INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in “sectioning” the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again - beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from “photographs” if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of “photographs” may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

University Microfilms International
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA
St. John’s Road, Tyler’s Green
High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR
FETTERS, Janis Lynn, 1946-
THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE OF THE BODY IN SPORT.
The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1976
Education, physical

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106

© Copyright by
Janis Lynn Fetters
1976
This dissertation is dedicated to my mother and father who have given me the meaning of love and to my brother who taught me to play.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The writer expresses her most sincere appreciation to Dr. Seymour Kleinman for his professional inspiration, continual guidance and encouragement. As an advisor and a friend, he created a warm and responsively open relationship; and the writer is deeply gratious for his sensitivity to her need for a substantially high degree of freedom in her pursuit of the doctoral degree.

The writer thanks Dr. Barbara Nelson for her personal and professional support. She provided an ongoing and stimulating interaction that encouraged critical and creative thinking throughout the candidate's graduate study.

The writer feels privileged, indeed, to have had the professional assistance and encouragement of such a superb educator in Dr. Paul Klohr. His insightful comments and reactions to the dissertation certainly enriched this experience.

The students/athletes in the writer's Psycho-Social classes at The Ohio State University deserve a very special recognition for their contributions in the form of experiential descriptions and openly honest dialogue about themselves and their feelings in the movement/sport experience.

Finally, and most importantly, the writer expresses her most profound gratitude to her parents for their unfailing support and
and warm understanding during this educational endeavor. It is to
their love and devotion that much of the writer's success in her own
search for meaning is attributed.
VITA

December 12, 1946 ............... Born - Lancaster, Ohio

1969 ............................... B.S., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1969-1970 ......................... Graduate Assistant, Physical Education, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, North Carolina

1970 ................................ M.S.P.E., University of North Carolina at Greensboro, Greensboro, North Carolina


1974-1976 ......................... Teaching Associate, Physical Education, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Physical Education

Studies in Philosophy of Sport and Movement Theory. Professor Seymour Kleinman

Studies in Sport and Society. Professor Barbara Nelson

Studies in Personality and Motivation. Professor Herbert Mirels

Studies in Small Group Theory. Professor Timothy Curry
Philosophy of Education:

Studies in Conceptual Analysis and the Philosophy of John Dewey. Professor Richard Pratte

Studies in Epistemology and Values in Education. Professor Gerald Reagan

Studies in Existentialism. Professor Ivan Boh
**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td></td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some Phenomenological Characterizations of Aesthetic Experience</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Aesthetic Field</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Characteristics of Aesthetic Experience</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aesthetic Delightfulness</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intuitiveness</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>THE BODY AESTHETIC: A SENSUAL EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Sensual and Erotic in Art</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Nude</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Beauty of the Body in Dance</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Performer's Experience of Beauty Incarnated</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Spatiality of the Body</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Temporality of the Body</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rhythmic Form: A Spatio-Temporal Totality</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>THE BODY AS SYMBOL</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Non-Discursive Symbol</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Felt&quot; Meaning and Presentational Immediacy</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Moving Body as a Sensuous Symbol</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>THE BODY AESTHETIC: A SYMBOLIC EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Body: Symbol of Pure Possibility and Freedom</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Body: Symbol of Existential Identity</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Body: Symbol of Oneness in-the-World</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Body: Symbol of Perfection</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Felt Perfection as Precision and Clarity</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Felt Perfection as Wholeness and Harmonized Diversity</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING AND COACHING AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Body Aesthetic: A Summary</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implications for Teaching and Coaching</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disembodiment: A &quot;Refusal&quot; of the Body Aesthetic</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Myth of Objective Measurement and the Body-Object</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Denial of Pain: A Negation of the Lived Body</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Somatic Revolution: A Changing Body Consciousness in Sport</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Teaching for the Body Aesthetic: Body Experience Education</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommendations for Future Research</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Increasingly, critics of institutionalized sport are directing their attention to its overemphasis on extreme and ruthless competitiveness. With this emphasis and the adoption of a "win-at-all-cost" ideology, the athlete's subjective experience has, at best, received secondary attention or has been virtually ignored. From the early sixties, the beginnings of the new "Golden Age of Sport," sport in many educational institutions could be most accurately described as organized and developed for the spectator, with emphasis on objective standards: goals scored, games won, records broken. An exclusive focus on rigid performance requirements and an exaggerated sense of the value of victory have all too frequently resulted in an alienation of the athlete from the delightfully sensuous immediacy of his body in movement, as he has learned to ignore his lived body in sport, to objectify and use his body as a commodity to be bought, hazed, drugged and manipulated to achieve the all important win.

This debasement and denigration of the body in sport reflects a more general negative attitude toward the body in society, an attitude perpetuated by religious, moral and metaphysical contempt for the body. Leonard [1975] angrily characterized the imposed alienation from one's own body when he wrote
Murder is being done to our bodies in this society. We are being turned into curious specimens, disembodied, isolated in mechanical capsules, separated from the impulses of our senses, from our most passionate feelings of grief or joy. We are out of touch [pp. 181-182].

Though many speak of this alienation and disembodiment, recent accounts [Hanna, 1970; Leonard, 1972] have suggested the beginnings of a cultural transition, an emergence of a "Somatic Revolution," a "Transformation," in which all experiences, including sport, are to be re-humanized by "coming back to our bodies," listening to our bodies and recognizing the quality of our bodily-being-in-the-world. This "coming back to the body" is a return to the uninhibited sensuality with which one is born. It is a return to the fresh perceptions of bodily joy experienced in the openness and innocence of the child. It is a willingness to see as a child sees, to feel as a child feels, prior to paralysis by religious and metaphysical censor or social convention.

It is not unreasonable to speculate that with this Somatic Revolution will come a changed consciousness in sport, a "body consciousness." Sport in this perspective, developed for the participant rather than solely for the spectator, would eulogize the experience of the body rather than objectify and denigrate the body. Attention to the pleasure and sensuality of the body would be reborn in the call to "come back to the body" to complete and heightened awareness and celebration of one's bodily experience in movement. The Somatic Revolution would insist that we resensitize and re-eroticize the body in sport.
This study reflects a consciousness of this Somatic Revolution, for the writer seeks to explore the nature of the subjective experience of one's body in the sport situation with the particular focus on an aesthetic experience of one's body. Attention is directed to the performer/athlete, with a hope of offering some clarity to the subjectively rich meanings available to the performer in the sport experience.

Modern theories of aesthetic experience have attributed major import to the role of the body in the experience. The primacy of the sensuous in the aesthetic experience is well accounted for in these theories [Berleant, 1964, 1970; Lipman, 1956, 1967; Lee, 1960; Lipps, 1960]. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the sensuous experience of the body is not only a necessary feature of the aesthetic experience, but that, indeed, one's body can also in itself be a rich and primary source of the aesthetic experience. The literature reveals clear similarities between descriptions of the aesthetic experience, as viewed by modern experiential aesthetic theorists, and accounts of the experience of one's bodily-being-in-the-world, as conceived by existential phenomenology. In light of the fundamental role of the somatic in aesthetic experience and the highly evident parallels between the aesthetic experience and the experience of one's body, it is surprising that little, if anything, has been explored or written regarding the aesthetic experience of the body from the perspective of the performer.

This is not to say that the body has been virtually ignored in the world of art. Indeed, throughout the ages the body has
functioned as an aesthetic object and has provided a central and pre-
dominant theme for painters and sculptors such as Michelangelo,
Renoir, Degas, Myron and Rembrandt. The "nude," invented by the
Greeks in the fifth century, B.C., so dominated as a subject of art
that Clark [1956] considered it not merely an art object, but rather,
an art form in itself.

From classical to contemporary art, men have tried to portray
the body in motion, to capture the energy of the human body in
sculpture and painting. The Greeks were the first to embody the
energy and rhythm of the body in art form, as they expressed the
beauty of the athlete in the early games. We are all undoubtedly
familiar with the "Diskobolos" by Myron, which Clark has character-
zized as the most famous sculpture reconciling "the body in action with
geometric perfection" [1956, p. 178].

In addition to the perception of the body as art object in
representational art, recent attention has been directed to the
performing arts in which the movement of the body is aesthetically
pleasing from the spectator's point of view. This perspective has
not been restricted to the dance. Kupfer [1975] described the "most
arresting aesthetic feature of sport" to be "the grace of the human
as art with reference to the beauty of the body in movement as one
dimension of the aesthetic experience for the spectator.

Fisher [1972] and Thomas [1972] extended the study of the
aesthetic experience from a focus on the spectator alone to a focus
on the performer's experience. Fisher described the performer's
experience as artist, but she made no reference to the experience of one's body as a work of art in sport. Thomas [1972] developed criteria of the aesthetic experience in sport, utilizing the concepts of Maslow's Peak Experience, Buber's I-Thou, McLuan's Hot and Cool Media, Sartre's Perfect Moment and Straus' Pathic Moment. However, her description is an account of the sport experience in general. She spoke of the body "only insofar as it allows facilitation of the athlete's experience" [p. 2]. Adopting Sartre's ontology, her conception of the body in the aesthetic experience of the athlete is, thus, a utilitarian one, and she does not focus on the body as the source of an aesthetic experience of the performer. The lived-body is that which is "surpassed toward meaning" in her sport aesthetic.

This study is an examination of the nature of an aesthetic experience of the moving body from the performer's point of view, an exploration of the role of the body as a work of art in sport. The writer will call this experiential aesthetic of the body from the performer's perspective "The Body Aesthetic."

Chapter III, "The Body Aesthetic: A Sensual Experience," is an exploration of how the body as it is spatially and temporally unified as a dynamic rhythmic form is sensually experienced in sport. Chapter IV, "The Body as Symbol," and Chapter V, "The Body Aesthetic: A Symbolic Experience," is an examination of how the body as it is sensually lived in sport may function as an immediate and direct presentational symbol of certain existential meanings in the world.

Many will argue that sport is not art, that sporting intentions are distinctly different from artistic intentions, for the
former emphasize mastery, effectance or ability while the latter emphasize perception and sensibility. Though sport may not be engaged in for the sole purpose of satisfying man's aesthetic craving, it may still offer moments of sensually rich aesthetic perception. The emphasis on functional achievement and interest in the contest in a sport form does not preclude aesthetic perception by the participant. Elliot [1974], discussing the experience of beauty in sport, suggested that a "tension between an interest in Victory and the perception of beauty is characteristic of the ordinary sports lover's state of mind" [p. 111]. He suggested that in this state of consciousness, beauty may arise "with such authority that [the percipient] is transported by it" [p. 112].

The writer contends that the primary intention to create a beautiful form or to express and communicate through that form is not necessary for an aesthetic experience to occur. The football player, as well as the dancer, can enter into the world of the beautiful and sensually delightful experience of his moving body.

Preceding a characterization of the Body Aesthetic as a sensual experience and as a symbolic experience, the writer will examine the nature of aesthetic experience in general (Chapter II). In light of experiential aesthetic theory, the writer will discuss aesthetic experience as a particular quality of consciousness that finds its uniqueness in the combination of three major characteristics: (1) unity in spatiality and temporality, (2) aesthetic delightfulness and (3) intuitiveness. The Body Aesthetic in Chapters III and V elucidates the particular ways in which these features of
unity, delightfulness and intuitiveness are manifest in an aesthetic experience of one's body in sport.

The writer will draw extensively from a descriptive account of the experience of one's bodily-being-in-the-world as conceived by existential phenomenological philosophy, particularly that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty's concept of embodiment is adopted as the philosophic basis for an understanding of the Body Aesthetic on the grounds that it permits the direct apprehension of the body as lived, an apprehension that occurs at the pre-reflective level of consciousness. 5

In addition to a consideration of the nature of one's bodily being as proposed in an existential phenomenology and the nature of aesthetic experience as characterized by an empirical aesthetic, the writer will provide descriptive examples of an experiential Body Aesthetic in athletes' self-reports. These self-reports were provided by physical education majors and athletes enrolled in Psycho-Social Aspects of Sports and Physical Activity classes at The Ohio State University during Winter and Spring quarters, 1976. This procedure will include:

1. An examination of experiential descriptions of the sport/movement situation for bodily references, with attention to references that have the particular qualities described as characteristic of aesthetic experiences.

2. The construction and analysis of a questionnaire designed to:
   a. generate experiential accounts of the athletes' body attention patterns, attitudes and feelings about the body in sport/movement before, during and
after performance.

b. explore the nature of the experience of one's body as a work of art in sport.
(See Appendix A.)

It should be noted here that the terms: "sensory," "sensuous," and "sensual" are used with high frequency throughout this discussion. Although a more thorough examination of the "sensuous" and the "sensual" in aesthetic experience appears later in Chapters II and III, the writer offers the following definitions to clarify the particular way in which these terms are used in this text.

Sensory. "Sensory" is used interchangeably with the term, somatic, and refers to the qualitative, physical character of primary experience that is prior to reflection, categorization and quantification. It is the immediate and direct mode of feeling in contrast to the secondary and reflectively analytic mode of thought. In other words, it represents the perceptual and concrete versus the conceptual and abstract.

Sensuous and Sensual. When sensory qualities assume "an intensity and concentration" [Berleant, 1970, p. 102] in experience, and when that intensity and concentration is pleasurable, the experience is lived as sensuous. Both sensuous and sensual connote the pleasure of the sensory mode of experience. The writer will later discuss the fallacious distinction made between the sensuous and the sensual; the former traditionally given favorable connotations and referring to aesthetic sensibilities—the property of the "higher" senses of sight and sound—and the latter given derogatory connotations and referring to non-aesthetic appetities—the property of the so-called "lower" contact senses. In this text the writer will employ the term "sensual" to emphasize one's total absorption and powerfully intense involvement in the sensuous quality of experience. The writer adopts Berleant's view that the sensual is experienced when the sensuous "enlarges and extends itself" to include the openly erotic; when the sensuous is "allowed to fill the space of perception as freely as it will" [Berleant, 1970, p. 102].
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I

1 The complexity and multiplicity of usages of the term, "sport," are such that it would be a mistake to ask for a single and all-inclusive definition. In this particular discussion, the writer refers to sport as typically involving an organized competitive activity:

a. which has the character of play (in the senses of being non-serious and separate from utilitarian concerns or practical consequences and freely engaged in for its own sake, and

b. in which the outcome is uncertain and primarily determined by a combination of physical prowess and strategy.

The primary consideration in this treatment of aesthetic experience of the body is movement as organized sport forms. However, other forms of movement that are not necessarily competitive in nature, such as dance and exercise and recreational cycling, backpacking, swimming, skiing, etc., are considered.

2 The term, "sensuous," as it is used in this text and as it is related to such terms as somatic, sensory and sensual is discussed on page eight of this chapter and is more thoroughly amplified in Chapter II in a discussion of the "sensuous" and the "sensual" in art.

3 In Chapter II, the writer, in line with such aestheticians as Croce, Ducasse and Dewey, uses the term, "art," to denote aesthetic experience (see page 10); and adopts Berleant's [1970] definition of a "work of art" as the "experiential unity" of all the aesthetic elements in the aesthetic field; that is, art object, perceiver, artist and performer. In Chapter III, the writer asserts that the body, as it is perceived from the performer's perspective, is in a privileged position to be called a work of art, for it perfectly and completely embodies the unity of the aesthetic elements, being at once the art object, the perceiver, artist and performer.

4 Kovach [1974] defined aesthetic experience as "an experience of beauty," which he further described as the "integral unity of a multitude or variety" [p. 305]. See Chapter II for a discussion of beauty as an experience of unity. The writer adopts this definition.
of beauty as one feature of aesthetic experience. See Chapter II, under Characteristics of Aesthetic Experience.

Throughout this study the writer has drawn extensively from the writings of John Dewey, as well as those of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In so doing, the writer is in no way suggesting that Dewey's pragmatism and Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology are identical or completely compatible. The writer believes that both of these theories, though they present distinctly different epistemologies, lend clarity to an understanding of "The Body Aesthetic" in their wholistic conception of man (mind-body unity) and their detailed explication of and emphasis on the nature of conscious experience.
CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

Introduction

It is the function of aesthetics as a branch of philosophy to identify, describe and clarify the realm of experience called "aesthetic." At first, it would seem that this is a relatively simple task, as each individual seems to easily and immediately recognize what is aesthetically appealing to him. However, much controversy obtains when one attempts to elucidate those factors which characterize this particular realm of experience and which distinguish the aesthetic from the non-aesthetic.

Variously conceived as an experience of beauty, sensual pleasure, artistic expression, heightened awareness, perfection or pure possibility, to mention a few, the nature of aesthetic experience has continued to be somewhat elusive and conceptually unclear. There seems to be no consensus among philosophers that an aesthetic experience is an experience sui generis, of its own kind. Many critics of aesthetics as a valid area of study have argued that aesthetic experience cannot be defined and rendered understandable as a unique realm worthy of distinction [Kennick, 1958, p. 323; Richards, 1925, p. 16; Cohen, 1965, p. 116; Dickie, 1964, pp. 56-65; and Dickie, 1965, pp. 129-136].
The writer contends that this view has evolved from the fact that many dissimilar kinds of experience; mystical, scholarly, religious, practical, athletic, etc., have at some time been called aesthetic. Because no one essential and common attribute has been identified in all these distinctly different experiences, aesthetic experience has not been recognized as a substantive and unique kind of experience.

However, if one accepts, as this writer does, the Deweyan notion of the general underlying continuity of experience, the aesthetic experience is rendered understandable not as a separate kind of experience, but rather, as a "mode in which experience may occur....Instead of being sharply demarcated by possessing some special unique feature, it is continuous with the whole range of human activity" [Berleant, 1970, p. 93]. Dewey [1934] described the essential difference between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experience to be one of "clarity and intensity;" that is, aesthetic experience occurs when ordinary experience is carried to its most intense and complete fulfillment or consummation. This consummation gives the experience a "heightened vitality" [p. 19] that contrasts the "apathy, lassitude and stereotype" of "ordinary experience" [p. 260].

The writer, then, speaks of aesthetic experience to signify a quality rather than to refer to the substantive features of a particular kind of activity, such as skiing, painting, cooking, reading, etc. This quality is a particular quality of consciousness as one engages in an activity. Berleant [1970] expressed this clearly when he conceived the aesthetic "mode" to be more a
"perspective" than a "kind" of experience [p. 94].

The investigator must then ask what is the nature of one's consciousness when an experience is qualitatively aesthetic and what are the antecedent conditions of this particular aesthetic mode of consciousness. The writer adopts Berleant's position that an experience obtains an aesthetic quality when a particular set of coordinates that commonly appear together are the dominant features of the experience. This point of view recognizes that no one single feature defines aesthetic experience. Aesthetic consciousness derives from the combination of a number of characteristics which gives it its unique quality. The task of the aesthete is to elucidate those characteristic features and to determine their interrelationships.

Berleant [1970] proposed that aesthetic theory be empirically grounded in aesthetic facts which are gleaned from experiential accounts of aesthetic perception and observations of practiced observers. In other words, the development of aesthetic theory must begin with a phenomenological account of aesthetic experience itself rather than with metaphysical, moral, pedagogical or socio-cultural a priori's. Aesthetic theorizing thus begins with experience and is an attempt to clarify what is rather than what "ought to be." To provide a literal rather than a metaphysical account of the characteristic features of aesthetic experience requires that one be guided "not by prior commitments or preconceptions from outside aesthetic experience, but by the intrinsic qualities of such experience" [Berleant, 1970, p. 43]. To identify these intrinsic
qualities, one must appeal to the primacy of perception in aesthetic experience and must begin to directly examine the nature of the actual perceptual experience rather than resting on a "tangled web of philosophic assumption, concepts and theory" [p. 93].

Some Phenomenological Characterizations of Aesthetic Experience

Those theorists who offer a phenomenological characterization of aesthetic experience have varied in their interpretations of the type and the number of characteristics composing aesthetic experience. Some have attempted to characterize the experience in terms of one single overall dominating feature; that is, either as an intellectual experience in which contemplation or reflective thought and knowledge is the main feature [Bullough, 1960, p. 394; Ducasse, 1955, pp. 72-73; Lee, 1938, pp. 36-37; Fry, 1956, p. 8; Watkin, 1950, pp. 318-321; Stolnitz, 1960, p. 34; and Gilson, 1959, p. 180]; or as an experience in which emotion dominates [Tolstoy, 1962, p. 122; Freud, 1943, p. 327; Parker, 1946, p. 56; and Berndtson, 1969, p. 12]. Others have characterized the experience as a combination of the intellectual-contemplative and the emotional [Prall, 1967, p. 19; Langer, 1953, p. 397].

Other theorists, such as Berleant [1970], Kovach [1974], Beardsley [1958], Dewey [1934] and Weitz [1950], have described aesthetic experience by listing a number of characteristic features. Dewey [1934] spoke of completeness and unity or integrity. Beardsley [1958, 1969] listed attention, intensity, coherence, completeness

It is obvious that these writers represent diverse interpretations of the elusive nature of aesthetic experience. However, though there are distinct differences in their descriptions, the reader will discover, after close examination of these phenomenological characterizations, that clear similarities and points of agreement do emerge among them. These will become conceptually clearer as the writer offers her own phenomenological characterization, gleaned from experiential aesthetic theory, personal experience and an analysis of experiential descriptions. Before proceeding to the writer's description of aesthetic experience, Berleant's account of the "aesthetic field" and "aesthetic transaction" will be offered as a theoretical framework for discussing the nature of aesthetic experience.

The Aesthetic Field

The term, "art," has been variously used to refer to the class of art objects; the process of producing art objects, that is, creative activity; and aesthetic experience. In line with such writers as Croce, Gotshalk, Ducasse and Dewey, this writer will use
the term, art, to denote aesthetic experience. The writer contends that art can be defined only by reference to the total situation in which the experience occurs. Berleant [1970] called this total situation the "aesthetic field" or the "context in which art objects are actively and creatively experienced as valuable" [p. 47]. According to him, the aesthetic field is constituted by four elements: the art object, the artist, the aesthetic perceiver and the performer. It is further conditioned by various biological, psychological, socio-cultural and philosophical factors. To give a complete account of an aesthetic experience, one must consider the role of each of these elements and conditioning factors and their functional relationship in the aesthetic field.

This functional relationship, or "aesthetic transaction," as Berleant described it, is "the experiential unity of the aesthetic situation" [p. 89]; that is, the aesthetic transaction represents the particular way in which the various elements of the aesthetic field (artist, art object, performer, perceiver) work together in "creative interplay" [p. 89].

Traditional aesthetic theories have fractionized the aesthetic field, focusing on only a portion of the field; that is, either the art object, the perceiver, the artist or the performer. Thus, these theories have offered an incomplete and distorted account of aesthetic experience. For example, the formalist theories have focused solely on what they call the inherent aesthetic qualities of the art object; such as line, color, plane and mass. They have denied any connections with experience that may be aesthetically relevant beyond these formal
elements which supposedly inhere in the art object. In so doing, they have recognized only the object pole of experience, ignoring the subject pole (see footnote 1). In other words, they have isolated the art object from the world of human experience. The roles of the perceiver, artist or performer are neglected as active elements in the aesthetic field.

In contrast, an experiential aesthetic recognizes the role of personal human response as an essential component in understanding the aesthetic situation. It recognizes that it is the aesthetic transaction among all of the elements of the aesthetic field which expresses the essential unity of an aesthetic experience.

Thomas [1972] reported that "the aesthetic experience and its examination has almost always presupposed an object" and that traditional aesthetic theories have concerned themselves with "the beauty of [that] object via some mode of sense perception" [p. 1]. She called for aestheticians examining the sport experience to

...look away from the art object and toward the artists' [athletes'] experience and the nature of the aesthetic experience as a probable alternative in the development of a sport aesthetic [p. 2].

Her intent was, justifiably, to challenge the exclusive attention to the material object or art product in the study of aesthetic experience.

The writer agrees that exclusive attention on the art object is inadequate if one is to examine and to understand the nature of aesthetic experience. However, the writer contends that the aesthetician cannot "look away" from the art object, but must recognize it as an integral element in the aesthetic transaction. The term, art
object, is not used here exclusively in the sense of a material object. Aesthetic experience, as Thomas [1972] conceived it, may include no observable physical or material object. However, experience, by its definition (see footnote 1), includes both a subject and object pole. The nature of consciousness is such that consciousness is consciousness of something. And in the aesthetic mode of experience this something, whether it be a material object in the world, a creation of the imagination, or a dynamic form or pattern created by one's moving body, functions as the object of focus in the aesthetic field. It will become apparent that the writer's conceptualization of the body aesthetic in sport incorporates both the experience of the body as a physically observable object in the world and the subjectively sensuous feelings of one's body in movement.

