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POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE CONGRESS:
A CONSTITUENT PERSPECTIVE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
Warren Phillip Yarnell, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1976

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FIELDS OF STUDY

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

During the last Congress, a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Government Operations produced a report concerning, in part, the discerned responsiveness of the federal government by the mass citizenry (Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, 1973; hereafter referred to as Subcommittee, 1973). The findings contained therein, based on a national survey by the Harris Organization in September, 1973, led the Subcommittee to make the startling observation that:

"(T)he American people's loss of confidence in their government has reached severe--even majority--proportions today" (Subcommittee, 1973, p. v.). This phenomenon was characterized as a "Crisis of Confidence."

The decline in confidence is particularly centered upon both houses of Congress. Only 30% of the respondents in the Harris survey had a "great deal of confidence" in the Senate. The comparable figure for the House of Representatives was 29%. This compares to 57% for doctors, who scored highest, and a remarkable 52% for trash collectors (second-place finishers). To be sure, both houses were doing relatively better than the executive establishment which received only a 19% rating and the White House with a lowly 18% (pp. 37-38). Esteem
for the House and Senate as recorded in a 1972 Harris poll was distinctly lower than in 1966, when a Harris survey recorded high confidence ratings of 42% for each house, versus 21% in the 1972 poll (p. 33).

The low esteem in which the whole federal establishment is held can be seen from another perspective. Almost 40% of the respondents in 1973 felt that the federal government had had a negative impact on their "quality of life" (p. vii).

Congressional Representation

In light of the above data, one may speculate that the policy output of Congress is one of the sources of dissatisfaction with the House and the Senate on the part of an "unacceptably large" proportion of citizens throughout the country. Additional data from the Harris survey leads me to conclude that some of the decline in House and Senate esteem does indeed result from a lack of congressional responsiveness to the policy views of the citizenry. Whereas 61% of the respondents in 1973 agreed with the statement: "What you think doesn't count much anymore," only 37% agreed in 1966. Similarly, in 1973, 55% believed that "(p)eople running the country don't really care what happens to you," while only 26% agree with this statement in 1966 (Subcommittee, 1973, p. 30).

It is true that the above attitudes are generalized ones and not directly linked to the Congress. Nevertheless, these data do lend support for an investigation of the nature and extent of the policy
representation offered citizens by their national representatives, as a possible source of disaffection with the Congress. Thus, the study to be conducted arises out of concern for the continued and successful functioning of our representative system of government, with the focus on the role played by Congress in affecting citizen attitudes regarding the responsiveness of national institutions.

REPRESENTATION: A CONSTITUENCY PERSPECTIVE

Most investigations concerned with congressional representation have employed the constituency of the member of Congress (hereafter referred to as "MC,") on the one hand and the roll call behavior of constituency's MC on the other, as the relevant units of analyses. For House members, the constituency is, of course, the congressional district. For members of the Senate, it is the entire state.

The central research task of studies of representation is the construction of measures of the constituency's policy views, occasionally based on constituent attitude surveys but more often inferred from demographic data used to describe the constituency's population, and of the MCs' policy actions as reflected in roll-call behavior. Controversy surrounds both the measurement of constituency attitudes and the policy actions of legislators. I will be looking at both foci of controversy, beginning with constituency measures.

Constituency Attitudes: Demographic Characteristics

The construction of indicators of a constituency's policy positions that are considered to be valid is a difficult task. A popular
procedure—no doubt because it is also more manageable—is to indirectly measure the constituency's policy preferences in terms of various demographic characteristics. (See, for example, Froman, 1963; Mayhew, 1966; and Flinn and Wolman, 1966.) These indirect measures of a constituency's policy preferences are then used to "explain" the legislative behavior of the district's MC.

Consider Mayhew (1966). He isolates all congressmen who have more than 10% of their district's work force involved in farming. These Mayhew labels as "farm congressmen." Their voting behavior on farm issues is then compared to that of "non-farm Congressmen." Similarly, "Labor Congressmen," are those representing districts in which 55% or more of the work force is blue-collar. Froman (1963, p. 12) describes districts, in part, in terms of the following variables: percent (1) "non-white," (2) "owner-occupied dwelling units," and (3) "urban population."

Still, it is not clear how a few coarse measures of certain demographic characteristics can meaningfully explain the legislative roll-call behavior of the district's MC. Mayhew (p. 8) just "assume(s)...(that) some logical relationship ordinarily exists between the public positions of congressmen and the demographic characteristics of their districts." However, the causal forces that may be at work here are not elucidated.

Flinn and Wolman (1966, p. 198) do better when they argue that demographic characteristics are rough indicators of the existence of "(the) actual and potential group interests of a constituency..."
These various groups have or could have political power. The MC, recognizing that there are such interests in his district and because he wishes to remain in office, is sensitive to their policy preferences (Froman, 1963).

Froman also takes a somewhat different approach in attempting to elucidate a causal explanation between demographic characteristics on the one hand and a MC's roll-call behavior on the other. He posits that demographic data indicate that a group of individuals have a common milieu. Out of this common milieu "shared attitudes", including policy preferences, will develop. The MC discerns the presence of such political attitudes in the district and the process then continues as outlined above. Additionally, where a number of individuals have compatible policy preferences (due to a common milieu) there is the likelihood of an interest group forming to promote these policy views.

The appropriateness of measuring a constituency's policy views by means of various political-socio-economic indicators has been criticized on a number of grounds. Matthews and Stimson (1968) charge that this approach fails to provide an adequate account of how various demographic characteristics or the political phenomena they supposedly represent can in reality have an impact on the MC's roll-call behavior.

More telling, perhaps, the inexactness of such demographic indicators has generated additional criticism. Are congressional districts so homogeneous that they can be "defined" in terms of only a few
demographic characteristics (Clausen, 1976) or only even one as in Mayhew's case? Moreover, even if a district has, say, 10% of the labor force in agriculture, what of the other 90% of the workers? Do not they too exert some influence on their MC?

The relative crudeness or insensitivity of demographic indicators is also suggested by one of Froman's findings. He reports a relationship between five selected demographic characteristics of a district and the roll-call behavior of the constituency's MC, but only for non-Southern MCs. The lack of a relationship for Southern MCs implies that some relevant causal forces are not "subsumed in" or taken account of by the demographic data collected by Froman. Certainly, for example, one would expect to find the relationship between race and MCs' roll-call behavior in the North to differ from that in the South.

Consider, as well, that demographic data characterize the whole district. However, our expectation may be that the MC will only represent his supporters in the past election. Yet, demographic data do not permit such a distinction to be made.

In sum, there are a number of reasons why the explanatory power of this approach—relating demographic characteristics to roll-call behavior—is poor. The claim is supported, I believe, by the related finding that the predictive power of this approach is also weak, i.e., predicting MCs roll-call behavior from district demographic data. (See Matthews and Stimson, 1969; and Fiorina, 1974).
Constituency Attitudes: Constituents' Policy Views

There is a second approach to measuring a constituency's policy preferences (i.e., the constituency is still the unit of analysis) that does not require any demographic data. With this procedure, the known policy views of constituents within a district are aggregated in some way and a summary policy position obtained which is then compared to the MC's roll-call votes. The best example of this technique is the representation study by Miller and Stokes (1970).

Miller and Stokes began with a random national survey of under 2000 respondents (p. 434). The congressional districts—116 of them—in which the surveyed individuals resided comprised the authors' sample of constituencies. This created sampling issues because the sample was not predesigned to provide a known probability of congressional districts being drawn into the sample. Moreover, the subset of respondents selected within any particular district, while constituting an unbiased sample, is also a sample subject to substantial sampling error because of small sample size combined with a general sample design that allowed geographical clustering of respondents.

To avoid these sampling difficulties, one could randomly select among the 435 congressional districts. Then, within each chosen district randomly sample its residents. However, the cost of such an enterprise would seem prohibitive. (See also Hedlund and Friesema, 1972.)
There is another perspective on congressional representation that does not involve the constituency as the unit of analysis and is actually more congruent with data of the sort generated by national pollsters. In this alternate perspective, the individual constituent is the unit of analysis, and his or her policy views are compared with the policy behavior of the district's representative.²

The traditional research question: "To what extent are constituencies represented by their MCs?" is replaced by "How well are constituents throughout the U.S. being represented by their MCs?" One can inquire into the conditions and factors that affect the level of representation.

Adopting a constituent perspective also enables one to avoid some of the methodological problems associated with other approaches that were identified above. Because there is no recourse to aggregate demographic data, critical questions concerning the validity of such indicators as urban-rural, percent non-white, etc., need not arise. The sampling difficulties involved in aggregating individuals' policy opinions to obtain a measure of the constituency's policy attitude, highlighted in relation to the Miller - Stokes study (1970), are eliminated. Citizen policy views need not be aggregated for the individual is now the unit of analysis, replacing the constituency in the representational relationship with the MC. Another benefit received when the individual is treated as the appropriate analytical
unit is a marked increase in sample size. Utilizing individual respondents from a typical University of Michigan bi-annual national survey, for example, increases the sample size to approximately 1550. Respondents are not only randomly selected but adequate in number as well.

Methodological considerations aside, on a theoretical level, there is merit in replacing the constituency with the individual constituent. Even a cursory examination of the political process which transforms a private citizen into a MC suggests that the MC's primary psychological attachment or loyalty is to selected individuals within the congressional district and not to the district itself.

For example, the "MC-to-be" may initially be recruited by a few close friends who may also be political leaders in the local party organization. Or, perhaps, the MC may be self-recruited in which case the MC may still seek advice and encouragement from close confidants, familiar with the "political lay of the land" in the district. The primary campaign follows. The future MC begins to build an electoral coalition among party affiliates. The base of support is broadened by attracting additional followers. In the ensuing general election, the candidate makes an even broader appeal for support throughout the constituency. Generally, however, efforts are directed to those areas where additional support is most likely to be attained. If successful, the candidate is elected the constituency's representative in Congress. In reality, of course, the "constituency" is a legal artifact. It is the votes of those citizens who comprise the MC's electoral coalition who are responsible for electoral success.
Therefore it seems reasonable to expect that the MC will represent the policy stances of these constituent supporters rather than some general constituency interest. That is, I do not believe that MCs perceive and respond to their constituencies in terms of an "undifferentiated mass of people (Michel and Dillehay, p. 761, 1969), as defined in the legal definition of constituency.

Additional evidence can be adduced which supports the argument that the object(s) of the MC's psychological attachment vis-a-vis the home district are selected constituents rather than the constituency as a whole. Consider Kingdon's (1967) finding that successful candidates for Congress tend to evaluate their respective constituents as rational, issue-voting citizens, knowledgeable of the policy attitudes held by MCs. (Kingdon's finding was modified somewhat by Kim and Racheter, 1973, who found that only congressional candidates who before the election held voters in low esteem tended to favorably reassess their evaluation of the competence of their constituents after a subsequent victory at the polls.) In a related finding, Miller and Stokes (1970) in interviewing congressmen discovered that MCs believed that their legislative behavior was highly conspicuous to their constituents, and thus, could definitely affect their chances for reelection. In other words, their constituents' level of awareness of their MC's legislative activities was thought to be high. The claim is that MCs are cognizing potential sources of constituency influence upon their behavior in terms of individual constituents, especially voters.
Moreover, if MCs do in fact believe that a good number of their constituents are closely attending to their activities, this also suggests that one examine the representational link between MC and individual constituent. Because the MC could not possibly respond to all the constituents whom the legislator believed were closely observing the MC's performance, it is important to discover whose policy attitudes are having an apparent impact.

I have been discussing the representational relationship from only one end of the link -- from the perspective of the MC. Clausen (1973) opines that individual constituents do not particularly care how well the entire constituency is being represented by its MC, but how well they are being represented.

Moreover, Eulau (1969), in discussing various historical conceptions of the term "representation," remarks that a dilemma arose when artificially drawn divisions of the land, e.g. districts, came to have representation in legislative bodies. The presumption was that the districts were "to be represented as wholes" (p. 91). However,

if that which is represented constitutes a whole, particularistic interests within the whole cannot be articulated, and as (Mac Iver has observed) 'the only policy he (i.e. the representative) (parentheses in the original) can logically stand for is the presumptive interest of the whole he represents.' (p. 91)

The difficulty is that "clearly, no representative can speak for the whole except in a formalistic sense" (Eulau, 1969, p. 91). Therefore,
I will avoid this problem by investigating the representational linkage between individual citizens (rather than whole constituencies) and the legislative behavior of their MCs.

In sum, therefore, it seems appropriate and important to examine the representational linkage between individual citizens on the one hand and the legislative behavior of their MC on the other. In a critical sense, to the extent that a MC is responsive to policy views originating "back home," the MC probably is directly responding to perceived "pressure" from individual constituents rather than an anthropomorphized district policy preference. One paramount aim of my paper will be to measure those traits of constituents which compel MCs to respond to their constituents.

THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMATION

If the MC is to reflect the policy views of constituents in his/her legislative behavior, the MC must first have some information concerning their policy preferences. Let me characterized this as an "informational requirement." Not unexpectedly, perhaps, it is just this informational requirement which the MC often fails to meet. There may be three explanations for this failure. First, the MC's constituents may not have formed any policy preferences with respect to those items on which the MC must vote. Second, assuming such preferences do exist, the MC may have failed to perceive them (i.e. the MC is not aware of their existence); or third the MC may misperceive constituent's views.
Assume, for the moment, that constituents have relevant policy preferences. Dexter (1957) argues that misperception by the MC of the (few) relevant policy views held by individual citizens is quite commonplace, if those views are at variance with those held by the MC. However, some data from the Miller and Stokes (1970) study mentioned earlier suggest that as the saliency of an issue increases for constituents, MCs' misperception of their views may decline. This was most noticeable with respect to a civil rights dimension. Concomitantly, constituents' policy views were better represented by the policy behavior of their MCs on the civil rights dimension than on other dimensions where greater misperception by MCs of constituents' policy positions occurred.

With respect to my proposed study of representation, the accuracy of the MC's perception of constituent policy preferences is not focused upon per se. Rather, the MC's policy position is related directly to constituency attitudes without an intervening measurement of perception. It seems reasonable to believe, however, that some instances of a lack of representation are the result of MC misperceptions of constituents' positions. This, in turn, relates to the properties of issues and constituents that affect the level of representation.

Informational Failure: Non-Existent Constituent Policy Preferences

Misperception of constituent preferences both adds to, and is affected by, the lack of representation that is due to constituent failure to have policy views. There is some evidentiary support
for this view. Converse (1968) argues that the amount of political information possessed by nonelites is modest at best. One example, according to the author, is that more than 60% of U.S. citizens did not realize during the Berlin confrontation in 1958 that the city was surrounded by Communist soldiers. Closer to home, Converse found that over 20% of respondents when asked for their appraisal of the major parties and/or candidates gave responses that were totally devoid of policy-relevance.

Respondents included in the survey employed in my study of representation who failed to indicate any policy views can neither be represented, misrepresented, or unrepresented. (The relative size and characteristics of this group are, of course, important data in any discussion of congressional representation.) Given the typical interview situation, moreover, it is probably the case that the administered questionnaire elicits policy opinions from respondents where none had existed before. Therefore, the prevalence of constituents' policy preferences may be overestimated, resulting in findings of less representation than actually does occur. One could not expect a MC to be aware of and hence represent ephemeral policy attitudes, which exist for the respondent only during the interview. It is essential to embrace such methodological considerations in the analysis of representation, e.g., attempting to discriminate between attitudes and "non-attitudes."

In conclusion, if a large proportion of the MC's constituents have not in fact formed any policy preferences with respect to political
issues considered by the Congress, then one would not expect MCs to possess much "direct information" concerning constituents' policy attitudes. The concept of "direct information" refers to explicit communications by constituents to their MCs concerning their policy preferences on issues. Examples of such communications are letters or telegrams sent by citizens which state policy views or personal visits by constituents to their MCs in Washington, D.C. at which time policy preferences are expressed. As a consequence, the subset of constituents with policy preferences that the MC is aware of, and hence can represent with his/her roll-call behavior, is likely to be rather small across most issue areas. Therefore I propose to relax the informational requirement after testing the following hypothesis:

\[ H_1: \text{ Constituents who are more politically aware (active) will be better represented than less-aware constituents.} \]

INDIRECT INFORMATION

I want to introduce the notion of "indirect information" which suggests that a MC's perception of constituents' policy views is more a result of reasoned intuition. For example, a MC might accurately predict constituents' policy responses to a particular bill without any direct communication from them. Instead, the member believes with a high degree of confidence that had the constituents communicated their position, it would essentially agree with the MC's prediction. Moreover, the MC may even presume a capacity to
accurately intuit what the constituents' policy positions would be (i.e., they currently do not have any) on particular legislative items if they, the constituents, knew as much about the issues as the MC.

Extending the argument, the claim is that a MC can more accurately perceive the policy positions (in the absence of any direct information) of those respondents with whom a common milieu is shared. Moreover, the MC may even share the same attitudes, in which case the MC's perceptual accuracy would likely be enhanced.

This claim is similar to the one that purports to justify the use of aggregate demographic data as indicators of a constituency's policy attitudes. Restated, the argument is that shared attitudes are formed among individuals within a common milieu. Included among these attitudes are similar policy attitudes on issues considered by the Congress.

In my study, on the other hand, I propose to test the following: if the MC has a background similar to those of the constituents, then either (1) the MC will be able to more accurately perceive the policy attitudes of the individuals with whom a common milieu is shared and/or (2) if a common milieu does indeed result in similar attitudes being held, then the MC will hold the same policy views. In either case, the prediction is:

$H_2$: The legislative behavior of the MC will more strongly reflect the policy preferences of individuals with whom the MC shares a common environment than those for whom the MC does not.
Because MCs are not being interviewed in my study, the two consequences hypothesized to result from a MC sharing a common milieu with constituents cannot be analytically distinguished. That is, if the policy positions of MCs are more highly correlated with the policy views of constituents from similar backgrounds than for constituents from dissimilar ones, either MCs more accurately perceived one set of constituents' policy preferences than the other and/or MCs just voted their own preferences which happened to be in accord with the policy views of constituents from similar backgrounds. The latter situation is subsumed within Clausen's (1973) concept of "involuntary representation," where the MC has "internaliz(ed) (the) political orientations of the constituency" (p. 131).

METHODOLOGY

To measure constituents' policy preferences and obtain other relevant data, the 1968 S.R.C. (University of Michigan) national survey is utilized. Policy information on MCs is obtained from roll-call data from the 91st Congress (1969-1970). It should be emphasized that I intend to examine the relationship between respondents and all of their MCs, i.e. the policy stance of a constituent vis-a-vis the policy position of both the representative and the two senators.

My impression is that the representation afforded to constituents by members of the House rather than the Senate is more often focused upon by scholars. Therefore, I think it is important to examine the
representational relationship existing between constituents and their senators. The differences between senators and congressmen linked to the different geographical units each represents, i.e. states versus districts, are legion. In particular, with respect to my study of representation, senators are considered to be more visible to their constituents than are congressmen. This occurs, in part, because states, much more than congressional districts, with respect to media coverage of elected officials, can be considered as natural communications networks or units. Hence,

\[ H_3: \text{ Constituents will be better represented by their senators than their congressmen.} \]

Analysis Techniques

The S.R.C. survey is a representative sample both at the national and regional levels. Therefore this study of representation can be conducted at two levels of analysis: nationwide and within regions. (There are four regions: Northeast, North-central, South and West.) Major reliance will be on correlational analysis.
There is some conceptual ambiguity with respect to this Harris question designed to elicit respondent's degree of confidence in various societal organizations. The question is worded as follows: (Subcommittee, 1973, p. 160)

As far as the people in charge of ___ are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?

However, Harris and Associates discuss their findings for this item in terms of respect or confidence held by the citizenry for various governmental and non-governmental organizations per se and not in relation to their leaders. I am using the Harris data solely for suggestive purposes to roughly delimit the scope of the "problem."

This perspective was suggested to me by Aage R. Clausen as one that has been considered by others but has not been implemented in studies.
CHAPTER TWO
A DISCUSSION OF METHODOLOGY

In this study of representation, constituents' policy views are to be directly compared with the policy positions of their respective MCs. This chapter will briefly outline the procedures followed first in clustering items to yield policy scales and then scoring constituents and MCs on these scales to obtain their policy scores or positions. On the basis of these scores, both constituents and MCs may then be ordered in terms of the level of support, e.g. from most to least supportive, of the particular policy concept to which each respective set of scaled items relates. Such orderings yield "policy dimensions." (See Clausen, 1973.) The central concern of this dissertation is to assess the degree of representation accorded to constituents by their MCs on a limited number of policy dimensions.

Next, after the clustering and scoring procedures have been delineated, the general liberalism and conservatism of senators and representatives will be examined. Specifically, the mean of their policy scores on each of the dimensions will be computed. If the respective means for the set of senators and of representatives are similar, then my confidence in the validity of the measuring
instruments (i.e. scales) will be increased, given that the measurements are based on two different groups of individuals.

The chapter will close with a discussion of the process by which each constituent's policy score with respect to a particular dimension was linked or matched to the policy score of the constituent's MC on that dimension. This resulted in the formation of two data sets. In one, constituents' policy positions were associated with the policy positions of their representatives across all policy dimensions. In the second data set, the policy scores of constituents' were linked to those of their senators'.

SCALE CONSTRUCTION

In order to assess the level of representation received by constituents from their MCs on a certain policy dimension, two measurements are required. First, one must measure the attitudes of constituents concerning the policy concept in question. Second, one needs to measure the legislative behavior of each constituent's MC with respect to bills concerning the same policy concept.

Constituents' policy views and MCs' policy behavior are represented on issue scales. The items comprising each scale were believed to 'tap' or relate to the same policy concept. The items included in an MC scale were legislative roll-calls; respondent scales consisted of questions asked of individual respondents to elicit their policy views.
The major objective was to identify the maximum number of policy dimensions for which scales could be constructed to measure both constituents' policy views and MCs' policy behavior. For example, a number of legislative items relating to governmental support for agriculture might form a scale with which one could measure MCs' policy behavior on this issue. However, such a scale would be of little utility, as was suggested above, unless there also existed a corresponding scale with which to measure constituents' attitudes on agriculture policy.

The greater the number of policy dimensions that are thereby formed, the more confidence one may have in any subsequent conclusion that is made concerning constituents who are well-represented. Moreover, if representation is analyzed across a number of policy dimensions, one may detect significant differences in constituent representation which are a function of the factors affecting representation on the dimensions under consideration.

Some of the policy dimensions for which both constituent and MC scales existed may be rather broad in scope. A policy dimension such as "Social Welfare," for example, can encompass numerous and somewhat diverse issues: urban renewal, health programs, unemployment benefits, etc. These more narrowly defined policy concepts may be used to isolate "sub-dimensions" of the general social welfare dimension.

Employing sub-dimensions in studying representation may have several advantages. First, the saliency to constituents of the
various issues comprising a broad policy concept can vary widely and, consequently, the intensity of constituents' attitudes on these issues as well. For their part, MCs may perceive that the salience to their constituents of these specific issues do vary. Hence, the motivation of MCs to represent their constituents' views may be differentially affected. The importance of using sub-dimensions is, therefore, that the level of constituent representation might vary from one to the next. Such variation may be masked within the measure of the overall level of representation received by constituents on the general policy dimension.

Second, the scales used to measure the attitudes of constituents and the policy behavior of MCs on sub-dimensions may have somewhat greater validity than the corresponding scales constructed to measure attitudes and behavior on the general policy dimension itself. This may occur because of the greater confidence one has in identifying items for a sub-dimension scale rather than a general-dimension one. Consider the social welfare policy dimension and an education sub-dimension which concerns the involvement of the national government with primary and secondary education. One can determine with relative ease those items which are appropriate to an education sub-dimension scale, a more narrowly prescribed topic than is social welfare policy. The confidence one has in being able to distinguish between those items which do and do not concern "social welfare," in general, may not always be quite as high. Take legislative proposals calling for the establishment of a consumer protection agency. It is not straight
forward, at least to me, whether such items should be considered for possible inclusion in a social welfare scale. Hence, scales pertaining to sub-dimensions may do a better job of measuring what they are supposed to measure than do scales relating to general policy dimensions.

CONSTITUENT SCALE CONSTRUCTION

The first task was the construction of scales with which to measure constituents' views with respect to various policy concepts. Constituent scale construction preceded that of MC scaling because it was expected that the former would yield fewer scales than the latter since the number of legislative roll-calls exceeded the number of issue-oriented questions asked of respondents by a very wide margin. This was especially true for the Senate. Thus, if I began with roll-calls, I might obtain numerous scales measuring MCs' policy positions, with but a subset of these scales corresponding to ones created to measure constituents' policy attitudes.

