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INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION: THE COMPREHENSIVE EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ACT

DISSertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

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**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES.</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1. CETA AND THE NEW FEDERALISM</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower Policy of the Federal Government</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Attempts at Manpower Reform</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Federalism</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Policy Issues</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2. A MODEL OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION.</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Study of Intergovernmental Relations</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Study of Policy Implementation</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Model of Intergovernmental Policy Implementation</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3. THE EFFECTS OF CETA IN FOUR OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing a Research Strategy</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Research Sites</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effects on the Political Process</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client Service Patterns in CETA</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Change</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nature of Citizen Input: Manpower Planning Councils</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4. EXPLAINING CETA PROGRAM PERFORMANCE</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of Elected Officials in CETA</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Role of Manpower Planning Councils in CETA</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Change in CETA</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Client Service Patterns in CETA</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. OPERATIONAL INDICATORS FOR CETA PROGRAM PERFORMANCE AND THE MODEL OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CETA</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOTES</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sex Distribution of CETA Clients as of June 30, 1975</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Age Distribution of CETA Clients as of June 30, 1975</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Educational Distribution of CETA Clients as of June 30, 1975</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Racial Distribution of CETA Clients as of June 30, 1975</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Percentage of Clients Economically Disadvantaged as of June 30, 1975</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Summary of Changes in Title I Clients between December, 1974 (2nd Quarter) and June, 1975 (4th Quarter)</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Summary of Changes in Title II Clients between December, 1974 (2nd Quarter) and June, 1974 (4th Quarter)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Summary of Changes in Title VI Clients between March, 1974 (3rd Quarter) and June, 1975 (4th Quarter)</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>A Comparison of Categorical Clients in FY'74 and CETA Title I Clients</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>A Comparison of PEP Clients and CETA Title II and VI Clients</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Summary of Priority Groups Selected in the FY'74, '75, '76 Manpower Plans</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Change in Programmatic Emphases Between FY'74 (CAMPS) and FY'75 and FY'76 (CETA): Expenditures for Short and Long Term Programs</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Change in Programmatic Emphases Between FY'74 (CAMPS) and FY'75 and FY'76 (CETA): Distribution of Clients for Short and Long Term Programs</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Distribution of Expenditures, Title I, FY'75 to FY'76 by Program Activity</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Distribution of Clients to be Served, Title I, FY'75 to FY'76 by Program Activity</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Meetings of the Manpower Planning Councils and Average Turnout</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>MPC Member Opinions on the Role of their MPC in the Performance of Manpower Functions</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>MPC Member Views on their Influence in the Prime Sponsorships</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Changing Unemployment Rates in the Prime Sponsorships</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Perceived Quality of Information Available to Planning Council Members</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Perceived Levels of Cooperation from Prime Sponsor Staffs and Elected Officials</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Selected Comparisons of 4th Quarter Title I, II and VI Clients with 1970 Census Data and to an Estimated Incidence of Need as of June, 1975</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure I: A Model of Intergovernmental Policy Implementation ... 45
Figure II: Characteristics of the Four Research Sites ............ 64
Figure III: Summary of the Effects of CETA in the Ohio Prime Sponsorships ........................................ 124
Figure IV: Explaining CETA Program Performance .............. 126
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFDC--Aid to Families with Dependent Children
AKRON--Akron Tri County Manpower Consortium, Ohio
ARA--Area Redevelopment Act (1961)
CAA(CAP,CAO)--Community Action Agency
CANTON--Canton-Stark-Wayne Manpower Consortium, Ohio
CAMPS--Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System
CEP--Concentrated Employment Program
CETA--Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (1973)
COLUMBUS--Columbus-Franklin County Consortium, Ohio
DOL--U.S. Department of Labor
EEA(PEP)--Emergency Employment Act (Public Employment Program) (1971)
EOA--Economic Opportunity Act (1964)
FY--Fiscal Year
GRS--General Revenue Sharing
JOP--Jobs Optional Program
MA--Manpower Administration, U.S. Department of Labor (renamed the Employment and Training Administration; January, 1976)
MPC(MAC)--Manpower Planning (Advisory) Council
MDTA--Manpower Development and Training Act (1962)
NAB--National Alliance of Businessmen
NOMC--Northeast Ohio Manpower Consortium, Ohio
NYC--Neighborhood Youth Corp
OBES--Ohio Bureau of Employment Services
OEO--Office of Economic Opportunity
OIC--Opportunities Industrialization Center
OJT--On-the-Job Training
PEP(EEA)--Public Employment Program (Emergency Employment Act) (1971)
POP--Project Operating Plan
PPS--Program Planning Summary
PS--Prime Sponsor
PSE--Public Service Employment (Titles II and VI of CETA)
QPR--Quarterly Progress Reports
QSCC--Quarterly Summary of Client Characteristics
R/DOL--Regional Department of Labor
SER--Service, Employment, Redevelopment
SKILLS CENTER--Classroom Training Centers established by MDTA
TITLE I--The Comprehensive Manpower Services Title of CETA
TITLE II--The Public Employment Programs Title of CETA
TITLE VI--The Emergency Jobs Programs Title of CETA
UL--Urban League

x
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the implementation of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA) in four Ohio Prime Sponsorships from January 1974 to July 1975. Three major purposes will be accomplished: an in depth treatment of the implementation of a specific intergovernmental social policy in four diverse settings, an assessment of the law's major consequences, and an exploration and refinement of the model of policy implementation that will be used to guide the analysis.

The principal foci of the literature on public policy and intergovernmental relations has been on the formulation of policy and the characteristics of the intergovernmental system. The emphasis of this paper shifts to the study of policy implementation and examines the effects of system characteristics and the distribution of power among different levels of the federal system.

A policy implementation perspective suggests an effort to describe and explain the process by which national public policies are transformed into public services at the local level. The paucity of knowledge about this process of intergovernmental policy implementation is a serious deficiency in our understanding of the policy process because it is likely to lead to ill-advised conclusions by policy makers. The focus on implementation gives the student of politics and the policy maker better evidence of how the intergovernmental system works—a system that
federal policy makers have relied upon to implement many of the broad social policies of the 1960s and 1970s.

Throughout the dissertation three themes will constantly re-emerge: manpower policy and CETA in particular, intergovernmental relations and the "New Federalism," and policy implementation. In order to provide the proper context for what follows, a very brief overview of the first two themes is presented in the introductory chapter. Attention will be focused on the development of manpower policy and CETA in the U.S., and upon the major policy issues raised by CETA as one attempt to reform the intergovernmental system. Policy implementation will be discussed in Chapter 2 and the model utilized in the dissertation outlined.

Chapter 3 focuses on the effects of CETA in the four jurisdictions along the lines identified in the earlier chapters. Chapter 4 offers explanations for the patterns of implementation, and policy outcomes. The concluding Chapter assesses the usefulness of this particular model of policy implementation, offers policy recommendations for the design and implementation of future intergovernmental policy and considers some of the broader policy questions raised by this approach to the delivery of social policy in the American system.
CHAPTER I: CETA AND THE NEW FEDERALISM

The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) evolved out of the lengthy development of manpower policy in the United States as well as the reformulation of the intergovernmental system in the late 1960s and early 1970s. As essential background for the analysis that follows, this chapter will describe the complicated history of federal manpower legislation, the protracted legislative struggle that produced CETA in 1973, and the central policy questions it raises.

Manpower Policy of the Federal Government

Although interest in the utilization of human resources or manpower—the size, structure, and characteristics of the labor force—and their effect on economic production has probably always been the concern of the federal government, the term "manpower policy" came into use in the early 1960s to refer to programs of a remedial nature. These programs were "designed to improve the employability and enhance the employment and earnings prospects of persons...suffering various disadvantages in competition for jobs" (Levitan, et.al., 1972, p.299).

The federal government had evidenced direct concerns in human capital as early as 1917, when the Congress passed the Smith-Hughes Act, which provided aid for vocational education and training to satisfy the demands for skilled labor in the economy. (For a more comprehensive discussion of the development of this and other early manpower policies of the federal government, see Mangum, 1969.) Depression in the 1930s
led to the establishment of the United States Employment Service--an agency to help match those seeking work with willing employers. And the federal government recognized as legitimate a role as provider of public employment in times of severe economic stress. Following the Second World War, the federal government committed itself to "foster and promote..., maximum employment production, and purchasing power," in the Employment Act of 1946 (see Bailey, 1950). Little was done during the 1950s to realize this obviously vague mandate.

Manpower programs focusing on individuals with personal or societal disadvantages in getting and keeping jobs emerged with the Area Redevelopment Act. Passed in 1961, it provided assistance to industries encouraging them to relocate in economically depressed areas that were experiencing shrinking job opportunities, and distributed aid to unemployed and underemployed individuals in those areas.

The main concern of Congress had been with the insidious impacts of technological change and the problems imposed on the middle-aged breadwinner forced out of work by it (see Senate Special Committee on Unemployment Problems, 1960). Bipartisan support was gained to pass the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962: MDTA was designed to provide subsistence payments for adults who were forced out of their jobs by automation while they retrained for a more saleable skill. A modest (by present standards) authorization of $100,000,000 was included for the program which would be administered by the U.S. Department of Labor through local board of education vocational schools. At the outset, restrictions were placed on the number of youthful participants. The program was clearly an experiment without precedent (see Mangum, 1968, for a detailed account).
The apocalyptic predictions about massive technological dislocations never materialized, but the notion of a federal role in training manpower, especially among the relatively disadvantaged, took hold (Grossman, p.12; Ruttenberg and Gutchess, 1970, p.15). While the nation's overall rate of unemployment declined in the early 1960s, the figures rose to 15% among youth and minorities. By 1963, MDTA began a process of development which would redirect its emphasis from middle aged adults to younger trainees.

Meanwhile, the Kennedy and Johnson Presidencies set forth on a "War on Poverty." One of the key weapons was the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 which authorized education, training, and work experience for impoverished youth. Instead of folding these programs into the existing Department of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare structures, the EOA created separate agencies--Community Action Agencies--to deliver some of the programs for inner city residents. Two keystones of the new program were the Neighborhood Youth Corp--a program of work experience in part time jobs for poor high school students and drop-outs; and the Job Corp--a residential training program, constructed with the intention of providing the total environment needed to overcome years of suffering in poverty (see Levitan, 1969).

In the mid-1960s manpower legislation was amended to create new programs and liberalize benefits directed at the disadvantaged clientele. To EOA, programs for the rural poor--Operation Mainstream--and a "New Careers" program of education and employment in public and nonprofit private institutions were added. (see Arthur Pearl and Frank Reissman, 1965). MDTA appropriations expanded nearly threefold, and the modified
law required 65% of the enrollees to be disadvantaged—in this case defined as unemployed, underemployed, poor, minorities, and handicapped.

Programs to aid the disadvantaged proliferated during the 1960s: each had its own authorization, guidelines, clientele, and delivery mechanism. Most of the programs were created on an experimental basis as new needs were "discovered" or promising approaches were touted. Administrators of the programs and representatives of people receiving the benefits from them joined Congressional defenders in a yearly defense of each special program: the "experimental" approaches grew into what seemed to be permanent fixtures.

Within a few years, according to some observers, these many categorical programs had become a plague on the system. (A categorical program is defined as a program which authorizes funds for specifically and narrowly defined purpose, leaving little room on the part of the recipient government (or agency) as to how it uses the grant (Reagan, 1972, p. 59).) These multiple programs resulted in duplication of services, confusion, and gaps in some areas (National Manpower Policy Task Force, 1969). By 1973, at the peak of the categorical era, the Department of Labor, which had by then taken over the administration of most manpower programs, presided over 10,800 separate contracts for manpower services (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1973, p. 352).

Early Attempts at Manpower Reform

After a little over five years had passed since the first "modern" manpower legislation went into effect, the Department of Labor recognized the need for reform. At first the efforts were limited to special
demonstration projects, such as the Special Impact program in 1968, which attempted to marshall manpower resources in a community for concentrated problem solving. These efforts expanded over a six year period while administration officials and the Congress attempted to reach agreement on legislative remedies.

The twin hallmarks of manpower reform were the coordination of manpower programs and the development of Comprehensive Centralized services for the client. The goal of coordination reflected the need to bring together the multiple, often competing manpower services in order to work out common, complementary strategies within communities. Coordination of the manpower system was no mean task. Rival programs were in competition for scarce resources and job contracts, and each felt the pressure to show substantial records of performance. A Government Accounting Office report on Manpower programs in the Washington, D.C. area listed 76 private and public programs, providing services at 91 centers with the support of seventeen federal contracts. (See, Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Intergovernmental Relations, of the Committee on Government Operations of the House, 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 168. Testimony of Elmer Staats, Comptroller General.)

An equally popular proposal suggested the provision of comprehensive centralized manpower services for clients which could either be dispensed by or at least controlled by a single agency. As the manpower programs had evolved each had essentially the responsibility for performing a limited set of services, such as recruitment, training and job placement, for their particular clientele group--youth, inner city residents, adult rural workers. In the resulting confusion, the clients were often lost
between agencies and programs. And manpower experts argued that some central agency should be able to regulate the flow of clients within the community. (Levitan and Zickler, 1974)

**Coordination of Manpower Services**

The most serious attempt at achieving the goal of coordination was launched in 1968--the Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS). The idea behind it was simple and relatively tame: to bring together all levels of government and private manpower program operators, organized labor and business to plan common strategies addressed to the characteristics of their communities. The CAMPS agreement boasted signatories from nine federal departments and agencies involved in manpower in 1968, but none was required to relinquish administrative control over its programs and each retained narrowly defined purposes in the manpower field. The vehicles for coordination were local planning committees which were charged with the task of planning a uniform program reflecting local circumstances. Parallel state-wide committees were responsible for consolidating the efforts of planning areas within the state. By 1971, there were 400 CAMPS committees at the local level and all states were participants.

The performance of CAMPS was disappointing to many reformers, but the shortcomings were not surprising. Although the CAMPS committees were to develop local priorities on the basis of local needs, and develop a system for meeting them, they had limited staff, no control over federal resources, and hence no leverage, save friendly persuasion, with autonomous service deliverers. CAMPS plans fell far short of creating unified approaches and were often "limited to the use of a common staple to hold individual" requests together (George Shultz, former Secretary of Labor...
as quoted in Davidson, 1972, p. 7). (See Ruttenberg and Gutchess, 1970 for more detail on the experience with CAMPS.)

CAMPS also played an important role in Nixon administration attempts to decentralize the control of manpower programs to local elected officials. It was part of a broad reform strategy called the New Federalism (discussed in more detail below) which held in part that locally oriented programs are best administered by those closest to an area's needs. By 1972 and 1973 CAMPS staff were shifted from the state employment services to Mayors in 126 larger cities and four counties. Many of the largest counties received staff support for the first time in 1973 through a system of "organizational planning grants" (Levitan and Zickler, 1974). In 1972 CAMPS guidelines designated local elected officials, rather than professional bureaucrats, as Chairmen of the local planning committees and responsible for drawing up and approving the plans. The degree of participation by elected officials varied widely, and many took no interest in manpower.

