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THE IROQUOIS RESTORATION: A STUDY OF IROQUOIS
POWER, POLITICS, AND RELATIONS WITH
INDIANS AND WHITES, 1700-1744

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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1977

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Introduction

While a student at Bowling Green State University in 1968, I read Francis Parkman's fascinating book, *The Jesuits in North America*. Parkman's historical narrative of the Iroquois' seventeenth-century wars against the Hurons and Eries presented a vivid, if not always accurate, picture of the Iroquois at the height of their power. Yet, Parkman's work left me unsatisfied, for he never explained fully what had happened to the Iroquois after 1700. Later historians have dealt mainly with the Iroquois of the mid-eighteenth century and have attributed the Confederacy's demise to the expulsion of the French from North America in 1763. Yet, they, like Parkman, neglected an important question, namely, what were the Iroquois doing between 1700 and 1750?

This study is my attempt to solve that puzzle. I hope to show that Iroquois power was at its nadir after King William's War and that after 1700 the Iroquois nations of New York devised and implemented a series of programs aimed at restoring the power and prestige of the Iroquois Confederacy.

This study contributes to the knowledge of Iroquois and American history in several ways. It reevaluates Iroquois relations with the English and French and explains how the Iroquois developed a symbiotic relationship with the English and French colonial governments. It analyzes Iroquois relations with various Indian tribes and shows how those tribes were politically, economically, socially, and militarily important to the Iroquois. It presents a new interpretation to the
Iroquois's role as middlemen in the fur trade. It further explains why the Iroquois waged war on the southern tribes. It presents a different view of the power and unity of the Iroquois Confederacy. It explains the role of factions in Iroquois politics. It explains the role of the Iroquois in the colonial wars of the early eighteenth century. Finally, it is a comprehensive study of the Iroquois, 1701-1744, and it demonstrates how Indians and whites interacted during the colonial period in an effort to achieve mutually beneficial goals.
PART I

THE DECLINE OF IROQUOIS POWER
Chapter 1. Early Iroquois Expansion

These Five Nations are very brave, the awe and dread of all other Indians in America, and a better protection to us than the same number of Christians.¹

-Governor Thomas Dongan to the Earl of Sunderland.

The five nations that comprised the Iroquois Confederacy were the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca. After 1712, the Tuscarora moved north from Carolina and were admitted into the League of the Iroquois as the sixth nation. During the seventeenth century, the homelands of the Five Nations or Iroquois ran parallel to and south of Lake Ontario. Prior to 1650, Iroquoia, the territory of the Iroquois, stretched from the Hudson to the Genesee River. After that date, the western boundary was extended to the Niagara River.² By 1600, each of the Five Nations held its own territory within Iroquoia. The Mohawks, the most eastern of the tribes, lived on the south bank of the Mohawk River. To their west were the Oneidas, located on the shores of Oneida Lake. Next came the Onondagas, who settled on the Onondaga River. Farther west were the Cayugas, situated near the eastern shore of Cayuga Lake. And farthest to the west were the Senecas, who lived near the Genesee River. After 1712, the Tuscaroras joined the Confederacy and were assigned homelands within Oneida territory.³

From their historic location in what is now central New York State, the Iroquois, in the 1640s, launched a series of wars aimed at the dispersion, destruction, or control of all their Indian neighbors.
Numerous reasons have been given for the Iroquois's motives in waging these wars. Most likely, several factors combined to cause the wave of Iroquoian warfare.

One of the most important of these was economic. During the first three decades of the seventeenth century, the Iroquois and Europeans developed a mutually profitable fur trade. The people of the Five Nations obtained trade goods, such as firearms, blankets, pots, and knives, from the Dutch and English in exchange for furs, mostly beaver pelts. While many Europeans became rich through this beaver trade, the Iroquois became dependent upon the whites' manufactured goods. The trade goods that had once been luxuries for the Indians were now necessities. Although the fur trade proved to be beneficial for both the whites and Indians, it proved harmful for the ecology of the area. By 1640, the New York homelands of the Five Nations were depleted of beaver. Since their trade with the Dutch and English was dependent upon beaver pelts, the Iroquois had to seek a new source for furs. This search led them into territory claimed by neighboring tribes and resulted in a series of wars sometimes called the Beaver Wars.4

In the 1680s, the Iroquois were still fighting their Indian neighbors for economic reasons. In 1681, M. de Chesneau, the Intendant of New France, stated that the Iroquois were attacking the Illinois tribes to force them to bring their peltry to the Five Nations "so that they [the Iroquois] may go and trade it afterwards with the English, also, to intimidate the other nations and constrain them to do the same thing."5 The following year Jesuits and government officials from Quebec, Montreal, and Three Rivers met in Canada to consider the Iroquois problem. They
concluded that the Iroquois sought to destroy the Illinois, Miami, and Kiskakous tribes "and by their defeat render themselves masters of Missilimackina and the Lakes Erie and Huron, the Bay des Puans, and thereby deprive us of all the trade drawn from that country."^6

The Iroquois culture, which provided motivation for men to fight, was equally important as a cause of the Iroquois wars of the seventeenth century. Honor, glory, and social success could best be achieved on the war path. The individuals who were held in great esteem by the tribe or who were chosen as Pine Tree Chiefs often achieved their status by first establishing reputations as successful warriors. In fact, by the mid-eighteenth century, Iroquois war chiefs sometimes held more power and public support than the hereditary civil sachems.7

Other cultural factors also made war a necessity for the Iroquois. For example, the people of the Five Nations frequently waged war to get revenge against other tribes. Canada's Governor de Nonville reported in 1686 that the Five Iroquois Nations "pant for revenge" against the tribes around Green Bay, that recently cut off an Iroquois war party. In April, 1687, Iroquois warriors were preparing to attack the Miamis in order to avenge the murders of several Iroquois hunters. Before departing, an Onondaga spokesman told New York's Governor Thomas Dongan that the Five Nations would like to live in peace but the Miamis attacked the peaceful Senecas first, so "we being united with them are unanimously resolved to ruin the Twichtwuchs [i.e. the Miamis] if it be possible."8 The desire for revenge also caused several Iroquois attacks on the French. Nicholas Bayard wrote, in 1689, to Francis Nicholson that because of French attacks on the Iroquois, "the sachems of the Five
Nations have told us that they intend to be revenged on Canada." On June 6, 1692, an Oneida sachem assured Major Richard Ingoldsby that his tribe would soon attack the French. The sachem said, "We have not many men but will do our utmost to be revenged."\(^9\)

The need to capture prisoners for adoption or torture provided additional cultural motivation for Iroquois attacks on their neighbors. It was customary for the Iroquois to replace all mourned-for dead persons. This could be done in two ways. A prisoner of war could be adopted into the dead man's family. He would then take the place of the deceased in the Iroquoian long house and society. The dead warrior could also be replaced in a spiritual sense. That is, a prisoner of war could be tortured to death by the dead warrior's family and friends.

According to Professor Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Since the victim was in many cases eaten afterwards and had in some cases been previously adopted, he was in a very real sense being incorporated by a family and a community, and becoming part of them."\(^{10}\) Captives were sometimes taken for another reason. When there was a serious loss of manpower due to warfare or disease, the Iroquois sought to replenish their population through mass adoptions. Occasionally, this was accomplished through adoption of entire villages.\(^{11}\) In any case, the Iroquois' cultural practices of adoption and torture required the procurement of prisoners, which in turn often led to warfare.

There also may have been psychological reasons for Iroquois warfare. Anthony F. C. Wallace has suggested that the Five Nations' League of Peace paradoxically caused them to lash out against foreign tribes. According to Wallace, "the Iroquois reputation for pertinacity and
and ruthlessness in fighting may be regarded as an indirect consequence of the blocking of the blood feud among the participating members of the League. The Pax Iroquois resulted in the displacement of revenge motivations outward onto surrounding peoples, Indian and European alike."^{12} Professor William N. Fenton also believes that, due to the League's effectiveness in blocking all fratricidal strife among the Five Nations, the Iroquois' pent up frustrations and hostilities had to be focused upon those outside of the Confederacy. Fenton has written, "With the composition of blood feud, aggression is directed outward. It is perhaps ironical that the cautions that were built into the acceptance of the principals of the Great Law produced a League of Peace that became a menace to all its neighbors during the seventeenth century."^{13}

The ultimate success of the Iroquois in their seventeenth-century Indian wars was due to a combination of factors. Their homelands provided the Iroquois with a strategic geographical position from which they were able to control the portal of the Great Lakes and the sources of streams flowing to both the Mississippi and Atlantic. Professor George T. Hunt has referred to Iroquoia as perhaps "the best military position on the continent." He claimed that this location enabled the Iroquois to send forth war parties for conquest in all directions, while "with Lake Ontario on their northern border, they were fairly safe from attack."^{14}

The Iroquois apparently were aware of the political advantages of their geographical location. According to the pioneer ethnologist Lewis Henry Morgan, the Iroquois themselves declared that their "country possessed many advantages superior to any other part of America."^{15}
The seventeenth-century French also understood the importance of the Iroquois' geographical location. The French realized in 1687 that should they be successful in destroying the Iroquois, they would have to fortify Niagara to make sure that no other tribes repopulated the strategic Iroquoia. The French knew that any Indians living in central and western New York could control traffic between Montreal and the interior, as well as passage to the lower Great Lakes, the Ohio Country, and the frontiers of New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia.

A second explanation for their military success is that the Five Nations usually possessed military superiority over their enemies. One reason for this military superiority was the League of the Ho-de-no-sau-nee, or Iroquois, which united the five Iroquois tribes into one confederacy. The League dates back to the late 1500s or early 1600s when Deganawidah the Prophet convinced the five Iroquois nations to stop their bickering and incessant warfare and to live beneath the shade of the Great Tree of Peace. Deganawidah implored all men to be brothers. He preached the Great Law of righteousness, civil authority, and peace, as he formed the union among the numerous Iroquois settlements that were scattered in the forests of central New York.

Historians Lewis Henry Morgan and Francis Parkman have given the League too much credit for Iroquois success in war. They have overstated the ability of the League to get the Five Nations to contribute warriors for a united war effort. Yet, Morgan and Parkman were not completely wrong, because on occasion, the Five Nations, through the League, did unite for a combined attack against a common enemy.
The League also served other important functions. It brought a period of internal peace to its five members, which allowed each to pursue other interests, such as trade wars or raids against hostile tribes, while not having to worry about intra-league fighting. At the same time, the League provided the Five Nations with a more effective socio-political organization than most of the other tribes of the Northeast Woodlands had. This organization allowed the Five Nations to withstand and adapt to the pressures of war and social change, while some of their enemies could not.20

Another reason for Iroquois military superiority was that the Five Nations were usually better armed than any of their Indian enemies. In 1685, Canada's Governor De Nonville made the following comparison of the Iroquois and the tribes of Canada: "The Iroquois are the most formidable; they are the most powerful by the reason of the facility they possess of procuring arms from the English... .Their large purchases of arms and ammunition from the English, at a low rate, have given them hitherto all the advantages they possess over other tribes, who in consequence of being disarmed, have been destroyed by the Iroquois." De Nonville added that if the English in New York did not trade arms and powder to the Iroquois then "that nation would be more easily conquered than any other."21

The following year De Nonville noted that unless France chastized the Iroquois soon, the western tribes, who are "our friends would revolt against us, and place themselves at the mercy of the Iroquois, more powerful because better armed, than any of them."22
New York's Governor Dongan confirmed the Iroquois' military advantage when he reported in 1687 that the French could not protect the Ottawas "from the arms of our [Iroquois] Indians." Several modern scholars also have concluded that the Iroquois were better armed than the western tribes. Elizabeth Tooker studied the Iroquois-Huron wars of 1645-1650 and concluded, "The Iroquois did...have two advantages over the Hurons: more guns and a shorter supply line to European traders. The Iroquois superiority in armament is fairly well established." Allen W. Trelease also concluded that throughout the early and mid-1600s, the Iroquois were better armed than the western tribes. On the other hand, George T. Hunt argued that "In the matter of armament...the assets of the Iroquois have been overstated." Yet, even Hunt admitted that the Iroquois were usually at least as well armed as their foes were. Hunt conceded that "It seems that the position of the Iroquois in regard to munitions of war was as fortunate as their geographic position for they were at the center of a lively competition where there was no practical solution of the problem open to the white colonists." In other words, if the Dutch declined to trade guns for furs, the Five Nations could take their trade to the English, Swedes, or French. The western tribes did not have this leverage, for the only Europeans they came into contact with were the French.

A third reason for Iroquois success in their wars of the seventeenth century was their intense motivation which stemmed from economic necessity, as well as from their cultural heritage. The Iroquois had to conquer their neighbors in order to acquire the furs needed for their vital trade with the Dutch and English. Such a do-or-die situation was
apt to provide the determination needed for success. No doubt, their culture, with its stress on glory and honor through war, also proved to be a reservoir of inspiration.

Lastly, there was a psychological factor working for the Iroquois. Every new victory struck added terror into the hearts of their enemies. By the mid-1630s, the Hurons were so frightened of the Iroquois that, at times, a mere rumor of an approaching Iroquois war party was enough to send an entire village fleeing into the woods in search of hiding places. On other occasions, the sight of suspicious looking footprints was all that was needed to set the Hurons scurrying in fright.

The Hurons did not have a monopoly on fear of the Iroquois. Perrot, the French trader and explorer, described the following incident in 1670: "More than 900 Ottawas came down to Montreal in canoes; in this number there were five of us French men...When we descended the calumets, we met...Monsieur de la Salle, who was hunting with five or six French men and ten or twelve Iroquois. That great fleet of Ottawas appeared already, shaking with terror at this sight, and desired to give up their voyage entirely on hearing...there were still several other bands of Iroquois who were hunting farther down..." Perrot added that he finally convinced the Ottawas to travel onward, but every time they sighted some Iroquois hunters, they became terrified and began to paddle rapidly. According to Perrot, the Ottawas did not relax until they reached the safety of Montreal.

Many times the western Indians did not even want to become involved in any affairs that concerned the Iroquois. A French official recorded in 1681 that on September 19, 1680, a Seneca chief was captured by some
Tionontate Indians. Later, while the Tionontates were visiting among the Illinois, an Illinois warrior stabbed the Seneca prisoner to death. The Tionontates immediately sent a message to the Iroquois to explain what had happened and to disclaim any culpability on their part. The French reporter noted, "At the same time, all the Ottawa Nations, on hearing of this murder, took to flight, dreading the anger of the Iroquois."29

In all fairness to the western tribes, they were not the only ones terrified of the Five Nations. The French, too, lived in dread of Iroquois attacks. Father Lamberville, the Jesuit missionary at Onondaga, wrote in 1684 to Governor de la Barre, "The French man who came here told me that whilst you were at La Famine a false alarm reached Montreal that the Iroquois were coming; that there was nothing but horror, flight, and weeping at Montreal."30

This intense fear of the Iroquois undoubtedly provided the Five Nations with a psychological advantage over their enemies.

The first wave of Iroquois warfare against the western tribes subsided by the mid-1660s. When the war clouds began to clear, several important results were evident. As a result of their successes in the wars against the western tribes, the Iroquois, by 1665, were the dominant force in the Western Country (this was a territory that extended from Iroquoia in the east to the lands north and south of Lake Michigan in the west. The Western Country was bounded by the Ohio River Valley in the south and the Ottawa River Valley in the north). By 1660, the Iroquois wars had nearly emptied this region of its native population. The Five Nations had conquered or dispersed the Huron, Tobacco,
Neutral, and Erie Nations, while other tribes had fled to safer lands in the north or farther west. The constant threat of Iroquois attacks drove the Miamis west and northward into the Wisconsin area, while it caused the Illinois to withdraw to the western side of the Mississippi River. Other nations like the Fox, Sac, Mascouten, and Kickapoo fled from lower Michigan in terror of the advancing Iroquois. This exodus of tribes left the Western Country open to the Iroquois. After years of fighting, the Five Nations had finally secured control over the vast western lands that could provide them with the beaver furs needed for the vital Albany trade.

The victory over the western tribes did not come cheaply. The cost was paid in Iroquois blood. In 1657, a French Jesuit, Father LeJeune, wrote, "Their victories have so depopulated their towns that there are more foreigners in them than natives." The Iroquois balanced off their war casualties through mass adoptions of foreign Indians. This policy is evident in an observation made by Nicolas Perrot. He explained that the Iroquois, after defeating the Neutrals in 1651, forced them to resettle in Iroquoia. Perrot explained, "Thus they augmented their own strength, not only by the many children whom they took captive, but by the great number of Neutral Hurons whom they carried to their own country." Such practices were common for the Iroquois, who at times even adopted entire villages. In 1657, Father LeJeune reported that "At Onondaga there are Indians of seven different nations permanently established; and, among the Senecas, of no less than eleven."
Through this policy of adoption, the Five Nations, despite their great war casualties, were able to retain their powerful position and preeminent status in the Great Lakes area. Various census reports up to the late 1680s bear out the consistency of Iroquois manpower. Father Lalemont, the author of the Jesuit Relation for 1660, estimated the total number of their warriors at 2200. Another French source in 1665 believed there were 2290 Iroquois warriors. Le Mercier, in the Jesuit Relation of 1665, placed the figure at 2350. When an Englishman, Wentworth Greenbrough, traveled through Iroquoia in 1677, he counted 2150 fighting men. Du Chesneau in 1681 estimated them at 2000. And in 1684, De La Barre said that due to adoptions, their number of warriors had grown to 2600. In 1685, De Nonville claimed that the Five Nations were powerful partly because "of the number of prisoners they daily make among their neighbors, whose children they carry off at any early age and adopt."36

In short, when the opening round of the Iroquois' wars in the Western Country came to a close in the mid-1660s, Iroquois power was still intact. The composition of the Five Nations' war parties may have been altered as adopted warriors replaced the dead Iroquois men, but the Iroquois' total strength in manpower had survived. Equally significant, after years of constant warfare, the Iroquois finally controlled the Western Country and its wealth of furs. At this point Iroquois strategists began to plot the course for the next round of warfare.

Several events of the early and mid-1660s had given the Iroquois reason to reconsider their relations with the western tribes and New France. First, smallpox plagued the Iroquois people in 1662 and left
the survivors in a depressed and weakened condition. One captive French man claimed to have baptized 300 dying infants. Secondly, the Susquehannock (or Andaste) Indians, a powerful tribe living south of the Five Nations on the lower Susquehanna River in Pennsylvania and Maryland, posed a threat to Iroquois villages and trade. Thirdly, the Algonquin tribes of the Northeast presented the Iroquois with another potential danger, for they had recently completed several successful raids into Iroquoia. Finally, to make matters worse, the French had decided to take a harder line against the intractable Iroquois. The famous Carignan-Salières Regiment was imported into Canada to invade Iroquoia. In 1666, the French carried out their plans by launching two expeditions, which successfully attacked Mohawk villages.37

It is not difficult to imagine what went through the minds of Iroquois sachems and war captains as they sat around their council fires during the winter of 1666. They probably realized that the Five Nations were being threatened in all directions, and they knew all too well that they could not win on all fronts. A plan of action or a strategy may have slowly emerged from those council fire discussions. Realizing that they already had defeated the western tribes, that they controlled the Western Country, and that the French were almost an unbeatable foe, the Iroquois nations apparently decided to concentrate their energies on the Susquehannocks, an enemy that could be defeated.

Before taking on the Susquehannocks, the Five Nations first had to remove the threat of a two-front or even four-front war. So in 1677, Iroquois deputies trekked northward to Canada to ask for peace. In 1677, the Five Nations and the French and their western Indian allies agreed
to bury their hatchets and weapons and pledged themselves to a lasting peace. This treaty effectively ended the possibility of war on the Iroquois' northern and western borders. Next, the Five Nations tried to stop the Algonquin raiders who had been attacking them from the northeast. The Iroquois sent ambassadors of peace to the Algonquins and even got the English to intervene on their behalf. The result was a treaty of peace, which was ratified in 1672. This treaty secured the Iroquois' northeastern borders.

Meanwhile, some of the Five Nations had already begun to focus their attention on the Susquehannocks, since the destruction of that tribe would secure the Iroquois' southern border. Between 1667 and 1675, Iroquois warriors continuously raided the Susquehannocks and other Indian enemies to the south. The Iroquois' hostilities with the Susquehannocks can be traced back to sixteenth-century blood feuds. By the seventeenth century, the feuding had escalated into full scale warfare due to economic rivalry in the fur trade. Perhaps the proximity of the two tribes, along with their warlike cultures, also contributed to the perpetuation and escalation of the hostilities.

The Five Nations soon learned that the extermination of the Susquehannocks would not be easy. The colonies of Virginia and Maryland took an active interest in the affairs of the Susquehannocks, for that tribe supplied them with furs and peltry. As a result, the Susquehannocks were able to obtain an abundance of firearms, and even cannons for their castles. These weapons cancelled out any superiority the Five Nations might have had in firepower. The war dragged on until the late 1670s. Then it came to a sudden close, with the mysterious
defeat of the Susquehannocks. Historians still debate the causes of the
Susquehannock defeat. George T. Hunt believed that Virginia and
Maryland colonists, who had earlier supplied the Susquehannocks, suddenly
turned on them and killed many Susquehannock warriors. The Iroquois
were then able to finish them off. Hunt said, "The most plausible
theory is that the Maryland and Virginia borderers, infuriated by Indian
murders, raised an extra-legal force and attacked the Susquehanna with
that lack of discrimination between Indian tribes which is characteristic of some men, notwithstanding the probably righteous Susquehanna
plea that the murders had been committed by marauding Senecas." 42 Historical evidence supports Hunt's theory. New York's Governor Nicolls
reported that the Iroquois had attacked the Susquehannocks as the
latter were retreating "behind Virginia." 43 In 1679, an Oneida sachem
told a Virginia official, "The Susquehannas are all destroyed for which
we return you many thanks." 44 Regardless of how the destruction of the
Susquehannocks occurred, the result was the same. The Susquehannock
Nation was no more. Any survivors were dispersed or incorporated into
the Five Nations. 45 In this manner the southern border of Iroquoia was
secured.

The Five Nations were not warring exclusively on the Susquehannocks
from 1667 until 1675. On occasion Iroquois warriors attacked other
tribes to the south and west. In 1677, the governor of Virginia sent
Henry Coursey to Iroquoia to ask the Five Nations to stop raiding the
various tribes of Virginia and Maryland. The Iroquois agreed to halt
their southern raids, which they had been making for years, and a treaty
was concluded in 1677. During this period some of the Five Nations also
made raids into the Western Country. One such raid occurred in 1670, when some Senecas attacked an Ottawa village. The French quickly stepped in as mediators and restored the peace.\footnote{46}

The Iroquois-French Treaty of 1667 and the Iroquois' preoccupation with the Susquehannock War brought a relative calm to the Western Country. Between 1667 and 1680, French Indians (i.e., Indian allies of New France) and couriers de bois took advantage of this respite in the West to drift back into the Western Country.\footnote{47} In fact, as soon as the French-Iroquois peace was concluded, some tribes tried to recover their earlier position in the West. One Jesuit, in 1668, reported, "The savages, our allies, no longer fearing that they will be surprised on the road, come in quest of us from all directions, from a distance of 5 and 600 leagues, either to re-establish their trade, interrupted by the Iroquois\footnote{48} wars; or to open new commercial dealings, as some very remote tribes claim to do." A French official later remarked in 1681 that the Illinois had used the Iroquois' preoccupation with the Susquehannocks as an opportunity to move back to their former lands east of the Mississippi River.\footnote{49} In 1683, a Mohawk sachem explained to the New York governor that his tribe now brought fewer pelts to Albany than before, because when they were at war with "other Indians, those Indians would not dare to come on their hunting places; but now they are all in peace; the Indians catch away the beaver so fast that there be but very few left."\footnote{50}

The Five Nations still realized that they needed the Western Country as a source of furs. The Iroquois' predicament was explained in 1671 by Canada's Governor de Courcelles, "It is well known that the
Iroquois Nations, especially the four upper ones, do not hunt any beaver or elk. They absolutely exhausted the side of Ontario which they inhabit, that is the south side, a long time ago. . . . to get any they are obliged to cross to the north side of the same lake, formerly inhabited by the Hurons."\(^{51}\)

The Iroquois had to hunt for furs in the Western Country. That was one of the reasons why their warriors had first driven out potential rivals from that area. But now those enemy tribes had returned and were hindering Iroquois hunters again. In 1680, La Salle wrote to Canada's Governor Frontenac:

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It is not to be wondered at that the Iroquois speak of waging war against our allies inasmuch as they receive affronts from them every year. I have seen, among the Pottawatomi and Miami at Michilimacinac, the spoils and scalps of numerous Iroquois whom the Indians of this region had treacherously killed while hunting last spring and earlier; which is not unknown to the Iroquois, our allies having the imprudence of celebrating this feat in their presence while they were trading among them, as I have seen Pottawatomi at Michilimacinac who, dancing with the calumet, boasted of this treachery, holding up the scalps at arms' length in the sight of three Mohawks who were there to trade.\(^{52}\)
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The following year another Frenchman, M. du Chesneau, remarked that the Iroquois had decided to attack the Illinois Indians because the latter had killed forty Iroquois hunters in the Western Country.\(^{53}\)

By 1680, the Five Nations had disposed of the Susquehannocks and again were determined to rid the West of all rivals. So the Iroquois warriors picked up their weapons and began their second wave of western warfare. The truce with the western tribes was over.
The Iroquois were officially at war with the Illinois by the beginning of 1680. Du Chesneau, the Intendant of New France, noted, "The Iroquois dispatched, in the month of April. . .1680, an army consisting of between 5 and 600 men who approached an Illinois village where Sieur de Tonty. . .happened to be with some Frenchmen. . .but they would not listen to the terms of peace proposed to them by Sieur de Tonty." He added that the Iroquois attacked and the Illinois fled, but "were pursued by the Iroquois, who killed and captured as many as 1200 of them, including women and children, having lost only 30 men. . . .Another detachment of the Iroquois army, met some hunters belonging to the Bay des Puants, whom they captured and brought into their country. . . . The victory achieved by the Iroquois rendered them so insolent that they have continued ever since that time to send out divers war parties."54

The Iroquois continued to do well in their early encounters against the western tribes. Several Jesuits complained in March, 1682, that the Iroquois had already won big victories against the Illinois and Miamis and were seeking to destroy those French allies. The Jesuits claimed they had tried to stop the fighting, but the Iroquois had refused. The Jesuits were afraid that the Ottawas would also be dragged into the fighting.55 In 1684, sachems of the Five Nations told the New York governor "that the Senecas have made seventy of the Dionondades [western Indians living near Michilimacinc] prisoners. " Canada's Governor De Nonville noted in 1686 that the Iroquois had again been successful in attacks against the Hurons and Ottawas of Michilimacinc. He added that for the past two years, the Illinois had also been suffering at the hands of the Iroquois.56
In January, 1687, a French official wrote to the Marquis of Seignelay that the Iroquois, in 1686, had attacked "the Hurons and the Ottawas, our most ancient subjects; swept by surprise from them more than 75 prisoners among whom were some of their principal chiefs, killed several others, and finally offered them peace and the restitution of their prisoners, if they would quit the French and acknowledge the English." He added that the Iroquois also attacked "the Illinois and the Miamis our allies who are in the neighborhood of Fort St. Louis... massacred and burnt a great number of them and carried off many prisoners."57

By 1687, the Ottawas were asking the French to mediate a peace between them and the Senecas. That same year New York's Governor Dongan tried to justify the Iroquois' victories in the West to a French Jesuit by saying, "I am sorry that our Iroquois Indians are so troublesome to the Indians of Canada, but... it is the custom of those people that what country they conquer belongs to them."58

The Five Nations' impressive victories in the early 1680s had the western tribes reeling. In 1687, both the French and English acknowledged the power of the Five Nations. In January of that year, a French official conceded to a superior in Paris that the Iroquois were "the most powerful and best disciplined Indians of all America." The next month Governor Dongan wrote to the Committee on Trade, "The Five Nations are the most warlike people in America, and are a bulwark between us and the French and all other Indians."59
But just at the moment when a total Iroquois victory in the West seemed imminent, the French decided to intervene. At that point, the long struggle, which later became entwined with King William's War, had begun.
Notes: Chapter 1


3 Morgan, League, 38, 39, 44.


9 Cal. of State Papers, 1689-1692, Entry 288, 102, Entry 2257, 647.

10 A. Wallace, Death and Rebirth, 103-104.

11 Francis Parkman, The Jesuits in North America (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1897), 549; A. Wallace, Death and Rebirth, 103.

12 A. Wallace, Death and Rebirth, 46-47.


24
14 Hunt, Wars, 68.
15 Morgan, League, 40-41.
16 DHSNY, I, 232.
17 Fenton, "Lore of Longhouse," 134.
18 Morgan, League, 8, 442; Parkman, Jesuits, 56, 59.
19 DHSNY, I, 97, 99, 127; Livingston, 114; NYOD, IV, 181.
22 DHSNY, I, 222.
24 Tooker, 117; Allen W. Trelase, "The Iroquois and the Western Fur Trade: A Problem in Interpretation," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIX (June, 1962), 50.
25 Hunt, Wars, 9, 165-175, 171.
26 Parkman, Jesuits, 149-150.
30 DHSNY, I, 141.
32 JR, XLIII, 265.
33 Report and Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin (Madison: Atwood and Rublee Printers, 1868), XVI, 10.
34 A. Wallace, Death and Rebirth, 103.
JR, XLIII, 265.

JR, XLV, 207; Parkman, Jesuits, 60; DHSNY, I, 11, 60; Pa. Archives, 2nd series, VI, 27.


Livingston, 29; Hunt, Wars, 135; Beauchamp, History, 218; T.C. Pease and R.C. Werner, eds., Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 1934), XXIII, French Series, I, 68.

Livingston, 36; Hunt, Wars, 135-136; Beauchamp, History, 221.

Hunt, Wars, 138-139; Parkman, Jesuits, 546-548.

Hunt, Wars, 137-138.

Hunt, Wars, 140-143.

NYCD, XIII, 516.

Livingston, 48.


Propositions of Col. Henry Coursey to Iroquois, June 20, 1677, in Livingston, 42; Beauchamp, 221.

Alvord, Illinois, 57.

JR, LI, 169.


DHSNY, I, 398.

NYCD, IX, 80.


Pa. Archives, 2nd series, VI, 9, 10.

56 Livingston, 100; *DHSNY*, I, 213.

57 *DHSNY*, I, 228.


59 *DHSNY*, I, 228, 154.
Chapter 2: The Twenty Years' War

The Iroquois war against the western tribes and their French allies lasted from the late 1670s until 1701. Although it began as an Indian war between the Five Nations and the western tribes, it eventually escalated into a full-scale colonial war, with the French and their Indians fighting the English and the Iroquois. Three main stages are evident in the fighting that occurred between 1680 and 1701 (hereafter, for the sake of simplicity, this twenty-year period will be referred to as the Twenty Years' War).

The first stage, 1680-1689, found the Iroquois on the offensive. Their raids during the first part of this decade had the French and Indians on the retreat. The French received a further setback in 1684 when their governor of New France, De La Barre, made an unsuccessful attempt to invade Iroquoia. De Nonville assumed the governorship in 1685 and immediately made plans to avenge his predecessor's humiliating defeat. His troops invaded the Senecas' homelands on June 30, 1687. During the next ten days, the French and Indian army destroyed four villages and the surrounding fields of corn and squash. But the Senecas had wisely chosen to retreat, so their power remained intact. Before the year was out, the Senecas and their Iroquois confederates had Montreal under a virtual siege, and the French regime in Canada was on the verge of paralysis due to famine, sickness, and the numerous Iroquois depredations. On July 26, over 1500 Iroquois warriors attacked the village of Lachine, just six miles upstream from Montreal.
Since De Nonville's garrison at Montreal could offer no effective resistance to the invaders, the results were disastrous. When a French rescue party finally arrived from Montreal, it found only smoldering houses and French bodies lying dead on the battleground or tortured on posts. Pierre Charlevoix, an early eighteenth-century Jesuit, described the Iroquois raid on Lachine as follows:

On the 25th of August, at the time when the French deemed themselves in the greatest security, 1500 Iroquois made a descent before day on the quarter of Lachine, which is on the south side of the Island, about 3 leagues above the city. They found all the people asleep, and began by massacring the men; then they set fire to the houses. By this means, all who had remained in them fell into the hands of these Indians, and experienced whatever fury can suggest to savages. They carried their fury even to excesses of which they had not been deemed capable. They opened the bodies of pregnant women, to tear out the fruit they bore; they put children alive on the spit, and forced the mothers to turn and roast them. They invented a number of other unheard-of tortures; and thus, in less than an hour, 200 persons, of every age and both sexes, perished in the most frightful tortures. This done, the enemy approached within a league of the city, everywhere committing the same ravages and perpetuating the same cruelties and, when weary of these horrors, they took 200 prisoners, whom they carried off to their villages and burned.

In all fairness to the Iroquois, their so-called massacre at Lachine was basically no different in conception or style than De Nonville's raids into Seneca territory, which had taken place earlier in the month. The only real difference was that the Iroquois' attack was successful.

Immediately following the Lachine raid, Iroquois power seemed to be at its peak, but already forces had been set in motion to counter the Iroquois' strength. Before 1689 was over, Canada would have a new governor, and the Iroquois would have new problems.
The year 1689 marked the beginning of the second stage of the war. Two noteworthy events occurred that year. The English openly entered the war, which then became intertwined with the colonial conflict, King William's War, and Count Frontenac returned to Canada to assume control of the French war effort. Frontenac's return proved to be the more important of the two events. He opened with a successful attack on Schenectady. His forces then repelled a poorly organized, joint English-colonial-Iroquois retaliatory effort. Within a year of his arrival, Frontenac had begun to turn the war around.5

The years 1693-1697 were characterized by French and Indian victories, Iroquois defeats, and English reluctance to fight, all of which combined to shift the Iroquois to the defensive. On January 25, 1694, Frontenac sent 600 French and Indians to invade Mohawk country. They took the Mohawks by surprise. When the fighting was over, 300 Mohawks had been captured, three Mohawk castles were burned, and the Mohawks' winter food supply was destroyed. Soon thereafter, many Iroquois, realizing that the English would not help them, began asking for peace. In 1695, Frontenac regained control of Ft. Cadaraqui. Its position enabled him to launch another massive attack into Iroquoia in 1696. This invasion convinced the Iroquois that the old Count could successfully invade their homelands at will. English-French hostilities ended the next year with the Treaty of Ryswick.6 Frontenac, however, refused to recognize the Five Nations as English subjects and demanded they make a separate peace before the war could be stopped with the French and Indians.7
The final stage of the Twenty Years’ War lasted from 1697 until 1701. During this period, the Iroquois were under constant attack from the French Indians and feared a total defeat. By the end of 1699, the Iroquois realized that they had few alternatives left. They knew the English could not be counted on for either aid or assistance. At the same time, they realized they could not defeat the French and Indians alone. To make matters worse, the Iroquois began to hear rumors of a French-English conspiracy to destroy the Five Nations. As a result, some Iroquois turned to what they felt was their only remaining option. They decided to negotiate a separate peace treaty with the French and Indians.

On March 21, 1700, two Iroquois arrived in Montreal to meet with Governor Callieres. According to Charlevoix, "They were invested with no powers; but were commissioned to announce a general deputation from the Cantons arriving in the month of July. For this delay, they adduced very frivolous reasons at which de Callieres seemed anything but satisfied." Although there is no definite evidence, it appears that not all of the Five Nations were responsible for sending the two messengers to Montreal. There are accounts that show that some Iroquois, even as late as July, comprised a pro-English faction that was opposed to any peace negotiations with New France. There are also other indications that the two messengers represented only the Iroquois peace faction, that is, the group or party among the Iroquois that sought peace through direct negotiations. One sign is that the messengers had no authority to act for the entire Five Nations. Also, the vagueness of the messengers when
questioned about the Five Nations' reasons for not coming to Montreal until July shows that they could not speak for all of the Iroquois. Lastly, since only six deputies from two of the Five Nations arrived in July to discuss peace, it seems probable that the two original messengers were not speaking on behalf of all the Five Nations when they arranged the July conference. Otherwise, more deputies from all the Five Nations would have arrived as promised.10

Although there is some question about who sent the two messengers, there is no doubt that their mission was a success. They not only got Callieres to agree to a summer date for the negotiations, but they also got him to declare a temporary ceasefire until the peace talks could be held in July.11

While the peace faction of the Iroquois was arranging the negotiations with New France, the English were becoming increasingly concerned over the status of the Five Nations. On April 20, 1700, Governor Bellomont of New York wrote to the Lords of Trade and reiterated the importance of the Iroquois. He made it clear that should the Iroquois defect to the French side, the English "in two months time would be forced off the continent."12 Robert Livingston, a New York Commissioner of Indian Affairs, visited Iroquois villages in April, 1700, and reported that all of the Five Nations were dejected and contemplating a separate peace treaty with the French. He added that although all of the Five Nations feared the French, the Mohawks, in particular, had felt the wrath of the French enemy. Livingston explained that nearly two-thirds of the Mohawks had already defected to the French and more might follow. Livingston apparently was aware that some of the Iroquois
were in favor of better relations with New France, for he pointed out that the Jesuits had strong control over some of the Five Nations and that many Iroquois people might desert to the French side. Livingston recommended to Bellomont that steps be taken to maintain the Five Nations' loyalty to New York. He felt that New York could stop the western tribes' raids on the Iroquois by opening up a trade with those far Indians. Livingston also recommended that New York should build forts to protect the Iroquois and should station Protestant missionaries throughout Iroquoia. These ministers could not only convert the Five Nations, but would also be in the position to neutralize the effects and artifices of the French Jesuits.13

Other English observers agreed with Livingston that the Five Nations were in a desperate condition. On May 11, the New York Indian Commissioners reported to Bellomont that the Five Nations were under constant harassment by the western tribes and lived in fear of French threats.14

By May, it was evident that the Iroquois had resolved to end their war with New France. On May 5, King Louis XIV of France notified Canada's Governor de Callieres that he was pleased to learn that the Iroquois had not committed any hostile acts recently. The King believed that the cessation of hostilities would become a lasting peace.15

The only question that remained was whether the Five Nations would make their peace independently of the English, as the French demanded, or allow the English to negotiate their peace for them, as the English (who claimed the Five Nations as subjects) wanted.
Those of the Five Nations who favored the English approach met with New York officials on several occasions in June, 1700. These Iroquois promised to remain loyal to the English and condemned their confederates who wanted to make a separate treaty with New France. On June 11, several pro-English Onondaga sachems informed New York officials, "We come to acquaint you that the sachems of the Senecas are gone to Canada to speak there." An Albany official replied, "We do thank the Brethren for their kind message and are sorry to hear the Senecas have forgot themselves so much as to go to Canada." After the Onondagas had established their own loyalty by exposing the Senecas, they asked the New York government to help them achieve a peace with the Wanganhas, or western Indians. The sachems asked the Albany government to provide free powder to the western Indians on the condition that they make peace with the Iroquois. The Albany officials agreed to comply with the Onondaga's request. Later, another group of pro-English Iroquois met with the New York Commissioners for Indian Affairs and reported that some western Indians, through French instigation, had recently killed some Iroquois. The sachems maintained that the Five Nations would not treat separately with the French and Indians if New York intervened and stopped the western tribes' attacks on the Iroquois. These Iroquois made it clear that they wanted to remain loyal to the English and would do so as long as New York helped them against the western or far Indians.

The western Indians' raids on the Iroquois that occurred in May and June probably undermined the position of those Iroquois who wanted to negotiate with New France. In March, the French governor had agreed
to a ceasefire until peace talks could be held in July. Yet, the western tribes' hostilities had not stopped. The pro-English faction among the Five Nations most likely used the ceasefire violations to show those Iroquois who had not yet committed themselves to either faction that the French and Indians could not be trusted. By July, very few Iroquois were willing to attend the scheduled peace conference at Montreal. The two Iroquois messengers who had arranged the July talks back in March had promised that deputies from the Oneidas, Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas would meet with the French governor. But when the time came, the pledge was not met. Many of the Iroquois had been convinced by New York's Governor Bellomont not to negotiate with the French. Yet not all of the Five Nations were willing to follow the New York governor's advice. Apparently, there were still some Iroquois who were determined to carry out the separate peace talks with New France's Governor de Callieres. For example, the New York Commissioners of Indian Affairs informed their superiors on July 5 that among the Iroquois there were pro-French factions that were set on negotiating with the French.17

On July 18, two Onondaga deputies and four Seneca deputies arrived at Montreal to attend the scheduled conference with Governor Callieres. Though they claimed to represent all the Iroquois nations except the Mohawks, it seems likely that they were sent only by the peace faction. Even their excuse as to why the Oneidas and Cayugas did not send their own deputies seemed flimsy. According to Charlevoix, they said "that they came in behalf of the four upper cantons, whose powers they bore; that they had long been resolved to treat without the Mohawks, and that
if among them there was no one from the Cayugas and Oneida Cantons, it was because the Chevalier Bellomont having sent Peter Schuyler to dissuade them from going down to Montreal, the deputies of those two cantons had gone to learn the reason of his opposition to their voyage. 18

The truth of the matter is that had the Cayugas and Oneidas really wanted to negotiate with New France, they would have, regardless of the New York governor's protests. What probably happened was that after the Iroquois' peace faction realized that the Cayugas, Oneidas, and Mohawks would not negotiate with the French, they concluded to send deputies to the scheduled conference anyway. These deputies could maintain that they were commissioned by all the Five Nations except the Mohawks, who were most loyal to the English due to proximity, and perhaps a settlement could be reached that the entire Confederacy would later find acceptable.

The six Iroquois deputies presented five belts of wampum to Governor Callieres. Each belt represented a major point that the Iroquois wanted to make. As they handed the first belt to the French governor, the deputies' spokesman said that the Five Nations had heard that the Treaty of Ryswick established peace between England and France, as well as all the Indian allies of both nations. He then said, "In that assurance we went to hunt, and whilst so occupied, 55 of our people have been killed. . .by the Ottawas. . .the Illinois. . .and Miamis. . . The hatchet is still hanging over our heads; we come to learn from our [French] Father whether he will withdraw it or have it taken away from his allies." 19 Callieres replied that the Iroquois were misinformed by
Bellomont, and they were not included in the Treaty of Ryswick. He explained that they had to conclude a separate agreement with the French and Indians if they wanted the fighting to stop.20

The Iroquois deputies then presented a second belt to the French governor and asked why the western tribes had repeatedly violated the ceasefire agreed to in March. The Iroquois spokesman said, "I request you, Father, to take the hatchet out of their hands so that they may strike no more; if I do not defend myself, it is not for want of courage, but because I wish to obey you." Callières replied that he had taken steps in March to prevent any further attacks by the western Indians, but the Five Nations' constant stalling plus an Iroquois attack on the Miamis had provoked the western tribes. Callières added that he regretted the attacks on the Iroquois, and, if the Five Nations were sincere in their requests for peace, they should send him peace ambassadors from all Five Nations within thirty days to conclude a treaty.

Then, said Callières, "the war-kettles should be overturned, the great tree of peace strengthened, the rivers cleansed, the roads made smooth so that everyone could come and go in all security whither he chose."21

The Iroquois responded with a third wampum belt and promised they would come within thirty days to make peace. The deputies then gave Callières another belt and requested that the Jesuit Bruyas and two soldiers, Maricourt and Joncaire, should accompany them on their return to Iroquoia. The deputies argued that such a French delegation would "convince the cantons that their French Father sincerely desired peace." The deputies added that the three French ambassadors would also be able to bring back to Canada all the Frenchmen being held as
prisoners in Iroquois villages.  

The request was a masterful stroke of strategy by the Iroquois deputies. The deputies probably realized that many Iroquois would interpret the arrival of the French ambassadors at Onondaga as a sign that the French had come begging to ask for peace, and more Iroquois might therefore be willing to negotiate a French treaty, independently of the English. The selection of the Jesuit and the two soldiers had been carefully planned. The deputies knew that the French were eager to send the Catholic missionaries to proselytize among the Iroquois and that many of their Iroquois people were equally intent on receiving the priests. The deputies also were aware that Maricourt and Joncaire would be well received by the Iroquois. Both, especially Joncaire, were held in esteem by the Five Nations. Joncaire first came into personal contact with the Iroquois when he was captured in a battle against the Senecas, probably in 1687. M. La Potherie, who was Joncaire's contemporary, stated, "He [Joncaire] was taken in a battle; the fierceness with which he fought a war chief who wished to bind him in order to burn his fingers until the sentence of death could be carried out, induced the others to grant him his life, his comrades having all been burned at a slow fire. They [the Senecas] adopted him, and the confidence which they had in him thenceforth led them to make him their mediator in all negotiations."  

Cadwallader Colden, a New York official, later remarked of Joncaire, "He ingratiated himself so much with that Nation that he was advanced to the rank of sachem, and preserved their esteem to the day of his death."
The French governor agreed to the Iroquois' request that Bruyas, Maricourt, and Joncaire be sent to Iroquois on the condition that some of the deputies remain in Montreal as hostages until the three Frenchmen returned safely. Four of the deputies volunteered to stay behind.

The Iroquois deputies then presented the fifth and final belt of wampum to the French governor. By this belt, the Iroquois pledged themselves to peace. They also promised Callières that the Iroquois would not listen to any Englishmen who tried to convince them not to make a peace treaty with New France independently of the English. The conference was then adjourned. Soon afterwards, two of the Iroquois deputies, along with Father Bruyas and the soldiers Maricourt and Joncaire and a small French escort, set out for Iroquois.25

If the Iroquois deputies were hoping that the arrival of the three Frenchmen would have a favorable impression on the Five Nations, they were not disappointed. Upon their arrival in Iroquois, the three French ambassadors were welcomed enthusiastically by the war-weary people of the Five Nations. The Jesuit Charlevoix described their reception, "From Lake Cannentaha, where the Iroquois had come to meet them, they were led as it were in triumph to the great village of the Canton. . .They entered the town amid volleys of musketry, and were then lavishly feasted. On the 10th of August, they were introduced into the Council Cabin, where they found the deputies of all the upper nations." The French ambassadors condoled the Five Nations for all their warriors slain in past wars. They then told their Iroquois hosts, "Children. It is now peace between the great Kings over the great water. Let it likewise be peace between you and us and the Rondachses, the Waganhaes,
Twightwees, Tiondadees, and all our other Nations of Indians." The French ambassadors also declared that they wished to exchange prisoners of war and place a Jesuit mission in Iroquoia. The Five Nations agreed to send deputies to Canada to arrange the peace and exchange of prisoners, but hedged on accepting a Jesuit mission.

The turnabout in the Five Nations' position on separate negotiations with New France was probably caused by two factors. First, the arrival of the French deputies to Onondaga convinced the Iroquois (as the deputies of the peace faction had hoped it would) that the French sincerely desired peace. Secondly, the reaction of English officials to the arrival of the French ambassadors was equally, if not more, important in convincing most of the Iroquois to negotiate with New France.

As soon as New York's Governor Bellomont received information concerning the arrival of the three Frenchmen, he dispatched John B. Van Eps to Onondaga to warn the Five Nations not to be deceived by the French. Van Eps later reported, "On the 31st of July, 1700, I arrived in Onondaga where I found Monsr. Maricourt and the Jesuit Bruyas with 12 other Frenchmen from Canada who had made propositions to the Five Nations of Indians two days before I came there." Van Eps said he told the Five Nations that the governor of New York ordered them not to even talk to the French. According to French sources, that English warning backfired and made even more Iroquois determined to negotiate with New France. Charlevoix claimed that the imperious tone of Bellomont's message shocked the Iroquois Council. The Jesuit added, "Nothing perhaps contributed more to incline that [Iroquois] Nation towards us, than this unseasonable step." The Five Nations had long believed that
they were not subjects of the English king, but were equal allies. Only one year earlier, a Frenchman had escaped from Iroquoia and reported that "the Iroquois publically maintain that they have no masters, and that they allowed the English to assume that title only in order to enjoy the trade in goods and arms they required; but when they will be inclined to make peace, they will negotiate it by themselves, independent of the English." Bellomont's message, as delivered by Van Eps, was a challenge to Iroquois sovereignty. The French ambassadors, led by Father Bruyas, convinced the Iroquois Council that Bellomont's message proved that the English looked upon the Five Nations as subjects and not allies. Joncaire even suggested that the English's reason for not wanting the Iroquois to make peace was so the Five Nations could be weakened through continued warfare. The Five Nations became even more indignant and determined to negotiate with the French when they received news that a governor from New England was furious about their talks with the French and had threatened to destroy them should they make a separate peace.27

Undoubtedly, many of the Five Nations decided to support the peace faction's position of negotiating a treaty with New France in response to these English attitudes. Unwittingly, the English had pushed many Iroquois into the waiting arms of the French.

On August 11, Joncaire left Onondaga for Seneca Country, where he had spent many years as an adopted prisoner. The Senecas warmly welcomed him back, both as a son and as an ambassador, and agreed to hand over all French captives to him. But to Joncaire's chagrin, many prisoners refused to return to Canada. They had been adopted into Seneca
families and had grown accustomed to Seneca ways, and they had no intention of abandoning their new lives.

Meanwhile, back at Onondaga, the League Council met and decided to carry out the negotiations with New France. Charlevoix described the meeting as follows, "A general council of the whole Iroquois Nation was held at Onondaga. The young English deputy of Bellomont was admitted, and Teganissorens [a member of the peace faction] spoke for all the Cantons." Teganissorens said that the Iroquois were going to comply with the French governor's request that each nation immediately send deputies to Canada for peace. Shortly thereafter, Bruyas and Maricourt left for Montreal, accompanied by deputies from Onondaga and Cayuga. A few days later, Joncaire arrived with six Seneca deputies and some released prisoners. In all, only thirteen French prisoners returned to Canada.28

The three French ambassadors had failed to bring back many prisoners of war, but they had succeeded in convincing most of the Five Nations to agree to separate negotiations with the French. However, not all of the Five Nations had agreed to talk peace. The Mohawks had not taken part in any of the conferences, and the Oneidas' sincerity in wanting peace was suspect. The Oneidas had not even sent deputies as promised, but merely sent wampum belts, insisting that their chief deputy was ill. Overall, though, prospects for peace between the Five Nations and the French and Indians never looked better. The efforts of the Iroquois peace faction along with the French actions and the English responses had pushed most Iroquois to the point where they were willing to negotiate directly with the French, as evidenced by the League
Council's adoption of the resolution calling for resumption of peace talks with New France. At the same time though, most Iroquois were not yet ready to completely abandon their long-time English allies. Some Iroquois were still convinced that the English could provide help to the Five Nations. Even as the Iroquois peace delegation made its way northward toward its rendezvous with the French governor, other Iroquois back home in Iroquoia sought assistance from the New York governor. On August 27, several Iroquois sachems met with Governor Bellomont and asked for protection from the western tribes allied to New France. They also requested that Protestant missions be established in Iroquois villages; that better trade policies be established at Albany; and that forts be built throughout Iroquoia to protect the Five Nations. The sachems even promised the governor that if he granted their requests, the Five Nations would not deal separately with New France.

Bellomont replied that he thought the Five Nations should stop fighting with the western tribes and, instead, should attempt to bring those nations into the Covenant Chain Alliance through trade. He then promised to build a fort at Onondaga if the Five Nations agreed to contribute workers to aid in the construction of it. Lastly, he recommended that the Iroquois seize all Jesuits who were among them and bring them to Albany as prisoners.

The sachems answered that they wanted the fort at Onondaga. One of the sachems shrewdly added:

You desire us to make peace with the remote Indians and at the same time to draw our Indians back from Canada, at the same time to bring the Jesuits who may come to our country prisoners hither. ...we are of the opinion that it will be more advisable, first to conclude a firm peace with
the...remote Indians, and then to draw back our Indians [i.e., relatives] from Canada...before we meddle with the Jesuits...for...if they [the far Indians] hear we commit any rudeness to the French Jesuits, it will put a stop not only to the said treaty [with those tribes] but exasperate our people that are at Canada and obstruct their coming over to us.29

It appears that these sachems sincerely wanted help from the New York government. They hoped Governor Bellomont would protect them by building a fort at Onondaga and by intervening on their behalf with the western tribes. The pro-English Iroquois promised that their nations would turn their backs on the French overtures if the governor agreed to meet their demands. At the same time though, the sachems were careful not to promise anything that might ruin the negotiations with New France. That probably explains why they were so reluctant to capture any Jesuits, as Bellomont requested. In short, most of the Five Nations were now willing to talk to both the English and the French and would deal with whoever had the most to offer.

When the Iroquois peace delegation arrived at Montreal in early September, 1700, they received a welcome fit for heroes and dignitaries. Charlevoix wrote that the nineteen Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca deputies, who also spoke for the Oneidas, "were received with a salute of patararoes [i.e. a short cannon set up vertically and plugged so as to make a very loud noise] which excited some jealousy in the hearts of our [Indian] allies."30

On September 3, 1700, the conference between the Iroquois deputies and the French Governor Callieres began. The spokesman for the Iroquois opened by stating that the Iroquois were willing to comply with the French desires for peace. The Iroquois deputy then carefully
explained several major points. First, as proof that the Iroquois wanted peace, they had already stopped a group of 200 of their warriors from attacking the French Indians in retaliation for earlier raids. Second, the Iroquois wanted all their prisoners of war returned by the French. Third, the Iroquois desired to open a trade with the French at Fort Catawba (located at the eastern end of Lake Ontario). Fourth, the Iroquois hoped the French would place a blacksmith at Fort Catawba to repair Iroquois guns and goods. And fifth, the Iroquois wanted a guarantee of French protection should the English attempt to chastize the Five Nations for treating separately with the French.31

The Iroquois demands clearly show the strategy of the Five Nations. They wanted peace and the return of all their prisoners from the French. But, they also wanted assurances that after the peace, they would still have access to trade goods, smiths, and protection.

Governor Callieres responded favorably to all the Iroquois requests. He commended them for recalling their warriors and promised they had nothing more to fear from the western tribes. He suggested that should a violation of the peace occur, the aggrieved party should come to him and he would act as a mediator to right the wrong. The governor agreed to provide trade goods and smiths for the Five Nations. He said, "I will at once send up a blacksmith and some trade goods for your most urgent needs, which will be supplied to you at the lowest price possible." He then promised to write his King to ask permission to protect the Iroquois from any English retaliatory actions. Finally, Callieres thanked the Iroquois for returning thirteen French prisoners of war and recommended that the entire Five Nations meet with the French
and their Indian allies the following August to formally ratify the peace and exchange all prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{32}

The Iroquois deputies voiced their approval and, according to one witness, "avowed that no more reasonable words had ever been addressed to them." The French Indian allies who were present, such as the Hurons, Ottawas, Abenakis, and Canadian Iroquois, then promised to stop warring on the Iroquois. Not all were eager to do so, though. The Abenakis and Canadian Iroquois were particularly reluctant to make peace with the Five Nations, but Callières nevertheless got them to agree. A preliminary treaty between the Five Nations, the French, and Canada's Indian allies was signed on September 8, 1700. Each Indian nation signed individually. Thus, marks were made by the chiefs representing the Hurons, Abenakis, Ottawas, and each of the five Iroquois nations. The deputies from the Onondagas, Cayugas, and Senecas were either authorized or took it upon themselves to sign for the Oneidas and Mohawks.\textsuperscript{33}

The conference was then adjourned with all promising to return in August, 1701, to conclude the general peace. The French immediately sent out messengers westward to spread the news of the peace and to order the northern and western tribes to send deputies and return all prisoners of war to the scheduled August conference. Meanwhile, the Iroquois deputies set out on their journey home. They had one important task left. Although they had signed a preliminary treaty of peace and had arranged for a grand ratification conference the following August, they still had to convince all of the Five Nations to accept their transactions.
The French were pleased with the results of their September meeting with the Iroquois delegation. On October 16, Governor Callieres proudly informed the Home Minister Ponchartrain that he had concluded peace with the Iroquois, and the final ratification and exchange of prisoners would occur in August, 1701. Callieres also noted that he was particularly pleased at the outcome because the Iroquois were making peace despite English disapproval. Callieres added that he was even willing to accept the Iroquois as a neutral party (i.e. favoring neither the French nor the English), for he was confident that the Jesuits could eventually win the neutral Iroquois over to the French side.

Governor Callieres and other French officials had another reason to be pleased. For a long time, New France had considered establishing a fort at Detroit. However, the constant threat posed by the Iroquois had made most French officials leary of attempting that project. But the Iroquois peace treaty opened the way for the construction of Fort Detroit. According to La Mothe de Cadillac, the French officer who later became the commandant at Fort Detroit, the objections to the founding of Detroit based on the belief that it would cause a perpetual war with the Iroquois were "now removed by the peace which has been concluded with them. That tribe was not in a position to keep up the war any longer, and will not be able to begin it again very soon; therefore, there could not be a more suitable time for establishing Detroit, which will be fortified more quickly than the Iroquois can make up the loss of their numbers." Cadillac argued, "It is an incontestible fact that the strength of the Iroquois savages lies in the remoteness of the French, and that ours increases against them with our proximity. For
it is certain that, with a little Indian corn, these [Iroquois] people have no difficulty in traversing two hundred leagues to come and take someone's life by stealth. . . . But, on the contrary, when we are the neighbors of that tribe and are within easy reach of them, they will be kept in awe and will find themselves forced to maintain peace. . . . unless they wish to ruin themselves irretrievably."35

While the French were pleased that the Iroquois were at last concluding a peace, the English were not yet fully aware of the turn of events. By late November, Governor Bellomont had been informed by the Onondagas that they no longer wanted an English fort built in their town. Bellomont wrongly attributed their change of mind to the schemes of some Albany residents.36 Actually, the Onondagas did not want the fort because they felt they no longer needed protection from the French and Indians. If anything, they probably believed they had more to fear from the English in the coming months than former French and Indian enemies.

Throughout early 1701, there were signs that the Five Nations had approved of their deputies' actions and were determined to ratify the peace treaty with the French and Indians at the upcoming August conference. In March, Iroquois deputies arrived at Montreal and complained about violations of the peace on the part of some western tribes allied to New France. The Iroquois deputies told Governor Callieres that the Ottawas had attacked the Iroquois last October, despite the ceasefire agreed upon at the September conference. The Iroquois said, "This blow has undoubtedly been struck by some giddy brave; but till this [Ottawa] Nation disavows it, they are deemed to authorize it. Still, as you have
ordered us to apply to you should anything of the kind occur, we come to beg you to begin by having restored to us the Seneca chief who has been led away a prisoner to Michilimakinac." The French governor replied that he would try to settle the Iroquois-Ottawa dispute, and if possible, would order the return of the captured Seneca. This affair shows that the Iroquois did not wish to fight against the Ottawas. Instead, they relied upon the French governor as a mediator in the hope that the peace arrangements would not be ruined.

The Iroquois' decision to ratify the French peace agreement in August may also help explain why the Onondagas concluded a "lasting peace" with the Colony of Pennsylvania in April, 1701. It is likely that the Onondagas were concerned about how the English colonies would react to the Five Nations' peace treaty with New France. It is therefore conceivable that the Onondagas made a treaty of friendship with Pennsylvania in April to help offset any bad feelings on the part of the English that might develop after August.

By late spring English colonial officials were aware that the Five Nations were planning to sign a separate treaty with New France. The governor of Pennsylvania reported to his Council, on May 17, that "some of the Five Nations of Indians had sent an embassy to our Indians on the Delaware, requiring their aid and concurrings, and that it was suspected that the French of Canada had been endeavoring to debauch the said Indians from their fidelity to the Crown of England." The New York governor also suspected that the Iroquois were about to conclude a treaty of friendship with the French. In June he dispatched envoys to Onondaga to convince the Five Nations not to make a
separate peace with New France.

