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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STATES
HAVING THREE FORMS OF TEACHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Nancy Lusk Zimpher, B.S., M.A.

The Ohio State University
1976

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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Generic Problem Area

Tradition of State Control of Education. There exists a strong tradition of state control of education. To quote the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education's Bicentennial Commission, "The Founding Fathers rejected the idea of a national system of education. Instead they left to the states the responsibility for providing educational opportunity for the people."\(^1\) As a consequence, early local lay boards of education were delegated authority by state legislatures for the establishment of standards for public education and for the preparation of personnel who staff elementary and secondary schools.

Although the certification of teachers was historically handled by local boards of education,

after the movement of teacher training into the state university system, this responsibility shifted to a centralized system of control by state boards of education and their education agencies. By 1965, the authority to determine regulations for teacher certification and to issue, re-issue and revoke certificates was almost completely vested by legislative authority in the respective state boards and state departments of education.\(^2\) State boards of education and their education agencies still are largely in control of education at the state level. Therefore, they are definitely the targets of any attempt to change the educational power structure by other constituents of the profession.

**Rationale for State Lay Board Control.** States will continue to have authority for education unless there is a federal constitutional change. However, state legislatures have the prerogative of delegating control of education to an agency or group of their choice. The rationale of state delegation of control of education to an appointed or elected lay board of

education stems from the fact that teaching is a public profession. State boards and state education agencies are viewed as guardians of the public interest. Supporters of state board control believe that those who determine public policy should be representatives of the general public. Further, proponents believe that such control is necessary to protect the public against monopolistic and selfish manipulations which would manifest themselves if the profession were to control its own licensure and standards procedures.\(^3\)

As a result of an extensive investigation of state educational governance structures, Campbell and Mazzoni offer an explanation of why proponents of state lay board control of teacher education are fearful of any diminution of this control by educators.

Critics of the movement to divest SEAs [state education agencies] of their traditional authority for certification maintain that the establishment of independent governing commissions would only fragment further the state education policy system that is presently beset by lack of comprehensive planning, articulation among

state services, and efficient allocation of resources. Of even greater concern is the prospect of educators extending their influence over state policy making for the public schools. Such influence, in the view of many observers, is already excessive compared with that of other groups. And the formation of educator-dominated teacher standards and certification commissions is seen as accelerating the erosion of public control of education.4

Arguments against State Board/Education Agency Control. In contrast, there are several arguments which have been advanced for removing control of the teaching profession from the state board and its education agency. One position taken in this governance struggle is that of the National Education Association (NEA) and its state affiliates, who claim:

The teaching profession must acquire the rights and responsibilities for governing its own standards for admission and retention in teaching. Governance...self-regulation...autonomy for the teaching profession...by whatever name, the meaning is the same: the fixing of responsibility for professional decisions with the teaching profession.5

4Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, State Governance Models for the Public Schools (Columbus: The Ohio State University, Educational Governance Project, 1974), p. 138.

5National Education Association, Division of Instruction and Professional Development, "Special Feature on Governance of the Profession," Today's Education (December 1971):20,22.
Two sub-arguments of this position are that 1) inherent in the definition of a profession is the autonomy of its members, and 2) professional autonomy will offer the public better protection than will lay control. The NEA advocates that control of teacher education at the state level should be delegated by the state legislature to a full-authority or advisory teacher standards and practices board.

A second argument against state agency control of the teaching profession was first posited by Conant, Koerner and other public critics of teacher education in the mid-sixties. The basis for their argument is that the "educational establishment" has, according to Koerner, managed over the years a dangerous degree of control over education and has, in fact, disenfranchised not only classroom teachers but academic scholars and the body politic. Both Koerner and Conant favored restructuring the political apparatus through which school personnel are prepared and licensed. The reformation Koerner suggests could take the form of a new state authority in teacher

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education in which classroom teachers, scholars of the liberal arts, and taxpayers would be enfranchised when heretofore they have been excluded from professional education decision making. 7

A third argument against state agency control is posed by critics of the education enterprise who seek community control over education. The Study Commission on Undergraduate Education states that there has been an "erosion of local cultural authority over education, of local community responsibility and will" 8 in licensing and related processes for accrediting institutions. The commission further claims that the state licensing system does not effectively protect the public from bad teachers or teachers who are ill-prepared to relate to the customs and designs of particular communities. The commission argues that what begins as consumer protection turns into a means for limiting entry to the profession of teaching.


8 Study Commission on Undergraduate Education and the Education of Teachers, Teacher Education in the United States (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1976), p. 101.
a demonstration of professional vested interest rather than public interest. Lierheimer concurs with this assessment and recommends a solution not unlike that of the study commission; that is, to create a new certification authority that would return control to the local districts in developing their own set of teacher standards. What would follow, then, are new participatory patterns unlike either of the previous suggestions for restructuring professional control mechanisms.

Although the NEA, Conant, Koerner and the Study Commission configurations for restructuring the governance of teacher education are all of extreme interest and importance to the educational community, that pattern which has begun to come into existence and therefore lends itself to investigation is the establishment of teacher standards and practices boards. There is very little information about the nature of these boards except for minimal descriptive

9Study Commission on Undergraduate Education and the Education of Teachers, Teacher Education in the United States, p. 119.

data about board composition, responsibilities, staffing, and financing. Although aspects of the report of The Ohio State University Educational Governance Project (EGP) speak to standards and practices board activity in several of the states studied, there exists no intensive determination of 1) how these boards have come into existence, or 2) what effect they are having on professional education policy determination.

In the EGP, Campbell and Mazzoni state:

Whether delegating to educators authority to govern their profession can be made compatible with effective public control of the schools, as advocates claim but opponents deny, is the fundamental question, one that can be answered only by examining operating examples of the different options. At the time of this writing, only a few states have established commissions and they have done so just recently. Therefore, we have no evidence on certification policy making as undertaken by an independent commission compared with the process undertaken by a state education agency.  

The Educational Governance Project was conducted by Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni at The Ohio State University. This study analyzed how states determine educational policies using comparative case studies of twelve states nationally. It also proposed alternative models of state educational governance for consideration by policy makers. Several issues were investigated in each state, one of which was in the area of teacher certification.

Campbell and Mazzoni, p. 140.
Existing Forms of Control of Teacher Education.

Currently there exist two "operating examples of the different options" to traditional state board/education agency control. These options include the establishment in the state statutes of a teacher standards and practices board, with either full authority or advisory responsibility. The three operating forms of control of teacher education in the states are defined as follows:

1) Full authority teacher standards and practices boards: In this instance a fully independent commission can be created by statute to exercise legal jurisdiction over the preparation and licensure of teachers (with ultimate authority resting with the state legislature to modify or repeal the law establishing the commission).

2) Teacher standards and practices boards which are advisory to the state board of education and its education agency: In this instance the responsibility for certain policy making and/or administrative functions can be formally vested in a special commission or board on which educators are heavily represented, but with the power of final approval being retained by the state board of education.

3) State board of education/state educational agency control: In this instance teacher education can continue to be delegated to the state education agency, assisted by an advisory council representing different segments of the profession and the teacher training institutions.
Background of the Study

The literature of teacher education describes the composition of the organized profession and the agendas of many of its constituent groups. It is a literature of intuitive observation and is highly editorial in nature. However the literature does describe those groups (agencies and associations) which are generally considered to be included in the teaching profession; what their roles are in the profession; and what their positions are on the issue of control of the profession. Descriptions of these groups are presented as background to this study because these are the groups which the literature

suggests are influential in the determination of public policy for teacher education.

The State Board/State Education Agency (SBE/SDE). Forty-nine of the fifty states have boards of education, usually composed of lay citizens, to which legislatures have delegated the control and responsibility for K-12 education and the maintenance of professional standards. Each state has a superintendent or commissioner of education, and a department of education consisting of professional and support staff headed by the superintendent. Specific teacher education certification and standards procedures are usually administered within the state department of education by the director of the division of teacher education and certification.

Both the chief state school officer and the director of teacher education and certification are members of national associations which represent their interests at the federal level. These two organizations are: The Council of Chief State School Officers and the National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and Certification.

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14 Campbell and Mazzoni, p. 9.
The establishment of standards and the accompanying power to enforce their compliance are commonly termed the regulatory function. As such, the state board of education (SBE) and the state department of education (SDE) become the chief guardians of the public interest.

All states have certification standards for teachers and for other educational personnel. Kinney defines certification as "a process of legal sanction, authorizing the holder of a credential to perform specific services in the public schools of the state." Its purpose is to establish and maintain standards for the preparation and employment of persons who teach or render certain non-teaching services in the schools. The term "licensure" is often used


18 Ibid., p. 3.
 interchangeably with "certification." The two terms differ primarily on a procedural basis. Certification is a state function. Licensure, on the other hand, is administered by the profession.¹⁹ In regard to certification, SDEs generally have control over issuance, re-issuance and revocation of certificates.²⁰

Accreditation is the maintenance of minimum academic standards for teacher training programs. State education agencies generally have legal authorization for the accreditation of teacher education programs in the state. According to Selden, the process may be called accepting, appraising, approving, classifying, listing, or registering; but, in any case, it means some modified pattern of accreditation.²¹ Such a system facilitates the approved program approach to certification, where graduates are certified if they are products of a state-approved program, rather than having their individual transcripts evaluated.

¹⁹ This study will use the terms licensure and certification interchangeably.

²⁰ Mayor, p. 21.

At least thirty-two states now participate in reciprocal agreements with each other, where a certificate is transferrable from one state to another.

There is great criticism of SBE/SDE control over teacher education, especially because education agencies have more money with which to make resource decisions. Because of the increasing costs of education and the size of resource allocations, state legislatures have become more active in formulating policy for these allocations as well. At the same time, educational interest groups are increasing their activity at the state level in order to gain some access to allocation and policy decisions.\(^{22}\)

There is, as well, the traditional criticism from the teaching profession against lay control. Kemble notes that the teaching profession is almost unique in that lay boards in most states govern professional matters as well as control education.\(^{23}\)

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Yet according to Haberman and Stinnett, there remains a reluctance on the part of legislatures to concede to the teaching profession the same degree of autonomy in its affairs as other professions, on the contention that a public profession such as teaching should remain under the control of the public.  

Also, there are criticisms of the dismal track record of most SBES/SDEs. Lieberman calls this power structure anachronistic and dysfunctional because of its slowness to initiate changes in the educational process. Clark and Marker describe state education agencies as working incrementally at best — or, more likely, as mild depressants to change because change comes slowly in agencies that have traditionally been reactors rather than initiators.

Professors. Some critics would charge that it is the professors of education who are in complete control

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24Haberman and Stinnett, p. 9.


of teacher education. The attack is two-pronged. Critics of the 60's (Koerner and Conant) believed that education professors control teacher education to the exclusion of the liberal arts professors. But Stiles and Carver (1967) surveyed teacher training institutions only to find that a monopoly of power did not exist in colleges of education, but was shared by liberal arts professors. Other accusations have come from organized teachers. In a speech to members of the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE), Collins warns: "Whatever its roots, our failure to recognize classroom colleagues as full partners leaves us open to charges we can disregard only at our peril." Not only are critics charging higher education with exclusion of teachers, they are suggesting collusion with state departments. Commissioner Pittenger of Pennsylvania suggests that


28 Ibid., p. 20.

the flow of program design for teacher education has often been from the university to the state department, not the reverse.\textsuperscript{30}

At present there are approximately 1,350 teacher training institutions in the United States. About 550 are accredited by the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE), a voluntary professional accrediting body for teacher education. Of the 1,350, approximately 800 hold institutional membership in the AACTE. Some members of teacher training institutions are members of the Association for Teacher Educators which also has state affiliate chapters. And numerous professors are members of various content related professional associations.

At present, schools, colleges and departments of education have primary control of the training of teachers. Although not substantively controlled by NCATE, the process these institutions use is subject to NCATE standards if the institution seeks NCATE accreditation. In many states, institutions are accredited by state level visitation teams as well.

\textsuperscript{30}Comments made at the Annual Conference of The Association of Teacher Educators, St. Louis, February, 1976.
Institutions are also being forced in some states to add classroom teachers to college level advisory boards. And they are dictated to in the conduct of their field experiences by components of negotiated contracts drawn up among teachers and administrators in local school districts. Although there is no evidence that representatives of colleges of education are being organized to impact on state legislative activity, they will increasingly be drawn into the fray as teachers continue to seek control of the profession.

The Teachers. The purpose of the National Education Association is: "To evaluate the character and advance the interests of the profession of teaching and to promote the cause of education in the United States." The NEA is one of the largest labor organizations in the world, with a membership of well

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over one million teachers. Rather than reiterate here the lengthy history of the NEA, this section will deal with the agenda most critical to this study -- the NEA's drive toward professionalization.

This movement has manifested itself in the concepts of autonomy and professional control. As Lindsey notes, the true meaning of professional autonomy is that the profession is granted by the public the right to make and carry out decisions that call for professional expertise. The activities of the NEA's former National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards (NCTEPS or TEPS) in establishing professional standards boards were toward making this definition of professional autonomy a reality.

In the NCTEPS report of the New Horizons Project (1961), Lindsey defines a professional as one who:


1) is liberally educated, 2) possesses a body of specialized skills and knowledge, 3) who makes rationale judgments and is responsible for them, 4) serves society rather than personal interest, 5) develops, enforces, and abides by a set of professional standards, 6) is employed full time, and 7) is continually searching for new knowledge. Clearly, meeting the criteria of this definition would confirm what Darland calls the "precedent" for delegating the rights and responsibilities of the profession to the profession.35

The National Education Association position is that for the public welfare, the public must delegate to the teaching profession the responsibility for:
1) licensure, 2) revocation/suspension of licences, 3) accreditation, and 4) the development of programs, studies and research designed to improve teacher education.37 How has the teaching profession organized itself for achieving this responsibility? The

37Ibid., p. 142.
foremost vehicle has been the NEA Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards. This commission was formed in 1946, to assist the profession in developing a set of professional standards and other professional concerns, and to secure public acceptance of the concept of professional responsibility. 38

The TEPS Commission's first move was to form an effective cooperative partnership with the major segments of the profession: the classroom teachers, the staff in teacher training institutions, and state agency personnel. Second, TEPS fostered the creation of both state and local TEPS committees nationally. All fifty states had TEPS committees by 1955. 39 They also formed alliance with state teacher education advisory councils which had been created by SBEs around the 1930's and functioned as advisory to the boards. 40

Although the TEPS Commission was designed to foster


40 Ibid., p. 393.
the acceptance of professional responsibility, it did not succeed in formulating a specific plan of action until 1961. At this time TEPS recommended: "that every state legislature in the United States establish a professional standards board of seven to eleven members as an adjunct to the office of the chief state school officer, but charged with the responsibility for accreditation and certification of professional personnel."

The NEA Professional Rights and Responsibilities Commission (PR&R) joined with NCTEPS in the effort and by 1969, succeeded in fostering the establishment of fifteen practices commissions and one combined standards and practices board, all advisory to either the SBE, the SDE, or both. Not satisfied with that progress, or the nature of the responsibilities of these boards, the PR&R, the NCTEPS and the NEA General Counsel developed a model bill, called The Model Teacher Standards and Licensure Act which state affiliates

\[41\] Lindsey, p. 213.

could use as a model for legislative activity.\footnote{National Education Association, "Special Feature on Governance of the Profession," p. 21.}

While states were not expected to adopt this bill without local conditions, it did represent a carefully developed rationale about the governance of the teaching profession.\footnote{National Education Association, "Special Feature on Governance of the Profession," p. 21.} It called for: 1) thirteen members, 2) appointed by the governor, 3) from a panel of names submitted by groups of certified personnel, 4) to issue four different types of licenses, 5) to revoke and suspend licenses, 6) to study and accredit teacher education programs, and 7) to provide for reciprocity procedures.\footnote{National Education Association, "Special Feature on Governance of the Profession," p. 21.} The boards which have been established are much like the board described in this model bill, with some variations.

The relationship of the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) to the professional standards movement is diffuse. Stinnett suggests two broad purposes for professional associations: 1) to nurture altruistic, intellectual and spiritual qualities basic to the
profession; and 2) the bread and butter purpose, to further the economic welfare of its members. The NEA is criticized for its over-emphasis on the former, and its lack of aggressive concern in the latter. In contrast, the AFT is seriously deficient in the former. It has no real program for certification, accreditation, or professional ethics.

Advocates of the NEA posture say it is a mistake to assume that economic gains can be achieved only in one way; that improving the quality of education will increase public support. Because the schism of the two teacher education organizations is clear (NEA wants unity; AFT wants AFL-CIO membership), the public agenda of these two groups is likely not to be concurrent in the near future.

Administrators. The literature of teacher education that deals in any way with the politics of professionalization makes little note of interest

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48 Stinnett, p. 173.
groups other than teachers, professors and members of SBEs/SDEs. It does notice the expulsion of administrators from the ranks of the NEA, but says little about the current concerns of groups like the American Association of School Administrators (AASA), the National Association of Secondary School Principals (NASSP), and the National Association of Elementary School Principals (NAESP). However, writers in the area of the politics of education do discuss the basis of influence of administrators in policy matters, if not specifically in decision-making in teacher education. According to Wirt and Kirst:

The administrators association's influence lies in the nature of its membership - school superintendents are highly respected members of their communities with an image as local experts on education. Consequently, they enjoy easier access to state legislators than do teachers.49

As is apparent in the review of related research in the politics of education, which appears in Chapter Two, administrator groups are active in policy formation regarding educational decisions at the state level.

As well, these groups are included in a group called "the Big Six" which is extremely interactive in federal legislative decision-making on education.\(^{50}\) For these reasons, the administrator associations are integral interest groups worth investigating in teacher education policy study.

**Parents.** Other interest groups, although not composed of professionals, are also interested in educational policy as an end in itself. The largest of these groups is the National Congress of Parents and Teachers (referred to as the PTA).\(^{51}\) At the state level the PTA usually aligns itself with school administrators. At the local level, this group is primarily concerned with the specific issues which face a particular school. In fact, the PTA is most active at the local level, as contrasted with state activity. According to Wirt and Kirst, "the PTA is viewed by legislators as a useful friend but not a very bothersome enemy."\(^{52}\) As with administrator


\(^{51}\)Wirt and Kirst, p. 53.

\(^{52}\)Ibid., p. 54.
groups, little mention is made of the PTA in the literature of teacher education, and in the governance debates of the profession. However, any attempts to arrest control of education from SBE/SDE units revolves around the issue of lay control which is as well a PTA concern.53

School Boards. Members of local school boards generally maintain membership in the state affiliate of the National School Boards Association (NSBA). Currently membership rates at the state level include approximately 90% of the local school board members of a given state. According to Wirt and Kirst, affiliates of the NSBA usually do not generate policy. Instead they act as watchdogs over public school legislation introduced by others.

Further, school board members feel that they represent both schools and the taxpayers, and therefore should represent schools at the state capital instead of public school employees.54 Like parents, school board members can also be expected to defend

lay control of education in any ensuing debate over the governance of the education profession. Some mention will be made again of the administrator, parent and school board groups in their political activities as summarized in the following chapter.

Statement of the Problem

State control of education includes the control of teacher education. Traditionally states have delegated control of teacher education to state lay boards of education and their education agencies. Constituents of the education profession are challenging state board/state agency control of teacher education by encouraging state legislatures to create autonomous teacher standards and practices boards, composed primarily of teachers, with the responsibility for teacher education certification and accreditation. Consequently there exist currently three operating forms of state control of teacher education, as follows:

1) Full authority teacher standards and practices board control.

2) State board of education and state education agency control, with a statutory advisory teacher standards and practices board.
3) State board of education and state education agency control.\textsuperscript{55}

The problem considered in the study was: In order to have control and understanding of what is happening to us in teacher education, we need to determine what variables, actors and conditions may be resulting in each of the three forms of teacher education control described above.

This study described, analyzed and compared the activities which have occurred in three state legislatures which have considered the adoption of teacher standards and practices boards. The investigation included the study of one state legislature which passed a full authority teacher standards and practices board bill (Oregon), one state legislature which passed an advisory board bill (Pennsylvania), and one state legislature which considered teacher standards and practices board legislation, but did not act on the legislation (Ohio). Further, this study described and analyzed how the two boards which were enacted were implemented and contrasts their implementation

\textsuperscript{55}These three operating forms of control of teacher education are described on page 9 of this study.
to the organizational aspects of the state board of education and its education agency in the state whose legislature did not enact a teacher standards and practices board bill.

Significance of the Study

This study is significant for students and practitioners concerned with the governance of teacher education in several ways. First, this study was about policy development in teacher education. According to Rich, the simplest and most basic reason for studying policy is that it has a significant effect on the lives of everyone. All organizations, he says, are regulated by policy, and the educational system is no exception. Therefore, as teacher educators it is crucial that we be able to understand and explain phenomena which result from educational policy decisions in teacher education.

Second, this study attempted to generate hypotheses that can be tested in future studies of other states where standards and practices boards exist or

have been defeated, to formulate models of political interaction which determine policy outcomes in teacher education. The end result of this study was to explore the problem area and to analyze and categorize the data, to the end that hypotheses could be generated for later study of additional states and policy issues.

Third, educational interest groups in other states can use the conclusions drawn in this study to develop their own influence resources to impact on passage or defeat of standards and practices board legislation.

Fourth, although studies in the politics of education probably have identified most of the interest groups observed in this study, the inclusion here of higher education interest groups presents an area of study about which little data exist. The findings of this study make an initial contribution to the study of higher education personnel as interest group participants in the legislative policy process.

And fifth, as the review of related research shows, educational researchers are becoming increasingly more comfortable with the use of the methodologies of political scientists to study educational
phenomena. However, no investigations in teacher education have attempted to employ these same methods, with the exception of the Educational Governance Study's minor treatment of the certification issue. Therefore, this study is significant because it was an initial attempt to employ the research methods of political science in the study of teacher education. As well this study was based on the conceptual framework of political systems analysis and a model of the policy delivery system. This study tested the applicability of those concepts to the study of teacher education policy making.

Assumptions

This study was based on the following assumptions:
1) that politics is an interactive phenomena where individuals use whatever resources they possess to influence policy decisions;\(^\text{57}\)
2) that policy-making

in education is a political phenomenon;\(^\text{58}\) 3) that educators, both individually and as members of interest groups, do compete with each other and/or form coalitions to try to influence educational decision-making in the political arena; and 4) that individuals active in a political situation are an appropriate source of information about how political activity occurs.

Limitations

The primary limitation of this study is in the causal-comparative methodology which it employed. Although educators often use this methodology to explain phenomena, this method of research has its limitations. According to Van Dalen,\(^\text{59}\) lack of control is the greatest weakness of the causal-comparative method. For instance, if a descriptive study produces data which indicate a relationship


between two variables, the researcher might conduct an experiment and control all other variables. However in a descriptive study, the best that can be done is to test relationships between as many variables as possible to test and rule out unrelated factors. Also, if the significant variable is not included among the factors being considered in the study, the cause may not be ascertained at all. For these reasons the researcher must possess considerable general knowledge of the phenomenon studied in order to identify possible relevant causes.

In addition, a complex phenomenon is usually the result of multiple causation — several important factors interacting to cause an event. Or, a complex phenomenon may occur in one instance for one reason and in another instance for yet a different reason. Even when factors evolve as important, it may be difficult to determine which factor was causal and which was the resultant effect. And finally, the researcher must define the variables under consideration with extreme care in order to produce useful data about the phenomenon under study. However, also according to Van Dalen, causal-comparative studies "...do provide a means of tackling problems that
cannot be probed in laboratory situations, and they
do yield valuable clues concerning the nature of
phenomena.\textsuperscript{60}

Generalizations for the national picture are very
difficult to draw because of the use of the case study
approach in only three states. However, this is an
exploratory study and an hypotheses-generating, not
an hypotheses-confirming study. Also, it is hoped
that the comparative nature of the study will assist
in the generation of patterns across the three states
that will apply in some ways to other states.

This study employed the interview technique as
one method of data collection. Tests for reliability
and validity are as appropriate for the interview
technique as for other types of measuring instruments.
However, some of the methods of testing reliability
and validity are often not feasible to gather or
conduct.\textsuperscript{61} Although the researcher attempted to
protect the reliability and validity of the interview
schedule, it may be a limitation of this study that

\textsuperscript{60}Van Dalen, p. 216.

\textsuperscript{61}Claire Selltiz, et al., Research Methods in
Social Relations (Henry Holt and Company, 1959),
p. 277.
yet other tests for reliability and validity were not employed.

And finally, the use of a political systems analysis approach as the conceptual framework for describing and categorizing data in this study may be considered by some readers as a limitation. Wirt and Kirst summarize criticisms of systems analysis as of basically two kinds: 1) that such analysis is ineffective and 2) that it is an undesirable way to think about an issue or an institution because of what it implies about the values of man and society. It is unnecessary here to elaborate on the totality of the criticisms or the rejoinders to these critiques. Although critics may perceive systems analysis as inappropriate, this research was based on the best of what systems analysis can do, as explained by Sroufe below:

We may use the systems approach as a conceptual framework which provides a model, a definitional question, boundaries, and analytic concepts and questions. It can assist us in describing and comparing systems that are important to us; it may help us to understand but it will not lead to a theory of politics of education. We will not be able to explain on the formal scientific sense; we will be able to tell what happened, and [provide] informal speculation about why it happened. 63

CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF RELATED RESEARCH

Introduction

The preceding chapter discussed the general problem area and the background for this study. This chapter reviews the related research from which the research questions evolved to guide the study. These questions are included in this chapter. There is no evidence in the literature of teacher education of the empirical study of the political interactions of the teaching profession. Consequently, the investigator had to rely on the research conducted in the area of the politics of education to guide in formulating this study. One could assume that there are three levels of related literature that would have provided information for this study.

First, and on the broadest level, there is the general literature on governance. It includes definitional and conceptual writings on politics and influence, policy making, and federal, state and
local political systems. Many of these works were used as background resources for the researcher.\(^1\)

In addition, there is an entire research literature of political science which relates the concepts and definitions of the discipline to studies of legislatures, voter behavior, and the politics of federal, state and local policies and programs. Some of these studies were referred to by the researcher as well.\(^2\) However, because the research related to the politics of education seemed to provide adequate background for this study, the general governance research is not reported in this chapter.


The second level of related literature includes research on the politics of education; and the third level, research on the politics of teacher education. What follows is a discussion of some of the most thorough and significant research studies in the politics of education which relate to the problem of this study. With the exception of the Educational Governance Project, these studies do not deal with teacher education. However, in all cases they are studies of the same subsystem, the state government unit, as was used in the framework of this study. There is, to date, no research on the politics of teacher education besides the EGP data.

Research on the Politics of Education

Three Landmark Studies. In the early sixties three landmark studies were conducted relative to the politics of education. In the first of these, Bailey, et al., investigated eight northeastern states to analyze school politics at the state level. The basic proposition of this study was that the amount of money state governments make available for general

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aid to public schools is determined politically. The findings confirmed the highly political nature of government support for education. Schoolmen (professional educators, state educational officials and leaders of professional associations) were found to experience success in direct relation to the sophistication of their understanding of the political instruments available to them. The investigators also found that certain kinds of political contexts enhance the success of schoolmen in this arena, and certain contexts hinder them as follows:

Enhancements: Strong executive and legislative leadership, active SDEs, disciplined political parties, coordinated educational pressure groups.

Hindrances: Strong localism, fragmented political parties, a rural population, inadequate SBEs/SDEs, weak executive and legislative leaders.

Finally, the Bailey study identified four types of leadership exhibited by schoolmen in politics.

1. Intellectual leadership - elaborating a need, studying existing laws, testing options and suggesting appropriate legislative language.

\footnote{Ibid., p. 104.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 104.}
2. Private interest group leadership - mobilizing consent, fertilizing grass roots, exploiting the media, and lobbying.

3. Bureaucratic leadership - helping in research and statistical analysis, in knowledge of education needs, in support of the state board, and in knowledge of the legislative process.

4. Political leadership - where schoolmen get politicians to act as sponsors and energizers and provide schoolmen with access to party politics.6

Bailey found that of all these factors, political leadership was the key to the success in the political arena.7

The study conducted by Usdan investigated the political power of education in New York State to find answers to these questions: Who articulates the educational demands? To what extent are the educational interests unified and cohesive? What strategy and tactics are employed to influence decisions?8 Usdan found the New York legislature efficiently organized, well-staffed and well-paid, and the

6Ibid., pp. 105-108.
7Ibid., p. 108.
educational organizations in the state well-directed and mobilized. In fact, the high degree of cooperation among professional organizations was an instrumental factor in their legislative success. Usdan also attributed the success of educational interests in New York State to the well-informed and responsible leadership of the state-wide education organizations and to the emphasis of these groups in improving education generally. Usdan concluded: "Undue emphasis in vested interest or 'bread and butter' issues such as salaries and other teacher benefits gives the educational interests a public image of selfishness, and in reality often decreases the prospects for desired legislation."  

In the third study, Masters, et al., visited three midwestern states to determine sources of power and the realities of the political process of education

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9 Ibid., p. 65.
10 Usdan, p. 65.
11 Ibid., p. 69.
12 Ibid., p. 69.
in those states. Several of their conclusions are relevant to this study. Masters found that the context for educational policy was either clearly identified with established influence systems or it is fragmented and fraught with a high degree of uncertainty. In order to be effective, school leaders had become a part of or attached themselves to the recognized leadership within the power structure. Issues did not generally come from great public pressure or protest, but became highly controversial to the public once on the legislative agenda. And finally, though specific to revenue, certain issues did activate groups that were capable of exerting strong counter pressures and manipulating strong consensus-building symbols in opposition to proposed changes or increases in expenditure levels.

14 Ibid., pp. 262-263.
15 Ibid., p. 264.
16 Ibid., p. 266.
17 Ibid., p. 267.
In his classic volume on politics in education, Iannaccone synthesized the findings of these three studies by looking at the patterns of political activity and generalizing about these patterns in a four-part typology as follows:

1. Locally-based disparate: where localism characterizes the linkages between educationists and the legislature, and schoolmen represent their school district first of all.

2. State-wide monolithic: where schoolmen customarily speak to the legislature on behalf of education.

3. State-wide fragmented: where state-wide associations of school board members, teachers of the AFT and NEA state affiliates, school administrators and parent groups come to the legislature disunited, often in conflict rather than consensus, injecting separate competitive proposals into the legislative process.

4. State-wide syndical: where the link is a formal governmental unit, like a state commission, usually created by the legislature, which forms an official state-wide coalition.18

Additional Related Studies. Several other related studies suggested other aspects of the political process of education. In a study of the politics

18Iannaccone, pp. 47-50.
of local school systems, Wirt and Kirst found that, in the state conversion process, all states were alike in being the object of increased political demands about school policies -- curriculum, training of professionals, finances, and so on.\textsuperscript{19} He further suggested that the legislatures which allocated educational resources at the state level did not operate independently of their environment, and that the impact of interest groups had been substantial.\textsuperscript{20} And finally, it was not the size of the education lobby that guaranteed success in the legislature, but rather the strategy of coalition that was most effective for educational interest groups.\textsuperscript{21}

In a study of education policy-making and the state legislature, Milstein and Jennings confirmed the importance of interest groups in legislative activity. They found that as states have increased their support of public education, education interest

\textsuperscript{19}Wirt and Kirst, p. 145.  
\textsuperscript{20}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 122.  
\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 128.
groups have increased their state level activities.\textsuperscript{22} Through surveys and interviews of legislators and other legislative participants, the authors were able to draw the following conclusions: 1) party politics is still very important to success in the legislative arena,\textsuperscript{23} 2) having information is important to legislators, 3) there is special interest in developing particular expertise in the legislature,\textsuperscript{24} and 4) interest groups were successful if they possessed the following influence mechanisms -- control over information, expertise, a demonstrated interest in child welfare, and the power to control votes in the general populace.\textsuperscript{25}

All of the above studies assisted in the identification of actors in the legislative process who should be considered in this study: executive


\textsuperscript{23}Milstein and Jennings, Educational Policy-Making and the State Legislature, p. 126.

\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 126.

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., p. 131.
officials, legislators, members of SBEs and SDEs, members of professional associations, and members of other interest groups. As Milstein and Jennings note in the New York study:

The criteria of persistence over time and intensity and focus of interest led to the selection of the groups depicted [in their study] as those interest groups most critical to the educational policy-making process at the state level in New York. Preliminary identification was made after reviewing past studies of educational interest groups...followed by discussions with legislative leaders and officials in the executive branch...concerning the most important educational interest groups.26

This mode of selection was essentially duplicated in the study reported in the following chapters.

Some of these studies also suggested ways in which these actors use their resources to influence the policy process individually and in coalitions. However, they do not deal with the issues specifically related to teacher education -- such as certification, standards, or professional control.

The Educational Governance Project. In the Educational Governance Project (EGP), professional certification was one of four issue areas researched

26Ibid., p. 83.
In each of twelve states studied. In relation to certification, three states of the twelve were recently or at the time of the investigation, involved in some deliberation relative to the governance of teacher education in the state. Before reporting the general findings of the EGP, selected findings in these three states will be summarized.

a. California

According to Aufderheide, teacher certification had been an intense controversy in California as far back as 1961, with the introduction of complex certification legislation, known as the Fisher Bill. It was the creation of the Citizens Advisory Committee in 1958 that two years later led to the introduction of the Fisher Bill. During 1970, the certification issues arose again and resulted in the passage of the Ryan Act, the Teacher Preparation and Licensure Act.

