggested time periods for the pre-test will be FY 1962-1965 which includes the first Kennedy-Johnson presidential terms. The post-test period will be FY 1971-1975 -- the first Nixon term and prior to his resignation. Selecting these years eliminates many of the confounding problems of budget and force changes which occurred as a result of the war in Vietnam. For example, Army units in Europe were maintained at lower strength due to the manpower requirements of Vietnam (FY 1966-FY 1971). Without developing a baseline criteria function, the period FY 1962-1965, the impact of reestablishing older Manning levels might lead to erroneous conclusions. It is suggested that most of the variables investigated will produce similar results. In fact, the two-and-one-half war strategy of Kennedy and the one-and-one-half war strategy of Nixon are particular instances of defense guidance stated early in each
administration. Consequently, this research establishes the first Kennedy-Johnson presidential term as its pre-test criteria function. Finally, these data points include the first defense budget which gave planning and policy control to new administrations.

While the conditions which Caporaso (1973) describes do not exist in a pure form, nevertheless this brief examination suggests that most of the necessary elements are present to do a simple pre-test and post-test quasi-experimental design. There are periodic measurements at equally spaced points in time; i.e., fiscal years. The event occurred between two distinct administrations which are separated in a philosophical and temporal sense. And the event, the Nixon Doctrine, occurred somewhere along this series. Yet, there continue to be difficulties with the time-series FY 1966-1970. It is here that a critical examination of alternative hypotheses will be made so as to assess the overall impact of the Nixon Doctrine. Of course, the difficulty with this period is that the available data cannot differentiate Vietnam and non-Vietnam cost, personnel strengths, or force deployments. Consequently, this research has adopted the position that it is possible to compare the first terms of succeeding administrations as well as examining those factors in the period FY 1966-1970 which might have an impact on Service behavior in the Nixon years.

The Quasi-Experimental Design: Structure

Since this study emphasizes the time-series design, its structure needs to be examined in more detail. Campbell and Stanley (1963, p. 170) stress that:
The essence of the time-series design is the presence of a periodic measurement process on some group or individual and the introduction of some experimental change into this time series of measurements, the results of which are indicated in the measurements recorded in the time series.

It can be diagrammed thus:

\[ \theta_1 \theta_2 \theta_3 \theta_4 \theta_5 \theta_6 \theta_7 \theta_8 \]

The "\(0_1-\theta_n's\)" are the dependent variables under examination, referred to as the "conditions" or observations and are temporally spaced. In this research the conditions are program allocations and force deployments of the three Armed Services over time (in fiscal years). The "\(X\)" is the treatment — in this case the Nixon Doctrine. To reject the hypothesis that the Nixon Doctrine had an effect on the defense establishment requires no significant change in the programs over time or changes in directions contrary to that suggested by the Nixon Doctrine.

Graphically, the following presentation of data should demonstrate the direction of this analytic strategy. This hypothetical graph displays the periodic measurement (in fiscal years) of some stipulated variable — the condition — at equally spaced points in time (\(t_{62}-t_{65}; t_{71}-t_{75}\)) and the occurrence of the treatment at some generalizable midpoint in the time series. Also displayed are the means (\(\overline{X}_A\) and \(\overline{X}_B\)) of the data sets which are separated by the treatment. There remains the problem, however, that the data presented in this set is discontinuous. That is, the non-observations (\(N_k\)) may have some impact on the validity of the
Figure 4
Hypothetical Display of Data Points

--- Mean ($\bar{x}$).

--- Trend

$X_n$, other possible treatments
quasi-experimental design. Unfortunately, there is no experimental design which can handle this type of discontinuous data unless the assumptions are relaxed somewhat. In this case, this research has previously argued that the Nixon Doctrine was a break with the earlier philosophies underpinning U.S. foreign policy. Further, the pre-test years are established as criteria which reflect the philosophy of worldwide containment and the two-and-one-half war strategy. If the Nixon Doctrine changed the philosophical approach to foreign policy away from containment and to a one-and-one-half war strategy, then the defense programs should have changed accordingly. Obviously, there are multiple confounding events which occurred prior to, during, or after the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine which might have effects on Service behavior exclusive of Nixon's policy statements. These are addressed in the following section.

Elaboration/An Appraisal of Confounding Events

Confounding factors in this type of quasi-experimental design must be met early on so as to provide credence and validity to an evaluation of organizational responsiveness. For these confounding factors to be relevant to this analysis, they must compete with the Nixon Doctrine as the most potent treatment. That is, the alternative conditions may be promoted as major hypotheses to explain Service behavior. Further, if this latter case should hold, then ascribing the Nixon Doctrine as the most relevant treatment would be
considered spurious. Hyman (1955, p. 256) describes spuriousness as it applies to situations where a variable other than the apparent explanation was found to have produced the observed effect, providing the other variable is not an intrinsic part of the developmental sequence which produces the apparent explanation.

Campbell and Stanley (1963, p. 210, also pp. 175-176) suggest that these confounding factors can be separated into internal and external sources of invalidity. They argue that, "... the problem of internal validity boils down to the question of plausible competing hypotheses that offer likely alternative explanations of the shift in the time series other than the effect of X (1963, p. 209)." External validity is only concerned with questions of generalization; "... like the questions of inductive inference, it is never completely answerable ... ." (Campbell and Stanley, 1963, p. 175.)

This study will not be concerned with questions of external validity. External validity is only necessary when we wish to generalize from a subset of a population to the entire population, those instances where inductive statistics are necessary. In this research we will be dealing with the universe of data; no inferential statistics are necessary (see Tufte, 1969).

Internal validity, on the other hand, concerns possible extraneous events or competing hypotheses that might confound analysis; they include the following (from Campbell and Stanley, 1963, pp. 175-176; also Campbell, 1972).
(1) History: Events other than the treatment occurring in the time series.

History refers to discrete events which might have impact on the policy process. Obviously, certain types of foreign policy events may have an effect on defense allocations and force deployments, both in areas of distribution and redistribution of federal funds. These might include the effects of the Vietnam War on the mood and disposition of Congress, the Sino-Soviet split, detente with the Soviets including SALT, rapprochement with the Chinese, various international crises, and changes in Soviet and Chinese defense spending. To ascertain if the Nixon Doctrine had more impact on Service behavior than any one of these events or any combination of these events is, indeed, difficult.

However, if our knowledge of bureaucratic politics offers any guidance, it would be that the Services probably perceived each of these events differently and, without the policy statements of the former President as a focus, most Services probably would have responded to each stimuli in a differing fashion. For example, the Air Force might have reacted to public criticism of the Vietnam War by reasserting its traditional strategic deterrent mission. The Navy, on the other hand, might have found it difficult to neglect its traditional Pacific Ocean mission. In its reaction to Vietnam, the Army might have responded by rejecting counter-guerrilla warfare, emphasizing its NATO mission.

However, the Nixon Doctrine attempted to focus on a specific set of events which were deemed critical to U.S. foreign policy at
the time. Nixon, most probably, attempted to divert a growing
sense of "isolationism" by selecting policies which the public and
Congress could support and which emphasized specific missions and
programs for the Armed Services. Essentially, the Nixon Doctrine
gave direction to the Services as they attempted to respond to
numerous events in the international and domestic areas that
occurred between FY 1966 and FY 1970.

(2) Maturation: Processes within various social units which
produce change as a function of organizational constraints,
"rules of the game," and governmental processes.

Maturation differs from history in that maturation is continuous and
process-oriented rather than discrete. The entire question of
organizational responsiveness under conditions of bureaucratic
conflict and cooperation is a substantial problem. For example,
Melvin Laird's "peace treaty" with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCF),
as well as the JCS learning the efficacy of unity on specific
defense issues during the McNamara years, are examples of maturation
(see Beecher, 1969; also Hessman, 1969).

One of the most obvious and most controversial maturation
effects is the mood and disposition of Congress. Since the two
Houses have a strong voice in DoD appropriations and since they can
act as a sounding board for the individual Services, the Congress
has the capacity to alter force deployments, change defense appropri-
ations, and approve treaties. However, as Robinson points out (1972),
Congress tends to be more reactive in the foreign policy area than
creative.
Maturation, then, refers to the effects of the treatment of other groups, most notably Congress, and the consequent effects of these groups on the Services. This suggests a debate which examines the nature of the international environment, America's role in the international system and, finally, the goals and objectives of U.S. foreign policy. The rationale of this debate would be to reach a consensus on the foundations of policy. Nixon (1971, p. 234) asked for such a debate, but it was never fully conducted.

This type of maturation suggests a political intersection of Congress and the Executive Branch — the politics of national security. Here the focus tends to cluster on the impact of Congress on Service behavior. For these maturation effects to be paramount, the Services would need to be more responsive to Congress, or some other group, than to the President. Alternatively, it might be that Congress so constrained the President that he was unable to implement his own programs effectively.

Maturation further suggests the impact of organizational politics and process on the organizational outcome — Service behavior. From this perspective, maturation refers to the "hauling and pulling" of key Administration officials, particularly the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Services, as each attempts to impart new foreign policy directions on the Defense establishment. As with all maturation processes, these actions should be continuous and process-oriented. The research contends that most of the key Administration officials attempted to implement
the Nixon Doctrine. Further, the centralization of foreign policy and defense decision-making in the National Security Council (NSC) assisted the politically appointed officials while reducing the organizational impact of the bureaucracies.

Maturation also emphasizes organizational processes in that all bureaucracies tend to routinize and defend procedures and missions. Organizations fight to retain their autonomy and budgets. This organizational process paradigm — Model II (Allison, 1971) — offers possible alternative hypotheses in that the Services might attempt to circumvent the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine so as to maintain their traditional missions and budgets. For example, the Navy should be reasonably satisfied with the Nixon Doctrine since a naval strategy is its major component. The Army, on the other hand, might view the foreign policy and budgetary direction of the Nixon Doctrine as threatening.

Essentially, it can be argued that the Nixon Doctrine, as a "blueprint" for the Services, focused attention on specific goals, policies, and programs. The Services were to then respond to these policy statements. Nixon, in this context, attempted to incorporate within the overall development and management of the Nixon Doctrine those conditions of history and maturation which were perceived as essential to U.S. foreign policy.

Data and Judgment Criteria

The design perspective presented in Chapter II interprets the Nixon Doctrine by assigning directional changes to program elements.
The directional component can be derived from three perspectives which should be relevant to this research: (1) Service requests of DoD; (2) DoD requests of OMB; and (3) Presidential budget requests to Congress. However, most of these data are unavailable; this research is left with analyzing the historical data contained in the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) and other available sources on budgets, equipment, and force deployments. Congressional actions essentially have been omitted from this stage of the analysis. For example, Congressional inputs to a complete explanation of organizational behavior are an important, but exceedingly complex, element that will not be included.

Changes in pre-test and post-test mean values will be the prime indicator of support or rejection. That is, since this dissertation is using a simple design strategy with a lack of sophisticated data, the sign of the change will be the most relevant criteria for evaluation of program responsiveness. However, the magnitude of change will also be evaluated for its impact for ascertaining organizational responsiveness.

Specifically, the test of support or rejection of the hypothesis that the President has an impact on the bureaucracy requires calculation of the difference and direction of change of the means, pre-test to post-test. Specifically, \( \text{diff} = \bar{X}_B - \bar{X}_A \) will be the equation for evaluation. Based on the specific policy choices elucidated in the Nixon Doctrine (from Chapter II), defense programs either increase or decrease as based on the hypothesized relationships.
Quasi-Experimental Design as an Ideal

While many of the elements of a quasi-experimental design are present in the analysis, there are multiple problems in achieving an ideal design with these data and this time period. The major problem encountered with this type of design is the problem of internal validity. To overcome this problem one needs to achieve control over the multiple confounding extraneous variables that can jeopardize internal validity (according to Campbell and Stanley, 1963, p. 177). It is practically impossible to do this very well in this area of research. One has very gross data, these data cover a very short time frame, many events are difficult to relate to policy decisions, and it is difficult to control for the impact of the process; e.g., how much do the Services anticipate DoD reactions, how much do DoD and OMB anticipate Congressional reaction, and how much does a program deferred by Congress impact on future requests?

Actually, there are better experimental designs, such as the Pre-test-Post-test Control Group Design (Campbell and Stanley, 1963, p. 183), that eliminates many of these problems. Unfortunately, the reality of this situation does not allow the use of this design since it is impossible to establish a control group in the defense establishment that is not affected by executive decisions, nor should we want one.

Summary

This chapter has argued that a time-series, quasi-experimental design is an appropriate technique for analysis. While it has been
suggested that there is a certain lack of rigor in this type of analysis, specific areas have been highlighted where supplemental research might be necessary so as to examine rival hypotheses.

Quite obviously, several problems appear when the years FY 1966-FY 1970 are omitted. Historical factors are compounded — such as U.S./PRC rapprochement, effects of Vietnam, SALT, etc. — as well as various maturation factors. The following chapter analyzes Service response to the Nixon Doctrine. Chapter V assesses these results by examining these rival hypotheses which might compete with the Nixon Doctrine as the most potent explanation of Service behavior.

In spite of all these disclaimers, it is still necessary to remember that observation is still the cornerstone of science.

Abraham Kaplan (1964, p. 146) has argued:

Observation remains basic to all science, but not all observation must be carried out by fully developed experimentation. This is as true for physical and biological science as for behavioral science.

If the impact of organizational response to the ends-means relationship is brought into focus, then this research will have made a contribution.
CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSIVENESS

Introduction

Organizational responsiveness to Presidential policy statements can be evaluated by the analysis of program decisions that are made by the armed services. This responsiveness will be measured by how well each service meets the defense program criteria established in the Design Perspective (Table 2) and the Mission-Programs of the Services (Table 4). These defense programs have operational indicators which can be analyzed to ascertain the degree of organizational response to the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine. These program indicators will be analyzed by a quasi-experimental time series design. Since the design perspective already presents a direction of change for each defense program (i.e., increase, enhance, reduce, etc.) from earlier administrations (1962-1965), no hypotheses will be presented. Directions of program change will be...

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1If this design perspective were to be used "in house" by a President, more precise data and analysis would be available and, ostensibly, more Presidential control over the force structure would be the result. Detailed analysis of internal DoD documents, specifically the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) and the Amended Program Decision Memorandum (APDM) which change the FYDP would yield greater insights into service responsiveness but are not available from published literature.
presented in tables which specify service operational indicators. It is felt that if there is change in the stipulated direction, then there is some evidence that the services are being responsive. If there is no change, or change is opposite to the stipulated direction, then there is evidence that the service or services are not being responsive to the President.

This chapter will stipulate the operational indicators (budgets, manning levels, force deployments, etc.) necessary to evaluate the services' responses to the policy guidelines set forth in the Nixon Doctrine. Since there are multiple indicators that can be associated with each program, and since there is the problem that the more detailed the analysis the more restricted and unavailable the data, research will primarily focus on the "macro" indicators. There also will be an attempt to develop the "micro" indicators for the specific programs. But this will be incidental to the main analytic thrust of this dissertation.2

The scope of the analytic effort can be described as the analysis of fourteen program-missions consisting of 51 programs that are represented by some 105 operational indicators. Since this effort is so complex, the format consisting of Tables 5, 8, and 10 will stipulate and define the operational indicators. The operational indicators for each service will be presented followed by an

2 For example, operations and maintenance costs (in constant dollars) over time for the Sixth Fleet will give one impression of the readiness of naval forces assigned to the Mediterranean mission. However, these figures are not available.
analysis and a general summary. The chapter will conclude by pulling together all of the summaries and offering conclusions as to the services' responsiveness.

ANALYSIS - ARMY

Requirements

The Nixon Doctrine stresses a principle commitment to NATO and a secondary commitment to Northeast Asia — both areas of high U.S. national interests. It has been in these locations where U.S. ground forces have been deployed so as to provide a deterrent to possible aggression. However, the threat in these locations can be differentiated.

In NATO, where the adversary is the Soviet Union, general purpose forces must possess sufficient combat power to withstand the attrition associated with the modern battlefield (as so vividly demonstrated in the 1967 and 1973 wars in the Middle East). The tactical configuration of Army units under these circumstances should be high in combat units and modest in support units; that is having a high "tooth-to-tail" ratio. In Korea, where the 2nd U.S. Infantry Division is currently deployed, the primary threat is a less sophisticated, predominantly infantry force; attrition of equipment in a conflict here should be less severe. In either case, the Army can rely on the host country's logistical infrastructure for some support. Essentially, it can be suggested that the
"tooth-to-tail" ratio\textsuperscript{3} should increase in response to NATO and Asian missions.