At about the same time Governor Callieres sent Father Bruyas, Joncaire, and another ambassador to Onondaga to remind the Iroquois about the ratification meeting scheduled for August. The three French ambassadors arrived only to find the English envoys already in the Iroquois village. Yet despite the presence of the Englishmen the three French ambassadors were greeted enthusiastically by the Iroquois people. Father Bruyas warned the League Council that if the Iroquois deputies did not attend the Montreal conference as promised, the Iroquois requests for peace would no longer be listened to by the French governor. The implied threat no doubt was obvious to the Iroquois sachems. Father Bruyas then reminded the Iroquois of their pledge to exchange all prisoners of war at the August meeting. Finally, he told them that a new French and English war might soon erupt, in which case they were to remain neutral.

The League Council then met in private to consider the two messages brought by the English envoys and the French ambassadors. Three days later they were ready to issue their answer. The English and French representatives were summoned before the Council, and Teganissorens (a leading member of the peace faction) was selected by the sachems to serve as the spokesman for the Five Nations. Teganissorens came right to the point. He said that the Five Nations would honor their promise to meet with Governor Callieres at Montreal in August and would then exchange prisoners of war. But then he added, "Five delegates are about to set out for Montreal, two others will go to Albany; I myself will remain on my mat, to show all the world that I take no side, and wish to preserve a strict neutrality."
The message was clear to both the French and English representatives. The Five Nations would negotiate with both sides. The League Council probably had several reasons for deciding to carry on simultaneous talks with the French and English. The Council was probably divided along factional lines. The sachems of the peace faction must have argued strenuously that the English could not prevent the Five Nations' total destruction should they renge on their pledge to ratify the peace agreement with the French and Indians. No doubt the pro-English sachems were just as insistent in their views that the Five Nations could not risk a total break with the English due to economic and military reasons. The decision to negotiate with both the French and English may have been the only alternative acceptable to all parties. Furthermore, the very nature of both the decision-making process and structure of the League of the Iroquois required compromise if they were to function at all. Therefore, it is little wonder that the League decided to send deputies to confer at Montreal and at Albany.

The League Council also may have had other motives for the decision. Perhaps some sachems believed that the Five Nations could play the French and English against each other, and in the process could extract concessions from each side. Moreover, some sachems may have hoped that a treaty with each could provide insurance against duplicity on the part of either the French or English.

Whatever their motivations, the decision was final. The Iroquois would carry out the promises made the previous September and send deputies to meet the French at Montreal in August. At the same time, the Iroquois would dispatch other deputies to talk with the English at Albany.
Early in July the three French ambassadors left Onondaga for Montreal. They were accompanied by deputies from the four upper Iroquois nations, plus around 200 Iroquois men, women, and children. The Mohawks promised that their deputies would follow shortly thereafter. At long last, the Five Nations were on their way to Montreal to ratify a general peace treaty with the French and Indians.

According to one French observer, the 200 Iroquois arrived on July 20, 1701, at the Catholic Iroquois village of the Sault, just outside of Montreal. As their canoes drew near, the Iroquois fired their guns in salute, and the Indians on the shore replied in kind. After spending the night at the Sault, the Iroquois left early the next morning for Montreal. There they were welcomed by the roars of cannons and greetings of French officials.

On July 22, the scene was repeated when 700-800 of New France's western and northern Indian allies arrived at Montreal. Again the French cannons and officers saluted their welcome. The Indians climbed from their canoes and soon went to work building temporary wigwams and shelters to house their delegates and people. Before long, a heterogeneous community of many tribes stood before the palisades of Montreal, where empty green fields had been only a few days earlier.

Yet despite their presence most of the deputies were not yet ready to ratify the Grand Peace Treaty. First they wanted to settle some complaints and questions with the governor. For the next few days, Callieres met with his Indian allies and talked over their grievances. He learned that many of these western and northern tribes did not want to make peace with the Iroquois. Nor did they want to return their
Iroquois prisoners of war. He also learned that many of the French allies were disgruntled, because the Iroquois had not brought or restored their prisoners, which showed a lack of good faith. 43

A Huron chief called Kondiaronk said, on behalf of all the French Indian allies, "My Father, you told us last autumn to bring you all the Iroquois prisoners in our hands. We have obeyed, and brought them. Now let us see if the Iroquois have also obeyed, and brought you our people whom they captured during the war. If they have done so, they are sincere; if not they are false. But I know that they have not brought them. I told you last year that it was better that they should bring their prisoners first. You see now how it is, and how they have deceived us." 44

In response to these attacks on their sincerity, an Iroquois spokesman replied that his nation had earnestly tried to return all prisoners, but had failed. According to the Iroquois, the young men of their villages had control of the prisoners. To further complicate the matter, "most of them were taken in childhood, did not know their own parents, and were attached to those who had adopted them." The French tribes made it known that they were not satisfied with the Iroquois' explanation, for they felt they had had the same problems, but returned the prisoners anyway. The Iroquois replied that they resented those who doubted their sincerity. 45 No doubt, it was clear to Governor Callieres that the prisoner issue was a definite obstacle in the way of a permanent peace.

Disease presented a second problem for the French governor. Throughout the conference, fever plagued the Indians, who were crowded
together in their makeshift villages. Many Hurons, including Kondiaronk, grew sick and died. Before long some Indians began to suspect witchcraft was to blame for the illness all around them. According to Charlevoix, "This affliction however obliged the Governor-General to hasten the conclusion of the treaty. All had been agreed upon in the private audiences, and it only remained to sign the articles and proclaim peace." Charlevoix explained that the governor "appointed the 4th day of August for the last general assembly, and wished nothing omitted to give the transaction all possible celebrity. A great plain without the city was selected: a double fence 128' long by 72' wide was erected, the space between being six feet. At one end there was a covered hall, 29' long and almost square, for the ladies and all the fashions of the town. The soldiers were drawn up around, and within the enclosure 1300 Indians were arranged in fine order." 

It must have been a fascinating sight for all those present. There were the French officers in their bright dress uniforms, replete with military decorations and highly polished buckles and implements. There were the French ladies and officials in their finest formal wear. And there were Indians from all over the eastern woodlands area. There were Iroquois from New York and Canada. Hurons and Ottawas from Michilimacinac. Weas from Chicago. Mascoutens, Sacs, Puants, Menominees, Foxes, Potawatomis, and Kickapoos from Green Bay. Crees from the north. Miamis and Mohegans from the St. Joseph River. Ojibwas from Lake Superior. And Illinois from the Illinois Country. There were also Abenakis from the east, as well as representatives from other scattered Indian bands from the Western Country and Canada. All these Indians
had come to ratify the Grand Peace Treaty. And like their white counterparts, they were also dressed in their finest attires.

The French governor began the conference with an address, in which he explained that the Grand Peace Council was convened to ratify the peace agreed upon the preceding September. Callieres then buried their war hatchets in a pit so deep that they could never be taken out. He told them that from then on they must all live like brothers and "if by chance one should strike another, the injured brother must not revenge the blow, but come for redress to him, Onontio, their common father."

Callieres' speech was then translated into several Indian languages, so it could be understood by all the tribes present. All of the Indians shouted their approval of Callieres' words. Wampum belts were then distributed to the Indian deputies, who rose in succession and delivered brief replies to the governor. The Indians allied to New France delivered up their Iroquois prisoners of war and said they were making peace merely to please Onontio. Charlevoix reported:

This ceremony, serious as it was to the Indians, was a kind of comedy to the French, who were greatly entertained. Most of the deputies, especially those of the more remote tribes, were dressed and adorned in a manner quite grotesque, contrasting curiously with the grave and serious demeanor they affected.

The Algonquin chief was dressed as a Canadian voyageur, and had his hair put up as a cock's head, with a red feather forming the crest and hanging down behind. . . . Onangauce /who apparently was a Sac who spoke for the Mississagas and Potawatomis/ wore the skin of the head of a young bull, the horns hanging over his ears. . . . While Miskouasouath, a Fox chief/ had his face painted red and wore an old rusty wig, profusely powdered and ill combed, which gave him an air at once frightful and ridiculous. As he had neither hat nor cap, and wished to salute the Governor-General in French style, he took off his wig. A great outburst of laughter followed, which did not disconcert him, for he doubtless took it as applause.
Most likely, the French were viewed in a somewhat similar manner by the Indians, who probably were quite entertained by the pretentiousness of the French gallery, costumes, and demeanor.

When the French Indians had finished their speeches, the Iroquois deputes rose to deliver their orations. One sachem maintained that the Iroquois "would convince the most incredulous of their fidelity, sincerity, and respect for their common father." The Iroquois added, "Onontio, we are pleased with all you have done, and we have listened to all you have said. We assure you by these four belts of wampum that we will stand fast in our obedience. As for the prisoners whom we have not brought you, we place them at your disposal, and you will send and fetch them."

The calumet of peace was then smoked by all the deputies. Next, the Grand Peace Treaty was brought forward and signed by all. Afterwards, huge kettles of boiled oxen were carried in, and a great feast began. The night ended with fireworks and salutes by cannon fire. It truly was an occasion for celebration, for the Twenty Years' War between the Iroquois and the French and Indians was over at last.

Governor Callieres met with the Iroquois deputes once more before their departure. On August 7, he impressed upon them that he would not stand for their reneging on the pledge to return all French and Indian prisoners of war. He ordered them to return those captives to Joncaire. If the prisoners then wished to remain in Iroquoia, they would be free to do so. Finally, Callieres reminded the Iroquois that they were to remain neutral should war break out again between the French and English. After complaining to no avail about the fort the French were building at
Detroit, the Iroquois agreed to comply with all the governor's requests. They then set out for their homelands. Shortly thereafter, the Mohawk deputies arrived at Montreal and ratified the peace treaty, as well as the other points that the deputies from the four upper Iroquois nations had agreed to earlier. According to Charlevoix, "Some time after, Joncaire arrived with very few prisoners, the others absolutely refusing to follow him. It was believed, or the authorities chose to pretend to believe, that this was no fault of the Iroquois, and there the matter rested." 50

At the very moment when the Iroquois deputies were en route to the Grand Council at Montreal, other Iroquois deputies were already in Albany negotiating with English officials. On July 14, 1701, the Iroquois deputies told New York's Lieutenant Governor John Nanfan, who had replaced the late Governor Bellomont, that the Five Nations had recently made peace with several tribes of western Indians. The Iroquois spokesman conveniently neglected to mention that the Iroquois-French Peace Treaty was responsible for the Iroquois peace with the western tribes. The Iroquois then informed the lieutenant governor that the Catholic Iroquois, who lived at Sault St. Louis outside of Montreal, refused to come home to Iroquoia.

The Iroquois deputies met again with Nanfan on July 19. They complained that the French were encroaching upon their territory and were building a fort at Troichsachronde (i.e. Detroit) without the Iroquois' consent. In a surprise move the Iroquois deputies then deeded to the English all their western hunting lands that lay north and south of Lake Erie between Iroquoia and Lake Huron. This was a territory
800 miles long and 400 miles wide. All the Iroquois asked in return was that the English guarantee them the right to hunt safely on those lands. Most likely, the Iroquois were looking ahead to the day when the French and western Indians might try to prevent Iroquois from hunting in the Western Country.

The Iroquois deputies then assured the lieutenant governor that the Five Nations had no love for the French Jesuits, and they again asked Nanfan to stop the French from building a fort at Detroit and from taking possession of their western hunting grounds.

The lieutenant governor accepted the Western Country on behalf of his King and promised to provide protection for Iroquois hunters in the West. The conference was then adjourned.51

The Iroquois-English Treaty made at Albany on July 19, together with the Iroquois-French Grand Treaty concluded in Montreal on August 4-7, comprise the Iroquois Peace Settlements of 1701. Collectively and individually, the settlements were important to the future of the Five Nations and signalled the beginning of a new era in Iroquois relations with their English, French, and Indian neighbors.

The most obvious result of the Grand Treaty signed at Montreal was that it brought an end to the Twenty Years’ War. The Iroquois had been fighting against the French and Indians since 1680, and the warfare, particularly during the last ten years, had been quite costly to the Five Nations. The conclusion of peace provided the Iroquois with a much needed respite and allowed them time to recover from the ravages of war and to reassess their policies toward both their Indian and white neighbors.
The Iroquois-French treaty also resulted in the movement of Indians into the Western Country. A major cause of the Twenty Years' War had been the Iroquois' insistence on exclusive hunting rights in the Western Country. But, after twenty years of fighting, the Iroquois were no longer in any condition to contest the hunting claims of other tribes. By signing the Grand Peace Treaty, the Iroquois in effect acknowledged the right of western and northern tribes to live and hunt on the western lands. Those tribes immediately took advantage of the Iroquois' concession and began to move southward and eastward toward better hunting and trade. The Hurons resettled the lands around Detroit, while the Miamis relocated on the Miami River. Other Indian tribes also moved deeper into the Western Country. By mid-century, the western lands once claimed exclusively by the Iroquois were the homelands of the Miami, Huron, Shawnee, Delaware, and other tribes.52

In addition, the Iroquois-French treaty provided for the exchange of prisoners between the Iroquois and the French and their Indian allies. Actually, the Iroquois received more prisoners than they gave up. Some historians have used that fact as proof that the Iroquois did not sincerely want peace or to show that the treaty was a victory for the Iroquois.53 Neither is necessarily true. Admittedly, the Five Nations never released the number of prisoners agreed to by their deputies. But that does not mean that the Iroquois were intentionally duping the French and Indians. It appears that the Five Nations did make an effort to comply with their deputies' promises. Most captives, though, refused to return to their original homes, and the League Council did not have the authority to order their removal from individual Iroquois families.
Those prisoners of war who did wish to go home were handed over to Joncaire, and he escorted them back to Canada. In short, the Iroquois Confederacy was unable, and not unwilling, to comply with the promises made by their deputies to release all prisoners of war.

Another important result of the Iroquois-French treaty was that it brought improved relations between the Iroquois and the French and Indians. In the years following the agreement the Iroquois developed better economic and political ties with both the French and the western tribes. The Iroquois later accepted French Jesuits into their villages. They began trading with the French at Fort Cataraqui and Montreal. They requested and received French smiths to mend guns and other implements in Iroquois villages. And they negotiated military and economic alliances with many of the western tribes. The Grand Peace of 1701 cleared the way for these improved relations.

A further result of the Iroquois-French treaty was that the Iroquois agreed to remain neutral in the event of renewed hostilities between the French and English. By doing so, the Iroquois received a French guarantee that their villages would be safe from French and Indian attacks. One Iroquois deputy remarked to Governor Callicieres, "We will be displeased if you reopen the war with the English, because you and they are both our friends, however if that should happen, we would leave you smoking peaceably on your mats; as you have asked us [i.e., the Iroquois would not interfere]."

The Iroquois-French treaty was significant for another reason. The decision to ratify the treaty probably helped calm the stormy waves of factionalism within the Confederacy. By 1701, certain groups, such
as the one led by Teganissorens, were determined to have peace with New France. Had the League Council opposed such measures, the result might have been increased factional strife within the Confederacy. Eventually the factionalism might have even brought about a division of the Five Nations similar to civil war. This was all prevented by the signing of the Grand Treaty at Montreal in 1701.

The treaty concluded between the Iroquois and the English at Albany was equally significant for the Five Nations. The English treaty had several important functions. First, the Iroquois hoped that the treaty would assure the continuance of peace with New York and the other English colonies. It is likely that some of the Iroquois were concerned about how the English would respond to the news that the Five Nations had signed a separate treaty with New France. The renewal of the Covenant Chain (i.e. the alliance between the English, Iroquois, and other pro-English Indian tribes) at Albany might have been done to demonstrate to the English that the Five Nations had no intention of abandoning their English alliance. To further their relationship with the English, the Iroquois deeded their western hunting lands to the English king. They also reiterated their contempt for the French. Most likely, each of the Iroquois actions was aimed at convincing the English that the Five Nations still considered themselves friends of the English and enemies of the French.

The Five Nations had another practical reason for negotiating a treaty with the English in 1701. The Iroquois hoped that the renewed English alliance would protect them against French duplicity or further threats by the western Indians. While the Iroquois deputies treated
with the English at Albany, they knew others of their nation were en route to Montreal to ratify a treaty that would open up the Western Country to the French and Indians. Therefore, the deputies at Albany desperately sought assurances that the English would protect all Iroquois hunters in the Western Country. The deputies achieved their goal by deeding those hunting grounds to the English in exchange for English promises to protect Iroquois hunters in the West. The Five Nations used the English in another way. They were aware that they could not prevent the French from building a fort at Detroit, so they asked the English to do it for them. In short, the Five Nations hoped that the Albany Treaty of 1701 would result in English actions that would contain French and Indian advances into the Western Country.

The treaty with the English also may have been a means to conciliate pro-English factions within the League. The pro-English sachems probably would not have consented to ratification of the French treaty had not the League Council agreed to treaty renewal with the English. In other words, the decision to sign simultaneous treaties with the English and French was a compromise by the League Council, aimed at conciliating all factions within the Confederacy. The existence of such determined pro-English groups would help answer several questions. It might explain why some of the Iroquois absolutely refused to give up French prisoners of war, as promised by the Iroquois deputies at Montreal. It might also account for the Mohawk deputies' tardiness in arriving at Montreal to ratify the French treaty. Since most of the Mohawks who lived in New York were staunchly pro-English, it seems likely that the Mohawk deputies were members of the Iroquois'
pro-English faction. Before leaving for Montreal, they could have stopped at Albany to make sure that the Iroquois Confederacy had renewed the Covenant Chain with the English. The Mohawks may not have been willing to ratify the French treaty until the English alliance was reconfirmed. The Mohawk deputies' presence at Albany on July 19 could explain why they were unable to reach Montreal before August 8. In any case, it seems likely that the Albany Treaty of 1701 placated the Iroquois' pro-English faction and enabled them to accept the treaty with New France.

The Settlements of 1701 were significant in several other ways. They are proof that the Five Nations had decided, by 1701, that it was no longer in their best interest to remain exclusive allies of the English. Instead the Iroquois planned to negotiate with both the English and the French and to accept whatever benefits each side had to offer. In subsequent years the Five Nations would perfect this technique to the point where they could play the French and English against each other in order to obtain what they wanted from each side.

The Settlements of 1701 are also important, because they are a sign that a new balance or equilibrium had been achieved by the various factions within the Confederacy. Pro-English factions no longer dominated the League Council. To be sure, they still existed, as evidenced by the Mohawks and Oneidas who were reluctant to ratify the French peace treaty, but they had been weakened by the ravages of war. For example, the Twenty Years' War was responsible for the deaths of many pro-English sachems. Also the heavy war losses and lack of English assistance had convinced many Iroquois that peace with New France was
the best alternative to ensure the future of the Confederacy. By 1701, the pro-French factions and peace factions had achieved such strength among the Five Nations that they no longer could be ignored. An indication of their strength is the fact that they were able to convince the League Council to negotiate a treaty with New France, despite English arguments to the contrary. That in itself is proof that pro-English sachems no longer controlled the League Council.

The Peace Settlements of 1701 are significant for another reason. In them can be found the origins of the Iroquois policy of neutrality. The 1701 treaties marked the first time that the Iroquois agreed to remain neutral in the event of an English-French war. It must be noted, however, that the Iroquois of later years did not always remain neutral. In each of the colonial wars of the eighteenth century, many of the Five Nations fought on the side of the English. Some even fought on the French side. Therefore, it would be erroneous and misleading to conclude that the Peace Settlements of 1701 established a permanent Iroquois neutrality. It would be more accurate to say that the Settlements of 1701 were a precedent for Iroquois neutrality. While the Iroquois of later years did not always adhere to the policy of neutrality, they did always consider it, for the Settlements of 1701 had established neutrality as a viable option.

The Settlements of 1701 were significant in two other ways. First, they showed that the Five Nations and the French both rejected English claims that the Iroquois were mere subjects of the King of England who could not conduct separate negotiations with New France. By concluding the Grand Treaty with New France, the Iroquois demonstrated to both the
English and the French that they were a sovereign Indian nation. Finally, the Settlements of 1701 helped set the stage for future colonial wars between England and France. By deeding their western hunting lands to the English King, the Iroquois gave the English a claim to the Ohio Country. When the French later contested the English claim to Ohio, war resulted.

The Settlements of 1701 marked the end of the final phase of the Twenty Years' War. From 1698 until 1701, the Iroquois had been under constant attack from the western Indians and had wanted to obtain peace, at almost any cost. But the Iroquois had found that they were trapped between two European giants. The French, with their Indians, demanded a separate peace or else they promised to annihilate the Five Nations. The English, on the other hand, warned the Iroquois that they would consider a separate Iroquois-French treaty a breach of the long-standing Covenant Chain Alliance between them. Caught in the middle, the Iroquois floundered for a few years. But in 1701, they found a solution. Out of necessity, the Five Nations simultaneously signed treaties with both sides. At long last, the Twenty Years' War was over.
Notes: Chapter 2


5 Colden, History, 101-104, 113-117; Hardcastle, 380,381; NYCD, IV, 16-18; Parkman, Frontenac, 223.

6 Trelease, Ind. Affairs, 311-323; Hardcastle, 380,381; NYCD, IV, 240, 294, 338.

7 NYCD, IV, 373; Parkman, Frontenac, 445-449.

8 NYCD, IV, 579.

9 Charlevoix, History, V, 100.

10 Livingston, 176; NYCD, IV, 693; Charlevoix, History, V, 100-101; NYCD, IV, 690.

11 Charlevoix, History, V, 100, 102.

12 NYCD, IV, 638.

13 NYCD, IV, 647, 648, 649.

14 NYCD, IV, 654-659.

15 NYCD, IX, 704.

16 Livingston, 176; NYCD, IV, 693.

17 Charlevoix, History, V, 99-102; NYCD, IV, 690.

18 Charlevoix, History, V, 101, 102.
19 NYCD, IX, 708.
20 NYCD, IX, 709.
21 NYCD, IX, 709; Charlevoix, History, V, 102-103.
22 Charlevoix, History, V, 99-103; NYCD, IX, 710-711.
24 Colden, History, 179.
25 NYCD, IX, 708-711; Charlevoix, History, V, 99-103.
26 Charlevoix, History, V, 103-104; Livingston, 180.
27 Livingston, 179; Charlevoix, History, V, 103-105; Pa. Archives, 2nd series, VI, 50.
28 Charlevoix, History, V, 105-108; Parkman, Frontenac, 441-442.
29 Wraxall, 34-35; NYCD, IV, 729, 735, 736.
32 NYCD, IX, 718-720; LaMontagne, Royal Ft. Fron., 200; Charlevoix, History, V, 109-110.
33 Charlevoix, History, V, 110-111; NYCD, IX, 720, IV, 798.
34 Misc. Hist'l Coll., XVI, 200; NYCD, IX, 711.
35 NYCD, IX, 711; MPJC, XXXIII, 97.
36 NYCD, IV, 783.
37 Charlevoix, History, V, 136.
40 Charlevoix, History, V, 138-140.
All decisions made by the Iroquois League Council had to be unanimous. Therefore, it is likely that many decisions had to be of a compromise nature in order to obtain the backing of the disparate groups on the Council. For a fuller explanation of unanimity on the League Council and the decision-making process, see Lewis Henry Morgan, League of the Iroquois (1851; rpt. Secaucus, New Jersey: The Citadel Press, 1972), 111-115.

Charlevoix, History, V, 141.

Parkman, Frontenac, 443-445; Charlevoix, History, V, 141-145.

Parkman, Frontenac, 444-445.

Charlevoix, History, V, 144-145.

Parkman, Frontenac, 445-447; Charlevoix, History, V, 148-149.

Parkman, Frontenac, 448.

Charlevoix, History, V, 150, 151.

Charlevoix, History, V, 152; Parkman, Frontenac, 450-451.

Parkman, Frontenac, 451; Charlevoix, History, V, 152-154; see also Baquessville de la Pothérie, Histoire de l'Amerique Septentrionale (Paris, 1722). The Montreal Treaty is described by La Pothérie in volume IV.

Wraxall, 39-41; NYCD, IV, 908, 888-906.

NYCD, VII, 583, 584; Randolph Downes, Council Fires on the Upper Ohio (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1940), 18, 19.


Charlevoix, History, V, 154.

For examples of improved relations, see: NYCD, IV, 1067, IX, 819; Wraxall, 46, 48, 52; MPHC, XXXIII, 328-330, 396; Cadwallader Colden, "History of the Five Indian Nations, for the years 1707-1720," in Collections of the New York Historical Society, volume 68 (New York: Little, Ives, and Company, 1937), 559.

Iroquois sachems to Governor Callieres, in A. Wallace, "Origins," 230.

Wraxall, 39-41.

59 See A. Wallace, "Origins."
Chapter 3: The Effects of the Twenty Years' War on the Iroquois

The peace settlements of 1701 brought the Twenty Years' War to an end. The French and English, in King William's War, had fought to a draw, but for the Five Nations there could be no stalemate. For the Iroquois the Twenty Years' War had been a thorough defeat. There would be no status quo ante bellum in Iroquoia. The Twenty Years' War was a turning point in Iroquois history. Prior to the war, the Iroquois had been a proud, powerful, and prosperous nation. After the war, they found themselves struggling for their very existence. The effects of the war on the Five Nations were quite apparent in the decades following the settlements of 1701.

To begin with, the military strength of the Iroquois had been broken by 1701. The constant warfare of the past twenty years had taken its toll, both physically and mentally, on the Iroquois. The strength of the Five Nations, measured in terms of manpower, diminished sharply as a result of their losses in the late war. Comparative studies of their population before and after the war list 2800 warriors in 1689 and only 1230 in 1698. First hand reports of the decreased power of the Iroquois also add credence to the theory that Iroquois strength had declined by the war's conclusion. In 1696 an Iroquois sachem stated to New York's Governor Fletcher, "We are become a small people and much lessened by the war." Governor Bellomont, in 1697, reported to the Lords of Trade that "the Five Nations are half-destroyed by this war." By 1699, Bellomont had concluded
that the Iroquois were "much disturbed and terrified by the French, which proceeds...from...their own decrease in number and strength being reduced from near 3500 men that they were at the beginning of the war, to about 1100 men now." Robert Livingston counted 1800 warriors among the Five Nations in 1712. This large increase was probably due to the Iroquois custom of adoption from other tribes, as well as natural increase. Yet even this growth in warriors was not large enough to offset the large numbers of western Indians who were repopulating the Western Country during these years. As late as 1722, New York's Governor Burnet realized that the "importance of the Iroquois had lessened due to the diminution of their numbers."  

Obviously, war casualties contributed greatly to the decrease in the Iroquois' population. There were, however, other contributing factors. Numerous Iroquois defected to the French side during the war. As early as 1693, Governor Fletcher mentioned "the staggering Indians of the Five Nations" who may be lost to the French. He then reported to the Commissioners of Trade that "our Indians are becoming very weary of the war and indifferent to us. The Mohawks are mostly destroyed by the war. Some of them run over to Canada."  

Robert Livingston, in a summary of his journey to Onondaga in 1700, stated that the Mohawks had grown weak and much lessened by the late war, but more since the peace by the French daily drawing them from us to Canada so that near two-thirds of said nation with their families are now actually at Canada with their families, who are kindly received, being clothed from head to foot, are secured in a fort guarded with soldiers, and have priests to instruct them...Two things are the principle cause of our Indian desertion. 1. Fear; seeing the French so formidable as to
destroy their cattle and we are not able to protect them.  
2. Our neglect of sending ministers among them to instruct 
them in their Christian faith.¹

Sickness and starvation also contributed to the decreasing popu-
lation of the Five Nations. At least two major smallpox epidemics swept 
through their villages in 1696 and 1717, reducing the number of warriors 
available for war. Lack of food, no doubt, also caused death for many 
Iroquois. The French made several successful forays into Iroquoia dur-
ing King William's War, burning villages and destroying food supplies 
as they went along. The New York colonists were able to provide the 
Iroquois with only a portion of the food supplies that had been 
destroyed. The scarcity of food during the winters of 1687, 1689, 
1694, and 1696 caused many Iroquois to die of starvation or lack of 
resistance to disease.⁵

The decrease in the Iroquois' population was only one reason for 
the decline of their fighting power. War-weariness was another. 
The Five Nations were tired of fighting and realized that their weaken-
ed position made them no match for the French and Indians. In a message 
to Governor Fletcher, an Onondaga sachem complained, "the Mohawks are 
as conquered, the Oneidas wavering, the Senecas have great force but 
more are inclined to beaver hunting than war, so the Onondagas lie in 
the greatest danger. You hear in your ears the cry of the women and 
children for the loss of their husbands and relations. Where is the 
help promised by the British?" ⁶

On other occasions the Iroquois were described as being in a 
"staggering condition," and "weary of war," or "discouraged by the lack 
of British help," and "terrified of the French." ⁷ Perhaps Robert
Livingston, in his message to the Lords of Trade, best captured the
defeatist attitude that permeated Iroquoian thought in 1703. Livingston
informed the Lords of Trade that for the past two years the Iroquois
had been "pressing upon him to come over to England and give your
Lordships an account of their condition." Livingston portrayed them
as a dejected people, "The late war and the great loss which they sus-
tained in their youth hath almost dispirited them, and during the peace
the French...have tried...to gain them to their side, or to terrify
them...of French power."8

The Twenty Years' War also was responsible for the destruction
of the Iroquois' economy, which was based largely on the fur trade.
During the war, the Iroquois were unable to go on regular hunts, for
they had to remain in Iroquoia to protect their families, villages,
and crops from the enemy. The fierceness of the French Indians in
the Western Country also made hunting there a dangerous proposition
for the Iroquois, who were at one time recognized as the sole possessors
of hunting rights in that area. Following the peace settlements of
1701, the Iroquois still could not hunt freely in the West. Their
homelands were still not completely safe from attack since the French
and Indians were involved in Queen Anne's War against the English,
who were allies of the Five Nations. No one could assure the Five
Nations that the war would not spread onto the New York frontier. In
addition the French Indians sometimes violated the truce of 1701, and
therefore posed a dangerous problem to any Iroquois who attempted to
hunt in the West. The illegal Montreal-Albany trade also was developing
during these years. Through this trade, the French obtained English
goods that enabled them to increase their trade with the western Indians. All of these factors combined to produce bad economic results for the Iroquois. The increased English-French-Indian trade meant increased competition for the furs of the West. At the same time, the weakened Iroquois feared sending hunting parties to the western lands. The end result was a diminution in the English-Iroquois fur trade at Albany. This spelled economic depression for the Five Nations.

Several accounts substantiate the bad economic times that had befallen the Iroquois. In 1693, signs of poverty already were evident among the Five Nations. In a letter to a high English official, Governor Fletcher stated that the Iroquois were dejected and "we have quite lost our fur trade." On June 15, a sachem requested English aid from the governor and added, "We are a mean poor people and have lost all by the enemy."

Frontenac's invasion of Iroquoia in 1696 further weakened the Iroquois economy. One French official noted:

assistance from the English [For the Iroquois], especially in provisions, comes in less abundantly. . . . The Mohawks have very little Indian corn; the Oneidas are ruined; and it is not known whether the Senecas will not remember the high price the Onondagas set on provisions at the time of their discomfort. . . . There remain then only the Cayugas who can succor their neighbors, and we cannot say if they alone are sufficient for that purpose. Their hunting and fishing will, without doubt, be interrupted by the different small parties now in the field. In fine, it is certain, by continuing the war as at its commencement, and as Count Frontenac determined, the Iroquois will be reduced to the necessity of dying of hunger, or accepting peace on the conditions we may think proper to impose on them."
The English were also cognizant of the Iroquois' plight. The Lords of Trade were advised in 1696 that "It is necessary to keep the Five Nations loyal. The best method of achieving this is by renewing the covenant chain... by giving presents to them, which at this juncture would be most grateful and acceptable to the Indians, who are now very poor, because the war has disturbed and prevented their beaver hunting by which they mostly subsist."12

Information sent to England during that same year by an ex-army chaplin shed further light on the depressed Albany-Iroquois trade. He told the Commissioners for Trade and the Plantations that the trade of Albany was mostly beaver and "formerly it may have been to the value of 10,000 [English pounds] a year, but is now decayed by reason of war between our Indians and the French." In 1697, Philip Schuyler, one of New York's Commissioners of Indian Affairs, noted that the Cayuga were in a state of poverty and requested powder and supplies from the English for protection.13

The reluctance of the Five Nations to go out hunting was explained in a letter from Robert Livingston to Lord Bellomont in 1699. Livingston reported that the Albany trade had been ruined, not only during the war, but also since peace had returned. He added, "The occasion of all which difficulties and defects of trade I humbly conceive to proceed from the French's instigation of the far Indians to be in a continued war with our Five Nations and threatening them that if they should hunt on the other side of the lake they would be destroyed by the French Indians."14
The Iroquois economy continued its downward trend throughout the early years of the eighteenth century. New York's Governor Bellomont, in 1700, wrote to the Lords of Admiralty, "I have been told that in one year when this province was in possession of the Dutch, there were 66,000 beaver skins exported from this town [New York City], and this last year there was but 15,241 beaver skins exported. . . . Tis a sign of our Five Nations being mightily diminished, but that is not all, that commodity is grown almost quite out of use, which is of ill consequence, for [if] it falls in price in England, it must necessarily do [the same] here. . . . [This] is a great discouragement [to the Five Nations]." 

Along with the decrease in the demand for beaver, there were other factors that contributed to the Iroquois' economic dilemma. Many Iroquois believed that the French and western Indians were hindering Iroquois hunters in the Western Country. In 1701, several Iroquois sachems complained to New York officials that the French were about to take control of the Iroquois' best hunting lands in the West. Similar complaints were made in 1708. The Iroquois were also leary of the designs of the western tribes. In 1704, a group of Oneidas told Albany leaders that a war with the western Indians had prevented most of the Oneida men from hunting in the Western Country.

Iroquois hunters had other reasons for staying at home. Sometimes the men of the Five Nations were reluctant to go out hunting, because they feared a possible French and Indian attack on their villages while they were away. On other occasions they stayed home at the request of New York neighbors, who were apprehensive about a supposed enemy attack.
In either case the result was the same. Without the furs or peltry, which were the products of the hunt, the Iroquois people had no purchasing power and were relegated to either accepting poverty or asking for help. In 1708, several Iroquois sachems explained to the New York Commissioners of Indian Affairs that since Iroquois men had stayed home at the request of the New York government, "we are poor, therefore we desire you will order our guns and axes to be mended free." Other Iroquois made similar requests. On August 13, 1710, a sachem of the Five Nations told New York's Governor Hunter:

\[\text{Witness}^\text{our poor and mean condition, occasioned by our people being kept all last year and last winter from hunting to be ready on all occasions to assist our brethren as well in the intended expedition against Canada as to oppose the French if they should have offered to make any attempt upon this government, and so have caught no beavers or peltry to supply our necessities, do therefore pray that your excellency will be pleased to order that our hatchets, kettles, and guns may be mended upon the public charge, especially since this our poverty has been occasioned merely by our obedience and fidelity to this her Majesty's government. This supplication is made with a sorrowful heart and with tears in our eyes by all the Five Nations.}\]

The reasons given by the sachem in the preceding speech for the Iroquois' decision to remain at home during the 1709-10 hunting season are questionable. Perhaps the Iroquois' fear of hunting in the Western Country or of leaving their homes unprotected in the wake of rumors of a French and Indian invasion of New York may have contributed to the decision; or maybe the sachem's speech was devised to obtain English aid in return for the Five Nations' display of loyalty toward the English. In any event the fact remains that the Iroquois were in a state of poverty during those years because they did not send out hunting parties to the Western Country.
The high prices and scarcity of goods at Albany also contributed to the Iroquois' poor economic conditions. The Iroquois repeatedly complained about the trading practices of the Albany merchants. On August 14, 1706, sachems of the Five Nations met with the New York Commissioners of Indian Affairs to register a formal grievance about the high cost of gunpowder. Two years later the Commissioners reported that the Iroquois complained "of the little regard of late had been shown and the want of care of their affairs and the dearness of powder for which reasons they were now like to lose their sense and reason."  

The Five Nations sometimes went directly to the governor of New York for help. On June 10, 1711, several sachems asked Governor Hunter for cheaper goods and powder and warned that if their requests were not granted, they would soon be "as poor as dogs." Later that year the Iroquois again reminded the governor that the Five Nations would not be able to survive unless they received cheaper goods and powder from the English. According to Cadwallader Golden, the Iroquois demonstrated their displeasure with the Albany traders at a public conference on September 8, 1711. Golden wrote, "They [the Iroquois] said they were barbarously used by the extravagant price demanded for goods at Albany especially for powder and lead without which they could not defend their country. If we (they said) shall be destroyed, you will not be able to defend yourselves as little as we can subsist without you."  

At another conference the following year an Iroquois sachem complained to a New York official once again about the high costs of goods and demanded lower prices or "we should become a defenseless
people, fall a prey to our enemies, and our union be dissolved." 20

The Twenty Years' War also affected Iroquoian society. The war-weakened Iroquois seemed to become paranoid in the years immediately following the war. Wild rumors of English plots to extirpate the population of the Five Nations traveled quickly from one castle to another. Incredible stories of purported French and English designs on the Iroquois' homelands were constantly being passed among the tribesmen. Even their fellow league members became subjects of suspicion. Tales of witchcraft and treachery circulated from village to village. In their militarily and economically weakened condition, the Five Nations felt vulnerable to all possible dangers and fell prey to even the most far-fetched rumors of apocalyptic destruction. These fears were evident in Iroquoia as early as 1699. In that year Lord Bellomont reported to the Lords of Trade that rumors were running rampant in Iroquoia that the English were making plans to disarm and destroy the Iroquois. Later that year an Onondaga sachem expressed his fears to Peter Schuyler that the Iroquois would soon be exterminated by a French and English conspiracy. 21

In 1700, Schuyler and the other Indian Commissioners reported that the Iroquois were afraid of rumors that told of French plans to build forts in Iroquoia and Lord Bellomont's plans to massacre them. A "Representation of the Lords of Trade Concerning New York in 1700" maintained that the French were responsible for spreading the rumors among the Iroquois that the English sought to extirpate them by poisoning them and withholding gunpowder from them. These rumors had become so serious that the Iroquois were wavering in their support for
The historian Francis Parkman also believed that the French originated many of the rumors that shook Iroquoia. According to Parkman, these stories had great effect. He wrote, "The Iroquois capital, Onondaga, was filled with wild rumors. The credulous savages were tossed among doubts, suspicions, and fears. Some were in terror of poison, and some of witchcraft, they believed that the rival European nations had leagued together to destroy them and divide their lands, and that they were bewitched by sorcerers, both French and British."23

In 1709, Lawrence Claase, an interpreter for the New York government, notified the Indian Commissioners at Albany that "the Senecas are in a great confusion amongst themselves and that most of them have a design to leave their country but know not as yet where they shall settle."24 Apparently the Senecas were frightened by rumors that the English would soon kill them to steal their land.

Perhaps the paranoia of the Five Nations reached its peak in 1714 when an Iroquois sachem made the following appeal to New York's Governor Hunter: "We have heard that the Christians of this government, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, and the rest... have concluded to cut the Five Nations and this we have not received by word of mouth only but by two belts of wampum... notwithstanding all these evil reports, we have ventured our lives to come hither to this conference with the governor and it is in your power to kill us if you please."25 Governor Hunter replied that the rumors were nonsense. But the Iroquois could take no chances. In their war-weakened condition, any story was believable and could possibly mean the end of the once mighty Iroquois
people.

In contrast to their illusory fears about French and English conspiracies, the Iroquois did have to cope with two serious threats to their existence. The western Indians and the French provided real reasons for fear. King William's War had established the western tribes as a menacing foe to the Iroquois. Prior to the war the Five Nations had dominated both the Western Country and the western Indians. Their relentless attacks had forced the western tribes to flee to safer lands and had won for the Iroquois the title of "the scourge of the West." The mere sight of a lone Iroquois hunter had sometimes been enough to send entire villages into panic. But the Twenty Years' War brought changes to the lords of the Western Country. The Iroquois had declined in strength and prosperity and were poorly armed by their English allies whereas their western enemies had grown in strength and had been trained and well-equipped by the French. The numerous western tribes had organized to focus their newly-obtained power on the fading warriors of the Five Nations. The results were unfamiliar to the Iroquois. For the first time in their recent history, the Iroquois were the hunted and Iroquoia was the arena. They now lived in daily fear of the scourge from the West.

The Cayugas realized in 1697 that they needed English assistance to protect them from the western Indians. A Cayuga spokesman told Peter Schuyler, "We are in poverty and we are menaced by the French and Miamis, both our enemies. We beg that you'll please to assist us with powder and lead that we may be capacitated to defend ourselves."26
Before the Twenty Years' War, no Iroquois had to fear hunting in
the Western Country. Yet, by 1699, the Five Nations, according to
Schuyler, were quite worried about 600 western Indians who were waiting
to ambush them in their hunting grounds on Lake Erie. The Iroquois la-
ter complained:

We sustain great damage daily by the far Indians which
is all done by the instigation of the French... You
tell us if any Indians do us harm in our hunting, we are
to repel force with force, which we will do, but with all
desire your assistance and arms, for the Ottawas are daily
upon our coasts, no longer than today we have an account
of several of the enemy being seen with two days journey of
this Ondadora castle, therefore we pray that some
ammunition may be delivered us, fearing that many of our
people are already killed in their beaver hunting.27

The Twenty Years' War apparently weakened the Iroquois and
strengthened the western tribes to the point where the Iroquois could
no longer defeat those Indians by themselves. This was evidenced in a
plea made by an Iroquois sachem to Governor Bellomont in 1700 "to de-
fend our people from the Dowaganhaes, Twichtwichi, and other nations over whom the French have an influence, and who have been en-
couraged by the French to destroy abundance of our people ever since
the peace between the two crowns."28

Prior to the Twenty Years' War the Iroquois were the ones who pro-
claimed war or peace against their western neighbors, but after the war
the Five Nations lacked this control in their dealings with the western
Indians. The Senecas stated in 1705 that they had received information
that several of the western nations had taken up the hatchet against
them. This declaration of war was not wanted by the Iroquois. Further
lack of control over neighboring tribes was evidenced in 1710, when
the New York governor asked the Five Nations if they could stop French Indians from committing atrocities on the New England frontier. The Iroquois replied that there was nothing they could do. In fact, they had all they could do just trying to prevent the western Indians from committing similar atrocities in Iroquoia. Finally, the Iroquois, not the western Indians, appeared to be the ones calling for peace in 1710. The Five Nations admitted to Governor Hunter that they were weary of the constant attacks by the western tribes, and they had asked the governor of Canada to intervene on their behalf. 29 This Iroquois plea for peace was indicative of the changing times. Prior to the Twenty Years' War the western tribes were always the first to yield. Following the war it was the Iroquois who sought peace.

The French, like the western Indians, also posed a threat to the Iroquois' existence. The Iroquois, before the war, had usually held their own against New France. When it was to their advantage, the Five Nations would even attack French travelers in the Western Country. Before 1680, the Iroquois respected French power, but hardly feared it. But after the war, things changed. The Iroquois had been battered by the French and Indians and were no longer a match for either one. To incur the wrath of the French after 1700 was the same as asking for the destruction of the Five Nations. Iroquois' respect for French power was joined by an immense fear of it.

The Iroquois made this fear known to New York Governor Bellomont on numerous occasions throughout 1698 and 1699. To insure their security and protection the Five Nations even asked the English to build forts and station troops within Iroquoia. This in itself was a drastic
change in Iroquois policy. Before 1680, the Iroquois were strong and proud, and they guarded their territorial integrity by refusing to allow English forts on their land. Their weakness after 1700 convinced the Five Nations that their position on forts within Iroquoia had to be altered. Sometimes the Iroquois' fear of French power even motivated them to cooperate with their former enemies. The Albany Indian Commissioners reported in 1706 that some of the Iroquois were trading with the French and raiding the Catawba Indians of Carolina at French insistence. The Commissioners believed that the Iroquois were cooperating with the French, because they were either afraid of or enamored by French power and diplomacy.30

Drunkenness was another problem gnawing at the fibre of Iroquois society following the Twenty Years' War. It would be unrealistic to attribute the drinking problems of the Iroquois Indians solely to the outcome of the Twenty Years' War. But it may be reasonable to assume that the fall of this once mighty and wealthy Indian nation to their weakened and impoverished post-war status did contribute to their fondness for liquor. In any event, the high consumption of alcohol in Iroquoia after the war did weaken the Five Nations. Throughout the early 1700s, the Iroquois constantly complained to New York officials about their drinking problems. In 1710, an Iroquois spokesman protested to Peter Schuyler, "It is your fault. We often desired that rum might not be sold to Indians, that the beaver given to enforce that request if they were laid on a heap would almost reach to the clouds, and we think you sell it with no other design than in order
to destroy us. . .Our young Indians are ungovernable when they get drunk, unspeakable are the mischiefs which arise from rum."

Unfortunately for the Iroquois, mischief was not the only result of their drinking. In many cases, drinking seems to have brought more serious problems to the surface. An Iroquois sachem told Governor Hunter in 1710 that liquor was causing many problems in the villages of the Five Nations and unless it was prohibited, it might lead to a civil war and a breakup of the Confederacy. A similar warning was given by several sachems to the Albany Indian Commissioners on June 15, 1716.32

King William's War and its aftermath also contributed to the despair of the Iroquois in the early 1700s. During the war many of their homes had been smashed and burned, and the English had done little to help them.33 The Iroquois realized that they were on their own. They also knew that they could do little to protect themselves if war should start up again. Those realizations may have added to the despair that was so visible throughout their villages during the early 1700s. On one occasion, Governor Bellomont described the Iroquois as "very sullen and cold being under much discontent by reasons of their sufferings during the war, for want of necessary succors, and the loss of 94 of their men by the French Indians since they had notice of peace."34 On a later occasion in 1700, Robert Livingston visited the Iroquois and found them quite dismayed. He reported that the Iroquois were depressed and feared the French so much that they might go to live in Canada.35

Iroquois society and culture were further weakened by the advent of French Catholicism. Many Iroquois abandoned their native beliefs
and accepted the new religion peddled throughout Iroquoia by the French Jesuits, whom the Indians called the Black Gowns. Equally devastating to Iroquois society was the fact that many Iroquois families broke up as the converts flocked to missions in Canada.

Jesuits began visiting Iroquoia in hopes of converting the Five Nations as early as the 1640s. The government of New France utilized the missionaries for political, as well as religious, purposes. The French official D'Aigremont explained in 1703 how the Black Gowns could be used to secure the Iroquois to the French cause: "These Iroquois Indians like the Jesuits... better than the Recollects; thus it would be necessary to give them a Jesuit as missionary to lead them, through the principles of religion, to be loyal to the French King." The Jesuits met with success in both the religious and political arenas. Between 1680 and 1714, they baptized many Iroquois and convinced some of them to move to missions in Canada. There the converted Iroquois came to be known as the Christian or Praying Iroquois. No doubt, some of the converts moved to the Canadian missions for materialistic or political reasons. Yet, many Iroquois were true believers in the gospel preached by the Black Gowns. One such convert was described in 1696 by Father Jacques de Lamberville. With macabre pride, Lamberville informed a colleague:

You will... be pleased to hear what happened to a Christian Iroquois of our mission at the Saut, named Marguerite, who was captured and burned... in Iroquois country... In the first place, they deprived her of several of her fingers and slashed her all over the body, while she uttered not a groan... At times, she addressed herself to God, at others to the Blessed Virgin; and, at others still, she exhorted her Iroquois countrymen to embrace the faith. After her
whole body had been burned and her scalp was removed, and she was untied, instead of running hither and thither, captives who are burned generally do, she knelt once more at the foot of the stake, where, while she continued her prayers, her torturers struck her on the head several times with bare to make an end of her; but in vain. This made the spectators say that, in derision, that Christians could not be killed, and that they were only spirits...they finally brought her martyrdom to an end by fire.

The Jesuits succeeded in establishing missions in Canada and Iroquoia. By 1681, some Iroquois converts were living at the Mission of the Mountain near Montreal. Three years later New York’s Governor Dongan reported that over 600 Iroquois had been converted by the Jesuits and had moved to Canada. Most of these Praying Iroquois settled at the Sault St. Louis mission near Montreal. In 1687, Dongan complained to the Committee on Trade that the French had priests among the Five Nations and had converted many "and the Jesuits do their utmost to draw them to Canada, to which place there are already 6 or 700 retired and more like to do, to the great prejudice of this government if not prevented." The governor added that the Praying Iroquois would return to New York only if he granted them land at Saratoga, built them a church, and provided them with priests.

Dongan was unable to meet their demands, so the Praying Iroquois stayed in Canada, and the missions continued to grow. In 1711, the Jesuit Joseph Germain described Sault St. Louis as follows: "one of the oldest and largest missions that we have, consisting of 5 or 600 Iroquois. These are families who have left their own country, because they were not free to form a church and to lead a Christian life there, on account of the insults offered by their infidel countrymen and the English."
The Jesuits were equally successful in establishing missions within Iroquoia. Governor Dongan, in his 1684 report on the state of the New York province, noted that Jesuits had established missions among the Five Nations and had converted many Iroquois to French Catholicism. One of the most influential Jesuits living in Iroquoia was Father de Lamberville, who established a mission at Onondaga, the capital of the Iroquois Confederacy. From this centrally-located position, Lamberville could baptize many Iroquois, as well as monitor and affect the workings of the League Council, which convened at least once a year at Onondaga. Father Millet served similar functions at his Oneida mission. Robert Livingston reported in 1693 that Father Millet "hath not only an absolute authority and power over the [people] of Oneida where he resides, but a great sway over all of the Five Nations by his emissaries who he constantly employs for the French interest." Livingston added that due to the Jesuit Millet, "many of our [Iroquois] Indians daily desert and run over to the enemy, particularly four Mohawks whom people put great confidence in are upon pretense to go and fight the enemy run over to the French being now seen at Montreal by the Jesuit's messenger."41

Though the missionaries frequently fled to Canada during times of war to avoid capture by the English or pro-English Iroquois, they usually returned to their missions when the fighting was over and resumed their religious and political activities. For example, at the conclusion of the Twenty Years' War, Father de Lamberville reoccupied his mission at Onondaga, while Fathers Carnier and Vaillant reopened the
missions among the Senecas. By 1707, the Iroquois missions were again flourishing. According to Cadwallader Colden, "Lawrence Claase the interpreter was kept constantly at Onondaga [during 1707] to prevent the mischiefs which were apprehended from the French and Jesuits that were settled among the Five Nations." 42

The success of both the Canada and Iroquois missions affected the Five Nations in several ways. The introduction of the new religion undoubtedly undermined the Iroquois' native beliefs and customs. Moreover, the defection of converts to missions in Canada meant the splintering of Iroquois society. Clans and families broke up as the Praying Iroquois moved northward. The exodus of the Christian Iroquois accounted, in part, for the dwindling population of the Five Nations. Finally, the adherence to French Catholicism by some Iroquois sharpened factional lines and led to further division within Iroquois society.

The Twenty Years' War also placed a heavy burden on the political structure of the League of the Five Nations. The strength of the French and Indians intimidated many Iroquois to the extent that they favored rapprochement with their former enemies. Governor Dongan, in 1687, was aware that many Iroquois wanted closer ties to the French; so he recommended to those Iroquois who were still loyal to the English that they not be misled by the "traitors." 43

The pro-French faction among the Five Nations was also noticed by Robert Livingston, who recorded a 1689 meeting between the Five Nations and colonial agents from Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Connecticut. According to Livingston, several Iroquois sachems requested a private audience with the agents, because they did not want the other sachems,
who were pro-French, to know about their decision to attack the Abenakis, who were French allies. By the mid-1690s, the pro-French faction of the Five Nations was trying desperately to obtain peace with New France. Nine pro-French Iroquois deputies arrived in Quebec in 1694 to talk peace with Governor Frontenac. In 1697, a pro-French Cayuga named Oureouhare assured Frontenac that his tribe sincerely wanted peace. Finally, in 1699 and 1700, a majority of the Iroquois agreed to a peace treaty with New France. That conclusion of peace was anticipated by the English. In 1700, the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs had informed the New York Council that the Iroquois were negotiating a settlement with the French and that several pro-French factions could be found among the Five Nations.

The Jesuits were responsible for bringing many Iroquois over to the French side. In 1694, Major Schuyler of New York informed Governor Fletcher that the Jesuit Millet had great power over the Oneidas. Robert Livingston noted in 1703 that the French priests played upon the fears of the Iroquois to cause many defections to Canada and factions among those who remained behind. From time to time, the French were even able to get the Praying Iroquois to attack their Iroquois kin.

Some Iroquois, however, opposed closer ties with the French and wished to remain loyal to the English. In 1694, several sachems of the Five Nations assured Albany officials that they did not agree with the Oneidas' attempts to make a separate peace with New France. Later, in 1697, many pro-English Iroquois expressed their displeasure when they learned that several Oneida families had defected to Canada. The following year, some Iroquois sachems reaffirmed their allegiance to
the English and reassured the Albany officials that the Iroquois who had met recently with the governor of Canada did not have the authority to speak for the Five Nations. Even after the French peace treaty was ratified by the League Council, many individual Iroquois refused to comply with all terms of the agreement. For example, some Iroquois would not return prisoners of war, as stipulated by the treaty.46

Factionalism continued to be a problem after the conclusion of the Twenty Years' War. Some of the Five Nations remained loyal to their English allies. They depended on the English for trade. They listened to English advice and tried to convince the Praying Iroquois to return to their original homes in Iroquoia. Some of these pro-English Iroquois spied on the French for the English, and on occasion, many pro-English Iroquois even joined the English in war against New France.47 The pro-French faction among the Iroquois was equally active during the early years of the eighteenth century. This faction was determined to keep peace with New France. Many of the pro-French Iroquois converted to Catholicism and listened with enthusiasm to the advice given by the Jesuits who were stationed in Iroquoia. The pro-French Iroquois traded with the French. They served as French spies in Iroquois villages. At times they even joined French and Indian war parties against other Indian tribes.48 The pro-French faction also got along splendidly with French visitors to their villages. According to the Jesuit Charlevoix, Joncaire was perhaps the most highly regarded Frenchman among the Iroquois. Charlevoix said, "The missionaries doubtless contributed [to maintaining the Iroquois-French peace]. . . . but they were greatly aided by the good conduct of the Sieur Joncaire,
and the harmony maintained with them by that officer. Joncaire, adopted by the Senecas and highly esteemed by the Onondagas, kept moving constantly from one canton to the other; he informed the missionaries of everything, . . and thus succeeded in baffling all the plans . . . of the English. He charmed the Iroquois by his frankness; he spoke their language as well as they, a thing that gratified the Iroquois wonderfully. 

Factionalism was probably indigenous to Iroquoian culture and had its roots in the long-standing family or group rivalries so commonly found among Indian tribes. What was significant, though, was the impact that this heightened factionalism had on the Five Nations.

Factionalism weakened the Iroquois. By 1709, French and English factions could be found among all the Five Nations. The Senecas and Onondagas were especially noted for their influential pro-French factions. These factions divided the Iroquois people and made it difficult for them to agree on a policy during war or peace. For example, after 1701, the Five Nations were unable to put forth a united position concerning the construction of the French fort at Detroit, that guarded an important passage to their hunting grounds. Some of the Five Nations adamantly opposed the fort. They complained to the French government and even asked the English to help them do away with that French threat. Other Iroquois, who were pro-French, actually welcomed the construction of Fort Detroit. In 1701, Father Vaillant, a Jesuit stationed at Fort Frontenac, wrote to La Mothe Cadillac to inform him that many Iroquois were pleased with the new fort at Detroit. Vaillant added, "Some even testified to me their joy that, when going out hunting on Lake Erie,
they will find at Detroit \[\text{in exchange}\] for the skins of the Roebuck, starr, and kind, all they want. Hence you will now only have to think of the means of providing goods there in \[\text{sufficient}\] quantities and cheap."^{52}

Had the Iroquois been united in their opposition to the building of Fort Detroit, the French, not wanting to alienate the Five Nations, might have stopped construction of the fort. As it was, the Iroquois could not agree, and their division led Cadillac to remark, "The apprehension that has been felt or pretended concerning this \[\text{Iroquois}\] tribe is ill-founded."^{53}

Factionalism, however, also created conditions that enabled the Iroquois to strengthen themselves. The existence of strong factions meant that neither the pro-English or pro-French factions could dominate the League Council. The Confederacy was forced, therefore, to adopt a middle or compromise policy. This led the Five Nations to a policy of neutrality between the French and English, which in turn provided the Iroquois with years of peace that gave them the opportunity to restore their power and prosperity. The existence of factions also kept the English and French guessing about the direction the League would take. In effect, the League of the Five Nations, due to the political stands of the opposing factions, was brought into a balance between its two European neighbors. At times, when the pro-French faction was dominant, the Confederacy tilted in favor of the French; at other times, when the pro-English faction grew in strength, the League leaned back toward the English. The English and French were forced to contribute gifts and supplies to ensure the Iroquois' friendship and
the continuance of the policy of neutrality.

Overall, factionalism continued to be a problem among the Five Nations throughout the early 1700s. The tensions caused by the opposing factions sometimes threatened to uproot the League’s symbolic Great Tree of Peace, whose shade had brought friendship and brotherhood among the Five Nations since the inception of the Confederacy. Most of the problems that divided the Iroquois centered upon what attitudes the League members should assume toward the French, the Jesuits, the English, and neighboring Indian tribes. Some Iroquois remained loyal to their long-time English allies, but the many defeats suffered at the hands of the French and Indians during the Twenty Years' War persuaded most Iroquois to adopt either a pro-French or neutral position after 1700.

The preceding overview of the Iroquois in the early years of the eighteenth century shows that the Twenty Years' War had a deleterious impact on the Five Nations. The war was responsible for weakening the Iroquois both militarily and economically. Furthermore, the causes of other Iroquois problems such as their paranoid fears of the English, their fear of the French and Indians, their strained political structure, the drunkenness, the depression, and the rise in factionalism all can be directly or indirectly traced back to the Twenty Years' War. The war left the Iroquois in a vulnerable and precarious position. Before long both the friendly English and the not-so-friendly French and Indians would begin to take advantage of the down-trodden Iroquois.
The decline of the Iroquois was significant in several ways. First, their decline in power resulted in their loss of the Western Country to the French and their Indian allies. The weakened status of the Iroquois facilitated the implementation of a new plan by the French to take possession of the Western Country. After 1700, the French began erecting forts at strategic locations throughout the West. These posts served three basic functions. First, they were visible symbols of the French claim to the Western Country based upon the first instance of discovery and the principle of occupation. Secondly, the posts served as agencies to keep the western tribes loyal and to prevent the Iroquois from reestablishing their control over the West. Lastly, some of the forts were designed to serve as points of departure for expeditions seeking to uncover mines or the Northwest Passage.

In 1700, a strong warehouse with an attached fort was constructed at Michilimackinac. The next year Fort Detroit was established at an important pass which led into Lake Huron and the rich fur regions of Michigan. This fort gave France the key to the upper Great Lakes country. The occupation of the Illinois territory was the next step in the French plan. Kasaskias, or Fort St. Louis, was founded on the Illinois River in 1700. The western Indians were then encouraged to settle near one of the French forts for both trading and security purposes. These western outposts, together with the strategic Fort Niagara which was established around 1720, intimidated the Iroquois and inhibited them from hunting freely in the Western Country.

The western tribes also contributed to the demise of Iroquois control over the Western Country. By the end of the Twenty Years' War
these tribes had developed their war skills to the extent that they no longer could be bullied by the Five Nations. In the previous century the Iroquois had expelled these tribes from their homelands. But now the western tribes were returning to reclaim their territories, knowing that the weakened Iroquois could do little to stop them. As early as 1699, the Iroquois complained to the governor of New York that their hunters were being killed by the western Indians. The Iroquois feared that "our Indians will soon be destroyed." Bellomont, the governor of New York, echoed these fears in his report to the Lords of Trade in 1700, when he noted that the western tribes must be stopped from warring on the Iroquois before the Five Nations were completely destroyed. The comeback of the western tribes can be attributed to two factors: the Iroquois were so weakened by the late war that they were unable to fight back; and the French were willing to arm and support the western Indians.