27 Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Educational Governance Project, 1974), p. 20.

28 J. A. Aufderheide, State Policy Making for the Public Schools of California (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Educational Governance Project, 1974), p. 55.
of 1970.29 This act created an independent commission to administer teacher certification standards and it effectively removed from the chief state school officer, the SBE and the SDE any substantial control over the administration of teacher education. Aufderheide noted that the legislation was approved during the last months of the Rafferty era and immediately preceding the election of the state superintendent.30 Supported by the California Teachers Association as a measure to give teachers more voice in licensing, this act was "the last example of a series of legislative moves to take power away from Max [Rafferty], as well as an example of the effect the personality of one individual can have on the political process."31

b. Massachusetts

In Massachusetts, in 1965, a committee concerned with certification recommended reform to the General Court (state legislature).32 Most of its

29 Ibid., p. 55.
30 Ibid., p. 56.
31 Ibid., p. 56.
32 Peggy M. Siegel, State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Massachusetts (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Educational Governance Project, 1974), p. 110.
recommendations were not adopted but the General Court did establish the Massachusetts Advisory Council on Education (MACE) to study the situation. In 1968, MACE published its findings, recommending a commission with quasi-legal powers to have full responsibility for certifying and improving educational personnel. This and other advisory boards have been suggested since 1968, but had failed to be accepted. In 1970, the SBE created its own Professional Standards Board along the MACE guidelines, but without statutory authority. Finally in 1973, the General Court did pass a bill creating a Professional Standards Advisory Commission.\(^{33}\) Siegel suggested several reasons for preceding failures and final passage of this certification bill: 1) the bill was not passed until educational interest groups were able to reach a consensus behind the scenes rather than before members of the Legislature; 2) interest groups had not been able to win the support of the Senate Education Committee chairperson, and did not experience success until a new chairperson was appointed; and 3) there was other education legislation pending which until 1973 received

\(^{33}\)Ibid., p. 117.
much of the legislature's attention, rather than the low-salient certification legislation. In summary, the certification issue in Massachusetts had become a legislative issue, affected only slightly by the weak bargaining power of the SDE.

c. Minnesota

Also in 1973, the Minnesota Legislature created the Teacher Standards and Certification Commission with authority to formulate preparation and licensure policy, subject to SBE approval. Both the Minnesota Education Association (MEA) and the Minnesota Federation of Teachers (MFT) took credit for originating this "self-determination" movement, with the MFT really getting it introduced and the MEA actually pushing it through the legislature. Of the three professional practices boards presented in the EGP, this one was the most elaborately detailed in its movement through the legislative process. Without repeating these

34Ibid., pp. 118-120.
36Tim L. Mazzoni, State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Minnesota (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University, Educational Governance Project, 1974), p. 106.
details, the observations drawn by Mazzoni will be reviewed. First the MFT had favored an advisory board, and the MEA a board with full legal authority. Therefore, in this instance, the MEA, not the MFT, propounded the more radical posture.37 Second, it was teacher power more than any other factor that caused the successful outcome of this bill in the legislature.38 Third, in addition to SDE opposition to this board as a threat to its power, the most "die hard" opposition came from the higher education teacher training institutions.39 And fourth, only when the MEA and the MFT were able to settle their differences and unite into one of the most formidable lobbies did the legislation succeed.40 Further, Mazzoni identified the influence resources of both the MEA and MFT as follows:

**MEA**
1. expertise on the legislation
2. professional lobbyists

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37Ibid., p. 119.
38Ibid., p. 119.
39Ibid., p. 117.
40Ibid., p. 119.
3. good communications with the local education associations
4. a large and active membership
5. the resources to offer candidate backing to supporters in the legislature

MFT
1. a strong lobbying force
2. candidate support in general elections

In his summary of the EGP findings, Nystrand offered several observations about the way the primary actors in the respective states interact to effect policy decisions. State boards of education were found to be most important in New York, Texas and Minnesota, although not particularly in relation to the certification issue. SBEs primarily gave legitimation to the proposals presented to them by chief state school officers, but had little direct

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41 Ibid., pp. 136-137.

role in contributing to policy decisions enacted by legislatures. The chief state school officers were perceived as from moderately to highly influential in policy decisions, and more likely reflected the interests of administrators and board members than those of other interest groups.

Governors tended to work primarily in the issue areas of their election platform and were most useful as access points to the legislature for certain interest groups. Teacher associations were ranked as the most influential of the education interest groups, followed by SBEs, administrators and teacher federations. But all legislatures appeared to be less inclined to accept the advice and policy wishes of educators at face value, and were often more interested in their constituents' concerns. And finally, in a comparative analysis of the linkage systems identified in the EGP to those identified by

43 Ibid., p. 377.
44 Ibid., pp. 378-379.
46 Ibid., p. 381.
47 Ibid., p. 383.
Iannaccone, the data show little evidence of statewide monolithic behavior, and the syndicated typology (referred to on page 45 of this chapter) existed only in Illinois.\textsuperscript{48}

Research Questions

The findings cited in the above studies on the politics of education suggest certain characteristics that appear to impact on policy-making; that is, that certain interest groups use various resources to influence educational decisions. There is reason to believe that these same groups and variables would also be operating when teacher education decisions are made. The purpose of this study is to determine which of these groups and variables are the same and which ones are different in relation to three different forms of teacher education governance. The following research questions have guided this investigation:

1. What was the historical context for teacher education control in each of the states studied which led to the introduction of a teacher standards and practices board bill in each state legislature? What was the nature of the legislation?

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., pp. 381-382.
2. Who were the major actors and interest groups who were involved in the legislative activity related to the introduction and disposition of a teacher standards and practices board bill?

3. What were the positions taken by the actors and interest groups who were identified?

4. Which influence resources were used by the actors and interest groups identified and how were the resources used (i.e., to what effect)?

5. What characteristics of the legislative setting impacted on the teacher standards and practices board legislation (e.g., the legislative docket, party politics, composition of the education committee)?

6. How did all of the actors and interest groups interact in the legislature to impact in the final disposition of the teacher standards and practices board legislation? Which were the most significant factors which influenced the disposition of the legislation?

7. What is the nature of the policies produced in composition, authority, terms, appointments, agenda, finances, and exemplary policies?

8. What is the structure of teacher education governance in the state where a nondecision occurred?

9. How did the implementation variables considered in this study impact on the implementation of enacted teacher standards and practices board legislation?

10. In what way are the implementation variables studied related to the activity in the state where a nondecision occurred?

11. Did persons or conditions active in the policy production phase effect implementation?
CHAPTER THREE

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter Two of this study presented a review of research which has been completed in the general area of the politics of education. As well, three studies were discussed which dealt specifically with the politics of teacher education. This chapter describes and presents the conceptual framework from political science in which this study was conducted. It also presents the methodology that was used in this study.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework used in this investigation was drawn from the related concepts, assumptions and questions that have been used in studies of political science and the politics of education. ¹

¹These studies include those cited earlier by Wirt and Kirst, Milstein and Jennings, and the Educational Governance Project. In addition, the use of conceptual models by Graham Allison in Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971) provided background information.
As scholars of political science suggest, there is little existing theory, in the traditional sense of the term, to allow for explanation and prediction of political phenomena. Instead, political scientists have sought ways to analyze and categorize these phenomena through the use of what Wirt and Kirst call "heuristic theory." This study was based on the heuristic scheme of Easton's framework for political phenomena.

2 Theory in its traditional sense is directed toward explanation and prediction by means of "a set of...related propositions which include among them some law-like generalizations, and which can be assigned specific truth value via empirical tests." In the absence of theory, Gregor suggests heuristic theory which is "not so much a predictive scheme as a method of analytically separating and categorizing items in experience." [See A. James Gregor, "Political Science and the Uses of Functional Analysis," American Political Science Review, 62 (1968), p. 425; and Wirt and Kirst, Political and Social Foundations of Education, pp. 12-13.] As Gregor and Wirt and Kirst suggest, this study employed a framework for political analysis which does not, in the true sense of the term, also represent theory. The framework merely resembles theory in that it provides a way of organizing data or events.
analysis and on allocative theory.\(^3\)

**Systems Analysis.** Simply stated, the political systems approach presents an interactive model in which demands are converted through the policy-making process into authoritative decisions.\(^4\) According to Meranto:

\[\ldots\text{the systems approach posits the proposition that the subject matter of political science may be viewed as a system because it is designed to focus on the set of interrelationships among political actors and institutions. These actors, working through the institutions, produce authoritative decisions concerning which competing political goals and aspirations will be written into public policy and consequently will be enforced by the legitimate power of the state. Such behavior and structures may be viewed as a system because the various parts are interrelated in such a manner that variation}\]

\(^3\) The systems framework is from David Easton's [A Systems Analysis of Political Life](https://www.jstor.org/stable/27841667) (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965). The application of allocative theory is from the EGP use of it as described by Mazzoni. The use of allocative theory adds to the political systems analysis the use of influence as "the dynamic in the pattern of actor relationships by which functions are performed, conflicts overcome, and decisions are reached." [See Roald F. Campbell and Tim L. Mazzoni, State Policy Making for the Public Schools (Berkeley: McCutchan Publishing Corporation, 1976), p. 8 and also Lasswell's Politics: Who Gets What, When, How?]  

in any one part has an impact on the remaining sectors. 5

As Wirt and Kirst describe the Political systems model:

This relationship is one in which stress in other subsystems of the social environment generates inputs of demands and supports upon the political system, which then reduces or converts these inputs into public decisions or outputs, which in turn feed back allocated values into the society whence the process began. 6

Figure 1 is a sketch of this set of interactions.

FIGURE 1

A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM

Environment

Demands

Support

The Political System

Decisions and Actions

Outputs

Environment

Environment


As will be shown in this chapter, the simplified model of a political system was further refined for use in this study. However, a somewhat fuller explanation of systems analysis is appropriate here before proceeding. To begin with, the environment which surrounds the political system is composed of the "general environment" and the "immediate environment." By "general environment" is meant the physical, socio-economic and political milieu that forms the backdrop for policy making.\(^7\) Information about the general environment includes readily accessible data on such items as demographic trends, political climate, and economic conditions. The immediate environment includes all the different persons who on occasion may interact in the political system.\(^8\)

According to Wirt and Kirst, outputs of the environment and hence inputs to the political system, "concentrate and mirror everything in the environment that is relevant to political stress."\(^9\) A demand is


\(^8\)Ibid., p. 6.

\(^9\)Wirt and Kirst, p. 15.
defined as:

pressures on the government regarding specific policy decisions and the supports that show an acceptance of a demand. 10

An output is:

whatever change occurs from the demand, which may take the form of new values, binding decisions or actions. 11

For purposes of this study, the political systems approach was adapted to a political science model of the policy delivery system. Figure 1 can be reduced to three component parts: input, conversion, and output. Van Meter and Van Horn suggest a systems model for studying these three stages in terms of a system where demands are created, are processed through some type of conversion system, and subsequently produce a policy. 12 However, in the Van Meter and Van Horn model, not only is the formulation of the policy studied, but as well its implementation and performance. An adaptation of this model is displayed in Figure 2.

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10 Easton, p. 38.
11 Ibid., p. 348.
12 Van Meter and Van Horn, p. 1.
FIGURE 2

THE POLICY DELIVERY SYSTEM

The Environment of the System

DEMANDS AND RESOURCES → CONVERSION PROCESS → POLICY → IMPLEMENTATION → PERFORMANCE

Feedback


The political systems approach is a way of viewing policy making as "an interactive process through which inputs, including demands for change, are converted into outputs, including authoritative decisions." ¹³ This is a system where the general and immediate environments of a particular system impact on the system to create outputs, identified as policy decisions.

Campbell and Mazzoni suggest three advantages to the use of such a conceptual framework:

¹³Campbell and Mazzoni, State Policy Making for the Public Schools, p. 5.
1) it constitutes an appropriate frame of reference for investigating what actors actually do in the decision of policy;

2) it delineates clusters of activities that are likely to be found across policy systems; and

3) it stresses preenactment processes, processes that are crucial in establishing the agenda of policy options from which final choices are typically made.  

The limitations of this framework are delineated in Chapter One.

Allocative Theory. Campbell and Mazzoni suggest that the political systems orientation, though necessary, is not sufficient to examine how education policy is made.  

Lasswell defines politics as "the study of influence and the influential." This definition supports the use of allocative theory in studying influence as "the dynamic" in the pattern of actor relationships in policy making. Several concepts are relevant to this view of the policy making process:

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14 Ibid., p. 8.
15 Ibid., p. 8.
16 Lasswell, p. 3.
17 Campbell and Mazzoni, State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis, p. 7.
power - the process of affecting policies of others with the help of [...threatened] severe deprivations for nonconformity with the policies intended.  

influence - when one person, without resorting to either a tacit or an overt threat of severe deprivation, causes the second to change his course of action.  

Nuttall, et al., emphasizes the use of power or influence (often used interchangeably in the literature) as achieving results in the political system "based on access to some form of resource" defined below:

resource - anything which allows one actor to control, provide, or apply a sanction [of reward or harm] to another actor.  

Using a combination of the above definitions, this study used allocative theory to consider the influence resources of various actors in the political system. 

*Systems Analysis and Allocative Theory Adapted to the Politics of Teacher Education.* It is now appropriate to consider the adaptation of political


19Ibid., p. 30.  

systems analysis and allocative theory to this study. Following on Iannaccone's contention about the political nature of education,²¹ this study extends that assumption to the political nature of teacher education. Because the establishment of teacher standards and practices boards occurs in the legislative arena, and involves competition for resources, the problem of this study was assumed to be political in nature.

According to Easton, "a point of departure for theoretical analysis assumes without further inquiry that political interactions in a society constitute a system of behavior."²² For purposes of this study, this framework was adjusted from the total societal level to the state level. Therefore, the unit of analysis of this study was the legislative branch of state government. The basic argument developed in this study was that a new output -- a teacher standards and practices board -- was the result of a mixture of past and immediate changes, both in the environment and within the political system, which came together in a unique grouping capable of

²¹Iannaccone, p. 39.
²²Easton, p. 18.
generating and subsequently getting implemented a new public policy.

This study analyzed two aspects of the state policy system: policy production and policy implementation (see Figure 2, page 64). It compared the policy decisions which occurred in two states (Oregon and Pennsylvania) to the non-decision which occurred in one state (Ohio).

In the policy production phase of this investigation the following variables were considered: the nature of the demands from the environment and political system which caused the policy (teacher standards and practices boards) to be passed or defeated; the nature of the conversion process; and the policy output.

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23 Bachrach and Baratz (Power and Poverty, pp. 3-16, 54) define an approach to the study of the political process which considers decisions and non-decisions. In both instances power is exercised. In decisions, persons use their power to make decisions that affect others. In non-decisions, persons use their power to prevent potentially dangerous issues from being raised. In non-decisional situations a policy recommendation may never reach the legislative agenda, or it may be introduced in the legislature and subsequently abandoned. This study looked at the consequences of power at both the decision and non-decisional levels.
The environments which surround this subsystem include the general environment (see definition, page 62), which included accessible data on the characteristic features of a state's political culture; and the immediate environment, which included various individuals and groups with interest in state teacher education policies, which might be expressed in the form of political demands. In this study, when these individuals interacted collectively they were referred to as an interest group. Further, the term "interest group" was used to refer to all groups external to the legislature who sought to influence decision making in the legislature. These actors, as identified by existing research and elaborated on in Chapter One (see Background of the Study), included members of state boards of education and state departments of education, professors, teachers, administrators, parents and school board members.

Referring back to Figure 2, the above interest groups were considered to be the sources for demands in the policy process. These actors were considered to have used influence resources (see section on allocative theory, page 65) to help give them access to the legislature and to help them interact within
the legislative conversion process.

There is a great deal of discussion in the literature as to what constitutes an influence resource. The classic typology is that of French and Raven, who suggest the following five "bases of power": 1) reward power; 2) coercive power; 3) referent power; 4) expert power; and 5) legitimate power. The EGP paid special attention to legal authority, information and specialized expertise, social status, group cohesion, and electoral potency. In the final analysis of the data, the concept of time (how much actual time an actor had to invest in the policy process) was added as an influence resource.

The typology used in this study is a combination and elaboration of the French and Raven and EGP typologies. Also, this typology uses the resource of power as defined by Bachrach and Baratz. The variables in this typology are:


25 Campbell and Mazzoni, State Policy Making for the Public Schools: A Comparative Analysis, p. 11.

26 Ibid., p. 11.
1) expertise - information, research ability, data on need.

2) authority - legal or legitimate power in the formal government structure to effect decision making.

3) coercive power - effecting decisions by threat of deprivation to those affected by the decision.

4) membership - size of the paying membership and funds used from dues for legislative activity; also includes campaign funds.

5) voting power - number of votes a group can generate; also grass roots control over membership.

6) access - availability to the legislative system through particular politicians, political parties, or executive officers; presentation of testimony.

7) social status - respect the group can generate in the legislature; credibility among legislators.

8) coalition - a resource only when several groups can "deliver" other groups.

In addition to considering the environment from which demands and resources evolved to impact on policy formulation, the policy implementation phase was studied as well. In the policy implementation phase a set of intervening variables was considered which might effect the linkage between policy formulation and the performance of the policy. The implementation variables used in this study are defined as follows:
1) policy standards and objectives - the specification of the overall goals of a policy decision.

2) policy resources - funds or other incentives that encourage or facilitate effective implementation of a policy.

3) agenda-building - how agendas are established; who has access to the organization.

4) inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities - the clarity of the policy's objectives; how accurately they are communicated and how they are achieved.

5) characteristics of the implementing agencies - the factors that impinge on an organization's capacity to implement policy (e.g., size, vitality, openness, etc.).

6) economic, social and political conditions - what and how certain environmental conditions impact on policy implementation (e.g., public opinion, the policy's effect on economic conditions, etc.).

7) the disposition of the implementors - how the implementors' understanding and acceptance of the policy affects their role in implementing the policy.27

Figure 3 is presented to show graphically how the adapted political systems framework used in this study delineates the dependent and independent variables of this study. The dependent variables were the three different governance structures existing

27 This typology was adapted from Donald L. Van Meter and Carl E. Van Horn, "The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework."
in the states investigated in this study. They are depicted in Figure 3 under Policy. The independent variables of this study were the general and immediate environments from which demands evolved and the influence resources shown under Demands and Resources. Additional influence resources were studied, as shown under Conversion Process. The independent variables are listed under Implementation, but for Performance were not considered in this study. Further, Figure 3 shows how the research questions used to guide this study (see Chapter Two) are related to the political systems framework of this investigation.
FIGURE 3

THE POLICY DELIVERY SYSTEM
(Subsystem: The State Government Level)

**DEMANDS & RESOURCES**
(Input)

- Demands from:
  - teachers
  - SBE/SDE
  - administrators
  - parents
  - board members
  - teacher educators
  - other interested citizens

- Resources:
  - expertise
  - authority
  - coercive power
  - membership
  - voting power
  - access
  - social status

**CONVERSION PROCESS**
(What Happens in the Legislature)

- Interaction of Demands and Resources:
  - coalitions

**POLICY**
(Output of the Conversion Process)

- Policy:
  - Type A: Full Authority Board
  - Type B: Advisory Board
  - Type C: Nondecision (Traditional structure)

**IMPLEMENTATION**
(Of the Policy)

**PERFORMANCE**

**Variables:**
- policy standards and objectives
- policy resources
- agenda building
- inter-organizational communication and enforcement activities
- characteristics of the implementing agency
- economic, social and political conditions
- the disposition of the implementors

1. What was the historical context which led to bill introduction?
2. Who were the major actors and interest groups?
3. What were their positions?
4. Which influence resources did they use?

1. What were the characteristics of the legislative setting?
2. How did the actors and interest groups interact with the legislature to effect the outcome of the bill?

1. What was the nature of the policy produced?
2. What is the structure of teacher education control where a nondecision occurred?

1. How did the implementation variables impact on the policy?
2. Were the same variables a factor in the nondecision state?
3. Did actors in policy production effect implementation?
Research Methodology

The design for this study was the causal-comparative method as described by Van Dalen, and the comparative case study approach as applied to studies in the politics of education. Use of this design allowed for the comparison of likenesses and differences among the variables to find out what factors or circumstances (environments, demands, resources, conversion processes) seemed to contribute to the passage or defeat and subsequent implementation of teacher standards and practices board legislation in three states.

This study focused on a set of research questions rather than on hypotheses, which made this an exploratory study. Exploratory studies have three purposes: to discover significant variables in the field situation, to discover relations among variables, and to lay the groundwork for later systematic testing of hypotheses. Studies of this type which are conducted in the life situation of schools, organization or

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28 Van Dalen, p. 36.

institutions have the advantage of strong realism, significance, strength of variables, theory orientation and heuristic quality.\(^\text{30}\)

**Sample.** The unit of analysis for this study involved a purposive sample of the 50 states (i.e., picking cases, or states, that are judged to be typical of the population in which one is interested).\(^\text{31}\)

There was some latitude possible in the selection of the states to be studied. The two states with fully authorized boards are California (1970) and Oregon (1973). Seven states have advisory boards, as follows: Connecticut (1967), Idaho (1972), Kansas (1969), Oklahoma (1969), Massachusetts (1973), Minnesota (1973), and Pennsylvania (1973).\(^\text{32}\) Although other states have defeated teacher standards and practices board legislation, Ohio has experienced two instances of legislative non-decision, and was obviously highly accessible to the researcher. The selection of the other two states involved two criteria: 1) recency of the legislation, and 2) a state not involved in the EGP. The

\(^{30}\text{Ibid., p. 406.}\)

\(^{31}\text{Sellitz, et al., pp. 520-521.}\)

\(^{32}\text{National Education Association, "The National Picture."}\)
later criterion assumed that choosing unexplored states would contribute new information and still allow for comparisons with EGP states. Based on these criteria, a selection of Oregon and Pennsylvania was made.

Within each of the three states selected actors and interest groups were identified based on their inclusion in the literature of teacher education and related research. Further, any actors and groups identified through selected informants in each state were included. Generally these actors were members of groups in each state who were on record as having interacted in the legislative activity related to the enactment of a teacher standards and practices board bill. The list of significant actors and interest groups included representatives of SDEs/SBEs, professors, teachers, administrators, parents and school board members.

**Data Collection.** The data base for this research was from three primary sources: 1) an analysis of fugitive documentation of the phenomenon under study including drafts of bills, records of testimony, in-state publications, etc.; 2) intensive interviews with significant actors; and 3) completed questionnaires
solicited from each actor who was interviewed.

Interview Schedule and Questionnaire. Two instruments were developed for this study. One of these was the interview schedule developed for use with each significant actor. (See Appendix A) Each of the questions was stated in such a way as to elicit information related to the research questions. Although several of the questions required a response of "yes" or "no", each respondent was encouraged to elaborate on each short answer question. As well, several open-ended questions were used in the interview to provide for the generation of variables that may not have been predicted in advance by the researcher.

The interview schedule had three parts: I. Policy Formation (e.g., Did your organization favor or oppose this legislation? Explain.); II. Historical Context (e.g., How did this legislation get introduced?); and III. Current Practice (e.g., What are the objectives of the teacher standards and practices board?). In some cases, actors were more knowledgeable about Parts I and II, than II and III. In such cases, only those parts of the schedule related to the actor's role were used in the interview. Using a structured interview schedule allowed for reliability in data
collection because of the similarity of the questioning in each interview setting. As well, the interviewer made every effort not to bias the responses of the interviewee by trying not to reinforce only those answers which confirmed the researcher's personal beliefs, to record selectively, or to omit questions that might have generated confounding data to the interviewer's investigation.\textsuperscript{33} The average amount of time for each interview was approximately 45 minutes. In each state, approximately 20 interviews were conducted. In a few cases, where a face to face interview was not possible, a telephone interview was conducted. Unless prohibited by the respondent, interviews were taped. Approximately 80% of the interviews were recorded.

The second instrument developed was a three-page questionnaire which was mailed to significant actors following their interview. The purpose of this questionnaire was to quantify some of the positions of the respondents that were addressed only partially in the open-ended interviews. (See Appendices B and C) On pages one and two, questions were asked about the

specific components, powers, etc. of an ideal teacher standards and practices board. These questions were also drawn from the research questions. On page three, the respondent was asked to rate the effectiveness of various educational interest groups in the legislative arena of the state. These questions were modeled after questionnaires used by Ziegler and Baer in their study of the influence of various lobbying groups in American state legislatures. The instrument was called the "Teacher Education Governance Inventory."

The interview schedule and the questionnaire were field tested in Ohio, using actors who had similar interests and/or associations to the interest groups identified in the study. This field testing involved representatives from teachers, higher education personnel, legislators and staff, and a state education agency representative. Results of the field testing required that certain sophisticated terms be replaced by more common language (e.g., "coercion" replaced by "threat"), and that the questionnaire be shortened to

assure adequate time for responses.

Revised questionnaires were mailed to a total of 62 respondents. A few interviewees who were used more as informants than as significant actors were not sent questionnaires. Seventy-six percent of these questionnaires were returned completed.

Site Visitations. In Oregon and Pennsylvania the first contact was made with the executive director of the existing teacher standards and practices board. In both states, these individuals were most helpful in identifying other significant actors and in providing general schedules for the state (such as when the legislature would be in session). In the case of Oregon, a preliminary visit was made to determine key actors. In Ohio and in Pennsylvania, preliminary field work was conducted by telephone. The researcher spent one week in both Oregon and Pennsylvania, interviewing from four to five actors per day. Interviewing in Ohio occurred over a three-week period with one to three interviews being conducted in a day.

Data Analysis. All interviews which were taped were subsequently transcribed. Each 45 minute tape produced approximately six to ten typed pages, counting just the responses to questions. Interviews which
were not taped, but which were recorded in writing by the interviewer, were also typed. Responses were then sorted and organized according to the research questions. The research questions constituted the outline for the analysis of the data.

Results of the mailed questionnaires were tabulated in either means or frequencies, depending on the question. These data were then integrated into the organizational outline of research questions in the data analyses which follow.
CHAPTER FOUR

TEACHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE IN OREGON

Introduction

Current Status. The current governance structure for teacher education in Oregon resembles one of the three operating forms of control considered in this study; that is, a full authority teacher standards and practices board. The board is officially called the Oregon Teacher Standards and Practices Commission (and is referred to in this study as the TSPC). Although the commission has been in existence since 1966, it was given autonomous powers by the Oregon General Assembly through the passage of H.B. 2127, in July, 1973. This commission coexists with other components of the state's education system; namely, the State Board of
Education and the State Board of Higher Education.

The commission, consisting of 17 members, is broadly representative of the education profession, and includes three members from the general public. This composition includes four elementary teachers, four secondary teachers, four school administrators, two teacher preparation institution members, one school board member, and the two lay members. All appointments to the commission are made by the State Board of Education from lists of nominations. Commission members are appointed for three-year terms and may serve for two terms. Operating funds for the commission come from fees paid by Oregon educators for their certificates. Commission members serve without compensation, but are reimbursed for expenses when attending meetings or otherwise engaged in commission business.

\[1\text{Functions assigned to the State Board of Education include the establishment of policy for the administration and operation of the public elementary and secondary schools and public community colleges. The State Department of Education functions under the direction and control of the SBE. Also the SBE must coordinate its activities with those of the State Board of Higher Education. Sources for these functions are found in Oregon Statutes 326.051, 326.071, and 326.111.}\]
According to Oregon Law, the commission has the authority to establish the standards for the approval of teacher education institutions and teacher education programs. In addition the commission makes rules necessary for the issuance, denial, continuation, renewal, lapse or reinstatement of certificates. It is responsible for representing the public interest in the development of educational policies, including the competence of teachers, the improvement of teaching and such problems as the adequacy of teacher supply and contested cases of certificate suspension. As these functions are assigned to the TSPC, the Oregon State Board of Education has only recommending responsibility concerning teacher education programs, institutions and certification. Actions of the commission cannot be appealed to the SBE, but are instead intended to be settled through the state's judicial system.²

A Brief Historical Summary. The initial introduction of legislation to create some type of teacher

²Sources for descriptions of the TSPC are the final draft of H.B. 2127 and a brochure published by the Commission, entitled "Oregon Teacher Standards and Practices Commission."
standards and practices commission in Oregon occurred in the 53rd (1965) General Assembly. According to an article in *Oregon Education* (a newsletter of the OEA, Oregon Education Association), "more educational legislation was passed at this session than any other in the previous history of legislative involvement."\(^3\)

Accordingly, 30 Senate and 26 House bills were passed related to education, including provisions for school finance, higher education, professional standards and welfare, school programs and elections, and school board operations. One of these bills, H.B. 1434, created the Teacher Standards and Practices Commission as a 16 member advisory group, charged with recommending standards to the State Board of Education on teacher preparation and certification, competent and ethical performance of teaching and administrative duties, and the suspension and revocation of certificates. Funds to support the Commission's activity were obtained by way of a three dollar surcharge on each certificate issued after January 1, 1966.

Activity related to the creation of some type of professional standards board dates back to the

\(^3\) *Oregon Education* (May 1965), p. 5.
publication of a position statement by the OEA's Education Policies Commission (EPC) in 1959, called A Conceptual Design for the Teaching Profession. Although the positions of the EPC were declared by the membership to be independent of the OEA, the group was composed of OEA members, and other representatives of the education profession in the state. In this document the commission made the following recommendation:

To insure maximum opportunity for professional performance of teachers certain relationships between agencies staffed by teachers should be somehow guaranteed. Teaching should be given legal status and teachers the privilege of professional self-government.4

The efforts of this commission toward the establishment of such "legal status" were buttressed by the activities of the NEA's National Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards (NCTEPS). In 1961, the national TEPS commission published a document also calling for the professionalization of teachers through creation of professional boards in

In 1962, in light of these activities in Oregon and nationally, OEA's Teacher Education and Professional Standards Commission convened a small ad hoc committee to write a proposal for what was then commonly referred to as a "Professional Practices Act." The committee (the Professional Practices Act Committee) was made up of Oregon TEPS commission members and representatives from other OEA groups. It is important to note that the chairperson of this committee was a professor and assistant dean from the University of Oregon. As well, other teacher education and higher education representatives served on the committee.

These activities centered primarily around the interests of the OEA, although at this point in the association's history it was broadly representative. According to OEA respondents, OEA then included members from the administrative and higher education ranks which it does not now contain. Other activities

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Lindsey, New Horizons for the Teaching Profession.

regarding the role of the profession in state level decision making were being reviewed by the State Department of Education. In 1956, the SDE had appointed a committee to make a study of the laws, rules and regulations governing the certification of teachers in Oregon. According to Kambly, chairperson of the OEA ad hoc committee mentioned above, this SDE committee may later have been influenced to some extent by the recommendations of various groups in the state that a Board of Teacher Standards and Licensure be established. Respondents suggested that partly because of this influence, a certification bill was passed by the state legislature creating a Certification Review Committee (CRC) to advise the State Board of Education.

Although the CRC was an important step in the professionalization of teaching in Oregon, it was not exactly the model the Professional Practices Act Committee was charged to create. In fact, according to the minutes of the committee, a great deal of its efforts were spent in informing the public as to the relationship of the CRC to any practices commission

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7Kambly, Oregon Education (October 1964), p. 22.
which might be created in the statutes. Kambly notes:

It soon became apparent, however, that the responsibilities granted to the Committee (CRC) were confined to matters concerning certification and that the profession, therefore, still had no voice in other matters such as determining competence, contractual obligations, or ethical performance.

The first meeting of the Practices Act Committee was held in April, 1963. Over the next year the committee met twelve times during which it considered legislative proposals on practices acts in other states, drafted position papers, and consulted with other educators throughout the state. A year later the committee had arrived at an adequate enough draft of possible legislation that the committee was able to have legislative staff persons put it in a final draft form.

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8All of the minutes, correspondence and extraneous notes of the ad hoc practices act committee were made available to the researcher while in Oregon. Much of this summary of the committee's activities comes from these notes, which are not easily formally cited. However, reference to these records is periodically noted in the next few pages of this chapter. Also, the writings of Paul E. Kambly are particularly germane, since Kambly was the chairperson of the ad hoc committee.

9Kambly, Oregon Education, p. 22.

10In Oregon, a non-partisan Legislative Counsel, composed of several staff members, drafts legislation for introduction to the General Assembly. This office prepared the draft of the committee's practices act.
This draft was then approved in December, 1964, by the OBE's representative Council and by members of the State Department who had worked closely with the Practices Act Committee in drafting the bill.