The current division structure with its initial support increment (ISI) has sufficient logistics — ammunition, petroleum, etc. — to sustain combat for thirty to ninety days, depending on the adversary and the nature of the war. This should be sufficient in a situation that has implications of escalation to nuclear war — the flexible response doctrine.\textsuperscript{4} If the Army followed the former President's guidance, then there should be an increase in the combat power of deployed units so they may effectively defend until reinforced or until the war is escalated by the use of tactical and theater nuclear weapons. Without an effective initial defense for the German border or along the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the probability of successful reinforcement is reduced and the risks increased.

The guards and reserves policies stem much from domestic political considerations as from rational attempts to develop

\textsuperscript{3} This can be measured by using the concept of the "division slice"; this figure is obtained by dividing airborne manpower by the number of active divisions. The lower the "slice", the higher the combat power or the higher the "tooth-to-tail ratio".

\textsuperscript{4} This is consistent with a short war strategy; it provides sufficient defense, plus some reinforcements from the U.S. to support serious diplomatic negotiations before resorting to escalation.
their utility to provide substance to the defense policies of the Nixon Administration. However, the guard and reserve forces are defined (Laird, 1971, p. 23) as being instrumental in the overall force posture. But, with reliance on a conventional deterrent strategy that requires active forces, the overall utility of these forces is placed into question. If the mobilization time of these units is long, then one cannot count on their ability to deter or defend. They cannot, by their definition, compel. If the mobilization time is to be short, then increased readiness, equipment inventories and training, must be high. Further, since the mobilization times for divisional sized units, with their logistical base, is long, we should expect that reliance will be placed on the smaller combat units such as brigades. 

In summary, the Nixon Doctrine suggests that the Army will be oriented to NATO first and Korea second. There are no other major missions emphasized. As a result of this orientation, the Army should be preparing for the high intensity battlefield in

5 An army division, active or reserve, is about 16,000 men. An additional support increment of 16,000 is required for limited combat operations. Roughly 32,000 troops are required for deployment of a divisional sized unit. To generate this capability in the reserves requires an amalgam of several units that have not trained together. Consequently, their expected utility, over a short duration is low. On the other hand, brigade sized units of roughly 3,000 men can be trained and equipped in one geographic location. This lowers the required alert time. Obviously, before one can make a decision on unit sizes, the choice of a long or short war-fighting strategy has to be resolved.
Europe while reducing its orientation for unconventional warfare.

Operational Indicators

Three program missions have been identified for the analyst of Army responsiveness. Table 5 on the following pages, presents the operational indicators that are stipulated to reflect the essential thrust of the programs under investigation. In some cases, non-quantifiable indicators will be incorporated in the discussion and analysis of each program mission. A fourth category, non-specific, Army-wide criteria, reflects the overall operational orientation of the service that impacts on bureaucratic responsiveness.

Several surrogate indicators are stipulated where more adequate criteria are not available. For instance, operations and maintenance costs (O&M) per person are offered as an indicator of Army readiness. (Further, it will be used for all Services.) A more appropriate indicator would be the "unit readiness level" scores that are submitted to the Services by the separate field commanders every quarter. However, as with most indicators of readiness, these data are unavailable. By using the Congressional budget items for allocations to the procurement of equipment, missiles, and aircraft (PEMA) per person, we may infer two things. For

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6 By per person it is meant total active duty manpower, or paid Guards and Reserves personnel.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Mission</th>
<th>Operational Indicator</th>
<th>Hypothesized Direction of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Specific Army-Wide Criteria</td>
<td>Allocations to Army General Purpose Forces (GPF) as percent total Army budget</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ratio: Allocations to Operations and Maintenance (O&amp;M) Active Army to Guards and Reserves O&amp;M</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ratio: Allocation to Procurement of Equipment, Missiles and Aircraft (PEMA) Active Army to Guards and Reserves</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manning level</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Manning level per active division</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nato Mission</td>
<td>Troop strength in USAEUR</td>
<td>No change or slight increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combat Maneuver Battalions in USAEUR as percent total Army</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3a</td>
<td>Upgrade readiness of active units in continental U.S. (CONUS)</td>
<td>Number of Maneuver Battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC4a</td>
<td>Upgrade rapid deployment capability</td>
<td>PEMA per person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB1c</td>
<td>Orient/equip/train for mid-intensity war</td>
<td>O&amp;M per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operational exercises&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian Mission</td>
<td>Preposition equipment in USAEUR&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CONUS unit with forward deployed brigade&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tank procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Personnel Carrier (APC) procurement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian Mission</td>
<td>Airborne battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Special forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Increase numbers of exercises or units involved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>b</sup> Increase numbers of exercises or units involved.

<sup>6</sup>
| Alpha numeric indicator refers to programs elaborated in Table 2. |
| Non-quantifiable indicators. |
example, the value of PEMA per capita should increase as a response to Army planning for operations in a mid-intensity war; i.e., the use of tanks, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and self-propelled artillery plus the associated levels of war reserve stocks. Mid-intensity wars present a capital intensive environment, rather than a labor intensive environment typical of counter-insurgency warfare. Second, PEMA per capita can also infer equipment procurement which is designed to provide units with the Army's authorized Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), thus enhancing service readiness.

There are five stipulated operational indicators that relate to non-specific, Army-wide criteria. As displayed on Figure 5, we can observe that while the Army became smaller under the Nixon administration (reduced by 140,000 men), the divisional slices (that is, total Army manning divided by total active divisions) had not changed substantially by FY 1975. With the Army expanding to 16-1/3 divisions in CY 77-78 (Rumsfeld, 1976, pp. 103-104), the division slice will drop to approximately 48,000 per division (vice the current divisional slice of 61,000). This policy will substantially alter the tooth-to-tail ratios in favor of higher on-line

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7 Readiness is a combination of the level of unit manning, of unit equipment, of unit maintenance, and of the level of operational proficiency reflected in unit training.

8 This is a rough indicator of combat-to-support ratios in the Army. A low "divisional slice" indicates high combat ratios; less in support's high "divisional slices" indicates low combat-to-support ratios. In World War II, the divisional slice was about 40,000.
Figure 5
Trends in Army Personnel Strength

- Non-RVN Army Personnel

Source: *Statistical Abstract*, 1976
combat power. Figure 6 tells a different story. Allocations to Army general purpose forces, as compared to the total Army budget, have dropped 10.9 percentage points from the earlier Kennedy-Johnson years; in fact, if we ignore the 1970-71 Vietnam budgetary reductions, then the Army's allocations to general purpose forces have suffered tremendously.

Figure 7 shows a substantial reallocation away from the active forces to Army Guards and Reserves. Again, if we omit the effects of phasing down the Vietnam War, then the outcome is unmistakable; active Army procurement and operational funds have been sacrificed to training and equipping the Reserves. An individual might infer from this that one program mission of the Nixon Doctrine is being met; however, it is being met at the expense of the standing Army and its combat capabilities.

The NATO Mission

There are seven quantifiable and three non-quantifiable indicators that describe the Army's NATO mission. Graph IV points out that there has been no significant change in the status of USAEUR maneuver battalions, at least through 1975. More recently there have been policy changes that may effectively increase the combat capabilities of USAEUR. The Army's response to the Nunn Amendment has been the creation of two additional combat brigades.

9 The Nunn Amendment required that the Army convert 15,000 personnel from support activities to combat activities or remove these troops from Europe. The Army's response was to shift these personnel to new combat units.
Figure 6
Trends in Army Budget Allocations to General Purpose Forces

GPF Allocations
Total Army Budget

Source: FYDP 1976
Figure 7

Trends in Army Support
of the Total Force Concept

- O & M (Operations and Maintenance) -- Active/G & R
- PEMA (Procurement Active Army) -- Active/G & R

Source: FYDP 1976
Figure 8
Trends in Army Support to NATO

--- Maneuver Bns in USAEUR (U.S. Army Europe)

--- USAEUR Bns
--- Total Bns

Source: FYDP 1976
in the 7th Army. These brigades came from a reduction in support personnel assigned to Germany. This action should add approximately seven maneuver battalions to the force strength; this nets approximately 65 to 66 maneuver battalions to be stationed in Germany. Further, the increased capabilities of more recently deployed equipment (anti-tank guided missiles — ATGM's, more effective tanks, and improved munitions, etc.) make this force considerably more effective than the force deployed in the early 1960s.

The Army has been less successful in maintaining or upgrading the capabilities of active CONUS based units that are responsive to NATO. Figure 9 portrays the PEMA per person and O&M per person allocations. The post-Nixon Doctrine PEMA per person allocations have shown a drop of about 850 dollars per person (in constant dollar terms); for an Army of 780 thousand this represents a difference of some 650 million dollars for one year. This substantial drop in procurement of equipment, missiles, and aircraft suggests a serious impact on the warfighting capabilities of CONUS based units, particularly since Europe has been receiving its fill of replacements. However, war reserve stocks in Europe and CONUS have not been fully restored since the October 1973 War in the Middle East. Further, the new policy for expanding by three divisions, which are to be either tank or mechanized infantry, will exacerbate inventory shortfalls — shortfalls that existed throughout the Army as a result of rearming Israel after the 1973 War. While there exists a PEMA funding shortfall, there has been an
Figure 9

Trends in Army Readiness and Capability

- PEMA/ person
- O & M/ person

PEMA/person  O & M/person
diff = -$819    diff = +$386

Source: FYDP, May 1975
expansion of O&M per capita funds to maintain existing equipment and for an expansion of training.

There are no available quantifiable criteria to measure the rapid deployment capability of CONUS based Army units. Solutions to this problem, from the Army's perspective, have been more organizational than changes in capabilities. The Army has continued to have operational exercises that deploy several units to Germany -- the Reforger Exercises. For example, traditionally the same units have participated in these exercises; recently, some additional units have either participated or have been scheduled to participate in the future. The deployment is to forward bases in Europe where these CONUS units draw their equipment from depots that maintain unit-sets of inventories. That is, an armored battalion draws its 54 tanks in addition to other pieces of equipment from depots in Germany. Critical airlift can be diverted to more sensitive resupply capabilities. Nevertheless, the deployment time for a CONUS division is still long. (Air Force programs to deal with these problems will be discussed later.) A third method of enhancing rapid deployment is the forward basing of one brigade -- 1/3 of a CONUS based division. Ostensibly these brigards are to be rotated in peacetime; during wartime the CONUS based division will deploy to the area of the forward brigade. In summary, the Army probably has upgraded its rapid deployment capability; but there is little the Army can do to enhance the sea and air lift capabilities necessary for a rapid deployment.
The changing Soviet capabilities in Central Europe and the recent lessons of the 1973 Middle East war have impacted on the Army's procurement of tanks, APC's and ATGM's. Since the Nixon Doctrine stipulates that NATO is of central concern, then the requirements of the Army are to defeat the Soviet threat which has increased significantly over the past ten years. Not only has the Army decided to convert several infantry divisions to armored or mechanized divisions, but there has also been a substantial change in the inventory objectives (I/O) for tanks and APC's (Rumsfeld, 1976, pp. 106-108). The conventional wisdom desired from the battlefield results of the Mid-East was acknowledges the high attrition rates of capital intensive forces. Consequently, Army planners have expanded the I/O's for tanks and APC's to compensate for higher expected attrition and for the expansion to heavier forces. As the table below shows, I/O's have expanded considerably.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 1976</th>
<th>FY 1977</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>14,400</td>
<td>4,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC's</td>
<td>16,500</td>
<td>21,400</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Rumsfeld, 1966, p. 103.
However, only with increased PEMA allocations to general purpose forces can the Army expect to achieve these higher objectives. If recent past history is any guide, it is difficult to believe that these I/O's will be achieved. Yet the facilities for tank production are in the process of expanding from 70 tanks per month to just over 100 tanks per month (Rumsfeld, 1976, p. 108). At this rate, it will take over three years to meet the programmed changes to the tank I/O's; when existing shortfalls and replacement are considered, it will take appreciably longer.

If results and numbers of on-going studies and new tactical doctrines are any indication of an Army orientation toward equipping and training units to fight in a mid-intensity battlefield, then there is a definite responsiveness of Army leadership to Executive policy guidance. Below this surface is an Army orientation away from Europe (probably for political and budgetary reasons) and a leadership mesmerized with the helicopters.  

It is difficult to say categorically that the Army has been responsive in the area of preparing and equipping units for a European battlefield. Externally it seems as if they have been. Responsiveness, if we are speaking of political accountability, must be measured in terms of public actions. Hence, the Army

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This information was gleaned from conversations with members of the Army Policy Council and several members of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense.
has been responsive to its NATO mission, but only marginally and only on the surface.

**Asian Mission**

Considering the nature of the Army's presumed battlefield orientation, it seems that there has been a continued reliance on non-mechanized battalions in the force posture. About 1/3 of the existing force structure are non-mechanized combat battalions (see Figure 10). This may be a contingency force structure for applying compellence -- such as airborne and air mobile forces -- in other regions of the world. With the proposed shift of infantry divisions to mechanized divisions the percentage should improve to about 80 percent. In fact, if we examine Figure 10 we can discover that "straight leg" infantry battalions have dropped from the pre-test years; if the Vietnam troop reduction is excluded, then the mean for the Nixon years is 27 battalions, or eleven battalions of infantry less than the earlier period. Special Forces groups have not changed substantially, neither have the air assault units -- airborne and airmobile. However, these air assault units have been "upgunned" with light tanks, anti-tank armed helicopters, and ATGM's. Their use has been contemplated in mid-intensity battlefields. In the author's opinion, the battlefield conditions would not be too confenial for their effective use. Most probably, their primary use will still be a strategic reserve for non-European conflicts. All in all, there has been a reduction in units equipped and oriented for Asian contingencies. Further reductions would
Figure 10

Trends in Army Light Infantry Units

Source: FYDP, May 1975
probably reduce the flexibility that decision-makers prefer when dealing with unforeseen contingencies, or that the Army would want to allow for bureaucratic reasons.

The Army has reduced units stationed in Asia. As Figure 11 shows, U.S. Army troops stationed in Korea have been reduced to nine battalions, 2/3rds of a division less than during the Kennedy-Johnson years. While the U.S. contribution is dwarfed by the numbers of Republic of Korea troops, the U.S. presence has contributed to the deterrence of war. It also places a U.S. stake in the evolving multipower relationships in Northeast Asia. This presence represents about 6-8 percent of the maneuver battalions in the total Army and approximately three percent of the manpower. To summarize, the Army has been responsive to its Asian mission.

Guards and Reserves Mission

Regardless of the logic of upgrading the capabilities of the Army Guard and Reserves forces in a "strategy of realistic deterrence," the Army has been required under the Nixon Doctrine to rely on Guards and Reserves in fulfilling its worldwide mission. As Figure 12 shows, there has been an increasing emphasis on the operations and maintenance and on the procurement of equipment for the Guard and Reserve force. The overall strength of paid members has changed by about 2,000 members (mean value) over the two periods in question. These allocations have probably increased the readiness and combat capabilities of
Figure 11

Trends in the Number of Army Maneuver Battalions in Korea

Source: FYDP, May 1975
Figure 12
Trends in Readiness and Capability
Army Guards and Reserves

$600/cap
\bar{x} = 430
\bar{x} = 538

$400/cap

$200/cap
\bar{x} = 172
\bar{x} = 224

Source: FYDP
Statistical Abstract
the Reserve forces, but substantial equipment shortfalls do exist, as they do in the active Army.

To reduce mobilization times, selected units have been assigned to active Army divisions. These are the "Round Out" units. Under this plan, these reserve brigades train with the active division; and during mobilization, these units will be the third combat brigade of the division. Since these smaller units have shorter mobilization times, their combat readiness is, in theory, enhanced. That is, smaller units can be centrally located for training, etc., divisional sized guard and reserve units cover several states and can never train together.  

Several of these round out units have or will participate in the Reforger exercises to reinforce Germany. Finally, these units have a priority on equipment and personnel fills in peacetime.

Summary

The Army's responsiveness to the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine has been selective. Overall the Army has been more responsive to the policy requirements of its Asian mission and its guards and reserves mission. There has been a substantial decrease in units stationed in Asia and there has been some reduction in the orientation to counter-insurgency warfare. The NATO mission has been the least responsive. The

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10 Essentially the Round Out units are "ready to go" in approximately 14 to 30 days; a guard division would be ready in 180 days.
### Table 7

**Army Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Operational Indicators</th>
<th>Responsive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Non-Responsive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-specific Criteria</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATO Mission</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA1d Maintain USAEUR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3a Readiness CONUS Army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC4a Upgrade deployment capability</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB1c Fight in mid intensity war</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total NATO</strong></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asian Mission</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB1a Reduce Asian Oriented Units</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB1b Reduce HQs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIC1a Reduce troops stationed in Asia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIA2a Reduce forward deployed units</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Asian</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guards and Reserve Mission</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3f Upgrade readiness</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE1a Decrease Mobilization time</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE2a Modernize equipment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall</strong></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*May not add to 100% due to rounding errors.*
Army has maintained, and even upgraded the combat capabilities of USAEUR. But upgrading the readiness and deployability of CONUS based units is complex; this complexity is shown in the spotty record of achieving the administration's policy guidelines. Yet, the ongoing activities in the Army point to an orientation toward fighting effectively on a modern battlefield. The Army has increased its reliance on and has begun to expand its inventory of tanks, APC's, ATGM's and anti-tank helicopters for a future battle with a well equipped foe. However, only the level of appropriations to general purpose forces in the near future will give an indication of how well the modernization program is going. If appropriation levels are lower than required, then the Army will have a mission requirement that it cannot fulfill. Of course, the Army must manage its resources such that general purpose forces receive a much higher percentage of the pie than has been the recent trend.

