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The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1977
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A CRITICAL APPARATUS FOR THE ASSESSMENT
OF HUMANISTIC EDUCATION:
AN ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY APPLIED TO THE
HUMANISTIC EDUCATION MOVEMENT IN PUBLIC SCHOOLING

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of the Ohio State University

By

Raymond John DiBlasio, A.B., M.A.
The Ohio State University
1977

Reading Committee:

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According to you and your friends, Protagoras, man is the measure of all things -- of white and heavy and light and everything of that sort. He possesses in himself the test of these things, and believing them to be such as he experiences them, he believes what is true and real for him.

If what every man believes as a result of perception is indeed to be true of him; if, just as no one is to be a better judge of what another experiences, so no one is better entitled to consider whether what another thinks is true or false, and, as we have said more than once, every man is to have his own beliefs for himself alone and they are all right and true -- then, my friend, where is the wisdom of Protagoras, to justify his setting up to teach others and to be handsomely paid for it, and where is our comparative ignorance or the need for us to go and sit at his feet, when each of us is himself the measure of his own wisdom?

Plato
Theatetus: 178, 161
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The use of critical skills of inquiry to temper the exercise of one's humanistic beliefs is the endeavor which this study is designed to facilitate, an endeavor whose continued pursuit has come to characterize the course of the author's personal and professional development. In offering this study the author gratefully acknowledges the formative influence of those who have been his companions in the dialectic of disinterested reason and empassioned belief:

Professor Ross Mooney, who provided rich stimulation and the model of a rationally disciplined humanism.

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My wife, Margaret, with whom the dialogue continues and the excitement is shared.
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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION: THE NEED FOR SYSTEMATIC IDEOLOGICAL CRITICISM IN THE ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT OF HUMANISTIC EDUCATION.

1. COMMON MISUNDERSTANDINGS CONCERNING THE NATURE OF IDEOLOGY AND ITS PREVALENCE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY.

Ask any educator in America to name an ideology; in all probability he will respond by identifying Communism. Americans have lived so long in the shadow of capitalist-communist contention, and have so often had the errors and dangerousness of this rival ideology presented to them that it would be difficult for them to avoid entirely the modeling of their expectations of ideology in the image of Communism. Hence, a stereotype emerges according to which ideologies are forensic, advertising their presence by bold pronouncements and aggressive moves. Their operations are concentrated in the identified political arena, and the blatant tactics of their propagandizing promote a definitively formulated official doctrine, summarized in some founder's writings or in a collectively endorsed manifesto. In this caricature, any ideology is by definition monolithic,
dogmatic, all but impervious to change, and given to rhetorical excess as a matter of course.

Not unexpectedly, anything possessed of all these threatening qualities is regarded as unqualifiedly bad, the social equivalent of pestilence. "Ideology," Alvin Gouldner observes, "is commonly stigmatized as a pathological object."¹ Since movements of such flamboyance and ferocity are not readily to be found in the market­places of America, the stereotype also specifies that ideologies are phenomena indigenous to other locales. If ideology is a disease it is a disease carried by "the other side".

Those Americans who permit themselves by virtue of cultivated passivity and a contentedly uncritical outlook to be guided by the stereotype do not, of course, perceive the presence of American ideologies; the exclusion of such eventualities is firmly stipulated by the stereotype. Additionally, as is set forth in succeeding chapters, as participants in the American ideology they could be expected to exhibit a characteristic ideological blindness impairing reflexive awareness and preventing the identification of their system as an ideology.

Much the same unwillingness to acknowledge the existence of American ideologies is often displayed by those endowed with considerably more sophistication, intellectual zeal and developed critical skills, people who are able to dismiss the stereotype and be amused by its simplistic devices; their reluctance, however, has a different explanation. The trappings of the ideology of Scientism\(^2\) are so thoroughly installed in our social machineries that one may not note its dominance because one rarely encounters a case of its absence; it is taken for granted as a permanent feature of the American scene, like smog. Over and above the apparent ubiquity of Scientism, there is a more compelling reason to be found in one of the modern myths that gained wide acceptance under its aegis. In addition to the belief that value-free science is both possible and desirable, Scientism inspired a timely and appealing conceit entitled *The End of Ideology*, a device which ironically, like the non-denominational religious denomination, proved to constitute yet another

\(^2\)Scientism, characterized by an almost exclusive preoccupation with the technologies of production and control, is not to be confused with the practice of science *per se*, or with the use of the scientific method in various endeavors. To improvise an analogy, one might say that Scientism is to science what religiosity is to religious experience.
ideology.

To summarize the end of ideology thesis rather bluntly, modern societies, of which the United States is the paradigm example, have so progressed in accomplishment and enlightenment as to have moved beyond the possibility of fundamental social conflict and the possible generation of ideology. The non-existence of ideology is legislated by fiat, in such a way that no one could challenge the stipulation without incurring the risk of impugning American modernity or its record of social progress. The formula, needless to say, worked rather well: ideology, if not extinct, was at least conveniently reduced to invisibility. One should note, however, that the only ideologies subjected to this sociological sleight of hand were tightly formulated, internationally active, overtly aggressive political ideologies. The end of ideology enthusiasts also were indisposed to acknowledge the diversity of ideologies, e.g., in their scope, structures, functions, context and impact on the status quo.

It is the burden of the analyses and applications in later chapters to delineate the extent of this diversity, as well as to show the dimensions of the power wielded by ideologies in shaping consciousness and behavior, and to account for the attraction and advantage that ideology presents to many.
Far from witnessing the end of ideology, American society has gestated a fresh abundance of ideologies, with the difference that the new ideologies no longer are concentrated in the highly visible political arena; they characteristically arise in specialized occupational collectivities. In deference to the "new enlightenment" proclaimed in consequence of the end of ideology myth, the new breed of ideologies finds it expedient to maintain a "low profile", forsaking many of the attention-claiming tactics of the past in favor of more unobtrusive maneuverings. Without being any the less prescriptive, their doctrines are more loosely organized. Their language is none the less consciousness-manipulating for being more temperately couched.

Moreover, now that our pluralistic society sports such a pluralism of ideologies, and since many Americans are required to move daily through a succession of specialized fields of interest, each perhaps possessed of a distinctive ideology, a new phenomenon has been produced by the forces of social evolution: the ideological parodist. Investing and divesting himself of feigned ideological perspectives to the rhythm of the opening and closing of doors, the parodist stands in witness of man's indomitable adaptability, it not of his abiding sincerity.

Ideologies of whatever sort are belief systems in
essence. Operationally considered, they are linguistic mechanisms, achieving their results through the instrumentality of language, which they restructure and refocus to suit their particular purposes.

The significance and power of ideologies is sometimes summarily discounted in view of their linguistic character. Some practitioners of simplistic pragmatism, and others who exhibit a cultivated ignorance and indifference in regard to language and linguistic principles would protest that "mere words" cannot have significant good or ill effect. To paraphrase the childhood chant whose lingering influence may conceivably play no little part in their adoption of this stance, "Sticks and stones can break my bones, but ideologies can never hurt me!"

The expression of such a view is little more than a celebration of ignorance, and an indication of the speaker's vulnerability to the many forms of symbolic influence and control. In support of "mere words" the observations of Edward Sapir are especially pertinent:

It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group... We see and
hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.  

The dialectic is a perennial one: men fashion languages for themselves and in turn are refashioned by their languages. Observation of this pattern being re-evidenced even in the case of post-McLuhan, post-communications-revolution English caused John Ciardi to ask, "Do we speak the language, or does it speak us?" If such observations can be made of ordinary language, evolving without systematic management in the conventions of usage favored by unspecified segments of humanity, all the stronger case can be made for the power of language that is exactly managed and finely reinterpreted in the service of an ideology. As an instrument of ideology, the manipulation of language is the manipulation of consciousness and, ultimately, of behavior.

As the summary comments of this section (to be substantiated in their proper places in the body of this study) would seem to indicate, there are no "standard" ideologies. Each must be studied with due regard for the

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social circumstances that have shaped its emergence, for ideologies are unique products of particular social situations at given times. Heterogeneity, complexity and novelty seem to be the only rules. Michael Apple concurs in this judgment:

...ideology cannot be treated as a simple phenomenon. Nor can it be employed merely as a bludgeon with which one hits an opponent over the head ("aha, your thought is no more than ideology and can be ignored.") without losing something in the process.  

2. OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING THE IDENTIFICATION AND INVESTIGATION OF IDEOLOGIES IN EDUCATION.

It is noted above that ideologies have increasingly migrated from the arena which would be popularly identified as political into more specialized, occupationally related contexts. The arena of education, always notably contentious, is hardly excepted. There are many ideologies, securely installed, gradually dissipating or newly coalescing, which determine the professional thought and practice of some educators and influence in some degree the thought and practice of others. It

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6The designation political is troublesome because ideologies consist not only of perspectives but of mandated programs of action. Fundamentally, therefore, every ideology is political, regardless of the arena in which it stages most of its overt operations. This point is addressed more thoroughly in a subsequent chapter.
cannot be expected that all such ideologies will answer to the name of "ideology". In consideration of the aura of anarchy, fanaticism and other forms of disrepute which still clings to ideology in the popular imagination, and of the necessity in public education to maintain a sensitivity to public norms of respectability, many educators wisely prefer to speak of their favored "educational theories" or "philosophies of education". Indeed, many have never doubted that they gave their commitment to anything other than a theory or a philosophy.

In point of fact, ideological systems and theoretical systems have little in common save that anyone with the perseverance to record their ideational content can distinguish in either a number of propositions representing belief assertions. Whereas the propositional components of a theoretical system are knit together by the causal necessity of logical interdependence, subject

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The reference is to theories in the strict sense, i.e., a set of propositions, rationally ordered and linked by logical causality, forming a consistently structured logical whole. Although some have thought to bestow the title of theory on assemblages of disparate claims, as well as on their personal conjectures and delusions, such eccentricities can hardly challenge the established conventions of rational discourse.
to scrutiny and corroboration by anyone versed in logic and knowledgeable in the appropriate discipline, the coherence of an ideology's belief assertions is based on an ineffable perception of affectively charged symbolic congruence which no outsider can hope to share adequately. Even if a theory should exhibit some of the brash ambitions of an ideology's program of action, it would lack developed psychosocial mechanisms for pursuing those ambitions effectively.

It is perhaps not too unkindly observed that the primary attraction that ideologies hold for educators is that they enable everyday educational operations and decisions to be dispatched with ease and speed, if not with increased wisdom, cautious reflection and superior results. An ideology supplies an avowedly complete array of ready-made categories to expedite information processing; the arduous task of arriving at one's own decisions with guiding reference to some valuational base is supplanted by an apodictic judgment-stipulating machinery. If ideology is, as some claim, a trap for the naive, then infallible practical recipes and certified solutions for every conceivable issue are the bait.

Ideologies once entrenched in an educational system cannot help but produce effects created in their image, or sometimes to block effects which are not conformable
to that image, as many writers have observed, e.g.:

It is ideology which defines the institutional arrangements and the practices constituting the educational blueprints...\textsuperscript{8}

The function of the examination and the ideology of the teacher who examines do not begin to square with each other\textsuperscript{9}

Still another difficulty is posed when adherents of different ideologies attempt to work out educational matters in common; their efforts may come to an impasse, e.g.:

...we are all not working out of the same basic structures (or metaphors, if you wish) and it is not sufficient simply to reason together for everything to become clarified and agreeable...\textsuperscript{10}

"The worst consequence of ideological extremism" according to Richard Davis, "has nothing to do with substantive ways of knowing, but rather with the closing off of opportunities to experience other ways of knowing."\textsuperscript{11} Although the ideologue's perception of his

\textsuperscript{8}Margaret Scotford Archer and Michalina Vaughan, "Domination and Assertion" in Archives Europeennes de Sociologie Vol. 9, No. 1, (1968), p. 11.


situation may continue to be that of vast new vistas beckoning for his exploration, a contrary narrowing of his perceptual capacities may be taking place.

The systematic analysis of ideology, developed and still in process of refinement by sociology, specifically, the sociology of knowledge, has a history of less than fifty years' duration and presents some fairly primitive aspects, notably an awkward investigational gap between its determination of the social causes of ideology and that of its social effects. Sociologists have concentrated on the origins and functions of ideology, but they have little to say about ideology as cultural system (a matrix of cognitive and evaluational standards) and the process of symbolic formulation in which it engages; they also have little to suggest concerning how the study of ideology might appropriately and productively be reorganized to focus attention on its formal aspect as a cultural system.

In past years sociologist-investigators have, like Americans in general, been addressing themselves primarily to ideologies identified as political, though this emphasis is changing in recognition of the outward shift in the concentration of ideologies. Consequently, the formal machinery of ideological investigation has only rarely been trained upon the phenomena of education, and
no investigation, to the writer's knowledge, has claimed to develop and employ aspects of the cultural system approach in an effort to approach comprehensiveness. Precisely the latter task is undertaken in the present study. Since the ideological character of the Humanistic Education movement is an assumption yet to be substantiated, a comprehensive framework of ideological criteria is employed, first in the positive identification of Humanistic Education as ideological and subsequently in explicating and ordering its more ideologically significant features as an aid and guide to assessment.

It must be emphasized that the identification is not being made in order to condemn or ridicule Humanistic Education as an ideology, nor indeed to disparage any ideologies. Identification of ideological character and determination of notable ideological characteristics is undertaken so that Humanistic Education can be treated appropriately, in keeping with the properties of its identified ideological type, its established stylistic patterns, and the particular conditions of its social and inter-ideological symbolic relationships. Since ideologies are not theoretical structures, and since there is little conformity among ideologies, each ideology must receive an investigational treatment tailored to its specifications. It appears that nothing short of this
approach can enhance the likelihood of an educational ideology's receiving an equitable, adequate assessment.

Conventionally conducted evaluations cannot be expected to be sensitive to the varying configurations of style, content and circumstance presented by particular ideologies, particularly in dealing with value positions whose eccentricities of expression and unfamiliar structuring may mystify and incapacitate the evaluator equipped only with the conventional skills. Moreover, Humanistic Education enthusiasts have expressed their hostility towards conventional evaluation practices, refusing to allow themselves or their programs to be judged by what they perceive to be insensitive, unsympathetic people employing wholly unsuitable methods. In the light of this reciprocal experiencing of frustration and the present fact of impasse, it seems opportune at this time to hazard a radically new approach that attempts to be ideologically sensitive without relinquishing rational control and the potential for reflexive criticism.

3. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE NEED FOR FOUNDATIONAL STUDIES APPLYING IDEOLOGICAL CRITICISM TO EDUCATIONAL THOUGHT AND PRACTICE.

There is a growing appreciation among practitioners of ideological criticism in any discipline that playing the "ideological detective" ("What have we here? An ideology, no doubt. Ah, yes, and here are its vital
statistics." while no doubt a legitimate and satisfying role in the infancy of ideological study, can no longer be justified as adequate to contemporary possibilities. The completion of a successful work of ideological identification and delineation no longer merits the full intensity of self-congratulation, for such an achievement, though significant, is now often regarded not as the terminus of the process but rather as the boundary of a preliminary stage. Ideological investigators are coming to appreciate the value of the completed critical analysis as a diagnostic or imaginative tool revealing what sort of attention should be focused on which particular aspects of a contemplated analytic or creative work.

While there is much to be done in developing the intermediate techniques and success criteria for applications of this imaginative sort, the mere recounting of the prospects envisioned for these projects seems to have revitalized the community of ideological analysts, many of whom have languished in complacent hard work ever since the welcome furor of the end of ideology debate died the last of its many announced deaths.

Ideological criticism, for example, could be used to reveal the social anomalies and paradigm inadequacies in ailing social systems and to suggest possibilities for
the remedial revision of those paradigms. William Speizman suggests that the improvement of educational evaluational practice might be accomplished through the instrumentality of ideological critiques of the personal beliefs of the evaluators. These critiques could be recast as "ethnographies of evaluation", i.e., as comprehensive descriptions of the cultural environment in which evaluators do what they do when they say they are doing evaluation. A comparative study of the collected ethnographies could reveal the functioning of a special "evaluation culture", if such exists:

There is no a priori reason to believe that textbook accounts of evaluation are adequate descriptions of what actually goes on when evaluators perform their work. What are the assumptions, presumptions and taken for granted orientation which inform evaluations?

Other writers share the conviction that the use of ideology as a diagnostic tool can reveal crucially important levels of meaning not accessible to empirical research and conventional conceptual studies, e.g.:

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12 Cf. Edgar S. Dunn, Jr., Economic and Social Development (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 260. Although the description of the problem and its solution by unspecified persons or agencies is taken from Dunn, the suggestion of a possible role for ideological criticism is the writer's own.

ideology constitutes a particularly effective tool for dealing with phenomena and relationships at certain levels of political behavior that are important but difficult to reach.\textsuperscript{14}

The social theorist as a systematically critical individual will take seriously and examine carefully the ideologies of the day for their central conceptions as responses to ongoing structural and cultural development... ideology can serve the theorist as a rich source of data on this society.\textsuperscript{15}

The selection of the area of inquiry for the present study, as well as the deliberations leading ultimately to the development and refinement of a methodology hybridized from several disciplines, are undertaken in the personal conviction that such ventures into the \textit{terra incognita} of education are as urgently needed and potentially useful as they are perilous: that there is much to be learned in hazarding the venture, whatever its outcome. This conviction, strongly held from the start, is reinforced by a similar belief expressed by Michael Apple:

\begin{quote}
In fact, if one were to point to one of the most neglected areas of educational scholarship, it would be just this, the critical study of the relationship between ideologies and educational thought and 
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}

\end{flushright}
practice, the study of the range of seemingly commonsense assumptions that guide our overly technically minded field.  

16Apple, op. cit., p. 121.
Chapter Two

DESIGNING AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY
OF HUMANISTIC EDUCATION

1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The bewildering, shifting assortment of notions and practices known collectively as Humanistic Education is rapidly spreading throughout the common schools. In terms of educational development, the basic problem posed by Humanistic Education is its resistance to conventional evaluation. When evaluation is attempted, proponents of Humanistic Education frequently express dissatisfaction or even hostility; outside evaluators are often suspect of fundamental rationalistic or "cognitivistic" bias.¹ On the other hand, evaluators are hard pressed to find enough theoretical coherence in Humanistic Education to

¹It is not suggested that these accusations are baseless. As Karier notes, "Evaluation inevitably occurs within some kind of value orientation that is part of an ideological framework." Cf. Clarence J. Karier "Ideology and Evaluation" in Michael W. Apple et al., (eds.) Educational Evaluation: Analysis and Responsibility (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1974), p. 279. While it can be argued that evaluators operate from their ideology as the humanistic educators operate from theirs, this does not justify the claim of humanistic education to be a "special case" deserving to be exempted from evaluation while seeking to be incorporated within public education.
guide them in structuring their criteria. The self-evaluations conducted by Humanistic Education enthusiasts according to their own perspective deliberately neglect some areas of traditional concern to public education; moreover, they are difficult to translate into useful forms that are compatible with data from other sources. Since continual assessment of contemporary educational practice is indispensable for the guidance of educational development, there is a need for instruments of assessment that can effectively be applied even to deviate ideological movements like Humanistic Education.

Accordingly, the problem entails six tasks to be undertaken in this study:

1. To devise a critical apparatus, a compendium of principles to guide the assessment of the claims and performances of the ideological movement designated as Humanistic Education.

2. At contextually suitable points in the study, to illustrate the principles compiled in the critical apparatus in application to instances drawn from the literature of Humanistic Education.

3. To undertake an extensive analysis of the nature and functions of ideology, and thereby to provide a basis for justifying the design
of the apparatus as appropriate to the nature of ideological systems.

4. To construct a comprehensive inventory of the identifying characteristics of ideologies; to utilize the inventory as an organizing framework for all application of the above analysis, and in facilitating the accomplishment of task five below.

5. To make a positive identification of the ideological character of the Humanistic Education movement through application of the inventory of ideological characteristics.

6. In the course of accomplishing task four, to provide a survey of Humanistic Education featuring explication of its ideologically significant properties and circumstances, and thereby to support the particular principles of the critical apparatus with the general guidance of an annotated comprehensive overview of the movement as a whole.

In regard to the first task, it is noted that the critical apparatus shall consist of methodological principles to be applied in assessment. The selection and formulation of these principles shall be responsive to distinctively ideological features identified in prior
analyses as ideologically significant in terms of potential influence on educational thought and practice. The term *assessment* is employed in order to emphasize that the anticipated procedure represents a foundational and procedural departure from conventional educational evaluation. If Humanistic Education were a rationally ordered theoretical structure, conventional instruments and logical analysis might suffice. As an ideology\(^2\), however, Humanistic Education is in some ways opaque to logical analysis; similarly, its vague or eccentric language and unfamiliar valuation structures may enable it to elude the procedures of conventional evaluation, or to mystify the evaluator with only conventional skills to apply.

The second task is partially accomplished in the body of the critical apparatus, and partly in illustrative segments scattered throughout the text, i.e., wherever any given principle is clearly extracted from a thoroughly explicated context. This is done in the interest of avoiding unnecessary duplication.

The inventory of ideological characteristics to be constructed as task four shall list and apply much more

\(^2\)The ideological status of Humanistic Education remains an assumption of the writer, pending the completion of task five in chapter four.
than the number of criteria that would reasonably be thought sufficient for identification of ideological character; the inventory shall attempt to present and employ an exhaustive list of identifying criteria. This measure has the effect not only of observing extra caution in judgment, but also of expanding the scope of the survey of Humanistic Education prescribed in task six.

In anticipation of its identification as ideological with the completion of task five, 'Humanistic Education' as a particular ideological movement is capitalized throughout the study. The lower case 'humanistic education' refers to any such characterization applied to education. In the writer's knowledge, there is no educational movement that would refuse to be characterized as humanistic in some fundamental sense. Furthermore, some educators select particular features of Humanistic Education to be incorporated within their personal philosophies of education; they may do this, however, without accepting the ideological perspective and program of the movement.

To verify the existence of a Humanistic Education ideology is not necessarily to identify all practitioners and sympathizers of Humanistic Education as committed adherents of the ideology to be analyzed below. No attempt is made in the study to determine whether or not the
populations of Humanistic Education *qua* ideology and of the self-identified "Humanistic Education Movement" are coextensive. Neither would it be feasible, in the writer's judgment, to make such a determination with any enduring credibility employing available methodologies in their present state of development. Furthermore, even if such information were attainable, it would have little conceivable application in education, except perhaps to be used disreputably as a justification for engaging in personal accusations and other deleterious or preferential treatment of educators.

There are other worthy reasons for resisting any impulse to attempt to fix the number of those who are to be considered "true believers", or ideologues in the strict sense:

1. The boundaries of the ideological movement are not firm. Humanistic Education is in accretionary flux, as befits the vagueness of its perceived mandate to expand human potential through the agency of schooling. Novelties of all sorts are constantly being assimilated from sources as disparate as the rituals of popularized Eastern mysticism and the experimental procedures of behavior modification laboratories. It is to be expected that new
adherents will be attracted by the incorporation of new elements, as also that some old adherents will be repelled and withdraw their allegiance.

2. It cannot be assumed that any ideology is held in utter uniformity by all identified adherents, much less that there be anything more than a broadly interpreted resemblance among the individual behaviors claimed to be motivated by a particular ideological commitment. Although ideologies are prescriptive belief systems, once internalized their function is necessarily constrained to some extent by the established configuration of the individual personality. The constraint imposed in the other direction, however, is usually far stronger; the moral force exerted by most ideologies is able to override almost all personal inclinations leading to deviation. A consummately personalistic ideology like Humanistic Education, espousing individual value relativism and freedom of choice, necessarily invites far more than the usual incidence of eccentric deviation.

The proposal in task six, that the critical
apparatus be reinforced by a more general guidance afforded by an ideologically comprehensive survey of the movement, is regarded as a necessary move. It is not expected that anyone should be able to make meaningful and productive use of the particularized principles contained in the apparatus without first assimilating the broader formulations of principle in their context of development in the preceding foundational analyses.

2. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The study is arranged in five chapters. The introductory chapter presents a rationale for undertaking a study of this kind. Specifically, the rationale seeks to justify the potential benefit of the study to educational practice and educational development, and to justify the following moves in terms of their educational relevance and their advantage to pursuance of the study:

1. Selection of the Humanistic Education movement and the phenomena of ideology as areas of inquiry.

2. Exploration of the Sociology of Knowledge and of the range of methodologies employed in ideological investigation.

3. Departure from customary practice in educational research, in that the critical apparatus
supplied in the study is not designed in anticipation of its use in conventional education evaluation.

4. Development and demonstration of a variant research methodology, accommodated from the cultural system approach to ideological criticism, to facilitate the assessment of educational ideologies.

Misunderstandings concerning ideology are explored and explanations offered for their occurrence. A summary account is made of the diversity and complexity of ideology, and of its power to mold thought and behavior. An effort is also made to explain the reluctance of some people to take ideologies seriously as linguistic devices, and to refute their reasoning. The mechanisms of ideological influence in education are summarized, as is the investigation, or rather the lack of appropriately designed investigation, of educational ideologies. The consequences of treating educational ideologies as though they were theoretical systems are detailed. The writer's intent is given in pursuing the identification and investigation of Humanistic Education as ideology. A case is made for the use of "completed" ideological investigations as diagnostic tools. Finally, writers are cited in support of the need for studies of this kind.
Chapter two stipulates boundaries for the study, defines its procedures and orders its formal structure. This design is conveyed in a statement of the problem and of the tasks to be undertaken in its resolution, and in a description of the organization of the study.

Chapter Three serves several functions concomitantly:

1. It outlines a conceptual history of ideology, chronicling the origin of the term and the emergence, through continual shifts in usage, of the present multivariate concept. Since the conceptual development of ideology has accompanied the acceleration of social change, both as stimulus and as expressive product, each phase of usage is briefly situated in its social context.

2. It provides a topical review of the literature in the Social Sciences, Education and Philosophy pertaining to ideology.

3. It offers a comparative survey of the theories and approaches employed in the study of ideology.

4. It engages in a metastudy of ideological inquiry, i.e., an intermittent critical analysis of the described modes of ideological
analysis. At appropriate times the narrative is suspended for second order analyses which yield recommendations for the subsequent analysis of Humanistic Education, in the form of cautions to be observed, or neglected areas to be explored and developed, or alternative conceptualizations to be employed.

5. In consequence of these four endeavors, selection is made of the particular approach to ideological analysis which is most congenial to the purpose of the study.

In the explorations of Chapter Three, differences of opinion unavoidably are emphasized in the interest of accounting for the variety of conceptions of ideology and of approaches to ideological investigation. Chapter Four identifies and employs many points of common agreement discovered in the course of the previous chapter. A generalized account of the typical "life cycle" of an ideology is constructed, describing the circumstances of the origin and entrenchment of an ideology and the patterns of its development and eventual demise.

Noteworthy observations extracted from the prior survey of ideological investigation in recognition of their utility as identifying criteria are then organized within a framework encompassing all previously determined aspects
of ideological investigation. This comprehensive framework is designated as an *inventory of ideological characteristics*, comprising twenty-two criteria in eight ideologically significant areas of investigation. In the remainder of the chapter each criterion of the inventory is applied in turn to instances of the thought and performance of Humanistic Education, in order to establish the ideological character of the movement.

Chapter Five, in which the critical apparatus is presented, constitutes a further refinement of the organization of principles of ideological criticism represented in the structure of the inventory. The special difficulties which educational ideologies can present to conventional evaluation efforts are reviewed. A case is made for the importance of scrutinizing goals rather than accepting them as given, in order to determine if they can be justified by being subsumed under the general goals of public education. Summary considerations are offered concerning circumstances of Humanistic Education warranting special attention in assessment. The principles of the critical apparatus are then listed, each followed by appropriate commentary and illustration.
Chapter Three

AN EXPLORATION OF THE NATURE AND FUNCTIONS OF IDEOLOGY

1. EMERGENCE AND RADICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

Antoine Destutt De Tracy coined and popularized the term "ideology" in 1797 with high expectations and noble intent: he was after all, naming a new, positive science of his own devising -- the science of ideas. It was a science, furthermore, for which the need was manifest, at least in France, where a new society was being constructed amid the entrenched prejudices that had flawed the old.

In the optimistic view of De Tracy and his converts among the *philosophes*, the society builders would require some intellectual grounding, some systematic development of "positive" rationality to wean them away from old, erroneous modes of thinking, if they were to avoid re-living the mistakes of the past. Hence the introduction of a science which would study the formation of new ideas and, by analyzing the empirical grounding of cognition, enable ideas to be evaluated for usefulness in a reformed society.

In condensing a theoretical framework of this
sort the writer incurs the risk of eulogizing De Tracy's work beyond its merit. The contemporary connotations of phrases like "empirical grounding" may influence the reader to assume that De Tracy had already begun to develop the sort of empirically referenced, theoretically regulated analysis that today characterizes sociology of knowledge. It appears that De Tracy, caught up in reactionary protest against Church and State, faith and authority, sought an alternative model for truth-seeking that was suitably free of associations with the French establishment. What De Tracy found was British empiricism, from which he derived a decidedly French variant that had lost much of its dispassionate character and was often surprisingly naive. De Tracy believed, for example, that one "purified" ideas (i.e., elevated them to objective truth) simply by reducing them to sense perceptions.

By means of this new empiricism De Tracy proposed to eliminate bias and to establish objectivity as the prevailing climate of scholarship, while developing ideology-as-science and inviting its application to rational social theories and programs. If these proposals seem familiar as well as ambitious, it is because the epistemological principles generated by De Tracy's ideologues (as they came to be designated) were before
long appropriated and incorporated virtually unchanged within Auguste Compte's philosophy of Positivism, and in the primary vehicle of positivist thought, the new science of Sociology.¹

De Tracy's conception of ideology-as-science did not survive the displeasure of Napoleon, a supporter of the ideologues in republican days, who as Emperor now moved to stop this speculation that was subverting morality and patriotism and offending his new-found attachment to religious institutions. The Institut National was ordered to stop all teaching of moral and political science, now considered contaminated beyond redemption by the ideologues and their pernicious "doctrine".²

Both "ideology" and "ideologue" were thus trans-


formed by fiat into terms of disapproval and contempt;³ "ideology" in this new, derogatory sense came to stand for a particular doctrine, or system of ideas, such as would have been subjected to analysis and evaluation by "Ideology" in the original sense, now unquestionably defunct. What Wittgenstein would hyperbolically attribute to philosophy had literally befallen Ideology, the Science of Ideas: it became the disease of which it should have been the cure.

The functions -- but not the designation -- of De Tracy's ideology-as-science were eventually assumed by sociology. In the meantime, the term "ideology" as a label for certain kinds of socially energized doctrines continued to undergo transmutations in the service of philosophical factions that emerged fitfully from academia to take prominent and aggressive roles in the political ferment of Europe. The development of the concept of ideology has until recent decades nicely

³"Ideology" was now used most often to refer to erroneous and dangerous ideas; in its least unfavorable usage, "ideology" was a mild epithet suggesting uselessness, analogous to "visionary moonshine" "airy speculation" etc. Cf. Naess, op, cit., pp. 153-154. Politically motivated and enforced semantic shifts of this sort were by no means uncommon in France at this time. In the aftermath of the Revolution similar alterations in usage were attempted, not always successfully, for such things as the names of the calendar months and of many common foods.
mirrored the history of the intelligentsia. Daniel Bell, with an over-simplified verve that is itself reminiscent of ideological expression, remarks that "one can say that what the priest is to religion, the intellectual is to ideology."\(^4\)

2. INFLUENCE OF MARXIST RHETORIC ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT

Among the politicized philosophical communities that found ideology to be an expedient device for dissemination of doctrine the Left Hegelians, particularly their radical wing, seemed most contemptuous of the religion-mediated ideologies (considered variant forms of "false consciousness") that had held sway in the past, and most enchanted with the prospect of creating and promulgating a "true consciousness" ideology of their own. In their drive to divest the present of the past

\(^4\)Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 89. Bell made this observation in 1960, while commenting on the contemporary ideological landscape. Although few would argue with his statement as applicable to the historical antecedents of "traditionally conceived" ideology (i.e., politically overt, forensic, highly standardized in content, legitimizing some readily identifiable class interest), the statement when uttered was already inadequate to contemporary ramifications and transformations of ideology. Certainly the role of the intellectual had already begun to deteriorate as the cultural forms and arenas of ideological expression continued to diversify. Neither is this statement the most egregious of Bell's over-simplifications: Bell's proclamation in the title of "The End of Ideology in the West" might more appropriately have been termed "The Waning of Traditionally Familiar Forms of Ideology in the West."
and to install a new, utterly rational, demythologized religion of humanity, these zealots gave ideology its sharpest characterization as a means of translating ideas into action. For most of the Left Hegelians, however, the "action" to be generated by ideology was largely in the academic mold: debating in the marketplace, publishing magazines and pamphlets.

One of the Left Hegelians, Karl Marx, also felt oppressed by the old ideologies and their accumulative burden of false consciousness. "The tradition of all the dead generations," Marx wrote, "weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living." Unlike many of his colleagues Marx was not content to wage merely literary warfare against the past. His aspirations were focused consistently in the struggle of classes, in which true consciousness might be achieved; his ideas called forth political action, not merely the engineering of social change, but economic and cultural revolution on an unprecedented scale. To the concept of ideology Marx contributed the consideration that ideologies, in addition to being false ideas, are masks for the interests of special groups and weapons for the promotion of those interests. The false consciousness that ideology both

5Quoted by Bell, op. cit., p. 88.
generates and expresses is further defined by Marx as thought that is alienated from the real social being of the thinker. Thus Marx proposes the foundational premise of what would become the sociology of knowledge: that man's consciousness, rather than being individually forged in isolated reflection, is determined by his social being.  

Marx's apocalyptic vision, together with his program for promoting its fulfillment in society, surely constitute the sort of social reality-interpreting, programmatic belief system that he and his contemporaries had been labeling "ideologies"; nevertheless the term "ideology", applied with passionate criticism to other systems of thought, especially to the new social science with its "pretentious and unjustified claims to scientifocity", is never applied by Marx to his own distinctive system of thought. With Marx it is repeatedly a case of "You have your ideology, but I have a rational understanding of the way things are." Ideology became, quite simply, a convenient label for the "false" views of a given opponent. This is a negative, polemical sense of

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7 Gouldner, op. cit., pp. 6-9.
"ideology" which, having been firmly entrenched in popular political language, is probably the sense in most common use today.

In this persistent blindness to the existence and import of his own ideology, Marx's behavior, it should be noted, is not eccentric but altogether characteristic of the perceptions of those who are strongly and pervasively influenced by an ideology, whether or not it is a system of thought which they have identified by name or to which they have chosen their commitment. The "taken for granted" aspect which ideological interpretations of reality quickly assume for most people appears to be an intensified form of ethnocentrism, a phenomenon only recently named but long recognized, as in Pascal's dictum that "what is truth on one side of the Pyrenees is error on the other."^9

3. MANNHEIM AND THE BEGINNINGS OF IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS

Condemnation of the "reality distortion" repre-

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^8As coined by W. G. Sumner in 1906, ethnocentrism is the "view of things in which one's group is the centre of everything and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it." Cf. G. Duncan Mitchell, (ed.) A Dictionary of Sociology (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968), p. 71.

^9Penseés V. 294.
sented in ideology was central to Marxist teaching, and was so well articulated that the study of ideology received its greatest impetus (but scant exemplification or direction) from Marx. Of those who sought resolution for the questions of ideology which Marx had brought to prominence, the most provocative stimulus and firmest guidance for the analysis of ideology was provided by Karl Mannheim, with the publication in 1929 of *Ideology and Utopia*, his seminal work in the sociology of knowledge.¹⁰

Mannheim stressed the influence of the collectivity and its ideological framework (the "group thought-system") on the thought and communication activity of the individual. Where Marx spoke judgmentally of reality

¹⁰Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1936). That the English translation of so significant a contribution was not printed until seven years after publication of the original may be attributed in part to a lingering suspicion that Mannheim had become a "dangerous" Marxist. The conceptual and attitudinal distinction between the "philosophical Marxist" and the "political activist Marxist" is a product of recent decades. That it should be possible for even a few social scientists to be diverted for a time from examining and evaluating Mannheim's work on its merits illustrates that a commitment to critical scholarship or to the use of the scientific method does not in itself necessarily mitigate individual susceptibility to ideological determination or influence. Cf. Nigel Harris, *Beliefs in Society* (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1968), p. 22.
distortion, Mannheim wrote dispassionately of reality transcendence, distinguishing two distinct but complementary styles or elements: the ideological, strictly speaking, and the utopian. Whereas ideologies are present-centered and designed by the dominant classes to protect the status quo by offering justifications which conceal their true interests, utopias are future-oriented mentalities promoted by oppressed classes, which vividly dramatize negative aspects of the apparatus of dominance, in the hope of overthrowing and supplanting the prevailing order of things.\textsuperscript{11}

In Mannheim's view collective consciousness is "reality transcending", i.e., it presents an image of

\textsuperscript{11}Mannheim, op. cit., p. 36. Mannheim's ideology-utopia distinction, although eminently useful for many years as a heuristic device, is in the judgment of some analysts too rigid a dichotomy to remain applicable to the complex shadings and interbreeding of rapidly shifting contemporary ideology. It has become commonplace to refer to "utopian elements" within particular ideologies, without suggesting (as Mannheim would) that these elements or the ideational systems containing them are for that reason to be termed "non-ideological".