In fiscal year 1974, the Department of Labor, which had by then consolidated EOA and MDTA funds under the Manpower Administration; instructed the CAMPS organizations to plan for those programs according to local priorities and to recommend allocation of funds by the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor. However, the system retained the critical limitation of previous years: each program agent continued to negotiate separately for contracts with federal representatives. Categorical programs persisted with each agency offering legislatively prescribed services for a particular type of individual. The significance of CAMPS for later developments was the efforts to involve elected officials in manpower programs and the development of staff capability at the local level.
Comprehensive Centralized Services

Parallel to the drive for coordination was the series of limited experiments with the creation of comprehensive manpower services, where a single sponsor either ran or purchased a wide range of programs and services for selected clientele. The Congress had recognized the desirability of such an approach in the EOA amendments of 1967. They mandated the coordination of all services under Community Action Agencies as prime contractors. The EOA authorized Comprehensive Work Training Program was abandoned in March of 1967 in favor of the Comprehensive Employment Program (CEP) generated by the Department of Labor and the Office of Economic Opportunity. At first the experiment was confined to 22 areas, but grew to 82 in 1973. Community Action Agencies were commonly the operators of these programs, but cities and counties occasionally were involved. Originally funded to serve a limited target area in the inner cities, they often expanded to serve city-wide manpower target populations. While many were unsuccessful in creating truly comprehensive manpower services for the disadvantaged, they did provide a valuable experience for future CETA programs, which shared a similar goal.

The Congress and Manpower Reform

While the Department of Labor moved to restructure the manpower system without legislative authorization, the Congress, the administration, and dozens of interest groups began (in 1969) the prolonged legislative process that produced CETA in late 1973 (see Davidson, 1972, and Levitan and Zickler, 1974 for more detailed accounts). Respected scholars, prestigious task forces and committees studying manpower, most administration officials and many Congressmen knowledgeable about manpower programs
agreed in the early stages on two important issues: the disheveled manpower system was in desperate need of a reconstitution from the impacts of haphazard legislative tinkering; and nationally determined programs were inflexible, and therefore often counterproductive in trying to meet the diverse needs of the nation's labor markets and the clientele they were intended to assist. On these subjects nearly all of the eight major reform bills introduced between 1969 and 1974 agreed.

On two other issues, however, there were serious disagreements within the Congress, and between the manpower experts in Congress and the Administration. The issues that incited the most disagreement among all parties were the question of the federal government as a provider of public service employment opportunities, and the goal of administrative decentralization to elected officials at the state and local levels. In general the Nixon Administration favored substantial decentralization with limited federal intervention, and opposed public jobs programs: the Democratic majorities of the House and Senate favored limited decentralization with vigorous federal oversight, and promoted public employment legislation as a stimulus to the economy and to help already fiscally weak state and local governments provide urgently needed public services. Each side eventually compromised, but it required four years of concentrated effort while these and numerous other contentious matters were resolved.

Efforts at legislative reform began in earnest in 1969 with the introduction of manpower bills by Representatives William A. Steiger (R-Wis.) and James G. O'Hara (D-Mich.). The Comprehensive Manpower Act (H.R.10908) and the O'Hara bill, simply called the Manpower Act
(H.R.11620) agreed on the need to decategorize manpower programs (dismantle the separate, narrowly defined programs and replace them with broad legislative mandates), but the Steiger bill designated the States as the prime sponsor, or principle operator of the programs, while the O'Hara legislation designated the Secretary of Labor in the role of prime sponsor. Neither bill gained wide approval. The Steiger bill placed too much emphasis on State governments, and the O'Hara bill was opposed by the administration as an unacceptable, federally oriented, solution.

The Administration's 1969 bill, known as the Manpower Training Act (MTA) (H.R.13472; S.2838) called for the combination of MDTA, and EOA programs under the authority of prime sponsors which would be designated by the nation's Governors. The MTA also failed to win approval as a combination of liabilities became apparent with its approach. Not only did it eliminate a number of special program favorites, which caused distress on the part of some Congressmen and program operators responsible for those programs, but it also placed a major burden on the States, and in particular the State employment services, which were thought to be insensitive to disadvantaged clientele and unresponsive to the needs of urban areas (See Davidson, 1972, pp. 23-37, and Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969, p.812).

The issues of decategorization and decentralization were linked to one another: a solution to one required a resolution of the conflict over the other. Senator Nelson, (D-Wis.) Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Employment, Manpower, and Poverty, of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare expressed this point in addressing former Secretary of Labor, George Shultz...
at hearings before the subcommittee in 1970: "some of the programs... were developed over the objections of city hall and/or state governors and if we throw the control back there all of a sudden, what might happen to some of them?" (See Hearings, Manpower Development and Training Legislation.) Recalling the period in an interview, Daniel Krivit, Chief Counsel to the House Education and Labor Select Subcommittee on Labor, observed that there was general agreement on the goals of breaking up the categorical system, but that "the real problem was... on how the power was to be distributed between the various levels of government" (National Academy of Sciences, 1974).

The two key subcommittees took up the process of molding an acceptable piece of legislation again in 1970, holding marathon hearings. This year, however, the deepening troubled economic conditions of the country were added to the equation. A parade of witnesses supported the concept of a federal job creation program. The administration was on record as opposed to public service employment legislation.

The Senate Committee sent just such a jobs creation bill to the floor of the chamber and it passed in mid-year. The bill, entitled the "Employment Opportunities and Training Act" (S.3867), also included a shift in program sponsorship to local governments, but retained a role for Community Action Agencies and authorized several traditional categorical programs. The House also passed its own version of manpower reform. Titled the "Comprehensive Manpower Act" (H.R.19519), the bill delegated the principle authority to run programs to the local level, included a more modest public service employment section, and eliminated more of the categorical programs.
The conferees met to resolve the main differences between the bills: the definition of the prime sponsors, the role of the states, the extent of categorical programs, and the size and nature of public service employment. The first two issues were easily resolved (Davidson, 1972, p.58-59), but the latter two proved more difficult. The Conference report basically reflected the Senate position of retention of some categorical programs and a more liberal public service employment program. The Republicans in the House refused to sign the report. The Bill, now called the Employment and Manpower Act, won easy acceptance in the Senate, but barely passed by a 177-159 vote in the House, with the Republicans solidly opposed (only 25 of the 147 voting favored the Report.)

In December of 1970, the President promptly vetoed the bill, charging that it retained and perpetuated "the deficiencies in our manpower programs" (see Veto Message, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, December 16, 1970). The President charged that the bill was not true manpower reform and objected to the "WPA type jobs." Although the veto was unpopular among the bill's supporters, it was sustained in the Senate, and almost undoubtedly would have been upheld by the House. (The actual vote in the Senate was 48 to 35 to override the veto--short of the 2/3 needed.) For the time being manpower reform seemed to be a dead issue.

The New Federalism

In 1971, the President began his drive to restructure intergovernmental relations through a program called a "New Federalism." Its basic
Tenets included the notions that government had grown too complex and fragmented, that power should be shifted to state and local officials on the assumption that these governments were "closer to the people," and that therefore the decisions on the use of funds could more faithfully reflect local needs and priorities. More important, these local officials would be more accountable to the people they served than the federal bureaucracy in Washington. (See, for a general discussion of Nixon's "new federalism," Reagan, 1972.)

The key elements of the President's approach were a regionalization of federal agencies to move power out of Washington; a general revenue sharing program (passed in 1972) that gave funds directly to local governments with few requirements; and a set of "special revenue sharing" packages that would combine groups of categorical programs under broad purposes, such as housing, education, and manpower, and place administrative responsibility at the local level. While the federal government would specify the general purpose for which funds were to be spent, the local governments would receive broad authority to allocate them as they saw fit.

President Nixon sent his manpower revenue sharing message to Congress in March of 1971, characterizing the present system as "overcentralized, bureaucratic, remote from people they mean to serve, overguidelined and ineffective" (see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, March 4, 1971). The cause for this illness was, according to the President, that "by and large their direction does not belong in federal hands." He contended that sending the money to states and localities who were "ready to apply their know-how if Washington will
help pay the bills," would solve many problems and would in turn
"sharply increase the citizen's ability to influence how funds are spent."

The new legislation received a cool reception on Capitol Hill. While earlier manpower reform legislation, including the vetoed Employment and Manpower Act of 1970, had authorized joint federal, state, and local participation in manpower delivery, the administration's 1971 manpower revenue sharing proposal (H.R.6181; S.1234) called for formula grants to local governments without prior federal approval of program plans and reduced the oversight role for the Department of Labor.

Despite the stall in the manpower reform movement, the crusade for some form of public jobs creation continued. Unemployment rose steadily, reaching 6% in 1971; state and local officials complained about deteriorating public services and shrinking revenues, especially in the inner cities; and returning Vietnam veterans were swelling the ranks of the jobless population.

The Senate and House passed an Emergency Employment Act (S.31), which authorized $1 billion for 140,000 to 200,000 public sector jobs for the unemployed. The bill received strong support in both chambers, especially from Democrats. In the process, both House and Senate had rejected efforts to merge the EEA with manpower reform, particularly of the President's variety. The White House agreed to support the bill, and the President signed it into law, but not without a quid pro quo. "In lending support to the bill, the administration was able to gain promises that both houses would move rapidly to consider comprehensive manpower legislation, including revenue sharing" (Davidson, 1972, p.91).
The EEA had important consequences from the Democratic majority's perspective: the White House had at least accepted the concept of public jobs creation in a period of difficult economic conditions. The Democrats would attempt to include similar provisions in future manpower legislation. Beyond the legislative process, EEA also was the first federal manpower legislation to place the control over the allocation of funds into the hands of local officials (Levitan and Zickler, 1974; Levitan and Taggart, 1974).

In 1972 the administration continued to push for manpower revenue sharing of the form introduced in H.R.6181. Labor Secretary Hodgeson derided the categorical system in appearances before the House Select Subcommittee on Labor. He contended that "the present system of grants limited the options of state and local officials...and inhibited responsive action with red tape and paper work related to federal standards and guidelines." He went on to suggest that "manpower services should be in response to the needs of the individual. Those needs are best perceived and responded to where the individual lives. So local responsivity must be combined with federal resources.." (see House Hearings on Employment and Manpower Act, 1972). The members of the committee clearly were not swayed by the rhetoric of the new federalism. Representative Dominick Daniels, (D-N.J.), Chairman of the Subcommittee, fretted over the control that would be placed in the hands of local authorities. He remarked to Secretary Hodgeson, "I don't think that the money should be shoveled out to a governor or mayor for him to use as he decides. This proposal (Employment and Manpower Act) does not go far enough on accountability" (see Hearings--above).
At the start of 1973, in the Fiscal Year 1974 Budget message the administration announced a radical change in strategy: it had decided to effect manpower revenue sharing by administrative regulation and abandon efforts for legislative reform. The Budget Message said, in part, "administrative requirements will be modified to allow the states and localities to group manpower services in ways that best meet local needs and to choose organizations to operate those programs. Manpower revenue sharing will be achieved administratively and build upon the CAMPS system."

The administration planned (under draft regulations) to have mayors designated as prime sponsors, and suggested that they would take over manpower programs run by the Urban League, SER, and the Opportunities Industrialization Centers. Finally, the administration proposed a ten percent cut in manpower funds and a phase out of the Emergency Employment Programs (see Budget Message of the President, 1974; and National Journal Reports, Vol. 5, No. 9, p.299).

To effect these reforms the administration needed an extension of the Manpower Development and Training Act which was due to expire. The reaction to the administration's plan was decidedly negative. Although the state and local government lobbies, such as the National League of Cities, U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National Association of Counties, and the National Governors' Conference favored reform, they preferred the legislative route which would guarantee that they were not subject to capricious actions by the Department of Labor. And categorical operators, such as the OIC, were able to marshall thousands of protestors to march on the Capital in opposition to the proposed DOL guidelines. In June the House Education and Labor Committee reported a bill (H.R.7950) which
authorized a simple one year extension of the MDTA, but as a rider to that legislation the committee tacked on a provision that specifically prohibited the administration from implementing manpower revenue sharing regulations, which were scheduled for publication in July.

Both the Senate and the House acted on legislation to extend public service employment programs. In July the Senate passed S.1560 which extended EEA for another year. The House Education and Labor Committee had reported a law to extend EEA in April, but it failed to gain support on the floor, so they simply reported another extension (H.R.7949) and held it along with the bill to extend MDTA and halt manpower revenue sharing.

Administration representatives, and leading manpower experts in the Senate (Nelson, Javits, Taft) and House (Daniels, Esch) met to fashion an acceptable compromise. The administration agreed to work for manpower reform in the House and withhold their attempts to restructure the manpower system administratively. The Senators agreed to hold up on the EEA extension and the already passed manpower reform bill, S.1559, which had been opposed by the Department of Labor. The House members similarly agreed to hold back floor action on H.R.7949 and 7950.

The members of the House Select Subcommittee on Labor and the administration eventually reached a compromise manpower reform bill which was passed by the House on November 28th. The administration had acceded to the long standing Democratic request for public service jobs as part of manpower reform, (and the specific desire for a $250 million supplemental appropriation for FY'74) and had accepted the language which provided for a significant role for the federal government
in the prior approval of local plans and subsequent monitoring. The administration had been granted a legislative manpower reform package that retained a limited number of categorical programs and provided the substantial local authority that they desired. Also the House bill (H.R.11010) was preferable to the Senate bill in the opinion of Labor Department officials because the latter bill retained many more categorical programs and contained a provision to revive Community Action Agencies that had been cut off by the Nixon administration, as of June 30. (Note that the CAAs were eventually extended by continuing appropriations despite the Nixon plan to dismantle them along with OEO).

William Bechtal, Executive Director of the Wisconsin State Manpower Planning Council, neatly summarized the series of concessions that produced the eleventh hour compromise legislation.

When this manpower debate began—with the introduction of the Administration's Manpower Training Act in 1969—Governors, Vocational Educators, and the State Employment Service all were arguing for a near dominant role in manpower programs. All three have made tremendous concessions in the interest of resolving a stalemate on this issue. Almost every city and county would really like to be directly funded...but most of them have come to accept the...cutoff somewhere around 100,000 or 150,000 population. Community Action Agencies and private, nonprofit groups have largely dropped their insistence that specific funds be earmarked for them. The Secretary of Labor and his regional manpower offices, have...made tremendous concessions, offering to yield much of their authority...The Administration has yielded significantly on retaining aspects of the Emergency Employment Act. (Prepared remarks submitted to the Select Subcommittee on Labor of Education and Labor of the House, October 28-29, 1973, p.110)

The Conference committee met to resolve nearly 100 differences between S.1559 and H.R.11010. By this time, however, most of the interest groups had lined up behind the delicate compromise represented in the House version and the Report contained a preponderance of House positions. Perhaps the most difficult issue to resolve was the Senate provision for
categorical programs. The Senate had made specific reference to certain manpower programs and delivery agents in S.1559, the House had not. The Senate receded, but mentioned SER and OIC in the Conference Report as programs of demonstrated effectiveness and deserving of attention by local prime sponsors. The President signed the bill, now called the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (P.L.93-203) on December 28, 1973 calling it, "one of the finest pieces of legislation to come to my desk this year" (see National Journal Reports, Vol. 6, No. 2, p.52).

The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act

What emerged as Public Law 93-203, CETA, was substantially different from the original administration bill. While CETA represents a significant piece of social legislation aimed at reforming the manpower system, it did not go nearly as far as some administration officials had hoped in removing federal oversight of implementation activities.