ANALYSIS - NAVY

Requirements

Except for areas where U.S. ground forces are actually deployed, the Nixon Doctrine assets that the United States will rely on the threatened country to provide the bulk of the manpower necessary for its defense. The Nixon Doctrine places great reliance on the U.S. providing complementary, high technology forces. Consequently, the priorities for the funding of
general purpose forces (GPFs) should be in the areas of tactical air power, both Navy and Air Force, and in combat ships (that add visibility to a commitment and combat power to combat deployments). This configuration allows for the effective intervention of the United States' greatest asset -- technologically sophisticated weapons systems -- while maintaining a minimum presence on the ground.

Naval general purpose forces are expected to support the Nixon Doctrine in several ways. First, surface forces can maintain the traditional role of showing the flag around the world. Second, these forces can practice the tactic of interposition: interposition refers to isolating an area from potential adversaries, such as securing the Eastern Mediterranean coast from Soviet naval presence or intervention. Finally, surface fleets can operate in support of our allies and friends without the commitment of ground combat units to a hostile area. The final commitment of tactical aircraft in Vietnam in 1972 is one example of this capability. In this instance U.S. ground troops did not directly intervene during the North Vietnamese Easter offensive. The South Vietnamese provided the ground power while the U.S. supported these operations with close air intervention under the Nixon Doctrine.

For the Power Projection Mission, the Marines are beginning to upgrade their Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) and have forward deployed several regiments of their three division force. One
MAF is stationed with the 6th Fleet and one with the 7th Fleet. An additional gackup regiment is stationed on Okinawa and one CONUS regiment assigned a contingency mission. In all, four of the nine Marine regiments should be ready for immediate use. In support of these operations the Navy has requested forward deployed logistic ships (Schlesinger, 1974, p. 165) which was rejected by Congress.

There are six specific naval program-missions and one non-specific fleetwide program to analyze in evaluating responsiveness. These programs are indicated in Table 8. Since the non-specific criteria provide a succinct overview of organizational direction, the analysis will begin here.

Non-Specific Criteria

There are two general categories of non-specific fleetwide criteria; these are indicators of overall fleet effectiveness and combat power. As the data on Figure 13 indicate, the overall effectiveness of naval warships should be substantially enhanced since the operations and maintenance (O&M) allocations per ship have almost doubled from the pre-test to the post-test period. While the O&M cost per ship have been increasing, the Navy has been retiring World War II vintage ships that required substantial maintenance funds. This should indicate that more funds are available for Navy operations, but as Figure 14 shows, Navy overseas deployments have been reduced substantially during the
### Table 8

**Navy Operational Indicators**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program - Mission</th>
<th>Operational Indicators</th>
<th>Hypothesized Direction of Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-specific Fleetwide Criteria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance (O&amp;M) per Warship</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel on Distant Deployment</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel per Total Ships Afloat</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Power</td>
<td>Procurement of Equipment, Missiles and Aircraft (PEMA)</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ship Construction</td>
<td>Increase Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surface Ships</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attack Aircraft</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Allocations to General Purpose Forces (GPF)</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO/Mediterranean Mission</td>
<td>Ship Days</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAlb Maintain Combat Power / Effectiveness of Sixth Fleet</td>
<td>Weapons oriented against threat*</td>
<td>Add cruise missile defense weapons, anti-submarine warfare weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3b Maintain Combat Power/Effectiveness 2nd Fleet</td>
<td>Add capability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IllIA2c Maintain Carrier Task Force Availability</td>
<td>Add capability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific/Indian Ocean Mission</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB3a Maintain Combat Power Effectiveness of 7th Fleet</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Porting* - Greece*</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrol Missile Ships Construction</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship Days Problem*</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare*</td>
<td>No Change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carriers Available</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier Vulnerability*</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft Capability* (F-4 v. F-14)</td>
<td>Add</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeporting - Japan*</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forward Basing - Guam*</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Diego Garcia</td>
<td>Add</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Subic Bay</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8
Navy Operational Indicators (continued)

| IB3c Maintain Combat Power/Effectiveness of 3rd Fleet | Ship Days Problems* |
| IIIA2c Maintain Carrier Task Force Availability | Carriers No Change |
| | Deployment No Change |

Power Projection

| IC2b Maintain Carrier and Surface Combat Capability | Numbers of Guns for Fire Support No Change |
| | Available Attack Aircraft No Change |
| IIIA2d Maintain Logistics Bases and Forward Deployment | Forward Basing* No Change |
| | Replenishment Capability Increase |
| IA3b Modernize Amphibious Lift Capability | Troop Lift Capability Maintain |
| IIIIB1b Maintain Base Rights Agreements | |

* Note: The asterisk indicates a metric or indicator.
Table 8  
Navy Operational Indicators (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IIIA2b Upgrade</th>
<th>Combat Capability Problems*</th>
<th>Increase deployment capability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) capability</td>
<td>Marine Personnel</td>
<td>No Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procurement of Equipment, Missiles and Aircraft (PEMA) per person</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance per person</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID3b Add Seabase Assault Capabilities</th>
<th>Harrier</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assault-Personnel Lift Capabilities</td>
<td>Surface Combatant</td>
<td>Maintain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval Strategic Visibility</th>
<th>Surface Ships</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IIIIB1a Upgrade Worldwide Visibility - Surface Ships</td>
<td>Ship Days</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8
Navy Operational Indicators (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>SS and SSN</th>
<th>Operations and Maintenance Navy and Marines</th>
<th>Operations and Maintenance Reserves Navy and Marines</th>
<th>Procurement of Equipment, Missiles and Aircraft (PEMA) Active</th>
<th>PEMA Reserves</th>
<th>Total Active General Purpose Forces (GPF)</th>
<th>Total Reserves GPF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IC2c Reduce Procurement of Attack Submarines purchased</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decrease or Maintain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIB1c Develop Extensive Visiting Rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3g Upgrade Readiness Naval Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance Navy and Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE2b Modernize Naval and Marine Reserves</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance Reserves Navy and Marines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sea Lift Mission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3c Maintain Sealift for Forward Deployment</td>
<td>Assault Lift Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID3a Retire Cargo Lift by Age</td>
<td>Cargo Ship Levels and Size</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Non-quantifiable Indicators
Figure 13

Trends in Navy Readiness (in constant dollars)

- - - - Total O & M
- - - - O & M/ship

Total O & M

\[ \text{diff} = +0.24 \times 10^9 \]

O & M per Ship

\[ \text{diff} = +1.31 \times 10^6 \]

Source: FYDP, May 1976

Navy Net Assessment, December 1975
Figure 14

Trends in Navy Distant Deployments

- Ships Deployed
- OCONUS (out of Continental U.S.) Personnel

Source: Navy Net Assessment, Dept. of Navy, December 1975
Statistical Abstract of U.S. 1976
Nixon years. A further anomaly is found in Kehoe (1975) discussion of changes in ship construction based on an analysis of World War II ships as compared to ships constructed in the 1970s. Based on five criteria, Mr. Polmar found that World War II ships had the following priorities: 1st, firepower; 2nd, propulsion; 3rd, electronics; 4th, endurance; and 5th, crew comfort. The ships of the 1970s have as their priorities: 1st, electronics; 2nd, crew comfort; 3rd, endurance; 4th, firepower; and 5th, propulsion. If we assume that the firepower and propulsion systems have the largest operations and maintenance cost, which is a reasonable assumption, it becomes more difficult to reconcile the increased O&M cost per ship in the 1970s. A possible conclusion is that Navy ships have become more effective during the Nixon period since greater O&M funds available per ship should increase their time at sea with more reliable, better maintained equipment.

Another feature of organizational effectiveness is the manning of naval warships or, more accurately, the manpower necessary to support deployed ships. The post-Vietnam personnel drawdown reduced the Navy by almost 200,000 men (see Figure 15) with an end strength in 1975 below the mean of the Kennedy-Johnson years.

Further, since the Nixon doctrine placed reliance on naval capabilities, limited intervention, and naval presence, one must wonder if the higher manning strength has been sacrificed for a reallocation of resources to capital investments such as ship
Figure 15

Trends in Navy Personnel Strength

--- Total Personnel
--- Personnel per Warship

Total Personnel: diff = 88,000
Per Warship: diff = 2770

Source: Historical Budget Data, Dept. of Navy, September 1976
construction. However, even with the present end strength, the number of naval personnel required to operate these ships has increased by 2,650 persons per ship. That is, as Figure 15 shows, the Navy required 9,970 persons to operate and maintain one warship during the pre-test period; 12,620 personnel were required for each warship during the post-test period. While it can be argued that the Navy has moved to larger ships in the post-1970 period (particularly the decision to retire World War II warships of less than 2,000 tons), it does not follow that the crews of these larger, newer ships are substantially larger or that these ships require a larger base and fleet maintenance support facility. What these data do suggest is a management decision to retain a specific personnel level, perhaps as a pool of trained personnel when the Navy attempts to expand to 600 ships in the latter part of the decade.

A third indicator of effectiveness in meeting the requirements of the Nixon doctrine is the number of ships deployed to distant waters. As Figure 16 shows, ships deployed to distant waters have been reduced substantially in the 1970s. This reduction in ships deployed is directly related to the smaller size of the fleet in the post-test period. However, with increased O&M costs per ship, one should expect that distant deployment would not have been reduced as greatly as it did considering that higher operations funds should allow more deployment days. Further, naval personnel afloat on distant deployment has dropped approximately 50% in the post-test period.
Figure 16

Trends in Ship Deployment*

*Excludes Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) and Underway Replenishment Ships and Patrol Craft
Figure 17 shows the total numbers of warships (which includes submarines and amphibious ships), surface combatants and budgetary allocations to ship construction (in constant dollars) for the pre-test and post-test periods. While construction dollars have increased, fleet size has progressively diminished. Surprisingly, from the stipulated requirements of the Nixon Doctrine, the largest reduction in warships has been in surface combatants. The present Navy has fewer ships to carry out the mission of presence and interposition even though these ships may be newer and have more capability. While warship construction dollars have increased substantially from the Kennedy-Johnson years (on an average of $130,000,000 per year), it has become impossible at present ship costs to replace warships on a one-for-one basis. In fact, the Spruance class destroyer, the DD-963, at over 8,000 tons, is substantially less capable than the ships it has been designed to replace, in that it cannot effectively operate independently. The Spruance class ship carries no air defense weapons; yet the cruise missile threat from submarine, surface or air-launched platforms is the primary threat. A newly configured Spruance class ship, the DLG-47 has an added air defense system, but the cost for this modified ship has risen from $101 million to $140 million.

The continued erosion of naval combat power is also reflected in Figure 18. Naval tactical aircraft has dropped over 400 planes. Carrier borne attack aircraft have dropped from approximately 900
Figure 17

Trends in Naval Combatants

- --- - Warship Construction Dollars
- - - - Warships
--- - Surface Combatants

Source: Historical Budget Data, Dept. of the Navy, April 1976
Figure 18
Trends in Naval Aviation

- Tactical Aircraft
- CVs (aircraft carriers)
- Attack Aircraft

Source: Historical Budget Data, Dept. of Navy, April 1976
in the Kennedy-Johnson years to about 650 in the Nixon-Ford years. Figure 18 also shows a reduction from 23.7 carriers in the pre-test period to 16.5 carriers in the post-test period (with the retirement of post-WWII carriers of the 45,000 - 50,000 ton class. These were primarily ASW carriers.) With the increased cost of aircraft carriers, they will not be replaced on a one-for-one basis in the future. In fact, during the 1976/77 time period there should be a reduction to 12 carrier platforms. The aircraft aboard these carriers will be more sophisticated in the post-test period (i.e., the Navy's F-14 Tomcat). There is a substantial loss in redundancy, i.e., the smaller number of aircraft carriers may not be able to fulfill the requirements of U.S. foreign policy since they cannot easily cover extended areas. For example, two U.S. carriers now have areas of operations which extend from the East Coast of Africa to the Northeast Pacific off of Japan.

Figure 19 shows the procurement of equipment, missiles and aircraft for the Navy in the time frame 1962 to 1975. Total procurement in constant dollars is less in the post-test period than in the pre-test period. While overall procurement of equipment, missiles and aircraft has decreased slightly, the Procurement of Equipment, Missiles, and Aircraft (PEMA) has increased substantially on a per ship basis. This might indicate that the combat power per ship has substantially increased in the post-test years; but this is clearly not the case.
Figure 19

Trends in Navy Procurement (constant dollars)

PEMA per Ship

Total PEMA

Source: FYDP 1976
Navy Net Assessment
Overall, the indicators of effectiveness and combat power have been shown diminishing during the Nixon-Ford years. This must be considered an indication that the Navy has not been responsive to the requirements of its naval missions. For all these anomalies, Figure 20 shows that the percentage of Navy resources going into general purpose forces categories, as compared to the total Navy budget, has remained generally constant across time at approximately 55 percent. Yet, Navy general purpose force allocations have increased over $500 million in the Nixon-Ford years. While this may not be a direct indicator of either effectiveness or combat power, it does show that the Navy manages the output side of defense programs in a better manner than, say, the Army.

**NATO/Mediterranean Mission**

The Navy's NATO/Mediterranean mission is composed of three specific programs. The first program is to maintain combat power and effectiveness of the Sixth Fleet (IALb). As pointed out in the *Defense Perspectives* (1976), the Navy has reduced combatant deployments to the Mediterranean by approximately three ships per day on station. Naval programs to enhance the effectiveness and capabilities of the Sixth Fleet, such as homeporting in Greece or patrol missile hydrofoil (PMH) construction have substantially failed in the latter part of the Nixon years, since the homeporting in Greece has been discontinued. The patrol missile hydrofoil ship has had its procurement rates reduced substantially. Finally, the weapons on board the ships
Figure 20
Trends in Navy Budget Allocations to General Purpose Forces (constant dollars)

- - - GPF as Percent Budget
--- --- GPF Allocations

Source: FYDP 1976
deployed to the Sixth Fleet are not capable of defeating the threat posed by the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron. Specifically, the Soviet threat is cruise missiles launched from submarine, surface and airborne platforms. In fact, the Egyptians, using the Styx missile in the 1967 Israeli war, sank the Israeli destroyer *Eilat*. In the ensuing nine years, the Navy has not deployed an on-board weapons system which can successfully defend against the primary threat. While the F-14 (Tomcat) with its Phoenix missile system may defend against cruise missiles, its success is not at all certain. As a result of this treaty most Sixth Fleet contingency plans call for the carrier task force to retire to the Western Mediterranean.

The second program is for the Navy to maintain combat power and effectiveness of the Second Fleet. From the 1976 *Defense Perspectives*, it can be ascertained that the average number of combatants deployed on any given day in the Atlantic has increased by eight ships per day. The primary responsibilities of the Second Fleet will be 1) conduct anti-submarine warfare against Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic should a war break out in Europe or 2) reinforce the Sixth Fleet. Existing Navy studies show that this present capability and its further enhancement in the future should be able to deal with the problem of the Soviet submarine threat. Overall, the Navy has probably enhanced the effectiveness of the Second Fleet during the Nixon years in the face of a growing threat; but to success-
fully defend the sea lines of communication from the U.S. to Western Europe would require substantial augmentation from the Third Fleet based on the U.S. West Coast.

The third program is to maintain carrier task force availability. The Second and Sixth Fleets presently have seven carriers available to complete their military missions. Since there is a standing requirement to maintain two carriers in the Mediterranean, there are five additional carriers (soon to be reduced to four) for use by the Second Fleet. However, since there are usually two carriers to back up the carriers in the Sixth Fleet on a rotation basis, and, considering the downtime for maintenance of these carriers, there are probably only three carriers available at any one time for the Second Fleet.