For an example of this usage see Reinert Beerling, "On Ideology" in Sociologica Neerlandica, Vol. 4, No. 1, (1966-67), pp. 28-29. Beerling reports that "some ideologies contain 'Utopian references' running counter to and transcending everything which is de facto present in a historically-and-socially-given reality. Other ideologies work with references which purport to be an extension of the factual reality . . . In our view, however, the Utopian elements, i.e., the element pointing to the future, should also be classified as ideological."
social reality which through selectivity in perception and communication departs from the objective situation. The mechanisms inherent in different social positions or life situations represent different motivations and produce different reality-transcending mentalities, or social "distortions". On one side of the polarity, members of the ruling group become incapable of seeing the real conditions of society because they are so interest-bound; this incapacity would presumably persist even for individuals in the group who could not give their belief to certain features of the legitimating ideology offered for mass credence. At the other pole, members of some oppressed groups develop such strong interest in having certain conditions changed that they increasingly are disposed to attend only to whatever seems likely to negate those conditions.\(^\text{12}\)

In terms of perceived reality ideologies are by design self-fulfilling.\(^\text{13}\) As shared perspectives which


supply the ideational templates (images, values, metaphors, expectations, etc.) for interpreting reality. Ideologies function both as unifying postulates and as self-validating beliefs. Having accepted an ideology (and necessarily, the interpretation of reality incorporated therein) one perceives things to be in accord with that interpretation. This self-fulfillment in perceived reality, however, offers no warrant for assuming a corresponding fulfillment in factual reality. Part of the foundation of Mannheim's ideology-utopia distinction is

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14 "A postulate that joins otherwise separate domains of experience, making it possible to understand all of them in the same terms, is very appealing. . . . We are inclined to accept such unifying postulates as true because they seem to make so many things clear." Ward. H. Goodenough, *Culture, Language and Society: Addison-Wesley Module in Anthropology No. 7* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishers, 1971), pp. 25-26.

15 Some beliefs are self-validating in that, believing something to be true, people act in such a way as to make their future experience consistent with their beliefs." *Ibid.*, p. 26. In his choice of examples Goodenough shows that he is describing these beliefs as self-validating in terms of 1) evoking appropriate perceptions and behaviors and 2) sometimes producing appropriate factual outcomes in ones environment. In Mannheim's view utopias can be self-validating in both respects, ideology only in the first.

"Definitions of reality have self-fulfilling potency." Berger and Luckmann, *op. cit.*, p. 128

the consideration of whether or not these states of mind can possibly be implemented, i.e., installed in factual reality. Mannheim's contention is that ideologies, however plausible they may seem in the perceptions of adherents, are expedient but improbable legitimizing fictions, incapable of implementation adequate to the belief. Utopias, given adequate dissemination, enthusiasm and opportunity, are very much in the realm of possibility.

The development of the systematic study of ideology within sociology of knowledge received a great deal of its momentum from the application -- as well as misapplication -- of major analytic devices originated by Mannheim: his distinction between particular and total conceptions of ideology, and the less commonly known distinction between special and general formulations of the total conception.

In the present explication of Mannheim's distinctions it is helpful to keep in mind that Mannheim is not dividing up ideological concepts, i.e., the products of ideologically determined thought; he is distinguishing

16"Contrasts between thought and action run through the theories about ideology, and echo Mannheim's distinction between ideology and utopia as the difference between what can not be implemented and that which can." L. B. Brown, op. cit., p. 172.
scholarly conceptions of ideology. The conceptions being classified are the deliberately adopted conceptions of the analyst, not the unconsciously amalgamated conceptions of those in the arena of ideological discourse, either as adherents, opponents or affected, uncritical onlookers.

Unless Mannheim's work is kept in historical perspective, one may be troubled by the tendency to project contemporary expectations onto these devices conceived in the infancy of serious ideological inquiry. Although Mannheim's analytic devices specify theoretical outlooks that have enjoyed almost fifty years of usefulness among those who court objectivity in the critical study of ideologies, the devices may not be presumed to catalogue the features of today's shifting assemblage of "traditional" ideologies and ideologies-in-transition. Mannheim's conceptions are outdated, if one attends primarily to the constant flow of trends in intellectual pursuits; in current empirical jargon, his conceptual apparatus is not isomorphic with "what's happening out there" in society. Nevertheless, some social scientists report and demonstrate that the apparatus still serves them well.

Against criticism of Mannheim's conceptions as "obsolete" or "ivory-towerish" one may counterpose the special constraints of the situation, which have not ameliorated appreciably since Mannheim's time: that the
phenomenon of ideology represents an exceedingly intricate and subtle interweaving of partially identified societal and personal elements. Further, that the trained observer with the full array of scientific "tools" at his disposal has not yet gained access to many of these elements. Ideology remains the psycho-social enigma par excellence. So long as appropriate observational strategies and criteria remain in the rudimentary stage of development, it remains both reasonable and practical that a conceptual apparatus like Mannheim's should have won acceptance on the basis of its ability to stimulate and organize inquiry.

Although changing social conditions have occasioned some new avenues of observing and reconceptualizing ideologies, it seems pointless to condemn old heuristic devices, or continually to accomodate them to the latest findings, as if formulation of predictive "laws of ideology" were imminent. Mannheim's distinctions require neither apology nor rehabilitation; they are simply devices which, like all such devices, are useful for a time before they are relinquished for the fresh stimulus of yet another device. Epistemological obsolescence is both inevitable and productive in the
social sciences.\footnote{17}

It should come as no surprise that Mannheim's particular-total distinction is often cast in the faintly hostile language of warfare and suspicion, for the tradition of impassioned discourse established by Marx still dominated matters ideological. In confrontation with opposing thought, Mannheim asserts, one's conceptualization of that thought may deal only with particular assertions which mask or rationalize the speaker's narrow assemblage of interests. The specific interests may concern matters of politics, economics, status, etc., deriving from one's affiliation with an occupational group or an epistemic community. Daniel Bell offers as an example of the particular conception the public assertion of Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson (former president of General Motors) that "what is good for the United States is good for General Motors, and vice-versa\footnote{18}.

\footnote{17}{The occasion for developing these observations is the writer's need to account for the confusingly disparate interpretations accorded Mannheim's use of \textit{particular}, \textit{total} and \textit{general} with reference to ideology. The attempts of some commentators to "simplify" or to "modernize" Mannheim have produced misrepresentations of his thought. Mannheim would no doubt have been pleased to view these distortions as symptomatic of unacknowledged ideological currents within the profession, providing the opportunity to reconfirm his thesis of universal ideological influence.}

\footnote{18}{Bell, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 95-96.}
Mannheim is somewhat less benevolent in his description:

The particular conception of ideology is implied when the term denotes that we are sceptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent. They are regarded as more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interests. These distortions range all the way from conscious lies to half-conscious and unwitting disguises; from calculated attempts to dupe others to self-deception.19

In contrast with the above, Mannheim proposes that the conceptualization of opposing thought can deal with the totality of shared, integrated belief systems which invests a class or stratum of society with a distinctive "angle of vision" from its social location, and a correspondingly distinctive way of thought. The total conception can be applied most obviously to any of the classic "isms" in political history, i.e., to all-inclusive belief systems, infused with passion and offering a comprehensive interpretation of reality, which seek to transform the whole of a way of life.20

Mannheim's description of the total conception extends to ideologies situated in time as well as in "social space":

Here we refer to the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e.g., of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group.21

20Paraphrased from Bell, op. cit., p. 96.
21Ibid., p. 56.
The above description is quite broad; some have expressed displeasure with its vagueness. Arne Naess speaks for the exasperated when he interrupts fifty-nine pages of calm semantic analysis of the term 'ideology' to exclaim, "Who can work with an entity introduced by the expression 'total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group'?" There is no real need, however, for more specificity; the instances of ideologies which could be conceived as total were diverse in social scope in Mannheim's day, and are considerably more diverse today. The total conception applies not only to the portentous "isms" embodied in global movements, but to the systematized beliefs and programs peculiar to any subcultural group or specialized collectivity.

Neither does "total" refer to the totality of ideological configurations present in a society, i.e., to the collection of ideologies which at any given time contribute much of a society's character.

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22 Naess, op. cit., p. 168

23 This misinterpretation is identified by Robert K. Carley, Ideology As Reflected in the Attitudes and Activities of Individuals, Unpublished dissertation, Indiana University, 1968, p. 5; it is exemplified by Harris, op. cit., p. 29, who writes of "views attributable to society as a whole."
Rather, the reference is to the totality of the shared belief system which provides a collectivity, large or small, prominent or obscure, with a common perceptual set and a common valuational basis for judgment.

The difference between the two conceptions, simply phrased, is the "difference between specific interest rationalization and a general perspective on the world, Weltanschauung." It is the difference between the psychological and the noological levels of analysis, between isolated assertions or behaviors made in the confluent service of one's personal interests and values and a prescriptive mentality or world view which is shared and developed within a collectivity.

In application, however, Mannheim concedes that the two conceptions may quite frequently coincide. The individual's interests and values come to be derived almost exclusively from the comprehensive belief system which he has internalized as a member of a collectivity,


25 "The first distinction concerns the question as to whether single isolated ideas or the entire mind is to be seen as ideological, and whether the social situation conditions merely the psychological manifestations of concept, or whether it even penetrates to the noological meanings." Mannheim, op. cit., p. 77n.
so that what might otherwise have been labeled self-interested rationalizing now must be seen as his acting in ideological good faith:

The particular conception of ideology merges with the total. This becomes apparent to the observer in the following manner: previously, one's adversary, as the representative of a certain politico-social position was accused of conscious or unconscious falsification. Now, however, the critique is more thoroughgoing in that, having discredited the total structure of his consciousness, we consider him no longer capable of thinking correctly.\(^\text{26}\)

Until this point in his study Mannheim had done little to emancipate himself from the stylistic canons of Marxist rhetoric, which by mere force of repetition dominated common usage. His analyses are framed in intellectualized adversary relationships and ideology is always to be found on the other side of that relationship. Ideological investigation had not yet "come home to roost", i.e., it had not yet been turned back upon itself, to scrutinize the ideologies of the investigators.

The change in Mannheim's verbal style -- accompanied by a profound rethinking of his foundational assumptions and a reorganization of his investigatory goals and methods -- was brought about, one may surmise, by his logical arrival at the "special-general" distinc-

\(^{26}\text{ibid.}, \ p. \ 69.\)
tion, and by the critical reflection which it invited.\textsuperscript{27} Mannheim's prolonged explication of the total conception had developed into the first full-scale theory of ideology to be offered for consideration: a theory that was adequate to explain the realities underlying such slogan words as "false consciousness" at all levels of social analysis. Application of the total conception to the ideas of one's adversaries was what Mannheim called the highly restricted, or special formulation of the theory. Mannheim came to appreciate that the special formulation was destined to be well regarded by political polemicists as a nicely "practical" theory for their purposes; it was, however, a grossly inadequate expression of the theory's total capacity for the creation of meaning. Mannheim felt a need to move beyond this restriction and to confront the consequences of that move:

In contrast to this special formulation, the general form of the total conception of ideology is being used by the analyst when he has the courage to subject not just the adversary's point of view but \textit{all points of view, including his own}, to the ideological analysis.

At the present stage in our understanding it is hardly possible to avoid this general formulation

\textsuperscript{27}For a decidedly less complimentary view of these developments, see Johannes Fabian "Ideology and Content" in \textit{Sociologus} (Berlin), Vol. 16, No. 1, (1965), pp. 2-3.
of the total conception of ideology, according to which the thought of all parties in all epochs is of an ideological character. (italics added for emphasis)\(^2\)

As is shown in the excerpted passage, the consequence of Mannheim's move is the logically forced acceptance of pan-ideologism: a conviction that ideology is universally pervasive, so that no human thought (with the tentative exception of the sociology of knowledge) is immune to the ideologizing influences of its social context.\(^2\) It was a position in which Mannheim discovered great capacity for experiencing discomfort, especially with the recurrent and growing doubt that the sociology of knowledge could claim immunity from influence, or adequacy in its counteractive measures. The doubt and the discomfort, though essentially self-generated, were quite probably nurtured by suspicious criticism of Scheler\(^3\) and Mannheim's claimed abandon-

\(^2\)Mannheim, *op. cit.*, p. 77. Mannheim's use of *general* ideology to mean pan-ideologism should not be confused with *generic* ideology, a designation taken from Gouldner, *op. cit.*, and employed elsewhere in this study to mean "the basic common denominator" of ideology, i.e., those elements which are common to all "traditional" ideologies.

\(^2\)Berger and Luckmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-10.

\(^3\)Max Scheler, a German sociologist who developed the groundwork for the sociology of knowledge concurrently with Mannheim, produced works reported to be overburdened with ornate philosophical "baggage"; perhaps for this reason his works remain untranslated to date.
ment of respectable sociological practice to pursue a novelty which they presumed to entitle sociology of knowledge. Anyone familiar with the cutting edge of academic and professional banter should be able to flesh out the situation with his own hypothetical, appropriately barbed dialogue, e.g., "All that's needed to put an end to this "sociology of knowledge" business is a little knowledge of sociology." Behind much of the ridicule there must have been an occasional presentiment of anxiety, a premonition that Mannheim's heretofore quite personal intellectual agonizing would grow into an abiding epistemological "curse" on sociology, damaging the credibility of its urgent and longstanding claim to full scientific character and prestige.

4. MANNHEIM'S PARADOX AND PROPOSALS FOR ITS CIRCUMVENTION

Like the fictional baker in children's tales whose generosity with yeast causes him to be engulfed in

After his flight from Nazism Mannheim brought to his teaching position in London a system which was less elaborately fixtured and consequently more congenial to English-speaking audiences. Berger and Luckmann, loc. cit., assert that "when sociologists today think of the sociology of knowledge, they usually do so in terms of Mannheim's formulation of it." Even were this not the case, the fact remains that the concept of ideology, which is central to Mannheim's sociology of knowledge, enjoys no comparable prominence in Scheler's. Invoking the same criterion, the present study makes no attempt to represent the theoretical and methodological contributions of eminent sociologists of knowledge such as Durkheim, Geiger, Stark, etc.
rising dough, Mannheim's steadfast pursuit of ideological analysis caused his investigation to be absorbed into its own referent. This predicament (although not intentionally preconceived for use as an argumentative device, as were the "classic" paradoxes of history, e.g., those of Zeno) has come to be known as Mannheim's paradox, stated most succinctly as "Where, if anywhere, does ideology leave off and science begin?"31

The paradox soon generated crises of confidence on two levels: for many the paradox undermined the insecurely established credibility of social science, and for some it also signaled the futility of all rational investigation. Gouldner argues that the first crisis was both self-inflicted and well deserved:

The inescapable paradox of the new social science was this: sociology had set itself up as the study of society, stressing the profound power and influence of the objects it studied -- society, groups, social structures -- and then it proceeded to claim that its own researches were free of biases derived from these same powerful influences. One need not accept the Marxist counterclaim to see the logical contradiction in which positivistic sociology had placed itself. The more one believed the claims of sociology the more one had to concede that it, too, must necessarily embody social limits on its cognition, which gave it no clear cognitive superiority to ideologies.32


32 Gouldner, op. cit., p. 18.
Some researchers who employ sociological methods in their work seem to regard Mannheim's paradox as an affliction, the intellectual analogue of haemophilia, which in certain sociological "families" is transmitted to posterity. As is observed in the previous section, beliefs of this sort function as self-fulfilling self-prophecy. Geertz's assessment of Mannheim's "legacy" identifies some of its lingering effect upon contemporary analysis of ideology:

"I am aware," a recent analyst of ideological preoccupations among American intellectuals concludes somewhat nervously, "that many readers will claim that my position is itself ideological." Whatever the fate of his other predictions, the validity of this one is certain. Although the arrival of a scientific sociology has been repeatedly proclaimed, the acknowledgment of its existence is far from universal, even among social scientists themselves; and nowhere is resistance to claims to objectivity greater than in the study of ideology.

It should not be imagined that all who utilize the social sciences today feel in some measure disillusioned, embarrassed or inconvenienced by the paradox. Many in fact welcome the deflation of what they consider to be the intemperate claims and pretensions

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33 The writer has coined this phrase in order to contrast acting so as to fulfill one's beliefs about oneself with the meaning commonly given to "self fulfilling prophecy" in educational usage, i.e., acting so as to fulfill one's beliefs about others.

34 Geertz, loc. cit.
of some sociologists. Accordingly, the paradox is regarded as a counterfeit problem for which no complete solution is possible or even desirable. Rather, the historical emergence of the paradox provided a solution of sorts to the real problem: the collective fantasy of social sciences destined eventually to equal the physical sciences in objectivity, precision, and other scientific desiderata. In this view, the paradox merely summarizes the circumstances (the "built-in constraints") which attend all disciplines of social inquiry, compelling them to abandon their mimicry of the natural sciences and to conceive distinctive models for their development. At the present level of development much of the "social conditioning of social inquiry" remains an unworkable, amorphous aggregate of factors. As this composite is made to yield discrete conceptualizations of constraints, there is no reason to doubt that methods can be devised to correct for each constraint. Expressions of such cautious optimism (a willingness to work within present

The situation for research is analogous -- although far greater in scope and potential for difficulty -- to that posed by troublesome constructs like "creativity" which need to be carved into a justifiable set of variables in order to be accessible to the researcher. In such situations, as in the situation described above, the prior and pressing need, largely unsatisfied and often unacknowledged, is for systematic foundational studies yielding improved conceptualizations.
limitations without necessarily accepting those limitations as invincible) are commonplace, e.g.:

There is no analysis of social phenomena which is not the expression of some special social standpoint, or which does not reflect the interests and values dominant in some sector of the human scene at a certain stage of its history. In consequence, although a sound distinction can be made in the natural sciences between the origin of a man's views and their factual validity, such a distinction allegedly cannot be made in social inquiry.36

We -- at least those of us in the highly industrialized nations -- are the products of the very paradigm we must transform, and our rational thought processes are but a reflection of the paradigm. As in the process of psychotherapy, the very things that a patient thinks will get him out of his difficulties so often turn out to make the situation worse.37

...the social context from which a new setting emerges, as well as the thinking of those who create new settings, reflects what seems "natural" in the society. And what seems natural is almost always a function of the culture to a degree that usually renders us incapable to recognizing wherein we are prisoners of the culture. Those who create new settings always want to do something new, usually unaware that they are armed with, and will subsequently be disarmed by, categories of thought which help produce the conditions the new setting hopes to remedy.38


On the second level of reaction mentioned above, Mannheim's paradox assumes the aspects of a classic case of infectious scepticism: that Mannheim's personal doubts about the reliability of rational investigation are communicable at full intensity to those who are susceptible, i.e., predisposed to scepticism. Predisposition would most likely be a concurrence of certain "negative" psychological states with prior commitment to cognitive or moral relativism, or with inadequate or imbalanced development of the critical skills by means of which doubts are managed. Under effective critical management one's doubts are either resolved, redirected, suppressed, contained or used to good advantage, but they do not escalate beyond control in self-defeating scepticism. As Dewey liked to observe, in practical experience we cannot doubt everything at once.39

At this point it is helpful to underscore the differences between two of the meanings given to the term 'scepticism', i.e., the differences between controlled scepticism and rampant scepticism. Controlled or "healthy" scepticism refers to the developed critical

outlook which is a distinguishing characteristic of the well educated\(^{40}\) person and which is commonly valued as an aim of education:

Since to make men critical is only to teach them to proportion the degree of their various beliefs to the weight of the evidence in their favor, it is difficult to see how it can properly be deprecated as an educational aim.\(^{41}\)

Ideally an undogmatic, curious, open mind continues to search for the truth about human beliefs or viewpoints regardless of obstacles or the force of convention or tradition, does not hesitate to make independent judgments and constant self-appraisals and is ready at all times to reconstruct untenable beliefs or opinions.\(^{42}\)

Controlled scepticism as described above is an intellectual *modus operandi* receiving stimulus and support as well as control from the individual's largely self-assembled\(^{43}\) critical framework, which includes beliefs of varying degrees of evidential support, command of some consistent means of verifying empirical and value

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\(^{40}\)As distinguished from well trained, well informed or well socialized.


\(^{43}\)As opposed to uncritical acceptance of entire "pre-packaged" frameworks available in ideologies, religions, and in the fixed, inviolable procedural codes which are sometimes substituted for theory in scientific and technological endeavor.
beliefs, fundamental value commitments, and criteria to be employed in making particular value decisions. In the absence of a developed critical framework and of its stabilizing influence on the questioning mind, there is nothing to prevent some individuals from being caught up in an accelerating, self-sustaining spiral of doubt: rampant scepticism.

From the time when scepticism first appeared as an occupational hazard of philosophers, among the Greek Sophists of the fifth century B.C., the sequence of stages leading to total scepticism has been firmly identified and repeatedly re-experienced. In a dialogue of mutual reinforcement between one's moral and intellectual doubts, the individual moves from cultural


By a coincidence which the writer regards as advantageous, the relativistic and sceptical teachings of Protagoras, the preeminent Sophist, are frequently quoted in rationales advanced by advocates of Humanistic education. This matter of value relativism and scepticism within the movement receives further attention in succeeding chapters.
relativism to personal relativism, from which position it is a small step to all-embracing scepticism:

Cultural relativity, if taken not simply as a theory, but as a working basis for political and private conduct, is a heady doctrine. For if moral standards are subjective in that they are relative to culture, it is an easy inference that they are subjective in that they are further relative to the individual -- that nothing is either right or wrong but thinking makes it so.46

If some of Mannheim's readers reacted to his paradox by sliding into complete scepticism, there is no reason to think that Mannheim himself completed that sequence. His statements of concern indicate that relativism is problem enough to consume his efforts:

The problem is thus made the more difficult by the fact that the very principles, in the light of which knowledge is to be criticized, are themselves found to be socially and historically conditioned. Hence their application appears to be limited to given historical periods and the particular types of knowledge then prevalent.47

Mannheim was not completely at ease with his relativism; he subsequently modified his views, only to reaffirm them in 1946, the year before his death.48

Neither would he accept the designation relativism (because of its vagueness, particularly its inability to specify the extent to which one's relativism

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48Nagel, op. cit., p. 545n.
had progressed); in its place he coined the term *relationism* to denote "the sober recognition that knowledge must always be knowledge from a certain position."49

In all his wrestlings with the paradox Mannheim retained the hope of finding some means of escape from the quandary. He placed that hope in the "socially unattached intelligentsia", a social stratum that he believed to be relatively free of class interests, and of the ideological perspective generated by such interests.50 This hope is not shared by many today,51


50Mannheim, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

51A notable exception is David Apter, who concurs with Mannheim on the grounds that intellectuals (whom he stipulates to be "practitioners of science") constitute in developed countries today a *meritocracy*, a new ruling class different from all those in the past in that it rests on knowledge rather than on interest or power. Cf. David E. Apter, "Introduction: Ideology and Discontent" in David E. Apter, (ed.) *Ideology and Discontent* pp. 37-39.


The basic weakness of Apter's claim would seem to be his notion of interest, which is defined so narrowly as to exclude knowledge. For an exposition of the ways in which all knowledge is grounded in interest, see James B. MacDonald, "Curriculum and Human Interests" in William Pinar, (ed.) *Curriculum Theorizing: The Reconceptualists* (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corp., 1975) pp. 287-88.
either because they feel that intellectuals are forming a new establishment with attachment to new interests of their own, or because intellectuals are to be found in a large number of social groups representing a number of different perspectives:

"Intellectuals' do not, by and large, constitute a coherent social group. Being an 'intellectual' suggests something about the kinds of topics in which you are interested, the way in which you are interested in them, but it does not denote a single perspective."

It is intended in the present explication to represent Mannheim's certainties as well as his doubts, pp. 287-88.

The most comprehensive elucidation of the varieties and workings of interests is provided by Gouldner, who summarizes that "whatever produces gratification for individuals is in their interest." Cf. Gouldner, op. cit., pp. 211-218.

In view of recently developed understanding of the dynamics of human interests, the writer concludes that detachment as a collective trait is unattainable by intellectuals or, for that matter, by any other stratum in contemporary society. Individuals, of course, retain the capability of attaining levels of detachment through the arduous process of successively identifying and correcting for a number of interest-based biases, at considerable risk of self-deception. One is inclined to speculate that the "completely detached individual", were such a person to present himself, would by definition be unfit to appraise or manage human affairs. The reasonable objective is to identify, temper, or counterbalance human interests, not to eradicate them.

52Harris, op. cit., p. 222.
to respect his hopes as well as his fears. Nevertheless, the foregoing considerations all converge in awareness that there is no need for "detached intellectuals" to engineer the escape from the paradox, because there is no demonstrable need for escape. If one is able to take responsibility for his own acceptance or avoidance of total scepticism, the initial disruptive power of Mannheim's paradox is quickly dissipated. To accept the validity of Mannheim's observations is not to abandon all hope of reliable knowledge; it is merely to relinquish any lingering fantasy of capturing "absolute truth", or of collecting any "eternal verities" that are not analytic statements.

In accord with this assessment, the paradox is not to be resolved, but to be lived with, to be accepted as part of the human condition. This is not to recommend passive acceptance; rather, the suggestion is that the

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53 e.g., "Figures with three sides are triangles", "Two plus two equals four". Such statements are self-defining as true; they are true because human convention has made them true.

54 Another unrecommended variety of acceptance is the ability cultivated by some Logical Positivist philosophers to laugh off the most serious defects in their foundational structure and heuristic devices (e.g., self-contradictory premises or paradoxes) so long as the structure yields productive results. Wittgenstein, most noted for good-humored dismissal of contradictions, explains that all his arguments are regarded as disposable instruments: "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me
state of affairs represented in the paradox be subjected to re-examination and to unhurried, meticulous reconceptualization. To use the metaphor of pathology favored by some analysts of ideology, it is time to abandon the futile, distractive quest for some permanent remedy, some epistemological "innoculation" that will forever protect sociological analysis from contamination by ideology. In the view of many sociologists, the present function of the paradox is to advertise the need for both vigilance and perseverance in continual exploratory and reflective effort:

Ideology is not some acned condition that sociology outgrows in its maturity. It remains, rather a boundary wall that is manned, watched, and recurrently repaired.\(^5\)

A great part of the problem lies in the lack of conceptual sophistication within social science itself, that the resistance of ideology to sociological analyses is so great because the analyses are in fact fundamentally inadequate, the theoretical framework they employ conspicuously incomplete...

\(^5\) Gouldner, op. cit., p. 10.
with Mannheim's paradox requires the perfection of a conceptual apparatus capable of dealing more adroitly with meaning. Bluntly we need a more exact apprehension of our object of study, lest we find ourselves in the position of the Javanese folktale figure, "Stupid Boy", who, having been counseled by his mother to seek a quiet wife, returned with a corpse... ...The best way to deal with Mannheim's as with any true paradox is to circumvent it by reformulating one's theoretical approach so as to avoid setting off once more down the well-worn path of argument that led to it in the first place.

5. AMERICAN APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF IDEOLOGY: EMERGENCE OF COMPETING THEORIES OF IDEOLOGY

Mannheim's delineation of "the problem of ideology eventually won wide acceptance in the United States, although the same cannot be said of all the methodological recommendations contained in his sociology of knowledge. Under the impetus of his work the investigation of ideology has made increasingly large claims on the resources of American sociology, in much the same way (to express the cynicism of some dissenting sociologists) as the quest for the Philosopher's Stone is reported to have dominated alchemy to the point of obsession. After forty years of investigation and debate it is difficult to assess whether the majority of American sociologists regard "the problem of ideology" as a problem to be resolved by means of sociology or as a problem indefinitely to be endured by sociology. Certainly the range of current viewpoints is discomfort-

56 Geertz, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-9, 71.
ingly broad, from ideology as a valued means to "help a social system to achieve greater integration or greater adaptation or adaptive capacity" to ideology as a "form of radical intellectual depravity." In this diversity of opinion it is possible to find some points of common agreement and frustration among American researchers and writers presently dealing with ideology:

1. Ideological phenomena seem to be omnipresent and continually polymorphous. To cite Rolf Schulze's aphorism, "There cannot be an ideological vacuum"; as ideologies fail or are discredited, new forms invariably take their places. What Schulze's maxim does not take into account is that new variants sometimes seem to emerge without a vacuum to call them forth, i.e., when no failures or fatal weaknesses are apparent in any of the prevailing ideological systems. If this

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58Attributed to Werner Stark in Geertz, op. cit., p. 50.

observation should be confirmed, it may be preferable in some instances to conceive of emergent ideologies in terms of "spontaneous mutations" rather than as planned reactionary developments.  

2. The relative effectiveness of various ideologies in winning adherents or producing desired social action has demonstrated its opacity to logical analysis. Each ideology comprises a public language, employing distinctive, readily identified presuppositions, imagery and styles of argument. Nevertheless, ideologies cannot be adequately or appropriately assessed by means of the same epistemological framework one employs for theories. Holzner points out that "ideologies are existential complexes of meaning which are capable of rational explica-

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60 This recommendation is advanced solely by the writer, on the basis of his survey of the literature.

61 Specifically, an ideology is a *sociolect*, a sociolinguistic speech variant (social dialect) which is characteristic of some class, stratum, or special interest collectivity in society. For extensive treatment of this aspect, see Gouldner, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-61, 81-83. Gouldner describes an ideology (p. 82) as an extraordinary sociolect which acts as a highly selective structuring mechanism to reorganize consciousness as a whole.
tion only as functional components of living systems. Their cognitive structure is not necessarily coherent throughout." Upon coming to appreciate this difficulty, some have abandoned the study of ideology as futile. The more reasonable and scholarly response has been to work toward the creation of new epistemological frameworks and new research methodologies, especially observational techniques, which are adequate to the task.

3. The impact of ideologies on society is not restricted to the verbal confrontation of competing ideologies in the public forum, or to the rhetorical devices by means of which ideologies disseminate a complimentary, appealing self-image among adherents and "outsiders" alike; neither are these explicit verbal behaviors necessarily the primary channel of ideological influence. In recognition of this characteristic it has become commonplace to distinguish two levels

of ideological analysis. Bluhm, for example speaks of *forensic* ideologies, "elaborate, self-conscious word systems, formulated at a rather abstract level, which constitute the language of political discussion"; in contrast with these are *latent* ideologies, implicit language "expressed in attitude and behavior,... ...but which can be 'excavated' -- that is, raised to the forensic level -- by social scientific research."\(^{63}\)

4. In addition to the dichotomy of explicitly verbal versus implicitly verbal or non-verbal described above, a second distinction is observed in classifying ideological phenomena. Ideologies can function as consciously intended by their adherents, but they are not limited to consciously directed operation; any ideology can have a number of unconscious, unintended functions. It was previously noted that some aspects of ideological function are latent in the sense of being hidden from "outsiders";\(^{64}\) they are

\(^{63}\)Bluhm, *op. cit.*., p. 10.

\(^{64}\)With limited exception for those "outsiders" who are appropriately trained observers and analysts.
not included in the explicit messages by means of which ideologies identify and locate themselves in the social world. In accord with the present distinction, some functions of ideology are latent in the sense of being hidden even from the reflective insider. For the purposes of this study, the former sense is designated \textit{objectively latent} and the latter sense, \textit{subjectively latent}.

The validity of the principle employed in the third statement above is readily appreciated if one recalls that ideologies, for all their complexities and distinctive features, are a species of shared belief system. In all matters of belief, verbal utterances provide a means of identifying a belief, but they do not of themselves constitute the whole of that belief. When one's belief is doubted, the test of that belief is performative, i.e., whether one's performance is in accord with one's verbal claim. Individual belief dispositions are exercised in behaviours of various kinds: verbal, performative and emotive.\textsuperscript{65} Although verbal

\textsuperscript{65}Cf. Gilbert Ryle, \textit{The Concept of Mind} (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1970). Ryle's classic work, in the writer's opinion, is unsurpassed for promoting clarity in the use of psychological concepts, notably that of belief. Ryle shows that there is no single pattern, no one special kind of activity called 'believing'. Rather, Ryle describes belief as a "multi-
utterances of belief are most often attended to (being easiest to deal with) they need not be the most frequent or significant expressions of that belief. The same considerations apply to shared belief systems.

In characterizing ideologies as shared belief systems, it is not suggested that the belief is uniformly accepted by all adherents. LaPalombara observes that "an ideology may or may not be believed by those who articulate it," e.g., it may be used cynically as an instrument of control. That feigned belief should be used as a means of exploitation and self-advancement is hardly a novelty in the annals of human behavior; in its systematic form it can be traced back at least as far as Macchiavelli. Yet here also the prior question asserts itself: What is meant by 'believing' an ideology?

track disposition the exercises of which are indefinitely heterogeneous." (pp. 44-45) 'Belief' is a determinable dispositional word signifying proneness "to do, not things of one unique kind, but things of lots of different kinds." (p. 118) It denotes "a propensity not only to make certain theoretical moves but also to make certain executive and imaginative moves, as well as to have certain feelings." (p. 135)

66For an extensive conceptual analysis of belief Cf. unpublished dissertation (Ohio State University, 1975) by Margaret Klempay DiBlasio, "Proposals for the Critical Examination of Belief Claims in Art Education: A Conceptual Analysis of Belief Applied to Foundational Issues in Art Education", pp. 50-97

LaPalombara speaks of an ideology being "rationally formulated and incorporated into one's belief system," which seems to indicate an opinion that 'believing' an ideology is giving intellectual assent to a set of belief propositions.

Ideologies, however, are something more than distinctively packaged sets of belief propositions. They are programs for social action, templates for social behavior; "ideologies provide man with an answer to the question of how he is to behave both as an individual and as a member of society."  

68 If an individual tells himself that he is withholding intellectual assent to a belief proposition, yet acts in accord with all that is contained in that belief proposition, how shall he be regarded? Is he pretending (to others) that he believes, or is he pretending (to himself) that he does not believe? It is commonly said that one "votes with his feet." Is there a corresponding sense in which one "believes with his feet," regardless of inner pretensions of dissent? However one chooses to resolve these questions, there is no reason to doubt that the ideologically conformed activity of "insincere" ideologues has the same potential for social influence as that of their "true believer"

68Beerling, op. cit., p. 33.
colleagues.

The third and fourth statements especially reflect the thought of Robert Merton, whose contributions to the sociology of knowledge, published twenty years ago, are commonly regarded as the most important development of the discipline since Mannheim's. Merton devised a new paradigm for the sociology of knowledge which represents a synthesis of the traditional approach (primarily Mannheim's) with the approaches being developed in structural-functional theory.

Merton is best known for introducing the concepts of manifest and latent function to social analysis. As Merton applied these concepts to ideological study, he distinguished between an ideology's intended, conscious functions and its unintended, unconscious ones. An educational ideology's manifest function, for example, may be to promote personal freedom of choice; its intentions are widely proclaimed and sloganized. A latent function of the same ideology may be to inhibit personal freedom of choice. This latent function would result from a number of unconsidered and unintended circumstances, e. g., the lack of unequivocal guidance; failure to

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promote acquisition of formally structured knowledge and critical skills that are sufficient to alleviate student disorientation and apprehensiveness in "deciding for oneself and living with the consequences."

To pursue another example, a manifest function of humanism (quite inadequately realized at present) is to counteract the "dehumanizing" influence of the scientific-technological establishment. Anyone familiar with the history of reactionary ideological movements cannot avoid wondering if the latent function would possibly be to become the replacement establishment, exerting a new variety of selectively repressive influence. Humanists would expectedly be horrified at this latter suggestion, repudiating any such intentions. Merton's point is that such developments are by nature -- and by his definition -- beyond intention.