Greater numbers seemed to be on the side of the western Indians. The Iroquois, whose own armies had decreased in size due to the Twenty Years' War, spoke in awe of the western tribes, who were "as numerous as the sand on the sea shore." In 1693, an Iroquois sachem pointed out to Governor Fletcher that the Iroquois could be more successful in their war against the French Indians if the English supplied them as well as the French did their Indians. According to the sachem, "Some of our men have guns and no powder and balls, and some but bows and arrows... whereas the Governor [of Canada] supplies his Indians with all sorts of guns and ammunition."
Governor Bellomont wrote to the Lords of Trade in 1699 concerning the change in the western Indians: "Formerly a hundred of our Indians would have made a thousand of them run, and now tis said the French have them to fear ours so little...that they will venture to fight them [Iroquois] upon the square." 59

Peter Schuyler noted in 1700 that the French kept the Five Nations in constant fear "with the far nations destroying them on one hand, and the French threatening them on the other." Lack of respect for Iroquois power during that period was epitomized in 1717 when representatives from several southern tribes warned the Five Nations that they would be destroyed, if they interfered in the southern tribes' war against the British. 60

Beginning around 1700, the western tribes began to repopulate the Western Country, that was once controlled by the Iroquois. These migrations were motivated by the reduction of the Iroquois threat, the encouragement from the French to settle around their forts, and the desire of the Indians to move closer to New York, where they hoped to establish a trade with the English. The major tribes moving into the Western Country between 1700 and 1750 were the Shawnees, the Delawares, the Wyandots (Hurons), the Miamis, the Ottawas, and the Illinois, as well as numerous smaller groups. 61

Their decline in power also caused the Iroquois to lose control of the western fur trade. After King William's War the French fur trade in the Western Country increased rapidly. French coureurs de bois once again swarmed throughout the West in search of valuable furs. But despite the many French trappers and traders, the fort system was
the mainstay of the French trade in the West. As early as 1700, the outpost at Michilimackinac was known as the trade capital of the West. By 1703, this important role had switched to Detroit. There the western tribes congregated, as they had done earlier at Michilimackinac, to barter their furs for the much-needed European goods.62

Other posts like Fort St. Louis, Fort Niagara, and Fort Cataraqui also served as successful trade centers. New York's Cadwallader Colden recognized the problem these forts posed to the Iroquois when he wrote that the French had Fort Cataraqui at the northeast end of Lake Ontario to keep a check on the Iroquois. Colden added that the French had Fort Niagara to command the western trade and overawe the Senecas, as well as several other forts among the upper nations of Indians on the "chief passages as the Indians come from their hunting to intercept the fur trade and to keep an awe and command over them."63 The Five Nations soon realized that the increased efforts of the French were harmful to their own aspirations in the West. One sachem expressed the concern of many Iroquois in 1701 when he asked New York's lieutenant governor, "Where shall we hunt if the French take possession of our beaver country?"64

Ironically, the English and Dutch traders at Albany, and not the French, may have been the ones to apply the coup de grace to whatever hopes the Iroquois may have had about retaining control over the western fur trade. In order to compensate for the smaller number of furs being brought in by the Iroquois, the Albany traders began to trade with their commercial counterparts in Montreal. The Caugnawagas (Praying Iroquois) often served as the carriers in this valuable trade.
They brought western furs, which had been obtained by Montreal merchants, to Albany and exchanged them for English goods which they then carried back to the waiting Montreal traders, who needed them for use in the western fur trade. By 1720, the Montreal-Albany trade was flourishing. It enabled the French to obtain cheap British goods which in turn strengthened their trade with the western Indians.\(^6\) Robert Livingston wrote to Peter Schuyler in 1720 that he foresaw a major danger developing in "the furnishing the French and their Indians with goods from hence /Albany/\(^7\), whereby they not only supply the far Indians and engross that trade to themselves," but they also secure the friendship of those far tribes and ally them against New York.\(^6\) The expanding Montreal-Albany fur trade was temporarily stopped during Governor Burnet's administration in New York during the early 1720s, but after 1729 it was resumed and thrived once again.\(^6\)

Like the French, the English also tried to increase their share in the western fur trade, even if they had to bypass the Iroquois to do it. After 1700 the Albany traders sought to open a direct trade with the Indians of the West. This was not a new idea. During the 1680s, Governor Dongan had tried to establish a direct trade with the far Indians, but at that time, both the French, who did not want their Indian allies trading with the English, and the Iroquois, who did not want their Indian enemies coming through Iroquoia to trade at Albany, were able to block Dongan's efforts.\(^6\) But times had changed by the conclusion of King William's War. Though the French were still opposed to an English-western Indian trade, the Iroquois were now ready to be persuaded that such a trade was to their advantage. The English argued
that if the western tribes could be brought within the great Covenant Alliance of peace through trade, then the western Indian-Iroquois hostilities would cease, and the Iroquois could hunt in the West without fear. The Iroquois agreed that such an arrangement could benefit all parties involved. So after 1701, the Iroquois allowed the western tribes free and safe passage through their territory. On occasion, the Five Nations even solicited various tribes to come to Albany for trade purposes.

The plan appeared to work, at least for the English. By 1703, a flourishing trade existed at Albany due to both the arrival of the western Indians and the Montreal-Albany trade. But the Iroquois did not profit greatly from this revival of the Albany trade, for although western furs were once again flowing into Albany, most of the avenues of trade were bypassing the Iroquois. Furthermore, many western tribes were still hostile enough to make living and hunting difficult for the Five Nations.

It was the western tribes that probably profited the most from the French and English trade policies. These tribes displaced the Iroquois as the chief gatherers of furs in the Western Country. As previously mentioned, Indians had begun to filter back into the Western Country during King William’s War because of the reduction of the Iroquois threat, the French encouragement to settle near their forts, and their desire to move closer to the trade city of Albany. This migration of tribes provided the Iroquois with increased competition for the furs of the western lands. To make matters worse, many of these western tribes harassed any Iroquois hunting parties that
ventured westward. Hostilities between some western Indians and the Iroquois were evident throughout the years following King William's War. In 1699, the western tribes threatened the Iroquois with destruction should they hunt in the Western Country. Later that same year Peter Schuyler informed Lord Bellomont that the Iroquois were frequently being attacked by the Indians who lived in the West. In 1700, one Iroquois sachem told the English, "The Dowagannahes or far nations have now again killed many of our people at their hunting." The problem was still evident in 1711. At that time several sachems allegedly told a French envoy, "The Wagenhaws have twelve times fallen upon us and killed several of our people. We suppose through your French means and for the sake of beaver." The French response was to invite the sachems to Canada to attend a large conference with the western tribes to determine "whose fault it is that the Far Indians kill every year of your people." In 1720, the Iroquois made additional complaints to the English that the French and the western tribes were encroaching upon their western hunting grounds.

After King William's War, the Iroquois lost their position as the chief gatherers of furs in the Western Country to the western Indians, who supplied pelts to both the French and the English. When Iroquois parties did attempt to hunt in the West, they had to contend with both the increased competition from friendly tribes and constant attacks by hostile ones. Neither situation was conducive to Iroquois hunting in the West.
A third major result of the decline in Iroquois power after the Twenty Years' War was that it forced the Iroquois to reevaluate their policies toward their Indian and white neighbors. Prior to the war, the Iroquois had been strong enough to employ their war clubs to achieve their goals in the Western Country. But the late war so weakened the Five Nations that they could no longer use the club to hammer their French and Indian enemies into submission. They realized that a rapprochement with the French and Indians was imperative for their survival, and the only weapon left to achieve such a settlement was diplomacy. If the Iroquois were to survive and if they were to be free to hunt in the West, then they had to improve their diplomatic relations with the French and the western tribes. The Iroquois could not afford continued warfare.

The Twenty Years' War was a major turning point in the history of the Five Nations. Prior to the war the Iroquois were a proud and prosperous people, who used their military prowess to intimidate the French and western Indians and to dominate the lands and furs of the Western Country. Following the war, everything changed. Iroquoia was in shambles. Many of the villages and crops of the Five Nations were destroyed. Their economy was in ruins. The people were beaten, war-weary, and divided by factionalism. Constant fears of attack by the English, French, and western Indians nagged their minds, while sickness, drunkenness, and poverty plagued their bodies. The warrior population had decreased by one-half due to defections, war deaths, famine, and disease. The resultant decline in power forced the
Iroquois to relinquish control of the Western Country and its wealth in furs to the French and their Indians. It also necessitated the adoption of a new policy, by the Iroquois, toward both their European and Indian neighbors. No longer could they afford additional hostilities with the western Indians. Continued warfare could only bring the destruction of the Iroquois Confederacy. With this in mind the Iroquois leaders turned toward diplomacy to improve their Indian and white relations.

Without a doubt the Iroquois Confederacy was in critical condition after the Twenty Years' War. Fortunately for the Confederacy, its leaders refused to give up hope. Instead, they analyzed their predicament and began to devise policies that would restore the power and prosperity of the Five Nations. The account of the Iroquois' efforts to implement these policies after 1700 is the history of the Iroquois Restoration.
Chapter 3: Notes

1. NYC, IV, 337, 345; DSHY, I, 690.
2. NYC, IV, 237, 305, 437; Livingston, 220; Wraxall, lxii.
3. NYC, IV, 1067, 37, 55.
4. NYC, IV, 648.
5. NYC, IV, 195; Wraxall, 120; NYC, IV, 173, 38, 20.
6. NYC, IV, 62.
7. NYC, IV, 37, 65, 74, 487.
8. NYC, IV, 1067.
10. NYC, IV, 13, 33.
11. DSHY, I, 338.
12. NYC, IV, 168, 169.
14. NYC, IV, 500.
15. NYC, IV, 789.
16. NYC, IV, 906; Wraxall, 41, 54; Livingston, 192, 193.
17. Wraxall, 60; NYC, V, 220.
18. Wraxall, 47; Colden, "History...1707-1720," 368.
20. Wraxall, 95.
21. NYC, IV, 608, 579.
22. NYC, IV, 654, 701.
24 Wraxall, 69.
25 NYCD, V, 332, 333.
26 NYCD, IV, 294.
27 NYCD, IV, 492, 554.
28 NYCD, IV, 435.
29 Wraxall, 34; NYCD, V, 226; Wraxall, 78.
30 NYCD, IV, 373, 487; Wraxall, 57, 58, 48.
31 Wraxall, 70.
32 NYCD, V, 217; Wraxall, 113.
33 NYCD, IV, 173, 6, 19.
34 NYCD, IV, 435.
35 NYCD, IV, 647.
36 See Parkman, Jesuits, chapter 20.
37 La Montagne, Royal Ft. Fron., 208.
38 JR, LXV, 33-35.
40 JR, LXVII, 205.
41 Eccl. Recs., II, 879; Pa. Archives, 2nd Series, VI, 22; NYCD, IV, 40; Livingston, 171.
42 Charlevoix, History, V, 91, 155; Golden, "History...1707-1720," 360.
43 Livingston, 134.
44 Livingston, 157; Charlevoix, History, IV, 250, V, 79, 99-111; NYCD, IV, 690.
45 NYCD, IV, 47, 1057; Charlevoix, History, V, 76.
46 NYCD, IV, 85; Charlevoix, History, V, 50; NYCD, IV, 342.

51 Livingston, 212; Golden, "History...1707-1720," 402.

52 Charlevoix, History, V, 154; Wraxall, 39-41; NYCD, IV, 906, 911; KPHG, XXXIII, 105.

53 KPHG, XXXIII, 106.


56 NYCD, IV, 488, 768.

57 NYCD, IV, 488.

58 NYCD, IV, 22.

59 NYCD, IV, 505.

60 NYCD, IV, 654; Wraxall, 117.

61 Downes, Council Fires, 38; Gibson, Br. Empire, V, 49; Billington, Westward Expansion, 112; NYCD, IV, 691, 748; H.C. Shetron, The Indian in Ohio (Columbus: Heer Printing, 1918), 49-59; C.C. Baldwin, "Early Indian Migrations in Ohio," Western Reserve Historical Tract #47 (Cleveland: 1888), 81; Wraxall, 662; DSHNY, I, 15.

62 Billington, Westward Expansion, 112; Parkman, Half-Century, 17, 22, 29.

63 DSHNY, IV, 240.
64 Wraxall, 39-41; NYCD, IV, 906, 911.
65 Parkman, Half-Century, 15; Wraxall, p. lxv.
66 NYCD, V, 559.
68 Wraxall, p. lxii; Leach, N. Col. Frontier, 126.
69 Wraxall, 34.
70 Wraxall, 70, 71; NYCD, V, 223.
71 Wraxall, 58.
72 NYCD, V, 226, 243, 267.
73 NYCD, IV, 500, 597.
74 NYCD, IV, 693.
75 Wraxall, 83, 243.
76 NYCD, V, 544.
PART II

THE IROQUOIS RESTORATION
Chapter 4: The Policy of Neutrality

In the years following the settlements of 1701, the Five Nations moved in several directions toward restoring their power and prosperity. It would be misleading to portray the Five Nations as convening one day in early 1702 to deliberately map out the course that would lead to their restoration, but it would also be wrong to insist that the actions of the Five Nations during this period had no direction or purpose. A policy aimed at restoring Iroquois economic, political, and military power evolved during the early years of the eighteenth century. By 1714, a loose program or group of policies emerged. This program (which hereafter shall be referred to as the Iroquois Restoration Policy) was at times followed by the Confederacy as a whole. On other occasions, it was utilized by individual tribes or persons within the League. The program was comprised of five major strategies: 1) The Five Nations followed a policy of neutrality toward the English and French; 2) The Iroquois established friendly relations with the tribes of the Western Country; 3) The Iroquois developed hegemony over the Indians and lands of Pennsylvania; 4) The Five Nations followed a policy of war toward the southern tribes; and 5) The Iroquois maintained good relations toward the northern tribes of Canada.

Each of the five strategies was aimed at improving the Iroquois' political, economic, and military position. The Five Nations hoped
that their Restoration Policy would enable them to rebuild their war-torn economy and recover their prestige among their European and Indian neighbors.

One of the cornerstones of the Iroquois Restoration Policy was the relationship of the Five Nations to the French and English colonies. Throughout most of the first half of the eighteenth century, the Iroquois maintained a policy of neutrality toward the English and French. The Five Nations first assumed this neutral posture in 1701 when they signed treaties of friendship with New France and the English colonies.¹

Between 1702 and 1708, the Iroquois strictly adhered to their pledges of neutrality. As a result, the Five Nations were able to develop good relations with both their European neighbors. This allowed the Iroquois to trade and negotiate with the English and the French on an annual basis. It also enabled the Five Nations to receive presents, supplies, and assistance from both sides.²

The Iroquois' policy of neutrality temporarily broke down in 1709 and 1711 when many Iroquois became convinced that the English were going to conquer New France. In 1709, New York was brought into Queen Anne's War through an English plan for a joint colonial invasion of Canada. Shortly thereafter, the New York government began to encourage the Five Nations to end their neutrality and join the English colonies in the fight against New France.
Governor Vaudreuil of Canada learned quickly of New York’s plans to get the Five Nations to declare war on the French. On November 12, 1708, the governor reported to Minister Ponchartrain that he had learned from Indian spies in Iroquois villages that the English were giving the Iroquois presents to get them to fight against New France.

In early 1709, the English increased their efforts to win over the Iroquois. On April 28, 1709, Lord Sunderland told New York’s Governor Lovelace to obtain Iroquois support and assistance for the proposed joint colonial expedition against Canada. The following month Captain Abraham Schuyler and Captain John Schuyler were dispatched to the Five Nations to engage them in the expedition against the French.

The negotiations between New York and the Five Nations continued into July. On July 14, 1709, New York’s new governor, Richard Ingoldsby, met with all of the Five Nations except the Senecas at Albany to renew the Covenant Chain. The governor told the Iroquois, “Brethren, I have sent for you upon an extraordinary occasion, to assist in an expedition for the reducing Canada, which you have so much longed for.” Ingoldsby reminded the Iroquois of their past hostilities with the French and pointed out to them that the French “have not only seduced your people and enticed them away from your country, but encouraged even your own Brethren to make war upon you, on purpose to weaken you.” He continued, “They have set the far Indians upon you and furnished them with arms and ammunition in order to destroy you... They encroached upon your rights and liberties by building forts upon your land against your wills, possessing the principal passes and hunting places, whereby all your hunting (your only support) was rendered
not only precarious, but dangerous." The governor then invited the Iroquois to join the allied invasion of Canada, adding "I am concerned to see none of the sachems of the Senecas here in this grand meeting... I fear the French Jesuits... have so far bewitched them, that they have forgot how the French used to treat them formerly...".

The governor's arguments apparently were convincing. On the following day, the four nations of Iroquois present at Albany informed the governor that they would join the English for the invasion of New France. The Iroquois guaranteed that the following numbers of warriors were resolved to take part in the expedition: 150 Mohawks, 105 Oneidas, 100 Cayugas, and 88 Onondagas.

At this time, there were at most 1500 Iroquois warriors, so only one out of three Iroquois agreed to declare war on New France. The Senecas, in particular, were intent on remaining neutral. Since they lived nearest to Canada and had the closest economic and political ties to New France, the Senecas were not eager to see a renewal of Iroquois-French hostilities. On several occasions the Senecas tried without success to convince the other Iroquois tribes not to war on New France. The Senecas' position prevented the entire Confederacy from declaring war on New France, but could not stop the other four Iroquois nations from joining the English expedition. Approximately 400 Iroquois warriors took part in the English invasion of Canada. These Iroquois believed that their interests could best be served by allying themselves to the English, who seemed certain to expel the French from Canada.
The plans for the English colonies' joint expedition called for a two-pronged attack of Canada. Colonel Francis Nicholson was appointed to lead 1500 colonial troops from New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, along with the Iroquois volunteers, overland against Montreal. At the same time, 1000 New Englanders were to join an English fleet for an attack on Port Royal and Quebec. When news of the English plans reached New France, the Canadians began to fear a total defeat. Governor Vaudreuil remarked solemnly, "A most-bloody war is imminent." Whatever his merits as an official, Vaudreuil's skills as a prognosticator were negligible. The war never materialized, because the invasion fizzled out, almost before it began. For four long months the English colonists awaited the arrival of the English fleet, but it never showed. Finally, in October, Governor Dudley of Massachusetts received official word that the English war ships had been sent instead to Portugal.8

The French leaders must have been overjoyed. The English colonial officials were furious. The Iroquois felt betrayed. According to Cadwallader Colden, the Iroquois were disillusioned with the English, when the fleet did not arrive as promised. The Iroquois also complained that they were not "so well-clothed and provided with necessaries as the French Indians are by the governor of Canada."9

The Iroquois had no choice but to ask for forgiveness from New France. Charlevoix reported that in early 1710 the Onondagas sent deputies to Governor Vaudreuil "to ask to be received into his favor... they explained that the war had not [been] undertaken by
the unanimous consent even of the Cantons, which had taken up arms. . .scarcely had the Onondagas gone, when some Mohawks were seen arriving, who spoke nearly in the same tone, and protested that they would never lift the hatchet against the French."\textsuperscript{10}

Some Frenchmen believed that the Iroquois sincerely wanted to follow neutrality in regard to the English and French. Father de Mareuil, the Jesuit missionary at Onondaga, maintained in 1709 that the English would not benefit from the Iroquois' declaration of war against New France. According to Charlevoix, Mareuil was told that the Onondagas had reminded the Iroquois League Council that the Five Nations "lying between two powerful nations each able to exterminate them and both interested in doing so when they no longer needed their help" should devote their attention "to keeping both English and French always in the necessity of conciliating them, and consequently preventing either from prevailing over the other." The League Council agreed with this policy and adopted a resolution "to act in the present circumstances according to this rule of policy." Charlevoix added:

In fact, the Iroquois had no sooner joined the English army, than, believing it strong enough to take Montreal without their help, they thought only of a means to destroy it, and resorted to the following. The army was encamped on the banks of a little river; the Iroquois, who spent almost all the time hunting, threw into it, just above the camp, all the skins of the animals they flayed, and the water was thus soon all corrupted. The English, unsuspicious of this treachery, continued to drink this water, and it carried off so many, that Father de Mareuil. . .estimated the number at over 1000.\textsuperscript{11}

The French governor was more skeptical of the Iroquois. Although Governor Vaudreuil agreed to pardon the Iroquois for their role in the attempted English invasion, he knew that some of the Iroquois, like the
Mohawks, who lived near Albany might again side with the English in the future. Vaudreuil, therefore, warned the Iroquois "that his allies only awaited his permission to declare war on them, and that if they wished to avoid that annoyance, they must remain quiet; that on the first movement he noticed on their part, he would leave all his \text{Indian} children free to dash in upon them." Several months later, Vaudreuil issued a similar warning to the Iroquois. In July, 1710, the French governor sent Joncaire and Longueuil to the Iroquois to remind them that as long as they stayed neutral, they would not be attacked by New France's Indian allies.\textsuperscript{12} On May 1, 1710, Governor Vaudreuil confided to Minister Ponchartrain, "I know that the true means of obliging them \text{Iroquois} to observe neutrality is to make them apprehend war with the upper nations. I keep them always under that impression, insinuating, and causing it to be insinuated to them, that our Indians await only my orders to declare themselves."\textsuperscript{13}

While the governor of New France was deciding on the best means to keep the Five Nations neutral, the government officials of the English colonies were plotting the best ways to utilize the Iroquois in a second attempt to conquer Canada. In 1710, the disgruntled English colonists sent a petition to England asking for British support for an invasion of New France. In conjunction with the petition New York also sent Peter Schuyler and five Mohawk Indians to England. The New Yorkers hoped that the colorful Indians would draw attention to the colonial request. Undoubtedly, the New Yorkers also felt that the sights of England would impress the Mohawks, who could then convince the rest of the Confederacy to join the English against New
France. The Mohawk ambassadors were enthusiastically received by the British. The Queen outfitted them with expensive clothing and held banquets in their honor. They were escorted about London as guests of the nation, given tours of the dockyards, arsenals, and landmarks, and saluted with cannon by Her Majesty's warships. The Mohawks served the New Yorkers' purposes quite well. They caught London's attention. More importantly, once English attention was riveted on the Mohawks and America, the Ministry agreed to aid the colonists in an attack on Port Royal. Shortly after the successful assault on that French fort, the English Ministry consented to plans for a second joint colonial invasion of Canada.14

In 1711, the English colonies geared up again for a joint expedition against New France. The plans were similar to those of the aborted 1709 venture. This time an English fleet of over sixty ships, commanded by Admiral Walker, was to attack Quebec by water, while Francis Nicholson was again to lead colonial troops and Iroquois warriors by land from Albany to Montreal.15

At the end of June, 1711, the New York governor sent Captain Abraham Schuyler and David Schuyler to Onondaga to convince the Five Nations to join the expedition. Cadwallader Colden noted that the Schuylers were "to tell them [Iroquois] that the fleet was arrived with the forces designed against Canada by sea, and to offer them the hatchet and to meet the forces at Albany immediately which were designed to march by land." Colden reported, "They all received the hatchet cheerfully and promised to make ready immediately desiring that the
Christians might make no delay because the season of the year was far advanced."  

On August 24, 656 Iroquois warriors arrived at Albany to join Nicholson's expedition. Present were 182 Senecas, 127 Cayugas, 99 Onondagas, 93 Oneidas, and 155 Mohawks. Actually, the fairly large turnout of warriors from all of the Five Nations, including the Senecas, must have pleased the New York governor.

Several factors probably combined to convince these members of the Five Nations to abandon their policy of neutrality. To begin with, many Iroquois were angry at the French, whom they believed were the instigators of recent western Indian attacks on Iroquois people. At the same time, most of the Iroquois felt that the French were about to be defeated by the English. Hendrick and his fellow Mohawk ambassadors had just returned from London and told stories of England's vast resources and power. Furthermore, the recent English victory at Port Royal and the arrival of the English fleet seemed to indicate that the conquest of Canada was inevitable. Finally, English gifts and promises of aid, as well as Iroquois thoughts of ending the French threat once and for all, were additional encouragements for the Iroquois to take part in the joint colonial expedition. It appeared that the Five Nations had everything to gain by joining the English who seemed unstoppable.

It must be emphasized, however, that not all the Iroquois were prepared to ally themselves to the English. Some Iroquois still were determined to remain neutral. In 1710, the Onondagas and Senecas informed Canada's Governor Vaudreuil that "he might count on the
fidelity of many [Iroquois]; but that the majority inclined to the English side." In fact, the 656 Iroquois who did accompany Nicholson's force comprised only one-third of all Iroquois warriors. Equally significant, only 182 Senecas (or one-fifth of all Seneca warriors) agreed to attack New France. The Iroquois maintained that more warriors would have taken part in the expedition, but they had to stay at home to protect their villages. This might have been true to some extent, but certainly the defense of Iroquoia did not require two-thirds of all Iroquois manpower. More likely, some of the Iroquois who refused to join the expedition did so because they either sympathized with the French cause or did not want to abandon the policy of neutrality.

The Iroquois warriors who joined the English expedition at Albany had several matters to discuss with Governor Hunter. They asked him to pardon Canada's Praying Iroquois, as long as the latter did not aid the French. They inquired about what would happen to prisoners of war. They asked that the people of Albany also be made to join the expedition. And finally, they requested that their chiefs be consulted whenever war plans were being made. Governor Hunter replied that the Praying Iroquois would be pardoned, if they did not fight against the English and colonial troops. He agreed to Iroquois requests that Indian prisoners of war would go to them, while white captives would go to the English. Next, the governor said he would not force the Albanians to join the expedition, for the invasion force would be better off without the Albany traders than to have them against their wills. Lastly, he assured them that General Nicholson "would advise with their sachems in matters relating to Indians."
Shortly thereafter, the expedition, comprised of colonial troops and Iroquois warriors, set out for Montreal. This time Francis Nicholson must have been certain that nothing could go wrong, since the fleet had already embarked for Quebec and warriors from all of the Five Nations had joined the land attack of Montreal.

The expedition had been in the field for only a few weeks before Nicholson learned that everything had gone wrong. The English fleet, that carried almost 12,000 men, met with disaster before reaching Quebec. Fog, stormy seas, and poor leadership were responsible for sinking ten ships near the mouth of the St. Lawrence River. The incompetent Admiral Walker panicked and ordered a hasty retreat to Boston. When news of Walker’s debacle reached Nicholson, he allegedly threw his hat down upon the ground and stomped upon it in frustration. Once again, Nicholson’s American and Indian expedition turned back in defeat.21

The Five Nations were bitter and depressed about the English colonists’ second failure. Cadwallader Colden wrote, "They [the Iroquois] complained that the greatest number of their men in the army wanted fire arms, and that they knew the French had been already informed of it. That having now twice failed in their designs against Canada in conjunction with the English they were ashamed and must cover their faces." The Iroquois also told Governor Hunter that forts had to be strengthened. They added, "God is against us and that we shall receive the first punishment from him for we can’t go forward to reduce Canada having returned twice."22
Fortunately for the Iroquois, the French were again willing to forgive them for their dalliance with the Nicholson expedition. On September 8, 1711, Governor Vaudreuil made a report to his home government on the condition of New France. The governor noted, "The English having spared nothing to induce the Iroquois to declare against us, and having even spent large sums for that purpose, I heard from several sources that as many as 600 of them [Iroquois] had been in their [English] camp; but that [even] before they [Iroquois] had news of the fleet beating back, they had almost all gone back and that there was not a hundred left with Nicholson when he resolved to return himself." Vaudreuil stated that he had asked the Iroquois who were at Montreal to convince the other Iroquois to remain neutral. He said, "I have no doubt that when they returned they used every endeavor to keep their promise to me, and I am persuaded that it will not be long before they come to me to make excuses for the others." The governor added, "It is a matter of importance to us...not to be at war with that tribe if we can possibly help it, and the five Iroquois villages [because of proximity] are more to be feared than the whole of New England. If they come, I shall take care to speak to them in such a manner as to show them that I am not obdurate."23

Governor Vaudreuil correctly guessed how the Iroquois would react after the English defeat. By the end of the year, deputies from all of the Five Nations arrived at Montreal, asked for pardon, and pledged their fidelity for the future.24

The war between England and France came to a close in 1713, with the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht. Twice during Queen Anne's War
New York had convinced some of the Iroquois to abandon their neutrality and to join in the fight against New France. And as many times, English blunders had prevented the proposed invasions from succeeding. The Five Nations filed away the memories of those feeble military ventures, and thereafter, they returned to a policy of neutrality between the English and the French. The failures of the English expeditions of 1709 and 1711 probably convinced the Iroquois that the English, regardless of their promises or boasts, were not likely to conquer New France. This realization made the Iroquois more determined than ever to maintain a neutral stance in regard to the two European powers. Fortunately for the Iroquois, the French and English generally remained at peace between 1713 and 1744, so the Iroquois were not pressured or called upon to ally themselves exclusively with either side. Instead, the Iroquois were allowed to remain neutral for over thirty-five years. As a result, with the brief exceptions of the aberrations of 1709 and 1711, the Iroquois maintained a policy of neutrality throughout the first half of the eighteenth century.25

The Iroquois had three major reasons for wanting to remain friends with both the French and English colonies. First, the Iroquois realized that a neutral position would allow them to use the English and French to further their own needs. Secondly, the Iroquois shrewdly reasoned that neutrality would allow them to play the French and English off against each other, thereby controlling the European colonies and preserving the sovereignty of the Five Nations. And finally, the Iroquois
correctly observed that they had no alternative. Necessity dictated neutrality.

The Iroquois needed and used the English in several ways. The Iroquois needed the English for economic reasons. The Six Nations traded with the English. They obtained blacksmiths, gunsmiths, and gifts from them. At times they were employed by the English. On other occasions, the Iroquois sold land to the English. They also used the English to protect their hunting lands from intruders. And lastly, in times of crisis, the Iroquois obtained economic assistance from the English.

English trade was especially important to the Six Nations. The Iroquois were aware that the English colonists could provide better quality goods at cheaper prices than the French could. Furthermore, the English merchants, located at Albany and later at Oswego, were closer to the Iroquois than the French traders at Montreal. Therefore, throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the Iroquois did most of their trading with the English. Every year Iroquois hunters ranged hundreds of miles in search of furs and peltry. Upon their return, they sold or exchanged their catches to the English for guns, powder, shot, kettles, tomahawks, knives, cloth, and other manufactured goods. Sometimes an item could only be obtained from the English. For example, a French official, M. Raudot, noted in 1709 that a scarlet cloth, made only in England, was highly valued by the Indians, who used it for clothing and other coverings. Raudot explained, "They [the Indians] are great admirers of this stuff, and it is to be feared that if they do not find it at our merchants', they will go to
Orange [Albany] for it."  

The Six Nations also received free blacksmithing from the British. The New York government, in particular, frequently provided smiths to mend the Iroquois' broken guns, kettles, knives, traps, and other implements. The Iroquois displayed their need for smiths on many occasions. On August 4, 1706, the Five Nations complained to the Albany Commissioners that the New York government still had not kept its promise to send them a smith. In 1708, they told the Commissioners, "We are poor therefore we desire you will order our guns and axes (to be mended)." In 1710, the Five Nations again asked the New York government to mend their weapons and kettles on "the public charge." A New York official noted in 1728 that every autumn the Iroquois asked that blacksmiths be sent to their villages. New York usually complied with these requests in order to strengthen the friendship between the Six Nations and the English.  

The Iroquois frequently profited from gifts given to them by the English colonial governments. The Six Nations often received presents when they met with English colonial governors to negotiate or renew friendship. New York's Governor Hunter distributed gifts to the Iroquois when he met with them in August, 1710. Governor Keith of Pennsylvania likewise gave presents to Iroquois deputies after a conference in 1721. Other governors also followed this policy of presenting gifts to the Iroquois in order to win their favor.  

At times, economic inducements were offered to the Iroquois in order to get their assistance. The English colonial governments gave gifts and economic assistance to all Iroquois warriors who agreed to
fight against England's enemies. In 1709 and 1711, the governor of New York provided weapons, ammunition, and other gifts to Iroquois warriors who volunteered to join military expeditions against New France. Later, between 1715 and 1717, the governments of New York, Carolina, and Virginia offered arms and ammunition to the Iroquois in return for their participation in the southern colonies' war against the Catawba Indians.29

Iroquois were sometimes employed by the English in other ways. From time to time, the New Yorkers hired Iroquois men to carry messages to other Indian tribes or to spy in Canada. In 1702, Iroquois were reputedly carrying English wampum belts to the western tribes, inviting the latter to trade at Albany. In 1708, Albany merchants hired the half-breed Andrew Montour and several Iroquois to go westward to invite the western Indians to trade at Albany. On October 28, 1719, the governor of New France noted that Iroquois couriers were employed by the English to carry messages to the Miami Indians. Cadwallader Colden reported that in 1708 the New York government was using Iroquois scouts to gather intelligence about French and Indian movements.30

The Six Nations obtained economic profits from the English colonies in additional ways. The Iroquois sometimes sold land to the English. In 1713 and again in the late 1730s, the Iroquois sold some of their Pennsylvania lands, which they claimed by the right of conquest, to the proprietors of Pennsylvania. According to Peter Wraxall, in 1742, the Senecas notified the Albany Commissioners that "they have sold the land at Irondequoit to Arent Stevens in behalf and for the use of this [New York] government." Later, in 1742, the Iroquois Confederacy
received a large payment for the release of all Iroquois land claims in Virginia and Maryland. On occasion individual Iroquois also made profits through land sales. In 1742, several Iroquois warriors, without the consent of the Confederacy, sold land in Pennsylvania to a group of white settlers.31

The Iroquois, at times, depended on the English to defend Iroquois hunting rights in the Western Country. The Five Nations deeded their western hunting grounds to the English king in 1701, and in return, asked only that the English protect Iroquois hunters on that land. In 1720, the Six Nations complained to the British about French encroachments upon their lands. Six years later the Iroquois asked New York's Governor Burnet to prevent the French from keeping a fort at Niagara, which was the strategic gateway to the western hunting grounds. Burnet noted that the Six Nations were "sensible of the damage which that post might do to them, by stopping the passage between their habitations and their hunting country." The New York governor agreed to help the Iroquois. But first he helped the English obtain a new deed to Iroquois lands. By promising the Iroquois protection, he persuaded the Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas "to surrender and submit all the land they live in, by an instrument signed and sealed to His Majesty." Immediately afterward, to the satisfaction of the Iroquois, Governor Burnet sent off a letter to the governor of New France to protest that the establishment of Fort Niagara was a breach of the Treaty of Utrecht.32

Finally, in times of crisis, the Six Nations received emergency economic assistance from the English. When famine threatened the survival of the Iroquois people in the 1740s, the New York and Pennsylvania
governments came to their aid. In 1741, Pennsylvania and New York provided corn, provisions, and ammunition to the Iroquois, whose crops, according to one observer, had been ruined by a "very severe and scarce winter."  

The Six Nations also needed the English (in particular the New York Colony) for military reasons. Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the Iroquois repeatedly sought New York's military support against potential enemies. The Six Nations not only relied on New York as a source of arms and ammunition, but also looked to New York as an ally that could build forts and supply troops to protect Iroquois villages from French or hostile Indian attacks.

Between 1701 and 1750, the Iroquois frequently asked the New York government for military assistance and protection. In July, 1702, Iroquois sachems complained to New York's Governor Cornbury that the French were still entrenched at Fort Cataracqui and had just occupied a new post at Detroit. The sachems requested that the English protect the Iroquois people by building similar forts throughout Iroquoia. That same year the Iroquois repeated their request. On August 26, four Mohawk sachems reminded Albany officials that the late governor, Lord Bellomont, had promised to protect them. The Mohawks suggested that the English build a fort in Mohawk country and station troops there to guard the Iroquois people.

Whenever the Six Nations had reason to suspect a French attack, they went to the New York government for help. In 1707, when Iroquois sachems feared a French invasion, they asked the New York governor to help them persuade the young Iroquois warriors not to leave their villages unprotected by going out on raids against the Catawbas. In
1708, the sachems of Onondaga sent Lawrence Claase to the New York governor to report that they had learned that the French were going to build two forts, one at Swegatchy and the other at Niagara. The Iroquois feared that the French were plotting to "disturb their hunting and to draw off as many of the Iroquois as they can and to debauch the rest and then fall upon them with their own men." The Onondagas recommended that New York should stop the French from building those forts. Later that year, an Iroquois sachem reminded Governor Cornbury, "we cannot without your assistance put a stop to the French designs."35

In 1710, the Iroquois again asked New York for protection. In May of that year, the Five Nations suggested to New York officials that they build a fort at Onondaga to keep out the French.36 In August the Five Nations met with New York's Governor Hunter and again discussed the subject of new forts. According to one New York official, when Governor Hunter asked the Iroquois if they wanted forts at their castles, a spokesman for the Five Nations replied that they would indeed like to see forts at each of their castles "which would tend to secure them from the insults of their enemies to which they are now very much exposed."37

When the Iroquois learned, in 1711, that French officers and troops were coming to their villages for talks, they asked the New York governor to send Colonel Schuyler to be present at the meeting. When Schuyler arrived, he assured the Iroquois of English protection and gave them the Queen's crest to set up in their villages. In October, 1711, the Iroquois met with Governor Hunter and again asked for stronger forts and protection from the French. The following spring, the Five
Nations, believing they would soon be fighting against some western Indians, and perhaps even the French, asked the New York government to assist them with troops, or at least arms and ammunition. Later, on July 30, the Iroquois informed the English that they were ready to send a war party against the western Indians and asked the New Yorkers to join them. But the English were noncommittal on both occasions. That year the New York government did partially comply with Iroquois requests for protection by constructing Fort Hunter at Tionondorague (a Mohawk castle) and garrisoning it with troops.\textsuperscript{38}

The Six Nations depended upon New York for aid against their enemies. In 1716, when the Iroquois feared an attack by western Indians, they notified the Albany Commissioners of their dilemma. On June 14, 1717, a spokesman for the Six Nations told Governor Hunter, "You have acquainted us yesterday that...as long as we continue faithful to the covenant chain, [the English king] will protect us against all such as shall dare to molest us as friends to him for which we are very thankful...You told us also that if any nation should attack us that you would assist or enable us by such methods as was in your power to repel force by force."\textsuperscript{39}

In 1720, the Iroquois asked the New York government to help them stop the French and western tribes from encroaching upon Iroquois land. Eventually, in 1726, the Six Nations obtained Governor Burnet's pledge that the English would stop French and Indian advances on those lands.\textsuperscript{40}

The Six Nations met with John Montgomerie, the governor of New York, at Albany in 1728 to renew the Covenant Chain Alliance. No doubt, they were pleased when Montgomerie promised to defend them
against any Indian aggressors. Five years later another New York governor, William Cosby, reaffirmed Montgomerie's pledge to the Iroquois. Cosby promised to defend the Iroquois should they be attacked. He pointed out that the new fort at Oswego was established by the English to protect the Six Nations, as well as to trade with them. 41

The Iroquois also relied upon their friendship with the English to protect them from plots aimed at destroying the Iroquois people. In 1703, the Iroquois received notice from the governor of Canada that the English "hath evil designs against the Five Nations." The Iroquois immediately dispatched deputies to Albany to learn the truth. A Mohawk messenger informed New York's Governor Corbury, "Brother Corlaer. We acquaint you that the sachems of the Five Nations are coming to Albany who desire you will be pleased to meet them there, to give consult of matters for the good of the Country." 42 Most likely, the sachems planned to meet with Cornbury to remind him of the Iroquois' long-standing friendship and to get his assurances that the French rumor was false. In 1711, Onondaga sachems related a similar account to Albany's Peter Schuyler. The Iroquois had learned from the French that the New Yorkers were scheming to destroy the Five Nations to get their lands. Schuyler assured the Onondagas that the story was false and the Five Nations had nothing to worry about. 43

After 1711, rumors of purported English plots to extirpate the Iroquois and/or to take away their lands occasionally passed through the villages of the Iroquois. Each time the Iroquois reminded the English of their Covenant Chain friendship and asked for assurances that the alleged conspiracies were false. The Six Nations realized
that they could not withstand an English attack any more than they
could one from the French or the western tribes. Therefore, the
Iroquois maintained their alliance and friendship with the British
as a guard against French, Indian, or even New Yorkers' attacks.\textsuperscript{44}

A third major reason the Six Nations needed the English colonial
governments was to control the actions of the English colonists. Be-
tween 1702 and 1750, the Iroquois frequently asked the English colonial
governments to put a stop to the many abuses committed by white people
against Indians. Some of the major complaints of the Iroquois involved
unscrupulous traders, the liquor traffic, and land fraud.

The Iroquois were particularly disturbed by the practices of un-
scrupulous white traders. The people of the Six Nations constantly
beseeched the English for cheaper prices and fairer trade practices.
On July 18, 1702, Iroquois sachems asked Governor Cornbury for lower
prices on manufactured goods at Albany. Robert Livingston reported in
1704 that an Oneida spokesman came to Albany and complained greatly
"of the scarcity of arms and ammunition, and desires that his people
may be furnished at a cheaper rate." In 1706, representatives of all
the Five Nations met with the Albany Commissioners and again complained
about the high cost of gun powder. Similar complaints about the high
costs of powder and shot were made in 1708, 1709, and 1711.\textsuperscript{45} The
Five Nations met with Peter Schuyler on July 7, 1712, and reiterated
their demands for lower priced goods. They maintained that unless
prices went down, the Iroquois would become poor and defenseless and
fall prey to their enemies.\textsuperscript{46} Cadwallader Colden noted that in 1717
the Six Nations "urged again to have goods cheaper and said they would
never desist from desiring this being that on which the covenant chain was founded and that it was as much the interest of the people of Albany to sell goods cheap as theirs to have them so, for by that means all the trade would be drawn from Canada and all the numerous Nations to the westward would depend on Corlær." 47

The Iroquois voiced similar complaints to the governor of Pennsylvania. In 1721, Chesaont, a Seneca chief acting as a spokesman for the Six Nations, complained to Governor Keith about the low prices that the Pennsylvania traders paid Iroquois hunters for their skins and furs. To the Iroquois' dismay, the governor merely told them to try and make better deals with the Pennsylvania traders. 48

The Iroquois were still griping about the high costs of trade goods when they met with New York's Governor Montgomerie in 1728. A sachem told the governor, "We desire that goods may be sold somewhat cheaper to us." 49 Apparently not much was done to satisfy the Iroquois, because in 1733, Iroquois sachems again complained "that the goods are too dear." Two years later, Iroquois sachems told the New York governor that prices for trade goods still were much too expensive. 50

In 1736, the Six Nations carried their complaints to Philadelphia. According to a Pennsylvania official, the Iroquois met with Thomas Penn and James Logan in October, 1736, and asked them that "We [Pennsylvanians] would be more reasonable in the sale of our goods, which are much dearer (they say) from our traders than from those of New York." 51

The high costs of trade goods long continued to be a problem for the Iroquois. Representatives from the Six Nations met with
New York's Governor Clinton in June, 1744, and noted with dismay that prices were now higher than ever at Oswego. The expensive and sometimes scarce English trade goods were a constant problem for the Iroquois between 1702 and 1750. Therefore, it is not surprising that the cost of goods was a common topic for discussion in Iroquois-English relations during those years.

The Iroquois were also concerned with the unscrupulous white traders who often cheated the Indians. On occasion violence occurred when traders attempted to cheat their Indian clientele. In 1722, a Seneca was murdered in a trading argument with a Pennsylvanian. More often, though, bitter feelings resulted from unfair trade practices. In 1725, the Iroquois complained to New York officials that the powder they bought from traders was of very poor quality. New York's Governor Burnet realized the Iroquois had just cause for discontent. The following year he ordered Major Abraham Schuyler to live among the Six Nations "to watch the motions of the French, to support our trade with the Far Indians, and to prevent the traders from abusing and imposing on them." But Burnet's good intentions could not stop the bad actions of white traders who were determined to cheat the Indians. In fact, some of the traders who were to blame lived in Pennsylvania, entirely out of the New York governor's jurisdiction. In July, 1727, several Iroquois sachems met with Pennsylvania's Governor Patrick Gordon. According to a Pennsylvania official, the Iroquois told the governor, "there come many sorts of traders among them, both Indians and whites, who all cheat them, and though they get their skins, they give them very little in pay. They have so little for them they
cannot live and can scarcely procure powder and shot to hunt with and get more." Gordon's reply must have been discouraging to the Iroquois. He merely told them that they had to get better bargains for themselves, because that is the way free trade operates. 54

New York's Governor Montgomerie sympathized with the Iroquois' problem. On December 21, 1730, Montgomerie informed the Lords of Trade that he wanted better regulation of the Indian trade at Oswego in order to stop the unscrupulous traders from cheating the Indians. 55 Yet, once again, unfair trade practices continued. Three years later, New York's Governor Cosby told the Iroquois, "Brethren, I am informed that some of our traders at Oswego have cheated the remote Indians by selling them water instead of rum. I will take care that no such thing be done in the future." 56

The Iroquois soon learned that Cosby's promise was worth about as much as the water that the traders had peddled as rum. The governor either would not or could not stop the unscrupulous traders. In either case, the Indians wound up cheated by the traders. On September 20, 1735, the Iroquois again complained to Cosby that the rum was being diluted by the Oswego traders. Several years later, in May, 1742, Cadwallader Colden informed Peter Collinson that Oswego traders occasionally put water, instead of liquor, into kegs for trade with far Indians. Colden added that all the Indians had been cheated so often by New York traders that "nothing but their natural enmity to the French and the repeated presents given them from time to time has preserved their fidelity, but these can never make them our hearty friends." 57
The Six Nations frequently sought help from the English colonial governments to control the abuses in the liquor trade. On numerous occasions Iroquois sachems asked colonial officials to either prohibit or regulate the rum traffic. For example, in 1710, Iroquois sachems reminded New York's David Schuyler that the rum traffic had to be curtailed, for liquor was destroying the young people of the Six Nations.\textsuperscript{58}

Cadwallader Colden reported that in 1712 "the carrying of rum into the Indians' country likewise produced many disorders and quarrels."

One pro-English Iroquois named Dekansora even threatened to resign as a sachem, unless the rum traffic were prohibited. In 1716, the Iroquois warned the Albany Commissioners that unless the sale of rum was stopped, it would cause a civil war among the Five Nations.\textsuperscript{59}

The French priest Lafitaau made the following report in 1718 on the effects of liquor on the Iroquois and other Indians:

When these [Indian] people are intoxicated, they become so furious that they break and smash everything in their houses; they utter horrible yells and shouts, and like madmen, seek their enemies to stab them. At such times, even their relatives and friends are not safe from their fury. . . . over 100 [Iroquois] persons had come to settle at Sault St. Louis in the hope of escaping the annoyances of this evil of drunkenness; but that many had returned thence [to Iroquoia] when they saw liquor and drunkenness as common and as frequent as in their own country. Although the savages like to drink, they are nevertheless sorry for having done so, because in their drunken fits they lose all they have, and they keenly regret this when they come to their senses.\textsuperscript{60}

The Iroquois often complained that rum deprived them of their senses, was ruining their lives and tribes, and was used by traders to cheat them out of their furs and lands. As a result throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the Iroquois repeatedly sought
help from English colonial officials to curb the abuses of the liquor trade. 61

The Six Nations also relied on the English colonial governments to protect them from unscrupulous, land-hungry colonists. In 1730, three Mohawk sachems complained to the Albany Commissioners that whites were plying the Iroquois with liquor in order to secure their signatures on deeds for land. 62 New York's Governor Cosby was aware of the land frauds being committed. On December 15, 1733, Cosby informed the Lords of Trade, "When I was at Albany in September to meet the Six Nations of Indians, the sachems... of the Mohawks... desired a conference with me," The Mohawks claimed that the people of Albany were trying to cheat them out of their best farm lands near Fort Hunter (i.e. Tionondega). After the Mohawks threatened to move to Canada unless the Albany government gave up the fraudulent deed, Cosby sided with the Indians. Shortly thereafter the deed was delivered to the sachems, who quickly destroyed it. 63 The Mohawks' victory did not deter the land-jobbers for long, however. Between 1734 and 1737, there were numerous attempts made by Albany people to seize Mohawk and Oneida lands without payment. In 1736, the Mohawks complained that whites often cheated them out of their land by taking more land than was stipulated in deeds. 64 The Iroquois likewise sought help from the governor of Pennsylvania to prevent whites from illegally grabbing Iroquois lands. In 1736, the Iroquois urged the Pennsylvania governor to help them obtain payment for lands allegedly stolen from them by settlers in Virginia and Carolina. Although on that occasion the Pennsylvania governor declined to assist them, the Iroquois eventually received
compensation for their land claims in the South at the Lancaster Con-
ference in 1744. 65

In addition to using the English as a source for economic and
military aid and as a means to control abuses by English colonists, the
Iroquois needed the English for one other reason. The Six Nations fre-
quently used their English ties to improve their relations with other
Indian tribes. Sometimes the Iroquois employed their political and
military alliances with the English to convince Indian tribes to ally
themselves to the Six Nations. On other occasions the Iroquois relied
upon their proximity to the English to persuade tribes to accept the
Six Nations as friends. For instance, the Six Nations quickly realized
that they could use English trade goods to advance their economic and
political relations with the western Indians. The western tribes
desired English goods, but the Iroquois' homelands stood in between
the Western Country and Albany or Oswego. The Iroquois were willing
to allow the western Indians a passage to the English trade—for a
price. The Iroquois demanded peace and an alliance with the western
tribes. The Iroquois later received a bonus by developing a lucrative
trade with the western Indians, who needed provisions, goods, and
services as they traveled through Iroquoia on the long journey to and
from Albany (or Oswego). In short, the English and their trade goods
were the keys to good relations between the western tribes, who
wanted English products, and the Iroquois, who controlled the access to
those products. Therefore, it was imperative that the Iroquois main-
tain their alliance with the English. 66
During the first half of the eighteenth century, the Iroquois needed the French nearly as much as they did the English. Like the English, the French were economically important to the Iroquois. Some of the Iroquois frequently traded with the French. In the fall of 1701, Joncaire brought goods to trade at Onondaga. In 1702, sachems of the Five Nations admitted to New York's Governor Cornbury that their people were trading with the Canadians. The following year Robert Livingston reported to the Lords of Trade that "our Indian trade is not a fifth part so much as it was formerly," due in part to French trade with the Five Nations. Livingston later noted that Indians of the Five Nations had settled near Fort Cataraqui, presumably to trade with the French. La Mothe Cadillac, the French commander at Fort Detroit, reported in November, 1704, that "there are at this very time at Detroit, thirty families of [Iroquois] who are settled there." These Iroquois undoubtedly hunted in the area and exchanged their furs for French goods.

Despite English protests, the Iroquois continued to trade with the French. In 1707, King Louis XIV dispatched de Clerambaut D'Aigremont to New France for an inspection of the western posts. D'Aigremont reported that de Tonty, the French officer in charge at Fort Frontenac, made excessive profits from the fur trade with the Iroquois and other Indians. At Niagara D'Aigremont encountered Joncaire, who recommended that a post be built at that portage to take advantage of the fur trade with the Iroquois. According to Joncaire, the "Iroquois would trade off there all the moose, deer, and bear skins they might bring, as these peltries could not be transported
to the English except by land, and consequently with considerable trouble." D'Aigremont eventually recommended that a fort not be built at Niagara, because it would bring the western tribes too close to the English traders at Albany. So, for the time being, the plans to erect a post at the Niagara portage were tabled. 69

In 1714, the Five Nations, in conjunction with other Indians, sent the following message to the governor of New France: "We the Five Nations, the Minisinks, and the Shawoness desire you would furnish us with powder at a cheap rate by this means you will gain a great trade and much profit." The following year, Joncaire, acting as a French agent, purchased 900 bushels of corn from the Iroquois to ship to Michilimackinac and Detroit, where there were shortages. He even secured the Iroquois' help in transporting the corn twenty miles to Lake Ontario, so that it could be shipped by water to the western posts. 70

The Iroquois sachem Dekansore, noted in 1717 that the French had a small trading post near Irondequoit, in Seneca country, and "sold a great quantity of goods" there. Other sachems also informed the English in 1717 that the Iroquois were trading with the French. 71

French plans to build a fort at the Niagara portage became a reality in 1720. In May, Joncaire returned from a winter at Fort Frontenac carrying many furs obtained in trade with Indians. He also had a message given to him by the Iroquois that caused many French traders to resume their clamoring for a post at Niagara. Joncaire announced that the Senecas wanted the French to erect a trading post at Niagara and that the Senecas had promised to help maintain and defend the post against any future English attacks. Soon thereafter,
a crude post was set up at Niagara, and Joncaire was named its commanding officer. This post was used for trading with the Iroquois and other tribes. At the same time, it hindered the Indians from going to Albany to trade.  

For awhile the Iroquois-French trade flourished, but by the mid-1720s, the trade began to taper off. The French official, Begon, made a report in 1725 on the fur trade at Forts Niagara and Frontenac. According to Begon, the trade dropped sharply in 1724 and 1725, "because the English have done almost all the trade at Niagara. They have even come to trade within ten leagues of Fort Frontenac. Besides, the price of furs has fallen so much that bear skins have been sold this year only at 47s each."  

The French acted quickly to rejuvenate their Indian trade. In 1725, Longueuil, the French officer who had been adopted by the Onondagas, obtained the Onondagas' consent for the French to erect a new stone fort at Niagara. Actually, the Onondagas had no authority to grant the French permission to build at Niagara, which was in Seneca territory. The Senecas had even sent a wampum belt to the Onondagas asking them to reject the French request, but the Onondagas did not listen. They agreed to the French request in return for French promises of trade and protection.  

The Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs quickly realized the threat that the French plans posed to English traders. On July 8, 1726, they wrote to New York's Governor Burnet to complain about the stone fort being built at Niagara. They also complained about two French ships that had begun to sail on Lake Ontario. The Commissioners
maintained that the French actions would hurt New York's fur trade. They explained that Fort Niagara was "conveniently situated to intercept all the fur trade of the Upper Nations and even of our Senecas who must pass that place as they come from their hunting who can't avoid passing by that place or so near it that the French there will trade with them. They are to have a large store of goods there for supplying the Indians." 75

Some of the Iroquois shared the New Yorkers' concern over the building of Fort Niagara. On December 26, 1726, Joncaire informed Longueil that the Senecas were reluctant to have the French stone fort at Niagara and complained that it was the Onondagas, and not the Senecas, who consented to the fort. Joncaire suggested, "One must restrain the [Senecas] in every way in this present affair, but it is necessary to interpose the Onondagas and say to the Iroquois nations: since when do you make no longer one body with the Onondagas? You have told us every year that what one Iroquois nation does or says, all the others agree to. Since when is all that changed?" 76

The French refused to give up their newly constructed stone trading and military post at Niagara, and by the end of the decade, trade once again flourished there. On March 22, 1729, King Louis XIV congratulated the governor and intendant of New France for the increase in trade at Forts Frontenac and Niagara. For the next ten years, the Iroquois continued to trade with the French at those two posts. 77

By 1738, French trade with the Iroquois was again declining. King Louis XIV observed, "It is annoying that this trade diminishes every year. The Sieurs de Beauharnois and Hoquart [the governor and
intendant of New France] attribute this decline to three causes: to the suppression of the brandy trade with the Indians, to the bad quality of the woolen material, and to the low price of beaver. Yet, the French trade with the Iroquois never stopped entirely. In 1741, the Onondagas, Cayugas, Oneidas, and Tuscaroras notified Governor Eauharnois that they would trade with the French if the French offered better values than the English. In 1743, Iroquois who lived on the Cuyahoga River began dealing with French traders from Detroit. And in 1744, the League Council at Onondaga received assurances from the governor of New France that the French would continue to supply the Iroquois with low cost goods and supplies.

The Iroquois also profited from the many gifts they received from the government of New France. Lawrence Claase reported in May, 1704, that the French were at Onondaga condoling the deaths of Iroquois sachems and distributing fine presents to the Iroquois people. In the winter of 1706-07, Cadillac presented tobacco, brandy, and knives to all the Iroquois chiefs who spoke to him at Detroit. During 1707, Governor Vaudreuil of New France gave free powder and lead to all Iroquois who agreed to help the French fight against the Flathead Indians of Carolina. Vaudreuil later noted that he had to give the Iroquois presents in order to preserve their friendship and to prevent them from siding with the English.

Throughout the remainder of the first half of the eighteenth century, the French continued their policy of distributing gifts to the Iroquois in order to win their favor and assistance. Lawrence Claase observed in 1709 that French Jesuits were handing out presents
almost daily in each of the Iroquois' villages. The Albany Commissioners lamented to the New York governor in 1711 that the New York Assembly refused to provide presents for the Iroquois, "while the French were using all means possible to debauch them." In 1715, Longueuil brought nine canoes of presents to Onondaga where he distributed them to the Iroquois. In 1720, Albany officials reported that the French, through presents and threats, had gained much influence over all of the Six Nations. The Albany Commissioners noted in 1738 that approximately one-eighth of all the Iroquois were pro-French. The Commissioners added that the French constantly had an interpreter among the Senecas and frequently sent messengers with presents to all the Six Nations. Later, in the early 1740s, the Commissioners complained that the French gave gifts to the Iroquois in order to gain their help in fighting the Flatheads.  

The French likewise provided provisions and supplies to the Iroquois in times of economic distress. In 1741 and 1742, when the Iroquois were suffering from a famine in their country, the governor of New France distributed food, blankets, ammunition, and powder to some of the distressed Iroquois. 

The French also aided the Iroquois economically by providing them with smiths to fix their broken guns, hatchets, kettles, and other manufactured goods. In November, 1702, the governor of New France informed the Minister de Ponchartrain that the Iroquois had asked for "some smiths to repair their arms, hatchets, and kettles. I have granted this request." Cadillac provided the same service to Iroquois who visited him at Detroit. Cadwallader Colden reported that in 1708
the French sent smiths among the Iroquois to repair their weapons
free of charge. In 1715, New York officials heard reports that French
blacksmiths would soon be living in Iroquois villages. The information
turned out to be true. According to Colden, "The French [in 1715]
settled a smith in the Senecas' country finding that the Senecas had
a greater regard for a smith than for a priest." The Iroquois
appreciated the free smiths and frequently asked the French to send
more. In 1716, the Senecas requested that the French place a resident
blacksmith in their village. The Onondagas asked the French governor
for a smith in 1734. In 1740 and 1741, the Iroquois again requested
smiths to repair their arms and other goods. On each occasion, the
French granted their requests.