Even so, aircraft carriers have become increasingly vulnerable to the Soviet threat (Kuzmak, 1972). In fact, most Soviet weapon systems are designed to neutralize the aircraft carrier in the advent of hostilities. The only defensive mechanism that aircraft carriers possess against the sophisticated Soviet cruise missile threat is the aircraft it presently carries on board. There are only limited point defense systems against these cruise missiles aboard these ships. To bridge this gap, the Navy has designed and is procuring the F-14 aircraft whose sole responsibility will be air protection of the fleet. The F-14 presently carries the Phoenix missile system, with its computer and radars, which is the most sophisticated air defense
system ever placed in an aircraft. Nevertheless, the aircraft mix on the present carriers tends to support the belief that it is designed to protect itself, having limited capability to project combat power off its flight deck. Finally, as older carriers are retired and the Navy moves to a total of twelve aircraft carriers in its inventory, the ability to maintain carrier task force availability will be reduced.

The overall impression of the Navy's NATO/Mediterranean mission is a force that is less capable of dealing with the threat than it was in the early 1960s. This has been the result of changes in the nature of the threat, more Soviet ships deployed, a reduction in the number of U.S. ships available, and procurement decisions that have not placed weapons which are designed to counter the specific cruise missile threat on board naval ships.

Pacific/Indian Ocean Mission

The first defense program is to maintain combat power and effectiveness of the Seventh Fleet (IB3a). The Defense Perspectives of 1976 shows a reduction of 78 combatants deployed per day during the period 1965 to 1975. Part of this drawdown can be explained by the large requirements of the Vietnam war in 1965. To compensate, the Navy has attempted to start two homeporting programs in the Western Pacific so as to maintain a high forward deployment rate. One homeport which is still operational is in Japan. The other homeport in Guam was designed to maintain a squadron of patrol frigates. As yet.
the homeport facility in Guam has not been started while patrol frigate production has been reduced. The Navy continues in its forward basing requirements in the Western Pacific, particularly at the large repair facility in Subic Bay. To support operations in the Indian Ocean, the Navy is also starting construction at Diego-Garcia.

The second Navy program is to maintain combat power and effectiveness of the Third Fleet (IB3c). There is very little evidence available to ascertain whether effectiveness of the Third Fleet has increased or decreased. However, it should be pointed out that most Third Fleet activities are designed to support the forward deployment of the Seventh Fleet by acting as a pool of ships available for rotation (usually there are two ships in U.S. ports to support one ship deployed).

The third Navy program supporting the Pacific/Indian Ocean region is to maintain carrier task force availability (IIIA2c). The carrier task force availability for the Seventh Fleet has been reduced to two carriers forward deployed while maintaining a surge capability of one additional aircraft carrier from the Third Fleet, raising the total to three in the Western Pacific. Additionally, one of the forward carriers is based in Japan. However, the reduction to 12 carriers has forced the Navy to adopt a NATO/Atlantic first strategy.

Overall, the Navy has probably done better in meeting the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. However, there are concerns that with the present
deployment and ship availability the U.S. would have difficulty in securing the sea lines of communication in the Western Pacific (Brown, 1977, p. 51).

**Power Projection Mission**

The first defense program supporting the mission of power projection is the Navy's ability to maintain carrier and surface combat capability (IC2b). Figure 21 shows the substantial reduction in the availability of carrier attack aircraft and guns for gunfire support of power projection. As the Navy has become increasingly reliant on missiles and aircraft in its capacity to project power, they have replaced large caliber guns as Figure 22 shows. The level has decreased from approximately 1100 large caliber guns in 1965 down to 350 guns available in 1975. Carrier attack aircraft availability also has been reduced during the Nixon years from 800 aircraft to a little over 500 aircraft available to project power ashore. Of course, this assessment must be tempered with consideration of the enhanced effectiveness of precision guided munitions (PGMs); PGMs allow a smaller attacking force a higher probability of target destruction than the older "iron bombs" of the 1960s.

An important consideration in projecting power and maintaining naval presence is the ability to keep naval forces on station for extended periods. As Figure 22 shows, the number of underway replenishment ships has decreased by approximately 50% in the period 1968 to 1975. Further, in the period FY 1970 through FY 1975 there were no funds allocated to construction of new
Figure 21

Trends in Naval Fire Support

- - - - Carrier Attack Aircraft
- - - - Guns

Source: Net Assessment, Dept. of Navy, December 1975
Figure 22
Trends in Underway Replenishment

Source: Net Assessment, Dept. of Navy, December 1975
replenishment ships. The FY 1976 budget request included $239,000,000 for the procurement of two replenishment ships. While the number of underway replenishment ships has diminished in the period from 1968 through 1975, the ratio of underway replenishment ships to surface combatants has remained generally level. This, of course, reflects the substantial reduction in surface combatants over this time period. In fact, the ratio in 1975 was even more favorable than in 1968.

Figure 23 shows the amphibious troop lift capability of the United States Navy in the time period 1965 through 1975. With the retirement of older, less capable ships the available troop lift has gone down from an average of 79,000 personnel lifted in 1968 to an average in the 70-75 time frame of 47,000 ending in 1975 with the capacity to move approximately 45,000 troops by amphibious lift. The drawdown in numbers of amphibious ships has been approximately the same. The planned introduction of ten LHAs (40,000 ton helicopter and assault craft carrying amphibious ships) has been changed to the procurement of only five ships. The primary reason for the cancellation of the remaining five ships has been in the prohibitive cost of their construction — almost a quarter of a billion dollars a piece. It is presently estimated that with the existing number of amphibious ships, it will take at least 30 days to move amphibious ships to a port of embarkation and load them before they can be dispatched in a power projection role. This, unfortunately, does not give the United States the ability to
Figure 23

Trends in Amphibious Lift

--- Troop Lift
--- Amphibious Ships

Source: *Net Assessment*, Dept. of Navy, December 1975
project power in a time-sensitive manner. It undercutsthe requirement to have the military means available to support U.S. diplomacy.

The ability to project power further requires that the United States maintain certain base right agreements. One of the lessons of the Yom Kippur war in 1973 was that the United States was constrained in its support of Israel by either the lack of base rights or constraints placed on their use. The use of naval base facilities in Rota, Spain was denied as were several of the ports in Greece. It seems imperative that if the military is going to support the policies of the Nixon Doctrine that military policymakers realize bases are a system of networks which are mutually supporting. While the function of guaranteeing base rights is more of a Department of State function, nevertheless the military services do not seem to be vocal in demonstrating the need nor the requirements for a system of overseas bases.

The United States Marine Corps is one of the primary proponents for the projection of land combat power. Yet, two of the three existing Marine Divisions with their associated air wings are presently analyzing the requirements of a war in Central Europe, if they are used in support of our NATO allies. Since the nature of the conflict in Central Europe may be substantially different from the normal missions of the Marine Corps, there will probably be substantial organizational changes, if this is to be a primary responsibility. It would require that the Marine Corps increase its inventory of tanks, armored
personnel carriers, artillery, and other heavy weapons, substantially reducing their ability to move at short notice or to move with any degree of combat power since available sea lift is constrained.

As Figure 24 shows when factoring out the Vietnam periods, the base level of Marine personnel has remained generally constant in the two periods. Procurement, however, has diminished substantially in the post-test period. Excluding the anomalies of the Vietnam procurement effort of the Marine Corps, the net change in the averages of PEMA per person has dropped about one third in the Nixon-Ford years, a change of approximately $275 per Marine. This suggests that the Marine Corps is not buying the capital intensive equipment necessary to fight in a high intensity environment. Obviously, the Marines are being pulled in opposite directions by two specific but unrelated mission requirements. First, the Marine Corps leadership wishes to maintain its mobility and not rely on the shipment of major items of military hardware such as tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers. Of course, this capability gives the Marines the ability to intervene in its classic World War II tradition. Its new orientation in defense planning toward Europe, however, would require a substantially heavier force structure and, consequently, the Marines might lose their mobility.

Operations and maintenance for the Marine Corps has continued in an upward trend throughout the entire period of the Nixon Doctrine. As Figure 25 shows, the entire O&M per capita trend
Figure 24

Trends in Marine Corps Personnel Strength (constant dollars)

Source: Historical Navy Budget, Dept. of Navy, April 1976
Figure 25

Trends in Marine Corps Readiness

- - - - - - - O & M/Cap
- - - - - - - TAC Aircraft

Source: Historical Navy Budget, Dept. of Navy, April 1976
line is substantially above the base of the 62-66 period. This can suggest that the Marines are maintaining their equipment readiness and increasing their operational training. It can further suggest that they are maintaining the equipment procured during the Vietnam war and, consequently, they have lowered their procurement costs by maintaining this equipment. Figure 25 also shows the reduction in tactical aircraft assets in the Marine Corps from the Kennedy-Johnson years to the Nixon-Ford years. This may reflect the increasing sophistication of aircraft and the fact that the Marines have not replaced the less capable aircraft of the early 60s on a one-for-one basis with the more modern aircraft of the early 70s. Tactical aircraft reductions have gone down about 20%, but helicopter inventories have increased. Part of the new Marine tactical aircraft procurement has been in the AV-8, the British Harrier tactical aircraft which has VSTOL\textsuperscript{11} capability. These aircraft can use the flight deck of the new LHA amphibious assault ship and they can be flown to beachheads for immediate use without the necessary preparation of runways. This substantially adds to the available firepower which the Marine Corps requires in their power projection operations.

The Marines continue to deploy two battalion size landing teams (BLT), one with the Sixth Fleet and one with the Seventh Fleet, on station at all times. Further, the Marines are

\textsuperscript{11}VSTOL - very short takeoff and landing. The AV-8 can be flown from the decks of current destroyers.
required to have an amphibious brigade ready to deploy on reasonably short notice to backup the BLTs. While the Marine divisions based in CONUS may be available on short notice also, the required naval amphibious lift capacity is not readily available.

**Strategic Visibility Mission**

The mission of having a visible presence has been undermined by the substantial reduction of surface combatants for deployment worldwide. As Figure 26 shows, in the time periods under investigation, there has been an overall reduction in naval warships, but the reduction in surface combatants has been greater. In the same time period, there has only been a smaller reduction in conventional submarines. While the attack submarines, the SSNs, do have substantial capabilities, they do not exert a deterrent value or a perceived commitment by remaining submerged. It is quite possible that a nuclear attack submarine could have attacked and eliminated the five or six surface combatants of the Soviet Navy that supported the Angola intervention. However, it is obvious that unless they exerted their power, the utility of the submarines to U.S. diplomacy was virtually nonexistent since their presence was unknown to Soviet and African leaders.

If one again looks at Figure 16, one can see that the reduction of ship days on distant deployment has dropped approximately 50% -- from about 60,000 ship days during the Johnson years to approximately 30,000 ship days deployed in 1975. This reduction in ship days has an obvious impact on the strategy of visibility in support of U.S. diplomacy.
Figure 26

Trends in Surface Warships and Submarines

Source: Net Assessment, 419-75, Dept. of Navy, 1975
Reserve Mission

The Department of the Navy does not suffer from the same problems with its Reserve force as do the Army and Air Force. The Navy is not saddled with a guard force that is politically active and, in many instances, a drain on the resources that can be devoted to active conventional forces. As Figure 27 shows, the operations and maintenance that the Navy has devoted to the Reserves has dropped considerably when compared to active O&M allocations. However, the PEMA ratio has increased dramatically in the Nixon-Ford years. One can infer that the Navy Reserves have received more modern equipment in the time frame from 1970 onward. This might account for the lower level in the O&M ratio in that the newer equipment would have less initial maintenance as it is placed into service. Most of these assets from the operations and maintenance fund are primarily for the naval reserve airwings which man reserve anti-submarine warfare aircraft squadrons, some attack squadrons, and other special mission squadrons. There has been decidedly less emphasis in the surface navy aspects of the Naval Reserve.

Figure 28 shows total naval general purpose forces as a ratio of total Reserve allocations. While the trend has been declining somewhat in the post-1970 period, there has not been a substantial change in the allocation ratio. This suggests more political control of the Naval Reserves by the Department of the Navy in
Figure 27

Trends in Navy Reserve Readiness

O & M Ratio

PEMA Ratio

Source: FYDP 1976
Figure 28

Ratios of Navy Active to Navy Reserve Budget Allocations
terms of how monies are spent. It might also suggest that the Navy sees little additional benefit accrued from activating Naval Reserve forces. It is interesting to note, however, that in 1973, when the Army was spending at a ratio of 2.5 to 1 in procurement for active to reserve forces, the Navy was continuing to allocate on a ratio of 25 to 1. Essentially, what these data suggest is that the Navy has not been responsive to the reserve mission as required under the Nixon Doctrine since they have continued along the same basic lines as they did in the pre-Nixon years.

**Sea Lift Mission**

The final area of concern is the sea lift mission of the United States Navy. Sea lift, as distinct from amphibious assault, implies moving the combat forces, their equipment and logistics from CONUS to overseas deployment areas. Essentially, the Navy has eliminated this mission. There have been no major allocations under the PBBS categories to Navy sea lift; the Navy has retired its ships and is now contracting the mission to the private sector. All of the sea lift cargo ships have been retired, and the only thing remaining is the amphibious assault capabilities that were previously discussed. Interestingly enough, the Navy has experimented with the use of civilian crews on certain types of Navy ships but primarily in the area of underway replenishment. There has been very little thought devoted to the use of the active U.S. merchant marine fleet in conjunction with the US Navy.
Summary

In summary, the Navy has been less responsive than the Army in meeting the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine. While the effectiveness of their ships may have increased somewhat, combat power of these surface fleets has diminished over prior years, at least in terms of priorities of the various systems carried on board naval ships. The has had some success in meeting its NATO/Mediterranean mission. This has been at the expense of meeting its Pacific/Indian Ocean mission. Navy capabilities to project power ashore, including the Marine Corps, have diminished substantially in that we have seen that the number of guns available for off-shore fire support and available TAC aircraft have diminished as have the number of platforms available to deliver these commodities. With the reduction of ships on distant deployment, the visibility strategy which the Navy employs as a political tool has diminished substantially with the retirement and lack of replacement of surface combatants. Finally, the Navy's handling of the reserve mission has been basically as it has been in the pre-Nixon years. Overall, the Navy has not been responsive to the requirements of the President.

ANALYSIS - AIR FORCE

Requirements

U.S. tactical airpower continues to be instrumental in meeting many of the defense roles envisaged in the Nixon Doctrine. Its inherent strategic mobility, its tactical flexibility, and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Non-specific fleetwide Criteria</th>
<th>Operational Indicators</th>
<th>Responsive</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Non-Responsive</th>
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<td>NATO/Mediterranean</td>
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<td>Pacific/Indian Ocean</td>
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<td>Power Projection</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and surface capability</td>
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<td>IZI2d Maintain Forward Bases</td>
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<td>IIIB3b Maintain Base Right</td>
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<td>IZI3a Provide Interposition</td>
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<td>IZI2e Reduce procurement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for forward deployment</td>
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<tr>
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<td>IZD3a Retire Cargo Ships</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Percent*</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
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*May not add to 100% due to rounding errors.
its combat capabilities have suggested to defense planners numerous technological solutions to complex diplomatic and military problems. According to the Nixon Doctrine (1971, pp. 94-97 and 197-181), except for the areas where U.S. combat forces are actually deployed, the United States will rely on the threatened country to provide the bulk of the manpower necessary for its defense. Consequently, the priorities for funding general purpose forces would have to be in the areas of tactical air power, both air force and navy. Since this configuration allows for the effective intervention of the United States' greatest asset, technological capability, while maintaining a minimum presence on the ground.

The structure, roles and missions of tactical airpower needs particular examination. Specifically, which mission, deep interdiction as used against North Vietnam or close air support as used in support of ground operations, is to be emphasized. Further, former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger (1974, p. 142) argues:

...quantity as well as sophistication is essential if our general purpose air forces are to be able to perform successfully their assigned missions. No matter how effective a particular tactical aircraft may be, a certain minimum number is needed to cover a battlefield, a front or a combat theater; or to equip an aircraft carrier force.

The Nixon Doctrine does not preclude the use of army and marine divisions in combat, particularly in Europe or the Middle East. To maintain this capacity to intervene the U.S. must rely on strategic mobility; since the timing of the intervention as
As the speed of the intervention becomes critical, force projection from CONUS must be rapid and/or forces must be pre-positioned in areas critical to U.S. interests. Defense expert Andrew Pierre (1972, p. 718) writes:

In order to deal with contingencies in the Third World, the United States will need to design military forces capable of rapid and effective intervention. Increased emphasis, therefore, should be accorded to the mobility of conventional forces so as to expand their reach in space and time. Priority should be given to airlift capacities and the construction of naval forces capable of underpinning American foreign policy on a worldwide basis.