Some caution needs to be observed in relating Merton's use of 'latent' to the two senses of 'latent' stipulated earlier. A latent function of ideology as conceived by Merton is subjectively latent, and in most cases is objectively latent as well. However, not every instance of objectively latent expression is subjectively latent. A particular value position, for example, rather than being explicitly stated by an ideology, may be implied in an emotively loaded hidden premise (i. e., the
value is objectively latent); nevertheless, the adherents may be aware of the value position and intend to promote it -- a conscious, i.e., manifest function.

The subjective-objective latency distinction provides an answer to a question that, in the writer's knowledge, has not been explicitly raised in the study of ideology by Merton or his followers: when an ideological function is said to be latent or manifest, to whom specifically is it latent or manifest? ...to the adherents, to those examining the ideology "from the outside," or to everyone? A practical reason for maintaining the distinction is that objectively latent ideological expressions can frequently be detected and made explicit when one can only surmise whether or not those expressions are consciously intended. Judgments concerning states of consciousness, individual or collective, are not easily made by one who does not participate in that consciousness. It is useful to remember that possession of an analytic device like "manifest-latent" does not create its own access to the secrets of human personality.

The need to distinguish modes of latency is most likely to be felt when one is engaged in linguistic analysis of ideological discourse. It is not likely that Merton, in writing of "latent functions", was especially
concerned with the linguistic expression of ideologies; his attention was given to what may be called their "social expression", i.e., to ideological functions as embodied in social structure.

Merton's contribution had the effect of widening the scope and complicating the rules of ideological investigation; in other words, he made an already formidable specialty even more of a challenge. However, Merton's transformation of the sociology of knowledge did not act as a deterrent to newcomers; rather, it imparted to the discipline a somewhat more "human" character, at once more flexible and more fallible, which served to enhance its attractiveness to many. In the current literature of several disciplines one can discover many who build on Merton's foundations, or who employ and rearticulate his concepts:

The liar, by definition, knows that he is lying. The ideologist does not. It is not our concern at this point to ask which of the two is ethically superior. We only stress once more the unreflected and unplanned way in which society normally operates.71

70 More precisely, Merton's concern with linguistic expression was exercised at the level of communications theory rather than at the level of linguistic analysis.

71 Peter L. Berger Invitation to Sociology (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1963), p. 112.
This guiding pattern in the life of every person is his philosophy, even though it be implicit in his actions rather than explicit in his mind, his inarticulate major premise...\textsuperscript{72}

The issue is not over whether or not to have a philosophy of psychology, but whether to have one that is conscious or unconscious.\textsuperscript{73}

The truth of an argument in the sense of its irrefutability -- the truth that it cannot be a matter of choice that there is or is not a God... ... -- this sense of truth vanishes in the quest for consensus which is the latent ideology of liberal-minded group discussion.\textsuperscript{74}

While Merton's concepts were still being absorbed by the academic communities, Talcott Parsons published \textit{The Social System}, an ambitiously conceived theoretical structure which is thought to have altered the working conceptualizations of most of the social analysts and theoreticians in this country. Unlike Merton, Parsons' efforts were not exerted within the sociology of knowledge or directed toward its development; in fact, Parsons did not choose to integrate the sociology of knowledge within his theoretical system. When Parsons writes, for example,


of ideology as a symptom of social malintegration, his frame of reference dictates that emphasis should be placed on the "unhealthy" social system rather than on the ideology.

Although Parsons did not wear the hat of a sociologist of knowledge, he stimulated the development of new approaches to ideological inquiry. This was accomplished by his introduction of an alternative to the reigning theory of the social determinants of ideology.

The historical development of the concept of ideology briefly chronicled in this chapter reveals the persistence of the notion that ideologies are social mechanisms designed to promote particular interests without advertising their presence. Given its most dramatic expression by Marx, the interest theory views ideologies as strategic moves in a universal struggle for advantage. The underlying assumption is that human nature is "a bundle of subrational drives for status, income, and power of which reason is a mere helpmate, not a governor." Because men are unable to live comfortably with this natural "law of the jungle" unless it is disguised by some appropriate myth, ideologies represent

75Bluhm, op. cit., p. 13.

76'Myth' is here used in the pejorative sense of a fictitious representation or an erroneous belief, rather than in the non-evaluative sense of any commonly shared belief of a cultural group.
attempts to rationalize often non-rational interests.

This battlefield image of society, in which every clash of principles is assumed to be masking a power conflict, has thoroughly permeated contemporary society. In barbershop discussions of current events the intellectual will frequently agree with his less sophisticated neighbor that "it all comes down to whose ox is being gored."

The interest theory exhibits similar vitality among students of ideology, although in these circles the theory undergoes diverse interpretation. Some prefer to proclaim the theory at full rhetorical strength:

Ideology is... ...a universal feature of every system of social organization. Naked power everywhere clothes itself in the robes of authority. An ideology is just that set of ideas and perspectives which confers legitimacy...77

Ideology is the conversion of ideas into social levers. Without irony, Max Lerner once entitled a book *Ideas are Weapons*. This is the language of ideology.78

In most instances, writers are more temperate in their characterization of conflicting interests:


78Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 96.
One of the most important aspects of the process of "rationalization" of action is the substitution for the unthinking acceptance of ancient custom, of deliberate adaptation to situations in terms of self-interest.  

The distinctiveness of ideology is rather that the same overall [symbolic] universe is interpreted in different ways, depending on concrete vested interests within the society in question. Frequently an ideology is taken on by a group because of specific theoretical elements that are conducive to its interests.

Some writers continue to refine the interest theory by specifying the mechanisms of intragroup and intergroup persuasion employed in the service of ideology:

The "command" dimension of an ideology is thus never simply grounded in its report dimensions, but is also grounded in some interest. "What is to be done" always depends in part on the pursuit or defense of an interest under conditions indicated in the "report." Correspondingly, reports about "what is" in the social world embedded in ideologies always further some interest; thus reports are always caught up in a functional relation with some interest.

Ideologies are texts, theories, doctrines, phrases, or concepts which are proposed by an interest group (proponent) with a target group or groups in mind, for the intended purpose of directing, politically organizing and energizing the target group toward behaving in a manner which is stated in the specific text of the message. This behavior is explicitly or

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81 Gouldner, *op. cit.*, p. 213.
implicitly stated as valuable and desirable as an activity or goal for the target group. Whether it is in fact valuable for the target group is an open question for research.82

Technocratic consciousness is, on the one hand, "less ideological" than all previous ideologies. For it does not have the opaque force of a delusion that only transfigures the implementation of interests. On the other hand today's dominant, rather glassy background ideology, which makes a fetish of science, is more irresistible and farther-reaching than ideologies of the old type. For with the veiling of practical problems it not only justifies a particular class's interest in domination and represses another class's partial need for emancipation, but affects the human race's emancipatory interest as such.83

Occasionally the interest theory is diluted beyond recognition or utility by a writer's vague conception of interest, e.g.:

Man cannot see their interests clearly, nor can those interests be identified outside general considerations of ethical, political and social values. Interests are no more than the ideas some people have, so that they do not stand clearly contrasted to 'ideas'. It is not too paradoxical to say that people's ideas are their interests, and ideologies express interests as people see them.84

As Geertz points out, "'interest', whatever its ambiguities, is at one and the same time a psychological


84 Harris, op. cit., p. 16.
and sociological concept -- referring both to a felt advantage of an individual or individuals and to the objective structure of opportunity within which an individual or group moves."85 The longstanding and possibly inherent defects of the interest theory are that its psychology has too little to say and says it ambiguously; its sociology is overly aggressive and dramatic; and the two have never been successfully integrated. The psychological analysis of motivation oscillates between a superficial utilitarianism in which all men are devious schemers and a vague historicism in which man's motives somehow emerge from broad social commitments.86 The sociological analysis of the social structural context views social action in terms of an unending struggle for power, to the neglect of ideology's broader, less dramatic social functions. "The intensity of interest theory is," in Geertz's sarcastic but insightful aphorism, "but the reward of its narrowness."

The new conceptual structure with which Talcott Parsons challenged the prevailing interest theory87 is similarly an amalgam of psychological and sociological

85Geertz, op. cit., p. 53.
86loc. cit.
87Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951) Especially Chaps I and VII.
analysis. Unlike the interest theory, however, Parsons' framework systematically organizes motivational background and social structural context and their interrelationship. Parsons elaborated the intertwining relationships between personal tension and societal dislocation in a psycho-social synthesis which is known as the strain theory:

It is, in fact, the addition of a developed conception of personality systems (basically Freudian), on the one hand, and of social systems (basically Durkheimian) on the other, and of their modes of interpenetration -- the Parsonian addition -- that transforms interest theory into strain theory. (italics added for emphasis)

The guiding assumption of the strain theory is the chronic malintegration of society: that there are antagonistic currents in human affairs (e.g., stability versus change, freedom versus control, efficiency versus cordiality) that no social system can hope to quell or mediate for long. There are discrepancies and discontinuities between norms, goals, and role expectations in different sectors of society which inevitably pose serious functional problems for any social arrangement. Social frictions are mirrored in the individual personality, which itself comes to be viewed as a malintegrated system troubled by discrepant beliefs, expectations, drives and perceptions. In the tension between things

88Geertz, op. cit., pp. 53-4.
as they are perceived and things as one would have them be the individual generates a succession of anxieties; these cluster into systems or patterns of anxiety which are characteristic of one's position in the social interaction of his time. According to this view, the two levels of strain, societal dislocation and personal tension, are mutually conformable, yielding distinct patterns of sociopsychological disequilibrium.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{89}The above account of sociopsychological strain does not reflect Parsons' description as much as subsequent elaborations of his notion by more congenially expressive writers. To his disadvantage, Parsons seems to have made a fetish of objectivity, not only in his research but in his descriptive narrations. It is not suggested that Parsons should have been willing to dilute his ideas, popularizing them by means of rhetoric, but that the professional communication of his ideas to the sociological community might have been more effective had it been less sterile. Parsons allows no hint of empathy to color his descriptions of people experiencing strain, as if he were a visiting Martian sociologist who did not participate in the human condition but found its workings to be somewhat interesting. This choice of communicative style may explain why Parsons is credited for fathering the strain theory, but not for raising it to maturity.

The tenor of Parsons' writing may be appreciated in his definition of ideology, which derives all of its explanatory effectiveness from prior acceptance of Parsons' convoluted theory of normative integration:

"An ideology ... ...is a system of beliefs, held in common by the members of a collectivity, i.e., a society, or a subcollectivity of one -- including a movement deviant from the main culture of the society -- a system of ideas which is oriented to the evaluative integration of the collectivity, by interpretation of the empirical nature of the collectivity and of the situation in which it is placed, the processes by which it has developed to its given state, the goals to which its members are
Against this framework, ideology is fundamentally conceived to be a response to the experiencing of such disequilibrium; "ideology is a patterned reaction to the patterned strains of a social role." Ideology supplies a symbolic outlet for attendant emotional promptings. In accord with the medical metaphor which pervades the strain theory (as a military metaphor dominates the interest theory) ideology is a symptom which demands diagnosis:

But there is more to diagnosis, either medical or sociological, than the identification of pertinent strains; one understands symptoms not merely etiologically but teleologically -- in terms of the ways in which they act as mechanisms, however unavailing, for dealing with the disturbances that have generated them. (italics added for emphasis)

In this view, an ideology is certainly a reaction to strain, but it is something more than an expressive response, an elaborated "ouch!" evoked by psychosocial "toe-stubbing"; ideology also represents an attempt to eliminate the strain if possible, to diminish it, or in some way to make it more bearable. Geertz identifies "collectively oriented, and their relation to the future course of events." Parsons, op. cit., p. 349.

F. X. Sutton, et. al., The American Business Creed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p.3. Parsons' basic strain theory is brought to its fullest development in this work, especially chapter XV.

Geertz, op. cit., p. 54.
four functional modes which ideologies can observe in attempts to deal with the strains that call them into being:

1. In *cathartic* functioning, an ideology seeks to alleviate emotional tension by projecting it into symbolic enemies (i.e., scapegoats) defined as legitimate targets. Not only is an emotional safety valve opened, but the resultant outpouring is nicely channeled to produce satisfaction.

2. The *morale building* function is exhibited when individuals or groups combat despair or apathy in the performance of their roles, either by resolutely denying the existence of any strain, or by giving it new legitimacy and meaning through appeal to higher values. The countercultural deviate rejected by the "middle class establishment" thus converts his strain to a badge of honor, testifying to the nobility of his sacrificial commitment to superior values and visions of the future.

3. According to the *solidarity* function, an ideology preserves the cohesiveness of a social group by manipulating emotionally laden symbols expressive of that group's particular
social predicament. The group is reminded, for example, that critics are only jealous of what they have in common, or they are given some variant of "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself."

4. The *advocatory* function is assumed when proponents of an ideology decide to "take their case to the public." Although an airing of grievances in the ideological forum is of itself unlikely to bring immediate relief, the ideology is likely to gain advantage in its new visibility, as well as in the forced polarization of issues. 92

Growing acceptance of the strain theory can be explained in part by the frustration experienced by many ideological investigators in attempting to apply the interest theory. It has come to be appreciated that the excavation of concealed interests is sometimes an impossible task, and sometimes yields only a portion of the desired explanation:

92Geertz, *op. cit.*, p. 55. The wording employed above departs considerably from that used by Geertz, who does not describe in terms of function, but there is no substantial modification in meaning.
Ideology is often equated with rationalization in the psychological sense. This equation perhaps arises from the widespread and partly correct theory that ideology is essentially a defense of vested interests. Actually, however, people may have ideological ideas that are even contrary to their interests or that are related to their interest in so complex a way that experts would hesitate to attempt to calculate the net effect.93

Thus ideology is not only a component of successful domination and assertion, but also delineates the means by which educational goals can be implemented. Therefore it does not only function as a source of legitimation for educational domination or assertion, but as an educational philosophy for the dominant or assertive group.

This second function of ideology means that the precise educational blueprint of a group cannot be derived from its interests alone.94

In much of the description in the preceding pages, negative aspects of the strain theory may unwittingly have been emphasized, inviting a mistaken conclusion that the two theories are to be distinguished primarily in terms of pursuit of advantage versus avoidance of anxiety. While the strain theory does abound in references to struggles to avoid or escape tension, anomie, and other forms of social trauma, many advocates of the theory prefer to view the positive side of the

93H. Johnson, op. cit., p. 81.

coin. They write of ideology in terms of a reaching out for meaning, or a resurgent quest for the means to re-establish one's identity in a world full of bewilderment:

Social disorganization and strains in the social structure often leave people uncertain and disoriented without an adequate or acceptable conception of the events going on around them. They are therefore likely to be receptive to an ideology that provides a meaningful version of what is happening -- one that links individual and group troubles to institutions, value systems and social structures.95

Ideology refers to more than doctrine. It links particular actions and mundane practices with a wider set of meanings and, by doing so, lends a more honorable and dignified complexion to human conduct.96

An ideology is the product of man's need for imposing intellectual order on the world. The need for an ideology is an intensification of the need for a cognitive and moral map of the universe which in a less intense and more intermittent form is a fundamental, although unequally distributed, disposition of man.97

...an image of the world becomes an ideology if it creates in the mind of the person holding it a role for himself which he values highly. New ideologies are therefore likely to arise if people feel that the roles which they occupy in the existing society are unsatisfactory to them or despised by others. To create a role, however, an ideology must create a drama. The first essential characteristic of an


96Apter, op. cit., p. 16.

ideology is then an interpretation of history sufficiently dramatic and convincing so that the individual feels that he can identify with it and which in turn can give the individual a role in the drama it portrays.98

The strain theory enables the investigator to give satisfying accounts of the sources of ideology, and to bolster his accounts with fairly precise determination of the configuration of strains which evokes a particular ideology. Much of the precision seems to evaporate, however, when the theory is employed in efforts to specify the consequences of an ideology. Here analysis wavers and ambiguity prevails. Functional analysis often cannot distinguish between human causality, consciously or unconsciously exerted, and coincidence ruled by chance, between identified paths of ideological influence and mere serendipity. "A pattern of behavior shaped by a certain set of forces turns out, by a plausible but nevertheless mysterious coincidence, to serve ends but tenuously related to those forces."99 An adherent of a "revolutionary" educational ideology, for example, accepts an administrative position in order to sabotage the system from within, yet after a prolonged period of acting according to his lights it becomes apparent that he has succeeded


99Geertz, *op. cit.*, p. 56.
only in strengthening the very system he would overthrow.

Those who leap to the claim that such an occurrence is a latent function of ideology may not be aware that the term 'latent function' provides a label for the phenomenon, but not *ipso facto* an explanation. Claimed latent function, like claimed criminal negligence, needs to be substantiated, and that substantiation cannot come from within the ideology in question; one aspect of the enchantment wrought by ideology is that its more fervent adherents are enabled to discover ideologically significant relationships linking together every facet of experience. Without expecting more of strain theory than the "present state of the art" in sociology will reasonably allow, one may note its unbalanced performance. Just as the theory demonstrates its strength in diagnosing the origins of an ideology, it quite frequently shows itself to be weak -- and equivocal -- in directing efforts to trace its effects.

In the development of the present study there is an increasingly sympathetic agreement with the criticisms and alternatives proposed by Clifford Geertz. Like the little boy viewing the Emperor's new clothes, Geertz does not hesitate to ask the immediately relevant but embarrassing question: Why does all this ideological analysis give so much attention to the social circumstances
of ideologies and so little attention to ideologies themselves, in their reality as elaborate symbolic structures? One suspects that the honest answer, were it to be given, is that the direction of research is determined not so much by intellectual curiosity as by the array of "tools" in which the researcher has invested heavily and which therefore he is determined to put to use.\textsuperscript{100} The sociologist equipped with what has come to be regarded as "conventional skills' will not ordinarily think to apply those skills to symbol systems. Geertz, Gouldner and others who bring a mastery of linguistic principles to their work have already made some progress in redefining the scope of the sociologist's conventional skills.\textsuperscript{101} Geertz explains how easily ideological

\textsuperscript{100}This statement is not intended to express resentment or condemnation. Rather, it describes a condition of our hyperspecialized times from which only today's "Renaissance Men", exhibiting a necessarily limited version of DaVinci-style generalism, can claim some exemption. Kaplan formulates the condition nicely in his law of the instrument: "Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that everything he encounters needs pounding. It comes as no surprise that a scientist formulates problems in a way which requires for their solution just those techniques in which he himself is especially skilled." Abraham Kaplan, \textit{The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science} (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), p. 28.

\textsuperscript{101}Any sociologist concerned with elucidating how symbols symbolize (i.e., specifying the processes by which symbols mediate meaning) is of necessity a trail-blazer without any appreciable formal guidance. As Walker Percy (as quoted by Geertz, p. 57) admits, "The embarrassing
structure can get lost in the investigational gap between identification of causes and identification of effects, in what amounts to an analytical short circuit:

Both interest theory and strain theory go directly from source analysis to consequence analysis without ever seriously examining ideologies as systems of interacting symbols, as patterns of interworking meanings. Themes are outlined, of course; among the content analysts, they are even counted. But they are referred for elucidation, not to other themes nor to any sort of semantic theory, but either backward to the affect they presumably mirror or forward to the social reality they presumably distort. The problem of how, after all, ideologies transform sentiment into significance and so make it socially available is short-circuited by the crude device of placing particular symbols and particular strains (or interests) side by side in such a way that the fact that the first are derivatives of the second seems mere common sense -- or at least post-Freudian, post-Marxian common sense. And so, if the analyst be deft enough, it does.102

Geertz suggests that this hiatus will diminish if future studies of ideology take into account not just psychosocial strain, but the full dimension of cultural systems which develop in response to such strains and serve as remedies for them. Stated most simply, one experiences cultural strain when one feels "lost" in the landscape of social interaction, i.e., when one's repertoire of fundamental beliefs and value commitments fact is that there does not exist today a natural empirical science of symbolic behavior as such... Sapir's gentle chiding about the lack of a science of symbolic behavior is more conspicuously true today than it was thirty-five years ago."

102 Geertz, op. cit., pp. 56-57.
becomes inadequate to direct one's overt and covert behavior. This life situation can be characterized as anomie, in the sense of "inadequacy of the cultural patterning of social interaction." Such anomie is likely to be experienced as unclear expectations, even though the individual may not always report "anxiety", a designation which many will apply to themselves only when experiencing anxiety in its most intense forms.

In keeping with the above notion of cultural strain, an ideology is viewed as a species of cultural system, a symbolic template for the organization of social and psychological processes, which comes most crucially into play in situations "where institutionalized guides for behavior, thought, or feeling are weak or absent. It is in country unfamiliar emotionally or topographically that one needs poems and road maps." Geertz's

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103 This phrase is taken from Johnson, op. cit., p. 80. The theoretical context in which Johnson employs the phrase is not adopted. Johnson, who follows the Parsonian model rather closely, tends to view cultural patterning as a convenient index of the normative integration of social systems rather than as a basic need of individuals, enabling personal and social experience to be coherently structured.

104 In this view, cultural systems are analogous to genetic systems which similarly constitute templates for the organization of organic processes. Geertz, op. cit., p. 62.

105 ibid., p. 63.
observation that symbolic patterns to guide feelings constitute serious needs can hardly be challenged, yet the apparent novelty of his comment is itself an indication of how thoroughly this area has been neglected by investigators.

In this modification of the theory, the emergence of an ideology is occasioned not only by psychosocial strain, but also by the lack of cultural resources by means of which to make sense of that strain, with both factors acting in a cycle of reciprocal aggravation.

And it is, in turn, the attempt of ideologies to render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them, that accounts both for the ideologies' highly figurative nature and for the intensity with which, once accepted, they are held. As metaphor extends language by broadening its semantic range, enabling it to express meanings it cannot or at least cannot yet express literally, so the head-on clash of literal meanings in ideology -- the irony, the hyperbole, the overdrawn antithesis -- provides novel symbolic frames against which to match the myriad "unfamiliar somethings" that, like a journey to a strange country, are produced by a transformation in political life. Whatever else ideologies may be -- projections of unacknowledged fears, disguises for ulterior motives, phatic expressions of group solidarity -- they are, most distinctively, maps of problematic social reality and matrices for the creation of collective conscience. Whether in any particular case, the map is accurate or the conscience creditable is a separate question. 106

106 ibid., p. 64.
In accord with the resolution that this study be guided primarily by the conceptualization of ideology as a symbolic structure, or cultural system, it is advisable to stipulate meanings for *symbol* and *culture*, two terms which are notorious in the disparity of their common usage.

A 'symbol' in the present context is something more than a synonym for 'sign', ¹⁰⁷ or that which represents anything to the cognitive faculty:

A *symbol* is defined as a stimulus that has a learned meaning and value for people, and man's response to a symbol is in terms of its meaning and value rather than in terms of its physical stimulation of his sense organ. To offer a simple example: a "chair" is not merely a collection of visual, aural, and tactile stimuli, but it "means" an object on which people may sit; and if one sits on it, it will "respond" by holding him up; and it has a value for that purpose... ...Thus, the symbol "chair" implies the physical comfort, the opportunity to do certain things which can best be done while sitting, and other similar "outcomes" of sitting in a chair. It should be understood, as Mead points out, that "language does not simply symbolize a situation or object which is already there in advance; it makes possible the existence or the appearance of that situation or object, for it is a part of the mechanism whereby that situation or object is created."¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷ The use of 'sign' and 'symbol' as synonymous is endemic to contemporary psychology.

Culture is understood to be a product of human learning, the shared elements of the cognitive and evaluational structures possessed by individuals within a group, which serve as a *system of standards* for that group:

Culture, then, consists of standards for deciding what is, standards for deciding what can be, standards for deciding how one feels about it, standards for deciding what to do about it, and standards for deciding how to go about doing it.¹⁰⁹

Culture can be conceived on many levels, from culture as a pan-human attribute to a person's operating culture, i.e., the particular set of standards that an individual employs on a given occasion. It can refer to a society's culture pool, the aggregate of every system of standards employed therein. In discussing ideology, however, the usual reference is to a subculture, a particular level in a hierarchy of public cultures. Ideology is in fact the means by which groups often construct distinctive or deviate cultures of their own:

Ideology may be regarded as a system of evaluative principles about the ends of human action, about the means of attaining these ends and about the nature of social and physical reality.

is culture-building. Of course the total effect of a revolutionary ideology depends on its adherence and strength but the general statement that ideology is culture-building does not need any empirical proof.110

The study of ideology as a cultural system can receive much stimulus and direction from the rapidly developing field of reference group111 theory. According to this theory, an individual who undertakes action uses the presumed perspective of some group (the reference group) as a frame of reference in organizing his perceptual field. The descriptions of group perspective offered by reference group theorists could well be applied to ideology, e.g.:

A perspective is an organized view of one's world, what is taken for granted about the attributes of objects, of events, and of human nature. The environment in which men live is an order of things remembered and expected as well as of things actually perceived. It includes assumptions of what is plausible and what is possible. Without such an order life would be chaotic; even doubts become possible only within an unquestioned frame of reference. Having such perspectives enables men to conceive of their ever changing world as being relatively stable, orderly, and predictable. As Riezler puts it, one's


111For some theorists the term of preference is 'reference relationship', since the reference is sometimes made to a single individual (or even to oneself) rather than to a group. Also, a group, as opposed to a mere collectivity, consists of individuals bound together by some role-taking relationship. Cf. Rose, op. cit., p. 11n.
Most of the descriptions of ideology cited in this chapter are composed, from all indications, on the assumption that ideologies are associated with organized, easily identified social groups; that an ideology first stimulates the organization of such a group and then serves the group as a means of maintaining its social identity and cohesion. This assumption is challenged by some provocative observations of reference group theorists:

Since perspectives are the products of communication, the groups to which they are imputed need not actually exist in real life. While most men are highly responsive to the views imputed to people with whom they are in direct association, reference groups may be imaginary -- as in the case of artists who claim to be "ahead of their time," scientists who work for "humanity," or philanthropists who give for "posterity."  

Although it would be an unlikely and rare occurrence for an ideology to refer to a purely imaginary group, it is suggested that the prevailing conception of an

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113 ibid., p. 138.
ideological primary group (those who are identified as "possessing" the ideology) is far too rigorous in its assumption of organization and sharply defined boundaries. The ideological analysis of humanistic education undertaken in this study works from the presupposition that contemporary ideological groups need not be highly organized; that there may be no highly visible concomitants of membership, and consequently that the parameters of the collectivity may be indistinct to the observer.

Rather than speak of an ideological 'group' and be encumbered by the entrenched association of certain organizational features with that term, it seems advantageous to adopt the practice of Burkart Holzner, whose term of preference is epistemic community. Holzner identifies an epistemic community as a set of at least partially interlinked roles (implying channels of communication) which are unified by a common frame of reference. In other words, the people in question "agree on the proper perspective for the construction of reality. In these communities the conditions of reliability and validity of reality constructs are known and the applicable

114 For an example of this rigorous conception, Cf. Shils, op. cit., p. 70.
standards are shared.” Examples of epistemic communities cited by Holzner include religious communities, work communities, and some ideological movements. The forthcoming analysis employs and tests the assumption that the humanistic education movement is one such epistemic community, ideological in character.

6. THE END OF IDEOLOGY CONTROVERSY AS AN INTENSIVE LEARNING EXPERIENCE

In 1954 Edward Shils, addressing the Congress of Cultural Freedom, used a provocative phrase, "the end of ideology," to summarize his contention that the advanced industrial societies of the West no longer experience fundamental social conflict and the urge to revolutionary transformation of the social order. Accordingly, ideology was destined to disappear, because there would be no basic social discontent of sufficient intensity and latitude to generate revolutionary political programs of action. Subsequently this claim was endorsed and elaborated by Seymour Lipset and Daniel Bell.116


116Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), p. 3. MacIntyre notes that Bell was willing at the time to consider the possibility that utopian visions might endure, so long as they were understood to be mere visions, without organized practical effect as programs of political action.
Proponents of "the end of ideology" stressed the obvious desirability of such a prospect for political dialogue: agreement could be secured on a common framework of values within which political compromises could be wrought with pragmatic dispatch.

Viewed as a symbolic expression of the prevailing intellectual climate of the time, the end of ideology thesis accurately reflects the mood of optimism and epitomizes the mythic potency invested in technocracy as the "new enlightenment", a presumably higher mode of consciousness capable of penetrating everywhere, displacing the old social mechanisms of influence, purging the erroneous and inadequate. As such, Gouldner observes, it was taken most seriously by American political managers, especially at the presidential level, where it was best articulated.\(^{117}\) If one considers the unnamed ideology (Marxism) whose apparent decline in the West is the principal occasion of the thesis, its attractiveness as a rallying symbol of the superiority of American technocratic contributions to the West is more obvious. The attitude of politicians concerning this thesis which fell most opportunely into their hands is probably that expressed in the Italian saying, "sì non è vero, è ben trovato: if it's not true, it's happily invented."

\(^{117}\)Gouldner, op. cit., p. 243.
Considered as a description of social reality, however, the thesis is deficient by reason of its exceedingly narrow conception of ideology; consequently it invites one to make logical moves which, being mistaken, are misleading. The end of ideology formulation closely resembles a rhetorical tactic which may be designated "elimination by definition."¹¹⁸ Through adroit tailoring of definitions to match the narrowly conceived need of the movement, phenomena are made to flicker in and out of existence. The hospital, now that it has enough beds to go around, decrees "the end of the epidemic"; the educational institution counts heads at graduation time and publicly congratulates itself on "the elimination of ignorance." This is not to suggest that statements of this sort are intentionally deceptive, or that it is their falsity as such which merits concern. Rather, if the stipulated definitions which make such announcements self-validating are widely known and accepted, the speaker does nothing but celebrate a tautology; if the audience and/or the speaker is unaware of the restricted usage, an announcement can promote false assessments which preclude, impede or delay the undertaking of needful or useful activity.

Even when allowance is made for the one-

¹¹⁸or, conversely, creation by definition.
dimensional view of ideology, it would be difficult to find someone today who accepted the thesis without further substantial qualification. Many of the original proponents, including Shils himself,\textsuperscript{119} have mitigated themselves out of any possibility of embarrassment. As a boastful slogan phrase "the end of ideology" is thoroughly defunct; belief in the omnipotence of technocratic consciousness has suffered constant attrition, accelerated by the disillusionment of the Viet Nam adventure. Similarly, the phrase is discredited as an adequate descriptor of the contemporary political scene. In other respects, however, "the end of ideology" retains much of its original provocative power. Both the introduction of the thesis and the particular zeal with which it was promoted elicited an immediate spasm of controversy, devolving into relatively calm scholarly debate.\textsuperscript{120} In addition to the initial flurry of publications, the controversy has generated a wave of professional and popular interest in ideology which persists to the present time.

\textsuperscript{119}Cf. Shils, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 75.

\textsuperscript{120}A representative sampling of this dialogue is offered in Chaim I Waxman (ed.) \textit{The End of Ideology Debate} (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969).
The "end of ideology" finds its significance, not as a guiding hypothesis, but as a stimulus to further inquiry and -- what is more important still -- to reflective reconsideration of prior inquiry, sometimes leading to redirection of research. In this regard the debate accomplishes what similar intellectual controversies have been known to accomplish: a field of study becomes highly energized and its traditional complacency is shattered, as is the sacredness of many of its conventional suppositions and routines. As one grows accustomed to constant rebuttal and learns to anticipate possible challenges from the opposing camp, one may easily begin to generate his own challenges, and to direct his newly honed critical skills inward as well as outward. Fresh viewpoints emerge, from which one may re-examine both the subject of study and the methodologies employed.

This phenomenon can be observed, for example, in the airing of such issues as the "Death of God" controversy in Theology, the "Beyond Freedom and Dignity" debate in Psychology, or the current "Deschooling Society-Alternative Schooling-Humanizing the Classroom-Back to the Basics" syndrome in education.\textsuperscript{121} It is commonly

\textsuperscript{121}Education, perhaps because it is not a formally organized discipline in the usual sense but a series of ventures in academic syncretism, displays a remarkable capacity for maintaining a number of such controversies at full pitch for extended periods of time.
understood that the intellectual dialogue is accompanied on another level by pedantic bickering, ad hominem frontal assaults and the trading of petty grievances; consequently it is understandable that these periods of ferment would not be universally welcomed as opportunities for growth and discovery. Although likely to be experienced as unpleasantly disruptive by many hapless participants, these periods of urgency and contention are times of forced and accelerated adaptation, which is to say that they are intensive learning experiences for the communities of entire disciplines.

It is fitting, therefore, to conclude this exploration of ideology and ideological study by listing some of the lessons that seem to have been learned in consequence of the "end of ideology" controversy, now that many researchers have had their "second looks", more imaginatively critical than the first, at ideological phenomena:

1. It is not useful to compile the usual lists of stylistic features to be used in identifying systems of thought as ideologies, e.g., dogmatism, rhetorical exaggeration and flamboyance, oversimplification. The essential features of ideology (not likely to be identified by superficial examination
of style) include a structure of belief used to interpret reality, implicit rules of interpretation, and commitment to a program of action mandated by the interpretation. Stylistic features are for the most part persuasive devices, like the tactics of advertising; these are strongly conditioned by the socio-historical context, and are responsive to fluctuations in that context. Thus a change in style, even though it appears to signal major revision, need not be accompanied by changes in an ideology's perspective or program. The stylistic innovation may be analogous to "updating" the merchandising techniques for the same old product. It is not opportune for a modern ideology to appear rigidly dogmatic, but that does not make its set of cognitions, preferences, expectations and prescriptions any the less definite or any the less ideological.\footnote{Paraphrased from LaPalombara, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 320.} Oversimplification, as explained in the description of ideological symbiosis (item five, below), is not a universal attribute of
ideologies, nor is it routinely employed by any particular ideology in all situations. As for rhetoric, its essential function of persuasion is exercised in many modes, from the bombastic to the subliminal. Most ideologues recognize the contemporary susceptibility to rhetorical devices that do not advertise themselves too boldly.\textsuperscript{123}

2. Categorizing ideologies as political, medical, educational, etc., assigns a different context, but not a different nature to each set of ideologies. Although such classifications are sometimes thought to indicate essential differences in ideological structure and operation, they merely identify a particular ideology's conceptual origins, its present sphere of (manifest) influence, or the arena in which it presently stages its moves. The "political ideology" label is especially troublesome in that many conceptualize it as a species of its own differing

\textsuperscript{123}This is not to suggest that the proselytizing ideologue deliberately selects rhetorical devices for particular audiences; ordinarily he repeats the rhetorical devices to which he himself is most susceptible, and which he may sincerely regard from his perspective as straightforward descriptions of the "way things are."
in nature and function from "other" ideologies. The designation 'political' is commonly applied to that set of ideologies which at a given time is being examined from the conventional vantage point of political science. Even though ideologies not included in that set may be designated "non-political", they are by no means non-political in nature. All ideologies are fundamentally political in that they incorporate programs of action which involve some aspect of competing for the allocation of authority and resources, rewards and power. In the extremely myopic view of the "end of ideology" enthusiasts, only ideologies in the political arena, and only epic revolutionary specimens of these, qualified as "real" ideologies.

3. **Ideologies are not confined to their original contexts.** As patterns of belief made publicly available for anyone's acceptance, ideologies cannot fully identify or control either their memberships or their channels of influence.

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124 In other words, "political" ideologies differ from other ideologies on the same basis that "astronomical" distances differ from other distances.
For this reason, descriptions which assign permanent social locations and boundaries to ideologies incur the risk of inaccuracy. In the course of its development in a highly differentiated society an ideology may gradually or unexpectedly expand, contract or shift its choice of arenas.\footnote{125}{The main contexts and referents of Western ideologies have shifted away from the political arena to more structurally differentiated and functionally specialized occupational collectivities... ...it is the applied social sciences and 'policy sciences' which have begun to form the strategic arenas for Western ideologies. John H. Marx, "A Multidimensional Conception of Ideologies in Professional Arenas" in \textit{Pacific Sociological Review} Vol. 12, No. 2. (Fall, 1969), p. 84.}

4. The birth of a new ideology is occasioned (but not, strictly speaking, caused) by persistent attempts to oppose, modify or dissolve existing ideological movements, as well as by the presumption of liberation from -- or "natural immunity" to -- ideological influence. The most spectacular and richly ironic achievement in this regard is that of the "end of ideology" sociologists who further postponed the end of ideology by creating yet another ideology.\footnote{126}{That the "end of ideology" thesis is itself an ideology is widely acknowledged, \textit{e.g.}: Gouldner, \textit{op. cit.},}
plight resembles that of a newly conceived "non-denominational" religious group which succeeds only in adding one more denomination to the list. The new "ideology of claiming to have no ideology" is widely espoused among practitioners of social engineering, systems analysis and planning, and other fields of managed change. The outcome of the "end of ideology" affair dramatizes the ineluctability of social mechanisms for perpetuating ideologies. Ideology is effectively neutralized only at the personal level, through rigorous application of developed critical skills.