Characteristics of Aesthetic Experience

The following is the writer's phenomenological characterization of aesthetic experience in terms of three major features: unity, aesthetic delightfulfulness and intuitiveness. Kovach [1974] defined aesthetic experience as an experience of "beauty" [p. 265], which he further described as the "integral unity of a multitude or variety" [p. 305]. In other words, what makes something beautiful [or aesthetically experienced] is the fact that, in it, whether "it" be a material object or some type of activity, there is a multitude of parts, components, factors, or aspects, and, at the same time, also a unity made up of those parts, components, or whatever [Kovach, 1976, p. 305].
Feibleman [1970] agreed, describing beauty as the "radiant quality which emerges from the perfect relations of parts in a whole...the quality of internal relations" [p. 295].

The following section delineates the particular nature of this "radiant quality" of unity as it is phenomenally perceived and as it functions as a fundamental concept in an explication of aesthetic experience.

Unity

Two senses of unity, unity in spatiality and unity in temporality, are central to aesthetic perception. Unity in spatiality is manifested in the gestalt perception of substantive form; whereas unity in temporality is expressed in the perception of coherence and continuity of experience over time.

It will become clear that these two senses of unity offer the foundation for the experience of the unity of one's bodily being as a work of art. Before discussing this experiential unity of one's body in movement, however, the writer will further clarify the constructs of spatial and temporal unity.

Unity in Spatiality

Spatiality denotes the phenomenological conception of "lived" space in contrast to objective or mathematical space. Merleau-Ponty [1962] described this structure of consciousness as "espace oriente" or oriented space. According to Schrag [1972], it is a "spatiality of situation" [p. 147]; that is, it takes on different values relative to the situation in which the lived body actualizes its
projects. Thus, it is existential space articulated through one's personal intentions, rather than quantitative, linear space subject to objective measurement. May, Angel and Ellenberger [1958] described Binswanger's suggestion that one's consciousness of space is influenced by one's emotions and feelings.

In its psychological expression oriented space becomes what he [Binswanger] calls "attuned space" (gestimmter Raum), space conditioned by one's emotions and feelings. Space thus becomes allied with a psychological mood. One's mood determines space as being full or empty, expanding or constricting [p. 110].

How one perceives the spatiality of the world is, thus, determined by what one is doing and feeling. Every sensuous quality is perceived in situation.³

Merleau-Ponty postulated that the lived body ("body-proper"), in its existential thrust in the world, constitutes or gives "form" to the world. This "form," according to Merleau-Ponty, can be described in terms of the gestalt figure-ground conception and is the "very definition of the phenomenon of perception" [1962, p. 4]. Phenomenologists describe the figure as the object of "focus" and ground and horizon as the "fringe" and "remote outlying field" of perception.

Every object appears as a particular "figure" against an horizon of meanings....Perception is always perception of the whole thing integrated in a more encompassing field, and this field itself is taken into an horizon of more distant meanings [Luijpen and Koren, 1969, p. 64].

H'Doubler [1940] suggested that
It is a property of the human organism to take the raw materials of sensation as unorganized energy, and to organize and relate them, thus endowing experience with a structure and individuality of its own [p. 102].

This "property" is the process of form perception. This "structure" or form as an expression of unity in spatiality has been variously described as an immediate, unanalyzable wholeness or gestalt separate from its surroundings [Joyce, 1966]; "structure, articulation, a whole resulting from the relation of mutually dependent factors" [Langer, 1957, p. 14]; "harmonious oneness" and "orderly arrangement" or "pattern" [Gates, 1968, p. 34]; "organic unity" in which each distinct element is necessary to the value of the whole [Parker, 1966, p. 323]; and "the unification of the expressive constituents" [Ellfeldt, 1976, p. 175]. Rugg [1963] explained the perception of form as the phenomenon in which the "emphasis is upon wholes, patterns, configuration, Gestalts; the key is interrelationship--both between parts and parts, and between parts and wholes" [p. 81]. He described the nature of form perception, or the delineation of figure and ground, as perception "centered primarily on such properties as contour, outline, shape, bulk, height and so forth" [p. 81]. However, these properties of form are not the exclusive province of visual perception. They are potentially disclosed through a variety of sensory channels.

Following Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, one can say that each sense is a particular modality for disclosing the spatiality of the world. Kinesthetic perception is not the same mode of apprehension as visual perception. Each modality has its own peculiar way of disclosing the world's spatiality. There is, however, the potential
for a unification of these diverse disclosures into "one lived spatiality" [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 260]. Form perception can be an act of the total body. In this sense, form is not merely visual form, but is more accurately described as "felt form." The properties of contour, outline, shape, bulk and height mentioned above become "felt" qualities. Form becomes "living form" as it is felt through total body involvement. Cassirer [1956] described this idea of "living form" as an expression of the unity of the "objective and subjective worlds" in aesthetic perception. He contended that "living forms" emerge and the aesthetic experience consists in our absorption in their "dynamic aspect" [pp. 184-194].

Berleant [1970] supported this conception of subject-object unity in his description of the perceiver and art object combining with other factors in the aesthetic field to form an experiential totality in the aesthetic transaction. He wrote

Aesthetic experience transcends psychophysical and epistemological dualisms, for it is the condition of an engagement of perceiver and object in a unified relationship that is forcefully immediate and direct [p. 150].

This unified relationship is characterized not by the traditional notion of a totally passive receptivity of the perceiver, but rather, by an active engagement and involvement of the perceiver with the art object. The perceiver creates the field from which his perception of form emerges. He "vitalizes the object by setting off its aesthetic potential" [Berleant, 1970, p. 52]. Form is neither a property of the art object alone nor is it entirely confined to a product of the subjectivity of the perceiver. According to Berleant,
a "reciprocal functional relationship" between the object and perceiver exists in aesthetic perception. "The object works on the perciipient, and the percipient, in turn, actively works on the object" [p. 52]. Berleant spoke of "the working of art" as a more accurate phrase than "work of art" to describe the essential dynamic relationship of the art object and perceiver.

Dewey's treatment of artistic form emphasizes this unity or oneness of subject and object in aesthetic experience. He defined form as "the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene and situation to its own integral fulfillment" [1934, p. 137], or as he called it, "consummation." He asserted that unity of self and environment, subject and object, is the essential condition for this consummatory experience; that is, the organism and the environment must "cooperate to institute an experience in which the two are so fully integrated that each disappears" [p. 249].

Rejecting the traditional dualistic aesthetic, Dewey countered the view that aesthetic value resided either in the perceiver or the perceived. His epistemology accounted for an explication of experience as the transaction between subject and object, and aesthetic experience as such complete integration of subject and object that neither pole is distinguishable.

Dewey's complete unity of subject and object and Cassirer's concept of "living form" as an expression of subject-object unity is paralleled by Joyce's [1966] description of "radiance" as an essential quality of the aesthetic. Radiance is the quality of being "at one with" the art object. The art object becomes a part
of the perceiver. It "radiates" its form and is "taken up" or internalized by the viewer. In other words, it "penetrates" the viewer or spectator.

A particularly clear example of radiance is found in dance as a performing art. Through kinesthetic empathy the spectator is "drawn into" the movement of the performer. The dancer, in a sense, "blasts his way into" the spectator's sensibilities [Berleant, 1970, p. 47]. John Martin [1939] suggested that the spectator dances "synthetically" with all his "musculature" [p. 10]. He becomes a part of the performance. He "lives" the form he sees.

Somatic participation, as a form of radiance, is not, however, reserved for the performing arts. Empathy theorists such as Lipps and Lee contend that muscular movements are an integral part of the aesthetic perception of any art object [Rader, 1960], and Berleant [1970] suggested that "in our own physical positions, postures, and movements, we join with an art object in a common activity" [p. 98]. For example, the perceiver participates in the space of the object. When encountering a sculpture that has formal imbalance, the perceiver experiences physical imbalance in his own body. 6

It is the writer's contention, in line with Cassirer's concept of living form, that the radiance or oneness experience is intensified when the perceiver is open to the full sensuality of his bodily response to the art object. To the extent that the perceiver actively engages the form as a living form through responsive-openness 7 to all the sensuous possibilities of the object; to the extent that this experience of form is a total body response; the
experience has greater aesthetic potential. Those who would limit aesthetic perception to the province of the so-called "higher senses" of sight and sound distort the richness of this experience of oneness or radiance in aesthetic perception.8

Dewey's conception of form and consummatory experience is not only a statement about unity in spatiality, but is also a particularly vivid description of a second sense of unity in aesthetic experience, unity in temporality.

**Unity in Temporality**

Temporality is a structure of consciousness which denotes lived or phenomenal time in contrast to objectively measured or linear time. Schrag [1972] asserted that "human time is qualitatively unique" [p. 148]. The experience of lived time is not a sensory process reflecting "real" time existing independent of the experiencer. It is, rather, a personal construction of consciousness. Time is lived as a past, a present and a future. The past and future are not objectively present, but they are subjectively real. One's existence can be predominantly experienced in terms of one's "pastness" or "retentional temporality" [Husserl, 1962]. It may also be dominated by one's "futurity" or "protentional temporality" [Husserl, 1962]; that is, one may live almost totally in the past, defining oneself and one's present experience in terms of what one has been or has experienced. One may also live totally in the future, defining oneself and one's experience in terms of what one wants to be or wants to experience. In both cases the individual, preoccupied with the past or the future, may lose awareness of what
the present moment has to offer. The richness of the full sensuality of his present experience may be restricted by preconceptions about what that experience should be in light of past experience or future goals.

Leonard [1972] wrote, "Our attention and energy are repeatedly directed away from the flow of the present and toward what has not yet happened or what is finished" [p. 19]. Perhaps to cope with the complexity of a fast-paced technological society man takes refuge in the sanctuaries of past accomplishments and future plans. An obsessive tendency to base his action on tradition and precedence and an overriding compulsion to plan ahead for security may separate him from his sensuous immediacy.

In contrast, aesthetic experience, as characterized by unity in temporality, is a synthesis of past, present and future into a single consummatory moment. Aesthetic experience, as an immediate experience of one's full sensuality in the present moment, is neither a denial of the past nor a denial of the future. It incorporates the past and future in the present and is, thereby, enriched as an experience of continuity and coherence. Dewey [1934] asserted, "Art celebrates with peculiar intensity the moments in which the past reinforces the present and in which the future is a quickening of what now is" [p. 18].

Similarly, Berleant [1970] attributed part of the richness and unpredictability of art to its "ability to tap the innermost recesses of memory, of vague recollection, and add the dimension of the past to what is most intensely present" [p. 110]; and Conry
[1974], following Husserl and Schultz, coined the phrase, "primary protention," to describe how the future enriches the present experience, providing it with continuity. These "primary protentions" indicate vague anticipations about the future that arise from spontaneous activity. Conry described them as "brief flashes" about what is to come; flashes that "spontaneously come to mind, existing in the primordial now, yet to be 'filled in' by the unrolling of experience" [p. 50].

When these vague anticipations are "filled in" and the moment "runs its course to fulfillment," Dewey [1934] described it as an experience of "consummation." His consummatory experience, thus, referred not merely to the conclusion of an experience, but to the anticipated end or conclusion, giving temporal unity and coherence to the total experience. He wrote

> It [the consummation or fulfillment] is anticipated throughout and is recurrently savored with special intensity....The end, the terminus, is significant not by itself but as the integration of the parts [1934, p. 55].

The experience of consummation, then, is a function of this coherence, which Beardsley [1969] described as a "continuity of development, without gaps or dead spaces...an orderly cumulation of energy toward a climax" [p. 7].

Dewey's account of aesthetic experience was an attempt to describe how human consciousness organizes a continuous flow of events into a temporal unity. He spoke of a "flow of feelings" through consciousness, referring to the unity of one's affective responses during an aesthetic experience. Similarly, Beardsley
[1969] discussed the experience of unity as a unity of phenomenally subjective elements, as well as a unity of phenomenally objective elements in experience. He referred to phenomenally objective elements as the "properties" or "features" of the work of art that appear in the experience and the phenomenally subjective elements as feelings and emotions or "affects" that are "evoked by" or are "responses to" the work of art [p. 5, 6].

The unity of these phenomenally subjective elements over time, experienced as a "flow of feeling," constitute the coherence of an aesthetic experience. Describing the richness of this temporal unity, Berleant [1970] wrote

Art pauses and dips, rushes forward in a cascade of sensation, moves gently onward with undulating movement, or is suspended in perceptual space for an eternal moment. The variety of the temporal surface of art is as wide as perception itself [p. 111].

This experience of temporal unity becomes a moment of intense clarity that characterizes aesthetic experience as a sensually vivid experience. According to Dewey, "Aesthetic experience, then, is ordinary experience distilled, heightened and sharpened; it is experience in its integrity, its wholeness and fullness" [Lawrence and Powers, 1974, p. 56].

**Summary**

In summary, unity, as a characteristic of aesthetic experience, is manifested as unity in spatiality, the experience of oneness of perceiver and art object; and unity in temporality, the experience of oneness of past, present and future into a moment of intense clarity. 10
In the fusion of the active and passive, the emotional and intellectual, the past and the present, the objective and the subjective, the aesthetic experience achieves its status [Lawrence and Powers, 1974, p. 56].

Aesthetic Delightfulness

For years aestheticians, supporting a hedonistic theory, have suggested that aesthetic experience is characterized as an experience which "delights" or "pleases" the percipient. Kovach [1974], defining aesthetic experience as an experience of beauty, described "the beautiful" as "that which, simply by becoming known, delights" [p. 312]. Beardsley [1969] contended that the critical dimension in a description of aesthetic experience is the amount of pleasure involved. Intensity of the experience is important, but it is intensity defined in a pleasurable direction. "When the experience is largely painful,...we must frankly say that what it provides is not much of an aesthetic experience, however intense it may be" [Beardsley, 1969, p. 10].

To say that an experience is pleasing or delightful, however, is not necessarily to say that it is an aesthetic experience. We are all familiar with experiences of intense pleasure and delight that we would not necessarily call aesthetic. The writer suggests that it is the task of the aesthetician to discern the uniqueness of aesthetic delightfulness; that is, to describe the peculiar nature of aesthetic delight which distinguishes it from other pleasurable experiences. The writer describes this uniqueness as a function of a combination of three qualities: (1) its intrinsic quality,
(2) effortlessness through responsive-openness, and (3) its origination and primacy in the sensuous.

Intrinsic

From pre-Christian Greek philosophers who stressed that beauty delights of and by itself, aestheticians, particularly those who have proposed a play theory of art, have described aesthetic experience as experience that is its own justification, that is valuable in and of itself. Berleant [1970] described aesthetic perception as "intrinsic perception" [p. 141]; perception for its own sake, sufficient in itself. Like play, aesthetic experience has been described as non-utilitarian, undertaken with no usefulness or purpose (in the sense of material productivity) beyond the activity itself. It is an end, not a means to an end. [1]

Thus, aesthetic experience depends upon a particular attitude of the percipient or individual involved in an activity. This "aesthetic attitude" has traditionally been described as one of "disinterestedness" [Spencer, 1892; Fry, 1925; Prall, 1967; Gilson, 1959; Langfeld, 1920]. Immanuel Kant [1919] used this term to refer to the absence of any consideration of usefulness.

To facilitate the observance of this "disinterestedness" of the aesthetic attitude, aestheticians have attempted to isolate the object or activity of aesthetic attention from everyday practical experience. This attempt has unfortunately resulted in a conception of the aesthetic attitude as one of detachment, separateness, remoteness and uninvolved; rather than one of full immersion and involvement in the experience.
The writer suggests that this aesthetic attitude is an attitude of detachment, but it is not a detachment from the "real" world to lose oneself in an illusory world. Rather, it is a detachment from the world of practical considerations, as one becomes totally engaged in the immediacy of one's concrete experience. Aesthetic attitude is, thus, characterized as more than disinterestedness. It is at the same time an intense interestedness in the aesthetic object or activity. Dewey's definition of disinterestedness emphasizes this intense interest in the experience itself. For him, disinterestedness suggests "thorough incorporation into [the] perceptual experience" [Kovach, 1974, p. 284].

Insofar as the aesthetic attitude is an openness to whatever an object of perception or an activity has to offer, it is an "interested attitude." Insofar, however, the aesthetic attitude refers to a "concentrated openness," a restriction of one's attention away from every other object or concern that might interfere with the aesthetic experience, it is a disinterested attitude. Kovach [1974] clarifies the uniqueness of aesthetic attention (attitude) as follows:

Being aesthetically interested and, at the same time, non-aesthetically disinterested, the aesthetic attention differs in its specific object from every other kind of attention or attitude, the speculative, the practical, etc. [p. 297].

Aesthetic attitude can, thus, be described as a total immersion or involvement that is characterized as an openness to or intense interestedness in the aesthetic qualities of the experience and a disinterestedness in the utilitarian or a "suspension of the ordinary" pragmatic world. It is this attitude which partially
accounts for the uniqueness of aesthetic delight.

Effortlessness Through
Responsive-Openness

Aesthetic delight is a delight in a quality of effortlessness; that is, the experience is an experience of ease or "flow." The perciipient seems to let the experience happen to him without trying too hard. The writer contends that this delight in the quality of effortlessness is born in a posture of "responsive-openness." The writer submits, along with play theorists (Hein, Groos, Spencer), that the aesthetic attitude is similar to the attitude with which one engages in playful activity. Roochnik's [1975] description of play as a stance of "responsive-openness" is particularly appropriate to this discussion. He described play as a "directed stance;" that is, openness is an openness to a particular world. The surfer must be acutely attuned to the roll of the giant wave as he rides precariously on its crest. The skier must be sensitively aware of the contours of his mountain. This openness is a willingness to see and feel all that one can see and feel, to be keenly aware of the full range of one's potential sensuous experience. Being open to one's experience means allowing oneself to receive into awareness all that is there to receive. In a sense, then, it is a receptive attitude. One allows the world "to be" and allows oneself to experience the perceptual richness of that world.

And yet, openness alone is not enough to qualify this aesthetic attitude. As Roochnik [1975] suggested in his description of play, openness is "radically qualified" by responsiveness. This
responsiveness implies a sensitively active orientation to oneself and the world. Dewey [1934] wrote, "For to perceive, a beholder must create his own experience" [p. 54]. It is not enough for the surfer to be acutely aware of the movement of his wave; he must also respond to and actively engage that movement if he is to experience the wave in its fullest aesthetic potential. It is not enough for the skier to be sensitively attuned to the contours of his mountain; he must actively respond to those curves to create his own experience of the mountain.

But to act without being open to the uniqueness of the particular perceptual situation is to alienate oneself from the richness of the experience. Each wave is different. Each mountain is different; and to be responsive to that difference, to experience the unique possibilities of each wave, each mountain, requires that one be receptively open.

Responsive-openness, then, is a willingness to "listen" sensitively to one's environment and to the promptings of one's inner experience and to be responsive to that environment and that experience. It is a willingness to be spontaneous in one's approach to the world, to bracket preconceptions and to allow oneself to respond to the immediacy of the situation.

Parallels to this concept of responsive-openness are found in Dewey's description of aesthetic experience as a balance of "doing" and "undergoing," in Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological portrayal of experience of the body as a unity of the active and passive and in the Oriental view of the harmony of the active and passive expressed in
the Taoist concept of "wu-wei" and the Zen concept of "effortless-effort."

For Dewey, if an experience is to approach the aesthetic ideal of harmony, fulfillment and final consummation, there must exist a balance of doing (action) and undergoing (reception). He wrote:

Experience is limited by all the causes which interfere with perception of the relations between undergoing and doing. There may be interference because of excess on the side of doing or of excess on the side of receptivity, of undergoing. Unbalance on either side blurs the perception of relations and leaves the experience partial and distorted with scant or false meaning [1934, p. 44].

Gestalt psychology, as it has functioned as a psychology of art, has demonstrated that the perceiver does not play an exclusively passive role, that he participates actively in the experience of aesthetic perception. And, similarly, the performer in the performing arts plays not only an active role. Describing the performer, Berleant [1970] suggested that a performance requires both "an active handling of the perceptual materials of the arts and an alert receptivity of them" [p. 65].

Merleau-Ponty portrayed the active or "doing" character of experience in his conception of the body as a dynamic center of action, bestowing or endowing meaning on the world through one's intending projects. The "lived-body" in its existential thrust in the world constitutes or gives "form" to experience. For Merleau-Ponty, to perceive is to act, but it is also to be acted upon. "Perception ...measures our possible action on things and by that, inversely the possible action of things on us" [Zaner, 1971, p. 246]. Merleau-Ponty
suggested that each perceived object is inseparably connected to one's body and is, therefore, an expression of who and what one is, one's "being-to-the-world." In other words, "consciousness is codetermined by the term to which it relates" [Kwant, 1967, p. 377] or intends. Thus, there exists for phenomenologists a reciprocal relation of action and reception, of doing and undergoing.

The harmony of active and passive is also expressed in the Taoist Yin-Yang symbol. According to the Taoist view, the universe is characterized by a balance of opposites; Yang, the active and Yin, the passive, continually flowing one into the other. The term "wu-wei," doing by not doing or action through inaction and the Zen paradox of "effortless effort" express this conception of being open, of "letting it happen" while actively directing one's energies. This Eastern conception of consciousness is marked by relaxed control that is at the same time "actively dynamic" [Rugg, 1962, p. xxi].

There exists numerous descriptions of the delightfulness of this effortless quality. Maslow [1968] described the peak experience as essentially effortless in the sense of being an experience of grace and perfection performed with ease and a lack of strain or difficulty [p. 83]. Eric Hawkins [1969] described the "free flow" and "unforced brilliance" of the dancer's body. In The Inner Game of Tennis, Gallwey [1974] described the tennis player having a "hot-streak" as letting it happen, not "overtrying." He suggested that

A player in this state knows where he wants the ball to go, but doesn't have to "try hard" to send it there....The player seems to be immersed in a flow of action which requires his energy, yet results in greater power and accuracy [p. 20].
Furlong [1976] described the experience of effortlessness as "The Flow Experience," or "the ecstatic feeling that everything is going just right" [p. 35], and he suggested that many people cannot experience "flow" because they cannot "surrender completely enough to the moment to allow" it [p. 38].

The writer contends that this effortless quality obtains from a total immersion in the particular activity or object of perception. This complete absorption, total involvement, intense centering of attention gives rise to a unique world of spatial and temporal unity described previously in this chapter. The performer/artist/athlete becomes one with his medium or his activity as he is immersed in the "here and now."

This experience of oneness is so frequently described in reference to the Eastern martial arts. In Eastern terms, as man's energy flows one with a "universal rhythm," he does not have to force his movement nor resist his medium, but rather "allows the outside energy to move him" [Huang, 1973, p. 132].

Whether one acknowledges such a "universal rhythm" is unimportant here. It is this experience of oneness that is intricately related to the delight of moving with a feeling of effortlessness. Some call it grace, some rhythm, some smoothness, others fluidity. But whatever the label, the experience of effortlessness is delightful. And unlike the delight in practical knowledge or skills which accrues with the recognition of the usefulness of the result or product of the activity, aesthetic delight is delight in the process, the experiencing, the feeling of this unity of doing and undergoing itself.
This experience of effortlessness is an inherently sensuous experience. In this moment of "flow," whether it is the painter creating his picture or the dancer performing his dance, the body tingles with exhilaration. The artist's delight is a sensuous delight as he dwells in the satisfaction of experiencing his energy flowing smoothly, rhythmically, freely. Aesthetic delight, then, is not a delight in the transcendent, the mystical or the abstract, but in the worldly and sensuously concrete.

Berleant [1964] asserted that the distinctive quality of art is the "intrinsic perception of sensation" [p. 186]. Assuming that the perceptual richness of an aesthetic experience is revealed through its sensuous qualities, Berleant characterized the aesthetic experience as a "perfection of sensation" [1970, p. 100].