To summarize the final draft of the bill (called A Teacher Standards and Practices Act): It created a 15 member commission, appointed by the State Board, with the right to advise the Board on matters of teacher practices as well as certification. Fourteen of the members were to be nominated by teachers and administrators, one from an approved private teacher education college, and one from a state system of higher education. Specifically the bill provided that the commission make recommendations to the State Board on 1) standards for issuance, suspension and revocation of certificates; 2) standards for professional contracts; 3) standards for assignments of staff; and 4) standards for competent and ethical performance of teaching and administrative support staff for the commission; and finally, that the Certification Review Committee be abolished upon enactment of this bill.11

Upon acceptance by the Representative Council of the bill draft, members of the Practices Act Committee and the OEA's TEPS commission launched a massive campaign to inform educators throughout the state as to the nature of the bill. As well, a conference was held for 100 educational leaders "to provide a thorough explanation of the measure and to ask participants to constitute an informal speaking corps to explain the measure to teachers in all parts of Oregon." Persons attending that workshop included OEA Board of Trustees members, teachers, administrators, local and county association presidents, and representatives of teacher training institutions. Speakers kits were prepared for these persons including a text explaining the bill, the act itself, and a statement of support from the superintendent of public instruction, Dr. Leon P. Minear. According to a representative of the OEA, this effort constituted a broad-based attempt to make the grass roots support of the OEA work toward the passage of this bill. To quote this representative, "Grass roots really worked. We wouldn't have gotten that bill had we not used the grass roots approach." 

\[12\] From a letter to educational leaders from the Oregon TEPS Commission, November, 1964.
According to other sources, there were additional preliminary steps taken that show specifically how the OEA got the practices act bill introduced in the 1965 session of the General Assembly. This activity initially focused around Kambly's contact with Representative Edward Branchfield (R-Medford). Branchfield was serving on the Legislative Interim Committee on Education during 1964, and was considered (according to Practices Act Committee notes) to be a friendly contact for possible consideration of the bill in the Interim Committee. As a result of this contact, the bill was considered by the Interim Committee in August, 1964. At that time testimony was taken from OEA representatives and from the executive secretary of the Oregon School Boards Association (OSBA) regarding the bill. Questions were raised by the committee as to the relationship of a new practices board to the CRC, and the extent to which local control and lay input might be usurped as a result of this board's creation.

In Oregon, the General Assembly meets biennially. During the off-season years, ad hoc interim committees are convened depending on the legislative leadership's interest in particular years. In 1964 there was a Legislative Interim Committee on Education, composed of members from both chambers from the previous session.
According to a spokesperson for OSBA, the association was concerned with the distribution of the membership of the new board (i.e., OSBA wanted more administrators and teacher educators), and with the absence of lay representation. Although the minutes of the Interim Committee do not include its rationale, the committee moved not to take action on this proposed bill. Respondents for the OEA speculated that the Interim Committee had simply not given enough consideration to the bill's proposals to be able to take action.

Consequently, Representative Branchfield agreed to introduce the bill in regular session, but requested the OEA members proceed to inform all of its members of the intent of the bill. He also suggested that he expected to encounter some opposition to the bill in the Senate and that as much groundwork as possible should be completed prior to introduction of the bill. Opposition was expected to center around the existence of the CRC and the new board. OEA publicly countered this argument in the literature it disseminated by

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14 Information regarding Interim Committee actions was taken from the minutes of the committee's meeting, 19 August 1964. Note is also made that this draft of the bill was presented to the Interim Committee prior to its approval by OEA's Representative Council.
describing the new board as an extension of the CRC. However, as the bill progressed through the legislature, the real opposition, as will be shown, arose over the amount of lay representation on the board.

H.B. 1434, to establish a Teacher Standards and Practices Commission received its first reading on February 5, 1965, on the floor of the House. The bill passed the House of Representatives on April 16, 1965. Some amendments were made in the House but they did not change the intent or purpose of the proposal in any degree. Some members of the House Education Committee did attempt to reduce the commission from 16 to 10 members, and to reduce the fee to finance the commission from three dollars to one dollar. The committee did not accept these amendments.

The difficulty in the progress of the bill did occur, as predicted, in the Senate. After passage of the bill in the House, the OEA learned that the President of the Senate was opposed in some manner to the bill and was undecided as to which committee he would send it. While President Boivin (D) was reading the bill and deciding on the appropriate committee, the chairperson of the Senate Education Committee, Senator Al Flegel (D, who also chaired the 1964 Interim
Committee on Education), contacted a representative of the OEA, the OSBA and a staff member for the Education Committee and instructed them to work out a compromise on the positions of the OEA and the OSBA. The conflict referred to arose over the OSBA's belief that lay members should have representation in the commission; a view which had been shared by the OSBA in advance with members of the Senate. The end result of this compromise was that two school board members were to be added as non-voting members of the commission. With this, the bill was introduced to the Senate Education Committee on April 27.

There was great debate about this compromise in the ranks of the OEA.15 Chief OEA staff members and Representative Branchfield had agreed in January that should an amendment be offered to add lay members to the commission, Branchfield should "simply let the bill be defeated." However, it became clear that compromise was a necessity. According to the OEA's executive secretary: "...in my estimation it is better to take the

15 In addition to responses from interviews, the source for OEA legislative activity was primarily a memorandum sent to OEA Board of Trustees members by the OEA Executive Secretary, Cecil Posey, 27 April 1965.
present proposal and attempt to correct it in the future than to risk losing everything that we have done to date." This position was exactly opposite the consensus of some members of the TEPS commission who were opposed to any change; in fact, "they would rather see the bill killed than to accept the changes."

Another interpretation of this sequence of events came from the OEA representative who struck the compromise. He recounts that even though he had to publicly accept the compromise of lay membership, he was integral in getting the TEPS commission and the OEA membership to fight the addition of lay people at the grass roots level. He notes:

I gave responsibilities out to individuals to contact various Senators and members of the House who were on our side, [and] to contact members of the Senate from their own districts. And we put on a pretty heavy persuasive team out there,...to literally button-hole opinionable people and talk to them about it. And well, to make a long story short, we were successful in keeping lay persons off.

On May 6, the Senate passed the bill and it was enacted into law by Governor Hatfield on May 26, 1965, with the exclusion of lay representation on the commission.

In the early years of the commission's operation it struggled with organizational and procedural problems,
including how it would relate in its advisory capacity to the State Board. Within three years the commission recognized its need to have its own staff instead of relying on part-time contracted people or utilizing SDE staff. In January, 1969, the commission decided to employ an executive secretary and a clerical person. In July, 1969, the commission elected Richard Jones, who continues to serve as the commission's executive head. Substantively, the commission was active prior to 1973 in four major activities: 1) the development of standards proposed for competency based personnel development; 2) the revision of a set of regular accreditation standards; 3) the development of a statewide plan for educational personnel development, called a "master plan;" and 4) various studies relating to personnel and performance and a review of all certification rules. Most of these activities were initiated

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at the request of Minear's successor, Dale Parnell, then superintendent of public instruction.

Coincidental to these substantive proposals, there was again activity in the legislative arena to grant the commission some autonomous authority. According to one respondent who had worked with the commission:

When it became evident that the legislature was going to transfer authority to the commission effective July 1, 1973, the Board and Parnell got organized so that all three of these documents were on the agenda, and two days before the transition took place, were accepted by the Board. It was a good thing because...it gave the commission a set of documents, materials and regulations to work with that had not just the commission's authority behind them, but the public authority of the state's Board of Education.

To summarize, the purpose of this section of the data analysis was to provide historical context for considering the activity which centered around the creation of a fully autonomous teacher standards and practices commission in Oregon. Because the legislation which made the commission autonomous was in effect a strengthening of the original legislation, it was necessary to clarify specially how the original bill (H.B. 1434) became law. In these activities several characteristics were repeatedly noted by respondents in regard to 1964-65 legislative activity: 1) OEA was an initiator in seeking introduction of a practices
act in the legislature; 2) OEA was more broadly representative of the education profession than it is today, including teachers, administrators and teacher educators, where now it only represents teachers; 3) a great deal of grass roots activity was perceived to enhance legislative success; 4) the SDE was publicly in support of H.B. 1434; 5) the bill appeared to have bipartisan support from legislators; and 6) the time span between the germ of the idea for a new board and its creation was six years. These characteristics will be reviewed again in this chapter in light of 1972-73 legislative activity.

The Legislation. The 1972-73 legislative activity referred to above began with the introduction of H.B. 2127 onto the floor of the House on January 25, 1973. Upon its second reading, the next day, it was referred to the Education Committee of the House. The bill was heard in committee on March 27 and April 3, and amended to require the commission to hear the recommendations of the State Board prior to adopting standards and rules which have the force of law. On April 3, the bill was passed out of the House Education Committee, and on a third reading of the bill on the House floor, passed by a vote of 54 to 3. The bill was first read in the
Senate on April 16, and referred to the Education Committee immediately upon its second reading. The bill was heard twice in committee and passed out of committee June 5. Upon its third reading in the Senate, the bill passed by 23 to 7. On June 12, the House concurred with the Senate and repassed the measure by 51 to 4. Governor Thomas McCall signed the bill into law in the early summer of 1973, effective July 1 of the same year.

Since this legislation required the transfer of certain State Board authority to an already existing commission, the bill provided for the continuation of the current membership until their individuals terms expired. However, the previous commission provided for 14 teachers and administrators. H.B. 2127 allowed for 12 and added to the autonomous commission one member from a panel of district school boards, and two members of the general public from a list submitted by the Governor. Therefore, when a vacancy occurred, reappointments had first to be added from the lay member categories.
Demands and Resources

Significant Actors. The purpose of this section is to identify those interest groups who were involved in getting H.B. 2127 introduced into the Oregon General Assembly and identifying the positions taken by other interest groups in support or opposition to the legislation.

According to responses from persons interviewed in this study, two groups were in some ways responsible for the introduction of the legislation: representatives of the OEA, representing classroom teachers, and the advisory Teacher Standards and Practices Commission. A representation of the Oregon Federation of Teachers also testified in support of the bill. Those offering testimony in opposition to H.B. 2127 included:

1. school board members - Oregon School Boards Association (OSBA)
2. administrators - Oregon Association of School Administrators (OASA)
3. professors (deans and directors) - State University Association of Deans and Directors
4. state education agencies - Oregon State Department of Education

Representatives of other interest groups were also interviewed because there was some evidence that these
groups had taken positions, although they did not present formal testimony, including:

1. school board members - Oregon State Board of Education

2. administrators - Confederation of Oregon School Administrators

The Oregon PTA did not take an official position or offer testimony on H.B. 2127. Because representatives of the Congress of Parents and Teachers had been so active in Ohio legislative activity, their representative was interviewed in Oregon to ascertain why no official position had been taken.

**Interest Group Positions.** The first indication of any formal discussions on making the Oregon TSPC fully autonomous was noted by the executive secretary of the commission. He recalls discussing autonomy with a few members of the commission and Dr. Parnell as early as 1970. However, it was decided then by the commission that the appropriate move at that time should be to seek only certificate revocation authority. Shortly thereafter, the OEA began to discuss the autonomy issue and decided, according to the OEA executive secretary, to move the group to "a fully autonomous commission outside the umbrella of the State Department of Education," during the 1971 session of the legislature. Accordingly,
the OEA requested the introduction of S.B. 538, "to
transfer authority for promulgating rules for granting
teacher certification from the State Board to [the]
Teacher Standards and Practices Commission." S.B. 346
was also introduced, creating a Professional Performance
Review Board to serve pursuant to appointment by the
TSPC. This board would have "responsibilities for
initiating and hearing teaching certificate suspension
and revocation proceedings." In the same session, at
the request of the SBE, S.B. 13 was introduced to
"transfer authority for teaching certificate revocation
or suspension to [the] Teacher Standards and Practices
Commission."

The commission, according to its executive secre-
tary, was opposed to the granting of full authority to
the commission. Respondents for the OEA speculated
that Jones (the executive secretary) felt the commission
was simply not ready for this responsibility. According
to an OEA spokesperson:

Dick [Jones] and some of the others down
down stood back and said, my goodness, if
we're given all this authority, where are
the guidelines? He just told us he wasn't
ready.

Jones was asked about the readiness of the commission
at that time. He recalled:
The commission's request was to get it involved only in disciplinary kind of activity. And that's what we worked for. It was clear that [OEA] wanted more than that, and I feel we were ready. I'm not sure why...the commission was not very heavily involved in many of the areas of teacher preparation and certification. The commission was successful in getting its ideas accepted and implemented through the Board and the superintendent. It was not necessary at that time for us to assume the responsibility and the related heat. It was also very doubtful that the proposals could get out of a Senate Education Committee which was chaired by Vic Atiyeh, who was not sympathetic to the concept.

Consequently, according to an OEA source, with the commission against the bill and with OSBA fighting it, too, "we pulled back off it for the '71 session."

Neither S.B. 538 or S.B. 13 were voted out of the Senate Education Committee during the session. S.B. 346 was passed out of the Senate Education Committee and sent to the House, where it was referred to the House Education Committee, with no further action taken.

In 1972, there was, as in 1964, another Interim Committee on Education. The committee took two directions for the year; one on basic education and the other on general education, including personnel practices and laws effecting education. On February 17, 1972, members of the committee raised both the
revocation and the autonomy issues. Parnell appeared before the committee in support of shifting authority for certificate revocation to the TSPC. The president of the TSPC, Henry Mascall, also testified in support of this plan, as did a representative for the OEA. A part of this discussion included the general issue of autonomy. Consequently, the commission’s autonomy became one of twelve educational issues discussed by the Interim Committee in the ’72 session.

At the request of one member of the committee, Representative Howard Cherry (D), representatives from the School Boards Association, the Superintendents Association, teacher training institutions, Dr. Parnell’s office and the TSPC met with Kathleen Beaufait of the Legislative Counsel to prepare a bill for the committee’s consideration. This draft was to deal primarily with revocation but included the group’s general consensus on autonomy. This group did meet; a draft was developed and heard by the Interim Committee on April 20, 1972. The only opponent to testify was Thomas Rigby, executive secretary of the OSBA, who opposed granting revocation

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17Sources for Interim Committee activities were taken from the minutes of 17 February and 20 April 1972.
authority to the TSPC. Final action on whether or not to include this draft in the Interim Committee's final report was delayed to a later date.18

According to one respondent, "the record of the interim committee is not all that great. I think the batting average is about forty percent." It was with some hesitation that the TSPC got the '72 Interim Committee involved in the autonomy issue at all. As one member put it, "sometimes an interim committee study is a curse of death." The TSPC's worst fears were realized. As one member recalled, the committee held its last hearing of the session at a cabin retreat, in what was described as an informal session. By late in the evening, when a vote was called for on whether or not to include the revocation issue in the package, several of the members whom the TSPC had counted on for support were gone, and one member had bargained away his "yes" vote on an unrelated reelection issue. As a result this draft bill was not included in the Interim Committee

18At the end of each Interim session, committees prepare reports of bills which they would like to have considered in the next regular legislative session; in this case, the 1973 session.
package.

In the meantime, since Jones and Parnell had first discussed autonomy in 1970, the commission had been given increasing responsibilities by the SDE. According to Jones:

Parnell instructed his staff not to take anything to the Board on teacher education or certification that hadn't first been routed to the commission for its consideration and recommendation. So what really ended up happening between the '71 and '73 sessions was that the commission was proposing resolutions for presentation to the board.

As a result of this growth in commission responsibility and the involvement of the commission in the Interim Committee session, respondents reported that there was great disappointment at the failure of the committee to include the autonomy issue in its package.

With the concurrence of the OEA, the TSPC requested the Legislative Counsel to prepare a bill for introduction in 1973, which would transfer authority for teacher certification and program approval from the SBE to the TSPC. The draft was prepared, according to Jones, after the session began and introduced as H.B. 2127. To reiterate, its primary proponents were the OEA and the TSPC. In addition to supporting autonomy, the OEA was concerned about retaining the right to nominate
candidates for membership on the commission. According to one OEA respondent: "One of our legislative objectives was to make sure that the association was able to nominate." That process was provided for in the bill and remained in tact throughout the progress of the bill through the legislature.

A representative for the Oregon Federation of Teachers (OFT) testified as a proponent for H.B. 2127, as well. Accordingly:

The OFT would favor any bill that would make the Teacher Standards and Practices Commission a body to handle the teaching profession... and would like for appeals to go beyond the commission, but not to the State Department.

Like the OEA, the OFT was concerned about the right to nominate candidates for membership. According to an OFT respondent, the Federation feared that the OEA would press for all teacher nominations to be made by the majority teacher organization in the state (i.e., the OEA). According to the OFT president, "I would still be against this even if we were the majority organization." The change in the appointment function which the OFT would have preferred was that the Governor make the appointments rather than the SBE. The current president of the OEA concurred that this would allow for some political accountability for the
appointments; that is, through the support or lack of support of particular gubernatorial candidates.

A primary opponent to H.B. 2127, and clearly a highly visible one, was the Oregon School Boards Association in the person of its executive secretary, Thomas Rigby. There were several facets to the OSBA position: 1) the association wanted lay members on the commission; 2) it wanted final appeal of commission actions to go through the SBE and not to the courts; and 3) it believed that there should be an equal number of administrators and teachers, and an equal balance between management and the teachers. According to one respondent, "the OSBA feared OEA control of the commission because the OEA wants to control supply and demand."

However, OSBA did not really get much assistance from other interest groups who usually defend lay control, particularly as will be shown in the Ohio case. The Oregon PTA, in fact, did not take an official position on this bill. According to a PTA spokesperson, "we did not know enough about the commission; nor was there any direct reference to it in our platform."

When other respondents were asked about the lay control/local school board control issue, most agreed that it had been discussed but was not a deciding factor in the
debate over this bill. One respondent noted:

It's always an issue at the legislature. Rigby uses it to it's best advantage; [he's] perhaps one of the craftiest guys in using that slogan about local control. He'll raise it on any issue that is unacceptable to him. And it has a lot of appeal. I think it's a myth.

School administrators, superintendents and principal groups were not very active on this legislation. One representative for the Oregon Association of School Administrators did testify only to clarify the association's position that it wanted certification retained as an ultimate responsibility of the SBE. One observer noted that:

There was frustration on the part of the superintendents that they were being led and used by the OSBA. In 1973, they were sort of with the school boards...[they were] not very vocal; as hard to get concerned about it as are school board members. Some may even have supported the commission. They weren't all that concerned with autonomy. As long as the commission was independent of teacher organization control, they could support it.

However, at about the same time the various administrator groups did form a Confederation of Oregon School Administrators, which has become an umbrella organization and a more avid spokesperson for administrators in the legislature in recent years.
The deans and directors of teacher training institutions in the state, representing the general interest group category of "professors," opposed granting of autonomy to the TSPC. They felt, according to one respondent, that "the review authority for Teacher Standards and Practices Commission actions ought to be the State Board of Education's." The respondent interpreted that to mean:

that the commission's decisions and policies would stand unless challenged by the Board of Education. They would have the right in the public's interest to intervene if they felt the public's interest was not being accounted for. The courts as a means for hearing appeals were not the proper institution.

Representatives of the deans and directors did not particularly support lay membership on the commission, but saw their addition as some sort of compromise move. One dean respondent noted:

I really don't believe that lay people belong on the TSPC. I do believe that the professional components need to be well represented, and I do believe that representation from the school board, and that in essence is a lay person, probably needs to be represented. I'd like to see the state superintendent's office represented on it. But I frankly don't see a hell of a lot of sense in having lay people who have no relationship to the schools, other than the fact that they happened by accident to have kids go to them. It doesn't make any sense to me at all. And nine out
of ten times I'm sure that the lay membership would be just sort of non-contributory.

Deans saw the addition of lay members to the board as an attempt to appease school board members and to dilute the power of teachers. As one respondent noted: "As far as I'm concerned, both these motives were crazy."

The official position of the Oregon State Department of Education was carried to the legislature in the person of its associate superintendent, Jesse Fasold. The minutes of House Education Committee testimony record the following:

Fasold, SDE, testified against the bill in its present form, stating that it is un-American. That the American way is to have a government by the people and this taking of our government out of the hands of the laymen and putting it in the hands of professionals is un-American.

As such, Fasold proposed several amendments to H.B. 2127, the primary one of which was: "The Teacher Standards and Practices Commission, subject to prior approval by the State Board of Education, shall establish standards...etc."

There were numerous conflicting reports about the SDE's position on an autonomous commission. Representatives of the commission felt that Parnell was
supportive of a new role for the commission, which accounts for the increased responsibilities he had been granting the commission. Others speculated that Parnell disliked adversarial relationships and was eager for the TSPC to take over an area that could only become increasingly controversial. Yet clearly Parnell had sent Fasold as his representative to the legislature. One respondent's interpretation of this apparent contradiction in positions was as follows:

I think what happened is that Dale [Parnell] had already indicated his support for the concept, and things were moving along. When this particular testimony was given [Fasold's], it was, I think, directly in response to the concern that the deputy superintendent had and that Eugene Fisher [then chairperson of the SBE] had.

The concern, as one respondent suggested, was that the TSPC might become too powerful. Another respondent observed that only after Fasold took a brief vacation, did the legislation really move. As one person noted, "Fasold came out of that one looking not too good, I felt. And he just sort of faded into the woodwork since then."

In terms of the State Board of Education position, no formal testimony was offered from a board member. However, by indirection, at least through
Faasold, the sentiments of some of the Board members were represented. Another Board member reported that some of the members were not clear on the issue and did not really understand that autonomy meant that there was no appeal mechanism for the Board on actions of the TSPC as a result of H.B. 2127. Also, SBE views were represented to some degree by the testimony of OSBA members, but only in that OSBA persons reported that they felt they were representing the feelings of the SBE as well.

In a follow-up questionnaire sent to each person interviewed in the Oregon case study, respondents were asked to identify which form of teacher education governance each would personally prefer if that structure were to be reorganized in the state. Responses were distributed among interest groups as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Returned Questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oregon State Board of Education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon Teacher Standards and Practices Commission</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon Education Association</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon General Assembly</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confederation of Oregon School Administrators</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon School Boards Association</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon Federation of Teachers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the total of 17 responses, all respondents preferred the form identified on the questionnaire as Type A (a full authority teacher standards and practices board, created by statute to exercise legal jurisdiction over the preparation and licensure of Teachers).

Respondents were also asked to identify the type of governance structure (from Type A to Type C) which should have responsibility for activities typically related to the administration of teacher education at
the state level. Of the eight activities listed in Table 1, all but three were assigned to a Type A structure by 60% or more of the respondents. These activities include the establishment of certification standards, the issuance and renewal of certificates, the establishment of standards for the approval of teacher education programs in colleges and universities, the approval of teacher education programs according to established standards, and the establishment and collection of certification fees.

The three remaining activities received the largest percentage of response as Type B activities, including the establishment and enforcement of a code of ethics for teachers, recommending the level of funding of teacher education programs in state universities to the legislature, and stimulating inservice education and research in teacher education.

In regard to the preferred structure of a teacher standards and practices board (either advisory or full authority), 44% reported that appointments to a board should be made by the state board of education. In contrast, 37% thought the board ought to be nominated by a statewide organization of professional educators, with the remaining 19% supporting governor
TABLE 1
PREFERRED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FOR TEACHER EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEACHER EDUCATION ACTIVITY</th>
<th>TYPE, N=16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) the establishment of certification standards</td>
<td>60%  33%  7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) the issuance and renewal of certificates</td>
<td>62%  19%  19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) the establishment of standards for the approval of teacher education programs in colleges and universities</td>
<td>50%  31%  19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) the approval of teacher education programs according to established standards</td>
<td>50%  31%  19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) the establishment and collection of certification fees</td>
<td>56%  25%  19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) the establishment and enforcement of a code of ethics (of professional practice) for teachers</td>
<td>70%  30%  0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) recommending the level of funding of teacher education programs in state universities to the legislature</td>
<td>31%  38%  31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) stimulating in-service education and research in teacher education</td>
<td>54%  33%  33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

appointment or some combination of the other means of appointment.
Respondents felt that members of a standards and practices board should serve from two to five years, with 68% selecting three years as the appropriate term and 13% each selecting four and five year terms. Six percent of the respondents felt that one year terms were appropriate. In terms of the size of a board, 64% of respondents chose the 12 to 15 members, and 14% choosing a 16 or more member board.

When given a choice as to the representation on a teacher standards and practices board, the following results were recorded by respondents: All respondents wanted classroom teachers to serve; 94% of the respondents favored both higher education and school administrator representation; 69% favored representation of local school board members and 50% could accept lay citizen representation.

When asked which of these above groups should have majority representation on a standards and practices board, or if there should be equal representation from each group, 53% would support majority representation from classroom teachers. The remaining respondents (47%) preferred equal representation.

Two final questions were asked about a standards and practices board in relation to the legislature and
the State Board of Education. For advising the legislature, 69% of the respondents thought the practices board ought to be a major source; 19% a minor source, and 6% each either not a source, or the most important source. In advising the SBE, 69% would make the practices board a major source; 19% the most important source and 12% a minor source.

The composite picture of the preferred board according to respondents in this study would be a board which has full authority for all teacher education activities, with the exception of recommending the appropriate funding level for teacher training in the state; appointed by the SBE; having 12 to 15 members, with three-year terms; with teachers in the majority and additional appointments equally distributed among other educational interest groups; and acting as a major source of advice for both the legislature and the SBE.

Since this section has dealt primarily with the presentation of positions through legislative testimony, it is appropriate here to discuss other data gathered through the above questionnaire. One respondent noted that testimony is perhaps the lowest form of influence in the legislative process. However, all
interest groups viewed it as a necessary part of their legislative activity. In many instances, lobbyists would duplicate copies of their testimony and disseminate it at committee hearings. Respondents indicated that testimony must be brief, organized and at all times accurate. Misinformation was viewed as more damaging to one's cause than not testifying at all. Respondents were asked to rate interest groups in terms of their general effectiveness in testifying before the legislature. The data from two separate questions are displayed in Table 2.
TABLE 2
TESTIMONY

| Question | Interest Group | Rating,*
|----------|---------------|----------
| 1) Testifies frequently at legislative hearings | 1) SBE/SDE | 5.6 |
| | 2) Professors | 2.3 |
| | 3) Teachers | 6.2 |
| | 4) Administrators | 5.2 |
| | 5) Parents | 2.9 |
| | 6) School Boards | 5.4 |

2) Effectively presents arguments at legislative hearings

| 1) SBE/SDE | 5.6 |
| 2) Professors | 3.0 |
| 3) Teachers | 5.6 |
| 4) Administrators | 4.4 |
| 5) Parents | 3.3 |
| 6) School Boards | 5.4 |

Demand Resources. In the conceptual framework of this study, eight influence resources were identified as likely to be related to the way in which the educational interest groups considered in this study impacted on the production of policy (in this instance H.B. 2127) in the legislative arena. It is difficult to separate these resources as to those which helped give the interest group access to the legislature and

*This and additional ratings reflect the mean score of a scale from 0 - meaning very ineffective to 8 - indicating maximum effectiveness.
those that helped the interest group interact within the legislature in the conversion process. In the abstract, all of these groups bring with them to the legislature certain of these resources, but they can be identified only as these groups interact in the conversion process. For this reason, the influence resources identified on page 71 of Chapter Three (except for "access") will be discussed under the section called "conversion process" in this and the succeeding two chapters.

The influence resource of access is directly related to the process of interest groups being able to get a demand item on the legislative docket. Obviously, in light of the previous discussion, the OEA and the TSPC demonstrated considerable access to legislators who were interested and willing to carry the demands of these groups to the legislature. Representatives Branchfield and Cherry gave these groups access to the services of the Legislative Counsel, as well. Without such access the autonomy/revocation issues could not have been considered even by the Interim Committee on Education in 1964 or 1972.

Also both the OEA and the TSPC have benefited from the long term incumbency of one staff member of
the Legislative Counsel who has worked continuously in the area of educational legislation. The person had drafted the original bill which created the TSPC and was, therefore, very knowledgeable about the necessary changes to make the commission autonomous. According to respondents, there was sufficient informal communication between the TSPC and the Legislative Counsel to draft a thorough piece of legislation prior to introduction in the formal session.

The Conversion Process

Legislative Characteristics. In an OEA publication the 1973 legislative session was considered "the greatest ever for professional educators."\(^{19}\) Accordingly, the 1973 Assembly passed a backlog of legislation including the extension of fair dismissal rights to all teachers, public employee bargaining, and the extension of unemployment insurance rights to all teachers. In fact, it was the number of educational bills in that session in addition to H.B. 2127 that so preoccupied the PTA that it did not attend to the

autonomy issue. Some of its concerns that were dealt with included state support for kindergarten, immunization for school-aged children, and a juvenile protection bill.

In addition to the above legislation, another bill was introduced prior to H.B. 2127 which was considered simultaneously with the autonomy proposal. This bill, H.B. 2030, revived the revocation issue. H.B. 2030 would transfer all powers over certification revocation to the TSPC. The bill also provided that action to suspend or revoke a certificate, or to discipline a teacher or administrator could be initiated by the TSPC on its own volition or on the basis of a written complaint from any administrator directly responsible to the school board by which the teacher or administrator was employed.

These two bills, H.B. 2030 and H.B. 2127, began their progression through the legislature in the House Education Committee. At a January meeting of the committee, Senator Atiyeh (chairperson of the 1972

Sources for the progress of these bills through the House and Senate Education Committees were the minutes of both committees during the consideration of these bills. 20
Interim Committee on Education) summarized the work of his committee and noted that both the revocation and the autonomy issues were considered in the interim. As well, two representatives who had served on Atiyeh's committee returned to the Education Committee in 1973: Representative Rieke (R) and Cherry (D). Rieke was now vice-chairperson of the Education Committee.

Within the first month of the session a third bill had been introduced regarding the TSPC, apparently at the OEA's request. This bill, H.B. 2148, would not have added lay members to the TSPC. Keeping in mind the proposals of H.B. 2030, H.B. 2127, and H.B. 2148, it is possible to summarize the actions of the Education Committee and its final passage of H.B. 2030 and H.B. 2127.

1) The committee favored the intent of H.B. 2030 and even the OSBA testified in support of it; 2) The chairperson of the committee (Perry-D) favored expanding H.B. 2127 and eliminating H.B. 2030 and H.B. 2148; 3) Rieke felt the issues were too complex to be considered together and the committee supported her motion to consider them separately; 4) An attempt was made to grant the TSPC authority over both certification and revocation, but to make the SBE an appeal board,
and the motion failed (Cherry was against total TSPC autonomy); 5) To placate others Rieke moved to keep certification in the SBE and give revocation to the TSPC, and the motion failed; 6) Rieke amended H.B. 2127 to force the TSPC to consider SBE recommendations and the bill passed as amended unanimously; and 7) Cherry attempted to amend H.B. 2030 so that the appellant could choose to go either to the courts or to the SBE for appeal, but the committee chose only court appeal and the bill was passed. Representative Rieke carried H.B. 2127 on the floor of the House.

In the Senate Education Committee, which is where both bills were sent after passage in the House, there were also three members who had been on the Interim Committee: Atiyeh (R), Carson (R), and Groener (D), vice-chairperson of the current committee. In this committee there was an attempt to consider the bills more independently of each other than they had been in the House. There was greater pressure for the amendment of H.B. 2127 to have actions of the TSPC appealed to the SBE. There is no record that any senator pressed for that amendment; only Fasold (SDE) and a representative of the OSBA. Consequently the committee passed both H.B. 2030 and H.B. 2127 in the
form passed in the House. That is, the TSPC was granted the final authority for accreditation, certification and revocation, with appeal procedures given to the courts and not the SBE.

At the heart of the discussions in the Senate regarding appeals procedures was the issue of lay involvement through the SBE. The issue was raised again when H.B. 2127 reached the floor of the Senate. According to records of floor proceedings and the observations of respondents, several senators who heretofore may have been perceived as rather cautious about shifting some of the authority of the SBE to the TSPC now favored it. One respondent noted:

Somebody surprised me who got up and said that higher education and the State Department have had it long enough and haven't done anything with it. It's time to let somebody else try.

Or as another recalled hearing during the floor debate:

"Teacher education is not what it should be and the State Board has not exercised its authority. Let's give the profession a chance." Representative Rieke remembered:

I didn't have any great issue in mind on the control issue. I also was just extraordinarily angry that although they [SBE/SDE] had had it for 20 years, and I've been trying to work through it, they
weren't doing anything with the fact that they had the control.

The above discussion characterizes legislator involvement in the progress of H.B. 2127. There are, in addition, some more general characteristics of the legislator profile that are important to consider. For instance, respondents repeatedly mentioned the significance of the number of legislators who were educators. In 1969, only four legislators could be identified who had been or currently were educators (teachers or professors). By 1973, there were eleven, three of whom were senators. They included teachers, professors, administrators and curriculum supervisors. As well, both Rieke and Cherry had been long term members of the Portland City School Board. The implications of this affiliation are less clear, since Cherry tended to align himself with the OSBA position, while Rieke led the floor fight for H.B. 2127.

More importantly, one of the teachers, Representative Larry Perry (D), an AFT member, happened as well to be chairing the House Education Committee in 1973. As one respondent noted: "In Oregon, the

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More importantly, one of the teachers, Representative Larry Perry (D), an AFT member, happened as well to be chairing the House Education Committee in 1973. As one respondent noted: "In Oregon, the

chairman has tremendous power." Not only was Perry a teacher but so was his administrative assistant, who was assigned to his committee by the Legislative Counsel. According to one informant:

Perry wanted that bill [H.B. 2127] to come out of committee and he wanted the bill to come out with the commission having total authority. And after Jesse's [Fasold] testimony came forth, and that was a little touched with the sabers of Eugene Fisher [SBE] and the School Boards Association, Perry just blocked everything else behind the bill...It became very clear that if Dale [Parnell, Superintendent, SDE] wanted anything else out of that committee that he was going to have to shut up about the commission and that was it.

This information sheds light as well on the apparent dichotomy of the SDE position. It also supports the point of view of most respondents that the education orientation of several of the legislators was very integral to the successful passage of H.B. 2127.