Consequently, the Air Force mission of strategic airlift provides the ability to project and sustain limited combat forces overseas. It is a component of our commitment to NATO, to the Middle East and to East Asia, primarily Japan and Korea, for deterrent purposes and contributes to the reinforcement of these areas for purposes of defense. Presently, the United States maintains four and two-thirds divisions in CONUS (Continental U.S.) for deployment to Europe should deterrence fail and the requirements for conventional defense be invoked.

There are four specific Air Force missions to be analyzed in this section plus one non-specific Air Force-wide mission. As in previous sections of this chapter, the specific missions are taken from the design perspective (Chapter II), while the operational indicators are selected as independent variables which are used to test organizational compliance or non-compliance.
Table 10 maps the operational indicators to each specific program or mission. Many of the specific indicators useful for detailed analysis are not available. Consequently, some aggregate indicators are used. These are found in the non-specific Tactical Air Command (TAC) worldwide missions. The evaluation of these data will suggest whether the Air Force, in an aggregate sense, is being responsive to the policy statements of the President.

**Non-specific Tactical Air Command Missions**

There are two general areas that we wish to investigate when we examine non-specific TAC missions. These are effectiveness and combat power. There is one specific program-mission (IA3c) which is "Upgrade the Readiness of TAC." There are three operational indicators available which should test Tactical Air Command readiness. These are: 1) operations and maintenance (O&M) per aircraft, 2) personnel per aircraft, and 3) procurement equipment, missiles and aircraft (PEMA) of support equipment per aircraft $\overline{PEMA(\text{Support}) \text{ per aircraft}}$.

As Figure 29 shows, operations and maintenance allocations are substantially higher in the post-test than in the pre-test period. The change of the means ($\overline{X}$) from years 1962 to 1965 and 1971 to 1975 show an increase of $62,000 in operations and maintenance funds per aircraft. This higher figure should represent increased readiness from the operational aspects of TAC (i.e., increased O&M funds provide more flying time to enhance
### Table 10

Air Force Operational Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Specific Tactical Air Command</th>
<th>Operational Indicators</th>
<th>Hypothesized Direction of Change</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA3c Upgrade Readiness of Tactical Air Command (TAC)</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance (O&amp;M) per aircraft</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Personnel per aircraft</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procurement of Equipment, Missiles and Aircraft (PEMA) (Support) per aircraft</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Indicators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Purpose Force (GPF) Allocations as a percent total Air Force budget</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Power</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC3a Upgrade Close Air Support</td>
<td>Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs)</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area Weapons* (such as improved conventional munitions and air scatterable anti-tank mines)</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A-10s*</td>
<td>Increase</td>
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Table 10
Air Force Operational Indicators (continued)

**GUARD/RESERVE MISSION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IA3h</td>
<td>Improve Readiness of Guards/Reserves</td>
<td>Personnel Assigned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total aircraft inventory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance (O&amp;M) per aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ratio total Air Force Ground Purpose Forces (GPF) Allocations to total G/R Allocations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID1b</td>
<td>Increase utilization rates of active units in crisis</td>
<td>Dual Crews*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE2c</td>
<td>Modernize Equipment</td>
<td>Procurement of Equipment, Missiles and Aircraft (PEMA) per aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Type aircraft in inventory*</td>
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**AIRCRAFT MISSION**

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<thead>
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<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Action</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>IA3d</td>
<td>Improve airlift capacity</td>
<td>Stretch C-141s*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC4a/IB4a</td>
<td>Maintain Airlift</td>
<td>Total Lift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 10

**Air Force Operational Indicators (continued)**

| IDla Increase airlift capability | Inflight Refueling* | Increase |
| IDlb Increase aircraft utilization rate in crisis | PEMA | Increase |
| **Other Indicators** | Reserve Crews* | Increase |
| Procurement of Equipment, Missiles and Aircraft (PEMA) (aircraft) per aircraft | | |
| PEMA (missiles) per aircraft | | Increase |
| Total TAC aircraft inventory | | No Change |
| Type of Tactical Aircraft* | | Improved |
| Mission of types of aircraft* | | reliance on close air support |

**NATO/USAFE MISSION**

| IAlc Maintain U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE) | Number of Personnel | No Change |
| | Number of Tactical Aircraft | No Change |
| | Number of Tactical Squadrons | No Change |
Table 10
Air Force Operational Indicators (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Goal</th>
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<tr>
<td>IA2c</td>
<td>Increase deployable Combat Power</td>
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<td>IIIIA3c</td>
<td>Enhance Ability to Reinforce</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASIAN MISSION</td>
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<tr>
<td>IB2b</td>
<td>Maintain forward deployed Air Power</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBld/IB3b</td>
<td>Maintain Tac Units forward</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>IC3b</td>
<td>Develop Rapid Deployment Packages</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of On-Call Tactical Squadrons</td>
<td>Increase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Personnel</td>
<td>Decrease</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bare Base Airfields*</td>
<td>Increase or maintain</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Non-quantifiable indicators
Figure 29
Trends in Tactical Air Force Command Readiness

--- O & M Funds
--- O & M per Aircraft

Source: FYDP, May 1976
air crew capability, more maintenance funds are available to keep aircraft off deadline status and in the operational inventory, and additional spares are on hand for the aircraft. Further, most avionics equipment may cost more money for initial procurement, but their design should reduce maintenance costs over the long run. Overall, from the indications of operations and maintenance per tactical aircraft, we can suggest that these additional funds have increased the readiness and the effectiveness of the Tactical Air Command.

The next indicator of effectiveness is personnel. As can be seen on Figure 30, personnel levels are a bit higher in the post-test years than in the pre-test years, but not by a significant difference. Yet when we examine personnel per tactical aircraft, we can see that there has been a net gain of over ten percent in terms of men per tactical aircraft. The distribution of these personnel is probably in both direct support (e.g., aircraft armorer, maintenance personnel and fuel handling personnel) as well as indirect support personnel (e.g., meteorological personnel, second echelon maintenance personnel, equipment and logistics handlers, etc.). Since there are no available direct output measures, such as sorties per aircraft, these data suggest in an indirect way that the increase in personnel per tactical aircraft may have enhanced the sortie rate, or effectiveness, of the Tactical Air Command. This analysis again, suggests that the Air Force has been responsive in upgrading the readiness of TAC.
Figure 30

Trends in Tactical Air Force Command Personnel Strength

Total Personnel
Personnel per Aircraft

Source: FYDP
The final indicator of TAC readiness can be found in support equipment available for each TAC aircraft. Figure 31 shows procurement of support equipment per TAC aircraft. As can be seen, the line is quite erratic. While the means ($X$) of post-test years are a bit larger than the pre-test years by approximately $6,000; this is an insignificant difference. Yet, the reduction, shown on the curve, during the Nixon years is quite dramatic. It might be that the investment in support during the earlier years as compared with 1973-1975 were being used as an investment in the later years, such, that support equipment was being "consumed" and not replaced. It might also be suggested that the Air Force is foregoing the procurement of support equipment for TAC so that it can allocate additional dollars to readiness and procurement of additional aircraft. These data and other data can neither confirm nor deny these hypotheses. Consequently, this research cannot make a judgment as to the impact of support procurement in terms of the readiness of TAC.

Two out of our three operational indicators have suggested that the Air Force is being responsive in upgrading the readiness of the Tactical Air Command. Operations and maintenance per aircraft are presently higher than in the Kennedy-Johnson years as well as personnel available per aircraft. As suggested above, these indicators would tend to support a conclusion that the Air Force is being responsive to "upgrading the readiness of TAC (Program IA3c)."
Figure 31

Trends in Tactical Air Force Command Support Costs

Source: FYDP

diff = +$5,000 per aircraft
Macroaggregate indicators also show Air Force responsiveness to upgrading Tactical Air Command effectiveness. As Figure 29 has shown, the operations and maintenance costs allocated to Tactical Air Command have increased substantially from the pre-test to the post-test years. Also, Figure 32 shows that the percentage of Air Force allocations to general purpose forces has gone up considerably over the pre-test years. In fact, the mean has changed 7.7%, equivalent to approximately a 50% increase from the pre-test years. This suggests that the Air Force has seen an increasing need for Tactical Air Command missions (as demanded by the Nixon Doctrine); consequently, Air Force funds have been reallocated to upgrade TAC effectiveness, perhaps to meet these mission-requirements.

The second non-specific tactical mission that we wish to examine is in TAC combat power. The specific program mission addressed is IC3a, "Upgrade Close Air Support." There are no quantifiable operational indicators specifically available to examine this program. There are three areas, however, which have a bearing on any such analysis. Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) were developed in the latter days of the Vietnam War for use on point targets and are guided by either TV or lasers to specific areas. The continued proliferation of PGMs throughout TAC has substantially enhanced its combat effectiveness by the fact that they can deliver munitions with precision where before they had not been able to do so. This represents a more efficient use of weapons and increases combat capability.
Figure 32

Trends in Air Force Command Budget Allocations to General Purpose Forces

diff = +7.7%

Source: FYDP, May 1976
Another area is the use of area weapons (the improved conventional munitions — ICMs). These weapons are designed to be used against area targets such as personnel, air defense weapons and, more recently, tanks. This last orientation against tanks is a direct result of the armor threat facing the U.S. forces in NATO. Finally, a specific aircraft, the A-10, has been designed to be an airborne antitank weapon in direct support of front line forces. This aircraft, which has been designed specifically to incorporate anti-tank cannons and area weapons, can provide antitank support in high density battlefields, such as in Europe. These examples tend to demonstrate a weapons system design procurement that is responsive to the programs stated for the Air Force.

There are other indicators, as suggested in Table 10, available for examining the combat power of Tactical Air Force Command. The first of these indicators, the procurement of aircraft, is examined on Figure 33. By examining procurement allocations for new aircraft per aircraft of TAC inventory, we can derive a measure of investment available to replace obsolete or aging aircraft. As this figure shows, investment per tactical aircraft has decreased in the Nixon period by $182,000 per aircraft. This suggests that the Air Force is not being responsive to maintaining or increasing the combat power of the Tactical Air Force Command since lower investment rates for aircraft procurement will force a gradual reduction in aircraft available. It can be suggested that during the 1971-1973 period there was low
Figure 33

Trends in Tactical Air Force Command Combat Capability

PEMA (Missiles) per TAC Aircraft
PEMA (Aircraft) per TAC Aircraft

diff = -$4000 per aircraft
diff = -$133,000 per aircraft

Source: FYDP, May 1976
investment since the Air Force was awaiting procurement of the F-15s, F-16s and A-10s.

Furthermore, there were almost 200 more aircraft in the TAC inventory in the 1971 to 1975 period than there were in the earlier years. Consequently, this research suggests that the Air Force is, in fact, consuming the inventory of mid-1960 aircraft (procured through 1973) and is getting ready to invest in procurement of the more modern tactical aircraft. This would suggest the Air Force is being responsive to the Nixon Doctrine by maintaining the combat power of the Tactical Air Force Command.

In terms of delivering combat power, the required ordnance or munitions for aircraft must be available for the mission. Figure 32 shows that there has been a reduction in procurement of missiles for Tactical Air Force aircraft from the pre-test to the post-test period. This reduction is approximately 13% or a change in the means by $4,000 per aircraft. However, there seem to be two major discontinuities in the graph — the 1964 period and the 1971 period. The 1964 expansion in procurement of tactical missiles can be explained by the change in conventional warfare doctrine of the Kennedy-McNamara period while the 1971 reduction can be explained by the drawdown in the Vietnam war, maintaining unused missiles. Other than that, it appears that procurement of missiles has been generally constant over the remaining years. It may be that the Tactical Air Force Command has a doctrine that produces a fixed allocation of weapons to aircraft which is probably correlated in terms of contingency planning for warfight-
ing missions. However, it is also true that the missiles in the post-test period, the precision guided munitions, are much more effective than the early 1960s. Their effectiveness was demonstrated in the Israeli war in 1973. These nonquantifiable aspects of tactical air procurement may be substantially correct. However, we will rely on the quantitative aspects which suggest that the Air Force has neither been responsive nor unresponsive to the requirements of maintaining combat power.

The final two indicators of combat power are nonquantifiable in that they discuss the type of tactical aircraft and their missions. Overall, the Air Force has begun to accept the concept of high-low mix; that is, some aircraft will be designed and procured to compete in high threat environments (e.g., deep interdiction missions in Central Europe), while aircraft of the low mix type will be less sophisticated aircraft that will not venture into the high threat environment. The high-low concept further requires that most aircraft be designed around a single mission role rather than multi-functions as was the F-4.

For example, the F-15 is designed as an air superiority fighter and long range escort for deep interdiction missions. The F-16, a low cost aircraft, is designed for interdiction missions as a tactical bomber as well as an air superiority fighter while being escorted by the F-15. The F-16 is the closest of the three types of aircraft for a dual performance role; i.e., as a tactical bombing aircraft and as an air superiori-
ity fighter. The A-10 is an example of the low mix design for it is to be used in support of the forward combat forces and not on the interdiction missions where the high performance aircraft are required. With these three types of aircraft the Air Force can more effectively allocate resources both for procurement and for combat missions to achieve economies for each specific requirement. In this regard, the Air Force is being responsive to its requirements by providing substantial combat power both to the front line force as close air support, and as deep interdiction (although the cost requirements of deep interdiction are substantially higher than close air support).

NATO/USAFE Mission

The Air Force, as the Army, has been reoriented under the concepts of the Nixon Doctrine towards the Central European front. Thus, the Air Force has been required to maintain or upgrade the effectiveness in combat power of USAFE (see Program IA1c). Figure 34 shows the number of aircraft and personnel that have been assigned to USAFE since the beginning of the Nixon administration. The number of aircraft has increased by almost 50%. However, since we do not have data available for the pre-test period, we can only assume that some of this increase has come about since the end of the war in Vietnam such that the Air Force is reallocating its aircraft to its prior order of battle in Europe. The increase in personnel is almost parallel to the increase in tactical aircraft in USAFE. Personnel levels have increased
Figure 34

Trends in Tactical Air Force Command Deployments to NATO

--- Personnel
--- Aircraft

Source: The Military Balance
almost three times over the period 1969-1976. This suggests an increased readiness posture and increased combat power for USAFE aircraft. If we compare personnel per tactical aircraft in USAFE in 1976, we find out there are 154 persons per aircraft. Compared to the overall Air Force personnel per tactical aircraft of 67 personnel per aircraft, we see that the allocations in USAFE are over twice as great as in the overall Air Force. Again, this suggests Air Force responsiveness to the requirement of USAFE. In fact, it suggests that effectiveness in combat power has been substantially increased in the post-test period.

The other indicators of the NATO/USAFE mission are to increase or enhance the deployed combat power of CONUS based units. The primary indicator in this instance is the number of on-call Tactical Air Force squadrons in CONUS available to reinforce in NATO. As the following table shows, there has not been a substantial change in the number of on-call TAC squadrons. Consequently, we can conclude that there has been no substantial increase in deployable combat power from on-call CONUS units.

**Air Force Asian Mission**

There are two quantifiable and one nonquantifiable indicators available to measure Air Force responsiveness to the Asian component of the Nixon Doctrine. The Air Force defense program to "maintain forward deployed airpower" (IB2b) has as its operational indicators the number of personnel assigned to the Western Pacific as well as the number of Tactical Air Force squadrons in
the Western Pacific. As shown on Figure 35 there has been a substantial drawdown in personnel assigned to the Pacific region in the Air Force. The majority of this reduction can be explained by the phasing down of the war in Vietnam. Unfortunately, there are no data available to examine the pre-test period. Figure 35 also shows the reduction in squadrons over this same period of time. The squadrons indicated on this figure are those not associated with the war in Vietnam. Thus, we can see that even though there was a reduction in personnel associated with the war in Vietnam, there has also been a reduction in the number of deployed squadrons in areas other than South Vietnam. This tends
Figure 35

Trends in Tactical Air Force Command Deployments to the Western Pacific Area

- - - - - Squadrons
--- Personnel

Source: The Military Balance
to reinforce many of the concepts of the Nixon Doctrine since the Nixon Doctrine does require the presence of some Air Force Tactical Air Force units to be available for contingency missions in supporting our alliance commitments, particularly in the Northeast Asian region. In fact, the reduction in squadrons has been from Thailand and Taiwan. There has been little reduction in the TAC squadrons oriented towards Northeast Asia -- located in Korea, Japan, Okinawa and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. This suggests along with the stabilization of personnel levels from 1974 to 1976 that the Air Force is being responsive to meeting its Asian requirements.

A nonquantifiable component of responsiveness to the Asian mission is the ability to deploy rapidly to regions critical to U.S. interests. In this context the Air Force has developed two bare-based airfield packages. These bare-based airfield packages provide engineering, logistics and maintenance support to establish two independent airfields in undeveloped regions. This allows the Tactical Air Force Command to deploy to those areas as the President may so direct in support of U.S. diplomacy. This suggests that the Air Force may also be responsive in meeting its requirements in Northeast Asia and other areas.