5. Ideologies sometimes co-exist in symbiotic relationships which are either negative or positive in affective character. It should be emphasized that "negative" and "positive" are characteristics of the language employed by pairs of ideologies in their mutual description. Fundamentally all instances of symbiosis are positive, in that they are

grounded in reciprocal gaining of advantages. From the beginning of ideological study, "negative" instances of ideologies in symbiotic conflict have been noted: the presence of a dreaded alternative is continually re-presented as a spur to renewed commitment and effort. It is in this situation that oversimplification is employed in portrayal of the adversary; it is a focusing device by means of which an embattled ideology elicits strong affective responses of fear and abhorrence, thereby enhancing the nobility and urgency of its cause. "Positive" symbiosis is a relatively recent phenomenon observed in post-industrial societies, in which ideologies support and legitimate one another through favorable descriptions and complimentary functions other than that of supplying reactionary stimulus. Scientism, for example, has established positive symbiosis with some national

127 Cf. MacIntyre, op. cit., p. 11.
ideologies\textsuperscript{128}

6. Apart from situations of symbiotic conflict or cooperation, ideologies increasingly display tolerance or indifference towards one another. This observation suggests a weakening of the traditional investigator's assumption that an ideology is held monopolistically, as the one and only correct view of the matters in question. Since this tolerance appears in pluralistic societies, it may tentatively be explained in terms of people who have learned to live in a state of incessant accommodation. Consequently, they take no ideological claims quite seriously, including their own; they participate in what has now become "the ideology game" with considerably lowered expectations.\textsuperscript{129}

7. In situations of ideological pluralism some individuals claim adherence to several ideologies, even if those ideologies are thought to be mutually exclusive. Continued


\textsuperscript{129}Cf. Berger & Luckmann, op. cit., p. 125.
differentiation in post-industrial societies poses special problems for the other-directed individual, i.e., one whose behavior is strongly dependent on cues taken from those in his immediate environment. Such an individual is inclined to solve his problems by becoming an ideological parodist, able to don and doff ideologies like clothing according to the situation of the moment. Although true believers would be shocked by what they would perceive as phony scheming, the parodist's self-justification is that he is forced to engage intermittently in different — and apparently unrelated — sets of transactions; living a compartmentalized life is just his way of being practical.

8. The urge to participate simultaneously in several ideologies sometimes results in an imperfect hybridization of historically rooted

130 Both the term 'parodist' and the hypothesis concerning his motivation are taken from Bernier and Williams, op. cit., p. 56.

131 Cf. Shibutani, op. cit., p. 139.
ideologies. Although it might be expected that mutually exclusive ideologies were incapable of being merged in this fashion, this is not the case. Americanism, for example, has assimilated Puritanism, Scientism and Romanticism, among others; some recent ideological hybrids, however, possess improbable lineages whose various elements are often contradictory. Obviously it is a superficial kind of syncretism that is being practiced in contemporary society: although various ideological threads are woven into a new fabric of belief, these elements are being "combined without the logic of their roots."^132 Hence the reference above to "imperfect" hybridization. Attractive features gleaned from a number of ideologies and divested of their original rationales and contextual meanings are expediently "glued together" by means of organizing concepts improvised for the occasion or borrowed from some extraneous source.^133 Although strict


^133^Cf. Beerling, *op. cit.*, p. 27.
logical consistency cannot be demanded of any ideology, these enervated hybrids cannot even show consistency with their claimed ideological traditions. Accounts of their self-attributed historical antecedents are likely to be psychologically revealing and historically useless.

9. "Ideologies are not to be viewed as inherently order-maintaining, solidarity-inducing or status quo-reinforcing elements of culture. For ideologies generate tensions as well as reduce them." Gouldner's pronouncement is based on the observation that the complex ideologies produced in complex societies are not the imperturbable monoliths they appear to be. Rather, they are uneasy alliances of a number of subgroups, each distinguished by its emphasis of particular shadings of interest and meaning. Ideologies therefore represent a necessary but precarious compromise, a "point of dynamic equilibrium" among the partisan interests and viewpoints.

134 Gouldner, op. cit., p. 223.
135 ibid., p. 222.
of the subgroups, each of which must settle for something less than it wants for itself, while committing itself to a program of action that entails more than it would otherwise care to undertake. Such concessions are made palatable by the pressing need for collaboration if anything at all is to be achieved.\textsuperscript{136} Behind the facade of unanimity there is continual dialectic between the ideology and the narrower perspectives of the subgroups. Under the strain of these internal pressures an ideology may be forced to drop some subgroups in favor of others, or to shift its perspective in quest of a more satisfying compromise. Ideologies that are unable to contain or channel these pressures are sometimes said to collapse\textsuperscript{137}; a more accurate description is that they shatter into fragments, which may regroup themselves in new ideological alliances.

\textsuperscript{136}ibid., p. 277.

\textsuperscript{137}e.g., "an important element in the dynamics of ideological interaction is the ability of an ideology to change without collapsing." Boulding, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 165.
10. Contemporary ideologies are inherently ambivalent; mystification, not distortion, is their primary linguistic product. Confronted with the constant threat of fragmentation and the need to reduce internal dissonance, an ideology finds it necessary to cultivate ambiguity. On the tightrope of instability an ideology has no choice but to perfect its "balancing act": it must be diffuse enough to attract the loyalties of the subgroups, yet concrete enough to serve as their rallying symbol.\(^{138}\) In the tension between the subgroups' mutual dependence and their expectations of differential allocation of rewards an ideology strives to make its language simultaneously emphatic and evasive, permissive and prescriptive, emotively potent and respectfully rational, sympathetic to each part and altruistically dedicated to the whole. If these contortions of "flexibility"\(^{139}\) have

\(^{138}\)Bernier and Williams, op. cit., p. 38.

\(^{139}\)In ideological self-reporting, "flexibility" is the favored euphemism for this variety of attempting the impossible. Surprisingly, some ideological analysts have adopted it, e.g., Bernier and Williams, loc. cit.
the effect of veiling the ideology in a fog of mystery, so much the better for the ideology's attractiveness to excessively demythologized modern man. The primary advantage of mystification, however, is the protection it offers from critical scrutiny: one does not present a sharply outlined target to potential enemies. For ideologies struggling to entrench themselves in rapidly changing modern societies, equivocation is survival.
Chapter Four

AN IDEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF HUMANISTIC EDUCATION

1. THE LIFE CYCLE OF AN IDEOLOGY

The primary purpose of the lengthy explorations of the previous chapter is to justify and clarify the selection of the cultural system approach to ideology as a guide for subsequent analysis and for construction of an apparatus for ideological assessment. To that end, an effort is made to account for conceptions of ideology in all their variety, and to explicate the basis of disagreement among conflicting theoretical approaches. This is to say that in the pursuit of thoroughness differences of opinion unavoidably are emphasized, to the neglect of identifying the many points of common agreement or of fairly widespread acceptance.

While acknowledging the great variety of forms assumed by contemporary ideologies, for example, one can nevertheless construct a generalized description of the typical "life cycle" of an ideology.

A system of descriptive and prescriptive beliefs about social issues comes to be perceived as meaningful and advantageous to a number of people inhabiting the same psychosocial situation and experiencing similar inad-
equacies of cultural guidance. As has often occurred in the past, it is possible for such a belief system to be formulated definitively at the onset of its career in the works of one or more authors; also, the formulated belief system can at a later stage be fixed and promulgated in a manifesto or compendium as the official position of an ideological group. Whatever the circumstances of authorship a definitive formulation, once possessed, ultimately functions as a "constitution" to be invoked and interpreted in times of controversy and adaptation.¹

In contemporary situations it is far more likely that the belief system will evolve "organically" and unreflectively rather than be artfully assembled. A number

¹Explicitly and comprehensively articulated ideologies of this sort are sometimes referred to as almanac or omnibus ideologies, most obviously exemplified by traditional Marxism and the works of Marx. This format, however, is no longer a common occurrence in post-industrial societies, either because no such definitive formulation is yet feasible, or because its publication would not be expedient. In the United States the pervasive technocratic perspective conditions even the behavior of the adversaries of technocracy; the tenaciously fashionable "end of ideology" myth suggests to many Americans that, since progress is supposed to render us immune to ideology, any semblance of ideology is to be regarded as retrogressive, if not un-American. Consequently, contemporary American ideological movements typically enhance effectiveness by maintaining a "low profile." They do not designate themselves -- and certainly do not advertise themselves -- as ideologies, either publicly or internally; it can be assumed that most of their adherents are not aware that they accept an ideology and refer to an ideology for support. The alleged end of ideology seems to be accomplishing the invisibility of ideology.
of elements of belief (particular empirical and metaphysical belief claims, terminal and instrumental value beliefs, attitudinal sets, etc.), often extracted from disparate ideological traditions and other unrelated conceptual sources, gradually coalesce into a distinctive psychological system. The particular combination of interacting beliefs is perceived as fitting and satisfying by those afflicted with similar cultural strain; it makes an otherwise incomprehensible and distressful social situation meaningful and bearable.

The belief system offers these people a definitive interpretation of social reality (the ideological report) and a mandated program of action (the ideological command) which is symbolically grounded in the report and is inseparable from it.\(^2\)

\(^2\)As opposed to a logical system, such as a theory, whose elements, in addition to being cast in a psychologically satisfying relationship of meanings, are logically interdependent. Cf. David W. Minar, "Ideology and Political Behavior" in *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5, No. 4 (November, 1961), p. 322.

\(^3\)The way an ideology connects its reports and commands is not arbitrary and capricious, but rational, although the rational discourse of ideologies falls short of the laws of logic. In other words, commands are not the logically necessary consequents of premises contained in the reports. Rather, the two are complexly related in symbolic terms, by a perceived congruence of meanings and values. The report-command device, originated by W. S. McCulloch and Gregory Bateson, is carefully employed and elaborated by Gouldner. Cf. Alvin W. Gouldner, *The Dialectic of Ideology and Technology* (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976) pp. 33-35, 55, 135-136, 213-214.
Although the belief system in its report and command sets definite restrictions on personal information seeking and forms of expression, it is perceived as desirable because the enforced categories and behavioral rules facilitate everyday information processing and decision making. Consequently the belief system is accepted in its entirety by these individuals, who find new identity, meaning and comfort in patterning their lives within its restrictions.

As the interworking symbols of the belief system are internalized they become established as stable personality patterns, which when widely shared provide a growing collectivity with habitual solutions to certain social issues, i.e., the symbols function as a new cultural system. Because of an increasingly shared perception that the new cultural system "works", it is transmitted more widely as a prized package of beliefs. As the ideology supplies goals for social behavior to an increased segment of a community, it may be embodied in a social movement and eventually in a more tightly organized group.  

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4Similarities are easily discovered between the processes of growth exhibited by ideological communities and religious communities, especially in past periods of intense religious activity. Daniel Bell goes so far as to characterize ideology as "secular religion". Cf. Daniel Bell, "The End of Ideology in the West" in Chaim
It often happens, however, that ideologies fail because of their success. With the growth and organization of its primary group an ideology ultimately must suffice for a number of subgroups, accommodating itself as needed to maintain their allegiance despite divergent partisan inclinations. If the subtleties of internal diplomacy are mastered and accommodations pressed by particular subgroups are accomplished smoothly and unobtrusively, the ideology establishes itself, although it may undergo considerable modification in the process; otherwise the pressures of internal dissonance become too severe and before long the ideology is fragmented beyond reclamation. Any new ideologies that coalesce around the fragments may bear scant resemblance to the original; they will be shaped primarily by the cultural strains which currently are being experienced most commonly in their respective circumstances.5

I. Waxman, (ed.), *The End of Ideology Debate* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 96. The religious metaphor becomes troublesome, however, when it is applied to the concept of membership in ideological groups. In the dynamics of ideology, membership always follows from belief. In organized religion, however, belief as often as not follows from church membership, notwithstanding official protestations to the contrary. It is only the sectarian splinter group in its early stages of development that bears any significant resemblance to an ideological community.

2. ESTABLISHING THE IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTER OF HUMANISTIC EDUCATION

It is assumed in the Statement of the Problem that the Humanistic Education movement embodies a distinctive ideology\(^6\). This assumption has yet to be substantiated. In pursuit of the identification of Humanistic Education as ideological, the present task is to determine account was suggested by Brown's provocatively brief description of the growth of ideologies. The description of the dialectic between the common ideological system and the partisan viewpoints of subgroups follows Gouldner *op. cit.*, pp. 220-224, 276-278.

\(^6\) More precisely, the assumption is that the thought and activity which is characteristic of the overwhelming majority of participants in the Humanistic Education movement is organized in the form of an ideology. It is not the concern of this study to determine whether or not the populations of Humanistic Education ideology and of the identified Humanistic Education movement are coextensive. It is the writer's opinion that a few participants in the movement have already used their critical skills to emancipate their thinking from the restrictive conditioning of the ideological perspective. Most noteworthy in this regard is a team of researchers, led by David Aspy, which has been engaged in foundational studies as a project of the National Consortium for Humanizing Education. Cf. the following: David N. Aspy, "The Humane Implications of a Humane Technology" in *The Peabody Journal of Education*, Vol. 53, No. 1 (October, 1973) pp. 3-8; David N. Aspy and Flora N. Roebuck, "From Humane Ideas to Humane Technology and Back Again Many Times" in *Education* Vol. 95, No. 2. (Winter, 1974), pp. 163-171. Carl Rogers, one of the "founding fathers" of the movement, also demonstrates an intellect that will not be contained by any ideology. Unfortunately, Rogers is far more widely honored than he is read, as is observed of Dewey and adherents of popularized variants of Deweyanism. This phenomenon is hardly surprising, since what many people find most attractive about ideologies is the prospect of being supplied with guaranteed recipes and easy answers defined as adequate for any eventuality.
and apply appropriate criteria.

In the first section, an account of the ideological life cycle is assembled from elements derived from the previous chapter. Similarly, noteworthy observations are extracted from the prior survey of ideological investigation. In order to insure that an adequate number of criteria are employed for identification, the selected observations are organized within a framework encompassing all areas of investigation. The resulting inventory of identifying characteristics is shown in Table 1.

It should be noted that the inventory as a

7It may be helpful to give a more explicit account of the reasoning which underlies this concern for establishing adequacy. Unambiguous criteria are required for making reliable judgments of any significance in any field of endeavor. In some disciplines the basic operative criteria are not only conventionalized, but absorbed within the structure of their methodologies, so that they are not often formally recognized and explicitly managed by the ordinary practitioner. Many specialized elaborations of the scientific method have developed distinctive sets of evidential criteria (e.g., for admissibility of evidence, for awarding the status of "fact" or "truth") which, being buried within customary routines, are likely to be taken for granted. The need for firm criteria is more widely recognized in making value judgments in which others are expected to concur, provided, of course, that it is a rationally guided acceptance which is solicited. A judgment of identification (i.e., of exclusion from or inclusion within a category) requires particular caution whenever the appropriate set of criteria has not been fixed by convention in any discipline, as is the case in identifying ideologies. In these circumstances the individual researcher must justify the sufficiency of his criteria. In the present case, the comprehensive nature of the inventory in Table 1. constitutes such justification.
## TABLE 1
AN INVENTORY OF IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA OF INQUIRY</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS</th>
<th>IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. ORIGIN</strong></td>
<td>psychosocial sources</td>
<td>responds to cultural strain, vested interests, or prospective gains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>social conditions favoring emergence</td>
<td>emerges in circumstances of marked social, technological or cultural change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. CONTENT</strong></td>
<td>reality-constructing beliefs</td>
<td>supplies perspective which interprets reality in regard to certain social issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>response-prescribing beliefs</td>
<td>mandates and directs a program of action concerning these issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;generic ideology&quot; belief</td>
<td>indicates a fundamental belief in the potency of ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. SYMBOLIC STRUCTURE</strong></td>
<td>integration of shared meanings and values in a cultural system</td>
<td>exhibits persistence, stability and coherence of belief elements within a quasi-logical system of standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>separation of report and command inconceivable</td>
<td>justifies program of action by its interpretation of reality, which in turn is reinforced when defined needs and priorities are honored in practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. LOCUS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE</strong></td>
<td>shared among members of an epistemic community or organization</td>
<td>finds acceptance within a social movement or group and is embodied in much of the significant social behavior exhibited in the collectivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>primary group is an amalgam of partisan subgroups</td>
<td>utilizes collective designation as &quot;umbrella&quot; for loose alliance of specialized subgroups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT</strong></td>
<td>ideologies utilized as major conceptual sources</td>
<td>exhibits features recognizably derived from particular ideologies and larger ideological traditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coexistence in symbiotic relationship, antagonistic or supportive</td>
<td>expends major effort in dramatizing evils of adversaries (oversimplification) or in reinforcing the position of allies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. LINGUISTIC TECHNIQUE</strong></td>
<td>restructuring and selective focusing of ordinary language</td>
<td>focuses consciousness on a program of action by means of linguistic manipulation and innovation, popularizing new symbols and extraordinary meanings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>indiscriminate commingling of facts and values</td>
<td>habitually treats value judgments as if they were factual statements, and often distorts facts through highly evaluative interpretation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TABLE 1 -- Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA OF INQUIRY</th>
<th>SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS</th>
<th>IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7. FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>therapeutic functions (strain-relieving)</td>
<td>gives evidence of cathartic, morale building, solidarity or advocatory efforts to deal with strain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of group activity</td>
<td>defines a program of action as legitimate and worthy of social acceptance and support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>legitimation</td>
<td>justifies new role definitions by appeal to the goals, norms and values of the program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of new role definitions</td>
<td>transmits ideas to selected groups, eliciting their activity or passivity in order to gain advantage in the allocation of power, resources or other rewards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in competition for resources and rewards</td>
<td>transmits the belief system to potential converts in order to widen the base of support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>persuasion of target groups</td>
<td>promoting stability is designed to support and maintain the status quo, regardless of the nature of its public claims (conservative ideology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in proselytization</td>
<td>promotes reform of particular practices in the status quo (reform ideology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. PURPOSE RELATIVE TO THE STATUS QUO</td>
<td>challenging stability</td>
<td>intends to substitute its own valutational structures for those of the status quo (revolutionary ideology)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>through limited change</td>
<td>through revolutionary change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>through protest</td>
<td>wishes to embarrass the status quo and expose its deficiencies by confronting it with deviant behavior, often claimed to be warranted by the circumstances (counterideology)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*a* The content of ideologies, here summarized as "beliefs", includes existential beliefs, value beliefs, and beliefs organized into attitudes; it may also include facts, although these facts, in being interpreted so as to complement the belief system, may be transformed beyond the limits of their original evidential support.

*b* This situational description does not apply to all instances of ideology; it may be applicable to a given ideology only at certain stages of its development.

*c* This is not an exhaustive listing of functions, nor are the functions as listed mutually exclusive.

*d* These four characterizations are here defined as mutually exclusive. Counterideology is sometimes regarded as a strategy which can be employed by revolutionary or reform ideologies. However, as described above counterideology is a distinct category, in that it rejects both instrumental and terminal values of the status quo without promoting a definite set of substitute values.
comprehensive structure sometimes lists a number of possible alternative forms which some aspect of ideology may assume, and that an identifying characteristic is supplied for each alternative. In some instances, however, the alternatives listed are by definition mutually exclusive. Moreover, some alternatives are realized only in ideologies operating in particular arenas or at a particular stage of development; situations of this sort are marked in the inventory by footnotes. In summary, the twenty-two identifying characteristics listed in the right-hand column are not to be construed as twenty-two criteria to be met for identification. The fulfillment of a single criterion (corresponding to one of the alternative descriptions) from each of the eight areas of inquiry listed in the left-hand column could quite reasonably be judged adequate for identification. In the forthcoming application of the inventory, however, almost all of the identifying characteristics are used, excepting only those which are logically excluded, as noted above.

Application of the inventory also signals a change in the nature of the sources which are cited. Up to this point in the study the authors cited, with few exceptions, are investigators of ideology, who make every effort within the bounds of their self-awareness to stand
outside the ideologies they describe and analyze. The remainder of the study generally employs citations of works written in avowed commitment to the perspective and program of Humanistic Education. The authors of these works do not conceal their strong personal grievances, concerns and aspirations regarding the character of education. However, in most of their claims and descriptions (particularly in supporting the urgency of the need for their programs) the writers presume to speak for the students who are allegedly experiencing an assortment of "dehumanizing" deprivations and indignities.

From a purely literary point of view, writers who assume the "spokesman" role are employing an altogether legitimate stylistic device. However, by the standards of scientific inquiry -- or even by the older standards of classical scholarship -- the descriptions of students' psychological states conveyed by the device cannot

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8This stylistic device assumes special importance when employed in rhetorical justification of one's professional activity, since even the most powerful rhetoric can be jeopardized by the appearance of self-interest. In appreciation of this fact, congressmen speak out for the voiceless taxpayer, the American Medical Association advertises its single-minded commitment to quality health care for every citizen, and teachers intent on changing a system which they find oppressive direct public attention not to themselves, but to the "victimized" students.
qualify as reliable knowledge, but only as untested perceptions and speculations. There are very few, if any empirical studies in Humanistic Education conducted with sufficient rigor to warrant the serious attention of educational researchers outside the movement.\footnote{Two explanations for this lack come readily to mind, the first ideological and the second pragmatic: Humanistic Education maintains high levels of enthusiasm within its ranks by fostering reactionary contempt for the "dehumanizing" paraphernalia of science and technology. If behavioral objectives are regarded with abhorrence, empirical research, with its dependence on behavioral measures, cannot be especially attractive. The second reason has to do with the movement's nebulously personalistic outlook, appropriately expressed in a rapidly shifting vocabulary which celebrates vagueness and ambiguity. Even if serious empirical studies were desired, they would not be feasible without a great deal of prior foundational (i.e., conceptual) research, at least enough to make a useful determination of the meaning (or meaninglessness) of such slogans as "integration of the self through centeredness." For the context (psychosynthesis) in which the phrase is employed Cf. John P. Miller, \textit{Humanizing The Classroom} (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 151-153.}

In view of this lack of empirical support, the more prudent course of action in dealing with reported descriptions of the inner states of students is to maintain the following critical assumption throughout the remainder of the study:

\begin{quote}
Unless some conventionally acceptable evidential support is presented, or its availability indicated, it is assumed that the cited authors have no reliable access to the inner states of students;
\end{quote}
consequently, their claims in this regard are presently to be regarded as unresolvably problematic. If anything of significance is being communicated by an author in making an unsupported claim of this sort, it is assumed to be his personal psychological state, acknowledged or unacknowledged, which is being projected\(^{10}\) (with or without foundation in fact) onto the students.

Metaphysical claims\(^{11}\) representing non-eviden-

\(^{10}\) Lloyd Humphreys (as assistant director for education of the National Science Foundation), seeking to determine how much of the articulated dissatisfaction with "conditions in the schools" is tempered by reason and grounded in fact, concludes that a great deal of projection is taking place:

It is instructive, by the way, to try to determine the sources for these widespread conclusions about the inadequacies of American education and what present techniques are doing to children. A major source is the following: An adult observer, intelligent, sensitive, and with a strong humanistic orientation, looks at classrooms, decides that he wouldn't like them if he were a student, and concludes that they are bad for children.


\(^{11}\) Metaphysical statements are for all practical purposes unverifiable; since no acceptable method of verification is known, there can be no agreement concerning the meaning of such statements. By contrast, the tests to be applied in verifying empirical statements are well known and commonly accepted. It is important to note that all value judgments are not to be dismissed immediately as metaphysical claims, for any value statement is *in principle* capable of being verified, to the extent that there is agreement concerning the appropriate criteria to be applied in particular assignments of value. These
ially based beliefs are too easily made and once made are as difficult to challenge as they are to support. Such claims offer convenient refuge from the heat of inquiry; the educator who employs them places himself beyond the reach of argument and the rules of argument. While such immunity from public challenge may justifiably be enjoyed in private educational enterprises, it cannot legitimately be claimed by those proposing the adoption of Humanistic Education in publicly funded schooling. Accordingly, the subjective reactions and conditions attributed to students in patently metaphysical claims or unsupported empirical claims are, for the purposes of this study attributed solely to the reporter of the claimed "observations". For example, the author of the apodictic statement that "students are intimidated by educational technology" is designated as the only one whose experiencing of intimidation can be presumed with reasonable assurance. While it is possible that the writer experiences only a vicarious intimidation generated by his non-evidential but strongly held belief concerning the intimidation of students, this eventuality does not challenge the assumption, but reinforces it.

The Humanistic Education movement identifies its beginnings as a response to cultural strains, forms of anomie variously described in terms of loss of personal identity, autonomy or self-esteem, and commonly summarized by the slogan word dehumanization. The designation of 'dehumanization' as a slogan word recognizes the fact that this term has no standard interpretation, i.e., that it does not yet summarize a definite set of particulars. Rather, its application keeps shifting and expanding as the Humanistic Education movement continues unpredictably to incorporate novelties, e.g., the "right brain-left brain" hypothesis of lobar dominance, classroom meditation psychosynthesis. The rapidly growing list of dehumanizing practices and conditions includes standardized testing and behavioral objectives, teacher evaluation of

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It may be noted that the term 'dehumanization' is Marxist in origin, referring to alienation from work caused by the division of labor in technological change. In adopting this word for its own sloganizing, Humanistic Education has given it a new, considerably extended and still developing interpretation.


students,\textsuperscript{15} compulsory attendance, \textsuperscript{16} and for some radical reformers, schooling itself. In practice 'dehumanization' and 'Humanistic Education' are mutually self-defining: Humanistic Education is the remedy for dehumanization, which in turn is the privation of Humanistic Education. In other words, dehumanization in education refers to the absence of those features which are prized by the Humanistic Education movement at any given time. Proponents of Humanistic Education clearly indicate that they are responding to a perceived strain:

And schools of education, not medical schools, are the proper places to advance this ideological and practical revolution in overcoming the societal causes of psychic pain.\textsuperscript{17}

It shall be maintained, further, that the disease of human manipulation and self-alienation is a society-wide phenomenon, which has left unmistakable marks on educational policies and practices; and that, if the threat is as ominous as maintained here, serious re-examination of many educational practices is in order.\textsuperscript{18}


\textsuperscript{16}Miller, op. cit., p. 3.

\textsuperscript{17}Alfred Alschuler, "The Rise in Educational Humanism", editorial article in Meforum Vol. 2, No. 1, (Spring, 1975), p. 2.

\textsuperscript{18}Arthur G. Wirth "On Existentialism, the
The absence of these conditions [empathic understanding, respect or nonpossessive warmth, genuineness] is dehumanizing. A child who was deprived of these conditions would not become a human being. [sic]19

Humanistic Education places the blame for dehumanization on the revolutionary advances in science and technology which have transformed society into a manipulative technocracy, in which "social life reaches such a level of complexity that the typical citizen must defer to experts on matters that concern him vitally."20 Although its dehumanizing effects are thought to be society-wide, technological change is believed to exert an especially devastating influence on educational institutions, which not only have failed to counteract this influence but also promote its spread by adopting educational technology:

If pressed: "where in the world did humanistic education come from?", my best answer would probably be that it rose in reactive protest against the overflow and over-exuberance of the scientists and

---


technicians who monopolize American education.\textsuperscript{21}

Where has all our social and personal alienation, disruption, and disorganization come from it not explicitly from those forces which have made us a specialized, technological, and impersonal society?\textsuperscript{22}

This national preoccupation with the sciences made manifest a reliance on technical reason that had, generally and subtly, already penetrated all levels and corners of educational institutions.\textsuperscript{23}

It appears that the desire to alleviate strain, rather than the promotion of vested interests, originally motivated the Humanistic Education movement. However, now that the movement has developed a number of distinctive areas of specialization in education, the continued employment of these new specialists becomes a primary interest of Humanistic Education.

\textit{Application of inventory area 2: content}

Humanistic Education provides its adherents with a system of beliefs (a new consciousness, or perspective) governing the interpretation of social issues related to


education. This results in a construction of reality which is often at variance with the prevailing reality construction in society:

Consciousness can be thought of as a perspective of reality which is highly related to one's social situation... ...Humanistic education views itself, even if such words are not used (but they often are) as a form of consciousness-raising.  

Humanistic education with its emphasis on individual choice, openness, exploration, discovery, individual inquiry, and lack of competition does not recognize the reality of American society.

This consciousness-raising is not limited to a new way of understanding the process of education. It requires of the individual a commitment to prescribed programs of action:

What is humanistic education? The easiest way to answer this is to say that humanistic education is a value commitment to certain educational goals.

The difference is that the existential humanists [as opposed to classical humanists] do not wait for the cosmos to carry out its design, or for the second coming, or for whatever distant millennium. They do not regard the Platonic self-mastery through ordered thought and feeling as the glory of the human

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species; they prefer freedom from all preconceived restraints. This freedom creates a compelling need to commit oneself to a significant deed - one that will authenticate the self. One must change the evil situation now and not stop with the understanding of it. Too much understanding is a temptation to forgiveness, and to forgive the evil of the world is precisely the temptation to which the new militant humanists believe the classical humanist yields.  

An element common to all ideologies -- for that reason designated by some writers as "generic ideology" -- is a belief in the potency of ideas:

Ideology proposes, whatever else it also does, to surmount the world by way of a rethinking. Change is expected to require a new and allegedly correct rethinking, and it is this that is assumed necessary. We may say, then, that the concept of ideas-as-potent constitutes a generic, underlying communality, being one of the basic dimensions of concrete ideologies or specific "isms." "Generic ideology," then is a belief in the potency of "ideas."  

That a belief of this kind is operative in humanistic education is demonstrated in the following excerpts:

This forward and future movement is made possible by the human's ability to choose, to dream, and to act now because of intangible stimuli. Man propels himself into the future by virtue of his aspirations.  


Self-actualizing people are motivated by the eternal verities, the B-Values, by pure truth and beauty in perfection.\textsuperscript{30}

The teacher who possesses these insights will have an openness to experience that constantly inserts into teaching the vitality, ferment and freshness coming from an involvement of self and others with the world of ideas.\textsuperscript{31}

\textit{Application of inventory area 3: symbolic structure}

The elements of belief commonly accepted in the Humanistic Education movement are organized in a system of cognitive and evaluative principles, or standards for thought and social behavior. The fact that these beliefs have persisted in relative stability\textsuperscript{32} over a number of years establishes that they are not just passing opinions, ephemeral attitudinal responses to some short-lived stimulus. That these beliefs are interrelated and interconnected in a system of some kind is known from the fact that the Humanistic Education movement retains its identity despite an inability to specify its boundaries with any precision.

\textsuperscript{30}Abraham H. Maslow, \textit{The Farther Reaches of Human Nature}. (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), pp. 192-3. The "B-Values" mentioned in the passage are Maslow's being-values, or "descriptions of the world as perceived in peak experiences." These values are listed on pp. 133-135.


\textsuperscript{32}i.e., although new beliefs continue to be incorporated within the system, the earlier beliefs are still held.
In contrast with theoretical systems, whose elements are bound together in the necessity of their logical interdependence, ideologies function as psychological systems,\textsuperscript{33} i.e., as belief systems which have a quasi-logical structure. Some beliefs are perceived as deriving from other beliefs, even though there is no logical basis for the derivation. Inconsistent or even contradictory beliefs may coexist within the system because they are held in isolation from one another, in clusters of supportive beliefs which protect them from relationship with other sets of beliefs.\textsuperscript{34} Humanistic Education writers show that they are promoting a belief system of this sort, rather than a logically structured theory of education:

To be sure, there is considerable writing about humanistic education, but it does not include a systematic, theoretically based foundation. Paradoxically, some writers are suggesting that humanistic education can be implemented by a technological approach...\textsuperscript{35}

It is useful at the present stage of our knowledge to skirt the issue of whether, or in what way, loadings stem directly or indirectly from fundamental concerns, or are associated with the emergence of yet higher

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{33}Cf. Minar, \textit{loc. cit.}
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\textsuperscript{35}Patterson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. x.
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needs, or are meaningfully related to specific models of human needs at all. We need not await the resolution of these theoretical and research issues to recognize the utility, for research and curriculum modification and development, of distinguishing between loadings and what we have been discussing in the previous section as concerns and blockages.36

Stanford and Roark demonstrate Humanistic Education's tolerance for logical inconsistency in claiming to achieve a "synthesis" of the basic assumptions of Freudian psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and third force psychology, when they do nothing more than combine a number of often contradictory elements.37 Similarly, Palomares and Rubin enunciate a principle of causality in human relationships which children are to learn in their Human Development Program: "Something that I can do can make you feel good or bad. Something that you can do can make me feel good or bad."38 This notion contradicts a cardinal principle honored by the human potential therapy systems from which Humanistic Education derives most of its


practices. According to the principle of taking responsibility for one's own experience, it is self-defeating behavior to act as if another person could make one feel anything; every person produces his own feelings in response to others. The Human Development Program seems to be instructing children to practice a "See what you made me feel!" variety of emotional blackmail on one another.

As noted above in the first section, another characteristic of the symbolic structure of ideologies is that report and command, interpretation and prescription, are mutually reinforcing and exhibit such congruence in meaning and value that their separation is inconceivable to the ideologue. Such a relationship of report and command obtains in Humanistic Education:

It [the humanistic approach to education] stands firmly on a position that affirms the essential and inescapable interrelatedness of mind with body, theory with practice, content with process, and ends with means. Accordingly, the basic questions which humanists ask in any field of endeavor are these: What should human beings do to resolve their problems? What is the relationship between what they say and what they do?

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The consequences of asking such questions are also fairly clear: humanism is radical. It will compromise with no alienating force, whether it be the educational system or something else which frustrates man.41

Application of inventory area 4: locus and social structure

The increasingly visible efforts of Humanistic Education enthusiasts to disseminate their beliefs have created, if not a highly organized group, at least an epistemic community42 whose members' educational thought and practice is dominated by this belief system. Dissemination is accomplished by a number of university centers43 and by dozens of smaller centers scattered across the country.44 In addition to publication of texts and journal articles, Humanistic Education beliefs are promoted in the workshops conducted by these centers, as well as by newsletters and resource services like the Humanistic Educators Network, published by the National

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42 The concept of epistemic community is clarified at the end of section five in the previous chapter.

43 These include Boston University, The University of California at Santa Barbara, The University of Massachusetts at Amherst, and the University of Florida.

44 For a selected list of such centers, Cf. Paul Nash and Cynthia Ganung, "Inventory of Resources in Humanistic Education: in Journal of Education Vol. 157, No. 3 (August, 1975), pp. 54-58.
Humanistic Education Center. Through efforts of this sort the epistemic community is expanding rapidly:

Recently the Ford Foundation commissioned Dr. Elizabeth Simpson to conduct a national survey to discover the status of this growing field [educational humanism]. One measure of breadth is that after a year's exhaustive search, she was still unable to construct a complete bibliography of books, pamphlets, programs, projects and people.

Although a common frame of reference is shared and channels of communication within the movement are clearly established, it is apparent that Humanistic Education views itself as a loose and sometimes uneasy alliance of subgroups, representing a compromise struck among a variety of specialized interests:

Humanistic education is an umbrella. It has clustered beneath it a diverse and amazing collection of people...

Humanistic educators are a diverse group, with overlapping concerns and values, but drawn from a wide range of backgrounds, traditions, disciplines and fields.

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45 The Center is located in Upper Jay, New York, 12987.

46 Alschuler, op. cit., p. 3.


This lack of sharp boundaries, the inability to say "yes, it is" or "no, it isn't" when confronted with single concepts or specific practices, is a structural necessity of these ideologies [humanistic education and open education].

Like many other approaches in the humanistic education field, values clarification has grown up as a separate "movement" with its own terminology, concepts and methods.

Application of inventory area 5: ideological context

The ideological sources of Humanistic Education and its relationship to other ideologies and ideological traditions are explicated more thoroughly in the following section. For the purpose of verifying the applicability of this area of the inventory to Humanistic Education, it can be shown that some writers acknowledge the ideological "genealogy" of their movement:

The new humanism in education must be seen primarily as a school version of the liberation movements throughout the society. It contains its distinct pedagogical strategies which differentiates it from some of the strategies used by humanistic psychologists or political radicals, for example; but the goals are the same.