However, traditional aesthetic theory evidences a general reluctance in according the senses a primary place in aesthetic experience. It is only with distinctions and restrictions that traditional theorists have admitted the sensuous into the province of aesthetic experience. In aesthetic theory the "sensuous" has traditionally connoted pleasurable attraction of the senses, the primary aesthetic senses being the so-called "higher" senses of sight and hearing. The "sensual," on the other hand, being neglected as aesthetically irrelevant, has referred to the experience of bodily pleasures that is a function of the "lower" senses of touch, taste, smell, etc.; those "grosser" bodily sensations, particularly the sexual [Berleant, 1964, p. 185].
Religious and moral censor grounded in metaphysical dualism and monism and their accompanying denigration and contempt for the body have resulted in the denial of the aesthetic value of a rich and fertile ground of sensual experience. Originating with Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas, the classic belief that sight and hearing are the aesthetic senses received the endorsement of such renowned aestheticians as Santayana [1896], Fry [1925] and Maritain [1962]. Following the tradition of Greek rationalism, the visual and the aural were regarded as the higher senses because they were considered to be most closely related to the operations of reason [Berleant, 1964]; while the tactile, kinesthetic, and other "contact" senses were given the stamp of inferior status because they were less related to "reason" and more associated with "body," calling attention "directly to the body" rather than directing it "outwardly" to external objects [Santayana, 1955, p. 37].

Traditionally associated with the contemplative mind was the attitude of detachment and distance. Idealist and rationalist aestheticians, regarding aesthetic experience as a function of the contemplative mind, admitted the organs of sight and hearing to the aesthetic realm for they were considered distance receptors, and "detachment from direct contact with the physical [could] be retained," while the contact senses, calling attention to the body, destroyed the "isolation of the contemplative mind" [Berleant, 1964, p. 187]. Isolating the senses and attributing the realm of the aesthetic to the "higher" senses while relegating the "lower" senses to the non-aesthetic has distorted experience in general and aesthetic
experience in particular, confining the latter to those regions that
have been judged acceptable in light of social, moral, political,
religious and metaphysical criteria.

Isolating the senses from one another and discriminating
among them have also resulted in the distinction between the sensuous
and the sensual, a distinction that unnecessarily and inaccurately
bifurcates experience. Merleau-Ponty's account of the nature of
sensuous perception offers a phenomenological argument against a
dualistic metaphysic and the fragmentation of sense experience. He
characterized the act of perception as an act of the whole body.
Zaner [1971] and Kwant [1966], interpreting Merleau-Ponty, wrote,
respectively: "Each sense...implicates the entire body, refers
simultaneously to all other senses, and, thus, is intrinsically
intersensory" [p. 180], and "What we call 'awareness' or 'conscious-
ness' is not one single reality, concentrated in one point. It is
spread all over the body and it is multiplied in many different
organs" [p. 54].

The total visual experience of the mountain's magnificence and
beauty is enhanced by one's bodily feelings of smallness, the sounds
of nature, the cool crispness of the early morning breeze and the
sweet smell of the pines. The total kinesthetic experience of the
perfect back-handspring series is supported by the sounds of the feet
and hands lightly contacting the mat in accelerating rhythm, the
visual image of what one's body looks like, and even the familiar
smell of the chalk dust in the room. Each perception, then, is a
total experience of the body.
This essential unity of the senses does not imply that one cannot perceive an experience as belonging predominantly to one particular sensory modality. For example, being overcome by the beauty and magnificence of a snow-capped mountain may be experienced as primarily a visual phenomenon; or experiencing the power and amplitude of a perfectly executed back-handspring series may be primarily a kinesthetic experience. We can describe certain experiences as distinctly characterized by particular sensuous fields, but at the same time, "the other sensuous fields serve as 'meaning giving' ground. Consciousness 'lights up' on what is focused, and this becomes a figure against the background of all the others" [Madenfort, 1974, p. 6]. In a phrase, the senses "echo" one another. Hans Hofmann succinctly expressed this perceptual integration of the senses when he wrote, "Seeing with the physical eyes borders on blindness. We see indeed with all our senses" [Berleant, 1970, p. 104].

This "synergetic unity" of the body in the act of perception is further revealed in the phenomenon of "synesthesia" or intersensory effects. Synesthesia has been defined as an experience

...in which certain sensations belonging to one sense or mode attach to certain sensations of another group and appear regularly whenever a stimulus of the latter occurs [Rugg, 1963, p. 226].

For example, synesthesia occurring when listening to music may be the "auditory-visual" type in which visual impressions accompany auditory stimuli. The percipient tends to visualize images of patterns and shapes when listening to the music. A kinesthetic-visual type of synesthesia is particularly relevant to this writer's account of the performer/athlete's experience of the body as a work of art. The
particular kinesthetic perception associated with a perfect execution of a movement skill may call up an aesthetically pleasing visual image of his body. This identification or association of kinesthetic and visual perceptions is discussed further in Chapter III.

The Japanese haiku is an example of an art form, the total impact of which depends on this phenomenon of synesthesia. A haiku accentuates the perceptual integration of the senses. Matshu Basho originated the haiku to present an experience "in its total force, odor, color, and sound" all fused into one [Berleant, 1970, p. 104].

Consider the following:

**Poppy petals fall**
- Softly quietly
- calmly
- When they are ready

To fully "understand" this haiku, the body "feels" the light, free, indirect qualities expressed in those four lines. The reader not only sees the verse, but lives through his body the softness and peaceful caress of his surrounding space. In contrast, consider the following haiku:

**Roaring winter storm**
- Rushing to its
- utter end...
- Ever sounding sea

The total experience of these words is qualified by the reader's feelings of the strong, forceful and direct qualities expressed in this verse.

The total force of each of these verses is, thus, manifested not only in visual images, but also in tactile, rhythmic and kinesthetic responses. Certain energy and spatial qualities are felt,
as one's experience of the haiku is characterized as a total body experience, not merely a literary experience.

Another example of "intersensorial transpositions" is the experience of sculpture, which is nominally characterized as a visual art, but which is also highly tactile in appeal. Both the tactile and kinesthetic senses are of primary significance in much graphic art.

Experience is, thus, distorted by categorizing it exclusively on the basis of a singular sense modality. Experience is a function of the whole body acting as a synergetic unity. Therefore, the distinction between the "sensuous" and the "sensual" as a function of the "higher" and "lower" senses is an untenable one, indeed.

As a sensuous experience and a total body experience aesthetic delight is not a delight in illusion, as many play theorist and aestheticians describe the experience of art. Instead, it is a deepening of the experience of reality. Cassirer [1956] characterized art as "an intensification of reality...a continuous process of concretion" [p. 184].

Borrowing Roochnik's [1975] description of play, the writer contends that aesthetic experience is a delightful encounter with the world, "not a pleasurable route away from it" [p.12]. Aesthetic experience as an intensely vivid experience of concrete reality is not, however, an ordinary experience, in the sense of everyday practical activity. In a "suspension of the ordinary," aesthetic experience is "felt" with a compelling directness. In an extraordinary experience the percipient/performer delights in the presentational
immediacy of the sensuously concrete.

Berleant [1970] contended that there can be no "process of concretion" without the compelling directness of sense perception. However, to suggest that aesthetic experience, as an intense encounter with the world, is originally grounded in sensory experience is not to suggest that aesthetic experience is wholly and exclusively a sensuous experience or that it is founded upon a dualistic metaphysic. Dewey [1934] asserted that no experience is "either merely physical or merely mental, no matter how much one factor or the other predominates" [p. 53]. The phenomenological conception of the unity of mind-body functioning is the metaphysical stance underlying this explication of aesthetic experience. Form perception is a total body-mind act and involves both sensory and cognitive powers.

Kovach [1974], defining the structure of aesthetic experience, recognized both the sensory and cognitive roles. He wrote

The beholder does several generically or specifically distinct things. Thus, he sees and hears; he unifies different sets of sense data (visual and audible, even tactile data); he imagines and associates; he takes delight in what he recognizes; he judges and remembers what he beheld and enjoyed; etc. [p. 291].

Not intending to bifurcate mind-body functioning, Kovach actually spoke of the cognitive powers in aesthetic experience as "internal senses." He described the first internal sense as the cognitive power to unify raw sense data into perceptually unified wholes and the second internal sense as the power of imagination; that is, "subjectification" of the perceptual image "with the result that the image may become thereby either more or less delightful" for the
perceiver [p. 303].

The term, "aesthetics," originating from the Greek word "aisthetikos," meaning perception-feeling, was coined by the philosopher, Baumgarten, to identify the "science of sensuous knowledge" [Ellfeldt, 1976, p. 133]. It is the contention of this writer that aesthetic experience originates in and is primarily a sensuous experience; and though it may at times be considered a cognitive experience, or "of the mind" (in the sense of being symbolic or imaginative), this cognition is grounded in the sensuous and its delight is obtained in its relation to the sensuous. That is, any cognition in aesthetic experience gains its aesthetic significance from its reference to some sensory event, past or present.

In his phenomenological characterization of aesthetic experience, Berleant [1970] emphasized this primacy and origination in the sensuous when he claimed

Sensory qualities predominate in their immediacy and directness, and even when experience intensifies to the degree of rapture or awe sensation is not transcended but lies at its very heart [p. 113].

While the role of the senses has been acknowledged in the last century and a half of aesthetic theorizing, it is a role "enacted on a spiritualized plane, disembodied, 'de-physicalized,' as it were" [Berleant, 1964, p. 189]. However, this separation of the senses and the dichotomy of the physical and spiritual are no longer viable groundings for a descriptive account of aesthetic experience, as more and more philosophers and social scientists give credence to the reality of man's wholistic mode of being-in-the-world.
Intuitiveness

The writer has said that aesthetic delight is not only a result of mere gross sensation, but is also a function of cognitive powers that account for the integration of raw data into perceptually unified wholes. Perception, as described previously, is not a mere passive reception of sense data, but involves an active ordering of that data into meaningful form. This cognitive process has been defined as intuitive in nature [Rugg, 1962; Berleant, 1970; Kovach, 1974; Thomas, 1972] in contrast to reflectively analytic. Recent neurophysiological research strongly suggests that this intuitive grasp of form is the specialized province of the right hemisphere of the brain; whereas reflective, logically rational thought is the function of the left hemisphere.

For years scientists of human behavior and creative intelligence, ignoring the "whole man" concept, have given exclusive attention to only one half of the mind; logical, analytic, left hemisphere functioning, while relegating the intuitive mode to the mystical, unscientific realm. This exclusive reliance upon the myth of rational consciousness16 and objective reasoning as the total sensitivity in man's search for the nature of reality and existence has alienated him from the full meaning of his existence by leaving out of consideration too many subtle but important operations of human consciousness. Reflectively, rational consciousness is only one mode of experience.

According to Ornstein [1972], who contended that the right hemisphere is involved in spatial and intuitive thought and non-
verbal modes of knowing such as movement, the right and left hemispheres process information differently. The products of the right hemisphere are not totally reducible to science or language due to the different information processing system of "spatial-holistic thinking. Unlike the primarily linear mode of the left hemisphere, the intuitive is referred to as a "gestalt mode of thought" [p. 11]. As such, it is "more holistic and relational and a more simultaneous process of integration than the analytic and sequential mode of the left hemisphere. Assagioli [1971] described the difference when he stated that intuition "does not work from the part to the whole--as the analytic mind does--but apprehends a totality directly in its living existence" [p. 217].

Kovach [1974] described this intuitiveness of aesthetic cognition in terms of two characteristics: instantaneity and non-discursiveness. This spatial-holistic thinking of the right hemisphere is an "immediate, yet full grasp" [p. 309] of the beauty of an object or activity. As an immediate qualitative apprehending, intuition requires no time for logical thinking or reflection. It is not a result of syllogistic reasoning. Neither a product of inductive nor deductive reasoning, the instant grasp of aesthetic form is non-reflective and non-discursive.

Phenix [1964] described non-discursive form as having its own distinctive logic that does not follow a rationally explicit logic [p. 82]; and Rugg [1963] coined the term "felt-thought" [p. 214] to indicate this non-discursive quality of intuitive functioning.
Identified with vision, insight and direct perception, aesthetic intuition can be described as a non-reflective experience in contrast to the discursive activities of analysis and synthesis that are largely reflective in character. This distinction between non-reflective and reflective realms of consciousness has received much attention in philosophic writings. Sartre [1973] spoke of pre-reflective and reflective cogito. Merleau-Ponty [1962] referred to the pre-personal and personal consciousness. Dewey [1934] distinguished primary, immediate, direct experience from secondary, mediate and indirect experience.

Merleau-Ponty explicated these two realms of consciousness in terms of two types of intentionality; an "active" or "absolute" intentionality of a cognitive (thetic) consciousness and an "operative" intentionality of a non-thetic consciousness. According to Merleau-Ponty, this operative intentionality represents a "primordial" and more fundamental consciousness than cognitive consciousness. He attributed this pre-cognitive primordial consciousness to one's immediate experience of one's body-in-the-world. Unlike the cognitive intentionality in which one projects oneself actively in the world, this non-cognitive intentionality of the body is, according to Merleau-Ponty, "already at work before every judgment...an art hidden in the depths of the human soul" [Zaner, 1971, p. 189]. In other words, he suggested that the body has its own intentionality that is not at the level of cognition, but is more fundamental as a "preliminary constitution." It is a "built in" intentionality, a synthesis that is already established, that is of intrinsic
significance and that underlies all perception. He asserted that through the pre-cognitive intentionality the body has a "latent knowledge" of the world; that is, the body "knows and comprehends the world in a pre-cognitive manner with no use of symbolic or objectifying functions" [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 141].

It is evident that Merleau-Ponty equated the terms, "cognitive" and "reflective" or "analytic." He did not recognize pre-reflective form perception as a cognitive process, but rather as a function of a so-called "body intentionality." It is the contention of this writer that right hemisphere intuitive processes may partially account for this "built-in" body intentionality proposed by Merleau-Ponty. Though it is non-analytic and distinctly different from left hemisphere reflection, this intuitive form perception cannot be called non-cognitive, as Merleau-Ponty and other writers would have it [Kant, 1914; Berleant, 1970]. As a function of the half brain, this intuitive process is, indeed, a cognitive process. Aesthetic intuition can, thus, be described as a non-reflective, non-analytic mode, but not a non-cognitive mode.

Cassirer [1956] affirmed this non-reflective, non-analytic characteristic when he spoke of art as "an interpretation of reality—not by concepts but by intuitions: not through the medium of thought but through that of sensuous forms" [p. 188]. It is evident that Cassirer, along with others [Rugg, 1963; Berleant, 1970], connects this aesthetic intuition with the sensuous realm. Though aesthetic intuition can be characterized as a cognitive process, being a specialized function of the right hemisphere, it is not confined to
cerebral activity.

Berleant [1970] spoke of the "powerful sensory presence of aesthetic intuition" [p. 116], and he added, "Aesthetic intuition is not only a psychological act, it involves what we might describe as a perceptual-motor intuition, an organic intuition" [p. 116]. Describing the intuitive "flash of meaning," Rugg (1963) contended that nothing is more basic than the role of the body. He described the most important constituents of the intuitive process ("flash of insight") to be the continuous flux of sensory imagery, motor adjustments and incipient movements of the body.

The entire organism is a mass of tensile pushes and pulls....Perceptual experience and physiological forms of movement, taken together, comprise...the motor determinants of meaning....These constitute the primary raw materials of the transliminal mind [that which is responsible for the creative act or "flash of insight" in creative perception] [Rugg, 1962, p. 63].

Aesthetic intuition is not mental as opposed to bodily. The traditional mind-body dichotomy must be dispelled if any valid and defensible theory of aesthetic experience is to be formulated. The role of sensory-cognitive integration, total body-mind involvement, in the presentational immediacy of an aesthetic moment will be described further in the following chapters.

A further understanding of aesthetic intuition can be gleaned from an examination of the search for wisdom in Eastern traditions. The development of this intuitive mode undergirds much of the Eastern forms of meditation. Designed to "quiet" the rationally analytic mind to allow the fresh, direct, spontaneous perception of the intuitive mode, these Eastern traditions focus on changing the
structure of ordinary consciousness. Blake spoke of "cleansing of
the doors of perception" [Ornstein, 1972, p. 133]; freeing oneself of
the restrictions and censorship of the biasing and filtering
processes of an analytic, linguistic consciousness. Phenomenologists
speak of "bracketing" the natural (scientific) attitude, suspending
one's presuppositions to see freshly and innocently as "through the
eyes of a child."

In order to achieve this all meditative forms employ some
form of concentrated attention. Whether it is total attention to
one's breathing, to a mantra, to an external object or to the feeling
of one's movement, the effect is similar. Taoist call it "wu-hsin"
or "no-mind." Watts [1957] described it as the Chinese "te," meaning
"the unthinkable ingenuity and creative power of man's spontaneous
and natural functioning--a power which is blocked when one tries to
master it in terms of formal methods and techniques" [p. 27]. This
intuitive mode is, thus, characterized by the previously described
effortlessness that accompanies total immersion in an activity. And
it is this complete immersion and effortlessness that identifies the
intuitive mode with the experience of "unity" or oneness that is
characteristic of aesthetic delight.

Summary

The writer has characterized the particular quality of
consciousness in aesthetic experience in terms of three major
features: (1) unity in spatiality and temporality, (2) aesthetic
delightfulness and (3) intuitiveness. Unity in spatiality is
conceived as an experience of oneness of perceiver and art object or performer and his medium. In the total immersion of the percipient in that which is perceived, form becomes "felt" form or "living" form. This unity in spatiality is a species of that experience of oneness that is so often described in the union of two loving human beings, in the feeling of harmony and interconnectedness that characterizes a peak experience or other altered states of consciousness, such as experiences of "cosmic" or "universal" consciousness achieved through meditation.

Unity in temporality is described as a coherence or continuity of past, present and future into a harmonized flow of events toward a completion or fulfilling closure. Past and future become sensually vivid in the immediacy of the present moment, giving intense clarity to the experience.

Aesthetic delightfulness is distinguished in terms of:

1. Its intrinsic quality, delightful in itself as an experience with no concern for usefulness.

2. A feeling of effortlessness in one's encounter with the world, achieved through responsive-openness, a balance of action and receptivity.

3. Origination and primacy in the sensuous, delight felt with the compelling directness of the sensuously concrete.

Intuitiveness, as a quality of aesthetic experience, is characterized as immediate, gestalt mode of perception; spatial-holistic thought of the right-hemisphere; non-discursive, non-reflective functioning.

The following chapters will elucidate the particular nature of these qualities of unity, delightfulness and intuitiveness as
they are manifested in an aesthetic experience of one's body in movement/sport activities.
The phenomenological notion of consciousness as employed by Merleau-Ponty is used here. Consciousness is consciousness of something, and is interchangeable with the Deweyan definition of experience as a subject-object unity. The subject "intends" the object. The subject is, so to speak, "open-to-the-world." There are, then, in every conscious experience two poles, often indicated by the terms, "noesis" (the conscious act) and "noema" (the object of consciousness). Experience in this non-dualistic conception is, according to Dewey, an "unanalyzed totality" that contradicts all forms of pure subjectivistic philosophy on the one hand and pure objectivistic philosophy on the other. An experience has a unity that cannot be analyzed and divided into distinctly separate and independent subject-object poles.

The feature of "unity" as a characteristic of aesthetic experience is examined more thoroughly in this chapter, page 19, and in Chapter III in a discussion of the spatiality and temporality of the body perceived as a work of art.

Perception is used here as "awareness ensuing directly from sensory processes; the awareness emerging either from external or from intraorganic stimuli" [Rugg, 1963, p. 80].

For a more extensive discussion of this unification of the senses in perception, see Chapter III under "The Spatiality of the Body."

See "The Aesthetic Field" in this chapter for a discussion of the aesthetic transaction.

When viewing one's own body as art object, this spatial involvement is intensified as one is the space. The perceiver as performer and art object does not have to be drawn into the space. For further discussion of body spatiality in aesthetic perception of one's body, see Chapter III.

The stance of "responsive-openness" is discussed under "Aesthetic Delightfulness" in this chapter.
A further examination of this fragmentation of sense experience into "higher" and "lower" senses in aesthetic perception appears later in this chapter and in Chapter III.

In this present-centeredness the linear, analytic world is for an instant "destructured." Ornstein [1972] suggested that these present-centered moments might be regarded as "shifts toward a right-hemisphere [of the brain] predominance" [p. 89]. See a discussion of "intuitive" functioning in this chapter for further amplification.

The sensually vivid experience of spatial and temporal unity of one's body in movement is explored in Chapter III.


See pages 19 and 25, "Unity in Spatiality" and "Unity in Temporality."

See definitions of sensuous, sensory and sensual, page 8.

The concepts of "disinterestedness" and "psychical distance," prominent in modern aesthetic theory, are extensions of this classical rationalism.


For a discussion of one's movement as a non-discursive symbolic form and its relation to an aesthetic experience of one's body, see Chapters IV and V, "The Body as Symbol," and "The Body Aesthetic: A Symbolic Experience."
THE BODY AESTHETIC: A SENSUAL EXPERIENCE

The Sensual and Erotic in Art

Metaphysical and moral contempt for the body, accompanied by the need to maintain the respectability of the art world, is manifested in the traditional notion that aesthetic pleasure is completely dissociated from physical pleasures. We have seen that, traditionally, those sensual experiences involving touch and other contact senses have been equated with the life of "low" and lustful appetite, tempting one to dwell on bodily pleasures, particularly the erotic; and that these experiences have been, therefore, excluded from the aesthetic realm.

Berleant [1964] suggested that this tendency to dissociate the beautiful from the sexually desirable is one of the most deep seated restraints on the full extension of aesthetic perception. He also contended that the erotic appeal of certain forms of artistic expression are, indeed, integral to their aesthetic merit, particularly when the human body is central in the work.

The Nude

The "nude" is a particularly vivid example of an art form in which powerful sensual attraction is central to its aesthetic appeal.
But the following statement by Professor Alexander is characteristic of the general denial of this erotic impact of the body in the world of art: "If the nude is so treated that it raises in the spectator ideas or desires appropriate to the material subject, it is false art and bad morals" [Clark, 1956, p. 8]. Clark [1956] countered this "high minded" theory in his assertion that

...no nude, however abstract, should fail to arouse in the spectator some vestige of erotic feeling...and if it does not do so, it is bad art and false morals....The amount of erotic content a work of art can hold in solution is, very high [p. 8].

Indeed, in many cases, contemporary art focuses on the erotic and exploits the full sensual possibilities of the medium.

The human body is rich in vivid associations. Berleant [1964] suggested that probably no object is infused with such intensity of emotional involvement as the human body [p. 107]. The writer submits that aesthetic appeal of the human figure in pose or in graceful movement is bound up with these rich sensual or erotic associations. In a phrase, the erotic infuses the entire human body with significance.

For the sensuous enters the sensual, and in a vast area of aesthetic creation and experience the sensual becomes a major if not predominant feature of its sensuous appeal. Indeed, the two are often indistinguishable [Berleant, 1964, p. 189].

The immense sensual appeal of the body has so fascinated artists that the "nude" has dominated as a subject of art from its invention in fifth century Greece. Artists have been drawn to express the magnetic lure of the body to the extent that Clark [1956] has considered the nude not merely an art object but, rather, an
"art form" in itself.

The Greek ideal of physical beauty has survived as an "indestructable image," furnishing, with varying degrees of intensity, a standard of perfection and erotic appeal. The rhythmic vitality, dynamic symmetry and balance between the strength and grace of the human body were ingeniously captured in the nudes of the fifth century, B.C., Apollo being the ultimate expression of physical beauty.

Speaking of the sensuous quality of the fifth century nude, Clark [1956] wrote, "Majesty is not lost, and the body is firm and muscular, but the overwhelming impression is one of grace and of a gentle sweetness" [p. 45]. This balance of the firm and muscular with the gentle and sweet is an expression of beauty as an "integral unity of a multitude" (see footnote 2). The Greek ideal of beauty of the human form was embodied in this delicate balance of a full range of sensuous qualities; and this ideal was inextricably related to the Greek philosophy of man's wholeness. The human body is, as Clark expressed, "inexhaustibly complex and suggestive" [p. 41], and to a fifth century Greek, it was the immediate and clear symbol of man's wholeness and perfection, embodying a set of values of which dedication, balance, modesty, proportion, energy and love were a few. 3

The cult of physical perfection, manifested most vividly in the Greek athlete, rested upon the concept of the unity and wholeness of man's bodily being-in-the-world. Willing to "stand naked before the Gods," the nude athlete portrayed the Greek confidence in physical beauty and respect for the body.
The Greek embodiment of physical beauty was most vividly expressed in the sculptures and paintings of the athletes of the Olympiad (776 B.C.). Clarity, balance, completeness, delicate eagerness and heightened sensuality were portrayed in those sculptures. Beauty, seen as the wholeness and perfected balance of the human form, was not captured as static figure but, rather, was expressed in the dynamic form of the body. These works of art revealed the human figure as an embodiment of athletic energy. Attempting to capture the ultimate in human motion in solid form, sculptors accentuated the sensuous qualities of flow, lightness, grace, power and speed. It could be said that these artists captured the experience of the sensuous immediacy of the moving body, and in so doing, captured "beauty incarnated."