Let us briefly consider the basic features of CETA. It eliminates the federally managed system of a dozen or more categorical programs authorized by the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 (MDTA) and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (EOA) and replaces them with a simple mandate to state and local manpower prime sponsors to create a system of "comprehensive manpower services throughout the nation" (Sec 101). CETA also retains some categorical programs such as Public Service Employment, the job corps, and programs for special target populations, such as Indians, migrant workers, and citizens with limited English speaking ability. Responsibility for operating manpower programs is divided among federal, state, and local levels of government, as well as private organizations.
Previous manpower programs were administered directly by the federal government through local contractors such as community action agencies, Urban Leagues, and boards of education. Under CETA the programs are administered primarily by units of local government called Prime Sponsors (PSs) in CETA jargon. The PSs may choose to run all the local programs themselves or continue ties with the community organizations. A city or county is eligible to be a prime sponsor if it has a population of 100,000 or more; smaller communities may either join larger ones in consortia or have their programs administered by the state. There are over 400 prime sponsors in the United States.

Title I, the Comprehensive Services title, authorizes almost any conceivable manpower program for the target population of low income individuals (defined as $7,000 per year for a family of four in 1969, as adjusted by the Consumer Price Index), the unemployed, and underemployed. The law includes the flexibility to reallocate Title I funds for public service employment programs—a provision favored by Congressional Democrats, and the application of Title II funds for Title I programs—a point championed by the Administration. $1.6 billion was appropriated for Title I in FY'75.

Public Service Employment for individuals in areas of substantial unemployment—6.5% for three consecutive months—is authorized under Title II of CETA. The law provides for at least $250 million in fiscal year 1974 and no less than $350 million in fiscal year 1975 for allocation among the estimated 400 state and local prime sponsors. In order for an individual to be eligible he or she must be unemployed for at least 30 days and reside within the areas of substantial unemployment.
Preference is to be afforded to Korean and Vietnam era veterans and to those "who are most severely disadvantaged in terms of the length of time they have been unemployed (Section 205 C, 5 and 7).

When unemployment rose from the 4.5% in December of 1973 (when CETA passed) to the 7% in December of 1974, Congress enacted additional public jobs programs. The Emergency Jobs Act of 1974 amended Title VI of CETA by providing for an additional $1.5 billion in jobs creation measures. Under the new Title, areas suffering "severe unemployment" (7% or more) are able to receive funds for individuals who have been unemployed for only 15 days. Just as in Title II, the added public service employment title will be administered by state and local political jurisdictions.

Funds are distributed to the prime sponsors through grants determined by a formula which takes into account measures of need (unemployment rate and poverty families) as well as previous expenditures. Each area of the country is entitled to receive funding, and no matching funds are required.

The law requires state and local prime sponsors to appoint manpower planning councils composed of representatives of the client community and community-based organizations, as well as traditional deliverers of manpower services such as the employment service, and individuals from business, and organized labor. These advisory councils are responsible for assisting in the development, monitoring, and evaluation of local manpower plans and programs. Final local decision-making authority rests with the chief elected officials (e.g., Mayors, County Commissioners, County Executives).
CETA preserves an important role for the federal government. The Department of Labor (DOL) through its regional office representatives (R/DOL) is responsible for reviewing and approving plans for comprehensive manpower services and public service employment programs, offering technical assistance to local administrators, and monitoring and evaluating local performance. As with most federal grants, CETA insists upon a multitude of advance assurances from the prime sponsors relating to discrimination, participation in political activities by enrollees, and so on, on top of the general expectations that the myriad stipulations of the law and the regulations will be adhered to. The exclusive focus of this paper will be on those programs were federal and local responsibility is shared—Titles I, II, and VI. The principal concentration will be on the Comprehensive Services Title I.

The Policy Issues

Shortly after CETA became law, the man who is chiefly responsible for its implementation observed:

CETA is a reconstitution of what I would call an intergovernmental system in one area of social policy—the manpower area—and a redefinition of the role of the federal, state, and local governments in a way in which I don't think they have quite been defined before ...There are a lot of unanswered questions for all of us... (Assistant Secretary for Manpower William Kolberg, Early Perceptions of CETA, 1974).

CETA offers a unique opportunity to examine some critical assumptions about our system of intergovernmental relations and policy delivery. It raises numerous policy issues relevant to manpower policy in particular and the shape of the federal-local relations in general. The dissertation will focus on analyzing the implementation and consequences of three major aspects of CETA which address these broader questions: decentralization
of authority to local elected officials, decategorization of narrowly defined grant programs, and participation by citizens at the local level in policy making.

Decentralization:

The decade of the 1960s produced a fantastic expansion in the area of social service by all levels of government. For the most part these programs were federally financed, but locally administered. In some areas, however, authority over programs was held in the hands of the federal government--manpower, or employment and training for the poor, was one of these areas. The growth in social services for the poor and disadvantaged with federal control emerged as the federal government assumed responsibility for services that were not handled by states and localities for financial and political reasons.

It was the recognition of this fact that led Congressional leaders to insist upon manpower reform legislation which withheld carte blanche authority from cities and counties and instead maintained a substantial federal role. But under CETA local governments do gain considerable control over the allocation of resources within their communities: the empirical question is what do the local officials do with their newfound authority?

The overriding political rationale for the original federally run grant in aid programs was that certain interest groups--particularly the disadvantaged and minorities--were more effective at the national level than at the state and local level (Monypenny, 1960; Reagan, 1972). Many mayors and county commissioners would probably agree with Mayor
Moon Landrieu of New Orleans, that "categorical programs made it possible and politically feasible to concentrate dollars in poorer sections of the nation's cities." Indeed many conservatives favored the revenue sharing 'no strings attached' approach because it "put the allocation decision at the local level where the conservative, anti-public sector, pro-status groups know they have the greatest say" (National Journal Reports, Vol. 4, p.1923). CETA has a number of strings attached to it, but state and local governments still must implement the law, and the issue is: Will the disadvantaged remain effective at the local level?

Decategorization:

It is clear from the legislative record that liberals and conservatives alike agreed on the compelling need for flexibility at the local level in order to terminate the recognized shortcomings of the categorical system. Few disputed the negative consequences of proliferating grant programs, categorical hardening, and insensitivity to community needs.

Put most starkly, two questions trouble the policy maker and student of government in the design of a workable distribution of responsibilities among levels of government: 1) exactly how much discretion should be given to state and local officials and how much program goal specification should be left in the hands of Congress? and 2) how big a price in either corruption or simply ignorant and ineffective choices is one willing to pay for the gain of enlarging the decision making options at the lower levels? (Reagan, 1972, p.101). CETA is one of the first legislative experiments to confront this issue.

State and local officials may have the authority to restructure the system of manpower delivery, but are they willing or able to exercise that option?
Citizen Participation:

The proponents of the New Federalism echoed the rhetoric of increased accountability for decisions made at the local level. President Nixon contended that passing power to states and localities would enhance the influence of each citizen over how federal monies were used: "the crucial question is not where the money comes from, but whether the official who spends it can be made to answer to those who are affected by the choices he makes" (Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents, Revenue Sharing Message, February, 1971). The fear that politically powerful citizens would have a disproportionate influence over the allocation of resources prompted liberals to call for the creation of local manpower advisory councils. These visible public groups made up of highly interested citizens would, some hoped, assure accountability and improve the position of certain vested interests that the federal government had nurtured at the local level over the objections of local elected officials. Thus local officials would be forced to contend with local citizens' groups that could function as a de facto federal presence.

The local elected officials and staff are nevertheless free to choose the members, designate the chairmen, and ask the councils to participate in any or no stage of the decision making process. The question is what role emerges for citizen input and what is the importance of citizen advisory councils?

In summary, CETA raises important questions about the forms of contemporary political organization that constitute the system of intergovernmental policy delivery. The essential task of this dissertation
is to explore these perplexing questions as they are revealed in the implementation of CETA.
The temporary resolution of policy issues with the enactment of CETA was but the first step because the question of implementing the law loomed large. As one of the key participants in the manpower reform debate observed, "we didn't get all the language we wanted. I feel there is enough to clearly indicate the federal role. Whether or not the Labor Department administers it that way is another thing" (Ken Young, AFL-CIO; as quoted in National Journal Reports, Vol. 6, No. 2).

As some scholars have noted, (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973) a law is analogous to a theory. It contains assumptions about the way the world works and what, in this case, is the best policy delivery system for manpower. The real test comes when one attempts to carry out the law—expectations must be tested, measured and re-examined in the light of experience. Pointing to the possible gap between the intentions of public officials on the one hand, and the delivery of public services on the other, Kenneth Dolbeare and Philip Hammond (1971:149) have argued that very little may really be decided by the words of a decision or statute: the enunciation of such national policy may be just the beginning of the decisive process of determining what will happen to whom, and understanding this further stage is the essential to a full understanding of politics.

The purpose of this Chapter is to explore several approaches to the study of intergovernmental relations and to offer a conceptual framework for analyzing the delivery of policies that require the participation of several levels of government. I will apply this framework to the analysis of CETA.
The Study of Intergovernmental Relations

Speculation about the consequences of American federalism dates back nearly two centuries—most notably to the Federalist Papers. The prevailing concern of much of the early and contemporary literature is the constitutional and normative foundations of federalism. Numerous writers (for example, Wheare, 1964; Publius, 1972) have debated the issue of which powers and functions are reserved—or should be reserved—for each governmental jurisdiction within the federal system. This constitutional-normative perspective viewed federalism in static terms; it also treated each unit of government as a relatively autonomous entity with separate sources of legitimacy and authority—thus spawning the concept of "dual federalism." ²

During the last two decades a number of social scientists (for example, Grodzins, 1965, 1966; Elazar, 1962, 1972; Break, 1967; Maxwell, 1965; Weidner, 1967; and Wright, 1972) have moved the discussion of federalism beyond the hortatory, legalistic, and constitutional arguments (at least in part) to a more dispassionate description and analysis of the distribution of power, which they view as apportioned among partners in a cooperative federal system. Impressed by the dynamic nature of the intergovernmental system, these writers are less interested in prescribing the proper allocation of responsibilities than with charting existing relationships where the assignment of responsibilities is shared by various governmental units. The primary task of these works has been to provide a description of the intergovernmental system with emphasis on such concerns as the distribution of power, the sources of leverage held by each governmental jurisdiction, and the consequences of administrative centralization and decentralization.
While this body of literature has alerted us to a number of important considerations, it has failed to provide an analytic framework promoting either tests of the significance of particular variable clusters (e.g., the characteristics of administrative personnel), an examination of the importance of the degree of cooperation and conflict between governmental units, or the policy implications of a particular administrative arrangement (e.g., general or special revenue sharing). Since most of these works lack a coherent theoretical perspective the results of the analysis lack generality, and they tell us little about how public policy is implemented in the intergovernmental system.

The relative lack of knowledge about the process of intergovernmental policy implementation is a deficiency in our understanding of the policy process because it is likely to lead to ill-advised conclusions by policymakers. For example, when faced with an unsuccessful program, many observers will attribute its failure to poor planning or inadequate funding. This attribution of blame is often unjustified. Viewing the Great Society's social policies generally, Robert A. Levine (1968:86) has concluded that most of the trouble with the War on Poverty resulted "not so much from the nature of the programs as from difficulties of administration." The focus on implementation adds a new dimension to the study of inter-governmental relations. It gives the student of politics and the policy-maker a new understanding of how the intergovernmental system succeeds or fails in translating general policy objectives into concrete and meaningful public services.
The Study of Policy Implementation

In their study of the Economic Development Administration's Oakland Project, Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky (1973:166) write:

There is (or there must be) a large literature about implementation in the social sciences—or so we have been told by numerous people. ...It must be there; it should be there; but in fact it is not. There is a kind of semantic illusion at work here because virtually everything ever done in public administration must, in the nature of things, have some bearing on implementation...Nevertheless, except for a few pieces mentioned in the body of this book, we have been unable to find any significant analytic work dealing with implementation.

While I share Pressman and Wildavsky's concern that far too little attention has been paid to the question of policy implementation, there is substantial literature that can be used to develop a better understanding of the process by which general policy decisions are translated into public services. This literature can be divided into two types. First, a growing number of policy analysts have turned their attention to the problems of implementation. Among the most important published studies of policy implementation are Herbert Kaufman's (1960) study of the U.S. Forest Service, Stephen Bailey and Edith Mosher's (1968) examination of the administration of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Martha Derthick's (1970) analysis of federal grants-in-aid programs, Neal Gross and associates' (1971) examination of planned organizational innovation, Joel Berke and Michael Kirst's (1972) study of federal aid to education programs, Derthick's (1972) analysis of the Johnson Administration's effort to create new communities on federally owned land in metropolitan areas, Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) study of Oakland's community development program, Jerome Murphy's (1974) analysis of the implementation of Title V of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, and Charles Jones' (1975) investigation of air pollution...
policy. While these and other studies have helped identify factors that contribute to an understanding of the process of policy implementation, there is still no coherent conceptual framework for guiding the analysis of intergovernmental policy implementation. Instead, where the literature does attempt to provide explanations, it has tended to focus—perhaps inevitably—on the set of variables that emerged in particular case studies. The aim of the conceptual framework presented here is to assist those seeking to derive generalizations from the findings of seemingly disparate case studies, and to provide a general blueprint for studying implementation—in this case CETA.

Second, there is a rich heritage from the social sciences that is often overlooked by those purporting to discuss the policy implementation process. This literature includes theoretical and empirical work in several disciplines, including sociology, public administration, social psychology, and political science. While most of these studies do not specifically examine the implementation of intergovernmental policy, close inspection reveals their significance.

In developing the conceptual framework that is advanced in this chapter, I was guided primarily by the organization theory literature—and more specifically, by the work in the area of organizational change (innovation) and control. Since the contributions of this literature are presented in considerable detail elsewhere (see Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975), I shall limit myself to a brief overview of the major ideas which have relevance to intergovernmental policy implementation.

Students of organizational theory and practice have dealt extensively with the topic of change (for example, Downs, 1967; and Gross, et al.,
1971). In an analysis of organizational change, Herbert Kaufman (1971) explores a variety of impediments to innovation in organizational structure and action. He examines such factors as resource limitations and the accumulation of official and unofficial constraints on behavior that "tend to keep organizations doing the things they have been doing in the recent past, and doing them in just the way they have been doing them" (Kaufman, 1971:39). Kaufman recognizes the many advantages of stability, and makes a serious effort to identify those forces conducive to organizational change—those that occur involuntarily and by design. Yet he concludes that most organizations "are imprisoned in the present and often cannot change, even when the future threatens them unless they do" (Kaufman, 1971:40).

Organizational control has also been a frequent research topic. Harold Wilensky (1967:3) defines control as the "problem of getting work done and securing compliance with organizational rules." Amitai Etzioni (1961) utilizes the concept of compliance—which can be useful in the study of implementation—as a basis for comparing complex organizations. He argues that different types of organizations will require different kinds of compliance systems. For example, where participants in an organization are alienated and have an intense negative orientation toward the organization, coercive power—the application, or the threat of punitive sanctions—may be required to achieve adherence to the organization's rules and objectives. Where most participants have intense positive orientations and are highly committed to the organization's goals and objectives, compliance can usually be achieved through the use of normative power—the allocation and manipulation of symbolic
rewards and deprivations. And where participants do not have intense orientations toward the organization and their involvement is a function of perceived costs and benefits, remunerative power—the allocation of material resources such as salaries, commissions, and fringe benefits—is likely to be the most effective means of achieving compliance.