51 Weinberg, NSSE Yearbook. 1974, p. 121.
A direct link exists between progressive education and the present humanistic education movement, but it is not often recognized either by those who identify with progressivism or by those who call themselves humanistic educators.52

As is noted in the application of area one above, science and technology are blamed for the dehumanization of educational policies and practices. It can be shown that Humanistic Education is caught up in "negative" or antagonistic symbiosis53 with the ideology of Scientism. In this relationship, either ideology is supplied with an adversary cast in the image of a dreaded alternative, perceived as the negation of all that is highly valued. The symbiotic arrangement generates an air of immediacy and urgency on both sides, calling for renewed commitment to action against the enemy now, "before it is too late." The energies of Humanistic Education, so long as it stays captive in this ideological symbiosis, are likely to be spent in endless reactionary moves:

How regretful is this orphan-child attitude. It makes the humanistic influence on the educational world so defensive and reactive, and ultimately, so impotent.54


53Ideological symbiosis is described in conclusion five in section six of the previous chapter.

54Bender, loc. cit.
In antagonistic symbiosis, oversimplification and hyperbole in portrayal of the adversary serve as focusing devices, i.e., they channel the motivations and affective responses of adherents so as to promote the advancement of the ideology. The nature of the relationship between Humanistic Education and Scientism (and "traditional" schooling, to the extent that it is perceived to be contaminated by Scientism) is apparent in the extensive use of these stylistic devices within the movement:

I am afraid, however, that as the students rebel against the spiritual emptiness of their technologically oriented educators, the efficiency hungry educators will respond by calling for more and better techniques for controlling behavior rather than examining their own assumptions and goals. (italics added for emphasis)

Bernier and Williams offer the following description of Scientism: "Scientism, with its emphasis upon the technological control of human life as a means of promoting human existence, portends to become increasingly powerful as man improves his ability to alter his own genetic composition and to control his consciousness chemically. As an ideological system, Scientism provides the fundamental elements for an ever-increasing technocratization of society and serves as a powerful force in channeling human perceptions." Normand R. Bernier and Jack E. Williams, "The Ideological Perspective" in Normand R. Bernier and Jack E. Williams, (eds.) Education for Liberation (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1973), pp. 12-13.

Moreover, the human curriculum may be able to halt the murder of human potential in today's schools. (italics added)\(^5^7\)

The main characteristic of this development [the scientific world-view] was the increasingly exclusive worship of reason and reliance upon reasoning powers for answers to all questions and solutions to all problems. (italics added)\(^5^8\)

Another form that this type of dehumanization takes is the robot relationship in which the individual is treated much like a machine. (italics added)\(^5^9\)

Society is at a juncture where the forces of technological efficiency and institutional regularity are in a life and death struggle with those persons who are victimized and know it. (italics added)\(^6^0\)

For the most part, schools appeared to be repressive factories whose main purpose at the elementary level was custodial and at the upper levels utilitarian. Children were raw material that was mass produced to fit into a number of molds bearing the U. S. stamp of approval. (italics added)\(^6^1\)

Application of inventory area 6: linguistic technique

The stylistic devices considered in the previous area are peculiar to situations of ideological symbiosis,


\(^5^9\)Rich, *op. cit*.


particularly if the symbiotic relationship is antagonistic. Some other linguistic techniques, however, are characteristic of all ideologies:

Somewhat more precisely: ideology is grounded in the utilization of an ordinary language, but it is the restructuring of an ordinary language in special ways: partly by changing certain of the meanings of the ordinary language, giving it a somewhat new or extraordinary meaning, extended redefinition, or focusing; partly by taking certain parts of ordinary language and making them newly problematical, thus assigning a new significance to them; partly, by the invention of new signs.62

Humanistic Education abounds with new and modified language constructions, and with familiar terms onto which new meanings have been grafted. In a sampling of the cliches of the movement one might encounter such neologisms as values clarification,63 psychosynthesis,64 sensitivity modules,65 and process consultation,66 as

62Gouldner, op. cit., p. 81.


65Cf. Howard Kirschenbaum, Sensitivity Modules (Upper Jay, N.Y.: National Humanistic Education Center, n.d.)

well as reinterpreted words like confluence, centering, connectedness, potency and the community of learners. In testimony to the personalistic focus of Humanistic Education, there is a surfeit of hyphenizations of self, including self-concept, self-esteem, self-expectations, self-identity, self-image alteration and self-confrontation, all of which are epitomized in self-actualization (self-realization, self-enhancement), the prized and most often critically unexamined legacy of Maslow and Rogers.


71 Cf. Weinstein and Fantini, loc. cit.


73 Cf. Schmuck and Schmuck, op. cit., p. 293.
It is also observed that Humanistic Education, like the human potential movement in general, appropriates countercultural slang:

Marshall McLuhan's concept that the medium is the message, that *how* something is said rather than *what* is said is of intense importance to the current culture, and fits well with the practice of the human potential movement. A common term, usually used derogatorily when attributed to someone else's behavior, is "game." Eric Berne's *Games People Play* has been read, enjoyed, and discussed by many of the leaders and participants of the movement. Another source of movement jargon has been the popular use of adolescent, drug and black expressions. In part this may be because in purpose and spirit the human potential movement borders on and at times overlaps with the counterculture.\(^\text{74}\)

The linguistic device *par excellence* remains the attachment of extraordinary meanings to the word *human* and its derivations, by means of which Humanistic Education is sheltered from much of the criticism that might otherwise be directed against it. Quite often closer scrutiny is deflected by the altogether favorable ordinary connotations of these words:

When someone states -- and this the literature does with broken-record repetitiveness -- "We must humanize education," my automatic response, silent fortunately, because I do not have the courage of bad manners, is, "Of course, my friend. Do you know

\(^{74}\text{Krasner and Ullmann, op. cit., p. 450.}\)
anyone outside a psycho ward who advocates the brutalization, the animalization, the barbarization of education?"^75

What then, is humanism? The term gathers adherents, in part, because of its vagueness and because language construction virtually disallows anyone's admitting himself a non-humanist or an anti-humanist.^76

A second criterion in this area is the indiscriminate commingling of facts and values, which many writers, following Gustav Bergmann, regard as the single most distinctive feature of ideological expression:

The motive power of a value judgment is often greatly increased when it appears within the rationale of those who hold it not under its proper logical flag as a value judgment but in the disguise of a statement of fact. A statement of this kind, that is, a value judgment disguised as, or mistaken for a statement of fact, I shall call an "ideological statement." A rationale or an important part of a rationale that contains in logically crucial places ideological statements I shall call an "ideology."^77


In identifying this criterion, Bergmann acknowledges that up to this point in history most of man's rationales have been ideologies because standards cast in this form have greater power to motivate the masses. He concedes that Thomas Jefferson's words (an ideological expression of his belief in natural law) would most likely not have so galvanized the people into action, had the text read "We hold these value judgments to be self-evident."
A fuller treatment of value-fact confusion is incorporated within the assessment apparatus presented in Chapter Five. The present purpose is served by identifying some instances in which proponents of Humanistic Education present value judgments made in accord with the beliefs of the movement as if these value judgments were factual statements.

Patterson, for example, states, "Education, then, retards rather than facilitates the learning of children." No evidential support is offered; neither is it indicated that such support is available, although the informed reader has reason to doubt that any could be produced if desired. Support is drawn from the conjectures and emotive appeals of several radical reformers, who do not describe the schools so much as they describe their subjective reactions to the schools. Clearly, a value judgment is being offered here concerning the inferiority of "traditional" schooling in comparison with Humanistic Education.

The following passage seems to convey supported fact, especially with its reference to documentation by Bergmann's intent, which is shared by this writer, is not to condemn ideologies, but to identify them so that they may be treated appropriately.

78Patterson, op. cit., p. 12.
several authors:

Ivan Illich, Edgar Friedenberg, John Holt, and Jonathan Kozol, as well as many other writers, have documented how certain features of schooling such as compulsory attendance, communication patterns, and role selection make it difficult for students to develop a genuine sense of identity.79

The style of the above statement resembles that of many research reports: observers $a$, $b$ and $c$ have documented that $x$ results in $y$. However, in the absence of any indication that student identity development was measured, or of how it might be measured, the statement can only be regarded as a value judgment. Since the criteria for judgment of what constitutes a "genuine" sense of identity are derived from the beliefs of Humanistic Education, this value judgment is unlikely to be accepted on its own merits by those outside the movement. In other words, once it is recognized as a value judgment acceptance of the judgment requires acceptance of the criteria. Presentation of the value judgment as a factual statement nicely circumvents the difficulty, although it probably is not intentionally done for that motive. The typical ideologue's perceptions are so strongly conditioned by his beliefs that he sincerely regards such value judgments as facts. The assimilation of values to facts is more often a matter

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79Miller, op. cit., p. 3.
of the ideologue's sharing his confusion, rather than his engaging in conscious deception. The nebulosity of the fact-value distinction among Humanistic Education enthusiasts sometimes approaches that expressed by Camus: "...to live is, in itself, a value judgment. To breathe is to judge."  

Application of inventory area 7: functions

The strain-relieving functions of Humanistic Education appear to be dominant; these are exercised in the antagonistic relationship with Scientism and with "traditional" schooling. Accordingly, passages already cited in the 'application of areas one, five and six above adequately exemplify functions which are responses to strains and attempted remedies for them.

The most obviously exercised function is cathartic; the "scientific-rational establishment" is neatly defined as the symbolic scapegoat, the recipient of blame for the alleged dehumanization of education. It should be emphasized that the selection of the ideological target is based, not on the logical pursuit of evidence of

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81 The label traditional is applied within Humanistic Education to forms of schooling which are perceived as dominantly rational, even to those which are highly innovative and by other standards "untraditional."
culpability, but on the perception of symbolic fittingness, Scientism is the scapegoat primarily because it is symbolically satisfying to think of it as such.

Humanistic Education exhibits the *morale-building* function by means of its appeal to "higher values" self-defined as superior to those of the establishment. In identifying themselves as victims of dehumanization, Humanistic Education adherents lay claim to the nobility of a martyrdom suffered through commitment to these higher values. In the common perception of the ideological community, victimhood is far more honorable than yielding to the blandishments of the oppressor.

That the *solidarity* function is being exercised is demonstrated by the preservation of some cohesiveness in Humanistic Education despite the diversity of its sources, the differences among its subgroups, and its continual absorption of novelties. The manipulation of emotively powerful symbols of allegiance thus far seems adequate to counterbalance disruptive tensions within the movement. The scope of publications and other communicative efforts noted earlier clearly indicate that Humanistic Education is taking its case to the public, i. e., that it performs the *advocatory* function in the public airing of its grievances.

The therapeutic functions just described in many
cases serve to rationalize the actions of Humanistic Education adherents to themselves. Another function of Humanistic Education is to rationalize or legitimate its activity to a larger audience in its social environment, striving to establish its programs in that audience's perception as worthy of their acceptance and support. Such legitimation is most commonly attempted by claiming to be the latest occurrence of a recurrent, favorable historical phenomenon, or by claiming to enhance the attainment of traditional educational aims as well as its own distinctive goals, e.g.:

It is my position that humanistic education is neither a new, nor a static, phenomenon. Its elements have existed for a long time; they have been changing and developing throughout that time in response to social, economic, and political forces. My central thesis is that the resurgence and reformulation of humanistic education have been associated with historical periods of human awakening and self-liberation when men and, later, women were throwing off previous limitations and gaining a vision of new human possibilities that had not previously existed or had not been perceived.82

Education will not be a preparation for living. It will be, in itself, an experience in living. Feelings of inadequacy, hatred, a desire for power, feelings of love and awe and respect, feelings of fear and dread, unhappiness with parents or with other children -- all these will be an open part of his curriculum,

as worthy of exploration as history or mathematics. In fact this openness to feelings will enable him to learn content materials more readily.83

Much of the legitimating effort in Humanistic Education is expended in the justification of new role definitions proposed for teachers. Friedenberg, for example, describes the traditional role definition as institutionalized incompetence:

We demand that the credential also tell us something positive about the incompetence that we require as a part of a candidate's qualifications -- about what Veblen calls his trained incapacity, or a horse-trader calls being well-broken. We expect it to assure us that the bearer will respect the conventional limits of the roles it makes available to him. To permit the members of a profession to make the fullest use of their technical powers would spoil the existing fit among society's various roles, impede the operation of its status system, and generate such hostility and mistrust as to jeopardize the place of the profession in the society. What tact and diplomacy do for individuals, trained incapacity does for role-definitions and role-expectations; and the credential must certify to that incapacity.84

In contrast with the conventional role definition so harshly criticized above, Humanistic Education proposes new models of the teacher's role, justified by the claim that student development is thereby enhanced:


The means by which humanists propose to achieve these goals are varied. However, nearly all advocates suggest that a restructuring of the classroom is necessary so that the teacher is no longer the central figure in the classroom. Instead, the teacher adopts the role of facilitator and resource person. As teachers become less central in the classroom, students become more active learners.85

Thus, we hold that the chief functions of teachers are to engage in interpersonal relationships which are healthy and growth-producing and to provide environments which foster this type of interaction for students.86

I think it's role-modeling and being a living exemplar, every teacher, a prophet, every teacher, who by the way he lives his life, a mixture of boldness, cunning, criticism, curiosity, fascination, love, concern, beliefs. His way of being rubs off, it's infectious. And the only way, I suppose, for teachers who aren't that way to become that way is to have heroes, leaders, principals, taxpayers, and others who are themselves that way and invite them to be that way.87

As is evident in consideration of its social context, namely, the institutions of education, Humanistic Education is engaged in competition with other schools of thought for the resources, status and other rewards allocated within those institutions. Accordingly, another function of Humanistic Education is to propagandize, i.e., to attempt the persuasion of selected target groups, either

85 Jensen, op. cit., p. 342.
86 Stanford and Roark, op. cit., p. viii
to gain advantage in the competition for rewards or to make converts so as to widen its base of support.

Application of inventory area 8: purpose relative to the status quo

The four types of ideology listed in area eight can be clarified through use of a schema devised by Merton\(^8\) to explain types of anomie. Merton's analysis begins by distinguishing values governing ends or goals to be sought (terminal values) from those regulating means to be employed in pursuit of those ends (instrumental values). Given these two kinds of values, Merton's schema\(^9\) differentiates anomic patterns of behavior:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anomic Behavior</th>
<th>Group-approved values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(conformity)(^9)</td>
<td>accepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>innovation</td>
<td>rejects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ritualism</td>
<td>accepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>retreatism</td>
<td>rejects</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| rebellion | rejects/ | rejects/
| substitute | substitute |


\(^9\)Conformity is obviously not anomic behavior; it is included in order to show all the possibilities of acception and rejection in the schema.
If types of ideology are substituted for the behaviors listed above, the categories of area eight are explained in the following schema:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Ideology</th>
<th>Values of the Status Quo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Instrumental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservative</td>
<td>accepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reform</td>
<td>rejects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>counterideology</td>
<td>rejects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revolutionary</td>
<td>rejects/ substitutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>substitutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to this schema the radical reformers in education are not advocating reform but retreat or revolution, since they reject terminal as well as instrumental values. Humanistic Education is seen to be a revolutionary ideology, substituting its own instrumental and terminal values for the rejected values of the status quo:

Rather, it cannot be assumed that what was good for one person or generation is necessarily good for another. And "good" may be defined however one wishes! Once that insight is acted upon, almost everything that was once sacred (history, nationalistic indoctrination, architecture, sequential learning, polite language, etc.) may have to be modified or abandoned. And once old patterns of

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91 The substitution excludes ritualism, which does not correspond with a particular type of ideology, although this behavior may conceivably be exhibited by individuals operating under the influence of ideologies of all types.
behavior may be questioned -- whether teacher roles, student roles, school roles, required courses, or acceptable extracurricular activities -- then all traditional standards and values are subject to restructuring.92

At present there seems to be an almost anarchistic value structure embracing the [humanism] movement. Personal here-and-now satisfaction is primary, often with insensitive regard for the consequences to others. Doing one's own thing and getting one's self together rank high in the personalized value structure. This is fine for those who have most of their survival needs satisfied and are now ready to explore psychic frontiers. But many of us are still groping for basic physiological needs.93

The new humanism or existential humanism is a challenge to all formal schooling and not merely to a specific form of it. "Relating" and "touching" and "mind blowing" are simply not in the same stable with studying, comprehending, and formulating.94

All of this paints a picture of conventional schools as obsolete. Excellent alternatives to school exist. The world today is a fabulous place in which to live. We are increasingly aware that the world is the curriculum.95

Indoctrinating people in basic skills so that they can survive is very useful and very important. But equally important and more neglected in the West, is the prophetic function to challenge all that -- to say what the hell is it all for anyway...96


96McLaughlin, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
3. SITUATING HUMANISTIC EDUCATION IN ITS IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT

As an ideology, Humanistic Education is necessarily a product of its times. Historical accounts of the antecedents of Humanistic Education cannot escape being ideologically conditioned perceptions of commonality with great endeavors and accomplishments of the past. As is shown in the application of area seven of the inventory in the previous section, whatever the intent of the author, such accounts function as legitimating devices for the present activities of Humanistic Education, or as propaganda in the service of its growth and security. The committed ideologue has a penchant for discovering supportive resemblances and associations at every turn. Regardless of claimed similarities with such unassailably favorable periods of antiquity as the golden age of Greece, the contemporary phenomenon of humanistic education derives the reasons for its emergence from contemporary social forces. The relevant genealogy is an ideological genealogy: the identification of those ideologies and ideological traditions from which elements of belief and patterns of response are drawn, whether or not these ideological traditions show any obvious resemblance with Humanistic Education. Because of the problem of "ideological blindness" (the extreme difficulty of escaping the perceptual conditioning of an ideology to which one is
committed) Humanistic Education cannot reliably make such identifications for itself.

The problem of ideological blindness is no different from that posed by ethnocentrism in general, as discussed in section two of the previous chapter. In this regard, the distinction to be kept in mind is that between being influenced by an ideology and being dominated by it. Even the most exactingly critical observer cannot hope to escape all ideological influence, but his judgments, even if slightly tainted, are nevertheless made through the exercise of his critical skills and are continually subject to reconsideration. By contrast the committed ideologue abdicates much of his judgment-making, allowing the ideological perspective and program to dictate his judgments. As is noted elsewhere, this labor-saving arrangement is very gratifying to anyone who is content to be guided by easy answers and recipes for professional conduct.

A familiar claim in Humanistic Education circles is that the movement represents a long-standing tradition which has been in existence for a century or, as some allege, has been in process of formation for twenty-five centuries, e.g.:

Humanistic education did not just "pop from nowhere;" it is a vital instance of a growing, swelling movement, reaching back at least a century and now
exhibiting the potential to humanize the present technological world.\footnote{97}

...Humanistic education is neither a new, nor a static phenomenon. Its elements have existed for a long time... the resurgence and reformulation of humanistic education have been associated with historical periods of human awakening and self-liberation... I shall look first to the classical Greeks for an example...\footnote{98}

The problem posed by claims of a continuity of tradition is that they ignore the substantive differences that divide Humanistic Education from classical humanism and the romantic tradition, in recognition of which differences Humanistic Education is more appropriately described as a neo-humanism and a neo-romanticism, and a neo-progressivism as well. Humanistic Education has adopted a great many elements from earlier systems, although it has in most cases borrowed them without the logic of their roots; the result of this syncretism is an amalgam of elements that is distinctively new.

Although the designation 'humanistic education' is sometimes applied to education in the humanities,\footnote{99} this pursuit of classical humanism has little in common

\footnote{97}{Bender, op. cit., pp. 32-32.}

\footnote{98}{Nash, "Some Historical Antecedents of Humanistic Education," 1975, loc. cit.}

\footnote{99}{e.g., as in Lionel Trilling, "The Uncertain Future of the Humanistic Educational Ideal" in The American Scholar Vol. 44, No. 1 (Winter, 1974-75), pp. 52-67.}
with the existentially tinged neo-humanism of the Humanistic Education movement. Classical humanism stresses the rule of reason:

The key to the human strategy from Plato on has been self-mastery, the control of commitment and action by reason. Reason to subdue the appetites and emotion to reinforce the decrees of reason was and, I believe, still is the formula for liberal humanism...\textsuperscript{100}

Neo-humanism rejects the emphasis on reason and challenges many of society's rational controls:

Freedom from the order of society and from the norms of the culture, and even from old ideals, provide the sign that one is existing authentically, indeed, that one is existing at all as a human being.\textsuperscript{101}

For this reason Broudy concludes that "the major cleavage in education today is not between scientific and humanistic studies, but rather between the old-line standard humanists and the new, or existential humanists."\textsuperscript{102} This cleavage is sometimes recognized by Humanistic Education writers when they are not actively pursuing the claim\textsuperscript{103} of continuity of tradition, e.g.:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{100}Broudy, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 51.
\item \textsuperscript{101}\textit{ibid.}, p. 52
\item \textsuperscript{102}\textit{ibid.}, p. 50.
\item \textsuperscript{103}That the claim of continuity contradicts the cleavage between humanisms might in other circumstances be quite troublesome. In ideological discourse, however, considerations of logical consistency readily yield to those of symbolic fittingness and utility toward ideological goals.
\end{itemize}
Currently, educational literature abounds with phrases such as "new priorities," "the new idea in education," "the new curriculum" as well as the words "humanistic," "humane," and "humanizing" -- none of which have much, if anything, in common with traditional humanism.¹⁰⁴

Humanistic Education would seem to fall under the description of romantic ideology offered by Kohlberg and Mayer in their treatment of three streams of educational ideology:

Romantics hold that what comes from within the child is the most important aspect of development...
Romantics stress the biological metaphors of "health" and "growth"...¹⁰⁵

In the light of the exploration of ideology in general and of Humanistic Education ideology in particular undertaken in this and the previous chapter, Kohlberg and Mayer's description of educational romanticism is perceived as failing to take into account any of the distinctive characteristics of ideology. Their definition of educational ideology ("a set of concepts defining desirable aims, content and methods of education")¹⁰⁶ is altogether inadequate; the definition applies equally well to logically ordered theories of education. To blur


¹⁰⁶ibid., p. 450.
the distinction between educational theories and ideologies in this fashion is to render oneself incapable of dealing effectively with the complex phenomena of educational ideologies and the equally complex problems they may engender.

Bernier and Williams' account of the ideology of Romanticism illustrates the difficulty of characterizing Romanticism without recourse to a device like the schema employed in the application of area eight of the inventory in the previous section:

Romanticism is the ideology of the rebel. Its focus is upon the liberation of the individual by the neutralization of the social forces which inhibit creativity and spontaneity. Adherents of Romanticism are not revolutionaries for they do not seek the transfer of power. Rather, they attempt to diminish the influence of power wherever it may appear. Historically, however, they have been charged with revolutionary activities and have suffered at the hands of the defenders of the established order who invariably label them revolutionaries.107

The character of an ideology, as Bernier and Williams observe above, need not coincide with the label placed upon it by others; neither, however, need it coincide with self-attributed labels. The "radical reformers" in education, for example, are either revolutionary or retreatist (i.e., romantic), but they are not engaged, strictly speaking, in reform. It is

107Bernier and Williams, op. cit., p. 61.
advisable to discount the implicit claims of labels and look instead to the treatment of instrumental and terminal values of the status quo.

By this measure twentieth-century Romanticism, embodied in the counterculture and informing much of the Human Potential Movement, is a retreatist movement, a counterideology, rejecting both terminal and instrumental values of the status quo but not replacing them with equivalently functioning values of their own. Romantics show little interest in the dominant societal standards of success and the approved occupational means to attainment of such success.

The spirit of the Romanticism of the Human Potential Movement is captured by Reich in his description of the "new consciousness" of the counterculture, which he terms "Consciousness III":

The foundation of Consciousness III is liberation. It comes into being the moment the individual frees himself from automatic acceptance of the imperatives of society and the false consciousness which society imposes... III declares that the individual self is the only true reality.

One device is particularly important: an individual cannot hope to achieve an independent consciousness unless he cultivates, by whatever means are available, including clothes, speech mannerisms, illegal activities and so forth, the feeling of being an outsider.
Consciousness III is deeply suspicious of logic, rationality, analysis, and of principles.  

In their analysis of the human potential movement Krasner and Ullmann identify this Romanticism as the product of American affluence:

In the presence of a surplus of the stimulus (satiation), a reinforcer loses its effectiveness. Parents who had experienced the depression of the 1930's and the anguish of World War II provided their children with as many of the good things of life as they could. In fact, the goal in life for many families was to provide for the children. Things once considered as marvelous gifts and even miracles now became expected as normal and a person's right.

Where people are forced to focus on survival via attaining food, clothing, and shelter, the successful attainment of these necessities gives meaning to life. In a period of abundance people seek meaning elsewhere.

As an offshoot of the Human Potential Movement, Humanistic Education bears the same traces of its affluent origins, which some writers see as a serious failing in a movement which intends to alter the course of public schooling, e.g.:

As the middle-class movement it now appears to be, contemporary humanistic activity caters to those who can afford the luxury of turning away from the tough problems facing our society.

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109Krasner and Ullmann, op. cit., pp. 446-47.

110Fantini, op. cit., p. 401.
It is attractive -- the bringing together of the affective and the cognitive, the attainment of higher values, self-actualization, becoming more fully human. But there is a catch, and it runs through the romantic prescriptions for the new education. Maslow should know it well, but, if he sees it, he does not say so. What he does say is that "a child cannot reach self-actualization until his needs for security, belongingness, dignity, love, respect, and esteem are all satisfied." Thus, humanistic education is for those who belong, for the secure, the dignified, the loved, the respected, and the esteemed, whoever they are; it is certainly not suitable for the oppressed, or perhaps it should be stated the other way around: the oppressed are not suited to it.  

It is noted above that counterideologies and revolutionary ideologies are alike in rejecting both instrumental and terminal values of the establishment; they differ in that a revolutionary ideology goes on to substitute values, while the counterideology remains on the periphery of society, caught up in protest and retreat. Although Humanistic Education received its initial impetus and much of the character of its language from the larger romantic movement, in attempting to install its thought and programs within the institution of the common schools it has developed distinctive educational


\[ \text{112 Cf. Application of inventory area eight in the previous section} \]

\[ \text{113 Excepted from this description -- and from the scope of this study -- are humanistic ventures in alternative schooling.} \]
values, instrumental and terminal, which parallel the traditionally institutionalized values. In so doing, Humanistic Education removes itself from mere romantic protest and becomes a movement actively engaged in revolutionizing education.

Humanistic Education shows many points of resemblance with American and English Progressive Education, although an affinity with Progressivism is rarely acknowledged within the movement. D. I. Lloyd's summary of the tenets of Progressivism reveals some of the resemblances:

Their [the progressive schools] curriculum reflected a shift away from the classical tradition ... The emotional side of man was seen to be good; and in learning, as important as, if not more important than, intelligence... This was all part of a larger view which was that the child should be considered in all aspects of his nature, physical, social, emotional and intellectual... Learning should involve direct experience. Book learning was second-hand and so it could not involve the whole personality of the child... The teacher was not seen as one who had the sole right to make decisions for everyone in school but the children, too, were regarded as having the right to take part in the running of the school.114

Specifically, Humanistic Education resembles a particular variety of Progressive Education. American involvement in World War I shattered national unity and

divided the progressive movement into the social reconstruction, life-adjustment and child-centered factions. It is child-centered Progressivism (creative expressionism), the approach favored by the Progressive Education Association at its founding in 1919, from which Humanistic Education appears to have borrowed many elements.

In view of these common elements, some of the criticism directed at child-centered education may apply to Humanistic Education, e.g.:

Progressive education deterred attacks upon the competence of the public school and its personnel by shifting the school's emphasis from subject matter to pupils. It established a special field over which the school asserted exclusive jurisdiction, and it obscured standards by which others might evaluate the school's effectiveness. Although parents, college professors or businessmen might claim to be judges of scholastic achievement, and might criticize the school for inadequate intellectual training of pupils, they were less able to disprove the school's contention that it was successfully developing the whole child, and that it alone had competence in this field.

Much of what is commonly labeled "romantic" in educational experimentation may in fact be neo-progressive:

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The rejection of formal schooling by romanticists is especially important in view of the numerous educational experiments which have been made recently in the United States. Many of these experiments appear superficially romantic but in fact are neo-progressive attempts at formal education. An authentic rebel would advocate deschooling rather than school reform.¹¹⁷

The striking similarities that can easily be found between postulates and programs of Progressivism and Humanistic Education suggest to some writers that humanistic education is neo-progressive in the sense that "only the language has been changed," e.g.:

Although the neo-progressives differ from their predecessors in style, their cause remains remarkably the same. Translating the old aims into "hip" language, we still can hear echoes of the felt-needs curriculum (Do your own thing), small group involvement (T-Groups), the teaching of the whole child (individualized instruction), creative self-expression (a Happening), integrated studies (the Open Classroom), social reconstructionism (community involvement), and the Project Method (action programs). Progressivism hasn't died; indeed, it hasn't even faded away.¹¹⁸

The notion that Progressivism lives on virtually unchanged under the new label "Humanistic Education" must be rejected, as must the suggestion that mere language changes are by nature insignificant. Humanistic Education is neo-progressive in the sense that it incorporates elements of the old progressivism and modifies them in

¹¹⁷ Bernier and Williams, Beyond Beliefs, p. 185.
¹¹⁸ ibid., pp. 333-334.
accord with its total perspective. The borrowed elements in Humanistic Education are wholly absorbed into the ideological belief system and are suffused with its unique character. If the behaviors exhibited within humanistic education are sometimes identical with those of progressivism, the rationales and, most likely, the long-term student outcomes are nonetheless quite different.

As for "mere changes of language," there is nothing trivial about language in the service of an ideology; manipulation of language is manipulation of consciousness and, ultimately, of behavior. Whatever the observed similarities between activities, the ideologically recaptioned activity functions differently in the ideology by virtue of the new designation. Moreover, the language changes effected by an ideology are not limited to substitution of new words; new interpretations may be given to familiar words, and the change may not be apparent outside the ideology. Thus Humanistic Education may share words with other ideological systems, e.g., in goal statements, but it does not necessarily share meanings.

In summary, although Humanistic Education contains elements which may be designated "neo-progressive," it is something more than neo-progressivism. It is a distinct ideological entity which differs in some important
respects from progressivism:

One striking difference between present developments and progressive education has been the lack of complementary pedagogical and social theory in humanistic education. One reason for this situation is undoubtedly its estrangement from the education profession.

...humanistic educators often express disdain for inspiration that comes from beyond the present collective self. They tend to interpret the dictum of Frederick Perls that "maturing is the transcendence from environmental support to self-support" in such a way that they reject historical meanings as foreign sources of direction and definition. All forms of the past are victims of this attitude, including the immediate progressive education past.\footnote{Rust, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 94-95.}

The new humanism represented in Humanistic Education is identified by adherents as existential, and indeed much of the special language of Humanistic Education is drawn from Existentialism. There is good reason, however, to dispute the claim that humanistic education is built on a foundation of existential philosophy, in the same way that other educational systems have been based on Idealism, Experimentalism, etc. The relationship of Humanistic Education to Existentialism cannot be the conventional relationship of a philosophy of education to a philosophical system; the impossibility of a logically mediated relationship is understood in considering the
distinctive features of both Existentialism and Humanistic Education.

Existentialism, which sustains itself by retaining its original character as a reactionary movement protesting the "failure" of all philosophical systems to yield personal meaning, is not a philosophical system and cannot perform the functions of a philosophical system. In other words, Existentialism rejects all systems of thought *qua* systems as meaningless. Systems, whether philosophical or scientific, are considered incapable of explaining the meaning of human existence because their abstract inquiry, analytic and impersonal, objectifies human existence. From this perspective an "existential educational system" is a contradiction in terms.

In the succinct description of Morris and Pai, "the entirety of philosophical content in Existentialism may be described as axiological... For existentialism is principally a value theory, a philosophy according to which everything must pass through the funnel of choice."120 The only thing excepted from this individual value relativism, the only thing given, not chosen, is human existence. Having discovered ourselves in being,

we go on individually making values for ourselves: "...our values consist of our own choices. In choosing we make our values out of nothing." Thus, in accord with the existentialist maxim, "Man makes himself." It is easy for one who treads this path to become trapped in the world of his private experience, unable to share it adequately with others or to receive the full benefit of the experience of others. To engage in systematic inquiry and communication, and to come to terms with values that are group norms is already to stray from the existential ideal. Therein lies the catch:

However, it is worth noting that the more systematic we become in building an existential philosophy and philosophy of education, the farther we get from the central message of Existentialism, namely a concern for the individual's relationship with personal beliefs and commitments.

In accumulating its catalogue of beliefs Humanistic Education, as an ideology, follows the promptings of social and psychological expediency rather than the dictates of logic. The presence of elements obviously drawn from existentialist thought does not necessarily establish that such elements were adopted on consideration of their philosophical context and rationale. It is noted above that ideologies characteristically engage

121 *ibid.*, p. 257.
122 *ibid.*, p. 393.
in accretion of elements without the logic of their roots. The identification of Humanistic Education with existentialism may well be justification after the fact of acceptance. According to Green's description of the mechanisms of belief, "a person may hold a belief because it is supported by the evidence, or he may accept the evidence because it happens to support a belief he already holds." 

As is shown in the previous section, Humanistic Education displays the tolerance of contradiction which is characteristic of belief systems, but not of logically coherent systems, or theories. Humanistic Education, therefore, is not a philosophy of education in the sense in which educators are accustomed to using that term. Even if the status of theory were gratuitously conferred upon it, Humanistic Education could not validly claim to have its theoretical foundation in Existentialism, for Existentialism constitutes itself incapable of serving in that capacity.

There is reason also to doubt that Humanistic Education correctly identifies its relationship with Scientism. In ideologically conditioned perception, of course, the two ideologies represent polarities which

\[123\text{Green, op. cit., p. 49.}\]
admit of no compromise or overlap. Humanistic Education adherents are not mistaken in characterizing Scientism as the dominant ideology of American society, but they are quite likely to be mistaken in their assumption that they escape that domination by virtue of identifying it, protesting it, and striving to neutralize it. The influence of Scientism is pervasive; it defines for us "what seems natural" in contemporary society. As Sarason points out, "what seems natural is almost always a function of the culture to a degree that usually renders us incapable of recognizing wherein we are prisoners of the culture." Some aspects of American society have become so much a part of us that it is inconceivable that things could be otherwise.

Thus some Humanistic Educators, having inveighed against the dehumanizing evils of technology per se, proceed to search for the "humanistic" technology that will advance their cause. Practices that are condemned when exercised under the mantle of Scientism, e.g., behavior modification and planned change employing coercive strategies, are advocated without embarassment.


125 Stanford and Roark, op. cit., pp. 11-12, 18-19.

126 Alfred S. Alschuler, "Humanistic Education" in
Programmed humanism, Price notes, "is a controlling, manipulative, coercive and behavioristic process,"\(^{127}\) i.e., it exhibits those features which Humanistic Education identifies as dehumanizing.

George Isaac Brown, one of the leading spokesmen for Humanistic Education, says in criticism of the men of the Age of Enlightenment who relied on analysis as the way toward reason that their efforts to eliminate the distortions of pathological emotion were contaminated by the same emotions: "they were contaminated by elements, and then used the contaminated process to try to eliminate these elements."\(^{128}\) Brown makes much the same observation concerning the Age of Romanticism, in which the contamination was intellectual. It may be that Brown imagines his own movement and times to enjoy some special immunity from influence by the dominant forces in his culture; it does not seem to occur to him that Humanistic Education is contaminated by the Scientism it seeks to eliminate.

An important aspect of Scientism is what Looft calls

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the *Psychology of More*, a set of values which, with the help of formal education, has brought about the phenomenon of American Consumerism, a rising spiral of desires accelerated by "sales pitches" of all kinds:

All of these institutions and processes are maintained, as has been argued here, by a particular set of assumptions, by a particular model of man -- that the human being is consumptive, reactive, and is imbued with the 'Psychology of More'.

The influence of the "Psychology of More" can be detected in the unrelenting quest of Humanistic Educators for new realms of experience, greater depths of feeling, and unprecedented levels of personal fulfillment. The sought-after goods and services are converted to psychic goods and services, but it is still the Psychology of More. In a recent interview psychoanalyst Herbert Henden observes "When I grew up there was a greed for material things; now it's a very egocentric greed for experience." In the same interview Charles Hampden-Turner, president-elect of the Association for Humanistic Psychology, concedes that "the Humanistic movement is top-heavy on the side of self-concern." Similar

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131 *loc. cit.*
observations have caused Peter Marin to name the Human Potential Movement "the New Narcissism":

That, precisely, is what I am talking about here: the growing solipsism and desperation of a beleaguered class, the world view emerging among us centered solely on the self and with individual survival as its sole good. It is a world view present not only in everything we say and do, but as an ambience, a feeling in the air, a general cast of perception and attitude; a retreat from the worlds of morality and history, an unembarrassed denial of human reciprocity and community.132

To the extent that Humanistic Education is burdened with this egocentric outlook, it is handicapped in its pursuit of realistic educational goals. An even more serious limitation, however, may be posed by the movement's militant anti-intellectualism. In subsequent analysis it is observed, in accord with Primack, that "without the method of reflective intelligence the goals of the humanists are beyond attainment."133

Chapter Five

A CRITICAL APPARATUS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF HUMANISTIC EDUCATION

1. ORGANIZATION OF THE APPARATUS

In previous chapters an extensive analysis of ideology is undertaken and the analysis is applied, through the agency of an inventory of ideological characteristics, to the Humanistic Education movement. The results of this application are several:

1. The Humanistic Education movement is identified as an ideology of the revolutionary type, coexisting in antagonistic symbiosis with the ideology of Scientism and comprising an alliance of partisan subgroups.