Guard/Reserve Mission

The first Air Force Guard and Reserve program taken from the design perspective is to "improve the readiness of the Guard/Reserve. This is program IA3h. There are four operational
indicators stipulated to test the responsiveness of the Air Force in improving the readiness of the Guard/Reserve force.

The first operational indicator is an examination of the personnel on paid status with the Guard and Reserve forces. As shown in Figure 36 we can see that the personnel levels for the Guard/Reserve forces are approximately 25,000 personnel larger in the post-test period. This higher manning level suggests improved readiness in the Guard and Reserves. Figure 36 also shows the aircraft inventory of the Guard and Reserve forces (the arrows on the graph show the introduction of new lines of aircraft into the Guard and Reserve force). There was substantial reduction in the 1970-1971 time period to an average of about 1,300 aircraft in the total Guard and Reserves inventory in the post-test years. This provides a stark comparison with the aircraft inventories in the pre-test years. The introduction of new aircraft into the Reserve components and the aircraft modernization has been increasing in the post-test period. Effectively this suggests that while the aircraft inventory in the post-test period is smaller, it is composed of more efficient aircraft. A majority of the aircraft in the pre-test period are the aircraft of the F-84 and F-86 vintage which have just been recently retired; i.e., in the reduction during 1970 and 1971.

Figure 37 shows the operations and maintenance funds allocated per aircraft in the Guard and Reserve force. The substantial difference between the pre-test and the post-test
Figure 36

Trends in Air Force Guard and Reserve Tactical Aircraft Inventories

Personnel
\[ \text{diff} = +28,000 \]

Aircraft
\[ \text{diff} = -695 \]

Source: FYDP
Figure 37

Trends in Air Force Guard and Reserve Readiness

diff = $57,800

Source: FYDP
years shows that the operations and maintenance allocated to each aircraft has increased dramatically in the post-test years. As older craft have been phased out of the Guard and Reserve inventory and newer craft phased in, the operations and maintenance cost should naturally be going lower since the introduction of newer aircraft in the inventory should reduce operations and maintenance cost overall. This graph suggests that the operations and maintenance funds are being used to enhance the readiness of the Guard and Reserve air forces rather than being used to maintain an obsolete fleet of inefficient aircraft.

Finally, if we examine the ratio of general purpose force allocations to the total Guard and Reserve budget, we find that the emphasis in the post-test period has been to emphasize allocations to the Guard and Reserve forces. The continued downward trend, shown in Figure 38, from 1970 shows that the ratio of active Air Force general purpose allocations as a ratio to the Guard and Reserves budget has decreased from approximately 8.2:1 to about 4.3:1. This suggests an Air Force decision to upgrade the readiness of the Guard and Reserve force. Consequently, it is responsive to Air Force requirements under the total force concept.

The Guard's second program was to increase the utilization rates of active units during crisis (IDlb). There is one nonquantifiable indicator related to increasing the utilization rates of crews. This concept is known as "dual crews" in Air Force jargon. Basically, this means that Reserve crews for
Figure 38

Ratios of Air Force Active to Air Force Guard and Reserve General Purpose Force Budget Allocations

diff = -.88:1

Source: FYDP
active Air Force units, such as the C-5A Galaxy Transport, are maintained in the Guard and Reserve units on standby status. If a crisis occurs, these units are activated (such as flight crews, maintenance crews, etc.) to aid in the manning of the active Air Force aircraft. The result is that the deployment and usage rates of the active Air Force aircraft can be increased since the primary constraint is the crew time in the air and the maintenance time on the ground. By having dual flight crews and dual maintenance crews, the Air Force has solved a major allocation problem of having either too many crews and too much maintenance available for routine service or too few crews or maintenance personnel available during crises.

The last Guard/Reserve mission is the modernization of equipment within the Guard and Reserve force (IE2c). There is one quantifiable indicator available to test Air Force responsiveness to the modernization of Reserve equipment. This is the PEMA for the Guard and Reserves. As Figure 39 shows, there has been a slight reduction in the post-test period for procurement of equipment for the Reserve forces by approximately 5%—hardly a meaningful difference. But it does suggest that there has been no major move toward the modernization of equipment through the procurement of equipment for the Guard and Reserves. However, when we consider the introduction of new aircraft into the Guard and Reserves, as shown on Figure 36, we are forced to conclude that the evidence is neither for nor against readiness in this instance.
Figure 39

Trends in Air Force Guard and Reserve Procurement

diff = -1.6 X 10^3

Source: FYDP, May 1976
Overall, we should conclude that the Air Force has been responsive to the "total force concept" required by the Nixon Doctrine. The Air Force has been responsive in improving the readiness of the Guard and Reserves, in increasing the utilization rates for active units and, partially at least, in modernizing the equipment of the Guard and Reserve forces.

**Airlift Mission**

There are three quantitative operational indicators and four nonquantifiable indicators available to test Air Force responsiveness to the airlift requirements of the Nixon Doctrine. To improve airlift capacity (IA3d), the Air Force has asked for a modification of the C-141 Starlifter force by stretching the center section some 24 feet to add increased cargo capacity for each aircraft. Recently, the modification program was begun using a prototype of the C-141. As yet, however, there has been no funding for the remainder of the C-141 fleet. Since the C-141s are the backbone of the Airlift Fleet, adding this additional capacity will substantially increase the payload capacity of the Force. The Air Force has also asked Congress, but has not received funding, for the CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet). The CRAF program modifies certain commercial aviation aircraft so they will be compatible with the lift requirements of the Air Force. Modifications of civil aircraft for troop lift are very minor. However, the modifications of other aircraft for carrying supplies and equipment are more difficult and have not been...
funded by Congress. It remains a major DoD priority (see Rumsfeld, 1976, pp. 155-158).

Figures 40 and 41 show the Air Force’s attempts to maintain airlift (IC4a/IB4a). Figure 40 shows the increase in maximum airlift in millions of pounds from the period 1962 through 1973. The increase in the 1970-1972 period reflects the C-5A Galaxy strategic airlift transport coming into the active inventory. However, due to the long construction time of this aircraft, whose concept was begun during the McNamara period in the Pentagon, it would be incorrect to state that the Air Force has been responsible for the increase in airlift capability as a response to the Nixon Doctrine. However, there has been no reduction in strategic airlift capacity since 1973. Further, there are no programs downstream which would suggest that the Air Force is contemplating a new strategic airlift aircraft. In terms of the operations and maintenance of the Airlift Fleet, we can see on Figure 41 that the operations and maintenance allocations are approximately equal over the two time periods. This also suggests that the Air Force has been responsive to maintaining airlift capacity. Overall, these data suggest that the Air Force has been responsive to maintaining its airlift mission as required.

The Air Force has increased airlift capability by providing inflight refueling for both the C-141 and C-5A aircraft. This allows these aircraft to fly to extremely long ranges with maximum payload; i.e., rather than taking off with the fuel
Trends in Strategic Airlift Capability

Source: Straight line interpolation of data from Setting National Priorities: The 1973 Budget, p. 44.

\[ \bar{x}_A = 27.5 \times 10^6 \]
\[ \bar{x}_B = 38.7 \times 10^6 \]

\[ \text{diff} = +11.2 \times 10^6 \]
Figure 41

Trends in Airlift Command Readiness

Source: FYDP
required to fly to their strategic destination, they can sacrifice fuel payload for effective payload by refueling in flight.

In examining allocations to airlift procurement, we find that the procurement has dropped tremendously over the period of 1970-1975. This reflects the production cycles of the strategic airlift force. Since the majority of these aircraft were purchased prior to 1973, the higher production cost should be associated in the earlier years. Since there are no aircraft in present production for strategic airlift, the allocations have dropped tremendously in the post-test period.

To increase aircraft utilization rates in crisis (ID1b), the Air Force is relying on Reserve crews as backups to the active crews assigned to the Military Airlift Command (MAC). Since this has been discussed previously, it is again suggested that the Air Force is being responsive to increasing the aircraft utilization rates and, consequently, increasing the capability of the strategic airlift mission.

Overall, the Air Force has been responsive to its airlift mission. It is attempting to improve capacity and it has increased the capability and the utilization of the strategic airlift as required by the Administration.

Summary

Overall the Air Force has been reasonably responsive to the requirements established by the Nixon Doctrine. This analysis
Figure 42

Trends in Procurement of Airlift Aircraft

Source: FYDP
### Table 12

**Air Force Summary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Operational Indicators</th>
<th>Responsive</th>
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* May not add to 100% due to rounding errors
has suggested that the Air Force responded on 62 percent of the stipulated operational indicators.

In terms of program-mission performance, the Air Force was most responsive (approximately 75 percent response) to the specific requirements of its NATO orientation; this was closely followed by the "non-specific TAC mission" which tended to be consistent with the NATO mission. While the Air Force was also responsive on most of its other missions, it may be judged that it was not responsive to the requirements of its Asian mission. It can be suggested that the Air Force was responsive, within reasonable limits, to the policy statements of the former President.

Summary of Analysis

Table 13 presents aggregate Service responsiveness by stipulated missions. These results show that the Army was the most responsive while the Navy, by a substantial margin, was the least responsive of the Services. It can be suggested that Army and Air Force missions, as required to support the Nixon Doctrine, are less vague than those of the Navy. Specifically, the Nixon Doctrine requires a major emphasis on NATO for military and political reasons. Further, the Army had only three specific missions and the Air Force had four specific missions, while the Navy had six missions. That is, NATO and Asian missions tended to be specific as to threat and location; consequently, it may be easier for the Services to respond and also to monitor. Navy missions, except for NATO/Mediterranean and Pacific/Indian Ocean
Table 13
Summary Table

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<th>Operational Indicators</th>
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<td>62%</td>
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* May not add to 100% due to rounding errors.
missions, tend to be diffuse — not oriented against an identified threat or area. It would seem, however, that the factors are also involved.

One possible factor is that the 13 specific program missions may not be equally weighted in the political context of military decisions. This implies that to judge all programs equally may be erroneous; i.e., the Navy's NATO/Mediterranean mission may be more important to both the President and the Navy than the Sealift mission. Consequently, more resources may be devoted to politically higher priorities. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter will reassess the initial results of the examination of organizational responsiveness of the Services to the policy statements of the President. Before we can be confident of the empirical analysis found in Chapter IV, the impact of possible alternative hypotheses must be examined as conditions which might force a rejection of the initial hypothesis — that the Nixon Doctrine is one of the most important causes of Service behavior — and alter the initial judgments concerning Service responsiveness. It is here that the relevant literature on national security issues will be integrated into a more rich and rewarding understanding in the examination of these alternative hypotheses. The research will then examine these alternative hypotheses as they impact on the empirical evidence. The logical extension of this discussion is an appraisal of the defense studies literature on the problems of political accountability and will suggest certain conclusions as to the larger implications of this research — the criteria of political accountability as presented in Chapter I. It is here that the use of a design perspective approach to foreign policy ends-means analysis will be evaluated. Finally, this dissertation will conclude with a look at the use of quasi-experimental designs in foreign policy.
research and at future areas of research that might either resolve or illuminate problems which may have confounded this analysis.

**Alternative Hypotheses/Relevant Literature**

As Chapter III suggests, a simple time-series, quasi-experimental design presents numerous analytic problems when attempting to infer causality to the effects of the Nixon Doctrine on defense programs. The problems inherent in this type of investigation are those of much of the existing social science research; this stems from multiple sources of causality which cannot be factored out of most social science research. As Glennan (1972, p. 185) argues: "... it is impossible to separate the effects of multiple causes in natural experiences." It would be an enviable position if it were possible to design this research as a true experiment so as to rule out either all rival explanations of change or alternative competing hypotheses. Since this is not the case, the research has been forced to accept the less rigorous quasi-experimental design.

Chapter III has elaborated on two categories of confounding factors that might alter our initial analysis as to the effect of the Nixon Doctrine on the Services. These factors are historical and maturation effects.

--- **Historical Factors**

Hartley (1975) identifies four major historical problems that confronted the Nixon Administration as it took office in 1969; three of these problems stemmed from the structure and process of the international environment: they were: (1) the emerging multiple centers
of power; (2) major alliance problems, principally within NATO; and (3) the U.S. dialogue with the Soviet Union over détente and SALT.

The fourth problem was domestic and was concerned with public opinion against the war in Vietnam. These factors are stipulated in the development of the Nixon Doctrine, and are most clearly expressed in the underlying principles or strategies of the Doctrine—partnership, negotiation, and strength. This envisages partnership with our allies to solve common problems, negotiations between the U.S. and USSR, and the strength necessary to deal with the Soviets and to support U.S. allies.

An important historical factor was obviously the war in Vietnam which also affects maturation factors. In the historical sense, the Nixon Doctrine emphasized major power relationships, traditional allies, and a reduced U.S. commitment and focus on Third World countries. The Nixon commitment to Vietnamization and to withdrawal of troops from Vietnam, as well as negotiation, are stipulated in the development of the Nixon Doctrine. These policies were part of an overall strategy. Several tactical decisions, such as the invasion and bombing of Cambodia, created enormous public and congressional protest; however, these latter factors are more aligned with maturation factors rather than with the historical factors.

There is one other historical factor that also needs elaboration; specifically, the Sino-Soviet split was recognized as an operative principle in international politics. As a consequence, part of the developmental sequence was a change back to a one-and-one-half war strategy. Further, this shift refocused U.S. and allied attention
on the "maturing" Soviet threat and away from wars along the Asian land mass.

These historical factors tend to cluster in the arena of systemic and national actor variables (Singer, 1962); or what Allison more recently called "the Rational Actor Paradigm" — Model I (1971, pp. 32-35). Basic to this level of analysis is a focus on the nation as a "rational" actor and government action/policy as choice based on goals, objectives, options, and evaluation of the consequences as these actions impact on the international system. The dominant pattern is policy directed toward a specific end. The formulation of the Nixon Doctrine seems to fit this pattern of Model I analysis. The implementation criteria of this Doctrine (i.e., the defense programs developed in Chapter II), while not as clear, seem to fit this pattern also. Hence, the development of the Nixon Doctrine seems to reflect the subtleties of Model I analysis.

From this perspective, the original analysis of Army and Air Force responsiveness to the policy statement of the President is essentially supported. That is, these Services responded to executive guidance in a majority of cases. The treatment is suggested to be a cause of these Services' responsiveness. With the Navy, the situation may be different. The Navy was not responsive. Hence, factors other than the historical factors must be operative.

In summary, Model I is useful in the elaboration of the developmental sequence of the Nixon Doctrine as it was presented to
the public in the Foreign Policy Reports, 1970-1973. Model I, as it implies a government working toward a specific end, also applies to the Army and Air Force. The Navy, it appears, has not succumbed to policy guidance; it seems the Navy may have been playing a different game.

--- Maturation Factors

Maturation factors are process oriented and, as such, are non-discrete. Maturation, in the context of this research, refers to changes in the issue positions, such as the support of the Nixon Doctrine over time or in the influence (i.e., the implementation of the Doctrine over time) of key administrative personnel in the Nixon Administration who had been subjected to the pressures of organizational constraints, interests, and pressures.

One set of maturation factors refers to the leadership of key officials in implementing and monitoring the programs that were derived to support the thrust of the Doctrine. The leadership of the Armed Services (principally the Chiefs of Staff), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (SANSA) seems paramount in developing the arguments for the maturation factors intrinsic to this process. The location of the source of political power in the implementation or execution of policy is central to the investigation. If the direction of national security programs were closely held, then the maturation effects of less central bureaucratic players are reduced. President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, as Hartley (1975, p. 10) points
out, "... closely [controlled] the planning of policy, the adoption of the plans and their execution."

The development of alternatives and their selection was highly centralized in the NSC. This process forced the various bureaucracies (Departments of State and Defense), through the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) process, to respond to centralized direction. In fact, by October 1971 the NSC had processed 138 NSSMs in the development and implementation of the Administration's national security policy. Further, Kissinger, as the SANSA, chaired the Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) of the NSC which kept, as Hartley (1975, p. 10) describes, "... an eye on the defense budget in the light of general foreign policy."