Integral to Etzioni's thinking, and to all discussions of control, is the relationship between superiors and subordinates in complex organizations. The classic Weberian interpretation of this relationship holds that the ideal role of subordinates is one of implementing faithfully the decisions made by their superiors. Policies are made at the highest levels; they are then carried out by lower participants whose discretion is acutely limited. While this interpretation is widely accepted, most organizations deviate considerably from it. Numerous studies have shown that such "lower participant" groups as attendants in mental hospitals (Scheff, 1971), maintenance workers in factories (Crozier, 1964), and prison inmates (Sykes, 1961) exercise power and affect the performance of complex organizations.

Not infrequently these instances are dismissed as exceptions to the rule. David Mechanic (1962) suggests, however, that they are manifestations of a general pattern. By acquiring control over persons, information, and instrumentalities, lower participants can wield considerable power that is not normally associated with their formally defined positions within the organizations. He (1962:351) argues that "organizations, in a sense, are continuously at the mercy of their lower participants, ..." In developing an analytic model of the judicial implementation process, Lawrence Baum (1976) suggests that lower-court judges be viewed as independent
actors "who will not follow the lead of higher courts unless conditions are favorable for their doing so." This perspective requires that we seek to identify those factors which determine the autonomy of lower participants.

Defining Policy Implementation

Policy implementation encompasses those actions by public and private individuals (or groups) that affect the achievement of objectives set forth in prior policy decisions. This includes factors affecting one-time efforts to transform decisions into operational terms, as well as continuing efforts to achieve the changes mandated by policy decisions. As Walter Williams (1971:144) observes: "In its most general form, an inquiry about implementation...seeks to determine whether an organization can bring together men and material in a cohesive organizational unit and motivate them in such a way as to carry out the organization's stated objectives."

It is important to make clear the distinction between policy implementation, policy performance and what is generally referred to as policy impact. These are distinct albeit related concepts. Policy impact studies examine the linkage between specific program approaches and observed consequences (e.g., Do remedial manpower programs have lasting salutary effects?). The study of policy implementation, on the other hand, highlights one of the forces that determines policy impact by focusing on those activities that affect the rendering of public services. As Dolbeare observes (1974), impact studies typically ask "What happened?" whereas implementation studies also ask "Why did it happen this way?"
The difference between the dependent variables of policy impact and policy implementation research parallels the distinction drawn by Levine (1969:1190) between a program's proximate and ultimate effects. An implementation study investigates the proximate effects—the delivery of services to intended beneficiaries and changes in program structure and operation. Policy impact studies typically address questions of ultimate effect—the upgrading of enrollee wages or employment potential.

The model utilized here is not designed to measure the ultimate impact of intergovernmental programs; rather it seeks to measure and explain program performance—the degree to which anticipated services are actually delivered to intended beneficiaries and the consequences of the CETA managerial concepts of decategorization and decentralization. Policies may be fully implemented but fail to have positive effects because they were poorly conceived or because of numerous other circumstances beyond the scope of the specific remedy. Adequate program performance is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the production of positive ultimate impacts.

A Model of Intergovernmental Policy Implementation

The policy implementation model directs attention to a set of variables and their inter-relations that determine policy performance within a particular jurisdiction. Therefore the selection of criteria for assessing performance is a crucial stage in the analysis: the performance measures are the dependent variables that are employed to determine whether or not policy objectives are realized. The ability of the policy analyst to make statements about the adequacy of implementation actions and to propose specific remedies that might be undertaken to
correct deficiencies depends upon the development of precise and meaningful (to policy makers) performance measures.

In selecting performance indicators one can rely on a number of alternative sources--the statements of policy makers in the legislative history of the act and amendments, the program's regulations, criteria suggested by client groups or by specialists in the field. Ultimately the measures deduced by the researcher should be based on the purpose for which the research is conducted (Rossi and Williams, 1972). I have chosen to concentrate on three pervasive assumptions (identified in Chapter 1) about the effects of CETA. These will serve as the research questions or dependent variables posed by the dissertation. The remainder of this section will discuss the nature of these concerns and suggest performance indicators. In the next section, I shall cover the independent variables in the model that will be employed to generate explanations for the observations about policy performance.

CETA Policy Performance: The Dependent Variables

When CETA passed in December of 1973 it followed almost a dozen years of experience with a categorical system of grants-in-aid for manpower programs. Its immediate predecessor, The Cooperative Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS), was the last in a series of administrative attempts to bring together the fragmented system to produce more comprehensive programs. But manpower under CAMPS remained fundamentally a disjointed mixture of categorical programs controlled by the regional Manpower Administration with little flexibility for planning at the local level. CETA was the product of the long standing struggle to change the system of manpower policy delivery.
Although CETA provides the legislative authority for several programs, Title I—Comprehensive Manpower Services will receive the most attention. Title II—Public Employment Programs, and Title VI (passed December, 1974) will also be considered for purposes of comparison. Three specific effects of the law will be examined: the political, programmatic, and citizen participation effects. The following is a brief review of each of these anticipated consequences, as well as suggested performance indicators for each.

**Political Effects:** Under CETA, authority and responsibility for the planning and operation of manpower programs is decentralized to city/county chief elected officials. The potential impacts of this shift raise perhaps the most important questions in modern federalism. Groups monitoring the decentralization effects of General Revenue Sharing (GRS) have concluded that it had a substantial influence on political processes, enhancing the role of local officials in the budgetary processes of their jurisdictions (Nathan, *et al.*: 1974). The concept of special revenue sharing, in contrast to GRS, established block grants to localities for Congressionally determined purposes—-in this case manpower programs for the disadvantaged and unemployed. Localities remain responsible for the total program, while the tools of federal influence are sharply reduced.

In order to convert this amorphous goal of decentralization into researchable questions, I have chosen to focus on two assumed effects of the transfer of authority: changes in the importance of local politics and politicians in manpower decision-making and changes in the characteristics of the clients served by the programs. Both of these effects
fall under the general heading of what will be referred to as the politicization of manpower programs. Politicization is a short-hand term for the consequences that may result when authority for manpower program operation is removed from the control of a professional cadre of bureaucrats and turned over to local elected officials who are subject to the immediate pressures within their communities. The potential effects on both the political process and the clientele will be measured.

The process effects address the question of the degree of participation in manpower decision-making by local officials. Do manpower revenue sharing funds affect the decision-making processes for manpower programs within the jurisdiction? Who determines the use of funds? What new additional groups are involved in the allocation of resources? Is greater public and political interest focused on the planning and operation of manpower programs? Does manpower become a political issue within the Prime Sponsorship?

The other measured effect of decentralization is the degree of change in the groups served by the programs. With the passing of the "stewardship of the disadvantaged" to local elected officials many observers (See, Levitan and Zickler, 1974; Reagan, 1972) have opined that despite legislative prescriptions, fewer disadvantaged individuals will be served. It is assumed that since the disadvantaged are among the least well organized and influential interests within the Prime Sponsorships they will receive less in the way of services in comparison to their treatment under the federally managed programs. It is assumed that political officials will weigh the political costs and benefits more heavily than the federal bureaucracy and seek to serve a clientele group with more political potential—such as the unemployed rather than disadvantaged individuals.
The in-depth study of each community will enable the researcher to uncover more subtle forms of politicization than one could gain from a simple summation of client characteristics. A finding which tends to disconfirm the assumption would be highly significant given the pervasive speculation to the contrary and is therefore worthy of examination. However, the expectation is that the decentralization of manpower programs will in fact lead to a politicization of the process (see Appendix A for a list of operational indicators).

Programmatic Effects: An equally important hallmark of CETA stemmed from a nearly universal consensus on the need to decategorize manpower programs. It was assumed that this would provide greater flexibility for the development of comprehensive manpower services more responsive to the unique characteristics of the labor market area. The categorical aid system, which functioned from 1962 until CETA, was a patchwork of several separately mandated laws that established a multitude of individual programs to serve particular client populations such as youths. The program operators administered federal programs under national guidelines and criteria of performance with little option for modifications, and no strong system for the coordination of their disparate efforts.

Therefore, an important question about the implementation of CETA is the degree of change that is achieved as a result of the new flexibility to determine the shape of manpower programs. For the first time, one set of individuals (the elected officials of the PS) have the authority to remake the programs that were included under MDTA and EOA and create a set of programs that meet locally determined priorities.
(It should be noted that not all manpower programs fall under CETA. As much as 60% (in terms of dollars expended) of the programs will not be subject to alteration.) The question is: what changes in the existing manpower system, and why?

No "model" system for comprehensive services is held up for comparison, but I will make comparisons of the shape of pre-CETA (CAMPS) plans for Fiscal Year 1974 and the CETA plans for 1975 and 1976. The analysis will chart the ways in which the PSs are coping with the reality of decategorization and offer explanations for the stability or change in the status-quo. Several questions about the nature of programmatic change will be answered: How does the manner of providing services change? How do previous program operators fare in the transition to CETA? What changes are experienced in the mix of manpower services? What is the degree of functional centralization? What factors lead to the changes over time? The working assumption is that the goal of decategorization will cause substantial programmatic change. (See Appendix A for operational indicators.)

Citizen Participation Effects: CETA establishes citizen advisory councils to provide input into the planning and evaluation of manpower programs in each locality. Manpower planning councils (MPCs) are appointed by the elected officials who are expected to consult them before submitting plans to the Department of Labor for CETA funds. A laundry-list of potential members is suggested in the law, however the elected officials are free to choose the membership, designate the chairmen of the MPC, and their terms of office. The law is silent on the form that MPC participation should take: they may participate in any or almost no stage of
the decision-making process. Final decisions on the recommendations of
the council rests with the elected officials.

The dissertation shall examine the nature of participation by the
manpower planning councils in the PSs. Several elements of their
participation will be considered. What responsibilities and tasks
are assigned to the MPCs? What recommendations do the MPCs make to
the PS and what happens to these recommendations? What is the importance
of the MPC in the development and evaluation of manpower programs? The
operating assumption will be that there will be substantive citizen input
by the MPCs. (See Appendix A for operational indicators.)

In summary the dissertation is designed to gauge three effects of
CETA. It has been assumed that the policy of decentralization will alter
the process for determining manpower programs and reorder in importance
the type of people who are served by them. It has also been assumed
that the decategorization of the manpower grant-in-aid system will produce
significant programmatic change at the local level. Finally, it has been
assumed that groups of citizens on MPCs will help structure the shape of
these programs. The performance indicators are designed to test the
degree to which any or all of these assumptions are justified empirically
and how the complexion varies across jurisdictions and over time. The
next section describes the independent variables that will be employed in
order to explain the variations on the performance measures.

The Independent Variables

An analysis of policy implementation requires more than the measure­
ment of program performance: the principal goal is to derive explanations
from the events and factors that intervene between the articulation of a
national policy and the results that occur within the states and localities. The research involves two stages: one must first establish that the measured program performance (politicization, programmatic change, and citizen participation) is indeed related to the introduction of the legislation (CETA); then one must attempt to explain the patterns of effects. The remainder of this chapter discusses the set of variables that are utilized in the second phase of the research.

The model outlined in Figure I posits eight variable clusters—policy resources, policy standards, communications, enforcement, dispositions of implementors, characteristics of the implementing agencies, the political conditions, and economic and social conditions—that influence implementation efforts to achieve local program performance. The model delineates several factors that shape the linkage between policy and performance, and specifies the relationships among these independent variables. It will aid in the description of the policy implementation process and serve as a guide in the research. The model's utility can be illustrated by reference to three general explanations for unsuccessful implementation which are similar to Kaufman's (1973:2) explanations for noncompliance in organizational settings:

---The Communication Process. Effective implementation requires that implementors know what they are supposed to do. As messages pass through any communications network, distortions are likely to occur—producing contradictory directives, ambiguities, inconsistencies in instructions, and incompatible requirements. Even when directives and requirements are clear, problems may arise as implementors fail to comprehend fully what is expected of them.
FIGURE I: A MODEL OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
--The Capability Problem. Successful implementation is also a function of the implementing organization's capacity to do what it is expected to do. The ability to implement policies may be hindered by such factors as overworked and incompetent staffs; insufficient information, political support and financial resources; and impossible time constraints.

--Dispositional Conflicts. Implementation efforts may fail because implementors refuse to do what they are supposed to do.

Most studies of implementation rely primarily upon one of these three general explanations for unsuccessful implementation. Few investigators have sought to integrate each of these explanations into their analyses. The conceptual framework utilizes these partial and insufficient explanations in an effort to provide the basis for a comprehensive understanding of the implementation process. I will now turn to a definition and brief elaboration of each variable cluster in the model. (Specific operational indicators for each variable cluster may be found in Appendix A.)

The Policy: Resources and Standards

Two components of the policy decision influence the implementation process: policy resources and policy standards. Policies provide financial and other resources for programs and their administration and enforcement. Funds and incentives are usually not adequate—a cause often cited for the failure of implementation efforts (Derthick, 1972:87; and Murphy, 1971). In addition, the timing of the release of funding information to the agency can have important consequences for the success of the program: administrators forced to plan with insufficient knowledge about the amount of funds available for the school year will experience
serious difficulties (Berke and Kirst, 1972:44). The amount of funding in any given year relative to previous levels will influence decisions made by program administrators. Agencies that are faced with severe budgetary cutbacks will perceive and carry out their tasks quite differently from those that enjoy expanding budgets. Finally, policy resources may influence the environment where implementation occurs, stimulating interested individuals and groups to press for full implementation and successful policy performance.

The other significant component of the policy decision is its standards. Policy standards move beyond the general legislative goals and preamble rhetoric and establish requirements, in varying degrees of specificity, for how those goals shall be implemented. Standards are commonly contained in the legislation and program regulations, but they may also be elaborated in such diverse sources as technical assistance guides, statements by policy makers, and news releases and brochures from the agency responsible for obtaining compliance.

A detailed profile of the standards relating to the performance measures should be constructed, and the changes over time charted. A longitudinal approach will enable analysts to examine the changing nature of the standards and to relate them to alterations in implementation actions and program performance. This profile of policy standards can be utilized to assess the quality, clarity, consistency, and accuracy of national level direction. It should also be compared with the interpretations of federal, state, and local levels. If the policy standards when viewed longitudinally are inconsistent, confusing, unclear, and inaccurate, then they will create problems that will seep into the policy
delivery system. Likewise, the actions of federal, state, and local actors must be compared with the standards, however imperfect, at the national level.

Policy standards tell federal, state, and local implementors what is expected of them and indicate the amount of discretion left open to them. Policy standards also provide overseers with the tools of influence and enforcement, since they set limits on the types of activities that are tolerable, and on the sanctions that can be imposed for deviations.

Ambiguities in policy standards may be fostered deliberately by policy makers in order to insure positive responses by implementors. National program regulations must accommodate diverse settings. Moreover, standards may remain vague because policy makers are unwilling or unable to reach a consensus on the directives that should be promulgated (see Bailey and Mosher, 1968; Murphy, 1971).

Communications

Policy standards represent no more than exhortations: they are inanimate messages that must be communicated to those in charge of executing the policy. Judicial impact studies (Milner, 1971; Dolbeare and Hammond, 1971; and Wasby, 1973) have frequently reported that the failure of lower court judges to show compliance with higher court decisions can be attributed to their ignorance of those rulings. Policy standards cannot be complied with unless they are communicated with sufficient clarity so that the implementors will know what is required of them.

Communication between levels of the federal system is a complex and difficult task. And in transmitting messages communicators inevitably distort them intentionally and unintentionally, placing their own emphases
and interpretations on what often begins as a uniform statement by the federal government (Downs, 1967; Wilensky, 1967). Moreover, different sources within the federal government are not always uniform in providing directives and interpretations, and the same source may serve up conflicting policy positions over time, diluting the impact of the message even further. While good communications will not necessarily contribute to a positive disposition on the part of implementors, variations in their support for the policy may often be explained partially in terms of their understanding and interpretations of the policy standards and the manner by which they are communicated.