**Conversion Resources.** The influence resources used by various interest groups to impact on the formulation of an autonomous commission (i.e., H.B. 2127) will be described below. The purpose of this section is to consider which of these factors seemed most important to the progress of the bill.
a. **Expertise**

H.B. 2127 was essentially a matter of who will control the teacher education responsibilities identified in the bill. As such it was difficult for either proponents or opponents to present substantive data supporting one type of control versus another type. The secondary proposition of the bill was that if control were granted to one group of persons rather than another, then teacher education would be improved. In fact, testimony seemed to confirm that under the direction of the SBE/SDE, teacher education had not fared very well. The few innovative studies on the SBE's record were actually reports prepared by the TSPC, not the Board. In this instance, according to one respondent, not only were proponents suggesting a change, but they were also able to point to the commission as a viable alternative to the current structure of control.

Respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of all educational interest groups in regard to the resource of expertise and the data confirm the perceived void in substantive innovation called for by the shifting of authority from the SBE to the TSPC. In fact, the data also show that, except for teachers
(who received the next highest rating below the SBE/SDE), other interest groups, including the knowledge producers (i.e., professors), were not perceived to be very adequate sources of expertise.

**TABLE 3**

**THE EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION OF RESULTS OF RELATED RESEARCH AT LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS (EXPERTISE)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
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<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
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<td>4) Administrators</td>
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<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b. Authority**

There was no evidence presented by respondents that any official government agencies other than the SBE/SDE were in any way involved in the formulation of H.B. 2127. Clearly, Parnell could have exerted more influence in the outcome of the bill, but for reasons explained above, he did not. In fact, according to one respondent, Parnell was perhaps the integral factor. As a representative of the OSBA noted, "we could have stopped it [H.B. 2127] had Parnell continued
to oppose it." The only additional government agency involvement was from Governor McCall who, at the signing of the bill into law, did so as a symbolic gesture at an NEA convention held in Oregon in the summer of 1973.

c. Coercive Power

Respondents were asked if their organizations were able to impact on the legislative decision by suggesting either negative or positive repercussions that might occur if the bill passed.

The only instance of coercion that was cited by any respondent was the occasion on which Representative Perry was said to have suggested to Parnell that his (Parnell's) support of H.B. 2127 was vital to the outcome of other bills which Parnell wanted to come out of Perry's committee. In the reverse, there was no evidence that interest groups used this influence resource on other interest groups or on legislators.

d. Membership/Voting Power

The variables of membership and voting power are reported together because of their interrelatedness. Size of membership determines the amount of funds available for executive staff, and for campaign support. As well, membership enhances the work of an interest
group in the various legislative districts, both in individual contacts with legislators at home and in the number of votes an interest group can command for a particular candidate.

As the majority teacher organization in Oregon, the OEA has the full-time support of a legislative lobbyist, a representative Legislative Advisory Council, and the support of a political action group, called People for the Improvement of Education (PIE). In 1967, the OEA Representative Assembly endorsed the idea of a political action arm, and elected an initial Board of Directors of the PIE that year. This group began with voluntary contributions and eventually initiated a system for membership contribution on an annual basis. Accordingly, through the contributions of this group the PIE has been able to endorse and support the candidacy of elected officials on the local, state and federal levels.

Other interest groups in Oregon also have legislative support staffs. Although the OFT now has three legislative lobbyists, it had only one during the 1973 legislative session. According to an administrator respondent, "Up until three years ago, the administrative lobbyists were fragmented among the various
administrative organization." Now, administrator groups (including elementary and secondary principals and superintendents) have an umbrella organization in COSA, which also provides lobbying staff for the organization. However, these groups did not have an official lobbyist in 1973. The OSBA continues to use the services of its executive director. The SDE used its associate and assistant superintendents for representation on the legislative front, as it did in the person of Jesse Pasold in the '73 session. Professors have tended to send as their representative in the legislature that person who was serving as president of the deans and directors group during a particular session. Respondents rated the general effectiveness of legislative lobbying staffs as reported in Table 4.

**TABLE 4**

**EFFECTIVE LEGISLATIVE LOBBYING STAFF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
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<td>3) Teachers</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Interest group respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of grass roots constituencies in influencing members of the legislature, and the data are displayed in Table 5.

TABLE 5
EFFECTIVE GRASS ROOTS CONSTITUENCY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>1.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were also asked to rate the effectiveness of educational interest groups in getting large turnouts of the membership at legislative hearings (see Table 6).

TABLE 6
APPEARANCE OF MEMBERSHIP AT LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In regard to the involvement of the membership of the interest groups in arriving at legislative policies, the OEA uses positions arrived at by its Representative Assembly to formulate priorities for each legislative session. The PIE also uses input from local district UniServ committees to decide on candidate endorsements and to generate local contacts from the membership with individual legislators. In addition, the PTA and the OSBA, and now COSA, all generate their legislative programs from input from some sort of advisory council.

In terms of constituent activity on H.B. 2127, interest group respondents tended to compare their efforts to those in 1965, when the TSPC was originally created. For instance, in 1965, the OEA had several large scale meetings, to discuss legislative activities with its membership. In fact, some 150 members actually attended one of the committee hearings to demonstrate their support for H.B. 1434. According to one OEA spokesperson, this kind of activity was just not necessary for H.B. 2127. As one person noted:

It wasn't necessary to beat a lot of drums
...it wasn't necessary to get a lot of people out of the woodwork to come and testify. The powers, the elements were there and basically in Parnell's area.
The kind of grass roots activity that was used involved a letter writing campaign in which many of the local association presidents sent letters in support of H.B. 2127 to the respective education committee chairpersons.

For the deans and directors, as one respondent recalled, "Our group was not well-organized at the time, and most of the efforts were individual." There was no evidence of AFT, PTA or administrator grass roots activity. That group most adamantly opposed to an autonomous commission was clearly the OSBA. Although several members of the association did appear to testify against H.B. 2127, there was little evidence of OSBA grass roots work. And particularly, there was little evidence of the ground swell of lay antagonism against this bill that was so apparent in Ohio's lay fight against H.B. 559. One legislator accounted for this lack of activity as follows:

I think it [H.B. 2127] was an education fight, and people in education at the higher level understood it...I don't think the teachers understood it. I don't think, by any means, that the general public understood it, and I don't really feel it ever became an issue of lay people.

Another respondent posited another explanation for the lack of organized political action from those opposed to H.B. 2127:
Oregon is a different kind of state. It's a very individualistic kind of thing in regard to political action. And organized political activity on matters like this one are not viewed as a priority kind of thing in most minds.

**e. Social Status**

In a brief summary of the stature of various interest groups in the legislature, and particularly in relation to the activity surrounding H.B. 2127, one legislative staff person observed:

The OEA is among the top. Rigby and the OSBA may be more successful in opposing rather than initiating, but not in 1973. The union lobby in '73 was most concerned with the collective bargaining bill. In fact, the orientation of the union movement in Oregon is toward the trades. The PTA was invisible.

Repeatedly, interest groups and legislative personnel saw the OEA and the school boards as ranking high in legislative influence. As one OEA respondent said, "the teachers are marked relatively high in terms of whom you will turn to if you wanted some educational advice." Perhaps the only detractor to the positive view of the OEA came from a respondent for its union counterpart, the OFT. Accordingly:

They see us [the OFT] as avid and militant unionists after proper salary, fringe benefits, and we nag them to death on public employee, collective bargaining legislation, but we've also appeared to testify on other matters of the profession...and also on
social legislation of a kind that, frankly, the OEA rarely bothers itself about.

Interest group self-perception served as one indicator of status in the legislature. Accordingly, a respondent for the deans noted:

We're still probably a very politically naive group. And of course, we're bound by legal constraints, as well as historical, that political activity was not the thing to do. We have very little credibility, very little visibility....There is a general suspicion that legislators have of higher education.

Respondents for the PTA and the Confederation of Oregon School Administrators both noted their own lack of status with legislators, and at least the administrators confirm that they intend in the future to improve on their legislative posture.

Perhaps the most comprehensive picture of the educational interest groups in political activity came from the following legislative observer's response:

The OEA is on top. I think they've gained a good deal of power. They have a lot of teacher representatives, they've elected as well as having been very influential in electing other legislators. Consequently their political power has increased. The School Boards Association has a fair amount of influence....They tend to be community leaders around the state, and by virtue of that have some political impact, too. I suppose special interest groups like parental groups representing handicapped kids may have the next highest influence on the legislature and then the State Department of
Education probably fits in there somewhere .... Administrator groups in the state have minimal impact. As recently reorganized, their power will be in concert with the School Boards Association. That's part of the management team that can't operate independently.

Respondents were asked to rate the degree of credibility each interest group had in general legislative activities. The results are displayed in Table 7.

**TABLE 7**

**CREDIBILITY WITH LEGISLATORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
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<td>3) Teachers</td>
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<td>4) Administrators</td>
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<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**f. Party Politics**

This influence resource constitutes an additional aspect of the influence variable identified as access. Previously access was discussed in terms of availability of interest groups to legislators in order to get a demand (i.e., issue) before the General Assembly for consideration. In this section access is discussed
in terms of interest group relationships to party politics and political leadership in the legislature. Essentially the question is: Was H.B. 2127 a partisan issue? The answer from most respondents was that this bill was not a partisan issue. To quote one observer, it was instead an issue of "teacher against non-teacher, rather than partisan." Another respondent recalled that it was a "complexion from liberal to conservative, not party to party."

When the individual legislators are considered who supported the bill, what is found is a rather even split between Republicans and Democrats, particularly since Rieke, a Republican, carried the floor fight in the House, and Carson, another Republican, carried it in the Senate. And also, Perry (a Democrat) was important to the progress of the bill out of the House Education Committee.

Related to political party disposition on this issue was the significance of the number of teachers and/or educators in the legislature in '73. There were, as noted previously, eleven educators, of whom ten were Democrats. But the one Republican, Lloyd Kinsey, was a strong supporter of H.B. 2127 as well. The fact that during that session the Democrats
controlled both chambers and both education committees cannot be considered unrelated to the success of education legislation generally. However, there seems to be no clear evidence that either party was the stronger advocate of the bill.

Respondents were asked to rank all educational interest groups in terms of the effect of their relationships with political leadership in the legislature. The data are displayed in Table 8.

**TABLE 8**

**EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE LEGISLATURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=16</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
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<td>4) Administrators</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>5.6</td>
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</table>

g. Coalition

There were somewhat contrasting views as to the nature of the coalition which was struck for H.B. 2127. As one proponent noted:
Whose help was necessary in order to get the bill through? I guess it is fair to say that without the OEA pressure, the bill would not have passed. I think without Dick's [Jones] influence...without Parnell's support, it probably wouldn't have gone through. I think what is different in Oregon from other states is the fact that we had, at least officially the State Board and state superintendent, the commission itself and the major professional organizations, the OEA and the OFT, all lined up behind the bill.

The difference of opinion, of course, is in the posture of the SBE/SDE. According to a school board member:

We fought vigorously and had the SDE on our side. We could have killed it, but the superintendent was threatened and had to change his position to get other bills through he wanted that year.

As far as other interest groups are concerned, a dean respondent noted:

I can't recall any groups particularly who were comfortable with us. Our power base was so slim compared to the Oregon Education Association and the like, that ours was a voice in the wilderness in comparison.

The OFT also claimed that on this and other issues, they usually formed a coalition with the state's AFL-CIO, but there was no evidence of the larger labor union's involvement in this particular legislative activity. Also, although administrators are currently working on what might be called a "management coalition"
(through COSA) there was no such coalition in 1973.

Respondents were asked to rate each others' effectiveness in forming coalitions, with the responses noted in Table 9. In summary, respondents were also asked to rate the general effectiveness of all interest groups in legislative decision-making, as recorded in Table 10.

**TABLE 9**

EFFECTIVENESS IN FORMING COALITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=16</th>
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</thead>
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<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
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<td>2) Professors</td>
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<td>3) Teachers</td>
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<td>4) Administrators</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 10**

EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPACTING ON LEGISLATIVE DECISION-MAKING

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Interest Group</th>
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<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
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<td>2) Professors</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
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<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Significant Factors.** All respondents were asked to summarize what they presumed to be the most significant factors in the disposition of H.B. 2127. One factor was mentioned repeatedly by respondents: the educational orientation of the 1973 General Assembly provided for by a heavy representation of teachers and other educators as legislators. Added to this general profile was the pivotal role played by the chairperson of the House Education committee, who was also a teacher.

Representative Perry's role is directly related to a second commonly mentioned factor in the success of H.B. 2127: that eventually the proponents of the bill had the support, even if somewhat covertly, of the state superintendent. Parnell's apparent support therefore broke whatever coalition the School Boards Association might have been able to build in opposition to the bill. A third significant factor in the bill's success was that the OSBA did not receive any help from the PTA or the general lay public in defending the lay control issue. Consequently, except for the addition of three lay members to the autonomous commission, lay control was really not an effective factor in stopping the legislation.
And finally, respondents suggested that the incremental change from an advisory to an autonomous commission did not generate the controversy that accompanied the legislation which originally created the commission, through the introduction of H.B. 1434 in the 1965 legislative session. Relatedly, the public was generally not well informed about the nature of the commission or what autonomy would mean to its operation. Since Oregon was in the vanguard of states which have attempted to create this type of commission, there were no examples of autonomous commissions in other states which could have provided either positive or negative implications for this kind of legislation.

Implementation

The Process. The previous section of this chapter described the specific forces and factors which led to the creation of an autonomous Teacher Standards and Practices Commission in Oregon. The purpose of this section is to consider which factors effected the implementation of this commission according to the conditions specified in H.B. 2127. More specifically, which factors facilitated implementation and which ones hindered that process? This discussion will focus
on the independent variable identified in Chapter Three (pages 71 and 72) of this study and the data gathered which provided evidence of the impact of these variables on policy implementation.

a. Policy Standards and Objectives

Respondents were asked how clearly they perceived the goals of the commission to have been specified by the legislation which created an autonomous TSPC. One respondent noted:

The legislature creates or proposes something in a very general unspecified form. And you could operate very well within the limits of what the law might be interpreted to have said, and still have something that's at two extremes quite different. It is as much attitudinal as anything. How one constructs standards, etc., is a very crucial issue, and no matter how you construct it, you'd be within the law.

This respondent and others were expressing a very common perception, that generally the commission could and does define for itself the latitude of its work. Much of that definition, according to commission members, has come from the Master Plan described earlier in this chapter. To recount briefly, three documents were accepted by the SBE as appropriate guidelines for the commission's work, only days before the TSPC became autonomous. Much of what is included in these
documents, then, has provided the context for commission work — both in certification and program approval.

Since the Master Plan and the other studies referred to were originally completed by the commission at Parnell's request, commission members noted that his influence was still profoundly felt on the commission.

Two other individuals have influenced the direction of the commission in interpreting its charge, according to respondents. One is the TSPC executive secretary. A respondent noted, "the executive secretary can really control the commission...and what his philosophy is, is going to be what the philosophy of the commission is." Most respondents reflected this same view, although confirming their perception that the current secretary was highly ethical and honest in his intention to interpret the goals of the commission. But he is not without detractors. For instance, one respondent noted:

Dick Jones is a superintendent and he responds to superintendents. He's not for changing things much. He'd like to have the power to say you can have what you want, on a personal basis.

There was, as well, some suspicion of the role of the chairperson of the commission, although the chair changes annually. However, some respondents suspected
the chairperson of imposing on the commission certain issues that were beyond the goals as defined by law. One respondent noted that his organization has seen instances of this kind of control, usually demonstrated by chair selection of committees, charges to these committees, and the composition of agendas. There was no confirming evidence that this perception of the misuse of power was widely felt.

b. Policy Resources

According to Oregon statutes, the commission is allowed to assess fees for certification not to exceed $25.00 for initial and renewal certificates. As well, there is a biennial appropriation of the collected fee from the legislature for "funding activities of the TSPC." In addition, travel expenses incurred by commission members to attend meetings, annual conferences or hearings are covered in the commission's budget. There is the added provision for payment of substitute teachers when commission members who are also teachers are called away from their duties. In

interviews with commission members, there was no
evidence of any financial constraints which might be
limitations to the activities of the commission.

   c. Agenda-building

   This variable was not one considered in the Van
Meter, Van Horn framework in Chapter Three. However,
since one of the generally accepted purposes of teacher
standards and practices commissions is to be broadly
representative of the education profession, it is
important to consider what kind of access and repre-
sentation various facets of the profession have to
to these boards. For the Oregon commission, agendas are
constructed jointly by the chairperson and the execu-
tive secretary before each meeting. Most respondents
reported that they received agendas well in advance
of commission meetings to be informed about the work
of the TSPC. Also, respondents reported that if they
wanted some input into the agenda of the commission,
they simply contacted Jones.

   Access, initially, was not as easily handled.
The OEA reported that: "we hadn't been getting access
...and we were told by our people on the commission
that many times they didn't get the agendas until the
last minute."

According to Jones, several changes
have been made since 1973 which allow agendas to be built well in advance of meetings; to hold meetings at times and places across the state where teachers could attend (a previous complaint of the OEA); and to respond to as many requests for time on the commission's agenda as possible.

A second issue that is related to access to the TSPC has to do with the nomination of commission members. The law states that professional education organizations who have a majority membership in the category can nominate candidates for membership and submit these names to the SBE for selection. It is the view of the OEA that the state superintendent ought to be more overtly involved in the selection process. According to one OEA respondent:

*We've encountered extreme resistance from the State Board in putting our nominees on there [the commission]. Because we are the majority organization, the OEA can nominate directly. We nominated two people, one extremely capable first class candidate, who was by-passed.*

Apparently the president of the OEA had written a letter to the Board suggesting that these were the best candidates. The letter and the candidates appeared to have been ignored. According to one observer:
"The OEA tried to blackmail the SBE into appointments."

OEA respondents concur that the letter was perceived by the SBE to be "heavy-handed."

However, the point that the OEA, and also the OFT, both want to make is that, as one OEA respondent noted:

It [the nominations process] does point up some weaknesses in the system. The State Board is appointed by the Governor, and then it in turn appoints the TSPC people. You know, that's three steps away from any kind of political accountability.

Other OEA respondents suggested that the organization will probably introduce legislation in 1977 to amend the statutes in order to have appointments to the commission made by the Governor.

d. Inter-organizational Communication and Enforcement Activities/Characteristics of the Implementing Agency

Two factors appeared to surface in relation to clarity of objectives and agency characteristics. First, there was some suggestion on the part of some respondents that the SDE, the commission and various legislators may interpret the role of the commission differently. According to one respondent:

At the present time there's a real problem in terms of the appellate function of the Board. We get one story from the commission, one story from the State Department, and one story from the legislature. And none of those three parties are talking together.
According to another respondent, the commission will discover for instance, that certain teachers in a given district do not have certificates. The commission then informs the SDE. When the SDE notifies the district, "...the State Department says, well, the legislature gave those people the power." So what is happening is that both agencies are not wanting to claim anything beyond their limits. One school board member noted that "communication between the SBE and the commission has been nil."

Although the broader issue of the commission's autonomy appeared to be causing some problem to interest groups, there is no evidence that the characteristics of the SDE are a deterrent to the effective functioning of the commission. Some respondents suggested that the flexibility of the SDE toward the commission is in some ways "a function of coincidence."

Almost all respondents mentioned one person who had worked in the area of certification in the Department until about 1972. This woman, Joy Hill Gubser, was "really a legend, strong-willed and adamant. She made demands on the commission for quick decisions which the commission could not really respond to because of its own rules." The existence of this person, and the
control she imposed on the commission, were apparently part of the reason for hiring an executive secretary for the commission -- to give it some independence from her operation, according to one respondent. Her retirement precipitated a more autonomous posture for the commission, even before it was officially granted autonomy.

However, the commission continues to operate with many of the same staff who served under Gubser. According to one SDE (and now commission) staff member, "we were assured by Parnell that there would be no major personnel changes as a result of the commission's autonomy." In fact, as one respondent noted, "Some people are not aware that we're not still in the State Department of Education!" As well, as one respondent noted, the fact that the executive secretary was on the board long before the commission became autonomous has made the transition from SDE to TSPC control much smoother.

e. Economic, Social and Political Conditions

The environmental condition that appeared most germane to the implementation of this policy related to the nature of public opinion about the commission. Most respondents confirmed that "the jury is still out"
as to the effectiveness of the commission. There was detected a picture of interest groups standing back and waiting to see what autonomy would do to the operation of the commission. For this reason, most groups were not claiming that they had any vested interest in the commission's success. They were, instead, noting the activities of the commission with great caution. As one respondent noted:

The commission's success depends upon what kind of discretion is exercised in the use of the commission. If teachers begin to use it as their own private preserve, it's a cancer I think. On the other hand, if we really implement it on a shared authority basis, it can be a real boon.

Another respondent from higher education expressed similar caution:

It's developmental. There are all kinds of misunderstandings and all kinds of difficulties in getting a complex organization like that going. And that has resulted in a lot of uncertainty and uncomfortableness with particular people in higher education. When they see folks whom they feel just don't comprehend the problem, making decisions in areas they are not competent in, or because of a lack of sophistication or experience and maturation...it's a developmental problem.

Perhaps a balance to the above views is one OEA respondent's answer, which the person replying called "kind of a warm, cold answer:"
We do like the direction the commission is moving. We're no where near satisfied with everything that has occurred, but the record will show that since the commission became autonomous, that no longer can superintendents just go down there and cry, and get any old teachers certified. The standards have to be met, and pretty much are being met. So, we didn't expect any instantaneous transformation with that legislation. And we've had none of those things. But there is a gradual moving toward a higher set of standards, and a commission decision versus a staff decision.

**f. Disposition of the Implementors**

This variable relates to perhaps the most controversial area in the history of the commission, particularly as both the SDE and the SBE are assumed to be responsible for the successful implementation of an autonomous commission. What has transpired is the formation last year in Oregon of an ad hoc committee appointed by the SBE to study the nature of the commission's authority. This committee, composed of a lawyer, a woman employed at home and a retired merchant, was charged to study the relationship between the SBE and the TSPC. According to one respondent, the formation of this committee:

...was an example of some dissatisfaction on Gene Fisher's part and, I assume, the fact that we've changed superintendents. I don't think Fisher could have talked Parnell into establishing such a committee. But here's Duncan [Verne Duncan, the new
superintendent], trying to establish his credibility with the Board that Fisher's on.

Another respondent noted that some new SBE members were under the impression that "the commission had been given its authority sort of over the protest of the State Board." At this writing, the results of the committee's report to the SBE are known, but not the actions that the SBE intends to take as a result of this report. The committee recommended that:

The TSPC should exist as a staff function under the superintendent and with the Department of Education. The Board should assign functions to it. The TSPC has shown a great sense of responsibility and provided valuable input in carrying out its duties. Whatever system is established by the Board, continued professional input should be guaranteed.

According to Fisher (but not as spokesperson for the Board):

The State Board of course will be urging this type of legislation for certification and accreditation. Our success will be determined by the makeup of the legislature. That is, whether they are controlled by the people or special interest.

The study committee also made several other recommendations (e.g., an elected SBE who would appoint the superintendent, and a legal-judicial review procedure for hearings) that appears to be the foundation for
the above changes.

**Significant Factors.** According to the reports of respondents, the most significant factors toward the successful implementation of an autonomous commission relate to the disposition of the implementors and public opinion about the commission. Although respondents felt that the commission has a great deal of latitude in defining its goals and objectives, they were far more concerned about its definition of autonomy. There appear to be only minimal constraints in terms of resources, staff support and the transition between SDE operation of certification and TSPC operations.

There was evidence of suspicion of teachers using the commission for vested interest purposes, although no specific instances of this were cited. Teachers, on the other hand, felt that decisions involving administrative problems were now being made more openly and fairly. Teachers are concerned about the nominating process, and other constituent groups are continuing to seek greater representation. But clearly the greatest concern is whether or not the commission, the profession and the public can define and abide by the notion of an autonomous teacher standards and
practices commission.

Chapter Summary

In 1965, the Oregon General Assembly created a Teacher Standards and Practices Commission composed of fourteen teachers and administrators, and two teacher educators, to advise the SBE in matters of teacher education and certification. The contributing factors in the success of this legislation were considered to be the extensive involvement of the OEA; the broad-based representation of the OEA at that time, which included teachers, professors and administrators; and the support of the SDE/SBE in creating the commission.

Efforts to make the commission autonomous were more complex than the events of the 1965 session. To compensate for expected opposition, the bill which proposed autonomy for the commission also expanded the membership of the TSPC to include three lay representatives, with the remainder of the commission left much the same. Opponents of the commission feared that autonomy would make the commission too powerful, leaving the commission vulnerable to abuse by its majority membership -- the classroom teachers. Also
by 1973, the membership of the OEA no longer included professors and administrators. Although the OEA and the members of the advisory TSPC favored full autonomy, opponents included teacher trainers, administrators and school board members. The pivotal issue was whether or not the superintendent and the SDE supported autonomy. Public testimony from an SDE representative disclosed some Department and State Board opposition to transferring SBE powers to the TSPC. However, in order to assure the enactment of certain other bills which were pending in the '73 legislature, the state superintendent agreed not to publicly oppose the autonomy bill. Therefore, the opponent coalition lost the needed support of the SDE, and the bill passed in the summer of 1973.

The disposition of the profession and members of the SBE against autonomy has plagued the implementation process involved in transferring SBE control to the TSPC. However, in Oregon, this is seen as a minor problem and not as directly effecting the future success of the TSPC. The role of the TSPC in relation to the SBE and the nature of the commission's autonomy continue to be contested. Consequently, it is highly likely that as the OEA presses for Governor appointment
of its nominees to the TSPC, members of the SBE on an ad hoc basis will work toward returning the authority of the TSPC to the State Board. Both of these demands should crystalize in the 1977 session of the Oregon General Assembly.
CHAPTER FIVE

TEACHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE IN PENNSYLVANIA

Introduction

Current Status. The current governance structure for teacher education in Pennsylvania resembles one of the three operating forms of control considered in this study; that is, a teacher standards and practices board which, according to Pennsylvania statutes, is advisory to the Pennsylvania State Board of Education. The board is officially called the Pennsylvania Professional Standards and Practices Commission (and is referred to in this study as the PSPC). The commission was established by the Pennsylvania General Assembly and signed into law as Act 141 by Governor Milton Shapp on December 12, 1973. This commission advises the state's Board of Education, which is a 16 member board serving both basic and higher education.

The commission, consisting of 16 members, is broadly representative of the education profession, and includes representation from the general public.
This composition includes eight public school classroom teachers, including one educational specialist; three public school administrators; two faculty members from teacher education institutions; one administrator from a teacher education institution; one teacher education student; and one parent of a child attending a public school. All appointments to the commission are made by the Governor from lists of nominations from statewide organizations of professional educators. Commission members are appointed for three-year terms and may serve for two terms. Operating funds for the commission come from monies appropriated by the legislature. Commission members serve without compensation, but are reimbursed for expenses when attending meetings or otherwise engaged in commission business.

According to Pennsylvania law, the commission has the authority to recommend to the State Board of Education: standards for certification of teachers, accreditation of teacher education programs and professional practice for teachers in public schools; procedures which assure that actions concerning suspension, annulment, or revocation of teaching
certificates comply with due process; processes for the evaluation of teacher education and certification program services and activities to determine the effectiveness in terms of annual and long range program plans; and recommendations for changes in certification and teacher education as a result of these evaluations.1

A Brief Historical Summary. Given the above form of teacher education governance in Pennsylvania, the purpose of this chapter, as in the chapter discussing Oregon, is to explain why this commission was created and how the specifications of the enabling legislation were implemented to form a functioning commission. As one step in that explanation, a brief summary of events which led to the introduction of Act 141 will be presented below.

The idea of a professional standards and practices commission is not new to the state of Pennsylvania. According to one source, the 1960 Governor's Commission on Higher Education recommended that a "professional

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1Sources for descriptions of the PSPC are the final printer's number draft of H.B. 903, and a document published by the PSPC called, "Facts about the Pennsylvania Professional Standards and Practices Commission."
teacher education standards board should be established by law. It should be broadly representative of the teaching profession."² Simultaneous to the Governor's study commission, the state affiliate of the National Education Association was also considering the issue of professional governance.

According to a spokesperson for the Pennsylvania State Education Association (PSEA), the association had been giving careful consideration to an ad hoc committee report of the NEA published in 1964, which studied and recommended the establishment of professional standards boards.³ As a result of this report (developed by teachers, administrators, teacher educators and state agency representatives), the PSEA's Teacher Education and Professional Standards Commission (PSEA-TEPS) first established a committee to study professional practices commissions in 1966. This committee, through regional TEPS conferences, discussed


³A primary source for the historical events which led to the introduction of H.B. 903 was a paper prepared by the PSEA's Director for Professional Development, William Cornell, called "The Development of a Standards and Practices Commission in Pennsylvania," n.d.
the idea of a standards and practices commission in Pennsylvania and, in December 1966, presented to the PSEA House of Delegates a report calling for legislation to establish a standards and practices commission. Proposed legislation was drafted and guidelines for such a bill were presented in a PSEA document called Guidelines for Professional Standards Boards. That year also, a permanent staff member was appointed by PSEA in the area identified as Professional Development.

Legislative sources recalled that in the 1966 session, legislation was introduced in the House of the Pennsylvania General Assembly which referred to the establishment of some sort of professional standards board. Evidently, the legislation was introduced late in the session and was not considered very carefully at that time. Also, prior to the passage of a state constitutional amendment, in 1968, the legislature did not meet on a yearly basis; but rather, biennially. As well, a legislative staff person noted that his "rule of thumb" for an idea is that "it takes seven years for a new idea to get through this legislature." As will be seen, in the case of professional standards board legislation for Pennsylvania, that
timeline was very accurate.

In 1968, the PSEA requested the introduction of S.B. 1285 into the legislature, to create a standards and practices board which would have taken over all functions of the State Department in matters of teacher education and certification. According to PSEA sources, the bill did not gain strong support, either by effective sponsorship or general sentiment on the part of legislators on the Senate Education Committee. However, the introduction of the bill did stimulate some action on the part of the Pennsylvania SBE, which resolved:

Since Senate Bill 1285 is designed to create a Professional Standards Board and a Professional Practices Commission wherein professional personnel employed by the state or its agencies would be assigned the authority to establish and control its own standards and policies over matters related to teacher certification, teacher education and standards of ethics and performance of teachers and in so doing Senate Bill 1285 would assign responsibility and authority for a major segment of educational control of such a board and commission drawn from the ranks of professional employees, which now properly constitutes a plenary function of the State Board of Education and the Secretary of Education.
Be it resolved that the State Board of Education be on record in total opposition to Senate Bill 1285.4

Additionally the State Board, at the Secretary of Education's5 request, adopted a regulation on March 13, 1970, to establish a professional standards committee to advise the Board on matters related to teacher education. This committee was composed of eight teachers, seven teacher educators, and six school administrators. This committee replaced an ad hoc committee on teacher education previously established by the Secretary in 1969. It was made up of deans, chairpersons of education departments, a state college president and an SDE staff member.6 According to PSEA sources, the new committee represented a change in the Secretary's philosophy in that: "the


5Pennsylvania has a secretary of education rather than a state superintendent. The secretary is appointed by the Governor to serve as executive officer of the SBE and administer the operations of the SDE. The SBE was created by the General Assembly in 1963. It consists of 17 members appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the state Senate. The SDE has existed since 1929.

Secretary did agree that the then existing practice of teacher education advisors being only college presidents was out-dated." 

Both PSEA representatives and sources who were serving in the SDE at the time report that the Secretary's advisory committee did not really function adequately. One source noted that it was hard to get the items of the committee onto the SBE's agenda, and that was a constant problem with the operation of the groups. Also, as the Director of the SDE's Bureau of Teacher Education was executive officer of the groups, his handling of the committee was, according to one respondent, "only as a sounding board for his own ideas." There were other suggestions that the Director of the Bureau and the Secretary decided which of the committee's issues should go to the Board, and at the same time went directly to the Board with other items without consulting the committee.

The PSEA continued to work on the professional practices act concept, and sought the help of the NEA's TEPS commission in arriving at another draft of a

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standards board bill. Consequently in the 1971 session of the General Assembly, S.B. 849 was introduced under the sponsorship of Senator Jeanette Reibman, who was chairperson of the Senate Education Committee. This bill provided for an autonomous standards and practices commission composed of 15 persons (eight teachers, four administrators and three faculty from higher education).

Open hearings were held on the bill. During these hearings, the PSEA was the primary proponent, with support also being offered by the legislative director of the PTA. PSEA testimony was offered by several members of the association and by Margaret Knispel as spokesperson for the NEA. Opponents included the SBE/SDE, through their spokesperson, the Secretary of Education; the Pennsylvania School Boards Association; school administrators; and the Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers. The PFT feared lack of representation on the commission. Most of the other opponent testimony focused on the issue of State Board control versus teacher control. The Secretary of Education opposed the removal of authority over teacher education and certification from his office, and the administrators and school board members
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supported that view, calling the bill "unwarranted and ill-advised."

According to a PSEA spokesperson, more sufficient groundwork needed to be added in order to get more support for this legislation. S.B. 849 had not been voted out of committee, in that session, so PSEA began immediately to prepare for activities related to reintroduction of the bill. Also, the PSEA had the added assistance of an NEA grant of $15,000.00 to help get a standards and practices act passed in Pennsylvania. According to another respondent, "it was clear that the NEA had identified target states for this activity, and Pennsylvania unfortunately happened to be one."

Accordingly, this money was used for "filmstrips, publications, and other materials to build support among teachers, the public, and the PTA, and the legislators." Statewide conferences were also held for the public and legislators to generate support for such legislation.