The Beauty of the Body in the Dance

In addition to portraying the beauty of the body in representational form, performers have also expressed this wholeness and aesthetic sensuality of the body in the performing arts, particularly the dance. The beauty of the moving body in the dance is not, however, defined solely in terms of visual criteria; but is a function of the spectator's whole body responding to the total sensuous impact of the moving form. As lightness, grace, buoyancy, power, thrust and speed are embodied in the performer's movements, the spectator can feel the form that is created. This movement empathy seems to be critical to an enjoyment of the performance. John Martin, dance critic, expressed the importance of one's bodily
response to the enjoyment of the dance when he impelled the spectator to "abandon all effort to figure out what it [the performance] means," and to "merely relax and let the muscles do the thinking" [Ellfeldt, 1976, p. 196].

The performer's body, expressing in dynamic form the varying sensuous dimensions of the qualities of time, force, space and flow, can be for the spectator not only visually aesthetic, but in some cases, openly erotic. Emancipated from non-aesthetic restrictions, moral, metaphysical or theoretical a priori's about what is or should be aesthetic, the sensuousness of the spectator's aesthetic perception can be freed to expand and extend itself to merge with the overtly erotic when viewing the dance as well as the nude as an art form. Describing this erotic impact of the human body in movement, Berleant [1970] wrote, "The erotic impulse readily diffuses itself so that every part and every movement of the body arouses our fascinated attention" [p. 106].

The Performer's Experience of Beauty Incarnated

The writer has suggested that to capture the experience of the delicate balance of sensuous qualities of the moving body as dynamic form, either in representational or presentational form, is to capture beauty incarnated. She further suggests that to experience the full sensuality of one's own athletic energy as dynamic form is to experience beauty incarnated. The rich sensual dimension of the movement experience is beautifully expressed by dancer, Edward Villella, in his remark:
I have a big feeling about muscle--to have a muscle, to feel a muscle, to have a muscle warmed up and toned and ready to do something--it's a marvelous, sensual feeling. Then to feel and sense the quality of a movement, to have it inside, absolutely in the middle of your muscles, so that it can emanate and move and come out [Ellfeldt, 1976, p. 209].

The following discussion examines the nature of this experience of beauty incarnated in an attempt to elucidate the "Body Aesthetic."

Lipman [1956] described three distinct roles of the human body in aesthetic creation and perception: (1) the body as a "qualitative presence," also called the "body-image;" (2) the body as an instrument of creative accomplishment; and (3) the body as a "persistent, intensely significant subject-matter of the arts" [p. 425]. He proceeded to explicate each of these body experiences as it functions in the aesthetic situation.

An experiential body aesthetic is an intensification of bodily experience as it unites all of these functions into one vividly lived presence. The body, as aesthetically perceived by the performer whose body it is, is at once the instrument of creation, the object of perception and the subject who perceives. As an instrument, then, the performer's body is distinctly and uniquely different from other instruments. Sartre [1973] referred to the body-for-itself as the instrument of one's being-in-the-world. However, this reference to the body as an instrument for the actualization of one's projects should not be misconstrued as a reference to the body as a mere object to be used. Rather, the body-for-itself (body-subject) is a "privileged instrument." Sartre [1973] wrote, "We do not use this instrument, for we are it" [p. 427].
The performer's body demonstrates at once one's objective and subjective orders of Being. It is, in a sense, a "thing among things," quantitative and visible, but it is also a subject who sees and feels and is sensitive to the world [Kwant, 1966, p. 48, 49]. As such, the body attains a privileged position in the aesthetic field and functions differently in the field from other art objects. Thus, the body, from the performer's perspective, must be regarded not as an art object, but as a "work of art." Berleant [1970] has written, "The work of art in its fullest dimensions is, in the final analysis, the aesthetic transaction in its entirety" [p. 53]. The reader will recall that aesthetic transaction has been defined by Berleant as the experiential unity of all the aesthetic elements in the Aesthetic Field. Thus, the body, from the performer's perspective, is in a privileged position to be called a work of art, for it perfectly and completely embodies the unity of the aesthetic elements (art object, perceiver, artist, performer).

"When the field is regarded as a unity in experience, the varying functions of object, perceiver, artist and performer are indissolubly connected and interdependent" [p. 82]. With apologies to Berleant, the writer adopts the term, "Bioaesthetic Field," to indicate that the aesthetic experience of the body by performer/athlete is particularly unique and distinct from the aesthetic experience of other art objects. This uniqueness will be explored as the writer examines the fundamental structures of body consciousness, spatiality and temporality.
Merleau-Ponty's [1962] account of the nature of sensuous perception offers a phenomenological characterization of the consciousness of one's body as a spatial presence. Arguing against a dualistic metaphysic and the fragmentation of sense experience, he described the consciousness of one's body as a unity of various senses into "one lived spatiality," the "corporeal scheme."

He conceived the corporeal scheme to be "a global consciousness of [one's] posture in the intersensorial world, a 'form' in the sense of Gestalt psychology" [Zaner, 1970, p. 166]. This "form" is a total organic "system;" that is, the various senses do not function singularly, but rather, function as a system.

My body is precisely an already constituted system of equivalence and intersensorial transformations. The senses mutually translate one another without any need for an interpreter, mutually comprehend one another without needing to pass by way of the idea [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 271].

As noted in Chapter II, each sense is a particular modality for disclosing the spatiality of the world. Kinesthetic perception is not the same mode of apprehension as visual perception. Each modality has its own peculiar way of disclosing the world's spatiality. There is, nevertheless, a unification of these diverse disclosures into "one lived spatiality" [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 260]. The body is thus conceived by Merleau-Ponty as a "unity in diversity." The various senses, being modes of access to one and the same world, "lead over into one another" to function as a "synergetic unity" [Zaner, 1970, p. 180].
It is only by breaking up this lived unity and simultaneous diversity that the diverse senses of one body, and correlative diverse "sense qualities" of one object, appear—and thus these are strictly artificial products of the analysis [Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 278].

Merleau-Ponty contended that one's particular corporeal scheme, or consciousness of one's body spatiality, is constituted by means of the body's tasks and movements. It is by means of movements, bodily actions in situation, that the "spatiality of the body is established" [p. 119]. The corporeal scheme is thus "a kind of resume of bodily experiences gained by [one's] awareness of interoceptive and proprioceptive sensations" [Kaelin, 1966, p. 239]. This spatiality, or corporeal scheme, is manifested in a certain typical "style" of bodily attitudes and actions. "Activities become crystallized into 'schemes,'" which are constituted as "ways of doing" or "modes of activity" [Zaner, 1970, p. 171]. The corporeal scheme is, thus, experienced as a dynamic form attained through one's particular projects in the world. It is the "total organization and coordination of actual and possible kinds of corporeal activities" [p. 173]. Merleau-Ponty used the term, "motivity," to express "intentional corporeal activities."

Consciousness of one's spatial presence is implicitly grasped during one's intentional movements in the world. The body, functioning as a synergetic unity imposing form on the world is, according to Merleau-Ponty, "always tacitly understood" as "the third term" in the figure-ground structure. He wrote, "As far as spatiality is concerned...every figure stands out against the double
horizon of external and bodily space" [Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 10].

This role of the somatic in aesthetic perception is expressed in the writer's previous description of a work of art being "felt" as "living form." However, this description of the body as a third term in the figure-ground structure is applicable only to an individual's perception of an external art object. When the body is itself the focus of perception it no longer functions as ground. Functioning at once as the experienced and the experiencer, the object of perception and the subject who perceives, the body becomes an intensified figure instead of part of the double grounds of perception.

If we are to understand aesthetic consciousness of one's own body we must begin to discern how the body as an intensified figure is phenomenally organized. As the writer has said, Merleau-Ponty suggested that one's corporeal scheme is constituted through one's motivity. One's spatial presence is, thus, qualified as a kinetic experience. Body spatiality is not conceived as a static form, but rather as a dynamic form, a "fluid everchanging projection of body movement as a Gestalt" [Sheets, 1966, p. 23]. As a kinetic phenomenon, one's body spatiality is not necessarily bounded by the limits of one's skin. It is intimately related to the way in which one uses one's energy, and includes what the Taoist call both "Yin" and "Yang" space; that space immediately surrounding one's physical body in which one projects one's energy and that space encompassed by one's physical boundaries. Leonard [1972] wrote, "The self is by no means confined to the skin, which is only the lesser boundaries
of the individual being we call human" [p. 13].

Variously referred to as the "subtle," "radiant body" or "energy body" in Eastern philosophy and martial arts and in Western body therapies, this concept of a biofield is not merely a mystical or metaphysical creation, but finds credence in scientific measurement. The body is surrounded by an electromagnetic field associated with the beat of the heart, the rhythmic pulsations of lungs expanding and contracting, and electrical nerve impulses during muscular contractions; by a cloud of ionized sweat; and by a field of radiant heat, all measurable by highly-sensitive instruments such as electrostatic indicators and infrared sensors.

The recognition of this biofield, an extension of man's being beyond his physical boundaries, offers an expanded conception of one's body as it can be aesthetically experienced. Dynamic form is not only perceived as the changing shape of one's physical body (Yang space), but is also felt as patterns or configurations of one's energy radiating through space (Yin space).

The body's effort, thus, has a form, takes a shape. Through movement the body creates or molds space into form. This sense of form may result from changes within the body parts, called "shape-flow" in the effort shape system of movement description [Dell, 1970], and is an experience in which the body is oriented to itself. Shape flow is not concerned primarily with space around the body, but more predominantly with the change in relationship of body parts. The experience of spatiality as shape-flow is a concern with one's Yang space and is sensuously experienced as growing and shrinking or
opening and closing.

Aesthetic perception of bodily form may exist in this experience of shape-flow. For example, as the sprinter repeatedly crouches in the starting blocks and explodes into fully extended stride, he may become increasingly and keenly aware of the precise sensuous quality of that change in bodily shape (form). In other words, he feels the growing and opening qualities of that change in body shape as a dynamic form.

The experience of dynamic form may also result from the body creating or adapting to the contour of two and three dimensional shapes in space, called "shaping" in the effort-shape system. In contrast to shape-flow, this experience is not an orientation of the body to itself, but is a concern with the shapes and forms of space immediately around the physical body (Yin space). For example, the gymnast is acutely sensitive to the contour of the bars as she swings from bar-to-bar and molds her body around them.

Thirdly, the experience of spatial form may result from the body creating a clear path going in a direction in space. The body, in this "directional" movement [Dell, 1970, p. 49], moves through a form in either "spoke-like" or "arc-like" paths. For example, the body may be experienced as a projectile as it catapults through the air carving a beautiful curve. Leonard [1975] described this consciousness of form in the running experience when he wrote, "Our passionate movements across the earth inscribe perfect arcs in space" [p. 170].
A gymnast best described these experiences of spatial form when she expressed

When I move I am the sculptor's hand forming my body into symmetry or asymmetry; making my curves into proper perspective. Or I am the painter, drawing patterns of geometric design on the ground or in the air....I am producing art; I feel like art; I am art!!!

Dynamic Form: A Total Body Experience

We have seen that the visual view that the performer has of his body is not the only ground for experiencing the beauty of his lived spatiality in its sensuous immediacy. Aesthetic awareness of his own spatiality is a consciousness of the full sensual impact of his body energy. Merle Marisicano, dancer, described this sensuous experience of lived space when he wrote

The air around me seems to have the capacity to solidify or melt. It can be heavy, then rarified, or agitated and then becalmed. Sometimes I have to force my way through it, and at other times I am driven by it [Eilfeldt, 1976, p. 197].

A synchronized swimmer expressed her encounter with space.

It's a mind-blowing experience...to have that keen perception of where you are moving your body, how you are creating space and feeling it with every muscle, every sense.

The sense of form is often embodied in formal visual properties of linear qualities such as proportion, symmetry, line, balance, etc. The aesthetic, sensuous appeal of the body to the performer is not only a function of these visual dimensions, mirroring the perfection of that "indestructable image" of the fifth century Greek athlete, but is also a function of the tactile and kinesthetic
qualities of expansion or contraction, hardness or softness, lightness or strongness, surrender or force, directness or indirectness, quickness or sustainment, freeness or boundness. Symmetry is a felt symmetry; balance, a felt balance.

In the aesthetic perception of his body in movement, the performer does not experience the separation between his body as viewed externally and his body as subjectively lived. Rather, he experiences the "fusion of this double givenness" [Madenfort, 1974, p. 7]. The performer's body, as "viewed externally," is not here conceived as body-object (body-for-the-other). In aesthetic perception the performer does not adopt the point of view of the "other," Sartre's second ontological dimension, in a sense of looking at his body from an external perspective, from a distance.

Contrary to Sartre, the performer cannot objectify his own body in the same sense as others can objectify it, for he cannot get outside his own body to attain the necessary distance. He is an embodied being. As the embodiment of consciousness, his body is a "lived body," a "body-subject," a fusion of consciousness-body; not a "dissectable thing body" [Vandenberg, 1962, p. 113]. No one else can "see" what he sees of his own body for his own view is a view enriched by unseen sensuous qualities. The skier's body "twists and contorts to unseen impacts" [Summit Films, 1968], but these are felt impacts that are known only to the skier. The spectator sees the gymnast's body flow around the uneven bars smoothly, gracefully, with apparent ease and elegance, but only the gymnast can know the brute strength of her body in this visually light and effortless performance,
for only she can feel it. It is this sensual knowledge which enriches and enhances her own visual image of her body as a work of art, and which makes this image uniquely her own, incomprehensible to another looking on.

**Aesthetic Perception:**

**A Loving "Look"**

The performer's visual perception of his own body does not necessarily transform his body into an object or a thing. It is not necessarily an alienation of performer from his body attributed to his internalizing the "scrutinizing" or condemning "Look" of the other, as Sartre would have it. It is, rather, a recognition and celebration of the body's visually aesthetic qualities as they are integrated with simultaneous kinesthetic and tactile experience.

Indeed, athletes have expressed a sense of self-consciousness in their awareness of the spectator's scrutinizing "look." But this frequently happens in moments of poor performance or when the athlete makes a mistake. A collegiate ice-hockey player stated, "I'm mostly aware of the spectators when I begin to tire and when I'm not playing well." And a physical education major reflected on her high school basketball experience, claiming that she did not think about her body nor was she aware of it unless she "was out of position" or she "made a mistake."

These are examples of an analytic, mechanical consciousness of one's body, accompanied by a sense of self-scrutiny and perhaps some embarrassment of being-in-one's own body.
The aesthetic look is, however, not a self-scrutinizing look. It is not a view of the body as an object. It is, rather, a "loving look," a view of one's lived body as subject, as a locus of beauty, an "entity" in all its aesthetic possibilities.

The Identification of Visual and Kinesthetic Images

Whether the performer's visual image of his body results from a previous perception of his own body (on film, for example) or from a visual image of another performer executing the same movement, the performer's experience of his body as a dynamic living form is enriched and given clarity as the visual image is identified with certain effort-shape qualities registered in the kinesthetic sensorium. Often times an athlete's image of his own body in performance assimilates the body of a champion athlete he has viewed. Having watched Olympic gymnasts perform, a collegiate gymnast described her "body identification" with them.

I felt the lift as they left the beat-board, the lift as they did an aerial or somi, the sense of being air-borne during leaps, and the strength and stamina needed for the bars. And when I practiced I visualized myself looking like them when I felt that same lift, that same sense of flight, and that same strength.

A college student described his perceptions of his body as a high school basketball player. He wrote

Pete Maravich was my idol in high school. I would picture him in my mind as I played and try to imitate his moves and as I did them more and more, developing them, I felt like my body looked exactly like him.
And a collegiate varsity tennis player discussed her approach to the game this way.

Since I have always patterned my game after a highly skilled performer whose game is "pleasing to the eye," I will fantasize what I would like my strokes to look like during my match, and I know when they look right by how they feel.

In these cases the athletes knew what good form feels like from watching and kinesthetically identifying with the movements of those champion athletes or highly skilled performers. And they knew when their bodies were perfect (or near perfect) replicas of these highly skilled performers because they could feel in the performance what they felt when watching the champion performers. The could visualize what they were feeling. A varsity collegiate miler expressed, "I can tell from how my body feels whether it is in good form, whether it looks good," and a gymnast added, "On the unevens I know what each movement should feel like and if I feel good I know I look good. Then my body approaches a work of art." A recreational skier, describing her body as a work of art, wrote

I felt the flow. The things I felt were smooth, controlled and graceful, it was as if I were seeing myself while doing it, and I wanted to perfect these moves into beautiful moves.

Functionalism and the Experience of Dynamic Form

A member of a women's collegiate field hockey team expressed how a particularly good performance or execution enhances one's visual image of one's body.

Usually, I am not aware of my body during the game because I'm focusing on so many other things, game strategy, where my teammates are, where the
opponents are positioned, etc. However, sometimes when I have a particularly good execution I know how I look and I can feel how I look. It's beautiful.

It would seem that the beauty of form felt by the athlete may be, in part, functionally determined. A women's collegiate tennis player explained

During the match when my body feels good, the way I perceive my body to look and the efficiency with which I perform will all come together naturally as a whole.

A collegiate basketball player added, "I feel beautiful when going high in the air and cleanly blocking a shot that in all fairness should have scored two points." And a football player reflected

I have perceived my body as a work of art when I have made a diving open field tackle or stretched with everything I had to intercept a pass that would have been a sure touchdown for the opponent. These movements can never be reconstructed.

Each athlete may come to know what movements "feel just right" in his sport as he learns which one's are successful and congruent with the purpose of the particular movement form. And the extent to which he visualizes his bodily performance as "beautiful" may be, in part, a function of this feeling.

Though this functionalism might, upon initial consideration, seem to preclude the intrinsic quality of aesthetic experience, described in Chapter II, the writer suggests that it does not necessarily do so. The purpose of a particular movement, such as preventing a pass completion or intercepting a pass, may take on a value in itself, quite separate from any consideration of the final score of the game at that moment. In other words, the interception may be intrinsically valuable as a distinct sensuous experience. A
clear example of a functional skill acquiring intrinsic delight for
the mover is found in the play experience in which individuals engage
in a skill outside the game context. Going out to play "pitch and
catch," to throw the football, or to shoot baskets is an indication
of this intrinsic value of skills that are quite functional in the
game situation.

In summary, aesthetic perception of one's own body as a
dynamic form is not the perception of an object in the sense of
perceiving other external objects of beauty in the world. Rather,
it is a spatially living sensuous body; a synthesis of the body as
art object (with its particular linear qualities) and the body as
lived or felt during the movement experience.

A particularly vivid example of this synthesis in aesthetic
perception can be found in intense training experiences. Discovering
new physical possibilities, extending his "outer limits," creating a
new sensuality that he has never experienced before; the athlete can
experience himself as the artist of this living work of art. Every
step, every strain, every hard breath is part of the creative process;
and in this process the athlete not only may become aware of the
obvious visual changes in body contour, but also may exhilarate in
his newly created sensuality.

You're watching the changes with your own eyes
and feeling it under your own skin and through your
own viens.
Fibers multiply and valves enlarge and walls
thicken.
A miracle [Russell, 1967, p. 51].
As a work of art, this "miracle" is a "living form" which celebrates the unity and wholeness of the performer's total mind-body consciousness.

Body Spatiality: A Oneness Experience

The aesthetic perception of body spatiality is not only lived as a unity of consciousness-body, but is also experienced as an intimate relation between the body and the world. Totally immersed in the sensuous, feeling qualities of his medium, the athlete has described his experience as a "oneness" of body with the world. The skier becomes a part of the mountain as he glides effortlessly through the soft cool powder; the surfer feels one with his wave as he rides it gently.

A men's collegiate cross country runner beautifully expressed the overwhelming quality of this sense of oneness in his description of an evening run.

The sun is bright orange, the grass and trees take on an eerie color making a sensational display and causing a feeling inside of me that tends to make me begin to feel a part of the earth. The movement of my body seems so smooth, so perfect--my senses become even more aware of my surroundings and I feel as though this is all I ever want to do--to just go on and on forever being a vital part of nature....I run faster, creating a deep feeling of love for life and the mother earth. I often feel like crying. What beauty of the earth, and for some unknown reason it is magnified by the motion of my body.

Fully in the moment, absolutely absorbed in his movement, the performer does not have to force his movement, nor resist his medium. His performance seems effortless as he "allows" his body to flow one with the medium.
This oneness experience has traditionally been characterized as a "transcendence" of the body [Sartre, 1973; VanDenberg, 1966]; that is, the body must be "lost" or "passed over in silence" during an intense engagement of the world. Beets [1964] interpreted Bannister's description of his four-minute mile by saying that he "forgets his body...to find a sense of unity and a source of power and beauty" [p. 75]. He concluded that

The sportsman may be looking for experiences in which he can forget his body...to find something of a very different nature; a sense of wholeness, a sense of unity of some kind [p. 75].

Contrary to Beets, I would suggest that the athlete does not "forget" or "surpass" his body to find a sense of unity and a source of power and beauty. Rather, he experiences these immediately in his body, in a heightened sensitivity to the feeling of his body, a vivid awareness that he is his body. Bannister [1963] wrote, "I was running now and a fresh rhythm entered my body. No longer conscious of my movement I discovered a new unity with nature. I found a new source of power and beauty" [p. 12].

Bannister seemed to be indicating that this unity or oneness is a body experience when he described it as a "fresh rhythm" entering his body. To say that he is "no longer conscious of his movement" is not to say that he "forgets" his body. It is only to say that he transcends technique; that he does not have to think about how to do what he is doing, and is, thereby, free to focus on the feeling of his body, to be open to the potential sensuality of the movement experience.
Thomas [1972], interpreting VanDenberg's discussion of Sartre's three dimensions of the body, wrote, "involvement in the activity, that is, participating in the first dimension, presupposes a 'forgetting' of intentions, equipment and the body" [p. 88]. I would clarify Thomas's statement by saying that to experience the body-subject, body in the first dimension, one does not forget the body; rather, one becomes increasingly and sensuously aware of one's body in its lived dimension. The "forgetting" which Sartre, VanDenberg and Thomas speak of is the forgetting of the body as it is experienced in its second dimension; that is, body-object. Similarly, the phrase that "one transcends one's body" in the oneness or unity experience is more appropriately and accurately stated as "one transcends one's consciousness of body as object" in the experience of oneness. It is not an analytic or mechanical awareness of the body but a sensuous, "feeling" awareness that is pre-reflectively and intuitively grasped.

A collegiate field hockey player expressed this kind of body awareness during performance this way.

During the game I am very aware of my body.... Not so aware of the mechanics of my movement and skills, but of the overall feeling of unity or disunity I get when performing the skill.

And a collegiate track team member added

I know for a fact that I am extremely aware of my body during performance, but on a subconscious level. I perceive the way it feels without trying. I have reached a level of performance that I do not have to look at myself so consciously....In other words, it comes natural.
An aesthetic experience of one's body spatiality as an experience of oneness is, thus, a perception of the body-subject. This oneness experience is an intensely sensual engagement with the world. The body is not "lost" in this communion, but is made more reverent by it. The writer characterized the intensity of this oneness experience in her reflections on running.

The hills have a rhythm that I'm getting to know--to feel. My rhythms have become a part of them. Together we create a song--my pulsating heart, my expanding lungs harmonize with the cadence of every step and these soothing hills carry me effortlessly. Each breath penetrates to my soul and takes in nature's gift of energy. My lungs are the billowy clouds; my feet--the earth; my sweat--the morning dew; my skin caresses the damp morning air. We climax. Nature's scents melt into my own bodily scents--Bathed by the sun, I am the sweetness of the pine, the musk of the wet leaves. The wind behind pushes me gently along cooling the back of my neck, consoling me as the twinge of pain in my side reminds me of my imperfection. I need the earth to recognize my completeness. With nature I am one--together we dance--in our gentleness we are beautifully powerful.