It will therefore be important to investigate the nature and content of the specific advice, orders, and clarifications communicated by federal implementors to state and local implementing agencies. Several questions should be raised: What is the accuracy, clarity, consistency, and timeliness of the communication compared with the national policy standards, and of the information going to a particular state or locality over time? What interpretations do the field representatives bring to their understanding of the program, and what are their definitions of acceptable local performance? What policy standards do they emphasize in their reviews of prime sponsorships and in their consultations with local officials?

Poor communications may be caused by a variety of factors, not the least of which is the original ambiguity contained in the national policy standards. Added to these inherent problems are the selective perceptions and concerns of federal implementors. Examining the record of standards and the process of communicating them to state and local actors will help isolate the areas where corrective action is most needed.
Enforcement

Successful implementation usually requires mechanisms and procedures whereby the federal government may increase the likelihood that state and local officials will act in a manner consistent with policy standards. There is no hierarchy of officials in the intergovernmental system that can be ordered toward a set of predetermined objectives: the careful specification of plans and standards, while important, will not suffice to guarantee effective program performance (Schultze, 1969;202; Neustadt, 1960).

Federal officials have essentially three means of achieving compliance from agencies and individuals who implement the program: norms, incentives, and sanctions. These correspond to Etzioni's (1961:5-8) distinction between normative, renumerative, and coercive forms of power. He argues that in different contexts, and with different organizations, one must employ different forms of power in order to achieve adherence to the organization's rules and objectives. Federal officials must be sensitive to the characteristics of the agencies they are dealing with when they make similar choices among the means of enforcement. State and local agencies with competent staffs and leadership require different enforcement approaches than those that are poorly staffed and led. And those with limited political resources may be more vulnerable to coercive power than those enjoying extensive support from public officials. Finally, federal assessment should change with the evolution of the program within the state or locality. Early efforts may be directed towards gaining minimal compliance, while later actions will be devoted to developing more effective programs.
Norms and incentives are frequently used enforcement techniques. An important method of federal influence is the socialization, persuasion, and cooptation of state and local officials. Federal agency personnel attempt to build alliances with state and local implementors—cultivating allies who can be counted on to carry out federal policy willfully (see Derthick, 1970; Bailey and Mosher, 1968; Etzioni, 1965 and Kaufman, 1960). A fragmented federal system makes constant oversight impossible and thus requires heavy reliance on this approach.

It is equally important to examine the possibility of the cooptation of the federal enforcers by the state and local implementing agency (see Lazin, 1973; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; and Murphy, 1971). Federal officials may be so concerned with maintaining cooperative relationships that they soften demands for compliance, lose sight of the goals of the policy, and even assume advocacy roles for the local agencies.

Federal officials may also use incentives in order to influence the behavior of implementors. Besides providing dollars for administration of the program, the federal government may render valuable services to them, such as technical assistance, research, staff loans, or may assist them in obtaining physical and other resources.

One of the most important enforcement relationships is the provision of support by the federal government to state and local agencies when they face hostile forces within their environments. This is particularly true with respect to bolstering state agencies in their dealings with large cities within the state. Compliance with policy standards will be enhanced if the federal government is willing and able to back state and local agencies that adhere to its policies when these agencies receive pressure to deviate from prescribed paths of acceptable performance.
Federal officials also have more compelling devices at their disposal, ranging from gentle to explicit forms of coercive power. A common practice is to require that states and localities draw up elaborate plans for the administration of federal programs. Once these assurances are made by the states and localities, the federal government will allocate funds on the condition that they may be withdrawn if the objectives set forth in the plans are not fulfilled. By concentrating on the initial stages of policy formulation and planning, the federal government seeks to employ "compliance in advance" (Derthick, 1970:209).

A similar strategy is to specify conditions and procedural requirements, such as elaborate reporting and accounting systems, in the regulations that accompany the acceptance of federal funds. There are, however, dangers in this procedure (Derthick, 1970:200):

Specificity entails risks... The more specific the language of the federal requirements, the lower the federal capacity to adapt to state peculiarities and the greater the danger that the limitations of federal capacity to compel conformance may be revealed. Moreover, stringent regulations and guidelines may induce a sort of goal displacement, wherein state and local officials strive to meet federal requirements in order to obtain funds and avoid sanctions, while ignoring the basic mission of the program.

Assurances do not guarantee that federal objectives will be fulfilled (nor that the federal government will be willing to impose sanctions), so more reliable forms of surveillance such as on-site visitations, state and local program reviews, program evaluations, and audits are usually conducted. And other feedback mechanisms, including reports by non-governmental advisory committees (such as local manpower planning councils) can be used

The most threatening form of potential federal power is the authority to withdraw or recover funds from a state or local agency for non-compliance. This ultimate weapon is rarely used. It may cause embarrassment to the federal agency and damage the only ally that it has within the area. Generally, the federal government negotiates with state and local officials in an effort to attain the greatest possible compliance without withholding funds. Federal officials will usually refrain from overt threats which could undermine cooperative relationships and generate congressional hostility at the expense of program goals. The more common practice short of withholding funds is the audit exception. State and local awareness of this regularized process of audit discovery often acts as a powerful deterrent to errant behavior (errant, that is, from a federal perspective).

**Dispositions of Implementors**

The success or failure of many federal programs has often been attributed to the level of support enjoyed within the agency responsible for implementation. As Petrick (1968:7) observes, this stems from the fact that "human groups find it difficult to carry out effectively acts for which they have no underlying beliefs." Three elements of the implementors' response may affect their ability or willingness to implement federal policy: their cognition (comprehension) of the policy's standards, the direction of their response towards them, and the intensity of their response.
Even when the policy standards are communicated with accuracy, clarity and consistency, successful implementation may be frustrated when officials are unaware that they are not in full compliance with the law and do not know what they must do to get there. The message transmission may operate correctly, but the receiver may malfunction due to ignorance or overload (see Wasby, 1970:97).

Implementors may not execute the policy's standards because they reject the objectives contained in them (see Peltason, 1961; Dolbeare and Hammond, 1971; Etzioni, 1961; Wasby, 1970). The objectives may be rejected for a variety of reasons: they may offend the implementors' personal value systems, self-interest, organizational loyalties, or existing preferred relationships. Finally, the intensity of the implementors' response may affect the implementation process. Those holding intense negative orientations toward the policy may openly defy program objectives (Bailey and Mosher, 1968). Less intense attitudes may cause implementors to attempt surreptitious diversion and evasion (Lazin, 1973).

**Characteristics of the Implementing Agencies**

The formal and informal attributes of the organization responsible for implementation affect its ability to carry out the policy's standards (see Ripley, *et al.*, 1973; Rourke, 1969; Downs, 1967; Kaufman, 1971). No matter what the attitudes of its personnel, certain features of the agency's staff, structure, and relations with other officials and units of government will tend to limit or enhance the prospects for effective implementation.

One important factor is the experience and competence of the staff to perform the tasks required of them. Obviously, a staff which lacks sufficient training and knowledge in the area of policy will have
difficulty coping with the type of tasks they must perform. For example, CETA programs place heavy demands on federal, state, and local agencies, requiring new procedures and mechanisms for achieving the policy's goals. At the same time, these agencies are burdened with the requirement to keep the federal government informed of activities relating to the program. A poorly led and staffed organization will be unable to conduct effective programs since they will have their hands full surviving and meeting minimum federal criteria.

The status of the agency within either the parent organization of which it is a part or the local government structure also affects its administrative capacity. An organization without sufficient financial and political support and without the necessary independence to make decisions and hire qualified personnel will face severe problems in administering programs. For example, if the agency must implement several programs simultaneously its effectiveness will undoubtedly be reduced (Bailey and Mosher, 1968).

Political Environment

The political environment of the implementing agencies affects the nature of policy performance and the implementing actions of the agencies. The extent of support for or opposition to the policy objectives by organizational superiors and by public and private individuals and groups influences implementation efforts and results, regardless of the positions of the implementors or the quality of the agency executing the program. Several scholars have noted that public and elite opinion, and the salience of the program to them, are important determinants in the policy implementation process (Dolbeare and Hammond, 1971; Derthick, 1970; Lazin, 1973; Peltason, 1961; Wasby, 1970).
Where the problems to be remedied by a program are severe and private citizens and interest groups are mobilized in support of a program, it is more likely that implementors will accept the policy's goals and objectives. Officials are compelled to accede to program standards by political demands within their jurisdictions.

The impact of federal enforcement activities may be mitigated when state and local implementors are opposed to certain aspects of the program and can enlist the support of organizational superiors or their congressional delegations. For example, the federal agency may be reluctant to intervene in situations where audits uncover gross misappropriations of funds, in part from the desire to demonstrate program success by avoiding embarrassing publicity. But more important, federal agencies often face pressure exerted by legislators and other public officials who do not wish to have reports of fund abuse in their districts disclosed.

Economic and Social Conditions

Economic conditions, both as needs and resources, influence the chances of successful program performance. Although specific indicators must be constructed around the types of policies in question, one would want to examine the needs of the jurisdiction for the service that the federal program is offering and the structure of those needs. Depending on the types of need within the community the implementor may be led to accept or reject certain goals of the policy or its approaches. Likewise, the extent of need may influence otherwise negatively oriented officials to embrace the policy in order to minimize public hostility or to respond to public wishes.
The resources of the community must also be considered. Some areas may have the capacity to carry out public services without federal assistance. If federal requirements are objectionable, they may refuse to participate in the program altogether. Also, the types of economic resources within the community will influence the kinds of services that can be offered and their importance. For example, in manpower programs, localities that enjoy extensive private industrial development and a high demand for skilled labor can structure their programs to take account of this potential.

Although the discussion has been presented in static terms, it is important to recognize the dynamic character of the policy implementation process. The implementation of intergovernmental policies may follow a developmental path: factors that affect the execution of a policy in its initial stages may be of little consequence at a later point in time. In its early stages policy may represent a radical departure from past practices and, therefore, engender great conflict over its goals and objectives. During this phase certain features of the model—particularly communications, enforcement, and the dispositions of implementors—may explain the success or failure of implementation efforts to achieve desired results. Later, individuals and organizations may adapt to the policy and consensus over goals may be achieved. At this point, other factors—such as the characteristics of the implementing agencies—may contribute more to the realization of program objectives. With this in mind, it is vital that the study of implementation be approached from a longitudinal perspective (as well as cross-sectionally); relationships identified at one point in time must not be extended casually to other time periods. The research design calls for the collection of information
over 18 months so that longitudinal variation may be charted and explained.

While far too little attention has been paid to how policy decisions are transformed into public services, one can identify a number of studies that look explicitly at the problems of policy implementation. The conceptual framework draws upon this literature and directs attention to a set of attributes, processes, and behaviors that will help provide a more comprehensive understanding of the policy implementation process and the performance of intergovernmental policy.

In discussing the eight variable clusters that comprise the model of intergovernmental policy implementation, I have not attempted to describe and justify each of the hypothesized relationships posited in Figure I. It should be noted, however, that this conceptual framework not only specifies the relationships between the independent variables and the ultimate dependent variable of interest, but also identifies explicitly the linkages among the independent variables.

I would suggest that this framework be viewed as an heuristic model. It is designed for the purpose of discovering facts about the policy implementation process and is useful for empirical research, but probably is not capable of definitive proof (and it is not intended for such purposes). It can be contrasted with the deductive-deterministic models which dominate political science and have been employed by many policy researchers--especially in policy-making studies. Both types of models have their place and purpose; however, the heuristic model is more appropriate for studying implementation and for deriving useful policy advice.

The policy implementation model aspires to discover how the law is implemented. It allows one to chart variations, and then to relate them
to outcomes. The end product is no concise formula that can be employed to explain (in any strict sense) the observed results; rather it can be used to extract a better understanding of the process and of those factors that facilitate or hinder policy performance.

The deductive-deterministic model aspires to provide precise explanations that are neither temporally nor spatially bound. These explanations rely on the best available sets of empirical laws or, in the case of most political science, on hypotheses that have been regularly confirmed. The more abstract and generally applicable the variable, the more amenable it will be to replication and refinement in similar analyses at other times and in other settings. Ideographic variables are rejected because they move the researcher away from his primary goal.

The major weakness of the deductive-deterministic model is that it offers little or no information to the policy-maker who wishes to make changes in implementation actions. By ignoring those immediate process-oriented factors that influence policy implementation, it forfeits the ability to make policy relevant advice. The parsimonious virtues of such a model are liabilities in most policy research enterprises, especially where administrative behavior is the subject of inquiry.

Therefore, it is my contention that this model offers a blueprint for the description and analysis of the policy implementation process, and that it proposes explanations for program achievements and failures. Studies of intergovernmental policy implementation--when approached in this manner--have much to offer policy analysts and policy-makers alike. For the policy analyst, implementation studies offer the promise of systematic explanations of the complexities of intergovernmental relations,
as well as a more thorough understanding of the policy consequences of the federal system. Implementation research may also lead the policymakers to explanations for observed impacts and point to variables that may be manipulated to improve the delivery of public services.

In summary, the basic approach of the dissertation is to evaluate three key assumptions about the effects of CETA in the four Ohio Prime Sponsorships over a 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) year period. The model will be employed to help describe and account for patterns of political, programmatic and participation effects. In the process, the model will be re-examined and assessed for its ability to explain policy performance. Finally, recommendations for the design and implementation of future intergovernmental policies will be offered.
CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECTS OF CETA IN FOUR OHIO PRIME SPONSORSHIPS

Chapter 3 describes the effects of the first 18 months of CETA. Politicization, programmatic change, and citizen participation will be discussed in turn, with special attention to the similarities and differences among the research sites. Before beginning this review, however, I will present a brief overview of the approach used in the analysis and the research sites.

Developing a Research Strategy

In order to generate explanations or understanding of the patterns of implementation, one must develop an effective research strategy. Three alternative strategies can be identified: an experimental method, a statistical approach, and a comparative case study approach (see Arend Lijphart, 1971). I have chosen to employ a comparative case study method (see Przeworski and Teune, 1970). This approach permits the investigator to examine a large number of variables in considerable detail while restricting attention to a rather limited number of cases. It resembles the statistical approach in that emphasis is placed upon the comparison of cases. Yet the reliance on data from only a few cases does not permit systematic control by means of partial correlations (or similar techniques).

What one "loses" with the comparative case study approach in terms of the number of cases and the precision with which controls can be applied...
is more than compensated for in terms of the type of analysis that it permits. The investigator may focus directly on the variety of actors, institutions, activities, and relationships that are of primary interest, without being limited by the availability of quantitative indicators. In an effort to expand the number of observations, investigators often rely upon numeric indicators that are poor surrogates for the phenomena that are of real interest. In essence, data availability winds up dictating the research agenda rather than vice versa.

It is important to note that a comparative case study approach need not be characterized by a series of unsystematic illustrations. Comparative case studies can be both systematic and rigorous; they can bring both quantitative and qualitative data to the task of identifying relevant variables and "testing" hypothesized relationships among those variables. Most important they can be guided by a well-developed structure or framework that facilitates both the analysis of individual cases and the comparison of a limited number of cases.