Forty-nine policy-related items were selected from the 1968, University of Michigan S.R.C. national survey. These were sorted into groups of items thought to relate to the same policy concept, e.g., items which appeared to bear upon Vietnam formed one group. Next, the entire set of items, grouped by policy concept, were entered into a correlation matrix. The criteria for the formulation of a scale were: (1) no item could have a correlation (gamma) less than .5 with any other item in the cluster and (2) the average correlation between all items in the scale had to be greater than .6. With these
restrictions, an analysis of the correlation matrix yielded scales for the following policy concepts: social welfare, civil rights, civil liberties, Vietnam and foreign aid.

Social Welfare

The social welfare scale consisted of four items. The first three concerned federal government financial assistance to communities for local education, establishment of a national health care system, and role as an "employer of last resort." The fourth item involved the degree of national government authority over local education.

The two education-related items were highly correlated and formed a sub-dimension scale pertaining to the involvement of the national government with local education. The single item on the government as a guarantor of jobs was also used as a sub-dimension scale to score constituents' attitudes. The item concerning medical care was not matched by any legislative roll-calls on this subject.

Civil Rights

Two civil rights scales were identified. The first concerned the scope of the federal government's role in assuring the civil rights of Blacks. The three items in this scale pertain to three aspects of civil rights: job discrimination, school desegregation, and public accommodations. The single item on the government's role in promoting school desegregation formed a sub-dimension scale with which to measure constituents' views.
The second scale concerned respondents' attitudes on two civil rights issues, open-housing and desegregation, without reference to government action, and their views on the black civil rights movement with respect to the movement's (1) patience in pursuing goals; (2) level of violence; and (3) success. Relatively low inter-item, inter-scale correlations (i.e. an item from one scale correlated with an item from the second scale) suggested the presence of two separate civil rights scales rather than a single, larger one.

Appropriate roll-calls were identified to measure MCs' policy positions on dimensions developed from the constituent interview items.

Civil Liberties

A three-item civil liberties scale was identified. Each item queried respondents for their views on different forms of protest activity directed against the government: (1) marches; (2) violating laws which are believed to be iniquitous; and (3) mass demonstrations.

Vietnam

A two-item Vietnam scale emerged. One item solicited respondents' views with respect to military escalation versus deescalation in Vietnam. The second, closely related item requested that respondents place themselves on a seven-point "Vietnam action scale," ranging from "immediate withdrawal" to "complete military victory."
Foreign Aid

There was only one question in the interview schedule which concerned respondents' attitudes on foreign aid. Respondents views on this issue, therefore, were measured with this single item.

In summary, dimensional analysis of 49 constituent-items yielded the following scales: social welfare; governmental involvement with local education (sub-dimension of social welfare); two civil rights scales; civil liberties; and a Vietnam scale. Single items were used to measure constituents' attitudes on the following issues: (1) the federal government's assuring jobs to all citizens (sub-dimension of social welfare); (2) the federal government's role in promoting school desegregation (sub-dimension of civil rights); and (3) foreign aid.

The next step was the construction of scales to measure MCs' policy behavior with respect to those policy concepts for which constituent scales were available. In all but one instance, the medical care item mentioned earlier, corresponding items could be found with which to measure MCs' policy positions. All items or roll-calls occurred during the 91st Congress, 1969-1970.

MC SCALE CONSTRUCTION

The procedure followed in scaling roll-calls differed from that employed with respect to constituent items. A different procedure was required due to the presence of a much larger number of potential, scalable items or roll-calls, especially in the Senate.
The method used to obtain MC scales did involve an initial grouping of policy-related items, e.g. all roll-calls thought to concern civil liberties were isolated. The specific policy concepts for which roll-calls were sought were determined by the issue-scales already constructed for constituents. However, due to the considerable number of roll-calls pertaining to each issue, all of the items could not be entered by policy group into a single, correlation matrix as was done with the constituent items. Analyzing a correlation matrix of 125 House roll-calls would have been perceptually difficult and one of 350 Senate roll-calls impossible from a programming perspective. Instead, for each set of items thought to relate to a particular policy concept, a separate correlation matrix (coefficient = gamma) was generated. Roll-calls that might concern more than one policy concept were included with the items for each concept.

As expected, roll-calls tended to be more highly correlated with one another than the constituent interview items. For the formulation of a MC scale, the new, more restrictive criteria were: (1) no item included in the scale could have a correlation lower than .6 with any other item in the scale; and (2) the mean correlation between all the items in a scale could not be less than .7. In practice, the first criterion proved the more difficult one for an item to pass. Generally, the mean correlation for a scale was greater than .85.
Social Welfare

In the House, a twenty-item social welfare scale was constructed. Roll-calls concerning the following subjects were included: the Office of Economic Opportunity; Food Stamp Program; unemployment benefits; urban renewal; Manpower Training Programs; education (e.g. the Elementary and Secondary Education Act or "ESEA"); funding for the Departments of Labor and HEW; and welfare-related programs.

A corresponding 51-item social welfare scale was generated for the Senate. Topics included those mentioned in the preceding paragraph in reference to the House scale with additional roll-calls related to health programs, right-to-work provisions, and a proposed Council of Social Advisors being included in the Senate social welfare scale.

An education sub-dimension was found in both the House and Senate. The three-item scale for the House included two roll-calls on the Office of Education (of HEW) and one on the ESEA. The Senate scale included five items, two on the ESEA, one on the Headstart Program, one on a Teachers Corps proposal, and one on the Office of Education.

The second sub-dimension within social welfare concerned the national government's commitment to finding jobs for all those who desired them. A six-item scale emerged in the House with which to measure congressmen's support for this policy. Of the six items, three concerned the O.E.O., two related to Manpower Training Programs, and the final item involved unemployment benefits. The corresponding scale in the Senate included 16 roll-calls, generally concerning the same topics.
Civil Rights

A ten-item scale was used to measure congressmen's policy behavior with respect to civil rights. Four roll-calls were concerned with voting rights and one with the Civil Rights Commission. Five bore upon issues related to school desegregation. These five items also formed a separate, sub-dimension scale relating to the national government's policy with respect to school desegregation.

The corresponding scales for the Senate were comparable but with a greater number of items. The general civil rights scale for the Senate comprised 42 roll-calls on the following subjects: voting rights, Civil Rights Commission, equal educational opportunities, equal employment opportunities, and school desegregation. The Senate scale concerning school desegregation included 22 items.

Civil Liberties

A civil liberties scale encompassing only roll-calls relating to various forms of protest activity was found for both the House and the Senate. Roll-calls not concerning such activity were excluded, even if the item pertained to other civil liberties' issues. This was done to increase the likelihood that the MC and the constituent civil liberties scales were measuring the same policy concept. It will be remembered that the civil liberties scale for constituents contained three items, each referring to some aspect of protest activity directed against governmental policy.
For the House, a six-item scale was identified. These roll-calls concerned demonstrations at the Pentagon; elsewhere in the District of Columbia; student disturbances on campus; federal support of student "rioters;" and congressional identification of individuals making inflammatory speeches at colleges and universities.

An unexpected situation was encountered with respect to the Senate. Only two items could be found concerning protest activity. Both referred to student disruptions on campuses. In order to maintain comparability with the corresponding constituent scale, non-protest-activity civil liberties items were excluded, although this Senate scale comprised fewer items than other Senate scales.

Vietnam

In constructing scales with which to measure MCs' policy behavior with respect to this issue, a circumstance similar to that just described concerning the civil liberties scales again arose: Roll-calls bearing upon Vietnam were often highly correlated with those referring to Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, or the Indochina peninsula in general. However, constituents were queried for their attitudes only with reference to Vietnam policy. Therefore, in the expectation of obtaining more valid measures, only roll-calls explicitly and solely concerning Vietnam were considered.

For the House, the result was a five-item scale. Two roll-calls referred to a Vietnam Moratorium and three to a particular Vietnam Resolution. The Senate Vietnam scale also contained five items; two
roll-calls on troop levels in Vietnam; one on draftees in Vietnam; one on the termination of funds for Vietnam; and one concerning the impact of the Cooper-Church amendment upon our forces in Vietnam.

Foreign Aid

The final scale to be constructed for MCs was in the policy area of foreign aid. This dimension was conceptualized in terms of the transfer of American monies to other nation-states or international, non-monetary organizations. Foreign-trade items were excluded. The 16-item House scale included the following subjects: foreign aid funding; the Peace Corps Program; United Nations funding; and the International Development Association.

There was a relative dearth of roll-calls on foreign aid in the Senate. The scale that did emerge contained six items concerning foreign aid funding, the International Development Association, the United Nations, and the International Labor Organization.

SCORING

After completing the selection of scale items, scale scores were produced for both constituents and MCs. The constituents' scores would indicate their policy attitude on a particular dimension; MCs' scores would reflect their policy behavior on the same dimension.

The scoring philosophy, in general, was identical for both constituents and MCs. Each item was trichotomized. A "liberal" response was one that indicated support for the policy concept involved, e.g.,
promotive of social welfare or foreign aid. With respect to Vietnam, the liberal response implied a desire for military deescalation and withdrawal. A liberal response was scored a "1." A "conservative" response to an item was construed as a lack of support for the policy concept in question. On a Vietnam item, a conservative response suggested that a policy of military escalation of the conflict was favored. A conservative response was scored a "3." The middle category indicated moderate or modest support for the policy concept involved and/or our military response to the then situation in Vietnam. Such responses were scored a "2."

To obtain an individual's policy position, his/her scores on each item of the scale were summed and then divided by the number of items comprising the scale. To avoid working with decimals, the resultant score was multiplied by 100. Hence, the scores for every scale ranged from 100 to 300. A score of 100 indicates the highest support for the policy concept—a liberal response to each item in the scale. A score of 300 implies just the reverse. Most scores, of course, tended to fall somewhere in between.

There remains one important aspect of scoring which should be discussed. This concerns the treatment of missing data. Because the constituent items and the roll-calls were coded differently, each will be considered separately. I will also briefly discuss the re-coding of items to yield trichotomous response-categories.
Constituent Scoring

Most constituent items were natural trichotomies as originally coded. Respondents might be asked for their views with respect to governmental activity in some issue area, e.g. school desegregation. The liberal response was that the federal government should be involved; the conservative response was that it should not be. Respondents who indicated that they were unsure or could not select one of the two above alternatives (i.e. "didn't know") were scored a "2," the moderate category. With respect to the Vietnam seven-point action scale item mentioned earlier, the first two response points were combined to form the liberal position and the last two for the conservative one. Positions 3, 4, and 5 were treated as moderate replies.

It should clearly be recognized that "Don't Knows" were not counted as missing data. Rather, such responses were considered to be in the same category as "Depends" and scored a two. The rationale is that respondents who could not choose, for example, between two competing courses of governmental action or state their opinion (either for or against) with respect to various forms of protest activity and so responded with a "don't know" to the item could be thought in fact to have a middle position as opposed to an extreme one, with respect to the policy in question. Perhaps, a respondent who gave a "don't know" was just being more honest than one who replied that it "depends" which course of action was personally favored. In practice, therefore, respondents who replied "don't know" to a question, those who were unable to state which governmental policy on an issue was
preferred and instead answered with a "depends," and those who judged the Black civil rights movement, for example, to be both violent and peaceful; successful and unsuccessful, etc. were all placed in the moderate category and scored a two.

What were missing data responses, then? Certainly a respondent who refused to answer a question was. Additionally, if a respondent indicated "no interest" in the issue raised by an item, this response was treated as missing data. The reasoning here is that there is an important difference between a respondent who indicates no interest in a policy area and one who is unable to decide which policy response is the more appropriate (i.e. "don't know").

I decided that a respondent would have to have valid responses (i.e. non-missing data ones) on at least one-half of the items comprising a scale for the respondent to be scored on that scale. (The only exception was for the two-item scale for which no missing data were allowed.) Otherwise, a 999 - missing data code - was assigned.

A problem did arise in scoring individuals with missing data responses on less than one-half the number of items. Consider a five item scale and a respondent with three valid responses and two missing data ones. If the items with missing data are excluded, respondent's score is dependent upon the responses given to three items. Assume a conservative response, or a three, to each. As a result, respondent is scored a 300 for this scale, indicating extreme lack of support for the policy concept involved. However, doubt may arise concerning the comparability of this score with an identical
300 score that is obtained from a respondent's replies to all five items. Does each 300 score (the first based on three items and the second on five) correctly imply a similar policy position for each respondent?

I think not. The first individual failed to indicate a lack of support for the policy concept involved on two of the items for which the second respondent did indicate such a lack of support. This suggests that the second individual has in fact a more negative orientation to the policy concept than the first. This should be reflected in their respective scores.

To accomplish this aim, I scored constituents with missing data on an item with a two. Therefore, every individual's scale score would be based on the same number of items. With respect to the first respondent above, who had three valid responses (scores of 3, 3, and 3) and two missing data ones (now scored as 2's), the individual's score would now be 260. This new score seems intuitively reasonable. (Of course, individuals with missing data on more than one-half the number of items in a scale are excluded.)

**MC Scoring**

The scoring of legislators was more straightforward and less complex because the response categories were the same for every roll-call and for both the House and the Senate. The following is the S.R.C. coding scheme:
0 Not a Member at Time of Vote
1 Yes
2 Paired Yes
3 Announced Yes
4 Announced No
5 Paired No
6 No
8 Present
9 Not Voting or Not Ascertained

For scoring purposes, the three "Yes" categories were collapsed into a single category and likewise the three "No" categories. A yes vote on a roll-call, an announced yes and a paired yes were all treated equally. This was done to minimize information loss with respect to the MC's policy behavior. Whether a yes or a no vote indicated support for a policy concept changed, of course, from roll-call to roll-call. Moderate responses for each item were assigned to those MCs receiving either an 8 (present) or a 9 (not voting or not ascertained). The rationale for this was essentially the same one employed for treating constituent "don't knows" as moderate replies.

Like the constituent scoring scheme, a liberal response to an item was scored a one, a moderate response a two, and a conservative response a three. Each MC's scores on the items comprising a scale were summed, divided by the number of items in the scale, and the result multiplied by 100. Hence the range of scores for any scale ran from 100 to 300.

In treating missing data for MCs, the same problem which occurred with respect to constituents was again encountered, i.e. how to preserve the relative "purity" of the extreme scale scores. The solution was identical.
For a MC to be scored on a scale, there must be valid responses to at least one-half the items comprising the scale. Otherwise, the legislator is assigned a missing data score of 999. The only response recognized as missing data is zero: The MC was not a member at the time the vote was taken. Under most circumstances, if a MC has missing data on one of the items contained in a scale, there would likely be missing data on enough of the other items to prevent the member from being scored on that scale.

This was not always the case, of course. For the MC with missing data on less than one-half the number of items in a scale, a moderate response (a two) was scored for those roll-calls taken when the MC was not in Congress for the purpose of calculating the MC's overall scale score. This was done to help assure that those MCs receiving the more extreme scale scores had in fact demonstrated with their legislative behavior the greatest/least support for the policy concept involved.

SCALE SCORES: RELATIVE POSITIONS OF MCS AND CONSTITUENTS

In this section, I want to briefly examine the overall pattern of constituent and MC scale scores. The mean score on each dimension for congressmen, senators, and constituents, respectively, is given (Table 1). Note that each constituent's policy score is not directly associated with the policy position of his/her MC. Rather, the data are compiled solely to demonstrate the relative liberalness/
### TABLE 1

**MEAN SCALE SCORES -- CONSTITUENTS AND MCs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Constituents</th>
<th>Congressmen</th>
<th>Senators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Welfare</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1350)a</td>
<td>(427)b</td>
<td>(96)c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1105)</td>
<td>(430)</td>
<td>(96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1407)</td>
<td>(431)</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Rights A</td>
<td>197 (1426)</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B: 215 (1554)</td>
<td>(418)</td>
<td>(96)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Desegregation</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1401)</td>
<td>(293)</td>
<td>(95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td>244 (1344)</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(427)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>210 (1312)</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(375)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>186 (1374)</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(421)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(97)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*a* There were originally 1557 constituents. The numbers in the parentheses indicate how many constituents had valid scores for that scale.

*b* There were originally 449 congressmen.

*c* There were originally 102 senators.
conservativeness of constituents, senators, and congressmen on a number of policy dimensions.

Table 1 reveals that the average difference in senators' and congressmen's mean policy scores across all dimensions except for Vietnam and civil liberties was eight. This suggests that on most dimensions the set of congressmen and the set of senators were supportive of the particular policy concept involved to about the same degree. The absence of marked differences in the relative liberalism/conservativeness of senators and congressmen on most dimensions tend to confirm, to a certain extent, the validity of the scales which were used to measure senators' and congressmen's legislative behavior. In essence, similar mean scale scores on each dimension were obtained, even though two different measuring instruments (or scales) had been applied to two separate populations, senators and congressmen. One may conclude, therefore, that each instrument was measuring the same phenomenon.

A similar situation does not obtain, however, for the Vietnam and civil liberties policy dimensions. On these two dimensions, senators are noticeably more liberal or supportive of the policy concept than are their colleagues in the House. The mean policy scores for senators and congressmen on civil liberties were respectively: 203 and 258, for a difference of 55. The difference in mean policy scores was nearly as large on the Vietnam dimension with senators averaging 193 to congressmen's 221, for a difference of 28. (The reader may recall that scale scores range from 100—the most liberal position on the scale, to 300—the most conservative.)
Both Vietnam and civil liberties were highly visible and emotion-laden issues during the late sixties. The civil liberties policy concept, as noted earlier, was narrowly defined to include only protest activities directed against governmental policies. Specifically, items relating to student disturbances on campuses, demonstrations on governmental property, e.g., the Pentagon, etc., were included in the scales used to measure MCs' policy behavior on this dimension. The point is that both dimensions -- Vietnam and civil liberties -- are, in one important sense, related. The protest activity was generally directed against the government's Vietnam policy.

That senators were observed to be noticeably more liberal than congressmen with regards to Vietnam and civil liberties is not counter-intuitive. Rather, this observation accords well, in my opinion, with the perceptions of most congressional scholars. Happily, there is also some empirical support for the claim that senators are more liberal than are congressmen on civil liberties matters. (See Clausen and Van Horn, 1974.)

FORMATION OF CONSTITUENT AND MC DATA SETS

Recall that the unit of analysis for this representational study is the individual constituent rather than the congressional district. Each constituent's policy attitude is compared to the policy behavior of the constituent's MC on that dimension.
Constituent/House Merged Data Set

There are 1554 constituents for whom I have obtained scale scores, excluding the three from the District of Columbia. These constituents, however, do not reside in all 435 congressional districts but in the 144 districts included in the S.R.C. cross-section sample. To conduct the analysis, the policy scores of the 144 representatives are matched with the scores of the 1554 constituents, on a one-to-one basis.

The merging of constituent and House records, however, was not entirely without complications. Of the 144 congressional districts in which respondents resided, four were represented by two congressmen in the 91st Congress. In one district the MCs had missing data assigned for every scale. With respect to the other three districts, each MC had at least one scale score, so I kept these six MCs. Fourteen respondents lived in these three districts.

In sum, the final merged House and constituent data set contains 1568 cases. The policy scores of 147 congressmen, representing 144 congressional districts, and 1554 constituents are included in the data set.

Constituent/Senate Merged Data Set

The set of 1554 constituents neither resided in all 435 congressional districts nor in all fifty states. In fact, respondents hailed from 36 states. Consequently, only the 72 senators from these states are included in the merged data set.
In merging the constituents' and these MCs' policy scores, the aim is again to match each constituent's scores with the policy scores of the constituent's MC. Unlike the situation with respect to the House where normally every constituent has one MC, each constituent has two MCs in the Senate. Therefore, each constituent will have the record of his/her scores associated with the records of two senators. The data set that results contains 3108 cases, two for each constituent.

Only one of the 36 states, Illinois, had more than two senators in the 91st Congress. Illinois had four. However, two had missing data scores for every scale and were excluded. (Dirksen died during the first session. His appointed replacement, Smith, was later defeated by Stevenson in the next general election, and then immediately resigned.)

In sum, there are two merged data sets for analysis, one for the Senate and one for the House.
CHAPTER NOTES

No individuals were interviewed from the following 14 states: New Hampshire; Vermont; Kansas; North Dakota; Idaho; Nevada; Alaska; Hawaii; Rhode Island; Delaware; Montana; New Mexico; Wyoming; and West Virginia.
CHAPTER THREE

IMPACT OF POLITICAL AWARENESS UPON REPRESENTATION

In this chapter, I will consider the policy representation received by the entire set of constituents. My aim is to identify those constituents who are well-represented and those who are poorly-represented. In the pursuant chapters, the representation accorded to two particular subsets of constituents will be examined. Chapter four will focus upon constituents whose party identification is the same as their MC's, while in chapter five, the representation received by constituents not of the same party as their MC will be considered.

NATURE OF POLITICAL AWARENESS

Two observers of congressional behavior have argued that MCs tend to believe that their legislative behavior is followed rather closely by their constituents. (See Miller and Stokes, 1970.) If it is not unreasonable to assume that MCs believe their voting record could have an impact upon their chances for reelection, then in all likelihood MCs would be motivated to take cognizance of and be responsive to their constituents' policy views. Such responsiveness
may take several forms. In particular, and of central concern to this paper, MCs might respond by attempting to reflect their constituents' policy preferences in their voting behavior sufficiently well as to avoid future electoral reprisals.

On the other hand, research tends to show a general lack of knowledge by constituents of their MC's legislative performance. For many constituents, the policy behavior of their MC is unknown, probably because such knowledge is not believed to be very important. (See Stokes and Miller, 1970.) Miller and Stokes suggest that one consequence of low constituent awareness is that MCs are generally free to vote their own policy preferences and to ignore those of their constituents.

Several explanations have been proposed to resolve this apparent inconsistency between MC's perceptions of constituent attentiveness and the degree of attentiveness which is suggested by research. According to Miller and Stokes, MCs probably do not interact with a representative sample of their constituency. These constituents of whom MCs are "mindful" tend to be more educated, informed, and politically sophisticated than the average individual in the MC's district who has never been in touch with the MC. However, MCs erroneously assume that all of the constituents residing in the district are similar to those of whom the MC is cognizant.

An important implication of this explanation is that constituents who are politically aware will be better represented. Two distinct lines of reasoning support this conclusion. First, the politically
aware are more likely to communicate their policy preferences to their MC than are the politically unaware. Constituent communication of policy views may take several forms (letters, telegrams, personal visits, etc., to the MC). Even letters to the city newspaper may catch the attention of the MC (or more likely one of his/her staff; c.f. also Converse et. al., 1965). Also, if the MC distributes mail questionnaires to elicit constituent attitudes on current issues, the politically aware have a greater likelihood of completing and returning the questionnaire. In sum, the MC is much more likely to have some information concerning the policy preferences of politically aware and active constituents. Hence, the MC could represent at least this subset of his/her constituents because its policy positions are somewhat known.

As noted, there is a second reason why the politically aware may be better represented than those constituents who are less politically aware. It was suggested earlier that MCs tend to believe that their policy behavior, e.g. roll-call voting, is closely observed by their constituency; that should a MC deviate too far from the policy views of the MC's constituents, there might be reprisals at the polls. Clearly, however, many constituents are unfamiliar with the policy stances adopted by their MC. Yet these constituents, I believe, may still have an impact upon their MC's legislative behavior.

Several scholars have argued that a very small subset of highly involved constituents function as intermediaries between MCs and the vast majority of constituents. Boynton (1969) characterizes these politically active individuals as "attentive constituents." (See
also Miller and Stokes, 1970; and Erickson, 1971.) They may perform several important functions vis-a-vis constituent representation. On the one hand, an attentive constituent may advise the MC of the policy views held by the MC's constituents, or at least the feelings of that subset of constituents with which the attentive constituent is familiar. On the other hand, an attentive constituent may inform some of the MC's constituents of the extent or degree to which the MC is representing their interests and views. Such an evaluation need not be very detailed. Rather, according to Miller and Stokes (1970), the messages ultimately received by constituents may simply contain favorable or unfavorable assessments of the MC based on his/her legislative performance.

The thrust and importance of this line of argument is that constituents who have their policy views communicated to their MC by an attentive constituent and/or receive some feedback from an attentive constituent concerning how well that MC is representing the constituents' interests will be better represented as a consequence. In one sense such constituents are more politically aware than are other constituents. This argument will be considered further below.