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8 Ibid., p. 9.
9 Ibid., p. 9.
Between 1969 and 1972, two other bills were introduced into the General Assembly, both calling for the creation of a professional standards board and a professional practices commission.10 Both of these bills would have removed certain powers from the SBE and vested them in these new boards. The 1969 bill, S.B. 93, was referred to the Senate Education Committee but was never voted out of committee. H.B. 1898, introduced in 1972, also remained in the committee to which it was referred, the House Education Committee. According to PSEA Sources, Representative Dager, who had sponsored H.B. 1898 was conferred with, and agreed to work out a compromise bill to be introduced in the 1973 session.

Simultaneous to the activities of the PSEA cited above, the Governor of Pennsylvania had convened a Citizens Commission on Basic Education in July, 1972. The commission was charged "with the responsibility of examining and making recommendations for the

10Reference to the legislative history of bills cited in this chapter were taken from The Legislative Journal, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
improvement of the quality of education in Pennsylvania. As such, the commission divided into seven sub-committees, one of which was on educational governance. Although no mention was made in this report of the establishment of a separate standards and practices board, the commission did criticize the SBE/SDE and make recommendations accordingly.

One criticism of the commission was that in the past, there had not always been a high degree of cooperation between the General Assembly, the State Board of Education and the State Department of Education. Therefore, the commission resolved that:

The General Assembly, the State Board of Education and the Secretary of Education should cooperate in close liaison in the development of statutory changes, new regulations and revised standards in the operation of the educational system.

And second, the commission found a lack of staff in the SDE to meet the work load created by its teacher education responsibilities. Consequently, the commission recommended that:

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12Ibid., p. 97.
The Department of Education should hire adequate staff to evaluate teacher education programs on a frequent and regular basis. 13

The results of this commission have been reported primarily because of the record of these commissions to influence public policy, as noted by several respondents. For instance, this 1972-1973 commission recommended that the General Assembly revise the Education Code of 1949, and in the 1975 session, the legislature proceeded to work on recodification. So, it is significant that at a time when the PSEA had unsuccessfully ventured to make changes in the governance structure of teacher education in the state, this commission was also reporting criticism of the existent form of teacher education control. Both of these activities, then, set the stage for the legislative activity of 1973 which did, in fact, change somewhat the governance structure for teacher education in the state.

Legislation. The legislation that was reintroduced by Representative Dager, at the request of the PSEA, was presented on the floor of the House of

13 Ibid., p. 103.
Representatives on May 1, 1973, as H.B. 903 (Printer's Number 1065). In the original draft, a 15 member commission was called for, which could recommend to the SBE standards for certification and accreditation, but could also adopt a code of ethics for teachers and monitor its application through rules and regulation developed by the commission. This version of the bill did not include the representation of a teacher education student.

The bill was amended to include representation by one teacher education student. As well, some of the powers granted to the commission were reduced through amendments. That is, the commission could only recommend to the SBE a code of ethics, instead of adopting and monitoring this code. Eventually even the code of ethics concept was amended to read "professional practice." In the fourth printer's number of the bill, private elementary and secondary schools were excluded from any of the issues raised in the bill. The version of the bill which was signed into law

14 All bills introduced in the General Assembly bear a printer's number. When the bill is amended a new number is added, citing as well the previous printer's number.
included this progression of amendments, including the expansion of the commission from 15 to 16 members.

H.B. 903 was reported out of the House Education Committee on July 2, 1973. Third consideration\(^\text{15}\) in the House and final passage of the amended bill, by a vote of 135 to 50, occurred on July 25, 1973. It was referred to the Senate Education Committee on July 25 and reported out of committee on October 10. Final passage of the bill on the floor of the Senate occurred on November 9, with a vote of 45 to 3. The House concurred with the Senate amendments of December 3, by 185 to 2, and the bill was signed into law on December 12, 1973.

Demands and Resources

Although the background information provided in the introductory section of this chapter is helpful in understanding previous activity in Pennsylvania, it does not provide answers to all of the research questions posed in this study. What is needed is a

\(^\text{15}\) In the Pennsylvania General Assembly, a bill cannot be voted on unless it has had three considerations on the floor of either chamber. The announcement of a committee's report on a bill is its first consideration. A second consideration is called to take comments from the floor and the third consideration requires that a vote be taken.
systematic analysis of why the governance structure of teacher education in Pennsylvania changed and how this change, through the passage of H.B. 903, was implemented. The initial question is: How did the demand for a change in the governance structure arrive on the legislative agenda, and what were the positions of those groups effected by the demand?

Significant Actors. According to responses from persons interviewed in this study, the PSEA, representing classroom teachers, was the primary group requesting introduction of some type of professional standards commission legislation. Although amendments to the original version of H.B. 903 made the bill more palatable to the bill's opponents, the interest groups which testified against the passage of H.B. 903 included:

1. school board members - Pennsylvania School Boards Association (PSBA)

2. state agencies - Pennsylvania State Department of Education (SDE) and Pennsylvania Board of Education (SBE)

3. classroom teachers - Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers (PFT)

4. school superintendents - Pennsylvania Association of School Administrators
5. school principals - Pennsylvania Association of Elementary and Secondary Principals

The Pennsylvania Catholic Conference took opposition to the bill in testimony and in a written document sent to Senator Reibman. Several other interest groups that were active in either Oregon or Ohio were also contacted during this investigation in Pennsylvania. These groups had not taken official positions during the hearings, but were contacted in order to discern why they had not. The legislative posture of these groups is recounted later in this same section for the following groups:

1. parents - Pennsylvania Congress of Parents and Teachers

2. professors - Pennsylvania Association of Teacher Educators
   Pennsylvania Association of Colleges for Teacher Education

Interest Group Positions. As was indicated earlier, the PSEA began to generate legislator support for a bill to create a standards and practices commission as early as 1971. Because of the additional funds to foster this activity, and because of the continued effort of PSEA to establish this commission, this legislation, according to one respondent, became the number one priority for the PSEA in 1973. Further,
one respondent recalled that the PSEA, at its Delegate Assembly that year, had guaranteed its members "that the organization would have a great deal of input" into the nature of the bill that established the commission.

As one legislative staff member noted, "the PSEA is good for an issue a year. On the off years it's a subsidy issue." For instance, in 1972, the PSEA had worked diligently for the passage of a teacher retirement bill, to equalize the pension system for teachers. As another respondent noted, "the PSEA is strong enough to have more than one legislative priority." But, since 1972 had been a subsidy year, the respondent noted, "they [PSEA] couldn't come back to say, 'give us more money.' So they were free to turn their attention to something else." And, as one person noted, "the PSEA needed something to take back to the membership."

Since 1966, and the first consideration of a professional standards bill, the PSEA had been on record as favoring an autonomous commission, which would remove certain powers from the SBE in regard to teacher education and vest them in a new commission. However, the first provision under "power and duties" in the
original draft of H.B. 903 required that the commission have only the power to "recommend" standards of certification and teacher education, not to "adopt" them. Therefore, the issue of compromise on this particular legislation was discussed by several respondents.

According to legislative staff, the PSEA had contacted the State Department of Education about its intentions to seek the introduction of H.B. 903. At the suggestion of autonomy, as one respondent recalled, "Pittenger had said he would have it vetoed." As one legislative staffer noted, the PSEA lobbyists "didn't understand the process...the pro's knew they [the PSEA] wouldn't get it autonomy." As these two staff members suggested, "the PSEA could have gotten more. But with the State Department against it, they would really have had to fight....They would have had to use up favors."

According to a PSEA spokesperson:

The major concession was to change the commission from being autonomous to being an advisory commission to the State Board of Education. It was felt by the PSEA that the concession was necessary or no bill could be passed in 1973.

Critics of the PSEA observed more desperation in the association's actions. As one respondent noted, "the
PSEA just needed to bring home a package that looked close." More penetrating than that observation was the feeling on the part of other staff members in the legislature that the PSEA was "just not really interested" in H.B. 903. Consequently, the commission proposed in H.B. 903 was advisory in nature.

The autonomy issue was only one in a list of concessions that the PSEA eventually had to make in order to get H.B. 903 through the legislature. Although the bill as introduced called for an advisory commission, the SDE had additional objections and so did other interest groups. In fact, in order to get effective sponsorship and support for the bill, the autonomy issue had to be dropped at the outset. Having made that initial compromise, Representative Dager did sponsor the bill, with the chairperson and vice chairperson of the House Education Committee adding their support as well.

In addition to the autonomy issue, the State Department had several other objections to H.B. 903 that required amendments. It is important here to add that although the SDE does have a legislative director, its primary spokesperson on this issue was Secretary John Pittenger. Pittenger had been appointed
to this cabinet post by Governor Shapp in 1972. As one respondent noted, Pittenger was brought in to:

...break the monopoly that educators had on public education in Pennsylvania [that is, higher education, teachers and others]. He had sort of a Ralph Nader image. He was not after any particular group...[he] got after a lot of them.

Other respondents confirmed that Pittenger was aggressive and, to understate his position, "not enthusiastic about the creation of an autonomous board.

The SDE objection to H.B. 903, as reported by staff members and through records of testimony, were as follows: 1) the lack of student representation, which was amended to include a teacher education student on the new commission; 2) the right of the commission to adopt a code of ethics, changed to recommending a code of ethics (eventually changed from code of ethics to standards of professional practice at PSEA's request\(^1\)); 3) the right of the commission to decertify teachers, (which the Secretary felt was within his authority only), changed to recommending procedures to assure due process in decertification

\(^1\)At some point in the debate the PSEA decided that it was inappropriate for the commission to deal with teacher ethics.
issues; 4) the continuation of the Secretary's Professional Standards Commission (created in 1970), upon the enactment of H.B. 903, changed to abolish that commission accordingly; 5) appointment of a director for the commission by the Governor, changed to allow the Secretary to appoint the director. As one legislative staff member observed, after these compromises were struck, "the PSEA ended up giving up the store... [there were] no teeth left in it [the bill]."

As was noted earlier, there were several other interest groups which opposed the bill, and on whose insistence a few additional amendments were made to H.B. 903. As a respondent for one of the chief opponents to the bill, the PSBA, recalled, "it was very obvious to us that in this last session and even before it that this bill was PSEA's number one priority."

Accordingly, PSBA opposed the bill for the following reasons:

(1) There is a clear lack of necessity for the establishment of a Professional Standards and Practices Commission (with another commission already in existence);

(2) There would be unwieldy power given to such a commission - power that could supersede the authority of the State Board of Education and the Secretary of Education (particularly in the area
of decertification and in adopting a code of ethics);

(3) There are many implications left by the unclear language of this bill (as the commission can adopt a code of ethics, but only recommend certification standards).

Public service should not be controlled by any private group. In spite of what else may be said on behalf of this bill, this is what is essentially at stake.

More damaging to PSEA's position was the belief on the part of PSBA members that this attempt to control teacher certification and decertification was in disguise what one respondent called a "super tenure law." He noted that before the collective bargaining bill in Pennsylvania one might have suspected that PSEA's motive was "to police its own ranks," and as he said "who could fault an organization for wanting to do that?" However, now that the state does have a "right to strike bill" and teachers and management have assumed more adversarial positions, he suspected that the motive behind the bill was really for "more protection for incompetence." In summary, the PSBA testified:

Certification, we recognize, is not and should not be the responsibility of local school boards. It should be a public, statewide service. It ought to be regulated by an official state agency, but certainly not by a vested
interest.
The record of testimony indicated appearances of both the Pennsylvania Association of Elementary and Secondary Principals and the Pennsylvania Association of School Administrators. Respondents for both groups recalled that they opposed H.B. 903 for the following reasons: 1) they did not want to see a commission created that would be dominated by teachers, 2) they did not want such a group to control decertification rules or processes and 3) they opposed the inclusion of parochial schools in the provisions of the bill. Although two of these three objections were resolved in amendments to the bill, respondents credit those changes to the SDE and not to administrator groups. However, their testimony added support to the Secretary's position.

The interest group most often referred to by respondents as really having deterred the progress of the bill was the Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers. According to a respondent for the Federation, its primary objection was to the composition of the new commission. On the first and second printer's numbers of the bill, the respondent noted:
The PSEA was guaranteed to dominate the board. The bill was held up until changes were made which seemed to open the bill and give the PFT representation. Representation was really a political hassle.

The bill had read:

Appointments shall be made by the Governor from panels of nominees submitted by statewide professional organizations...

It was changed to read:

The Governor in making appointments shall consider recommendations from panels of nominees submitted by statewide organizations of professional educators...

The PFT argument was that in the initial wording, nominees for classroom teacher representation would come only from the majority teacher organization in the state (the PSEA). The second version helped to open nominations to all professional groups regardless of size of membership. A revision of the fifth and final printer's number deleted another section of the bill that would have potentially limited teacher organization nominations to the PSEA.

Another opposition interest group caused further amendment of the bill. This group, the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, opposed the bill because it applied certain additional certification requirements on clerics who were teaching in parochial schools.
Since clerics had been granted a special type of certification, acquired after three years of teaching experience but not required graduation in an approved teacher education program, they opposed the implication that they might now have to seek regular certification. They noted:

We do not feel the state should be regulating religiously-affiliated schools, which are not publicly funded, to the point of requiring that all teachers in such schools have certificates — although there is no reason why certificates should not be available to these teachers.

Therefore, the bill was amended to specify that the regulations of the bill applied only to public schools. The Pennsylvania Association of Independent Schools also supported this position.

As noted earlier, several interest groups were absent from activity in Pennsylvania, who had in some ways been involved in either Ohio or Oregon. One of these groups, the PTA, according to their respondent, "was just not in operation in 1973. We have not made any effort to get smart about the commission, although we did hear a lot of mutter/mutter, fuss/fuss when it was formed!" Although the respondent recalled hearing some talk among the membership about too many teachers on the commission, the organization still had no
legislative position on the issue.

Neither the Pennsylvania Association for Teacher Educators and the Pennsylvania Association of Colleges for Teacher Education were involved in the legislative activity of 1973. Although these groups report that currently they are making efforts to become more politically active, they simply were not active three years ago. Both groups have passed resolutions in support of the current operation of the commission.

In a follow-up questionnaire sent to each person interviewed in the Pennsylvania case study, respondents were asked to identify which form of teacher education governance each would personally prefer if that structure were reorganized in the state. The responses were distributed across interest groups as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Returned Questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania State Board of Education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania State Department of Education</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania Professional Standards and Practices Commission</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania General Assembly</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania School Boards Association</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania Association of School Administrators</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania Association of Elementary and Secondary School Principals</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of those who returned questionnaires, 55% of the respondents preferred the form identified on the questionnaire as Type B (a teacher standards and practices board, established in the statutes, and advisory to the state board and department of education).
Thirty-three percent of the respondents preferred Type C (state board of education/state education agency control, assisted by a teacher education advisory council established by the board); and 11% preferred Type A (a fully autonomous teacher standards and practices board.

Respondents were also asked to identify the type of governance structure (from Type A to Type C) which should have responsibility for activities typically related to the administration of teacher education at the state level. Of the eight activities listed in Table 11, respondents chose either Types B or C structures to handle all of the activities. Type A structure did not receive the highest percentage for any of the activities. Respondents chose to have the following responsibilities given to the Type B structure: the establishment of certification standards, the establishment of standards for program approval, the recommendation of funding levels for teacher education and the stimulation of research. The Type C structure was chosen for: the issuance and renewal of certificates, the approval of teacher education programs, and the establishment and collection of certification fees. The respondents were equally
divided on the establishment and enforcement of a code of ethics between Types B and C.

### TABLE 11

**PREFERRED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FOR TEACHER EDUCATION ACTIVITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEACHER EDUCATION ACTIVITY</th>
<th>TYPE, N=12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) the establishment of certification standards</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) the issuance and renewal of certificates</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) the establishment of standards for the approval of teacher education programs in colleges and universities</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) the approval of teacher education programs according to established standards</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) the establishment and collection of certification fees</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) the establishment and enforcement of a code of ethics (of professional practice) for teachers</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) recommending the level of funding of teacher education programs in state universities to the legislature</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) stimulating in-service education and research in teacher education</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In regard to the preferred structure of a teacher standards and practices board (either advisory or autonomous), 40% of the respondents reported that appointments to a board should be made by the governor. In contrast, another 40% of the respondents supported governor appointment from lists of nominees from professional organizations. Ten percent each of the respondents chose governor appointment, subject to legislative approval or state board of education appointment.

Respondents felt that members of a standards and practices board serve from two to four years, with 60% selecting three years as the appropriate term and 20% each selecting two and four year terms. In terms of the size of a board, 40% each thought the board should be composed of either 8 to 11 or 12 to 15 members. Twenty percent of the respondents preferred 16 or more member boards.

When given a choice as to the representation on a teacher standards and practices board, the following results were recorded by respondents: All respondents wanted classroom teachers, teacher educators and administrators to serve; 88% wanted lay citizens on the board; and 55% would prefer school board member
representation.

When asked which of these above groups should have majority representation on a standards and practices board, or if there should be equal representation from each group, 70% would support majority representation from classroom teachers. The remaining respondents (30%) preferred equal representation.

Two final questions were asked about a standards and practices board in relation to the legislature and the State Board of Education. For advising the legislature, 30% each of the respondents thought the board ought to be a major source, a minor source, or not a source. Ten percent thought the board ought to be the most important source to the legislature. In advising the SBE, 55% would make the board a major source; 33% the most important source and 12% a minor source.

The composite picture of the preferred board according to the respondents in Pennsylvania would be an advisory board, in the statutes, with responsibility for establishing certification standards, standards for the approval of teacher education programs, levels of funding for teacher education in the state and inservice and research activities. Respondents preferred
to leave to the SBE/SDE the issuance and renewal of certificates, the approval of teacher education programs and collection of certification fees. Responsibility for a code of ethics would fall to either an advisory board or the SBE/SDE, according to respondents.

The preferred board would be appointed by the governor, with nominees from statewide professional organizations, would have eight to fifteen members, with three-year terms; with classroom teachers in the majority and additional appointments equally distributed among other educational interest groups; and acting as a major source of advice to the SBE, but disagreement as to a major or minor source of advice for the legislature.

Since this section has dealt primarily with the presentation of positions through legislative testimony, it is appropriate here to discuss other data gathered through the above questionnaire. Respondents were asked to rate interest groups in terms of their general effectiveness in testifying before the legislature. The data from two separate questions are displayed in Table 12.
TABLE 12
TESTIMONY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Testifies frequently at legislative hearings</td>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Effectively presents arguments at legislative hearings</td>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demand Resources. As in Chapter Four, the independent variable of "access" will be discussed in light of demands and resources, with the remaining variables related to influencing policy formulation being discussed within the conversion process section of this chapter.

Since the influence resource of access is directly related to the process of interest groups being able to get a demand onto the legislative docket, the PSEA deserves first consideration. As has been noted
earlier, the PSEA had a special allocation from the NEA to assist in generating support for a teacher standards and practices board. Consequently, PSEA was able to work with legislators and provide them information well in advance of the legislative session. In addition, one of the chief legislative staff members on the Senate side was a past PSEA member and former state association president. As well both chambers have adequate full-time staff to allow for continuous interchange of staff and interest groups all during the legislative year. This access, as one respondent recalled, has always been used by the PSEA "to its best advantage."

Clearly another interest group exercised direct access to the legislature in the case of H.B. 903 -- the State Department. As respondents recalled, prior to introduction of H.B. 903, the Secretary's position had to be cleared. Apparently, as one staff member suggested, that was a "norm" for proceeding on such an issue as controversial as control and autonomy for teachers was in Pennsylvania. These observations suggest that there were in fact two agendas upon which the PSEA's demand had to be placed: the legislature and the SDE.
The Conversion Process

This section identifies the characteristics of the legislative session in which H.B. 903 was considered, and the interactions of the legislature and the interest groups in the exercise of influence in policy formation.

Legislative Characteristics. As should be clear by now, the progress of H.B. 903 was fraught with delays for amendments. As has also been noted, 1973 was not a subsidy year, nor were there many other educational bills competing for legislator attention during that session. In that session, the Republicans were in the majority. Even so H.B. 903 got not only the sponsorship of the House Education Committee chair, Representative G.Sieker Pancoast, but also the minority vice chairperson's support, by Representative James J.A. Gallagher (D). Representative Dager was a Democrat as well. It was Dager's responsibility to carry the bill on the floor of the House, once the bill had passed the Education Committee and vice chairperson at that time on the Senate Education Committee, Senator Reibman's responsibility in the Senate. Clearly, there was bi-partisan support for H.B. 903. Additionally, one respondent observed that in the House,
"sponsorship is not really a major item" on educational issues. He continued, "this committee [the Education Committee] has the least amount of individual jealousy of any committee in the House."

Several of the major compromises and/or amendments on the bill were made before it was reintroduced on the floor of either Chamber. According to one legislative staff member, the House Education Committee "would not have reported out an autonomous bill." He further noted that it was the sentiment of both the staff and the committee members "that teachers couldn't control as well as the State Department, because of too much self-interest." This feeling was one of the reasons, according to respondents, that the PSEA/SDE compromise had to be struck prior to introduction of the bill.

Amendments made in the House Education Committee included: changing the membership to add the student, and changing adoption of decertification procedures to "recommending." In the Senate Education Committee, an amendment was added to delete private schools from the effects of the bill, and to allow the Secretary of Education to appoint the Director of the new
Amendments were also called for on the floor of the House and the Senate. In the House, the bill was amended to allow the SDE to transfer funds from the existing professional advisory committee, set up in 1970, to the new commission. Two additional amendments were introduced which would have expanded the composition of the commission in one case by two parents, and in the second amendment by eight members other than teachers. Both amendments were defeated by a large margin.

In the Senate, Senator Reibman did introduce what respondents referred to as a "democratizing amendment," to assure representation by the PFT. According to a legislative staffer, "clearly the thing that stalled the bill was basically this question of representation." By that date, October 16 (six months after the bill's introduction) there was enough support for this amendment that a verbal support vote was all that was required on the floor for passage. Two other amendments were attempted, to add more lay members, but both were defeated. Even though six months had passed before final Senate action occurred, the affirmative vote did mean that the bill was passed in the first year.
of a two-year legislative session. But, as one respondent noted, "It was not unusual for the bill to move in the first year of the session, particularly since PSEA had let it be known that it was their principal priority."

On reflection of the 1973 legislative session, staff members in both the House and the Senate recalled that they viewed H.B. 903 as "really something for the SDE and the teachers to fight out...It was a housekeeping bill." Respondents concurred that if those two groups could agree, then the committees would formalize the agreement by passing the bill. According to one staff member:

The function of a legislature is to delay; to impede the law-making process; to make judgments and to put grease on squeaky wheels. When decisions are mindlessly made, then that's when the system malfunctions. Through delay, the inappropriate aspects of legislation seem to fall out. An efficient legislature destroys its reason for existence.

All of this is to say that staff members viewed the delaying amendments of H.B. 903 as an appropriate way to arrive at the best possible piece of legislation.

Conversion Resources. The influence resources used by various interest groups to impact on the formulation of an autonomous commission (i.e., H.B. 903)
will be described below. The purpose of this section is to consider which of these factors seemed most important to the progress of the bill.

**a. Expertise**

There was little evidence to indicate that the opponents of H.B. 903 were sufficiently satisfied with the productivity of the SDE/SBE that that was their reason for opposing a change in control. In fact the 1973 Governor's Citizens Commission report would suggest that there was not a great deal of public support for the way in which the SDE/SBE were handling teacher education. Even though the PSEA did have to concede on the autonomy issue, the association, respondents suggest, was able to capitalize on some public sentiment against the department. The PSEA also launched a massive information campaign to explain to teachers, the public and the legislature the nature of a standards and practices board well in advance of the introduction of H.B. 903.

However, since the issue at hand was really one of control, neither opponents or proponents were able to present results of related research to legislators that would have made their decision more substance-based.
Respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of all educational interest groups in regard to the resource of expertise and the results showed that none of the interest groups were rated very high on this resource. The data are displayed in Table 13.

**TABLE 13**

THE EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION OF RESULTS OF RELATED RESEARCH AT LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS (EXPERTISE)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Authority

There was no evidence presented by respondents that any official government agencies other than the SBE/SDE were in any way involved in the formulation of H.B. 903. As in Oregon, the chief state school officer was integral to the decision on the bill. As one respondent noted: "when the Secretary agreed to the basic change in the nature of the commission, that was tantamount to saying, 'this flies.'"
The only additional government agency involvement was from Governor Shapp who, somewhat like Oregon's Governor McCall, at the signing of the bill into law, did so as a symbolic gesture at the December, 1973 meeting of PSEA's House of Delegates meeting.

c. Coercive Power

Respondents were asked if their organizations were able to impact on the legislative decision by suggesting either negative or positive repercussions that might occur if the bill passed.

Two instances of which might be construed as coercive were cited. One, as previously mentioned, was Pittenger's threat to have H.B. 903 vetoed by the Governor if it created an autonomous commission. And two, one respondent observed that after the bill was amended, "if people voted against the bill they got on the PSEA bad list." This threat is, of course, related to candidate support, as will be discussed in the section which follows.

d. Membership/Voting Power

As in the Oregon chapter, these two influence resources will be considered concurrently. The PSEA, as the majority teacher organization in the state, has at least three lobbyists who were referred to as
active during the debate over H.B. 903. As in Oregon, the association also has a political action arm, called the Political Action Commission for Education. As well the association includes in its membership over 100,000 teachers. As one respondent noted, "that's not as many people as labor has, but it's well distributed at about one teacher per every 100 residents of the state." Respondents also confirmed the effectiveness of the PSEA lobbying staff, even though it may have misjudged the autonomy issue in '73. As one observer noted, "Sometimes bills move so rapidly that affected interest groups may not be aware of it. The PSEA is more on top of the situation than the PFT. Unlike the PSEA, the PFT offices are located outside the capital city of Harrisburg. The PFT has primary affiliation in three cities: Scranton, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. Its membership is much smaller than PSEA's but, as one respondent noted, "the PFT has clout because Philadelphia has clout." PFT has the services of one full-time lobbyist and also, depending on the issue, the lobbying services of the AFL-CIO.

The PSBA has a legislative director, as do the two administrator groups. As was noted earlier,
higher education professional associations are trying to get organized politically, but were not in 1973, as was true for the PTA. Respondents rated the general effectiveness of legislative lobbying staffs as reported in Table 14.

TABLE 14
EFFECTIVE LEGISLATIVE LOBBYING STAFF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interest group respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of grass roots constituencies in influencing members of the legislature, and the data are displayed in Table 15.
Respondents were also asked to rate the effectiveness of educational interest groups in getting large turnouts of the membership at legislative hearings (see Table 16).

**TABLE 15**

**EFFECTIVE GRASS ROOTS CONSTITUENCY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 16**

**APPEARANCE OF MEMBERSHIP AT LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As was noted earlier, the PSEA House of Delegates approved the efforts of the association to introduce legislation on a teacher standards and practices commission bill. Because this issue was the major priority of the association in 1973, one respondent observed that "the PSEA lobbyists had so extended themselves by their promises to the membership that their willingness to compromise was more than usual." This statement exemplifies the nature of the information given to the membership in regard to yearly legislative programs for the organization.

The PSEA sends out regular information to its members in a newsletter called The Voice. As well the main office utilizes the services of 43 field offices in the state to organize letter writing campaigns and other political activities which the association supports. In addition, as one legislative staff member noted, the association regularly invites legislators to informational sessions where potential legislative issues are discussed. To summarize, as one spokesperson observed, "PSEA has significant clout, even in three PFT cities. One thousand members can be very important at the polls, although that doesn't mean that they win every fight."
Earlier in the history of the PSEA, the membership of the PSEA used to include representation of administrator groups as well as teachers. But, as one respondent noted, "after the passage of the collective bargaining bill in 1970, it became obvious that no person in management could be a member of the bargaining unit." So the elementary and secondary principals disassociated from the PSEA. The Pennsylvania Association of School Administrators separated from the PSEA in October, 1969. Both of these organizations use legislative committees to generate positions on bills introduced in the General Assembly. And respondents report that their legislative clout is increasing, though it was not very effective in 1973.

Perhaps the most underdeveloped lobby in the state, according to respondents, is the lay public lobby. As one person observed, "the PSBA is the closest thing to a public lobby in education." For its membership, the PSBA has organized local legislative committees, and holds statewide conventions to establish its legislative posture. But the parent lobby is considerably less organized and therefore, less effective. As one respondent observed about the PTA:
It has a large membership which is not very forceful, to my despair. It allows itself to be manipulated. The women of the PTA have not become embittered... they're too trusting. The PTA is excessively democratic, which is next door to impotent.

Most respondents expressed regret at the association's inability to get organized. As one person observed, "with 503 districts, and a dollar a family, the citizen interest lobby could be very powerful." But as another person noted, "to the PTA, politics is dirty."

The only other lobby of note in the education area is that of the State Department of Education. Of the three states considered in this study, Pennsylvania is the only state whose SDE has a legislative staff who publicizes the Department's legislative positions on a regular basis. This posture for the SDE has become increasingly important under the direction of Secretary Pittenger. In fact, one respondent who no longer works for the Department observed that he left the Department because of his "disenchantment with the lawyer-politician profile of the head office."

e. Social Status

Although respondents for all interest groups seemed to agree that the PSEA has a lot of power in the
legislature, they were more hesitant to rank the association highest in terms of status or credibility. As one legislator noted, "the PSEA is an honest and informed lobby." This same respondent noted that "honest and ignorant lobbyists are bad, but the worst are knowledgeable and dishonest!" This same respondent observed that at times he had found the PSBA "to be more self-serving than even the unions." In the case of H.B. 903, "although the PSBA thought it was the major blocking influence on the bill, it was not. The Department was."

At least one reason for this rather negative view of the PSBA is that, shortly before interviewing in Pennsylvania, the legislature had just experienced a great deal of controversy over the recodification issue. In this case, the PSBA had been the primary opponent in what respondents called a rather bitter fight.

Several respondents suggested that the status of the PSEA had been in a state of change, particularly since the passage of the collective bargaining bill. As one respondent observed:

Pennsylvania is getting the backlash of collective bargaining. In 1970, the public was for teachers. They were the underdog. But the sentiment has drastically shifted and the public is now
soured. PSEA is not getting things through as fast. It has really peaked out. They [teachers] were little rich kids who grew up fast, and then had this let down. Really they didn't know how to manage their power and they were using union tactics that the rank and file and the public didn't like.

Respondents confirmed that the view of the PSEA was in part a factor in the number of compromises the association was forced to make on H.B. 903.

Respondents were asked to rate the degree of credibility each interest group had in general legislative activities. The results are displayed in Table 17.

**TABLE 17**

**CREDIBILITY WITH LEGISLATORS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**f. Party Politics**

This influence resource constitutes an additional aspect of the influence variable identified as access. Here it is discussed in terms of interest group
relationships to party politics and political leadership in the legislature. Accordingly, respondents were asked if H.B. 903 was a partisan issue. Most respondents replied that the bill was not partisan; that, in fact, H.B. 903 had had sponsorship from both parties and bi-partisan support from the floors of both chambers as well.

As one respondent from the House Education Committee noted:

We haven't had a straight party vote on an issue in a long time. Even 195 [the collective bargaining bill] was not totally along party lines. Pennsylvania is a strong, labor state, with strong allegiances to labor. There is a positive attitude about it that tends to cut across party lines.

As another respondent noted, the collective bargaining bill had been passed by a Republican Senate. He noted that "although there is a tendency for Republicans to be pro-business, and the Democrats pro-labor, it varies tremendously from individual to individual."

Another legislative staff member summarized the issue by noting that "the only partisan votes are for appropriations and taxes."

Respondents were asked to rank all educational interest groups in terms of the effect of their
relationships with political leadership in the legislature. The data are displayed in Table 18.

**TABLE 18**

**EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE LEGISLATURE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**g. Coalition**

Respondents reported that there were no orchestrated coalitions formed on the opposition side for H.B. 903. However several informal alliances were made simply because of the fact that there were so many educational interest groups in opposition to the bill. As the respondent for PSBA noted, "the PFT was on our side because they realized that the commission was primarily for PSEA." The same respondent noted that the school boards did not get any help from the PTA; that, in fact, "the PTA is a nonentity except when the PSEA uses them." The PFT also enlisted the
services of the AFL-CIO lobby when, as one respondent noted, "the PFT was about to be out-gunned by PSEA."

Legislative observers noted that "the PSEA would not be more powerful, if everyone else took them on." But as one respondent noted, "it has been hard to get the opposition together." For instance, the school boards association and administrators have recently been working on the formation of a coalition on an issue by issue basis. The operating principle, as one respondent explained, is for these groups to form a management team. The problem is that since principals have no bargaining unit, they are active in Pennsylvania in the formation of a union. But as one other member of the management team observed, "we're opposed to that because it's foreign to management." Such differences have made this coalition a hard one to activate.

Respondents were asked to rate each others' effectiveness in forming coalitions, with the responses noted in Table 19. In summary, respondents were also asked to rate the general effectiveness of all interest groups in legislative decision-making, as recorded in Table 20.
TABLE 19
EFFECTIVENESS IN FORMING COALITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 20
EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPACTING ON LEGISLATIVE DECISION-MAKING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant Factors. All respondents were asked to summarize what they presumed to be the most significant factors in the disposition of H.B. 903. Respondents agree that the primary reason that the amended version of H.B. 903 passed was because the
PSEA had promised a standards and practices board to its membership that year. Consequently, to get the bill through the legislature, the PSEA had to make more compromises than it usually might have been expected to make. These compromises were necessary because of a second very important factor to the disposition of the bill -- Secretary of Education John Pittenger. Pittenger opposed an autonomous commission or even the granting of authority for decertification to an advisory commission. The PSEA was forced to concede on both of these counts.