While the meetings of the DPRC eventually lapsed into infrequent occurrences, they were probably instrumental in making the important initial changes in the direction of budgetary allocations to general defense program areas and to the sizing and deployments of the armed forces. This would argue strongly that factors other than maturation predominated in the process of developing and implementing the Nixon Doctrine. It argues for accepting the notion that strong administration bureaucratic actors were instrumental in translating presidential policy statements to general directions for defense programs. However, the study of national security politics leads us to believe that there are strong organizational processes at work which confound straight-forward analysis.
Organizations are apt to resist changes that produce lower budgets, lower manning levels, and the elimination of traditional missions. If these factors were working in the period 1969-1972, then they are part of the maturation process and may compete with the original hypothesis. Interestingly, Secretary of Defense Laird "bargained with" the Joint Chiefs of Staff by offering Service autonomy over their specific programs if they would agree to (1) limited budget cuts; and (2) recognition of general guidelines which supported administration policy (see Beecher, 1969). This suggests some loss of control by the Secretary of Defense to the Services.

These observations suggest that possible explanations other than the Nixon Doctrine are available for understanding Service behavior in the post-1970 period. This aspect of maturation effects could be classified as bureaucratic politics — what administrative officials might call "hauling and pulling" their bureaucracies into line to implement the Nixon Doctrine. These maturation factors cluster around the organizational process paradigm, including the area of budgetary politics.

Allison (1971, pp. 162-181) describes governmental or bureaucratic politics (Model III) as centrally focused on government actions as a result of conflict, compromise, and confusion between governmental officials; not only does this occur among organizations, but also within organizations. The dominant patterns of this analysis are the action channels available to the players to reach policy-makers, the positions of the players on specific issues, the
preferences of these players, and the pulling and hauling between players to reach a final compromise.

Obviously, the behavior of officials in attempting to influence policy comes, in part, from the availability of information in the system concerning the issues and issue positions of the central decision makers. Secrecy, in this context, is power. Nixon and Kissinger, by maintaining centralized control over information, were to a large part able to control the "game." This is suggested from the available evidence concerning the issues of SALT, the Nixon trip to China, and the bombings in Southeast Asia (for example, see: Newhouse, 1974).

Centralized control was probably prevalent in the structuring of general purpose forces also. However, large changes in Service budgets and missions usually affect the stakes of each Service, their priorities, perceptions, and interests. In the context of Model III, the Laird "peace treaty" with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is a salient example. In an attempt to divert Service criticism over the strategy of the Doctrine, Laird offered a degree of control to each Service over their respective budgets. Further, Chiefs of Staff were not selected by the Nixon team. They were appointed by and the spokesmen for their separate Services. To Laird and Nixon this probably produced some type of accommodation between the Executive Branch and the Service Chiefs over the rules of the game.
Overall, the planning and execution of foreign policy during the first term of the Nixon Administration was organized to exploit the bureaucracy by centralizing power. This suggests that the pulling and hauling of key officials to keep the Services in line with Administration policy was strong, at least when viewed from outside of the policy making process. It can be suggested that these maturation factors parallel, in some respects, the patterns of Model III. From this perspective, these factors became part of the development of the Nixon Doctrine and were operative at least through the first four years of the Administration.

However, maturation factors can also be analyzed by using the organizational process paradigm and its subset which can be called the budgetary process model — Model II. Allison (1971, pp. 78-96) suggests that organizational processes focus on policy/action as the output of organizations which have operational goals (e.g., more and better aircraft carriers) and programs or SOPs to handle the routine matters facing them. The dominant theme from Model II analysis is that governmental action follows established procedures along the lines of organizational interests such that organizations have limited flexibility and process change incrementally. From the budgetary perspective, according to Wildavsky (1964), the Service allocations to programs and missions should change incrementally.

There are many situations in the empirical data to suggest that the organizational process model applies to some aspects of each of the Service's behavior. The Navy, it seems from earlier analysis, has resisted change in its programs. Initially, this is perplexing
since the Nixon Doctrine supports a strong Navy and key Administration officials increased the Navy's share of the budget. Organizationally, however, it can be suggested that much of the Navy's ship construction funding was split among the traditional categories of naval aviation, including aircraft carriers, surface ships, and submarines. Further, by adding increasingly sophisticated equipment requiring larger ships, the production of ships available for the Service diminished. The Navy was further split over the issue of nuclear power which adds significant costs to the construction of these ships. Yet, the proponents of nuclear power have even persuaded Congress that all major surface ships must be nuclear powered. To argue that there is substantial flux in the existing and future shipbuilding programs is to understate the situation. It seems the Navy has been resistant to developing the means required by the President to support the ends of U.S. foreign policy. The Nixon Doctrine, as a cause of Navy behavior, has had minimal impact.

Maturation factors expressed in Model II terms may well be a potent source for understanding Service behavior. However, it must also be pointed out that the Navy assumed numerous missions under the Nixon Doctrine -- almost as many as the Army and Air Force combined. Consequently, it should be more difficult to respond. Of course, the other Services may well have been influenced by maturation factors; but there is less evidence to support this contention.

Perhaps as the Army and Air Force turned away from Vietnam, they began to reassert their older and more primary missions, the defense of NATO. Regardless of the impact of their organizational
policy maker, these program choices did support the requirements of
the President. Unless one can research the internal policy processes
of these Services, the answers will remain vague. Right now, this
research is left with the conclusion that the Army and Air Force
exhibited behavior that paralleled the policy statements of the
President. Whether the cause was the Doctrine or some other matura-
tion factor is indefinite. It can be suggested, however, that the
Nixon Doctrine was probably a most potent treatment based on the
empirical evidence.

Maturation factors also refer to the behavior of groups, latent
or manifest, concerned with the development of foreign policy. It
is in this context that former President Nixon (1971, p. V) has
stated that the President has, "... an obligation to lay before
the American people and its Congress the basic premise of his policy
and to report fully on the issues, developments, and prospects
confronting the nation." The President (1971, p. 234) in his
concluding remarks reiterated this theme by stating,

"We have a responsibility to debate the means of achieving
our foreign policy goals, but ... we ... have an even
greater responsibility to discuss the goals themselves
and together understand the new character of America's
involvement in the world.

This appeal to debate the larger issues of national security policy
was reiterated by the President and his cabinet members. There was
no real debate as Congress and the public continued to focus on
means rather than ends.
By design, the Nixon Doctrine was a response to the domestic dissatisfaction from the continuing war in Vietnam (see Brezinski, 1973; Hartley, 1975). As Nixon (1971, p. 21) acknowledged, "This dialogue between the government and the people is all the more imperative in this transitional era." This was, perhaps, a move to diffuse the issues of Vietnam and move foreign policy discussions toward "building a durable structure of peace." Whatever the intent, Vietnam, as a foreign policy and domestic issue, was not removed from the policy domain until the fall of Saigon in the spring of 1975.

These factors derived from the continuing frustration with the involvement of Southeast Asia produced reactions that can be classified as maturation effects. The whole concept of separation of powers involves policy interactions, action, and reaction between the Executive and Congress. It is really the arena of the "politics" of national security policy.

The use of Rosenau's (1966, p. 222) concept of an "undertaking" is an excellent vehicle for this elaboration; but as Ripley (1969) points out, the concept of an undertaking is too general. What is needed is to further examine the process of statement, action, and outcome by examining the impact of executive action on Congress. What was the Congressional response to the Nixon Doctrine? More importantly, did the dialogue between the President, the Congress, and the public focus on U.S. interests, goals, and commitments? Or, did the thrust of the dialogue continue over the means of implementing national strategy? This research suggests that most of the
Congressional dialogue concerned specific weapons decisions and forced deployments overseas (e.g., the Navy shipbuilding program, the cost overruns of the F-14, the Mansfield Amendment on troops in Europe, and discussions over U.S. troops in Korea). There was never a major discussion over goals although this was to be expected (Robinson, 1967). Further, Congress has been more negative and reactive to foreign policy than it has been in exhibiting initiative. As Robinson (1967, p. 174) points out, "The role of Congress in the U.S. system of government has been gradually shifting away from the initiation of public policies toward the legitimation and amendment of policies originally devised in the Executive Branch." Robinson continues by stating this has been particularly noticeable in foreign policy. Yet, Kantor does find Congressional impact of a programmatic nature. Kantor (1972, p. 130) suggests, "Congressional judgments regarding specific defense programs and the relationship to national security . . . explain Congress's scrutiny of the defense budget." Kantor found that Congressional focus has been on research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) and on procurement of military equipment (PEMA) as a means of bringing strategy and force structure into line with Congressional perceptions of foreign policy. He further argues (1972, p. 142),

Congress's changes in the defense budget can be readily explained in terms of its dissatisfaction with defense postures and policies . . . [yet] Congressional policy preferences . . . were different from those of the President and often resembled those of the military service. Indeed, case studies would probably reveal the military has been the source of Congress's defense policy objectives.
This suggests that one of the most potent maturation factors is between Congress and the separate armed services. Consequently, the degree to which the executive can control his various chiefs of staff during Congressional testimony and prevent budget reclamas would provide a clue to the responsiveness of the Services. Regardless, only the Navy, with its Congressional shipbuilding lobby, seems unresponsive. The Navy has an ally in Congress; but the current problems with the shipbuilding program and the overall costs and effectiveness of the Navy ships may undermine this effect in the future. It would be remiss not to suggest that the construction of naval ships with high costs and with long operational lives would be highly contested for its future impact on both domestic and foreign policy.

Reassessment of the Empirical Evidence

Several hypotheses other than the Nixon Doctrine remain as plausible explanations of Service behavior in the post-1970 period. It is improbable, at this level of aggregation and focus, to discriminate further these confounding effects. More than likely, each of the remaining factors have some measure of impact on the understanding of Service behavior. This suggests that these factors have some weighted impact on responsiveness. To elaborate these findings, the empirical evidence of each Service's program missions will be compared to the various types of confounding factors previously identified.
Army Missions

The Army NATO mission contains four defense programs composed of eleven operational indicators. The empirical analysis suggests that 60% of the Army indicators support the NATO mission while only one indicator or 10% show nonsupport. Since the Nixon Doctrine emphasized the Army's role in NATO, it seems proper to suggest that from a consideration of the historical factors, the Army has been responsive to this mission. However, the organizational process model would suggest that with a declining and unsatisfactory role in Vietnam, the Army would internally reemphasize its older, more traditional mission. The Army's internal policy actions and desires may or may not correspond to the stipulated requirements of the Nixon Doctrine. However, the Army has publicly shown responsiveness to the policy statements of the President. Finally, the Nunn Amendment which demanded conversion of support units to combat brigades in Europe was a maturation factor. Thus, some responsiveness of the Army in meeting its NATO mission was to the Senate, which was not in the developmental sequence of the Doctrine. Yet, these actions correspond to the Doctrine. Obviously, there were several factors that contributed to the Army's behavior in meeting its NATO mission; but, it seems the Nixon Doctrine remains as one of the most potent treatments in understanding Army responsiveness.

There were seven operational indicators used to examine the four Army programs associated with its Asian mission. The Army was responsive in all seven cases. Since none of these indicators were associated with Army activities in Southeast Asia, there is more
confidence in the accepting the results of Army responsiveness to the Asian mission requirements as stipulated by the Doctrine. From the perspective of the organizational process model, the Army should have resisted reduction in its personnel associated with its missions in Asia. Yet, they did not; in fact, there seems to be a consensus between the Executive, Congress, and the public that there should be reductions in the Army's Asian mission. Whether or not the Nixon Doctrine internalized these viewpoints (which it seems it did), the Army did reduce its Asian presence. Consequently, we should judge the Army's behavior in meeting the requirements of its Asian mission as being responsive to the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine. While there may be some argument as to whether the other factors were responsible for the Army's behavior in meeting its Asian missions, the public record shows that the Army's post-1970 actions in Asia met the requirements established by the President.

The empirical evidence has also shown that the Army was responsive in all three of the operational indicators used in examining the Guards and Reserves mission. While it is common knowledge that many political factors affect the organization and budgets of the Guard and Reserve forces, the overall thrust of the Army's behavior was toward the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine.

In summary, there are several possible explanations of the Army's behavior in the post-1970 period. Nevertheless, the behavior examined here has supported the policy statements of the President. While there are obviously internal factors in the Army's policy process and external factors available to assist in understanding
the Army's behavior, it must be concluded that, from the public record, the Army has been responsive in meeting the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine. Of course, there were only two active Army missions — NATO and Asia. These two missions tended to be mutually reinforcing in that reductions in one area could be used to strengthen the other. In this situation, the Army would attempt to act as any typical organization when faced with a reduction of men, money, and missions. Overall, the Army, in over two-thirds of the cases examined (i.e., 72%), was accountable to the President in the execution of its defense programs which supported the foreign policy means of the Administration.

--- Navy Missions

While the sum of Navy indicators suggests that the Navy has not been responsive to the policy statements of the President, the Navy has been responsive in the two missions which relate to warfighting and tradition. That is, if one examines the operational indicators of the NATO/Mediterranean and Pacific/Indian Ocean missions, one finds that the Navy has been responsive in five out of 13 indicators (or 38%) and has shown nonsupport in only three of the indicators (or 23%). As a basis for comparison, the Navy was responsive on only 35 percent of the total operational indicators. Meeting the requirements of these two operational missions suggests that the Navy has been more responsive to certain elements of the Nixon Doctrine. However, it is also feasible to argue that the organizational process model is an adequate response to this conjecture.
Just as obvious, these missions are based around the availability of the large carrier task force which has been a traditional enterprise of the Navy since World War II.

In the less combat-oriented missions, the Navy has been exceedingly unresponsive to the requirements suggested by the President. In the area of power projection, the Navy has been responsive in only four out of the 11 stipulated indicators. It can be suggested that several problems emerged in the implementation of the President's policy statements. First, the organizational process in the Navy tended to interfere with the development of power projection capabilities by shifting investment priorities toward other combat capabilities (i.e., to fight on the periphery of the Soviet Union with the large aircraft carriers) and away from those forces required for power projection (i.e., the cancellation of the last five LHAs — the large amphibious assault ships).

Bureaucratic politics may be another possible explanation since the Navy may have been less than willing to share resources with the Marine Corps. Finally, the effects of Vietnam and the whole concept of power projection have come into question as a viable U.S. strategy. Allison (1973) suggests this was the case in his study of the Senate's response to the Navy's request for a fast deployment logistic ship.

The mission of visibility met none of the requirements established by the President. Perhaps as one wag suggested, you can sell gadgets to Congress for warfighting, but you cannot sell presence or
visibility as important components of defense policy. Yet, to have visibility requires a large surface fleet with numerous forward deployed forces which, with the decline of U.S. naval forces, the U.S. does not have. The organizational process paradigm suggests that the Navy would continue to invest in large ships having substantial capabilities but, unfortunately, with high unit costs. Within a finite budget this policy reduces the number of ships purchased. The Navy has also continued to invest in highly capable nuclear attack submarines which do not possess the capability of providing a visible conventional deterrent. Further, maturation factors have affected the Navy, the House, the Senate, and Admiral Rickover such that they cannot agree on design, size, or capabilities of ships or over the structure and missions of the U.S. Navy. The problem stems, in part, from the fact that ships are expensive and possess a long service life (at least 30 years). Consequently, it becomes difficult to define the requirements and capabilities of a ship when the future is uncertain and as technology rapidly evolves. Of course, there has never been a complete debate over how the Navy programs support defense policy.

The Navy has not been responsive in meeting the requirements of its Reserve missions. Again, this is to an extent a problem with congressionally controlled and politically influenced reserve forces. Further, within the Navy it is thought that there is little warfighting utility in the reserves since they require long periods of time to become operational. Most contingencies suggest that under the
current reserve operations the war would most probably be over before reserve ships could be recommissioned.

In sea lift the Navy has also been unresponsive. In the area of sea lift the Navy has forfeited this capability by retiring its cargo ships. This probably relates to maturation factors between the political interest of the maritime unions, ship owners within the United States, and Congress. In fact, sea lift for the United States Navy has been taken over by civilian firms, as has part of the underway replenishment of combat ships.

In summary, the Navy has been unresponsive to the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine. Much of this unresponsiveness can be attributed to the organizational processes within the Navy. The fact that the Navy was most responsive to its warfighting missions which required the traditional attack carrier illustrates much of this organizational process model. The Navy has been more comfortable with these traditional missions and possibly afforded them a greater slice of a limited budget. Further, if the sea control requirements, as suggested by the NATO/Mediterranean and Pacific/Indian Oceans missions were not met, then the other missions are difficult, if not impossible to achieve. Further, the "politics" involved in the Navy shipbuilding program — between the various Navy factions (naval air, surface line, and submarine components), Admiral Rickover and his nuclear lobby, and Congress — has produced some of this disarray. The Nixon Doctrine, as a treatment, does not seem to have really mattered. The Navy has not been accountable to the President.
Air Force Missions

Prior empirical analysis has shown that the Air Force was responsive in meeting the stipulated requirements of its NATO/USAFE mission. This mission was the most responsive of all program missions considered (the Air Force met three out of four of the stipulated requirements). There seem to be no specific, recognizable factors which can explain this responsiveness unless, of course, a more generalizable reaction to Vietnam is considered. Of course, a part of TAC's responsiveness might be attributed to the larger percentage of the budget which TAC received in the post-1970 period. This increase in TAC's budget stemmed from the reduction in procurement of strategic forces in the late 1960s when the procurement of bombers and ICBMs was concluded. Thus, a historical factor may have had some impact. Regardless, the Nixon Doctrine called for an expanded role for TAC in NATO/USAFE and this requirement was accomplished; USAFE was much stronger in numbers and performance of aircraft and in operational support in the post-1970 period.