To conclude, the general hypothesis to be tested in this chapter is:

H: Constituents who are more politically aware will be better represented than are constituents who are less politically aware.
Measures of Political Awareness

Political awareness is a multifaceted concept. There are several indicators available with which one could measure constituents' level of awareness. I have selected three. These are: (1) respondent's psychological involvement in politics; (2) whether respondent voted or not; and (3) the amount of political information possessed by the respondent.

The first indicator, respondent's involvement in politics, is strictly an attitudinal measure of political awareness. Respondents are queried for their attitudes in the following two areas: (1) the degree to which respondent "cares" which party is victorious in the upcoming election, and (2) how "interested" respondent is in the electoral campaign. Individual's responses to these two items are combined by the S.R.C. to yield a "Political Involvement Index."¹ (The method used by S.R.C. to combine responses is indicated in Note 1 to this chapter.)

The next indicator, if respondent voted or not, is more of a behavioral measure of political awareness. Unfortunately, it is not possible to ascertain whether or not those respondents who indicated that they had voted did in fact do so.

The third indicator, the political information possessed by a respondent, is strictly a behavioral measure of political awareness. Respondents are asked to give the names of the candidates from their district who competed for a seat in the House in the recently concluded
election. Additionally, respondents were requested to identify the respective party of each candidate.

This measure differs in an important way from the previous two. With respect to both involvement and voting, the respondent with his/her replies established his/her own level of political awareness. In effect, both indicators are self-determined. However, with regard to information, the researcher decides on objective grounds how well-informed the respondent actually is. The candidates and their party affiliation is unambiguous information. Consequently, it may be "easier" for respondents to be more politically aware on the basis of involvement and voting than on information.

The representation accorded to constituents with varying levels of political awareness as measured by each of the three indicators will be examined in successive sections. How well these constituents are represented in the House will be considered first and then in the Senate, a preference ordering that will be maintained throughout the dissertation.

POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE

Before assessing the impact of constituents' political awareness upon representation in the House of Representatives, it is important to establish, for comparative purposes, some baseline of the representation being accorded collectively by MCs to all constituents. To accomplish this, the policy scores of all the constituents were
correlated with the policy scores of their respective congressmen across all dimensions.

One would not expect the resultant correlations (gammas) to depart too far from zero. As indicated in Chapter II, the scores of many constituents—all those residing in the same district—were paired with the same score of their MC. Unless the variation among these constituent scores was slight, the MC would be hard pressed to represent the views of more than a few constituents with the MC's policy behavior. Accordingly, the gammas would be low. The results of this "No-Control" situation are presented below in Figure 1. Policy areas are ordered along the X-axis in terms of the level of representation received by constituents. (Please note: Sample sizes for all data presented in the dissertation are available upon request.)

The figure confirms the expectation of slight representation of constituents' policy attitudes. Only with respect to school desegregation is the picture altered somewhat. The gamma correlation for this sub-dimension of civil rights is .17, about double the correlations for most of the other dimensions. Constituents were next best well-represented on the two general civil rights dimensions. This suggests that the views of constituents on civil rights are, in general, better represented by their MCs' policy behavior than are their attitudes on other issues. This finding confirms a similar observation by Miller and Stokes (1970) concerning constituent representation in the 86th Congress, 1959-1960.
Figure 1: POLICY REPRESENTATION OF CONSTITUENTS IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Impact of Political Involvement

It has been hypothesized that those constituents who are "politically aware" interact more with their MCs than do "unaware constituents." Hence, the expectation is that politically aware constituents will be better represented, in part, because they have communicated their policy preferences to their MCs with greater frequency than have other constituents. Additionally, it was suggested that constituents who receive information concerning their MCs' legislative behavior from attentive constituents and/or in turn have had their policy interests made known to their MCs by attentive constituents, as a consequence, will be better represented. One might characterize this latter set of constituents as "moderately aware."

In this section one component of the concept of political awareness will be explored in some detail. Specifically, it is the influence of political involvement upon representation. The precise hypothesis to be tested is:

$H_1$: Constituents who are more highly involved politically will be better represented.

The findings are presented in Figure 2. Recall that the political involvement measure in an index created by S.R.C. from respondents' replies to two questions. One elicited the degree to which the respondent cared which party was victorious in the election. The second question ascertained how interested the respondent was in the electoral campaign. The resulting index consisted of scores ranging
Figure 2: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE BY CONSTITUENTS' LEVEL OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT
from one through eight. A score of "1" indicated the greatest level of political involvement.

In Figure 2, the involvement variable has been trichotomized to yield the following categories: (1) respondents with scores of one or two; (2) respondents with a score of 3; and (3) respondents with scores of 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8. Respondents were grouped in this fashion in order to obtain three subsets of approximately equal size.

Closely examining the results presented in Figure 2, one finds mild support for the hypothesis. On every policy dimension with the lone exception of school desegregation, highly involved constituents were accorded the best representation. Moderately involved constituents were the next best represented subset on about half of the dimensions.

While the levels of constituent representation generally varied in the anticipated direction, the absolute difference in the amount of representation received by the best and worst represented subset was not large. The relationship between political involvement and representation was strongest on the Vietnam dimension and, to a somewhat lesser extent, on the civil liberties one. Constituent representation on these two dimensions contrasts most sharply with the pattern found on the school desegregation one. On the latter dimension, political involvement is negatively related to participation. Highly involved constituents are the worst represented group; the least involved are accorded the best representation.
Both the Vietnam War and the controversial methods used by some anti-war activists (i.e. civil liberties concerns) were highly visible issues during the late sixties. Although constituents may have been more aware of these two issues because of their relatively high visibility, nevertheless both issues are probably more complicated than are the other policy concepts considered in this dissertation. Hence, it may have been more difficult for the average constituent to develop a clear and consistent policy position on each. Constituents who are more involved politically, as a consequence, may receive better representation which is partially attributable to their more definite, well-defined issue positions.

The school desegregation issue, on the other hand, is in certain respects both quite similar and dissimilar to Vietnam and civil liberties concerns. The school desegregation controversy was also a highly visible issue. Moreover, more constituents were probably more directly affected by it. While in Vietnam conflict might present an ambiguous situation, the turmoil at Johnny's school was certainly close to home and unambiguous in its ramifications.

MCs may have therefore been especially sensitive to the impact of school desegregation policies upon their constituents who would be most directly affected by such policies. Accordingly, these constituents may have had their interests represented by their MC without ever having directly communicated their policy preferences to the MC. In this instance, though, the constituents do have policy positions to be reflected in their MC's legislative behavior. The argument is
based on the assumption that those constituents who are less politically involved tend to be the very same individuals who are most directly affected by the school desegregation controversy. The agitation surrounding the busing of school children in Boston might be cited as a case in point.

In sum, comparing the relationships found on the civil liberties and Vietnam dimensions with that observed on the school desegregation dimension suggests that different sorts of individuals are being better represented on these dimensions. It will be interesting to ascertain whether or not a similar pattern also emerges when the other two measures of political awareness are employed. Again, overall, highly involved constituents did receive the best representation on every dimension but one.

Impact of Voting

Another component of the general concept of political awareness to be focused upon is voting, probably the one most frequently engaged in act of political participation. In this section, the policy representation received by voters versus that received by non-voters on a number of policy dimensions will be compared.

The rationale which underlies this analysis is similar to the one advanced with respect to political involvement. It is assumed that voters are much more likely to communicate their policy preferences to their MCs than are non-voters. Such communication can take many forms, including under certain restrictive conditions the act of
voting itself. Consequently, one would expect MCs to have more and better information concerning the views of voters than of non-voters.

Additionally, it is assumed that constituents who are voters are more likely to have interacted with "attentive constituents" than are non-voters. Such interaction may affect constituent representation in several ways. First, attentive constituents may in turn inform MCs of the policy interests of the subset of the MCs' constituents with whom they, the attentive constituents, have interacted. Second, individuals who interact with attentive constituents may receive, as a result, some general indication as to how well the MC is representing their views. Such awareness may motivate these individuals to communicate their preferences directly to their MC and/or to cast a ballot in the next election for or against the MC.

Specifically, the hypothesis to be tested in this section is:

\[ H_2: \] Voters will be better represented than non-voters.

("Voters" are those respondents who indicated that they had cast a ballot in the 1968 election. This does not necessarily mean that these individuals voted in the specific House and/or Senate contests of that year.)

If voting does indeed make a difference with respect to the representation received, then the correlation between voters' policy attitudes and the policy scores of their MCs on a dimension should be higher than the corresponding correlation between non-voters and their MCs' scores on that dimension. It is important to recognize
that it is the difference between the two correlations that is of greatest import and not the absolute value of each. The comparison of voters and non-voters is presented in Figure 3. For this figure, policy dimensions are ordered in terms of the absolute difference in the level of representation received by voters and non-voters, from greatest to least and from left to right. The greater the difference, the greater the opening between the scissor blades, if I may borrow from Key.

The data suggest first that voters are consistently as well as or better represented than non-voters. Voting has but little impact upon the representation of constituent views on the following dimensions: the social welfare-related dimensions and the civil rights-related dimensions, including school desegregation.

On the other hand, voters are somewhat better represented than non-voters especially with respect to Vietnam and civil liberties. A similar finding also emerged in the previous section when political awareness was conceptualized in terms of political involvement. Apparently, constituent representation on these two dimension may be more influenced by constituents' level of political awareness than are the other dimensions.

In sum, the hypothesis that voters will be better represented than non-voters has received some support based on the analysis of the data. Particularly on the Vietnam and civil liberties and to a somewhat lesser extent foreign aid dimensions, voters received better representation than non-voters. With respect to the remaining dimensions,
Figure 3: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE OF VOTERS AND NON-VOTERS
voters too were better represented; but their relative advantage in representation over non-voters tended to be slight. The question of the comparative impact of voting versus political involvement upon constituent representation will be addressed after the final component of political awareness to be considered is discussed in the following section.

Impact of Political Information

The third measure of political awareness to be used is constituents' level of political information. The rationale underlying the hypothesis to be tested in this section is by now a familiar one. It is assumed that those individuals who are highly informed politically are more likely to communicate their policy attitudes to their MCs than are constituents with a low level of political information. Additionally, the better informed are also more likely to have interacted with attentive constituents, either as a cause or as a consequence or both of their greater amount of political information possessed. Hence, this line of reasoning suggests the following hypothesis:

\[ H_3: \text{ Constituents who are highly informed politically will be better represented by their MCs than are politically low-informed constituents.} \]

To measure the amount of political information possessed by individuals, I will make use of the S.R.C. item that asks respondents to identify (i.e. supply the names of) the candidates running for a seat in the House from their districts in the 1968 election and each candidate's party. Respondents who were able to identify both
candidates for office and the respective party of each are characterized as "Highly Informed" constituents. "Moderately Informed" constituents identified one of the two congressional candidates and that candidate's party. Respondents who could not name either candidate were considered to be "Least Informed" politically. (Only a few respondents identified a candidate but then were unable to indicate the appropriate party.)

The findings are presented in Figure 4. Three patterns of representation emerge. First, support for the hypothesis is found on the civil liberties, Vietnam, and civil rights dimensions. On each of these dimensions, and especially with respect to civil liberties, highly informed constituents do receive the best representation. Moderately informed individuals are also better represented than the least informed on all of these dimensions with but one exception. On one of the two general civil rights dimensions, least informed constituents are slightly better represented than constituents who are moderately informed.

A second pattern emerges with respect to social welfare concerns, including educational and job-related matters, and school desegregation, a sub-dimension of civil rights. On these dimensions, moderately informed constituents are clearly better represented than are the highly informed who in turn receive better representation than do constituents with a low level of political information.

With respect to foreign aid, a third pattern emerges. It suggests that level of political information is not related
LEGEND: Low Information - No identification by respondent of a congressional candidate and that candidate's party.
Moderate Information - Identification of one congressional candidate and party.
High Information - Identification of two congressional candidates and parties.

Figure 4: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE BY CONSTITUENTS' LEVEL OF POLITICAL INFORMATION
to constituent representation on this dimension. Moderately informed constituents were accorded the best representation on foreign aid, but highly informed individuals received the worst representation. However, the gap between both sets of constituents was not large, thus indicating that political information is not an important explanatory variable for this dimension.

In sum, the pattern of relationships observed between political information and representation across the various dimensions suggests again that different sorts or classes of constituents are receiving the best representation depending on the particular policy concept under consideration. On certain dimensions, most noticeably civil liberties, highly informed constituents are unmistakably the best represented. Being highly informed politically, one may assume, is one trait or characteristic of a constituent who, in general, is very much aware of and interested in politics. Such an individual may himself/herself be an attentive constituent. Furthermore, one would normally expect these constituents to be more active in communicating their policy preferences to their MCs than less aware and concerned constituents.

On the other hand, on the civil rights dimensions and especially on the social welfare-related dimensions, the moderately informed received the best representation. This would suggest that different "slices" of constituents are having their attitudes well-represented by their MCs on these various dimensions. It may be that moderately informed constituents are more likely to be directly affected by
social welfare and civil rights policies than are the highly informed, although politics in general may be more salient to the latter. If the moderately informed do experience a greater impact, one would expect them to be especially motivated to make known in one way or another their policy preferences to their MC. This first requires, of course, knowing who the MC is but does not extend to being able to identify the MC's electoral opponent. The latter may be considered superfluous information from the perspective of the moderately informed constituent. Stokes and Miller (1970) do find that constituents possess much more information about the MC who is running for reelection than about the MC's opponent.

Finally, least informed constituents receive the worst representation on the civil rights and social welfare related dimensions, which is also the case on all of the other dimensions with but two exceptions. Yet, it may be that individuals with a low level of political information are just those who are most directly affected by civil rights and social welfare policies. However, their failure to know who their MC is may create a nearly insuperable barrier, precluding any efforts on their part to protect and promote their interests.

IMPACT OF POLITICAL AWARENESS: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE

Before turning attention to constituent representation in the Senate, I want to briefly reconsider the findings thus far presented. Of the three measures of political awareness that were employed, political information was clearly the most successful in differentiating
among constituents with respect to the degree of representation received. That is, the range between the best and worst representation accorded to various categories of constituents was greatest when constituents were subset by political information. Political involvement was next most successful in distinguishing well- and poorly-represented classes of individuals, and voting was least successful. This suggests that the political information measure may be the most efficacious in identifying constituents who have communicated their policy preferences to their MCs, either directly or perhaps with the assistance of attentive constituents.

Three specific hypotheses were tested. For each, much of the data were in the right direction. With respect to political involvement, highly involved constituents were the best represented subset on every dimension with but one exception. Moderately involved constituents were the next best represented subset on about half of the dimensions.

Voters were better represented than non-voters on all of the dimensions considered. The difference in representation received was somewhat marked on three dimensions but slight on the remaining ones. On every dimension, either moderately or highly informed constituents were accorded the best representation. Individuals with a low level of political information received the worst representation on all dimensions but two. On these latter two dimensions, low informed constituents finished in a near tie for worst represented.
The above discussion highlights the amount of representation received by constituents of varying levels of political awareness, as indicated by three separate measures. Another approach to summarizing the findings reached so far in this chapter is to consider the pattern of representation found on the various policy dimensions.

**Policy Representation by Dimension**

Consider first the social welfare policy dimension and the two related sub-dimensions — education and jobs. The relationship observed between representation and political involvement on these dimensions was generally positive, but weak. On each dimension, highly involved constituents did receive the best representation. Moderately involved constituents were accorded the next highest level of representation on two of the three dimensions. Voters, however, were not particularly better represented than non-voters were with respect to social welfare matters. Finally, moderately informed constituents were accorded better representation on these dimensions than were the highly informed, while the least politically informed received the worst representation.

These findings do not necessarily suggest, of course, that the subset of constituents who are being well-represented on social welfare issues changes with the particular measure of political awareness that is employed. It may very well be, for example, that highly involved constituents are but moderately informed politically. Such a situation might characterize an individual strongly attached to one of the two parties. While politically active, this individual may be
unconcerned with the affairs of the other party and consequently only moderately informed as the concept is defined in this paper.

The representational pattern found on the civil rights policy dimension is similar in a number of respects to that observed on social welfare. The relationship between political involvement and level of constituent representation is again positive, but weak, with the highly involved most often receiving the best representation. Voters were slightly better represented than were non-voters. However, in a departure from the pattern which characterized social welfare, highly informed constituents were better represented on the civil rights dimensions than were moderately and least informed constituents.

On the civil liberties and Vietnam dimensions, by contrast, the sharpest pattern yet of representation emerges. The level of representation received by highly involved constituents exceeds that received by the least involved by the widest margin on these two dimensions. Too, voters are noticeably better represented than are non-voters. Finally, highly informed constituents are much better represented than are individuals with moderate and low levels of political information. One important implication of these findings may be that a different "cut" of the district's constituents is being better represented on Vietnam and civil liberties issues than was the case for social welfare and civil rights matters.

The final dimension to be considered is foreign aid. The representational pattern which emerges here suggests that political information is not related to constituent representation on this dimension.
Constituents with high, moderate, and low levels of information are all about equally represented.

POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE

For the remainder of this chapter, the impact of political awareness upon representation in the Senate will be examined. Primarily, the aim will be to ascertain whether or not the patterns which emerged with respect to the representation of constituents' policy views in the House also characterizes the Senate. It is also the case that the Senate - Constituent merged data set contains approximately twice the number of cases as does the House - Constituent data set. Each constituent has two representational relationships: one with each of the constituents two senators.

It should be noted that the set of constituents with valid scale scores who are included in the analyses of representation in the Senate and House varies, even on the same dimension. For example, assume a constituent has a policy position on Vietnam. Only if that constituent's representative also has a policy score on Vietnam, will this case, or particular representational relationship, be included among those investigated to determine the extent to which constituents' policy views on Vietnam are represented by their MCs' legislative behavior. On the other hand, one of that same constituent's senators may lack a policy position on Vietnam. Hence, this particular case, or the relationship between that constituent and the senator with a missing score, will be excluded from the analysis.
The level of representation received by constituents from their senators is about the same as the level of representation obtained from their representatives when all constituents' policy views are compared to the policy behavior of their MCs, with no subsetting of constituents. The only exception occurs with respect to civil rights and school desegregation. With regard to the House, constituents were moderately better represented on those dimensions than on any other. With respect to the Senate, however, constituents' views on civil rights and school desegregation were represented about as well as their other policy attitudes were. (Figure not presented.) As was true for the House, the resultant correlations for the Senate were not high for this no control situation. This finding may suggest that civil rights matters are of greater concern or salience to representatives than to senators. Given the greater homogeneity of congressional districts versus entire states, an increase in the visibility of civil rights and in representatives' responsiveness is understandable.

**Impact of Political Involvement**

Recall the hypothesis tested with respect to political involvement and constituent representation in the House:

\[ H_1: \text{ Constituents who are more highly involved politically will be better represented.} \]

The data suggest about the same level of support for the hypothesis. (Figure not presented.) On every dimension but two, highly involved constituents were accorded the best representation. The
amount of representation they received, however, did not greatly exceed that received by the worst represented subset on each dimension, which in more than half the cases were the moderately involved.

Constituent representation with respect to civil liberties and Vietnam in the Senate most closely parallels the representation received by constituents on these two dimensions in the House. On both dimensions, constituent representation decreases with the decline in constituents' political involvement. This positive relationship between involvement and representation appears most consistently on these two dimensions, which was also the situation in the House.

In sum, patterns of representation similar to those found in regards to the House also tended to emerge with respect to the Senate. However, the relationships observed for the Senate were somewhat weaker than those observed for the House.

**Impact of Voting**

The hypothesis that voters will be better represented than non-voters received some support with respect to the House. The data for the Senate also tends to support the proposition (Figure 5). On all of the dimensions, voters are consistently as well as or better represented than non-voters. The largest differences occurred on the following dimensions: civil liberties, Vietnam, foreign aid, and school desegregation. With respect to the House, the largest differences in the representation received by voters as compared to non-voters also occurred on the first three of these dimensions.
Figure 5: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE OF VOTERS AND NON-VOTERS
On the school desegregation dimension, voters evinced the greatest, relative representational edge over non-voters in the Senate. Interestingly, voters and non-voters were accorded equal representation in the House on this dimension. Moreover, such representation was slightly better than that received even by voters on the dimension in the Senate. This may suggest a greater saliency to all constituents within a district, voters and non-voters alike, of the school desegregation issue and consequently a greater motivation to make known their views to their MCs. Additionally, there may exist a greater homogeneity of attitudes on this issue within the congressional district. With respect to Senate, on the other hand, voters may be communicating different policy preferences to their MCs than are non-voters. Too, the latter may not be communicating any policy preferences whatsoever.

Impact of Political Information

Recall that the concept of political information was operationally defined in terms of constituents' ability to identify the congressional candidates from their district and the respective party of each candidate. Although policy representation in the Senate is now being considered, I shall employ the same measure to determine the level of political information possessed by respondents.

Given the greater visibility of senators vis-a-vis congressmen, it would probably be easier for a constituent to identify a senatorial candidate and that candidate's party. As a consequence, if political information were measured in terms of constituents' ability to name
candidates for the Senate, the resultant proportions of highly and moderately informed constituents would probably be greater than those observed with respect to the House. For this reason, then, the measure of political information is a more conservative one if identification of congressional rather than senatorial candidates is required.

A more obvious reason, perhaps, for measuring information with respect to House candidates is that only two-thirds of the states have senatorial contests in any election year. Hence, one could not measure the political information possessed by roughly one-third of the constituents in the sample. This would be a severe price to pay if one were to define the concept of political information in terms of constituents' ability to identify senatorial candidates.

Finally, I come to the most compelling reason of all for using the congressional information variable. There are no Senate knowledge data available.

The hypothesis to be tested in this section is:

\[ H_3: \text{Constituents who are highly informed politically will be better represented by their MCs than are politically low-informed constituents.} \]

There is some support for the proposition (Figure 6). Highly informed constituents do receive the best representation on every dimension but one. This is a stronger pattern than that which emerged with respect to the House. There is mixed support for the hypothesis among the moderate and least informed. On just over one-third of the
Figure 6: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE BY CONSTITUENTS' LEVEL OF POLITICAL INFORMATION
dimensions, constituents with a moderate level of political information were better represented than were constituents with a low level. On three dimensions, the reverse was true. On the remaining two dimensions, the moderate and least informed were accorded equal representation.

Additionally, as was true in the House, the highest level of representation was received by highly informed constituents on the civil liberties dimension. This suggests that these well-informed constituents are having their policy views on this dimension particularly well-represented both by their senators and congressmen.

The final observation to be made concerns the differences in the amount of representation received by constituents of varying levels of political information on each of the dimensions considered. Specifically, the best represented constituents were not that much better represented than the worst represented constituents on every dimension but civil liberties and school desegregation -- a sub-dimension of civil rights. On the latter two dimensions, highly informed constituents were more noticeably the better represented. In a comparative sense, the political information measure was more efficacious in differentiating well- and poorly-represented constituents in the House than in the Senate.

IMPACT OF POLITICAL AWARENESS; POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE

Many of the representational patterns which appeared with respect to the House also emerged in regards to the Senate. Generally, however,
the relationships observed were not quite as strong. The three measures of political awareness employed -- involvement, voting, and information -- tended to be relatively more successful in differentiating among constituents with respect to the degree of representation received in the House than in the Senate. Given the much greater heterogeneity and size of states vis-a-vis congressional districts with the concomitant multiplicity of conflicting stimuli impinging upon senators, it is understandable, perhaps, that the various subsets of constituents heretofore considered are not generally represented in the Senate at markedly differing levels.

Still, support for the general hypothesis that political awareness is positively related to constituent representation has been adduced. Voters are as well as or better represented than non-voters are in the Senate on each of the dimensions considered. Too, highly informed constituents receive the best representation on every dimension but one. Especially with respect to these measures of political awareness, the data are in the right direction and tend to confirm the major proposition tested in this chapter.
CHAPTER NOTES

The response codes to the "Care" question are as follows:

1 - Care, Very Much
2 - Care, Pretty Much
3 - Pro - Con, Depends
4 - Care Some
5 - Don't Care
6 - Don't Care About Party
8 - DK
9 - NA

The response codes to the "Interest" question are as follows:

1 - Very Much Interested
3 - Somewhat Interested
5 - Not Much Interested
9 - NA

The "Involvement Index" was created by S.R.C. by combining responses to these two questions according to the following scheme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARE</th>
<th>1 2 3 4 5 6 8 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTEREST</td>
<td>1 - 1 2 3 2 3 3 3 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 - 3 3 4 4 5 4 4 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5 - 4 5 7 6 8 7 7 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 - 3 4 6 5 8 8 8 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 - 3 4 6 5 8 9 9 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

78
In this chapter, I will consider the policy representation received by three sets of constituents who have the same party identification as their MC: (1) Republican and Democratic constituents with MCs of the same, respective party; (2) only the Democratic constituents with a Democratic MC and (3) only the Republican constituents with a Republican MC. Representation will be considered first with respect to the House and then to the Senate.