Investigators who use a case study approach are frequently criticized for the manner in which research sites are selected. Critics are quick to point out that this research strategy does not permit investigators to make valid generalizations from their findings. The emphasis on generalizability has led some policy researchers to employ a variety of random sampling techniques, but the nature of implementation research—which involves the collection of data on a large number of variables over a long period of time and finite resources—precludes this sampling strategy.
The inability to apply random sampling techniques should not be cause for abandoning implementation research. In this developing, but infant area of the discipline the emphasis should be upon developing research strategies that will yield explanations for the variability of relationships from one case to another. This does not mean that policy implementation research should not strive for generalizations.

In early, exploratory research, the investigator should develop a site selection strategy that will maximize variation in both the dependent and independent variables (see Selltiz, et.al., 1959, for discussion of alternative nonprobability sampling strategies). In addition, some consideration must be given to the accessibility of actors and information. I have attempted to incorporate both concerns into my selection of cases.

The Research Sites

Four units of local government, (prime sponsors) in Ohio have been chosen for intensive analysis. Together they include a rich variation in prime sponsor composition, history of past manpower programs, size, economic, social and political characteristics. The four sites are the Akron Tri-County Manpower Consortium (hereafter referred to as Akron); the Canton-Stark-Wayne Manpower Consortium (hereafter referred to as Canton); the Columbus and Franklin County Manpower Consortium (hereafter referred to as Columbus); and the Northeast Ohio Manpower Consortium (hereafter referred to as NOMC). They are large and important manpower consortia within the state of Ohio, with their total appropriations constituting about 30% of the statewide total. Their final Title I appropriations for fiscal year 1975 ranged from $1.5 million in Canton to $5.0 million in Columbus. Figure II provides a summary of important characteristics about the cases.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Akron</th>
<th>Canton</th>
<th>Columbus</th>
<th>NOMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Final FY 75 CETA Budgets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in thousands)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title I</td>
<td>$4,100</td>
<td>$1,500</td>
<td>$5,000</td>
<td>$4,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title II</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$400</td>
<td>$900</td>
<td>$1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title VI</td>
<td>$1,600</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,700</td>
<td>$1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composition:</td>
<td>3 counties</td>
<td>2 counties</td>
<td>1 county</td>
<td>4 counties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Administrative Entity for CETA</td>
<td>City of Akron</td>
<td>City of Canton</td>
<td>City of Columbus</td>
<td>Regional Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor of Central City</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Republican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>D.=12,R.=1</td>
<td>D.=10,R.=5</td>
<td>D.=5,R.=2</td>
<td>D.=4,R.=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County Commissioners</td>
<td>D.=7,R.=2</td>
<td>D.=3,R.=3</td>
<td>D.=2,R.=1</td>
<td>D.=7,R.=5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of CEP Operation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of Training Center</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Population Black (1970 Census)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consortium:</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central City:</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan., 1975 (Ohio Bureau of Employment Services)</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower Planning Council (Date Appointed)</td>
<td>Jan., 1974</td>
<td>June, 1974</td>
<td>April, 1974</td>
<td>Feb., 1975</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure II: Characteristics of the Four Research Sites
The four research sites do not represent the universe of over 400 prime sponsors in the nation or even the seventeen prime sponsors in the state of Ohio, but there is good promise that they will provide meaningful comparisons and the basis for limited generalizations and solidly based observations about the results of CETA and the process of intergovernmental policy implementation. Where possible the findings in the four sites will be compared to state-wide and national level evidence and experience.

The Effects of CETA

A common assumption expressed by the formulators of CETA's form of decentralized decision-making was that elected officials would become more involved in manpower decision making. Critics charged that this would have negative consequences; defenders of CETA doubted this and in fact extolled the virtue of local elected officials because they are accountable to local citizens for their decisions.

This section examines the two components of this assumption. The first question is--are the elected officials more involved and to what extent, and are citizens aware of elected official's actions in manpower? The second component involves the measurement of client service patterns, which might be related to this shift in authority to the local level.

Effects on the Political Process

Substantial evidence suggests that elected officials are more heavily involved in the making of manpower decisions under CETA than before. Under the old CAMPS arrangement some elected officials in the research sites did not even have remote responsibility for manpower because it concentrated
attention on large city mayors instead of county commissioners. All elected officials interviewed reported that they spend more time on manpower issues under CETA than under CAMPS. Confirming evidence is also offered by staff members.

While political officials spend more time on CETA, the nature of their involvement and influence has been largely indirect and focused on a limited number of issues in the range of manpower decisions: The primary concern of elected officials has been in the allocation of resources within their consortia among partners or political jurisdictions. The DOL provides the block grants to the Prime sponsorships as a whole, and then it is up to the elected officials to decide how that money will be distributed. (The allocation of Title II and VI monies is done automatically by the Department of Labor.)

Their direct participation in other decisions—such as choice of project operators, priority groups to be served, and the overall design of manpower programs in the jurisdiction—have been mixed, but generally limited to oversight and approval of staff and manpower planning council recommendations. In only one case (NOMC) was the involvement of elected officials substantial both in policy matters and in day-to-day administrative details. NOMC is the only area that has regular consortium board meetings: The consortium is the legal entity responsible for administering the law, as opposed to the more common pattern of delegating administrative responsibility to one political jurisdiction.

Several indicators of participation will show the variation in concern and interest expressed by elected officials, including the number of formal meetings of consortium boards, the meetings of MPC attended by elected
officials, and observations by other manpower actors. On the first item, the variation ranges from 20 consortium board meetings over the 18 month period in NOMC; 12 in Canton; 7 in Akron, and none in Columbus. (In Columbus there is evidence that informal contact substituted for the formal meetings.) In NOMC the elected officials attended the MPC meetings (there were only three) and they chaired all the committees of it. Columbus elected officials each attend MPC meetings once, in both cases to inform the MPC that elected officials, not the MPC, had responsibility for the program. In Akron and in Canton they did not attend, except to give an initial charge to the membership.

Elected officials who were interviewed reported different amounts of time spent on manpower activities. The NOMC elected officials reported that they spent considerable amounts of time on manpower--one even claimed to spend 50% of his time as a Commissioner on CETA. Others in Akron complained of the requirement to attend occasional meetings, preferring to leave it to the staff.

Results of the Planning Council Questionnaires reveal the differences in the research sites also. In Akron, 53% of the respondents listed the elected officials as not very influential, while in the three other prime sponsorships the overwhelming majority of council members (from 88% to 68%) rated elected officials as either influential or very influential in manpower decision-making.

In fact there seem to be three models of decision-making evident for Title I programs--which will be elaborated in more detail in Chapter Four. Akron is characterized by a staff/council domination, with ratification by the elected officials who take little interest in manpower. Canton has
a three way influence relationship with staff, council, and elected officials nearly equal. Columbus and NOMC are characterized by a staff-elected official dominance. Thus in all but one the elected officials play some role, and in all cases they have to give their approval to major manpower decisions.

The role of elected officials has been more substantial under Titles II and VI than under Title I. While PSE is not the main focus of the present work, a few observations are warranted. Under PSE programs, elected officials have been involved in the detailed decisions about which agencies shall be allocated PSE slots and in NOMC choosing the clients from lists of applicants. It is also true that elected officials have demonstrated an increasing interest in manpower during the first two years of CETA because of the general perceived decline in the economy—real in all the PSs studied, and because of the approximately 400% increase in the size of the PSE allocations.

As the year progressed, city councilmen also became involved in CETA to a limited extent. Originally city councils approved the agreements for cross-jurisdictional cooperation under consortia. Later, in cases where a city remained responsible for administering the program (Columbus, Akron, and Canton), the city councils were asked to approve contracts with project operators. In Columbus, the local Community Action Agency (CAA) approached the council for support in the negotiations with the city over the size of their allocation. In this case the CAA was able to obtain a larger budget with city council assistance. Finally, city councils were involved in the allocation of PSE slots to agencies and to smaller units of government (townships, villages) within the consortium area. In
nearly all instances they approved the lists sent to them by the PS staff. Except for a few sporadic cases city councils failed to take advantage of their power of the purse.

Public Interest in CETA: Given the absence of survey data on citizen attitudes about CETA, two surrogates for public attitudes are used: the degree of citizen awareness reported by manpower actors, and the attention to manpower programs by the local press. In general, I wish to assess the opportunities for citizens to exercise some accountability over manpower programs at the local level--an important element in the arguments of those who supported CETA.

Evidence from interviews of manpower actors is clear and unidimensional--all felt that knowledge and concern over manpower was and still is minimal. As one elected official said, "when you have got a job, why should you care about manpower programs--and that is still 93% of the labor force..." Not a single public official felt that any additional concerns were expressed to them by the "average" citizen--those without vested interests in a possible manpower contract or job. Indeed, even most manpower planning council members (from 87% to 60% of them) reported that the overwhelming majority of their fellow citizens had little or no interest in manpower programs.

An analysis of newspaper and media coverage of manpower issues reveals that the citizens were given very little opportunity to find out about CETA locally. In three of the research sites newspaper coverage was limited to press releases--pictures of manpower enrollees or announcements of funding levels. One journalist, when asked to explain, indicated
that manpower was "too complicated" and that the issues did not lend
themselves to easy coverage.

In Columbus, the interest in manpower by the press was a little
more substantial. It was sustained for a few months by internal squabbles
among manpower actors, including the Mayor, a CAA, and the manpower
planning council, and also by a leaky system which favored attempts to
get the story to the press. Even here, however, the focus was upon the
personalities who were being fired, and some negative letters from the
R/DOL: no systematic attention was given to the types of programs funded
or the evaluations of them.

Manpower and CETA has remained at the periphery of public visibility.
Unless a major scandal erupts, no newspaper or television station is likely
to pay much attention to it.

Manpower as a Political Issue: In the traditional partisan sense,
manpower was not particularly important. The actions of consortium
boards (all with mixed Republican and Democratic membership) did not
follow partisan splits. CETA did not surface directly as an issue in
campaigns for elections. In one city a Democratic primary candidate for
Mayor accused the Republican incumbent of poor administration and ignoring
citizen input on manpower issues. He did not gain the party nomination and
his fellow partisan who did, stayed away from these issues in the general
election.

Manpower was affected by the elections, even though it did not
directly affect them. In three of the four cases the election campaign
had some impact on CETA decisions--or non-decisions. While we shall
have more to say about this later, under the discussions of political influence on programmatic decisions, a few instances will be recounted here. In Canton, a group of discouraged project operators who had been denied contracts under the Title I program were rewarded with substantial PSE jobs instead. It was widely interpreted as a move by the incumbent Mayor of the central city to avoid mobilizing opposition for the election campaign just one month away. In Columbus, decisions about the shape of the second year of CETA were deliberately postponed until after the election so as not to risk losing support from some interested groups of project operators. And finally the Youngstown Mayor up for re-election fired his manpower administrator when slim evidence of fraud was released. He acted, according to an aide, to give the "appearance of routing out the corruption before it could be associated with him during the campaign."

In yet another sense manpower could be considered an issue with political implications. Elected officials and their staffs often express the notion that manpower has the latent potential of embarrassing elected officials. In this sense, (weighing political costs and benefits) decisions about CETA were politicized. Also the fact that the prime sponsors' funds could be cut off for maladministration made the ability to retain funds a potential political issue of some importance. Consequently by the force of this alone, manpower assumed a place, although usually a low one, in the elected official's agenda.

**Political Corruption:** It was widely assumed that elected officials at the local level would be tempted to use CETA for a whole host of improper activities ranging from direct patronage to utilizing manpower trainees in election campaigns. While evidence on these matters is quite
difficult to obtain, it would seem that the worst fears were not born out in the four research sites (with a few exceptions).

One of the most obvious manipulations of manpower funds comes in the subversion of eligibility requirements for enrollees. One county was slapped with an audit recovery notice for 90% of their expenditures in a summer program. The county officials knew that they were violating the law, but felt that the mandated group of eligibles (economically disadvantaged youth), were less deserving than middle income college students.

The Mayor of another city admitted that he hired PSE enrollees to "buy off" city councilmen—who had previously tried to get the staff of the consortium to hire friends and relatives—despite the prohibition against nepotism. Another consortium board member insisted that friends of the elected officials be hired as manpower staff; and they were, over the objections of the existing staff.

One county commissioner in another consortium admitted that he falsely certified people as eligible for manpower programs. In fact, we were present when a person entered the commissioner's office seeking aid for his daughter. The commissioner told the man that his "girl would be taken care of."

But the fear engendered by the possibility of a DOL audit led most elected officials to steer clear of open fraud and misuse of funds and to deal harshly with those in the organization who were caught doing so. For example, one manpower employee was hiring people on the basis of their party registration and later requesting return personal favors for the placement. This combination of political and personal extortion led to
dismissal (though not prosecution) of the city employee. The staff director informed me that they had no hesitation in dismissing the person because the mayor had specifically instructed them to "keep the program clean." In general the evidence of political corruption and favoritism was not widespread in the four cases.

**Client Service Patterns in CETA**

Another concern expressed by opponents of CETA's decentralization concept was that Mayors and County Commissioners were insensitive to the needs of the disadvantaged and minorities. Specifically, some detractors warned that the transfer of authority to suburban based county commissioners who do not draw their traditional base of support from the disadvantaged would lead to whiter, less disadvantaged participants in manpower programs locally. It was also felt that the disadvantaged in particular were the least well represented group locally or least able to represent themselves. Supporters of CETA argued that the transfer of authority would not have negative consequences, because local elected officials had recently demonstrated more sensitivity to the downtrodden.

As we have seen, the general level of elected official involvement in CETA attests to the fact that the observed changes will not be wholly attributable to elected official influence--there are no elected officials who have been that intimately involved in client service decisions. Thus their input, while important, will be one of several factors that contribute to an explanation of client service patterns.

This section will provide concrete descriptive statements about the nature of CETA enrollees in Titles I, II and VI in the four research cites for Fiscal Year 1975. The nature of CETA participants will be
compared with categorical enrollees where possible. In addition, observations about the patterns in the four research cites will be compared to statewide and national trends.

Comparisons of CETA participants with categorical enrollees at the prime sponsor level is impossible for several reasons. While similar categorical programs can be matched with CETA Title I, II, and VI programs, the categorical operators were not required to keep detailed client characteristics. Where the data does exist the categories are often non-comparable with CETA client profiles. And the operators readily admit that their records represent guess work at best. As a substitute I shall make some comparisons with overall statewide data and employ the observations of manpower actors--staff, project operators, planning council members. More important, I will analyze the trends during fiscal year 1975 on a quarterly basis.

Comparisons will be made of the first half of Fiscal 1975—July to December 1974 (when many of the enrollees were carried over from categorical programs) with the June 30, 1975 summary data. The principal focus will be upon measures of sex, age, race, education, and family income.

An Overview of CETA Clients: Statewide, 62,093 clients were served by Titles I, II, and VI by the end of CETA's first year. Eighty-three percent, or 51,651 individuals, were served by the comprehensive Title I. The total number of public service employees, including Title I PSE programs was 11,473 or 19% of the total client population. The size of the client groups in the research sites ranged from over 9,000 in Columbus' Title I to 118 in Canton's Title II program.
Analysis of the growth in enrollment from the mid-year point in December to June 30th reveals substantial increases in all Titles statewide and for the four cases. For example, statewide, Title I tripled in size during the six month period and Title II increased by 250%. From the third quarter in March (the first quarter of Title VI) to the final FY'75 quarter, Title VI grew by nearly 50%. The important point is that the comparisons between the second and fourth quarters (see below) are not comparisons of a stable client group. The influx of so many new enrollees during this six month period afforded manpower decision-makers ample opportunity to inject their own priorities into manpower if they desired to do so.