Some Iroquois profited by working for the French. The Senecas
often earned wages by carrying French goods across the Niagara portage.
A French writer observed in 1718, "The Niagara portage is 2$ \frac{1}{2} \text{ leagues}
to 3 leagues long, but the road, over which carts roll 2 or 3 times
a year, is very fine, with very beautiful and open woods through which
a person is visible for a distance of 600 paces... Senecas are
employed by the French, from whom they earn money by carrying the
goods of those who are going to the Upper Country... and on the return
of the French they carry their packs of furs for some peltry. This
portage is made for the purpose of avoiding the cataract of Niagara." The Iroquois benefited economically from French help in yet
another way. The Five Nations knew that the French could order the
western tribes not to interfere with Iroquois hunters in the Western
Country. This realization was partially responsible for the Iroquois'
desire to make peace with New France in 1701. On November 4, 1702, Governor Callieres reported to Minister Ponchartrain that the peace of 1701 was working well and all parties could hunt safely in the West. No doubt, after 1701, the Iroquois were pleased to have the French's guarantee that Iroquois hunters would not be attacked by western Indians. 86

Aside from their economic motives, the Iroquois had military and political reasons for wanting peace with New France. The Iroquois respected the power of the French and their Indian allies and did not want war with either of them. Cadillac was aware of the Iroquois' fear of the French and Indians. In 1704, Cadillac wrote, "as long as Detroit is fortified by the French and by savages, the Iroquois will never make war upon us." Four years later Cadillac stated that he could "set so many enemies on to the Iroquois that they will leave him in peace" and not interfere with him or Fort Detroit. 87 The governor of New France warned the Iroquois in 1710 that his Indian allies would attack them if any of the Five Nations ever broke the peace with New France. Later that year the French again warned the Iroquois "that so long as they observed the neutrality, they had nothing to fear from the other Nations. ..[but] should they be so ill-advised as to join the enemies of the French, they must expect at once to have all the tribes of the north and west dash down upon them and show no quarter." 88 On May 1, 1710, Governor Vaudreuil assured the French Minister Ponchartrain that the Iroquois' fear of the French Indians prevented the Iroquois from abandoning their policy of neutrality. 89
The government of New York also recognized the Iroquois' fear of
the French and Indians. In 1706, the Albany Commissioners observed
that fear probably was responsible for the Five Nations' efforts to
improve their relations with New France. In 1708, Lawrence Claasen noted
that the Onondagas stood in awe of French power. The Albany Commissioners
stated in 1738 that, partly out of fear, some of the Five Nations
were inclined to the French interest. Perhaps Peter Wraxall best
explained the Iroquois' position when he said, "I believe their [the
Iroquois'] affections are in our [British] favor, but their fears are
on the French side." These fears of French and Indian power helped
convince the Iroquois that a policy of peace toward New France was in
their own best interests.

The Iroquois also realized that they needed the French to control
the numerous and powerful western tribes. The Five Nations relied on
the French to enforce the Grand Peace Settlement between the Iroquois
Confederacy and the Indian allies of New France. When Vaudreuil was
appointed governor of New France in 1703, the Senecas presented him
with wampum to remind him of his obligation to protect the Iroquois.
The following year the Senecas made it known to the Indians at Detroit
that the Five Nations planned to keep the general peace made by
Onontio (the Iroquois' name for the governor of New France). When
violations of the peace did occur, the Iroquois quickly applied to the
French governor for help. In 1704, Ottawas from Michilimackinac
attacked and killed some Iroquois near Fort Frontenac. At about the
same time, Miamis killed several Seneca hunters in the Western Country.
The Iroquois did not retaliate. Instead, they relied on Governor
Vaudreuil to obtain justice for them. In September, 1704, the French
governor sent a message to the Miamis to show them "how wrong they
were to attack the Iroquois, our allies and theirs, without any
cause." The following autumn, deputies from all of the Five Nations
except the Mohawks met with Vaudreuil to discuss the outbreaks of vio-
ence. The Iroquois complained that the western Indians from the upper
country were breaking the peace of 1701 by having "killed us on divers
occasions." The Iroquois added, "Remember, Father, the promise which
was given us at the Peace [of 1701], that if any of your children
struck another, we would form a union in order to exterminate the
nation which struck the blow." Vaudreuil thanked the Iroquois for not
retaliating and explained that before he took up arms against the
Ottawas, he wanted to give them a chance to correct their wrong
actions. 92

On October 19, 1705, Governor Vaudreuil informed Minister
Ponchartrain about his meeting with the Iroquois. The governor explain-
ed that the Iroquois had agreed to continue their neutrality, despite
the attacks by the western tribes. According to Vaudreuil, the
Iroquois asked him to "declare against the Ottawas, according to
the provisions of the general peace, and I have been very glad to ex-
plain to them the two articles of the treaty which do not render it
imperative to adopt offensive proceedings until after having made
these efforts to procure them satisfaction...and were it not for this
reserve, we should be every day subjected to great expense, or be
obliged to go to war." 93
For the next two years, Vaudreuil did all in his power to obtain a negotiated settlement between the Iroquois and Ottawas. Finally, in the spring of 1707, the Ottawas came to Montreal and agreed to a peace with the Iroquois. The Five Nations were grateful to Vaudreuil for his intervention, but the French governor did not help the Iroquois merely for altruistic reasons. Vaudreuil was afraid that the Iroquois might join with the Hurons and Miamis in a war against the Ottawas, and if they were successful, they might then turn on the French. Vaudreuil realized that it was to New France's benefit not to have war between the Iroquois and the Ottawas. Vaudreuil reasoned, "the only policy that can be pursued in regard to the savages is to prevent any connection between the natives of the upper country, namely the Ottawas, and the people around the lakes, with the Iroquois, so that in the event of one of the two tribes wanting to make war on this colony, we could set the other against it. . . . It is in order to prevent the latter from being destroyed by the Iroquois that we have tried to compose all differences." 94

When the Iroquois were attacked by some western Indians in 1710, they again turned to Governor Vaudreuil for help. On October 31, the governor notified Ponchartrain that Iroquois had complained about some western Indians who had killed several Iroquois. Vaudreuil added that the Iroquois hoped "he would cause justice to be done them." 95 Several months later the French governor invited the Iroquois sachems to attend a conference with the western Indians in Canada to determine "whose fault it is that the far Indians kill every year of your people." 96
Throughout the remainder of the first half of the eighteenth century, the Iroquois relied on the French to prevent attacks by the western and northern Indians. In 1712, the Iroquois asked Governor Vaudreuil for protection against the nations of the upper country who allegedly were planning "to pounce upon them." The French governor was prepared to intervene on the Iroquois' behalf in 1717 after several Ottawas murdered an Iroquois on the Miami River. The Iroquois again turned to the French governor for help in 1724 when they were afraid of the great number of far Indians who were passing through Iroquola to reach the Albany trade.97 In 1741, the Iroquois sought and received the French governor's assurances that he would continue his efforts to maintain good relations between the Iroquois and all other tribes allied to New France. The following year, the Onondagas asked for the governor's help when one of their warriors killed an Indian from the Sault. The French governor replied that since the Iroquois had long kept the peace of 1701, all would be forgiven and peace would continue.98

Some Iroquois believed that they also needed French military protection as a guard against possible attacks by the English. The French frequently warned the Iroquois about purported English plots to exterminate the Five Nations. Then, the French would offer to defend the Iroquois, thereby winning their gratitude and friendship. Governor Vaudreuil employed these tactics in 1703, when he promised to protect the Iroquois in the event of a rumored English attack. In 1708, the French took advantage of the scarcity of powder at Albany to persuade some Iroquois that the English were trying to deprive the
Five Nations of all means to defend themselves. The French also insisted that the Queen of England had asked the French King to join with her to destroy the Five Nations and to divide their lands, but that the French King was resolved to protect the Iroquois. 99

The French continued to spread rumors among the Iroquois. In 1709, Lawrence Claase observed that due to French rumors, the Senecas were in great confusion and were considering abandoning their homelands to avoid an English attack. In 1712, the Iroquois were again distressed by French messages that the English were planning to destroy them. 100 In 1724, King Louis XV ordered Governor Vaudreuil to warn the Iroquois "that if the English are endeavoring to form an alliance with the Ottawas, it is with a view of obtaining assistance from them for their (the Iroquois') destruction." Governor Beauharnois of New France used similar scare tactics in 1742. Beauharnois warned the Iroquois that English fortifications at Oswego were an indication that "some evil design against you and me must be hatching." 101

These constant French warnings about English treacheries helped convince many Iroquois that they needed the French as a guard against possible attacks by the English. The Iroquois never rejected any French proposals of protection, and sometimes, they even asked the French to defend them. For instance, when Iroquois deputies went to Montreal in 1717 to condole the death of Louis XIV, they expressed hope that the new French King would "protect us from any attacks that may be made against us." 102

Some of the Five Nations needed peace with New France for religious and social reasons. Many Iroquois wanted French missionaries. In
1702, Iroquois deputes asked Governor Callieres of New France to station Jesuits in Iroquois villages. Callieres immediately complied with their request by sending Father Lamberville to the Onondagas and Fathers Garnier and Vallant to the Senecas. The following year, Robert Livingston informed the Lords of Trade that the Jesuits had much backing among the Iroquois. The Albany Commissioners reported in 1706 that the Iroquois still had Jesuits among them. Cadwallader Colden observed that, by 1708, the French had five Jesuits living in Iroquoia. The French missionaries were forced to leave Iroquoia in 1709, when many Iroquois joined New York in the war against New France. But though they abandoned their missions, they did not forsake their missionary work. After 1709, the Jesuits did most of their proselytizing in Canada and were successful in settling many Iroquois converts in missions near Montreal.  

Some Iroquois wanted the Jesuits for more than religious reasons. Many Iroquois had political or economic motives for welcoming the missionaries. One pragmatic Iroquois man once remarked, "If the English sell goods cheaper than the French, we will have ministers; If the French sell them cheaper than the English, we will have priests."  

There were some Iroquois, however, who sincerely desired the religious teachings of the French priests. In 1711, Father Joseph Germain observed that over 500 Iroquois were living at a mission near Montreal, because their countrymen would not allow them to practice Christianity in Iroquoia. Father Nau also noted the religious devotion of the Praying Iroquois. In 1735, the Jesuit described the
Iroquois at Sault St. Louis as excellent churchgoers and singers. Four years later, Nau wrote to his mother, "The [Rosary] beads and devotional articles that you have thus far sent have brought joy to the hearts of my poor Iroquois."106

After the Christian Iroquois moved to Canadian missions, the Six Nations had another reason for keeping the peace with New France. They realized that war would interfere with their social ties to the Iroquois emigrants. In the event of an all out war between the Six Nations and New France, the New York Iroquois and the Canadian Iroquois, who were French allies, might even find themselves shooting at each other. Therefore, it was imperative that the Six Nations remain at peace with New France.

The Six Nations had a second major reason for maintaining neutrality between the two European powers. The Iroquois understood that they could further their own needs by playing the English and French off against each other. The Iroquois felt that they could obtain concessions from one side by threatening to take their friendship and business to the other. In 1702, the Five Nations, who knew that the English did not want them to trade with the French, promised the governor of New York that they would trade exclusively at Albany if the English lowered their prices.107 The Iroquois used similar tactics against the French. On November 3, 1702, the governor and intendant of New France wrote to a French minister, "The Iroquois who came down this summer complained not only about the dearness of our goods but even that they were no longer given drink when they came to Ft. Frontenac, as was customary when they came to trade. . . . It is to be
feared that they may be discouraged and break the neutrality they have promised." The following day Governor Callieres wrote another letter to Minister Ponchartrain. In it, he informed the minister that the Iroquois had agreed to stay neutral in Queen Anne's War, "so as to preserve the liberty to trade with Montreal and Orange [Albany]."

In 1706, the Cayugas guaranteed the English that they would not allow a French priest to live among them, if the English provided them with an interpreter and a blacksmith. Later that year, the Five Nations joined together and warned the Albany Commissioners that, unless they received an interpreter and blacksmith soon from the English, they would accept them from the French. The Iroquois made similar threats in 1710. On August 9th of that year, the Five Nations told New York officials that they wanted the English to provide them with free blacksmithing and to stop selling rum or else they would turn to the French.

The Mohawks resorted to similar threats in 1733, when they wanted to stop English colonists from stealing their lands. In September, the Mohawks warned New York's Governor Cosby that they would move to Canada unless he got the Albany government to give up the fraudulent land claims. The governor, who did not want to lose the Mohawks as allies, was thereby forced to comply with their demands.

On occasion, the Iroquois used each European power to check the expansion of the other. In 1702, the Iroquois told New York's Governor Cornbury that they were concerned over the French forts at Cataracaui and Detroit. They recommended that the English build forts to offset those of the French. The Iroquois took the same position
in 1726. When the French erected a stone post at Niagara, the Iroquois allowed the English to build a fort at nearby Oswego. 112

The French were aware of the Iroquois' strategy. In October, 1728, the Paris government ordered Governor Beauharnois not to build any more forts in Iroquoia. The French leaders reasoned that the cost of a new fort would be more than its worth, for, not only would the Iroquois resist a new fort, but they would allow the English to build one right next to it. One French official explained that the Iroquois' policy was that "neither of the two nations should be superior in their country." 113

The Five Nations also used their neutrality to prevent the French and English from fighting each other in the vicinity of Iroquois villages. In 1741, Iroquois deputies reminded the Albany Commissioners that the Six Nations "had given the French leave to build the house at Niagara as they had to [New York] to build one at Oswego and desired no molestation might be on either side." The Iroquois likewise made their position clear to the French. On October 8, 1744, Governor Beauharnois informed Count Maurepas, a French minister, that he could not attack Oswego because of the Iroquois. Beauharnois explained that the Iroquois recently announced that, if both Oswego and Niagara remained undisturbed, the Six Nations would continue their neutrality. The following month, Beauharnois reported to Maurepas that the Iroquois were still neutral. The governor added that the Senecas had again told him that the Iroquois would remain neutral as long as Oswego and Niagara remained untouched by all parties. 114
The Iroquois obviously realized the benefits of neutrality. The Jesuit Charlevoix remarked that in 1704 the Five Nations in general, and the Senecas in particular, "did not wish to infringe the neutrality they had vowed, as they began to appreciate its advantages." Other observers in the eighteenth century also believed the Iroquois were aware of the benefits of their policy of neutrality. Cadwallader Colden described Consora, a Seneca leader, as follows:

This Consora had been famous with both the English and French having been long a great captain or leader among the Five Nations and generally their speaker at all treaties. A very cunning and subtle fellow. I am told that when Brigadier Hunter designed to engage the Five Nations to join in the late expedition against Canada, this man raised himself upon a barrel to harangue to his people and to dissuade them from engaging in that expedition. Among other arguments, he said that they ought not to join either with the English...or with the French...but to keep the balance betwixt the two, for if the English should prevail over the French, the Five Nations would be of means to enslave, for then the English would make no more account of them than they do now of the River or Long Island Indians, but if the Five Nations would now observe an exact neutrality, they would be courted and feared by both sides. Indeed, Consora seemed to pursue this maxim always.

In 1740, Peter Wraxall made a similar observation about the Six Nations and their policy of neutrality. He wrote, "to preserve the balance between us and the French is the great ruling principle of the modern [Iroquois] Indian politics."

The Iroquois had a third major reason for following a policy of neutrality between the English and French. They had no feasible alternative. As previously mentioned, the Iroquois needed both the English and the French for economic, political, military, and social reasons, so they could not afford to alienate either side. Furthermore, the Iroquois were not powerful enough to wage successful warfare
against the English or French. Iroquois military strength had been
decimated by the Twenty Years' War. To make matters worse, major
disasters such as smallpox epidemics in 1717, 1732, and 1733, and
famines in 1741 and 1742 further weakened Iroquois military
strength. Finally, factionalism splintered Iroquois society and
dDictated that the Iroquois Confederacy follow a neutral policy in
regard to the English and French.

During the first half of the eighteenth century, there was no
unanimity among the Six Nations when it came to relations with the
English and French. One New York official remarked, "The [Iroquois]
Nations are full of factions." There was an English party and a
French party in every village. The Senecas, who lived closest to
New France and thus were the most likely to feel French wrath in the
event of war, were especially pro-French in their politics. In June,
1710, the Senecas tried to justify their position to New York officials
and the rest of the Confederacy by saying, "Brethren. I am suspected
to be inclined to the French, but how would you have me to act
differently from what I do for if I do not keep silent the Governor
of Canada. . . . sets all his instruments upon me to destroy me and you
know that I have no assistance given me."119

Whatever the Senecas' reasons, they, as well as others of the
Five Nations, frequently voiced pro-French positions. At the same
time, many Mohawks (who lived closest to the English) and other
Iroquois adopted a pro-English posture. As a result, the Confederacy,
which depended upon compromise for survival, was forced to steer a
middle course in regard to the English and French. In other words, the various factions usually prevented the League Council from adopting either a pro-French or pro-English position. Instead, the League had to favor neutrality in order to avert intraleague political strife and perhaps even a civil war.120

The English had numerous reasons for accepting the Iroquois' decision to remain neutral. Some businessmen and officials in colonial New York realized that the Iroquois' neutrality policy could benefit New York's economy. By 1702, many Albany traders and New York merchants were involved in the notorious Montreal-Albany trade, and they saw Queen Anne's War, which began in 1702, as a threat to their profitable Canadian commerce. If New York and the Five Nations were dragged into the war against New France, the resulting turmoil on the New York frontier would undoubtedly interrupt all trade. Therefore, these New York businessmen were eager to see the Iroquois remain neutral. They knew that as long as the Iroquois continued to be neutral, New France would not attack the New York countryside and the Montreal-Albany trade would continue. The New Yorkers' logic was correct. In 1703, Canada's Governor Vaudreuil informed the French Minister Ponchartrain that the people of Albany wanted to retain a truce between Albany and Montreal despite the war in New England. Vaudreuil added that such an armistice was necessary in order to keep the Iroquois neutral. Peter Wraxall later noted that by 1706 the Five Nations had established a neutrality in favor of the English, by "which means, peace and trade flourished at Albany." In 1708, the Albany Commissioners observed that the Five Nations, with the
concurrence of the New York government, had procured a tacit neutrality between New York and Canada, and as a result, trade thrived at Albany.\textsuperscript{121}

The English colonists had other reasons for accepting the Iroquois' neutral position. They realized that the English colonies could not afford to lose the friendship of the Six Nations. Some English colonists wanted Iroquois friendship for economic reasons. Many New Yorkers made huge profits by trading with the Iroquois. Others needed the Iroquois to open up trade with the western tribes. They knew that the western Indians could not reach Albany without going through or near Iroquois territory. So, the New Yorkers relied on the Iroquois to give the western Indians a free and safe passage through Iroquoia. On occasion, New York officials and businessmen also used the Iroquois to invite western Indians to trade at Albany. Finally, some officials and colonists realized that English colonial economic expansion could be facilitated through the purchase of lands from the Six Nations.\textsuperscript{122}

The English colonists also had military reasons for wanting to retain the friendship of the Six Nations. The English needed the Iroquois as allies and intelligence gatherers in wars against the French and their Indian allies. The English colonists were likewise aware of the strategic importance of the Iroquois' geographic location. Situated between New France and the middle English colonies, Iroquoia was the perfect defensive barrier to guard the English colonists from French and Indian attacks.\textsuperscript{123}

Finally, the English needed the Iroquois for political reasons. English colonial governments frequently used the Iroquois to control
other Indians or to expand the English Covenant Chain Alliance to include more tribes. Charlevoix reported that, in 1702, many of the western tribes "were negotiating with the English through the Iroquois." Cadwallader Colden later noted that in 1707 the Iroquois said "that by the advice of their [English] Brethren, they had concluded a peace with a nation of the far Indians living to the westward called Tieuchsarcoenoies."

The English also used the Iroquois to check French expansion. When the French tried to expand their power and control over the Great Lakes by building a post at Niagara in 1719, the English secured the Iroquois' permission to erect a similar post at Oswego in order to counterbalance the French advance. In 1738, the English again received Iroquois help in containing the French. On November 21, 1738, New York's Lieutenant Governor Clarke wrote to the Lords of Trade, "I got them [Iroquois] not to permit the French to erect a trading house there [at Tierondequat] nor suffer them to take any other footing among them and to give what encouragement they can to the remote Nations of Indians to bring their beaver to Oswego [and not to the French]."

The French, like the English, also were willing to accept the Iroquois neutrality in order to retain the friendship of the Six Nations. The French realized that the Iroquois could help them in many ways. The French were aware of the Iroquois' military importance. Despite the Iroquois' setback in King William's War most French officials did not want to risk another war with the Iroquois, whose proximity and numbers still made them a threat to the survival of New
France. In 1705, King Louis XIV warned Governor Vaudreuil to avoid war with the Iroquois who could cause the "destruction of the colony." Two years later, Vaudreuil wrote to Minister Ponchartrain, "The tranquility of this colony depends on the peace with these [Iroquois] Indians. I neglect nothing to insure the continuance thereof but I dare assure you at the same time that I do so honorably." Governor Vaudreuil understood very well the implications of a war with the Iroquois. In 1709, he pointed out to his superiors in Paris that, if Canada were at war with the Iroquois, he would have to send at least 800 or 900 men to escort every convoy of provisions that went to Fort Frontenac. Vaudreuil informed the Paris government in 1711, "It is a matter of importance to us...not to be at war with that [Iroquois] tribe if we can possibly help it, and the Five Iroquois villages are more to be feared than the whole of New England."128

Although the French were not eager to fight against the Iroquois, they were eager to have those Indians fighting on their side. Governor Vaudreuil noted, in 1708, that Iroquois friendship was important to New France, because Iroquois warriors could be employed to force the western tribes to remain at peace with New France. The French utilized this strategy in 1715, when they convinced some Iroquois men to fight against a western tribe that was hostile toward New France. The governor of New France tried to implement this plan again in 1737 when he asked the Iroquois to join the French in a war against the Fox Indians.129

The French realized that the Iroquois could help their colony's military position in another way. Iroquois, who had been converted by
Jesuit missionaries, could be resettled in communities in Canada. These Praying Iroquois, or Caugnawagas, would then be available to assist the French in wars against the English or other enemies. At the same time, the Caugnawagas and their villages would serve as buffers to insulate Canadian settlements from attack.  

The French also understood that as long as the Iroquois-French peace remained in effect, the Six Nations would not aid the English in a war against New France. Furthermore, if the French could fully win over the Iroquois to the French side, the English would be in a desperate situation. The French believed that by improving their own relationship with the Iroquois, they could weaken the English position. New York's Governor Montgomerie was wise to the French designs. On December 21, 1730, Montgomerie wrote to the Lords of Trade, "The Six Nations is a barrier between Canada and New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, that the former security of these provinces in the late war with France, has been owing to that barrier; if the French therefore should by any arts alienate the affections of those nations, all these provinces, in case of another war between the two crowns, must be exposed to all the miserable effects of a barbarous enemy." Montgomerie noted, "That the French have a just sense of the importance the Six Nations are to us, and would be to them could they gain them, appears from the great expense they put themselves to in keeping their emissaries among them, making presents to the principal men, inviting, entertaining, and caressing them when they go to Canada, using all possible arts to ingratiate themselves to magnify their own power, and to depreciate ours."
The French, like the English, benefited economically from their friendship with the Iroquois. Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the French frequently traded with the Iroquois. Men of the Six Nations also served as middlemen in the Montreal-Albany trade. The Iroquois transported English goods from Albany to Montreal. The Caugnawagas, who lived near Montreal and had close ties to the Montreal traders, were usually the carriers in this Montreal-Albany trade.

The French realized that the Iroquois could also be of help in preventing the western Indians from trading at Albany. Sometimes, the French asked the Iroquois to harass the western Indians, as they passed through Iroquoia en route to Albany. In 1706, the French gave powder and shot to Iroquois so they could attack far Indians who were traveling to Albany. In 1709, the French asked the Senecas to stop any western Indians who tried to trade at Albany. The Albany Commissioners reported in 1715 that "several far Indians were on their way to Albany with a great quantity of beaver, but that the Onondaga Indians had killed some and taken others prisoners so that the rest were fled." According to Cadwallader Colden, the French were responsible for the Onondagas' attack. In 1719, the Albany Commissioners again noted that the French were encouraging the Senecas to make war on western Indians who traded at Albany. On other occasions the French sought the Iroquois' permission to build forts that would block the western and northern Indians' routes to the Albany trade. The French were particularly interested in building forts at strategic sites such as Niagara, Crown Point, and Irondequoit.
Finally, the French needed the Iroquois for political reasons. The French obtained valuable information concerning English movements from the Iroquois. They also tried to use the Iroquois to check English expansion. In 1718, the governor of New France cautioned the Iroquois "not to allow them [English] to establish any posts on [Iroquois] territory." The French offered similar warnings to the Iroquois in 1726. They told the Iroquois that, if Oswego were built, the English, and not the Iroquois, would be the masters of Iroquoia. In 1744, the French governor again cautioned the Iroquois to stop selling their lands to the English. The governor said, "do you not perceive that he [the English] has no other object in view than to make himself stronger, perhaps in order some day to crush you?"

The French used the Iroquois for one other political purpose. They frequently employed Iroquois warriors in raids against southern Indian tribes, like the Catawbas, Cherokees, and Choctaws. The French hoped that the constant harassment by the Iroquois would force those southern tribes to abandon their English alliances in order to obtain a ceasefire and protection from the French.

In short, both the French and the English needed the Iroquois for a variety of reasons. At the same time, neither wanted to risk alienating the Six Nations by refusing to accept the Iroquois' position of neutrality. As a result, the path was cleared for the Iroquois to pursue their goals by employing the Neutrality Policy.
Overall, neutrality benefited the Six Nations in several ways.

First, the Iroquois obtained many economic benefits from their policy of neutrality. Throughout the first fifty years of the eighteenth century, the Iroquois were able to trade with the English or French, depending upon whomever offered the best prices and values. The Iroquois were also in a position to receive aid from both sides. The English and French provided the Iroquois with smiths, gifts, and emergency assistance during times of disease or famine. Furthermore, the neutral position allowed the Iroquois people to hire themselves out to the English and French as belt carriers, mercenaries, scouts, and porters.

Secondly, the policy of neutrality brought significant political advantages to the Iroquois. Neutrality enabled the Iroquois to use both the English and French as instruments to further Iroquois relations with other tribes. For example, western tribes thought twice about attacking Iroquois hunters after they learned that the Iroquois had the English and French as allies. Neutrality also helped the Iroquois to retain their own sovereignty. Through their neutral stance, the Iroquois established a balance of power position. The French were constantly afraid that the Six Nations would tilt to the English side, thereby assuring an English victory over New France. The English suffered from similar fears. This balance of power kept the Iroquois important to both sides. Since the English and French were both unsure of Iroquois attitudes, they had to continually court the Iroquois' favor. The balance of power role, established by the neutrality policy, gave the Iroquois leverage against the whites that
other tribes lacked. This leverage enabled the Iroquois to preserve their independence by playing the two European powers off against each other. The Iroquois could use each side to check the advances or abuses of the other.

Thirdly, neutrality provided the Iroquois with military advantages. The Iroquois were assured of military assistance, supplies, and advice from both the English and French. They constantly received assurances that each side would support the Iroquois in a war against the other. The English and French also promised to protect the Iroquois from attacks by hostile Indian tribes.

Fourthly, the policy of neutrality was beneficial for Iroquois society. It provided the Six Nations with a relatively uninterrupted period of peace that allowed the Iroquois people to recover from the trauma and setbacks of the Twenty Years' War. Neutrality also lessened the strife between factions in Iroquois society and government. By its very nature, the neutrality policy was a compromise. As such, it mitigated division and conflict within the Iroquois Confederacy by placating the pro-English, pro-French, and neutral factions.

Finally, the policy of neutrality provided the Iroquois people with the opportunity to receive the goods, ideas, and services being offered by both the English and French. At the same time, it served as a check against excesses and abuses by either the English or French.
Chapter 4: Notes

1. Wraxall, 39, 40; NYCD, IV, 888, 889; Charlevoix, History, V, 141-154.


3. NYCD, IX, 817.


5. Livingston, 206-209.


13. NYCD, IX, 843.


17. Wraxall, 91; NYCD, V, 270.


19. Charlevoix, History, V, 236; Colden, "History...1707-20," 402-408; NYCD, IX, 856; Wraxall, 91.
NYCD, V, 267-270; Wraxall, 91; Colden, "History...1707-20," 404-406.

21 Parkman, Half-Century, 127-133; Wraxall, 92; Colden, "History...1707-20," 408.

22 Colden, "History...1707-20," 408; NYCD, V, 278.

23 MPHc, XXXIII, 528-532.

24 Charlevoix, History, V, 256.


27 Wraxall, 47, 60, 174; NYCD, V, 220, 384, 866.


29 NYCD, IX, 817, V, 272; Colden, "History...1707-20," 422.

30 MPHc, XXXIII, 118; Colden, "History...1707-20," 370; Wisc. Hist'l Coll., XVI, 382; Colden, "History...1707-20," 369.


32 Wraxall, 39, 40, 131, 168; NYCD, V, 783-785.

33 NYCD, IX, 1075; Wraxall, 221, 222, 223, 224; Pa. Minutes, IV, 501.

34 NYCD, IV, 987-988; Livingston, 184.

35 Wraxall, 52; Colden, "History...1707-20," 363; Wraxall, 54; Colden, "History...1707-20," 367.

36 Wraxall, 70.

37 NYCD, V, 217-226; Wraxall, 77.

38 Colden, "History...1707-20," 399-402; NYCD, V, 246-49, 278; Colden, "History...1707-20," 411; Wraxall, 96; Colden, "History...1707-20," 412.
39 Wraxall, 115; Livingston, 224, 225.

40 NYCD, V, 542-44, 550; Wraxall, 131, 168, 169, 170; NYCD, V, 799.

41 NYCD, V, 859-869, 963.

42 Livingston, 190.

43 NYCD, V, 246-249.

44 Colden, "History...1707-20," 416; NYCD, V, 382; Livingston, 226.

45 NYCD, IV, 986; Livingston, 193; Wraxall, 47, 60, 63, 86, 87.

46 Wraxall, 95.

47 Colden, "History...1707-20," 426.

48 Pa.Minutes, III, 125, 129.

49 Wraxall, 174; NYCD, V, 863-64.

50 Wraxall, 188; NYCD, V, 967-68; Wraxall, 195.

51 Pa.Minutes, IV, 92.

52 NYCD, VI, 265.


55 NYCD, V, 905.

56 Wraxall, 187.


58 Wraxall, 70.

59 Colden, "History...1707-20," 414; Wraxall, 113.

60 JR, LXVII, 39-41.


62 Wraxall, 179.
63 NYCD, V, 960.

64 NYCD, VI, 15-100; Cadwallader Colden to Gov. Clarke, Nov. 3, 1736, in OC Papers, II, 158-160.


66 Wraxall, 218, 230, 70, 176; Beauchamp, A History, 290; NYCD, IV, 888, 908-911; Wraxall, 34, 29, 70, 77, 144, 171; NYCD, IV, 691, 748, V, 42, 222, 659.

67 Severance, Joncaire, 93; NYCD, IV, 968, 1067; Livingston, 197.

68 MPHC, XXXIII, 207.

69 Wraxall, 48; Severance, Joncaire, 96; Wisc. Hist'l Coll., IX, 246; NYCD, IX, 819-826; LaMontagne, Royal Ft. Fron., 205-208; Joncaire to d'Aigremont, in Severance, Joncaire, 101.


71 Colden, "History...1707-20," 425; Wraxall, 120.

72 Severance, Joncaire, 115-128; NYCD, V, 588.

73 Begon to Dupuy, October 31, 1725, in LaMontagne, Royal Ft. Fron., 217.

74 NYCD, IX, 1081; Severance, Joncaire, 169.

75 Wraxall, 163.

76 Severance, Joncaire, 165-167.

77 LaMontagne, Royal Ft. Fron., 218; DHSNY, IV, 240, 241.

78 LaMontagne, Royal Ft. Fron., 225.


80 Livingston, 194; MPHC, XXXIII, 314; Colden, "History...1707-20," 363; MPHC, XXXIII, 402.

81 Wraxall, 63; Colden, "History...1707-20," 402, 419; Wisc. Hist'l Coll., XVI, 337; NYCD, V, 570; DHSNY, IV, 240; Wraxall, 224, 229.

82 NYCD, IX, 1075, 1084, 1089.
83 NYCD, IX, 736; MPHC, XXXIII, 314; Colden, "History...1707-1720," 370; Wraxall, 103; Colden, "History...1707-20," 419.
84 Colden, "History...1707-20," 559; NYCD, IX, 1041, 1063, 1075, 1081-1084.
86 NYCD, IX, 736.
87 MPHC, XXXIII, 207, 391.
88 Charlevoix, History, V, 223, 236.
89 NYCD, IX, 843.
91 NYCD, V, 591-623, IX, 1052; Charlevoix, History, V, 159; MPHC, XXXIII, 190, 191.
92 Charlevoix, History, V, 165; NYCD, IX, 759, 761, 765, 767, 768.
93 NYCD, IX, 766.
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96 NYCD, V, 243.
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108 Callieries and Beauharnois to the Minister, Nov. 3, 1702, in LaMontagne, Royal Ft. Fron., 204.
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119 Parkman, Half-Century, 27; NYCD, IV, 1067; Charlevoix, History, V, 165, 236, 237; Livingston, 212; Colden, "History...1707-20," 356.
120 NYCD, IX, 863, 1041, 1099, V, 570, 727, 728; Colden, "History...1707-20," 402, 424, 430, 432; Charlevoix, History, V, 256; Severance, Joncaire, 107, 108; CC Papers, I, 129, 130; Wraxall, 189, 207; Wisc. Hist'l Coll., XVII, 420.
121 NYCD, IX, 743; Wraxall, 46, 58.
122 NYCD, IV, 990, 1067, V, 217, 799, 960, VI, 14, 15, IX, 751, 761; Charlevoix, History, V, 164; Wraxall, 62, 64, 171, 191, 203, 228; Pa. Arch., Ist series, I, 498.
123 NYCD, V, 42, 228; Wraxall, 69, 91; NYCD, V, 85; Colden, "History...1707-20," 362; NYCD, IV, 1067, V, 907, 908.
125 Colden, "History...1707-20," 361.

127 NYCD, IX, 765; Wisc. Hist'l Coll., XVI, 240.

128 MPHc, XXXIII, 453, 529.

129 MPHc, XXXIII, 403; Wraxall, 103, 204.

130 JR, LXVII, 191-193, 205; Wraxall, 50; Colden, "History...1707-20," 394; Parkman, Half-Century, 54; Norton, Fur Trade, 126.

131 NYCD, V, 907, 908.

132 LaMontagne, Royal Ft. Fron., 204; NYCD, IX, 736, 1081, 1082; Wraxall, 48; Wisc. Hist'l Coll., IX, 246.

133 NYCD, IX, 811; Norton, Fur Trade, 122, 126; Parkman, Half-Century, 28.

134 Wraxall, 48, 68, 102, 127; Colden, "History...1707-20," 419; Wraxall, 124, 125; NYCD, VI, 112, IX, 1081.

135 NYCD, IX, 817; LaMontagne, Royal Ft. Fron., 207; Charlevoix, History, V, 236, 237.

136 NYCD, IX, 884, 952, 1085.

137 Wraxall, 52, 171; NYCD, IX, 884; Colden, "History...1707-20," 363, 432.
Chapter 5: The Iroquois and the Western Tribes

Iroquois relations with the various tribes of the Western Country—a territory that extended from the Niagara Frontier in the east to the lands north and south of Lake Michigan in the west and bounded by the Ohio River Valley in the south and the Ottawa River Valley in the north—underwent a dramatic change in the eighteenth century. Throughout the 1600s, the Five Nations had carried out a policy of war toward western tribes such as the Miami, Illinois, Ottawa, Huron, Potawatomi, Sac, and Fox, but by the turn of the century, the Iroquois of New York found themselves in a weakened position and realized they could no longer afford to continue hostilities with the Indians of the West. This realization on the part of the Five Nations led to the introduction of a new policy toward the western tribes aimed at a rapprochement which would facilitate travel, hunting, and trade for all Indians in the Western Country.

The Iroquois needed the Western Country as a source for furs. Iroquoia had been depleted of beaver by 1650, so after that date the Western Country served as the Iroquois' primary hunting grounds. The Five Nations had won the right to hunt in the Western Country by defeating the western tribes in a series of wars during the seventeenth century. Beginning in the mid-1640s, the Iroquois consecutively defeated the Hurons, Neutrals, and Eries. The survivors of the Iroquois attacks retreated westward. They were joined by other tribes of the
Great Lakes region such as the Illinois, Miami, Fox, Sac, Kickapoo, and Mascouten, who decided to flee rather than defend their homelands against the fierce Iroquois invaders.²

The dispersion of these Indians by the mid-1660s nearly emptied the Western Country of its native inhabitants and gave the Iroquois almost exclusive hunting rights in the West. But the Iroquois' hegemony was short-lived. By 1700, Iroquois power was waning, while the strength of the western tribes was increasing. Participation in King William's War had proved costly for the Iroquois. At war's end, the Five Nations had lost one-half of their warriors.³ Meanwhile, as the power of the Iroquois decreased, the strength of the western tribes seemed to be on an upsurge. Western Indians had begun to repopulate the Great Lakes region by 1700. These migrations into the Western Country were motivated by the reduction of the Iroquois threat, the encouragement of the French to settle around their new posts recently built in the area, and the desire of some Indians to move closer to New York and Pennsylvania, where they hoped to establish a trade with the English.⁴ The major tribes moving into the Western Country between 1700 and 1750 were the Wyandots (Hurons), Miamis, Ottawas, Illinois, Potawatomis, Sauteurs, Mississagas, Shawnees, and Delawars.⁵

La Mothe de Cadillac, the French commander at Fort Detroit, played a significant role in establishing Indian villages near his fort. Cadillac reported that the Sauteurs, Hurons, and Mississagas had moved to Detroit in 1703, and that they had settled near the Hurons, Nepissings, and Ottawas who were already established there. Cadillac
explained, "More than fifty years ago, the Iroquois drove most of the tribes by force of arms to the end of Lake Superior, that is 500 leagues to the north of this [Detroit] post, which is barren and fearful country; and that about 32 years ago we brought them together again in the district of Michilimackinac which is also unfruitful, where they have been reduced to the necessity of living on fish only." Cadillac added, in a characteristically immodest tone, "It appears, therefore, that God has raised me up like another Moses to go and deliver this people from its captivity, or like another Caleb to bring it back to the land of its fathers and its former dwelling place."6

The Iroquois were awed by the great numbers of Indians moving into the Western Country.7 According to a French memoir that was written in 1718, over 3500 warriors lived between Lake Erie and the Mississippi River. The annual report of the Lords of Trade in 1721 estimated that 6600 warriors lived in the areas adjacent to Lake Michigan or on the rivers flowing into it. A French census taken in 1736 placed the number of western Indian warriors at 6170.8 The Iroquois could not match the manpower of these western Indians.9

The French frequently tried to keep the Iroquois in check by impressing them with the power of the western tribes. In 1710, Governor Vaudreuil warned the Five Nations that should they join the enemies of France, the powerful western tribes would immediately destroy them. The following year the governor ordered his officers "to bring the savages of the Upper Country allied to us down here [to Montreal], not only to obtain reinforcements of men in this way,
but also to show the Iroquois that the moment they declare themselves against us, the tribes of the upper country will fall upon them."\(^{10}\)

The lessons were not wasted on the Iroquois. They were impressed and had respect, if not outright fear, of the numerous and powerful western tribes. As early as 1699, the Iroquois complained to New York Governor Bellomont that their hunters were being killed by the western Indians. Some Iroquois even feared that the Five Nations would be destroyed. Bellomont echoed these fears in his report to the Lords of Trade in 1700.\(^ {11}\) In 1700, the Albany Commissioners reported to Bellomont that the Iroquois lived in great fear of the western tribes.\(^ {12}\) That same year, the Iroquois asked the governor to defend the Five Nations against western tribes such as the Dowaganhaes, Twicottwicks, and others who were allied to New France.\(^ {13}\)

Even after a peace treaty was signed between the Iroquois and the western Indians, the Five Nations did not trust the western tribes. The Onondagas informed Albany officials in 1704 that "Indians of the Five Nations had made a settlement near Cadaraqui and since the Waganhas [a generic term for western Indians] have also settled there about (who now consist in much greater number than those of the Five Nations) they are resettling back to the Five Nations again."\(^ {14}\)

Other accounts show that the Iroquois feared the western tribes. In 1708, Cadillac noted that the Iroquois would not attack Fort Detroit, because they knew that he could send many western Indians against them in retaliation. Another French official, Clerambault D' Aigremont, described an event in 1708 that likewise demonstrated the Iroquois' timidity in regard to the western Indians. According to D' Aigremont,
a group of Mississaga and Sautour Indians arrived at Fort Frontenac in June, 1708, and began to sing insulting songs about the Five Nations. Iroquois were present, but they concealed their feelings and did nothing even though the western Indians called them weaklings, "which, among Indians is the greatest of all insults." The Iroquois frequently worried about being attacked by the western tribes and repeatedly sought English protection against the advances of the western Indians.

After 1700, the Five Nations found themselves in a predicament. Their fear of the western tribes plus their own weakened position convinced the Iroquois that they could not obtain control of the Western Country by force. Yet, the Five Nations also knew that their economic well-being, if not their very existence, depended on their being able to hunt safely in the Western Country, which provided them with the beaver furs needed for the valuable Albany trade. Furthermore, the Five Nations were aware that they would suffer many casualties in the event of renewed hostilities with the numerous and powerful western tribes. These realizations set the stage for the shift in Iroquois policy toward the western Indians in the early eighteenth century. The Iroquois hoped that where a policy of war had failed to provide them with a source of furs from the Western Country, a policy of peace would succeed. They also hoped that whereas warfare had failed to give them dominance and influence over the western tribes, diplomacy would succeed. From these attitudes evolved the Iroquois' policy of rapprochement toward the western Indians.
The first step toward improved relations with the Indians of the West came in 1701, when Iroquois deputies journeyed to Montreal to treat with the French and their Indian allies. Representatives from important western tribes like the Miami, Illinois, Huron, Ottawa, Mascouten, Kickapoo, Menominee, and Mississaga were summoned by the French to take part in the grand council with the Iroquois. The settlement of 1701 established the neutrality of the Five Nations in any future wars between England and France, a peace between the Iroquois and New France's northern and western Indian allies, and the right of all Indians to hunt safely in the western country. At the conference, New France's Governor Callières stated confidently to all the Indian nations that now there would be peace and all could hunt in safety. He added that should the peace be broken, the aggrieved party should not take revenge, but should come to him for justice.

Callières' words were exactly what the Iroquois wanted to hear. From then on, whenever western Indians violated the peace agreement, the Iroquois sought justice and protection from the French governor. When a party of Ottawas murdered several Senecas near Cataraqui in 1704, the Five Nations relied on the French to settle the matter. On June 17, 1705, Louis XIV issued a directive to his governor of New France to keep the peace with the Iroquois and to warn the Ottawas and Miamis (who had also attacked Iroquois hunters) to stop fighting the Iroquois or else face punishment from the government of New France. Iroquois deputies met with Governor Vaudreuil on August 16, 1705, and complained that the western Indians were repeatedly breaking the peace of 1701. The Iroquois reminded the governor of
his obligation to intervene on their behalf. By autumn the governor
had successfully mediated a solution to the Iroquois' problems with
the western Indians.\(^{19}\)

The Five Nations were delighted with the French governor, who
protected them from the western tribes. The Paris government was also
pleased with the actions of Governor Vaudreuil. On June 9, 1706,
Minister Ponchartrain wrote to Vaudreuil: "His Majesty has approved
the measures you have adopted to prevent the war between the Iroquois
and the Ottawas... If you could succeed in driving off those Ottawas
who have ill treated the Iroquois, it must be done, in order to con-
vince them of your sincerity."\(^{20}\)

After 1706, skirmishes and battles occurred from time to time
between Iroquois and western Indians. On each occasion, the Five
Nations sought help from the French.\(^{21}\) The Iroquois knew that French
aid could enable them to maintain peaceful relations with the fierce
tribes of the Western Country. On July 17, 1742, Seneca deputies
reiterated to the governor of New France that the Iroquois wanted the
tree of peace with the French and Indians to be firm. The Senecas
added that the roots on their side were strong, and "none are rotten
but those which are on the side of sundown [i.e. to the West]; We
repair them by this belt."\(^{22}\)

The Iroquois had good reason not to be disillusioned with the
failure of the Settlement of 1701 to establish an absolute peace among
all Indians in the Western Country. After all, the settlement did
provide the Five Nations with a French ally who promised to punish any
Indians who violated the ceasefire. Furthermore, the settlement brought
about a period of relative peace between the Iroquois and the western tribes. Not only did it allow the Iroquois to hunt and travel throughout the West in relative safety, but it provided the Iroquois with the opening needed to visit the villages of the western tribes and peddle their most important ware, namely the opportunity for the western Indians to obtain English trade goods.

The Five Nations quickly realized that their political and geographical proximity to the English could be used to promote Iroquois interests in the Western Country. They had listened carefully to New York's Governor Bellomont in 1700 when he told them:

You must needs be sensible that the Dowagenhaes, Miami, Ottawas, and Tobaccos and the other remote Indians are vastly more numerous than you Five Nations and that by their continued warring upon you they will in a few years totally destroy you; I think therefore it prudent and good policy in you to try all possible means to fix a trade and correspondence with all those nations, by which you would retain them to yourselves, and with my assistance I am in hopes in a short time they might be brought to be united with us in the Covenant Chain, and then you might at all times go a hunting into their country without any sort of hazzard, which I understand is much the best for beaver hunting.23

The Five Nations apparently agreed with Bellomont, for soon thereafter they moved to establish better economic and political ties with those Indians. They dangled before the western Indians the opportunity to obtain English manufactured goods, which were better quality yet cheaper than French products. In 1724, Cadwallader Colden commented on the Indians' eagerness to have English goods. Colden pointed out that French products were not nearly as desirable as English goods. He added, "the strords [English woolens] which the Indians value more than any other clothing are made only in England." Furthermore, French
brandy cost the Indians more than English rum. And finally, New York traders could sell their goods at one-half the price of what the French charged.24

The Iroquois, whose homelands stood between the western tribes and the trade city of Albany, hoped to establish a geographic middleman position that would enable them to obtain diplomatic and economic concessions from the western Indians. The Iroquois offered the western tribes a free and safe passage through Iroquoia to the English trading posts at Albany and later Oswego. In return, those Indians had to remain at peace with the Iroquois and not molest Iroquois hunting parties in the Western Country. Many western Indians were quick to accept the Iroquois' proposal. In 1700, the Iroquois reported to the Albany Commissioners that "there are five Waganhaes come to Onondaga who are sent by three several nations, who are very strong and numerous, to make peace with the Five Nations." The Iroquois added that the Waganhaes wanted to trade at Albany. That same year an Englishman named Samuel York returned from the Western Country, where he had been held captive. He reported that the numerous Indians of that region were eager to come to Albany for trade purposes, but feared traveling through Iroquoia.25

After 1701, the Iroquois did their best to quell those fears. In 1702, the Miamis accepted Iroquois and English invitations to trade at Albany. Governor Vaudreuil of Canada noted in 1703 that the Hurons had told him that "the Mohawks have come on the part of the English to invite the Hurons to Orang." Later that year Vaudreuil admitted that the Hurons and Miamis were trying to establish trade with the
English at Albany.  

The traffic between the Western Country and Albany soon increased dramatically. In June, 1704, Indians from Detroit arrived at Albany and made two requests. First, they asked for English trade. Then they said, "Brothers the Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas, we desire you'll permit us a free passage through your country." A workable arrangement apparently was agreed upon, because by the end of the year, the leaders of New France were expressing concern that numerous Indians from the Detroit area were trading at Albany. 

Many of the western tribes continued to trade at Albany throughout the remainder of the decade. The governor of New York, Lord Cornbury, was delighted with the tribes coming to Albany. He wrote, in 1708, to the Lords of Trade, "Twelve of the far nations of Indians came to trade [at Albany] with our people. There are two nations of them who are called Twigtwicks and Dionondades; the nearest of their castles is 800 miles from Albany." Cornbury added that he hoped to have them trading regularly at Albany. French officials were dismayed with the turn of events. One French officer complained, "Detroit has brought the savages only too near the English. Almost all the beaverskins produced go to Orange, and we see hardly any...from that post." 

The Sieur D'Aigremont agreed that Fort Detroit had brought the western Indians too close to the English and Iroquois. He explained, "The Huron [of Detroit]...constantly pass through [Iroquois] districts to take their beaverskins to the English. They were not content with doing this trade alone; they have also introduced the Miamis to it, who were formerly the enemies of the Iroquois...the Iroquois have
taken advantage of the time since Detroit was established to attract our allies so that they may have them on their side in case of war."\textsuperscript{31}

English observers were able to record the proceedings of a 1710 conference between the Iroquois and one western tribe. Cadwallader Golden reported that the Iroquois prepared for their talks with the Waganshas by soliciting English support. Golden wrote, "[the Iroquois] sent at three several times messengers to Albany to tell that they designed to meet some Wagansha sachems in the general meeting to be held at Onondaga and therefore desired their Brethren to send some persons of note, . . . to represent their Brother Corlaer [the New York governor] and to bring some of the River Indian sachems along with them. Captain Evert Banker and Mr. David Schuyler were sent." The conference between the Waganshas, Iroquois, River Indians, and English convened during the first week in June. According to Golden, the Senecas first met privately with the rest of the Iroquois and told them, "that when the Wagansha ambassadors came this last time to them they spoke to the ambassadors as follows: 'We take you by the hand to conduct you to our Brother Corlaer and Quider. The doors stand everywhere open for you. Your lodgings are prepared from the Seneca's country to that of our Brother Corlaer and Quider, the path is made plain and easy and there is no evil in our country.'\textsuperscript{32}

On June 7, the Iroquois, in conjunction with the government of New York and the River Indians, presented the following wampum belts to the Wagansha ambassadors:

1st Belt. Brethren, I desire a firm and everlasting peace to to kept inviolably not only by us but by our children likewise. If you shall preserve this peace our children will grow up in
joy, but if you do the contrary, either you or I will repent it.

2nd Belt. Brethren, by this we cleanse your minds and wash away all evil thoughts.

3rd Belt. By this we reconcile the young men our soldiers to yours that if any nation should after this attack either of us, we may jointly defend ourselves and destroy our enemies. Brethren, if any of our people fall into your country naked and hungry supply them with victuals and clothing.

4th Belt. Brethren. If any difficulty should hereafter happen between any of your people and any of this house [i.e. the Iroquois or their River Indian and English allies], let no revenge be taken till enquiry made of the occasion of such injury. Come first to us here if any harm happen to be done by any of our people before you take revenge, for you may safely do it and we shall do in like manner with you.

5th Belt. Brethren. I desire that we may walk and travel safely and trade freely.

6th Belt. Brethren. Corlaer and Quider and the River Indians speak to you by this belt as well as the Five Nations who altogether make one house here. The path from the place where you live to Albany is beaten and made plain by this belt and all molestation or trouble removed out of the way. If any other nation would walk in this path who is not acquainted with it, help him forward. You have a free and safe passage to my Brother Corlaer to walk in it as you please without molestation.

7th Belt. Brethren. We hear that one [of] your great sachems who always inclined to our Brother Corlaer and Quider is dead. We desire you may put another good man in his room.

As soon as the Iroquois sachem completed his speech, Albany agents presented two strayed blankets and other gifts to clothe the new Waganha sachem. The following day the Wanaghahas gave their reply:

[Belt] 1. Brethren Corlaer and Quider. You have accepted me for your child. I have last summer sucked one of your breasts, but now I am come to suck them both. Have compassion on us as a Father hath on his children. Father, I take the hatchet out of your hands because you have spoken of peace that you may have peace everywhere... .

[Belt] 2. Father you have taken me into your Covenant Chain which shall be preserved so firmly that no ax shall be able to cut it asunder...

[Belt] 3. Father Corlaer and Quider. I am resolved to go to your house to see how the trade is there, and if you use us well we will return next Spring.

[Belt] 4. Now Father and Brethren. We accept of the peace as it is offered to us and thank the whole house for it, We promise to observe it forever in token...we give these two
calumets. 33

These negotiations probably were typical of the treaty settlements that occurred between the Iroquois and western tribes. The Iroquois gave wampum belts to show off their close English alliance to the Waganhas (belts 6 and 7); to establish peace and an alliance with the Waganhas (belts 1, 2, 3, and 4); to obtain the right to travel and hunt safely in the Western Country (belts 3 and 5); and to offer in exchange to the Waganhas a free and safe passage to the Albany trade (belt 6). The Waganhas accepted the Iroquois' proposals and presented their own wampum belts to show that they would uphold peace and the Covenant Chain alliance (belts 1 and 2) and that they looked forward to trading at Albany (belt 3).

After 1710, the Iroquois continued their strategy of offering the western tribes free and safe passage to the Albany trade in return for peace and the right to hunt and travel in the West. Colden noted that in June, 1711, "several of the far Indians under the French dominion came to Albany to trade." In 1714, the Iroquois promised the governor of New York "not only to give a free passage to the far Indians but would likewise incite them to come to trade at Albany." 34

Western tribes regularly traded at Albany between 1715 and 1719. 35 The French officer Alphonse de Tonty reported in 1718 that, on one occasion, he saw nine canoes of western Indians who were en route to the Albany trade. Three were from Michilimackinac, three were from Detroit, and three from Saginaw. That same year another French officer, M. Sabrevois, informed Cadillac that the Indians of Detroit generally went to Albany to trade. Peter Wraxall noted that in June, 1719, many
Indians from the region south of the Great Lakes arrived at Albany to trade with the English.36

Throughout the 1720s, the Albany trade with the western tribes continued to grow. On October 22, 1720, New France's Governor Vaudreuil notified the Council of Marine that some of the Miamis (one of France's most powerful western Indian allies) were trading at Albany.37

William Burnet, the new governor of New York, was partially responsible for the increase in the numbers of western Indians taking part in the Albany trade. Burnet gave New York's western fur trade a boost when he secured a prohibition of the notorious Montreal-Albany trade, which had been carried on between the merchants of those two cities since the turn of the century. This made many western tribes even more eager to obtain Iroquois permission to pass through their homelands to reach the Albany trade. On July 12, 1721, Governor Burnet reported that the Montreal-Albany trade had been stopped and, as a result, many of the far Indians were now trading at Albany.38

Burnet sought to increase trade with the western tribes in another way. On September 8, 1722, he instructed Major Abraham Schuyler to lead a party of traders to a location on Lake Ontario (probably Oswego) in Seneca country, where they were to reside for one year. Burnet ordered them "to trade with the far Indians that are come from the upper lakes, and endeavor by all suitable means to persuade them to come and trade at Albany or with this new settlement." Burnet told Schuyler, "You are also to acquaint all the far Indians that I have an absolute promise and engagement from the Five Nations that they will not only suffer them to pass freely and peaceably through their country,
but will give them all due encouragement, and sweep and keep the path open and clean whenever they intend to come and trade with this province." 39

Between them, Burnet and the Iroquois succeeded in bringing in many western Indians to trade at Albany and the new establishment on Lake Ontario. Governor Vaudreuil informed the Council of Marine on October 6, 1721, that the English constantly send out Iroquois to invite the western Indians to trade in the New York province. Vaudreuil wrote, "Some of those [Iroquois] emissaries, who passed the winter this year in [a Miami] village, chose the time when Sieur Dumont [who was stationed among the Miamis] was among the Ouyatanons, to take along eight or ten canoes of Miamis to Orange to do their trading there." 40

For the next twenty years western Indians traveled through Iroquoia to trade at Albany and Oswego. The Albany Commissioners reported that in 1723 several tribes from Michilimackinac had come to Albany to make peace with the Iroquois and English in order to pave the way for trade with the latter. Peter Wraxall noted, in 1723, that many Indians from the West had come to Albany for trade purposes. Wraxall observed that, in 1725, Indians from Detroit continued to trade at Albany. On September 2nd of that year, the Albany Commissioners informed the New York governor that, during the past summer, forty-three canoes of western Indians brought into Albany and Schenectady over 200 bundles of beaver and fur. In 1726, Canada's Governor Vaudreuil complained that many western tribes were traveling to Albany to trade with the English. 41
Throughout these years the Iroquois continued to offer the western tribes free passage through their homelands in return for peaceful relations. Wraxall reported that on August 5, 1727, "Two Seneca sachems acquaint the Commissioners that they have been among the western or far Nations in order to bring them into the interest of this government and say they have prevailed over four tribes or nations and were in hopes of including many others into a trade and friendship with this government." In October, 1728, the Six Nations assured the governor of New York that they would "use their endeavors to draw as many of the Far Indians as they can to trade with [New York]." Peter Wraxall wrote that on June 10, 1735, "A Cayuga warrior reports to the Commissioners that he and another Indian returning this spring from their winter hunting stopped at a castle of the Waganhas or Ottawa Indians who received them kindly and that their sachems met and told them that a peace and good correspondence had been formerly established between their nation and the Five Nations and though the sachems were dead who made it yet they now renewed it and desired it might be continued." The Commissioners thanked the Iroquois for endeavoring to get the Waganhas to come to trade at Albany.

According to Wraxall, many far Indians were trading at Oswego in 1736. He noted that in the summer of 1736 alone over 160 canoes of western Indians came to Oswego to trade. Governor Beauharnois of New France was aware of the many Indians who were trading at Oswego. On August 12, 1736, he informed a French minister that the western tribes "find plenty of [liquor] at Chouoguen [Oswego], where they repair from all the posts of the upper country."
New York's Lieutenant Governor Clarke wrote to the Lords of Trade in 1738 that the western Indians were still trading at Oswego. Clarke explained that it was very easy to travel by water from New York to "the Onidas' lake to Oswego, and the lakes and rivers even to the branches of the Mississippi, it is from the Indians that inhabit near, and to the northward and westward of those lakes, that we have our beaver in exchange chiefly for goods of the manufacture of England." Clarke later added that the Iroquois had pledged "to give what encouragement they can to the remote nations of Indians to bring their beaver to Oswego." 45

Apparently western Indians continued to accept the Iroquois' offer of free and safe passage through Iroquoia, for during the autumn of 1742, Governor Beauharnois thought it necessary to tell several western tribes not to trade at Oswego. 46

Actually, not all Iroquois were eager to have the western Indians passing through their country. In 1724, some Onondagas told the governor of New France that they were afraid of the great numbers of far Indians who passed through Iroquoia en route to Albany. On occasion, some Iroquois even tried to prevent western Indians from trading in New York. In 1710, several Iroquois men nearly disrupted negotiations with the Ottawas, when they became drunk and threatened to kill the Ottawas whom they disliked. In 1715, a group of pro-French Onondagas attacked some western Indians in order to stop them from trading at Albany. 47

Most Iroquois, however, were glad that western Indians were traveling through Iroquoia and trading at Albany. By granting the
western Indians a safe and free passage through their homelands, the Iroquois had obtained peace from those tribes, as well as the right to hunt and travel safely in the Western Country. Furthermore, some Iroquois were able to develop a lucrative trade with the western Indians as they passed through Iroquoia.

Governor Vaudreuil of New France explained this Iroquois-western Indian trade in a memoir he wrote in 1708. Vaudreuil claimed that the Iroquois would never allow the British to establish a post at Niagara because:

The Iroquois is too skillful, and understands his interests too well to permit it. If the Englishman were settled there, the Iroquois would find himself deprived of the profit he makes out of the people of the Lakes who pass through their territory to go to the English, or from the beaverskins they [the western Indians] trade in with them [the Iroquois] on which they [the Iroquois] make a profit out of the Englishmen. There is yet another reason which would cause the Iroquois to oppose it, namely, that if the English were settled there [at Niagara], the people of the Lakes would no longer have need of the Iroquois for trading with the English, who would attract to them all the tribes of the Lakes, so that, in this way [i.e. by opposing the settlement of the English at Niagara], the Iroquois would be between the English and the Lakes tribes, who would always side with the English because they [the Lakes tribes] would be attracted by the trade they would do with that [English] nation.49

Vaudreuil’s memoir is extremely significant, because it not only shows that the Iroquois understood the importance of their geographic middleman position between the western tribes and the English, but it also explains exactly how the Iroquois benefited from the western Indian traffic that went through Iroquoia en route to Albany. First, the memoir indicates that the Iroquois made profits from the western Indians as they passed through Iroquoia. Most likely, the Iroquois provided the Indian travelers with the goods and services they needed
for their journey between Albany and the Western Country. Secondly, it points out that the Iroquois obtained furs from the western Indian travelers at a low cost and then resold them to English traders for a substantial profit. And thirdly, the memoir explains that the Iroquois benefited politically from their geographic location between Albany and the Western Country. The western Indians had to remain on good terms with the Iroquois in order to reach the Albany trade.