After all of the compromises were struck and the amendments were added, and after the SDE had essentially been added to the list of proponents, those who had continued to oppose the bill (namely the PSBA and administrator groups) could not form a coalition strong enough to combat the proponents. Also, the PSBA had no assistance from any lay lobbying groups, and specifically the PTA. Although an active PFT had managed to delay the progress of the bill, their opposition was not effective enough to deny passage of the bill.
Implementation

The Process. The previous section of this chapter described the specific forces and factors which led to the creation of an autonomous Professional Standards and Practices Commission in Pennsylvania. The purpose of this section is to consider which factors effected the implementation of this commission according to the conditions specified in H.B. 903.

a. Policy Standards and Objectives

Respondents were asked how clearly they perceived the goals of the commission to have been specified by the legislation which created the PSPC. There was general agreement by all groups as to the substantive areas which were within the domain of the commission. The problem in interpretation came with the word "advises," or as the law reads, "to recommend." In addition to these various definitions of an advisory commission, some of the goals and purposes of the commission were being defined by virtue of what the SBE or the Secretary chose to ask the commission to investigate. Both of these issues, of purpose and of the meaning of advisory, are addressed below in one respondent's observation:
While organizing, the commission was confronted with a number of controversial certification proposals submitted to the State Board of Education by the Secretary of Education. The commission immediately became a reacting agent. Also, the commission was testing the meanings of advising the State Board and attempting to establish stronger ties of communication. A law may state that one body advises another, but there is no law stating the degree of attentiveness to such advice.

In actuality, even though the general areas of concern assigned by law to the commission were clear, knowing how to address these issues in the specific was, as some respondents noted, somewhat of a problem. Also, members seemed to suggest that these choices as to issue definition were somewhat constrained by what they were being asked to do for the Board and the SDE. Yet, clearly, as the director of the commission noted, the commission was trying, in its reactive posture to be as responsive to the SBE as possible. He quotes, "we had an obligation to take a look at whatever they gave us." As well, the director reported that in its second year of operation, the commission will try to be more initiatory than reactive.

Another factor is important to an understanding of the purposes and goals of the commission. Several respondents remarked on the role of the Secretary of
Education in defining policy for the SBE and consequently the PSPC. As one respondent remarked, "the Secretary holds real powers of persuasion. The Board does not, except by its policies, tell the Secretary how he's going to run things." Also, a commission member noted that the Board, in light of Pittenger's strength, "is more likely to listen to him than to us." For instance, as this same respondent noted, "when the Department says it, it must be true. When the commission says it, it may be true." As will be seen, these observations are equally related to implementor disposition as to commission purpose.

b. Policy Resources

According to the enabling legislation, appropriations from the legislature for funding activities for the PSPC were to come from allocations already made to a commission of the SDE which was discontinued when the new commission was created. In addition, travel expenses incurred by commission members to attend meetings or hearings are covered in the commission's budget. There is the added provision, according to commission regulations, "that commission members
shall not suffer loss of pay during meeting dates."\textsuperscript{17}

In interviews with commission members, there was no evidence of any financial constraints which might be limitations to the activities of the commission.

A related issue was raised, however, by a respondent for the SDE. He noted the current low fee for certificates and the difficulty of the Bureau of Teacher Education in doing an adequate job with such a low budget. If, he said, the PSPC were ever to assume these functions for the Bureau:

...it could probably raise the certification fee like Oregon's TSPC did, and put the Department in a terrible position. It would make the commission look pretty good. We could raise the fees, on the other hand, and they'd go into the General Fund and we might never get them.

Again, a note of competition between the Department and the commission is reflected in the above comment, however hypothetical the observation.

c. Agenda-building

As noted in the Oregon chapter, this is an added variable to the implementation framework used in this study. As the inclusion of this variable suggests,
it is important to consider what kind of access and representation various facets of the profession have to the commission. In Pennsylvania, agendas are constructed by the director and the commission chairperson, and distributed well in advance of commission meetings. According to the director, anyone can request to appear before the commission and he has tried very hard to make the commission responsive to these requests. As was earlier noted, commission agendas are all in part determined by the number and kind of items for which the SBE has requested consideration. According to a commission member, these have been priority items.

Respondents from various interest groups report that they receive constant communication from the commission, and that agendas arrive in adequate time to plan to attend meetings. However, few associations report continued attendance of commission meetings.

An issue related to the agenda of the commission is the nature of the membership. As noted in Act 141, the Governor was given the right to appoint members to the commission. In doing so, he asked one of his former staff members (and now Executive Director of the Senate Education Committee, and past PSEA president) to draw up a list of appointments to the initial roster
of the commission. From a list of 220 nominees, approximately 70 persons were interviewed and the final list of the members, according to the prescribed representation, were presented to the Governor for his approval. Of the group, seven were PSEA members. Therefore, when it came time to elect a chairperson for the commission, one respondent recalled, "the PSEA members decided to caucus to choose their candidates for leaders." Consequently, the chairperson and one subcommittee chair were given to the PSEA members. Although caucuses do occur occasionally, respondents agreed that there is little evidence of block voting by any constituent group on the commission; that instead commission members tend to vote their own prerogatives.

d. Inter-organizational Communication and Enforcement Activities/Characteristics of the Implementing Agency

Clearly, the implementing agency for the Pennsylvania PSPC was the State Department of Education. As such, prior to the selection of a commission director, one of the staff members of the Department served as acting director. The selection of a director was given to the Secretary through the enabling legislation. He selected three candidates whom he found acceptable,
and then agreed to employ which ever of these three candidates the commission selected. The candidate, who continues as director currently, according to a PSEA respondent, "surprised the Secretary of Education and the PSEA as he became a strong proponent for a really independent professionally thinking and acting commission."

This staff selection and the nominations to the commission were completed within 12 months of Act 141's enactment. As the commission, in full force, began to interact with the SBE in its advisory role, some problems did develop, however. According to one source:

The State Board of Education established a special committee of its Higher Education Committee to meet with the Commission before each of the Board's bimonthly meetings. But these meetings also pointed out a problem in the relationship when it was found that the Department of Education was setting the agenda for State Board of Education meetings with its Standards and Practices Commission. The certification and teacher education bureaus of the Department of Education sent proposed changes directly to the State Board of Education. The commission found itself reacting to the wishes of the profession.

Access to the Board is a continuing issue with the commission. Although a special sub-committee of the Board acts as liason for the commission, there is
evidence that the commission does not receive as much of the Board's attention as it would like.

**e. Economic, Social and Political Conditions**

As with Oregon, the environmental condition that appeared most relevant to the implementation of the PSPC involved the nature of public opinion about the commission. The posture of most interest groups, as respondents noted, was described as a "wait and see" attitude. One respondent noted some "confusion on what the commission really does." Another response related to the previous advisory committee set up by the Secretary of Education in 1970: "They [the SDE] needed an advisory committee to advise them, but they already had one."

Other public reaction appeared to focus around the issue of autonomy. Several interest group respondents speculated that they feared "that the commission would try to change its role from advisory to autonomous...and there's no reason to believe they'd do any better than the Department." But perhaps a summary of the general sentiment of interest groups which had originally opposed the commission legislation came from one respondent who noted: "I think it's a waste of money. They're [teachers] not getting
anything out of this commission that they couldn't get from any ad hoc committee." He further noted, "the commission is stretching to try to be visible and justify its existence."

f. Disposition of the Implementors

Although the SDE has carried the primary responsibility for initiating the operation of the commission, the PSPC is in actuality advisory to the Board, not the Department. Therefore, whether or not the Board is accepting of the role of the commission has been very important to its implementation. As one respondent observed, "some State Board of Education members and Department staff have viewed the commission with a wait and see attitude." Relatedly, another respondent noted: "The location of the commission in the hierarchy of state education control has never existed, so we've had to find our own level." He also noted that some of the Board members can't accept the commission's ideas readily. For example, "after the commission gives an opinion, then the Board asks for the Department's opinion and it puts us in an adversarial relationship."

A commission member summarizes the disposition of the implementors as follows:
It took almost one year for the anti-PSEA members of the Board to come off of the biased view that the commission was a PSEA board. For us the Board seems to have an inability to deal with crucial issues, which it says it is unable to respond to. At the same time, the Department presents long range issues and the Board responds immediately.

**Significant Factors.** According to the responses of persons interviewed, the problems of getting the commission implemented seemed to have stemmed from the disposition of the implementors and the aggressive role which the Secretary of Education continues to play in teacher education policy. The dispositional problems seemed to relate to the various definitions of "advisory" and whether or not the commission has adequate access to the SBE. Also, at present, there seems to be some duplication of effort in what the commission deals with and what the SDE does. But this is probably, as one respondent suggested, a function of shifting out responsibilities and the division of labor.

There is as well some public sentiment that the commission is not necessary, that it is teacher controlled, and that it will probably want to be autonomous eventually. These attitudes have created some general suspicion that continues to haunt the
implementation of the PSPC.

Chapter Summary

Although activity to create a teacher standards and practices commission in Pennsylvania originated in 1966, the state did not create a commission until 1973. With the enactment of H.B. 903, a professional standards and practices commission was established to advise the SBE in matters of teacher education, certification, decertification, and professional practice.

The primary reason that an amended H.B. 903 passed the Pennsylvania General Assembly was because the Pennsylvania Secretary of Education was willing to lend his support to a bill creating the advisory commission. Although the PSEA had originally sought the creation of a fully autonomous board, it was forced to compromise in order to win the secretary's support, without which the bill would certainly have been defeated. As well, the PSEA had promised its membership a commission bill which also placed pressure on the association to compromise in order to carry a successful bill back to its membership. The strength of the Secretary's disposition, and the fact that once the
PSEA and the Department had compromised, essentially meant that the bill would pass. Therefore, although there was lay opposition to the bill, there was an inadequate coalition of opponents to stop the bill.

In the implementation of H.B. 903, the delaying factors in an optimally functioning commission have been the result of the attitudes of both Board members and Department staff toward the commission. Most of these persons continue to view the commission as unnecessary. To date the commission continues to struggle for its place in the hierarchy of Pennsylvania governance of teacher education.
CHAPTER SIX
TEACHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE IN OHIO

Introduction

Current Status. The current governance structure for teacher education in Ohio is that form most comparable to traditional forms of state governance of the profession. There exists in Ohio an elected State Board of Education and its implementing agency, the State Department of Education. The SBE has been delegated by the legislature the authority to set and enforce standards for teacher and administrator certification and for the approval of teacher training programs in the state's higher education institutions. In addition, a Teacher Education and Certification Advisory Commission was created by the State Board of Education in December, 1974.¹

As will be discussed in this chapter, this commission was an outgrowth of the SDE's Teacher Education Redesign effort. It was created by the SBE to guarantee the continued input of education professionals who were involved in the Redesign project in the implementation of the new teacher education standards. It is composed of 15 members, appointed by the SBE pursuant to the recommendations of the Superintendent. The commission is representative of members from:

1) approved or chartered schools or school districts, including teachers, supervisors and administrators;
2) higher education, including college students, professors of education, administrative heads of teacher education, and presidents; and
3) the lay public. As well, education related groups and organizations may submit names of nominees to the Superintendent for appointment to the commission. The term of appointment is for three years.

The purposes of the commission as stated in the resolution which created it are:

1. Study teacher education and certification standards and make recommendations pertaining thereto to the State Board of Education;

2. Formulate advisory interpretations of teacher education and certification standards for use in the development of teacher education programs by colleges
3. Review State Department of Education evaluations of colleges or universities preparing teachers and make recommendations pertaining thereto;

4. Collect data concerning the current and projected need for certificated personnel in the various teaching fields and areas of specialization to be used in making informed recommendations concerning the adoption of comprehensive staff development policies by the State Board of Education; and

5. Analyze and report the financial requirements of teacher education as it pertains to colleges and universities and approved or chartered schools or school districts to the State Department of Education.

A Brief Historical Summary. The introduction of legislation to create some type of teacher standards and practices commission in Ohio occurred in the 110th General Assembly. In January, 1973, Representative Norman A. Murdock (R, Cincinnati) introduced onto the floor of the House of Representatives H.B. 198, creating a state board for professional personnel in public schools. The genesis for this bill stemmed from the creation in 1970, of a statewide commission on public school personnel policies funded by twelve Ohio foundations and called the Commission on Public School
Personnel Policies in Ohio. According to a representative of one of these foundations, historically Ohio has had a weak Board of Education, with little initiative to bring about change. Consequently, this respondent felt that foundations ought to support a state commission that could begin to look at issues that would have impact on educational policy formulation.

The composition of this commission was diverse, consisting of industrialists and labor leaders, civic leaders, and professional educators. Its charge was, "...to engage in non-partisan analysis, study and research of methods to achieve optimum quality and utilization of teaching staffs and to enlarge the attractiveness of teaching as a career."² The commission spent most of 1971 in data collection throughout the state, interviewing and conducting hearings with lay citizens and professional educators. As results were compiled and ideas began to crystalize, the Commission was able to publish several reports on issues of importance from June, 1971, through June, 1972.

ranging from organizational development and differentiated staffing, to teacher tenure. In November, 1972, the Commission published *Realities and Revolution in Teacher Education*, the report which is most significant to this discussion because it was to serve as the source for H.B. 198.

According to a staff member in the House during this time, Representative Murdock, chairperson of the House Education Committee, had requested his staff to make inquiries into the nature of teacher education in Ohio as a result of various contacts from his constituents about teacher education. In the course of these inquiries Murdock discovered the work of the commission and the possibility of legislation evolving from the Commission's reports.

H.B. 198 was referred to the Education Committee and first heard in Committee in May, 1973. By that time H.B. 279 had also been introduced in the House by Representative Marcus A. Roberto (D, Ravenna).

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3 The reports of the Stranahan Commission include: *Organizing for Learning*, *Organizing for Learning II*, *Teacher Tenure*, *Teacher Evaluation to Improve Learning*, *Time and Opportunity - The School Year* and *Realities and Revolution*. 
This bill had been introduced by Roberto at the request of the Ohio Education Association (OEA), in keeping with the effort of the NEA across the country to introduce legislation giving control of teacher training and certification over to the classroom teacher. According to OEA spokespersons, this legislation was not merely introduced as a counterpart to H.B. 198. However, there is no evidence of the long history of involvement of the OEA's Commission on Teacher Education and Professional Standards as was apparent in Oregon. Instead the issue seems to have generated from the OEA's hierarchy and its knowledge of the national picture.

Both H.B. 198 and H.B. 279 called for the creation of a board separate from the State Board of Education and the State Department of Education. Both bills assigned to this board the responsibility for the certification of teachers and the accreditation of teacher education colleges. But each bill specified different membership on the Board. The Educational Practices Board of H.B. 279 called for nine members. The OEA could submit a list of five names for each position and the Governor could choose from these and other recommendations any members who had a minimum
of five years of active service in Ohio public education. The State Board of Professional Personnel of H.B. 198 consisted of five teachers (four from the OEA and one from the Ohio Federation of Teachers, OFT), five teacher educators, three superintendents, one secondary principal, one elementary school principal, two school board members, and two members from the public at large, all to be appointed by the Governor.

For H.B. 198, representatives of the Commission, often referred to by its chairperson's name as the Stranahan Commission, were its primary proponents; and for H.B. 279, the OEA was the proponent. Most of the opponents to these bills were in opposition to a separate board, regardless of its composition. These opponents included representatives of administrators, teacher educators, school board members, parents and the State Board of Education and the Education Department. The general nature of the opposition was that the State Board of Education was doing an adequate job, and that matters with which it dealt should appropriately be left under the control of the lay public. A new board, opponents feared, would create more bureaucracy and would give the Governor appointment power which would make the Board too political. Also, many
who testified felt that teachers were too self-interested and too protective of each other to be effective board members. 

Over a three month period an unprecedented number of hearings, 16, were held by both the full Education Committee and its sub-committee. Compromises were apparently struck with the drafting of a substitute bill, Sub. H.B. 198. This version of the bill would have broadened the representation of the board and made the board advisory to the State Board rather than autonomous of it. Although representatives of the Stranahan Commission were willing to support the compromise, the OEA was not willing to relinquish majority control of the proposed board. Such division of opinion was reflected in the indecision of the Committee.

At the final hearing of Sub. H.B. 198, the chairperson of the Committee (Donald Pease, D, Oberlin) noted the uncertainty and confusion on the substitute bill, and conceded that the last days of the session

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Although there are no permanent records of committee hearings from 1973, the researcher attended each of these hearings and recorded notes of testimony at that time.
had been too hectic to give adequate consideration to the nature of the bill's provisions. A vote of the Committee was not called for because there were not enough votes to pass the bill out of Committee. Consequently, the bill was again referred to a subcommittee for further study and was not discussed again during the 110th session of the General Assembly. Concomitantly, the work of the Stranahan Commission came to a close when it was not refunded for 1974.

However, out of this year of debate over the governance of teacher education in Ohio, several important developments occurred. First, a lay commission had actively investigated the problems of public education and particularly the management of teacher education. Second, as a result of these investigations, much discontent with the present state of teacher education had been disclosed. Third, the actions of the Stranahan Commission had led to the introduction of legislation which challenged the role of the State Board and Department of Education in teacher education. Simultaneously, the OEA made public its support of the NEA's national move to grant control of teacher education to the classroom teacher. Finally, as speculated by numerous respondents in this study, the threat
posed by the 1973 legislation in the governance arena prompted action on the part of the State Board and Department to launch its massive state-wide redesign of teacher education. In fact, many opponents of H.B. 198 and H.B. 279 testified as to their discontent with the Department and the need for immediate action. It was as if opponents were saying that they, too, might become proponents of a separate board if the Department were unable to demonstrate progress over the next few years.

In response to such speculation about the motivation of the State Department in its activities in teacher education, Ohio's chief state school officer, Dr. Martin W. Essex, recounts another history. In 1968, personnel in the State Department, because of their awareness that teacher education in Ohio was not acceptable, adequate or even fully respected by the citizenry, made an $82,000 grant to the Educational Research Council of America in Cleveland to research needed changes in secondary teacher preparation. Concurrently, the Department assisted the University of

5The results of this research are cited in "Teacher Education in Ohio," Educational Research Council of America, 1971.
Toledo in acquiring a federal grant to conduct research in elementary teacher training. Essex felt that the Department should have both of these studies completed and available for application in the state when teacher supply exceeded demand, when he felt some changes could be made in training programs. The secondary education investigation, called the Teacher Education Assessment Project, was completed in December, 1970.

A second major investigation was launched by the Department in 1971 because of, according to Essex, the general dissatisfaction of the public about education. Other respondents have suggested that the reason was more directly a response to legislation passed under Am. Sub. H.B. 465, which required the Department to:

...Develop a comprehensive system for providing educational management and accountability capabilities. ...Develop-mental work by the Department shall... strive, with regard to all public and non-public elementary and secondary schools in the state, to (1) define...measurable ob-jectives...[and] (2) identify pertinent data elements and devise methods and sys-tems for...measuring and reporting the extent to which the defined objectives are met....The Department shall submit to the General Assembly on or before June 30, 1972, a report on its progress...
Beginning in May, 1972, at the instigation of the State Department, 604 school districts in Ohio held Local Citizen Seminars to identify priorities for a redesign of education in Ohio. Because of additional involvement of citizens in regional conferences, the number of persons consulted finally totalled 125,000 in what the Department has called its "Search for Consensus." According to Essex, out of these conferences came a mandate from the public for the Department to pursue a redesign of teacher education in Ohio. Consequently, when the Department reported its progress to the legislative mandate of the General Assembly in June, 1972, it also commenced a project known as "Teacher Education Redesign." According to State Board President John R. Meckstroth, the purpose of redesign was, "...to begin a thorough, comprehensive, and appropriate restructuring of teacher education."  

During the next 15 months, from September, 1973 through November, 1974, lay citizens and professional  

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6 Results of this Search for Consensus are recorded in "What 125,000 Ohioans Want from Their Schools," Ohio Department of Education, 1973.
educators met and discussed the redesign of teacher training standards and the consequent revision of the existing "Standards and Regulation Governing the Approval of Colleges and Universities Preparing Teachers in Ohio" (Ohio Department of Education, 1970, pp. 79-82). Organizationally, the redesign effort included input from: 1) all educational constituent groups (i.e., teachers, administrators, teacher educators, etc.) formed in statewide councils; 2) a State Advisory Committee, broadly representative, which met on a regular basis; and 3) regional hearings where testimony was received by the Department and the Advisory Committee. Henry M. Brickell, from the Institute for Educational Development, facilitated and coordinated the dialogue of these three sources.

Largely through the work of the Advisory Committee, the Department was able to hold hearings on an initial draft of the standards in the Fall of 1974. At these hearings, testimony and proposals were received from the statewide councils, expert witnesses and interested others. After several revisions, a new set of standards was formulated and adopted by the State Board of Education in December, 1974. Simultaneously the Board passed a resolution to establish
a broadly representative and continuing commission
to facilitate the implementation of the new standards,
called the Teacher Education and Certification Advisory
Commission.

The Legislation. It is within this context that
H.B. 559 was introduced onto the floor of the House
of Representatives, on March 18, 1975, during the 111th
Ohio General Assembly, by Representative Robert J.
Boggs (D, Ashtabula). The introduction of H.B. 559
signalled the second consideration in three years of
legislation which would redistribute the control of
teacher education in Ohio, and is the primary focus
of this case study of the governance of teacher edu-
cation in Ohio.

Existing Ohio law requires the State Board of
Education to formulate and prescribe minimum standards
for all elementary and high schools in the state.
These standards must adequately provide for teacher,
administrator, and other professional personnel certi-
fication. The State Board is also required to estab-
lish standards and courses of study for the prepara-
tion of teachers, to inspect and approve teacher train-
ing institutions, and to certificate graduates of such
institutions. Existing law also provides that the
State Board may establish standards below those set for provisional certificates by which temporary one year certificates are granted.

H.B. 559 established a Teacher Education Planning Board to recommend to the appropriate agency standards and procedures for accrediting teacher training institutions, standards for teacher and other professional personnel certification, funding of teacher education in state universities, assistance to colleges of education and school districts in providing for cooperative training of teacher education students and in planning and executing plans to help educators grow professionally, and the stimulation and coordination of research in teaching and teacher education. Within 120 days after receiving the Planning Board’s recommendations relating to teacher education and certification, the State Board would either have to approve or reject all of them. If rejected, the State Board would have to return them to the Planning Board with written reasons for rejection.

The bill provided that the standards and courses of study the State Board presently establishes for the preparation of teachers would have to be endorsed by the Planning Board. In the prescription of standards
for teacher certification, the State Board would be permitted to prescribe only those standards recommended by the Planning Board. The Planning Board would consist of nine members with four-year terms who were appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The membership of the Board had to be representative of the teaching profession, except that one member would be a representative of the public and could not be an employee of a board of education, college or university at the time of appointment. An executive director could be appointed by the Board who would serve at its pleasure. The director would be the Board's chief administrative officer and would appoint all employees of the Board who would serve under his direction and control.

In March, 1975, H.B. 559 was referred to the House Education Committee and was first heard on May 14, 1975. Testimony was taken at two additional hearings, May 21 and May 28, 1975. The bill was before the Committee again on June 11, at which time amendments were adopted to the bill and it was forwarded to a sub-committee for further study. The bill had not been returned to the Education Committee docket at the time of this writing.
Demands and Resources

Significant Actors. This section will identify those interest groups who were integral in bringing the issue of a standards and practices board to legislators, as well as the positions of these proponents of H.B. 559. As well opponent interest groups and their positions are summarized.

The only educational interest group offering supportive testimony for H.B. 559 was the OEA, representing classroom teachers. Opponents of H.B. 559, who also offered testimony, included representatives of the following groups:

1. school board members - Ohio State Board of Education (SBE)
   - Ohio School Boards Association (OSBA)

2. superintendents - Buckeye Association of School Administrators (BASA)

3. school principals - Ohio Association of Elementary School Principals (OAESP)
   - Ohio Association of Secondary School Principals (OASSP)

4. university administrators and teacher educators - State University Education Deans (SUED)

5. state education agencies - Ohio State Department of Education (SDE)
6. parents - Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers (PTA)

Representatives of interest groups which were mentioned in interviews with the above representatives, or who were significant because of their absence at any of the legislative hearings were interviewed as follows:

1. classroom teachers - Ohio Federation of Teachers (OFT)

2. higher education teacher educators - Ohio Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (OACTE)

Interest Group Positions. The OEA requested that Representative Boggs introduce H.B. 559. Additionally, the bill was drafted by the Legislative Services Commission to the specifications conveyed to Boggs by the association. Representatives of the OEA admitted that an independent planning board would be impossible to achieve during the 111th General Assembly. (Some reasons for this view will be reported later.) The legislation was therefore introduced making the professional board an advisory board, but an advisory board with real power. This "real power" referred to the fact that the State Board would be able to prescribe only those standards recommended to it by the Teacher Education Planning Board. According to the OEA, an independent board is ideal, but the next best
thing is to create an advisory board whose advice has
to be followed or at the very least a board which pre­
vents the State Board from acting independently. Ad­
ditionally the role of the SBE was left in the bill
to allay fears that the Department of Education would
lose the Division of Teacher Education and Certifica­
tion. However, any less role for the planning board
than is written into the bill would, according to
the OEA, "gut" it.

Testimony presented by the OEA described this
bill as one of five legislative priorities for the
1975 session of the 111th General Assembly.⁸ As such,
the OEA argued that the quality of teaching personnel
is equal to the quality of their training, and only
teachers know what teachers need. A second argument
in support of H.B. 559 was that teaching was the only
profession without "self-governance," and that the
definition of a profession mandates this type of leg­
islation.

A third portion attacked the work of the State
Department in Teacher Education Redesign on the following

⁸"OEA's Legislative Priorities for 1975," Ohio
Schools, 17 January 1975, pp. 18-19.
points: 1) teachers were left out of the planning for Redesign; 2) composition of the original State Advisory Committee did not include teachers; 3) meetings and hearings were poorly publicized and materials were not distributed in sufficient time before hearings; 4) teachers were unable to get the problems of inservice education resolved through the Redesign; and 5) although the new standards are very weak, they would have been weaker had the OEA not imposed teacher participation. Additionally, although a Teacher Education and Certification Advisory Committee had been created by the State Board (in December, 1974), the OEA feared that it could just as easily be eliminated by the Board; and, it only had three teachers on it anyway. One OEA respondent summarized the nature of the association's testimony as mainly an "effort to discredit what was being done, both in the way of reform and currently in universities and teacher education, and an attempt to make the argument that professionals need control of their own licensing body."

In response, a fairly lengthy list of opponents testified at succeeding hearings. Their positions are summarized as follows. The State Department was strongly opposed to H.B. 559, although it was very
supportive of the idea of an advisory committee. However, the thrust of this bill would have placed the responsibility for teacher education in the hands solely of teachers since the SBE had to accept the recommendations of the planning board. Obviously, philosophically, the SDE believes in control by lay citizens. The Department also felt that now that Redesign was completed and implementation beginning, it would be unfortunate to legislate the State Board powerless in matters related to teacher education.

It is appropriate to add here that Ohio's Department of Education usually assumes a very low profile in the legislative arena; that is, the Department and the Board usually find their spokespersons from groups outside the SDE/SBE. But in this instance, two members of the Board testified as opponents, and the Department personally arranged for the appearance of certain education interest group members to be present and offer testimony at H.B. 559 hearings. Representatives of the Board testified as to the cumbersome nature of the legislation, in that the State Board could accept or reject only total packages of recommendations by the newly created planning board. Additionally SBE members felt that teacher education
should be beyond the control of teachers alone, and that other professions (medicine, law) were not particularly good examples of professional control. Further, one respondent for the SBE said that the 
"...[teaching] profession would change too slowly if left just to educators."

One additional observation is helpful in explaining the position taken by the SDE/SBE. A representative of the Department was asked on what basis the Department decided to assume such a high legislative profile on this particular bill. The answer was four-fold: 1) for philosophical reasons which support a lay board of education; 2) because of the constitutional amendment and enabling legislation which created an elected board in the early 50's; 3) because the Department must resist anything that would infringe on the role of the Board; and 4) because the Department and the Board had gone to the people of Ohio and asked for their involvement both in the Search for Consensus and in Redesign, consequently the SDE had to serve as protector of that input. The nature of SDE/SBE sentiment is summarized by one respondent who noted, "Proponents of 559 claimed that nothing has been done, but that negates the history of study,
research and action in education in Ohio."

The Ohio School Boards Association opposed any intrusion by teachers into the domain of lay control. Further, representatives of OSBA testified that the nature of the exchange of ideas between the SBE and the new planning board was cumbersome and time-consuming. More importantly OSBA believed that local boards as representatives of the community should make their own determinations as to the quality of their professional staff. And finally, the OSBA raised the issue often quoted by other opponents, that parents do not have the same choice in teacher selection as they do in choosing their physician or lawyer, therefore ruling out the "compared to other professions" argument.

The Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers presented an almost identical argument to that of OSBA in opposition to H.B. 559. Quoting from the PTA's 1975-76 legislative program: "Control of the public schools belongs to the taxpayers through their elected nonpartisan local boards of education; and (the PTA) opposes any legislation that would curtail the power and the responsibilities of the State Board of Education and of local boards of education." Both the
OSBA and the PTA supported as well the progress made by the SDE/SBE in Teacher Education Redesign and felt that support of H.B. 559 would be a vote of no confidence in the continuation of these efforts.

A respondent for the Buckeye Association of School Administrators summarized BASA's position: The association believed that the SBE's primary function is to act as a vote for the people; that teachers and other professionals ought to have input but not control; that the Board should "bite the bullet" and assume more responsibility for the reform of teacher education; and that the Board ought to make itself a better representative of the public. Additionally, H.B. 559 did have a catalytic effect on education in Ohio and to that extent BASA is pleased that it was an issue for debate in the legislature. Representatives of two other administrator groups, OAESP and OASSP, put forth similar arguments: 1) that a planning board ought to be advisory and not in the position to mandate SBE policy; 2) that there was no need to further bureaucratize the state's education system with another board; and 3) that the mechanism for professional advice be "a two-way street" where both the professionals and the board had to talk to each other but
not in the "in toto" fashion proposed by H.B. 559.

Higher education was represented in committee hearings by spokespersons from the State University Education Deans. Testimony from two deans covered the following points: 1) H.B. 559 was ill-timed because the newly created advisory commission of the SBE had not had time to function, nor had the new standards been tested; 2) H.B. 559 was unneeded because a structure already exists to advise and influence the State Board and to advise and influence teacher education directly through the external advisory committees mandated by the new standards; and 3) H.B. 559 was misconceived because the nine-member board is not representative of the profession, seemingly has no responsibility to any other official body, and has no mechanism for assisting in the implementation of policies it might recommend to the SBE.

Potentially, higher education teacher educators could be represented by other professional organizations in the state. One of these organizations, OACTE, was contacted and reported that it had taken no official position on H.B. 559 and had not appeared before the legislature. However, this respondent did report that both OACTE and the Ohio Association of Teacher
Educators perceived themselves to be represented by SUED.

One additional education interest group, the OFT, had a public position against H.B. 559, but did not testify. Spokespersons for the OFT reported that the Federation feared OEA control of any board proposed in legislation instigated by the OEA. Essentially one respondent for the Federation was saying that OPT supports the concept of teacher control, but is not supportive of that teacher control residing exclusively with the OEA.

In a follow-up questionnaire sent to each person interviewed in the Ohio case study (which included 20 persons), respondents were asked to identify which form of teacher education governance each would personally prefer if that structure were to be reorganized in the state. The respondents came from the following interest groups:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Number of Returned Questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio State Board of Education</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio State Department of Education</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Education Association</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio General Assembly</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher Education and Certification Advisory Committee</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buckeye Association of School Administrators</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Association of Elementary School Principals</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio School Boards Association</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the 15 responses, 20% preferred the form identified on the questionnaire as Type A (a full authority teacher standards and practices board, created by statute to exercise legal jurisdiction over the preparation and licensure of teacher); 10% preferred Type B (a teacher
standards and practices board, established in the statutes, and advisory to the State Board of Education and its education agency); and 70% of the respondents chose Type C (state board of education/state education agency control, assisted by a teacher education advisory council established by the board), which is the existing structure in Ohio.

Respondents were also asked to identify the type of governance structure (from Type A to Type C) which should have responsibility for activities typically related to the administration of teacher education at the state level. Of the eight activities listed in Table 21, five were assigned to a Type C structure by 60% or more of the respondents. These activities include the establishment of certification standards, the issuance and renewal of certificates, the establishment of standards for the approval of teacher education programs in colleges and universities, the approval of teacher education programs according to established standards, and the establishment and collection of certification fees. The three remaining activities received the largest percentage of response as Type B activities, including the establishment and enforcement of a code of ethics for teachers,
recommending the level of funding of teacher education programs in state universities to the legislature, and stimulating inservice education and research in teacher education.

**TABLE 21**

PREFERRED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FOR TEACHER EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TEACHER EDUCATION ACTIVITY</th>
<th>TYPE, N=15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) the establishment of certification standards</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) the issuance and renewal of certificates</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) the establishment of standards for the approval of teacher education programs in colleges and universities</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) the approval of teacher education programs according to established standards</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) the establishment and collection of certification fees</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) the establishment and enforcement of a code of ethics (of professional practice) for teachers</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) recommending the level of funding of teacher education programs in state universities to the legislature</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) stimulating in-service education and research in teacher education</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In regard to the preferred structure of a teacher standards and practices board (either advisory or full authority), 41% of the respondents reported that appointments to a board should be made by the state board of education. In contrast, 25% thought the board ought to be appointed by the Governor, subject to the approval of the legislature. Seventeen percent preferred nomination of the board by a statewide organization of professional educators, with the remaining respondents, 17%, suggesting other means of appointment (usually some combination of the above choices).