Leonard [1975] expressed this oneness as a sense of erotic union with the world during his running experience. He wrote, "I am overwhelmed by a sense of the erotic. Everything is erotic--the sun, the mountain, the dust on the trails, the motion of my body, the air I breathe" [p. 188].

Summary

In summary, unity in spatiality is experienced as an inter-sensory unity, a unity of consciousness-body and a oneness with the world. In aesthetic perception of one's own body, the body is existentially unified in space as a "living form." Unlike the
perception of an external art object, one does not have to be "drawn into the space" of the object of perception to experience the sense of oneness or radiance of this living form. For when the body itself is aesthetically perceived, it is the space. A collegiate synchronized swimmer portrayed the sense of beauty found in this experience of spatial unity when she wrote

My very own space...I own it right now....This is my world, in which nothing except art belongs. Here is where there exists a glimmering radiance nowhere else to be found....What is it that radiates such beauty and joy? Muscles and Mind together as one. We take over all the available space with contorting and impulsive shapes. In my mind I perceive my muscles and my muscle movements as works of art. When I move, I really become one with space, one with my body. The sense of wholeness is so intense, so sharp and oh so real--Nothing else is of concern.

The Temporality of the Body

Felt time has a sort of voluminousness and complexity and variability that makes it utterly unlike metric time [Bufford, 1972, p. 14].

One's direct experience of time (perceived or lived time) is a bodily experience. It "is the passage of vital functions and lived events felt (emphasis mine) inwardly" [Langer, 1956, p. 37], not only as emotional and mental "tensions" but also as "somatic tensions which have a characteristic pattern" [p. 37]. Speaking of the lived experience of time in contrast to objective time, Langer [1953] contented that

Subjective time exists for us because we undergo tensions and their resolutions, their building-up, their ways of breaking or diminishing or merging into longer and greater tensions make a vast variety of temporal forms [p. 112].
She described these tensions as "not simply successive" but as "forming a dense fabric" of multiple relations that compose a "qualitative rather than quantitative ingredient in temporal experience" [p. 38]. The performer's experience of time is, thus, a uniquely personal experience that is subjectively relative, dependent upon his particular activity and a function of his total body-mind orientation in the world.

The Body as Facticity and Possibility In-The-World

The performer's body, as it is lived in the present moment, is characterized by his pastness and his futurity. His body is its past in the sense that his body is constituted by that which he has been, his previous actions in the world. His past is felt in the present moment as he delights in the sensual qualities of his hard-earned strength, endurance or flexibility; or as he agonizes in the pain, frailty, inhibitions or restrictions of movement, all products of a sedentary past.

However, the performer's body is always qualified by futurity. He can neither rest on his past perfections, nor must he dwell in his agony. His body, as his possibility in the world, rescues his past from determinism, reopens his past [Schrag, 1972, p. 149]. When he acknowledges that he has a future, that his past, whatever it has been, can be translated into possibility, the performer recognizes that his body, as the manifestation of his pastness, is not his essence, his final definition, but only a point of departure. For example, in the radical physical rehabilitation
experience or in the intense training experience, the participant's consciousness of temporality can become acutely vivid as the past and future are connected in the present struggle:

The realization of
What I was
In the moment of approaching the ideal of
What I can be...

The realization of
What I looked like and
How I felt
In the moments of creating
New images of my body
And discovering
New feelings
A new sensuality...

These realizations
Are gifts
From my body.

In these realizations the performer's/athlete's body as it is temporally unified is revealed to him. It is at once experienced as his "facticity in-the-world," his "existence as qualified by pastness," and his "possibility in-the-world," his "existence as qualified by futurity" [Schrag, 1972, p. 149].

Temporal Unity: A Sensual Experience of Consummation

A dynamic "living form," the moving body as a work of art, is characterized not only by unity in spatiality, but also by this unity in temporality. Dewey [1934] called the aesthetic experience "dynamic" because it "takes time to complete...because it is a growth. There is inception, development, fulfillment" [p. 55].

As described previously, as a "consummatory experience" this aesthetic experience is not merely the conclusion, but is the
anticipation of the end or climax, "recurrently savored with special intensity" throughout the total experience. Just as the lover may savor the sensual vibrancy of each second in the sexual act as a "felt" anticipation of the ultimate climax, the performer may live each sensuous moment during his movement as an anticipation of the rich sensual quality to come in the successful completion of his movement. Each moment is sensually enriched by the anticipated end.

This consummation or climax of a total bodily experience in sport has been described as reaching the intensity of a sexual orgasm. Billie Jean King described this sensual experience of consummation that accompanies the completion of a perfect shot. She exclaimed:

My heart pounds, my eyes get damp, and my ears feel like they're wiggling, but it's also just totally peaceful. It's almost like having an orgasm--it's exactly like that [Lipsyte, 1975, p. 280].

Sport offers endless opportunities for this consummatory, climactic experience of sensual vibrancy: the cool, tingling exhilaration as the diver's body opens up to neatly cut the water's surface after somersaulting freely through the air; the feeling of an artist's perfection as the skier carves his own unique path through the cool virgin powder on an empty mountainside; the feeling of ultimate awareness and control of every muscle of her body as the gymnast dismounts from the unevens, adding the final expression to her performance and; the climactic vision of the vast expanse at one's feet upon reaching the top of the mountain, transforming all the pain and exhaustion into exhilaration and a total bodily
During each of these movement activities the phenomenally subjective sensations of the diver, the skier, the gymnast and the climber are experienced as a "flow of feeling" and given coherence by the athlete's anticipations of that final climactic moment or consummation. In other words, intentional bodily movement toward a goal can give continuity to successive moments of sensuous perception. As each moment anticipates the future and the anticipated future unifies the successive sensuous moments into one temporal whole, the performer experiences duration.

Duration is not an experience of each instant apprehended as a separate, discrete unit of the succession "before," "now," and "after;" rather, duration is experienced as a flow of time from past to future. The body is, thus, temporally lived as a synthesis of past, present and future as it organizes a continuous flow of sensations, experienced over time, into a final moment of consummation or fulfillment.

Temporal Unity: The "Eternal Moment"

The experience of temporal unity is often intensified as one's sense of duration is interrupted or suspended in what can be called an "eternal moment." Describing a final attempt to score in a "heated" basketball game, an athlete wrote, "I was up in the air and could stay there forever. Time stood still. I could feel every muscle, every last blood vessel, every drop of sweat." A skin diver added, "The present surrounds you. It presses against every inch of
your body." Immersed in the full sensuality of that moment the athlete's normal experience of duration is suspended. The present is no longer an infinitesimal point, a moment so instantaneous that its meaning is impossible to grasp; but it is an expanded moment that seems to last forever, allowing one to indulge and rejoice in the full sensual richness of every detail.

Sheets [1966] claimed that in the duration experience one is implicitly aware of self "as past, present and future, in the mode of not being any one of these at any given moment" [p. 17, 18]. However, the writer suggests that in the "eternal moment," the performer is implicitly aware of self as a unity of past, present and future, in the mode of being all of these at that given instant. In other words, this moment is not experienced as either one's past or one's present or one's future, but as a synthesis of these three dimensions into one experiential unity. The performer apprehends himself as a complete temporal being existing fully in the given moment.

Sheets [1966], interpreting Sartre's phenomenological elucidation of time, described man's experience of the present as a "flight which projects him into his future." Man "is his present in the mode of not being fixed in the instant" [p. 16]. He is "always at a distance from himself, always in flight" [p. 17]. Contrarily, the writer contends that in an experience of an "eternal moment," the performer is not "in flight," for there is nothing beyond what he is. He is fixed in the instant as he experiences his body as perfect and complete in itself. Similar to Maslow's "fusion of fact and value," everything is as it should be. The performer
is at that moment all that he desires to be. His body, as his facticity and his possibility in the world, is pre-reflectively and immediately grasped in this single moment of temporal unity.

One might say that in this "eternal moment" the performer "feels" the completion or perfection of the future in the present moment. A former high school quarterback, reporting a particularly vivid experience, claimed

I sensed that I was floating through the air for an endless amount of time and I felt the ball in my receiver's hands before I released it. I knew everything was right before it happened. I could feel it.

Summary

Aesthetic experience was characterized in Chapter II as an immediate experience of one's full sensuality in the present moment; the present moment being felt as a synthesis of past, present and future. The writer suggests that the performer/athlete's body as it is temporally unified can be clearly revealed to him in the movement/sport experience. Manifested in the sensually intense experience of consummation and/or in the sensually vivid experience of the "eternal moment," consciousness of his temporal unity enhances the performer's aesthetic experience of his body.

Rhythmic Form: A Spatio-Temporal Totality

The experience of one's body in graceful flowing motion captures the unity of one's movement in space and time. As the body moves it unifies the "here" and the "there" of location and the past, present and future into rhythmic form. Langer [1957] proposed that a "rhythmic pattern arises whenever the completion of one event
appears as the beginning of another" [p. 51]. She clarified an "event" to be "a change in the world having a beginning and a completion" [p. 50]. Thus, it has duration. In movement the performer/athlete does not experience each discrete point in space, each distinct instant in time, as the beginning of the next point, the next instant. Rather, he experiences the flow of sensuous events. For example, the completion of each breath is the beginning of the next, each step the beginning of the next, each movement the beginning of the next.

The word, "rhythm," is said to have originated from the Greek word meaning "to flow" [Gates, 1968, p. 109]. A collegiate field hockey player described her experience of "flow."

When I begin to master a skill for the first time my body seems to flow. It is as though all my movements are synchronized with one another and work as a unit and almost become one. My movements aren't jerky anymore. They have a rhythm.

And consistent with Langer's definition of rhythm, a tennis player characterized the rhythm of her serve as a pendulum. The completion of her backswing is experienced as the beginning of her foreshwing. She wrote

I coil my body up like a snake low and back. My arm and racket swinging back loosely and flowing forward through space like a pendulum returning. I feel my body uncoiling, floating forward and up.

One could say that each sensuous event flows into the next as it is organically and functionally related to the next. Lived time and lived space are harmoniously synchronized into one spatio-temporal totality as the performer experiences his body as a "pattern of changes," a "form of motion."
H'Doubler [1940] described rhythm as the "primary, fundamental art form" and suggested that it is difficult to define because "its significance is arrived at only by actually experiencing it" [p. 86]. As described above, this experience of rhythm is intrinsically a sensuous experience. Rhythm excites the sense, and the experience of rhythmic form, as an expression of a spatio-temporal totality, enhances the erotic attractiveness of the moving body. No longer struggling to "be there at the right time" the performer delights in the effortlessness of his body as a dynamic rhythmic form. One could say that his body "surrenders" to the rhythm of the experience. To experience this organic flow of movement during a flawless execution or performance is, indeed, to experience beauty incarnated.

Summary

In this chapter the writer has examined how consciousness exists (lives) its body during the aesthetic perception of one's own body in movement. The writer has suggested that an aesthetic experience of one's own body in movement is an experience of beauty incarnated. Beauty, previously defined as "an integral unity of a multitude," is manifested in one's body as it is spatially and temporally unified as a dynamic rhythmic form.

Unity in spatiality has been characterized as an experience of intersensory-unity, total body perception (kinesthetic and tactile as well as visual sensory perception); an experience of the unity of consciousness-body, body-subject and the realization that "I am my
body," and an experience of oneness of body with the world. Unity in temporality has been described as an experience of consummation and an experience of an "eternal moment."

The writer has further suggested that a sensuously rich rhythmic quality characterizes an experience of the body as a spatio-temporal totality. The perception of the moving body as a rhythmic form is an experience of a flow of sensuous events.

Beauty incarnated is, thus, a "felt" beauty. A diver exclaimed, "I had hit every dive with perfect form and timing. I felt so confident I could feel the 'beauty' of my performance radiating from within." And she added

When I came down on the board, my balance was flawless. With all my strength, I reached up toward the clouds, I was freely suspended in the air. This is the ultimate moment--the feeling of power that nothing can stop you from creating a beautiful, beautiful feeling that's all yours.

This "feeling" of beauty has been characterized as a pleasantly sensuous feeling of effortlessness. The performer "surrenders" to the rhythm of the experience. A tennis player described it this way:

I am moving in slow motion, feeling the relaxed muscles in my body work, feeling only my body. No longer am I hitting the ball. I am art, poetry. Swinging loose and free, exploding as I hit the ball. My body coiling and springing up; floating. No pressure, only slight tension in my shoulder and the quick whip as my arm cracks the ball.

A collegiate miler described his body as a work of art when he feels this effortlessness. He reflected, "I see my body as a work of art when I break through the threshold of pain and get an
airy lightness, a floating feeling." He further suggested that this effortlessness, relaxed feeling is accompanied by a heightened or sharpened sensitivity to minute sensuous detail when he wrote:

It was an inner peace, a world of complete calmness. Relaxation was to the point where I could feel my eye lashes bounce shut on each stride. My even breathing, and my heart beat seemed to act as a willing time piece for my whole body.

A national caliber competitor in swimming characterized her feeling of beauty as a "tranquil flow of energy."

If I've had a bad day or my times aren't up to par, I can feel my muscles struggle and gruel. Afterwards, I ache all over....But if I have an exceptional race I can hardly feel the pain and I recover much quicker. It seems as if there is a tremendous flow of energy going through my body in races like that and its a tranquil flow rather than surging. Its beautiful.

She seem to connect a feeling of power with this effortlessness. A collegiate cross-country runner expressed the aesthetic experience of his body as a combination of this sense of effortlessness and power when he said, "It's so easy...no pain...just a feeling of powerfulness. I'm unstoppable." And another collegiate swimmer explained how she experienced these qualities as she visualized her body as that of a highly skilled swimmer. She claimed, "When I imagine a highly skilled swimmer, I feel powerful, yet I feel like I'm just gliding along without using a lot of energy."

This effortless flow of sensuous events into rhythmic form is commonly perceived as a quality of gracefulness. Describing Russian pairs skaters performing the overhead extension lift, a young skater wrote, "They make it look so easy. I can feel their grace." The nationally competitive swimmer, who described her
exceptional performance as experiences of a "tremendous" yet "tranquil" flow of energy, further characterized her aesthetic experience of her body in these races as an experience of grace. She explained, "I experience my body aesthetically in my best races. They have had a smooth and graceful quality that I feel. That gives them beauty."

The writer requotes Clark's [1956] description of the fifth century, B.C., nude: "Majesty is not lost, and the body is firm and muscular, but the overwhelming impression is one of grace and of a gentle sweetness" [p. 45]. It is evident that the Greek ideal of beauty of the human form, embodied in the delicate balance of a full range of sensuous qualities, has survived today. The "firm and muscular" balanced by the "gentle and sweet;" the powerful tempered by the graceful, characterizes that "indestructable image" of perfection expressed first in the fifth century, B.C., nude. In the performer's perception of his own body as a work of art this "indestructable image" survives not only as a visual image, but also as a felt image. His body is experienced as beauty incarnated when he feels this delicate balance of sensuous qualities, when he experiences his body as an "integral unity of a multitude of sensuous qualities."

A synchronized swimmer beautifully expressed the sense of beauty she found in this "indestructable image" when she exclaimed

What other physical object is more pleasing to all of our senses than the human body? What is more soft (or hard), plush, curvey, symmetrical, sensuous and absolutely fascinating!!!
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1 See definition of "sensual" on page eight, Chapter I.

2 See Chapter II, page 18, for a discussion of the concept of beauty as it has been used in aesthetic theory and as it is defined in this thesis.

3 The aesthetic experience of one's body as immediate symbol of certain existential meanings is examined in Chapter V, "The Body Aesthetic: A Symbolic Experience."

4 Susanne Langer [1957] used the phrase "dynamic form" in her theory of art to refer to "forms of motion." This concept is developed further in this chapter in a consideration of the spatiality and temporality of one's body as it is aesthetically perceived.

5 The body-for-itself is Sartre's term for the lived, body-subject, experienced pre-reflectively in the first dimension. His ontology is explored further in this chapter in a discussion of the body perceived as a dynamic form.

6 See discussion of distinction between "higher" and "lower" senses in Chapter II, page 37.

7 See Chapter II, under "Unity in Spatiality" for a discussion of "living form."

8 Sartre contended that when I attempt to apprehend my own body I act as "Other" and the way I view it is, therefore, limited by Sartre's "being-for-the-other," which is characterized as a subject-object relation or an object-subject relation. A subject-subject relation is not possible in his ontology. Therefore, in the attempt to apprehend my body, according to Sartre, I necessarily view it as object.

9 See Chapter VI, "Summary, Implications for Teaching and Coaching and Recommendations for Further Research," for discussion of the concept of alienation as it pertains to one's experience of one's own body.

11 See Chapter VI for an indictment of the perpetuation of contempt for and alienation from the body in traditional methods of teaching and coaching.

12 Sarano [1966] used the term, "entity," to describe the body-subject in contrast to the body as a "thing."

13 See discussion of Dewey's consummatory experience, Chapter II, under "Unity in Temporality."

14 See Chapter II, under "Unity in Temporality," for a discussion of Dewey's consummatory experience as characterized by a "flow of feelings" or a unity of one's affective responses during an aesthetic experience.


16 The concept of dynamic form as a "form of motion" is borrowed from S. Langer, Problems of Art, 1957.
CHAPTER IV

THE BODY AS SYMBOL


The writer has suggested that the experience of the body in movement as a dynamic rhythmic form is an experience of beauty incarnated, and she has further contended that the perception of this dynamic rhythmic form is a function of the total body acting as a synergetic unity. This chapter, along with Chapter V, "The Body Aesthetic: A Symbolic Experience," is an exploration of the contention that the body perceived as a dynamic rhythmic form can also function as a symbol of certain existential meanings in the world; and that this function as symbol enhances the aesthetic perception of one's body in movement/sport.

Berleant [1970] and other experiential theorists have accused traditional aestheticians of distorting aesthetic experience by attempting to explain its essential feature as a function of "cognitive" (reflective) consciousness, resulting in "surrogate theories" that interpret art as minesis, as a means of expression, symbolism, or as a language for communication, rather than as a genuine theory of aesthetic experience. These surrogate theories "interpret the experience of art as ultimately referential, as being
It is not the intent of the writer to characterize aesthetic experience of one's body as "ultimately referential" or as a reflectively analytic experience. As described previously in Chapter II, aesthetic experience is non-discursively and intuitively grasped. Contrary to Berleant, the writer recognizes expression and symbolism as possible aesthetic experiences. However, this expression and symbolism are founded in the sensuous and non-discursive immediacy of a pre-reflective realm of consciousness.

Although Berleant has restricted the functioning of the symbol to the reflective consciousness, Phenix [1964], following Langer's theory of art, has suggested the existence of non-discursive symbolism occurring in the "presentational immediacy" of a non-analytic consciousness. The writer will examine the validity of such a concept and will explore the role of non-discursive symbolism in the pre-reflective experience of one's body as a work of art.

The Non-Discursive Symbol

The writer adopts Langer's [1957] use of the term, symbol, as a "formulation" or "articulation" of meaning. Meaning is conceived by this writer as the recognized relationship or pattern of relationship between: (1) two or more perceptual forms; (2) a perceptual form and some idea or conception; or (3) two or more ideas or conceptions.

The writer recognizes both the immediate, pre-reflective and the secondary, reflective realms of consciousness as sources of
meaning; that is, meaning is available to the experiencer prior to reflection as immediately grasped awarenesses or insights and during or following reflective inquiry as verbally explicit relationships. A symbol, then, as a formulation of meaning, exists as a pre-reflective presentation of meaning, as well as a reflective representation of certain logical concepts, relationships or abstractions.

The writer previously characterized aesthetic experience as an intuitive grasp of form. As such, it is both pre-reflectively immediate and non-discursive in nature in contrast to the discursive activities of analysis and synthesis that are largely reflective in nature. Consequently, in this explication of the Body Aesthetic the writer is concerned primarily with the symbol as a pre-reflective presentation of meaning, particularly as it formulates the relationship between a perceptual form(s) (example, a kinesthetically perceived form) and some idea or conception such as freedom, perfection or oneness.

"Felt" Meaning and Presentational Immediacy

Metheny [1965] contended that "any sensory experience may be transformed into an abstraction which is an idea of the experience because that is the way the human mind functions" [p. 113]. But these "abstractions" or "ideas of the experience" are not necessarily reflective in nature nor products of a discursive symbolism. In aesthetic perception of one's body these meanings are immediately "felt" as they are intrinsically bound up with the sensuous experience
of the body as a dynamic rhythmic form.

Roberts [1975] clarified "apperception" as concerned with "the intrinsic, formal features of the object or event under perception, that is, its lines, movements and proportions" [p. 100]; and he defined "expression" as "involved with the extrinsic nonformal ideas or emotions thought or felt in association with the perceived object or event" [p. 100]. He suggested that expression and apperception are distinctly separate events. Contrary to Roberts, the writer submits that expression and apperception are not necessarily separate and distinct events; that the meanings expressed in the perception of a work of art as an expressive form are not extrinsic to that perception, but are inseparably tied to it and immediately presented in it.

Langer [1957] discussed the non-discursive symbol in which meaning is implicit in the symbolic form itself and is grasped pre-reflectively. Speaking of a work of art as a non-discursive symbolic form, Langer suggested that the meaning that a particular work of art "expresses" seems to the beholder to be directly contained in it....The confluence is so striking that symbol and meaning appear as one reality" [p. 26]; that is, the perceiver "has difficulty distinguishing the symbolic expressive form from what it conveys" [p. 20].

The term, "symbol," is commonly used to denote something which "stands for" something else; something that represents something else. Something that is literally symbolic refers to a concept or idea that is external or separate from the actual symbol. A work of art as non-discursive symbol in Langer's theory is unlike this literal,
referential symbol in that it presents rather than represents meaning; not referring or "pointing beyond itself so that one's thought passes on to the concept symbolized." Rather, the idea "remains bound up in the form that makes it conceivable" [Langer, 1957, p. 67].

Langer [1957] admitted that her art symbol is not a symbol in the familiar sense. She explained that it is a symbol in a "special and derivative sense....It formulates and objectifies experience for direct intellectual perception, or intuition, but it does not abstract a concept for discursive thought" [p. 139]. Pre-reflective meaning, or as Langer calls it, "vital import," inheres in the total symbolic form. This formulation or expression of pre-reflective meaning is not a product of a discursive "symbolism" or conventional system of symbols; that is, meaning expressed in art form is not "built up" in a logically discursive fashion. It is, rather, a single intuitive grasp of "total import." In other words, a work of art, as a non-discursive symbolic form, presents meanings in a unitary vision such that they are grasped all at once, rather than unfolding in a sequential and logical order. Rader [1960] interpreted Arnheim's work in Gestalt psychology, describing the "expressiveness" of an art form as "intrinsic to the integrated structure of the whole," rather than "attained by adding up isolated parts and combining associated ideas and feelings with sensory data" [p. 240].

Aesthetic meaning is not, then, mediately represented in the art form as a symbol, but is immediately presented in sensuously concrete perception. Through the non-discursive symbolic form the
perceiver comes to "feel" rather than "know"\[5\] [Langer, 1957, p. 34]
the subjective side of existence that cannot be formulated in logical or discursive processes. In Langer's words, this subjective meaning or

...vital import is the element of felt life objectified in the work [of art]...[and] made amenable to our understanding. In this way and in no other essential way, a work of art is a symbol [1957, p. 60].

Berleant [1970] criticized Langer's use of the term "symbol," in her theory of art. His criticism rests upon his two assumptions that: (1) symbol is necessarily a product of cognitively reflective consciousness and (2) the experience of art (aesthetic experience) is a non-cognitive\[6\] experience. He concluded, then, that aesthetic experience is necessarily non-symbolic; and that any theory which purports to explain aesthetic experience as a symbolic experience is merely a surrogate theory.

The writer has already suggested that aesthetic experience is, indeed, a "cognitive" experience,\[7\] though it is non-reflective in nature in the sense of being intuitively grasped without discursive reasoning nor the benefit of logic. Though Berleant did not recognize the conception of a non-discursive symbol, and though he decried Langer's use of "symbol" to describe the direct, non-reflective presentation of vital import, he actually spoke of the same idea of presentational immediacy characterizing a work of art. He wrote
The symbol functions aesthetically, not as an intellectual object which facilitates the analysis of meaning, but as a vehicle for the direct perception of an identity between it and the object symbolized. When we apprehend this identity with intuitive immediacy, the symbol has been employed successfully [p. 131].