Other accounts from the early eighteenth century provide additional evidence that the Iroquois derived economic profits from the western Indians who passed through Iroquoia. The French official D'Aigremont wrote in 1708, "I do not think the Iroquois would permit . . . [the English to take possession of Detroit] for if they [the English] were masters there, they would do the whole trade independently of the Iroquois, which would certainly not suit them [Iroquois]. They [the Iroquois] are quite willing for the English to do this trade, but want it done through them [i.e. geographically through Iroquoia], so that they may share the profit on it with them." 49 Two other French officials, Ramezay and Begon, informed a French minister in 1715 that the Mississagas and Amikoes "trade with the Iroquois on their way, when returning from their hunting around Lake Erie." 50

The Albany Commissioners made a report in 1724 on the advantages of drawing western Indians to Albany for trade purposes. The Commissioners said, "This trade with the Far Indians, if it could be entirely brought hither [to Albany], would not only be of great consequence to His Majesty's interest, but no small encouragement to the Five Nations
in general, who have opened a path, and invited them [far Indians] to trade with them and the inhabitants of this province. . . . With those. . . . far Indians, the Five Nations promote a trade in their passage [through Iroquois] to this place [Albany], and several stay and marry among them." 51

The governor of New York noted, in 1727, that the Iroquois had every reason to fear the construction of a French fort at Niagara, since the fort would "cut [them] off from all trade with the farther Indians, who being no longer able to repair to the country of the Five Nations, could not consequently visit the English colonies for the purpose of trade." 52

The Iroquois provided supplies and services for the western Indians, who traveled through their country. In 1710, the Senecas promised a group of Ottawas "the doors stand everywhere open for you. Your lodgings are prepared from the Seneca's country to that of our Brother Corlaer." New York's Governor Burnet remarked to the Lords of Trade in 1723, "as the Indians that come from the remote lakes to go to Canada are commonly in want of provisions when they come below the falls of Niagara, they are obliged to supply themselves in the Seneca's country." The Albany Commissioners observed, in 1730, that frequently "the foreign Indians stop there [near Irondequoit in Seneca country] and go by land to the Senecas to furnish themselves with provisions." 53

Many Iroquois believed that granting the western Indians a passage to Albany could benefit the Five Nations in another way. They were convinced that the increase in business at Albany would result in
better trade values. New York officials and businessmen, who were eager to trade with the western tribes, constantly urged the Iroquois to give the far Indians permission to travel through Iroquoia. The New Yorkers assured the Iroquois that they too would benefit from the increased trade at Albany and Oswego, since goods would become more plentiful and less expensive. In 1713, an English spokesman told the Iroquois that they should let the far Indians pass through their country "for the more trade comes into your country the more are the trappers encouraged to get goods from England."  

New York's Governor Burnet met with Iroquois deputies in September, 1724, and explained how the English trade with the western tribes benefited the Six Nations. Burnet said, "You have made the path open for the far Indians to come to trade with our people, among you, and to come through to Albany, if they please, by which means goods are now become plenty amongst you, and our people see you often as good Brethren ought to do." Burnet added that in the spring he would send some men to live "among the Onondagas where the chief trade with the Far Indians lies." The governor promised the Iroquois that these men would build a trading post that would bring "the great beaver trade into your own country, where it will be for your advantage that it should come, rather than to Canada, where you cannot buy goods without paying excessive prices."  

Another New York governor, John Montgomerie, gave the Iroquois the following assurance in 1728, "I hear that you have been often apprehensive that a trade [at Oswego] with the [far] Indians would be to your prejudice, and that it would make goods you want dear, but I
can assure you that the woolen manufactory in Great Britain is able
to supply the whole world, so the greater trade is carried on, the
greater will the supply be and cheaper than formerly."\textsuperscript{57}

When New York's Governor Cosby met with the Six Nations in September, 1733, he reiterated almost verbatim the words that Montgomerie had
said in 1728, i.e. the more Far Indians that came to trade at Oswego,
the more abundant and less expensive the goods would be.\textsuperscript{58} Governor
George Clarke of New York used a similar approach to secure the Six
Nations' consent for the western Indians to travel through Iroquoia.

On June 28, 1737, Clarke asked the Iroquois to "keep the paths that
leads to that [Oswego] trading house open not only for you selves
but also for all the upper nations. We have great plenty of goods
to supply both you and them and the more skins you and the remote
Indians bring thither the more goods shall we send to traffic with
you and we shall always sell them cheaper to you than the French who
are obliged to buy many goods from us."\textsuperscript{59}

The Six Nations were so convinced that the English-western
Indian trade was beneficial to them that they frequently asked the
English to improve trade conditions so that even more western Indians
would be drawn to Albany. For example, the Iroquois often asked the
English to lower their retail prices and to curb unfair trade practices.

In 1710, Iroquois sachems suggested to the New York governor that the
Five Nations could be more successful in building good relations with
the western tribes if the British would lower their prices at Albany,
because cheaper goods would be more of an inducement to draw the western
Indians to Albany. In fact, the Iroquois were even willing to pay
higher prices than the western Indians if it meant an increase in trade and better relations with those tribes. One Iroquois sachem told New York's Governor Hunter, "We shall always be willing to encourage their [the western Indians'] coming [to Albany], but the Brethren can do more to promote this trade than we can, that is by selling goods cheap. Yea, we would have you for this purpose sell cheaper to them than you do to us, and this will infallibly draw them [western Indians] to you."\(^{60}\)

Several Oneida sachems complained to the Albany Commissioners on January 19, 1716, that the Albany prices were too high and the traders were unscrupulous. As a result, the Far Indians came to trade once, but after being cheated, they never came again.\(^{61}\) According to Cadwallader Colden, in 1717, the Six Nations urged "again to have goods cheaper and said...that it was as much the interest of the people of Albany to sell goods cheap as theirs to have them so, for by that means all the trade would be drawn from Canada and all the numerous nations to the westward would depend on Corlaer."\(^{62}\)

In 1722, the Iroquois told Governor Burnet that they had sent envoys to invite the western tribes to pass through Iroquoia to trade at Albany. The sachems then requested of Governor Burnet that these tribes be given good prices, even "cheaper than we of the Five Nations have it ourselves, which will be the only means to draw them and to induce them to come hither."\(^{63}\) This request, like the one made in 1710, shows that the Iroquois wanted to get the western tribes to trade at Albany, even if it meant offering to those tribes better prices than the Iroquois themselves were getting. The only logical explanation
for this Iroquois position is that the Iroquois realized they had much to gain by drawing the western Indians to the Albany trade. Specifically, such an arrangement would allow the Iroquois to obtain peace with the western Indians, to hunt in the Western Country, and to trade with the western Indians as they traveled through Iroquoa.

In 1733, the Iroquois complained to New York Governor Cosby that the Albany merchants were hindering their efforts to bring in more Indians. Peter Wraxall observed, "They [the Iroquois] complain that the goods are too dear there [at Oswego] which further frustrates their efforts of drawing the far Indians thither."

Apparently, the Iroquois told the western Indians that they could find cheap prices for manufactured goods and quality rum, if they journeyed through Iroquoa and traded at Albany or Oswego. The use of such a sales pitch by the Iroquois would explain their comments made to Governor Cosby at a conference in 1735. They complained that, at Oswego, the prices were too high and the rum was diluted, both of which made the Iroquois look like liars in the eyes of the western Indians. The Iroquois were still pressing the English for lower priced goods in 1737. On June 30th of that year, representatives of the Six Nations told New York’s Governor Clarke that they wanted cheaper goods at Oswego, because "then all the far Nations will come and trade there."

Along with asking for better prices and trade practices, the Iroquois frequently sought prohibition of the notorious Montreal-Albany trade, which they felt was undermining their efforts to draw the western tribes to Albany for trade purposes. The Iroquois argued that,
if the English colonial governments outlawed the Montreal-Albany trade, the western tribes, desirous of English goods, would have to bring their business to Albany and Oswego.

Cadwallader Colden noted that Iroquois leaders grumbled to the New York governor about the Montreal-Albany trade in 1712 and were told that he did not approve of it either. In 1717, Dekanesora, a Seneca sachem, advised the governor that New York would benefit greatly if the Montreal-Albany trade were ended. Dekanesora pointed out that "the French had a trading house near the Senecas' country... and sold a great quantity of goods but that these goods were mostly English and sent from Albany to Montreal."67 Dekanesora's reasoning was sound. If the French were denied access to English goods, then the western tribes would have to trade directly with the English. That same year, another Iroquois sachem complained about the Montreal-Albany trade. According to Colden, a Seneca named Blue Beak told the Albany Commissioners "that...there was much more notice taken of the French Indians that came to carry goods between Canada and Albany than of any of the Five Nations, and that the carrying [of] so much goods to Canada kept the goods so dear at Albany that they [the Iroquois] received little benefit. ...You desire (he said) that we should persuade the far Indians to come to Albany to trade. If you did not furnish the French with goods the French would not be able to supply them and they would come of course where they could buy."68

In the early 1720s, Governor William Burnet of New York made public his intentions of shutting down the Montreal-Albany trade. On July 21, 1721, Burnet reported that the Albany trade with the French
had been stopped. As the Iroquois predicted, many far Indians began coming to Albany to obtain the goods that they could no longer get from the French. Later, in a report to the Lords of Trade, Burnet justified his prohibition of the Montreal-Albany trade by saying that many Iroquois sachems had requested the ban and had "assured him that without it some other nations would be lost from the English interest." 69

Burnet's Commissioners of Indian Affairs agreed that the governor's ban on the Montreal-Albany trade was necessary, because "the sachems of the Five Nations have often applied to this government to prohibit the selling of Indian goods to the French for they affirmed that by that [trade] they [the French] were enabled to supply the Far Indians, whereby they [the French] prevented them [far Indians] from coming to trade with the inhabitants of this province." 70

If the Six Nations were pleased with Burnet's prohibition, their satisfaction was short-lived. On June 16, 1725, the Lords of Trade, spurred on by merchant interests, repealed the acts that banned the Montreal-Albany trade, on the grounds that they violated the civil rights of New York traders. Soon thereafter, the Iroquois were again complaining about New York's trade with the French. 71

While some of the Six Nations concentrated on developing their role as geographic middlemen, others sought to become economic middlemen in the trade between the English and the western tribes. The idea was not a new one. During the previous century, the Iroquois had repeatedly tried to establish themselves as economic middlemen, but had usually failed. In 1696, a party of Iroquois journeyed to Detroit
loaded with trade goods, but several groups of western Indians attacked them and seized the goods, plus 500 beaverskins. Sometimes, however, the Iroquois were able to succeed as economic middlemen. When they did they obtained diplomatic, as well as economic, benefits. Western tribes, depending on the Iroquois for English trade goods, were less likely to attack any of the Five Nations, including Iroquois hunters, in the Western Country. The Iroquois' role as economic middlemen is evident in the following examples. In 1708, the Frenchman D'Aigremont inspected several French forts along the Great Lakes. He concluded that the French should not build a trading post at Niagara, because "all the beaver brought thither by any [Indian] nations whatsoever would pass to the English by means of their low priced druggets, which they would have sold there by the Iroquois without our being ever able to prevent them, unless by selling the French goods at the same rate as the English, . . .which cannot be." In 1730, several Pennsylvania Indian traders reported, "Mingo [Iroquois] Indians brought 14 cags of rum from Albany [to Allegheny], whereupon the Delaware Indians sold all the goods they had in order to purchase the rum."74

Perhaps the most conclusive proof that the Iroquois sometimes acted as economic middlemen is found in the following message sent to Canada's Governor Beauharnois in 1741 by the Cayugas, Onondagas, Oneidas, and Tuscaroras. The Iroquois sachems said:

Father, you sent a message last year to all our villages. You told us that we seemed to have very intimate commercial relations with our brethren, the English; that we carried their goods and liquors in quantities, to every place where we knew there was any peltry to be procured; you added, that each ought to trade on his own soil, and that you were well satisfied that we should sell our own property
wherever we pleased; we heard your message; we have buried the goods in the earth, and the liquors in the rocks. By these strings of wampum, we assure you, Father, that we shall not carry on this trade any more.\textsuperscript{75}

Apparently, the Iroquois never carried out this promise to stop carrying goods to the far Indians, because in 1742, Beauchanois complained to the Iroquois, "Children, you told me last year that you had buried the goods, and shut the liquor up in the rocks, assuring me that you would not carry on that trade anymore; I have been told that your young men continue their trade notwithstanding; it is for you to regulate this if you wish me to believe you sincere.\textsuperscript{76}

The Iroquois must not have been too concerned with proving their sincerity to Beauchanois, for they said nothing in reply to his charges, and after 1742, they continued to carry English goods to the western tribes.\textsuperscript{77}

Overall, the Iroquois' role as economic middlemen, although not as developed nor as important as their position as geographic middlemen, did provide some of the Six Nations with economic benefits, as well as better diplomatic relations with western Indians.

The Iroquois' close ties to the English helped them in several other ways to establish better relations with the western tribes. The Iroquois had the advantage of being New York's foremost Indian ally. As such, they could be of use to the western Indians who desired improved relations with the English. Those tribes knew that the Iroquois' friendship could facilitate the development of an English-western Indian trade. In 1702, the Jesuit Carheil explained that the Indians at Michilimackinac mistrusted all the Indians who moved to
Detroit and "think that they intend to go there in order to surrender to the Iroquois, so as to join in the trade with the English."

Charlevoix reported that, in 1712, the Foxes "had recently confederated with the Iroquois, and had apparently, through them, just formed an alliance with the English." Other tribes also realized that good relations with the Iroquois could bring friendly relations and valuable trade with the English. For example, in 1748, representatives of the Miamis, Iroquois, and Pennsylvania government met for a conference at Lancaster, and at the request of the Iroquois, the Miamis were received as friends by the English.78

On occasion, English officials insisted that western Indians maintain peace with the Iroquois in order to be accepted as English trade partners. Peter Wraxall noted that, in 1711, the New York governor welcomed Indian deputies from Detroit and told them that he wanted peace between their tribe and the Iroquois. The following year, Albany officials made it known to some western Indians that they expected those Indians to show respect for the Iroquois, who were English allies. Cadwallader Colden described the incident as follows: "Some of the Far Indians came...this year [1712] to Albany, particularly the Mississagas and some others who had left their own country and settled with the Senecas. These last in their propositions called the Senecas their children, which was a preferring their nation to the Senecas, for which they were reproved by the Commissioners."79

In 1715, the governor of New York told a group of western Indians that they would be welcome to trade at Albany. According to Colden, the governor then reminded the Indians "all that are friends to the
Five Nations shall be looked upon as friends to this government and shall be welcome to come hither, as on the other hand, all that are enemies to the Five Nations shall be looked on as enemies to us."

Most likely, the Iroquois also made it clear to the western Indians that the British wanted all Indians to be at peace. New York's Governor Clarke told the Iroquois, in 1740, that "It is His Majesty's royal pleasure that all the nations of Indians to the westward and southward even as far as the River Mississippi shall live together in a strict union as brethren of the same family." Governor Clarke went on to say that the tribes who made peace with the Iroquois were thereby accepted into the Covenant Chain of peace with the English.

In 1743, sachems from three western tribes living near the western side of Lake Erie arrived in Albany to talk peace with the Albany Commissioners. They were told by the Commissioners that, "There should be an everlasting peace between this government, the Five Nations, and their nation and that the road should be kept open and secure between their country and this city with free liberty of trade and all other rights of hospitality." The point was clear to the western tribes. The English wanted peace among all their Indian allies. If the western tribes desired peace and trade with the English, then they had to accept peace with the Iroquois. In this way the influence of the English helped the Iroquois maintain friendly relations with the western tribes.

British support of the Iroquois was manifested in several other ways. The English frequently sent agents to attend Iroquois conferences with the western tribes. The Iroquois realized that the presence of
English agents showed the western Indians that the English took an interest in the affairs of the Iroquois Confederacy. At times the Five Nations even asked the English to send representatives to these meetings. Cadwallader Colden reported that in 1708, "some Far Indians being come to the Senecas' country, messages were sent [by the Senecas] to all the other [Five] Nations and to Albany to desire them to send deputies to meet the said far Indians to hear what they had to say and to give their answer jointly." In April, 1709, the Five Nations sent a similar message to the Albany Commissioners. They informed the English about an upcoming meeting with the Waganhas, so that the English could have a representative there. The following spring the Iroquois reminded the Commissioners to send an agent to the scheduled meeting between the Ottawas and Iroquois. Peter Wraxall noted that on May 7, 1729, "Two deputies arrive from the Six Nations to acquaint the governor and commissioners that they expect every day at Onondaga 300 Indians of the Nations called Makinous and Shawanoes. . .and that a general council is to be held at Onondaga in 7 or 8 days and they desire that one or two proper persons may be sent there to represent this government."84

The English's use of the Iroquois as messengers or wampum belt carriers also demonstrated to the western tribes the closeness of the English and Iroquois relationship. In 1703, Mohawks carried wampum belts to the western tribes inviting them, on behalf of the English, to come and trade at Albany. Cadwallader Colden explained that in 1708, "One [Andrew] Montour of Canada and some Indians [undoubtedly Iroquois] had been employed from Albany to endeavor to gain the Far
Indians to come to trade at Albany and to make peace with the Five Nations for that purpose which messengers had all the success with those Indians that could be expected."

In 1719, Governor Vaudreuil of New France wrote to the Council of Marine and explained, "The English...are incessantly distributing belts in secret among all the nations, to attract them to themselves by means of certain Iroquois runners and others in their pay."

French officials sent similar complaints to their home government in 1741. An abstract of the dispatches received from Canada during that year stated, "The news received from the Upper countries to the effect that some underground belts were sent by the English [by the means of the Iroquois] to divers Indian nations, inviting them to rid themselves of the French scattered throughout that region."

Serving as English messengers to the tribes of the West strengthened the Iroquois' position in the Western Country. This role reinforced the close Iroquois-English relationship in the minds of the western Indians and provided an additional reason for those western tribes, who desired English trade, to maintain peaceful relations with the Iroquois.

The Iroquois realized the importance of English support to the preservation of their friendly relations with the western tribes. As a result, whenever English support for the Iroquois in the West seemed to waver, the Five Nations requested it be made strong again. On August 9, 1708, Iroquois sachems, according to Cadwallader Colden, complained to the Albany Commissioners "of the little regard of late had been shown and the want of care of their affairs." The Iroquois
said that if the English "had heartily assisted them, they should have been able to have brought over all the Indians now under the influence and dominion of Canada." Several Mohawk sachems reminded the Albany Commissioners in 1739 that, "The Covenant Chain with the upper and western Indians is not kept so bright as formerly and that the French on the contrary have so great an influence over them that they direct them as they please." The sachems of the Six Nations also seemed worried in 1744 when New York's Governor Clinton did not mention relations with the western tribes, as was customary at the annual conferences to renew the Covenant Chain Alliance. The sachems said, "It has always been customary to recommend to us to keep up a correspondence with the far Indians, which at this time has not been done, however we will do all we can to keep friendship with those nations, who are united with us and then we can overcome any enemy whatsoever." The Iroquois apparently were aware that English support was quite helpful, if not absolutely necessary, if they were to retain peaceful relations with the western tribes.

The arrival of English traders in the Western Country also proved beneficial to the Iroquois in their pursuit of better relations with the western Indians. Every tribe that began trading with the English usually had to agree to remain at peace with the Iroquois, who were English allies. As a result, Iroquois influence and security in the Western Country rose correspondingly with the amount of English trade done in the West. By 1720, English traders were traveling into the Western Country to barter among the Indians. French officials noted that, in 1716, the Iroquois invited the Miamis and Ouyatanons "to come
and get what they need at a post established on the Oyo River [i.e. Wabash River], which is a new settlement of the English of Carolina. They said that there they would find merchandise at half the prices asked by the French, who were tyrannizing over them."

The governor and intendant of New France reported in 1726 that the British of Carolina had trading posts near the present day site of Fort Wayne, Indiana. That same year, the Albany Commissioners wrote to New York's Governor Burnet, "We hear of many [English traders] that are gone to trade to the westward even to the number of fifty canoes. People encourage that trade now to emulation even those who were at first against it." 93

In 1730, the French official M. de Noyan reported that the English were trading along all the rivers that flowed into Lake Erie. Noyan wrote, "I have said that in the country around Lake Erie, the English are found scattered as far as the sea, trading with the Chaouenons, the Miamis, and the Onyatanous." 94

By the 1730s, English traders from New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and the Carolinas were trading throughout the Western Country. The amount of trade done by the English in the West continued to grow during the 1740s. To facilitate this trade the Miamis established the Indian trading village of Pickawillany in 1748. By 1750, English traders were scattered as far as the Illinois Country. 95 These English traders brought more and more western tribes into the Covenant Chain Alliance, and every tribe that became friendly toward the English became one less enemy for the Iroquois. This new alignment in trade
relations, by 1745, allowed the Iroquois to hunt and trade in the Western Country, with little fear of being attacked.

The Iroquois also relied on English military power to ensure their position in the Western Country. In 1701, the Iroquois ceded to the English all their western lands, which due to their weakened power, they no longer controlled anyway. The land involved was north and west of Lake Ontario and between Lake Huron and Lake Erie. In return, the English promised to protect the Iroquois' right to hunt on that land. It was the hope of the Five Nations that, with English help, the French and Indians could be forced into accepting Iroquois hunting in the Western Country.

Some of the Six Nations signed a similar deed in 1726 in order to obtain English military support. In the autumn of that year New York's Governor Burnet convinced the Senecas, Onondagas, and Cayugas that New York would protect them from their enemies if they deeded their western hunting lands to the English. The Iroquois, who also wanted protection for their homes, asked the governor to include their castles in the deed. Burnet was only too happy to comply with their request, and the deed was signed.

On numerous occasions, the Iroquois asked their New York allies for military assistance against the western tribes. In 1704, the Oneidas asked the New York governor to provide them with more and cheaper arms and ammunition so they could fight the Waganhas. In 1711, Iroquois men requested powder from the English so they could protect themselves from attacks by western Indians. The following year the Five Nations informed New York officials that they were about to send
a war party against the western tribes, and they asked New York to assist them by providing troops, or at least arms and ammunion.98

The Iroquois, hoping for aid, informed the Albany Commissioners in September, 1716, that the Waganhas were planning an attack on Iroquois villages. In 1720, the Iroquois applied to the English for protection from the western Indians. The Senecas expressed their concern to the English by saying, "The Far Nations are numerous in men...[and] have resolved to fight the Five Nations." In 1728, the Iroquois again asked for New York's protection, and no doubt were pleased when Governor John Montgomerie, on October 2, 1728, promised to defend them against any Indian nation who dared attack them.99 As the 1700s progressed and the British became more influential in the Western Country, the promise of British protection for the Iroquois, combined with the opportunity for trade, quite possibly dissuaded some western tribes from making war on the Iroquois.

Along with using the French and English to control the western tribes, the Iroquois employed a third tool to forge a policy of peace with the Indians of the Western Country. The Iroquois, after 1701, tried to develop closer social, political, and military relations with the western Indians.

After 1701, many Iroquois hunted, traveled, and often lived in the Western Country. Therefore, social contact between Iroquois and western Indians became common. Some Iroquois even married Indians from western tribes. For example, Cadillac reported in 1703, "I have chosen my time well for beginning this [Detroit] settlement; the Iroquois have entirely withdrawn, or, if any remain, they are
incorporated with our [Indian] allies." At a 1709 meeting of the
Albany Commissioners, Robert Livingston remarked, "A Seneca Indian
who lived at Tjughsaaghrondie [i.e. Detroit], who is married there, is
come home to his own country." In 1717, Governor Vaudreuil of New
France noted that five Ottawas recently murdered an Iroquois man, his
Miami wife, and two children near the Miami River. Vaudreuil explained,
"This wrongful attack concerns the Iroquois because the man who was
killed was of their tribe. It also concerns the Miamis, for the man
was married [to a Miami woman] and living with them."

Several Iroquois sachems, in 1741, told Governor Beauharnois of
New France, "We have intermarried with all [Indian] Nations, and they
with us; it is consequently, impossible for the Earth to be troubled
on the part of the Five Nations and our brethren, the upper
Indians." By mid-century, large numbers of Iroquois lived in the Western
Country. According to one Pennsylvania official, Iroquois sachems
told the governor of Pennsylvania in 1742 that "they had always abun-
dance of their men out amongst the Nations to the westward, that they
had kindled a fire with a vast many nations, some whereof were their
tributaries, and they had a good understanding with all." In
1743, a French officer, Sieur Navarre, reported to his commander at
Fort Detroit, "There are ten different tribes settled upon [Cuyahoga]
River, numbering altogether about 5 or 600 men, namely the Senecas,
Cayugas, Oneidas, Onondagas, Mohawks, Loups, Moraignans, Ottawas,
Aebakis of St. Francis, and Sauteux of the lower end of Lake Ontario
... The number of Indians who have settled on this river increases
every day; since hunting there is abundant; while on the other hand, at their former homes there is no more game.\textsuperscript{104}

In September, 1748, Conrad Weiser, the well-informed Indian interpreter for the Pennsylvania government, made up a list of all the warriors from the Indian nations settled along the Ohio River. Among them were 307 Iroquois.\textsuperscript{105}

Many Iroquois even learned how to speak the languages of the western tribes. When, for instance, some Indians from Detroit came to Albany in 1708, they spoke to the governor through an Iroquois interpreter who understood their language. The affinity of the Iroquois and Huron languages (both stemmed from the same Iroquoian language stock) also facilitated communication between the Iroquois and the western Indians, many of whom spoke or understood the Huron speech. The Jesuit, Father Rale, observed in 1723, "The Huron language is the chief language of the savages, and when a person is master of that, he can in less than three months make himself understood by the Five Iroquois tribes."\textsuperscript{106}

M. de Noyan, the commanding officer at Fort Detroit, wrote in 1738, "This post is much disturbed by a quarrel which has arisen between the Hurons and Ottawas. The bloodshed which it has caused makes me fear lest all the savages should take sides in it; for these two tongues affect all the tribes of this country." Iroquois travelers probably could make themselves understood in the West by knowing their own Iroquois language or the Ottawa-Algonkin tongue. There is also some evidence that a sign language might have been used to facilitate communication between different Indian groups. The Reverend John
Heckewelder wrote in 1818, "The Indians have a language of signs, by which they communicate with each other on occasions when speaking is not prudent or proper... By this means they also make themselves understood to those nations of Indians whose languages they are not acquainted with, for all the Indian nations understand each other in this way."

The Iroquois sometimes consolidated social ties by inviting western Indians to come and live in Iroquoia. On July 6, 1709, the French Minister Ponchartrain noted that he was glad the Hurons had turned down "the proposal of the Iroquois that they should settle among them." Cadwallader Golden reported that, in 1712, Mississagras, as well as some other western Indians, were living with the Senecas. That same year a French officer at Detroit named Du Buisson wrote to Governor Vaudreuil, "It is asserted that Quinetonant's band and Makatemangona's [i.e. two Fox bands] have been received by the Iroquois to form a village among them."

In 1715, another French officer, de Longueuil, warned French officials that the Hurons of Detroit might accept an Iroquois invitation to settle in Iroquoia. The Jesuit de la Richardie noted in 1739 that the Hurons feared the Ottawas and "may...go either to the Senecas, as they have been asked to do, or beyond the Belle Riviere." By resettling western Indians in Iroquoia, the Iroquois not only strengthened themselves, but also developed better social ties to western tribes who were relatives or friends of those who moved to Iroquoia.
After 1710, the Five Nations sought closer political and military relations with the western Indians. Quite often the Iroquois succeeded in developing alliances with many of the important tribes of the Western Country. The Sieur D'Aigremont reported in 1708 that the Iroquois were forming alliances with the Hurons, Miamis, and western Indians "so that they may have them on their side in case of war." In 1710, the Five Nations negotiated a mutual defense alliance with a tribe of Waganhas. That same year the Iroquois renewed an alliance they had with the Fox Indians. On October 23, 1714, the French officials Ramezay and Begon wrote to a minister in Paris, "The Reynards [Foxes], Ouyatanons, Mascoutins, and Kickapoo have recently gone to invite the Iroquois to join them against us and the Ottawa nations."

By 1720, at least some of the Miamis had close ties to the Iroquois, for on October 22, 1720, Vaudreuil informed the Council of Marine that several Miami chiefs "are very much under the influence of the Iroquois." Charlevoix visited the Wisconsin country in 1721 and reported, "The tribe which, for the last twenty years, has been more talked about than any other in these western lands is that of the Outagamies [Foxes]. The natural ferocity of these savages; increased by the bad treatment often inflicted on them (sometimes very unreasonably), and their alliance with the Iroquois, who are always disposed to excite fresh enemies against us, have rendered them formidable."

Peter Wraxall noted that in May, 1723, Hurons from Michilimackinac arrived at Albany to confer with the Commissioners of Indian Affairs. The Hurons made it known that they wished to trade with the English and
have peace with the English and Iroquois. So, the English accepted
the Hurons into the Covenant Chain Alliance. The Hurons thereby became
allies of the Iroquois, as well as the English.\textsuperscript{112}

By mid-century, the Six Nations had numerous political and
military alliances with western Indians. In August, 1732, an
Iroquois spokesman told the governor of Pennsylvania that the Six
Nations had alliances with many powerful western tribes. On September
28, 1736, an Iroquois sachem assured Pennsylvania officials that the
Iroquois Confederacy had strengthened itself by entering into firm
leagues of friendship and alliance with several western nations.\textsuperscript{113}
Other Iroquois sachems announced to the New York governor in 1740
that "all the Indians which were formerly our enemies are now entered
into the Covenant with us almost as far as the River Mississippi."\textsuperscript{114}

Canada's Governor Beauharnois referred to the Iroquois' many
Indian alliances in 1741. Beauharnois told the Iroquois, "Children,
I know you are in alliance with all your Brethren, the Nations of the
upper country; I unite with you in rejoicing there at, for you are all
equally my children."\textsuperscript{115}

The Six Nations' vast network of western Indian alliances was
recorded in July, 1742, in the minutes of the Pennsylvania Governor's
Council. According to Pennsylvania officials, the Iroquois were allied
to at least eight major Indian nations numbering well over 6000
warriors.\textsuperscript{116} Three years later the Iroquois told New York's Governor
Clinton, "We are in alliance with a great number of Far Indians."\textsuperscript{117}

The Iroquois' political and military alliances with the western
tribes, together with their increased social contacts with those
Indians, undoubtedly helped the Six Nations maintain peace with the tribes of the Western Country.

Iroquois relations with the western tribes underwent significant changes during the first half of the eighteenth century. Prior to 1700, the Five Nations used military force to conquer and control the Indians of the Western Country. But after 1700, the Iroquois adopted a rapprochement policy toward the western tribes and promoted coexistence for all Indians in the West. This new Iroquois policy evolved along three major lines. First, the Iroquois used French mediation and protection to improve their relations with the western tribes. Second, the Iroquois utilized English influence, power, and trade to obtain better relations with the western tribes. And third, the Iroquois worked to develop closer social, political, and military ties to the western tribes.

The Five Nations' new policy of peace with the western Indians benefited the Iroquois people in several ways. It provided the Iroquois with a much needed respite from their hostilities with the western tribes. By 1701, Iroquois power had been worn down by the Twenty Years' War, while the strength of the western tribes had increased. The Iroquois, therefore, could not afford to continue fighting the western Indians. Peace gave the Iroquois time to rebuild their villages and economy, as well as the chance to recoup from the devastating Twenty Years' War.
The rapprochement with the western tribes actually strengthened the Iroquois militarily. It not only neutralized a potentially dangerous enemy (the western tribes), but it transformed that enemy into an ally. As a result, the Iroquois' military position improved with every mutual-defense pact negotiated between the Five Nations and the western tribes.

The Iroquois' peace with the western Indians benefited the Iroquois people in another way. It gave the Iroquois access to the Western Country. This meant that the Iroquois, whose own homelands were nearly devoid of valuable fur bearing animals, could hunt in the West. It likewise allowed the Iroquois to trade in the Western Country. Some Iroquois were able to serve as economic middlemen between the English traders and the western Indians. They carried English goods westward and traded them to the western Indians for valuable furs and peltry. After 1701, Iroquois were also able to live in the Western Country without having to fear attacks by the western tribes. Furthermore, the Iroquois' peace with the western Indians meant that Iroquois could pass freely through the villages of the western tribes. This enabled the Five Nations to develop closer social ties with western Indians. Some Iroquois even married persons from the western tribes.

Finally, the rapprochement between the Five Nations and the western tribes gave the Iroquois the opportunity to develop a geographic middleman position. The peace enabled the Iroquois to invite the western Indians to travel through Iroquoia to trade at Albany. At the same time, it allowed the western Indians to accept. As a result,
the Iroquois gained a lucrative trade with the Indians who passed through their country. They also received an additional diplomatic advantage, since the western Indians had to maintain good relations with the Iroquois in order to reach the Albany trade.

After 1701, the Iroquois and the western tribes occasionally became involved in disagreements and skirmishes. But the reasons and framework for establishing and maintaining peace were firmly fixed in all the participants' minds by the mid-1700s, so peace among the tribes eventually prevailed.
Chapter 5: Notes

1 JR, XXVII, 289-291, XXVIII, 287, XLVII, 111, LIV, 117; NYCD, IX, 761; Wis. Hist'l Coll., XVI, 241; Livingston, 207; NYCD, V, 544, 784; Wraxall, 40.

2 Alvord, Illinois, 36, 37; Gipson, Br. Empire, V, 74.

3 NYCD, IV, 337, 345; DHSNY, I, 690; NYCD, IV, 305; Wraxall, lxii.

4 Downes, Council Fires, 38; Gipson, Br. Empire, V, 49; NYCD, IV, 691, 748.

5 She trone, Ind. in Ohio, 49-59; Baldwin, "Early Indian.", 81; Wraxall, 662; DHSNY, I, 15; MPHC, XXXIII, 680; NYCD, IX, 1052.

6 MPHC, XXXIII, 161, 162, 163, 170.

7 NYCD, IV, 488.

8 Pa. Arch., 2nd series, VI, 51-60; NYCD, IX, 885, V, 622, IX, 1052.

9 Livingston, 220; NYCD, IX, 1052; DHSNY, IV, 240.

10 Charlevoix, History, V, 236; MPHC, XXXIII, 497; NYCD, IX, 854.

11 NYCD, IV, 488, 768.

12 NYCD, IV, 654.

13 NYCD, IV, 729.

14 Livingston, 197, 198.

15 MPHC, XXXIII, 391; LaMontagne, Royal Ft. Fron., 205, 206.

16 NYCD, V, 271; Wraxall, 94; LaMontagne, Royal Ft. Fron., 209; NYCD, V, 544, 543.


18 NYCD, IX, 722.

19 Charlevoix, History, V, 165; NYCD, IX, 765, 767, 768; Charlevoix, History, V, 179.
21 Charlevoix, History, V, 225; Wraxall, 78; NYCD, IX, 848, V, 243; MPHC, XXXIII, 592.
22 NYCD, IX, 1089.
23 Wraxall, 34.
24 NYCD, V, 728, 729, 730.
25 NYCD, V, 691, 748.
26 MPHC, XXXIII, 118; NYCD, IV, 979-981, IX, 751, 743.
27 Livingston, 196; NYCD, IX, 761.
28 NYCD, IX, 773, 811; Golden, "History...1707-20," 367, 370, 372; Wraxall, 55, 58, 59, 66, 67, 68.
29 NYCD, V, 65.
30 MPHC, XXXIII, 395.
31 MPHC, XXXIII, 431.
32 Golden, "History...1707-20," 381-383.
33 Conference between the Waganhas and the Iroquois, English, and River Indians, June, 1710, in Golden, "History...1707-20," 384-86.
34 Golden, "History...1707-20," 403, 417.
36 Severance, Joncaire, 111; MPHC, XXXIII, 594; Wraxall, 123.
38 NYCD, V, 586.
39 Livingston, 232-235.
41 NYCD, V, 693; Wraxall, 144, 159; NYCD, IX, 952.
42 Wraxall, 171.
43 Wraxall, 173.
44. Wraxall, 197; NYCD, IX, 1048.
45. NYCD, IV, 112, 113, VI, 135.
47. Wraxall, 148, 70, 102; Colden, "History...1707-20," 419.
48. MPH, XXXIII, 415, 416.
49. MPH, XXXIII, 445.
51. NYCD, V, 741.
52. NYCD, IX, 998.
54. NYCD, IV, 990, V, 217, 221, 372, VI, 135; Livingston, 194; Wraxall, 62, 64; CC Papers, I, 131.
55. NYCD, V, 372.
56. NYCD, V, 715, 716.
57. NYCD, V, 861.
58. NYCD, V, 963.
59. NYCD, VI, 102.
60. NYCD, V, 223; Colden, "History...1707-20," 392, 393.
61. Wraxall, 111.
63. NYCD, V, 659; Trelease, "The Iroquois," 45.
64. Wraxall, 188.
65. Wraxall, 195.
66. Wraxall, 204, 205.
68. Colden, "History...1707-20," 430.
Memorial written by John Maddox, Anthony Saduskus, and John Fiskes, August 8, 1730, in *Pa. Arch., 1st series*, I, 265.

74 *Memorial*...
MPHC, XXXIV, 73, 75, 76.

Gipson, Br. Empire, IV, 166; NYCD, IX, 1027; Leach, N. Col. Frontier, 158; Beauchamp, History, 293.

NYCD, IV, 888, 908-911; Wraxall, 39, 40.

NYCD, V, 799-801.

Livingston, 192, 193; NYCD, V, 249; Wraxall, 96; Colden, "History...1707-20," 411.

Wraxall, 115; NYCD, V, 542-544, 861.

MPHC, XXXIII, 171, 172.

Livingston, 210; MPHC, XXXIII, 592, 593.

NYCD, IX, 1081.


NYCD, IX, 1099; Sieur Navarre's Report to Sieur de Caleron, 1743, in Hanna, Wilderness Trail, I, 316.


Colden, "History...1707-20," 367; JR, LXVII, 145.


NYCD, IX, 826; Wisc. Hist'l Coll., XVI, 262; Colden, "History...1707-20," 409, 410; MPHC, XXXIII, 537.


MPHC, XXXIII, 431; Wraxall, 70, 71, 74; NYCD, IX, 863; Wisc. Hist'l Coll., XVI, 310, 394.


NYCD, V, 693.

Pa. Minutes, III, 440, IV, 84.

NYCD, VI, 178.
115 NYCD, IX, 1082.
117 NYCD, VI, 299.
Chapter 6: Iroquois Hegemony in Pennsylvania

After 1701, the Iroquois devised and implemented a strategy that was aimed at controlling the Indians and lands of the Susquehanna and Delaware River Valleys, which were located just south of the homelands of the Iroquois Confederacy. The Iroquois goal was to use the Pennsylvania Indians and lands to further their own economic, political, and military interests.

Iroquois relations with the Pennsylvania Indians can be traced back to the 1600s. In 1687, New York's Governor Thomas Dongan wrote to the Lords of Trade, "The Five Nations are the most warlike people in America...and indeed they are so considerable that all the Indians in these parts of America are tributaries to them." In 1712, a New York official reported to Governor Robert Hunter, "There are above 2000 Indians to the southward and westward who are tributaries of the Five Nations and under their command." From accounts such as these came notions that the Pennsylvania Indians were tributaries who were dependent upon the Iroquois or that the Iroquois held suzerainty over the Pennsylvania Indians. These descriptions are not totally accurate and can be misleading.

The Indian concept of a tributary was quite different from the European concept. For the Indian, tributary status did not connote any inferiority or mark of opprobrium. At the same time, it did not make the tributary submissive to or dependent upon the nation that
received the tribute. Professor Paul A. W. Wallace has explained, "To be tributary did not mean that they [the Indian tributaries] were humiliated and denationalized. It meant that they accepted Iroquois protection, became loyal 'props to the [Iroquois] longhouse,' and acknowledged that relationship by token gifts of wampum." In short, the so-called tributaries were not under the authority of the Five Nations prior to 1700. These tribes that lived in the Susquehanna and Delaware River Valleys (i.e. the Delawares, or Lenapes, Conestogas, Shawnees, and Canawese) governed themselves, owned and sold their own land, sometimes skipped tribute payments to the Iroquois Confederacy, and did not always comply with Iroquois requests or directives. In effect, the Pennsylvania tribes were autonomous during the last years of the seventeenth century. It would be more accurate, therefore, to refer to the Pennsylvania Indians as props, tributary allies, or junior partners of the Iroquois Confederacy, rather than as tributaries, since the term tributary, when used by itself, implies an inferior status.

After 1701, instead of honoring the traditional relations between the Iroquois Confederacy and the tributary allies, the Iroquois slowly moved toward establishing complete control and authority over their tributary allies. The Iroquois goal, after 1701, was to manipulate the Pennsylvania tribes in order to further the Confederacy's economic, political, and military positions.

The first phase in the Iroquois' strategy to gain hegemony over the Pennsylvania Indians and their lands lasted from 1701 until 1718. During those years the Iroquois began to make their presence felt in Pennsylvania. Between 1701 and 1718, the Five Nations increased their
interaction with the Pennsylvania Indians. After 1701, the Iroquois escalated their war on the southern tribes living in Virginia and the Carolinas. Since Iroquois warriors either had to travel through central Pennsylvania or western Pennsylvania to reach the South, it is reasonable to assume that the Iroquois were frequently in contact with the Pennsylvania Indians. Sometimes Pennsylvania Indians even joined Iroquois war parties for raids on the southern tribes. For example, in 1704, Indians from Conestoga and the Potomac assisted the Senecas in an attack against the Indians of Carolina.

The Iroquois and Pennsylvania Indians interacted in other ways. In 1710, some of the Senecas' most important leaders journeyed to Conestoga for talks with the Indian chiefs of Pennsylvania. The following year the Five Nations received intelligence from the Conestogas that the English and French were plotting to destroy the Iroquois in order to steal their lands. In 1711, Iroquois sachems were again at Conestoga to meet with Pennsylvania Indians. The Cayugas and Onidas sent various messages to the Conestogas in 1713 concerning an earlier attempt made by the Senecas to establish trade in Pennsylvania. The Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs reported in May, 1714, that "there is to be a general meeting at Onondaga speedily not only of the Five Nations but of all the Indians living at the Jerseys, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Carolina, etc."

The Commissioners later learned that the Iroquois and their allies decided to send an emissary to Canada to ask for peace, neutrality, and trade with New France. In 1716, the Commissioners noted that the Iroquois Confederacy had expanded to Six Nations with the admission of
the Tuscaroras, along with some Susquehanna Indians.\(^5\)

The Iroquois may have even relied upon occasional threats to increase their influence with the Pennsylvania Indians. A French trader informed the Pennsylvania Governor's Council in 1704 that the Five Nations were planning to attack the Shawnees who lived in the Susquehanna River Valley. The following year the Iroquois were rumored to be planning an attack on the Indians living on the Delaware, Skuykill, and Susquehanna Rivers. In 1706, the Nanticokes told the Pennsylvania governor that they had recently been threatened by the Five Nations.\(^6\) The Iroquois never actually attacked the Pennsylvania Indians. Most likely, the Five Nations were merely waving their war clubs to notify the Pennsylvania Indians that war was a distinct possibility if they did not cooperate with the Confederacy.

During Queen Anne's War the Iroquois sought military assistance from their Pennsylvania Indian allies. In 1711, the Iroquois, along with New York's Governor Robert Hunter, called upon the Pennsylvania Indians to provide warriors for the war effort against New France, and in August, Shawnee warriors joined an Iroquois and English army for an invasion of Canada.\(^7\)

Iroquois relations with the Pennsylvania Indians were also maintained along formal lines. On almost a yearly basis from 1701 until 1718, the tributary allies presented the Iroquois with wampum belts to acknowledge their position in the Iroquois Covenant Chain. In 1706, the Nanticokes informed the governor of Pennsylvania that the Five Nations would soon be arriving "to receive the Nanticokes' tribute." The Nanticokes told the Pennsylvania governor in 1707 that they had
been tributaries of the Five Nations for twenty-seven years. A Pennsylvania official noted in 1709 that Pennsylvania tribes like the Conestogas, Delawares, and Carawese were preparing to send their tribute wampum to the Iroquois. And in 1712, Pennsylvania's Governor Gookin reported that the Delawares were about to send thirty-two belts of tribute wampum to the Five Nations.8

After 1701, the Iroquois also sought increased contacts with Pennsylvania's white settlers. The Pennsylvania government was aware of the Iroquois' rising importance in Pennsylvania and, therefore, took an active role in developing better relations with the Five Nations. A Pennsylvania official reported in 1704, "Two Indians sent on a message from the Onondaga...presented an otter skin and informed [us] that there were a company of their nation...coming down to this town [Philadelphia] in order to trade." The Pennsylvania governor promised them good prices for trade goods and encouraged them to come every year and to keep up a friendly correspondence.9

On May 18, 1704, the Pennsylvania Council received news that the Five Nations intended to attack the Shawnees, who were allies of Pennsylvania. The Council members decided to send a representative to the Iroquois with a request that they suspend their planned hostilities against the Shawnees or other tribes that were friends of the Pennsylvania government. The Iroquois' reply reached the governor of Pennsylvania on June 23, 1705. According to one Council member, the Five Nations "assured us they had no hostile designs against us or any of our Indians, but were at peace with all the English and the Indians residing amongst them."10
In June, 1707, Pennsylvania's Lieutenant Governor John Evans joined with the Conestogas, Conoys, and Nanticokes to send wampum belts to the Five Nations as tokens of friendship. Evans later met with some Iroquois at the Shawnee town of Pequehan and told them, "You must be sure you remember to acquaint your chiefs that you have seen me here, and at the Shawnee town; and of the friendship and alliance that is betwixt us and the Indians."11

When Lieutenant Governor Charles Gookin of Pennsylvania learned in May, 1711, that Iroquois representatives were at Conestoga, he immediately set out for that town. On June 18, Gookin arrived at Conestoga and presented five belts of wampum to the Five Nations and one to the Conestoga Indians in order to renew the bonds of alliance between those Indians and the colonial government of Pennsylvania.12

The following year Gookin made another effort to show the Five Nations that Pennsylvania wanted their friendship. On May 13, he commissioned a party of Delawares to deliver two wampum belts to the Five Nations "as tokens of a firm and real friendship between them and us."13

On October 14, 1712, the Delawares returned from their mission to Iroquoia. They reported, "that they delivered the presents sent by the governor to the chiefs of the Five Towns, who received them very kindly and thankfully." The Delawares then presented a wampum belt to the Pennsylvania governor on behalf of the Senecas, who hoped that "a trade might be opened between them and [Pennsylvania] for the future." The Senecas also asked for a lasting friendship and open road between Pennsylvania and the Seneca country. The governor replied
that he was glad to accept the Senecas as friends and trading partners.¹⁴

Yet, despite the increase in Iroquois' contacts with Pennsylvania Indians and whites that occurred between 1701 and 1718, the Iroquois' relationship to the Pennsylvania tribes remained basically unaltered. The Pennsylvania Indians were still independent allies of the Five Nations. Throughout these years the Pennsylvania tribes continued to rule themselves and did not always back the Iroquois. For example, in 1701, the chiefs of the Conestogas, Shawnees, and Canawese negotiated an important treaty of friendship and alliance with the Pennsylvania government. Although an Indian who was referred to as "Ahoakassongh, Brother to the Emperor or Great King of the Onondagas" was present, there is no indication that he had any influence over the other Indian chiefs who attended the conference. Each tribe apparently negotiated the settlement independently of the Five Nations.¹⁵

In fact, the degree of the Pennsylvania tribes' autonomy may be surmised from the following account. The governor of Pennsylvania told his Council on September 15, 1701, "I am also to tell you the good news of the governor of New York's happy issue of his conferences with the Five Nations of Indians, that he hath not only made peace with them for the King's subjects of that colony, but [also]. . .for those of all other governments under the Crown of England on the continent of America, as also the nations of Indians within those respective colonies."¹⁶ The implication of the governor's message seems clear. He was pleased that the Indians and whites of Pennsylvania had obtained a treaty of peace with the Iroquois Confederacy. The governor
therefore must have believed that prior to the 1701 treaty, neither
the Indians nor the whites of Pennsylvania had any alliance or official
relations with the Five Nations.

Other evidence further shows that the Iroquois had little, if
any, control over the Pennsylvania Indians. The Conestogas, Shawnees,
and Canawese attended a conference at Philadelphia in June, 1706.
Once again those tribes negotiated with the English "about public
affairs relating to them." Once again the Iroquois were not repre-
sented and thus had no say in the diplomatic dealings of those
Pennsylvania tribes. Sometimes the Pennsylvania Indians showed their
independence by refusing to honor their obligations as tributary allies
of the Iroquois Confederacy. In 1709, the Delawares decided not to
deliver their tribute wampum to the Five Nations when they learned
that the Confederacy was preparing for war with the French. The
Delawares also declined to send warriors to aid the Iroquois, even
though they were obligated to do so by the Covenant Chain Alliance.
Throughout 1710, the Pennsylvania tribes continued to negotiate with
the English independently of the Five Nations. The following year
Lieutenant Governor Cookin met with representatives of the Conestogas
and the Five Nations. He presented six wampum belts to them, one
each for the Conestogas, Senecas, Cayugas, Onondagas, Oneidas, and
Mohawks. This procedure indicates that Cookin recognized the
sovereignty of the Conestogas.

The lack of Iroquois control over Pennsylvania Indians was clear-
lly evident during the summer of 1711. On August 1, a Pennsylvania
official reported that Cookin asked a party of Pennsylvania Indians
"why they did not make the best of their way to the Five Nations, pursuant to Colonel Hunter's letter to them." The Indians, who seemed reluctant to join the Iroquois, claimed that they realized they were "under covenant with the Five Nations to go to war, when they required them," but they added, they were waiting for Pennsylvania's Colonel French to join them before they left for Iroquoia. This incident shows that the Pennsylvania Indians were not controlled by the Five Nations. To begin with, it was New York's Governor Robert Hunter, and not the Iroquois, who had called upon the Pennsylvania tribes to assist the Iroquois. If the Five Nations had any authority over the Pennsylvania Indians, they would have been the ones to issue the directive. They would not have needed Hunter's influence. Secondly, the Pennsylvania Indians seemed to be reluctant to aid the Iroquois, despite the fact that they were "under covenant" to provide such help. This reluctance or avoidance of their obligation suggests that the Pennsylvania Indians made political or military decisions on their own. They did not automatically comply with Iroquois requests.

The sovereignty of the Pennsylvania tribes was further displayed at a conference between the Pennsylvania governor and the Delaware and Schuylkill Indians in 1715. According to a Pennsylvania official, the chief of the Delawares, Sasoonan, told the governor "that the Calumet, the bond of peace, which they [the Delawares] had carried to all the Nations round they had now brought hither; that it was a sure bond and seal of peace amongst them [the Delawares] and us [Pennsylvania] forever." Sasoonan then presented a wampum belt to signify peace "in behalf of all our Indians on this side of Sasquehanna, who are all
concerned with him in this treaty." Sasoonan added that the Conestogas spoke for themselves and thus were not included in the treaty. Later, the Conestogas and Ganawese made their own treaties with the governor. In both instances the Iroquois played no part in the negotiations between the Pennsylvania tribes and the Pennsylvania governor.  

In 1718, the Conestogas, Shawnees, Delawares, and Ganawese that lived on the Susquehanna River renewed their alliance with the Pennsylvania government. One Pennsylvania official noted that Civility, the chief of the Conestogas, said, "They [the Indians] were come only on a friendly visit to see us [the Pennsylvania officials] and to renew the old league of friendship that had hitherto been between us and them."  

As in earlier conferences, the Pennsylvania tribes conducted their own affairs with the Pennsylvania government. The Iroquois apparently had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Pennsylvania Indians.

The second stage in the Iroquois' plan to gain hegemony over the Pennsylvania Indians and their lands lasted from 1719 until 1727. During those years the Iroquois Confederacy gained the recognition and friendship of the Pennsylvania government.

Between 1719 and 1727, the Iroquois became an increasing concern for the Pennsylvania government. The Iroquois' wars against the tribes of Virginia and the Carolinas posed a threat to Indian and white settlers in Pennsylvania. Iroquois warriors, who frequently passed through Pennsylvania en route to the southern battlefields, sometimes
harassed settlers and stole supplies from their farms. The Iroquois also enlisted Pennsylvania Indians for their war parties. As a result, the Pennsylvania tribes became involved in the southern wars. To make matters worse, the Pennsylvania Indians, whose settlements stood like a buffer between the southern tribes and the Iroquois, absorbed most of the retaliatory blows by southern Indian war parties. On April 28, 1719, Governor Keith informed his Pennsylvania Council: "I have received a letter from the Indian chiefs at Conestoga by a letter to Mr. Secretary [James] Logan, which informs us that our Indian hunters have been attacked near the head of the Potomack River, by a considerable body of southern Indians come out to war against the Five Nations and the Indian settlements on Susquehanna. They have killed several of our people and alarmed them all." Keith dispatched Colonel John French to inform the Conestogas that the southern Indians would not attack them if they did not join the Iroquois war parties. French told the Conestogas, "I am also to acquaint you that 'tis the governor's pleasure that if any of the Five Nations come amongst you to trade or hunt that you receive them as friends and brothers, but if they come amongst you either to persuade you to go to war or to go themselves, or in their return from it, that then you have nothing to do with them nor entertain them...lest they bring you into a snare and you suffer hurt for their faults." 

James Logan brought a similar message to the Conestogas, Shawnees, Canawese, and Delawares in June, 1720. Logan explained, "I must... lay before you the consequence of your suffering any of your young
men to join with those of the Five Nations. They come through your towns and bring back their prisoners through your settlements, thus they open a clear path from these southern Indians to your towns. . . . Thus you who have done but little. . . may be the first that are fallen upon, while those of the Five Nations are safe at home at a great distance. . . .

In July, 1720, Governor Keith condemned the Iroquois' southern warfare in a letter to the governor of New York. He pointed out that the Iroquois raids into the South were exposing Pennsylvania's Indian and white settlements to possible retaliatory actions by the southern tribes. Keith also complained that Iroquois warriors, while traveling through Pennsylvania, had slaughtered settlers' livestock for no apparent reason and had robbed a trader's store. . . .

Keith tried to establish a peace between the Pennsylvania Indians and the southern tribes in 1721. The Pennsylvania governor journeyed to the South, and with the help of Virginia's Governor Spotswood, a peace settlement was worked out between the Pennsylvania and southern Indians. Shortly thereafter, in June, 1721, Governor Keith met with an Iroquois representative at Philadelphia and encouraged him and his Confederacy to also accept the treaty settlement. The governor knew that peace with the southern tribes could not be retained without the cooperation of the Iroquois. . . .

Pennsylvania officials had other reasons to be interested in the Iroquois. In particular, they had to deal with Iroquois pretensions to Susquehanna lands. The Pennsylvania government believed that William Penn's purchase of an Iroquois deed for the Susquehanna lands
from New York's ex-governor Thomas Dongan negated any claims the Five Nations might have to those lands. Some of the Iroquois, however, thought otherwise. Cadwallader Colden reported that on August 3, 1719, Cayuga sachems informed New York officials "that 34 or 35 years ago they had joined the lands on the Susquehanna River to this [New York] government and offered now to sell it outright that they might not be under any temptations from the neighboring government to purchase it."\(^\text{28}\)

Pennsylvania officials learned about the Cayugas' claim to the Susquehanna lands the following year. The Pennsylvania Council reported that in July, 1720, "Civility [the Conestoga chief] desired to speak with the Secretary [James Logan] in private. . . he acquainted the Secretary that some of the Five Nations, especially the Cayoogoes, had at divers times expressed a dissatisfaction at the large settlements made by the English on Sasquehanna, and that they seemed to claim a property or right to those lands." Logan replied that Civility and all the Indians "were sensible of the contrary, and that the Five Nations had long since made over all their right to Sasquehanna to the government of New York, and that Governor Penn had purchased that right." Civility agreed, but then added he was merely warning the Secretary so that "we might the better prevent all misunderstanding."\(^\text{29}\)

Governor Keith of Pennsylvania was astounded by the Cayugas' claims. He immediately sent off a letter of protest to the governor of New York. Keith wrote, "Some of the [Cayuga] nation. . . had the boldness to assert that all the lands upon the Sasquehanna River belonged to them, and that the English had no right to settle there,
intimating as if they (the Cayoogoes) speedily intended to come down with their people to Philadelphia, in order to demand possession of those lands: an insolent way of speaking, which I am told they have but lately assumed, since the death of two of their ancient men who kept them in some awe, and even showed a faithful regard to the English interest.”

Keith then explained that the Iroquois had sold their rights to the Susquehanna lands to Dongan, who in turn sold them to William Penn. Keith pointed out that the Iroquois had always acknowledged that transaction. For example, around 1710 or 1711, fifty Iroquois chiefs came to Conestoga for a conference with Governor Gookin. When the Dongan deed was mentioned to them, "they not only appeared to be fully satisfied therewith, but proceeded in a formal manner, without any hesitation, to confirm all our former treaties of friendship with them." Governor Keith concluded that "neither the whole Five Nations together, nor any one of them separately, have the least appearance of a just right to any of these lands they would now claim."

The Cayugas, however, were not about to give up their claims to the Susquehanna lands. On June 15, 1722, Governor Keith met with the Conestogas, Shawnees, and Ganawese at Conestoga. He reminded the Indians that many years ago they had consented to William Penn's purchase of the lands on both sides of the Susquehanna River. He added, "But I find both you and we are like to be disturbed by idle people from Maryland and also by others who have presumed to survey lands on the banks of Susquehanna, without any powers from William Penn or his children to whom they belong, and without so much as asking your
consent. I am therefore now come to hold a council and consult with you how to prevent such unjust practices for the future." The Pennsylvania governor then suggested that the Indians cede the lands to Pennsylvania, so no one else could settle on them. According to the official minutes of the meeting, the spokesman for the Pennsylvania Indians relied that:

They have considered of what the governor proposed to them yesterday and think it a matter of very great importance to them to hinder the Marylanders from settling or taking up lands so near them upon Sasquehanna. They very much approve what the governor spoke... but they are not willing to discourse particularly on the business of land lest the Five Nations may reproach or blame them. They declare again their satisfaction with all that the governor said yesterday to them in council; and although they know that the Five Nations have not any right to these lands, and that four of the towns do not pretend to any, yet the fifth town, viz. the Cayugoes are always claiming some right to lands on Sasquehanna, even where they themselves now live; wherefore, they think it will be a very proper time when the governor goes to Albany to settle that matter with the Cayugoes, and then all parties will be satisfied.

The significance of the Pennsylvania Indians' reply must have been clear to Governor Keith. The Susquehanna tribes refused to acknowledge the Iroquois claims to Susquehanna lands. Yet, they did not wish to offend any of the Five Nations by selling those lands to Pennsylvania. In effect, the Pennsylvania government could no longer purchase lands in the Susquehanna Valley without first obtaining consent from the Iroquois.