MEASURING PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Classifying respondents as either Republican or Democratic identifiers was straightforward. The treatment of individuals who indicated that they were independents was less so. Independents can be trichotomized into respondents "leaning" to the Democratic Party or to the Republican Party and finally those who can be characterized as hard-core or true Independents. Originally, the set of Independents was not subdivided. Subsequent analyses revealed that Independents, as a group, were receiving very high levels of representation on almost all policy dimensions. Because this finding was unexpected,
I decided to separate Independents into "Leaners" and "True Independents." The data indicated that Leaners were being well-represented by the MCs of their party, e.g. Democratic Leaners represented by Democratic MCs, but that the set of true Independents was not well-represented at all. Therefore a decision was made to include Leaners with respondents who were party identifiers and to classify only the non-Leaners as Independents. The impact of strength of party identification upon the level of representation received will be considered later in this chapter.

**IMPACT OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION UPON REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE**

It is expected that MCs will be more likely to represent constituents from their own party than those identifying with the other party or none at all, i.e. Independents. This occurs for three reasons. First, the MC's electoral coalition is largely comprised of voters with the same party identification as the MC. Second, constituents may be more likely to communicate their policy attitudes to their MC when that MC is of the same party than when the MC is of the other party. Consequently, MCs will have more information concerning the views of their party's supporters in the electorate. Third, a MC and those of the MC's constituents with the same party attachment may be more likely to share a common milieu and thereby also have shared policy attitudes. Thus, by voting his/her own policy preferences the MC may represent the views of constituents of the same party. This
section will compare the representation received by constituents whose party identification is the same as their MC's with that received by the full set of constituents.

Specifically, the hypothesis to be tested in this section is:

$$H_1: \text{ Constituents of the same party as their MC will be better represented than the full set of constituents.}$$

How well all constituents are represented on each of the policy dimensions has already been examined in chapter III. Those data are presented again along with the level of representation received by constituents whose party identification is the same as their MC's in Figure 7.

On every dimension but one, constituents of the same party as their MC are better represented than the full set of constituents. The largest differences in the levels of representation received by each group of constituents occur on the social welfare policy dimension and on the education and jobs sub-dimensions. This finding suggests that social welfare issues may be the most party-oriented of the issues being considered. It has often been recognized that social welfare concerns, perhaps harking back to the New Deal, still distinguish the two parties and their respective supporters in the electorate.

The impact of party upon foreign aid is nil. On all the other dimensions, party had at least some influence upon representation. Once again, it has proven difficult to identify a group of constituents who are particularly well-represented on foreign aid. The extent of the impact of party will be further examined in the following chapter.
Constituents with MCs of the Same Party

Full Set of Constituents


Figure 7: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE: CONSTITUENTS WITH THE SAME PARTY IDENTIFICATION AS THEIR MC'S AND THE FULL SET OF CONSTITUENTS
when the policy representation received by the subset of constituents who have a MC of the same party is directly compared to the representation received by constituents whose MC is of the other party.

**Representation Within Party**

Having learned that constituents with MCs of the same party are better represented immediately raises a concomitant question. Do Democratic congressmen represent their Democratic constituents better or worse than Republican congressmen do their Republican constituents?

I would anticipate that Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs would be the better represented subset. Republican MCs facing reelection usually have to garner support from Democratic constituents to be victorious. One strategy used by Republican MCs to obtain these needed votes might be to represent the policy attitudes of at least some Democratic constituents but at the possible expense of the representation of the views of their Republican constituents. Democratic MCs, however, are not dependent in most instances upon Republican support in order to be reelected. Thus, Democratic MCs are free to seek electoral support solely among Democratic constituents by reflecting the policy attitudes of these constituents in the MC's legislative behavior. Accordingly, one would therefore expect Democratic constituents to be better represented than Republican ones.

The dimensions are ordered along the x-axis of Figure 8 in terms of the declining advantage in representation received by Democratic as opposed to Republican constituents. For example, with respect to
Figure 8: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE: DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUENTS WITH DEMOCRATIC MCs AND REPUBLICAN CONSTITUENTS WITH REPUBLICAN MCs
the first dimension on the left, one finds the greatest difference in
the levels of representation accorded to Democratic and Republican
constituents, to the benefit of the former. For the last dimension
on the right, the representational difference is again the largest
but now to the advantage of Republican constituents.

The pattern of constituent representation found on the civil
rights-related dimensions lends support to the argument outlined
above. Especially on the school desegregation sub-dimension, Demo­
cratic constituents were clearly better represented by Democratic
MCs than were Republican constituents by Republican MCs. Republican
constituents, on the other hand, were relatively better represented
than were Democratic constituents particularly with respect to Viet­
nam and jobs, but also on social welfare and foreign aid.

Caution, however, must be exercised in interpreting the data
presented in Figure 8. This particular need for caution is linked
to the usage of correlational analysis to measure the extent, or
how well, constituents' views are represented by their MC's policy
behavior. Accordingly, the level of representation observed for
the set of Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs and for
Republican constituents with Republican MCs on each of the various
policy dimensions may be a function, in part, of the variation among
the policy positions held by the constituents and MCs within each
party.

For example, consider the school desegregation sub-dimension.
Assume that the views of Republican MCs and constituents on this
dimension are about as homogeneous within congressional districts as
the corresponding preferences of Democratic MCs and constituents.
However, considering the makeup of the Democratic party, one might
too expect that the school desegregation attitudes among Democrats
in and out of the House would also vary more across districts than
the views held by Republicans. One might therefore find a higher
correlation between the preferences held by Democratic constituents
and MCs because of the greater inter-district variation in their
policy positions (Clausen, 1976). The better representation by
Republican MCs of the policy attitudes of their Republican constituents
concerning the war in Vietnam may likewise indicate a greater homoge­
neity of (Republican) constituent viewpoints within congressional,
districts and a greater difference across districts.

Thus, findings that indicate a lack of constituent representation
but which are based upon correlations may be attributable, in part,
to the lack of inter-district variation among the views held by that
particular subset of constituents. The statistical problem associated
with the relative sizes of inter/intra party differences will be
further explored in the following section.

Variation Among Constituents' Attitudes, By Party

In this section, the variation among the policy positions of
the constituents of each party will be investigated. Of all the
policy dimensions for which constituents' attitudes have been measured,
only the Vietnam and school desegregation dimensions will be focused
upon here. On the Vietnam dimension, Republican constituents who were represented by Republican MCs evinced the greatest (relative) representational advantage over Democratic constituents who were represented by Democratic MCs. Concerning school desegregation, just the reverse was true. Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs were better represented by the widest margin over Republican constituents with Republican MCs on this dimension. Specifically, I want to consider whether or not these two findings can be explained in terms of the intra-district homogeneity and inter-district heterogeneity of the views held by constituents.

Before examining the data, I want to explore some necessary "conditions" which must obtain in order for representation to exhibit itself in terms of correlations. The possible combinations with respect to the relative sizes of the inter- and intra-district variation of constituents' views are presented in Table 2. The rationale which underlies the particular cell entries in Table 2 is that the opportunities for correlations to reflect the true state of representation are enhanced as the ratio of inter-district to intra-district variation becomes larger (Clausen, 1976).

Of particular interest is the opportunity for representation to occur given that constituents' preferences are quite homogeneous within congressional districts, i.e. cells "a" and "c". Ordinarily, one would expect to find the highest level of representation when this condition of intra-district homogeneity of preferences occurs. (I am holding constant the motivation of MCs to reflect these constituents')
TABLE 2

OPPORTUNITIES FOR REPRESENTATION TO REFLECT THE TRUE STATE OF REPRESENTATION UNDER DIFFERING AMOUNTS OF INTER- AND INTRA-DISTRICT VARIATION OF CONSTITUENTS' VIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intra-district Homogeneity of Constituents' Views</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter-district Heterogeneity of Constituents' Views</td>
<td>High: Large(^1)</td>
<td>Small (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low: Small</td>
<td>Nil (b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Cell entries indicate the opportunities for representation to exhibit itself in terms of correlations given the specified levels of intra- versus inter-district variation in constituents' views.
views in the MCs' legislative behavior.) However, in order to have good representation (when measured with correlations), a second requirement is that there must also be a high level of inter-district variation in constituents' preferences as well. When both of these conditions obtain, the ratio of inter-district to intra-district variation is maximized. Hence, there is the greatest opportunity for representation to exhibit itself in terms of correlations (cell "a").

On the other hand, if the level of inter-district variation is low (and still assuming that constituents' views within districts are quite homogeneous), then this ratio of inter- to intra-district variation will be smaller. The opportunity to observe high correlations is accordingly reduced (cell "c").

Just the reverse of these conditions will also yield a smaller ratio. That is, the level of inter-district variation among constituents' views is high, but the homogeneity of these views within districts is low (cell "b").

The ratio of inter-district to intra-district variation is minimized when the inter-district heterogeneity of constituents' views is low as well as the intra-district homogeneity of constituents' views. Under this worst possible situation, the opportunity for representation to be reflected in correlations is virtually nil (cell "d").
To determine if the representational patterns observed on the Vietnam and school desegregation dimensions can be explained in terms of inter- and intra-district variation, I calculated the median and median deviation of the policy scores of Democratic constituents within each of the congressional districts with a Democratic congressman. A similar procedure was followed with respect to Republican constituents in those districts with Republican MCs. The focus here is on the intra-district homogeneity and inter-district variation of the policy preferences of the subset of constituents within each party who are represented by a MC of that party.

Independents as well as party identifiers who lacked a policy score on the dimension being examined were also excluded. Consequently, the number of constituents that were found within each appropriate district averaged less than ten for Democrats and around five for Republicans. Hence, caution must be exercised in interpreting the data due to small sample sizes.

(At first, I contemplated using means and standard deviations rather than medians and median deviations. However, because of the small number of constituents from each party within most of the districts, the mean statistic might be unduly influenced by a few extreme policy scores. Of course, if a mean statistic were so influenced, this would also affect the standard deviation of the policy scores calculated within that district. Therefore, for each subset of constituents of one party in a district with a MC of the same party,
I calculated the median and median deviation of their respective policy scores.¹)

To measure the degree of homogeneity amongst the attitudes held by constituents of each party within districts with MCs of that party, the median deviation of their scores was computed. Then, in order to obtain a single, overall indicator of the level of homogeneity of views within the districts with Democratic MCs and constituents in comparison to those districts with Republican MCs and constituents, the mean of the respective district median deviations was calculated. Thus, two mean statistics were obtained, one characterizing Democratic identifiers and the other Republican identifiers. The larger the mean, the less homogeneous are the attitudes of a party's constituents within congressional districts.

One difficulty did arise with respect to districts that contained but one Democrat or Republican constituent. The resultant median deviation for each such district, of course, was zero. If these districts were included, the zero median deviations would clearly depress the mean statistic, far beyond the relative contribution of each such district to the final correlation obtained between constituents' policy views and the legislative behavior of their MCs of the same party. I therefore decided that these districts should be eliminated from the analysis.

To measure inter-district variation, the initial step was to obtain the median of the policy scores of constituents of each party within districts with MCs of the same party.² Then the standard
deviation for each set of medians was calculated. The larger the resultant standard deviation, the greater is the inter-district variation among the policy positions of constituents of the party being examined.

Districts were separated into those containing at least one constituent of the MC's party and those having two or more constituents from that party. In this instance, however, the impact of these single-constituent districts upon the final statistic differed. The medians that were calculated from such districts tended ultimately to increase the standard deviation and, thus, the inter-district variation. Again, I believe that the impact exerted by these districts upon the standard deviation statistic clearly exceeded the relative contribution made by such districts to the calculation of the correlation coefficient. Hence, I decided to compute the standard deviation for the constituents of each party based on medians only from districts with at least two or more constituents from the MC's party.

The Vietnam policy dimension will be examined first (Figure 9). Recall that Republican constituents with Republican MCs evinced the greatest representational edge over Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs on this issue. With respect to intra-district homogeneity, the data suggest that the views of Democratic constituents with respect to Vietnam are less homogeneous than are the Vietnam views of Republican constituents. With respect to the inter-district
MEAN OF MEDIAN DEVIATIONS  
(Intra-district Homogeneity)  

STANDARD DEVIATION OF  
MEDIANS  
(Inter-district Variation)  

RATIO OF INTER- TO INTRA-DISTRICT VARIATION  

Figure 9: VARIATION OF CONSTITUENTS' VIETNAM POLICY PREFERENCES
variation of views, the preferences of Democratic constituents differ less from district to district (with Democratic MCs) than do the views held by Republican constituents (across those districts with Republican MCs).

The ratio of inter-district to intra-district variation in the preferences held by constituents of each party is also given in Figure 9. This ratio is slightly larger among Republicans (1.367) than among Democrats (1.182), indicating a somewhat greater opportunity for representation to be reflected in larger correlations. However, this "advantage" for Republicans is at most a modest one. Therefore the finding of better representation of Republican constituents on the Vietnam dimension becomes less of a statistical artifact.

The relationships observed with respect to school desegregation differ (Figure 10). The views of Democratic constituents with respect to school desegregation vary just slightly more within districts than do the corresponding views of Republican constituents. The difference is almost negligible. One the other hand, the views held by Democratic constituents clearly vary more among districts (i.e. inter-district variation) than do the corresponding views of Republican constituents. Consequently, the ratio of inter-district to intra-district variation of views is larger for Democrats (1.604) than for Republicans (1.481).

Although the ratio of inter- to intra-district variation of views is now larger among Democrats, the relative difference again seems to be a modest one. Because the "advantage" is indeed small, the earlier
Figure 10: VARIATION OF CONSTITUENTS' SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PREFERENCES
finding that the policy preferences of Democratic constituents with respect to school desegregation were better represented than were the attitudes of Republican constituents on this dimension also becomes less of a statistical artifact.

**Impact of Strength of Party Identification Upon Representation**

It was found earlier that the subset of constituents who were of the same party as their MC were better represented than were the full set of constituents. Subsequently, this subset of constituents with the same party identification as their MC was separated on the basis of party into Democratic and Republican constituents and MCs. The representation received by each group was then observed. In this section, the subset of constituents whose party identification is the same as their MC's, which includes both Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs and Republican constituents with Republican MCs, will be separated according to the strength of these constituents' attachments to their respective parties. Partisan identifiers can be divided into three sub-groups: Strong party identifiers; Weak party identifiers; and Independents who are leaning to one of the parties (hereafter referred to as "leaners").

It is expected that strong party identifiers will receive the best representation while leaners will receive the worst. The rationale which underlies this expectation was articulated earlier, in part, in reference to another argument.
First, it is assumed that constituents with a strong party identification will, in general, be more politically active in partisan affairs than are weak identifiers who in turn participate politically more than leaner do. The greater the amount of partisan political activity engaged in by a constituent, the more likely it is that that constituent's policy preferences will be communicated to his/her MC in one way or another. Second, from a slightly different perspective, again assume that strong identifiers participate more than weak identifiers and leaners. This participation may take many forms, especially including the direct communication by the constituent of his/her views to the MC. Consequently, for either of the above two reasons, MCs will have more and better information concerning the policy attitudes of strong identifiers, then of weak identifiers and finally of leaners, in this descending order. Hence, the expectation exists that MCs will best represent constituents who are strongly attached to the MC's party and worst represent constituents who are but leaning to that party.

Third, it may be that strong party identifiers and their MCs are more likely to share a common milieu than are weak identifiers and their MCs or leaners and theirs. Thus, constituents who have a strong partisan attachment and their respective MCs may have shared policy attitudes which derive from a shared milieu. Thus, the MC by voting the MC's own policy views best represents with his/her legislative behavior the attitudes of constituents who are strong identifiers of the party of the MC.
Specifically, the hypothesis to be tested in this section is:

\[ H_2: \text{ Constituents who are strongly attached to their party will be better represented by MCs of that party than are weak identifiers. The worst representation will be received by constituents who are leaning to the party.} \]

Figure 11 below, portrays the relationship between the strength of constituents' party attachment and the representation of their policy attitudes by their MCs of the same party.

A definite pattern emerges but one which is in direct contradiction of the hypothesis being tested. The evidence contained in Figure 11 indicates that constituents' strength of party attachment is inversely related to the representation of these constituents' views by their MCs of the same party. A monotonic, negative relationship can be found on almost all of the policy dimensions. Leaning-Independent identifiers received the highest level of representation on every dimension. In contrast, strong party identifiers were accorded the worst representation on all but two dimensions. The conclusion is unmistakable. The weaker a constituent's attachment to a party, the better represented his/her views are by the constituent's MC of the same party. This was particularly the case on the social welfare and school desegregation dimensions.

The reasonable inference to be drawn is that MCs of one party tend to better represent the attitudes of constituents identifying with that party who are more likely to vote for the candidate from the other party at the next election. For example, strong Democrats have very low defection rates. Thus, a Democratic MC would be fairly
Figure 11: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE RECEIVED BY CONSTITUENTS SUBSET ACCORDING TO THEIR STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION FROM THEIR MCs OF THE SAME PARTY.

Strong Weak Leaners
(SW L) (SW L) (SW L) (SW L) (SW L)
(Strength of party identification)
(policy dimension)
GAMMA VALUES

.50
.45
.40
.35
.30
.25
.20
.15
.10
.05
.00
-.05

1 1 1

Strong Weak Leaners

Civil Liberties Foreign Aid Vietnam Education

Figure 11 (continued)
certain of receiving their votes, almost regardless of the MC's legislative behavior. The Democratic MC would be less certain of receiving the support of Weak and Independent Democrats (leaners) and be more aggressive in pursuing their votes by considering their policy attitudes than those of the Strong Democrats.

The data considered so far in this section generally demonstrate that strength of party identification is negatively associated with the level of representation received by constituents with MCs of the same party. A moment's reflection, however, may be in order to ponder the extent to which that perennial nemesis of good representation—the inter/intra district variation of constituents' views—may have influenced this finding. Possibly, strong partisans and their MCs may have fairly homogeneous views in contrast to the more heterogeneous views held by leaners and their MC's. As a consequence, lower correlations might be observed for the former and higher ones for the latter.

One approach that may be used to assess the impact that differing degrees of variation have had upon levels of representation is to subset the data set by party. This would yield two subsets: (1) Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs and (2) Republican constituents with Republican MCs. The variation among constituents views' is maximized in the merged data set, because both Democrats and Republicans are included. However, when constituents and MCs are separated on the basis of party, then the amount of variation extant within each subset of constituents and MCs should be lower.
than that found in the larger set. The reason is that the variation within party is known to be less than the variation that exists between the parties on most issues. Thus, one would expect the representational correlations to be weaker or lower when it is computed within party (Clausen, 1976). The data for Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs (Figure 12) and Republican constituents with Republican MCs (Figure 13) are presented below.

The first observation can be drawn is that the stronger a Democratic constituent's attachment to that party is, the less-well his/her views are represented by the constituent's Democratic MC. On every dimension, Independent Democrats received the best representation. The worst representation on all but two dimensions was accorded to Strong Democrats.

A similar, nearly as strong pattern, emerges with respect to the representation received by Republican identifiers from their Republican MCs (Figure 13). On every dimension, Strong Republicans are accorded the worst representation, with the exception of Vietnam where they place second. Either Weak or Independent Republicans receive the best representation on all dimensions.

Thus, the negative relationship between the strength of constituents' attachment to a party and level of representation received that was found with respect to the set of all constituents with MCs of the same party still persists when the set is separated on the basis of party. A similar, negative relationship characterized the representation received by Democratic constituents from Democratic MCs and by
Figure 12: REPRESENTATION BY HOUSE DEMOCRATIC MCs OF DEMOCRATIC IDENTIFIERS SUBSET BY PARTY LOYALTY
Figure 13: POLICY REPRESENTATION BY HOUSE REPUBLICAN MCs OF REPUBLICAN IDENTIFIERS SUBSET BY STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Republican constituents from Republican MCs. I would conclude, therefore, that the original finding of the negative relationship with respect to the merged data set is not merely attributable to the pattern of intra/inter-district variation which characterizes the views held by constituents of varying degrees of party loyalty.

The finding that strength of party identification is negatively associated with representation suggests that MCs of both parties modify their positions in the direction of the positions held by weaker partisans, whether this means moving toward the center or toward the extremes. For example, Independent Republicans may have been the least supportive of social welfare, etc. This argument will be further considered in the concluding chapter.

**Impact of Party Identification: Policy Representation in the House**

Before turning attention to constituent representation in the Senate, I want to briefly reconsider the findings thus far presented. Party has had an impact upon constituent representation in the House. Constituents of the same party as their MC were found to be better represented than were the full set of constituents. This was particularly the case on the social welfare-related dimensions.

Too, on some dimensions — noticeably school desegregation — Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs were distinctly better represented than Republican constituents with Republican MCs. On other dimensions, particularly Vietnam, just the reverse was true. The Republican constituents were better represented.
Finally, and perhaps most intriguing, a negative relationship was observed between the strength of constituents' attachment to a party and the representation received from MCs of that party. Independents leaning to either party, and especially to the Democratic party, tended to receive the best representation. Strong party identifiers in nearly every case received the worst representation.

POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE

For the remainder of this chapter the impact of party upon representation in the Senate will be examined. Primarily, the aim will be to ascertain whether or not the patterns which emerged with respect to the representation of constituent's policy views in the House also characterizes the Senate.

Impact of Party Identification

Recall that the following hypothesis concerning constituent representation in the House was supported by the data:

\[ H_1: \text{ Constituents of the same party as their MC will be better represented than the full set of constituents.} \]

The rationale underlying this hypothesis is that MCs will have more information concerning the policy preferences of the subset of their constituents who are of the same party than of the full set of constituents. This may occur for several reasons. First, constituents may be more likely to communicate their views to an MC of the same party. Second, the MC is more likely to be aware of the policy
preferences of those individuals — usually of the same party identification as the MC — who comprise the MC's electoral coalition.

Third, constituents and MCs of the same party are more likely to share a common milieu. Consequently, such constituents and MCs may have shared policy attitudes which derive from a shared milieu. In this latter instance, the MC merely by voting his/her own policy preferences will represent the views of those constituents of the same party.

With respect to the Senate, however, the hypothesis receives mixed support (Figure 14). The greatest impact of party occurs on the social welfare dimensions, especially jobs and education. It is on these dimensions that constituents whose senators are of the same party are found to be relatively better represented than are the full set of constituents. This suggests that social welfare matters may distinguish the parties and their supporters at the statewide level. A similar, but stronger pattern existed in the House.

However, party did not have the expected impact on the civil rights and civil liberties dimensions. Indeed, the full set of constituents were better represented than were constituents of the same party as their senator's. I will reconsider these findings and suggest an explanation for their occurrence in the final section of this chapter.
Figure 14: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE: CONSTITUENTS WITH THE SAME PARTY IDENTIFICATION AS THEIR MC'S AND THE FULL SET OF CONSTITUENTS
Representation Within Party

Recall that earlier in the chapter the representation received by Democratic constituents from their Democratic MCs was contrasted with that received by Republican constituents from their Republican MCs with respect to the House. On about half the dimensions, particularly those related to civil rights, the Democratic constituents were observed to be the better represented group. On the remaining dimensions, particularly Vietnam, the Republicans were accorded higher levels of representation. The data with respect to the representation received by Democratic and Republican constituents in the Senate from their MCs of the same party is presented below (Figure 15).

Democratic constituents are better represented, and then just barely so, than Republican constituents on but two dimensions: social welfare and jobs. With respect to one of the two civil rights scales, the constituents of each party have their views represented equally well by MCs of their respective party. On all of the remaining dimensions, Republican constituents with Republican MCs are better represented than are Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs.

One finding that is readily apparent from Figure 15 is that both Republican constituents and Democratic ones are not well-represented by their respective senators of the same party. Higher correlations were observed with respect to the representation of constituents by their MCs of the same party in the House. These lower correlations for the Senate will also be considered in the final section.
Figure 15: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE: DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUENTS WITH DEMOCRATIC MCs AND REPUBLICAN CONSTITUENTS WITH REPUBLICAN MCs
Impact of Strength of Party Identification Upon Representation

Recall the hypothesized relationship thought to exist with respect to the House between the strength of a constituent's loyalty to a party and the subsequent representation of that constituent's policy views by his/her congressmen.

$H_2$: Constituents who are strongly attached to a party will be better represented by MCs of that party than are constituents who are but weakly identified with that party. The worst representation will be received by constituents who are "leaning" to the party.