Nature of CETA Clients in CETA's First Year: The most generally important characteristics on which data are available to provide a profile of CETA enrollees involves sex, age, educational attainment, racial background, and family income (i.e. those considered economically disadvantaged according to CETA regulations). (Note: A person is determined to be economically disadvantaged if a) he is the recipient of public assistance or AFDC benefits. and/or b) his income (adjusted for family size) is below the federally established poverty levels—which are adjusted periodically by the consumer price index). Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 present the basic profile of CETA participants in the nation, in all 14 Ohio Prime sponsorships, and for the four case studies. (Ohio figures are calculated from Quarterly Summaries of Client Characteristics, which are reported to the Department of Labor by the individual prime sponsorships. National Figures were reported in the Manpower Information Service for October 1, 1975 and come from the Manpower Administration.)
The data from the tables lead to several general observations about CETA enrollees and about the nature of the different Titles:

1. The male/female distribution of CETA clients in the four cases is very similar to state and national data. Females receive a decreasing degree of service from Title I to Titles II and VI, which are almost entirely public service jobs. Akron has the most balanced male/female ratio: NOMC has the greatest imbalance in a program made up principally of men, in Titles I and VI especially.

2. Title I participants in three cases are younger than state and national averages. But all areas follow a similar pattern in age distribution across the Titles: II and VI clients are much older than Title I enrollees.

3. In formal education, the participants in the four areas are in general somewhat better educated, particularly in Titles II and VI, than state and national averages. Once again, however, a common pattern obtains: Title VI clients are generally better educated than Title II clients, and both have received much more formal education than the Title I participant.

4. The patterns of service to blacks and whites is quite diverse. Ohio prime sponsors, Akron, and Columbus serve considerably more blacks than national averages. NOMC serves below the national average (except in Title I).

5. Blacks are much more likely to have Title I slots than Title II or VI slots nationally and statewide, but Columbus' and NOMC's Title II programs serve more blacks than Titles I or VI, as do Canton's Title II and VI programs.
6. Important differences in the four cases are revealed. Title I service to blacks ranges from 72% in Columbus to 25% in NOMC. Eighty-one percent of the enrollees in Columbus Title II are black, while only 38% are black in Akron.

7. Three of the four cases exceed national and state averages in enrollment of the economically disadvantaged in all three titles, while one (NOMC) falls below the national average in all three titles. National, state, and case trends follow the pattern of increasingly less service to the economically disadvantaged as one moves from Title I to the public employment programs under Title II and VI. Once again the data reveal important differences between the four cases. Most notably NOMC serves far fewer economically disadvantaged people in all its programs than the other cases.

At the national and state level, Title VI clients are relatively the most male, oldest, best educated, whitest and least economically disadvantaged of the three groups of clients. Title I enrollees are relatively the most female, the youngest, the least educated, blackest, and most economically disadvantaged. Title II clients are in the middle but resemble the Title VI enrollee, more than the Title I client. While the four cases depart somewhat from these state and national trends, they generally conform to them.

Changes in Client Characteristics: In order to unearth patterns that emerged as the local prime sponsors assumed control of the manpower programs, I analyzed the changes in service patterns on the key demographic characteristics, and compared two benchmarks during FY'75. The first half of the year is chosen as representative of the early manpower
Table 1: Sex Distribution of CETA Clients as of June 30, 1975
(4th Quarter)
(Figure in Percent)

(\(\bar{X}\) = Mean Percent of Clients; \(N\) = Number of Clients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title I</th>
<th></th>
<th>Title II</th>
<th></th>
<th>Title VI</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S.</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(554,732)</td>
<td>(462,639)</td>
<td>(109,729)</td>
<td>(57,851)</td>
<td>(92,785)</td>
<td>(38,191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ohio</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(28,695)</td>
<td>(22,866)</td>
<td>(4,033)</td>
<td>(1,942)</td>
<td>(2,948)</td>
<td>(1,609)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(2,262)</td>
<td>(1,841)</td>
<td>(184)</td>
<td>(127)</td>
<td>(140)</td>
<td>(135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(700)</td>
<td>(456)</td>
<td>(70)</td>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>(90)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(5,245)</td>
<td>(3,966)</td>
<td>(184)</td>
<td>(92)</td>
<td>(141)</td>
<td>(78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMC</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(1,094)</td>
<td>(576)</td>
<td>(262)</td>
<td>(224)</td>
<td>(194)</td>
<td>(74)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Quarterly Summaries of Client Characteristics reported by the Prime Sponsors
Table 2: Age Distribution of CETA Clients as of June 30, 1975 (4th Quarter)

(Figures in Percent)

(\(\bar{X}\) = Mean Percent of Clients; N = Number of Clients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title I</th>
<th></th>
<th>Title II</th>
<th></th>
<th>Title VI</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 22</td>
<td>22-44</td>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>55 &amp; over</td>
<td>Under 22</td>
<td>22-44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S.</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(1,017,371)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(167,580)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(130,976)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ohio</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(41,561)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(5,975)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(4,557)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(4,103)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(311)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(275)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(1,156)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(118)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(130)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(9,211)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(276)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(219)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMC</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(1,670)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(486)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(268)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Quarterly Summaries of Client Characteristics reported by the Prime Sponsors
Table 3: Educational Distribution of CETA Clients as of June 30, 1975 (4th Quarter)

(Figures in Percent)

(\( \bar{X} \) = Mean Percent of Clients; \( N \) = Number of Clients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title I</th>
<th></th>
<th>Title II</th>
<th></th>
<th>Title VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8 grades or less</td>
<td>9-11 grades</td>
<td>12 or more grades</td>
<td>8 grades or less</td>
<td>9-11 grades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S.</td>
<td>( \bar{X} )</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>(1,017,371)</td>
<td>(167,580)</td>
<td>(130,976)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ohio</td>
<td>( \bar{X} )</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>(51,561)</td>
<td>(5,975)</td>
<td>(4,557)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron</td>
<td>( \bar{X} )</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>(4,103)</td>
<td>(311)</td>
<td>(275)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>( \bar{X} )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>(1,156)</td>
<td>(118)</td>
<td>(130)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>( \bar{X} )</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>(9,211)</td>
<td>(276)</td>
<td>(219)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMIC</td>
<td>( \bar{X} )</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>(1,670)</td>
<td>(486)</td>
<td>(268)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Quarterly Summaries of Client Characteristics reported by the Prime Sponsors
Table 4: Racial Distribution of CETA Clients as of June 30, 1975 (4th Quarter)  
(Figures in Percent)  
(\(\bar{X} = \text{Mean Percent of Clients, } N = \text{Number of Clients}\))

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title I</th>
<th>Title II</th>
<th>Title VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>White</td>
<td>Black</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. (\bar{X})</td>
<td>54 (568,411)</td>
<td>37 (386,905)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>45 (23,149)</td>
<td>52 (27,015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ohio (\bar{X})</td>
<td>45 (1,855)</td>
<td>55 (2,237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>58 (674)</td>
<td>41 (478)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron (\bar{X})</td>
<td>27 (2,521)</td>
<td>72 (6,647)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>73 (1,225)</td>
<td>25 (420)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Quarterly Summaries of Client Characteristics reported by the Prime Sponsors
Table 5: Percentage of CETA Clients Economically Disadvantaged as of June 30, 1975 (4th Quarter)

(Figures in Percent)

(\(\bar{X}\) = Mean Percent of Clients; \(N\) = Number of Clients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title I</th>
<th>Title II</th>
<th>Title VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S.</td>
<td>(\bar{X}) = 78</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N) = (788,614)</td>
<td>(N) = (74,759)</td>
<td>(N) = (56,531)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ohio</td>
<td>(\bar{X}) = 82</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N) = (42,391)</td>
<td>(N) = (2,592)</td>
<td>(N) = (1,701)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron</td>
<td>(\bar{X}) = 96</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N) = (3,939)</td>
<td>(N) = (185)</td>
<td>(N) = (176)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>(\bar{X}) = 100</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N) = (1,156)</td>
<td>(N) = (105)</td>
<td>(N) = (77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>(\bar{X}) = 82</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N) = (7,535)</td>
<td>(N) = (204)</td>
<td>(N) = (135)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMC</td>
<td>(\bar{X}) = 61</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N) = (1,026)</td>
<td>(N) = (163)</td>
<td>(N) = (22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Quarterly Summaries of Client Characteristics reported by the Prime Sponsor
period, where it can be argued the impact, if any, of local control would not have been reflected. This is compared with the final figures for the first year. The programs experienced enormous growth during this period and it is reasonable to assume that systematic effects might be revealed. An assessment of definite trends will have to await the availability of additional data based on subsequent years under CETA, but a preliminary view is possible.

Data on the characteristics of Title I and II participants as of December 31, 1974 and June 30, 1975 were compared nationally, on a statewide basis and on an individual prime sponsor basis to look for evidence of stability and change. A similar analysis was done for the first two quarters of Title VI (March 31 and June 30, 1975).

Change in Title I Client Service Patterns: Table 6 summarizes a large amount of data derived from Quarterly Summaries of Client Characteristics. The national and Ohio patterns are similar: Title I clients became older, better educated, more male, whiter, and less economically disadvantaged during the six month period. The four cases demonstrate various patterns of change and stability. While NOMC and Columbus followed the state and national trend and indeed exceeded it, Akron and Canton reversed the trend in key areas such as service to blacks (Akron), and to the economically disadvantaged (Akron and Canton). There is a divergent pattern among the four cases on every variable chosen for inclusion in the analysis. Nearly all the changes observed are statistically significant. Thus a search for assignable causes, which will be undertaken in the following chapter, is warranted by the results.
Table 6: Summary of Changes in Title I Clients between December, 1974 (2nd Quarter) and June, 1975 (4th Quarter)
(Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes in Client Characteristics</th>
<th>Age (% under 22)</th>
<th>Education (% with 12 or more)</th>
<th>Race (% Black)</th>
<th>Economic Status (% Econ. Disadv.)</th>
<th>Sex (% Female)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. (N = 1,017,371)</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ohio (N = 51,561)</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>+2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron (N = 4,103)</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton (N = 1,156)</td>
<td>+6</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>+27</td>
<td>+5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus (N = 9,211)</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMC (N = 1,670)</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-23</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from Quarterly Summaries of Client Characteristics Reported by the Prime Sponsors
Changes in Title II Client Service Patterns: A summary of the Title II changes is contained in Table 7. The changes in the U.S. and Ohio were generally not as great as those revealed in Title I. Also, while nationwide and statewide trends followed the same direction in service to the better educated and blacks, Ohio reversed the nationwide trend in providing more service to younger people, women, and the economically disadvantaged. Most of the changes observed for the four research cites were not statistically significant. However, Akron substantially reduced service to blacks and economically disadvantaged, and NOMC increased service to the 22 to 44 age group. One should not draw the conclusion that the prime sponsors had less opportunity for change in Title II during this period than with Title I. The four research sites areas increased the size of their Title II client population by between 200% and 400% during the six month period. Therefore, most prime sponsors have continued to serve the same groups under Title II that they initially decided to serve in the first months of the program.

Changes in Title VI Client Service Patterns: Despite substantial increases in enrollment at the state and national levels, there was little change in the profile of Title VI enrollees during the three month period (see Table 8). There was the appearance of a movement towards the older worker nationwide, and away from the economically disadvantaged at the state level.
Table 7: Summary of Changes in Title II Clients between December, 1974 (2nd Quarter) and June, 1975 (4th Quarter)  
(Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Changes in Client Characteristics</th>
<th>Total U.S. (N = 167,580)</th>
<th>Total Ohio (N = 5,975)</th>
<th>Akron (N = 311)</th>
<th>Canton (N = 118)</th>
<th>Columbus (N = 276)</th>
<th>NOMC (N = 486)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age (% 22-44)</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>+25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (% with 12 or more)</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+8</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race (% Black)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-15</td>
<td>-13</td>
<td>+2</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Status (% Econ. Disadv.)</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>+7</td>
<td>-31</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex (% Female)</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>+12</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from the Quarterly Summaries of Client Characteristics Reported by the Prime Sponsors
Table 8: Summary of Changes in Title VI Clients between March, 1975 (3rd Quarter) and June, 1975 (4th Quarter) (Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Changes in Client Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Age (% 22-44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U.S.</strong> (N = 130,976)</td>
<td>+6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ohio</strong> (N = 4,557)</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Akron</strong> (N = 275)</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canton</strong> (N = 130)</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Columbus</strong> (N = 219)</td>
<td>±0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NOMC</strong> (N = 268)</td>
<td>±0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from the Quarterly Summaries of Client Characteristics reported by the Prime Sponsors
In the four cases areas, the increases in enrollment between the two quarters was moderate to slight and in most cases the resultant change was also not significant. Canton, however, increased service to blacks and substantially decreased service to economically disadvantaged persons. NMC, also reduced service to the economically disadvantaged enrollee during the period.

Change in Clients between FY 74 and FY 75: Table 9 presents data comparing Title I clients in FY 75 in Ohio and the entire U.S. with similar categorical program clients in FY 74. Very little change is detected in most areas. CETA enrollees do seem to be less economically disadvantaged, however, at both state and national levels. The appearance of little change in racial composition in Ohio between the two years may be due to the fact that Neighborhood Youth Corp enrollees are omitted. NYC clients were predominately black and economically disadvantaged in Ohio and nationwide. Thus the decrease in service to the economically disadvantaged is probably also understated.

Table 10 compares Title II and VI participants with Public Employment Program clients in FY'74. CETA clients in Ohio are older than PEP clients and considerably better educated in formal terms. But Ohio prime sponsors serve considerably more blacks and economically disadvantaged under CETA.

In general, the available data on state and national trends would indicate that there was limited change from FY'74 to FY'75 in the overall nature of the clients served, and in cases where there was change it seemed to involve increases in service to minorities and economically disadvantaged. This finding contrasts sharply with the analysis of trends during the
Table 9: A Comparison of Categorical Clients in FY 74 and CETA Title I Clients as of June 30, 1975

(Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Distribution by Age</th>
<th>% Distribution by Education</th>
<th>% Distribution by Race</th>
<th>% Economically Disadvantaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 22</td>
<td>22-44</td>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>55 &amp; over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio - categorical programs * in FY 74 (N = 22,200)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio - Title I Clients as of June 30, 1975 (N = 51,561)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. - categorical programs in FY 74 (N = 549,700)</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. - Title I Clients as of June 30, 1975 (N = 1,017,371)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Omits NYC - In-School, which makes the information on age and education non-comparable and probably lowers % of black and disadvantaged.
Table 10: A Comparison of PEP Clients and CETA Title II and VI Clients as of June 30, 1975

(Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% Distribution by Age</th>
<th>% Distribution by Education</th>
<th>% Distribution by Race</th>
<th>% Economically Disadvantaged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under 22</td>
<td>22-44</td>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>55 &amp; over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio - PEP Clients in FY 74</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=8,100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio - Title II Clients as of June 30, 1975</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 5,975)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio - Title VI Clients as of June 30, 1975</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 4,557)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. - PEP Clients in FY 74</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 66,200)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. - Title II Clients</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 167,580)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. - Title VI Clients</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N = 130,976)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
first year of CETA where the trend statewide, nationally and to a certain extent in the four cases has been to serve increasingly fewer minorities and disadvantaged people. For Title I the explanation is that the changes that have occurred are in the expected direction, but are less dramatic than anticipated. For the PSE program, it seems that the PEP program in Ohio served a predominately white, non-economically disadvantaged population. There is evidence that quite a few of the PEP enrollees were returning Vietnam veterans, with at least high school educations, but very young. Service to veterans in CETA is sharply reduced.