Respondents felt that members of a standards and practices board should serve from two to four years, with 46% selecting three years as the appropriate term and 27% each selecting two and four year terms. In terms of the size of a board, 45% of the respondents chose the 12 to 15 member size of group, with 36% selecting a size of 8 to 11 members, and 19% choosing a 16 or more member board.

When given a choice as to the representation on a teacher standards and practices board, all respondents agreed that teachers and teacher educators should be represented. Ninety percent of the respondents
favored administrator representation. But, only 60% of the respondents supported lay citizen and local school board member representation. When asked which of these same groups should have majority representation on a standards and practices board, or if there should be equal representation from each group, 46% of the respondents chose equal representation. Twenty-seven percent would give majority representation to teachers, 18% to lay citizens, and 9% to higher education teacher educators. Two final questions were asked about a standards and practices board in relation to the legislature and the State Board of Education. For advising the legislature 64% of the respondents thought the board ought to be a major source; 18% a minor source; and 18% the most important source. In advising the SBE, 54% would make the board a major source; 37% the most important source, and 9% a minor source.

The composite picture of the preferred board according to respondents in this study would be a board which is advisory to a SBE, but not established by statute; having responsibility for advisement in regard to standards for certification issuance and revocation, standard for accreditation, and approval of teacher
education programs; would be appointed by the SBE; having 12 to 15 members with three-year terms; with equal representation from classroom teachers, higher education teacher educators, lay citizens, local school board members, and school administrators; and acting as a major source of advice for both the legislature and the SBE.

As was indicated earlier, all groups identified in this study presented their positions in formal testimony on H.B. 559, except the OFT and the OACTE. One legislator's observation of opponent testimony on H.B. 559.

My view is that the opposition to the legislation, as a matter of strategy, overstated its case so that testimony tended to exceed the bounds of objectivity in terms of its [H.B. 559] effect on the educational environment and procedures. But you have to take that with a grain of salt in the legislative process. It's called 'trade puffing.' It clouds the real issue, but it is not unique to these interest groups.

Respondents were asked to rate interest groups in terms of their general effectiveness in testifying before the legislature. The data from two separate questions are displayed in Table 22.

Demand Resources. As in the Oregon and Pennsylvania chapters, all influence resources except "access"
TABLE 22
TESTIMONY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Testifies frequently at legislative hearings</td>
<td>1) SBE/SDE 7.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Professors 2.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Teachers 6.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Administrators 6.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Parents 3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) School Boards 6.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Effectively presents arguments at legislative hearings</td>
<td>1) SBE/SDE 6.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2) Professors 4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3) Teachers 6.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4) Administrators 5.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Parents 3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) School Boards 5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

will be considered in relation to the conversion process. In terms of access to legislators to present demands, obviously the OEA had easy accessibility. Perhaps not coincidently the sponsor of H.B. 559 (Boggs) had also been a teacher prior to his election. As well other interest groups which appeared before the legislature to oppose H.B. 559 were all, according to one legislator, familiar faces at Education Committee hearings. As one lobbyist noted, "we become like members of the committee during the session." Such
access facilitated communication of interest group positions to the legislature, and was in most cases evidence of the kind of rapport most interest groups felt they were trying to build with legislators.

Conversion Process

Legislative Characteristics. The first year of the 111th session saw the introduction of several highly significant pieces of educational legislation. One of these broadly debated bills was S.B. 170, which established a new equalized school foundation formula, increasing teacher salaries in the first year of its application and increasing financing for schools through a revised state aid calculation formula. This bill passed both chambers and was signed into law by the Governor in July, 1975.

Another very controversial piece of legislation was S.B. 70, a collective bargaining bill. S.B. 70 would have repealed the Ferguson Act, which prohibits public employee strikes. The bill was enacted by the General Assembly, vetoed by the Governor, overridden by the Senate, but sustained by the House in 1975.

And third, S.B. 208 was enacted by the General Assembly and is currently pending the Governor's action. This
is a fair dismissal bill which establishes due process rights for both teachers and non-teachers, and establishes evaluation procedures for all school districts in the state.

In 1976, H.B. 268 was enacted by the Assembly and signed into law by the Governor, revising conditions for teacher retirement by reducing the number of years required for retirement, and including an expanded cost of living adjustment in retirement benefits. With the addition of H.B. 559, these five bills constitute the five legislative priorities identified by the OEA for the 111th General Assembly. Of these five bills, two were referred to the House Education Committee: S.B. 208 after passage in the Senate, and H.B. 559. The House Education Committee was composed of nine Republicans and twelve Democrats, four of whom had experience as classroom teachers. According to one OEA observer, the general profile of the Education Committee in regard to H.B. 559 was that no Republican vote was guaranteed in support of the bill, and only eight of the twelve Democratic votes could be counted as support votes. According to the OEA, the Republican members of the House Education Committee represented the conservative element of their party.
OEA cited as an example the fact that nine Republicans voted for S.B. 208 (the collective bargaining bill) on the floor, but only one of these persons served on the Education Committee.

Of the four dissenting Democrats, one was a close colleague to an SBE member and both were from the same district. Another Democrat was heavily attacked by superintendents and members of the PTA in his home district for supporting the collective bargaining bill, and therefore he had to concede to an opponent position on H.B. 559. Another Democrat had advised the OEA in advance that for philosophical reasons he could not support the bill. And the fourth "no" vote came from a Democrat who wanted to wait and see how effective the new Teacher Education and Certification Advisory Commission was before supporting the establishment of a new board.

The momentum of support for the bill was essentially carried by its sponsor, the vice chairperson of the committee, and by the remaining Democrats, including the committee's chairperson, Marcus Roberto. Roberto's position was that "the technical aspects of teaching should reside with those who are competent for the task -- professionals. Those aspects should
be something the professional should have some control over." When asked if the issue of lay control was relevant to the disposition of H.B. 559, one supporting Democrat responded:

My position is that lay control is a straw man. Boards of education exert little or no influence over teacher standards. Mostly they accept what they get and hire and issue certificates as told. The issue seems to be a ruse to avoid relinquishing control on the state level.

In contrast, a dissenter observed that if H.B. 559 had "hit the floor, interest in lay control in this state would certainly have shown."

In addition to the issue of teacher control vs. lay control, two other specific items of the bill were heavily debated: 1) the advisory nature of the commission, and 2) the composition of the commission.

In the process of debate, an amendment was offered by Roberto and adopted by the committee, which would have removed from the bill that section which required the SBE to accept the recommendations of the planning board "in toto." A second amendment, adopted June 11, 1975, expanded the membership of the board from nine to fifteen, but did not add further specification as to the type of professional educator the additional members would represent.
As was noted earlier, the OEA could not support any dilution of the recommending power of the new board and could not therefore support the amended version of the bill. According to one OEA respondent, to have supported a bill that appeared to have strong teacher input, but which was really still under the control of the SBE would have been to give overt support to such control. As a result of the passage of these amendments, the OEA reduced its push for passage of the legislation out of committee. Although the amended version could have been further amended on the floor, OEA respondents said that the association preferred to have bills come out of committee that were in keeping with the OEA's original position on the legislation. All respondent groups, including the legislators interviewed, agreed that at the time there were simply not enough votes to bring the bill out of committee. Rather than make public a negative vote, the bill was assigned to a sub-committee for further study.

Conversion Resources. The influence resources described in Chapter Three will be discussed below. The purpose of this section is to consider how these resources were used to effect the passage of H.B. 559.
a. Expertise

All interest group respondents unanimously agreed that on this issue the State Department employed the resource of expertise more adequately than any other group. According to one interviewee:

That strategy [of the SBE] might be summed up as the best defense is a good offense. And I say that because that's exactly what I see the Search for Consensus and Teacher Education Redesign to be.

This view was confirmed by one OEA respondent who said, "OEA wanted control but had no program. We were always in the position of reacting to the SDE's plan." All interest group respondents noted that they are depended on by legislators to present accurate and complete information, which helps to establish their credibility in the legislature. But in this instance, other opponents of H.B. 559 were merely speculating on the effects of the legislation and had to turn, in their defense of SDE/SBE control of teacher education, to supporting the recent activities of the Department in the area of teacher education.

Respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of all educational interest groups in regard to the resource of expertise. The data confirm the perceived effectiveness of the SDE/SBE's expertise. These results
are displayed in Table 23. Teachers received an equally high rating in expertise, although by its own admission, the majority teacher association did not exercise this resource effectively in H.B. 559.

**TABLE 23**

**THE EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION OF RESULTS OF RELATED RESEARCH AT LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS (EXPERTISE)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b. Authority**

Of the interest groups which impacted on the debate over H.B. 559, only two groups had official status as agencies or units of state government - the State Department and the State Board. Because of the authority vested in these two groups in the state statutes, they were in advantageous positions to effect activities related to teacher education. Consequently the SBE/SDE decision to invest thousands of dollars and hours of staff service in Consensus and Redesign allowed
these groups to present arguments to the legislature as to the progress of these activities. There was no evidence of the involvement of any other official government unit in the discussion of H.B. 559; particularly, no involvement of the Governor's office as either proponent or opponent.

**c. Coercive Power**

Respondents were asked if their organizations were able to impact on the legislative decision by suggesting either negative or positive repercussions that might occur if the bill passed. Perhaps because of the negative connotations of the question, or because of the implication of the use of "threats" in the legislative debate, all respondents denied instances of the use of this resource in their legislative program. One respondent noted, "we don't have that kind of power. In other words you have to have a power base and you have to have dollars." The reference here is to power in the form of campaign funds. Excluding the use of campaign funds by educational interest groups from this definition of coercion, no instances of the application of coercive power as an influence resource were recorded.
d. Membership/Voting Power

In terms of size of membership, the OEA includes approximately 80,000 teachers as compared to an approximate membership of the OFT of 20,000. BASA can account for a membership of approximately 1300 superintendents and both principal groups together total 4300 in members. The state deans include members from the 13 state assisted institutions. OSBA can account for a membership of 3500, and the PTA constitutes 430,000 members. In terms of legislative staff, the OEA has a full time staff of three professional lobbyists in addition to their support staff. In contrast, BASA, OSBA, OEASP, and OASSP generally each have one staff member in charge of legislative affairs, with the assistance on particular issues of the executive secretary of the association. The PTA has a legislative director whose services are voluntary.

The state deans have no legislative director, although the president of the organization may from time to time give leadership in legislative concerns. State deans do have access to the legislative lobbyist in their individual institutions. However, one informant suggested that it has never occurred to his university's lobbyist that teacher education
legislation, and specifically H.B. 559, might have impact on the on-going functioning of that institution. The State Department has no legislative division, although one of the assistant superintendents is in charge of legislative concerns. According to one spokesperson for the Department, the general membership of the Department is the public. However, in terms of spokespersons for the Department in the legislature, the SDE is dependent on other educational interest groups to support its interests, and on the membership of the SBE. Respondents rated the general effectiveness of legislative lobbying staffs as reported in Table 24.

**TABLE 24**

EFFECTIVE LEGISLATIVE LOBBYING STAFF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Interest group respondents were asked to rate the effectiveness of grass roots constituencies in influencing members of the legislature, and the data are displayed in Table 25.

**TABLE 25**

**EFFECTIVE GRASS ROOTS CONSTITUENCY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Respondents were also asked to rate the effectiveness of educational interest groups in getting large turnouts of the membership at legislative hearings.
TABLE 26
APPEARANCE OF MEMBERSHIP
AT
LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In regard to the involvement of the membership of the interest groups in arriving at legislative policies, all groups except the deans and the SDE/SBE use the positions arrived at in annual delegate assemblies or conferences in formulating a legislative program. These priorities are then carried out by the organization's legislative staff with the assistance of some kind of legislative committee. If a particular piece of legislation appears on the General Assembly docket for which no policy exists, lobbyists attempt some informal collection of the opinions of the membership on that issue.

In terms of constituent activity on H.B. 559, spokespersons for BASA, OSBA and the principals recount
that they did not find it necessary to launch any specific grass roots activities for this bill. According to one respondent, "we probably would not have done anything until such time as the committee would have voted the bill out, or we would have known for sure that there were a number of votes to get the bill out." Accordingly, most intensive grass roots lobbying often occurs after a bill has passed one chamber and gets into the next chamber. Then, as one respondent noted, they know that someone is taking the bill seriously. This rule of operation applies more to H.B. 559 than to others, one interviewee said, because this type of legislation had been up before, and the groups were really waiting to see how it progressed.

Each of these interest groups were reporting on the progress of H.B. 559 in newsletters to their membership. Because the bill involved the issue of lay control, OSBA and PTA report more intensive contact of their members with legislators in the home district. Because this was an OEA bill, most of the aggressive, initiatory activity focused on the teachers. Opponents could afford to take a reactive stance. Most respondents agreed that the OEA is generally
very effective in rallying grass roots support. As one administrator lobbyist noted, "I don't represent a group who are normally followers. Now I don't think the OEA can [dictate positions for their membership], but they can probably come closer to it, not because teachers are any lesser persons by nature, but in the way they operate in the school system, they take orders. They are followers." In response to inquiries about the OEA's use of grass roots support in this instance, the following response summarizes the organization's activity:

H.B. 559 was the one our members would have picked to be the sacrificial lamb, probably, although we never had time to put it to them quite that way. We were probably with our members though. Unfortunately, teachers on line are more worried about collective bargaining, salaries, and fair dismissal. They've already gone through teacher education and know that that can't effect them again. H.B. 559 is philosophical, far-reaching and sort of futuristic. The leadership of OEA would do all they can, but you're talking about grass roots. The grass roots membership was not as worried about this one.

Although other interest groups perceived the grass roots activity of the OEA to be effective, particularly in getting the bill before the Education Committee, the OEA perceived grass roots support as somewhat
below what was necessary to get the bill out of committee.

e. Social Status

As an introduction to a discussion of the status of educational interest groups in relation to the legislature, one legislator has remarked:

The area of education is peculiar in that legislators are generally suspect of education professionals, administrators and teachers because of vested interest and lack of knowledge and understanding of the role and function of education in American society. Most people make judgments on the basis of personal experience, on an emotional basis. Professionals' decision-making base unfortunately suffers from the same human frailty. Some of them are insightful; some are not.

Although perhaps not the most accurate test of social status, self-perception is one indicator of this status. The SDE/SBE perceives itself as welcomed, appreciated and respected. According to one respondent, the SDE gives legislators official answers to questions on which they need data. "Sometimes we are criticized for not taking positions, but we cannot really lobby. We try to be careful not to take a stand except where we have official legislative responsibility." Another spokesperson for the Department said that the SDE is viewed as proactive, able
to anticipate problems, and take action. More candidly, one respondent for the SDE said, "We come as an organization jealously guarding its territory, and perceived by others as having too much power and influence to begin with."

The management groups (BASA, OSBA, OAESP, OASSP) view themselves as growing in status within the legislature. The school boards and BASA have been lobbying for at least ten years. Elementary and secondary principals have just become involved in the lobbying effort. According to one administrator lobbyist, "I think that over the two years we've made a tremendous impact." On the whole, these groups do not feel that they are viewed by the legislature as representing the particular employee benefits of their members as is true of the OEA. One respondent noted, "In effect we have been told that it will be a sad day when you come down here to lobby for a benefit for a superintendent. You know you'll lose a lot... but in unions and the OEA, or the AFL-CIO, that's why they're there." The status of the PTA is a little more difficult to assess. By its own admission, the PTA often feels that it is not taken seriously. As well the organization is accused of only mimicking the
OSBA, and having no opinion of its own. According to one representative:

The PTA derives its weakness from taking the identical position of management. It is effective to unify on various issues, but my personal view is that the role of various legislative groups is to exercise independent judgment. The PTA is not representing its membership when its issues are always identical to administrators.

Deans view themselves as bringing a certain amount of status to the legislature. However, a spokesperson for the deans suggests that the legislature is not convinced that deans speak for a very broad constituency. "We come with expertise, title and degree." Generally this view was confirmed by legislators; that is, informed but not particularly effective as a representative voice.

The OEA has a special status among the legislators and its peer interest groups. All respondents view the OEA as effective in the legislature. This effectiveness stems from the numbers it represents, the money available for campaign activities, and the time it invests in the legislative arena. It is viewed as a special interest group, as an advocate for employee benefits but, according to one respondent, the OEA is viewed as more professional than most union
groups in that it is interested in professional issues (like control) as well as benefit issues. Legislators confirm that they respect the OEA lobby and often use the OEA as a source of information, as well as the SDE and administrator groups.

Respondents were asked to rate the degree of credibility each interest group had in general legislative activities. The results are displayed in Table 27.

**TABLE 27**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**f. Party Politics**

This influence resource constitutes an additional aspect of the influence variable earlier identified as access. As in Oregon and Pennsylvania, the question is: Was H.B. 559 a partisan issue? Respondents tended to say two things at one in response to this question:
1) They felt that this was not particularly a partisan issue; and 2) When summarizing positions, they tended to describe Democrats as proponents and Republicans as opponents. There are a couple of explanations for this phenomenon. Philosophically, H.B. 559 is a labor/management issue of control. Further, as one respondent suggests, Republicans in Ohio tend to be basically management oriented in philosophy, and Democrats, labor oriented. However, one respondent suggested that both parties have historically been critical of SDE/SBE management of education, which may have made this more of a bi-partisan issue (i.e., where Republicans were more willing to support a bill that was of benefit to the employee organization). This respondent further noted, "Had it been anyone other than the OEA that was really pushing the bill, 559 might be a law now." Also, many respondents viewed Murdock (R) as a proponent of the legislation, probably because of his sponsorship of the Stranahan bill in 1973. Murdock might have been considered a "swing vote" on the committee. Had he been willing to support the bill, he might have carried with him the bi-partisan support necessary for the bill's passage out of committee. Murdock theorized that legislation often is held
up (not passed) in many instances because of the inclinations of one strong legislator who opposes it. He suggests that this was in part the case for H.B. 559.

OEA respondents reported that they discussed the chances for passage of H.B. 559 with the leadership of both chambers, and concluded that the chances did not look good for passage of the bill should it reach either floor. One explanation for this was that the legislative docket was too full of other bills that the OEA was pushing, which reduced the influence the OEA could have with legislators on this bill. Inherent in the use of the work "pushing" is the clear understanding on the part of all respondents interviewed in this study that the OEA has the kind of power, in money and in votes, to impact significantly on the prospects for re-election of almost all of the legislators in both the House and the Senate. Respondents were asked to rank all educational interest groups in terms of the effect of their relationships with political leadership in the legislature. The data are displayed in Table 28.
TABLE 28
EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN THE LEGISLATURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

g. Time

The number of pieces of OEA legislation on the General Assembly's docket for 1975-1976 and the amount of time the OEA had to give to each piece of legislation makes necessary the consideration of the influence resource of "time." This resource was identified in the EGP conceptual framework but was not found to be related to standards and practices board legislation in the states considered in the governance study. However, almost all respondents in the study posited that one explanation for the current disposition of H.B. 559 is related to the preoccupation of the OEA with other legislative efforts. In response to this assessment, a representative
of the OEA explained that:

We can't put in equal time[ on all bills]. We have to put priorities on our time depending on the stage a bill is in. Someone else was working on the collective bargaining bill. I was split between S.B. 208 and H.B. 559. As 559 got held up in the House, I then worked a lot more on 208. Had there been a chance, we would never have held up on 559. We'd fight for it equally. It's a matter of judging the chances of a priority.

Speculation on the part of other respondents suggests that the observation of the OEA respondent cited above is somewhat out of order. In fact, respondents suggested that it was because the OEA was elsewhere preoccupied that H.B. 559 did not have a chance; not the reverse of that. As one lobbyist observed:

They[ the OEA] needed to count all of their votes on 208 and I think they knew that, and I think everybody else knew it. You only go to the well so often, and someday it's going to be dry, and you don't like to use the last drop unless you really need it.

By its own admission, according to an OEA respondent, "We know that you cannot ask legislators to go with us on all issues. They also have constituents who are school board members, PTA members, etc." As an example, an OEA respondent explained that the OEA would support a candidate if that person had supported
three out of four of the association's legislative priorities; or even two out of four possibly. As well, the OEA was following another bill, H.B. 257, which would have established a legislative committee to monitor the work of all state agencies. Apparently the OEA felt that it might impact on a legislative committee at least as effectively as an advisory board to the SBE. H.B. 257 did not really make much progress through the legislature and was rejected by other respondents as the type of OEA preoccupation they were suggesting.

h. Coalition

The major coalition which was struck in regard to H.B. 559 was with what the OEA calls the "school management coalition." According to one interest group respondent, the SDE organized the effort by alerting various interest groups to the dates of bill hearings. However, the positions of the opponent groups were generated within their own organizations. One respondent observed that because "559 was being fought for only by the OEA, it caused significant alignment of the other interest groups." Not all of the opponent groups would confirm contact with the SDE. but representatives of BASA, OSBA, OAESP, OASSP,
PTA, SUED and SDE/SBE agreed that they had each other's help and support on this issue. The management groups did suggest that the education coalition varies from issue to issue, but rarely includes the OEA. There was some comment from school board and administrator groups that the lobbyists from the OEA are unwilling to compromise, and that an advisory teacher standards and practices board bill could have been passed if the OEA had supported it. In response, the OEA views the management groups as uncompromising. Respondents were asked to rate each other's effectiveness in forming coalitions, with the responses noted in Table 29. In summary, respondents were asked to rate the general effectiveness of all interest groups on legislative decision-making, as recorded in Table 30.

TABLE 29

EFFECTIVENESS IN FORMING COALITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 30
EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPACTING ON LEGISLATIVE DECISION-MAKING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Group</th>
<th>Rating, N=15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) SBE/SDE</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Professors</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teachers</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Administrators</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Parents</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) School Boards</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Significant Factors. All respondents were asked to summarize what they presumed to be the most significant factors in the disposition of H.B. 559. The most commonly suggested factors are: 1) that the OEA was preoccupied with legislative concerns that were more germane to the employment conditions of its members; and 2) that the SDE/SBE had succeeded in taking an offensive position which allowed them to present evidence of the progress they were making in the reform of teacher education in Ohio. A third frequently mentioned factor was that of lay control. As one respondent remarked, "The issue of lay control is almost a guise for teacher control. How something is governed is one thing. Who controls it is more
important. The idea of losing lay control is not so profound as the OEA having it." Included in the lay control issue is the fact that for the last 20 years Ohio has had an elected lay Board of Education, and strong advocates from the OSBA and the PTA in maintaining that tradition. And finally, in keeping with the assumption that incremental changes are more palatable than drastic changes, some respondents suggested that had the OEA been willing to compromise and support the establishment of an advisory board, that could have been the first step in a long-term move to make the board autonomous.

Implementation

The policy under consideration in this chapter has been the establishment in the statutes of an advisory teacher standards and practices commission. Because a formal vote was not taken on H.B. 559, no policy was formulated to create such a commission. Consequently, unlike in Oregon and Pennsylvania, there are no data to report in regard to policy implementation in Ohio. However, in the final chapter (Chapter Seven), the data regarding the implementation of the policy considered in Oregon and Pennsylvania
will be compared to the descriptive data on the current form of teacher education control in Ohio.

Chapter Summary

In Ohio, there have been two separate attempts to create either an advisory or an autonomous teacher standards and practices commission. Both instances were abortive; that is, in both cases the bills were not voted out of the House Education Committee when they were both first referred. In both 1973 and in 1975, the OEA was a primary proponent of the legislation. In 1973 the demand for such policy consideration was generated by a citizens committee; and in 1975, by the OEA. In both cases, the legislation was opposed by the SDE/SBE, the OSBA, BASA, OAESP, OASSP, PTA and the State University Education Deans. Also in both instances, the primary reason for opponent success was related to the activities of the State Department of Education. Beginning as early as 1968, the SDE initiated research in teacher education and sponsored a massive statewide consensus on needed reforms in education. As a result of these activities, The SDE sponsored a project to redesign the standards for teacher training programs in 1973. In order to
facilitate the implementation of these standards the SBE formed a Teacher Education and Certification Advisory Commission with broad representation from the profession.

Although the SDE contends that this advisory commission was a logical outgrowth of the Redesign effort, others believed it to be a very effective offensive tactic to obfuscate the need for the creation of any teacher standards and practices commission in Ohio, either advisory or autonomous. Along with other factors which effected the outcome of H.B. 559 (e.g., OEA preoccupation with other legislation, considerable lay opposition to the bill), the actions of the SBE/SDE in creating its own advisory commission was considered by all respondents to have impacted significantly on legislator disposition against the need for another type of teacher education commission. As such, Ohio's form of teacher education control continues to be represented by SBE/SDE authority with input from an advisory commission representing different segments of the profession and the teacher training institutions.
CHAPTER SEVEN

DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS AND RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: 1) to discuss the findings which resulted from this research and 2) to draw from the findings implications for future research, including the statement of testable hypotheses for use in other policy investigations.

Discussion of Findings

The primary purpose of the study was to identify independent variables in the policy-making process which appear to be related to the policy outcomes considered in this study. In order to analyze the policy-making process, this study posed four broad questions:

1) What is the nature of the policy which dictates the type of teacher education control in three different states? (Policy Output)

2) How and by whom was a demand generated to seek a change in policy related to teacher education control in three different states? (Demands and Resources)
3) How did various actors and interest
groups influence the interaction in
three different state legislatures
to seek a decision on the control of
teacher education in those states?
(Conversion Process)

4) What factors appeared to effect the
implementation process in two of the
three states considered in this study
where a policy related to teacher edu-
cation control was formulated?
(Implementation)

The results of this study will be discussed below in
relation to each of these four broad questions.

Question 1: What is the nature of the
policy which dictates the type of teacher
education control in three different states?

The policies generated in both Pennsylvania and
Oregon are similar in that they both called for the
establishment of a teacher standards and practices
board composed primarily of teachers. Similarly, both
commissions include the representation of superinten-
dents, principals, teacher educators, and lay persons.
As well, both boards are granted some type of respon-
sibility in the areas of teacher certification and
teacher education program approval. The primary
difference in the two commissions is in the nature of
their authority. In Oregon, the commission has full
authority for teacher education policy, where the
Pennsylvania commission has only the responsibility
to advise the Pennsylvania State Board of Education.

In both states, the legislative debate focused on three aspects of the policy: 1) whether or not the commission should be autonomous; 2) whether lay persons should have representation on the commission; and 3) what percentage of the teacher representation should be from the state's teachers association or the teachers union.

In terms of autonomy, Oregon proponents had several advantages over Pennsylvania proponents. First, Oregon had already established a teacher standards and practices commission in 1965, seven years prior to the introduction of legislation to make the commission autonomous. Law-makers and the lay public had had time to adjust to the existence of such a commission in the state and had firsthand knowledge of how the commission functioned. Therefore, the change from an advisory to an autonomous commission is what Van Meter and Van Horn would classify as an incremental change in policy. In contrast to Pennsylvania and Ohio, the prior introduction of an advisory board in Oregon seemed to pave the way for

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1Van Meter and Van Horn, p. 3.
later introduction of an autonomous commission. It would appear that gradual change is more palatable than severe change. The results in Oregon would also suggest that states could be expected to move from advisory to autonomous commissions incrementally, not quickly. In fact, in Ohio it appears that the establishment of an advisory commission might have been palatable to the majority of the interest groups had the major proponent group (the OEA) been willing to make certain compromises when the first commission legislation was introduced in 1973.

In Oregon, it appears that the issue of autonomy simply was not as heavily debated as the initial introduction of a proposal to create the original advisory commission in 1965. In contrast, supporters of an autonomous teacher standards and practices commission in Pennsylvania had the disadvantage of not only introducing a change in teacher education control in the state, but as well the complete removal of that control from the traditional controlling body, the State Board of Education. As was shown, Pennsylvania proponents had to withdraw the autonomy component of their proposal before it was even introduced in the legislature.
Lay representation had been an issue in the legislative consideration of a teacher standards and practices commission in Oregon in 1965, but since the commission did not preempt any of the decision-making power of the lay state board of education, proponents did not have to concede to demands for lay membership on the commission. Only in 1973, in order to generate lay support for the autonomous move, was the commission forced to add lay representation. In Pennsylvania, lay representation was included in the original legislative proposal in order to generate immediate lay support for an autonomous commission. Ironically, even after the issue of a fully autonomous commission was withdrawn from the bill, lay representation remained. The final outcome of the legislative activity in Pennsylvania led some observers to speculate that had the proposal begun with advisory powers instead of autonomy, lay representation might not have had to be added.

Autonomy and lay representation are not unrelated to the whole issue of lay control. In all states, lay persons as represented by the PTA and the school boards association opposed the transfer of control over teacher education from a lay board to a board of
professional educators. It seems to have been a significant issue in Ohio; however, some respondents suggest that it was a guise for simple opposition to teacher control. Although the issue was raised in Pennsylvania and Oregon, it did not have the impact that it apparently had in Ohio.

The debate over teacher representation was crucial in both Oregon and Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania, the dissatisfaction over possible PSEA domination of the commission was the major reason why the legislation was held up in both chambers. In Oregon, the OFT wanted governor appointment of the commission members because the federation thought this would increase its chances for greater representation on the commission. The OFT amendment failed, but the language regarding appointment was democratized as in Pennsylvania to include federation representation.

In Ohio, there was a legislative history of several proposals to form some kind of commission. Like Pennsylvania and Oregon, there was a bill proposing autonomy, one proposing an advisory commission, and one suggesting an intricate system of recommendations to the SBE that would have made the commission the controlling force in teacher education policy making.
Unlike Pennsylvania or Oregon, a compromise was not struck on the autonomy issue in Ohio. Some respondents speculated that Ohio could have followed Oregon's pattern of incremental change, but proponents of the 1975 legislation rejected such a compromise. Consequently, the control of teacher education in Ohio is still very much vested under the State Board of Education, although the Board has established its own advisory commission.

As will be shown in the remaining sections of this chapter, the policies which evolved in both Oregon and Pennsylvania represented a series of compromises which were made during the conversion process. In both states, the positions of proponent interest groups were necessarily amended to assure the passage of a bill that was acceptable to the majority of the constituent groups. In Ohio, the demands of opponent groups were responded to rather than those of proponents.

In all three states, results of a questionnaire show that the type of teacher standards and practices commission preferred by the interest group respondents was in fact the type of commission that actually existed in that state. In all states respondents
supported majority representation on a commission by teachers, although most of the respondents wanted to assure representation from other education interest groups and lay members. Clearly the consensus view in all states was that teachers should not have exclusive control of teacher education policy. As well, most respondents in Pennsylvania thought that the governor should make appointments to the commission, which is the case currently in Pennsylvania. But, in Oregon and Ohio, respondents opted for SBE appointment. Even though governor appointment had been an issue in Oregon among federation and association teachers, it was not, apparently, a very widely accepted position among other interest groups.

Question 2: How and by whom was a demand generated to seek a change in policy related to teacher education control in three different states? (Demands and Resources)

In the most recent legislative activity in Oregon, Pennsylvania and Ohio to modify teacher education control policy, the major voice for change was the teachers association; that is, the state affiliate of the NEA. This finding confirms the conclusions about teacher power drawn by Mazzoni in the Educational
Governance Project. He contends that teacher power is integral to education policy production as appears to be the case in the production of commission legislation.

In only one instance, in Ohio in 1973, was a different group responsible for bringing a demand to the legislature which would call for a change in the teacher education control structure. That group, the Stranahan Commission, did propose an autonomous professional practices commission with majority teacher representation. Respondents in Ohio did speculate that the introduction of legislation derived from Stranahan Commission efforts was at least one factor in the Ohio Education Association's decision to seek introduction of teacher standards and practices commission legislation during the same year. The existence of the Stranahan Commission appears to be significant in that it may have caused various groups in Ohio to resent any interference in the current governance structure of teacher education in Ohio.

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2Mazzoni, State Policy Making for The Public Schools of Minnesota, p. 117.
In all three states, as well, the teacher federation (state affiliate of the AFT) was in some way opposed to the commission legislation. Specifically, this opposition focused on the amount of representation guaranteed to federation members on any proposed commission. In both Pennsylvania and Oregon, the federation position was responded to through amendments to teacher standards and practices commission legislation. Both Mazzoni and Siegel suggest the importance of teacher group coalitions. However, due to the opposition of the federation to commission legislation in all three states no such coalitions were struck between the teacher associations and the unions in any of the three states considered in this study.

In all three states, certain interest groups were consistently opponents to teacher standards and practices commission legislation whether the commission was to be autonomous or advisory. These groups included essentially everyone but teachers; that is, the state associations for superintendents, elementary and secondary principals, teacher educators (deans and

\[3^{\text{Ibid.}}, \text{p. 113; and Siegel, State Policy Making for the Public Schools of Massachusetts, p. 58.}\]
directors), and local school board members. The only exception to these alignments was in Oregon in 1965. At that time, the state teachers association included in its membership administrators and professors who were very supportive of the creation of an advisory teacher standards and practices commission. Later, in 1973, these same groups had disaffiliated with the teachers association and were opponents of the move to make the Oregon TSPC autonomous. As numerous respondents observed, since the use of collective bargaining in school settings, teachers and administrators have become increasingly adversarial in their relationships. As will be discussed later, in recent legislative activity there was no evidence of a coalition between teacher groups and either administrators or professors. In all states, administrators had disaffiliated with the state chapter of the NEA.