2. Since the inventory selects the most noteworthy characteristics of ideologies and interrelates them within a coherent structure, its application to Humanistic Education has the effect of selecting and organizing the salient features of this particular ideology.

3. The citations employed in applying the inventory serve as a sampling of the literature of
Humanistic Education. The boundaries of Humanistic Education, which continually incorporates novelties, are often indistinct and its literature correspondingly vast; consequently, anyone attempting to undertake a conventional review of the literature would experience no little difficulty in justifying the scope of the review as adequate to the phenomenon of Humanistic Education. The sampling provided relates to the core beliefs of Humanistic Education, and to other features which, by virtue of the formal structure of the inventory which guides their selection, are ipso facto known to be ideologically significant and representative features. For this reason the sampling, even though it cannot pretend to function as an exhaustive survey, should adequately convey the essence or the spirit of the movement.

The final task of the study is to construct a critical apparatus, a compendium of general methodological principles and particular criteria to guide the assessment

1Supra, p. 147, citation 49
2Supra, p. 146, citation 46
of Humanistic Education claims and performances. The use of the apparatus is to be demonstrated by applying selected portions of the apparatus to particular beliefs and practices within the movement. It may be noted that many of the elements of the apparatus have already been identified in Chapters Three and Four, if sometimes only in rudimentary form: points of ideological criticism and parenthetic assessments of Humanistic Education particulars are scattered throughout the analysis and the application of the inventory. It remains now to collect and supplement these critical observations, to refine them and to clarify the expression of operative principles, and to order them coherently within a structure that facilitates their use.

It is repeatedly stressed above that ideologies differ in substantive ways from other ideational systems which they may superficially resemble. They are not bound by the necessities of logic, for example, as are philosophical systems and other theories in the strict sense of the word. To cite another point of difference, the incessant restructuring of language by ideologies bestows special interpretations -- and unfamiliar meanings -- upon many familiar terms. The existence of these special interpretations, moreover, is often included in the arcane knowledge (the "family secrets") which serves to promote
solidarity within the ideology.

In view of such differences, it is clearly an advantage for the critical observer to approach the study of ideological phenomena with foreknowledge of the special properties and investigational problems peculiarly presented by ideologies. Accordingly, the first of the three sections of the apparatus lists general methodological principles to be observed throughout the assessment of humanistic education, or of any other educational ideology.

The type of assessment envisaged by the writer, which the critical apparatus is designed to facilitate, entails not only making judgments concerning the efficacy of Humanistic Education means in achieving Humanistic Education goals, but also judging the suitability or tenability of the goals themselves. The more familiar evaluational practice is to accept goals as given, not questioning them but employing them as points of reference against which performances, curricular plans and institutional arrangements can be measured and in consideration of which modifications may be suggested. While the writer has no quarrel with this practice in many other settings, it does not seem that evaluation thus conceived is adequate to the special circumstances of Humanistic Education: Humanistic Education in many aspects represents a significant departure from the traditions and official
commitments of public education, yet it seeks to establish itself in publicly financed schooling.\(^3\)

If it is proposed that Humanistic Education programs be pursued within the present settings of public education, and that their installation be of benefit to public education, the justification to the public of such moves requires that the goals of Humanistic Education be capable of being subsumed under the general goals of the total educational enterprise. It is in this way that new programs identify the value of their particular contributions to the public system of education; to be lacking in demonstrated compatibility of goals is simply to lack justification for public support.

In consideration of this ineluctable reasoning, the second section of the apparatus is given to criteria for determining if Humanistic Education goals are tenable in the context of public education. The term \textit{goals} is not employed, however, since Humanistic Education, with its cherished emphasis of free expression, spontaneity, "going with the flow" and making "intuitive" decisions

\(^3\)As noted previously, Humanistic Education ventures in independent "alternative schools," or in any other private schooling, present no possibility of such goal conflict. Consequently, these aspects of Humanistic Education activity are not the concern of this study.
moment by moment, rarely achieves the sort of definite, unambiguous formulation that is commonly expected of goal statements. Rather, the term *terminal values* is employed, referring to desired social and personal end-states, however vaguely and ambiguously conceived.

The third section of the apparatus is directed to the assessment of instrumental values, or beliefs that given modes of behavior are socially and personally

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4 Many of these attributes flow from the conviction reminiscent of gestalt therapy as promoted by Fritz Perls, that one should "live in the here and now." In human potential circles this is commonly interpreted to mean that one should not reflect on the past or anticipate the future in any way, including the making of plans to guide one's teaching activity. During the Summer of 1972 the writer was able to observe many prominent gestalt therapists at work, notably James Simpkin, widely acknowledged as an outstanding trainer of therapists and a leader in developing gestalt technique. Whenever a client attempted to analyze his behavior, to make provision for probable future developments, or to think in terms of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent, good and bad, Dr. Simpkin intervened forcibly, in most instances while shouting, "Stop being so (expletive deleted) Aristotelian!" One surmised that nothing was conceivably worse than being Aristotelian, i.e., rational, or "living in your head." In the writer's opinion, much the same *animus* pervades the Humanistic Education movement.

preferable in all situations. In adopting the distinction between terminal and instrumental values for purposes of critical observation it is noted that some Humanistic Educators, in the fervor of their enthusiasm (and in the ideological conditioning of perception intensified by heightened enthusiasm) obfuscate the distinction between means and ends or, in the name of "process education," eliminate it altogether. As Alschuler concedes, "Some teachers make humanistic methods ends in themselves."7

One may note -- as well as enjoy -- the rich irony presented by the above mentioned circumstance: it is precisely such conversion of methods to ends-in-themselves that Humanistic Education, in one of its more familiar rhetorical refrains, singles out for condemnation as a shortcoming allegedly peculiar to Scientism, which ideology is portrayed as obsessed with technique and heedless of ultimate consequences. Taking note of this situation serves to reinforce an earlier observation8 that humanistic educators, the accusers, though thoroughly contaminated

6Cf. Rokeach, Beliefs, Attitudes and Values, p. 160.


8Supra, pp. 182-185.
by the pervasive ideology of Scientism, are psychologically indisposed to acknowledge the reality of such contamination. It is by no means unusual, however, that the continuance of strongly held beliefs should prevail over the admission of conflicting information; cultists of various persuasions are known to glory in the impracticality or awkwardness of their beliefs, regarding any experiencing of dissonance with the "outside world" as further confirmation of their privileged status as believers.

The fact that Humanistic Educators are sometimes caught up in a confusion of means and ends constitutes no argument against employing the distinction in the critical apparatus. The apparatus does not pretend to honor the special perceptions of the committed Humanistic Education ideologues; indeed, it would be enfeebled or invalidated as a critical apparatus were it to do so. The apparatus, after all, is offered for the use of the outside observer and evaluator, i.e., one who does not concur in the total belief system⁹ or experience any commitment to it. The

⁹It is likely that any observer could find a number of particular beliefs in Humanistic Education attractive and worthy of acceptance, but this selective placement of belief would hardly condition the observer's perceptions in any way comparable to that effected by acceptance of the complete, "packaged" ideology. Committed ideologues do not pick and choose items to their liking from the essential "package", although they may be free to select
committed Humanistic Educator typically experiences no need for the guidance of a critical apparatus; the ideology is perceived as providing him with abundant guidance for any eventuality, and is prized for that reason.

To give ideologies due credit, they do function efficiently as dispensers of guidance. They supply their adherents with a basis for making judgments of all sorts with relative ease, through a judgmental apparatus that is remarkably clear-cut, uncomplicated and reliable, in contrast with the arduous, slow-moving and sometimes inconclusive process of arriving at decisions through independently selected, disciplined systems of reasoning and unpressured reflection. The decision-expediting apparatus of an ideology, however attractive it may be as an alternative to the rigors of independently exercising one's developed critical skills, represents nothing more than the application of a set of uncontestable value beliefs to whatever circumstances present themselves. As such it is a judgment-stipulating their preferences from the ideological addenda in process of being assimilated on the periphery of an ideological movement. In the history of ideologies, those exercising undue selectivity eventually either drift away from the ideology (and sometimes into the "apostasy" of developed critical thinking) or are instrumental in the founding of splinter ideologies.
apparatus rather than an apparatus to guide autonomous deliberation in arriving at judgment. The judgmental apparatus of an ideology bears scant resemblance to a critical apparatus; rather, it eventually supplants any critical apparatus in the ideologue's decision making, standing as an impediment to the ideologue's subsequent productive, i.e., unbiased use of a critical apparatus.

The above observations have a direct bearing on the demand, quite often issued by Humanistic Educators confronted by mandated evaluation of their new programs, that they be exempted from outside evaluation\(^\text{10}\) by uncommitted and presumably objective outside evaluators. Often characterizing their programs as unique ventures into uncharted territory, the Humanistic Educators plead

\(^{10}\text{In the following discussion of Humanistic Education evaluation and evaluators, it should be kept in mind that the sort of evaluation that is usually mandated by funding agencies or delivered by the bulk of professional evaluators is much more narrowly conceived than the evaluation intended to be served by the critical apparatus of this study. The writer's conception of evaluation attends to many of the foundational issues, crucial in their ultimate practical outcomes, which most evaluators (many of whom practice a naive pragmatism) will dismiss as "philosophical", meaning "unmanageable". In consequence of a resolve to demonstrate the management of the unmanageable, the writer chooses to employ the term assessment, refering to this broader concept of evaluation.}
that no adequate measures yet exist for many of their outcomes, so that conventional evaluation is senseless. If evaluation cannot be escaped, they ask that they at least be permitted to conduct the evaluation themselves, and that they be allowed to conduct it in "their way". "Their way" is unlikely to be recognizable as an evaluation, observing few of the conventions and yielding little data that is useful, i.e., conformable with accumulated data from other evaluations.

At first hearing the argument for exemption or privileged treatment as a "special case" may seem cogent: is it unreasonable, after all, considering the uniqueness of this bold new educational enterprise still being aggressively developed, to ask that its evaluation be conducted by sympathetic people of some experience in the field, who "know the territory" and have some intuitive basis for deciding just how to proceed with the evaluation with minimal violence to the delicately balanced relationships?

The problem posed by self-designed and self-administered evaluation of Humanistic Education is not so much a matter of the sympathies of the inside evaluator. One may reasonably doubt that many evaluators, whatever their acknowledged affiliations, are able by their best efforts to approach the Olympian ideal of disinterested
objectivity. The most incapacitating biases may well be the unacknowledged ones. There is also some merit to the argument that the familiarity gained by experience in a field of endeavor is an advantage, especially in making impromptu practical decisions while managing an evaluation.

The compelling and probably insurmountable difficulty is that the people and programs to be evaluated operate within -- and under the dominance of -- an ideology. As is progressively demonstrated in the study and summarized in the preceding paragraphs, the ideologue-evaluator, in addition to exhibiting sympathy, familiarity and specialized expertise, exhibits ideological blindness. Unless he abandons his ideological belief and commitment entirely, he is unable, despite any amount of goodwill and determination, to "stand outside" his ideology and view it objectively and critically; his perceptions of the ideology are inescapably conditioned by the ideology, although, since the ideological perspective is comprehensive, such conditioning is normally beyond awareness.

11To borrow and adapt a memorable phrase of Peter Berger's, trying to function as an ideologue-evaluator within one's own ideology is "somewhat like trying to push a bus in which one is riding". Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 13.
Sincerely reported perceptions of committed ideologues are none the less ideological perceptions for being sincerely reported. What may be offered in good conscience as objective findings can easily be unwitting exercises in special pleading and self-congratulation.

Neither is it feasible to suggest that a critical apparatus like the forthcoming be offered for use by Humanistic Educators in conducting their own evaluations. The value mandates to which one submits in ideological commitment preclude the free exercise of judgment in self-examination. The foundational value positions are accepted as core beliefs, impervious (until and unless they are abandoned) to testing and modification and resistant even to examination. The value judgments are not only regarded as self-evident; they are taken for granted to the extent of receding from awareness. It seems that no purpose can be served by placing a critical apparatus in the hands of those who have abdicated critical functioning in the very matters to be judged.

The presentation of the following critical apparatus, therefore, constitutes an effort towards providing a viable alternative to the futility of Humanistic Education self-evaluation, namely an assessment that is conducted by "outsiders" who are unhampered by ideological blindness, yet who possess a privileged
understanding, accessible only to outsiders,\(^{12}\) of the workings of ideological movements and of the ideological mentality. Under the guidance of an ideologically sensitive critical apparatus like the one presented for consideration below, the outsider can enjoy the advantage of a *reasoned* familiarity\(^ {13}\) with the field; he will have an appreciation of the possible rewards and pitfalls awaiting his efforts; he will have a sense of where to look for significance and where to exercise exceptional care.

\(^{12}\)Nigel Harris offers a description of the privileged access of the outsider: "Ideology is for the group what consciousness is for the individual, and as the individual will not know the full meaning and origin of what he himself believes (it has been forgotten, not by him, for he probably never knew, but by his group or by mankind), so a group will not know the significance that we, outsiders from the group situation, might attribute to its beliefs." Nigel Harris, *Beliefs in Society* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 45.

\(^{13}\)Reasoned familiarity is contrasted with the familiarity that arises from accumulated experience which has not been subjected to regular and well grounded critical reflection. This reasoned familiarity is necessarily based on vicarious experience, which cannot possibly match the breadth of the Humanistic Educator's personal experience. In the final analysis, however, the choice must be made between the limited but rationally respectable evaluation of the informed outsider and the extensive but doubtfully valid evaluation of the ideological insider. The writer feels that anyone who cannot justify gambling recklessly with the future of public schooling will choose the former. Too many moves, some of them perhaps irreversible, have already been made without the security of respectable research and a solid, publicly justifiable conceptual foundation.
Since the apparatus summarizes and orders many points of analysis which have already been ventured and supported in prior chapters, it would be unnecessary and cumbersome to reiterate their full supporting arguments and citations in the apparatus. Accordingly, the commentary following each item is designed primarily to clarify the preceding formulation, and only in selected instances to justify the validity of some part of the principle stated. Cross-references are provided, should one desire to review the supporting material for any summary statement. It is not anticipated that anyone should be able to utilize the apparatus to good advantage after a cursory reading, without assimilating the foundational studies contained in the preceding chapters.

2. THE CRITICAL APPARATUS: GENERAL METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

1.A. The ideologies of contemporary society are increasingly heterogeneous. In the identification of educational systems as ideological one cannot rely on the stereotype of ideologies as dogmatic, flamboyantly rhetorical and desirous of unlimited public attention
Although ideologies are ideational structures, they are not maintained in splendid Platonic isolation like the mental fabrications of pure Idealists. They are very much social entities, arising from and shaped by the social currents of the times. An ideology derives its meaning from the role it plays in a social system.\footnote{Cf. Erik Allardt, "Culture, Structure and Revolutionary Ideologies" in \textit{International Journal of Comparative Sociology} Vol. 12, No. 1 (March, 1971), p. 39.}

In any era, a conservative ideology which seeks to preserve the prevailing values of a society will be virtually indetectable to the members of that society; so long as its dominance remains pervasive, it will be taken for granted.

In the United States the ideological climate presently remains strongly conditioned by the far-reaching impact of the "end of ideology" ideology, which successfully implanted the notion that, since progress confers immunity to ideology, truly modern Americans are \textit{de facto} beyond any need for ideologies and impervious to their appeals.\footnote{Supra, p. 122n.} In consequence of the promulgation of this myth, it can no longer be assumed that an ideology will advertise its presence very stridently or stage all its
campaigns aggressively in the public forum. It has become expedient to ideological self-interest to maintain a "low profile". The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries' periodic trumpeting of dogmatic, total solutions to world problems is no more, says Apter: "Today our ideologies are disguised. Their language has changed."¹⁶

Contemporary ideologies vary widely in their stylistic features, and social structures and functions. Some may be constructed around a definitively formulated credo to which all disputes are referred for judgment¹⁷ and their membership may be sharply demarcated by the test of acceptance of the total formula of belief. Others, like Humanistic Education, may be nebulous both in credal formulation and in boundaries, continually evolving from one amorphous state to another.

1.B. In view of the great variety of features exhibited, determination of ideological character is most reliably accomplished by employing a comprehensive checklist of ideological


¹⁷Supra, p. 122.
criteria like the Inventory of Ideological Characteristics. ¹⁸

The utilization of a comprehensive device like the Inventory of Ideological Characteristics offers, in addition to verification or disallowance of ideological character, the opportunity for structural and functional classification, situating an ideology in its social and symbolic context. In this manner Humanistic Education is identified as a revolutionary ideology, an amalgam of diverse partisan subgroups, an antagonistic symbiont of Scientism, etc.

2.A. Under questioning, ideologues are not always able to articulate their commitment; they are not always clear in acknowledging or forthright in verbally affirming or disclaiming particular points of belief. ¹⁹

¹⁸*Supra*, pp. 128-129.

¹⁹The difficulty of expressing one's beliefs accurately is not peculiar to ideologues, as Scheffler observes:

Expressing one's actual beliefs, to put the point briefly, is not dependent simply on the appropriate striving. A person may lack insight respecting his own beliefs. Or he may, through weakness of character
Calculated deception is not excluded from the tactics employed by ideologues to advance their cause, though it is not common enough to be presumed of contemporary ideologues, and probably never matched the caricature of the scheming liar promulgated by Marx and echoed by Mannheim. The sincerity of the ideologue, however, is not primarily at issue here, but rather the ideologue's awareness and understanding of those beliefs to which he is pledged.

2.B. It cannot be assumed that every ideologue identifies his belief system as an ideology, that he is aware of its influence on his thought and behavior, or that he clearly and adequately understands the particular beliefs to which he holds himself committed.

or some other cause, develop a certain motivated blindness concerning certain beliefs of his, with respect to which he systematically deceives himself. In such circumstances, he may strive to say what is true but fail to express his beliefs accurately. Israel Scheffler, Conditions of Knowledge (Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1965), pp. 82-83.

As is explained in principles 2.A. and 2.B. below, however, the circumstances of the ideologue constitute additional and significant impediments to identifying, expressing and understanding one's beliefs.

20Supra, p. 37, p. 47 citation 19.
Although it might seem impossible that anyone could believe what he is unsure of or comprehends very dimly, it should be remembered that ideologies are held as systems of non-evidentially based beliefs, and that they demand to be accepted as entire packages. While the rationally guided believer makes the decision to accept only after studying the claim and considering the evidence adduced in its support (and perhaps conducting his own search for confirming or contrary evidence), the ideologue has other motives for acceptance, and he lacks the advantage of inquiry conducted (as it must be conducted in order to remain effective inquiry) prior to the full commitment of belief. The array of beliefs presented in an ideology are accepted, not because they are understood to be derived by logical necessity one from another, but because they are perceived as complementary and harmonious, comprising in terms of culturally powerful, affectively loaded symbolism a satisfying whole. This, of course, is precisely what an ideology is designed to accomplish; those that fail to elicit such satisfaction do not survive.

In summary, the non-evidential believer holds his beliefs contrary to evidence, or without regard to evidence or the reliable procedures for dealing with evidence. His only "reason" for holding a particular belief may be that it appears to support some other belief or beliefs he
already holds; if he subsequently gives the appearance of accepting evidence, he may be selectively accepting only those pieces of "evidence" that happen to support the belief he already holds. Inquiry, and the understanding that inquiry confers have little to do with the ideologue's acquisition of his beliefs, and should not be expected to characterize the exercise of his beliefs. As a non-evidential believer, the ideologue does not ipso facto gain any depth of understanding concerning his belief, just as the superstitious believer does not by virtue of believing necessarily acquire an appreciation of his superstition, e.g., of why it should be black cats that augur misfortune.

2.C. Ideologies, being collective belief systems, are subject to the established epistemological principle that the ultimate test of an individual's belief is not verbal but performative.

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21 In these circumstances, what could otherwise serve as evidence cannot possibly function in the formality of evidential support. It is one thing to possess evidence, and another thing to have it function as evidence. Cf. Scheffler, op. cit., pp. 68-74.

As a believer, regardless of the manner of his belief, the ideologue is disposed to exercise his belief verbally, performatively and emotively. Verbal utterances serve to affix a label on a belief, but the final test of actual belief is whether one acts in accord with a verbal claim. Even if that claim should be imperfectly verbalized by one ideologue, its verbal formulation can be ascertained from the ideological collectivity. Since ideologies are programs of social action, 'believing an ideology' can hardly be limited to giving one's intellectual assent to propositions which one recites repeatedly; it must extend to putting that belief into practice.

It does not serve the present purpose to speculate concerning all the personal and social factors that may account for an ideologue's occasionally feigning an unaccepted belief, or disavowing a belief that is actually held. The observer may hear professional conversations

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23 This is to say that what is asserted is not the full-blown belief, with all its interrelated nondiscursive meanings, formal relations, and implicit predictions, but merely the contextually significant or appropriate aspects of the belief." Philip G. Smith, Philosophy of Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 177.

24 Supra, p. 71.

25 Supra, pp. 72-73.
in which an avowed adherent of an ideology says, e.g.:
"Oh, I don't really go along with all that stuff, you
know. Why, some of it is just impossible to talk about
with a straight face!"

Yet if those who make such verbal disclaimers
comply with the ideologically prescribed patterns of
behavior, the question of their allegiance to the ideology
is moot. The ideologically conformed behavior of
"dissenting" ideologues has the same potential for social
influence as that of their "true believer" colleagues.26

3.A. An ideology, operationally considered, is
a special language or, more precisely, a special
interpretation and elaborate restructuring of
ordinary language,27 by means of which it
refocuses the consciousness and manipulates the
behavior of its adherents.28 Consequently,
language considerations warrant primary

26 Supra, pp. 73-74.

27 "Ideologies permit interpretations of everyday
life that are not possible within the terms of everyday
life's ordinary language... ...Ideologies become the
self-consciousness of ordinary language: they are a meta-
language." Alvin W. Gouldner, The Dialectic of Ideology

28 Supra, pp. 151-152, 176-177.
attention in any assessment involving an educational ideology.

Whatever the critical observer's feeling about linguistic studies in general or his reservations concerning the practical impact of ordinary language analysis on the conduct of education, to maintain a bias against dealing with language "trivialities" in the case of an educational ideology is to incapacitate oneself for effective assessment. In any aspect of the educational enterprise, language considerations are never as trivial as some "no-nonsense" pragmatists and other educational philistines would have them be. As H. L. Nieburg summarizes, "Words are important because they carry an operational code about the nature of reality." Ideol-

29 Out of respect for the contributions of Dewey and his predecessors in the lineage of philosophically grounded, disciplined pragmatists, it should be noted that many who claim the title today have no patience with philosophy, or indeed with any other intellectual pursuit that will "slow them down" in their urgent need to accomplish goals of barely examined, therefore questionable value. If labels were to be assigned more accurately, unreflective, compulsive "doers" of this sort would be known as practitioners, not of reasoned Pragmatism, but of crass expediency. While the practice of expediency is within the civil rights of any educator, the usurpation of an honorable philosophical title may not be easily justified.

ologies, as noted under principle I.A., are not static configurations of belief propositions but dynamic concentrations of human energy, selectively channeled into social activity. That activity is accomplished through language. Abstractions of ideologies as mental furniture do not change the course of human events; ideologies in the concrete are linguistic mechanisms, which certainly do. In Gouldner's words, "Ideology, then, is that part of consciousness which is focused linguistically on public projects." Whatever an ideology accomplishes in educational change or in any other arena will have been accomplished through the instrumentality of its restructured language.

3.B. An ideology functions as a perception-regulating, reality-constructing mechanism which constitutes an all-sufficient symbolic universe for the ideologue and renders him incapable of full reflexive awareness of his ideological


32Gouldner, op. cit., p. 81.
situation. Special caution is to be exercised in dealing with references to reality expressed within an ideological system, e.g., appeals to realistic thinking, "Real" persons, things or situations, common sense, human nature, or "what everyone knows to be the case." Such presentations, offered in good faith as objective, "out-there" reality, may be assumed to be deviate, ideologically constructed reality, especially in matters of known ideological concern.

3.C. There is strong probability that statements offered as the product of an ideologue's distinctive personal research, experience or insight are unwittingly assimilated standard formulas supplied by the ideology.

By means of the restructuring and refocusing of ordinary language, an ideology achieves a uniformity of perception within its sphere of domination. Although

33"Ideologies serve as mechanisms to ensure that members of a group will perceive events in a similar fashion." Normand R. Bernier and Jack E. Williams, "The Ideological Perspective" in Normand R. Bernier and Jack E. Williams, (eds.) Education For Liberation
every cultural group engages to some degree in a new social construction of reality, an ideology constructs its own reality in an exceptionally comprehensive and exclusive sense.

The ideologue in accepting the standard perspective of his ideology enters into a satisfying reality, an exactly tailored world adequate to his particular social needs. Within the shelter of the ideological community and its shared ideological perception the ideologue inhabits a reassuringly ordered symbolic universe in which he is supplied with gratifyingly authoritative, all-sufficient, uncompromising formulations:

This is the way things are.

This is what things should be like.

This is what must be done.36


34 The new reality construction is satisfying because it is designed to remedy just those strains or to further precisely those interests which originally disposed the ideologue to give his allegiance to the ideology, perhaps even before the full content of the ideological belief system was known.

35 The concept of an ideology developing into a symbolic universe that "encompasses the institutional order in a symbolic totality" is taken from Berger & Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality pp. 92-108.

36 All three formulations would be featured in reform and revolutionary ideologies. The second formulation, representing a future-oriented or utopian element, would have no function in a conservative ideology. A
When the ideologically constructed reality is inhabited for an appreciable time, the ideologue tends to regard his perceived reality as reality unqualified, the one and only reality. The taken-for-granted aspect of the ideological perspective, an essential feature of any ideological commitment,\textsuperscript{37} comes to dominate the whole of consciousness. It is at this point that one can recognize the entrenchment of a reflexive impotency that is a more intense, ideological form of ethnocentrism\textsuperscript{38} namely, \textit{ideological blindness}:

Ideology is thus characterized by its \textit{inhibition} about addressing the question of its own \textit{grounding}, and thus by self-imposed restrictions on its own reflexivity. It is this impaired reflexivity, concerning its grounding, that is the analytical essence of the limit on the rationality of ideology.\textsuperscript{39}

In the thoroughly conditioned self-perception of the ideologue, he does not follow the pathways of ideology; counterideology would have little if anything to offer under the third formulation.


\textsuperscript{38}\textit{Supra}, pp. 38, 197-198.

\textsuperscript{39}Gouldner, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 214.
he freely explores the real world. He is not an ideologue and a conformer to the thinking of the collectivity; he is a free-thinking realist. Ideological attachment that reaches this level is all but impregnable. By virtue of his strongly-held, non-evidential beliefs the ideologue places himself beyond challenge, beyond the rules of argument, and beyond consequential dialogue with anyone who does not share his perspective.

4. It is not to be assumed that the confident manner of participants in educational ideologies and their willingness to venture quick judgments in complex and controversial matters are reliable indications of exceptional expertise and the possession of solid logical grounds for judgment.

The non-evidential believer is characteristically the most confident of believers. The evidential believer, having justified his acceptance of evidence, continues to hold his belief open to examination, to modification in the light of new evidence, and to the possibility of being overthrown by future contrary evidence. No such openness, caution or vestiges of doubt apply to the non-evidentially believing ideologue, whose conviction of certainty is significantly reinforced by possession of infallible
recipes for responding to all major issues.

The ideologue experiences himself as possessing an incalculably significant and indubitable truth, and thereby undergoes a certain transformation of personality. In the strength of his conviction and the security of being supplied with broadly efficacious answers to issues that matter to him, the ideologue exhibits a characteristic confidence and an eagerness to volunteer instant solutions to problems at first hearing. As Gouldner observes, "It is not that he feels he knows all. But he feels that what he knows is decisive."

5.A. In recognition of the ideological conditioning of perception, all claims made by adherents of educational ideologies, whatever their content, warrant exceptionally careful scrutiny. Of these claims, those conveying an ideological movement's self-descriptions are especially suspect of being either delusionary or deceptive.


41 Gouldner, op. cit., p. 47.
5.B. Alterations of an ideology's self-image, or other stylistic transformations, are not necessarily symptomatic of substantive changes in that ideology's perspective or programs.

The self-attributed labels and commendations, the versions of collective image cultivated by an ideology for either private or public promulgation are not entirely to be explained simply in terms of "what an ideology prefers to believe about itself." In this respect hardly any contemporary social movement can be considered innocent of self-complimentary tactics; in our competitive society a good deal of image manipulation has come to be regarded as both socially acceptable and desirable as a probable means of bolstering the self-esteem, motivation and achievement of any aggressively participating group. Whatever its actual benefit to the welfare of the group, few desire to risk its neglect, and image-tailoring has become an established industry of the American scene.

Over and above this commonplace level of preoccupation with collective image, an ideology has reason to address itself with uncommon intensity to the fine adjustment of its image for purveyance to different audiences. All image-mongering involves a certain amount of attempted legitimation of group activities and roles in society,
usually ventured in order to gain advantage for the group by rationalizing and sometimes masking its particular interests. In the case of ideologies, however, much more than advantage is usually at stake; for an ideology, successful legitimation may determine survival.

In other words, an ideology may find it necessary to pursue legitimation by image cultivation on two fronts: internal and external. It is first of all a matter of what the typical contemporary ideology, being a delicately balanced alliance of partisan subgroups, finds it necessary to believe of itself in order to at least partially appease all factions and temper internal conflicts that would lead, if unchecked, to fragmentation. Negotiated compromises with troublesome factions are not accomplished by overt, rational discussion; they take the form of a series of relatively inconspicuous shifts in emphasis, ultimately producing a notable alteration of the ideology's self-image. The outsider who chances to observe an ideology during one of these periods of adjustment will encounter more than the usual disparity among claims issued by adherents. Humanistic education, for example, seems to be relinquishing much of its association with the anarchistic image of the radical reformers and moving towards a more respectable, "establishment" image, in recognition of the

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42 Supra, pp. 117-118, 146-147.
fact that an increasing number of its supporters in public education have no desire for the notoriety of militant challenge and wish to work quietly within the system. This stylistic change, however, is not to be regarded as necessarily signaling a substantive change in the perspective or programs of humanistic education. As noted above, the stylistic innovation is more likely analogous to "updating" the merchandising techniques in order to enhance the sales appeal of the same old product.

In addition to rationalizing its character to its own adherents, an ideology needs to justify its presence to at least some sectors of its social environment. Even if it is not aggressively proselytizing, an ideology cannot afford to forfeit its claim to participate in the allocation of a society's resources and rewards. An educational ideology desiring to establish itself in public education especially needs to propagandize selected target groups in the polity, school personnel, and interested general public, striving to establish itself in those audiences' perception as worthy of social acceptance and public tax support.

Those who choose to identify themselves as radical

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43 Supra, p. 108.

44 Supra, pp. 159, 161.
reformers, for example, are laying claim to a respectability they could not enjoy were they to be more accurately portrayed either as intemperate educational demolitionists or as ineffectual visionaries of the countercultural fringe.\textsuperscript{45} The fact remains that the radical reformers' sentiments and proposals either go far beyond the reform of existing schooling, to its annihilation in any recognizable form, or fall far short of reform, being short-circuited in the nirvana of the retreatist.

As for the self-reports of the Humanistic Education movement, its tenuous boundaries and the precarious amalgamation of its factions are often presented in a positive light to its adherents as signs of dedication to unrestrained personal freedom, e.g.: "you will find it very hard for them [humanists] to agree on anything but the necessity of pluralism."\textsuperscript{46} In other attempts to legitimate itself to target groups, Humanistic Education portrays itself (contrary to fact or sometimes even to

\textsuperscript{45}\textit{Supra,} pp. 163, 171-172.

logical possibility) as a systematic existential philosophy of education, \(^{47}\) as the contemporary manifestation of an eminent and longstanding historical tradition, \(^{48}\) or as a movement both willing and able to attain traditional educational goals. \(^{49}\)

6. An ideology's omissions and silences can be as significant as its expressions. The critical observer should give special attention to those things, normally receiving interested and concerned attention in education, that are not mentioned by an educational ideology. It may be assumed that these areas of silence relate to significant and problematic features of the ideology.

The restructuring and refocusing of language and consciousness by an ideology is highly selective, emphasizing at any given time what is conducive to its interests and glossing over those of its features which it would be deleterious to acknowledge to its own

\(^{47}\) *Supra*, p. 178.

\(^{48}\) *Supra*, pp. 166-167.

\(^{49}\) *Supra*, pp. 159-160.
adherents or to outsiders. To use Michael Apple's phrase, educational ideologies like Progressivism have simply "bracketed out issues that the progressives did not feel compelled to respond to." To this one might add the evasion of issues too embarrassing to acknowledge, or potentially damaging to solidarity or morale.

Ideological repression is merely another aspect of the defensive mechanism described in principle 5. as image promotion; the ideological motivation remains the same as that described above. Among the significant silences of humanistic education are its failure to acknowledge all that it has borrowed (and transformed) from Progressivism, the reluctance to admit its affluent origins and its enduring character as a middle-class movement best suited for meeting the needs of the comfortable and secure, and its concealment of conflicts and tensions among the specialized subgroups comprising the alleged "big happy family" of the movement. Humanistic Education also does not reveal how it proposes to observe

52 Supra, pp. 174-178.
53 Supra, pp. 172-173.
accountability, e.g., how it can establish the fulfillment of its claim to achieve traditional goals of schooling in the process of pursuing its own methods, so long as it retains its aversion to all conventionally respectable measurement.

7. In order to know the meaning of a slogan favored by an educational ideology, one must determine the special interpretation assigned to it by the ideology, as applies also to any newly coined terms routinely employed by the ideology. A particular caution to be observed by the investigator concerns the fact that many ordinary terms are given a special interpretation and a notably altered meaning by ideologies. These special interpretations, moreover, are not always made publicly accessible; they must often be inferred by the investigator from the linguistic and behavioral context.

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54 This portion of the principle follows Komisar and McClellan, whose most succinct formulation (p. 207) is "The slogans in a slogan system mean what the system's author interprets them to mean." Cf. B. Paul Komisar and James E. McClellan, "The Logic of Slogans" in B. Othaniel Smith and Robert H. Ennis, (eds.) Language and Concepts in Education (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1961), pp. 201-209.
The early stages of development of an ideology are marked by a convergence of slogans which express the strain or interests mobilizing the ideological collectivity.\(^5\) The formal content of an ideology can therefore be regarded as a slogan system, \(^6\) "one grand slogan...[like Humanistic Education's *humanizing the classroom*]...used to summarize many subslogans."\(^7\) The cited work of Komisar and McClellan is recommended for particular guidance in the analysis of slogans.

One advantage presented to the investigator by slogans and neologisms is that they elicit cautious treatment by advertising their novelty and variance from the familiar patterns of ordinary language. No such warning is afforded as one encounters familiar words to which extraordinary meanings have been attached by an ideology.\(^8\) Some of the ideologically loaded terms

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\(^6\) The writer cautions that this statement is not to be construed as meaning that the total phenomenon of an ideology is equated with a slogan system. Although some linguistic analysts in education persist in reducing ideologies to neatly contained packets of propositions, it is the burden of this study to demonstrate that any ideology is a complex, fluid psychosocial mechanism verging on coalescence around a slogan system.

\(^7\) Komisar & McClellan, *op. cit.*, p. 206.

\(^8\) *Supra*, pp. 151-152, 176-177.
favored by Humanistic Education are identified in the following sections of the apparatus; perhaps the most ubiquitous example is significant learning, interpreted to refer to many unconventional student achievements not highly valued at present by society at large, while excluding from significance some commonly valued achievements whose absence could be expected to impede the student on his entry into the larger society.

If these special interpretations are not often volunteered to outsiders, this may be done in the interest of enveloping the ideology in an attractive, blemish-concealing veil of mystery. As noted above, the advantage of secrecy to ideologies is enhanced solidarity; the advantage of mystification is protection from critical scrutiny, i.e., not presenting a sharply outlined target to potential adversaries.