The rationale which underlies this hypothesis was discussed in the analysis of House representation. However, the hypothesis was disconfirmed. The finding was that stronger attachment to a particular party yielded poorer representation. This was especially true of Democratic constituents represented by Democratic MCs but also characterized the representation received by Republican constituents from Republican MCs, as well as that received by constituents of either party in the merged data set from their MCs of the same party.

How well strong, weak and leaning identifiers are represented in the Senate by their MC's of the same party is presented below (Figure 16). Once again, strength of party identification appears to be negatively associated with the level of representation received. The relationship, however, was stronger with respect to the House.

To assess the impact that the variation among the views respectively held by strong, weak, and leaning identifiers may have had upon this finding, the merged data set will also be separated on the basis of
Figure 16: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE RECEIVED BY CONSTITUENTS SUBSET ACCORDING TO THEIR STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION FROM THEIR MCs OF THE SAME PARTY.
party. The representation received by Democratic constituents from their Democratic senators (Figure 17) and by Republican constituents from their Republican senators (Figure 18) is presented below.

Strength of attachment to the Democratic party and the representation of constituents' policy attitudes are negatively related, especially on the social welfare-related dimensions. The major exception concerns the foreign aid policy dimension. Here strength of party identification and level of representation were not related at all. Strong, weak, and independent Democrats were all similarly represented on foreign aid, with each group having no representation of their foreign aid views.

Figure 17 does indicate that on all of the dimensions except foreign aid and one of the two civil rights scales, independent Democrats are better represented than weak and strong Democratic partisans. On the single civil rights scale that is the exception, weak Democrats receive the best representation followed by independent Democrats. Finally, strong Democrats receive the worst representation on all dimensions but Vietnam where weak Democrats do just slightly worse.

The reasonable conclusion is that Senate Democrats, like their counterparts from both parties in the House, tend to take for granted the electoral support of constituents who identify strongly with their party. Thus, Senate Democrats would be more inclined to represent the policy views of weak and especially independent Democrats. The
Figure 17: REPRESENTATION BY SENATE DEMOCRATIC MCs OF DEMOCRATIC IDENTIFIERS SUBSET BY PARTY LOYALTY
Figure 18: POLICY REPRESENTATION BY SENATE REPUBLICAN MCs OF REPUBLICAN IDENTIFIERS SUBSET BY STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
rationale would be to secure the votes of party identifiers whose support at the next election tends to be less certain.

The pattern with respect to Republican senators is much less clear. On a third of the dimensions, independent Republicans are better represented than strong Republicans (Figure 18). The data also suggest, however, that all three groups -- strong, weak, and independent Republicans -- tend to be more equally represented by their Republican MCs than were the three corresponding groups of Democratic constituents by their Democratic MCs.

In sum, subsetting the data set by party has yielded the following observations. The data suggest a strong, negative relationship between the strength of Democratic constituents' attachment to their party and the representation of their policy attitudes by Democratic MCs. This relationship is as strong, if not stronger, than the one which characterized the merged set of constituents from both parties and the subset of each party's identifiers with respect to the House. One the other hand, the relationship was found to be much weaker among Republican constituents with Republican senators.

**Impact of Party Identification: Policy Representation in the Senate**

It was found that constituents of the same party as their MC's were better represented than the full set of constituents on about one-half of the dimensions, especially the social welfare-related ones. The reverse was true, however, on the remaining dimensions.
With respect to the House, the data support the proposition that constituents of the same party as their MC will be better represented.

The data also suggest that among Democrats, the stronger the attachment of constituents to their party, the less well-represented their views are. With respect to Republican senators and constituents, on less than half the dimensions was this the case. In regards to the House and considering MCs and constituents of each of the two respective parties, one finds strong evidence that strength of party attachment is negatively related to constituent representation.

In sum, party appears to have had a greater impact upon representation in the House than in the Senate. More pervasive (i.e. confirmed on more dimensions) and stronger representational relationships were observed with respect to the House. Thus, not only did hypotheses receive stronger support in regards to the House than the Senate but for the one hypothesis which was falsified, the data clearly suggested the existence of a new, counter-hypothesis.

There are at least two, very different explanations for this greater impact of party upon constituent representation in the House. First, many congressional observers have noted that party does have more of an influence upon MCs' legislative behavior in the House than in the Senate. One might expect, therefore, that party would also have a greater effect upon the representation by MCs of constituents' policy preferences in the House as well.
Second, the sheer size of the geographical unit may directly affect the ability of the MC to well-represent his/her constituents. Obviously, many more citizens will reside in a state than in a congressional district, with the lone exception of those states with but one MC in the House. Consequently, as was discussed in Chapter Two, the policy score of a senator is "matched" with the scores of a greater number of constituents than is the policy score of a representative. If one then makes the not unreasonable assumption that constituents' attitudes are more heterogeneous within a state than within a congressional district (within the same party), the barriers to good constituent representation in the Senate become clear. A Senator is faced with the perplexing task of attempting to reflect in his/her legislative behavior a much wider range of constituents' views than is the representative. Thus, the general expectation is that the representation -- correlation will generally be lower for the Senate than for the House.

In the following chapter, I will consider the policy representation received by constituents who have a party identification different from their MC's. Too, the representation accorded to Independents by Democratic and Republican MCs will be examined in the next chapter. Then I will compare the representation received by the various subsets of constituents considered in the two chapters.
CHAPTER NOTES

1. The formula for the median deviation is:

\[
\text{Median Deviation} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} |X_i - M_d|}{N}
\]

2. I am indebted to Steven M. Yarnell for writing the computer program which generated the appropriate data.
CHAPTER FIVE
POLICY REPRESENTATION RECEIVED BY CONSTITUENTS
NOT OF THE SAME PARTY AS THEIR MC

In the previous chapter, the representation received by constituents who were of the same party as their MC was examined. In this chapter, I will consider the policy representation accorded to constituents who have a party identification different from their MC's. This group of constituents can be separated into the following four subsets: (1) Democratic constituents with a Republican MC; (2) Independent constituents with a Republican MC; (3) Republican constituents with a Democratic MC; and (4) Independent constituents with a Democratic MC. (Recall that an "Independent constituent" is a constituent who is not identified with or even "leaning" to either party.) Then I will compare the levels of representation received by these subsets of constituents with those accorded to the groups of constituents who were considered in the previous chapter. My purpose is to identify the subset of constituents who were better represented than any other. Representation will be examined first with respect to the House and then to the Senate.

Impact of Party Identification Upon Representation in the House

In chapter four, it was hypothesized that constituents of the same party as their MC will be better represented than the full set
of constituents. The former were expected to be better represented because it was believed that MCs would possess more accurate information concerning the policy preferences of this subset of their constituents having the same party identification. This may occur for several reasons. Briefly, constituents may be more likely to communicate their views to their MC if he/she is of the same party. Second, "attentive constituents" may inform the MC of the general policy attitudes held by the MC's supporters in the electorate, most of whom will have the same party identification as the MC. Third, constituents and a MC with the same party identification may be more likely to have similar policy preferences arising from a common milieu than would the MC and constituents belonging to the other party or to none at all. Therefore, the MC merely be voting the MC's own views will represent, perhaps even unknowingly, the views held by those constituents with the same party loyalty.

With regard to the House, there was support for the proposition. Constituents of the same party as their MC were found to be better represented than the full set of constituents. In this section, I want to compare directly the representation received by the subset of constituents whose party identification is the same as their MC's with the subset of constituents who have a party identification different from their MC's, with respect to the House.

Specifically, the following hypothesis is to be tested:

\[ H_1: \text{ Constituents of the same party as their MC will be better represented than constituents not of the same party as their MC.} \]
(All Independents are included in the subset of constituents who have a different party identification than their MC.)

Of course, we know now that the hypothesis to be tested in this section will be supported, given that the subset of constituents of the same party as their MC have previously been observed to be better represented than the full set of constituents. This finding necessarily implies that constituents not of the same party as their MC are also not as well-represented as are those constituents whose party identification is the same as their MC's. However, directly comparing the representation received by constituents of the same party as their MC with that received by constituents not of the same party as their MC can more clearly show the impact of party upon representation...

The data suggest that the respective parties tend to well-represent the general social welfare attitudes of their adherents, including specific opinions with respect to education and, to a lesser degree, jobs (Figure 19).

Moreover, Democratic and Republican constituents, one may infer, have markedly different policy views on these policy dimensions. This is indicated by the negative correlations for the subset of respondents not of the same party as their MC in comparison to the positive correlations observed for respondents who were of the same party as their MC. Minimally, these negative and positive correlations suggest that within districts there are sharp inter-party differences among constituents with respect to their social welfare attitudes.
Figure 19: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE: CONSTITUENTS WITH THE SAME PARTY IDENTIFICATION AS THEIR MC's AND CONSTITUENTS HAVING A PARTY IDENTIFICATION DIFFERENT FROM THEIR MC's
Party then exerts its greatest impact upon constituent representation on the social welfare-related dimensions.

For the subset of constituents not of the same party as their MC, the gamma correlations between their policy attitudes and the policy positions of their respective MCs was negative only on the social welfare-related policy dimensions. The legislative behavior of MCs tended systematically to reflect policy positions diametrically opposed to the preferences held by constituents not of the same party as the MC. On the remaining policy dimensions, the correlation approached zero. A zero correlation implies that MCs simply do not represent the policy views of constituents not identifying with their party. In effect, it is as if the views of these constituents were being randomly matched with the policy positions of their respective other-party MCs, with respect to non-social-welfare issues.

In sum, there is strong support for the hypothesis. On every policy dimension but one (foreign aid) constituents of the same party as their MC were better represented than constituents not of the same party as their MC. The largest differences in the levels of representation received by each group of constituents occur on the social welfare policy dimensions, including the education and jobs sub-dimensions. This finding suggests, as was noted earlier, that social-welfare issues may be the most party-oriented of the issues under consideration.

The subset of constituents focused upon in this section who have a party identification different from their MC's is in turn further
comprised of several subsets. In the following section, I want to examine the representation received by each of these latter subsets.

Representation of Independents and of Constituents of one Party With an MC in the Other

Constituents not of the same party as their MC can be dichotomized into Independents, represented by MCs from either party, and constituents identifying with one party but who are represented in the House by a MC of the other. While constituents of the same party as their MC have been found to be better represented than constituents not of the same party as theirs, it may prove interesting to determine if this occurs because of the poor representation accorded by MCs to Independents or to constituents identifying with the other party. Another possibility, of course, is that both of these subsets of constituents are about equally, but rather poorly, represented by their respective MCs.

My expectation is that Independents will be better represented than are partisans with a MC of the opposite party. This belief is based on the assumption that MCs will more readily represent the policy preferences held by constituents who are then more likely to reciprocate by supporting the MC at the next election. In this regard, a greater proportion of Independents could be expected to cast their ballots for the MC in response to the MC's (favorable) legislative behavior than would constituents of the other party.
From another perspective, to garner electoral support from adherents of the other party, a MC would have to better represent their views than the MC would correspondingly need to do with respect to the preferences of Independents in order to win their votes. That is, constituents who identify with the other party, I would argue, need greater inducements to defect from their party than do Independents who, of course, have no psychological attachment to any party.

There is a second reason why Independents may receive better representation than do constituents with a MC of the other party. It may be "easier" for MCs to represent the preferences of Independents than of those constituents identified with the other party. That is, the views of the former may be closer to the views held by constituents of the MC's party who have already been found to be better represented. Hence, the expectation is that constituents not of the MC's party will be poorly represented.

Specifically, the hypothesis to be tested in this section is:

\[ H_2: \text{Independents will be better represented by MCs of either party than are constituents of one party whose MC is of the other.} \]

The first observation that may be drawn is that Independents are not especially well-represented by their MCs (Figure 20). Recall that these are non-leaning Independents being considered here. A modest exception occurs on the civil rights dimensions. This is probably a function of the earlier finding that all constituents tend
Figure 20: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE: CONSTITUENTS OF ONE PARTY WHOSE MC IS OF THE OTHER AND OF CONSTITUENTS WHO ARE INDEPENDENTS
to have their views on civil rights better represented by their MCs' behavior than on any other dimension.

While Independents may not be well-represented, constituents of one party whose MC is in the other are even worse off with but one exception (foreign aid). The negative correlations observed for these constituents on the social welfare-related dimensions are even greater than those found in the previous section with respect to the subset of all constituents not of the same party as their MC. For the latter, Independents exerted some positive influence, albeit of only slight magnitude.

The conclusion is unmistakable. If a constituent's MC is of the other party, do not expect the MC to represent that constituent's policy views in the MC's legislative behavior. This is especially true for social welfare, education, and jobs. Consider, as the prime example, the representation received by constituents with the same party identification as their MC on the education sub-dimension (.35 gamma correlation) in comparison to the representation received by constituents of one party whose MC is of the other (-.20) (Figures 19 and 20).

Clearly, the hypothesis is supported by the data. Independents are not particularly well-represented. However, they are better represented as predicted than constituents of one party with a MC of the other. The latter tend to have their non-social welfare preferences virtually ignored by their respective MCs. Even worse, with
respect to social welfare concerns, the legislative behavior of MCs tends to reflect policy positions quite divergent from the social welfare attitudes held by their constituents in the other party. This again demonstrates the impact of party upon constituent representation on the social welfare-related dimensions.

Two final observations remain to be made. The first concerns the level of representation received by Democratic constituents from their Republican MCs in contrast to that received by Republican constituents who have Democratic MCs. On every dimension except those concerning civil rights, there is virtually no difference in the levels of representation accorded to each group of constituents (i.e. constituents of one party with an MC of the other). Both groups are generally poorly represented. The only exception is on the civil rights dimensions where Republican constituents with Democratic MCs tend to be slightly better represented but still not well-represented. (Figure not presented.)

The other observation concerns the representation received by Independents from Democratic as opposed to Republican MCs. It was mentioned in Chapter Four that Republican MCs gave better representation to Republican constituents than Democratic MCs did for Democratic constituents particularly on the Vietnam and civil liberties dimensions. The same is true with respect to the representation of Independents' views concerning Vietnam and civil liberties. Independents with Republican MCs were better represented than those with Democratic MCs on the civil liberties (.37 vs .04) and Vietnam (.33 vs .01)
dimensions. (Figure not presented.) With respect to the remaining dimensions, no consistent pattern emerged. On the social welfare dimension, Independents with Republican MCs were somewhat better represented, but on the education and jobs sub-dimensions Independents with Democratic MCs were. The latter were also better represented on the school desegregation dimension and on one of the two civil rights dimensions.

In sum, it has been learned in this section that constituents of one party with a MC in the other are virtually unrepresented, particularly on the social welfare-related dimensions. This subset of constituents, however, can be further subdivided according to the strength of their attachment to their respective parties. In the following section, I want to consider whether or not the representation received by constituents of one party with a MC of the other is affected by the strength of these constituents' party loyalty.

Impact of Strength of Party Identification Upon Representation

In Chapter Four, it was hypothesized that constituents who are strongly attached to a party will be better represented by MCs of that party than are constituents who are but weakly attached to that party. The worst representation would be received by constituents who are but leaning to that party. The proposition, however, was clearly disconfirmed. Rather, it was observed that the stronger a constituent's attachment to a party, the less well his/her views were represented by MCs of that party. This was particularly true with respect to
representation in the House. To explain the finding that strength of constituents' attachment to a party and the representation of their policy attitudes by MCs of that same party is negatively related, it was suggested that MCs of both parties modify their positions in the direction of the positions held by weaker partisans, whether this means moving toward the center or toward the extremes; e.g. Independent Democrats may have been the strongest critics of our Vietnam involvement, most supportive of civil rights, etc.

While Chapter Four was concerned with the representation received by constituents with MCs of the same party, this chapter focuses upon constituents not of the same party as their MC. The expectation is that the strength of constituents' attachment to their party will be negatively related to the representation of their policy preferences by MCs of the other party. Thus, MCs of one party will tend to better represent the attitudes held by those constituents of the other party who have a greater likelihood of defecting from their party at the next election and of supporting the MC. For example, Strong Republicans (constituents) have very low defection rates. A Democratic MC would be fairly certain of not receiving their votes, almost regardless of the MC's legislative behavior. The Democratic MC would be more likely to receive the support of weak and independent Republicans. Thus, the Democratic MC might aggressively pursue their votes by considering their policy attitudes more than strong Republicans'. 
The precise hypothesis to be tested in this section is:

\( H_3 \): Constituents who are leaning to the Democratic (Republican) party will be better represented by Republican (Democratic) MCs than are weak identifiers with the Democratic (Republican) party. The worst representation will be received by constituents who are strongly attached to the Democratic (Republican) party from Republican (Democratic) MCs.

Looking first at the representation that Democratic MCs give to their Republican constituents, we see that support for the hypothesis is at best mixed (Figure 21). On about half of the policy dimensions, the relative representation of strong, weak, and independent Republicans is in the predicted direction. The former received the worst representation and the latter the best. Strong Republicans were most poorly represented by their Democratic MCs on the education and school desegregation dimensions, particularly if viewed in comparison to the at least fair representation accorded to independent and weak Republicans on these dimensions.

That strong Republicans would not have their school desegregation preferences well-represented may make sense. It was observed in Chapter Four that Democratic MCs tend to represent well the views held by Democratic constituents concerning desegregation matters. Thus, the implication is that the desegregation views of strong Republicans diverge more from the positions held by Democratic constituents than do the preferences of weak and independent Republicans. On the other hand, my expectation was that strong Republicans would be poorly represented on all of the social welfare-related
Figure 21: POLICY REPRESENTATION BY HOUSE DEMOCRATIC MCs OF REPUBLICAN IDENTIFIERS SUBSET BY STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
policy dimensions, given the earlier findings in this chapter that the social welfare preferences held by supporters of each party are quite divergent. Only on the education sub-dimension was this expectation realized.

On the remaining policy dimensions, strong Republicans were the better represented subset. Weak and independent Republicans with one exception were about equally but not as well-represented on these other dimensions. These data tend to disconfirm the hypothesis being tested in this section.

Somewhat greater support for the hypothesis is found when one examines the representation received by Democratic constituents from their Republican MCs (Figure 22). Independent Democrats are better represented than weak and strong Democrats on about two-thirds of the policy dimensions. Strong Democrats received the worst representation on about one-half the dimensions and were the best represented subset on only one.

The hypothesis was most successful in predicting the representational pattern found on the Vietnam dimension. Independent Democrats were noticeably better represented than strong Democrats. The level of representation received by weak Democrats fell nearly in the center between these two extremes. This finding accords nicely with the observation made in Chapter Four that Republican MCs tend to represent particularly well the Vietnam policy preferences of their Republican constituents. The assumption is that the latter diverge most from the Vietnam policy views presumably held by strong Democrats.
Figure 22: POLICY REPRESENTATION BY HOUSE REPUBLICAN MCs OF DEMOCRATIC IDENTIFIERS SUBSET BY STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
In sum, overall support for the hypothesis that among constituents of one party represented by a MC of the other, independent identifiers will be better represented than weak identifiers who in turn will be better represented than strong identifiers was mixed. On more than half the policy dimensions, the predicted representational relationships were observed. Too, the predicted relationships were found more frequently with respect to the representation of Democratic constituents by Republican MCs than of Republican constituents by Democratic MCs.

This chapter has focused upon the representation received by constituents not of the same party as their MC. The previous chapter examined the representation accorded to constituents who were of the same party as their MC. The general purpose of these analyses is to determine which constituents are better represented on the various policy dimensions. As shown in Figure 23, the subset of constituents receiving the best representation in the House on all dimensions are Independents leaning either to the Republican or Democratic parties, with but two exceptions. Weak Republicans receive the best representation on one dimension and true Independents on another. There is a strong indication that those constituents with weaker ties to their party are accorded the best representation by their MCs.

Finally, it should be observed that the correlations for the various subsets of constituents considered with respect to foreign aid tended to be lower in comparison to the respective correlations obtained on the other policy dimensions. No single group of
Figure 23: POLICY REPRESENTATION RECEIVED ON EACH DIMENSION BY ALL CONSTITUENTS (NO CONTROL SITUATION) COMPARED TO HIGHEST LEVEL RECEIVED BY ANY SUBSET OF CONSTITUENTS HERETOFORE CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
constituents was much better represented than the rest on the foreign aid dimension. This may suggest, on the one hand, that party is not an important variable in differentiating well- and poorly-represented constituents on this dimension. On the other, several studies have shown the greater influence of the President upon MCs' legislative behavior with respect to foreign affairs. (See, for example, Kesselman, 1970.)

POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE

For the remainder of this chapter, the impact of party upon representation in the Senate will be examined. Primarily, the aim will be to ascertain whether or not the patterns which emerged with respect to the representation of constituents' policy views in the House also characterizes the Senate.

Impact of Party Identification

Recall that the following hypothesis concerning constituent representation in the House was supported by the data:

\[ H_1: \text{ Constituents of the same party as their MC will be better represented than constituents not of the same party as their MC.} \]

With respect to the Senate, however, the hypothesis receives mixed support. (Figure 24). This conforms to the finding (Chapter Four) that constituents of the same party as their MC were not found to be consistently better represented than were the full set of constituents.
Figure 24: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE: CONSTITUENTS WITH THE SAME PARTY IDENTIFICATION AS THEIR MC's AND CONSTITUENTS HAVING A PARTY IDENTIFICATION DIFFERENT FROM THEIR MC's
The greatest impact of party occurs on the social welfare-related policy dimensions, especially the jobs and education sub-dimensions. Constituents of the same party as their senator's are better represented than are constituents not of the same party. Apparently, social welfare concerns do distinguish the parties and their respective supporters at the statewide level. A similar, although much stronger pattern existed in the House.

Party, on the other hand, did not manifest any positive impact on the civil rights and civil liberties policy dimensions. Indeed, constituents not of the same party as their senator's were better represented than constituents who were of the same party. This may mean that civil rights and civil liberties were not perceived by senators as particularly salient to their own party supporters throughout the state.

The finding that party does not have any influence on several policy dimensions suggests that the group of constituents with senators not of the same party might fruitfully be further examined. In the following section, the representation accorded to constituents who (1) identify with one party but whose senator is in the other and (2) are true Independents will be discussed.

Representation of Independents and of Constituents of One Party With An MC in the Other

Recall that the following hypothesis also was supported by the data with respect to the House:
Independents will be better represented by MCs of either party than are constituents of one party whose MC is of the other.

The rationale underlying this hypothesis concerns the relative ease with which an MC may gain electoral support from each group of constituents by reflecting their respective policy preferences in the MC's legislative behavior. The assumption is that constituents of one party will not readily defect from their party to vote for an MC of the other party. Therefore, for the MC to win the support of those constituents from the other party, the MC will have to very well-represent their views. Independents, on the other hand, have no psychological attachment to either party. An MC may consequently believe that independents need not be represented as well or to the same high degree in order to secure their votes at the next election. The policy views of constituents of the other party may, as a result, be ignored altogether.

There is another related reason why Independents may be expected to be better represented than constituents of one party with an MC of the other. The policy preferences held by Independents may be more similar to those held by constituents of the same party as the MC than are the views of constituents not of the same party as the MC. MCs have already been observed in Chapter Four and Five to better represent the subset of their constituents of the same party. This may "spillover" into better representation also being accorded to Independents than to constituents of the other party if indeed the
former's policy positions diverge less from those held by constituents of the MC's party.

From Figure 25, one may observe that on all dimensions but two (foreign aid and education) Independents are better represented than constituents of one party with senators of the opposite party. However, the differences except on the jobs sub-dimension are slight. This contrasts rather sharply with the House. There the pattern which emerged portrayed constituents with MCs in the House of the opposite party to be quite poorly represented, especially on social welfare matters. The jobs sub-dimension aside, this is certainly not the case for the Senate.

In sum, independents generally were better represented than were constituents with a senator of the opposite party, but the difference in the amount of representation received was small. The data also seem to suggest that senators may be more willing to represent the policy views of constituents identifying with the other party than are congressmen.

In this section it has been learned that constituents of one party with a senator of the opposite party are nearly as well represented as Independents. In the following section, I want to examine the relationship between the strength of the former's attachment to their respective parties and the representation accorded them by their other-party MCs.
Figure 25: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE: CONSTITUENTS OF ONE PARTY WHOSE MC IS OF THE OTHER AND OF CONSTITUENTS WHO ARE INDEPENDENTS.
Impact of Strength of Party Identification Upon Representation

Recall that the following hypothesis received but mixed support with respect to the House:

\[ H_3: \] Constituents who are leaning to the Democratic (Republican) party will be better represented by Republican (Democratic) MCs than are weak identifiers with the Democratic (Republican) Party. The worst representation will be received by constituents who are strongly attached to the Democratic (Republican) Party from Republican (Democratic) MCs.