Although there is no longer a division of higher education in the three state associations, there was some evidence of continued professor association with NEA affiliates. This study was unique in that it considered the activities of higher education interest groups in policy formulation, but these groups were not found to be effective interest group lobbyists.
Higher education interest groups were found to appear infrequently at legislative hearings, to carry little clout (or constituent support) in relation to individual legislators, to exercise little influence over legislative policy-making decisions generally, and to react defensively to any proposed change in the governance of teacher education in their state.

The activities of two other major groups varied from state to state; that is, of the SBE/SDE and the PTA affiliate. The disposition of the chief state school officer in each of the three states was found to be very important to the outcome of teacher standards and practices legislation. The findings of the Educational Governance Project suggest the importance of the role of the chief state school officer\(^4\) and the data from this study appear to confirm the nature of that influence. In Oregon, Parnell's rather covert support of TSPC autonomy was noted by respondents as the pivotal factor in the success of H.B. 2127. In Pennsylvania, at the insistence of the Secretary of Education, the autonomy issue was not even presented to the legislature. To review the

\(^4\)Nystrand, p. 79.
Pennsylvania case, once Secretary Pittenger agreed to an advisory board, that was tantamount to passage of the bill. And in Ohio, the strategic actions of a superintendent described as "clever and aggressive" were credited as the factor which eliminated the need for the creation of a teacher standards and practices commission.

As noted in the Governance Project, SBE's had little effect on education policy except in legitimizing the activities of the state superintendent. This posture of SBEs appears to have been true in all three states studied. Respondents from various interest groups reported that several members of the SBE were adamantly opposed to granting autonomy to the Oregon TSPC. However, no SBE member testified, and the apparent spokesperson for the Board did not appear to be a particularly effective representative of Board sentiments. In Pennsylvania, SBE members did not testify. Two SBE members testified in Ohio, but clearly to confirm their support for the activities of the chief state school offices.

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5Aufderheide, p. 56.
The findings of related research presented no evidence that state PTA's were in any way particularly effective in the legislative arena. However, in the first case conducted in this study, in Ohio, the PTA was noted by other respondents as a very active group. Consequently inquiries were made in Oregon and Pennsylvania as to the involvement of their affiliate of the PTA. The results show that the PTA in Oregon and Pennsylvania was to quote one respondent, "almost invisible." Even in Ohio, there was general consensus that although the PTA was very active, it was not very effective. However, as the PTA worked with other opponent groups, its strength was more noticeable. In fact, several respondents did credit the Ohio PTA with a clear articulation of the lay public's opposition to a shift in control from the SBE to any other commission. In the other states, the public lobby was really constituted in the state affiliate of the National School Boards Association.

Question 3: How did various actors and interest groups influence the interaction in three different state legislatures to seek a decision on the control of teacher education in those states? (Conversion Process)
In the conversion of a demand into a policy output, this study considered how interest groups employed certain influence resources to effect the legislative outcomes. The influence resource of expertise (information, research ability, data on need) appears to have been most effectively used by the SDE in Ohio. In this state, the education agency and the chief state school officer seemed to be able to demonstrate to the satisfaction of legislators and other interest groups that the activities of the SDE had been effective in regard to teacher education in the state. In contrast, the education association which was demanding a change in the governance structure of teacher education was unable to present evidence that its own plan for controlling teacher education in a way that would have been more adequate than what the SDE was doing. Also, as noted previously, the OEA was also preoccupied with other education legislation at the time.

Essentially, the Ohio SDE appears to have preempted the need for a teacher standards and practices commission by creating its own advisory commission along the guidelines of a typical teacher standards and practices commission. In Oregon and Pennsylvania,
the past record of the SDE was not a primary issue even though an underlying assumption in the establishment of these commissions is that it is necessary to arrest control of teacher education from SDEs in order to improve teacher education.

The variables of authority (legal or legitimate power in the formal government structure to effect decision making) and coercion (effecting decisions by threat of deprivation to those affected by the decision) did not appear to be contributing factors in the policy decision of either Ohio or Pennsylvania. Clearly, in both of those states, the chief state school officer exercised his authority in explaining the position of the SDE with regard to teacher standards and practices commissions. In neither state did the superintendent control the decisions of the legislators, although legislators did appear to adhere to the superintendent prerogatives. In Oregon, there was some evidence that one individual used the authority of his position to introduce the threat of deprivation to others affected by the policy decision. That is, the chairperson of the Oregon House Education Committee threatened to stall other legislation which the state superintendent wanted passed if the superintendent
did not agree to support full autonomy for the Oregon TSPC. In this case, the use of coercion appears to have been a significant factor in the progress of H.B. 2127.

Membership and voting power (size of voting membership, funds from dues, grass roots votes and activities) were two resources repeatedly referred to as strengths of the teachers association. In both Oregon and Pennsylvania, as well, political action committees had been very active. In the minds of all respondents in every state, the teachers association was considered to be the prominent educational lobbying group among educationists and legislators alike. Such "teacher power" gave the association access to the legislature, generated support from individual legislators, and supplied the resources necessary to inform the grass roots membership of the issues involved so that they in turn could influence legislator decisions. Apparently the most effective manifestation of teacher power was in Oregon, in the OEA's successful drive to get educators into the legislature. Repeatedly respondents noted the significance of the number of educator/legislators in the legislative session which granted the Oregon TSPC autonomy.
Access (availability to the legislative system through particular politicians, political parties; presentation of testimony), as mentioned previously, was important in that teachers associations used their access to legislators to get a demand on the legislative docket. As to party politics, respondents in each state confirmed that the issue of a teacher standards and practices commission was not particularly a partisan issue. In all states there was some indication of support from both parties, particularly in Oregon and Pennsylvania. Therefore, the political nature of the issue did not appear to be a contributing factor in the disposition of the legislation.

Social status (respect the group can generate in the legislature; credibility among legislators) did not appear to be a pivotal influence resource in the outcome of teacher standards and practices commission legislation. General characteristics can be noted though. In all states, some respondents felt that the teachers association had "used up most of its favors" with the legislators; called on legislators too many times for votes; and appeared to be uncompromising in its legislative activity. On the other end of the spectrum, the PTA affiliates were generally
considered to be not much of a threat in the legislative arena. However, there was general support for the potential of the PTA lobby should the organization become interested in cultivating its constituency.

The influence resource of coalition building (a resource only when several groups can "deliver" other groups) seems to have been most important in Ohio. Although the State Department had no specific membership to call upon for support in the legislature, it did have access to other interest groups as it was able to orchestrate support from these groups in opposing H.B. 559. In all three states there was what was called the management coalition. Although it was formed as well in Oregon and Pennsylvania to include superintendents, principals, school board members and occasionally the PTA, only in Ohio did it also include the SDE. Even though in Pennsylvania the SDE opposed an autonomous commission, it did support an advisory commission, while the remainder of the management lobby opposed it. Another coalition noted earlier as important in the Governance Study data, between teachers associations and unions, did not appear to be important in the legislative outcome of teacher
standards and practices commissions in any state.

Another resource influence, which was not included in the conceptual framework of this study, did evolve as an important factor in the legislative disposition on a teacher standards and practices commission in Ohio. The factor of time (how much time a lobbying group is able to devote to legislative activity) was important in Ohio. According to respondents, the OEA was apparently preoccupied with other legislation and therefore could not devote the time necessary to achieve passage on H.B. 559. In contrast, the PSEA had only one legislative objective in 1973, to establish a teacher standards and practices commission. This factor did not appear to be an issue in Oregon.

Respondents from all interest groups were asked to rank the effectiveness of each other in the use of these resources generally. These data were displayed individually in Chapters Four, Five and Six. The data confirm the strength of both teacher groups and SBE/SDEs in employing these resources, as well as the relative lack of success by parents and professors in using the same resources. These rankings also confirmed EGP rankings of interest group effectiveness,
as teachers were most effective, followed by the SBE, and the administrator groups.

To summarize, the influence resources which appeared to be important to the legislative disposition of teacher standards and practices commission legislation in Oregon, Pennsylvania and Ohio seemed to be related to the use of expertise and/or authority by SDE's; the application of coercion in the legislative setting; the number of educator/legislators in the legislature in a given session; the formation of a management coalition; and the amount of time available to a lobbying group for legislative activity. These factors, as well as those mentioned in the preceding section of this chapter, are depicted in Table 31 of this chapter. A "+" recorded under a state means that the factor appears to have had a positive effect on the legislative outcome; a "-" means a negative effect; and a "0" means the factor was not considered to be important to the disposition of the legislation.

Respondents suggested that a critical variable was also whether or not the superintendent was elected or appointed. Only Ohio's superintendent was appointed, making him perhaps less vulnerable to constituent group pressures from teachers, administrators and lay persons.
TABLE 31

SIGNIFICANT FACTORS IN POLICY FORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Oregon</th>
<th>Pennsylvania</th>
<th>Ohio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Nature of change called for by the policy</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Lay control as an issue</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Teacher association support of the legislation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) SDE and CSSO support of the legislation</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) Coercion by legislative leadership</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) Number of educator/legislators</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) The formation of a management coalition to include the SDE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) Time spent on legislation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There was no specific conformation for this assumption, although such a factor might be a useful variable to consider in future studies.

Question 4: What actors appeared to affect the implementation process in two of the three states considered in this study where a policy related to teacher education control was formulated? (Implementation)
Although there were particular nuances in the individual implementation of commission legislation in Pennsylvania and Oregon, both states seemed to have the same general problems in implementation. As respondents reported, in both states the attitudes of the implementing agencies and public opinion were two factors that had some delaying effect on the implementation of the policy had to do with adequate resources and access to agendas and meetings. In both states there was great latitude in defining purposes and objective, but this did not appear to deter implementation. However, in Pennsylvania defining the meaning of "advisory" had caused strained relations between the PSPC and the SBE. In both states there were no major problems in inter-organizational communications, although in Pennsylvania the PSPC would like more regular communications with the SBE.

In contrast, the implementation of a Teacher Education and Certification Advisory Commission in Ohio did not carry with it the kind of ambiguity implicit in the transfer of certain responsibilities from one agency to another. The commission was created by the SBE, at the superintendent's request, to function with the SBE. As the commission was
implemented, there have been funds available, access to the SBE, positive dispositions toward the commission, and adequate staff to help the commission.
The problem with the Ohio situation is that since the commission was not created by the legislature, there is no external audit of the influence of the commission on the board. Therefore, the crucial question is, will the commission's creators allow it to function as an advisory commission?

Implications for Further Research

This research has explored those variables that appear to have been important in states where three different forms of teacher education control have evolved. Through interviews with representatives of interest groups involved in teacher education decision making in each state, promising variables have been generated. These variables will be restated below in the form of testable hypotheses. In relation to the policy formulation process, the promising variables have been identified in the chart on page 312. The relevant hypotheses are as follows:

a. If gradual change in teacher education governance occurs through the introduction of advisory commission legislation prior to a move to establish an
autonomous commission, then the likelihood of creating an autonomous commission is greater.

b. If strong lay opposition is voiced to commission legislation, then the legislation will be defeated or at least be amended from an autonomous to an advisory commission.

c. If there is strong teacher association support and lobbying activity for commission legislation, the legislation is more likely to be passed than without teacher association support.

d. Chief state school officers are pivotal to the success of commission legislation; that is, if the superintendent supports the legislation it is more likely to pass than if the superintendent opposes the legislation.

e. If the chief state school officer opposes commission legislation and if a management coalition is formed against the legislation, the legislation is more likely to be defeated. Without the support of the superintendent, the management coalition may not be effective enough to cause commission legislation to be defeated.

f. If the lobbying groups which support or oppose commission legislation invest great amounts of time and effort in advocating their position, then these groups will very likely succeed in effecting either passage or defeat of commission legislation.

g. If the disposition of the implementing agency is against the establishment of a commission, then the commission is more likely to fail to be fully implemented than if the commission lacked adequate goals, financial support, or
other types of support from the implementing agency.

The important next step in the research effort to understand teacher education governance policy is to formulate future research studies to test these hypotheses. As the configuration of hypotheses suggest, no one factor seems to be the crucial variable in any of the states studied. However, that too is an important question for research.

In formulating research studies to best test these hypotheses, the critical factor is not the identification of the unit of study; that is, any of the remaining 47 states, or all 50 states. Rather, the problem with policy research is in identifying the sources of data and the methods of data collection. When so many categories of actors are involved in policy formation and implementation, the problem is in establishing a random sample of these groups. For instance, one could survey legislators to test some of these hypotheses, but that would ignore the perspectives of other interest groups. Also, in sampling part of the total membership of a constituent group, one might really be testing the knowledge of the rank and file of that group on the particular issues rather
than the causes for policy formation and implementation. As in this study, the hierarchy of most interest groups appears to be the policy actors, and not the entire membership of that group. Therefore, it is recommended that future research employ a purposive sample of policy makers in testing the hypotheses generated in this study.

A second major future research direction which is related to the policy considerations in this study deals with the evaluation of how effectively policy is implemented and the degree of effect of the policy once it is set. This study was clearly limited to the formulation and implementation of policy. This decision was made because the policies in question have existed only two to three years. In five years time, it would also be appropriate to develop a research method to measure the effectiveness of commissions in Pennsylvania, Oregon, Ohio and other states.

A third direction for future research in regard to standards commission research would be the generation of an alternative conceptual framework to the political systems analysis. Other frameworks might include a more thorough exploration of organizational
climate in the implementing agency, the nature of conflict resolution in the legislature, or the application of change theory in the transferral of control from one agency to another.

A fourth research thrust in considering standards commissions would be to consider the broader context of education policy making in a given state to ascertain whether formation of teacher standards and practices commission policy is alike or different from other education policy adopted in a specific state. This type of study could go beyond education policy, and consider policy adoption generally.

To reiterate, the primary purpose of this research was to generate promising variables in the formation and implementation of teacher education policy that could be tested in other states. Such research would assist in the identification of important factors in one aspect of teacher education policy and would make an initial contribution to the study of teacher education in the political context.
CHAPTER EIGHT
SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the preceding study. The objective of this research was to determine what variables, actors and conditions, may be resulting in three forms of teacher education control.

In Chapter One, the tradition of state control of education was described as well as the rationale for state legislatures' delegation of that control to lay boards of education. Several arguments were explored for removing control of teacher education from lay boards of education, particularly in the efforts of the National Education Association to establish autonomous teacher standards and practices commissions to assume this responsibility for teacher education.

Further, recent developments were described which provide operating examples of the different options to traditional state board of education control of teacher education. These options are:
1) Full authority teacher standards and practices board control;

2) State board of education and state education agency control, with a statutory advisory teacher standards and practices board; and

3) State board of education and state education agency control.

Also in that chapter, the various interest groups who are generally considered in the literature to be included in the teaching profession were described, as well as their roles in the profession and their positions on the issue of control of the profession.

Since activity to change the traditional structure for teacher education control in a state has occurred in the legislative arena, this study considered activities in three states where some kind of legislation had been introduced to create a teacher standards and practices board, either autonomous or advisory. The states studied were Oregon (where an autonomous commission exists), Pennsylvania (where an advisory commission was created in the statutes to advise the SBE), and Ohio (where commission legislation was introduced, but was not brought out of committee, and where the SBE/SDE continue to control teacher education).
In Chapter Two, the literature of governance in education and governance in teacher education was reviewed to identify variables which were considered important in other policy studies, and which might be worth investigating in terms of the attempts to change policy in teacher education. Although this literature dealt with educational governance, it gave only minimal consideration to teacher education governance. Therefore it was felt that there was inadequate research data to support the formulation of hypotheses which would have linked policy outcomes with certain pre-identified independent variables. Consequently, in Chapter Two, in lieu of hypotheses, the research questions are stated which guided this exploratory study to identify testable variables in teacher education policy formation and implementation.

In Chapter Three, in the absence of existing theory which could have helped predict the outcomes of the policy process, a conceptual framework was described which guided this causal comparative study of teacher education governance activities in three states. First, political systems analysis facilitated a view of policy making in the broader context of a political system. Using an interactive model in which
demands for a policy change are converted during the policy-making process into decision enactments, the system outputs are specific policy decisions. These decisions are then implemented by whatever agency is assigned that responsibility. Second, allocative theory helped focus upon actors and interest groups in the education profession who used various influence resources to impact on the competitive process of policy making. Third, the independent variables identified in the policy-making process were investigated to discern which ones helped or hindered the implementation of the policy decision.

In Chapters Four, Five and Six, results of the use of this conceptual framework were reported. In each state, demands and resources, the conversion process and the implementation process were considered in light of research questions derived from the conceptual framework.

In Oregon, the 1965 General Assembly created a Teacher Standards and Practices Commission composed of twelve teachers and administrators, and two teacher educators, to advise the SBE in matters of teacher education and certification. The contributing factors in the success of this legislation were considered to
be the extensive involvement of the OEA; the broad-based representation of the OEA at that time, which included teachers, professors and administrators; and the support of the SBE/SDE in creating the commission.

In 1973, a bill was introduced to make the Oregon advisory TSPC autonomous of the SBE. Although the OEA and the members of the TSPC favored full autonomy, opponents included teacher trainers, administrators and school board members. The pivotal issue was whether or not the SDE supported autonomy. Public testimony from an SDE representative disclosed some Department and State Board opposition to transferring SBE powers to the TSPC. However, in order to assure the enactment of certain other bills which were pending in the '73 legislative session, the state superintendent agreed not to publicly oppose the autonomy bill. Therefore, the opponent coalition lost the needed support of the SDE, and the bill passed in the summer of 1973.

The disposition of the profession and members of the Oregon SBE against autonomy has plagued the implementation process involved in transferring SBE control to the TSPC. The role of the TSPC in relation to the SBE and the nature of the commission's autonomy
continue to be contested, even as the commission enters its third year of autonomous operation.

Although activity to create a teacher standards and practices commission in Pennsylvania originated in 1966, the state did not create a commission until 1973. With the enactment of H.B. 903, a professional standards and practices commission was established to advise the SBE in matters of teacher education, certification, decertification and professional practice.

The primary reason that an amended H.B. 903 passed the Pennsylvania General Assembly seemed to be the result of concessions made to the chief state school officer. According to respondents, the secretary opposed legislation to create an autonomous commission. But since the PSEA had promised some type of standards and practices board to its membership, the association was forced to concede autonomy in order to have something to take back to its membership. Consequently, in its advisory form, the bill had the support of both the secretary and the PSEA. Therefore, although there was lay opposition to the bill, there was an inadequate coalition of opponents to stop the bill.
In the implementation of H.B. 903, the delaying factors in to optimally functioning commission have been the attitudes of the SBE and the Department staff that the commission was unnecessary. To date the commission continues to struggle for its place in the hierarchy of Pennsylvania governance of teacher education.

In Ohio, there have been two separate attempts to create either an advisory or an autonomous teacher standards and practices commission. Both instances saw the bills referred to the House Education Committee, which never reported out any of the bills. In both cases, the OEA was a primary proponent of the legislation. The legislation was opposed by the SBE/SDE, administrators, teacher educators and school board members and the lay public. Also in both instances, the primary reason for opponent success was related to the activities of the State Department of Education. In 1974 the SBE created its own Teacher Education and Certification Advisory Commission.

Along with other factors which effected the outcome of H.B. 559 (e.g., reported OEA preoccupation with other legislation, considerable lay opposition to the bill), the actions of the SBE/SDE in creating
its own advisory commission was considered by all respondents to have impacted significantly on legislator disposition against the need for another type of teacher education commission.

In Chapter Seven, comparative analyses of the findings of this research were presented and hypotheses for future research were formulated. Significant variables which appear to have affected the policy-making process included SDE and chief state school officer support of the legislation, teacher association support, the formation of a management coalition, the amount of time which interest groups spent on legislative activities, and the nature of the change called for by the policy. The single most significant factor in the implementation of policy appears to have been the disposition of those responsible for carrying out the intent of the formulated policy.

Variables identified in the conceptual framework which did not appear to be related to the outcomes of the policy process considered in this study include: 1) access to the legislative arena, although certain interest groups used this access to better advantage than others (It appeared that no group stood at a disadvantage in the policy process because of lack of
access to the process; 2) uses of coercive power to substantially effect the policy-making process; and, 3) expertise, although employed by some groups more than others, did not appear to be a deciding factor in effecting policy outcomes considered in this study.
APPENDIX A

SIGNIFICANT ACTOR INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

I. POLICY FORMATION

1. Did your organization favor or oppose this legislation?
   
   Yes. . . 1 No. . . 2

   Why:

2. Was your organization's position presented to the legislature?
   
   Yes. . . 1 No. . . 2

   If yes, in what way(s):

   a. (Expertise) Did you provide for the legislature orally or in draft form any information reports regarding the legislation?
      
      Yes. . . 1 No. . . 2

      Describe:

   b. (Authority) Did your organization use access to any other legal power to effect this legislative decision (i.e. the Governor's Office)?
      
      Yes. . . 1 No. . . 2

      How:
c. (Coercive Power) Were you able to impact on the legislative decision by suggesting either negative or positive repercussions that might occur if the bill passed?

Yes. .  .1 No. .  .2

Describe:

d. (Membership) Do you have resources which were used to effect this legislative decision, e.g., funds for lobbying generated from dues, etc.?

Yes. .  .1 No. .  .2

Describe:

e. (Voting Power) Were you able to influence legislator decisions by virtue of any grass roots constituency which your organization might have?

Yes. .  .1 No. .  .2

How:

f. (Access) Were you able to impact on this decision through any contact your organization might have with certain political leaders in the legislature (i.e., your use of party politics)?

Yes. .  .1 No. .  .2

Describe:

Were there clear party positions on this legislation?

Yes. .  .1 No. .  .2

Describe:
g. (Social Status) Do you feel that the respect your organization carries with the legislature had any effect on your relation with the legislature in this instance?

Yes. . .1 No. . .2

Describe:

What characteristics of your organization were working against you in this instance?

h. Are there other factors which we have not mentioned which you used to effect this legislative decision?

Yes. . .1 No. . .2

Describe:

i. Of all of the factors we've discussed, can you give some priority to their effect (i.e., what was the most significant factor in your being able to influence their decision)?

What type of influence would have persuaded the legislature which you might not have had but could have used if you had had it?

3. What other interest groups sought to influence the outcome of this legislative decision and what were their positions?

4. Given the factors we've talked about and others which may occur to you, how did the groups you've just mentioned seek to influence the legislative decision in question? (Refer to: expertise, authority, coercive power, membership voting power, access, social status, coalition, others).

5. Which of these groups was most effective and why?
6. (Coalition) Did you work with any other interest groups in effecting this legislative decision?

Yes...1 No...2

Describe:

Is this pattern typical, or does it change according to the issue?

Yes...1 No...2

7. What positions were taken by significant legislators?

What do you think influenced their decisions, other than the effect of education groups?

8. Although we have talked rather specifically, what is the overriding reason for the disposition of this legislation?

II. HISTORY

1. In your opinion, how did the legislation get introduced?

2. What do you think was the purpose of the legislation?

3. What was the educational climate in the state which set the stage for the introduction of the legislation?

III. CURRENT PRACTICE

1. Why was the board created?

2. How was the board created? Who introduced the motion? Who favored it? Who opposed it?

3. What are the objectives of this board? How are they met?
4. What funds are used to support this board? How are they used?

5. How are agendas arrived at by this board? Does your organization have access to this board, its agendas, and policies?

6. What are examples of the policies adopted by this board? How are they enforced?

7. What has been the disposition of those persons responsible for the creation of this board?

8. How well has this board been received by your organization? By other organization?

9. Do you personally think it was a good idea to create this board?

   Yes. . .1 No. . .2

   Explain:
APPENDIX B

FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONNAIRE

Teacher Education Governance Inventory
TEACHER EDUCATION GOVERNANCE INVENTORY

Three different forms of teacher education governance exist nationally. They are as follows:

TYPE A: A full authority teacher standards and practices board, created by statute to exercise legal jurisdiction over the preparation and licensure of teachers (with ultimate authority resting with the state legislature to modify or repeal the law establishing the board).

TYPE B: A teacher standards and practices board, established in the statutes, and advisory to the state board of education and its education agency.

TYPE C: State board of education/state education agency control, assisted by a teacher education advisory council established by the board.

1. Which of the above types of teacher education governance most closely approximate the existing structure in your state? (Check one.)
   ____ TYPE A   ____ TYPE B   ____ TYPE C

2. Of the three forms of teacher education governance listed above, which form would you personally prefer most if teacher education governance were reorganized in your state? (Check one.)
   ____ TYPE A   ____ TYPE B   ____ TYPE C

3. Which of the three types of governance structures listed above should be responsible for the following activities: (Indicate your preference of TYPES A, B, or C in the space provided to the left of each item below.)

   TYPE
   ____ 1) the establishment of certification standards.
   ____ 2) the issuance and renewal of certificates.
   ____ 3) the establishment of standards for the approval of teacher education programs in colleges and universities.
   ____ 4) the approval of teacher education programs according to established standards.
   ____ 5) the establishment and collection of certification fees.
   ____ 6) the establishment and enforcement of a code of ethics (of professional practice) for teachers.
   ____ 7) recommending the level of funding of teacher education programs in state universities to the legislature.
   ____ 8) stimulating in-service education and research in teacher education.
4. If a teacher standards and practices board (either advisory or full authority) exists in your state or is established in your state in the future, what is your preference as to the structure of an *ideal* board? (Check one.)

a. The teacher standards and practices board should be:

- 1) appointed by the governor.
- 2) appointed by the governor, subject to approval by the legislature.
- 3) appointed by the state board of education.
- 4) nominated by a statewide organization of professional educators.
- 5) other (specify) ________________________

b. Members of the teacher standards and practices board should serve for a period of: (Check one.)

- 1) two years.
- 2) three years.
- 3) four years.
- 4) five years.
- 5) more than five years.

d. Membership on the teacher standards and practices board should be from: (Check "YES" or "NO" for each item.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) classroom teachers.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2) higher education teacher educators.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3) lay citizens.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) local school board members.</td>
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<td>5) school administrators.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6) other (specify)</td>
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</table>

e. Size of membership of the teacher standards and practices board should be: (Check one.)

- 1) five to seven members.
- 2) eight to eleven members.
- 3) twelve to fifteen members.
- 4) sixteen or more members.

f. In relation to the legislature and to the state board of education, how important should the teacher standards and practices board be as a source of advice on educational matters? (Check one number for each question below.)

1) As a source of advice to the legislature, the teacher standards and practices board should be:

- a) not a source.
- b) a minor source.
- c) a major source.
- d) the most important source.

2) As a source of advice to the state board of education, the teacher standards and practices board should be:

- a) not a source.
- b) a minor source.
- c) a major source.
- d) the most important source.
5. Please rate how effectively you feel the interest groups listed in the right hand columns are in using the following activities to influence members of the legislature. Using a score of from 0 - meaning very ineffective to 8 - indicating maximum effectiveness, give each group a score. All groups may receive the same or different scores.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ADMINISTRATORS</th>
<th>PARENTS</th>
<th>PROFESSORS</th>
<th>TEACHERS</th>
<th>SBE/SDE*</th>
<th>SCHOOL BOARDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) testifies frequently at legislative hearings.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2) presents results of related research at legislative hearings.</td>
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<td>3) effectively presents arguments at legislative hearings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>4) is able to get large turn-outs of membership at legislative hearings.</td>
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<td>5) has credibility with legislators.</td>
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<td>6) has significant impact on educational legislative decision making.</td>
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<td>7) has an effective legislative lobbying staff.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8) has an effective grass roots constituency which impacts on legislators.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9) has effective relationships with political leadership in the legislature.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10) works effectively with other education interest groups in the legislature.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Means members of the state board of education, state department of education.
APPENDIX C
THANK YOU LETTER

Dear ,

First I want to thank you very much for your willingness to talk with me about the governance of teacher education. I am reviewing your responses now and am finding the information you gave me very helpful.

If you have any additional material which you think might be helpful, I would appreciate your forwarding it to me.

Also, I have enclosed a very brief questionnaire about the governance of teacher education which I hope you will be willing to complete and return in the attached envelope at your earliest convenience. Although the identification number on the cover is necessary for my records, I assure you that your anonymity will be maintained in any public sharing of this information. If you need to contact me while completing the questionnaire, please call me at 614/422-2461.

I sincerely appreciate your willingness to be a part of this study.

Cordially,

Nancy L. Zimpher

Enclosure
APPENDIX D

SIGNIFICANT ACTORS - OREGON

Oregon State Board of Education

Mr. Eugene Fisher, Chairperson

Oregon Teacher Standards and Practices Commission

Mr. Richard Jones, Executive Secretary
(formerly SDE)
Mr. David Wyton, Director of Teacher Education
Ms. Doris Sanders, Administrative Assistant
(formerly SDE)
Mr. David Wesirow, Chairperson

Oregon Education Association

Mr. Cecil Posey, Past Executive Secretary
Mr. Patrick Maney, Assistant Executive Secretary
Mr. John Danielson, Legislative Lobbyist
Ms. Phyllis Van Zyl, President

Oregon General Assembly

The Honorable Mary Rieke, State Representative
The Honorable Lloyd Kinsey, State Representative
Ms. Kathleen Beaufait, Oregon Legislative Counsel

Higher Education

Dr. Alan G. Robertson, Chairperson, Deans and Directors Association (Lewis and Clark College)
Dr. Robert Gilberts, Member, TSPC (University of Oregon)
Dr. James Wallace, Former Staff Member, TSPC (Lewis and Clark College)
Dr. Sylvia Tucker, (Oregon State University)
Confederation of Oregon School Administrators

Mr. Ray Klappenbach, President Elect (Former member, TSPC)

Oregon School Boards Association

Mr. Thomas Rigby, Executive Director

Oregon Federation of Teachers

Ms. Shirley Gold, President

Oregon Congress of Parents and Teachers

Ms. Wanda Silverman, Past Legislative Director
(Member, SBE)
APPENDIX E

SIGNIFICANT ACTORS - PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania State Board of Education

Mr. Paul Christman, Chairperson, Committee on Teacher Education and Certification

Pennsylvania State Department of Education

Mr. Ronald Corrigan, Director, Bureau of Teacher Certification
Mr. Walter Koch, Coordinator, Legislative Services

Pennsylvania Professional Standards and Practices Commission

Dr. Dan Austin, Director
Mr. Robert Keefer, Chairperson, Certification Standards Committee

Pennsylvania State Education Association

Dr. William Cornell, Assistant Executive Director for Professional Development

Pennsylvania General Assembly

Mr. Phil Murphy, Executive Director, House Education Committee (Office of Representative James Gallagher, Chairperson, House Education Committee)
Ms. Jean Houseal, Staff Assistant, Senate Education Committee (Office of Senator Jeanette Reibman, Chairperson, Senate Education Committee)
Mr. Dave Kirkpatrick, Executive Director, Senate Education Committee
Mr. Fred Hershey, Pennsylvania Joint State Government Commission

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Pennsylvania Association of Teacher Educators

Dr. Lester Bowers, President (East Strausburg State College)

Pennsylvania Association of Colleges for Teacher Education

Dr. Norman Miller, President (Beaver College)

Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers

Mr. Marvin Ginsburg, Legal Counsel and Legislative Representative

Pennsylvania School Boards Association

Mr. Albert Unger, Legislative Director

Pennsylvania Association of School Administrators

Dr. Glenn C. Hess, Executive Secretary

Pennsylvania Association of Elementary and Secondary Principals

Mr. B. Anton Hess, Executive Secretary

Pennsylvania Congress of Parents and Teachers

Ms. Pauline Leet, Legislative Chairperson (Franklin and Marshall College)
APPENDIX F

SIGNIFICANT ACTORS - OHIO

Ohio State Board of Education

Mr. John R. Meckstroth, Past President

Ohio Department of Education

Dr. Martin W. Essex, Superintendent
Dr. Paul E. Spayde, Assistant Superintendent
Dr. G. Robert Bowers, Assistant Superintendent
Dr. Paul W. Hailey, Director, Div. of Teacher Education and Certification

Ohio Education Association

Ms. Sandra Schwartz, Governmental Relations
Mr. James Brehm, Professional Development

Ohio General Assembly

The Honorable Norman A. Murdock, Member, House Education Committee
The Honorable Marcus A. Roberto, Chairperson, House Education Committee
Mr. Steven Stover, Ohio Legislative Services Commission

State University Education Deans

Dr. Robert Alfonso, President (Dean, College of Education, Kent State University)

Teacher Education and Certification Advisory Commission

Dr. James Gress, Chairperson (The Ohio State University)
Ms. Dorothy Kavanaugh, Liaison with the SDE
Ohio Federation of Teachers
Mr. Raymond D. Kikta, President
Mr. Ronald Marec, Legislative Chairperson

Buckeye Association of School Administrators
Mr. Paul Taylor, Associate Executive Director

Ohio Association of Elementary School Principals
Mr. Richard Murray, Assistant Executive Director

Ohio Association of Secondary School Principals
Mr. Ross Flemming, Executive Secretary

Ohio Congress of Parents and Teachers
Ms. Frankie Ross, Legislative Chairperson

Ohio School Boards Association
Mr. Dean Jolley, Legislative Director

Ohio Association of Colleges for Teacher Education
Dr. Richard Johnson, President (Wittenberg University)
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