The Pennsylvania government had an additional reason to be concerned with the Iroquois Confederacy. In March, 1722, a Seneca man was murdered at Manakassy, a branch of the Potomac River, by some whites during an argument over rum. The Pennsylvania government
wanted to avoid bad feelings between the Iroquois and the Pennsylvanians, so they decided to send a messenger to the Five Nations to condole them for the murder of the Seneca man. James Logan and the Pennsylvania Indians chose to send Skatcheetchoo, who was described by one official as "a Cayoogoe of the Five Nations, and of that next in situation to the Senecas, who had for divers years resided among our [Pennsylvania] Indians." 34

The murder of the Seneca man provided the Pennsylvania government with the opportunity to expand its communications and relations with the Iroquois Confederacy. On May 4, 1722, Skatcheetchoo returned from Iroquoia with a reply from the Five Nations. He said that the Iroquois were willing to accept Pennsylvania's apology for the death of the Seneca, if the governor of Pennsylvania came to Iroquoia to fully condole the Senecas. The Five Nations added that if the governor came to their country they might even make peace with the southern tribes. Governor Keith instructed Skatcheetchoo to deliver the following response to the Iroquois: "Our [first] message from Conestoga was only sent to express our sorrow, and not to offer any satisfaction for our brother's death. We have already taken and shall continue to pursue the same measures with the offenders as if an Englishman had lost his life, but they must be judged by the laws of our Great King, which make a difference between the case of a man killed in a quarrel through heat of blood, and when the design is formed in the mind before hand to destroy or kill a man." Governor Keith added that they, the Iroquois, "know very well that the governor of Virginia has promised either to come himself or to send ambassadors to meet them at Albany
this summer; if therefore my great and good friend the governor of New York will please to go to Albany at the same time, I shall be glad to go along with him, that I may eat, drink, and discourse with all the breathren and open our breasts to one another.”

The stage was set for a meeting between the Pennsylvania government and the Iroquois Confederacy. On June 15, 1722, Governor Keith told representatives of the Conestogas, Shawnees, and Canawese that the Five Nations "invite me to come to them, and I purpose in a short time to go and meet them at Albany, and make the chain between us as bright as the sun.” Keith had several specific goals in mind. First, he wanted to settle the matter involving the murdered Seneca. Second, he wanted to ratify a treaty of friendship between the Iroquois and the government of Pennsylvania. Third, he hoped to work out a peace settlement between the Iroquois, the Pennsylvania Indians, and the southern tribes. And fourth, he wished to extinguish any Iroquois claims to lands in the Susquehanna Valley.

Governor Keith led a Pennsylvania delegation to Albany in early September, 1722. Keith told the Iroquois, "Brethren, I have travelled a great way to see you and to hold some discourse with you. . . . I am come to brighten the chain between us.” He explained how the Seneca man was killed during a drunken brawl over a trade disagreement. He then presented gifts to the Iroquois and said, "I desire you may receive them [gifts] as a pledge of our firm friendship with the Five Nations; that you will ever remember us as your brethren, and not suffer your young men, when they travel, to hurt any of our inhabitants, no more than they would their own, or to kill their cattle
and stock; and that this visit and the Covenant Chain which is hereby
brightened may be recorded in everlasting remembrance."

The Iroquois replied, "We thank you for your good will to us... we... do in the most solemn and public manner renew the Covenant and
brighten the chain made between us... You desire there may be a per-
petual peace and friendship between you and the Five Nations and between
your children and our children... and we desire that the peace and
tranquility that is now established between us may be as clear as the
sun... and that the same may continue forever." The Iroquois then
said they would forgive the murder of the Seneca in Pennsylvania.
Later, the Iroquois added, "We here now freely surrender to you all
those lands about Conestoga which the Five Nations have claimed, and
it is our desire that the same may be settled with Christians... .
According to the best understanding, we have renewed at this time
with you all former treaties between your people and us, we therefore
expect, that if any of our people come to trade at Philadelphia you
will order that they be received like Brethren and have the goods as
cheap as possible.""39

The Pennsylvania governor did not fall into the trap set by the
Iroquois. He realized that by accepting the Iroquois' free surrender
of "those lands about Conestoga," he would be recognizing later
Iroquois claims to the rest of the Susquehanna Valley. Keith therefore
shrewdly replied, "Brethren, you know very well that the lands about
Conestoga upon the River Sasquehannah belong to your old friend and
kind brother William Penn; nevertheless I do here, in his name,
kindly accept of the offer and surrender which you have now made to
me, because it will put an end to all other claims and disputes if any should be made hereafter." In regard to trade, Keith said, "Considering how well you are provided with goods at Albany, I think Philadelphia will be far out of your way to trade, but as often as any of your people come to us in love and friendship, they shall be treated like brethren."40

Deputies from Virginia also met with the Iroquois and they worked out a settlement to stop the warfare between the northern and southern tribes. Virginia's Governor Spotswood guaranteed that the tribes of the Southeast would not go north of the Potomac River or west of the Appalachian Mountains. The Iroquois deputies, who spoke for their Confederacy as well as for the Conestogas, Shawnees, Octatiguaranann-koons, and Ostagues (who apparently were Susquehanna River Indians), pledged that they would not go south or east of the said boundaries.41

According to the council minutes, Governor Keith told New York's Governor William Burnet that "he hoped the Virginia Act which had been read would [restrain] all the northern Indians from proceeding any more that way to the southward."42

The governors of Virginia and Pennsylvania later agreed that the Pennsylvania tribes, who had been included in the Virginia-Iroquois Treaty, should ratify the treaty for themselves to ensure their adherence to its provisions. Keith explained, "I could not but think that if our [Pennsylvania] Indians who are so much nearer to Virginia were brought voluntarily and distinctly by themselves to accept of and confirm the same proposition as to the boundaries which the Five Nations have actually [agreed to] for them, that they shall observe, it would
in all probability prevent future disturbance on the frontiers of these colonies, and tend to a general peace amongst the Indians on this side the lakes."

On October 11, 1722, the Pennsylvania governor met with the Susquehanna River Indians to obtain their agreement to the Virginia-Iroquois Treaty. He pointed out to them that that treaty "concerns you for they [the Iroquois] have included you in it, and have obliged you to observe it as well as themselves." He then reminded them that any Indians who crossed the Spotswood Boundary "without a passport [from their colonial governor]. . .shall be put to death for so being or be transported and sold for slaves." Keith added, "You see, therefore, my friends and Brethren, that as the Five Nations have thought it for preventing all further misunderstandings with Virginia, to bind not only themselves but have taken upon them to bind you, also most firmly to observe this treaty. You for your own safety. . .must give notice to all your people." The Pennsylvania Indians replied that they would "take care to observe. . .the treaty which is engaged on our parts."

The September, 1722, negotiations between the Iroquois and the governments of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia elevated the prestige and position of the Iroquois Confederacy. Representatives of Virginia and Pennsylvania had been forced, by necessity, to travel hundreds of miles to negotiate with the Iroquois, and both colonial governments needed Iroquois cooperation to settle problems that plagued their colonies. Virginia and Pennsylvania wanted Iroquois warriors to stop raiding southern Indians and harassing colonial settlers. And Pennsylvania wanted the Iroquois to give up their claims
to Susquehanna lands. By the mid-1720s, the friendship and cooperation of the Iroquois Confederacy became quite important to the Pennsylvania and Virginia colonial governments.

By 1727, the Iroquois had greatly advanced their position in Pennsylvania. The colonial government of Pennsylvania recognized that it had to deal with the Iroquois Confederacy. The Pennsylvania leaders knew that Iroquois land claims in the Susquehanna Valley had to be settled. In 1722, Susquehanna River tribes refused to sell lands to the Pennsylvania government without Iroquois approval. Five years later Iroquois sachems confronted Pennsylvania's Governor Patrick Gordon with the land issue. The sachems, on July 3, 1727, offered to sell their Susquehanna lands to Pennsylvania. Gordon replied that Pennsylvania already owned those lands and had the deeds to prove it. Neither side was able to put forth a totally convincing argument; so, the question of ownership of the Susquehanna lands remained unresolved.

The Pennsylvania government was also aware that Iroquois relations with the tribes of Pennsylvania and the South could affect the security of the Pennsylvania colony. The secretary for the Pennsylvania Council noted that, in 1722, Governor Keith met with New York's Governor Burnet and expressed his hope that some measures would "be taken to prevent the Five Nations from taking their warlike courses through Pennsylvania to the southward, it was more the necessary because the Conestoga Indians...actually pay tribute now to the Five Nations, and either from natural affection or fear are under their influence and power."
The tribes of Pennsylvania also had respect for the Iroquois' increasing power. In 1720, Pennsylvania's Governor Keith noted that Pennsylvania Indians joined Iroquois war parties against the southern tribes because they were "axed by them [Iroquois]." Keith added, "Our Indians dread to offend them [Iroquois], and are cautious of even mentioning them but with respect." In July, 1720, the Conestogas, Shawnees, and Ganawese told Governor Keith that they were afraid that the Senecas would attack them if they made peace with the southern tribes. The following year a spokesman for the Susquehanna River Indians stated that his people did not wish to offend the Five Nations, and in October, 1722, Governor Keith noted that the Conestogas were under the Iroquois' power, perhaps due to fear.47

Yet, despite the fact that Iroquois power had grown in Pennsylvania during the early 1720s, the Pennsylvania tribes still showed signs that they ruled themselves and were not merely satellites of the Iroquois Confederacy. The Pennsylvania tribes did not always back the Five Nations' official positions. In 1719 and 1720, Pennsylvania Indians promised the Pennsylvania government that they would not listen to the Iroquois, who wanted them to war on the southern tribes. The Susquehanna River tribes also refused to recognize claims to land in the Susquehanna Valley. And in 1723, the Ganawese, Conestogas, Delawares, and Shawnees expressed to the Pennsylvania governor their displeasure with the Spotswood Boundary negotiated for them by the Iroquois.48 There were additional indications of the Pennsylvania tribes' autonomy. Between 1719 and 1727, the Pennsylvania tribes negotiated directly with Pennsylvania officials,
with no interference from the Five Nations. And when the Pennsylvania Indians did conduct official business with the Iroquois Confederacy, they seem to have done so on an equal basis. For example, a Pennsylvania justice of the peace reported in 1722 that the Conestogas, Shawnees, Conoys, and Nanticokes had decided to visit the Five Nations "to renew former friendship and strengthen it in unity for time to come." 49

Pennsylvania officials probably were aware that the tribes of Pennsylvania were friends and allies of the Five Nations, but not under their domination. In 1720, when Governor Keith was trying to persuade the Pennsylvania Indians to adopt a position contrary to that of the Five Nations, he assured the Pennsylvania tribes, "We are all friends to the Five Nations and have a great respect for them, and these [Iroquois] cannot but be pleased to find that our [Pennsylvania] Indians live in such friendship with their English neighbors, as to resolve also to live in peace with our friends. Whenever any of these Minguays [Iroquois] come amongst them, they must not fail to inform them that they and we are one people and not to be separated in interest, and we desire that the Minguays also may be the same, and live with us as brothers." 50

The following year Governor Keith warned the Iroquois that any of their warriors who go to war against the southern tribes had better not "pass this way amongst our [Indian] people, whose eyes I have opened... to their destruction... [We] know what is for their good, for though they are weak yet they are our brethren, we will therefore take care of them that they be not misled with ill
council [from the Iroquois warriors]."51

In 1722, Governor Keith told the Conestoga Indians that the Iroquois were the "great friends and allies" of the English and Indians of Pennsylvania. Later that year Keith and Governor Spotswood of Virginia agreed that the Pennsylvania tribes should ratify the Virginia-Iroquois Treaty on their own, even though the Iroquois had already signed the treaty on their behalf. Even the Iroquois did not claim to have authority over all the tribes of Pennsylvania. The Five Nations ratified the Spotswood Treaty "in behalf of the Tuscaroras, the Conestogas, the Shawanese, the OctatiguannanKroons, and the Ostagues." No other tribes were mentioned.52 Apparently, the Iroquois did not feel they had the authority to speak for the other Susquehanna River tribes or any of the Indians who lived along the Delaware River. Although Iroquois power was on the increase in Pennsylvania during the 1720s, the Five Nations still did not control the Pennsylvania tribes.

The third and final phase in the Iroquois' plan to gain hegemony over the Pennsylvania Indians and their lands lasted from 1728 until 1744. During those years the Iroquois Confederacy collaborated with the Pennsylvania government to gain complete control over the Pennsylvania tribes.

Pennsylvania government officials decided to help the Iroquois establish authority over Pennsylvania Indians because they believed that the Confederacy could help them control the Pennsylvania tribes. Between 1728 and 1732, the Pennsylvania government was having problems
with the Indians of the Susquehanna and Delaware River Valleys. The Shawnees were a major source of the difficulties. Governor Gordon informed the Pennsylvania Council on May 6, 1728, that he had recently received a letter from a Mr. Wright at Conestoga. Wright reported that a war might break out between the "Indians of these parts" and the Shawnees, who had recently killed two Conestogas. The governor noted that he did not want hostilities between the two Pennsylvania tribes.53

The Shawnees also posed a threat to white settlers in Pennsylvania. On May 15, 1728, Governor Gordon told his Council that the country around Mahanatamy (which was about a day's journey from Philadelphia) was in a turmoil. Gordon explained, "The country [was] in very great disorder, occasioned by the noise of the skirmish that happened between some of our people and a small party of [Shawnee] Indians." The governor reported on May 20, 1728, that he had received a message from Ka-Kow-Watchy, a Shawnee chief. Ka-Kow-Watchy said "that he having heard that the Flatheads...were come into this province with a design to make war upon our Indians, he had sent eleven of his men armed to enquire into the truth of the report." The eleven Shawnees, according to Ka-Kow-Watchy, tried to take some provisions from white settlers and wound up exchanging gun fire with them. Ka-Kow-Watchy apologized to the governor for the incident.54

The Pennsylvania government feared, with good reason, that the Shawnees and other Pennsylvania Indians were becoming too friendly with the French. On August 4, 1731, Governor Gordon informed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives that the French were trying to win over the Shawnees who lived in the upper Allegheny River Valley.
The following month the Albany Commissioners noted that Joncaire
had gone out to bring the Shawnees into the French interest. Joncaire
apparently was successful, for, by the end of 1731, two Pennsylvania
traders reported that the Shawnees and other Indians on the upper
Allegheny were dealing with the French. On October 29, 1731, Jonah
Davenport stated that he recently returned from Allegheny "where there
are now Indian settlements consisting of about 300 Delawares, 260
Shawnees, 100 Asswekalaes, and some Mingoes." He added that the French
were trying to win these Indians over to their side. Another trader,
Edmund Cartlidge, gave similar information on December 7, 1731.
According to Cartlidge, settlements of Shawnees, Delawares, Asseehales,
and Mingoes could be found at Allegheny. Cartlidge said that several
Shawnees had even gone to visit the French governor at Montreal and
"ever since that time there has been a great appearance of friendship
and goodwill between the French and them."\(^{55}\)

Other incidents contributed to the Pennsylvania government's
growing concern with Indian affairs. In the spring of 1728, Thomas
Wright, an Indian trader, was murdered by several Indians. When the
Pennsylvania governor demanded justice from the Conestoga Indians, who
lived in the area where the crime was committed, he was told that the
murder "was not done by them [i.e. the Conestogas], it was done by one
of the Menysincks [the Minisinks were a Delaware tribe] who are of
another nation and therefore they can say nothing to it." The governor
accepted their dubious story and said he would have to obtain satis-
faction from the Minisinks.\(^{56}\) The Delawares or Lenapes provided
another source of friction when they began protesting about land sales
in 1728. On June 5, Sasoonan (alias Alumpees), an important chief of one Lenape band, complained to James Logan that "he was grown old and was troubled to see the Christians settle on lands that the Indians had never been paid for, they had settled on his lands for which he had never received anything." Logan produced a ten-year-old deed, signed by Sasoonan and the Lenapes, to prove that the land had been fairly purchased by the Pennsylvania government. Sasoonan then replied that he remembered the treaty, but that treaty and deed did not include the lands that were now being settled by the German Palatines. Logan promised to do further research into the matter.57

Pennsylvania's white settlers became increasingly concerned with the Indian problems. Rumors of coming Indian attacks spread quickly through white settlements. In April, 1728, an Indian trader named James Le Tort informed the Pennsylvania Council that he had learned that the Iroquois, Miamis, and Delawares were planning to declare war on the Pennsylvania colonists. After hearing Le Tort's story, the Council concluded, "There is no great dependence to be had on this information...however it will be advisable to make further inquiries that in case there should be any foundation for the story it may be known as soon as possible."58 The following month a trader at Conestoga notified Pennsylvania's Governor Gordon that many frontier settlers feared Indian attacks and that some had even abandoned their farms out of fear.59

In May, 1728, Governor Gordon told a Conestoga chief that he had heard rumors that the Twichtwees, or Miamis, were planning to attack Pennsylvania settlers. Gordon added, "I believe it is false for we
never hurt the Twechtweys...60

By autumn other rumors reached the Pennsylvania governor. A member of the Pennsylvania Council noted that several traders had informed the governor that "all the Indians were removed from Shamokin, except Allummapees and Okekasset; that at the Shawanese town called Malson, the Shawanese had hanged one Timothy Higgins, a servant of Henry Smith's, an Indian trader." At the time Governor Gordon felt that other traders might also be in danger, because the Pennsylvania Indians were dissatisfied with many of the traders, whom they considered unfair. Gordon, however, refused to believe that the Indians would actually hang a white man, and he said he wanted to get to the cause of the rumors and restlessness among the Indians. The governor's hunch later proved to be correct when it was learned that Higgins was alive.61

Pennsylvania settlers sometimes lashed out at any Indians who were in the area. For example, after a small Shawnee raiding party attacked whites in the spring of 1728, some settlers were intent on getting revenge. Governor Gordon explained, "Some of the inhabitants seemed so incensed that they seemed determined to kill any Indian they could find and that great pains were taken on this head to make them cautious of doing any rash act which might be attended with fatal consequences." Unfortunately, the pains taken were not great enough. Within a short time the governor learned that two white men had murdered three friendly Indians in retaliation for the Shawnees' attack. Tensions remained so high that on May 16, 1728, Governor Gordon issued a proclamation to the people of Pennsylvania. He ordered them not
to "abuse any Indian native around us, visit: the Delawares, Conestogas, Canawese, Shawanese, Mingoos, or those of the Five Nations, or any other coming and demeaning themselves peaceably amongst us, but that on all occasions they treat all the said Indians with the same civil regard that they would an English subject." 62

Between 1728 and 1732, Governor Gordon and other Pennsylvania officials came to the conclusion that the Iroquois could help the Pennsylvania government control the tribes of Pennsylvania. In the spring of 1728, the governor received word that "chiefs of the Five Nations" would soon be arriving at Philadelphia to renew the Covenant Chain Alliance. Gordon quickly informed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives about the upcoming visit of the Iroquois. He also hinted that the Iroquois might be of use to the Pennsylvania government. Gordon explained, "Some of the chiefs of the Five Nations are to be here with us at Philadelphia on a friendly visit, of which good uses may be made, seeing all our Indians of these parts have an entire dependance on those [five Iroquois] Nations." 63

Whether the Pennsylvania tribes were really dependent upon the Five Nations was of little concern to Governor Gordon. He proceeded on the assumption that they were. In June, 1728, Gordon and his Council met with Sasoonan and his Delawares. An Iroquois named Shickellamy, who may have been sent to Pennsylvania by the Iroquois League Council to watch over the troublesome Shawnees, was also present at the meeting. If Shickellamy had any authority over the Delawares, it certainly was not evident. The Iroquois representative merely sat there while Sasoonan put forth Delaware views on land sales
and other issues that affected Pennsylvania Indians and whites. But Governor Gordon and his advisers were not deterred by Schickellamy's poor showing. They decided that Schickellamy and the Iroquois could provide the solution to the Pennsylvania government's growing problems with the Shawnees, Delawares, and other tribes.

In September, 1728, the Pennsylvania Council recommended to Governor Gordon that he send the following message to Schickellamy:

"That as he [Schickellamy] is appointed (as 'tis said) by the Five Nations to preside over the Shawanese, it's expected he will give a good account of them; That they came into this government as strangers and had leave to settle amongst us, the Conestoga Indians becoming their security, and that 'tis to be hoped they have behaved themselves well." The secretary of the Pennsylvania Council added, "It was further considered by the Board that as the Five Nations have an absolute authority over all our Indians, and may command them as they please, it is of great importance to remove any impressions that have been made upon them [Iroquois] to the prejudice of the English, and that by all means it is necessary they should be spoke with." The Council then sent a message, via the Conestogas, to invite the Iroquois to visit the governor at Philadelphia.

Governor Gordon agreed with James Logan and the rest of his advisers. He immediately dispatched two deputies to inform Schickellamy that the government of Pennsylvania wanted him to watch the Shawnees very closely. Gordon noted, "He [Schickellamy] is a good man, and I hope will give a good account of them [Shawnees]."
Governor Gordon and his Council had taken two significant steps. First, they decided to recognize the Iroquois' absolute authority over all Pennsylvania Indians. Secondly, they proposed to utilize that Iroquois authority to control the actions of the Pennsylvania tribes. It was a bold plan, and they quickly put it into effect.

The Iroquois were eager to cooperate. In October, 1728, Governor Gordon met with Sasoonan and several Delawares at Philadelphia. Once again Shickellamy attended the conference. This time, however, his contribution was noticed. Sasoonan renewed friendship on behalf of all Pennsylvania Indians. According to the official minutes of the conference, Sasoonan then said, "The Five Nations have often told them [the Delawares] that they [the Delawares] were as women only and desired them to plant corn and mind their own private business, for that they [the Iroquois] would take care of what related to peace and war, and that therefore they [the Delawares] have ever had good and peaceful thoughts towards us [the English]. That the ... Five Nations have frequently told them that it was likewise their desire that peace and friendship should be still kept and preserved between us [the English and Indians] as long as the sun shall rise and set." Sasoonan added that he hoped friendship would continue, as the Iroquois had requested. Governor Gordon responded by renewing the Covenant Chain Alliance between Pennsylvania and all the Indians. The governor then distributed presents to all the chiefs. One Pennsylvania official noted that a special gift was given to "Shickellima, of the Five Nations, appointed to reside among the Shawnee, whose services had been and may yet further be of great advantage to this government." Shickellamy
received a gun, a shirt, and blankets for himself, his wife and daughter. No doubt he was pleased. Soon Shickellamy would show that he was willing to assist the Pennsylvania government in additional ways.

The Pennsylvania tribes quickly perceived the Pennsylvania government's interest in the Iroquois Confederacy. On May 26, 1729, representatives of the Conestogas, Ganawese, Shawnees, and Delawares met with Governor Gordon and promised to keep open the communications between the Pennsylvania government, the Pennsylvania Indians, and the Five Nations. The Conestoga chief, Civility, served as their spokesman. He said, "the Conestoga, Delaware, Shawanese, and Ganawese all ...resolve forever to continue in the same love and friendship with the English as one people." He added that they would keep the roads clear and open "between Philadelphia, Conestoga, and the Five Nations."  

Pennsylvania officials, however, had no intentions of letting their relations with the Iroquois deteriorate. On August 4, 1731, Governor Gordon informed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives that the French were trying to win over the Shawnees living on the upper Allegheny. The governor stated that James Logan believed that the loss of the Shawnees to the French would be disastrous for the security of the Pennsylvania Colony. He said that Logan had made the following recommendation:

that to prevent or put a stop to these [French] designs if possible a treaty would be set on foot with the Five Nations, who have an absolute authority as well over the Shawanese as all our Indians, that by their means the Shawanese may not only be kept firm to the English interest, but likewise be induced to
remove from Allegheny nearer to the English settlements, and that such a treaty [with the Iroquois] becomes now the more necessary, because 'tis several years since any of those [Five] Nations have visited us, and no opportunity ought to be lost of cultivating and improving the friendship which has always subsisted between this government and them.70

Three days later the House of Representatives gave the governor the financial backing to make a treaty with the Iroquois. Governor Gordon immediately informed his Council that "an opportunity now favorably presented itself of sending a message to the Six (formerly called the Five) Nations by Shekallamy, who is willing to undertake it, and is a trusty good man and a great lover of the English." The governor and the Council members agreed that Shickellamy should be given a present as a reward for his help. They also decided that a gift of 10 L. should be presented to the Five Nations when they are issued the invitation "to come and visit us at Philadelphia."71

Governor Gordon met with Shickellamy on August 16, 1731, and explained his proposition for the Iroquois. Gordon told Shickellamy to inform the chiefs of the Five Nations "that from the first settlement of this province by William Penn, there has subsisted a firm friendship between this government and them, that accordingly they have frequently visited us as their friends, that it is several years since we have seen any of them at Philadelphia, that we sent them a message about two years since, but would now willingly see some of their old wise men of authority amongst them, to discourse of some affairs concerning their own security and the peace of these countries."72

Shickellamy understood the implications of Gordon's request. He realized that the Pennsylvania government wanted a close working
relationship with the Iroquois Confederacy and that both parties could profit from it. He carried that message to Iroquoia.

Shickellamy returned from his mission in early December and requested an audience with the governor. The meeting was held on December 10. Conrad Weiser, who was employed as Pennsylvania's official Indian interpreter and who was Shickellamy's close friend, served as interpreter. According to the official minutes, Shickellamy said "that he had delivered the governor's message to the chiefs of the Six Nations...who were extremely pleased to hear from the governor." The Six Nations gladly received the governor's presents and promised to come to Philadelphia in the spring. The governor was satisfied and gave Shickellamy 10 L. worth of goods for his help.⁷³

Everything was set; Iroquois sachems would arrive in Philadelphia in the spring to ratify the new treaty. Both the Iroquois Confederacy and the Pennsylvania government stood to benefit by the new relationship. The Confederacy would gain power over Pennsylvania Indians and would profit by aiding the government of Pennsylvania. Meanwhile the Pennsylvania government would have the Six Nations to police the Pennsylvania tribes and to facilitate the implementation of government policy in Pennsylvania.

Governor Gordon also realized that he could use the Iroquois to check the expansion of other colonies. For example, on April 18, 1732, Gordon informed Maryland's Governor Ogle that the Iroquois "have been acknowledged by all the natives of these parts as their masters." He added that "since their conquest of the Sasquehanna Indians, [the Iroquois] have always claimed that river and all the lands upon it or
its branches as their property, and this claim has constantly been acknowledged by all the other Indians in these parts.\textsuperscript{74} Most likely, Governor Gordon was trying to establish Iroquois ownership to the Susquehanna lands in order to block Marylanders who were trying to settle in the Susquehanna Valley. Later he could tell the Maryland governor that the Iroquois had sold those lands to the government of Pennsylvania. In that way Pennsylvania would have a clear title to all the Susquehanna lands and Maryland would be legally excluded from the area. It was therefore in Pennsylvania's best interests to back Iroquois land claims in the Susquehanna Valley.

The fiction of the Iroquois' absolute authority over Pennsylvania Indians and lands was quickly becoming a reality, but it was not fact yet. Between 1728 and 1732, the Pennsylvania tribes clung to their independence. They continued to negotiate on their own behalf with the Pennsylvania government and received little interference from the Iroquois. Shickellamy's presence in the Susquehanna Valley may have been the Confederacy's sole attempt to influence Pennsylvania Indian affairs. Yet even Shickellamy did not appear to have any authority over the Delawares, Conestogas, or Ganawese, as evidenced by his lack of participation in conferences between those tribes and colonial officials.\textsuperscript{75} Shickellamy's initial duties seem to have been only to watch over the Shawnees. The Iroquois probably were displeased because the Shawnees were threatening the Conestogas and Pennsylvania whites and making overtures to the French. The League therefore may have sent Shickellamy to gather intelligence and to keep an eye on the troublesome Shawnees. It is even possible that some of the Pennsylvania
tribes may have even asked the Confederacy to send an ambassador (i.e. Shickellamy) to mediate the difficulties between the Shawnees and Conestogas, who were both allies and props in the Iroquois Covenant Chain. There is, however, no record that such a request occurred.

On August 18, 1732, Iroquois sachems arrived at Philadelphia for their scheduled conference with the governor of Pennsylvania. For five days they rested and enjoyed the hospitality of their hosts. Then, on August 23, 1732, the treaty negotiations that would forever alter the Iroquois' relationships with the Pennsylvania tribes began. Representing the government of Pennsylvania were the proprietor, Thomas Penn, the governor, Patrick Gordon, and the members of the Governor's Council. Representing the Iroquois Confederacy were Shickellamy and three other Oneida chiefs, along with two Seneca chiefs, one Cayuga chief, and fifteen other Iroquois.

Thomas Penn spoke first, through the interpreter Conrad Welser. He renewed friendship with the Iroquois and stated that he wished to make the Covenant Chain Alliance "stronger and brighter." He added, "As proof of this we would now enter into a close discourse with you on affairs that nearly concern your own peace and safety; for as true brothers that are as one body and have the same interest, we lay to our hearts whatever may effect and touch you. But this requires plainness and freedom; we should open our hearts, conceal nothing."76

The proprietor then asked the Iroquois about their relations with the French and the Indian tribes to the north and west. Penn told them to consider the questions carefully and then tomorrow they could speak freely. He concluded by saying, "and when we have finished this
friendly treaty, we shall have a present for you to return with home
that will confirm all we shall say to you." 77

Hetaquantagechtty, a Seneca, immediately replied that he and the
other deputies were glad to meet with the proprietor and governor. He
explained that although the chiefs who were present came only from the
Senecas, Oneidas, and Cayugas, they "are fully empowered and authorized
to treat and speak in behalf of them all." He promised that they
would be open and truthful about all matters to be discussed. The
conference then adjourned for the night. 78

The tone for the conference was set during that first day. The
Pennsylvania government had made it clear that they felt that they and
the Iroquois Confederacy had similar interests and both could profit
by cooperating with each other. The Iroquois deputies showed that
they were interested in the proposition and willing to cooperate.

The next morning Governor Gordon told his Council members that
"the Indians had desired further time to consider of their answer,
whereupon the hearing of them was put off till tomorrow." The governor
and his Council then discussed whether it would be better to hold the
conference outdoors or within the council chamber. Some Council
members expressed fears that the Iroquois would not speak as freely if
the conference were held in public. So it was decided to let the
Iroquois choose the setting. On August 25, Conrad Weiser told the
governor that the Iroquois "had acquainted him it would be more agree-
able to their inclinations to treat at the governor's house." 79 The
Iroquois realized that the Pennsylvania tribes would not appreciate
the Iroquois-Pennsylvania machinations, and therefore they wanted
closed-door sessions.

Shortly thereafter, the conference resumed, this time in the
secrecy of the governor's chambers. Hetaquantagechtty served as the
Iroquois spokesman. He informed the Pennsylvania officials that the
Iroquois were presently at peace with the French, as well as with the
northern and western tribes. He added that the Iroquois were trying
to prevent the French from winning over the Shawnees and other Indians
living on the Ohio River.

Hetaquantagechtty noted that the Iroquois were pleased to conduct
such friendly talks with the proprietor, whom they called Brother Onas.
He said that the Iroquois "are willing and desirous that there may be
more frequent opportunities of conferring and discoursing with their
Brethren, and that these may be managed by means of Shickellamy and
Conrad Weiser, the interpreter." Thomas Penn gave his approval of all
they said. He then presented them with gifts and said, according to
the official minutes, that "afterwards [he] would confer with them
more closely on several subjects." The council was then adjourned
for the night. 80

The meeting reconvened the next day. The Iroquois, in response to
several specific questions, told the Pennsylvania officials that the
Iroquois Confederacy held great sway over many of the powerful western
tribes. They assured the governor and proprietor that those tribes
"had put their hearts into their [the Iroquois'] hands and would now
do whatever they ordered or directed." The Iroquois' exaggerated
account of their influence with the western tribes was apparently taken
at face value by the Pennsylvania officials, who seemed satisfied with
the Iroquois' response.

The Pennsylvania officials then explained to the Iroquois the problem that Pennsylvania was having with the Shawnees. According to the minutes of the conference, the Pennsylvania officials told the Iroquois that:

The Shawanese who were settled to the southward, being made uneasy by their neighbors, about 60 families of them came up to Conestoga, about 35 years since and desired leave of the Sasquehanna Indians who were planted there, to settle on that river; that those Sasquehanna Indians applied to this government that they might accordingly settle, and they would become answerable for their good behavior. . . . the proprietor agreed to their settlement, and the Shawanese thereupon came under the protection of this government; that from that time greater numbers of the same Indians followed them, and settled on Sasquehanna and Delaware; that as they had joined themselves to the Sasquehanna Indians who were dependent on the Five Nations, they thereby fell also under their protection. That we had held several treaties with those Shawanese, and from their first coming were accounted and treated as our own Indians; but that some of their young men having between four and five years since committed some disorders, though we had fully made it up with them yet being afraid of the Six Nations they had removed themselves to Ohio, and there had lately put themselves under the protection of the French, who had received them as their children. That we had sent a message to them to return, and to encourage them had laid out a large tract of land on the west side of the Sasquehanna, round the principal town where they had been settled, and we desired by all means that they would return thither.81

The Iroquois were then told by the Pennsylvania officials "that as they were the chiefs of all the northern Indians in these parts, and the Shawanese had been under their protection, they should oblige them to return."82

The Iroquois deputies asked the Pennsylvania officials if the Confederacy had to bring the Shawnees back by themselves. The officials replied that they wanted the Iroquois to join with them to engage the Shawnees to return. The Iroquois deputies then said they "craved
time to consider of it amongst themselves and then the conference ended."

At last the proposition had been officially proffered. The Pennsylvania government was willing to form a close alliance with the Iroquois Confederacy, to recognize Iroquois sovereignty over Pennsylvania Indians, and to provide gifts to the Five Nations. In return, the Iroquois had to help the Pennsylvania government control the unruly tribes of Pennsylvania.

The Iroquois gave their reply on August 28, 1732. According to the council minutes, they said, "that they are much indebted to their [Pennsylvania] brethren for the good will and affection they show in advising them to strengthen themselves by friendship with their neighbors of several Indians. . . . Then laying down some strings of wampum: they desire we all join with them in calling back the Shawnees which they conceive they can do by preventing our Indian traders from going to Ohio, for while the Indians are supplied at that place with such goods as they want, they will be more unwilling to remove." The Iroquois added that "though they may be able to prevail with the Shawanese to return from Ohio, yet they will not be so capable of affecting it, unless we call our traders back from thence, and hinder them from furnishing them with goods and receiving their peltry there. It will therefore be our own fault if they do not return." With those words, the Iroquois accepted the Pennsylvania government's offer. Their reply, however, shows that the Iroquois knew the Shawnees would not obey Iroquois orders that they return to Pennsylvania. The Iroquois realized that only a trade boycott could force the
Shawnees to leave the Ohio River.

Thomas Penn replied to the Iroquois on August 29. He said, "We are much obliged to you for the readiness you show to join with us in this matter, and we are desirous to have the same put into execution as soon as may be." He explained that, because of the coming winter, the traders and Shawnees could not be recalled until spring. Penn added, "As to what you have said about employing Shickellamy and Conrad Weiser...we are very glad you agree with us in the choice of so good men to go between us. We believe them to be very honest, and will with cheerfullness employ them." The Iroquois then expressed their satisfaction with all that was said and the conference was adjourned.85

On August 31, the Pennsylvania officials met again with the Iroquois deputies. The proprietor reiterated the major points that were to be included in the treaty. First, a close friendship was established between the Pennsylvania government and the Iroquois Confederacy. A council fire was to be established for the Iroquois at Philadelphia, and Shickellamy and Conrad Weiser were to be the go-betweens for the Pennsylvania government and the Confederacy. Secondly, the Iroquois were supposed to bring more tribes into the Covenant Chain and inform those new allies that by joining the Iroquois they also became friends of all the English. Finally, the Iroquois were supposed to establish control over the Shawnees and remove them and the Delawares from the Ohio River back to Pennsylvania. The proprietor confirmed the new arrangements by presenting guns, powder, lead, clothing, tobacco, and other gifts to the Iroquois.86
The Iroquois gave their response to Thomas Penn's speech on September 2. Once again Hetaquantagechtty served as speaker. He announced that the Iroquois deputies approved of all that was said by Penn. Hetaquantagechtty then told the Pennsylvania officials, "Let your hearts, Brethren, be easy, and be assured that to all you have proposed or desired of us, you will have such an answer as will be to your good liking. We take all and every article of what you have said very well, therefore we will have them all signed and confirmed at our great [Onondaga Council] Fire. Yet it may so happen that the summer will be far spent before we bring a full answer from our great Council; we will take a convenient time to do it, and as soon as may be." The Iroquois added that they would be leaving within two days and requested supplies and horses to carry their many presents back to Iroquoia. Thomas Penn promised to provide them with everything they needed for their return home. Governor Gordon then made arrangements for the Iroquois' entertainment for the duration of their stay in Philadelphia. One Pennsylvania official observed, "The Indians, taking the proprietor, governor, and members of council by the hand, departed, and thus the Treaty ended." The treaty negotiations of 1732 were significant for several reasons. First, the resultant treaty marked the beginning of a new relationship between the Pennsylvania government and the Iroquois Confederacy. From that point on they shared a symbiotic relationship. The Iroquois and the Pennsylvania government were to have a mutually-advantageous partnership. The Iroquois, due to the Pennsylvania government's support, were able to extend their authority over the
lands and tribes of Pennsylvania, while the Pennsylvania government, because of the Iroquois' executive authority, was able to control the Indians and lands of Pennsylvania. Secondly, the Treaty of 1732 advanced the Iroquois' position in Pennsylvania. After 1732, Pennsylvania Indians realized that the Confederacy had the authority and backing of the Pennsylvania government. At the same time the settlement elevated the status of Shickellamy. He became the ambassador of the Confederacy and the Iroquois vice-regent in charge of Pennsylvania Indian affairs. And finally, the Treaty of 1732 marked the beginning of the end of the traditional Iroquois-Pennsylvania Indian relationship within the Covenant Chain. After 1732, the Iroquois rapidly became the preeminent partner in the Covenant Chain Alliance, and the Pennsylvania tribes became dependencies rather than allies or props of the Iroquois Confederacy. In effect, the negotiations and Treaty of 1732 constituted a self-fulfilling prophecy. Because the Pennsylvania government recognized the Iroquois' absolute authority over the Pennsylvania tribes, the Iroquois were able to establish hegemony over those tribes.

During the next decade the Iroquois Confederacy and the Pennsylvania government worked together to improve their partnership. On June 18, 1733, Shickellamy arrived in Philadelphia with a message for the proprietor. The Iroquois vice-regent explained that one article of the Treaty of 1732 said that if either the English or the Indians heard any rumors or ill news, they should inform the other about it. Shickellamy therefore had the following information for the Pennsylvania government, "That two days before he left home..."
messenger came to him from the Ganawese Indians, who live between Pextan and Conestoga, with an account that they understood the governor of Virginia was about to send a party of armed men...to cut them off, for a murder committed in Virginia." Shickellamy said that the Ganawese were asking all Indians to help them, so he had now come to see if there was truth in the Ganawese's story. Shickellamy added that other Pennsylvania Indians fear the governor of Pennsylvania wants to destroy them. Shickellamy also made a complaint, on behalf of all Pennsylvania tribes, that a trader named Peter Cheaver was illegally bringing rum among the Indians.

Thomas Penn replied to Shickellamy on June 19. He said Pennsylvania was not planning to cut off any Indian tribe. He added that the evil rumors "appear to have come from the Ganawese...it is to be feared they have not behaved themselves well; that it will be necessary that Shickellamy and the others with him should go amongst these people and enquire into these matters and what they have been doing on the borders of Virginia...if the Indians offend against the white men they must likewise suffer from it."

Shickellamy promised he would learn the truth about the incident and make a full report to the proprietor. Penn then said that Peter Cheaver would be dealt with in the proper manner. He added, "Shickellamy is our good friend, and we expect he will endeavor to live in good understanding with all our people, and care shall be taken on our parts that no person shall offend him without feeling our dis­pleasure." Before the meeting ended, Shickellamy used the opportunity to advance Iroquois land claims in Pennsylvania. He told the proprietor
that a trader, John Harris, had built a house and was clearing fields at the mouth of the Juniata. Shickellamy warned that "the warriors of the Six Nations, when they pass that way, may take it ill to see a settlement made on lands which they [the Iroquois] have always desired to be kept free from any persons settling on."89

Shickellamy came to Philadelphia again in August, 1733. This time he was accompanied by Conrad Weiser and Hetaquantagehty, the Seneca chief who had been the Iroquois spokesman at the Treaty of 1732. On August 16, a conference was held, and the two Iroquois representatives made it clear that they would help the Pennsylvania government control the Ganawese. According to the official minutes of the meeting, Hetaquantagehty said:

that he comes hither from the Six Nations on a message touching the Treaty [of 1732] held here with them last fall; that while he was on the road hither he was gladly troubled to hear from Shekallamy that a report had been spread that some of the Ganawese Indians had killed two whitemen on the borders of Virginia; that he has made enquiry into it jointly with Shekallamy, who he understands had orders from this government for that end, and before he proceeds to deliver the message that he was sent upon, he is willingly to clear up to his Brethren this other affair [that concerns the Ganawese].90

Hetaquantagehty explained that Shickellamy learned that the Ganawese had killed three Tootelo Indians in Virginia and had scalped two of them. On the way home they met a Delaware man with rum. They got drunk together, and the Delaware was beaten. For revenge, the Delaware started a rumor that the Ganawese had scalped two whites, instead of two Tooteloes. Hetaquantagehty expressed hope that "his [Pennsylvania] Brethren will give no credit to it, for that the Six Nations would certainly order the persons, if guilty, to be
punished." According to the council minutes, Shickellamy added that "he examined them [scalps] carefully, and from the marks upon them, of their hair being in some places pulled out, of its being greased and tied up in a small bundle on the top of the head after the Indian manner, he [Shickellamy] is very positive that these scalps are of Indians."\(^91\)

Hetaquantagechtty then told the Pennsylvania officials that the Five Nations had postponed ratification of the Treaty of 1732. He explained that a smallpox epidemic prevented the League Council from convening to discuss the treaty and "lest the delay should be misinterpreted or taken ill, he was dispatched from...that great council to acquaint their Brethren here with the reason of it."\(^92\)

Thomas Penn accepted everything the two Iroquois representatives told him. He then complained that some Iroquois warriors had recently passed near English settlements at Pextan in a disorderly and wanton manner. Hetaquantagechtty insisted that Shawnees, and not Iroquois, were to blame for the incident near Pextan, but Penn was not mollified.

The Pennsylvania proprietor pointed out, "As the Six Nations have the command over all the Indians, it is in their power to prevent abuses of this sort, and we hope they will give orders accordingly."\(^93\) Thus, the understanding had been reaffirmed between the Pennsylvania government and the Iroquois. The government of Pennsylvania would acknowledge Iroquois authority over the Pennsylvania Indians, but the Iroquois had to exercise a police function over those tribes.

The following year Shickellamy, Hetaquantagechtty, and Conrad Weiser met again with the proprietor, governor, and Council of
Pennsylvania. For the second year in a row, Hetaquantagechty said the Iroquois sachems were unable to come to Philadelphia to ratify the Treaty of 1732. He assured the Pennsylvania officials that "the Six Nations had considered of all the matters that had been done and said, and would certainly come next summer and fully ratify it themselves."

Hetaquantagechty then turned to several other matters. He explained that rum was still a big problem for the Indians. He said the Iroquois had kept their promise to the Pennsylvania government and had recently sent a message to the Shawnees asking them to return from the Ohio River Valley. But the Shawnees had not yet given their reply. Hetaquantagechty confided to the Pennsylvania officials that "if the Shawanese should go over to the French country, the Delawares would follow them." Finally, he said that the Indians at Shamokin needed a gunsmith.

The proprietor replied, "I desire you to assure all the Indians, and particularly my good friends of the Six Nations, that it shall be my constant care to strengthen that firm league and friendship which my Father [William Penn] first began." Penn added that he did not like the news about the Shawnees moving into French country. He requested that the Iroquois "use their endeavors to prevent the Shawanese going off, and likewise caution the Delawares." The proprietor then expressed his sorrow about the Indians' rum problem. He noted that the Indians had to solve their problem by abstaining from rum, for he had already passed many stringent laws to restrict the sale of rum to Indians.94
A year passed, and the Iroquois sachems still did not come to Philadelphia to ratify the Treaty of 1732. On September 10, 1735, Pennsylvania officials met with Hetaquantagechty, Shickellamy, and two other Iroquois. Hetaquantagechty said that he and the others were sent by the League Council to explain that the sachems could not come to Philadelphia this fall, as promised, because they had to stay home to meet with the governor of New York. He assured them that the sachems had not forgotten the Treaty of 1732 and would come to Philadelphia early in the spring to ratify it. Hetaquantagechty informed the Pennsylvania officials that the Five Nations had been unable to get the Shawnees to move back to the Susquehanna Valley. He said that Iroquois messengers "had been pressing with them [Shawnee] to return towards Sasquehannah, assuring them that the Six Nations would take them under their wings and protect them, but that the Shawanese had entirely refused to leave that place [on the Ohio River], which they said was more commodious for them." Hetaquantagechty added that the Iroquois no longer trusted the Shawnees. He explained that one of the Iroquois messengers, a Seneca chief, was murdered by the Shawnees and that "the Six Nations greatly resented this barbarity, and think it ought not to pass unreavenged, but they would willingly have [the Pennsylvania government's] advice on this occasion."^5

John Penn told the Iroquois deputies that his government would try to locate the Shawnees who murdered the Seneca envoy. He then said he looked forward to meeting with the Iroquois sachems in the spring. Lastly, he asked that the Iroquois continue their efforts "to preserve peace and friendship amongst all Nations and people about
you...both northward and southward." 96

The Iroquois-Pennsylvania relationship grew closer in 1736. On September 28, Iroquois sachems finally met with Pennsylvania officials to ratify the landmark Treaty of 1732. The two parties renewed the promises they had made four years earlier. Significantly, for the first time, the Five Nations renewed the Covenant Chain with the Pennsylvania government not only for themselves, but also on behalf of "the Delawares, Canayes, and the Indians living on the Susquehanna, and all the other Indians who are now in league and friendship with the Six Nations." 97

The Iroquois sachems then spoke on several other matters. They expressed hope that the Pennsylvania government would recall its traders from the Ohio River Valley. They also requested that Pennsylvania traders not be allowed to bring rum to Iroquois warriors who passed through Allegheny. They asked for cheaper prices and better trade values at Philadelphia. And finally, they gave their views on land sales in Pennsylvania. They signed a deed to release all lands lying on both sides of the Susquehanna River to the Pennsylvania government. They recognized the Pennsylvania government's sole authority to buy more lands in Pennsylvania. The Iroquois, according to the council minutes, then explained that they had recently received a message from the Maryland governor. The message said that the King of England had ordered the Maryland governor "to see that they [the Iroquois] should not be wronged of their lands; that he had understood this [Maryland] government had wronged them, and if they would send some of their people to him, he would take care they
should be righted." The Iroquois then "earnestly pressed that we [the Pennsylvania government] would write to the governors of Maryland and Virginia to make them [the Iroquois] satisfaction for the lands belonging to them (the Indians), which the people of those governments were possessed of, that had never been purchased of them." The Iroquois claimed "that all the lands of Susquehanna and at Shenandoa were theirs, and they must be satisfied for them; that they had agreed with us [i.e. Pennsylvania officials] for the lands they now released to us, but they had never received anything from the other governments to the southward for theirs." The Iroquois added, "that if Civility [the chief], at Conestoga should attempt to make a sale of any lands to us or any of our neighbors they must let us know that he hath no power to do so, and if he does anything of the kind, they, the [Iroquois] Indians, will utterly disown him."98

Pennsylvania officials replied to each of the Iroquois' points. James Logan, the president of the Governor's Council, pointed out that it would be senseless for Pennsylvania to recall its traders from the Ohio Country, since traders from other colonies would only replace them. Logan told the Iroquois that the Pennsylvania government could not help them with rum problems or trade regulations, so the Iroquois would have to look out for themselves. Concerning land, Logan said, "we would be glad to do them [the Iroquois] any service with the neighboring governments, but we do not clearly understand this matter. As to what is said of a letter from the King of England, we do not believe there is any truth in that report. We have indeed heard of a letter sent up to Sasquehanna from the governor of Maryland. If he
[the Maryland governor] mentions anything in it of orders from the King of England they should send some persons to that government to enquire into the matter." Logan added, "As to the claim they [the Iroquois] make on the lands of Maryland and Virginia, we know not how this is supported; the lands on Sasquehanna, we believe, belong to the Six Nations by the conquest of the Indians of that river; but how their pretensions are also made good to the lands to the southward we know not, and we ought to be better informed before we can write on this head." 99 Logan then presented the Iroquois with numerous gifts and provided them "with horses and carriages to make their journey home as easy as possible." Shortly thereafter the conference adjourned. 100 Most likely, the Iroquois sachems were pleased as they made their way back to Iroquoia. They had received valuable gifts from the Pennsylvania government. The Pennsylvania government-Iroquois partnership was reaffirmed. And the Pennsylvania government had accepted Iroquois claims to lands also claimed by Susquehanna River tribes.

In the next few years there were other indications that the Iroquois and Pennsylvania government were developing a close working relationship. In 1737, the Pennsylvania Council expressed their concern that Iroquois warriors were being killed in raids on southern tribes. The Pennsylvania Council advised the Iroquois to make peace with the southern Indians, for continued warfare would only weaken the Iroquois and make it harder for them to defend their villages. 101 In an August, 1740, conference between Pennsylvania officials and Delaware and Iroquois chiefs, there were additional signs that the
Iroquois had become Pennsylvania's most-favored Indian nation. On August 1, Sassocon, the Delaware chief, complained that Pennsylvania traders gave better trade prices and values to the Iroquois than to other Indians. On August 6, Pennsylvania's Governor George Thomas explained to the Iroquois representative, Shickellamy, that a Mohican had recently attacked a settler named Henry Webb. The governor said the Mohicans were not cooperating and refused to give up the guilty man. Governor Thomas added, "This conduct in a King who is one of the tributaries of the Five Nations, is a direct violation of the treaties subsisting between them and us. . . . We therefore desire the Five Nations. . . . Interpose their authority, and not only take notice of the failure of duty in the Mohican King, one of their tributaries, but order Awannameak [the Indian guilty of assault] to be severely punished."102

The Pennsylvania government also used the Iroquois to counter land claims filed by Pennsylvania Indians. In March, 1741, a band of Delawares complained that their lands in Bucks County had been taken from them without payment. The Pennsylvania Council brought forth deeds for the Bucks County lands signed by the Six Nations and statements from the Iroquois that said the Delawares "have no lands to dispose of, and praying the proprietor not to buy or accept of any grant of lands from them." The Pennsylvania Council then disallowed the Delaware claims and upheld the right of the Iroquois to sell those lands.103

Many Pennsylvania tribes were unhappy with the machinations of the Iroquois-Pennsylvania government alliance. Between 1732 and 1742,
these Indians did all they could to retain their independence. The Shawnees proved to be the most intractable of the Iroquois' Pennsylvania Indian allies. Time after time the Shawnees refused to adhere to Iroquois orders that they return from the Ohio Valley to their former homes on the Susquehanna. In October, 1736, Governor Beaubarnois of New France noted that Joncaire was among the Shawnees and had reported that the Shawnees "continued to reject the evil advice of the Iroquois, and were disposed to follow their [French] Father's pleasure." Joncaire's report was an understatement. In the past year the Shawnees had repeatedly ignored Iroquois and Pennsylvania directives. On one occasion some Shawnees even murdered an Iroquois deputy. Both actions underscored the sovereignty of the Shawnees. Other tribes, to a lesser extent, also showed they were independent of the Iroquois Confederacy. During the 1730s, the Conestogas, Canawese, and Delawares continued to negotiate directly with the Pennsylvania government. Yet, in the end, the Pennsylvania tribes that refused to yield to the Iroquois had but one option left. They had to move westward to the Ohio Country, like the Shawnees had done, in order to escape the power of the Iroquois and Pennsylvania government. Those Indians who remained in Pennsylvania became increasingly under the control of the Iroquois Confederacy.

The alliance between the Iroquois Confederacy and the Pennsylvania government was further strengthened in 1742. In July of that year Iroquois sachems arrived in Philadelphia for a conference that proved to be beneficial for both the Pennsylvania government and the Confederacy. The Iroquois advanced their interests in several ways.
They received additional gifts from the Pennsylvania government for the Susquehanna lands. They officially voiced their opposition against Maryland settlers who were squatting on Susquehanna lands. And they conspired with the Pennsylvania government to tighten their control over the Delaware Indians.

Pennsylvania officials also had reasons to be pleased with the talks. The Iroquois informed the Pennsylvania governor that many western tribes were allied to the Confederacy. The Iroquois promised the governor that in case war broke out between France and England, the Confederacy would help the latter. And finally, the Iroquois acted decisively to help Pennsylvania counter Delaware land claims. On July 12, Canassatego, the Iroquois' spokesman, told the Pennsylvania governor:

The other day you informed us of the misbehavior of our cousins the Delawares with respect to their continuing to claim and refusing to remove from some land on the River Delaware [which their ancestors allegedly had sold to the Pennsylvania government]. . . . then you requested us to remove them. . . . We see with our own eyes that they have been a very unruly people and are altogether in the wrong with their dealings with you. We have concluded to remove them, and oblige them to go over the River Delaware, and to quit all claim to any lands on this side for the future.107

The governor of Pennsylvania must have been pleased with Canassatego's speech. The Iroquois, in effect, were agreeing to help the Pennsylvania government remove the Delaware Indians from lands which they (the Delawares) had traditionally owned and refused to sell. Prior to 1742, the Iroquois had no pretensions to lands in the Delaware Valley. Now, however, the Iroquois were ready to claim those lands in order to aid the Pennsylvania government.
Canassatego told Sasoonan and the other Delawares who were present at the meeting:

Let this belt of wampum serve to chastize you; You ought to be taken by the hair of the head and shaked severely till you recover your senses and become sober. . . . Our Brother Onas' case is very just and plain. . . . We have seen with our eyes a deed signed by nine of your ancestors above 50 years ago for this very land. . . . But how come you to take upon you to sell land at all? We conquered you, we made women of you, you know you are women, and can no more sell land than women. Nor is it fit you should have the power of selling lands since you would abuse it. . . . Did you ever tell us that you had sold this land? Did we ever receive any part, even the value of a pipe Shank, from you for it? You have told us a blind story that you sent a messenger to us to inform us of the sale but he never came among us, nor we never heard any thing about it. This is acting in the dark, and very different from the conduct our Six Nations observe in their sales of land. On such occasions they give public notice and invite all the Indians of their united nations, and give them a share of the present they receive for their lands. . . . We. . . . assign you two places to go—either to Wyoming or Shamokin. You may go to either of these places, and then we shall have you more under our eye. . . . Don't deliberate, but remove away [instantly]. . . . Neither you nor any who shall descend from you ever hereafter to presume to sell any land. . . . depart the council and consider what has been said to you.108

Canassatego's words must have done severe damage to the pride of the Delawares. Yet, the Delawares could not strike back. They knew that they could not defeat the partnership of the Iroquois and Pennsylvania government. So they withdrew from the council. On that day the Delawares lost much of their land and part of their sovereignty.

During the next year the Pennsylvania government made further use of the Iroquois' growing executive authority over the Pennsylvania tribes and lands. On August 20, 1742, the governor of Pennsylvania told his Council members that the Iroquois "are of great authority, and are held in great esteem amongst all our neighboring Indians." The
next month the governor relied on the Iroquois to settle a problem with another band of Delawares. On November 20, a group of Christian Delawares petitioned the governor for permission to remain living on the Delaware River. The Christian Delawares assured the governor that they had had nothing to do with the earlier problems caused by Sasoonan's Delaware band. The governor denied them permission on the grounds that "it might not only be resented by the Six Nations, but . . . by the [other] Delawares." He told them that if the Iroquois granted them permission, they could stay on the Delaware River.109

No doubt, the governor's reply further reinforced the authority of the Iroquois in Pennsylvania.

The Iroquois eagerly accepted the executive authority thrust upon them by the Pennsylvania government. When three Delawares murdered a Pennsylvania trader in 1744, the Iroquois quickly carried out their police function. Governor Thomas told the Pennsylvania Assembly on May 15, 1744, that "Shickellamy and the Indians settled at Shamokin... apprehended two of the murderers."110

Yet, just when the Iroquois-Pennsylvania partnership seemed to be going so well, an incident occurred that threatened to break the alliance apart. On January 24, 1743, an Indian trader named Thomas McKee informed the Pennsylvania Council that Iroquois warriors had recently been involved in a skirmish against white settlers in Virginia.111 Two days later, Pennsylvania's Governor Thomas sent off an urgent letter to Conrad Weiser. The governor wrote, "Mr. Weiser: I hoped that our last treaty with the Six Nations would have made us easy for some time to come as to all Indian affairs, but
you will see by the enclosed deposition. . . . By Thomas McKee, that if things are not prudently managed we may chance to be involved in the consequences of their [the Iroquois'] resentment against the people of Virginia." He explained, "although the [Iroquois] Indians behaved very peaceably in their journey through Pennsylvania, so soon as they got into Virginia, they fell to killing the inhabitants' cattle and hogs, and shot one man's mare, and by that means were themselves the occasion of the misfortune that followed. . . . the Virginia captain upon his approach to the Indians hung out a white flag. . . . but they fired and killed him and some of his men before one shot was fired by his party."112 The governor then asked Weiser to persuade the Iroquois to settle this affair peacefully with the Virginia governor. Thomas warned that if the Iroquois decided to make war on the Virginia colonists, the Pennsylvania government would have to stop Iroquois warriors from passing through Pennsylvania to reach Virginia, and this would undoubtedly cause an Iroquois-Pennsylvania war.113

The Pennsylvania Assembly agreed with Governor Thomas' assessment of the situation. They declared, "As it has ever been the care of this government to cultivate a good understanding with the Indians in general, and particularly with the Six Nations, the late unhappy action between some of the inhabitants of the upper part of Virginia and a party of those [Six] Nations gives us just cause of concern."114

Conrad Weiser reported back to the governor on April 5, 1743. Weiser said the Iroquois at Shamokin gave him a different account of the incident and insisted that the Virginians had fired first. The Pennsylvania interpreter added that he had asked the Iroquois to settle
the matter peacefully. He said that, according to Shickellamy, the Iroquois were willing to discuss the affair with the governor of Pennsylvania, and for the time being, the Iroquois had asked their allies not to attack the people of Virginia. Weiser warned that unless the matter was resolved quickly, war would break out between the Six Nations and the people of Virginia. Soon thereafter Governor Thomas made arrangements with the governor of Virginia to settle the Iroquois-Virginia controversy.  

On June 25, 1744, representatives from the colonial governments of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland arrived at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, to meet with deputies from the Iroquois Confederacy. Before the conference began, Governor Thomas met privately with the Virginia and Maryland commissioners and stressed to them the importance of the Iroquois' friendship. Thomas explained:

The [Iroquois] Indians by their situation are a frontier to some of them [i.e. the English colonies], and from thence, if friends are capable of defending the settlements; if enemies of making cruel ravages upon them; if neutrals, they may deny the French [who are at war with England] a passage through their country and give us timely notice of their designs. These are but some of the motives for cultivating a good understanding with them but from hence the disadvantages of a rupture are abundantly evident. Every advantage you [the Maryland and Virginia governments] gain over them in war will be a weakening of the barrier of those colonies, and consequently will be in effect victories over yourselves and your fellow subjects.

Governor Thomas opened the Lancaster Conference with the statement that the goal of both the Iroquois and the English should be to establish a lasting peace. The Iroquois quickly replied that they were willing to make peace, but first they wanted to settle the Iroquois-Virginia incident, as well as several disputes over land.
The Iroquois went on to establish their claims to certain tracts of land in Virginia and Maryland, based upon the right of conquest. The Iroquois maintained that since they had defeated the Conestogas, Conoys, and other tribes of Virginia and Maryland, they had the right to sell the lands once inhabited by those Indians. The Iroquois then complained that their right to travel in Virginia was being hampered by white settlers. The Iroquois explained that they had already moved their road to Virginia farther to the west on several occasions, but whites always settled in the way of new trails. The Iroquois argued that they could no longer move the road farther westward because of the mountain barrier. They warned, "Either the Virginia people must be obliged to remove more easterly or...warriors marching that way to the southward shall go sharers with them in what they plant."\(^\text{117}\)

The commissioners of Maryland and Virginia reluctantly accepted the Iroquois' positions. The Maryland representatives told the Iroquois, "Although we cannot admit your right [to land ownership in Maryland], yet we are so resolved to live in brotherly love and affection with the Six Nations that upon giving us a release in writing of all your claim to any lands in Maryland, we shall make you a compensation to the value of 300 L. currency."\(^\text{118}\)

The Virginia commissioners also made a reluctant acceptance of the Iroquois' demands. The Virginia representatives began by denying Iroquois land ownership in Virginia. They then granted the Iroquois the right to travel in Virginia within the guidelines specified in the Spotswood Treaty. The Virginia commissioners added, "We may proceed to settle what we are to give you for any right you may have
or have had to all the lands to the southward and westward of... Maryland, ... and [Pennsylvania], though we are informed the southern Indians claim these very lands you do.\textsuperscript{119}

The positions taken by both the Virginia and Maryland commissioners show that both those colonies apparently decided to deny the Iroquois' title to any southern lands in order to avoid establishing a precedent that could later be used by the Iroquois to claim additional lands. At the same time, though, Virginia and Maryland were willing to pay the Iroquois for their release of land claims in order to establish good will with the Confederacy.