And he further added

In its artistic use, however, the symbol becomes more like a substitute, a replacement for its referent. As such it is self-sufficient and thus actually no longer a symbol [p. 131].

Admittedly, Langer's use of the term, "symbol," is a curious one, as she has stipulated a definition which varies considerably from its common usage. However, if we understand her intent and how she was using the term, there is no reason for criticism. She was merely saying that a work of art as a non-discursive expressive form presents meaning (vital import) differently than do other literally discursive symbolic forms, such as language and mathematics.

Whether the work of art is called a "vehicle," a "substitute" or "replacement," or a "symbolic form," the fact remains that it directly presents a meaning to the percipient without referring to something outside itself. The art symbol thus has experiential relevance rather than referential relevance. Meaning is grasped in the direct experiential engagement of the art symbol.

Though the writer accepts Langer's non-discursive symbolic form, this does not imply that she adopts Langer's entire theory of art to explain the Body Aesthetic. Bufford [1972], analyzing Langer's theory, concluded that it is essentially two theories: (1) an "Expression Theory" and (2) a "Perceivability Theory." Characterized as and "Expression Theory," Langer's theory describes works of
art as "expressions of human feelings in a sensuous form that presents them for our perception and contemplation" [Bufford, 1972, p. 9]. Necessarily implied here is the contention that a work of art is the product of an intentional expression of the artist's feelings. However, the writer contends that a work of art may be created and perceived and may immediately symbolize various existential meanings to the performer/athlete, regardless of whether the performer intended to express these particular feelings or meanings.

In lieu of viewing Langer's theory as an "Expression Theory," the writer finds Bufford's second interpretation of her theory, a "Perceivability Theory," much more conducive and helpful to an explication of the performer's aesthetic experience of his moving body as an immediate symbol of certain existential meanings in the world. Characterized as a "Perceivability Theory," Langer's theory of art claims that works of art are forms which "make more perceivable to us aspects of either the world around us or our own experience" [Bufford, 1972, p. 10]. In other words, a work of art provides us with a heightened awareness and increased perceptive sensitivity to "what we are ordinarily only dimly aware of" [p. 19].

Thus, it may be said that the moving body experienced as a work of art may give clarity or make more perceptible certain meanings. These meanings are directly symbolized or expressed in the moving body. The term, "expression" is not used by this writer in the sense of intentional expression of a particular feeling or meaning for the purpose of communication (in the sense of Langer's "Expression Theory"). Sarano [1966], speaking of the "richness" of
the word, "express," described it first in terms of

...extracting...of showing on the outside that
which is hidden, of rendering present that which is
still absent, inaccessible, ungraspable; and
secondly in terms of communicating a message to
someone [p. 91].

To say that the moving body as a dynamic symbolic form expresses
certain existential meanings is to say in this thesis that it makes
those meanings more accessible, graspable, more perceptible to the
mover himself.

Though the sporting intention in certain subjectively judged,
body oriented sports, such as gymnastics and figure-skating, is
primarily the production of aesthetically appealing form, with
attention to expressive qualities, the sporting intentions of other
objectively scored, external goal-oriented sports, such as basketball
and football, do not include a primary concern for aesthetic form or
expressiveness. The writer is not here concerned with this expression
in the sense of communicating to a judge or audience, but rather,
with meanings made more perceptible to the performer in his perform­
ance. In this sense the writer does not distinguish between those
subjectively judged, body-oriented sports and objectively scored
external goal-oriented sports such as football and basketball.
Meanings symbolized or expressed in the moving body are available to
the athlete in these sports as well as in the former. The sporting
intention in these sports does not necessarily preclude an aesthetic
experience or formulation of meaning that may be quite incidental
to that intention.
Langer [1957] characterized a work of art or an expressive form as "a created sensuous symbol" [p. 46]. Similarly, the body as a dynamic rhythmic form can be described as a "sensuous symbol." In other words, meanings evolve from, or are symbolized in, the body as it is sensuously experienced. Meaning inheres in the experiential phenomenal qualities of the moving body. To say that meanings obtain directly in the sensuous perception of the qualitative dimensions of one's moving body is not to deny that meanings associated with quantitative aspects, such as scoring, winning or other instrumental products of one's movement, are found in sport. Meanings may be associated with the moving body quite independent of the sensuous feeling qualities of the movement; that is, the athlete may bring certain meanings to the sport situation, and by mere association these meanings may become identified with one's bodily being in sport. But meanings are experienced in sport not only through the process of association, but also through direct presentation in the sensuous, dynamic qualities of the moving body. Pre-reflective consciousness of these meanings comes through a total body awareness of the varying qualities of force, time, space and flow; and these meanings found in the sensuous perception of one's body as a dynamic rhythmic form are valuable in their own right.

One can say that the performer feels these meanings as they...

...arise from felt tensions and rhythms of the organism itself, without objectification in any non-human thing.10 Thus the meanings...communicated are, so to speak, flesh of our flesh and bone of our bone [Phenix, 1964, p. 167].
In this sense, the moving body as a symbol can be said to be a "felt" symbol.

Much support is given to this conception of a formulation of pre-reflective, bodily or "felt" meaning in both philosophical and psychological literature. Nietzsche [1961] wrote, "There is more reason in your body than in your best wisdom" and he spoke of the body as "an unknown sage" [p. 62]. Barkan [1975], in his characterization of the human body as "Natures Work of Art," referred to it as "simultaneously abstract and concrete" [p. 5]. Sarano [1966] described "the immediate intelligence of the body" as "a 'reasoning' that is immediate, implicit and lived, included in the body itself" [p. 87]. He further suggested that there exists an "implicit language" that "radiates directly from our body" [p. 120] without the intermediacy of conventional or discursive symbolism.

In the aesthetic perception of one's body, the form, proportions, line and effort qualities of the moving body compose this "implicit language," as meanings are formulated (articulated) in the presentational directness of aesthetic perception. Berleant [1970] suggested that when aesthetic perception is "successfully connected with ideas," it "brings us back to the noncognitive [meaning non-reflective] perceptual root of our concepts and...it evokes the sensory significance of ideas" [p. 132].

There is something of import to be found at this pre-reflective level of primary sensuous experience. However, the importance of this primary (immediate) experience of one's body lies not only in its function as a starting point for reflective inquiry
or a source of data for an analysis of the experience. This immediate sensuous experience of one's body as an expressive form is intrinsically valuable in itself as it makes more perceptible the meanings of one's immediate presence as a bodily-being-in-the-world.\(^{12}\)

Langer [1957] contended that the Art Symbol\(^{13}\) fulfills the "prime office of symbols," though one which is overlooked in the usual definition of symbol as that which stands for something else or refers to something apart from itself. And that office is its "power of formulating" subjective experience, "the character of so-called 'inner-life'" [p. 133] as something imaginable in the first place. It is the power of articulating the vital import (pre-reflective meanings) of that rich portion of existence that is, in the beginning, untouchable by discursive symbolism. Langer [1957] wrote

> The actual felt process of life, the tensions interwoven and shifting from moment to moment, the flowing and slowing, the drive and directedness of desires, and above all the rhythmic continuity of our selfhood...cannot be rendered linguistically.

> A work of art is an expressive form, and vitality, in all its manifestations from sheer sensibility to the most elaborate phases of awareness and emotion, is what it may express [p. 133].

Similarly, one's body perceived aesthetically as an expressive form formulates one's subjective, lived movement experience, transforming sensuous perception, that defies complete discursive articulation, into meaningful conception. Just how these conceptions or meanings are formulated at the pre-reflective level from sensuous percept is far from clear in spite of years of research on the nature of perception and symbolic transformation. Rugg [1962]
characterized this process by which "stimuli arouse signals in the nervous system which are transformed into...symbols of meaning," as the greatest "mystery" in creative imagination; a mystery that lies at the heart of the "unsolved problem of meaning" [p. 101].

Referring to this meaning as "felt thought" grounded in a "non-verbal gestural symbolism" [p. 242], he emphasized the "bodily beginnings" of this "flash of insight" or meaning. He presented evidence to support the principle of "ideomotor action" which states that "an idea can produce specific patterns of muscular response" [p. 147]. In other words, an idea is felt; imagined conception is grounded in one's physiology.

Murphy [1947], discussing the individuality of a creative work, suggested that a conception is felt in terms of "organic and kinesthetic sensations" [p. 410]. It can be said that the conception or meaning inheres in certain phenomenal qualities of one's sensuous perception. The meanings found in these experiential qualities of the moving body are, so to speak, "fused with the vital force of biological consciousness" [Berleant, 1970, p. 132]. And it is in this fusion that they have a significant impact on the performer.

We have seen that to the fifth century, B.C., Greek, the human body immediately and clearly symbolized man's wholeness and perfection, and that the nudes of the Greek athlete embodied such values as balance, proportion, modesty, dedication, energy and love [Clark, 1956]. Today, the human form of the twentieth century athlete is not without this symbolic function. And though the same philosophic commitment to man's wholeness (unity of mind-body-soul),
expressed in the dignity and the beauty of human form, is threatened in the all too frequently mechanistic and, at times, brutal treatment of the human body in twentieth century sport; such meanings as perfection, and wholeness and oneness are available to the athlete in his bodily-being-in-sport. These are existential meanings, not metaphysical concepts. They are lived in the body; apprehended in a personally embodied way. They are not abstract and intangible, but concretely familiar and immediately felt as somatic and sensuous realities.

Though this flash of meaning is characterized as an intuitive, immediate and non-discursive process of discovery, the meaning itself does not necessarily fully elude discursive explication. The performer who perceives his body as a dynamic symbolic form may immediately and non-discursively grasp certain existential meanings in an intuitive fashion, but these meanings may then be available to him for further reflection and discursive representation.

This distinction between the intuitive formulation of meaning in direct experience and the logically discursive representation of that meaning in reflective inquiry and verification is expressed by Rugg [1963]. He characterized the former as an intuitive "act of discovery" or "concept-formation" as distinct from the latter "process of verification" which is the "use of a concept" [p. 76].

Though the moving body as a work of art expresses meaning in its own form, and the experience cannot be exactly translated to any other form, some clues to the meanings available may be obtained in reflection and shared in discursive fashion. These
pre-reflective meanings, which are formulations of first conceptions of one's subjective existence, may gain an enriched and expanded force through reflective inquiry\textsuperscript{14} and then may be turned back to a subsequent sensuous experience to inform and enhance the total perceptual effect or qualitative nature of that movement experience.

The writer is not suggesting that those meanings that are pre-reflectively grasped in the sensuous experience of one's moving body are conceived for the first time by the performer. The movement experience does not necessarily provide the performer with his first apprehension of these meanings, but it may provide the first conception of these meanings as they are immediately and vividly relevant to his existence or bodily being-in-the-world. For example, such abstract concepts as freedom, perfection and unity may be transformed into personally meaningful self-definitions through their immediate expression in the moving body as a dynamic sensuous form.

The following chapter is a reflective examination of those "flashes of meaning:"

1. That have been non-discursively presented to the writer in her perception of her body as a dynamic rhythmic form, and

2. That have been alluded to in athletes' descriptions of their encounters in particular sport situations.\textsuperscript{15}
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1 A perceptual form as it has been used in this thesis can be defined as an immediate organization of sensory stimuli into a patterned whole.

2 The writer adopts an existential phenomenological view in contrast to a Deweyan or pragmatic epistemology which defines meaning as a product of reflective experience only.

3 Langer referred to meaning in the Deweyan or pragmatic sense; that is, meaning is a product of reflective consciousness only. Therefore, she preferred the phrase, "vital import," to refer to that which is "expressed" in a work of art. However, her use of this phrase is synonymous with the writer's conception of pre-reflective meaning, and, therefore, will be used interchangeably with the latter in this text.

4 Langer used the terms, "symbolize," "express," "formulate," and "present" synonymously in her discussion of the Art Symbol. What the Art Symbol expresses or presents is "vital import" or "feeling," synonymous with the writer's conception of pre-reflective meaning. Langer defined "feeling" to mean in the broadest sense "everything that can be felt, from physical sensation, pain and comfort, excitement and repose, to the most complex emotions, intellectual tensions, or the steady feeling tones of a conscious human life" [1957, p. 15]. Although her definition of "feeling is a particularly broad and inclusive one, the writer suggests that her intent was to describe or refer to the immediate and primary "felt" life in contrast to secondary and reflective experience.

5 Following the Deweyan (pragmatic) notion of knowledge, "know" here is used by Langer as the product of reflection inquiry or logical thought processes.

6 As explained previously in Chapter II, Berleant used the term, "cognitive," to refer exclusively to reflective, discursive cognition with no reference to right hemisphere intuitive cognition.

7 See Chapter II for an explanation of aesthetic experience as a cognitive experience; that is, as a possible function of right hemisphere functioning or intuitive thought.
Berleant also adopted the Deweyan notion of the word, "meaning" as a product of reflective consciousness. And yet, he later suggested that there is something about meaning that exists prior to reflection when he wrote, "Aesthetic experience, because it is pre-logical, concerns the human perceptual experience of meaning rather than its cognitive [reflective] apprehension" [1970, p. 135].

Langer chose the phrase, "expressive form," in lieu of Clive Bell's term, "significant form," because in her theory, a work of art as Art Symbol is not a "sign" that points to a meaning beyond its own presence, but is rather a direct presentation or articulation of feeling or vital import in the form itself [1957, p. 134].

Perhaps it is more appropriate to say that these meanings are "embodied" rather than "expressed."

The reader is referred to the writer's explication of Merleau-Ponty's "body intentionality" in Chapter II.

This phrase, "bodily-being-in-the-world," refers here to one's lived body or body-subject as Merleau-Ponty conceived it.

Langer capitalized this phrase, "Art Symbol," to distinguish it from the symbol as it is commonly used in discursive language.

Dewey spoke of the "primary" and the "ultimacy" of immediate experience; the primary experience being a gross, inchoate experience, the source of data for reflective inquiry and ultimate experience being that experience to which the products of reflection have been returned and find their verification. For his discussion of the role of reflection in relation to immediate experience, see Dewey's Experience and Nature, 1925.

H'Doubler [1940] also supported this idea of the referential quality of immediate experience when she wrote, "The feelings [meanings] that accompany an activity are mental states that become recorded in the sentient being for future reference" [p. 117].

The objective of the writer is to identify and begin to elucidate some meanings that may be symbolized in one's moving body, not to assert that the meanings described are the only meanings available to the athlete nor that each of the identified meanings will necessarily be pre-reflectively experienced by every athlete who participates. It is only to assert that these meanings have been and may be symbolized in one's bodily experience in sport.
CHAPTER V

THE BODY AESTHETIC: A SYMBOLIC EXPERIENCE

In Chapter IV the writer characterized the work of art as a non-discursive symbol that presents meaning in the sensuous immediacy of perception; and she further suggested that the body experienced in sport as a dynamic rhythmic form may function as such a non-discursive and sensuous symbol expressing (making more perceptible to the performer) certain existential meanings. This chapter will examine some of these "felt" meanings; specifically, pure possibility and freedom, identity, oneness, and perfection, as they are pre-reflectively and sensuously lived in the sport experience.

The Body: Symbol of Pure Possibility and Freedom

Of stature tall and straightly fashioned,
Like his desire, lift upwards and divine.

[Barkan, 1975, p. 35]

The athlete's body perceived as a work of art may be an immediate and direct symbol of his possibility of being. In his personal bodily engagement with his medium the athlete may discover not only his finiteness, his maladroitness, his limitations; but also his vastness, his possibilities, his grandeur. In sport the
athlete finds the opportunity to transcend old limits, to reach into previously and unfelt virgin realms of physical performance and sensation to rejoice in a revelation of new limits; to make yesterday's "impossible" today's possibility.

The athlete's experience of his body as an expression of his possibility of being is not conceived here as a mere rational formulation of some ideal performance or speculation about what might be in the future. Such experience of possibility, as Kierkegaard clearly saw, "must always remain unpresent--and in this sense, unrealized-possibility" [Fallico, 1962, pp. 24-25]. Rather, in this discussion of the body as a work of art, the experience of the athlete's body as possibility of being is conceived as an experience of realized-possibility, possibility felt in the immediate presence of the movement experience in which the athlete extends his outer limits of physical capability or performance.

He experiences for a moment, though it may be quite transient and fleeting, the feeling of a newly created realm of action. In that moment, he has created, and may perceive, his body in time and space as a dynamic rhythmic form that is complete in itself as a definition of his possibility. Felt possibility is fully and directly realized as his bodily presence, and in this moment possibility is transformed into heightened reality. But the experience is neither permanent nor is it guaranteed to occur in the future. It remains forever as a possibility for him to reach again. One "taste" of it invites him to seek it again and to extend its boundaries beyond its present definition. And though the actual
experience vanishes with the moment, the body remains as the constant reminder, the enduring symbol of that realm of felt possibility. The athlete can repeatedly call forth the feelings of that newly discovered realm of experience and relive the dynamic form of the experience registered in his kinesthetic sensorium.

Fallico [1962], in his existential interpretation of the art object, contended, "In the art-object, the envisioned possibility is so fully realized that it is made as present as existence itself" [p. 25]. Similarly, in the body experienced as a dynamic rhythmic form, envisioned possibility may be "made as present as existence itself."

The athlete's body immediately and directly presents possibility of being to him. He cannot forget that he has reached certain heights and transcended certain limits, that he is a "possible self" in a "possible world." His body reveals more to him than his finitude. It is an everpresent reminder that he is not bound by his current levels of performance or physiological condition; that he is free to pursue and extend his own limits and, if his vision allows, to scale the heights of human athletic endeavor.

To perceive one's body as possibility is to approach Nietzsche's vision of the Overman, adopting a philosophy of action and "throwing oneself into life in a grand fashion" [Shvartz, 1972, p. 185]. It is to view one's body as the incarnation of energy and vitality, a symbol of vigor and resolution; to be supremely confident in the power of one's physical capabilities and one's freedom to exert that power. Describing Nietzsche's philosophy,
Shvartz [1972] wrote:

This is humanism in its extreme, a doctrine of action, a refusal to surrender to human weaknesses and falsely human institutions, a call for excellence in every aspect of human endeavor [p. 184].

In Sartre's terms, man is, so to speak, "condemned to freedom," and to perceive one's body as possibility is not to deny this freedom, but to fully acknowledge it. It is this sense of freedom, therefore, that is inextricably tied to the athlete's experience of his body as the direct presentation of his possibility in the world. He may experience this sense of freedom in his mastery of previously unattained levels of skill or in the attainment of increased physiological condition that enables him to control his sport environment. No longer bound by total attention to technique or "how to do" what he is doing, nor concerned with limiting physiological response, the athlete is free to create a new realm of experience, a new space-time relation with his medium; to experience his body as a newly created dynamic form.

This sense of freedom is not limited, however, to the experience of scaling one's heights of performance or achievement. It may be presented to the athlete daily in the sensuous feeling qualities of his movement. On numerous occasions, athletes have reported the exhilarating sensation of freedom during performance, and in most cases these experiences could be described as a momentary feeling of release. Numerous descriptions of the experience of "floating," the sensation of being suspended in flight and the feeling of weightlessness suggest that athletes may momentarily experience a sense of
breaking free or being released from the restrictions of gravity. In that instant the athlete feels as if he is no longer controlled by natural forces. Freedom may be the ecstasy of a weightless descent as the skier flies down the slope barely caressing the virgin powder; or it may be the sense of being suspended in flight. A basketball player stated, "I was just hanging in the air waiting for the right instant to release the ball...I could stay there forever." And a runner described his sense of floating when he wrote, "The gain of 'spring' in your stride, it is flying--between each springing stride you float for an instant, free in the air" [Rohe, 1974].

In addition to this feeling of apparent release from gravity freedom is also experienced sensuously as a freeing of oneself from the conventional, linear perspective of time and space. As the gymnast executes a backhandspring series with increasing speed, he may feel the accelerating rotation as if he could spring infinitely faster, unbound by inertia and the physical limitations of his body mass. Mastery of a movement form may result in a bodily sense of freedom experienced as total immersion in one's sensual presence. Feeling a temporary "emancipation of being," the athlete is freed of utilitarian intentions and concern with what will happen in the future. Rohe [1974] expressed, "I am running free and easy, my breath rolling in, pouring out, entirely present in the now of this experience."

Freedom may also present itself as an experience of sheer unrestricted, spontaneous movement. A skier exclaimed
On a few occasions I've felt spontaneous, unrestricted movement, as if the mountain would adhere to all my actions, turning, whirling, white going past, time is non-existent [Bevilacqua, 1976].

The sense of freedom may eventualize as the athlete breaks through the threshold of pain and reaches second wind. Released from the breathlessness and straining, tight, bounded feeling in his chest he can rejoice in his newly found freedom to continue. The writer reflected upon her experience of second wind:

I love that single instant in the run. It's a refreshing breath, a gift that cleanses and rejuvenates my entire body. It moves down through my center, up my spine, expands my lungs and fans out through my shoulder blades. It fills me with an ecstatically powerful feeling that I could go on forever, defying the physical limits of the human body.

Freedom may be felt during flexibility warm-ups in the sensation of release when breaking through muscular tension and reaching an extended range of motion. This felt freedom is a feeling of "expanse" [Berge, 1975] within the body, an opening up to move without restrictions, a sensation of stretch and of extending one's energy beyond one's physical boundaries. The writer suggests that this feeling of "release" may be a prime incentive to exercise and that it is consciously sought out in many cases. A dancer described her experience:

I absolutely love that sensational feeling of contracting and lengthening. The contraction to that "beautiful bulge"...and the lengthening of fibers into a stream-line, slender tension...squeezing to a tightness with so much tension [and almost pain] that you could burst, but controlling this until you ease out of it into a peaceful relieved state.
Freedom may also be felt in sport as the exhilarating excitement of free expression which is usually preceded by a certain mastery of the movement form. The body freely "expresses" the medium and makes more perceptible to the athlete the sensuous quality of his relationship to that medium. Released from the demands of precedent, the athlete is free to create his own definition and own relation with the world; and his body becomes the expression of his unique style.

The light and new, the relaxed and the elegant can go anywhere. They name their own threshold. The inventive ones no longer are concerned with technique [Summit Films, 1968].

Each man makes his own statement, "his own definition of elegance" [Summit Films, 1968].

In addition to setting the conditions for free expression, mastery brings with it a sense of effortlessness. This effortlessness is experienced not only as ease of movement without restriction, but, in its fullest dimension, it is a sense of a flow of power. It is a fresh revelation of the athlete's physical prowess and finesse as he reaches the heights of physical perfection with seemingly little effort. A sprinter described this combined sense of power and effortlessness when he reflected, "When I am at my peak, I can do anything! There is a feeling that is mostly a surge of energy and elation that spreads over my body and leads me to the finish line. I just let it happen." A collegiate cross-country runner added, "It's so easy...no pain...just a feeling of powerfulness and freedom to go as far as I want. I'm unstoppable."
At the onset of the contest or in the explosion of that first movement, felt freedom may ensue as the sudden release of "butterflies" and built-up tensions that have mounted in those waiting moments before competition. Describing the "moment before," a sprinter wrote:

A flighty feeling inside, starting in my stomach and reaching out to my extremities—Shaking inside with nervousness, flooded with energy with nowhere for it to go, ready to explode....But when the gun sounds, my body is totally released of the binding pressure and I feel strong, fluid and free when I sprint.

His body transforms those pre-performance "butterflies" and tensions into a sense of surging power.

Finally, the bodily experience of freedom may present itself to the risk-taker in sport as he "flirts" with a loss of control, putting himself on the brink of disaster. Describing surfers, Rogin [1965] wrote, "They are looking for the limits of control--the edge where you feel out of control but are really in control" [p. 106]. Exploring the precarious and delicate balance of personal powers and external forces, the surfer, climber, skier, gymnast, diver feels freedom as the energizing exhilaration of being in control of his own destiny; not overcome by external forces such as the harsh coldness of the rock resisting the climber, the relentless pull of gravity against the gymnast or the crashing curl of a giant wave that can literally rip the surfer's board in two.