The rationale underlying this proposition concerns the ease with which an MC might expect to win electoral support from those constituents identifying with the opposite party. It was thought that the stronger a constituent's attachment to the other party, the less likely that constituent would defect from his/her party in response to the MC's legislative behavior, even if such behavior was perceived as favorable by this opposite-party constituent. The MC might, therefore, pursue more aggressively the future votes of constituents "leaning" or but weakly attached to the other party by according them better representation.

A corollary to the above hypothesis is that the predicted representational relationship will not be as strong among the subset of Democratic constituents with Republican senators. This expectation is linked to the Republican senator's electoral predicament. The Republican senator, more so than a Democratic one, must secure support from constituents identifying with the other party.
The test of the hypothesis with respect to the Senate yields findings that are somewhat unique. Heretofore, stronger representa­tional relationships were always observed with respect to the House rather than to the Senate. This occurred for either or both of the following reasons. First, the absolute differences in the levels of representation accorded to the particular subsets of constituents identified in the hypothesis being tested was larger with respect to the House. Second, more deviant instances or cases appeared when examining representation in the Senate. For example, a group of constituents who were hypothesized to be poorly-represented were found to be well-represented.

The representation received by Republican constituents from their Democratic senators will be considered first (Figure 26). As predicted by the hypothesis, independent Republicans received the best representation on every policy dimension. Strong Republicans were accorded the lowest level of representation on two-thirds of the dimension. The hypothesis appears confirmed with respect to Republican constituents with Democratic senators. The stronger these constituents' attachment to the Republican party, the less-well represented their policy preferences are by their Democratic senators.

The situation differs with respect to the representation received by Democratic constituents from their Republican senators (Figure 27). According to the hypothesis, independent Democrats should be the best represented subset, followed by weak Democrats; and strong Democrats should be the worst represented on the various policy
Figure 26: POLICY REPRESENTATION BY SENATE DEMOCRATIC MCs OF REPUBLICAN IDENTIFIERS SUBSET BY STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Figure 27: POLICY REPRESENTATION BY SENATE REPUBLICAN MCs OF DEMOCRATIC IDENTIFIERS SUBSET BY STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION
dimensions. With but one exception, however, all three subsets of constituents are about equally represented on every dimension by their respective Republican senators.

In sum, the representation by Senate Democratic MCs of Republican constituents subset by the strength of their party identification conforms well with the hypothesis being tested in this section. Independent Republicans received the best representation on every policy dimension. This suggests that Democratic senators may be trying to strengthen their already existing electoral advantage by garnering as much support as possible from those constituents located across the center of the political spectrum. These constituents would include weak and independent Democrats, Independents, and independent and weak Republicans. This line of reasoning is supported by the additional observation that independent Republicans in every case receive better representation from their Democratic MCs than Strong Democrats do from theirs (Figure not presented.)

Republican senators, on the other hand, represent about equally-well the policy views of the subset of their constituents identifying with the Democratic party, irrespective of the strength of these constituents' attachment to that party. The Republican senator's greater overall need for support from constituents identifying with the other party may explain this finding. Democratic senators are under less constraint and may represent well only those Republican constituents who hold policy preferences more similar to their own
and/or to the views of Democratic constituents. Indeed, Senate Democratic MCs noticeably better represent independent Republicans than Senate Republican MCs represent independent Democrats.

In Figure 28, I identify the subset of constituents considered in this and the previous chapter who have received the highest level of representation in the Senate on each of the policy dimensions. To facilitate comparisons, the amount of representation received by all constituents from their senators on each policy dimension is also depicted.

On all dimensions except foreign aid, the best representation is provided by Democratic senators. In three instances, the subset of constituents who are the beneficiaries of this good representation is independent Democrats. On three dimensions, it is independent Republicans. On two, Independents are the best represented subset of constituents. On every dimension, as was the situation in the House, Independents or leaners were the best represented, single subset of constituents. Thus, the negative relationship between strength of party identification and level of representation is reaffirmed.

Finally, Figure 28 also indicates that not much success was realized in identifying subsets of constituents who were well-represented on the foreign aid or Vietnam dimensions. The amount of representation received by all constituents from their senators on these two dimensions was somewhat low to begin with. Subsetting by party did not raise these levels by very much.
Figure 28: POLICY REPRESENTATION RECEIVED ON EACH DIMENSION BY ALL CONSTITUENTS (NO CONTROL SITUATION) COMPARED TO HIGHEST LEVEL RECEIVED BY ANY SUBSET OF CONSTITUENTS HERETOFORE CONSIDERED WITH RESPECT TO THE SENATE.
In the preceding chapters, the impact of political awareness and of party upon representation in the House and in the Senate have been examined. In general, constituents who were more politically aware were found to be better represented than less-aware constituents. The differences, however, were not always large. Too, some constituents who were more unaware politically were observed, nonetheless, to be better represented on at least two of the three measures of awareness employed. In sum, the relationship between political awareness and constituent representation was neither a strong nor a consistent one.

The situation differed with respect to party. More clear-cut findings emerged when the relationship between party and representation was considered. Two findings are particularly important. First, constituents of the same party as their MCs were accorded better representation than were constituents with MCs of the opposite party. Second, among constituents with MCs of the same party, significant covariation of representation with strength of party identification was observed. Unexpectedly, however, it was the stronger party
identifiers who received the worst representation on each of the dimensions, with Independents leaning to either party being the best represented.

In this chapter, additional hypotheses will not be tested. Rather, I will attempt to better understand the two relationships concerning party and representation by analyzing the effect upon each when controlling for political awareness.

The representation received in the House by the subset of constituents with MCs of the same party and by the subset with MCs of the opposite party, and controlling for these constituents' level of political awareness, will be examined first. Recall that three indicators were used to measure constituents' political awareness. These were: (1) respondent's psychological involvement in politics; (2) whether respondent had voted or not; and (3) the amount of political information possessed by the respondent. Each will be treated as a separate control variable.

Party and Political Involvement

The hypothesis that constituents who are more highly involved politically will be better represented by their MCs in the House received mild support in Chapter Three. On every policy dimension with the lone exception of school desegregation, highly involved constituents were accorded the best representation. Moderately involved constituents were the next best represented subset on about half of the dimensions.
While the levels of constituent representation generally varied in the anticipated direction, the absolute difference in the amount of representation received by the best and worst represented subset was not large. The relationship between political involvement and representation was strongest on the Vietnam dimension and, to a somewhat lesser extent, on the civil liberties one. Constituent representation on these two dimensions contrasted most sharply with the pattern found on the school desegregation one. On the latter dimension, political involvement was negatively related to representation. Highly involved constituents were the worst represented group; the least involved were accorded the best representation.

In this section, I will examine the representation received by constituents with MCs of the same party but with different levels of involvement. The amount of representation accorded to these constituents will then be compared to that received by constituents with MCs not of the same party but with comparable levels of political involvement. The data are presented below in Figure 29.

Recall that constituents of the same party as their MC were found to be better represented than constituents not of the same party as their MC on every policy dimension but one -- foreign aid. Moreover, the largest differences in the levels of representation received by each group of constituents occurred on the social welfare policy dimensions, including the education and jobs subdimensions. This suggests that social welfare issues are the most party-oriented of the issues being considered.
Constituents with HCs of the same party

Constituents with MCs of the opposite party

Figure 29: HOUSE: POLICY REPRESENTATION FOR CONSTITUENTS WITH MCs OF THE SAME PARTY COMPARED TO REPRESENTATION OF CONSTITUENT WITH MCs OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY, BY POLICY DIMENSION AND BY CONSTITUENTS' LEVEL OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT
Figure 29 (continued)
The conclusion is strengthened with the evidence contained in Figure 29. Among constituents with MCs of the same party, political involvement and level of representation is positively associated on each of the three social welfare-related dimensions. Furthermore, the subset of constituents with the lowest level of political involvement was accorded much better representation than were constituents with MCs of the opposite party, regardless of the level of political involvement. For example, constituents with MCs of the same party who were the least politically involved had their social welfare views better represented (.18) than did constituents with MCs of the opposite party who were either highly involved (-.15), moderately involved (-.16), or least involved (-.14). The data also suggest that among constituents with MCs of the other party political involvement and representation are not positively related on the social welfare, education, and jobs dimensions.

The influence of party is also greater on the remaining dimensions than is political involvement with but one notable exception. The impact of party upon foreign aid is nil. Constituents with the same level of political involvement are accorded nearly the identical amount of representation irrespective of whether their MCs are or are not of the same party. On each of the other dimensions, it is generally the case that among constituents with MCs of the same party the subset with the lowest level of representation and a particular level of involvement is still better represented than any subset
of constituents with MCs not of the same party, at any level of political involvement.

Focusing upon Vietnam and civil liberties, one finds, perhaps, the strongest influence of political involvement relative to that of party. Both among constituents having a MC of the same party and, to a lesser extent, among those having a MC of the other, involvement is positively associated with representation. The data suggest that constituent representation on each of these dimensions is less affected by party than were the social welfare dimensions and more influenced by the extent of constituents' political involvement. (The further apart the straight and broken-lines, which indicate the level of representation respectively obtained by constituents having and not having MCs of the same party, are in Figure 29; the greater is the impact of party.) It may be that civil liberties and especially Vietnam were such complex issues that individuals who were more highly aware politically were better able to formulate sophisticated policy views than were less politically aware constituents. Consequently, MCs became more cognizant of the views held by the former, especially of those constituents who were of the same party. Individuals who are very politically aware are, of course, more likely to communicate their policy preferences to their MCs. One implication of this argument is that these two issues were not "gut-issues" as the term is popularly employed. Rather, they are of the mind and not of the stomach. More data bearing on this preliminary judgment will be examined in the following two sections.
The final policy dimension to be considered in this section is that of school desegregation. It was noted earlier that political involvement and representation were found, surprisingly, to be negatively related on this dimension. Figure 29 suggests that this relationship only holds for those constituents with MCs of the same party. Among those constituents having MCs of the opposite party, the impact of involvement upon their representation is slight, although still in a negative direction. In effect, the school desegregation views held by the latter simply go unrepresented by their MCs of the other party, irrespective of these constituents' level of political involvement. That among constituents with MCs of the same party the less involved are better represented than the more involved is contrapuntal to the findings which emerged with respect to Vietnam and civil liberties. An explanation for this apparent anomaly, however, must await the upcoming examination of the influence of the other two indicators of political awareness upon constituent representation.

In sum, this section has focused upon the impact of political involvement upon the representation received by two subsets of constituents: those with MCs of the same party and those with MCs of the opposite party. One desired result has been to demonstrate the greater effect of involvement than was apparent when constituents were not separated according to their and their MC's party identification. On certain policy dimensions, e.g. those related to social
welfare matters, party clearly exerted a greater influence upon representation than did political involvement. With respect to civil liberties and Vietnam, on the other hand, the impact of these two factors was more balanced. On all of these dimensions — social welfare, education, jobs, civil liberties, and Vietnam — involvement was positively associated with the level of representation obtained, at least for those constituents with MCs of the same party. School desegregation presented the major exception. A negative relationship was observed between the level of constituents' political involvement and the representation received on this dimension. These findings specifically relate only to the political involvement measure of political awareness. To assess their pervasiveness, I will examine in the next section the relationship between another indicator of awareness — voting — and the representation received by constituents who have and who do not have MCs of the same party.

Party and Voting

Recall that the proposition that voters will be better represented than non-voters in the House received some support in Chapter Three. Particularly on the Vietnam and civil liberties dimensions and to a somewhat lesser extent on foreign aid, voters did receive better representation than non-voters. In contrast, voting had little impact upon the representation of constituents' views on civil rights and social welfare, including the various sub-dimensions related to each. This section will examine the representation accorded to
constituents with and without MCs of the same party and who, respectively, do and do not vote.

I will consider first the three social welfare-related policy dimensions: social welfare, education, and jobs. Does party or vote exert the greater influence? As shown in Figure 30, party has a stronger impact upon representation than does vote. (It was suggested earlier that the further apart the graphed lines are, the greater is the impact of party.) With respect to all of the policy dimensions, party exerts the greatest influence upon representation on the social welfare-related dimensions and to a slightly less degree on the civil rights-related ones. These data tend to confirm an observation made in the previous section. Social welfare issues may be the most party-oriented of those being considered.

Among constituents whose MC has the same party identification, vote is positively linked to representation both on the social welfare and jobs dimensions, i.e. voters are better represented than non-voters. On education, just the reverse is true. Non-voters are better represented.

The impact of party and vote on the remaining dimensions is generally similar to the pattern observed with respect to party and involvement in the previous section. The impact of party on foreign aid is slight in one instance and in an unexpected direction in the other. Voters are equally represented on this dimension whether or not they have MCs of the same party. Among non-voters, those with MCs of the opposite party are surprisingly better represented than
Figure 30: HOUSE: POLICY REPRESENTATION FOR CONSTITUENTS WITH MCs OF THE SAME PARTY COMPARED TO REPRESENTATION OF CONSTITUENTS WITH MCs OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY, BY POLICY DIMENSION AND BY CONSTITUENTS' VOTE
Figure 30 (continued)
are those with MCs of the same party. It has continually proven difficult to identify factors which significantly and in an understandable manner affect constituent representation with respect to foreign aid.

Focusing upon civil liberties and Vietnam, one probably finds the strongest influence of vote relative to that of party. Party does have an impact upon constituent representation on these two dimensions. However, the impact is clearly less than that which was manifested on the three social welfare-related dimensions. Vote, then, may exert a more nearly equal influence upon representation on these two dimensions. Thus, among constituents with MCs of the same party voters are clearly better represented than are non-voters on the civil liberties and Vietnam dimensions. The same relationship holds among constituents with MCs of the opposite party. The reduced impact of party is suggested by the better representation of voters with MCs of the opposite party than of non-voters who have MCs of the same party.

These data lend support to the claim advanced in the previous section that representation on the Vietnam and civil liberties dimensions is less affected by party and more by political awareness than is true for representation on the social welfare-related policy dimensions. There may be a cost to constituents, however, which is attributable to this greater, relative impact of vote. The overall levels of representation received do tend to be higher on the social welfare dimensions than on the civil liberties and Vietnam ones.
The remaining dimensions to be discussed are all linked to civil rights. In particular, the impact of vote vis-a-vis that of party upon constituent representation on these dimensions is slight. Constituents with MCs of the same party are clearly better represented than are constituents with MCs of the opposite party. Whether these constituents voted or not is essentially irrelevant if one is primarily concerned with representation. Overall, the pattern of findings is similar to that which emerged with respect to party and involvement in the previous section concerning these policy dimensions. Party then appears to exert the stronger impact, greater than that which was observed on the civil liberties and Vietnam dimensions but less of an impact upon representation than was manifested on the social welfare-related dimensions.

In sum, the findings obtained with vote as the measure of political awareness are in general agreement with those where political involvement was used as an indicator of awareness. On dimensions relating to social welfare matters, party again exerted the greater influence, more than, in this instance, vote. The impact of party and vote was relatively more balanced on the civil liberties and Vietnam dimensions. On the dimensions linked to civil rights, party did have some influence upon the extent of representation received by constituents. The impact of vote, in contrast, was nil.

Separating constituents into those with MCs of the same party and those with MCs of the opposite party, one perceives that vote
has a greater impact upon representation than was apparent when constituents were not subset in this manner. We learned in Chapter Three that voters were better represented than non-voters on the Vietnam and civil liberties policy dimensions. The same but somewhat stronger relationship between voters and non-voters held both for the subset of constituents with MCs of the same party and for the subset of constituents with MCs not of the same party.

On the other hand, the impact of vote upon the representation received by the full set of constituents on the social welfare-related dimensions was negligible. However, separating constituents according to their MC's party revealed that among constituents with MCs not of the same party, non-voters were about as well represented as voters. Among constituents with MCs of the same party, in contrast, voters tended to be accorded higher levels of representation.

In looking at the relationship between party and political awareness vis-a-vis constituent representation, there remains but one measure of awareness to be considered -- political information. Should the tentative conclusions heretofore presented be supported by the data in the next section, then confidence in their validity will be increased.

**Party and Political Information**

Among all of the policy dimensions, the greatest impact of party upon representation relative to that of information occurs on the three social welfare-related dimensions (Figure 31). However, the
Figure 31: HOUSE: POLICY REPRESENTATION FOR CONSTITUENTS WITH MCs OF THE SAME PARTY COMPARED TO REPRESENTATION OF CONSTITUENTS WITH MCs OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY, BY POLICY DIMENSION AND BY CONSTITUENTS' LEVEL OF POLITICAL INFORMATION
Figure 31 (continued)
influence of party vis-a-vis that of information upon the representation of constituents' social welfare views is less than that which was manifested by party when it was compared with each of the two previous indicators of political awareness -- involvement and vote.

Among constituents with MCs of the same party, those who are most highly informed are in every instance better represented than are those with the lowest level of political information. However, on two of the three dimensions concerning social welfare matters, moderately informed constituents received the highest level of representation.

The relative impact of party and political information on each of the remaining policy dimensions is roughly similar to that observed with respect to party and involvement and to party and vote. Foreign aid is again a conundrum. Only on this dimension do constituents with MCs not of the same party tend to be at least as well or even better represented than are the constituents with MCs of the same party. The single exception occurs among constituents with low levels of information. For this group, those with MCs of the same party are indeed better represented.

The strongest influence of the measure of political awareness examined in this section -- political information -- relative to that of party is found once more on the civil liberties and Vietnam policy dimensions. For example, with respect to civil liberties constituents who are highly informed and are represented by MCs of the same party are only slightly better represented than are
highly informed constituents with MCs of the opposite party. Party though does exert a stronger impact upon the representation received by moderate and low informed individuals with and without MCs of the same party, to the clear advantage of the former -- i.e. those constituents with MCs of the same party.

The impact of political information upon constituents' representation on each of the remaining civil rights-related dimensions seems somewhat greater than the respective impact of political involvement and of vote that was observed in the previous two sections. This is particularly the case with regard to the school desegregation sub-dimension and the representation accorded to constituents with varying levels of information whose MCs are not of the same party.

In this section the impact upon representation of party vis-à-vis that of political information has been investigated. The findings obtained with this indicator of political awareness are in rough accord with those pertaining to political involvement and vote. The greatest influence of party relative to that of information does occur on the social welfare-related policy dimensions. On the civil liberties and Vietnam dimensions, the impact of party and information is more equiponderant. On the civil rights-related dimensions, party does exert some influence upon the extent of constituent representation, although the impact of political information is not insignificant.
The relationship between constituents' level of political information and the representation of their policy preferences across all of the policy dimensions is somewhat perplexing. This is particularly true with respect to the subset of constituents with MCs of the same party. Among the latter, the highly informed are in every instance better represented than are those constituents with low levels of information. This finding is not unexpected. However, the level of representation accorded to moderately informed constituents tends to vary from the pattern one might anticipate in light of the above finding. On the civil rights-related dimensions and on the foreign aid one, the worst representation was received by constituents with moderate levels of political information. The best represented subset on the education and jobs sub-dimensions were moderately informed constituents. Finally, on the civil rights, Vietnam, and social welfare dimensions, moderately informed constituents were better represented than the least informed but not as well-represented as the best informed constituents. Only on these latter dimensions was political information monotonically, positively associated with the extent of representation received by constituents from their MCs of the same party.

Party and Political Awareness: An Overview

The impact of party vis-a-vis three forms of political awareness upon constituent representation has been examined. Several findings have consistently emerged. First, the greatest influence
of party relative to that of political awareness occurs on the social welfare, jobs, and education dimensions. For example, among constituents who vary in the extent of their political awareness but all of whom have MCs of the same party, those with the lowest level of representation -- who are nearly always the least politically aware -- are still noticeably better represented than are constituents with MCs of the opposite party, irrespective of the latter's level of political awareness.

Second, considering only those constituents with MCs of the same party, one does tend to find that political awareness and level of representation are positively associated. In contrast, among constituents with MCs of the opposite party, the exact relationship between political awareness and representation on these social welfare-related dimensions varies depending on the particular measure of awareness that is used.

Third, on the Vietnam and civil liberties policy dimensions, the impact of party is less and that of political awareness is greater. On these two dimensions, the influence of party and awareness upon constituent representation is probably more balanced than on any of the other policy dimensions. Among both constituents with MCs of the same party and those with MCs of the other party, there is generally a positive relationship between the constituents' level of political awareness and the amount of representation received. With respect to those policy dimension relating to social
welfare matters, such a relationship existed only for those constituents with MCs of the same party.

Fourth, on the school desegregation sub-dimension, the influence of party relative to that of political awareness was again clearly greater. Moreover, among constituents with MCs of the same party there was a tendency for the level of political awareness to be inversely related to the extent of representation received. With respect to the major civil rights dimensions, party is also the more important factor although political awareness may have exerted more of an influence on these two dimensions than it did on the school desegregation one.

Finally, the smallest impact of party upon representation occurred on the foreign aid dimension. More so than on any other dimension, constituents with and without MCs of the same party and with identical levels of political awareness are almost equally well-represented.

In conclusion, the following generalizations seem warranted by the data. Across all of the policy dimensions being considered, constituents with MCs of the same party are generally better represented than are those with MCs of the opposite party. Too, constituents who are highly aware politically tend to be accorded better representation than are those who are least politically aware. Most important, the single best avenue to better representation for the average constituent is to have a MC of the same party rather than
to be active politically. A summary of the findings reached in the preceding sections is presented below (Table 3).

At this time, I think it propitious to analyze some data with respect to the impact of party and political awareness upon constituent representation in the Senate. However, I will further examine representation in the House later in this chapter. In previous chapters, the procedure has been to focus initially upon representation in the House and then in the Senate. A departure from this preference ordering is now necessary. First, by controlling for constituents' level of political awareness, the number of categories (i.e. particular subsets of constituents) for which the level of representation must be investigated is much greater than in earlier chapters. Therefore, to facilitate making comparisons, I want to consider immediately the representation received by these same subsets of constituents in the Senate.

Second, I do not intend to present all of the relevant data concerning constituent representation in the Senate. Rather, I will make some general observations with respect to Senate conformance to the House patterns of representation that were identified above. Some appropriate Senate data will then be cited in support of these observations.

In an earlier chapter, I observed that party has a greater impact upon representation in the House than in the Senate. If one controls on political awareness, the generalization still holds.
TABLE 3: PARTY AND POLITICAL AWARENESS: A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATIONSHIP:</th>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>TDTS</th>
<th>JCSS</th>
<th>C/L</th>
<th>C/P-A</th>
<th>C/P-B</th>
<th>RMK</th>
<th>F/A</th>
<th>S&amp;H</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Constituents who are more politically aware are better represented than less-aware constituents.</td>
<td>Weak (^1)</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Constituents of the same party as their MCs are better represented than constituents with MCs of the opposite party.</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Strong-</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Mod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Among constituents with MCs of the same party, political awareness and level of representation are positively associated.</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Among constituents with MCs of the opposite party, political awareness and level of representation are positively associated.</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) Cell entries indicate strength of the relationship concerning constituent representation found on that dimension.

\(^2\) Cell entries indicate one of the following: (1) whether party or awareness exerted the greater impact upon constituent representation on the dimension; (2) party and awareness exerted about the same impact; or (3) neither had much of an impact.

LEGEND: Mod = Moderate; Aware = Awareness
I will discuss the representation received by constituents with MCs of the same party and by constituents with MCs of the opposite party and using "vote" as the measure of political awareness. I selected this measure because it is a dichotomous variable and the resulting patterns of relationships were less ambiguous. (See Figure 32)

It was on the social welfare-related dimensions that party exerted the greatest influence in the House. For the Senate, however, the impact of party is clearly diminished. No longer are constituents with MCs of the same party, irrespective of whether or not they vote, better represented than either voting or non-voting constituents with MCs of the opposite party. While constituents of the same party as their MC who vote still receive the best representation, the next best represented subset tends to be, somewhat inexplicably, non-voting constituents with MCs of the opposite party.

On the Vietnam and civil liberties dimensions in the House, the impact of party and political awareness tended to be more balanced. With respect to the Senate, the impact of party on these dimensions as well as on the civil rights-related ones seems to be nil. Surprisingly, constituents with MCs of the opposite party, either voters or non-voters, now tend to be the better represented subset.