8. Although some educational ideologies claim the designation of an "educational theory" or a "philosophy of education", they are not constructed as theoretical systems, and are therefore resistant

59Supra, pp. 119-120.
to conventional, logically-based analysis. The investigator may not assume that contradictory elements and other logical inconsistences constitute faults or weaknesses that would adversely affect an educational ideology's capacity for influencing educational thought and practice.

In contrast with theoretical systems in the strict sense, whose elements are bound together in the necessity of their logical interdependence, ideologies function for the ideologue as psychological rather than as strictly logical systems, i.e., as belief systems having what can only be called a quasi-logical structure. Their cognitive structure is not, by logical standards, coherent throughout. Some beliefs are perceived as deriving from others, even though there is no logical basis for the

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60 Supra, pp. 68-69.

61 "The rules we use in general justification of belief are subject to the requirement that they be true to our credibilities on the whole... ...A particular belief, then, is justified by its conformity with rules so justified. In effect, it is justified if it hangs together with that family of beliefs that as a whole commands our highest degree of confidence. (italics added for emphasis) Israel Scheffler, Reason and Teaching (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 120.
derivation. Inconsistent or even contradictory beliefs may coexist within the system because they are held in isolation from one another, in clusters of supportive beliefs which protect them from relationship with other sets of beliefs.

Ideologies are not conceptual enterprises conducted on some high level of abstraction; their concern is not the conveyance of truth claims but the creation of social meaning and the stimulation of social action. "It should be pointed out," writes Edward Shils, "that no great ideology has ever regarded the disciplined pursuit of truth -- by scientific procedures and in the mood characteristic of modern science -- as part of its obligations."

The frustrations presented to the logically oriented investigator by Humanistic Education begin with...
the ambiguity and circularity of its basic themes, e.g., the expectation of becoming *more fully human*. No success criteria are provided for this anticipated achievement. No determination is made of what counts as *less human*, *more human*, or *fully human*, or of how these might differ from instances of what is commonly recognized as simply being *human*. In the judgment of linguistic analysis *more fully human* must be dismissed as meaningless, but in the instrumentality of an ideology's carefully managed symbol system, the phrase demonstrates an awesome power to seize the imagination, channel motivation, and shape human events.

An abundance of contradictions and inconsistencies can be found in humanistic education principles and practices, e.g., the attempt to develop the student's unlimited "freedom to be himself" without providing the student with strong initial guidance or the critical skills essential to the long-term management and preservation of personal freedom of choice. In a movement so thoroughly suffused with anti-intellectual, anti-rational sentiment, however, such logical lapses are not likely to be regarded as embarrassing or unfortunate, but rather as honorable gestures, exuberant affirmations of the spirit of the movement. The ideology's embarrassment and disappointment are more likely to be elicited by symbols that fail to
exert their anticipated emotive force.

9. The most distinctive and most commonly encountered feature of ideological expression is the ideological statement, defined as "a value judgment disguised as, or mistaken for a statement of fact." Uncritical acceptance of the factual status of assertions issued within an educational ideology in a factual manner or with the explicit claim of demonstrated factuality hinders investigation in two ways: it can vitiate the investigator's store of reliable knowledge guiding him in his work, and it can remove the opportunity to examine crucially important value judgments and possibly to determine the criteria employed in the assignment of value.

The centrality of indiscriminate commingling of facts and values to ideological perception and expression is so well established that many authors define ideology

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on this basis, e.g.:

By "ideology" I mean a system of beliefs that presents value-judgments as empirical truths in order to justify, with or without conscious intent, a particular socio-economic group's claim to material and prestigial rewards.67

In view of what is summarized in this section concerning ideological conditioning of perception, the distinctive construction or reality, the impaired reflexive awareness, the heightened subjective confidence and convictions of certainty, the disposition to take much for granted, the dependence on ideologically formulated solutions and patterns of language, it can come as no surprise that the ideologue should habitually assimilate facts and values to each other. Supplied with ideological mechanisms that supplant so many of his reflections and deliberations, he has little need or opportunity to employ the fact-value distinction and to retain facility in its use. Moreover, within the conveniently ordered and simplified symbolic universe he inhabits, the familiar value positions of his ideology presumably exhibit a givenness and immutability that cause them to be regarded as obvious, universally shared truths of experience. In the words of Joseph Margolis, ideological values "congeal

into normative verities."  

In order to eliminate the possibility that a different sort of confusion concerning facts and values might impede the present commentary, it is noted that, while value judgments are not statements of fact, it is not clearly inappropriate to speak of "value facts", i.e., psychological facts, or statements of the fact that a certain person has the sort of experience that would be verbalized as a value judgment. Should the investigator wish to refresh his understanding of these matters, John Wilson's Language and the Pursuit of Truth is recommended for its lucid explication of value statements and empirical statements, and of the method of verification appropriate to either. While some might consider it odd to refer to the verification of value judgments, Wilson observes that their method of verification entails reaching agreement about the appropriate criteria to be observed in assigning value: "The distinguishing feature of value statements lies in the importance of the criteria for verifying them."

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69 Cf. Bergmann, op. cit., p. 207.
71 Ibid., p. 68.
Herein lies the advantage, presumably not acknowledged or consciously exploited, for the ideologue who presents his values as facts: if his statements were to be recognized as value judgments, acceptance of the judgments would be contingent on acceptance of his criteria for judgment. Since the criteria are probably other value beliefs of the ideology, which an outsider would not be expected to share, the particular value judgment would most likely not be accepted on its own merits. Fact-value confusion functions, consciously or unconsciously, as a tactic for evading critical scrutiny, which the ideologue's confident statements might not be able to withstand.

The task of the investigator is to routinely question the allegedly factual statements that emanate from educational ideologies and, whenever they are revealed as ideological statements, to force a discussion of the criteria on which the value judgment is based. While such a discussion may be inconclusive, considering the reflexive limitations suffered by ideologues, the investigator will have the opportunity to test and perhaps augment his understanding of the actual value structure of the ideology. Such understanding can be crucially important in assessment of that ideology's means-ends performance.

Ideological statements are presented at every turn
by Humanistic Education, and will be sampled in the following sections. Ideological statements are most frequently issued concerning the basic attributes valued in school environments, e.g., in teachers, teaching, learning and socializing. The language employed in characterizing these values usually bears the traces of the existential jargon or countercultural slang from which it has been appropriated, e.g., "genuineness in the facilitator or learner", "discovering your real self", "lowering the barriers between teacher and student", "gut-level learning", "arriving at solutions that are best for you".

3. GUIDELINES FOR JUDGING THE TENABILITY AND APPROPRIATENESS OF HUMANISTIC EDUCATION TERMINAL VALUES AS PURSUED WITHIN PUBLIC EDUCATION.

The preceding methodological principles might supply guidance for the assessment of any ideological movement in education, although their explication emphasizes aspects of the particular structural and functional configuration represented in Humanistic Education. The guidelines offered in this and the following section are formulated in consideration of the distinctive content of Humanistic Education pronouncements and performances. No attempt is made to represent the movement in all its vastness or in the diversity of all
its partisan subgroups; rather, the principal values, i.e., those which appear to be honored with reasonable uniformity throughout the movement, are selected for comment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>10.</th>
<th>The terminal values which Humanistic Education identifies for itself represent aspects of an overall commitment to individualism or personalism in school and society; these values include the following desired personal end states:</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.A.</td>
<td>The achievement of self-actualization as the summary aim of education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.B.</td>
<td>The affective development of the individual, in compensation for present obsession with cognitive development to the neglect of the affective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.C.</td>
<td>The personal integration of the individual; the achievement of a unity of consciousness in which the affective and the cognitive are effectively fused.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.D.</td>
<td>The creation of personal meaning for the individual through interpersonal learning experience.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10.E. The fulfillment of the individual's basic personal needs, i.e., self-identity, potency and positive affiliation.

10.F. Liberation of the individual from preconceived constraints; autonomous self-development based on the individual's free choice of the means and ends of his education. (This amounts to the prizing of individual value relativism.)

10.G. The enhancement of the individual's personal expressiveness; the achievement of candor, spontaneity, authenticity, heightened imagination, creativity.

11. In addition to the social conditions whose attainment would be presupposed in the achievement of these personal end states, Humanistic Education terminal values include the following desired social end states, summarized in the prizing of a humane society:

11.A. A social structure no longer based on competition, but rather on cooperation.
11.B. A society no longer dominated and
dehumanized by science and technology, with their
overwhelming concern for efficiency, measurement
and control.

11.C. An open, flexible society no longer
constrained by its traditions or anxious to impose
conformity; a society in which individual
eccentricities are tolerated and respected as
human qualities.

In the above listing of self-identified terminal
values an effort is made (with the exception of the
parenthetic comment in 10.F.) to respect the choice of
language and formal distinctions most favored by
Humanistic Educators, i.e., to be limited to those
formulations even though a particular expression might
seem inane or lacking in clarity. Humanistic Education
is thus permitted to "speak for itself" in this matter.

It is useful to recall, however, that in
proclaiming its desired ends to its constituency or to its
target audiences Humanistic Education, like any ideology,
is tailoring its image to meet its ideological needs;
consequently it employs a great deal of language that is
self-protectively obscure, i.e., terms which are vague,
ambitious and ideologically loaded. 72

As might also be expected, the motive power of some of these value expressions is enhanced by employing them as slogans; given adequate repetition such slogans acquire a familiarity by virtue of which they come to be regarded as self-evident and therefore universally accepted goods. 73 "Self-actualization" is one such slogan word, as is "autonomous self development". It does not seem to occur to the committed Humanistic Educator that anyone could have reason to withhold or qualify his approval of such a confidently proclaimed good.

12. In consideration of the continuing effort to install Humanistic Education programs in publicly funded schooling, the terminal values listed above are not to be regarded and dismissed as privately held value positions; they are to be scrutinized as value judgments offered in expectation of broad public concurrence. Considered in this formality, most of the terminal values lack the specificity needed for meaningful acceptance by anyone who does not share the presuppositions of the

72 Supra, pp. 215-220.

73 Supra, pp. 222-223.
ideological perspective. Little or no indication is given in Humanistic Education literature of the criteria employed in the assignments of value.

If the terminal values in question were to be considered solely in their aspect of value positions which the Humanistic Education collectivity has adopted in the course of directing and motivating its own internal affairs, there would be no readily justifiable basis for the challenging of these values or their grounding by anyone outside the collectivity; neither would there be any good reason, from this point of view, for initiating such a challenge. However, Humanistic Education, by entering into competition for public resources and rewards, forfeits any such claim to privacy and immunity from public scrutiny. To the extent that it seeks to participate in the funding and respectability of public education it must accept also the burden of accountability: it must present its value judgments -- and whatever reasons it can adduce in support of those judgments -- in the public forum.

The failure of Humanistic Education to supply its criteria for the particular assignments of value is hardly surprising, given the ordinary manner of accepting either empirical or value beliefs within an ideological
framework. It is likely that the criteria are themselves ideological and beyond awareness, i.e., that a given value belief is accepted because of its perceived congruence with already accepted ideological beliefs. It is conceivable that no deliberation at all would precede the value "judgments"; most ideologues could accept the value beliefs automatically, by virtue of their acceptance of the entire ideological package of beliefs. There would not, of course, be any value judgment taking place in such circumstances, but only the uncritical acceptance of value stipulations. Nevertheless, justification of the claim for public support requires that value judgments of some kind, either affirmative or negative, be made by those in other sectors of society.

"Self-actualization", or "self-realization", identified in 10.A. as summarizing the terminal values of Humanistic Education, is simply too indeterminate a concept to serve plausibly as an aim of education. The problem, according to R. S. Peters, is one of providing firm standards by reference to which one is able to separate what is worth encouraging in students from what is not:

\[74\] Supra, pp. 205-206.
For concepts such as 'self-realisation' and 'growth' presuppose standards of value which determine both the sort of 'self' which is worth realising and the direction of growth. Human beings are not like flowers in having a predetermined end which serves as a final cause of their development. 'Growing' or 'realising oneself' implies doing things which are thought to be worth-while rather than others.\textsuperscript{75}

While it may not be altogether pointless to speak of self-actualization as an educational aim, as Gribble observes, "it just doesn't get us very far until we begin to specify the activities which will realize the self in worthwhile ways."\textsuperscript{76} Moreover, Gribble notes, once such a specification is accomplished all the vague talk about "self-actualization" becomes redundant. Gribble's accusation of redundancy ignores the fact that the rational-logical functioning of such terms is minimal from the start; they are favored expressions because of their emotive richness and strength. Referring to educational achievements as "self-actualization" may be gilding the lily, but as Humanistic Educators demonstrate, many are susceptible to such forms of flattery.


Much the same observations can be made concerning the other terminal values. The indiscriminate championing of affective experience (10.B.) in order to compensate for the alleged cognitive excesses of the past ignores the importance of, to quote Broudy, "knowing the difference between what is worth keeping and what is not." If it were to be supposed that all affective experience was equally desirable and developmentally useful, one might expect to find instances of greatest development among ghetto children, who, whatever else they lack, are unsurpassed in the quantity and intensity of their affective experience. Clearly there is need for the application of some standards of worth beyond the ephemeral preferences of the student; such application, however, would most likely be perceived by Humanistic Educators as violating autonomy and individual value relativism.

Freedom (10.F.) is another nebulous concept, all

77 One may find a fairly obvious analogy between this line of thought and the reasoning offered in support of Affirmative Action. In either case the difficulty is that of recognizing when one has over-compensated to the point of detriment.

but useless in educational practice until one begins specifying the results of free activity. An additional difficulty is that freedom, as Morris and Pai observe, is used by Humanistic Educators in at least two very different senses, although the distinction is not clearly delineated by them or reliably observed:

In the first sense freedom is the quality of a learning climate in which threats, punishments and regimentation are absent. In the second sense, freedom is the power of an individual to self-actualize.\(^7\)

Similarly, promoting the enhancement of personal expressiveness (10.G.) would seem to require some means of knowing whether or not communication of private experience has been successfully accomplished. There would also be need for placing some prudent limits on the exercise of candor and spontaneity. As the matter stands in current practice, Humanistic Education makes two presumptions, identified by Krasner and Ullman:

The first is that radical, unselected honesty is necessarily good. But knowing when to say something and when to be quiet...influences whether a verbal message is effective rather than destructive. The second presumption is that what is said without

consideration, with honesty and candor, is valuable and accurate...that what is socially unusual and unacceptable expresses the "real" person...13. The terminal values of Humanistic Education in some instances represent reactionary positions adopted in response to an assumed societal or educational situation; these assumptions, moreover, are often questionably supported. Any strong challenge to the validity of the underlying assumption may constitute a similar challenge to the desirability of the value constructed on that assumption.

It is observed in the previous section of the critical apparatus that ideologues, including those who are skilled in finding the blemishes in other systems, are rarely troubled by the inconsistencies, contradictions and other logica non grata to be found among or within the particular beliefs that comprise their ideology. The fact is that ideologues, sheltered within the construction of reality supplied by their ideology, do not ordinarily


81 Supra, pp. 226-227.
perceive logical incongruities as failings or experience them as troublesome; one should not, however, interpret this phenomenon to mean that these logical inconsistencies are mere linguistic lapses or defects only in the quality of one's abstractions, i.e., that inconsistencies of this sort would somehow be prevented from leading eventually to conflicts and failures in the practical endeavors of education. Ideological blindness, as the term suggests, is the benign exclusion from one's attention not only of uncomplimentary logical observations but also of their embarrassing practical consequences. Whenever the ideologue does not produce a success to his liking, his inclination is to define one into existence.

Those who are aware of the scars inflicted on public education by the delusionary successes of past ideological movements will not want to base their acceptance or rejection of Humanistic Education programs on the claims of integrity and utility offered in complete sincerity by Humanistic Educators. They will judge humanistic education programs on the basis of theoretical integrity as well as on its claimed record of performance to date, knowing that it is only a matter of time before any fundamental conceptual unsoundness is translated into practical failure.

The terminal value expressed in 11.B. rests on the
assumption, known from previous analyses to be an ideological core belief of Humanistic Education, that dehumanization (anomie, alienation) is caused exclusively by the infiltration of Scientism into all aspects of American society. It is important, given the antagonistic symbiotic character of its relationship with Scientism, that this assumption be kept alive by Humanistic Education, in order to lend urgency to its cause and to motivate renewed commitment. In directing this charge against Scientism, Humanistic Education ignores (is blind to) the fact that a good portion of the anomie, alienation or dehumanization is self-inflicted, the consequence of its failure to provide adequate guidance or to impose adequate discipline in all its cultivation of spontaneous, unrestrained, unconventional behavior. As Joel Feinberg observes, anomie cannot be said to result exclusively or even primarily from the influence and control of outside forces:

When the I is incapable of governing its me, the result is anomie, a condition which is not control from without, but rather being virtually "out of control" altogether.\(^\text{83}\)

\(^{82}\)Supra, pp. 128, 148-149.

The disquieting predicament of Humanistic Education is summarized by Pratte: "existentialist theory of education is found in the position of advocating choice without providing necessary guidelines." In proclaiming its abhorrence of the traditional prizing of cognitive skills, Humanistic Education also admits that it has discarded the critical tools by means of which its internal dissonances might be detected and ameliorated. As it is, the Humanistic Educator, bereft of the means for remedy and rendered psychologically incapable of acknowledging the problem, is caught in the frustration of his own contradictions. With undaunted resolve he attempts the impossible: to turn out autonomous, self-directing individuals without providing the strong guidance needed to assist the student through the difficulties of the initial formative period, during which the beginner has need of a clear model of

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84Richard Pratte, *Contemporary Theories of Education* (Scranton: Intext Educational Publishers, 1971), p. 275. In view of earlier observations (Supra, pp. 179-180) concerning the character of existentialism, it is the writer's opinion that existentialist theory of education cited above is a contradiction in terms, provided that one employs theory in the strict sense, as might readily be supposed of the author of *Contemporary Theories of Education*. If one should agree with the opinion that Existentialism in practice occasions a mass of conceptual-behavioral contradictions, a self-contradictory designation might seem altogether appropriate.
imagination and enthusiasm tempered by discipline and order. What is more, the student is not supplied with the critical skills needed if he is to continue unaided in self-management in later years; these skills, unfortunately, are rational skills, for that reason neither prized nor often made accessible in Humanistic Education.

Caught in these unreasolvable conflicts and experiencing futility without being able to trace it to its source, the Humanistic Educator takes refuge in his assumption that he is the victim of outside forces, which he resolves anew to neutralize by the expedient of more fervent commitment to his cause. Thus the circle of his epistemological entrapment continues to tighten around him.

This assumption, which underlies values 10.F. and 10.G. as well as 11.B., is clearly delusionary, and cannot help but pose an obstacle to the unqualified acceptance of those terminal values:

Courage, temperance, justice, spirituality -- all these are killed not by technology but by insufficient self-cultivation, insufficient imagination, and insufficient sensitivity. For individuality to survive requires great effort, and merely changing the system will not relieve us of the necessity of such effort. 85

85 Broudy, op. cit., p. 168.
Perhaps the strongest example of unsupported assumptions is to be found in the case of compensatory affective development and the confluence of affective and cognitive (10.B., 10.C.). Stated simply, the assumptions in question would seem to be the following:

1. That it is possible to isolate the cognitive from the affective in human experience.
2. That such a cognitive-affective split has already taken place, to such an extent that it characterizes "traditional" schooling.
3. That cognitive development has been stressed to the virtual neglect of affective development. This imbalance is also regarded as characteristic of "traditional" schooling.
4. That Humanist Education's conversely unbalanced emphasis of the affective will promote confluence and restore the student to wholeness.

It would be difficult to find anyone versed in the psychological sciences who could accept the validity of the first assumption. It is accepted as a commonplace truth that just as the senses and the intellect interpenetrate in the awareness of human beings, so also do the cognitive and affective interpenetrate in mental functioning. Try as one might to "shut off" the intellect
and to perceive the world in the manner of an animal, the feat cannot possibly be accomplished, if for no other reason than that one's sense perceptions are habitually contaminated by the incessant previous intrusions of intellect to define and perhaps evaluate just what it is that one perceives. Similarly, the effort to exclude affective activity is self-defeating; the effort itself is very likely to generate an affective response of its own.86

In order to explain the commonplace references within Humanistic Education to the cognitive-affective split, one can only surmise that there is widespread confusion of what is possible in abstraction and what is possible in personal experience. One encounters no difficulty whatsoever in separating the cognitive and affective abstractions when studying and talking about human experience, but in the context of the interacting teacher and student cognitive and affective functions are being exercised far more often than they are analyzed.

The entire misunderstanding seems to have originated with the ubiquitous taxonomy of educational

86It is not suggested that every instance of cognitive activity is accompanied by a discrete instance of affective activity, but only that the incidence of affective phenomena is not reliably subject to internal or external control.
objectives, considering how often that work is cited by Humanistic Educators in support of their belief. It must be observed in favor of Bloom, Krathwohl and Masia that they are fairly aggressive in discouraging their readers from thinking in terms of an actual split:

We recognize that human behavior can rarely be neatly compartmentalized in terms of cognition and affect. It is easier to divide educational objectives and intended behaviors into these two domains. However, even the separation of objectives into these two groups is somewhat artificial in that no teacher or curriculum worker really intends one entirely without the other.  

The disclaimer cited above is buried within a ninety-five page introduction, which one suspects is as infrequently read as the early works of Pestalozzi. A more conspicuous and powerful exemplar is presented to the

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87 David R. Krathwohl, Benjamin S. Bloom and Bertram B. Masia, *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives* Handbook II: Affective Domain (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1971), p. 85. While it is understandable that those engaged in classifying objectives might fix their concern on the intentions of the educator, it seems ludicrous in the passage cited to appeal to the coincidence of cognitive and affective in the educator's intentions when it is precisely in contexts like the framing of one's intentions for the activity of others that cognition and affect can readily be separated in abstraction. What is more to the point is the inseparability of cognition and affect in the actual experience of the students. One of the most disenchanting lessons to be learned by educators once they leave the private world of academic preparation and research to grapple with the realities of the classroom is that the actual experience of the students is not necessarily constrained by, or even related to, the most earnest intent of the educator. It is surprising to find the authors, seasoned educators all, indirectly perpetrating the illusion of omnipotent intent.
reader\textsuperscript{88} in the format adopted for the body of the taxonomy, in which cognition and affect, notwithstanding the disclaimer, are not only assigned to different domains but also -- adding visual statement to verbal -- banished to separate volumes.

A further result of this unfortunate compromise with psychological reality\textsuperscript{89} is that some mental entities are left without an adequate conceptual niche in which they might be appropriately studied, much as the \textit{euglena viridis} was excluded from membership in both the plant and animal kingdoms of the original, biological taxonomy of Linnaeus. Among the categorically misplaced are beliefs in all their variety, each identified by its

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{88}The exemplary power of the format is indicated by the large number of writers in education who continue to cite the taxonomy in support of their opinions concerning the cognitive-affective split, which is generally regarded, to judge from their comments, as a certified psychological reality, e.g.: Harry Morgan, \textit{The Learning Community} (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1973), p. 11. John B. MaGee, \textit{Philosophical Analysis in Education} (New York: Harper \& Row, 1971), p. 135.
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{89}Unfortunate it was, in the writer's considered judgment, but hardly unexpected, considering that the work is attributed to an occasional committee of forty-two. Perhaps one should be grateful that the taxonomy did not emerge from committee carved into forty-two domains.
\end{quote}
propositional cognitive context but also comprising a disposition to affective behavior. Of these, value beliefs and attitudes are most obviously to be considered cognitive-affective hybrids.

To force all consideration of beliefs to be contained within the mold of the affective domain, as is done in the taxonomy, is to jeopardize understanding of the process of accepting, ordering and supporting beliefs. This process is a matter of central importance in the pursuit of the traditionally idealized conception of education, not to be confused with the information brokering that many contemporaries designate as education. It can plausibly be argued that education thus conceived has more to do with belief than with knowledge. 90

90To summarize the argument rather sparingly, belief is the antecedent state and necessary condition of knowledge. If the reliability of the knowledge conveyed to students is to be confirmed and appreciated rather than be accepted abjectly on the authority of the presenter, the educational process will be marked by the constant accumulation of evidential support for a continuing series of beliefs, some of which eventually may achieve verification.

In this traditional view of education the student not only acquires knowledge from others, he acquires the means to produce his own knowledge and to test his beliefs as worthy of his acceptance. In Bertrand Russell's definition, "the rational [educated] man is one who always proportions the degree of intensity with which he holds his various beliefs to the amount of evidence available to each belief." Bertrand Russell, as quoted in D. J. O'Connor, An Introduction To The Philosophy of Education (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), p. 27.
In view of the reasons produced above in refutation of the first assumption, the validity of the second is moot: there can be no incidence of the impossible. If the statements were to be interpreted as referring to an *abstractive* split, both assumptions would be reduced to triviality. Anything that is analyzed is subject to such "splits", without undergoing any corresponding ontological change.

Concerning the third assumption, there is no denying that cognitive development has been stressed in public education, in official word if not in common deed. It is difficult to see how such an emphasis could responsibly be neglected, given the expectations of parents that their children be prepared for advantageous placement in society, and given the widespread prizing in society of cognitive skills and achievements as the usual price of admission to favored status and advancement.

Even if it were gratuitously conceded that cognitive development has been heavily stressed in actual classroom practice, and that affective development has thereby been neglected *in the conscious deliberation and intent* of educators, it does not necessarily follow that affective development has been neglected *in fact*. The subtlety and intricacy of cognitive-affective linkage in human expression and perception is such that most
teachers\textsuperscript{91} are unaware of the affective stimulation, direction and reinforcement which emanates from even the most rigorously "cognitive" instruction. Distracted by other worthy concerns, the teacher cannot possibly avert to affective signals subliminally transmitted in countless symbolic constructions of verbal language and in the ineffable nuances of "body language". In addition to responding to affective cues, each student in a given classroom situation is capable of generating associations and affective experiences peculiar to himself.

If one reflects on the vastness and complexity of the uncharted world of affective transactions, the rudimentary state of our orderly investigation of that world, and the extraordinary effort and array of competencies required of the practitioners of these infant sciences, one might suspect that the ordinary teacher does well to neglect deliberately managed affective development. Concentrating attention on complex operations which normally are exercised without conscious direction can induce erratic behavior, or even paralysis. Perhaps the new breed of affective coaches should recall La Fontaine's centipede who was asked how he managed to keep all those

\begin{footnote}{\textup{91Excluding only the exceptional (and improbable) teacher who has achieved both theoretical and \textit{practical} mastery of Psycholinguistics and Semiotics.}}


feet under simultaneous control; after responding that
he didn't know but that he would think about it, the
centipede thought about it, only to discover that he
could no longer walk.

The mechanisms of affective influence incorporated
within ordinary language represent the condensation and
refinement of patterns extracted from the accumulated
learning experience of many generations. A teacher who
has command of the language knows a great deal about how
to use these mechanisms, even though he is unable to
articulate his knowledge; in Michael Polanyi's words,
"we can know more than we can tell."92 To exchange one's
reliance on this extensive store of tacit knowledge for
amateur ventures in affective manipulation is a move
which might be attractive and ego-bolstering for the
teacher, but extremely difficult to justify in terms of
educational benefit. The innovative systems of explicit
management of student affective experience cannot hope
to match the comprehensiveness and tested effectiveness of
the meta-system called language; moreover, the self-
conscious effort and refocusing of attention exerted by
practitioners of the new affective techniques are likely

92Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Garden
to contaminate, impede or extensively vitiate the normal unconscious exercise of the affective management skills already conferred through language.

All the debate concerning the amount of affective experience afforded the student and how far it falls short of someone's stipulation of sufficiency seems to ignore an elementary axiom: in order to judge the relative sufficiency of anything, one must have a clear standard of sufficiency, reliable means of measurement, and reliable means of identifying all instances of whatever is being measured. It appears that the affective development enthusiasts are lacking on all three counts.

What is more significant, quantitative discussions of this sort distract from serious consideration of the quality of a student's affective experience. The teacher who would wish to make such qualitative judgments of his own, i.e., without simply restating institutionally or culturally prescribed standards, would have need of critical skills and a critical framework within which to employ these skills, if he is to avoid arbitrary judgments of little use in either the student's or the teacher's

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93 Reluctance to employ such standards might be expected of the Humanistic Educator, considering that the movement increasingly maintains a posture of anti-establishment protest, most likely appropriated from the countercultural "refugees" who have taken shelter in its ranks.
development.

If it were to be accepted that the student's affective experiences should be explicitly managed in the interest of his development, then there is no escaping the need not only to encourage but more importantly to train the student to engage in critical reflective activity beyond his merely "having affective experiences". As Bernier and Williams would caution educators intent on providing their students with more opportunity for relevant, direct experience, "the unexamined experience regardless of its nature has little educational value."94

Humanistic Educators might be expected to protest that each individual is to be sole judge of the quality of his experiences. This laissez faire posture can only be regarded as fundamentally irresponsible: the teacher is not only evading but subverting his professional obligation to prepare the student for effective functioning in society. Whatever political and economic reshaping might be anticipated for society, the permanence and central importance of the most basic intercultural patterns may prudently be assumed. In abandoning the student to narcissistic preoccupation with his own

experiences, some Humanistic Educators reveal their desire to imagine away any sort of cultural standard or constraint. In the context of the public school, however, the teacher, whatever his persuasion, incurs the obligation of assisting in the student's acculturation.\(^{95}\)

In terms of affective education, acculturation can be served by teaching the student how to appreciate, order and express his affective experiences in reference to

\(^{95}\)The mention of acculturation through schooling invites protests from some circles that our cultural pluralism makes simple acculturation impossible; further, that acculturation in the service of the dominant sub-culture perpetuates the injustice of the hegemonic arrangement and affronts minority subcultures. The writer is in agreement with the reasoning (though not with all the rhetoric) favoring the cultivation in public schooling of a responsiveness to the varying standards honored within the particular assemblage of subcultures represented in a local constituency.

In the text above it is suggested that the teacher refer his evaluations to intercultural standards, i.e., those which are common to the plurality. It is anticipated that the number of such standards may be adequate for most classroom situations. However, a teacher with a penchant for involvement in the controversial will not find intercultural standards adequate to his needs. In this event, one may present several alternative standards without personal evaluative comment.

Much of the awkwardness of multi-cultural referencing can be avoided by presenting not standards, but cultural products within which the standards are implicitly contained. Not only is the possibility of personal bias in formulating standards circumvented, but the students also can be initiated in the process of explication, a desirable skill in its own right.
cultural standards introduced by the teacher. It is to be hoped that pre-formulated standards would not be "preached at" the student; these would more appropriately be conveyed through exposure to the pancultural legacy contained in literature, history and other products of human art, classical as well as contemporary, which testify to the richness of human reflective experience and its remarkable consistency throughout centuries of change:

Although it sounds paradoxical, one learns to express one's emotions by learning to describe not oneself but the world and its objects from different points of view, as worthy of despair, love, nostalgia, etc.

In consequence of what is set forth above concerning the first three assumptions, the fourth can be dismissed as pointless, in that it is constructed upon a concern to remedy a defect whose existence cannot be substantiated. To summarize earlier criticism, the compensatory affective development programs being promoted in Humanistic Education are inadvisable and, as presently conducted, unjustifiable in public education. This judgment is made, not so much in recognition of the reactionary overemphasis of affect, but rather in recognition that the affective programs are radically

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uninformed and directionless, lacking either a respectable conceptual base, or unanimity concerning goals and criteria, or techniques of tested reliability. 97

What is practiced in the name of affective education quite often resembles a naive form of affective tinkering. The aspect which elicits the most serious reservations is that practitioners of affective education have little control over the outcome of their tactics; neither can they show success in predicting outcomes, or in neutralizing or ameliorating unexpectedly undesirable outcomes.

There is no outward indication that anyone in Humanistic Education is considering the possible long-term social consequences of such programs, should they be installed extensively in public schooling. Michael Apple identifies the danger of bringing intimate dispositions and personal meanings under the purview of public institutions. The future possibility is that the schools will gradually extend their custodial functions to hitherto inviolable sectors of the human personality. In

97 "There do not appear to be either clearly formulated programs for action or a well-developed rationale for the kinds of feelings to be nurtured. ...It is this ambiguity and seeming simplicity that attract many unqualified persons to affective education. Such individuals may ultimately do more psychological harm than good." Morris and Pai, op. cit., p. 398.
this eventuality, warns Apple, "Public behavior replaces private meaning." 98

As for the promised achievement of the confluence of affect and cognition, there is reason to regard confluence as a brilliantly conceived, motivationally powerful slogan word, rather than as an educational end-in-view. There is a manifest affinity between the zealous pursuit of confluent education and the unrelenting quest for utter psychosomatic integration in gestalt therapy and its satellite cultic groups. The phobia most in vogue at present is that of being fragmented in some unspecified way in consequence of one's struggles to cope with the complexities of society. In this apocopated logic, fragmented societies eventually produce fragmented people. Given the popularity of this belief, it comes as no surprise that anything described as confluent, integrated, holistic, etc., should gain easy entry to the contemporary mind.

One courts absurdity in proclaiming confluence to be an achievement of note, an end to be attained with certainty only through the agency of Humanistic Education. As is suggested above in the analysis of the first assumption, confluence does not describe an achievement,

ordinary or extraordinary; confluence describes the mode of mental activity which is a normal endowment of human beings, possessed without being sought, although like all aspects of mental functioning it is capable of cultivation and refinement. The pre-schooler cannot match the cognitive and affective development of the graduate student, but he has no need of being taught how to become confluent. As is observed above, some mental entities, notably value beliefs, are confluent in essence; they constitute a quasi-ontological argument for confluence as an original state of mind.

The effort that many now expend in paradoxically striving to reach the threshold of confluence might more profitably be redirected to the development of confluent skills, e.g., the ability to temper one's judgments with affect without obfuscating the dictates of reason; the ability to employ rational skills in channeling affective experience and expression to one's personal and social advantage, without distorting or diminishing one's capacity for a full and appreciative affective life. The simultaneous exercise of cognitive and affective faculties in a given operation is no accomplishment in itself. Prudent management of the active interface of cognition and affect in the service of one's social transactions is an accomplishment of some distinction, and a worthy goal
for any educational enterprise.

The analysis of affective development proposals offered above serves to exemplify at considerable length the manner on which any of the principles in the critical apparatus might be employed in assessment. The summary assessment of Humanistic Education programs in affective development, supported by the preceding analyses, is that these programs are conceptually spurious, inadequately developed, methodologically lax, and incapable of exercising responsible control over its outcomes. These judgments alone warrant their exclusion from public education until their failings are corrected, if this be possible. It is further shown that these programs lack a developed rationale to justify either their existence or their particular choice of strategies. The fragmentary rationale advertised by the programs is shown to be incompatible at a fundamental level with the aims to which public education is committed, in deference to the interests attributable to society at large, or at least to the major portion of that society.

14. The terminal values of Humanistic Education, in keeping with their nature as ideological self-reports, are sometimes most significant in their
silences and omissions. These values, even if they appear to be comprehensively formulated, should be measured against the critical observer's compendium of factors whose consideration is essential to the public educational enterprise in all its operations.

Viewed against this framework, many of the value formulations may be revealed as incomplete, i.e., as failing to account for major factors in their particular areas of concern. To the extent that these value formulations are inadequate to the realities of the educational process and of the social context, they must be judged incapable of functioning reliably and effectively in long-term motivation and orientation of public educational endeavor.

It is recommended with good reason that the critical observer assemble his own compendium of educational factors, drawing suggestions from any sources he wishes, but honoring his personal inclinations and sentiments in the final selection and arrangements of elements. Although a compendium thus constructed may not

98 Supra, pp. 220-222.
display the comprehensiveness and rigorous order of many checklists to be found in print, the advantages of this approach are considerable. The personal compendium is likely to be used more effectively because it is already conformed to the user's favored and familiar (and most developed) patterns of mental process, i.e., those he feels most comfortable and confident in pursuing. A compendium cast in personalized form is likely to be retained in memory entire, or it may be capable of being reconstructed easily. Unlike a borrowed compendium, which may need to be consulted repeatedly and reviewed for applicability section by section, a personal compilation is likely to remain continuously accessible as a whole, and is thus able to inform the observer's perceptions as well as his formal efforts of assessment.