And yet, to experience this delicate balance of personal and external forces is to know that one's freedom is tempered by certain limits. Though the athlete's body is a direct and enduring
symbol of his freedom, it is at once a lucid reminder of his facticity, his limitations and his condition that he is necessarily in-the-world. The body is, thus, the everpresent image of the constant interplay of freedom and facticity.

Fallico [1962] described the work of art as a work of "pure possibility," that is, it directly presents the sense of possibility "qua possibility, nameless and unincorporated...not divided from, toward, or for-the-sake-of anything" [p. 52-53], supremely indifferent to utilitarian concerns of everyday living. He characterized aesthetic consciousness as a "dreamlike consciousness" that "makes and lives in free possibilities of being, cast in kind of actuality which is indifferent to time, space and even death" [p. 60]. It is a momentary transcendence of the intentional life world to enter a world of "sheer possible being."

Through his body the athlete may feel the presence of infinite possibility. And though this sense of possibility "neither springs from nor is directed at a particular hope or dispair in [his] life experience" [Fallico, 1962, p. 52] (in the sense of being pragmatic utilitarian or a means to another end), it is not created in a totally subjective, dreamlike, unreal world; but it is grounded in his bodily existence or facticity in-the-world. As an experience of pure possibility, it is an intrinsic delight in the possibility of his bodily-being-in-the-world.

It should be emphasized that there is a difference between the body as object or instrument to be used and the body as "pure possibility" in the world. Only when the body is treated and
experienced as a human subjectivity free to structure its own efforts, to deliberately initiate and control its own movement, and to create its own definition and relationship with the world, does an individual come to understand his body as the direct presentational symbol of his possibility in the world. Marcel [1952] expressed, "in the fact of my body there is something which transcends what can be called its materiality, something which cannot be reduced to any of its objective qualities" [p. 315]. This "something" is the embodiment of a conscious intentionality. In Sartre's words, "Consciousness exists its body" [1973, p. 434]; and insofar as I objectify my body "my possibilities are no longer real, but dead possibilities" [Zaner, 1971, p. 82]. If I treat my body as an object to be used in the world of other objects or allow others to use it as an instrument, at that moment, I cannot experience it as a direct expression of my possibility and freedom in the world. The body as it functions symbolically as a work of art, presenting possibility of being, is thus the body-subject, not body-object.

It is through my body that I accept or refuse [the] witness of [my] spirit; from this refusal results the body-object, the body-residue, the non-assumed body. The body is the interpreter, the translator, the revealor, the catalyzer, the spokesman, the herald who proclaims—in short, the body is the symbol of my choice [Sarano, 1966, p. 117].

As symbol of my choice the body is the metaphor of my spirit, my possibility.
The Body: Symbol of Existential Identity

As the "symbol of my choice," the metaphor of my spirit, the body-subject directly presents my unique identity to me. Sarano [1966] submitted

Our body is not simply the mediator of our thought....It outlines and hems in the inimitable individuality of each spirit, of each visage, circumscribing its personal singularity [p. 126].

Thus, my body "singles out" my being as special and peculiar, as different from the rest of the world. Sartre [1973] wrote, "the body represents the individualization of my engagement in the world" [p. 310]. In this singling out, the body becomes the source of human subjectivity, the direct manifestation of my individuality and uniqueness. "The body is the root of personality and individuality, the ultimate referent of a concrete philosophy" [Sarano, 1966, p. 27]. My body confers upon me my existential identity and is, thus, indistinguishable from "who I am," my "selfness." In other words, my immediate apprehension of "who I am" evolves from my body as concretely lived, not abstractly known. And my body, as concretely lived in sport, becomes a personalized idiosyncratic body as I master a movement form and lend my personal grace to it, marking it with my personal stamp. My body, perceived as a dynamic rhythmic form, is an expression of my unique style.

The realization of unique being is intensified when the athlete confronts the physical challenges of a sport situation. Those physical challenges magnify the immediate feeling of the body, a feeling that is not found in sedentary pursuits, a feeling that
brings vividly to consciousness the awareness that he is his body.

The writer suggests that this sense of existential identity is enhanced in activities which provide for an opportunity to create an image of self as a powerful being. In imposing one's own bodily force on another person or object, or in making a significant difference in a game situation, one's own impact is immediately and directly felt. A physical education major described this sensuous experience of power in basketball and football:

> When I block out well and go up for a rebound I love to kick my legs out and clamp onto the ball; I feel sky high! It gives me a feeling of power. Or when I make a nice drive and turn it into a twisting lay-up. I love that; especially in the middle of the big guys. Tackling is an art. I love the contact, moving into someone on a solo tackle and intercepting his body, changing its force or stopping it cold.

The writer submits that a strong sense of identity may be experienced in sport not only as a result of the athlete's awareness of his physical accomplishments or the development of his abilities to meet certain challenges, but also in his sensibility, his keen and delicate sensitivity to the sensuous feeling qualities of his moving body. A runner described her intensified feelings during workout:

> I can feel my body heat pouring off as I sweat through my clothes. I am warm all over as I feel my face glowing red; my breath is heavy and my heart is pounding. As much as a workout may be somewhat painful at times, I love it anyhow. These are moments I feel the greatest; so alive!

The intense physical training in preparation for sport participation, as well as the actual engagement in one's sport, counters the "alienation of man from his biophysical reality" [Shvartz, 1972, p. 186].
Body psychologists, psychotherapists and body therapists, such as Seymour Fisher, Alexander Lowen and Stanley Keleman,\(^4\) insist that the body as it is concretely lived reflects man's being-in-the-world. The writer suggests that the body as a symbol directly and immediately presents to the one who's body it is his being-in-the-world; and sport offers a particularly favorable arena for the body to function as sensuous symbol in its presentational directness.

**The Body: A Symbol of Oneness In-The-World**

It is through my body that I not only mark myself off from the rest of the world, but that I am also necessarily in-the-world with others. The body not only expresses the "inimitable indivisibility of each spirit" but also the prevasive oneness of a kindred spirit. In this bodily experience of oneness, differences are not felt as a form of dissociation, but only as a mark of one's uniqueness as an individual. The sense of bodily self is not necessarily a sense of separation. Identity is marked by more than one's differences, one's boundaries. It is inextricably grounded in one's relatedness to others. This relatedness is characterized by an interdependence of man and man, and man and nature; a sense of mutuality.

Sarano [1966] wrote:

Through my body I am centered; I am egoistic and world devouring; I aspire to possess, attract, direct, and assimilate the different to myself, in order to transform it into my own substance [p. 132].

This description seems to indicate an appropriative stance, much in the tradition of the Saratrean subject-object relationship. But
one's bodily relationship to the world and others is not necessarily an appropriative stance. Individualization goes beyond egistic ambition, lust, manipulation and possessiveness to a sense of oneness and mutuality in the world. One might say that the sense of individuality expands to a global feeling of man's existence. "The universal 'denies' the singular only in the sense that it causes it to blossom, fulfills it, and increases it in an infinite network of love" [Sarano, 1966, p. 139].

Sarano coined the phrase, "the rhythm of corporeality," to speak of one's experience of the "individual body" (body as the mark of one's distinctness) and the "universal body" (body as an expression of one's relatedness to mankind). And though he used the phrase in a somewhat different context, the writer suggests that it is particularly appropriate to describe the fluctuating experience of one's bodily-being in sport; the sense of the body as an expression of the athlete's inimitable uniqueness on the one hand, and as the expression of his universality, his mutuality on the other.

"I grasp the universe, I am the universe through this umbilical cord, and the universe is in me through this same strange ambassador, my own body. My body is this bifaced intermediary, this mediator; it is me and it is the universe [Sarano, 1966, p. 99]."

This experience of the "rhythm of corporeality" rejects the dichotomy of an inner self over and apart from an outer world. The body is a "world self," not merely an atomic self; and a premium is placed on the mutuality and inseparability of man and man, and man and nature.
If this attitude of mutuality and inseparability characterizes the sport experience, the athlete does not view himself competing against his opponent, but rather, as competing with his opponent; mutually affirming one another's unique bodily existence in a common world of personal freedom, not in an antagonistic world of reciprocal hostility.

The athlete's body and the body of the other, opponent or teammate, are experienced as body-subject, not body-object. Harmony, rather than manipulation and brutality, characterize the player-opponent relationship. And, as in the oriental martial art of Aikido, the athlete views his and his opponent's body as a center of subtle and powerful energy, and he seeks to harmonize with this "energy body" of his opponent. The athlete's bodily engagement with the other becomes a resonating interplay of energy forces as the athlete creates the energy field around him and responds sensitively to the field of the other.

This sensitive response to the other can be characterized, in Kleinman's terms, as a "sensual dialectic" [1975]. He contended that sport is "alive with possibilities" for relating to the other, not through what he termed "the 'philosophic stance' or intellectual dialectic, but through a sensual dialectic;" and he added, "bodily engagement pursues the sensual. Becoming a self through sport demands a literal 'being in touch with other'" [p. 49]. This sensual engagement brings with it an absolute lucidity of meaning and a level of communication not often found in other more sedentary pursuits.
Sport offers numerous opportunities for this experience of oneness as a sensual dialogue with the world and others. This dialogue has been variously referred to as a oneness with one's medium (movement), a oneness with the earth, a oneness with others (teammates and opponents), and a oneness with environmental elements. As described in Chapter III, athletes have described this oneness experience as a total immersion in the sensuous qualities of their medium, and as an experience of effortlessness in which they do not have to force their movement nor resist their medium, but rather, "allow the outside energy to move" them [Huang, 1973, p. 132]. It is, so to speak, an absence of opposition and an experience of harmony.

In his Zen approach to running, Rohe [1974] alluded to this direct sensual experience of oneness as a "grounding" that is "direct contact with Great Mother Earth, meaning that electrical equilibrium is established between you and the planet." A field-hockey player described this sensual dialogue as a sensation of "feeling the energy" of her teammates. She wrote, "I can feel the vibrations of the others, even though I can't see them." And Rohe [1974] further characterized the feeling of oneness as an experience of shared rhythm with a running partner when he expressed

You can run side by side
Stride by stride
Feet slapping ground as one
Two breathing as one
Dancing the oneness
Of human being.
Another athlete spoke of the sense of oneness in her sensuous engagement of the elements in the acts of swimming and skiing:

*My body and water become one. I can derive energy from the warm glowing sun and cool vibrating ocean...*

The coolness of snowflakes on my face brings joy and freedom. The snow falls lightly, blending into my continuous whirling movement, gently melting and trickling down my face [Bevilacqua, 1976].

Another athlete described his sensual immersion with the elements in running this way:

Touch the sun and sky,  
Absorb the warmth,  
Shiver with a chill,  
Breath sweet water from the air...  

[Walker, 1975]

Sarano [1966] beautifully articulated this lucidity of the body as a direct presentational symbol of oneness in his expression, "...the universal body: my true body is the world, woven of relationships between men of flesh" [p. 140].

**The Body: Symbol of Perfection**

We do not wish to imitate, we wish to perfect  
[Clark, 1956, p. 6].

Since the fifth century, B.C., man has attempted to capture the Hellenic ideal of youthful physical perfection in sculpture and painting. When Clark, describing the Nude as an art form, wrote, "We do not wish to imitate, we wish to perfect," he reflected man's age-old desire to create (both in action and in perception) the body as an image of perfection, and to produce "ideal form" as an exemplar of all that the human being should be. Clark contended that the
Greeks perfected the nude "in order that man might feel like a god" [p. 370].

To capture this sense of perfection man has, through the ages, looked to the athlete's body as exemplar of symmetry, proportion and aplomb. As artists searched for ideal form in their particular mediums, so does the athlete search in his own medium. But this form is not perceived as a static form. As the fifth century B.C. sculptors sought to create the nude as an embodiment of athletic energy, so the athlete of today seeks ideal form as a dynamic rhythmic form.

This search for ideal form is not then a search for an "impossible, impersonal perfection." The ideal, the perfect, is not an hypostatized absolute that dwells in a realm of reality separate and more original than the field of experience, distinct from one's bodily being. The athlete who, for a single moment, experiences in his body the sense of "just-rightness," of being all that he should be, may also in that same instant envisage his personal perfection as exemplar of universal human perfection.

In the last section, the writer spoke of the "rhythm of corporeality" in reference to the fluctuating experience of the body as an expression of individual uniqueness and as an expression of oneness with world or universality. Similarly, the athlete may experience his body, both as an expression of his individual perfection (Sarano's individual body) and as the symbol of the perfection of mankind [Sarano's universal body). Clark [1956] added, "We still feel close to divinity in those flashes of self-identification when
through our own bodies, we seem to be aware of a universal order" [p. 370].

The writer suggests that the athlete's thrill of the perfect in movement/sport is vividly and directly presented in the sensuous experience of ideal form as a dynamic rhythmic form.

Felt Perfection as Precision and Clarity

Athletes have used such terms as "immaculate," "clean," "precise," "pure," and "complete," all of which seem to refer to a sense of perfection in sport. For example, Steve Williams, world class sprinter, wrote, "The 440. A beautifully run quarter mile is a moving experience. It's immaculate, one clean lap with no cutting out of the lane" [Moore, 1974, p. 36]. A college gymnast described her moment of perfection:

I can feel when everything is just right, the stunning precision of my body in flight, its clean, crisp rotation, its solid landing. I keep returning for those fleeting moments of perfection.

The moments of perfection, "just-rightness," flawlessly accurate and precise performances, are often moments of intense clarity for the athlete. They are magnified and "stand out" in perception. The athlete can feel every detail and this acute perception brings with it a heightened consciousness of his immediate bodily-being-in-the-world. These experiences of perfection have been described as moments of sudden illumination when everything seems to come together or "click." A basketball player wrote, "I can tell when I shoot right away if the 'hoop' is good. It's funny to explain
but it's an inward kind of 'click'!" Although they are fleeting, these instants are crystallized into unforgettably distinct and articulate moments of what man can be and the potential richness of his perceptual experience.

Felt Perfection as Wholeness and Harmonized Diversity

Perfection may also be experienced directly as a wholeness or unity of mind and body. An athlete wrote

Excellence, both physically and mentally. Completely involved. Mind and body just one, working in perfect synchronization. All my faculties working together, each at their [its] zenith, striving for those moments of perfection--the ultimate I. [Chandler, 1974].

The bodily experience of unity ensues in sport as a harmony of intention and action. In this experience the athlete's body, created in movement as a dynamic rhythmic form, is the perfect actualization of his intentionality. The writer suggests that perfection experienced as this sense of unity or vision of wholeness is incarnate in the experience of grace. Sarano [1966] wrote, "...a unity of existence where one would not have to distinguish between body and soul, is perfectly expressed by the idea and experience of grace" [p. 50]. The body as the summit of perfection is, thus, the graceful body, as all one's faculties are coordinated "in perfect synchronization" and dynamic form is born as a resolution of tensions and a delicate balance of opposing forces.

Barkan [1975] suggested that the body in its stationary form is a "paradigm of proportion" because "it is a totality each and all
whose parts can be expressed in terms of simple fractions of the total" [p. 137]. Similarly, the writer suggests that the body, as it is both visually and kinesthetically perceived as a dynamic rhythmic form, may be experienced as the concrete image of proportion and harmony.

Perfection may be experienced in movement as a balance of diverse sensuous qualities, a unification of contrasting bodily experiences into one effective movement sequence, one dynamic rhythmic form. For example, dynamic rhythmic form may be experienced as the rhythm of the powerful and the gentle. Excellence of performance may require not merely brute force, but controlled force, strategically balanced by delicate finesse. And the athlete may experience his moving body as the perfect proportion of these diverse qualities, a harmonized diversity.

The feeling of a sensitively soft touch in fielding a ball, followed immediately by a powerfully forceful throw to first base, creates a pattern of gentleness and power that can be perceived aesthetically as a dynamic balance of sensuous qualities. The explosive force of a fast-break culminating in gently laying the ball in the basket; a delicately soft pitch-out followed by a crushing block in football; or a gentle hairpin shot climaxing in a powerful smash in badminton may all magnify the perfection of the human body as the "unification of diversity," or as Barkan described the stationary body, "the quintessential example of the art of proportion" [p. 120].
In a study of the metaphoric treatment of the human body, Barkan [1975] spoke of the "mystical vision of wholeness" [p. 118] and contended that "the body is perfection in the sense that it is an abstract unification of diversity" [p. 120]. The writer submits that in the sport experience the moving body perceived as dynamic rhythmic form is a felt image of wholeness rather than a "mystical vision," and that the sensuously direct savory of bodily perfection is experienced as a concrete rather than "abstract" unification of diversity.

Summary

The writer has suggested that sport offers a particularly favorable arena for the body to function as symbol in its presentational directness. In this chapter, the writer has attempted to identify and elucidate the experiences of one's body, perceived as a dynamic rhythmic form, that immediately and sensuously present to the participant certain existential meanings; in particular, pure possibility and freedom, identity, oneness and perfection.

Presenting these meanings, the moving body becomes, as Conry [1974] has described it, a "valid theoretical spectacle of man's inner sense of being" [p. 27]. In other words, the moving body is conceived as a source or evocation of meaning, as well as an instrument for the intentional expression or communication of meaning. When Merleau-Ponty spoke of the body as "our anchorage in the world" [1962, p. 144], and stated that "bodily experience forces us to acknowledge an imposition of meaning which is not the work of a universal constituting consciousness" [p. 17], he alluded to this
function of the body as meaning-giving or expressive.

The writer further suggested that aesthetic experience of the moving body is a function of its expressive qualities, as well as the pure sensuous experience of one's spatiality and temporality. Beauty incarnated is experienced in the magnificent eloquence of the body as a dynamic rhythmic form. Lowen [1967] beautifully expressed this eloquence and revelation of meaning in one's direct bodily experience when he wrote:

It is the body that melts with love, freezes with fear, trembles in anger, and reaches for warmth and contact. Apart from the body these words are poetic images. Experienced in the body, they have a reality that gives meaning to existence. Based on reality of bodily feeling, an identity has substance and structure. Abstracted from this reality, identity is a social artifact, a skeleton without flesh [p. 5-6].
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER V

1 See Chapter III, under "The Temporality of the Body," for a brief discussion of the body experienced as one's possibility in the world and for an examination of the experience of completion in a consummatory moment and an eternal moment.

2 For an excellent presentation of Nietzsche's doctrine of the Overman as it pertains to a philosophy of fitness, see Shvartz, Esar. "Nietzsche: A Philosophy of Fitness," in Gerber, Sport and the Body: A Philosophic Symposium, 1972.

3 The reader is referred to Chapter II for a characterization of aesthetic experience as a delight in the quality of effortlessness.


5 Walt Whitman [1962] eloquently expressed his love of this sensual engagement with the other when he wrote:

To be surrounded by beautiful, curious, breathing, laughing flesh is enough,
To pass among them or touch anyone, or rest my arm ever so lightly around his or her neck for a moment, what is this then?
I do not ask any more delight, I swim in it as in a sea.

[p. 100,101]

6 This acute perception has been described by Schachtel as "allocentric perception," that is, a level of perceptual clarity that "transcends the usual modes of perception which classify, label and capsculate the familiar world for convenience" [Privette, 1964, p. 11].

7 "Expressive" here means "making more perceivable" to the mover himself, not communication to others.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING AND COACHING

AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The Body Aesthetic: A Summary

Art is man's way of bridging his existential alienation from nature by means of the reincorporation of sensuality into his experience of himself and his world [Basescu, 1969, p. 135].

This study was an attempt to explore the "reincorporation of sensuality" into the athlete's experience of himself and his world. The purpose was to examine and begin to elucidate the nature of an aesthetic experience of one's own body in physical activity, herein called "The Body Aesthetic." In the development of the Body Aesthetic the writer has drawn extensively from empirical aesthetic theory and existential phenomenological philosophy of the body in addition to an examination of experiential accounts of athlete's perceptions, feelings and body attention patterns during their participation in various movement forms.

In Chapter II, the writer referred to aesthetic experience as a particular quality of consciousness. Aesthetic consciousness was described as a qualitatively distinct interaction of the subject and object or activity in the world. However, the writer contended that no one particular feature or characteristic defines aesthetic
experience. The uniqueness of aesthetic consciousness derives from the combination of a number of characteristics. These characteristics were described as unity, aesthetic delightfulness, and intuitiveness.

The writer suggested that two senses of unity are central to aesthetic perception:

1. Unity in spatiality manifested in the gestalt perception of substantive form and in the experience of oneness of perceiver and art object, and

2. Unity in temporality manifested in the perception of coherence and continuity of experience over time and in the experience of a oneness of past, present and future into a moment of intense clarity.

The uniqueness of aesthetic delight rests in the fact that it is a delight in (1) the intrinsic (non-utilitarian) value of the experience, (2) the quality of effortlessness acquired through an attitude of responsive-openness, and (3) the immediate quality of the experience.

Aesthetic experience was characterized as an intuitive experience in that it is an immediately grasped, gestalt mode of perception; involving non-discursive, spatial-holistic thought characteristic of right hemisphere functioning, rather than a reflectively analytic and logically discursive mode of being-in-the-world.

Chapters III and V, "The Body Aesthetic: A Sensual Experience," and "The Body Aesthetic: A Symbolic Experience," elucidate the particular way in which these qualities of unity,
delightfulness and intuitiveness are manifested in an aesthetic experience of one's body in physical activity.

The writer suggested that the body, as it is perceived by the performer, attains a privileged position in the aesthetic field and functions differently in the field from other art objects, for it perfectly and completely embodies the unity of the aesthetic elements (art object, perceiver, artist and performer). As such, the aesthetic experience of the body by the performer/athlete was considered particularly unique and distinct from the aesthetic experience of other art objects or activities.

This uniqueness is manifested in the way in which the performer experiences the spatiality and temporality of his body. Through movement, the athlete creates his body spatiality and temporality, giving it form. This is a dynamic felt form. The performer's consciousness of his body as a work of art and the sensuous experience of his effort qualities are, thus, indivisible. The writer contended that beauty, defined as "an integral unity of a multitude," is expressed in one's body as it is spatially and temporally unified as a dynamic rhythmic form.

The writer reviewed Merleau-Ponty's account of the nature of sensuous perception as a phenomenological characterization of the consciousness of one's body spatiality. The consciousness of one's body spatiality was described as a unity of the various senses into one "lived spatiality." In other words, the body is perceived as a "form," a "unification of all the diverse sensory modalities into one synergetic totality."
The writer further submitted that the athlete's body spatiality is perceived not as a static form, but as a dynamic form, a "fluid everchanging projection of body movement as a Gestalt" [Sheets, 1966, p. 23]. Body spatiality was thus conceived as a kinetic phenomenon, intimately related to the way in which one uses one's energy. This dynamic form is not only perceived as the changing shape of one's physical body, but is also felt as patterns of one's energy radiating through space. In other words, the body's effort has a form.

The visual view that the performer has of his body is not then the only ground for experiencing the beauty of his lived spatiality in its sensuous immediacy. Aesthetic awareness of his own spatiality is a consciousness of the full sensuous impact of his body energy. Thus, in the performer's perception of his own body as a work of art, the Greek ideal of beauty of human form survives not only as a visual image, but also as a felt image. The athlete's body is beauty incarnated when he experiences it as an "integral unity of a multitude" of sensuous qualities. Aesthetic perception of one's own body spatiality is an experience of a spatially living, sensuous body; a synthesis of the body as art object, with its particular linear qualities, and the body as lived or felt during the movement experience. The body is, thus, the body-subject and unity in spatiality is here experienced by the athlete as a unity of consciousness and body.

In addition to the aesthetic perception of body spatiality lived as an intersensorial unity and a unity of consciousness-body,
it is also experienced as an intimate oneness of body with the medium (world). Cassirer's concept of "living form" and Joyce's notion of "radiance" were summoned to clarify this experience of oneness in aesthetic perception. This oneness experience was characterized as an intensely sensual engagement with the world. As such, the writer contended that it is not an experience of transcendence of the lived body, as some writers have interpreted it. The body is not "lost" in this communion; rather, it is made more acutely vivid in its lived dimension.

The experience of oneness was further characterized as a sense of effortlessness as the athlete, totally absorbed in the sensuous feeling qualities of his medium, allows his body to be moved.