In sum, the positive impact of party upon constituent representation is clearly reduced when one focuses upon the Senate. It is still the case, though, that among constituents with MCs of the
Figure 32: SENATE: POLICY REPRESENTATION FOR CONSTITUENTS WITH MCs OF THE SAME PARTY COMPARED TO REPRESENTATION OF CONSTITUENTS WITH MCs OF THE OPPOSITE PARTY, BY POLICY DIMENSION AND BY CONSTITUENTS' VOTE
Figure 32 (continued)
same party political awareness is positively associated with the level of representation received. Among constituents with MCs of the opposite party, on the other hand, the most prevalent patterns are either a negative relationship or no relationship whatsoever between level of political awareness and representation.

The preceding sections have analyzed the effect of political awareness upon the representation received by constituents with MCs of the same party identification and by those having MCs of the opposite party. The former proved to be the better represented subset. In the sections remaining which concern policy representation in the House, I will examine the impact of political awareness upon the representation received solely by constituents with MCs of the same party but who vary in their strength of attachment to their respective parties. The subset of constituents with MCs not of the same party are thereby excluded from this analysis.

**IMPACT OF STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND POLITICAL AWARENESS UPON REPRESENTATION**

In the following sections, I will analyze the specific impact of each of the three measures of political awareness employed in this paper upon the representation received by constituents who vary in their degree of party loyalty. The first indicator of awareness to be considered is political involvement.
Political Involvement and Strength of Party Identification

Before examining the data presented in Figure 33, a word about sample sizes is in order. There are roughly the same number of strong and weak identifiers with MCs of the same party. There are slightly over half as many independent leaners. Consequently, when the latter are subset by their level of political involvement, a trichotomous variable, the resultant cell frequencies tend to range between forty and fifty. Hence, the customary warning that some caution must be exercised in interpreting these data because of rather small N's is required.

It is also the case that strong party identifiers are inclined to be moderately or highly involved politically. The number of strong party identifiers with low levels of political involvement as a result is between forty-five and fifty for most of the policy dimensions. Restraint may again be justified in drawing inferences from the data.

The highest level of representation tends to be accorded to highly involved leaners. On the two dimensions that are the exceptions, moderately involved leaners received the best representation, although on one of the dimensions highly involved leaners were nearly as well-represented. Such data and those cited below do lend support to the claim that representation is negatively related to the strength of constituents' party identification but positively associated with constituents' level of political awareness.
Figure 33: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE OF STRONG, WEAK, ANDLEANING IDENTIFIERS
SUBSET BY THEIR LEVEL OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT.
Figure 33 (continued)
Among constituents who are highly involved politically, the level of representation received does tend to decline as the strength of these constituents' party attachment increases. On every dimension highly involved leaners are better represented than highly involved strong party identifiers. On one-third of the dimensions, though, highly involved weak identifiers receive the lowest level of representation, which represents a deviation from a monotonic negative relationship.

Among moderately involved constituents, there is a nice, negative relationship between their level of representation and strength of their party attachment on all of the dimensions save those related to civil rights and the foreign aid one. With regard to the latter dimensions, strength of party identification tends either not to have an impact upon the representation received by moderately involved constituents or else only to affect the representation accorded to moderately involved weak identifiers.

The relationship between strength of party identification and level of representation received is weakest among those constituents who are the least involved politically. On about half the dimensions, least involved constituents are nearly equally represented, regardless of their strength of party identification. Certainly, the variation in the levels of representation attained is not nearly so great as that which occurs with respect to strong and moderately involved constituents when they are subseted according to the strength of their respective party attachments. On the remaining dimensions, the
relationship between representation and strength of party identification among least politically involved constituents changes extensively; and no particular pattern predominates.

In sum, the data examined within this section have generally supported the proposition that there is an inverse relationship between the level of representation accorded to constituents and their strength of party identification. By controlling for the level of political involvement, it was learned that this negative relationship by and large holds for both the highly and moderately involved. Among constituents who were least involved politically, it proved difficult to specify precisely how representation was related to strength of party identification. Even with respect to constituents who were highly or moderately involved, however, the relationship between representation and strength of party identification was not always strictly negative. Deviations from the expected pattern did occur. For this reason as well as that some of the cell frequencies fell below fifty, it would be judicious to examine the impact of a second measure of political awareness upon the representation received by constituents with different levels or degrees of party attachment from their MCs of that same party.

Vote and Strength of Party Identification

Before examining the effect of vote relative to that of strength of party identification upon representation, another but different word about sample sizes is again in order. There are more voters
than non-voters in the overall sample, and the relative difference becomes even greater when those constituents lacking policy attitudes are excluded. The proportion of non-voters without such attitudes is clearly higher than that of voters. Consequently, when non-voters with MCs of the same party are then subset by their strength of party identification, cell frequencies become rather attenuated. The number of strong party identifiers who are also non-voters hovers around forty across the various policy dimensions. Non-voting leaners are even more scarce. They number about twenty on each dimension. In light of these smaller sample sizes, some caution is certainly justified in drawing conclusions based on these data. However, should representational patterns similar to those which emerged in the previous section again be observed, my confidence in their substantiality will be increased. The data are presented in Figure 34.

The highest level of representation on most of the policy dimensions is decisively accorded to voting-leaners. On two of the dimensions, non-voting leaners are the best represented subset; but leaners who vote are nearly as well-represented. On the school desegregation dimension, non-voting leaners also received the highest level of representation and were much better represented than even voting-leaners. However, the perfect gamma correlation observed with respect to non-voting leaners on this dimension is attributable in large part to their quite small number (13), even fewer than were found on the other policy dimensions.
Figure 34: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE OF STRONG, WEAK, AND LEANING IDENTIFIERS SUBSET BY VOTE
Figure 34 (continued)
Among constituents who are voters, there is evidence of a negative relationship between level of representation received and their strength of party identification. On every dimension, voting-leaners are better represented than are voting-strong party identifiers, usually by a wide margin. Weak party identifiers who vote, though, tend not to be accorded much higher levels of representation than voting-strong party identifiers. On several dimensions, voting-weak party identifiers are actually less-well represented than strong party identifiers who vote.

How strength of party identification relates to representation among non-voting constituents is less clear. On two dimensions, social welfare and school desegregation, there is a strong, negative relationship between the two. All told, on about half the dimensions the relationship between representation and strength of party identification is generally a negative one. On the remaining dimensions, however, the relationship seems to be more positive. Non-voting strong-party identifiers are better represented on these other dimensions than are non-voting leaning-identifiers.

In this section additional support has been gathered for the proposition that a negative relationship between level of representation received and strength of party identification holds especially among constituents who are more highly aware politically. As in the previous section, the evidence with respect to less politically aware constituents is more mixed. On several dimensions, the
relationship is a negative one, while on others it tends to be more positive. These conclusions will be tested one last time with respect to the third measure of political awareness -- political information.

Political Information and Strength of Party Identification

The highest level of representation on most of the policy dimensions is decidedly bestowed upon leaners who are highly informed politically (Figure 35). Of the three remaining dimensions, moderately informed leaners receive the best representation on two; and least informed leaners are the best represented subset on the third. On all three of these dimensions, though, highly informed leaners are the second-best represented subset and are almost as well-represented as moderately informed leaners are on one of them.

The relationship between level of representation attained and strength of party identification among constituents who are highly informed politically is consistent across the various policy dimensions although somewhat unanticipated. On every dimension but civil liberties, the representational pattern is "V-shaped," except that the left side of the "V" is about half the length of the right. Thus, highly informed-leaners are in every instance better represented than highly informed-strong party identifiers who in turn are better represented than highly informed-weak party identifiers. The former, moreover, tend to receive much higher levels of representation than do the latter. The relationship on the civil liberties dimension that is the exception is a strictly negative one.
Figure 35: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE OF STRONG, WEAK, AND LEANING IDENTIFIERS, SUBSET BY THEIR LEVEL OF POLITICAL INFORMATION
Figure 35 (continued)
Among constituents who are moderately informed politically, the relationship between their strength of party identification and level of representation received takes the pattern of an inverted "v" shape on more than half the dimensions. Weak party identifiers who are moderately informed are now accorded the highest level of representation on these dimensions. Moderately informed-strong and -leaning identifiers are about equally well-represented, though usually at a much lower level than are moderately informed-weak identifiers. On the remaining dimensions, strength of party identification among the moderately informed does tend to be negatively related to how well they are represented.

The relationship between representation and strength of party identification is more strongly negative, somewhat surprisingly, among constituents who are least informed politically. On every dimension but one, low informed-leaners are better represented than low informed-strong party identifiers. Furthermore, the representational pattern found on most of these dimensions is a strictly negative one, with low informed-weak identifiers receiving better representation than low informed-strong identifiers but at a level lower than that attained by low informed-leaners.

In sum, there is evidence for a negative relationship between constituents' strength of party identification and the amount of representation they are accorded within all three categories of political information: the highly, moderately, and least informed.
The evidence is strongest among those constituents at the extremes on the information variable -- the most and least politically informed, and with respect to strength of party identification -- the strong party identifiers and the leaners.

Political Awareness and Strength of Party Identification: A Final Overview

In a previous chapter, it was discovered that the extent of constituents' political awareness tends to be positively associated with the amount of representation received. Later, the strength of constituents' party identification was found to be negatively related to the level of representation received. In the latter half of this chapter, the joint impact of both political awareness and strength of party identification upon the representation received by constituents with MCs of the same party was examined. In particular, I wanted to learn whether or not the relationship between strength of party identification and level of representation would remain negative within subsets of constituents with different levels of political awareness. Three separate indicators of political awareness were again employed.

Among constituents who were found to be highly aware politically on each individual indicator, the relationship between their strength of party identification and representation received appeared to be negative. For example, on every dimension highly involved constituents who were also leaners (i.e. Independents "leaning" to one
party or the other in terms of their party loyalty) were clearly better represented than were highly involved constituents who were strong party identifiers. Remarkably, a similar pattern was observed among voters and among highly informed constituents. On every dimension, voters or, respectively, highly informed constituents who were also leaners were better represented than were voters or, respectively, highly informed constituents who were strong partisans.

The representation received by constituents who are highly aware and also weak identifiers is somewhat of a minor anomaly. On about half the dimensions, these constituents are not as well represented as highly aware, strong partisans are. If strength of party identification and representation were strictly negatively associated, the worst representation on each dimension should have been accorded to strong party identifiers. (The poorer representation received by weak identifiers is especially noticeable when awareness is measured with the political information variable.)

Among constituents who were less aware politically, it was difficult to determine exactly how representation was related to the strength of their party identification. On about half the dimensions, a negative relationship between strength of party identification and level of representation was observed for moderately involved constituents. With respect to moderately informed constituents, a similar, negative relationship was found on about a third of the dimensions. On the remaining dimensions, either no relationship was apparent or
the relationship changed extensively across these dimensions; and no one pattern predominated.

Among the least aware constituents, the overall relationship between strength of party identification and level of representation was also unclear. Among the least involved, representation and strength of party identification appeared to be almost uniquely associated on each dimension — certainly no one pattern predominated. With respect to non-voters, a negative relationship was found on about half the dimensions. The same was true among the least informed constituents. (These findings are summarized in Table 4.)

I now want to examine some comparable data for the Senate. The relationship between constituents' strength of party identification and level of representation received controlling first for constituents' level of political involvement and then for their level of political information is presented below (Figure 36 and Figure 37). Somewhat unexpectedly, a stronger negative association between strength of party identification and representation, and controlling on awareness, is observed with respect to the Senate than was found in the House.

Highly involved leaners are better represented than highly involved strong party identifiers on every dimension, although on a couple of dimensions the advantage is slight. The relationship is not strictly negative because highly involved weak identifiers are slightly better represented than highly involved leaners on several dimensions.
TABLE 4: STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND POLITICAL AWARENESS: A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>S/K</th>
<th>ECON</th>
<th>JCBS</th>
<th>POL</th>
<th>S/K</th>
<th>C/K-A</th>
<th>C/K-B</th>
<th>RVR</th>
<th>P/A</th>
<th>GCB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Among constituents with MCs of the same party, strength of party identification is negatively associated with level of representation received.</td>
<td>Strong-1</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Strong-</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Among highly aware constituents with MCs of the same party, strength of party identification is negatively associated with level of representation received.</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Among moderately aware constituents with MCs of the same party, strength of party identification is negatively associated with level of representation received.</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Among least aware constituents with MCs of the same party, strength of party identification is negatively associated with level of representation received.</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Cell entries indicate strength of the relationship concerning constituent representation found on that dimension.

LEGEND: Mod = Moderate

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Figure 36: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE OF STRONG, WEAK, AND LEANING IDENTIFIERS, SUBSET BY THEIR LEVEL OF POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT
Figure 36 (continued)
Figure 37: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE OF STRONG, WEAK, AND LEANING IDENTIFIERS, SUBSET BY THEIR LEVEL OF POLITICAL INFORMATION
Figure 37 (continued)
Among the highly informed, an even stronger negative relationship between strength of party identification and representation received emerges. A strictly negative relationship can now be found on more than half the dimensions. On the remaining dimensions, with the exception of the jobs sub-dimension, highly informed weak identifiers tend to be but slightly worse represented than highly informed strong partisans.

On every dimension with but two exceptions, the relationship between moderately involved constituents' strength of party identification and their level of representation is a nice, monotonic negative relationship. On one of the two dimensions that deviates from this pattern -- one of the civil rights scales -- weak identifiers are clearly better represented than strong partisans and somewhat better represented than leaners. Among the moderately informed, an essentially negative relationship is found on two-thirds of the dimensions.

With respect to the least involved constituents, the relationship between the level of their representation and strength of party identification is negative on just under half the dimensions. Among the least informed, it is negative on just over half. Thus, the negative relationship between strength of party identification and representation is not quite as pervasive among the least politically aware constituents than the highly and moderately aware.

In sum, controlling on political awareness, one finds in examining the Senate data even greater support for the hypothesis that constituents' strength of party identification is inversely
associated with their level of representation received than was found with respect to the House. This hypothesized relationship was most apparent among more aware constituents. Across all of the policy dimensions, the relationship is essentially negative within each level of political awareness except on two dimensions. On the Vietnam and foreign aid dimensions, representation does not appear to be negatively related to constituents' strength of party identification, irrespective of the level of political awareness examined.
In this concluding chapter, I first want to review the main propositions that were tested in this study and briefly summarize the data with respect to each. I then will explore the theoretical and practical significances of the findings obtained, especially from the perspective of the individual constituent who may desire to influence, in the short run, the policy behavior of his/her MC and in the long run, the policy output of the Congress. Third, in light of the conclusions reached concerning constituent representation, I will speculate upon the form that future research efforts might take.

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Impact of Political Awareness Upon Representation

The first proposition tested was:

\[ H_1: \text{ Constituents who are more politically aware will be better represented than are constituents who are less politically aware. (Chapter Three) } \]

One rationale which undergirded this hypothesis is that the politically aware are more likely to communicate their policy preferences to their
MC than are the politically unaware. The MC is therefore much more likely to have some information concerning the policy preferences of more politically aware constituents. Hence, the MC could represent at least this subset of his/her constituents because its policy positions are somewhat known.

Three separate indicators were used to measure constituents' level of political awareness: (1) respondent's psychological involvement in politics; (2) whether respondent voted or not; and (3) the amount of political information possessed by the respondent. The findings with respect to each indicator and a summary evaluation of the general hypothesis concerning the relationship between level of representation received and level of political awareness is presented below (Table 5).

In general, constituents who were more politically aware were found to be better represented than less-aware constituents. The differences, however, were not always large. The relationship between political awareness and constituent representation was not a strong one.

It may also prove fruitful to examine the findings dimension by dimension. To facilitate the subsequent drawing of comparisons between dimensions, I want to subset issues for which constituents' views were measured on the basis of three, important characteristics relevant to each issue.

First, one may speak of the "visibility" of an issue. I would characterize Vietnam and civil liberties concerns (e.g. campus
TABLE 5: IMPACT OF POLITICAL AWARENESS UPON REPRESENTATION: A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>S/W</th>
<th>EDUC</th>
<th>JOBS</th>
<th>C/L</th>
<th>C/R-A</th>
<th>C/R-B</th>
<th>RVN</th>
<th>F/A</th>
<th>SEG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Constituents who are more politically involved are better represented than less-involved constituents.</td>
<td>Weak&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Weak-</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Weak-</td>
<td>Weak-</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Weak-</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Constituents who are voters are better represented than non-voters.</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Constituents who are more politically informed are better represented than less-informed constituents.</td>
<td>Weak-</td>
<td>Weak-</td>
<td>Weak-</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak-</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Constituents who are more politically aware are better represented than less-aware constituents.</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Mod-</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>1</sup> Cell entries indicate strength of the relationship concerning constituent representation found on that dimension.

LEGEND: Mod - Moderate
disruptions) as highly visible. At the other end of the spectrum, one might find the foreign aid issue, i.e. low visibility. Certainly the visibility of an issue is closely associated with the public controversy surrounding that issue. My assessment of the relative visibility of each issue is contained in Table 6, along with my evaluation of each issue with respect to the two following characteristics: salience and complexity.

The "salience" of an issue refers to the extent to which that issue is perceived to be personally important and relevant to an individual. Social welfare issues may be highly salient, for example, in the sense of directly affecting an individual's standard of living. In contrast, civil liberties matters would seem to be of low salience to many people.

Finally, one may speak of the "complexity" of an issue. This characteristic concerns the ease or difficulty with which an individual may establish a well-reasoned and coherent policy preference on that issue. Foreign aid, I believe, is an issue which is complex in that there are a multiplicity of factors and programs which must first be considered before one formulates a well-grounded viewpoint. On the other hand, the policy alternatives with respect to the school desegregation question are for most people probably quite straightforward and comprehensible and limited in number.

Characterizing each issue with respect to its visibility, salience, and complexity yields four clusters of issues. First, there
### TABLE 6: ISSUE TYPOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHARACTERISTIC</th>
<th>S/W</th>
<th>EDUC</th>
<th>JOBS</th>
<th>SCH</th>
<th>DESSEG</th>
<th>C/R-A</th>
<th>C/R-B</th>
<th>FVN</th>
<th>C/L</th>
<th>F/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Visibility</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Saliency</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Complexity</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LEGEND: Mod = Moderate
are the social welfare-related issues. These I conceive to be of low visibility to most people but of high salience and low complexity. One might also describe most of the issues in this cluster as primarily "bread and butter issues."

Diametrically opposed to the issues contained in the first cluster are the Vietnam and civil liberties issues. I have characterized both of these in terms of high visibility but of low salience and high complexity. Let me refer to both as "cerebral issues."

The third cluster has but one member -- foreign aid. It is of low visibility and of low salience but of high complexity. I will designate it as the "remote issue."

The final cluster contains those issues relating to civil rights. These issues are of high-to-moderate visibility and salience and of moderate-to-low complexity. These I have labeled the "emotional issues." In examining the hypotheses tested in this study, I will make frequent references to the above typology.

Having now developed a typology that can be used to subset the policy dimensions, I want to reconsider, for a moment, the first hypothesis tested in this study. According to Table 5, the strongest, positive relationship between level of constituents' political awareness and representation received was found on the "cerebral" policy dimensions -- Vietnam and civil liberties. Admittedly, the strength of the relationship on these two dimensions was but moderate-to-weak, while on the remaining dimensions the relationship was
observed to be but a weak one. Still, it is not counter-intuitive that constituents who are more politically aware, and thus presumably more educated and politically sophisticated, would be better represented than less-aware constituents on the two dimensions that I have characterized as being of low salience and of high complexity.

Impact of Party Upon Constituent Representation: Constituents with MCs of the Same Party and Those with MCs not of the Same Party

After assessing the impact of political awareness upon representation, I then turned attention to the effect of party upon constituent representation. The following hypothesis was tested in Chapter Five:

\[ H_2: \text{ Constituents of the same party as their MC will be better represented than constituents with MCs of the opposite party.} \]

The rationale which underlies this hypothesis is that MCs are assumed to possess more accurate information concerning the policy preferences of the subset of their constituents having the same party identification. This may occur for several reasons. Briefly, constituents may be more likely to communicate their views to their MC if he/she is of the same party. Second, "attentive constituents" may inform the MC of the general policy attitudes held by the MC's supporters in the electorate, most of whom will have the same party identification as the MC. Third, constituents and a MC with the same party identification may be more likely to have similar policy preferences arising from a common milieu than would the MC and
constituents belonging to the other party or to none at all. Therefore, the MC merely by voting the MC's own views, will represent, perhaps even unknowingly, the views held by those constituents with the same party loyalty.

The data, which are summarized in Table 7, suggest that the respective parties tend to well-represent the general social welfare attitudes of their adherents, or what I have characterized as the "bread and butter issues." Another, related observation that was supported by the data was that Democratic and Republican constituents have markedly different policy views on the social welfare-related dimensions.

On the remaining dimensions, support was also drawn for the hypothesis with the lone exception of foreign aid, which I have dubbed the "remote" issue. Party, though, does exert its greatest impact upon constituent representation on the social welfare-related dimensions. Party is the mechanism by which constituents' views on a group of issues that I have characterized as being of low visibility but of high salience are represented in the congressional, policy-making process.

A hypothesis related to the above one was also tested in Chapter Five. It posited that:

\[ H_3: \text{Independents will be better represented by MCs of either party than are constituents of one party whose MC is of the other.} \]
TABLE 7: IMPACT OF PARTY UPON CONSTITUENT REPRESENTATION: A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATIONSHIP:</th>
<th>S/W</th>
<th>EDUC</th>
<th>JOBS</th>
<th>C/L</th>
<th>Policy Dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Constituents with MCs of the same party are better represented than constituents with MCs of the opposite party.</td>
<td>Strong- Strong</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod- Weak</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Mod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Independents are better represented by MCs of either party than are constituents of one party with a MC of the other.</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod- Mod</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Mod- Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Are Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs or Republican constituents with Republican MCs the better represented subset?</td>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>Dem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Dimension</th>
<th>SCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C/R-A</td>
<td>C/R-B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mod- Weak</td>
<td>Mod- Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mod- Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mod- Weak</td>
<td>Dem</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Cell entries indicate strength of the relationship concerning constituent representation found on that dimension.

2 Cell entries indicate whether Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs or Republican constituents with Republican MCs are the better represented subset and the relative advantage in representation that was observed.

LEGEND: Mod - Moderate; Rep - Republican; Dem - Democrat
The proposition is based on the assumption that MCs will more readily represent the policy preferences held by constituents who are then more likely to reciprocate by supporting the MC at the next election. In this regard, a greater proportion of Independents could be expected to cast their ballots for the MC in response to the MC's (favorable) legislative behavior than would constituents of the other party.

A second reason why Independents may receive better representation is that it may be "easier" for MCs to represent the preferences of Independents than of those constituents identified with the other party. That is, the views of the former may be closer to the views held by constituents of the MC's party.

The findings are summarized in Table 7. Again, support for the hypothesis is strongest on the social welfare dimensions. Constituents with MCs of the opposite party tend to have their non-social welfare preferences virtually ignored by their respective MCs. But even worse, with respect to social welfare concerns, the legislative behavior of MCs tends to reflect policy positions quite divergent from the social welfare attitudes held by their constituents in the other party. This clearly demonstrates the impact of party upon constituent representation on the social welfare dimensions.

The conclusion is unmistakable. If a constituent's MC is of the other party, do not expect the MC to represent that constituent's policy views in the MC's legislative behavior.
Impact of Party: Democratic Constituents with Democratic MCs and Republican Constituents with Republican MCs.

Having learned that constituents with MCs of the same party were better represented than were constituents with MCs of the opposite party, I then addressed the concomitant question as to whether Democratic MCs represent their Democratic constituents better or worse than Republican MCs do their Republican constituents. I anticipated that Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs would be the better represented subset.

Republican MCs facing re-election usually have to garner support from Democratic constituents to be victorious. One strategy used by Republican MCs to obtain these needed votes might be to represent the policy attitudes of at least some Democratic constituents but at the possible expense of the representation of the views of their Republican constituents. Democratic MCs, however, are not dependent in most instances upon Republican support in order to be reelected. Thus, Democratic MCs are free to seek electoral support solely among Democratic constituents by reflecting the policy attitudes of these constituents in the MC’s legislative behavior. Accordingly, one would therefore expect Democratic constituents to be better represented than Republican ones.

The findings are also summarized in Table 7. The pattern of constituent representation found on the civil rights-related dimensions lends support to the argument outlined above. Especially
on the school desegregation sub-dimension, Democratic constituents
were clearly better represented by Democratic MCs than were
Republican constituents by Republican MCs. Republican constituents,
on the other hand, were relatively better represented than were
Democratic constituents particularly with respect to Vietnam and jobs,
but also on social welfare and foreign aid.