At first reading, value 10.D. may appear to deal adequately with notably influential circumstances attending the learning experience. "The creation of personal meaning" is not troublesome; anyone reflecting on his own educational experiences can agree that something newly learned becomes significant and fully accessible to the learner only when it is personalized, or brought into mutually influential association with other things he already values and holds securely, i.e., things which are already personally meaningful.
Neither is there any quarrel with the notion that personal meaning is most readily acquired in an interpersonal setting. As an inescapably social animal, Man cannot escape his socially conditioned perceptions and responses, nor his manifold dependencies on others, even if he should manage a permanent escape from their company. In appreciation of this phenomenon, one may say that all learning is social learning at its fundament.

The inadequacy of the formulation is to be located in its neglect of the society found outside the school environment, supposedly on the premise that the microcosm of the classroom community is substantially representative of the social macrocosm. Such a premise might conceivably be defended if applied to the sort of classroom which Humanistic Education writers condemn as replicating the technocratic, managerial, competitive, repressive vices of the society they propose to restore some day to romantic integrity.

The classroom environments created by and for the pursuit of Humanistic Education may justifiably receive a number of positive characterizations (e.g., stimulating, tolerant, flexible), but representative is not one of them; a representative classroom is by the movement's standards a conspicuous proof of failure. Humanistic Education settings, like those of the group therapy and encounter
systems from which many of its trappings are derived, are intended to be highly artificial, isolated environments, each an emotionally charged, intensely protective atmosphere in which all mechanisms of control are concealed and the managerial acts of the leader are disguised as mere ventilation of personal feelings, or as impromptu hunches and semi-serious suggestions, or as invitations to engage in democratic process. The control exerted by the leader is nevertheless quite likely to be securely and extensively applied.99

99This evaluative description of artificially protective settings is supported by the writer's personal experience, both in observing group sessions conducted by a number of different therapists and in conducting his own group experiences. A veil of professional secrecy is usually drawn over the therapist's artful concealment of control; the typical therapist would probably evade direct questioning by calling himself "just one of a group of equals, who every once in a while happens to function as a permissive facilitator." Public denials notwithstanding, achieving invisibility of control is a highly skilled, complex endeavor, which most therapists in training master only with prolonged effort. The expedient deceits of therapists come to mind whenever Humanistic Educators insist that they be known henceforth as facilitators, co-learners, and members of the learning community.

It seems significant also to note that a problem much discussed among therapists is that of helping the participant to cope with "re-entry into the real world." Whatever their other deceptions, therapists at least are able to acknowledge the artificiality and isolation of their created environments, and the difficulty of transplanting one's sheltered accomplishments into the harsh, demanding context of the "real world." If Humanistic Educators make similar acknowledgments, this writer has yet to discover them.
The difficulty presented by the maintenance of an artificially supportive community is that the educators in charge shirk their mandate to advance the socialization of their students. The individual's hothouse "accomplishments" and gratifications may not survive the trip home, much less prove to be viable and functional when schooling is completed and society is confronted full face. Even if the effects of these experiences should be more durable the Humanistic Educator would not have disposed the student to be "weaned away" from his sheltered learning at the time of his entry into a competitive society not especially disposed to make things easy for him.

To select a second example, value 10.E. is burdened by a similar deficiency in its enumeration of the three basic personal needs: self-identity, potency and positive affiliation. It should be asserted from the start that the validity and significance of identifying these three traits as basic needs is not to be challenged, but reinforced. Humanistic Educators have made a noteworthy contribution to the profession through their efforts to thrust these neglected areas of development into the collective awareness of educators.

The "traditional" educator may still be unwilling to hazard any confrontation with areas of student
personality which he (and most of his colleagues) persist in labeling too "intimate", too "mysterious" and too "sensitive" for anyone but a veteran psychologist to invade with confidence. Perhaps this reluctance, which Humanistic Educators are inclined to deride as either baseless fear or incompetence, owes more to wisdom than it does to timidity. It is conceivable that these educators are fully appreciative of the value of meeting these needs, but that they are equally aware of the high stakes (including the possibility of inflicting irreparable trauma) attending the slightest misstep.

It seems that in this regard the "traditional" educator may find himself in a situation evoking both wonderment and dread, not unlike that of the proverbial eskimo accepting delivery of his new refrigerator: he senses through some faint presentiment of potential value that he is now in possession of a Good Thing of some sort, although it may take him quite a long time to figure out what to do with it; in the meantime he does a lot of cautious admiring from a safe distance.

The difficulty arises from the preoccupation with self which is at once the glory and the endemic disease of the movement. Caught up in the heady concentration (and, necessarily, the intensification) of attention which ideologies encourage in order to maintain orthodoxy,
Humanistic Educators emerge from their ideological collaborations in a psychic state analogous to the intoxication of teenagers: everything is beautiful; everything is simple; everything is going to be just fine; and why doesn't everyone else know that? Heightened ideological consciousness has much in common with Pollyannaism.

The three needs in question, if regarded in such a beneficent light, will genuinely be regarded as an ultimate statement, consummately refined, efficacious, and all-sufficient, i.e., exhausting all possibilities.

One risks very little in being indulgently tolerant of the emotive excesses of these particular ideologues. Even the most eminent and serene statesmen, for example, have been known to succumb to the manipulation of collectively exerted emotion while under the roofs of their fraternal organizations. What is more to the point, no harm of any import is done to education by enthusiastic participation in the Dionysian rites of Humanistic Education, at least not by the enthusiasm qua enthusiasm.

The educational claims which might be made in the heat of enthusiasm, however, are quite another matter. These are to be weighed and scrutinized for their possible introduction of good or ill effect, like educational
claims from any other source. If the claims should emanate from an ideology, the most prudent course of exploration is to presuppose delusions of adequacy until the contrary is proved.

There are a good many personal needs listed in the compilations of psychological texts beyond the three presented above, although many of the "additional" needs may simply be formulations constructed on a different conceptual base and possibly reducible to one or more of the three in question. The "problem" of bringing such lists into concordance appears to be an exclusively taxonomic issue and task, which need not burden the present discussion.

What is of concern is the omission from 10.E. of any socially-referenced personal needs apart from "positive affiliation" which concerns the individual's participation in a modicum of selected collectivities among the many instances to be found of these smallest sub-units of society. No recognition is indicated of the student's need to be socialized on a larger scale,\footnote{Socialization on any scale poses considerable difficulty for humanistic education, as Inglis observes: "because there is no set subject area...it is impossible to specify a given intellectual identity and the process of socialization which goes with it." Fred Inglis, \textit{Ideology and the Imagination} (Cambridge: The University Press, 1975), p. 208.}
especially in a world made effectively smaller through the instrumentality of contemporary modes of communication and transportation. No mention is made, in deference to a nationwide system of public education, of the need for politicization, i.e., for initiating the student into responsible citizenship by developing appropriate practical and critical skills, enlightened by a wide-ranging sense of history and enlivened by a familiarity with the myriad possibilities inherent in our basic governmental system and yet to be realized.

These failings to respond seriously to the larger social obligations and opportunities offer still another indication of how thoroughly Humanistic Education has spun itself into an insulating cocoon of narcissistic personalism.101 This reluctance to come to terms with the entire social context may also suggest to some observers that Humanistic Education's utopian streak is evolving into a more aggressive form. Once the vision of

101"People [humanists] so concentrate on the "I", and so concentrate on the self as the fundamental and final judge, that they lose sight of the fact that we live in a social world, that we have obligations to others,... and that we must be held accountable for our own personal behavior." Ira J. Gordon, "What Is Success?" in I. David Welch, Fred Richards and Anne Cohen Richards (eds.) Educational Accountability: A Humanistic Perspective (Fort Collins, Colorado: Shields Publishing Co., n.d.), p. 208.
the "perfect" or "appropriate" society seizes the ideological imagination with sufficient force to color all perception, it is understandable that interest in social participation, never a strong point in revolutionary ideologies, should dwindle sharply. It makes no sense, after all, to waste effort in building up or trying to modify a social structure which is shortly -- and suddenly -- going to be replaced with something more to your liking.

15. An uncompromisingly utopian element is rising to prominence within the ideological perspective of Humanistic Education; it may prudently be assumed, therefore, that ideological perception and expression within the movement will increasingly come under the influence of its rigorous mandate to "settle for nothing less than the future as we have designed it."

The progressive exertion of the control of utopian elements appears to be not only an irreversible process, but one repeated with fair uniformity throughout history.

Once the commonly exhibited features of this process are extracted, these elements can be organized into reasonably reliable predictions
concerning the future course of ideological development.

The investigator of Humanistic Education is thus enabled to frame his observations and speculations against the movement's probable "future scenario":

A). As the future orientation of the movement intensifies, its adherents will display less and less willingness to acknowledge present realities, to deal with present external problems and obligations, or to honor presently observed social conventions.

B). The urgency presently animating the movement will gradually give way to impatience, manifested through increases in organizational laxity, in the incidence of disruptively extravagant claims and public behavior, and in the turbulence of inter-faction conflict, possibly leading to fragmentation and regrouping.

C). The present disinclination to make any significant compromise with "traditional" education will develop into a posture of unapproachable, intractable superiority. As adherents continue to succumb to the conviction that "victory is
almost in our grasp", the identified leaders may consider it undignified even to engage in dialogue with the opposition.

16. The hypothesis offered below, to judge from the manner of its origin, is conjectural. It is presented for use, not as a guiding principle but as a heuristic device, perhaps of more interest than a great many others, and possibly capable of stimulating fresh approaches in exploration.

The future scenario in the previous guideline is constructed on the premise that not all in the movement will be content to move with the slow tide of accelerating intensity and boldness in order that the ideologue -- or, more likely, the ideologue's descendants -- might at length be ushered into a comfortable future. However, even the most rudimentary knowledge of human differences supports the notion that gradualism will not appease all parties, and may even aggravate the impatience of some. Since a grand revolutionary coup is beyond their capacities, the impatient few, it is hypothesized, consciously devise (or unconsciously
generate) an alternative strategy which offers the added advantage of immediate gratification. The ideologues take immediate refuge in a projected future, i.e., from a purely epistemological point of view, some Humanistic Educators are already living in the future.

The predictions contained in the "future scenario" are predicated on the re-emergence of elements common to similarly oriented ideologies in the past. The common elements are distilled from the writer's historical survey of ideological movements which could be characterized as strongly utopian in emphasis.

As some ideologies begin to develop that forward-looking single mindedness and ferocity of resolve which characterize the utopian rush to the perfect future, a certain social obstinacy and peevishness comes to complicate the ordinary ideological blindness. Perhaps the ideologue chooses this means to draw attention to the nobility of his cause and the urgency of his need. Whatever the motive may be, the fact is that, in addition to those ideologically troublesome phenomena which the ideologue is conditioned not to notice, there is now an occasional phenomenon which the ideologue, from all indications, does notice, but whose reality or accuracy
he stoutly denies before certain audiences.

The refusal to acknowledge the character of certain realities might also be a mechanism of contempt, signalling the ideologue's judgment that a particular state of affairs no longer merits continued existence. If, as Scriven and Scriven comment, Humanistic Educators will not recognize the reality of American society\(^{102}\) (at least not to outsiders), this may occur because any description of that society's principal characteristics will include in its list the antithesis of each of the major emphases and efforts cherished by the movement. According to this conjecture, the Humanistic Educator cannot bear to be reminded so often that "virtue" is still so far from triumph, while "vice" flourishes on all sides.

Still another hypothesis may be advanced in explanation of ideological behaviour in a time of utopian dominance. The most plausible explanation may be that ideologues respond to the impetus of future-dominated thought by taking refuge from the hostile environments they are anxious to change, eventually establishing a vicarious residence in the future world whose landscape is

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already so familiar to them through years of elaborate projection in their private and communal fantasies. Epistemologically speaking one could say that certain precursors of the movement, by virtue of either the brute force of impatience or the placidity of utter commitment, are already living in the future.

It would appear that these standarized conceptions of the future, whether or not they are also summoned forth in times of undistracted solitude, are most commonly projected onto (i.e., superimposed upon) their counterparts in the world of the present. Thus, to pursue the hypothesis, the reason why the humanistic educator ignores present reality is that his attention is more favorably occupied. If the present reality is regarded as unworthy of his concern, it has only received treatment appropriate to its function as a projection screen.

Other indications can be produced that some have already divested themselves of old (i.e., present) manners and expectations, especially old rules of behavior. In the new world of the humanistic future, one might surmise, there are no longer any preferential judgments and barriers based on the array and state of development of one's competencies. Anyone can do anything in this future, or at least will have the freedom to make his best attempt. Paul Nash's description of recent
Humanistic Education history raises the question of whether future-stimulated expectations were being imposed upon contemporary educational situations:

There also arose a new amateurism, with skepticism about professional expertise, questioning of professional exclusions, and breaking down of disciplinary boundaries.103

The obvious problem to be encountered in the confidently pursued ventures of ideologically motivated amateurs is that all the trappings of that future world, which provide support and meaning for the ideologue, simply do not exist for the rest of us, who must inhabit the present world and endure the present effects of amateurism and other such escapades. In other words, ideological projection, unlike ordinary fantasizing, would not so often be harmless private preoccupation as it would be a publicly exercised preoccupation easily escalated into a public prank.

If the old reality has already, for all practical purposes, come to an end for these ideologues, then there is no need for them to feel bound by its proprieties. In the world of education it is commonly understood and accepted that changes in the educational environment are

to be treated as givens, the inevitable consequences of larger social changes; whenever such changes occur it can be expected that the teachers assigned to these places would fulfill their professional obligations to adapt themselves -- and make necessary adjustments in training, priorities, outside activities, etc. -- so as to be suited to the new setting.

According to the hypothesis, the world of education described above has already winked out of existence for the future-inhabiting ideologue, who will have substituted a new, ideologically simplified educational world whose arrangements are sure to be more convenient to the ideologue's preferences. If not projection than some sort of mental protective mechanism must be employed by the Humanistic Educators who are already well known for their supremely confident, neat inversions of the unwritten educational code. The Humanistic Educator who arrives on a particular educational scene is quite likely to demand that the professional environment be reconstructed in accord with his particular competencies and preferences.

In similar expedient maneuvers, Humanistic Educators seem to have blanked out the old world in which education means accountability, accountability means
evaluation, and evaluation means standards to be applied to all. In place of these stabilities, the Humanistic Educators project a future arrangement in which the certified elite may not only be exempted from the indignities of comparison with others, but also may devise -- and keep on devising -- "humane", "flexible" standards congruent with their personal achievements of flexibility and humaneness.

The comments of some writers considering this last phenomenon barely manage to veil their scepticism and contempt in polite language. Primack, for example, warns the Humanistic Educators "not to so worship the spontaneous and the notion of equality that they abandon all reasonable levels of assured competence."104 Broudy, acting in mock seriousness as the spokesman of the Humanistic Educators writes, "to extend this freedom to their students, "good " schools must be free from the mores of the bad establishments and from the restrictions of academic requirements."105

The hypothesis of "living in the future", it


105 Broudy, op. cit., p. 75.
should be noted, is supported neither by evidence nor by discovery of the means by which evidence might ultimately be acquired. It is not presented here for anyone's hasty acceptance; the intent is rather to test its efficacy as a heuristic device. Heuristic devices, it is recalled, need not be true in order to function effectively in organizing thought and stimulating the generation of new points of view.

17. Humanistic Education is not yet able to show that it is capable of sharing large areas of common interest and value with public education. The discrepancy between the two is illustrated by the fact that Humanistic Education terminal values are quite frequently pursued in deliberate isolation, without providing indication of an intent to promote, study, or even to recognize the needs of society at large.

18. Taken as a whole, the terminal values of Humanistic Education constitute not only a new conception of education, but also a radically new conception of humanity and society. The intended effect of pursuing Humanistic Education is not
limited to revolutionizing public schooling; it extends also to revolutionizing the cultural standards of society. Accordingly, Humanistic Education should be considered closer to social revolution than it is to educational reform. Despite the ambitious scope of its revolutionary ambitions, the radical remaking of education retains central importance in the priorities and values of Humanistic Education; whatever other revolutionary promptings it cultivates in the larger society -- and there are many thus cultivated -- are undertaken in anticipation of facilitating the growth and increased prestige of the movement.

The above guidelines are constructed as summary statements whose central messages are not only constructed from, but rationally supported by, conclusions extracted from the entire section. Since each of the conclusions employed is supported in its proper place in the text, there is no need to reiterate their collected supporting arguments.

The general import of the assessment emerging from the demonstration of the above portion of the apparatus is that the incompatibility of Humanistic Education with
public schooling is profound. If the reference of one's judgment is confined to the established value commitments generally honored in public education, then little can be reported that is positive or even neutral in Humanistic Education. The conflicts are radical; they run deep, and appear to flow from the essential, assumedly permanent features of either system. Should Humanistic Education succeed in its efforts to "reform" public schooling, it will, more accurately speaking, have supplanted public schooling, while effecting major transformations in the ethos and institutional arrangements of American society.

4. GUIDELINES FOR ASSESSMENT OF INSTRUMENTAL VALUES IN HUMANISTIC EDUCATION.

The approach employed in constructing and presenting the guidelines of this final section of the apparatus differs in some ways from that employed in the previous section. Introduction of changes at this point represents an attempt to recognize fundamental differences between the functions of terminal and instrumental values in any educational endeavor, as well as to respect particular differences between the roles assigned to either set of values in the current pursuit of Humanistic Education. In the interest of clarity, some of the more cogent points of difference may be reviewed briefly.

Terminal values, as desirable end states, are
future possibilities not likely to remain in the consciousness of the ordinary educational practitioner unless the spokesmen of a particular ideational system do what is necessary to keep these values as alive in common awareness as if they were already accomplished, presently experienced realities.

The leaders of Humanistic Education, intent on guaranteeing the viability and accessibility of their terminal values, insert these propositions into public discussions and seek to strengthen consensus in their favor. In order to prevent dissipation of the movement's energies, they strive at regular intervals to fix their number. Above all, they attempt to approach standard formulations, concise and memorable, in order to enhance their ideological functioning.

Instrumental values stand in marked contrast to the above description. As desirable modes of behavior they emanate, not from the leadership, but from the multitude of practitioners in all their variety. In

106 More accurately, in the case of Humanistic Education they are perceived in the ideological mentality as future possibilities. In consideration of the internal contradictions already revealed above, the writer would be reluctant to concede that all their terminal values are presently possible to achieve, or that they can ever become possibilities in future circumstances. Time may heal all wounds; it cannot heal logical contradictions.
Humanistic Education a new instrumental value is likely to be born each time an individual trys out a new way of approaching one of the movement's terminal values. These values are not always explicitly stated, and may have no standard interpretation even when they are made explicit. As methodological, often ephemeral phenomena, instrumental values are characteristically not verbally articulated by the practitioner, much less disseminated throughout the movement. It is part of the movement's anti-intellectual mystique that one's primary statements are to be made by one's activity and non-verbal productions. In the individualistic climate of the movement, valued techniques, should they be shared with others, are easily transformed, i.e., recast to suit the personalities of the new practioners.

The number of these instrumental values is not fixed, and cannot conceivably be fixed in these circumstances, considering the inexhaustibility of human imagination and the movement's penchant for annexing the novelties and eccentricities of many fields. Given these conditions, there obviously can be no consensus; on the contrary, much of the tension between partisan subgroups in the movement seems to be generated by preferential differences concerning these values and their placement in the assignment of priorities.
In the light of the above observations it would be both pointless and misleading to attempt a comprehensive or representative listing of instrumental values, as is done with the values of the previous section. In acceptance of the fact that instrumental valuing is in constant flux within the movement, this portion of the apparatus is highly selective in its demonstration of particular applications. On the assumption that there are no truly "representative" instrumental values to be found, attention is given to those whose points of assessment are likely to be most instructive, and suggestive of the spirit prevailing the practical endeavors of the movement.

In other words, the guidance to be supplied in this area of assessment is designedly both minimal and generalized, serving not so much to prescribe modes of assessment as to suggest possibilities which might stimulate others to develop approaches suitably tailored to their particular circumstances.

It might be protested by many of considerable experience in educational evaluation that the format of the critical apparatus presupposes an unrealistic (i.e., generally unavailable) possession of resourcefulness, unconventional skills and broad interdisciplinary knowledge by the evaluator. It is not suggested, however, that a similar array of competencies should be required of
all evaluators in all their evaluation activity. It is only in consideration of the exceptional hazards of dealing with ideologies that exceptionally equipped evaluators are recommended. These hazards are amply documented throughout the study: one must resist the contagious emotional outpourings of ideologues and penetrate layers of linguistic mystification and cosmetic patterns of behavior in order to reveal the plain facts of educational intent and accomplishment. Given these complexities, it seems inconceivable that the fluctuating morass of Humanistic Education could be discriminatingly observed, ordered, and credibly assessed by one equipped only with conventional quantitative skills.

19. It is not uncommon for the Humanistic Educator to pursue a particular set of educational practices with consuming intensity, to the increasing exclusion of other activities. As the escalation progresses, the educator may become fully immersed in his enthusiasms, i.e., his "educational consciousness" appears to be fully occupied or dominated by attention given to the performance of his presently favored endeavors. It is the performance as such, rather than reflection on his activity or analysis of it, which so commands his
conscious attention. In the interest of maintaining reliable information, any educator giving indication of a similar preoccupation is to be assumed incapable of acknowledging educational priorities or of distinguishing educational ends and means. Identifications and descriptions of instrumental or terminal values offered by someone in these circumstances are to be summarily discounted.

20. The Humanistic Education claim to innovative leadership in the development of process education is impossible to accept at face value, considering that process education has been pursued on a limited basis for decades, and is fairly widely employed in recent years by "traditional" educators. It is to be assumed, rather, that the motive of the claim is contained within the hidden premise of process education. The questions to be raised are: What are the characteristics of the particular processes to be favored? What characteristics are to be fostered in students through participation in these processes? It is important
to distinguish, for example, between a process
education designed to foster socialization and a
process education designed to cultivate cultural
revolutionaries.

Although the obsessive syndrom described in
guideline 19 is by no means restricted to the Humanistic
sector of the educational community, the frequency of its
incidence in Humanistic Education has caused it to be
regarded as a commonplace occurrence, an "occupational
hazard" no longer meriting anyone's prolonged attention.
The particular susceptibility of Humanistic Educators may
possibly be explained in terms of the convergence and
mutual reinforcement of two already powerfully
emphasized beliefs in the ideological perspective.

Much attention is given in the movement to the
importance of process, specifically, that the student
should learn through his involvement in process rather
than by having pre-formulated content (traditional subject
matter) thrown at him for ingestion. Few educators, Dewey
least of all, would take exception with the basic

107 The phenomenon may be considered analogous to
the synergistic effects observed in Pharmacology, e.g.,
the addition of alcohol to barbiturates produces in the
individual a dangerous chemical "whole" which is far
greater than the sum of its parts.
preferability of process education over the sterility of
the (all but defunct) stereotype of "bookish" classroom
drilling. The points which seem to be so often missed
by Humanistic Educators in their blinding enthusiasm for
the ideals of process education are the following:

1. There are processes of all sorts, and many
of those exercised to good advantage in
education are not particularly spectacular,
novel, exhilarating, or daringly unconven-
tional; they do not especially remove inhibi-
tions, progress toward chaos, or require
prodigious expenditures of energy (and
additional school time for recuperation).

2. "Traditional" educators are already involving
their students in processes of the less
conspicuous sort, in the understanding that
high levels of educational stimulation can be
sustained without always generating a great
deal of group tension and dramatized behavior.

The inclination of some process enthusiasts is to
progress steadily toward the more gratifyingly obvious
(and thereby self-validating) forms of process, i.e.,
those which culminate in the exaggerated responses and
erratic behavior of induced hyperexcitation.
The second factor contributing to the preoccupation of the occasional Humanistic Educator is a belief, adopted from the Gestaltists, that "one should live in the here and now." This maxim is most commonly understood to be a reminder of the futility of rehashing the past and worrying about all the possible outcomes of the future; in this interpretation it is good counsel for any context. However, after the maxim is interpreted through the ideological filters of Humanistic Education, it emerges for some as a blunt mandate to narrow one's consciousness exclusively to the activities of the present moment. Although it is not possible to carry out this exclusion of past and future with any real thoroughness, the sustained attempt to do so is sure to impede deliberate reflection and the formative mechanisms of intentionality.

The combined, or rather, the synergistic effect of these two strongly held beliefs is, for some individuals, the obsessive state described above. There is, of course, no communicative access to the private world of the monomaniac. Being estranged from his own reflectivity, he may not be able to tell himself why he does what he does, much less report it to others. Activity seems to act as a narcotic: a little stimulates the desire for more; a considerable amount eventually
brings a short-lived satisfaction. To speculate on the basis of his patterns of behavior, the tenor of such an individual's thought is that what he is doing constitutes its own reason for being done; that the only thing of importance is to keep on with what he is doing. It should be clear that the concepts of "goal" and "method" have no place in a mental scheme of this sort, which is to say they can have no meaning that is useful to others in education.

21. Humanistic Education, in appealing to relevance as the standard to be respected in selecting subject matter and adjusting institutional arrangements, is exploiting an absurdity to its advantage. Relevance is not a standard, but a personal judgment in need of a standard. Rhetorical demands for (unspecified) relevance have the effect of reinforcing student reliance on immediate gratification.

If there were times when the ideological curtain parted momentarily, so that ideologues were permitted a access to their pre-ideological common sense, they might appreciate that everyone, including the most intractable educational administrator, wants relevance for himself, the catch being that relevance varies widely with one's
stage of development and social circumstance. In the past, educational disputes concerning relevance have been settled by a solomonic compromise, not completely agreeable, but at least enforceable: in matters of educational importance the teachers' view of relevance prevailed; in any other matter (like the location of the class picnic) the students could determine relevance for themselves.

Even if this approach was rigorous, it was nonetheless wise. Its wisdom is grounded in an appreciation of the features of human development. In progressing through the stages of his development, no human can anticipate his future experiences. The values and outlooks of unattained later stages are inaccessible and mysterious: the six year old, supremely content with his toy gun, cannot begin to understand why his sixteen year old brother prefers girls to toy guns. Students cannot value beyond their developmental stage; they cannot possibly appreciate the relevance of things which are to be accomplished, refined and usefully employed several stages hence. Accordingly, the future-referenced relevance must be supplied by someone more advanced in his development. Even though the student cannot, strictly speaking, value this imposed relevance, he can honor the assignment of value by authority. The
alternative is to abandon the educational enterprise as responsibly guided development.

None of these concerns with guided development appear to enter into the thoughts of Humanistic Educators clamoring for student-defined relevance. Steward Shapiro, for example, lists the following passage as one of the nine essential features of confluent education:

Subject matter which is closely related to the significant personal needs and feelings of the students. The major criterion for inclusion of any subject is the extent to which children (students) can come to feel significantly related to it. (italics added for emphasis)

In dealing with Shapiro's criterion of significant relationship (or relevance) as felt by students, one has a choice of interpretations: either that the children can eventually come to feel its relevance, or that they can immediately come to feel it. If the interpretation of eventual relevance is that intended by the author, then Shapiro is in this matter fraternizing with the "traditional" enemy. Eventual relevance can only be a future projection, and only the teacher or parent can make that projection with intelligence and respect for personal needs and traits of which the student has little or no

awareness at present.

If immediate relevance is to be the interpretation, then Shapiro speaks for the movement: the student at any age is to be supplied with just enough relevance to quiet his expressed demands. If there should be other wants he cannot quite express, or even identify to himself, no matter; it will all come out in the long run. If each of a student's relevances over the years is not constructed upon and supported by the previous relevances, it they do not all hang together or point in any promising direction, this also is no misfortune. Perhaps the society he enters is ready to abandon its worship of competition and success.

Without speculating further concerning the dire future consequences of the rule of student-refined relevance, one can clearly identify the immediate consequence of such an approach: the reinforcement of student expectations of immediate gratification. The growth of this phenomenon has already been charted and viewed with alarm as a trait which may incapacitate students when they are forced to cope with the realities of a society which bestows its rewards only after certain conditions have been met, many of them time-consuming. Anyone who is unable to defer gratification, or to get anything done while waiting for gratification, can hardly
be said to be prepared for responsible participation in society. The children of our affluent society arrive at the classroom already conditioned by a reward system offering immediate gratification. Yielding to their every demand in the name of relevancy could only intensify their plight.

22. Of all the means considered for enhancing the teaching-learning relationship, the proposal most highly favored in humanistic education is that the role of teacher should be redefined. The teacher, to be known thereafter as a facilitator, would no longer wield authority, but would function as a co-learner, a model participant in the community of learners.

A). If the role redefinition is to be nothing more than the adoption of new euphemisms to distract attention from the use of newly concealed mechanisms of control, then the teaching-learning relationship is not enhanced, but jeopardized by the addition of elaborate structures of deception.

B). If the role redéfinition is seriously anticipated, these anticipations are naive and perhaps impossible to achieve, in that they ignore the nature and function of roles in society.
C). Even if the previous difficulty were removed, it is difficult to see how the teacher could maintain credibility in his new role, i.e., how he could avoid the necessity of faking his activities and the risk of being caught in his fakery.

The principles involved in observation A). have already been explicated under guideline 14 of the previous section, to which the reader is referred.\(^{109}\) If this first possibility should be the course of action eventually taken by the movement, such a move would be impossible to justify in terms of Humanistic Education's own self-proclaimed codes. If the control allegedly wielded by technocrats over others in society is a moral outrage to be subverted by the best efforts of the movement, no less a condemnation -- and similar subversive attempts -- are in order if control is still being exerted in the classroom after the name change. If control over others is to be considered intrinsically evil, then it is evil in any situation. Neither can the change be evaded by contriving a virtual invisibility of control. Technocrats were even more vehemently condemned by the movement for failing to advertise their control mechanisms.

\(^{109}\)Supra, p. 266n.
The misgivings expressed in observation B) reflect appreciation of an elementary sociological principle apparently forgotten or expediently ignored by Humanistic Educators. To paraphrase this principle, roles are by nature relational entities, i.e., they are constituted by the sum of mutual relationships which develop in all directions among a set of social locations, binding them together in a mutually maintained network of dependencies, demands, permissions, expectations, conventions of language and definitions of acceptable behavior. Each role is pursued within the limits imposed by one's role-opposites, i.e., all other roles included in the interdependency of the relational web.

Since roles are considerably more than assumed titles or behavioral postures maintained in order to make a "good appearance" in society, neither can the alteration of roles be simply accomplished. Roles cannot be changed by sheer intensity of desire for change, by public proclamation, nor by any unilateral action. It is only with the consent or tolerance of all the role opposites that roles are changed, and even then within the new limits set by the redefined relationships.

The Humanistic Education proposal ignores the social reality of the interdependency of roles. The contemplated shift could not be accomplished by fiat.
Administrators, students and parents would exert the discretionary power in any change, rather than those in the movement most eagerly seeking the change. Parents, for example, might like to have their children exposed to visibly exercised authority. The change process could not in such circumstances be simply accomplished.

It is possible that those who originally conceived of the role change were led either by ignorance or confusion to take as their model the dramatic role, which actors may switch and interpret and alter with relative freedom, having only the audience's reactions to take into account.

Even if the role transformation were accomplished, the new classroom situation, presumably divested of authority and other undesirable things, would present some fresh difficulties for the facilitator, as anticipated in observation C). Humanistic Education writers seem to be agreed -- and to be entirely serious -- in their references to the facilitator as a co-learner in the learning community. In order to present the students with a concrete model of learning, the facilitator is to participate in learning activity which is simultaneous with the student's activity and which is directed to the same subject matter.

Any teacher will agree that a considerable amount
of learning continues to take place by virtue of engaging in teaching. The learning reported in these cases, however, seems to differ substantially from the proposed ideal of co-learning. While it is true that the first few months (or even years) of teaching will result in a gradual refinement of the teacher's understanding of the subject matter also being learned by the student, the area of learning soon shifts away from the subject matter. The teacher is then learning a great deal about the individual students, as well as sharpening his predictive knowledge of human nature. Although teacher and student are learning together, they are learning different things. Moreover, it seems that the teacher is enabled to achieve much of his learning through situations effected by invoking the authority and controlling power invested in his role.

To return to the hypothetical facilitator who is eager to provide his students with a sincere, credible model of co-learning, it may be conceded that the resourceful person will find something new to learn, or a new way to learn, in subject matter presenting some interest and complexity to an adult. The question cannot be avoided, however, of how co-learning is possibly to be accomplished in teaching the basics. By means of what psychic convulsions is one rendered illiterate in order
to co-learn to read? Or how are the multiplication tables to be unlearned in order to preserve one's sincerity in the community of learners?

There appears to be no way that the co-learning facilitator can avoid dissembling in the observance of duty. It is naive, and contrary to commonly reported classroom experience, to imagine that even the youngest children will remain unaware of such fakery, especially when the performances are regularly scheduled. The framers of this learning scheme cannot be faulted in stressing the facilitator's function as a model of learning; there is general agreement in psychology concerning the inevitability of modeling behavior and its formative influence over long periods of an individual's development.

With so much at stake in terms of the course of student development, however, it seems opportune to raise the crucial issue concerning the facilitator as model: which model will the students perceive and emulate, that of the earnest companion in learning, or that of the artful hypocrite who will go to any lengths to ingratiate himself with others?
5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

The present study is ventured in the hope of satisfying a heretofore unmet need for foundational research in educational ideologies. The outcomes of Humanistic Education programs are presently being measured against those of more "traditional" programs. One has good reason, however, to question the wisdom of undertaking empirical studies before the conceptual groundwork is laid, and to challenge the reliability of empirical findings which are not guided by adequate foundational study.

It would seem that an appreciation of the complexities and unique characteristics of ideological phenomena is needed if the educational researcher's observation of an ideological movement like Humanistic Education is to be an informed observation. Those features of educational thought and practice which are significant in an ideological context are not likely to be obvious to the observer who is ignorant of the nature and function of ideology, or who does not recognize that he is dealing with an ideological movement.

The portrayal of Humanistic Education ideology offered above is extracted from the literature of the movement. It is conceded that all the classroom practices which may be labeled as "humanistic education" need not
conform to the claims of Humanistic Education literature. Particular features of Humanistic Education are sometimes judged on their own merits by educators, who incorporate these features within their educational programs without accepting the ideological perspective and program of the movement.

Humanistic Education as practiced by the committed ideologue, however, allows for no such selectivity. The ideologue's commitment necessarily extends to the totality of the ideological perspective and program. The classroom practices of the ideologically committed Humanistic Educator not merely are influenced, but rather are determined by the values stipulated within the literature of the movement. An attempt is made in the study to lay bare the value structure of Humanistic Education literature, on the understanding that these value stipulations operate as behavioral determinants within the sphere of ideological commitment. It is the prior task of the evaluator to determine whether or not a particular education program falls within this sphere of ideological commitment.

The observer who is unable to ascertain whether he is dealing with nothing more than a few elements which have been borrowed from Humanistic Education or with a
program whose design is determined by commitment to the movement may employ the Inventory of Ideological Characteristics offered in Chapter Four to guide his judgment. If the character of the program should thereby be identified as ideological, the careful observer may choose to take the principles of the Critical Apparatus into account in framing his assessment of the program.

It is not the writer's intent to discredit the Humanistic Education movement per se, or to disparage the motives of Humanistic Educators, who are defined as sincere believers by virtue of their ideological commitment. Certainly the broad ideal of humanistic development is cherished by most, if not by all educators, although many would challenge the ideologue's conviction that such an ideal is so readily approached. From the "traditional" point of view, humanistic teaching represents a rare achievement, accomplished only when the teacher integrates significant learning from a great many cultural sources, becoming in effect a microcosm of collected human accomplishment and wisdom. According to this conception, humanistic educators cannot be constituted merely by personal authenticity and intensity of conviction.

The demonstrated application of the Critical Apparatus raises serious questions concerning the
problems confronted by and posed by Humanistic Education in the context of public schooling. The vagueness and ambiguity of the language of Humanistic Educators and the naïveté of many of their claims present difficulties in determining whether academic standards are being honored, evaded or subverted. The characteristic enthusiasm with which Humanistic Educators approach their tasks may claim more attention than their performance in predicting or evaluating student outcomes. Accountability may not easily be exercised when strong emphasis is placed on idiosyncratic development.

Perhaps the greatest disadvantage to be encountered in committing oneself to an ideological movement in education is the restriction of personal inquiry and forms of expression. The enforced categories and behavioral rules which characterize ideologically motivated behavior are not likely to be perceived as restrictive by the ideologue, whose everyday information processing and decision making is facilitated by acceptance of the ideological framework. The ideologue may report himself to be experiencing a broadening of his imaginative horizons and of his capacity for creative expression. However these claims are to be regarded, it is clear that the ideologue abdicates much of his responsibility for critical judgment in the act
of forming his commitment. This trait must be regarded as disadvantageous in the context of public schooling as a rationally guided educational enterprise.
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