After a brief consultation, the Iroquois deputies responded to the offers made by the colonial representatives. The Iroquois agreed to sign a release for all Maryland lands in exchange for the compensation offered by Maryland. Next they replied to the Virginia commissioners. The Iroquois denied that they were to blame for the renewal of hostilities with the Catawba Indians. They maintained that the New York governor had given them belts on behalf of the Cherokees and Catawbas, but that the Catawbas had later reneged on their promise of peace and had insulted the Iroquois' honor. Therefore, the Iroquois believed, "the war must continue till one of us is destroyed." The Iroquois then replied to Virginia's offer of compensation for the Six Nations' Virginia land claims. They told the Virginia commissioners that they wanted to know the amount of compensation before they agreed to any release of claims. When the Virginia commissioners showed the Iroquois deputies the goods the Confederacy would receive as compensation, the Iroquois quickly approved of the deal.\textsuperscript{120}
Next, the representatives of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland turned to other matters that concerned their colonies. Pennsylvania's Governor Thomas informed the Iroquois that France and England had recently declared war against each other. He reminded them that the Iroquois Confederacy and the English colonies were allied through the Covenant Chain Alliance. He added, "We therefore expect that you will not suffer the French or any of the Indians in alliance with them to march through your country to disturb any of our settlements. And that you will give us the earliest and best intelligence of any designs that may be formed by them to our disadvantage, as we promise to do of any that may be to your's." The commissioners from Virginia also reminded the Iroquois about their treaty of friendship, and they implored the Iroquois to make peace with the Catawbas. The commissioners from Maryland gave a final reiteration of the peace settlements agreed upon by the Iroquois and English colonies.

The Iroquois deputies then gave their replies to the Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland representatives. Canassetega served as the Iroquois' spokesman. He promised the governor of Pennsylvania that the Six Nations would not allow the French to march through Iroquoia to attack English settlements. Next, Canassetega made several remarks that probably were designed to impress the English with the great importance of the Confederacy. Although his statement exaggerated the power of the Iroquois, it probably was a successful piece of propaganda. He said, "The Six Nations have a great authority and influence over sundry tribes of Indians in alliance with the French and particularly over the Praying Indians, formerly a part with ourselves,
who stand in the very gates of the French, and to show our further care, we have engaged these very Indians and other Indian allies of the French for you. They will not join the French against you. . . . Our interest is very considerable with them and many other Nations, and as far as ever it extends, we shall use it for your service." He also promised that the Iroquois would help the Pennsylvania government find the Indians who had recently murdered a Pennsylvania trader and his two assistants. 124

The Iroquois then thanked the Maryland and Virginia commissioners for renewing the Covenant Chain and settling the land disputes. In reference to the Catawbas, Canassetega said, "We shall not be against a peace on reasonable terms provided they will come northward to treat about it." The Iroquois added that there were still some Tuscarorasa living in Virginia and they wanted to be free to send messengers to them. Also, there were Conoy Indians in Virginia who wanted to move north to Iroquoria, and the Iroquois asked that they be given free and safe passage out of Virginia. The Virginia commissioners consented to the Iroquois' requests. 125

Finally, the Iroquois used the forum at the conference to further expand the image of the Confederacy. Canassetega proudly told the colonial representatives, "We heartily recommend union and good agreement between you our [English] Brethren. Never disagree but preserve a strict friendship for one another, and thereby you as well as we will become stronger. Our wise forefathers established union and amity between the Five Nations; this has made us formidable, this has given us great weight and authority with our neighboring Nations. We are a
powerful Confederacy, and by your observing the same methods our wise forefathers have taken, you will acquire fresh strength and power."\(^1\)

Actually, the Iroquois were neither as united nor as powerful as Canassettaga bragged they were. But the colonial representatives were willing to accept the Iroquois claims, because they believed it was to their own advantage to build up the power of the Iroquois and retain them as a friendly Indian nation. The English realized that the Iroquois, because of their numbers and geographic location, could serve as a buffer to insulate the English colonies from French attack. They also knew that the Iroquois Confederacy could be used as an instrument to manipulate other tribes, who were more loosely organized and thus more difficult to deal with than the Six Nations. Furthermore, the English understood that by recognizing Iroquois sovereignty over various Indian tribes, the English colonial governments could secure title to the lands possessed by those tribes simply by making one purchase from the cooperative Iroquois Confederacy. These realizations help explain why the English colonies recognized, and even aided, Iroquois efforts to establish control over neighboring tribes and lands. The English believed that the Six Nations, as suzerains and buffers, would be a valuable asset for the English colonies.

The Lancaster Treaty was significant for both the English and the Iroquois. The English received an Iroquois pledge of friendship and peace. The Iroquois also promised they would remain neutral in the English-French war and that they would not allow French armies through Iroquoia to attack English settlements. Furthermore, the Iroquois assured the English that they would consider making peace with the
Catawbas. At the same time the Iroquois promised to aid the Pennsylvania government in capturing Delaware Indians who had murdered a Pennsylvania trader and his two assistants. And finally, Virginia and Maryland obtained releases for all lands that the Iroquois claimed in those colonies.

The Iroquois likewise benefited from the treaty agreements. The Iroquois received the right of travel in Virginia. They received compensation for their land claims in Virginia and Maryland. Also, Iroquois authority over other tribes was reinforced by the English's acceptance of the Iroquois claims that they had conquered and now controlled tribes like the Conestogas and Conoys. Finally, peace between the Iroquois and the southern English colonies was guaranteed. The Iroquois-Virginia incident was settled, and the Covenant Chain Alliance was brightened between the Iroquois Confederacy and all the English colonies.

With the signing of the Lancaster Treaty in 1744, the Iroquois completed their quest for hegemony over nearby Indians and lands. The Six Nations' preeminent status had been won, though, at the negotiating table, and not on the battlefield. English cooperation and recognition, and not Indian warfare, had given the Iroquois control over the tribes and lands that were located near Iroquoia.

Certainly not all Pennsylvania Indians welcomed the Iroquois. Some Indians, particularly among the Shawnees and Delawares, resented Iroquois interference and settlement. For example, in July, 1744, Pennsylvania's Governor Thomas noted, "I have been informed that the Six Nations and the Shawanese are far from being on good terms and
that the latter have been endeavoring to draw the Delawares from Shamokin to Ohio, from whence the Six Nations entertain a jealousy of some ill designs; and it is whispered amongst them that should they be obliged to take part in the war between us and the French, they will have the Shawanese and perhaps the Delawares also to oppose them."

In the end the Indians of Pennsylvania had little choice. Either they submitted to the power of the Iroquois and Pennsylvania government alliance or they fled to new homes on the Ohio, where they could be free to govern themselves.

Between 1701 and 1744, the Iroquois' strategy in Pennsylvania was to obtain hegemony over the Indians and lands in the Susquehanna and Delaware River Valleys. This Pennsylvania strategy, along with the hegemony itself, affected the Iroquois in several ways.

First, the Iroquois benefited economically. Not only did they receive annual tribute wampum from the tribes that were their tributaries, but they also got numerous presents and economic favors from a Pennsylvania government that was eager to retain the friendship of the increasingly important Iroquois Confederacy. Furthermore, the Iroquois profited by selling their tributaries' lands to the government of Pennsylvania.

Secondly, the Iroquois' Pennsylvania strategy and hegemony advanced their political position in Pennsylvania. As the prestige of the Confederacy increased, the Iroquois became more important to both Indians and whites in Pennsylvania. Many Pennsylvania tribes quickly
understood that the Iroquois had close ties to the Pennsylvania government. These Pennsylvania Indians were therefore put in the position where they had to cooperate with the Iroquois in order to retain good relations with the government of Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, the Pennsylvania government also sought the friendship and cooperation of the Six Nations. Pennsylvania officials realized that they could use the Iroquois to control the Pennsylvania tribes, who were tributaries of the Confederacy. Pennsylvania leaders likewise knew that the Iroquois could aid the Pennsylvania government in securing title to the lands possessed by those Pennsylvania tribes. In short, both the whites and Indians of Pennsylvania realized that it was in their best interests to do all they could to win the friendship and support of the Iroquois Confederacy.

Thirdly, hegemony over the Pennsylvania tribes benefited the Iroquois militarily. The tributary allies served as buffers to insulate Iroquoia from attack. During war time the tributary allies also provided warriors and scouts to aid the Iroquois against enemies. At the same time, the Iroquois, because of their preeminent position over the other Indians in the Covenant Chain, received the friendship and military backing of the Pennsylvania government. Both contributed to a stronger Iroquois position in Pennsylvania.

Lastly, the development of hegemony over Pennsylvania's Indians and lands affected Iroquois society. As Iroquois influence grew in Pennsylvania, more and more Iroquois migrated to river valleys like Susquehanna, Allegheny, and Ohio. There, increased social contact and intermarriage resulted between Iroquois and Pennsylvania Indians.
Chapter 6: Notes

1 DHSNY, I, 154; Livingston, 221.


5 Pa. Min., II, 513; Wraxall, 83; Pa. Min., II, 531, 565; Livingston, 221; Wraxall, 96, 97, 115.

6 Pa. Min., II, 145, 204, 244, 245.

7 Pa. Min., II, 537; Wraxall, 91.

8 Pa. Min., II, 244, 245, 246, 386, 469, 546.


17 Pa. Min., II, 244.


28 Colden, "History...1707-20," 432.
42 Pa. Min., III, 204.
46 Pa. Min., III, 204.
47 Pa. Min., III, 99, 100, 102, 182, 204.
48 Pa. Min., III, 80, 97, 182, 216-221.


Pa. Min., IV, 82-84.

100 Pa. Min., IV, 91-94.
103 Pa. Min., IV, 481.
111 Pa. Min., IV, 630.
112 Pa. Min., IV, 635.
118 Pa. Min., IV, 715.
120 Pa. Min., IV, 719, 726.
121 Pa. Min., IV, 727.
127 Pa. Min., IV, 739.
Chapter 7: The Southern Wars of the Iroquois

Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the Five Iroquois Nations of New York made war on the tribes that lived in what is now the southeastern United States. Most Iroquois attacks were aimed at the Catawbas, and to a lesser extent, the Cherokees, Choctaws, and Chickasaws. Historians have never fully explained the Iroquois' reasons for warring on those tribes.

The Iroquois' eighteenth century wars on the southern tribes began shortly after 1701. However, Iroquois men had taken the warriors' paths southward for many decades. A lull occurred in the fighting between 1692 and 1702, when the Five Nations found themselves on the defensive against the French and northern Indians during King William's War. The power of the Five Nations decreased dramatically during King William's War, and Iroquois warriors understandably were more concerned with protecting their families and homes than they were with traveling hundreds of miles to raid southern Indians who were no threat to Iroquoia. In 1701, the Iroquois Confederacy signed a peace treaty with the French and northern Indians. Shortly thereafter Iroquois warriors resumed their attacks on the southern tribes. The Iroquois hostilities against the southern Indians, and in particular against the Catawbas and the Choctaws (both of whom were also referred to as Flatheads), continued for the next fifty years. Despite numerous attempts by the English to mediate
a peace between their Iroquois and southern Indian allies or repeated
Iroquois pledges to honor ceasefires, the Iroquois war against the
Catawbas and other southern tribes dragged on into the second half of
the eighteenth century.

Early historians and observers believed that the Iroquois' seventeenth century wars against the southern Indians were fought for individual glory and revenge. The Jesuit Lalemant noted in 1661 that Iroquois warriors were raiding Indians near Virginia. He later explained that the Iroquois attacked the southern tribes to avenge Iroquois warriors "who were killed there eight or nine years ago."

James Adair, an eighteenth century English colonist and trader, wrote, "I have known the Indians to go a thousand miles for the purpose of revenge...[and]...it is by scalps they get all their war-titles, which distinguish them among the brave; and these they hold in as high esteem, as the most ambitious Roman general ever did a great triumph."

Modern historians, accepting these explanations for the seventeenth century warfare, have generally assumed that the Iroquois wars against the southern tribes in the eighteenth century were waged for the same reasons. This, however, was not the case. Whereas the Iroquois of the 1600s fought by choice for glory and revenge, the Iroquois of the 1700s fought by necessity for a variety of reasons. Although glory and revenge were still important motivating factors, external pressures from the French and their Indian allies, as well as from the English, provided the Iroquois with additional reasons to attack the southern tribes during the eighteenth century.
The Iroquois' involvement in the eighteenth century wars on the southern tribes can be traced back to 1700. In that year the French decided to use their Indian allies to block the expansion of English traders and to force southern tribes like the Catawbas and Choctaws into abandoning the English and joining the French cause. The governor of New France instructed M. de Longueuil, the commanding officer at Detroit, to implement the new French strategy against the southern Indians. In 1700, Longueuil met with the Ottawas, Hurons, Potawatomis, and Mississagas at Detroit. He informed the Indians that the King wanted them to war against the Indians and English of Virginia and Carolina. The French officer promised the Indians that they could keep all goods that they took from English traders. He said, "If the English escape you on the Beautiful River [the Ohio], you will find them a little farther off with his brother the Flathead (Choctaw). . . . It is in that country that. . .the Governor of Menade [Virginia] hath for a long time exercised his tyranny over all the Nations." Longueuil added that since the Flatheads were being employed by the English to kill the French and Indians, they too should be killed. The Indians of Detroit unanimously agreed to take up the hatchet against the English and Flatheads of Virginia and Carolina.6

On June 19, 1700, Longueuil traveled to the White River and repeated his message to other Indians allied to New France. After receiving powder and ball from the French officer, the Indians on White River agreed to raid the Virginians and their Flathead allies.7

The Five Nations probably learned of the French requests within a very short time, since Iroquois men were constantly out hunting and
intermingling with the Indians of Detroit and the Western Country. Many Iroquois realized that a sure way to guarantee their peace and friendship with the French and western Indians, which the Iroquois greatly needed so they could hunt in the Western Country without having to fear for their own lives or those of their relatives back home, was by joining the French and western Indians in the attacks on the Flathead Indians. By 1703, some Iroquois warriors were fighting alongside the western tribes against the southern Indians. In 1704, a Pennsylvania trader reported, "that upon the return of the Carolina Indian, who was taken...by some of the Five Nations last year, and after his escape went homewards...some of the Carolina Indians, to the number of 40, in revenge, were lately come up, and had set upon some of those of the Potomac, but they [of the Potomac]...being secured, the [Carolina Indians] declared to them that they (of Carolina) had been for many years attacked and injured by...the Senecas and those of Potomac and Conestoga, and that they were resolved to be revenged." 8

Between 1705 and 1710, the Five Nations warred continuously on the tribes of Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas. In 1705, two Indians from Conestoga informed the Pennsylvania governor that warriors from the Five Nations had recently raided whites and Indians in Maryland. The following year New York officials noted that the Five Nations had had "several skirmishes" with southern Indians. 9 On September 29, 1706, the Albany Commissioners of Indian Affairs reported that the French were trying to keep the Five Nations off balance by "fomenting wars, feuds, and misunderstandings between them and the
far nations that lie to the south and west of the Senecas, and did en-
ge the Iroquois in a war with the Flatheads of Carolina." The
Commissioners added that the French supplied the Iroquois with powder
and shot so they could attack the southern tribes. 10

Despite the New Yorkers' warnings, the Five Nations followed the
advice of the French and Indians and made further attacks on the
southern tribes in 1707. According to Cadwallader Colden, a Mohawk
told the Albany Commissioners in June that "the French had persuaded
the Mohawks by [means of] the Christian Mohawks to go against the...
Flatheads who live near Carolina." Colden noted that in July several
Iroquois told New York's Governor Cornbury "that their young men were
persuaded by the French to go against the...Flatheads who live near
Carolina." 11 The governor immediately dispatched Lawrence Claase to
Onondaga to dissuade the Iroquois from fighting the Flatheads, but
Claase had little effect on the Five Nations' warriors. On October
4, 1707, Lawrence Claase reported:

that most of the Five Nations were out against the Flatheads
near Carolina. That they brought in a great many prisoners
most of whom spoke English. That the Cayugas had brought
home 36, had burnt one that spoke English and ate his flesh.
That they continue to bring more daily. That the governor
of Canada encourages them by giving all those powder and
lead that go upon that expedition. That there was not 10 men
left of the Oneidas at home from these expeditions. That the
Cayuga, Onondaga, and Oneida sachems entreated that a new belt
might be sent to each nation by some considerable person to
dissuade their people from these enterprises, because they were
afraid of the designs of the French now their country was naked
of fighting men and were informed that the French were making
great preparations for some secret expedition. 12

The Iroquois continued their attacks on the southern tribes
during the early months of 1708, but by summer they appeared to be willing
to halt their hostilities against the Indians of Virginia, Maryland,
and Carolina. In August, 1708, several sachems promised the Albany Commissioners that their warriors would stop fighting the Catawbas. The following month some Iroquois even asked the New York governor to help them make a peace with the Indians of Maryland. The sudden turn-about in the Iroquois position was probably occasioned by the fact that the Iroquois believed that the French, who were largely responsible for their war on the southern Indians, were about to be conquered by the English. Many of the Five Nations were even preparing to join an English colonial expedition aimed at expelling the French from Canada. After the failure of the English scheme to defeat New France, the Iroquois resumed their war against the southern tribes. 13

In the spring of 1710, the governor of New York sent a belt of wampum to the Five Nations asking that they halt their attacks on the southern Indians. The Senecas refused to accept the belt and insisted that they had to avenge their warriors who had been slain by the Flatheads. 14

Soon after his appointment as the new governor of New York, Robert Hunter met with the Five Nations at Albany in order to renew the Covenant Chain Alliance and to discuss several issues of import. On August 19, 1710, Governor Hunter brought up the subject of the Iroquois' war on the southern tribes. He asked the Five Nations to stop fighting the Catawbas, "who have not injured you, and are a peaceable people." The Iroquois agreed to follow the governor's advice. In January, the Albany Commissioners gave the Iroquois further reason to comply with Hunter's request. They informed the Five Nations that an English fleet was coming to invade Canada and
that Port Royal had already been captured.\textsuperscript{15}

For the next year and a half, the Five Nations honored their pledge not to war on the southern tribes. Several reasons may account for their willingness to suspend the hostilities with the Flatheads. The Iroquois were being threatened in 1710 and 1711 by various enemies. During those years the Five Nations heard rumors of English and French plots to destroy them. At the same time the Iroquois actually suffered attacks by some western tribes like the Potawatomies, Sauuteurs, and Ottawas.\textsuperscript{16} As a result, the Iroquois men may have been reluctant to go on extended war parties down South, since it would mean leaving their families and homes vulnerable to attack by the western tribes or other enemies.

Secondly, many Iroquois were disenchanted with the French, whom they felt were the instigators of the attacks by the western tribes, and so they may have been less willing to cooperate with the French by raiding the Flatheads.\textsuperscript{17}

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the Iroquois were thoroughly convinced that the English would soon defeat the French. Hendrick and three other Mohawks had recently returned from a visit to London, where they had been royally received, and they spread the word among all the Five Nations of the great power of the English. The recent capture of Port Royal and the news of the approach of the English fleet also may have been interpreted by the Iroquois as signs that the French could not possibly withstand the coming joint colonial invasion. When the Iroquois added the New Yorkers' promises of protection, supplies, and cheaper goods to the near certainty of English victory,
the reasons to listen to the English were overwhelming. Therefore, when the English told the Iroquois not to attack the Flatheads, but to concentrate on extending their alliances to all tribes friendly to the English, the Iroquois obeyed. Besides, the Five Nations probably realized that it would be senseless for them to attack the Catawbas in order to improve relations with the French, since it appeared inevitable that the French were going to be expelled from Canada anyway.

Finally, after June, 1711, many of the Five Nations were involved with the preparations for the upcoming expedition against Canada, so they had no opportunity to take part in any raids on the southern tribes. In any event, for the second time in two years, the Five Nations called off their war on the southern Indians after they became convinced that the English would drive the French out of Canada.

Unfortunately for the Iroquois, the second English attempt to take Canada, like the first, ended in failure. Once again the Five Nations were forced to ask the governor of New France to pardon them for their role in the English invasion of Canada. Shortly thereafter, the Iroquois resumed their hostilities with the Flatheads. Most likely, the Iroquois believed that their participation in the war on the Catawbas could reinstate them to favor with the government of New France.

In the early months of 1712, the Iroquois got an additional impetus to attack the Flatheads of Carolina. During the spring, the Iroquois received wampum belts from the Tuscaroras, an Iroquoian-speaking tribe living in the Carolinas who were allied to the Five
Nations by similar generic origins and/or a political alliance. The Tuscaroras asked the Five Nations to help them fight the Catawbas and colonists of Virginia and the Carolinas. Cadwallader Colden reported that the governor of New York, after learning about the Tuscaroras' request, sent a message to each of the Five Nations "to warn them not to engage in that quarrel, but to use all possible endeavors to make an accommodation and to oblige those [Tuscarora] Indians to desist from making war on the people of Carolina." The Iroquois promised that they would ask the Tuscaroras to stop fighting if the New York governor requested the Carolinians to also put down their arms. 21

Peace might have been made had it not been for the machinations of the French. The French used the Tuscarora War, along with the recent defeat of the English Canadian expedition, to convince some Iroquois to join the Tuscaroras in the fight against the English colonists and Catawbas. The French told the Five Nations that they had intercepted orders for Francis Nicholson (the commander of the English forces that had recently failed to conquer Canada) that showed that the English intended to defeat the Five Nations as soon as Canada had been subdued. Moreover, the French maintained that New York and Carolina wished to destroy the Five Nations because they were friends of the Tuscaroras. The French added that the high cost of powder at Albany was proof of the English's evil intentions. 22

Many Iroquois believed the French stories. According to two English colonial officials, some of the Five Nations even joined the Tuscaroras' war against the Flatheads. Virginia's Governor
Spotswood wrote that throughout 1712 and 1713 Iroquois warriors helped the Tuscaroras fight the English colonists and their Catawba allies. Spotswood added that on one occasion about 200 Iroquois attacked some Virginia traders who were carrying supplies to the southern Indians. New York's Cadwallader Colden also reported that the Iroquois had joined the Tuscarora War. Colden said, "The French...engaged the Five Nations to go against the Flatheads...These Indians called Flatheads had joined the people of Carolina against the Tuscaroras and by setting the Five Nations upon the English allies at this time, they were in hopes to produce a break between the English and the Five Nations. The Five Nations were likewise made believe that the English made war on the Tuscarora only...to get their lands."

The English were not pleased that one of their Indian allies (the Iroquois) was warring on another (the Catawbas). Yet, their efforts to end the Iroquois-Catawba conflict usually were not successful. In September, 1714, New York's Governor Hunter asked the sachems of the Five Nations to stop their young men from making war upon any Indians, like the Catawbas, who were allied to the English colonies. The sachems maintained that they could not make peace with the Flatheads until they first consulted with the warriors of the Five Nations. Whether the sachems were merely stalling for time or whether the warriors refused to listen to the admonitions of their sachems and the New York governor is not certain. What is certain is that Iroquois raids on the Flatheads continued. On February 21, 1715, several Iroquois sachems informed the Albany Commissioners "that several parties had been gone out against the Flatheads before the
sachems returned from Albany." By mid-summer the Iroquois still seemed determined to continue their war on the Catawbas. A New York official reported in June that some French Indians were among the Five Nations instigating them to war on the Flatheads.\(^24\)

In the summer of 1715, the English did a dramatic about face in regard to their position on the Iroquois-Catawba war. Governor Robert Hunter of New York met with the Five Nations in August, 1715, and asked them to join the English against the Catawbas, who had recently declared war on Carolina. According to Cadwallader Colden, the governor asked the Iroquois to interpose by mediation or armed intervention to force the Flatheads of Carolina to stop warring on the English colonists. Governor Hunter said, "The cause of \([\text{the Flatheads}]\) fury against His Majesty's subjects is chiefly this, that when the Flatheads implored \([\text{Carolina's}]\) assistance against the Five Nations, they absolutely refused it because you \([\text{the Five Nations}]\) were ever in strict alliance with the Crown and good friends to the subjects of Great Britain." The Five Nations were too sophisticated to accept Governor Hunter's simplistic explanation of the matter. They insisted that the Catawbas were fighting the Carolinians because the latter had reneged on their agreement to give the Catawbas better prices for trade goods after they had helped Carolina defeat the Tuscarorras. The Iroquois pointed out, "It is wholly impracticable for us to gain anything upon those \([\text{Flathead}]\) Indians by fair means. There is no faith nor love in them. Neither can we trust them because they have always been our enemies and if we should send any deputies to treat with them they would certainly cut the throats of our messengers." The
Iroquois concluded by offering to destroy the Catawbas if the English provided them with considerable amounts of arms and ammunition.  

Governor Hunter accepted the Iroquois' proposal. On August 29, 1715, he informed Secretary Popples of the Lords of Trade that the Five Nations would "put an end to the Carolina War by putting an end to the enemies of that colony." By September, Iroquois warriors were again raiding the Catawbas, this time with the approbation of the English colonial governments. On September 13, 1715, the governor and intendant of New France wrote the French Minister Ponchartrain that "the English of Carolina have recourse to every expedient to attract the Indian tribes of the South by means of the Iroquois." The French realized that the English were using the Iroquois to convince the southern Indians to keep the peace with the English colonies.

On October 3, 1715, the Five Nations informed the Albany Commissioners that they had sent eight messengers to the Catawbas with a request that they cease their hostilities against the Carolina colonists. The Iroquois move was unexpected. In August and September the Iroquois repeatedly had insisted that they would not negotiate with the Catawbas, whom they considered treacherous enemies. As late as September 15, the Five Nations had reiterated to the Commissioners that they were going to exterminate the Catawbas and requested large amounts of arms and ammunition. The Iroquois had even asked Robert Livingston to "keep it a secret that they [the Catawbas] may not know of it, for if they do they shall be on their guards." Considering the Iroquois' earlier statements, it is difficult to ascertain why they sent peace envoys to the Catawbas in early October. There are
two likely explanations. First, the peace delegation may have been a
decoy to lull the Catawbas into thinking that the Five Nations wanted
to negotiate. The Iroquois could then catch the Catawbas off guard
with a surprise attack. Or, secondly, the Iroquois may actually have
been trying to settle the Catawbas' differences with the southern
colonies. The Iroquois had originally promised the New York government
that they would destroy the Catawbas in return for large amounts of
military supplies. Later, the Five Nations may have reconsidered the
difficulties of a full-scale war against the Catawbas, and so decided
to try for a peaceful settlement. The Iroquois may have felt that
everyone could benefit from a negotiated settlement. The English and
Catawbas would get peace, while the Five Nations would receive arms and
ammunition from the English, without having to wage a costly war
against the Catawbas.

Whatever the Iroquois' motivations for sending peace envoys to
the Catawbas, the English did not seem to appreciate the Five Nations'
move toward a peaceful solution. The Albany Commissioners made it
clear to the Iroquois that they would receive the promised military
supplies only after they began fighting the Catawbas.29

Soon thereafter, the Five Nations resumed their attacks on the
southern Indians. On October 17, 1715, an Albany resident reported to
Governor Hunter that the Iroquois daily go out to war on the Catawbas
and bring back prisoners and scalps. Cadwallader Colden wrote that
during the fall of 1715, "the parties of the Five Nations brought
in...2 prisoners and 20 scalps of the Flathead." Governor Hunter
informed the Lords of Trade on April 30, 1716, that the Five Nations
were doing an excellent job fighting the Catawbas and hoped to defeat them by spring.\textsuperscript{30}

As things turned out, however, the English decided that they did not want the Five Nations to destroy the Catawbas. By the spring of 1717, Governor Spotswood of Virginia was negotiating a treaty of peace with the Flatheads, so he and the other English governors requested the Iroquois to cease their attacks on that tribe. But the Five Nations were not about to suspend their war on the Catawbas simply because the English had changed their minds. Two French envoys, Longueuil and Joncaire, had recently distributed gifts among the Iroquois to ensure their continued hostilities with the Flatheads. Furthermore, ambassadors from several southern tribes allied to New France had just urged the Iroquois to continue their attacks on the Flatheads. According to Cadwallader Colden, the pro-French southern Indians "informed the Five Nations that they had destroyed 200 Christian families." Colden added, "twenty Senecas had gone with these ambassadors on their return to their own country and the French had their messengers continually passing to and from these Indians that were in Carolina through the Senecas' country."\textsuperscript{31}

Governor Spotswood of Virginia was furious with the Iroquois' refusal to honor the ceasefire with the Catawbas. On May 30, 1717, Spotswood wrote a letter to New York's Governor Hunter complaining about Iroquois violations of the truce. According to the Virginia governor, he was negotiating a treaty with the Catawbas in April, when a party of Iroquois attacked the Catawba deputies, killed five, and captured five others. Spotswood said that one Catawba escaped and
testified that "the party were Senecas, a term which they give all the
Five Nations, and about forty in number, among whom 5 or 6 were of
another nation [i.e. other than Iroquois]." Spotswood recommended
that a conference be scheduled with the Iroquois to discuss the
matter. 32

Governor Hunter met with the Five Nations in June. After thanking
them for their aid in the recent English war against the Catawbas, he
reminded the Iroquois that since the Catawba war was now over, they
should stop their attacks on that tribe. The Iroquois apologized for
attacking the Catawbas after the latter had made peace with the Virginia
government but then spoke of their hatred for those "treacherous
Catawbas." Cadwallader Colden believed that the French were responsible
for the Iroquois' determination to fight the southern tribes. Colden
wrote, "the Governor of Canada, sending some of his Indians through
the several Nations to make [war] that way [to the South] they easily
prevailed on the warlike genius of the young men and carried away
several parties of young men whether the sachems would [agree] or not."
Colden added that the Iroquois sachems admitted that their young
warriors were determined to attack the Flatheads and "they had no power
over them to turn them from it."33

Between 1717 and 1722, the Five Nations continued their war on
the Catawbas, despite the English's disapproval. In the autumn of
1717, the New York governor received news that a large Iroquois war
party was headed southward to attack the Catawbas. The governor imme-
diately dispatched a messenger to stop the Iroquois warriors. The
governor's man overtook the Iroquois on September 2, as they stopped to
camp in the Susquehanna River Valley. The messenger noted that there were 400-500 Iroquois warriors, including 40 French Indians, in the war party. According to Colden, the messenger told the Indians that "he was sent by the governor to persuade them to desist from their design of going against the Indians that were subjects to the Crown of Great Britain." They answered "that they would desist from their design of going against the Indians that live on the borders of Virginia and that they would direct their march westward against Indians that lie above 600 miles from any English settlements. . . .But they said they were afraid that the governor would be deceived by the [Catawba] Indians who live near him because they have several times in the midst of profound peace made between them and the Five Nations surprised and murdered several of our people." They added, "if these Indians shall at any time commit hostilities against Virginia, if the governor will let them know of it, they will pursue them so long as one of them shall remain upon the face of the earth. In the meantime that all disagreeable accidents be prevented they think it advisable for the governor of Virginia to send agents to treat with the Five Nations at Albany."34

It was later learned that the Iroquois had no intention of attacking any Indians west of Virginia. Instead they followed their original course and raided within Virginia's borders. Two years later Governor Spotswood recalled that on September 2, 1717, a Five Nations war party had promised "that they would desist from molesting our [Indian] allies, and bend their course to the westward against Indians above 600 miles from any English settlement, but the event has shown
that this promise was no sincerer than [others they broke]. . . for they forthwith passing on this side of the mountains directed their course in the Catawba country, and there fell upon. . . those Indians."35

Throughout 1717 and 1718, the governors of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York tried their utmost to bring about an Iroquois-Catawba peace. In the summer of 1717, Virginia's Governor Spotswood dispatched Captain Christopher Smith on a mission to Iroquoia. Smith had orders to meet with the Five Nations at Albany to discuss the Iroquois' April, 1717, attack on the Catawbas, who were then negotiating a peace treaty with Governor Spotswood at Fort Christiana. Smith got the Senecas to admit that they had attacked the Catawbas at Fort Christiana, but the Senecas refused to make reparations. They maintained that since they were not aware that the Catawbas were at peace with Virginia, they were not to blame for the incident. The Senecas further frustrated Virginia's hopes for peace when they claimed they could not return any Catawba prisoners, as the Catawbas demanded, because they had none. Although far from pleased with the Senecas' answers, Captain Smith had no alternative but to accept their excuses and warn them not to do it again.

Before returning to Virginia, Captain Smith stopped at Conestoga, where he met with Pennsylvania's Governor Keith and several leaders of the Pennsylvania tribes. Together the Pennsylvania and Virginia officials urged the Pennsylvania Indians not to join the Five Nations in any further attacks on the Catawbas. The Pennsylvania Indians promised not to go on any more raids in the South.36
New York's Governor Robert Hunter also tried to bring about an Iroquois-Catawba peace. In the autumn of 1718, he met with the Five Nations to renew the Covenant Chain. On that occasion, the Iroquois expressed concern over rumors that the English planned to conquer the Five Nations and take their lands, as they had done to the Tuscaroras. The governor assured the Five Nations that the English had no such intentions. He explained that the Tuscaroras had lost their land because they had attacked the Carolinians first. Hunter added, "You say that you believe these rumors more readily because powder is so expensive." He then pointed out that the last time he saw them he gave them powder as a gift for hunting and protection, but they used it "to harass and attack some [southern] Indians who live far away from you and did not molest you, and I have reason to fear that they are some with whom you should not bother. But let them be who they may, what did you gain by it? You have lost a number of your swift young people, one of whom is worth a thousand Flatheads." At the end of his speech, Hunter gave the Iroquois some powder in order to calm their fears of conspiracy, but he warned them not to use it to attack the southern tribes.37

The Five Nations did not intend to follow the advice given to them by either Governor Hunter or Governor Spotswood. They were intent on continuing their war on the Catawbas. On October 30, 1718, Canada's Governor Vaudreuil reported to the Council of Marine that the Five Nations were "constantly occupied in war with the Flatheads." Governor Spotswood later wrote, "After their exploits with the Catawbas [in 1717], they [the Iroquois] were during the year 1718 continually
hovering about our Christiana Indian settlement, and though I sent out
to invite them into a treaty with me, they would not come. . .answering
me very haughtily that I must go to Albany to treat, and instantly
demanding that I should turn the Christiana Indians from under the
protection of the fort."\(^38\)

The Iroquois continued to harass the Catawbas and other southern
Indians throughout 1719. Governor Spotswood noted that after he re-
fused to treat with the Iroquois at Albany and to stop protecting the
Christiana Indians from Iroquois attacks, the Iroquois warriors marched
home in May, 1719, "openly threatening to return again with a greater
force to try the strength of our Fort [Christiana]." All along the
way, they committed robberies and outrages against Virginian colonists.
Spotswood also reported that in July, 1719, the Iroquois destroyed
cornfields near Christiana and attacked the fort itself, killing both
whites and Indians.\(^39\)

By June, 1719, the governors of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and
Virginia had repeatedly complained to the New York governor about the
incursions of the Five Nations into their colonies. Yet, the New York
governor could not stop the Iroquois' southern raids. When he did
question the Five Nations about their attacks, they replied that they
only raided southern tribes that were at war with the English colonies.
Meanwhile, as the English were trying to halt the Iroquois attacks, the
French were doing all they could to encourage them. Of the two, the
French were far more successful. Joncaire was constantly among the
Iroquois in 1719, and he frequently was able to convince Iroquois
warriors to raid the southern tribes.\(^40\)
Throughout 1720, the Iroquois continued to make war on the southern Indians. In July, 1720, several Pennsylvania Indians informed Governor Keith that "the Five Nations still follow the practice of going thither [to the South] to war, of whom at this time there is great numbers going that way." The Pennsylvania Indians complained that the Iroquois often forced them to join the raids on the southern tribes."\(^{41}\)

Governor Keith promised the Pennsylvania tribes that he would try to bring peace between the southern tribes and them, and perhaps even the Five Nations. The Pennsylvania governor's determination soon brought about an important breakthrough in the efforts to establish a peace between the Iroquois and the Indians of Virginia and Carolina. In the spring of 1721, Governor Keith journeyed to Virginia to mediate a peace between the tribes of Pennsylvania and Virginia. Keith secured the help of Virginia's Governor Spotswood, and together they established the conditions for a peace between the southern Indians and those of Pennsylvania. Spotswood proposed that the Potomac River and the mountains extending along the back of Virginia be established as boundaries between the tribes of Pennsylvania and those of the South. He said the southern Indians had promised not to go across the river or mountains on the condition that the northern tribes observed the same boundaries. After Keith explained that the Pennsylvania tribes lived east of the mountains and had to cross them in order to hunt, Spotswood agreed to limit the Virginia-Pennsylvania Indian boundary to the Potomac River. But the governors concurred that both the Potomac River and the Allegheny
Mountain boundaries should be observed by the Five Nations, who lived north of the river and west of the mountains. The arrangements made by the two governors brought peace between the Virginia and Carolina tribes and the Pennsylvania Indians. They were also the first step toward a treaty between some of the southern tribes and the Iroquois.

On June 17, 1721, Governor Keith met with Iroquois deputies at Conestoga. After discussing several important issues, such as improved trade relations and the rum traffic between Pennsylvania and Iroquois, the governor announced to the Iroquois that peace had been ratified between the southern tribes and the Indians of Pennsylvania. He then ordered the Five Nations to stop pressuring the Pennsylvania Indians to join them on southern raids. Next, Governor Keith warned the Five Nations that they had better end their war on the southern tribes, who were allied to the English. Keith said, "I much fear you hearken to others [i.e. the French] who never were nor never will be your friends. You know very well that the French have been your enemies from the beginning, and though they made peace with you... yet by subtle practices they still endeavor to ensnare you...for when they persuade you to go out to war against others it is only that you may be destroyed yourself."43

The Iroquois deputies listened carefully to the words of the Pennsylvania governor. After the conference adjourned, one of the deputies, Ghesaont, talked with James Logan, who was a member of the Governor's Council. His comments show that at least some of the Five Nations were willing to comply with Keith's requests. According to Logan, Ghesaont said that he had "taken more pains to have [peace]
established than all the English had done... that they [the Iroquois] had now a universal peace with all the Indians, excepting three small nations to the southward, with whom he hoped to have one concluded upon his present journey by means of the Governor of Virginia." Logan pointed out that Chesaont wanted peace and wished that Governor Keith would have been more forceful in ordering the Iroquois not to war in the South, for then the Five Nations would have been more apt to listen.

Later that summer New York's Governor Burnet met with the Five Nations, and he, like his counterparts in Pennsylvania and Virginia, urged the Iroquois to stop their war on the Catawbas. On August 7, Burnet told the Iroquois that the governor of Virginia wanted "to settle the limits betwixt the Indians of Virginia and them that neither should pass the River Potomac or the high mountains to the westward of Virginia without leave of their respective governments." The Iroquois spokesman agreed to the limits placed on travel into Virginia, "upon condition the Virginia Indians observe the same limits." For awhile it appeared as if the Iroquois war on the Indians of the South was over.

Within a month, Governor Burnet learned that the Iroquois had broken their promise and were still raiding in the South. On September 7, Burnet again met with the Iroquois. This time he chastized them for reneging on their pledge not to attack the Indians of Virginia. Again the Iroquois promised to abide by the boundary established by Governor Spotswood.
In 1722, the governors of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia moved to strengthen the delicate peace between the Five Nations and the Indians south of the Potomac. In September, the New York governor reminded the Iroquois not to war on the Indians of Virginia. The Iroquois assured the governor that although they were warring on some Catawbas, they had not attacked any Indians that were protected by Spotswood's boundary. The Virginia governor was also busy in 1722 trying to keep the peace between his Indians and the Five Nations. In autumn, Spotswood wrote a letter to Pennsylvania's Governor Keith announcing that the Iroquois had recently agreed to keep the peace with the southern tribes and not to cross the Potomac into Virginia. On October 6, Keith replied that he believed Spotswood's treaty with the Iroquois would "secure all these colonies, as well as Virginia, from being any longer imposed upon and molested by [the Iroquois'] accustomed way of breaking...former treaties and solemn promises to the English governments, without any excuses than that they were not able to restrain their young men. I was well satisfied to see their hands so effectively tied up by their own voluntary act."

On October 11, Governor Keith met with representatives of the Pennsylvania tribes, who were tributary allies of the Iroquois Confederacy. He informed them of the Five Nations' recent treaties with Virginia, New York, and Pennsylvania. The governor explained that in order to ensure the peace between the southern and northern Indians, the Virginia government had adopted a new stringent policy, namely if any southern Indians "shall come to the northward of Potomac or pass to
the westward of the great ridge it shall be lawful to put them to
death, and if any of the Five Nations shall pass the said boundaries
to the southward or eastward of the same boundaries, they shall be
treated as public enemies and be put to death or transported into
other countries beyond the seas." Keith pointed out that he agreed
with this policy and that from hereon all Indians must have passports
from their respective governors if they intended to travel in the
restricted zones. Keith reminded the Pennsylvania Indians that when
the Five Nations consented to that new treaty with Virginia, they did
so not only for themselves, but also for Pennsylvania tribes who were
their allies and tributaries. He added that for their own safety they
must notify all their people to abide by the new treaty.

The 1721-1722 treaties between the Five Nations and the govern-
ments of Virginia, New York, and Pennsylvania resulted in a temporary
decrease in the number of raids that the Iroquois made on the southern
tribes. They did not, however, end the Iroquois' warfare against the
southern Indians. To begin with, not all southern Indians were pro-
tected under the 1721-1722 agreements. Only those tribes living south
of the Potomac and east of the Appalachian Mountains were included in
the treaties. Therefore after 1722, the Five Nations could, and did,
make war on the southern tribes living west of the mountain boundary.
Yet, even the southern Indians who lived within the borders of
Spotswood's boundaries were not completely safe from Iroquois attacks.
Between 1723 and 1728, warriors of the Five Nations often violated
their Confederacy's pledge not to war on the tribes of Virginia and
Carolina. Cadwallader Golden reported that in 1724 some Iroquois were
fighting against the Indians of Virginia at the instigation of the French. In 1726, the Five Nations admitted that some of their warriors were raiding in Virginia and Carolina. The following year the Iroquois threatened to attack the Virginia Indians. In order to stop them the New York governor dispatched Lawrence Claase to Onondaga to "endeavor to prevent the Indians from going out to war against the Flatheads, which it is thought the French have put them upon to get them out of the way in order better to carry on their designs against Oswego." 49

In 1729, the Iroquois again raided south of the Potomac. Peter Wraxall noted:

A deputation from the Oneidas acquaint the Commissioners that their nation is in the utmost sorrow and distress upon account of the loss they have sustained by the Virginia Indians with whom they had a battle which lasted two days. That the Virginia Indians were two hundred men to their hundred. That on the 2nd day their enemies proposed to come to a peace with them and they recollecting the Governor's admonition to them to make peace with all their enemies agreed to their enemies' proposal which they no sooner did, than the Virginia Indians fell upon and massacred several of their people. By this they have sustained a loss of 55 men killed and wounded. They insist that our governor shall write to the governor of Virginia to get the release of the prisoners which his Indians have taken. 50

If the Iroquois hoped to receive support from the English, they were mistaken. Pennsylvania's Governor Gordon told Shickellamy that he was sorry for the Iroquois defeat at the hands of the Virginia Indians, but the entire incident could have been avoided had the Five Nations not attacked southern Indians who were friends of the English. Even Civility, the chief of the Conestogas who were tributary allies of the Confederacy, believed that the Iroquois were to blame. Civility told Governor Gordon, "I impute [the defeat] to the Five Nations' own
fault for they was the cause of their own ruin. Had they stayed at home they might still been all living."51

Governor Gooch of Virginia also felt that the Iroquois were to blame for the attack on the southern Indians. On February 14, 1730, he wrote to the governor of New York and explained the southern Indians' version of what had happened. Gooch pointed out that the Iroquois had fought not with his Virginia Indians, but with the Catawbas of South Carolina. Gooch said, "the first hostilities were committed by a party of the Six Nations who fell upon a town of the Catawbas in the absence of their warriors, killed several women and children, and took some prisoners." The Iroquois war party was "afterwards pursued and destroyed by the Catawba warriors." Governor Gooch promised that he would try to recover the Iroquois prisoners and arrange for a peace between the Six Nations and the Catawbas.52

In April, Gooch notified the governor of New York that, if the Six Nations wanted peace, they would have to send deputies to Virginia to treat with the Catawbas. According to Peter Wraxall, the Iroquois rejected Gooch's proposal and insisted that "the governor of Virginia should bring the Catawbas to Albany to treat with them and that he should recover their prisoners from the Catawba." The Iroquois warned that "unless this be done they will raise all the force of the Six Nations and their allies and prosecute the war with the Catawbas with the utmost vigor." Wraxall noted that the Six Nations held the Virginia governor responsible and therefore might attack Virginia settlements.53
The Iroquois-Catawba matter was not settled immediately, and for the next four years the Iroquois continued to raid in Virginia and Carolina. In 1731, a Pennsylvanian reported that he recently saw an Iroquois raiding party returning from the South. In 1733, an Iroquois sachem told New York's Governor Cosby, "You told us...that we should not let our young Indians to go war any more against the Indians to the Southward or Far Indians, and that those Indians have submitted themselves subjects of the Great King of Great Britain. That we should find out a means to cultivate a peace with them; there is no dependence on the words of said far Indians. They are felonious and traitorous people." He added, "Nevertheless, we shall do our endeavor as much as in our power to persuade our warriors to stay at home...we are a people who live at a distance from another; very often our warriors go out by night when they perceive we endeavor to prevent it. Yea often when we think they are on hunting, then we hear afterwards they are gone a fighting."^54

By late 1734 and early 1735, the Six Nations were asking the English to help them make a peace with the Catawbas. Peter Wraxall reported that on April 8, 1735, "Hendrick a Mohawk sachem acquaints the Commissioners that the Six Nations are inclined to make a peace with the Flatheads of South Carolina. The Commissioners approve thereof and give the said Hendrick a large belt of wampum to be sent through the Six Nations to encourage them to push this matter forward." In September, 1735, Iroquois sachems informed New York's Governor Cosby that they were willing to have him serve as an intermediary to bring peace between the Six Nations and the Catawbas.55
The Six Nations wanted peace because in 1732 and 1733 smallpox epidemics had decimated their warrior ranks and weakened their economy. The debilitating effects of the smallpox on the Iroquois are evident in the following accounts. On July 24, 1733, Canada's Governor Beauharnois wrote to a superior, "This [smallpox] disease has made great havoc with the Iroquois (there are some here [at Montreal] now); they say they have lost 500 warriors in their five villages, without counting women and children. If that be true, they will be much humbled." On September 7, New York's Governor Cosby told the sachems of the Six Nations, "Brethren. I understand with concern that you have had a great mortality among you by the smallpox, and lost many of your people." Apparently, the smallpox epidemics helped cool the Iroquois' desire to be involved in war against the Catawbas, for throughout 1735 and 1736, Iroquois attacks against southern tribes came to a halt.

By 1737, the Six Nations seem to have recovered from their bout with smallpox, and they no longer seemed eager for a peace treaty with the southern Indians. Early that year the New York governor informed the Iroquois that arrangements had been made for a peace between them and the southern tribes. On March 9, the governor dispatched Lawrence Claase to Onondaga to explain the conditions to the Iroquois. Claase told the Six Nations that Governor Cooch of Virginia had prevailed upon the southern Indians to send deputies to Williamsburg in April, where he hoped they could meet and treat with representatives from the Six Nations. In the meantime the Virginia governor requested a cease-fire between the two Indian parties.
The Iroquois gave an evasive reply on April 9. They insisted that Governor Gooch should not have by-passed Albany and that any peace talks should take place in Albany, not Williamsburg. The Iroquois even were reluctant to agree to the proposed ceasefire. According to Peter Wraxall, the Iroquois sachems said "that the Governor's orders for their committing no hostilities came too late. A party of between 300 and 400 fighters of the Six Nations were already gone out a fighting but they will use their endeavors to hinder others from following."\(^57\)

The Iroquois warriors reached their southern targets, for on July 3, 1737, Governor Gooch notified James Logan that an Iroquois war party had recently killed three Catawbas, which brought the total to eleven since last April. Gooch added that the Catawbas "are so exasperated that they will hearken to no terms of accommodation, at least, till they have their revenge. But the Cherokees having fortunately found means to fall into a friendly conversation with a party of the Five Nations, had sent with them deputies to conclude a peace for themselves."\(^58\)

Logan and the Pennsylvania Council were not pleased to learn about the Iroquois' attack on the Catawbas. In an attempt to prevent the cancellation of the Iroquois peace talks with the southern tribes, which were scheduled for April, the Pennsylvania Council sent the following message to the Iroquois: "We...desire our Brethren the Six Nations to use their utmost endeavors to settle a peace with those southern Indians, for they may clearly see that by their wars they only lessen their numbers and weaken themselves and render themselves less able to defend their country. ...They know, and we grieve to
see that their numbers are much lessened within these twenty years, and if they proceed to send out their young men against people that live at so great a distance from them, they will continue to lose more and more.' "59

The Albany Commissioners also were intent on seeing the Six Nations make their peace with the southern tribes. On March 6, 1738, the Commissioners asked Lawrence Claase to remind the Senecas that "they are expected at Albany this spring from the Cherokees and Catawbas to make a firm peace between them and the Six Nations." The Commissioners further requested Claase to try to "prevent any of them [Iroquois] from going out a fighting against those nations." "60

By summer the possibilities of an Iroquois treaty with the southern tribes had faded. On July 26, 1738, Lawrence Claase reported to the Commissioners that several Senecas had gone out to fight against the Catawbas. According to Claase, the Iroquois claimed that "they had stayed at home from hunting in expectation of the deputies of the Cherokees and Catawbas coming to Albany according to the message they had received from Corlaer, but they found now those nations had cheated them for they had lately murdered a Cayuga." What the Iroquois failed to mention was that those southern Indians probably killed the Cayuga in retaliation for the Iroquois' recent raid on the Catawbas. Peter Wraxall reported that on August 25, 1738, the Commissioners informed New York's lieutenant governor that "some deputies from the Mohawks have been with them and proposed to send ambassadors from the Six Nations by sea to Virginia in order to treat of peace with the southward Indians as the time for their coming hither is elapsed. But the
commissioners say they think this is all sham as numbers of their warriors are going out a fighting and the war seems to be carried on with additional vigor."

As 1738 came to a close it became evident to the English that the Six Nations no longer were interested in peace with the southern tribes. On December 6, the Lords of Trade informed New York's lieutenant governor, George Clarke, that Governor Gooch of Virginia had complained to them about the Six Nations' refusal to make peace. According to Gooch, the Iroquois were still at war with the Catawbas and Cherokees who lived in the backcountry of Carolina and Georgia. Gooch had also complained that after a time and place for treaty negotiations had been appointed and a ceasefire had been agreed to, the Six Nations "had broke off the negotiations by a treacherous attack on the Catawba Indians and -did afterwards murder 11 English inhabitants dwelling on the back of the Mountains." The Lords of Trade were astounded by this news and exclaimed to Lieutenant Governor Clarke, "it seems very extraordinary to us that these Five Nations who are protected by the British government should employ their force to destroy other nations of Indians under the same protection which is effectually doing the work of our common enemy." The Lords urged the New York lieutenant governor to put pressure on the Iroquois to stop their southern raids.

The Six Nations continued their attacks on the southern Indians in 1739. Lieutenant Governor Clarke informed the Lords of Trade in August that the Mohawks had recently joined the French and their Indian allies to attack the Cherokees living in Georgia and Carolina.
In September, the Commissioners of Indian Affairs learned from a group of Mohawks that "the Senecas are going in conjunction with other western Indians to join the French army against the Chickasaws." Actually, the Senecas were not the only Iroquois who were joining the French. A French officer noted that Senecas, Onondagas, Oneidas, and Cayugas, as well as Praying Iroquois from the falls of St. Louis and the Lake of Two Mountains, accompanied M. de Nouvail's expedition against the Chickasaws in 1739. 63

Yet despite the Six Nations' reluctance to treat with the southern tribes, Lieutenant Governor Clarke continued his efforts to work out a peace settlement. Finally, his determination produced results. On January 28, 1740, Clarke wrote to the Lords of Trade, "I have disposed the Six Nations to enter on a treaty of peace with all the southern Indians under his Majesty's protection. I write to Governor Gooch last spring, . . .desiring that deputies may be sent from those Indians next June or July to Albany." In April, Clarke reminded the Iroquois "not to go out against the southern Indians because he has a power from them to make a peace with the Six Nations." 64

Iroquois sachems met with Lieutenant Governor Clarke in August to discuss their hostilities with the Flatheads. Clarke reprimanded the Six Nations for their "constant practice of their joining the French parties who go out to destroy the distant nations of [southern] Indians." He informed them that the King wanted the Six Nations to conclude a general peace with all Indians to the southward and westward. According to Peter Wraxall, the Iroquois spokesman agreed to a peace with those tribes, "but they desire that some sachems of the
southward Indians may come to Albany to strengthen and confirm this union and they will give them two years time to come." The sachems then consented to a ceasefire until the southern ambassadors should come to ratify a permanent treaty. 65

Not all Iroquois were ready to accept a peace with the southern Indians. Some of the Six Nations were even willing to sabotage Clarke's plans to bring the Iroquois and southern tribes together for peace talks. On October 1, 1740, Canada's Governor Beauharnois notified a French minister that he had recently welcomed to Montreal forty-five Iroquois who seemed "very well disposed" toward the French.

Beauharnois added:

The Sieur de Joncaire [i.e. Joncaire's son] reported to me what the Onondaga did with reference to the 100 Tetes-plates [Flatheads] who were to go...to them. He reported to me that they did not reach the village of the former [the Onondagas], who met them on the way, killed several of them and put the others to flight; that many war parties have gone there; that he will urge them, as far as he can to continue to strike at that [Flathead] Nation, and that whatever the English may do to get them to make peace with them, he does not think they can succeed. 66

In effect, New York's Lieutenant Governor Clarke had gotten the Iroquois sachems to agree to a peace with the southern tribes, but he was unable to get all Iroquois warriors to abide by the ceasefire. As a result, Iroquois attacks on the southern Indians continued throughout 1741. One French official remarked, "Three bands of Senecas came back from the Chickasaw country, bringing 12 prisoners and 10 scalps; they had lost but one man themselves. They were expecting two other bands July 24, 1741." 67 While the Iroquois were reluctant to end their attacks on the southern Indians, the latter
were eager for a cessation of hostilities. William Bull, the lieutenant governor of South Carolina, wrote to New York's George Clarke in June, 1741, "Sir: I herewith send...a copy of what passed in a conference I had with the Cherokee and Catawba Indians in relation to the peace [that I] had been pleased to make with the Six Nations on behalf of the southern Indians in amity with us His Majesty's subjects...The news was...very agreeable to them." The Cherokees, according to Bull, said, "We are desirous to be at peace with the Six Nations." The Catawbas were of a similar opinion. They said, "We are very desirous to be at peace with the Six Nations and request exchange of prisoners of war."68

Lieutenant Governor Clarke realized that the Iroquois were still the major obstacle in the way of peace. In the winter of 1741-42, Clarke grew increasingly concerned over the probability that come spring Iroquois warriors would resume their attacks on the southern tribes. On January 11, the Albany Commissioners notified the lieutenant governor that the French had distributed many presents among the Six Nations to convince them to join an upcoming French expedition against the southern Indians. The Commissioners assured Clarke that they would remind the Iroquois that they promised not to attack the southern tribes. The Commissioners later reported that on January 26, the Iroquois told them "that it is the unanimous resolution of the Six Nations that none of their people shall go out a fighting to the southward for these two years and in token of their sincerity they give a belt."69
Clarke probably understood that Iroquois promises made in the cold of a New York winter might, like the snow and ice, disappear with the arrival of warmer weather. So he moved quickly to transform the temporary ceasefire into a lasting peace. On June 15, 1742, Clarke announced to the Six Nations that the southern tribes had met the Iroquois’ demand that they ratify a general peace within two years. With much pomp, Clarke presented the Iroquois with tokens and belts sent by the southern tribes to cement a lasting peace. The Iroquois must have been impressed by Clarke’s words, because they, at least in public, overlooked the fact that no Flatheads had come to Iroquoia to make the peace. The Iroquois accepted the treaty with the Flatheads. 70

The following month a group of Senecas and Onondagas met with Governor Beauharnois in Canada. The Senecas carefully tried to prepare the Governor for the news that the Iroquois, due to English pressure, were making peace with the southern tribes. The Senecas informed Beauharnois that in the spring they would be having a council with the Flatheads. Feigning innocence, the Senecas added that they "know not what they [the Flatheads] want of us." The French governor was not at all fooled by the Senecas’ act. He informed them that he had received news about the recent conference at Albany, wherein the English had told the Iroquois not to war on the Flatheads, Cherokees, and Chickasaws, who were English allies. Beauharnois then warned the Senecas that all of New France’s Indian allies were at war with the southern tribes, and they would be insulted if the Six Nations made peace with their enemies. 71
Soon thereafter Iroquois warriors resumed their attacks on the southern tribes. The Albany Commissioners, on December 1, 1742, reported to Lieutenant Governor Clarke that the French had distributed presents to the Senecas and had convinced fifty Senecas to join war parties against the Flatheads of South Carolina. Peter Wraxall noted, "I find the French interest among our Six Nations so prevailing that some of every nation but the Mohawks joined the French in their parties against the southern Indians. And the sachems say they could not hinder some of their young men from going out." On January 24, 1743, a Pennsylvania trader named Thomas McKee informed the Pennsylvania Council of a skirmish that had recently occurred in Virginia between some settlers and Iroquois warriors. McKee explained that the Iroquois had been in the South fighting against Indians in Maryland and Virginia.72

McKee's account gave Pennsylvania officials reason for concern. The governor of Pennsylvania asked Conrad Weiser to persuade the Iroquois to settle the affair peacefully with the governor of Virginia. Pennsylvania officials were concerned that, unless the matter was resolved, Pennsylvania might clash with the Iroquois warriors who had to journey through Pennsylvania en route to war in Virginia.73

Government officials in New York were also worried that the Iroquois-Virginia incident might spark an all-out war between the Six Nations and the English. On May 2, the Albany Commissioners sent the following message to the Six Nations: "Our governor has received a letter from the governor of Virginia... He says that a party of Indians of the Six Nations appeared upon their frontiers in a hostile
manner and killed and carried away many horses." They added that the Iroquois warriors allegedly had also murdered a Virginian and then "fired upon the other English without any manner of provocation." The Iroquois replied to the Commissioners that the Virginians shot first. 74

New York's Lieutenant Governor Clarke, on June 16, 1743, wrote to Virginia's Governor Gooch and asked that the Virginia government "not be hasty to take any steps that may lead to widen a breach that may involve all the colonies in a war. . . . The [Iroquois] sachems. . . endeavor all they can to restrain their youth from these [southern] excursions, but it is next to impossible." 75

Despite the fact that the Iroquois' southern raids had brought them to the brink of war with Virginia, and maybe even Pennsylvania, the Six Nations still were not inclined to end their hostilities with the southern tribes. At Onondaga on August 2, 1743, Iroquois sachems confided to Conrad Weiser, "We are engaged in a war with the Catawbas which will last to the end of the world, for they molest us and speak contemptuous of us, which our warriors will not bear, and they will soon go to war against them again. It will be in vain for us to dissuade them from it." The sachems added that their warriors, while en route southward, would not bother whites if the whites did not interfere with them. 76

In October, Canada's Governor Beauharnois wrote to Count de Maurepas, "Sieur de Joncaire writes me that the Senecas have raised different parties against them [the Flatheads]; that some had returned with scalps and that others had again immediately set forth in quest of more. He adds that these [Seneca] Indians are more excited than
ever in this war, and that he observes they're disposed not to accept any proposals of peace the Flatheads might offer them. I recommend this officer to keep them in these sentiments, and I will encourage them therein more and more."