It was then suggested, however, that caution must be exer-
cised in interpreting such data. The level of representation
observed for the set of Democratic constituents with Democratic
MCs and for Republican constituents with Republican MCs on each
of the various policy dimensions might be a function, in part, of
the variation among the policy positions held by the constituents
within each party.

Consequently, I examined the ratio of inter-district to
intra-district variation in the preferences held by constituents
of each party with respect to Vietnam and then to school desegrega-
tion. The ratio was slightly larger among Republicans than among
Democrats in regard to Vietnam, indicating a somewhat greater
opportunity for representation to be reflected in larger correla-
tions. However, this "advantage" for Republicans was at most a
modest one.

With respect to school desegregation, the ratio of inter-
to intra-district variation of views was larger among Democrats.
The difference, however, appeared to be a modest one. Therefore,
I concluded that the earlier findings of better representation
of Republican constituents on the Vietnam dimension and of Demo-
cratic constituents on the school desegregation dimension was not
a statistical artifact.

**Impact of Party Upon Representation: A Second Cut**

One important finding discussed above was the better
representation received by constituents with MCs of the same
party in relative contrast to that received by constituents with
MCs of the opposite party. The question of which subset is the
better represented one was again considered in Chapter Six. In
that chapter, I controlled for constituents' level of political
awareness and then examined the level of representation received
by each group of constituents, i.e. those with MCs of the same
party and those with MCs of the opposite party.

Again, the same relationship emerged, but perhaps even
stronger. On every dimension with the lone exception of foreign
aid, among constituents with the same level of political awareness
those having MCs of the same party were in every instance better
represented than those with MCs of the opposite party. This
was true for each of the three separate indicators of political
awareness used in this study. Not surprisingly, the greatest
representational advantage enjoyed by constituents with MCs
of the same party and controlling for awareness occurred on the
social welfare-related dimensions.
A second finding that was discussed above concerned those dimensions on which Republican constituents with Republican MCs were observed to be the better represented subset (e.g. Vietnam) and those on which Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs were (e.g. school desegregation). An examination of the ratios of inter-to intra-district variation among the views of each party's constituents on two of the dimensions suggested that the particular patterns of representation that were observed were not merely statistical artifacts.

One may also calculate the standard deviation of the preferences held by constituents of each party on each of the respective dimensions, ignoring congressional districts. Figure 38, below, indicates the absolute difference in the standard deviation of the views held by Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs and of those of Republican constituents with Republican MCs.

It is immediately apparent that the preferences of Democratic constituents vary more on each of the dimensions than do the corresponding preferences of Republican constituents. The only exception is Vietnam for which the respective standard deviation of each party's adherents was identical. Interestingly, it was on this dimension that Republican constituents evinced their greatest, relative representational advantage over Democratic constituents. On the other hand, with respect to school desegregation the views held by Democratic constituents vary just slightly more than do the views of Republicans. It was on the school desegregation
Figure 38: NET DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE STANDARD DEVIATION CALCULATED FOR THE VIEWS HELD BY DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUENTS WITH DEMOCRATIC MCs AND THE STANDARD DEVIATION CALCULATED FOR THE VIEWS HELD BY REPUBLICAN CONSTITUENTS WITH REPUBLICAN MCs, BY POLICY DIMENSION
dimension, though, that Democratic constituents were relatively the best represented subset vis-a-vis the level of representation accorded to Republican constituents. Moreover, on the civil liberties dimension Democratic constituents and Republican constituents were about equally-well represented, although the views of the former do vary to a greater extent.

Consequently, I would again conclude that the pattern of representation observed on each of the dimensions with respect to Democratic and Republican constituents is not a function of the variation that characterizes the preferences held by each party's identifiers. In this instance I am basing my conclusion on standard deviations that were computed for the preferences of Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs and for the views of Republican constituents with Republican MCs, but irrespective of congressional districts.

In the following section, I will consider the third major finding to emerge concerning the impact of party upon constituent representation. This finding is probably the most important one of the study.

**Impact of Strength of Party Identification Upon Representation**

It was found earlier that the subset of constituents who were of the same party as their MC were better represented than were constituents with MCs of the opposite party. The former subset was then separated according to the strength of these constituents'
attachment to their respective parties. Partisan identifiers were divided into three sub-groups: strong party identifiers, weak party identifiers and leaners.

It was expected that strong party identifiers would receive the best representation while leaners would receive the worst. The rationale which underlies this expectation was articulated in Chapter Four.

The following hypothesis was tested in that chapter:

\[ H_4: \text{Constituents who are strongly attached to their party will be better represented by MCs of that party than are weak identifiers. The worst representation will be received by constituents who are leaning to the party.} \]

A definite pattern emerged but one which was in direct contradiction of the hypothesis. The data indicated that constituents' strength of party attachment was inversely related to the representation of these constituents' views by their MCs of the same party. A monotonic negative relationship was found on almost all of the policy dimensions. Leaning-independent identifiers received the highest level of representation on every dimension. In contrast, strong party identifiers were accorded the worst representation on all but two dimensions. The conclusion was unmistakeable. The weaker a constituents' attachment to a party, the better represented his/her views were by the constituent's MC of the same party. The findings are summarized in Table 8.
### TABLE 8

**IMPACT OF STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION UPON CONSTITUENT REPRESENTATION: A SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELATIONSHIP</th>
<th>S/W</th>
<th>EDUC</th>
<th>JOBS</th>
<th>C/L</th>
<th>C/R-A</th>
<th>C/R-B</th>
<th>RVN</th>
<th>F/A</th>
<th>SCH</th>
<th>DESSEG</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Among constituents with MCs of the same party,</td>
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<td>associated with level of representation received.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Among constituents with Democratic MCs,</td>
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<td>Strong</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
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<tr>
<td>strength of party identification is negatively</td>
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<td>associated with level of representation received.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Among Republican constituents with Republican</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Mod</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCs, strength of party identification is</td>
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<td>negatively associated with level of representation</td>
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<td>received.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Cell entries indicate strength of the relationship concerning constituent representation found on that dimension.

**LEGEND:** Mod - Moderate
One inference that can be drawn is that MCs of one party tend to better represent the attitudes of constituents identifying with that party who are more likely to vote for the candidate from the other party at the next election. For example, strong Democrats have very low defection rates. Thus, a Democratic MC would be fairly certain of receiving their votes, almost regardless of the MC's legislative behavior. The Democratic MC would be less certain of receiving the support of weak and independent Democrats and be more aggressive in pursuing their votes by considering their policy attitudes than those of the strong Democrats.

An alternative explanation is that MCs of both parties modify their positions in the direction of the positions held by weaker partisans, whether this means moving toward the center or toward the extremes. For example, independent Democrats may have been the most supportive of social welfare, etc. This argument will be further considered in the following section.

The data thus generally demonstrated that strength of party identification was negatively associated with the level of representation received by constituents with MCs of the same party. One still had to consider the possibility, however, that the inter/intra district variation of constituents' views had influenced this finding. Strong partisans and their MCs may have fairly homogeneous views in contrast to the more heterogeneous views held by leaners and their MC's. As a consequence, lower correlations would be observed for the former and higher ones for the latter.
To assess the impact that differing degrees of variation had had upon levels of representation, I subseted the data set by party. This yielded two subsets: (1) Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs and (2) Republican constituents with Republican MCs. The variation among constituents' views was maximized in the merged data set because both Democrats and Republicans are included. However, when constituents and MCs were separated on the basis of party, the amount of variation extant within each subset of constituents and MCs was lower than that found in the larger set. The reason is that the variation within party is known to be less than the variation that exists between the parties on most issues. Thus, one would expect the representational correlations to be weaker or lower when it is computed within party (Clausen, 1976). The data for Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs and Republican constituents with Republican MCs is also summarized in Table 8.

The negative relationship between the strength of constituents' attachment to a party and level of representation received that was found with respect to the set of all constituents with MCs of the same party still persisted when the set was separated on the basis of party. A similar, negative relationship characterized the representation received by Democratic constituents from Democratic MCs and by Republican constituents from Republican MCs. I concluded, therefore, that the original finding of the negative relationship with respect to the merged data set was not merely attributable to
the pattern of inter/intra district variation which characterized
the views held by constituents of varying degrees of party loyalty.

This negative relationship between strength of party identifica-
tion and representation was again reexamined in Chapter Six. In that
chapter, I controlled for constituents' level of political awareness.
I wanted to learn whether or not the relationship would remain nega-
tive within subsets of constituents with different levels of political
awareness. Three separate indicators of awareness were used. The
findings are summarized in Table 4.

Among constituents who were highly aware politically on each
individual indicator, the relationship between their strength of party
identification and representation received appeared to be negative.
Among constituents who were less aware politically, however, it
proved more difficult to determine exactly how representation was
related to the strength of their party identification. A stronger
negative association between strength of party identification and
representation, and controlling on awareness, was observed with
respect to the Senate than was found in the House.

Impact of Strength of Party Identification Upon Constituent Representa-
tion: A Second Cut

In the above section, it was suggested that the finding that
strength of party identification was negatively associated with
representation indicated that MCs of both parties were modifying their
positions in the direction of the positions held by weaker partisans.
In this section, I want to learn whether this meant moving toward the center or toward the extremes.

Figure 39, below, indicates the respective mean policy position of strong, weak, and leaning Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs and the mean positions for strong, weak, and leaning Republican identifiers who have a Republican MC. I will focus upon the subsets of Democratic constituents first.

On the social welfare-related dimensions, as the strength of constituents' attachment to the Democratic party declines so does their level of support for these "bread and butter" issues. This would imply a movement by Democratic MCs toward the center of the political spectrum. Recall that the greatest, relative advantage, in representation received by leaning Democrats vis-a-vis strong Democrats did occur on the social welfare dimensions. On the school desegregation dimension, leaning and weak Democratic constituents have the same mean position but are less supportive of the policy concept than strong Democrats.

On the remaining dimensions, strong Democrats are generally the most supportive, followed by leaners, while weak Democrats tend to be least supportive of the policy concept involved. The major exception is Vietnam, with respect to which each group of constituents manifests about the same level of support.

Among Republican constituents who vary in the strength of their party loyalty and who also have Republican MCs, a different pattern understandably is observed. On every dimension with the exception
Figure 39: MEAN POLICY POSITION OF CONSTITUENTS WITH MCs OF THE SAME PARTY, SUBSET BY LOYALTY
of foreign aid, weak Republicans evince the greatest amount of support for that policy concept. On the civil rights-related dimensions and the education sub-dimension, strong Republicans are least supportive, while on the remaining dimensions (excluding foreign aid) it is the Independents who are leaning to the Republican party who are least supportive.

Thus, among Democratic MCs the better representation proffered to their Democratic leaners suggests a movement by these MCs toward more moderate positions. This is particularly the case with respect to social welfare. Among Republican MCs the situation is less clear. This occurs because weak Republicans are in every instance but one the most supportive sub-group. The better representation received by Republican leaners on civil rights dimensions suggest a modest movement toward the extreme (i.e. less support) by Republican MCs. On most of the remaining dimensions, the higher levels of representation accorded to leaners suggest a much sharper turn in the direction of less support of the policy concept.

**Impact of Strength of Party Identification Upon Constituent Representation: A Final Cut**

In this section, I will consider another possible explanation for the negative relationship between the strength of constituents' party attachment and level of representation received that has consistently emerged. Specifically, I want to determine whether or not leaners are more like their MCs than are strong party identifiers.
Table 9, below, indicates how well-educated are constituents of each party, subset by the strength of their party attachment. Among Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs, level of education appears to be inversely related to strength of party identification. Democratic leaners are clearly better educated than are strong Democratic identifiers. Weak Democrats fall in-between but are closer to Strong Democrats in terms of educational levels.

Among Republican constituents with Republican MCs, the relationship between strength of party identification and level of education is no longer strictly a negative one. Republican leaners are the best educated subset. However, strong Republicans are slightly better educated than weak Republicans.

These data suggest that one explanation for the better representation received by leaners may be that they are more like their MCs, at least in terms of education, than weak and/or strong identifiers might be. It was also the case that the negative relationship between strength of party identification and level of representation received was stronger among Democratic constituents with Democratic MCs than among Republican constituents with Republican MCs. This too might be explained by the differing relationships between education and strength of party identification that characterizes each party's supporters.

It may prove fruitful therefore to examine again the relationship between representation and strength of party identification,
### Table 9: Educational Level of Each Party's Supporters Subset by the Strength of Their Party Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength of Constituent's Party Idem.</th>
<th>Party of Constituent's MC</th>
<th>Low Education</th>
<th>Moderate Education</th>
<th>High Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Dem</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Dem</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaners - Dem</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaners - Rep</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Rep</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Rep</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Low Education**: 0 - 8 grades
- **Moderate Education**: 9 - 12 grades, high school graduate
- **High Education**: post high school education
now controlling for education. This issue was addressed, albeit indirectly perhaps, in Chapter Six when I controlled for constituents' level of political awareness. Generally, the negative relationship persisted, especially among the highly aware politically.

Figure 40, below, indicates the level of representation accorded to constituents who vary in their strength of party loyalty, and controlling on education. Two preliminary remarks need to be made. First, constituents with the same degree of party loyalty and who have MCs of the same party are included in the same subset. For example, strong Democratic identifiers with Democratic MCs and strong Republican identifiers with Republican MCs encompass the group of "strong partisans." Second, leaners with low levels of education are a rather scarce phenomenon; sample sizes hover around ten. Therefore caution is justified in interpreting the representational correlations obtained for this particular subset of constituents.

According to Figure 40, on about two-thirds of the dimensions the relationship between level of representation received and strength of party identification continues to be a negative one, controlling on constituents' level of education. Among highly educated citizens, the relationship is not generally negative only on the jobs, education and Vietnam dimensions. Among the moderately educated, one does not observe a negative relationship on the civil rights-related dimensions. Among the least educated constituents,
Figure 40: POLICY REPRESENTATION IN THE HOUSE OF STRONG, WEAK, AND LEANING IDENTIFIERS, SUBSET BY THEIR LEVEL OF EDUCATION
Figure 40 (continued)
the foreign aid, civil liberties and Vietnam dimensions are the major exceptions.

Thus, the finding that the level of representation accorded to constituents varies inversely with the strength of their party identification has not been altered by controlling on education. In fact, the patterns of representation observed when education was controlled are quite similar to those found when political awareness was controlled in Chapter Six. In retrospect, perhaps this should have been anticipated.

This concludes my review of the main propositions that were tested in this study. In the following section, I will explore some of the theoretical and practical significances of these findings.

Implications

It was learned that constituents who are more politically aware tend to be better represented than are constituents who are less politically aware. Certainly, a constituent who was so inclined could become more politically active and consequently increase, perhaps, the level of representation obtained from the constituent's MC. This increase in activity on the part of such a constituent might involve a closer attention to the MC's legislative performance, an increase in the frequency with which the constituent communicates his/her policy views to the MC, and perhaps even a greater participation by this constituent in legislative campaigning. In the final analysis, however, it is probably the case that a tremendous amount
of effort would be required on the part of the constituent to exert even a minimal impact upon the MC's legislative behavior. This may be attributable to the markedly greater influence of party upon constituent representation than that of political awareness.

The data suggest that the single, most important factor with respect to how well constituents are represented by their MCs is whether or not constituent and MC share a common party identification. If so, the constituent will be fairly well-represented regardless of his/her level of political awareness. Still, among these constituents with MCs of the same party, political awareness and extent of representation received do appear to be positively associated. There is, therefore, some variation in the level of representation received by this subset of constituents having MCs of the same party but possessing different degrees of awareness.

Consider, on the other hand, the plight of those constituents having MCs of the opposite party. Not only are they not especially well-represented as a group, but their worst representation occurs on the social welfare dimensions. And most likely, it is this set of issues which more directly affect the average citizen in his/her daily life, certainly to a greater extent than might the civil liberties and Vietnam issue areas.

This finding that MCs accord much higher levels of representation to those constituents of the same party than to those of the other must be accounted for in any proposed theory of representation. In
the more traditional approach to the study of representation in
which the entire district's policy position is measured either with
demographic or survey data, the very clear but implicit assumption
is that the MC "ought" to be representing the entire district.
That is, to the degree that the MC does reflect the policy views
of the MC's constituents in the MC's legislative behavior, the
expectation is that the MC will consider the preferences of all
the constituents residing in the district.

However, by examining the representational relationship between
individual constituents and their respective MCs, I have learned
that such an expectation is unfulfilled. To expect MCs to represent
constituents of both parties may have been politically unrealistic
to start with. The data indicate that each party's adherents tend
to have divergent policy preferences across the various dimensions.
The MC in order to maintain his/her electoral coalition would
necessarily have to give first consideration to his/her largest
bloc of supporters in the district -- those constituents who identify
with the same party.

Clausen (1973) has opined that an MC should only be expected
to represent the subset of constituents who supported the MC in
the previous election. (See Chapter One). Given the impact of party
upon congressional voting, especially during midterm elections,
most of these constituents would also be members of the same party
as the MC. To the extent that this is indeed the case, my findings
do lend empirical support to Clausen's argument.
The constituent who identifies with one party but whose MC is of the other may be in a severe predicament with respect to increasing the match between that constituent's policy views and the legislative behavior of the constituent's MC. I have argued that party is the single, most important influence upon the level of representation accorded to a constituent. However, the variable – party – is not maniputable by the individual. Once a candidate has been elected to office, there would seem to be little that a constituent from the other party could do in order to increase that constituent's level of representation. Consequently, and popular notions aside, letter-writing and other means that may be used by a constituent to communicate policy views to the constituent's MC of the other party may be nothing more than exercises in futility. (Note: This and the following argument emerged in conversations with A. Clausen, 1976.)

Of course, the constituent still possesses the option of working to defeat his/her MC of the other party at the next election. If the constituent is lucky enough to reside in one of the competitive congressional districts, approximately twenty percent of the total, then campaign activity aimed at defeating the other party's candidate may be considered as a viable alternative. On the other hand, even in a competitive district the incumbent still has a clear advantage over his/her non-incumbent opponent; and the impact that our "unfortunately placed" constituent may have upon the electoral contest may be miniscule, at best.
All is not lost, however. Clausen has opined that there exists yet another alternative for the constituent faced with the relatively unsavory prospect of being represented by an MC of the other party who appears likely to remain in office for some time. Clausen cogently suggest that such a constituent who is still desirous of influencing the policy output of the House must abandon his/her psychological attachment to the particular congressional district in which the constituent resides. Instead, this constituent must look to congressional candidates and especially incumbent MCs from other districts across the country whom the constituent perceives to have policy positions more similar to his/her own. The constituent would then support these individuals, primarily lending financial support.

Most Americans are particularly tied to the belief that residents of a district are represented in the Congress only by the duly elected congressman from that district. That is, most individuals look primarily to their own respective congressman for representation in the House. This expectation is reinforced through custom and the constitutional requirement that MCs reside in the districts from which they are elected.

Interest groups, on the other hand, do not feel constrained to limit their lobbying activities to a few congressional districts. Rather, in an attempt to influence the policy output of the Senate or House, groups such as COPE of the AFL-CIO may support candidates
throughout the country who are perceived favorably on labor issues. The pro and anti-Equal Rights Amendment forces have carried their particular missives into numerous congressional contests that are thought to involve MCs whose support or opposition is deemed critical by one side or the other.

Having discussed one potential solution for those constituents with MCs not of the same party but who still seek to influence the policy output of the House, I now want to consider again the representation received by the subset of constituents whose MC is of the same party. It was mentioned earlier that the level of these constituents' political awareness was generally found to be positively related to the amount of representation received. A much stronger finding, though, was that the strength of these constituents' attachment to their party is clearly negatively related to the level of representation accorded to them by their MCs of the same party. Weak-party identifiers were much better represented than were strong-party identifiers.

Apparently, an MC may be motivated to represent with the MC's legislative behavior particularly those constituents of the same party who are the most likely to defect to the opposition candidate at the next election -- the weak party-identifiers and the leaning-independents. The support of strong partisans is virtually assured. Even if the MC moderates his/her views to appeal to weak identifiers and leaners, the strong identifier will certainly be better represented with an MC of the same party than with one from the other.
We are still left with the question of whether MCs do in acutality make such precise and rational, electoral calculations. Downs has argued that the optimal strategy for both candidates would, under certain restricted assumptions, be to move toward the center of the political spectrum in search of electoral support. Real-world MCs may lack the necessary information to determine exactly where the center of this spectrum does in reality lie. The data, however, with respect to the levels of representation received by constituents of varying degrees of party loyalty from their MCs of the same party do not allow one to discount or ignore a Downsian interpretation that purports to explain the MCs behavior vis-a-vis constituent representation.

Implications: Senate

One of the advantages that obtains from examining the representational relationship that exists between an individual constituent and that constituent's MCs is that statements about the extent of constituent representation in the Senate can more readily be made. An examination of most of the political science literature concerning representation reveals that nearly all studies have focused only upon representation in the House of Representatives. This is understandable. Demographic data, for example, as an indirect measure of an electoral unit's policy views, are probably more appropriate to use with respect to congressional districts rather than entire states. The former tend to be much more
homogeneous than the latter. Few states consequently could fruitfully be contrasted and compared simply on the basis of socio-economic data. Most researchers who have resorted to demographic data as indicators of policy preferences have done so with respect to the House.

There is another, perhaps even more severe difficulty attendant to examining constituent representation in the Senate if states are employed as the units of analysis, irrespective of the particular means used to measure the policy preferences of each states' constituents. I am referring to the problem of the small sample size that results with states as the analytical units. More precisely, one does not in fact have a sample of states but rather the entire population. However, the set still contains but a relative handful of members.

It was stated in Chapter One that each constituent has three MCs -- one representative and two senators. The level of representation accorded to a constituent by each of the constituent's two senators can be investigated separately. Consequently, a sample of more than 1,500 constituents will yield more than 3,000 representational relationships existing between individual constituents and their respective senators. This large a number, 3,000, allows one to further subset the data set along theoretically interesting lines, e.g. investigating how well constituents who vary in their strength of party identification are represented.
It was stated above that party is the single, most important influence upon constituent representation in the House. Constituents with congressmen of the same party are definitely better represented than are constituents whose congressmen are in the other. A similar, slightly weaker pattern also emerged in the Senate but only with respect to those policy dimensions relating to social welfare matters. On these dimensions, constituents of the same party as their senator were better represented than were constituents of the opposite party.

Party, on the other hand, did not manifest any positive impact on the civil rights and civil liberties policy dimensions. Indeed, constituents from a different party than their senator were better represented than constituents who were on the same party. This may mean that civil rights and civil liberties were not perceived by senators as particularly salient to their own party supporters throughout the state.

**Future Research Strategies**

The proposals for future research that are discussed below essentially involve three tacks: (1) to determine whether or not the findings concerning constituent representation in the 91st Congress also hold with respect to other congresses; (2) to operationalize in other ways variables that were considered in this analysis; and (3) to consider new variables which may also have an impact upon the level of constituent representation.
The first proposal for additional research simply involves an extension of the study to another congress, most likely the 92nd Congress. The advantage of the 92nd Congress is that it too occurred during the same presidential administration, allowing one to hold relatively constant the influence of the president upon congressional behavior. Of course, the impact of a change in the party holding the presidency upon constituent representation in the Congress may be explored by focusing upon the two LBJ congresses which preceded the 91st.

The second research proposal entails a more refined analysis of the extent to which the sharing of a common milieu between constituent and MC may ultimately result in higher levels of representation. In this study, milieu was primarily operationalized in terms of MC and constituent attachment to the same party. In future research endeavors, the variable could be defined with respect to income or status. "Common milieu" might also be measured by determining whether or not constituent and MC reside within the same local community within the larger congressional district. Finally, a good test of the proposition that a common milieu may result in shared policy attitudes and hence better representation may be attained by investigating how well blacks are represented by black as opposed to white MCs.

Finally, future research efforts may require the introduction of additional variables. Several concern the set of issues upon which constituents' policy attitudes were measured. The salience
of these various issues to constituents may be importantly related
to how well constituents' views on such issues are represented by
the constituents' MCs. In the current study, issues were assumed
to be equally salient to all constituents. Too, it may be more
appropriate to measure constituents' attitudes on very specific
issues rather than deriving summary, and perhaps more ambiguous,
measures of constituents' attitudes with respect to a group of
items thought to subsume a common policy concept, i.e. a policy
dimension. The use of specific issues may result in findings of
higher levels of representation being accorded to constituents.

Also, it may prove fruitful to subset MCs according to the
competitiveness of their respective seats. The belief still
abounds that MCs from competitive districts have a greater incentive
to represent their constituents' views than do MCs from safe-
districts. Constituent representation would then be negatively
related to how secure the MC psychologically felt his/her seat
to be. (Kornberg, 1966).
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