The Air Force was less successful in meeting the requirements of its Asian mission, achieving only one success in the three areas investigated. This is unusual since the Nixon Doctrine called for a reliance on tactical air power (rather than on Army involvement) in meeting commitments to our Asian allies. Again, a response produced by the Vietnam war seems likely as a possible explanation. Maturation could suggest an organizational response as: (1) turning
back to NATO requirements; and (2) reliance on CONUS assets to fulfill Asian missions so as not to alienate public opinion.

Both maturation and historical factors might explain the reduction in forward air bases as a result of Executive-Congressional interactions. However, these losses in forward bases primarily occurred in Thailand and Southeast Asia rather than in Northeast Asia where the Nixon Doctrine made its major commitments.

The Air Force was relatively responsive in its Guards and Reserves mission. Only in the area of equipment modernization could the Air Force be faulted. Nevertheless, the aircraft of the Vietnam era, the F-4s and A-7s, were introduced as they were phased out of active inventory. This responsiveness in some aspects relates to historical effects since the readiness of most Guards and Reserves squadrons had been proven in the 1960s during the Berlin and Cuban crises, and during the USS Pueblo incident. Of course, the impact of Congress on the Guard and Reserves must have had an effect. Nevertheless, the Air Force did meet the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine as it pertained to this mission.

The Air Force was responsive to the Airlift Mission on 57 percent of the operational indicators tested. The Air Force can only be slighted for its failure to "increase capability (IDla)." This failure related to the lowering of C5A transport purchases after the extreme reaction by Congress over the cost over-run associated with its procurement. This is purely a maturation effect. Subsequently, in 1972 in Vietnam and in 1973 during the October War
In the Middle East, the C5A proved its utility. Further modifications, such as in-flight refueling and Reserve crew association, have increased its surge utilization and, consequently, its overall payload capability. Since there had been no long range airlift available in the early 1960s, historical effects can be eliminated. One maturation process, Military Airlift Command as an actor in the organizational process, can probably explain a part of this behavior. A parallel maturation factor, Congress in its most negative foreign policy role, is one possible explanation with the perceived failure of airlift enhancement since Congress has been critical of the C5A and has failed to authorize funding for the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF).

The Air Force has responded favorably to the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine. It has been successful in three out of four program-mission areas and in 62 percent of the indicators examined. While there are several alternate explanations for Air Force behavior in the post-1970 period, the responsiveness to the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine seems most persuasive.

Organizational Responsiveness and Political Accountability

From this research, it seems foreign policy decision making requires a management system which more effectively relates decisions on military capabilities and force structure to the foreign policy ends of an administration. Huntington (1961A, pp. 123-135) addressed this problem when he differentiated strategic issues (policy ends)
from structural issues (the military posture designed to meet the policy ends). To Huntington, strategic issues are considered to be executive in locale while structural issues are congressional in locale and reflect much of the domestic legislative process. In this context, structural issues are proposed by the Executive Branch and disposed of by Congress.

But Huntington fails to consider the degree of correspondence between strategic and structural issues; he identifies the process but does not directly address the problem of whether the structural proposals were responsive to the strategic programs of the executive. This is a serious omission when examining the foreign policy ends/means process. The result of Huntington's study is a theoretical focus on the interrelationships between strategy and structure; but the empirical relationship which allows a determination of organizational/structural responsiveness to the strategic programs is omitted.

Unfortunately, most of the traditional literature concerning the political accountability of organizations is nonempirical (Lyons, 1961; Levithan, 1970; Finer, 1971; Frederick, 1971; and Bletz, 1972). Essentially, this research has attempted to address this empirical void.

The only specific attempts to relate defense programs to the larger strategic issues of foreign policy ends is the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS). This has been referred to as the rationality process which attempts to link perceptions of threat
and risk, as defined by the political leadership, to the structure of the military forces. However, as Hammond (1973, p. 184) points out:

The military requirements generation processes have not been very successful in performing this function. Even the special deference accorded the JCS has not made it conspicuously successful in performing the function by developing and adapting strategic objectives, strategic concepts, and force postures to each other . . . . Deference to military requirements decisions has served at least to protect the military establishment from external probings about the reasonableness of military programs, but without assuring effective internal handling of problems.

Hitch and McKeen (1960) were the first to propose the concept of PPBS in their book titled The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. This was PPBS in its purely theoretical form. At the policy level, Enthoven and Smith (1971) have attempted to relate PPBS decisions to specific foreign policy areas. The authors describe analysis done on strategic forces and on forces for NATO. However, the delineation of general purpose forces as a category of the PPBS system is several steps removed from the requirements process of defining what forces are sufficient for any particular theater of military operations. Without the explicit probing of these various military scenarios, it is generally impossible to relate the force structures within the general purpose program categories to the larger requirements of foreign policy.\textsuperscript{12} The General Purpose Forces

\textsuperscript{12}Although the Brookings Institution attempts to do this in its annual Setting National Priorities.
(GPF) category is not nearly as specific as the Strategic Forces category; GPFs are essentially an aggregation of differing and often conflicting force requirements based on policy statements and specific scenarios. Further, within the strategic forces category it is possible to use trade-off and marginal analysis as a rather precise tool for decisions; it is much more difficult with general purpose forces. The utility of ground forces as compared to tactical air forces in high intensity wars such as Europe or in counterinsurgencies such as in Southeast Asia is suspect. It is nearly impossible to analyze GPFs on a marginal analysis basis. Of course, priorities can be stipulated, as did McNamara when he planned for a two-and-one-half war strategy; but it leaves one no closer to understanding the relationship of general force structure to foreign policy. The major problem in using PPBS categories is in the fact that the development of forces is removed as an issue in its presentation to the public in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Defense Posture Statement.

A second focus in the defense policy literature concerns the politics and organizational processes internal to defense decision making. This also includes the politics of the budgetary processes. Yet, most of these studies pertain to the bureaucratic political processes internal to the Defense establishment and not to the more important aspects of program implementation necessary to evaluate the program under investigation to the foreign policy goals stated by the President; that is, there has been insufficient attention
directed toward the analysis of organizational responsiveness in this literature. Further, a bureaucratic political or organizational process model views the mechanisms of DoD resource allocations too narrowly. The focus on internal bargaining arrangements between the Services over resources and missions is an important consideration in understanding the decisions within DoD; but the lack of a substantive orientation on the final product — the force structure itself — does not meet the larger considerations of ends/means analysis as envisaged here. The entire rationale for the force structure is to support the foreign policy goals of the United States as declared by the President and his Administration. As a result, while the political and organizational processes studies may give detailed analysis of why decisions were made and who made them, they give little guidance as to the political impact of these bureaucratic and organizational outcomes. This is not to belittle the importance of these studies; it is only to point out that they are part of a larger whole.

Typically, these studies use time-series analysis to evaluate organizational processes and budgetary processes over time. Within these groups there are two differing methodologies; Huntington (1961A) and Yarmolinski (1971) use some data to support their arguments. Huntington (1961A, p. X) writes:

If this book has any distinctive message, it is that military policy can only be understood as the responses of the government to the conflicting pressures from its foreign and domestic environments. Decisions on strategic programs in particular must be viewed in the broader context of American politics in government.
It is within this context that Huntington then analyzes the impact of two differing Presidents facing similar international environments on defense spending in general and strategy in particular. Yet, Huntington has failed to perceive that a presidential role in foreign policy must be more than a chairman of the board. While there is no denying there is a necessity for give and take in the making of foreign policy and in the developing a consensus over the direction of that policy, the execution of policy is another matter entirely. This becomes pronounced as the center of national security is becoming more centralized in the office of the President.

Typical time-series analyses of budgets include Korb (1971); Russett (1972); Crecine (1970); Crecine and Fischer (1973); and Stromberg (1970). These authors examine changes in budgets over time in an effort to delineate which Services and what Service programs are winning in the budgetary fight and the reasons for success. Often in this type of research the incremental or systemic changes in the Defense budget are related (as a dependent variable) to the various types of independent variables, such as the political philosophy of the President, changes in the perceptions of the threat, and, ultimately, to the politics of national security, and to the rising prestige of a Service or to its unique mission performance.

A further area of interest from authors using this approach, in some combination with organizational and bureaucratic politics, is directed toward the impact of internal operations and politics both within and between Services on the changes in the internal
distribution and redistribution of the defense dollar. That the Services do compete fiercely for the distribution of funds for new programs and missions is not new. Only the impact of this competition is neglected. Nor is this competition specifically related by these authors to the larger questions of defense policies themselves. Unfortunately, these authors have been swayed by Wildavsky’s thesis on incrementalism (1964). (For a contending and more compelling thesis, see Moreland, 1973.)

A third area of defense studies centers around the use of specific case studies. The case study accounts of DoD decisions and budgets are numerous, entertaining, and enlightening but usually not designed for generalizations concerning the ends/means relationship involved in national security planning and execution. Typical examples of this style are Halperin (1972A); Art (1968); Armacost (1969); Kaufman (1964); and Smith (1969). Here the authors attempt to elucidate the reasoning and political processes behind the various Defense policy decisions. Often, as in the Art and the Armacost studies, the ultimate ends of a weapons decision are left implicit, while the bureaucratic politics of the decision are expounded in detail. Art’s "The TFX Decision (1968)," Halperin’s "The Decision to Deploy the ABM (1970)," and Smith’s "The Vietnam Policy Reversal of 1968 (1969)" are studies of the bureaucratic politics involved in foreign policy making. Other than the history, there is little to suggest the ultimate ends/means relationship to the foreign policy of the United States, although this may be a bit harsh about Smith’s
contribution. The major problem with the case study approach is that these studies do not lend themselves to scientific empirical investigations. Consequently, we lose inductive generality and the cumulative impact on future policy analysis (see; Rosenau, 1966). We might also observe that bureaucracies are designed to provide a history of past decisions and continual feedback for future decisions. If this is true, then it becomes more obvious that the President and his politically accountable executives need a better and more self-serving feedback mechanism if they are to be held accountable to Congress and the public for the actions of the bureaucracy.

In summary, much of the literature on defense policy making does not lend itself to a comprehensive examination of the ends/means relationship. The case study approach is episodic and generally too narrowly focused to develop an adequate accounting mechanism. The political and organizational process approaches are focused on a level of analysis that is divorced from the larger strategic issues which are the concern of a President, of Congress, and of the public. The design perspective offered in this research presents a method of relating means to ends and a method of evaluating the performance of organizations as they attempt to meet the requirements stipulated by the President. Several caveats must be made here concerning this initial research into organizational responsiveness. Foremost is the fact that this research considered all defense programs as equally important. While there is a certain internal logic to this design perspective approach, there has not
been a method of investigating program and mission priorities. These priorities stem from at least two causes. First, there are the priorities which each Service faces in the allocation of a finite budget. This is most obvious in the investigation of the Navy's behavior. Second are the political priorities established by the President and his Administration. In this case, additional weighting of Service programs associated with the NATO mission would be in order; then, Army responsiveness falls (to 60 percent) while Air Force and Navy responsiveness increases (to 75 percent and 40 percent respectively). But weightings would be subjective in any case.

Areas of Future Research

The analysis presented in this research relied on the concept of the design perspective in examining the policy statement to policy action sequence and on the use of a quasi-experimental design to evaluate the correspondence of action to statement. This analysis suggests that both techniques are useful in policy analysis if one perceives the utility of "mission research" in policy making. The use of the design perspective seems straightforward; however, the use of a quasi-experimental design is more difficult, particularly if the data is discontinuous due to systemic changes in the environment. These problems, as well as possible solutions to these and other problems are discussed in the literature. Rather than being
dissuaded from the use of the quasi-experimental design, this research suggests that it can be a valuable tool in the evaluation of the policy formulation sequence — statement, action, outcome.

Replication of this design perspective, by independent analysis, should produce very similar results. The goals and objectives stipulated by the Nixon Doctrine are quite specific; even specific policies were articulated by the former President and his key officials. However, as one moves toward defense commitments and defense programs, the specifications become more diffuse; but, these commitments and programs must logically follow from the more specific statements. There could be many possible interpretations of the requirement for the Armed Services "to maintain a cohesive NATO;" however, a reduction of deployed forces certainly is not one of them. Finally, the selection of operational indicators (presented in Chapter IV) is contingent upon the identification of defense programs as stipulated in the design perspective. This specific set of operational indicators was selected since it tended to measure the Defense Programs as presented in the design perspective and because they were available.

Replication of this design perspective could also possibly come from documents internal to the Department of Defense policy making process. In this instance one would start with the Secretary of Defense's planning guidance — the Defense Planning Program Guidance document — and then analyze the Service and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) interactions — through analysis of the Program
Objective Memoranda (POMs) process. This process ostensibly relates the larger issues of national security policy to specific Service programs. One principal evaluation criterion available to analyze the outcome of this bureaucratic process is the Joint Readiness Report which is produced every quarter of a fiscal year by the Unified (e.g., NATO) and Specified Commands (e.g., MAC -- Military Airlift Command). It is here that statements such as "increase Army readiness in NATO" can be evaluated.

While the results of these policy making activities are not available to the public, an examination of them would tend to support the design perspective suggested by this research as well as the selection of indicators used in evaluation of Service behavior.

There are numerous areas where this type of research may proceed in the investigation of organizational responsiveness. For simplicity and completeness, these areas can be related to the maturation effects on policies previously examined.

Maturation factors, the phenomenon of bureaucratic politics, can best be addressed by elite interviewing. This allows an investigation of the key policy makers' perceptions of the salient requirements of the Nixon Doctrine vs. their perceived record of implementation. This could further suggest the political priorities of defense missions and programs. Only the key decision makers (e.g., the Special Advisor for National Security Affairs, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force, and the Chief of Naval
Operations) would need to be interviewed. These interviews would first address the strategic issues of the Nixon Doctrine; then these policy makers would be asked specific and open-ended questions concerning their organizations' record of implementation. Finally, the empirical evidence of implementation, as derived by this research, would be offered for a critique.

Another examination would combine elite interviewing of principal decision makers with congressional interviews over the same range of issues. The emphasis here is to develop the substance of the debate between the Administration and Congress over strategic missions and programs. To balance the possible distortions of this approach, it is also possible to do content analysis of the Congressional Record to ascertain the amount of time Congress involved itself with the Nixon Doctrine as a strategic program. This method of analysis should measure the amount and the direction of the debate over foreign policy ends as opposed to means.

Organizational processes are much more difficult to analyze since much of the relevant data is unavailable. Specifically, the budgetary process allows policy makers, who are appointed by the President and politically accountable to the public, to influence the shape of the Defense budget so as to achieve the Administration's goals. The nature of this analysis is described in the following figure.
This figure suggests four areas for possible analysis in evaluating organizational response and implementation. First, the Service, by its requests for funds, can be examined for responsiveness; i.e., did the requests, by their amount and direction of change, fulfill the requirements suggested by the President? Second, there was the possibility of the Secretary of Defense changing the Service's request, which implies a degree of control over Service implementation of policy; i.e., the Secretary of Defense could have altered Service requests in attempting to meet the requirements of the Nixon Doctrine. Third, the Office of Management and Budget might have altered Service program budget requests to fall in line with presidential policy. Finally, Congress, through its examination of
Defense Posture Statements, the President's Foreign Policy Report to Congress, and testimony of various key Administration officials, makes the final authorization for a particular Service program request.

This entire nature of the budgetary process from the initial Service request through final congressional authorization is a potentially fruitful area of research in attempting to come to grips with the organizational responsiveness and bureaucratic politics of national security policy. This could be examined by the content analysis of the Congressional Record to ascertain the amount of debate within Congress on specific programs and the mark-up or mark-down of the budget requests for these specific Service programs. In this context, the testimony of key Administration officials, including the Chiefs of Staff of the Services and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be instrumental in examining the support of presidential policy statements by the interested bureaucracies. If Kantor (1972) is any guide, this area would be fruitful in the research on congressional-executive relations and the ends/means debate in foreign policy.

In summary, the use of a design perspective in evaluating organizational responsiveness to the President and, ultimately, to the larger issues of ends/means relationship in foreign policy seems to be a persuasive tool. Only by extending the original analysis can its ultimate utility be ascertained.
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