By the end of 1743, even New York's usually optimistic lieutenant governor, George Clarke, appeared reconciled to the Iroquois' determination to war on the southern tribes. In his report on New York, the lieutenant governor noted that the French were gaining influence among the Six Nations. Clarke explained that due to the martial spirit of Iroquois youth, the French could entice the young warriors "to join them in their expeditions against the Indian nations... of Virginia, the two Carolinas and Georgia." Clarke was quick to point out that these attacks were in violation of the public pledges made by the Six Nations. 78

Several English colonial governments made a joint effort in 1744 to settle the differences between them, their Indian allies, and the Six Nations. In June, representatives from Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania met with deputies from the Six Nations at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, to discuss issues such as Iroquois-English relations, territorial boundaries, land ownership, Iroquois raids on Virginians, the Iroquois' right of passage through Virginia, and the Iroquois' war on the southern tribes.

By the time the conference ended, some important matters had been resolved. The Six Nations renounced all claims to lands in Virginia and Maryland in exchange for compensation from those colonies. The Iroquois also promised to remain close friends to the English and not
to side with New France. Other issues, however, such as the Iroquois' war on the Flatheads and the Six Nations' right of passage through Virginia remained unresolved. 79

In response to the Iroquois' demand that they be allowed to travel through Virginia, the Virginia commissioners sarcastically replied:

We intended to prevent any occasion for it [i.e. the Iroquois' need to travel through Virginia] by making a peace between you [Iroquois] and the southern Indians a few years since, at a considerable expense to our Great King, which you confirmed at Albany. It seems by your being at war with the Catawbas, that it has not long been kept between you. However, if you desire a road, we will agree to one on the terms of the treaty you made with Colonel Spotswood and your people's behaving themselves orderly like friends. . .shall be used in their passage through Virginia. 80

The Iroquois adamantly denied that they were responsible for breaking the peace. They maintained:

The governor of New York at Albany, in behalf of Assaraquoa [the Iroquois' name for the governor of Virginia] gave us several belts from the Cherokees and Catawbas, and we agreed to a peace if those nations would send some of their great men to us to confirm it face to face, and that they would trade with us. . .but they never came. . . .We met the Cherokees and confirmed the peace. . . .The Catawbas refused to come, and sent us word that we were but women; that they were men and double men for they had two penise[s]; that they could make women of us, and would always be at war with us. They are a deceitful people. . . .We have confirmed the peace with the Cherokees, but not with the Catawbas. They have been treacherous, and know it so that the war must continue until one of us is destroyed. 81

The Iroquois then promised to observe better standards of conduct in their future travels through Virginia. A Virginia commissioner replied to the Iroquois, "We believe they [the Catawbas] have been unfaithful to you and spoke of you with a foolish contempt, but this may be only the rashness of some of their young men. In this time of war with our common enemies, the French and Spanish, it will be
the wisest way to be at peace between you and them."\textsuperscript{82}

The Iroquois gave their same evasive response: "We shall not be against a peace on reasonable terms provided they [the Catawbas] will come northward to treat about it."\textsuperscript{33}

When the conference adjourned on July 4, 1744, the English were no closer to bringing a general peace between the Six Nations and the southern tribes than they were before the meeting convened at Lancaster. The Iroquois were determined to continue their southern raids and would not consider peace until the Catawbas asked for it.

Virginia's Governor Gooch explained the Six Nations' position to several Catawba chiefs on October 31, 1744. The Catawbas refused to comply with the Iroquois' demands. They said, "We should be heartily glad if a peace between us and the Six Nations could be once concluded; we have truly followed the directions of your former letter to us, and have not suffered one of our people to go against them for this four years past; though not withstanding, they the Six Nations are constantly upon us, and have killed forty odd lately." The Catawba chiefs said they were afraid to send deputies to Iroquoia, since the Iroquois would probably kill them. They added, "We have already sent our belt and other tokens of peace to the Six Nations...and have never yet received any answer or token from them, otherwise than constant war."\textsuperscript{84}

After 1744, the Iroquois warfare on the southern Indians continued. Despite numerous attempts by the English to mediate a peace or repeated Iroquois pledges to honor ceasefires with the Flatheads, the Iroquois war against the Catawbas and other southern tribes dragged on
Several important considerations were responsible for the Iroquois' determination to war on the southern tribes during the eighteenth century. First, the Iroquois fought the southern Indians in order to improve their own political and economic relations with New France. After 1700, the French frequently encouraged their Indian allies to attack various southern tribes that were friendly toward the English. The French hoped that their Indian auxiliaries could help block English expansion by forcing the pro-English southern tribes into adopting a pro-French position. The French may also have believed that an Iroquois war on the southern tribes allied to the English could serve two additional purposes. Such a war could enable the French to contain the Iroquois. This warfare would force the Iroquois to focus their military efforts on the southern Indians, and not New France. At the same time, the warfare would help check the growth of Iroquois power, since a number of Iroquois warriors would be killed in the fighting. Secondly, the Iroquois-southern Indian war would interfere with English plans to unite all her Indian allies.

The English were aware of the French designs. Peter Wraxall noted that between 1701 and 1706 the French were trying to keep the Five Nations off balance by instigating wars and misunderstandings between them and the Far Nations that lived south and west of the Senecas. In 1720, James Logan warned some Pennsylvania Indians that the French would like to see the Iroquois, the Pennsylvania tribes, and the
southern Indians destroy each other. Pennsylvania's Governor Keith also recognized the French plans. On July 19, 1720, Keith asked the governor of New York, "Can we suppose that anything else but French councils could have formed an artifice like this, to set all the Indians in friendship with the English at war with one another, in such a manner as cannot fail even to imbroil the English colonies themselves?" 86

Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the French repeatedly asked the Iroquois to make war on the southern tribes. In 1706, the Albany Commissioners noted that the French had enlisted the Iroquois to fight against the Catawbas. Lawrence Claase reported in 1709, "that many French were among our Indians and persuaded them to go against the Flatheads." According to Cadwallader Colden, in 1712, "the French engaged the Five Nations to go against the Flatheads... these Indians called Flatheads had joined the people of Carolina against the Tuscaroras and by setting the Five Nations upon the English allies at this time, they were in hopes to produce a breach between the English and the Five Nations." 87

In 1721, New York's Governor Burnet chastized the Iroquois for complying with French requests that they attack southern Indians. Years later, the Iroquois were still raiding southern tribes at the instigation of the French. According to Peter Wraxall, the French convinced the Iroquois to attack the Flatheads in 1727. On August 30, 1739, New York's Lieutenant Governor George Clarke reported that some Mohawks had joined the French and Indians to raid the Cherokees in Georgia and Carolina. 88
At a conference in September, 1741, Canada's Governor Beauharnois strongly encouraged the Senecas to continue their war against the Flatheads. On January 11, 1742, the Albany Commissioners notified George Clarke that the French had distributed presents to the Iroquois to persuade them to join a French expedition against some southern tribes. In December, the Commissioners notified Clarke that the French had again given presents to the Senecas and had convinced at least fifty of them to attack Flatheads in South Carolina. Peter Wraxall later noted that warriors from all the Iroquois nations, except maybe the Mohawks, had joined French war parties against the southern Indians in 1742. 89

The Iroquois had good reason to join the French against the southern Indians. The great losses that the Iroquois had suffered in the Twenty Years' War had convinced them that further resistance to the French was futile, so after 1701, the Five Nations generally sought peace with New France. Most likely, many Iroquois felt that by consenting to the French requests that they join the war on the southern tribes, the Six Nations could improve their own political relations with New France. By 1706, the Iroquois were warring on the southern tribes. Presumably the French were pleased, for that year the Albany Commissioners noted that relations between the Iroquois and the French had improved. 90

The Iroquois also knew that they could obtain French economic assistance if they declared war against the southern tribes. In 1706, the French gave Iroquois warriors powder and shot so they could attack southern and western Indian tribes that were pro-English. The
following year the French again provided the Iroquois with ammunition to use against southern Indians. On October 4, 1707, Lawrence Claase wrote, "the governor of Canada encourages them [Iroquois] by giving all those powder and lead that go upon that expedition [against the Flatheads]." On occasion, the Iroquois were able to obtain other types of presents, such as blankets, food, and powder for hunting, from the French in exchange for their participation in the attacks on the southern Indians. In 1742, the Albany Commissioners reported to Lieutenant Governor Clarke that the French had distributed presents to the Iroquois in order to prevail on them to join a French expedition against the southern tribes. Later that year the French again gave presents to Iroquois warriors who agreed to fight the Flatheads.

The Iroquois had a second reason for warring on the southern Indians. The Six Nations hoped that by fighting the southern tribes they could improve their relations with the western and northern Indians who were allies of New France. Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the French constantly had their Indian allies fighting the southern tribes. During those years the Iroquois did all they could to maintain peace with the French Indians. The Five Nations were aware of the economic and political benefits that could be derived from an Iroquois alliance with the western and northern tribes. Such an alliance could guarantee friendship between the Five Nations and the western tribes. The Iroquois, who had lost one-half of their warriors during the Twenty Years' War, could not afford renewed hostilities with the numerous and powerful French Indians. Peace with the French Indians was essential to the Iroquois' survival.
Furthermore, the Five Nations needed peace with the western Indians so that Iroquois hunters could travel safely into the Ohio Country. Finally, the Iroquois realized that peace would allow them to conduct a profitable trade with the western tribes. Most likely, many Iroquois joined the French Indians' war parties against the southern tribes in order to improve relations between the Five Nations and the western and northern Indians.

Actual threats may have also prompted the Iroquois to join the French Indians against the Flatheads. For instance, in 1741, Canada's Governor Beauharnois warned the Iroquois, "You know that all the [Indian] Nations are out at war with the Flatheads, and that... a peace [between the Iroquois and the Flatheads] would be a declaration of hostilities against them." The following year Beauharnois issued a similar threat to the Iroquois. He said, "I have given his [the Chickasaws'] flesh for food to all the [Indian] Nations... how dangerous it would be for you, in regard to the other Nations to make peace with them." Yet another reason for the southern warfare by the Iroquois was an occasional request for such service by the English colonial governments. Between 1715 and 1717, the English encouraged the Iroquois to raid the Catawbas, who were at war with Virginia and the Carolinas. In return for their assistance the Iroquois obtained free arms, powder, and supplies, as well as the friendship of the English, who were greatly indebted to the Iroquois for their help.

Individual English colonists also may have employed Iroquois warriors to attack southern Indians. In 1719, the Six Nations
insisted that Virginia colonists had requested them to make war on the Catawbas. Virginia's Governor Spotswood, on January 25, 1720, informed the governor of New York that he was disappointed that the New York governor did not keep his word to inquire of the Six Nations "who that chief man of Virginia was that had (as your Indians declared in the conference at Albany on the 19th day of June last) invited them to come to wage war upon our frontiers, and had promised to assist them in the undertaking with ammunition."  

Along with wanting to improve relations with the English, French, and French Indians, the Six Nations had additional political motivations for waging war on the southern tribes. For one thing the Iroquois probably saw the southern wars as a means to further their own relations with the tribes of Pennsylvania, who were tributary allies of the Iroquois Confederacy. Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the Iroquois repeatedly asked the Indians living on the Susquehanna and Delaware Rivers to join them in the war on the southern tribes. The Six Nations may have been using the Flatheads as a common enemy in order to cement the alliance of the Iroquois and their allies in Pennsylvania. The war on the Flatheads also provided the Iroquois with the opportunity to expand their social and political contacts with the tribes of Pennsylvania. For example, camaraderie was likely to develop between Iroquois and Pennsylvania Indian warriors who joined together to raid in the South. Finally, the southern wars enabled the Iroquois to offer their protection to the weaker Pennsylvania tribes, which in turn meant greater dependence of those tribes on the Six Nations. When these political gains are added to
the military assistance that the Pennsylvania Indians could provide, it is easy to understand why the Iroquois were so eager to involve the Indians of Pennsylvania in the war against the Flatheads.\textsuperscript{98}

The Iroquois may have also used the southern wars to improve their political position in relation to the southern colonies. The southern warfare gave the Six Nations valuable political leverage against the Virginia, Pennsylvania, Carolina, and Maryland colonies. Officials from those colonies were not pleased with Iroquois warriors who came southward to raid within their borders. The officials were upset that the Six Nations were fighting other pro-English Indian tribes. Furthermore, they were angry that the Iroquois warriors, while en route southward, frequently stole livestock and food stuffs from the colonists, and at times even attacked and robbed the colonists themselves.\textsuperscript{99} Officials of the southern colonies demanded that the Iroquois stop raiding and looting in the South. The Six Nations were willing to listen—for a price. The Iroquois wanted the governments of those colonies to recognize Iroquois rights of passage and land ownership in the South. In the end, the colonial officials, wanting to stop the Iroquois incursions in the South, had no choice but to accept the Iroquois demands. At the Lancaster Conference in 1744, the southern colonies agreed to pay the Iroquois for most of their land claims in the South and to allow the Iroquois the right of passage through their colonies. In return, the Six Nations promised to stop looting the southern colonists, to behave in an orderly fashion when traveling in the South, and to consider a peace with the Catawbas.\textsuperscript{100} In effect, the Six Nations' southern warfare had enabled
the Iroquois to extract these concessions from the southern colonies. Without the southern wars, the Iroquois would have had no presence in the South, and thus no political leverage against the southern colonial governments.

The Iroquois gained other political advantages by fighting in the South. The southern warfare gave the Iroquois the opportunity to strengthen themselves through alliances with southern tribes that were enemies of the Catawbas. For example, between 1712 and 1715, the Iroquois aided the Tuscaroras in the latter's fight against the Flatheads and the southern colonies. The Tuscaroras, after their defeat, fled to Iroquois, where they were accepted as the sixth Iroquois nation. This Tuscarora migration resulted in a dramatic increase in Iroquois military and political power. In May, 1715, two French officers, Longueuil and Joncaire, visited three Iroquois villages and noticed the change in the Iroquois. Another French official later noted that Longueuil had "reported on his return that he had never found them [Iroquois] so haughty. They had been joined by savages coming from Carolina [i.e. the Tuscaroras] with whom they amount to about 3000 men bearing arms." Had the Iroquois chosen not to aid the Tuscaroras in the war on the Catawbas, the Tuscaroras might not have moved to Iroquoia, and Iroquois political and military power would not have increased. The southern warfare also enabled the Iroquois to increase their population and strength through the adoption of prisoners of war.

Aside from being politically motivated, the southern wars of the Iroquois were also economically motivated. As previously mentioned,
the Six Nations obtained supplies, arms and ammunition from both the English and French in return for some of their raids on the Flatheads. However, there may have been other economic reasons for the Iroquois' decision to war on the southern tribes. On July 7, 1720, England's Board of Trade reported that the source of the trouble between the Iroquois and the southern Indians was the "emulation about the fur trade carried on with Indians from Carolina, Virginia, New York, and other His Majesty's plantations." The full meaning of the Board's cryptic remark is unclear. Perhaps the Board was saying that the origins of the Iroquois wars with the southern tribes could be traced back to the 1660s when the Iroquois were involved in a trade war with the Susquehannocks. Or maybe the Board was alluding to a conflict that possibly existed between the Iroquois and southern Indians over who had the right to trap and hunt on the Ohio, Potomac, and lower Susquehanna Rivers. Since the Iroquois and some southern tribes both hunted in those river valleys, it is quite possible that the southern wars may have been fought, at least in part, to determine hunting rights on those disputed lands.

Many Iroquois warriors also took part in the southern wars in order to obtain plunder or other economic profits. According to Virginia's Governor Spotswood, the Iroquois frequently looted the Indians and settlers of Virginia. Governor Keith of Pennsylvania voiced similar complaints in 1721. Another Pennsylvanian, Samuel Blunstone, noted in 1731 that "a few days ago about 20 of the Five Nations' warriors, returning this way from the southward, brought with them 3 negroes and a mulatto." Blunstone explained that the
Iroquois sold one negro, who was lame and unable to travel, and took the rest back to Iroquoia. In 1743, the Iroquois were again raiding and looting in the South. The governor of Pennsylvania remarked that Iroquois frequently killed cattle and hogs belonging to Virginia settlers. New York's Lieutenant Governor Clarke later noted that the Iroquois youths who attacked southern whites and Indians were "forced to it by hunger."

Social, cultural, and pragmatic reasons comprise a final cause of the Iroquois' southern wars. The Six Nations' culture and society made it necessary for the Iroquois to wage war. Prestige, social position, and political advancement were just some of the rewards available to men who achieved great success in battle. For example, the Reverend Henry Barclay, on December 7, 1741, wrote to Cadwallader Colden, "Their [the Iroquois'] only inducement to war is glory, and esteem it the greater honor the farther distant they seek an enemy from their own country. They go out always in small parties consisting of 20 or 30 men and often but 10, may sometimes 2, 3, and 4." Psychological inducements, such as the need for revenge or mental release, may have also made war a necessity for the Iroquois. Very likely, the Iroquois felt a need to get revenge for their warriors or those of their Tuscarora brethren who had been killed in wars against the Flatheads. In 1710, the Senecas sent the following message to the New York governor: "When I think of the brave warriors that have been slain by the Flatheads, I can govern myself no longer...I reject your belt [i.e. the governor's request that
they not attack the Flatheads] for the hatred I bear to the Flatheads can never be forgotten."\textsuperscript{110}

Canada's Governor Beauharnois understood the Iroquois' need for revenge and war. During a 1741 conference, Beauharnois put forth the following argument to convince the Senecas to attack the southern tribes: "Children...I have heard that the Onondagas desired to...set you to make peace with the Flatheads...but what would become of your young men, and where could they go to divert themselves? Besides, your blood has been repeatedly shed in the country of that nation."\textsuperscript{111}

If social and cultural reasons made war a necessity for the Iroquois, pragmatic reasons dictated that the war should be waged against the southern tribes. To begin with, the Iroquois had no one else to fight. In 1701, the Five Nations had ratified a peace treaty with the French Indians, which included most tribes living to the northeast, north, and west of Iroquoia. And the war-weakened Iroquois were in no position to renew hostilities with New France's powerful Indian allies. Not being able to war on the Indians to their west or north, the Iroquois had only one option left. They had to follow the warriors' path southward. In 1720, Pennsylvania's Governor Keith carefully explained this situation to the governor of New York:

I would humbly entreat you to recollect how that upon the former peace with the French, the Five Nations immediately desisted from going out to war against the Illinois, the Hurons, and other Indians in league with the French, so that their young men or warriors were obliged to go a great way off towards the Southwest against Indians settled upon or near to the lower branches of Mississippi, but of late,
they seemed to have relinquished that path, and... their course and projects of war is now generally bent against the Indians who are in amity with Virginia and Carolina. 112

Actually, the choice of the southern tribes as an enemy was wise for a number of reasons. The southern Indians were not as united as those in the western country. Also, the Iroquois could count on assistance from the western tribes who were fighting the southern Indians at French instigation. Finally, the southern war was a low-risk war for the Five Nations. Iroquois warriors could raid the villages of the southern Indians, but the Flatheads found it nearly impossible to retaliate. The reason was a simple one. Iroquois allies buffered Iroquoia from attacks by the southern tribes. 113

Pro-Iroquois Indian villages on the Susquehanna and Allegheny Rivers stood between the homelands of the Iroquois and those of the Flatheads. Iroquois warriors could pass freely down the Susquehanna Trail and along the southern and western warriors' paths to raid the southern Indians, while the Flatheads found it difficult to strike back. The route northward was blocked by pro-Iroquois villages on the Susquehanna River. The warriors' path through the Cumberland Gap was also extremely hazardous. This pass had numerous hiding places which were ideal for ambuscades and was frequently traveled by the Iroquois and other northern Indian enemies of the southern tribes. 114

The arrangement was ideal for the Five Nations, since it allowed them to attack the southern Indians with near impunity. This low-risk situation enabled the Five Nations to wage war, as their society and culture required, but yet have peace in Iroquoia, which was essential to the growth of
the Iroquois economy.

The Iroquois' southern wars had important repercussions for whites and Indians. Iroquois incursions into the South forced the governments of Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas to develop political and diplomatic relations with the Iroquois Confederacy. Iroquois war parties frequently harassed white settlers on the southern frontier. Iroquois attacks weakened the Catawbas and Cherokees, who were important English allies. The warfare undermined English efforts to create a northern and southern Indian alliance to oppose the French. The warfare also affected the cultures of northern and southern tribes. The fighting, adoption of prisoners, and introduction to new customs and local habits facilitated interaction and cultural exchange between northern and southern Indians.

Yet, despite the significance of the southern warfare, historians have never fully analyzed the Iroquois' reasons for traveling hundreds of miles to war on the southern tribes. Historians have assumed that the Iroquois fought the southern tribes solely for revenge and glory. This, however, was not the case. Although revenge and glory were important motivations, Iroquois men had other equally important reasons for raiding in the South. Some Iroquois fought southern Indians to improve their relations with the French. Other Iroquois raided in the South to advance ties with northern and western tribes. Between 1715 and 1717, Iroquois fought the Catawbas in response to English requests. At times Iroquois warred on southern Indians to promote alliances with the Tuscaroras and Pennsylvania tribes. On other occasions Iroquois raided southern tribes for economic gains. In short, the southern wars of the Iroquois had multiple causes and cannot be attributed merely to quests for revenge and glory.
Chapter 7: Notes


4 JR, XLVII, 143, 147; Adair, 158, 159.


6 Livingston, 240; NYCD, IX, 704.

7 NYCD, IX, 707.


10 Wraxall, 48.

11 Golden, "History...1707-20," 361, 362.

12 Wraxall, 52; Golden, "History...1707-20," 363.

13 Wraxall, 60, 62; MPHC, XXXIII, 404; Golden, "History...1707-20," 380.

14 Senecas to David Schuyler, Onondaga Conference, June, 1710, in Golden, "History...1707-20," 381-382.

15 NYCD, V, 217-226; Golden, "History...1707-20," 389-394; Wraxall, 77, 80.

16 Golden, "History...1707-20," 398, 399; Wraxall, 77-78, 80; Severance, "Joncaire," 478.
17 Colden, "History...1707-20," 398; NYCD, V, 267-275; Wraxall, 80.

18 Colden, "History...1707-20," 398; Parkman, Half-Century, 111-112; Colden, "History...1707-20," 403-408; NYCD, V, 267-275; Wraxall, 80.

19 NYCD, V, 267-275.

20 Charlevoix, History, V, 256.

21 Colden, "History...1707-20," 409.

22 NYCD, V, 346; Livingston, 223; Colden, "History...1707-20," 410.

23 Pa.Min., III, 82-84; Colden, "History...1707-20," 413-414.

24 NYCD, V, 382-384; Colden, "History...1707-20," 417, 418; Wraxall, 103.


26 Wraxall, 109-110; NYCD, V, 450.


28 NYCD, V, 463.

29 NYCD, V, 463.

30 NYCD, V, 464; Colden, "History...1707-20," 423; NYCD, V, 476.

31 Livingston, 222; Colden, "History...1707-20," 425.

32 Livingston, 222-223; NYCD, V, 484-491; Colden, "History...1707-20," 426-428.

33 Livingston, 222-223; NYCD, V, 484-491; Colden, "History...1707-20," 426-428.

34 Colden, "History...1707-20," 428-429.


37 Livingston, 226-227.

38 NYCD, IX, 884; Pa.Min., III, 85.
40 Colden, "History...1707-20," 431; Wraxall, 124, 125; Colden, "History...1707-20," 432.
45 Conference between Gov. Burnet and Five Nations, August 7, 1721, in CC Papers, I, 131-133.
46 NYCD, V, 637.
49 NYCD, V, 733, 793-796; Wraxall, 171.
50 Wraxall, 177.
52 Wraxall, 177-178.
53 Wraxall, 178.
54 MPHC, XXXIV, 76; Pa. Arch., 1st series, I, 295; NYCD, V, 967.
55 Wraxall, 191, 195.
56 MPHC, XXXIV, 109; NYCD, V, 693.
57 Wraxall, 198.
60 Wraxall, 209.
61 Wraxall, 210, 211.
62 NYCD, VI, 137.

NYCD, VI, 159; Wraxall, 217.

NYCD, IX, 1062, VI, 172-178; Wraxall, 217-219.

MPHC, XXXIV, 184; Misc. Hist'l Coll., XVII, 334.


NYCD, VI, 210.

Wraxall, 224.

NYCD, VI, 216-218.

NYCD, IX, 1091.

Wraxall, 229; Pa.Min., IV, 630.


NYCD, VI, 238-239.

NYCD, VI, 241.


NYCD, IX, 1097-1098.

DHSNY, I, 465.


NYCD, IX, 706, 707; Misc. Hist'l Coll., XVII, 161; JR, LXIX, 49; NYCD, VI, 242, IX, 1095-1098.
87 Wraxall, 48; Colden, "History...1707-20," 380, 413, 414, 428, 432.
88 NYCD, V, 637, 733; Wraxall, 171; NYCD, VI, 148.
89 NYCD, IX, 1085; Wraxall, 224, 229.
90 Wraxall, 48.
91 Wisc. Hist'l Coll., XVII, 163, 164; Wraxall, 48, 52; Colden,
   "History...1707-20," 363.
92 Wraxall, 224, 229.
93 NYCD, IX, 704; Colden, "History...1707-20," 361; NYCD, IX, 885;
   Wisc. Hist'l Coll., XVI, 422, XVII, 161; MPHC, XXXIV, 108, 109; NYCD,
   IX, 1091.
94 Wraxall, 34; NYCD, IV, 500; Conference between Iroquois,
   English, and western tribes, May, 1710, in Colden, "History...1707-20,
   420-422; NYCD, V, 217-223.
95 NYCD, IX, 1085, 1091.
96 NYCD, V, 437, 463; Colden, "History...1707-20," 422; NYCD,
   IX, 931; Wraxall, 109, 110.
97 Pa.Min., III, 82.
99 Pa.Min., III, 82-87, 92-98; Colden, "History...1707-20," 431.
101 Wraxall, 115; Colden, "History...1707-20," 414; Wisc. Hist'l
   Coll., XVI, 315.
102 NYCD, V, 464, 375; Livingston, 221-223; Wraxall, 177, 115;
103 NYCD, V, 548.

For interesting insights on the psychological functions of Iroquois warfare, see A. Wallace, Death and Rebirth, 44-48.

Golden, "History...1707-20," 381.

NYCD, IX, 1084.


Archer B. Hulbert, Indian Thoroughfares (Historic Highways of America, II, Cleveland, 1902), 48-50; Hunt, 68, 69.
Chapter 81  Peace With the Northern Tribes

Living to the north of Iroquoia were the tribes that the French called the domiciliated Indians of Canada. These northern tribes lived in several villages located near the French cities of Montreal and Quebec. In 1711, the Jesuit Joseph Germain wrote a letter to his superior in which he explained the locations of the domiciliated Indians. According to Germain, over 1200 Ottawas, Hurons, Algonquins, and Abnakis lived in missions near Quebec. Father Germain proudly noted that the Huron mission at Laurette, near Quebec, was quite successful, because the Hurons were fervent Christians. He added that the Abnakis also had a mission village near Quebec, at St. Francis. Germain pointed out that another important mission village was located near Montreal at Sault St. Louis. He described it as "one of the oldest and largest that we have [dating back to the 1670s] consisting of 500 or 600 [Praying] Iroquois. These are families who have left their own country, because they were not free to form a church and to lead a Christian life there, on account of the insults offered by their infidel countrymen and the English."¹

The domiciliated Indians had fought alongside the French against the Iroquois during the Twenty Years' War. In 1701, the domiciliated Indians, along with New France's other Indian allies, ratified the Grand Peace Settlement with the Iroquois.² After 1701, the policy of the Iroquois Confederacy generally was to maintain peace with the domiciliated Indians of Canada.

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At first the Iroquois strictly adhered to their policy of peace with the northern tribes. Four Mohawk sachems stopped at Albany on August 26, 1702, and announced that they had been appointed by the Five Nations "to go and conclude the peace with the... Onnagongue [i.e. Abnakis]." The Mohawks said they would meet the Abnakis at nearby Schachkook. The following year Onondaga sachems told Albany officials that Iroquois messengers were with the Praying Iroquois in Canada "to consult about matters for the good of the country."

In 1705, Iroquois deputies complained to the governor of New France that the domiciliated Indians of Sault St. Louis and Lake of Two Mountains, who were at peace with the Five Nations, were fighting against the English. The Iroquois maintained that since they (the Five Nations) were neutral in Queen Anne's War, the domiciliated tribes should also be neutral.  

Some New York officials believed that the Iroquois had influence with the domiciliated Indians. Peter Wraxall observed that on September 29, 1706, "The [Albany] Commissioners used their endeavors with the Five Nations to exert their influence with the Indians in Canada and elsewhere not to make war upon New England, but this had little or no effect."

Cadwallader Colden reported that several Iroquois sachems came to Albany in 1707 and told Governor Cornbury "that they had obeyed the [governor's] directions... in going to Canada to persuade their praying Indians living there to lay down the hatchet that they had taken up by the instigation of the governor of Canada against New England and to persuade them to leave that country and to return to their habitations with the Five Nations. But
they found them entirely under the influence of the governor of Canada and that they were not like to succeed in either."

The peace between the Iroquois and Canada's domiciliated Indians continued throughout 1708. On July 24, 1707, Governor Vaudreuil of New France reported to a French minister that all the tribes, including the Iroquois, had observed the truce over the winter. In fact, even when the Abnakis and Praying Iroquois were fighting against the New England colonists, they continued their peace with the Iroquois.

The Iroquois peace with the Indians of Canada almost came to an end in 1709. In the spring of that year New York officials convinced many Iroquois to join a colonial expedition against New France. Yet, even though these Iroquois were willing to declare war on New France, they still did not wish to fight the northern Indians. As a result, in July, 1709, the Onondagas sent a warning to the Indians living near Montreal. They informed those domiciliated Indians about the coming invasion and cautioned them not to fight alongside the French. The Mohawks also sent a warning to the Praying Iroquois of Sault St. Louis. According to New France's Governor Vaudreuil, the Mohawks told the Praying Iroquois that "It was with great regret they [the Mohawks] had consented to Peter Schuyler's message [i.e. that the Iroquois declare war on New France]; that the hatchet which had been placed in their hands did not afford them any pleasure, but that it was impossible for them to refuse it...considering the large military force that was at Orange." The Mohawks then advised the Praying Iroquois "as good brothers, that the French never could resist the English army;
that it was still time for those at Sault to take their choice and to retire, but if they did not do so, they might consider themselves dead men."\(^7\)

The way things turned out, the Iroquois did not have to fight either the French or the domiciliated Indians. The English colonies' planned invasion of Canada never occurred, so the Iroquois were able to maintain their peace with the Indians who were allied to New France.

Several English colonies made a second attempt to invade New France in 1711. Once again, they solicited the Iroquois' help. Once again, the Iroquois warned the Praying Iroquois not to get involved. And then, once again, the plans for the invasion were abandoned.\(^8\) So in the end, the Iroquois peace with the domiciliated Indians remained unbroken.

After 1711, the Iroquois Confederacy returned to its policy of neutrality in regard to the English and French, and it generally adhered to a policy of peace toward the northern tribes. For example, in April, 1712, a Caugnawaga sachem arrived at Albany to renew peace between his tribe and New York. Such a visit would not have been possible unless the Five Nations and the Caugnawagas were at peace. Later that year, the Iroquois reminded the Indians at Sault St. Louis that they were at peace and asked them "to remain passive on their mats, and not to take any sides [in the event of renewed Iroquois-French hostilities]."\(^9\)

The peace continued between the Iroquois and the domiciliated Indians. In 1715, Caugnawagas were among the Five Nations instigating them to war on the Catawbas. By 1717, Iroquois warriors were
frequently accompanying northern Indians on raids against the tribes of Virginia and Carolina. The Iroquois' close ties to the domiciliated Indians were evident during an autumn conference between Iroquois deputies and Governor Vaudreuil. The Iroquois deputies had gone to Montreal in order to condole the death of King Louis XIV. On October 24th, the deputies told Vaudreuil that the Iroquois Confederacy hoped that the new French king would "protect us from any attacks that may be made against us. We ask the same favors for all those [Indians] of the Sault St. Louis, and of Sault an Recollet, for the Abenakis, the Outauois, the Nepissings, and all others who belong to us and are our brethren."10

In 1718, a French official believed that the Iroquois were conspiring with the Abnakis to attack French settlers. He said, "The Iroquois are soliciting the Abenaquis by belts which they send them underground, to cooperate with them against the French."11

Iroquois-Abnaki relations continued to be close. On several occasions the Abnakis even asked the Iroquois to join them in a war against the New England colonies. On September 8, 1722, an Iroquois spokesman told New York's Governor Burnet, "We [Iroquois] are sorry to hear of the mischiefs that are done to the eastward [i.e. the Abnaki attacks on New England]. We know nothing of that affair, but the reports we hear here, neither do we know of any Belt that was sent to any of the Five Nations lately by those eastern Indians." The Iroquois spokesman acknowledged that "about a year and a half ago the Mohawks received a belt of Black Wampum from the...[Abnakis] eastern Indians by which they said to the Mohawks: 'Fathers, we are designed to
make war upon the English to the Eastward and desire you to consider of it, and to assist us in the prosecution of that war, and before we begin we will acquaint you with it."12

Actually, the war between the Abnakis and the New England colonists almost brought an end to the Iroquois-Abnaki peace. In the spring of 1723, the English colonists pressured the Iroquois into ordering the Abnakis to cease hostilities with the English or else face a war with the Iroquois Confederacy. By October it was evident that the Abnakis would not halt their activities, so the Confederacy was forced to declare war on that northeastern tribe. Yet, the Iroquois were not eager to fight the Abnakis, particularly since the Caugnawagas and other domiciliated Indians had promised to back the Abnakis in case of an Iroquois attack. So, the Iroquois reneged on their promise to aid the New England colonists. Throughout 1724, the Iroquois repeatedly refused to help the English make war on the Abnakis. On November 7, 1724, Governor Burnet wrote to the Lords of Trade, "I have not been able to effect any thing material that way [i.e. to secure Iroquois aid for Massachusetts] except some messages from the Six Nations to the Eastern Indians to persuade them to desist, which the Eastern [Indians] have answered evasively; and their answers have furnished an excuse to the Six Nations for their declining to go to war with them."13

The Iroquois were reluctant to fight against the Abnakis, who were being aided by the Caugnawagas, Micmacs, and other northern Indians. On November 28, 1724, Governor Vaudreuil wrote to a French minister, "Deputies from the Five Nations came this summer to assure
me that they will not take up the hatchet in favor of the English against the Abenakis; and in order to retain them in these favorable dispositions, I thought I could not do better than to send Sieur de Joncaire to winter at Niagara and among the Senecas." Governor Vaudreuil had no reason to be alarmed, for the Iroquois evidently had no intention of fighting the Abnakis or any other French Indians.

Throughout the 1730s, the Iroquois and the domiciliated Indians remained on good terms. In October, 1731, Iroquois visitors were among Canada's mission Indians. Governor Beauharnois of New France complained, "The Iroquois...have given a brilliant account of this visit [of four Mohawks who had an audience with England's Queen Anne] to our domiciliated Indians, insinuating into their minds the superiority of the English over the French." Iroquois warriors also joined northern Indian war parties against southern tribes. On August 30, 1739, New York's Lieutenant Governor Clarke reported to the Lords of Trade that some Mohawks had joined the French and Indians to raid the Cherokees in the back country of Georgia and Carolina. On another occasion warriors from the other four Iroquois nations accompanied French soldiers and Indian warriors from Canada and the upper Great Lakes country on an expedition against the Chickasaws.

The Iroquois seemed satisfied with their friendly relations with the domiciliated Indians. In August, 1740, Iroquois deputies proudly told Lieutenant Governor Clarke that the Six Nations were allied to all the northern Indians, as well as the western tribes. The following year the Albany Commissioners reported to Clarke that the Iroquois had gone to Canada "to treat with the [French] Governor and the Cacknawaga
Indians about a neutrality in case of a war between the French and us [the English]." 17

In 1742, the Iroquois again made an effort to preserve their peace with the domiciliated Indians. An Onondaga deputy was sent to Montreal to apologize for a murder of a Sault St. Louis Indian by an Iroquois warrior. The Onondaga messenger told Governor Beauharnois that the murder had "stained a leaf [of the Great Tree of Peace] with blood; we bury this affair by this belt; Father, we request you to prevail on your nations to forget it." Beauharnois accepted their apology and assured them that the peace that had long been in effect between the Iroquois and the French and their Indian allies would remain unbroken. 18

The Iroquois peace with the domiciliated Indians did continue. In June, 1744, an Iroquois spokesman at the Lancaster Conference assured English colonial officials that the Iroquois Confederacy had great influence with many tribes, "particularly over the Praying Indians...who stand in the very gates of the French." 19 In short, from 1701 through 1744, the Iroquois maintained peaceful relations with the northern tribes.

The Iroquois had several reasons for following a policy of peace toward the domiciliated Indians. To begin with, the Iroquois wanted peace for military reasons. The Iroquois realized that the numerical strength and proximity of the northern Indians made them a potentially dangerous foe. In 1711, Governor Vaudreuil built cabins near Quebec and brought over 1200 Ottawas, Hurons, Abnakis, and Algonquins to live there as a means of reinforcing Canada's defenses. By 1718, the
Abnakis apparently were strong enough to hold off the Iroquois, because a French officer noted, "This [Abnakis] Nation is the only support of the colony against the English or the Iroquois." Father Loyard, a French Jesuit, also believed that the Abnakis were a capable fighting force. In 1722, Loyard wrote, "Of all the savages of New France, those who have rendered and who are in a condition to render, the greatest services are the Abenakis. This nation is composed of five villages, which in all make 500 men bearing arms. Two of these villages are situated along the River St. Lawrence near Three Rivers... The three others are in the region of Acadia."²⁰

A census of the Indian tribes allied to Canada, taken by the French in 1736, clearly indicates the numerical strength of the northern tribes. The number of warriors and their villages were listed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Warriors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At Quebec</td>
<td>60 Hurons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>350 Abenakis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Becancour</td>
<td>60 Abenakis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At St. Francis</td>
<td>180 Abenakis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Three Rivers</td>
<td>15 Abenakis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Montreal</td>
<td>20 Algonquins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Lake of Two Mountains</td>
<td>50 Nepissingsues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63 Praying Iroquois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Sault St. Louis</td>
<td>300 Praying Iroquois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At Lake Ontario</td>
<td>150 Mississagas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1248 northern Indian warriors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same census counted 1100 warriors from the Six Nations, so the numerical strength of Canada's domiciliated Indians was approximately equal to that of the Iroquois Confederacy.²¹

A 1738 census taken by New York officials further shows that the domiciliated Indians had about the same number of warriors as the Iroquois. The Albany Commissioners reported to Lieutenant Governor
Clarkes, "The Six Nations of Indians including the River and Schaahkook Indians are about 1500 fighting men. . . . The Indians living near the neighborhood of Montreal and Quebec are about 1000 fighting men." 22

The Iroquois had another military reason for wanting to maintain friendship with the northern tribes. The Iroquois and the domiciliated Indians were allies in the war against the Catawbas and other southern tribes. In 1707, Caugnawagas and Mohawks joined together to raid the Flatheads of Carolina. In 1717, Caugnawagas accompanied a large Iroquois war party against southern Indians. On August 30, 1739, New York's George Clarke reported that some Mohawks had joined a French and Indian war party on a raid against the Cherokees in Georgia and Carolina. The following year Clarke complained that the Iroquois were constantly aiding the French and Indians in their war against the Flatheads. But despite the lieutenant governor's disapproval, the Iroquois and the Indians of New France continued to make war on the southern tribes throughout the 1740s. 23

The powerful allies of the domiciliated Indians provided an additional military reason for the Iroquois' willingness to remain at peace with the northern tribes. The domiciliated Indians were allied to New France and western nations like the Miami, Ottawa, and Huron. After 1701, the weakened Iroquois wanted to remain at peace with the French and the strong western tribes, so they had no alternative but to keep the peace with the domiciliated Indians too.

The Iroquois Confederacy also had political reasons for maintaining a policy of peace toward the tribes of Canada. Factionalism in Iroquois politics made it difficult, if not impossible, for the League
Council to declare war on the northern Indians. Many Iroquois were pro-French and thus sympathetic toward the domiciliated Indians. The Onondagas informed the New York governor in 1703 that many Senecas favored a pro-French position. Robert Livingston noted in 1709 that the Five Nations were divided politically. Some favored the English, while others supported the French. Years later Governor William Burnet of New York declared that pro-French Iroquois were responsible for the Six Nations' reluctance to make war on the Abnakis. Other New York officials likewise believed that many Iroquois favored the French and Indians. On January 26, 1738, the Albany Commissioners reported that one-eighth of the Six Nations were inclined to the French interest. In reality the figure may have been even higher.

The Iroquois had another political reason for wanting peace with the tribes of Canada. The Iroquois realized that their importance to the English rose correspondingly with the number of tribes that were allies or friends of the Iroquois Confederacy. The more tribes the Iroquois had influence with, the more useful the Iroquois were to the English. Therefore, the Iroquois did their best to maintain good relations with the northern tribes, while the English frequently tried to make use of the Iroquois' connections. For instance, in 1704, the governor of New York asked the Iroquois to use their influence to prevent the Abnakis from attacking the colonists of New England. Two years later, the Albany Commissioners again asked the Iroquois to "exert their influence with the Indians in Canada and elsewhere not to make war on New England." Throughout the early 1720s, the English continued to use the Iroquois to mediate a peace between the Abnakis and
Economics provided the Iroquois with a third reason for keeping peace with the domiciliated Indians of Canada. After 1700, the Iroquois frequently bartered valuable furs for French arms, ammunition, blankets, and other manufactured goods. The Iroquois' trade with the French depended in part upon continued peace between the northern tribes and the Iroquois. The French probably would have been unwilling to trade with the Iroquois if the latter were at war with the domiciliated Indians, who were allies of New France. And even if the French were willing, they probably would have been unable to trade with the Iroquois, since the domiciliated Indians-Iroquois warfare would have made travel unsafe for Indian and white traders. In effect, if the Iroquois wanted to trade with the French, they had to remain at peace with the Indians of Canada.

Good relations with the domiciliated Indians helped the Iroquois' economy in other ways. Peace allowed the domiciliated Indians to travel through Iroquoia and to serve as middlemen in the Montreal-Albany trade. The safe passage to Albany also enabled many northern Indians to take advantage of the inexpensive trade goods offered by the English. Peter Wraxall noted that Caugnawagas came to Albany in 1715 to trade with the English. In 1722, the Caugnawagas, as well as other domiciliated Indians, were reportedly serving as carriers in the Montreal-Albany trade. On September 21, 1741, Governor Beauharnois informed Minister Maurepas that Praying Iroquois, from Sault St. Louis, were smuggling furs out of Canada to trade at Albany. Later, in 1744, the Caugnawagas assured New York officials that all the domiciliated
Indians wanted to remain neutral in the recently declared war between England and France and wished to continue their trade at Albany. The Iroquois profited from the northern Indians' traffic through Iroquoia. As geographic middlemen, the Iroquois stood between the Albany trade and the northern tribes. As a result, the Iroquois were in a position to sell the northern Indian travelers the provisions and services they needed for the trip between Albany and Canada. Some Iroquois may have even served as carriers in the Montreal-Albany trade. In either case, the Iroquois profited by remaining at peace with the domiciliated Indians and by allowing them a free passage to Albany. New York's Governor William Burnet explained the economic pressures that were on the Iroquois to keep the peace with the tribes of Canada. Burnet told the Lords of Trade that the Iroquois were reluctant to fight the northern tribes because of "the interest the French and their friends among us are secretly cultivating with the Six Nations and the fear they are in that if the Six Nations go to war, the road between Albany and Canada may prove dangerous and so their trade quite interrupted which they now carry on."  

Finally, the Iroquois had important social reasons for maintaining peace with the domiciliated Indians of Canada. Many Iroquois were reluctant to fight against their relatives and friends who lived in Canada. Iroquois began moving to Canada during the 1670s. A French official noted in 1681 that Iroquois were living at the Mission of the Mountain of Montreal. In 1684, New York's Governor Dongan reported that 600 or 700 Iroquois had moved to Canada. Three years later, Dongan complained that the French had priests among the Five Nations
and they had converted many "and do their utmost to draw them to Canada, to which place there are already 6 or 700 retired." By 1704, there were at least three villages of Praying Iroquois living in Canada. New York officials reported in 1711 that about 200 Praying Iroquois warriors lived in Canada. In 1716, the French Council of the Marine noted, "There is an Iroquois mission on the other side of the River, two leagues above Montreal, under the direction of the Jesuits; it may contain about 200 warriors." The Iroquois' exodus to Canada continued throughout the first half of the eighteenth century. On October 2, 1735, Father Nau, the Jesuit at Sault St. Louis, wrote to Father Bonin, "The Five Iroquois Nations...are visibly on the decrease, on account of their incessant quarrels and the use of intoxicants supplied by the English. It is for this reason that the more provident abandon a country where they cannot live peaceably, and come to settle among us. Others, who are accused of witchcraft, are also obliged to take refuge at Sault St. Louis." French officials reported, in 1736, that 363 Praying Iroquois warriors, plus their families, lived at the Lake of Two Mountains and the Sault St. Louis missions. Other French accounts corroborate the large number of Iroquois who lived in Canada. For example, a letter written by Father Nau to his mother in 1739 shows that at least 300 Praying Iroquois warriors and their families lived at Sault St. Louis.30

The New York Iroquois maintained close relations with their northern brethren who moved to Canada. Between 1701 and 1744, the Iroquois constantly visited and communicated with the Praying Iroquois.31 Iroquois warriors frequently fought alongside the Praying Iroquois
against southern Indian enemies. And when the Iroquois declared war against New France in 1709 and 1711, they took precautions to ensure the safety of the Iroquois living in Canada. The familial and social bonds between many Iroquois and Praying Iroquois, along with the presence of pro-French factions in Iroquois society, were two important reasons why the Iroquois Confederacy wanted to maintain peace with the domiciliated Indians of Canada.

Between 1701 and 1744, the Iroquois followed a policy of peace toward the northern tribes. This policy benefited the Iroquois in several ways.

First, peace with the domiciliated Indians was militarily helpful for the Six Nations. It secured the Iroquois' northern border and allowed the Iroquois to concentrate on Indian enemies in the South. Furthermore, their improved relations with the Indians of Canada provided the Iroquois with a formidable ally in the wars against the southern tribes.

Secondly, the Iroquois benefited politically from their peace with the domiciliated Indians. The peace policy mitigated political divisions within the Iroquois Confederacy by placating those Iroquois who were members of the pro-French faction or who had relatives or friends living in Canada. The peace policy strengthened the Iroquois in other ways. By bringing the northern tribes into the Iroquois' alliance, it increased the Iroquois' military power. At the same time, it enhanced the political position of the Iroquois Confederacy. The more allies
the Iroquois had, the more important they were to the English and French, who hoped to use the Iroquois to influence and control other tribes.

Thirdly, peace with the domiciled Indians aided the development of the Iroquois economy. Iroquois men were free to hunt without having to worry about northern Indians attacking them or their families, while they were away. Peace also facilitated the rise of commerce between the Iroquois and the French. Furthermore, the absence of warfare on the New York frontier allowed an extensive and lucrative trade to develop between Albany and Montreal. Many Iroquois profited by supplying the domiciled Indians, who served as middlemen in this trade, with the goods and services needed for the long journey between Albany and Montreal. Some Iroquois even served as carriers of goods in this Montreal-Albany traffic.

Finally, the Iroquois' policy of peace toward the northern tribes benefited Iroquois society. Peace allowed the Iroquois to maintain close ties with relatives and friends who had moved to Canada. It also may have reduced the tensions and divisions that existed in Iroquois society from factionalism. And peace provided Iroquois society with the opportunity to recover from the devastating Twenty Years' War.
Chapter 8: Notes

1 JR, LAVII, 191-193, 203-205.

2 Parkman, Count Frontenac, 442-452.

3 Livingston, 184, 190; NYCD, IX, 767.

4 Wraxall, 48.

5 Colden, "History...1707-20," 361; Wraxall, 50.

6 MPHC, XXXIII, 328; Colden, "History...1707-20," 362, 364, 365, 369.

7 Charlevoix, History, V, 215, 216; Livingston, 212; NYCD, IX, 828.

8 Colden, "History...1707-20," 403-408; Wraxall, 91; NYCD, V, 284.


10 Wraxall, 103; Colden, "History...1707-20," 428, 429; NYCD, IX, 876.

11 NYCD, IX, 878.

12 Livingston, 231.

13 Wraxall, 146, 148; NYCD, IX, 933, V, 720; Wraxall, 155; NYCD, V, 711, 712.

14 NYCD, IX, 936.

15 NYCD, IX, 1030.

16 NYCD, VI, 148; Claiborne, Mississippi, I, 72.

17 NYCD, VI, 178; Wraxall, 220.

18 NYCD, IX, 1086-1088.


20 JR, LXVII, 191-193; NYCD, IX, 878; JR, LXVII, 121.

21 NYCD, IX, 1052.

22 Wraxall, 207, 208; NYCD, VI, 126.

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23 Colden, "History...1707-20," 361, 428, 429; NYCD, VI, 148, 172, IX, 1073, 1091, 1097, 1098.

24 Livingston, 187, 212; NYCD, V, 712; DHSNY, IV, 240.

25 Charlevoix, History, V, 164; Wraxall, 48; Livingston, 231, 232, 236; Wraxall, 146, 148, 155, 171; NYCD, IX, 933.

26 Wraxall, 48; NYCD, IX, 1081.

27 Wraxall, 110; JR, LXVII, 75, 76; NYCD, IX, 1071; Wraxall, 232-233.

28 NYCD, V, 712.


30 JR, LXVIII, 279; NYCD, IX, 1052; JR, LXIX, 39.

31 Livingston, 190; Colden, "History...1707-20," 361, 395, 397; Wraxall, 50, 220; NYCD, IX, 1030, 1086, 1091.

32 Colden, "History...1707-20," 361, 428, 429; NYCD, VI, 148, 172, IX, 1073, 1091, 1097, 1098.

33 Livingston, 212; NYCD, IX, 828; Colden, "History...1707-20," 403, 404.
Chapter 9: Results of the Restoration Policy

Between 1701 and 1744, the Iroquois devised and implemented a program to restore the power, influence, and prosperity of the Five Nations. This Restoration Policy took several forms. First, the Five Nations followed a policy of neutrality toward the English and French and tried to use both European powers to further their own interests. Second, the Iroquois cooperated with the colonial government of Pennsylvania to gain hegemony over the tribes and lands of Pennsylvania. Third, the Iroquois sought a rapprochement with the powerful western tribes. Fourth, the Five Nations maintained friendly relations with the domiciliated Indians of Canada. And fifth, the Iroquois waged war against the southern tribes. Throughout the first half of the eighteenth century, the Iroquois generally adhered to their Restoration Policy. Sometimes, such as at the Lancaster Conference in 1744, the League Council implemented the strategies. On other occasions, individual Iroquois tribes or persons followed the policy. When taken together, the actions of the Iroquois League Council, tribes, and individuals basically followed the same pattern during the first fifty years of the eighteenth century.

By 1744, the effects of the Restoration Policy on the Six Nations were clearly evident. To begin with, the policy aided the recovery of the Iroquois' economy after the devastating Twenty Years' War. The peace that resulted from the policy enabled the Iroquois to hunt and
farm without having to worry about being attacked by the French or
their Indian allies. The Restoration Policy also gave the Iroquois the
chance to develop a geographic middleman position between the Western
Country and Albany. In this capacity they profited by supplying
western and northern Indians with goods and services as they passed
through Iroquoia en route to and from the Albany trade. In addition,
the Restoration Policy allowed the Iroquois to gain hegemony over the
tribes and lands of Pennsylvania. The Iroquois then profited by sell-
ing these lands to the Pennsylvania government. Furthermore, the
Restoration Policy enabled the Iroquois to gain economic benefits from
both the English and French. The Iroquois traded with both sides, and
at times, the Iroquois received presents and economic assistance from
New France, as well as the English colonies. In short, the Restoration
Policy enabled the Iroquois to develop and maintain the type of rela-
tions with the English, French, and Indians that was most beneficial
to the Iroquois economy.

The Restoration Policy also aided the military recovery of the
Five Nations. Through the policy the borders of Iroquoia were secured
from attack and peace was guaranteed for the Iroquois. The population
of the Five Nations was given the opportunity to recover from the many
casualties it incurred during the Twenty Years' War. The policy also
provided the Iroquois with many new allies, Indian as well as white.
The policy gave the Iroquois the military backing, protection, and
assistance of the English and French. Such alliances assured the
Iroquois of protection from enemy attack. At the same time, however,
the improved military position of the Iroquois was somewhat offset by
the increase in power of the western and northern tribes. By 1744, Iroquois power had grown, but so had the strength of the western Indians. As a result, the Iroquois never fully recovered the military stature they had had in the Western Country prior to 1680. Yet, the Restoration Policy did enable the Iroquois to remain a potent military force in New York.

The Restoration Policy benefited the Iroquois in a third way. It advanced the political power and influence of the Iroquois Confederacy. The policy enabled the Iroquois to develop a close working relationship with both the English and French. The Iroquois' symbiotic relationship with the English was especially important. The English believed that they could utilize the Iroquois Confederacy to further their own goals with other Indian tribes, so they made the Iroquois their primary Indian ally. Such a designation guaranteed the results. By recognizing the Iroquois Confederacy as being most important, the Confederacy did indeed become important. As the first link in England's Covenant Chain Alliance, the Iroquois gained stature and influence among other Indians. The English were then able to utilize the Iroquois to further their own goals. At the same time, the Iroquois were able to use their English connection to advance their own interests with other Indian tribes. In effect, the Iroquois-English relationship proved to be mutually advantageous.

Good relations with New France further contributed to the rise of the Confederacy's political power and influence. The western and northern tribes realized that the Five Nations had French backing, so they had to recognize the Confederacy's status as a political ally of
New France and deal with them accordingly. Iroquois relations with the French and English were two important keys to Iroquois greatness. The Iroquois' connections to the European powers were largely responsible for the rise of the Iroquois' political influence over other Indian tribes during the first half of the eighteenth century.

The Restoration Policy also improved the Iroquois' political position with the English and French. The neutrality that resulted from the policy allowed the Iroquois to play the French and English off against each other. Since neither the French nor English wished to lose the Iroquois to the other side, both were forced to solicit the Iroquois' favor in order to keep their friendship. Neutrality and the Restoration Policy, therefore, advanced the political position of the Iroquois in regard to the English and French colonies, as well as other Indian tribes.

In addition, the Restoration Policy enabled the Iroquois to develop political and military relations with Indian tribes that were beneficial to the Confederacy. The Iroquois were able to secure a lasting friendship with the powerful tribes of the Western Country and Canada. They were able to gain control over the nearby tribes of Pennsylvania and manipulate them to the advantage of the Five Nations. And finally, the Iroquois were able to wage war against the southern tribes without endangering the security of Iroquaia.

Iroquois society was also affected by the Restoration Policy. The policy helped mitigate social divisions by offering accommodation for all groups. Pro-French and pro-English factions thrived under the Restoration Policy, since each had its place of importance and
functions. Political differences between warriors and sachems were likewise accommodated by the Restoration Policy. Social and political crises were thus avoided by the development of an Iroquois society that adhered to the pluralistic goals of the Restoration Policy. The policy affected Iroquois society in other ways. Iroquois relations with other tribes greatly expanded. The Five Nations increased their social contacts with the many tribes that lived around them. Some Iroquois intermarried with the Indians who lived in the Western Country, Canada, or Pennsylvania, and many Iroquois even settled down in the regions inhabited by the western and northern Indians. As a result, the Iroquois population, by 1744, was dispersed and, to a large extent, was integrated with the other Indians of the Northeastern Woodlands.

The Iroquois' Restoration Policy quickly became inoperative after 1744, when new conditions arose. For example, King George's War and the Seven Years' War made it difficult for the Iroquois to remain neutral. When the Iroquois were forced to choose sides, they lost the political advantage that neutrality had given them. Iroquois relations with the western tribes were likewise upset after 1744. Since 1700, Iroquois relations with the western Indians had been based upon mutual needs. The Iroquois needed peace with the western tribes in order to hunt safely in the Western Country. The Iroquois also hoped to avoid war against the powerful western tribes. At the same time, the western Indians needed the Iroquois. Western Indians had to travel through Iroquoia to reach the Albany trade. They also had to remain at peace with the Iroquois in order to satisfy the English, with whom
they wanted to trade. But after 1744, things began to change. The Iroquois lost their geographic middleman position as English traders began to travel to the Western Country to trade directly with the western tribes. By mid-century, the western tribes no longer needed the Iroquois to trade or deal with the English, so the Iroquois lost the leverage they had with those tribes. The loss of Iroquois influence with the western Indians meant a corresponding decrease in the Iroquois' usefulness to the European powers. As France and England increasingly turned their attention to the Western Country, they began to ignore the Iroquois, who no longer had great influence there. Instead, the European powers began to court the friendship of the powerful western tribes, and the Iroquois became less important.

At the same time, Iroquois hegemony over the Pennsylvania tribes began to crumble. Many Pennsylvania tribes, like the Delawares and Shawnees, resented the Iroquois' interference in their affairs; so they moved to Ohio, where they were out of reach of the Confederacy's meddling. The Pennsylvania government then began dealing directly with those tribes. As a result, the Iroquois were no longer needed and lost much of their influence in Pennsylvania.

Aside from losing their influence with the English, French, and western tribes, the Iroquois had other worries. Throughout the 1740s, smallpox, famine, and economic disasters plagued the Six Nations. To make matters worse, some Iroquois began an exodus from Iroquoia in search of better opportunities. Plentiful game and rich farmlands drew many Iroquois to the Western Country. In short, by 1750, the Iroquois Restoration had ended, and the Iroquois were again in decline.
In the end, the Iroquois Restoration was only partially successful. It failed to completely restore the Iroquois to the powerful and influential position they had enjoyed prior to 1680. The Iroquois never regained the control they once exercised over the Western Country. The Restoration Policy also created tensions that hurt the Iroquois in the long run. The policy of neutrality kept alive the fires of factionalism that divided the Iroquois people. The Iroquois' hegemony in Pennsylvania caused bitter resentment by the Shawnees and Delawares, who eventually turned against the Six Nations. And ironically, even the successes of the Restoration Policy that enhanced the influence of the Confederacy undermined the Iroquois, because the Iroquois population became dispersed and weakened as many Iroquois began moving westward where the Iroquois' reputation was great.

Yet, the Iroquois Restoration was more of a success than a failure. The Five Nations did recoup much of their political, military, and economic power. Equally important, the Iroquois Confederacy, through the Restoration Policy, propped itself up and remained a potent political and military force up until mid-century. Only then did the power and prestige of the Iroquois begin to fade.

# # #
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