A characterization of the athlete's experience of his body as a dynamic rhythmic form must include a description of his body as it is temporally unified as well as spatially unified. This temporal unity in the aesthetic experience of one's body was characterized (1) as a sensually intense experience of consummation, and (2) as a sensually vivid experience of an "eternal moment" in sport. In the experience of consummation the body is temporally lived as a synthesis of past, present and future, as it organizes a continuous flow of sensations (experienced over time) into a final moment of consummation or fulfillment. The "eternal moment" is experienced as an expanded moment that seems to last forever as the athlete's sense of duration is interrupted or suspended. The writer suggested that in this moment the athlete is implicitly aware of self as a unity of
past, present and future, in the mode of being all of these at that given instant. He apprehends himself as a complete temporal being existing fully in that moment. He pre-reflectively and immediately grasps his body as at once his facticity and possibility in the world as he "feels" the completion and perfection of the future in the present moment.

The writer further described the athlete's spatial and temporal consciousness of his body as a work of art to be an experience of rhythm. This sense of rhythm, experienced as a "flow" of sensuous events, characterizes the body as a spatio-temporal totality. In these experiences of spatial and temporal unity and the experience of rhythm the delightfully rich sensuality of one's athletic energy is experienced as beauty incarnated. The writer submits that this creation and perception of the body as a sensuously experienced dynamic rhythmic form is unavailable to those who are not open to the challenge of extending the range, increasing the intensity and enriching the quality of their body experience through movement and sport activities.

In Chapters IV and V the writer examined the experience of one's moving body as an immediate sensuous symbol of certain existential meanings in sport; specifically, pure possibility and freedom, identity oneness and perfection. Contrary to other experiential aestheticians, such as Berleant [1970], the writer includes expression and symbolism as a viable part of aesthetic experience. However, contrary to traditional symbolic theories of art, this expression and symbolism are founded in the sensuous and
non-discursive immediacy of a pre-reflective realm of consciousness. The writer utilized Langer's conception of the "Art Symbol" as a non-discursive formulation of meaning that is intuitively grasped in the presentational immediacy of sensuously concrete perception. In other words, meaning inheres or is directly embodied in the sensuous perception of one's moving body. Pure possibility and freedom, existential identity, oneness and perfection are "felt" meanings as they are pre-reflectively lived as the quality of one's athletic energy. An aesthetic experience of one's moving body was, thus, conceived as a function of the body's "expressive" qualities, as well as the pure sensual experience of one's spatiality and temporality. Beauty incarnated is, thus, lived as the magnificent eloquence of the moving body.

Implications for Teaching and Coaching

You can go through contemporary life fudging and evading, indulging and slacking, never really hungry nor frightened nor passionately stirred, your highest moment a mere sentimental orgasm, and your first real contact with primary and elemental necessities the sweat of your deathbed [H. G. Wells].

Disembodiment: A "Refusal" of the Body Aesthetic

Those who deny or ignore their bodies lack contact with the rich sensuous qualities and the emotional meanings that eminate from them. Alienated from the full sensuality of their bodies, people come to live with "apathy, lassitude, and stereotype." As Dewey [1934] expressed, "We are not sufficiently alive to feel the tang of
This sense of alienation from one's own body has been described by body psychologists as "depersonalization" [Fisher, 1973, p. 13], and by philosophers as "disembodiment." It is a sense of regarding one's body "as somehow distant, not really [one's] own—even foreign in its feel." It is "literally a sense of not being intimately unified with one's body, of regarding it with some detachment" [Fisher, 1973, p. 13].

Aesthetic experience of one's body rests not on an attitude or feeling of "detachment" but on a sense of unity of consciousness-body and total immersion in the sensuous feeling qualities of one's bodily experience. It is a consciousness of one's body as subject. Alienation of self from one's body, on the other hand, is perpetuated by the tendency to view the body as object, to ignore the subjective, lived body in favor of the objectified, reified body. The body-object precludes the aesthetic experience for it expresses a particular attitude toward the body which deprives one of the rich sensual possibilities of the movement experience. The body-subject is a celebration of the "life quality" [Schrag, 1972, p. 146] of one's bodily being. The body-object expresses "my refusal."

It measures my refusal to assume and welcome my body to allow myself to be penetrated by it, to be incorporated in it, to be incarnated in it, to recognize myself in it and to recognize it as being myself [Sarano, 1966, p. 100].

This "refusal" and sense of alienation is linked to the stilted way in which adults require children to focus on their bodies. Fisher [1973] suggested that attention is turned away from one's
bodily feeling at an early age. Rather than learning to tune in and "listen" to his subtle body messages, the child learns that priority is placed on gaining control over and automatizing his body. He learns early that the body represents "the rawness of nature, the non respectable...the potentially uncontrollable" [p. 139] if allowed to function spontaneously without careful censor.

Taught to be suspicious of and to repress the "messages" from his body in favor of externally imposed schedules which dictate when it is proper to eat, to sleep, to play, the child soon learns to tune out his bodily world. Fisher suggested that with a premium on rationality in advanced cultures, bodily arousal is regarded as a "flimsy basis for acting." The child quickly learns that "action must be based on rational 'reasons' rather than body feelings" [p. 11].

Blinders are placed on the child as socialization practices legitimize only a few rare occasions for carefully scrutinizing his own bodily feelings. Fisher contended that the primary occasion for this sole attention to one's body is when the child is sick, and thus body awareness becomes "enmeshed with the sick role" [p. 6]. The writer suggests that sport offers another occasion for close scrutiny of one's body. However, this scrutiny is not necessarily a focused attention to the subjective feeling qualities of the body. It is all too frequently a consciousness of body as object or instrument to be used or manipulated.
The Myth of Objective Measurement and the Body-Object

A prevailing cultural myth, as it is particularly operative in the sporting environment, perpetuates this view of body as object and prevents the athlete from being fully aware of and sensitively responsive to his bodily experience. It is the myth of objective measurement and is manifested in the belief that the exclusive reliance upon fact, "hard" data, directly observable and measurable externalities defines the manner in which reality is to be experienced. This myth structures a predictable and precise world of hard fact and places the premium on objective, impersonal and detached modes of being and perception.

The application of the objective measurement myth to a science of human behavior results in a narrow and restricted understanding of human perception and experience. The tendency to rely totally on objective investigation blinds the scientist to the ontological difference between bodily being and mere object; and man begins to treat his fellowman as object.

This myth has had a profound and insidious influence on the sporting scene. The athlete, consistently viewed as a commodity to be used and manipulated in the most expedient manner to produce the win, may begin to impose this same objectification on himself. In the "win is everything" ethic he may learn to treat himself as an object, to divorce self from body, and then to use the body, violate it and even ignore it for the sacred victory. Laing [1967] wrote, "Human beings have so brutalized themselves, have become so banal and
stultified, that they are unaware of their own debasement" [p. 61]. This brutality and debasement is particularly descriptive of the treatment of the body in organized sport. The voluntary use of anabolic steroids, amphetamines and pain killers and the submission of the athlete to extreme physical brutality is evidence of this objectification, disparagement and denigration of the body that all too frequently occurs in institutionalized sport. Anesthesized by the super-emotionalism and totally subsumed with the external pressures associated with a "win at all cost" ideology, the athlete loses "touch" with the sensually rich aesthetic possibilities available to him.

The Denial of Pain: A Negation of the Lived Body

Coaches' typical attitude toward pain reflects this negation of the lived body (body-subject) in sport. Athletes, "unaware of their own debasement," are encouraged to ignore the pain during training or the game, to focus away from their bodily feelings in order to perform mechanically without human inhibition. This attitude in dealing with pain perpetuates the view of body as object to be used. A collegiate lacrosse player described it this way.

After the play is begun there is no time for bodily concern. You must numb your body during play in order not to think about the pain. Your body is a tool, a weapon and you must use it accordingly.

A trackman spoke of the training experience: "I just look forward to the end and try to forget my body." Trained to "not feel pain" these athletes may become incapable of even feeling the
pleasures of their moving bodies.

A few athletes, however, have expressed a different attitude toward pain. They have expressed a willingness to acknowledge their pain, to live it and "listen" to it as an existential reality of the lived body. A collegiate trackwoman described her affirmation of pain.

During practice I totally concentrate on my bodily feelings. Our coach always told us to concentrate on something else to get our minds off of how tired or hurt we were. I could never do that. My mind constantly buzzes with messages from my body. When we have a hard workout, I concentrate on a very rhythmical breathing to go with my stride ...when my lungs start to hurt and my legs feel like lead I try to get into the pain and push beyond it.

A miler, describing the approach of second wind, added

At times I am painfully aware of my body and how each pain feels. I let myself feel the pain because I know it precedes the feeling of full deep breathing, solid and steady heart beat, the warmth, and the feeling of power that I love.

These athletes seem to recognize that the experience of pain is a part of being sensitive to their bodies: and to attempt to numb their bodies, to forget or deny their pain would mean to also forgo the sensuous delight available to them in the sport experience. The voice of pain becomes a vivid reminder of one's human limits. To acknowledge one's pain, to tune into it, is to remind oneself that this body is a lived subject, not an unfeeling object. And as subject, the body does not live a "banal and stultified" existence, but one sensuously rich with aesthetic possibilities.
The Somatic Revolution: A Changing Body Consciousness in Sport

When a premium is placed on objectively measured results, the consciousness of the athlete is incessantly directed to those extraneous factors which restrict him from partaking of the "pleasures" of his body in sport. He may learn to perform for external and delayed rewards, becoming oblivious to the sensuously immediate phenomenal presence of his body. Trophies, championships, being number one, living up to other's (peers and parental) expectations become the primary focus of the athlete's consciousness. Spontaneity and sensuality may give way to self-consciousness and fear of failure.

Lipsyte [1975] wrote, "The joy of sport is as real and accessible as the joy of sex; and both have been distorted and commercialized to make up consume and conform" [p. 281]. He vividly expressed the rape of the youth sporting experience by overjealous adults who have lost the sensitivity to the sensual pleasures available in movement.

A million Little Leaguers stand for hours while a criminally obese "coach" drills the joy of sport out of their souls, makes them self-conscious and fearful....And their mothers and fathers "Jog for Health" and "Swim for Your Life" in grim and dogged programs without ever sighing in ecstasy at the wind touching the sweaty roots of their hair, without moaning at the water's stroke on their gliding bodies [p. 281].

However, a few athletes have begun to share those rare moments of sensuous delight that have occurred in spite of this obsessive attention to and priority on the win, the point, the score. A physical education major reflected on his high school varsity
baseball experience when as a Freshman, first time at bat, he was
pinch hitting in the last inning with a 3-2 count:

   My swing was so smooth, I didn't even feel the
ball hit the bat. It was a beautiful feeling. I
just stood there and watched it sail through the air
400 feet out hitting the fence on one bounce. If I
hadn't stood there taking all the feeling in, it seems
that I could have gone around the bases twice. I only
got a triple though and the coach was screaming at me
about taking an hour getting out of the box, but it
was worth it! I loved it!

A collegiate tennis player described her best serve as

   ...an effortless experience that results from
my muscles being relaxed--just flowing through the
serve pattern. I feel the ball completely centered
on the strings. If returned, I invariably lost the
point cause I would get so caught up in the sensa-
tion of that serve that I wouldn't "wake up" to the
reality of the point itself.

   Perhaps educators need to provide some experiences in which
the "point" itself is not the only reality. I A basketball player
acknowledged another reality in her play as the feeling of "pure
movement." She wrote, "For the first time, I felt the freedom of not
caring whether the ball went in or out. The pure movement--feeling
my body move relaxed and easy through space."

   These athletes may be representative of the beginnings of a
changing consciousness toward one's bodily experience in sport, an
increased sensitivity to the sensuous pleasures of participation,
and a reordering of priorities traditionally set for commercial,
financial or political advantage.
Teaching for the Body Aesthetic:
Body Experience Education

The emergence of "body techniques" such as rolfing, bio-energetic exercises, hatha yoga, alexander technique, tai-chi chuan and body awareness as central in encounter therapy represents a thrust to "get back to" the lived body. An emphasis in therapy upon experiencing one's body in a variety of movement activities, employing one's body actively and forcefully, is a counter to the depersonalization and alienation of the body.

In addition to these forms of body therapy, sport may be a potentially effective antidote for this alienation from one's own bodily experience. Sport activities may provide the needed opportunity to experience intensified sensuous feeling. The demand for total involvement and concentration, unencumbered by extraneous pressures when performing a complex movement skill, offers the setting for complete absorption in the moment, for heightened awareness of one's bodily presence. In this all-absorbing moment, the athlete may become acutely perceptive of his bodily sensations, totally engrossed in the sensual richness of his effort qualities.

The writer submits that sport as an antidote for the depersonalization of one's body is enhanced if it is conducted as body experience education. Conceived as body experience education, it will be concerned not only with effectance and ability, but also with perception and sensibility. Ferdun [1972] suggested that sport and art as "advanced cultural forms" reflect specialized functions. "Art," she said, "emphasizes the perceptual experience" with dominant
concern being "the quality of the sensory experience," whereas, "sport emphasizes the action experience" with the dominant concern being "doing and being able to do" [p. 81], the refinement of skills and abilities. These are not meant to be exclusively separate modes of experience. An athlete's experience of his body may shift and flow between a consciousness of the quality of his sensory experience and a concern with technical ability. The problem in sport occurs when there is a neglect of the qualitative perceptual experience in favor of an exclusive emphasis on technical achievement, mastery and "the win."

In a personal indictment of the undue pressures of competition perpetuated by insensitive coaches, a recreational gymnast described the reason why she quit varsity sports:

I generally feel better about my body during practice. I feel free and light and everything flows along smoothly...in competition, I get extremely uptight. I am not much of a competitor, I guess that is why I never stuck with varsity sports. In competition a small mistake is blown out of proportion by the coach and I am no longer the freely flowing body that I once was.

This sensuous feeling of "flow" and effortlessness, described earlier in this thesis, is often precluded by the extreme bodily tension and "up-tightness" experienced by the athlete in a highly pressured and insensitively administered competitive program.

The writer has suggested that the aesthetic experience of one's body requires an attitude of "responsive-openness." As an openness, it is a receptive attitude, allowing one to receive into awareness the full range of potential perceptual experience. As a responsiveness, it is a sensitively active orientation to self and
the world. As described earlier, responsive-openness is a willingness to "listen" sensitively to one's environment and to the promptings of one's inner experience, and to be responsive to that environment and that experience. Regrettably, this responsive-openness is often destroyed in favor of external control and mechanization when sport is conducted solely for the win with all devouring attention given to the product or result of competition rather than to how it is being experienced by the athlete.

A commitment to sport as body experience education is a recognition that meanings derive from sensibilities as well as abilities, from sensuous perception as well as effective action. It is a validation of the qualitative sensual richness of one's moving body. Laing [1967] once suggested that "Personal action is either predominantly validating, confirming, encouraging, supporting, enhancing, or invalidating, denying, discouraging, undermining and constricting [p. 34]. Through the latter destructive behaviors, coaches and teachers can "invalidate not only the significance, modality and content of personal experience, but also the very capacity to remember at all" [Laing, 1967, p. 36]. Reality is culturally defined according to a consensus politic and the student learns to neglect, repress or deny his experience when it is not in line with the cultural definition of reality. Laing calls this "transpersonal invalidation." Through this process the student learns what to experience and how to experience it. When society places an over-emphasis on winning and external reward systems significance is found exclusively in winning, in being number one, not in one's
aesthetic sensitivity to the joy of one's bodily experience. To feel a "high" during performance, to experience a sense of freedom in the quality of one's movement, to view one's body as a dynamic rhythmic form, to lose the sense of linear time in movement, to feel a oneness of body and medium all have a mystical ring to them and are often dismissed as illusory or mere topics of idle chatter in the serious business of sport.

Body experience education is an attempt to validate and confirm the athlete's experiences that transcend or differ from the traditional cultural prescription of what is real and what is illusory, what is important and what is insignificant. It is a promise to sensitize the athlete to the modality and significance of the aesthetic realm of experience, the sensual richness of his body as a dynamic rhythmic form.

The promotion of the athlete's aesthetic experience of his body in sport requires a dedication to the spirit of playfulness; that is, (1) a stance of responsive-openness, (2) an attitude of engaging in the experience for the sheer joy of the activity itself, with minimal concern for external contingencies, and (3) the conduct of sport such that it is freely chosen and regulated by the individual self structure of the athlete rather than totally controlled by an externally imposed structure.

H'Doubler [1940] captured the essence of body experience education when she wrote, "The inherent relationship between thought, feeling, and action furnishes the basis and direction for a procedure of creative teaching and learning" [p. xxiii]. All too frequently,
physical educators and sports leaders have forgotten this "feeling" dimension in sport. It is the business of education to get back to this feeling dimension, to allow the athlete to see himself not merely as a moving object, but as a sensitive, feeling self. Body experience education is an attempt to encourage the student to turn to his body with special intensity, to be caught up and fascinated with his inner world of body experience, to invest in what he generates from within and to be open to the meanings that are pre-reflectively and immediately presented in the perception of the sensuous feeling qualities of his moving body.

Fisher [1973] attributed the negative attitude toward the body in contemporary society to religious and moralistic contempt for the body and to the "disrepute into which the body has fallen as an object of worth as a result of its decreasing importance as a source of energy" [p. 41]. Body experience education is a counter to this contempt for the body and an affirmation that it is neither bad nor irrational to tune into one's body world. It is a call to "come back to the body" to experience it in the "innocence" of a child. Sarano [1966] expressed it well when he wrote, "...in the innocence one imagines to be present in the infant and in primeval man, it is so simple to be one's body" [p. 49]. Freed from the inhibiting restrictions of moral and metaphysical censor, a student may experience the full organic vitality of his body.

To experience the body in its fullest aesthetic possibilities, the student must come to recognize that the wide range and subtle variety of his body sensuality is a prime source of the aesthetic

Aesthetic sensuousness is not effete sensibility nurtured through withdrawal. On the contrary, it requires the full vitality of human responsiveness, and makes both our world more human and our humanity more worldly [p. 110].

The call to humanize the sport experience rests upon our willingness as educators to reconsider the role of the body in the experience and to recognize the rich aesthetic sensuousness of one's bodily experience in physical activity.

Sartre once suggested that the fundamental mode of givenness of one's body or the constant disclosure of one's body to consciousness is a "dull and inescapable nausea" [Zaner, 1971, p. 98]. The writer contends that the Body Aesthetic discloses one's body not as this so-called "dull and inescapable nausea," but rather, as a joyous and penetrating exuberance.

"Art, centering around the intrinsically perceived qualities of sensory experience, turns men's eyes not to the glory of heaven but to the glories of the earth" [Berleant, 1964, p. 189]. Sport as body experience education invites one to partake in the "glories" of one's own corporeality. As Bruce Kidd, the Canadian distance runner, described it, sport "is a pleasure of the flesh" [Lipsyte, 1975, p. 283]. And as Henderson [1970] reflected on his running experience, "The joy has come from creating and discovering, or rediscovering sensations I've experienced thousands of times" [p. 48].

Critics have suggested that contemporary man, alienated from his body, is incapable of sensual expression as a certain hardness,
guardedness and rigidity characterize his encounter with his world. Body experience education calls for a shift in body consciousness. It is an invitation to be seduced by the sensual richness of an aesthetic moment; to feel the pounding of blood in head and chest, the soothing caress of the early morning breeze, the climactic release of one's explosive energy or the passionate syncopated rhythm of expanding lungs, pulsating heart and flowing stride; to allow movement to penetrate one's inner sensibilities. This is the essence of a Body Aesthetic.

Recommendations for Future Research

Further exploration of the subjective dimensions of the performer/athlete's body experience will enrich our understanding of the educational value of the sport experience, may lend some insight into the motivations undergirding man's intense and lifelong commitment to and participation in play, and may provide some direction to philosophic and methodological considerations of teachers, coaches and recreation leaders.

Although no distinctions were made in this study between subjectively judged, body-oriented sports and objectively scored, goal-oriented sports, distinctions may become evident with regard to the frequency of and degree to which a performer is permitted or encouraged to enter into an aesthetic consciousness of his/her body as a dynamic rhythmic form. In addition, the frequency and intensity of an aesthetic consciousness of the body within a particular sport form at varying levels of organization and competition, such as the
"pick-up" game, a physical education class, an intramural experience and a varsity experience, might be discerned. This type of knowledge would undoubtedly offer insight into the possible relationship between different play environments and the opportunity for developing and enhancing the aesthetic mode of experience and a reverence for one's body as a work of art. Some may wish to extend this to an examination of alternative social environments, such as cooperative versus competitive, in terms of possible differences in body attention patterns and aesthetic consciousness.

A further study might combine body-image testing, experiential descriptions and in-depth or follow-up interviews to determine conditions and features that might promote and preclude an aesthetic consciousness of one's body, as depicted within the confines of this study.

Longitudinal studies examining relationships between developmental changes and the child's feelings about the awareness of his body in the play environment might be undertaken.

Pre- and post-body attitude and awareness testing might be conducted with the intervention of planned body-energy awareness activities or awareness training classes.

Another study might explore the subjective experience of one's body during an intense training or physical conditioning program and might further explore the relationship of fitness levels to body attitudes and the frequency of an aesthetic mode of experience as conceived in this study.
In the oriental art of Tai Chi Chuan, a movement meditation, movement is used as the intense focus of concentration as the performer becomes totally absorbed in his body action. A study might examine one's body consciousness during this movement meditation and might explore the effects of such an experience on changing body attitudes and levels of sensitivity toward one's body experience.

A study might explore the possibilities of an interdisciplinary approach to body experience education, utilizing dance, music, the graphic arts, philosophy, psychology, sport and exercise activities to examine the subjective dimension of the body as a work of art.

Another study might examine attitudes toward the "Other" and the influence of specific Others upon the performer's body perceptions.

A particularly fertile area of research may be in the study of the handicapped, the poorly skilled, or the overweight in terms of body consciousness and the potential contribution of body experience education to the development of positive body attitudes and an aesthetic mode of experience for these people.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER VI

This is not to suggest that the point or score is unimportant. To engage in competition usually requires that one "keep score." A game is partially defined by the way it is scored. In agreeing to compete, the athlete is making a promise to play his best. To indulge and become "lost" in one's own sensuous feelings to the extent of becoming oblivious to the object of the game is to be inconsiderate of one's opponent. In this case, the athlete must learn to be open to and to appreciate the sensuous experiences available to him in his sport without dwelling on them; to be willing to let them go and "move on."
APPENDIX A

BODY ATTENTION QUESTIONNAIRE
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Experience</th>
<th>H.S.</th>
<th>College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Varsity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jr. Varsity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intramural</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Explain)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Instructions:

The following questions are directed to an exploration of the athlete/performer's experience of his/her body during a game or performance. The questions are open-ended and are to serve as starting points for your own experiential description. When answering, describe in as much detail as possible and feel free to expand beyond the original focus of each question. Depending upon your answer, some questions may be redundant. So, if you feel that you have already answered a question, just indicate as such.

1. To what extent are you consciously aware of your body (or focus awareness on your body) during performance, prior to performance, after performance? (e.g., how your body feels, how it looks, its efficiency, etc.)

2. Do you ever visualize or imagine your body looking like the body of a well known or highly skilled athlete in your sport(s)? Describe. Does this happen during, prior to or after performance?

3. Have you ever perceived your body as a work of art while performing? Describe.

4. When watching a highly skilled performer in your sport(s) do you ever feel his/her movements as he/she moves, that is, have you ever kinesthetically identified with his/her movements while watching? Describe.

When performing in the same sport have you ever been able to experience that same or similar bodily feeling that you had when you watched the highly skilled or expert performer? Describe.

5. When participating in any kind of intense training or conditioning program when, how and to what degree do you focus on how your body looks? How do you perceive your body? Are you particularly aware of any particular parts of your body? Do you concentrate on how your body feels (e.g., breathing, heart beat, pain, fatigue, warmth) or do you try to focus your attention to other things (away from your body)? Describe.
6. During performance how aware are you of others looking at your body: (a) when learning a new skill? (b) when performing a skill or sport that you do well? Do spectators effect the way you feel about your body?

7. Are there any differences between the way you feel about and experience your body during actual performance and during practice? Describe.

8. Have you ever had a sensuous/sensual experience in sport? Can you describe it?
REFERENCES

Books


Summit Films, Producer. Ski Outer Limits. Santa Monica, California: Pyramid Films, 1968. (Film)


Periodicals


Kennick, Wm. E. "Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?" Mind, 1958, 67, 317-334.


Roochnik, D. "Play and Sport." Journal of Philosophy of Sport, 1975, 2, 36-44.


**Unpublished Materials**