Programmatic Change

Among the main arguments made for the passage of CETA was that changes were needed in the shape of manpower programs. It was felt that the Federal government lacked the intimate knowledge of local labor and economic conditions with which to make rational local planning choices. And it was argued that local manpower systems slapped together by 12 years of haphazard law-making were out of control and duplicative--a Byzantine structure with no central administrative control. Decentralization to a single local authority in the prime sponsorship was intended to remedy these problems. The purpose of the framers of this part of the legislation was change.

In assessing programmatic change in the four research cites, I will describe four aspects of change in the Title I or Comprehensive Title: Changes in priority groups for service; changes in the mix of manpower services to be delivered--the relative amounts of expenditures for training, (both classroom and on-the-job), work experience, public service
employment, and supportive service; changes in the operators chosen to deliver these services; and finally changes in the methods of service delivery. In short, I shall focus on the who, what, where and how of manpower programs in the prime sponsorships.

In most cases throughout this section, I will use three benchmarks for assessing change. Changes between pre-CETA programs and the first CETA plan for FY'75, changes that occurred during the first full year of operation, and the changes planned for FY'76.

Priority Groups

CETA Title I defines very broad groups for eligibility--those who are unemployed (for 7 days), underemployed, or economically disadvantaged qualify for manpower services. But the law also makes it clear that within these broad categories a prime sponsor can single out groups for special attention. These priority groups, called "significant segments" are defined in the regulations as "those groups most in need of services to be provided by the act" (Federal Register, Vol. 39, No. 108, June 4, 1974, p.19891; Section 94.4 Definitions). The revised regulations change the definition slightly, but for our purposes it is fair to compare significant segments of priority groups across the 18 month period of the study.

Changes in Priority Groups from 1974 to 1976: From 1974 to 1975, the priority groups remained remarkably similar. The key groups in most prime sponsorships included economically disadvantaged youths, welfare recipients and veterans. In 1975 veterans and welfare recipients were somewhat less likely to be singled out.

The key changes occur from FY 75 to FY 76. In the four cases, the youth emphasis declines and is replaced by adult heads of households.
The heavy stress on the economically disadvantaged is replaced by an announced increase in service to the unemployed, who may or may not be economically disadvantaged. Veterans continue to fall down the list of potential priority groups. Table 11 gives more detailed evidence of the changes.

Table 11: Summary of Priority Groups Selected in the FY'74, '75 and '76 Manpower Plans *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akron</td>
<td>Poor Youth</td>
<td>Poor Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare Recipients</td>
<td>Welfare Recipients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black Adults</td>
<td>Black Adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Heads of Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>Poor Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare Recipients</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Black Adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>Poor Youth</td>
<td>Poor Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare Recipients</td>
<td>Veterans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Veterans</td>
<td>Offenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor Youth</td>
<td>Poor Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare Recipients</td>
<td>Unemployed 15+ weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Poor Heads of Households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed Males</td>
<td>Poor Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Veterans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor Youth</td>
<td>Poor Adult/Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Unemployed Blacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Welfare Recipients</td>
<td>Unemployed Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Veterans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Veterans</td>
<td>Poor Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poor Youth</td>
<td>Adults without Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Youth Dropouts</td>
<td>Adults unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poor Youth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* (Top three groups only)
Source: Data from Prime Sponsor Plans

Changes in the Mix of Manpower Services

Under CETA, manpower programs could include a myriad of activities ranging from training people for employment in a skilled trade to providing day-care for children of public service enrollees, but it is possible to classify manpower programs into four basic types: 1) (Classroom training) training in a classroom setting for a specific job, during which
time the client is given some financial incentive to stay with the program, but the principal aim is to obtain unsubsidized employment in a training-related occupation. 2) (On-the-job training (OJT)) training that takes place on the job. The employer is given an incentive in the form of a wage subsidy, and the employee is paid slightly below normal wages, but will eventually advance to full-time employment in the job. 3) (Work experience) the underlying notion here is that the person needs to develop productive work habits, and can do this at a job while earning a low wage. There is usually no specific skills training, since most of the jobs involve menial labor. The employer is given the incentive of a part-time employee for only the cost of supervision. 4) (Public Service Employment) the most direct way to help individuals is through a public service job which pays regular wages on a full-time basis. There is usually no training component to the job—the person is expected to be ready to merge in with the regular work force.

The local mix of manpower services is the relative amounts of effort placed in each one of these activities by the local prime sponsors. In order to make comparisons with pre-CETA programs for which comparable data is not readily available, I have collapsed the four major categories into two: Short and long term programs. Short term programs—Work Experience and Public Service Employment—are designed to meet an immediate need in the form of wages for the work experience enrollee or a public service job. Long term programs—classroom training and on-the-job training—do not have the immediate pay off of a job or subsidy, but presumably prepare the individual for employment at some point in the future. For a person training in a job situation, this may be immediate,
when the program ends; for a person in a training program for auto mechanics, it may be less direct. Long term programs require an investment of time before the dividends are reaped; short term programs provide immediate relief to the individual, but when the programs end, or the individual's eligibility for them lapses, he has not gained in skills but in experience only. Short term programs are much more easy to set up and operate; long term programs require working with the business community and educators to provide the jobs and training or the specific instructional courses for skilled jobs.

Table 12 presents an analysis of the shifts in expenditures on short and long term programs for three time periods, FY'74, FY'75, and FY'76. In general, we see the impact of decategorization in the diversity that is displayed in FY'75 and '76 as opposed to FY'74. In '74 all the prime sponsor areas expended the majority of their monies on long term programs, with Akron and Columbus taking the lead. In '75 and '76 we see dramatic shifts; Columbus in particular shows a very strong commitment to long term programs which continues in FY'76. Canton shifts to short term programs in FY'75 and back to long term programs in FY'76. Akron moves into a more balanced pattern of expenditures for the CETA years; NOMC remains stable from FY'74 to FY'75 and then shifts to a primarily short term program in FY'76.

The distribution of clients served under the two types of programs is presented in Table 13. Looked at in this way, Akron and Canton display very stable ratios of clients in short and long term programs across the three years. In Columbus, however, there is a shift to many more short term clients in FY'76, and a substantial increase in long term program
Table 12: Change in Programmatic Emphases Between FY'74 (Camps) and FY'75 and FY'76 (CETA): Expenditures for Short and Long Term Programs ¹
(Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron Tri-Co.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton-Stark</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus-Franklin Co.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMC</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Short Term Programs include Work Experience (NYC-In School, NYC-Out of School, NYC-Summer, Operation Mainstream), Public Service Careers, and Public Service Employment. Long Term Programs include Training (MDTA Institutional, CEP) and On-the-Job training (Urban League, OIC, SER, JOP)

Sources: FY'74-CAMPS COOP Format, FY'75-Project Operating Plan--March Modification, FY'76-Program Planning Summary--Original Plan.
Table 13: Change in Programmatic Emphases Between FY'74 (CAMPS) and FY'75 and FY'76 (CETA): Distribution of Clients for Short and Long Term Programs

(Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1974</th>
<th>1975</th>
<th>1976</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Short</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron Tri-Co.</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton-Stark</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus-Franklin Co.</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMC</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Short Term Programs include Work Experience (NYC-In School, NYC-Out of School, NYC-Summer, Operation Mainstream), Public Service Careers, and Public Service Employment. Long Term Programs include Training (MDTA Institutional, CEP) and On-the-Job training (Urban League, OIC, SER, JOP).

Sources: FY'74-CAMPS COOP Format, FY'75-Project Operating Plan--March Modification, FY'76-Program Planning Summary--Original Plan.
participants in the NOMC area in 1976.

If one looks at Table 12 and Table 13 together it will be immediately obvious that client patterns do not directly translate into expenditure patterns because the cost per enrollee for the programs varies widely. A PSE slot may cost as much as $10,000 per individual; a work experience enrollee may be employed part time for an entire year for 1/10 that amount. The cost of training a person in the classroom ranges from around $1,500 to $4,000 for instruction plus a small stipend for the client. An on-the-job slot can be very expensive or very inexpensive depending on the duration and magnitude of the subsidy to the employer.

A more detailed picture of program mix is provided in Tables 14 and 15 which show the distribution of expenditures and clients for the CETA period. Both tables show the changes from early summer 1974 when the original FY'75 plans were drawn up; to March, 1975 when modifications were made to the Title I plans; to the summer to early fall period when the FY'76 plans were drawn up. In all but NOMC there is a trend (most pronounced in Columbus) in reduced spending on OJT programs. Expenditures for classroom training remain stable in Akron, rise sharply and then decline in Columbus and decline in NOMC. NOMC and Akron are also stable in expenditures for work experience, while Canton increases its spending sharply and Columbus decreases and then increases its expenditures. Tables 14 & 15 also reveal the interesting variation among the four cases in the mix of services that they have selected.

Title I expenditures for Public Service Employment present a particularly interesting case. Sections 101 and 108(C) of CETA permit the expenditure of Title I money for public service programs, in addition to
### Table 14: Distribution of Expenditures, Title I, FY'75 to FY'76 by Program Activity
(Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIME SPONSOR</th>
<th>Classroom Training</th>
<th>On-the-job Training</th>
<th>Work Experience</th>
<th>Public Service Employment</th>
<th>Total Planned Expenditures (in thousands)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Akron:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'75 (a)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>$2113</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modified FY'75 (b)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'76 (c)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canton:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'75</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified FY'75</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'76</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Columbus:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'75</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2267</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modified FY'75</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'76</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4977</td>
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<td><strong>NOMC:</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'75</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified FY'75</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>2724</td>
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<tr>
<td>Original FY'76</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3015</td>
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<td><strong>Ohio Prime Sponsors:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'75 (N=14)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modified FY'75 (N=14)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>37,956</td>
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<tr>
<td>Original FY'76 (N=17)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>65,077</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The original FY'75 plan was developed in June and July of 1974
(b) The Modifications of the FY'75 plan used in the table are for March, 1975
(c) The original FY'76 plan was developed in June, July, August, and September of 1975

Sources: Prime Sponsor Plans for Title I, FY'75 to FY'76
Table 15: Distribution of Clients to be Served, Title I, FY'75 to FY'76 by Program Activity
(Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRIME SPONSOR</th>
<th>Classroom Training</th>
<th>On-the-job Training</th>
<th>Work Experience</th>
<th>Public Service Employment</th>
<th>Total Number of Clients (Planned)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akron:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'75 (a)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified FY'75 (b)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'76 (c)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'75</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modified FY'75</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Columbus:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'75</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>1,360</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modified FY'75</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'76</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>Original FY'75</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>69</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,055</td>
</tr>
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<td>59</td>
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<td>1,230</td>
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<td>Ohio Prime Sponsors:</td>
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<td>39,951</td>
</tr>
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<td>Modified FY'75</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>39,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original FY'76</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>41,392</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The original FY'75 plan was developed in June and July of 1974
(b) The Modifications of the FY'75 plan used in the table are for March, 1975
(c) The original FY'76 plan was developed in June, July, August, and September of 1975

Sources: Prime Sponsor Plan for Title I, FY'75 to FY'76
the money allocated under Title II and then later added with Title VI. As the reader may recall in the development of CETA, the Administration position was to prohibit the usage of Title I for public jobs programs. Democrats on the House and Senate manpower subcommittees insisted on this flexibility and it eventually found its way into the law. As Table 14 indicates, the prime sponsors have reacted differently to this option. Canton and Columbus had not utilized Title I monies in this fashion and did not plan to do so as of the FY'76 plan. (It should be noted that Columbus in its first modification to the FY'76 plan in early fall of 1975 did plan for a very substantial Title I PSE program.) Akron on the other hand started without a PSE program, and then developed a small one. NOMC has had and continues to support a modest Title I PSE program. None of the prime sponsors, however, reached near the magnitude of the Title I PSE program in the Cleveland manpower consortium, where public service expenditures accounted for nearly 50% of the total Title I effort.

**Choice of Project Operators**

Having chosen priority groups for service and determined program mixes, a prime sponsor also had to decide what agencies within the community would receive the contracts for providing manpower programs. A great deal of concern was expressed during the development of manpower reform legislation by those agencies who had held manpower contracts with the federal government. The decentralized model involved choices at the local level by elected officials (ultimately) with whom many contractors had not had frequent and/or positive contact. Particular concern was expressed by community action agencies over their potential for maintaining a foothold in the manpower system.
A struggle over this issue between House and Senate conferees produced a watered down endorsement of the previous categorical program operators, but contracts with them were not mandated. Section 105 of CETA (Conditions for Receipt of Federal Assistance) instructs the Secretary of Labor to review local plans and obtain assurances from local prime sponsors that they have considered "programs of demonstrated effectiveness" and that they have attempted to utilize "existing facilities and services" such as the employment service and the MDTA Skills Centers.

In brief, the results in the four research sites over a two year period demonstrate that the worst fears of the categorical operators were unfounded: most were able to retain a similar position within the manpower system. The prime sponsors have also brought about incremental changes in the local stable of project operators, completely dropping some, adding others, or reducing and reshaping an agency's mission.

Changes from 1974 to 1976: In the four cases, very little change occurred in the nature of service deliverers during the initial transition to CETA. Only one program (National Alliance of Businessmen in Akron) was completely dropped of the nearly fifty contracts for manpower services in the four research sites. In mid-year, when most prime sponsors received additional funding under Title I, all four prime sponsors reassessed their manpower programs--however, once again, no previous operators were eliminated. Akron did add three new agencies in demonstration projects. Canton also added a new program.

The most important changes in the project operators occurred in the 1976 plan. Akron dropped three agencies--the local OIC, and two other
community based organizations that were running work experience programs. (Eventually, however, they found another place for them in the system).

Canton eliminated the Canton Board of Education program for high school drop outs, terminated its OJT program at the Canton Urban League, cut out both work experience programs with the Human Development Council (the local community action agency), and defunded the Stark County Mental Health and Retardation Board program which had just begun a few months before. These agencies were replaced by the Stark County Board of Education, an increased contract with the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, and an enlarged prime sponsor staff. The elimination of three of the agencies was softened by the cushion of PSE jobs. HDC, the Canton UL, and the Mental Health Board all were rewarded with PSE slots for their agencies. The Canton Board of Education retained another manpower program, but did not obtain PSE positions. Thus, no agency really felt the sting of total deprivation.

Columbus did not change project operators for the FY'76 plan, which was submitted in early summer of 1975. They planned changes, if any, to take place following the Mayoral election in November.

NOMC made one change in FY'76. They assumed responsibility for the payment of allowances and wages of CETA enrollees that had been performed by the Bureau of Employment Services.

The important changes were not apparent in the adding and subtracting of agencies, but in the methods for delivering manpower programs at the local level. All the research sites made some restructuring of their delivery systems. In some cases this involved revamping the goals of existing agencies; in others it led to a substantial increase in the role
played by the staff of the consortium or units of local government.
That process of change will be described in more detail below, for it is
here that one must look for the results of manpower revenue sharing.
Wholesale change did not occur, but underneath some important revisions
were taking place.

Changes in the Method of Delivery

Before we consider the individual cases, a few words about the nature
of the pre-CETA system will provide essential background for the
description of changes in the method of manpower service delivery.
Prior to CETA, the DOL contracted with local organizations, like the
board of education and community based organizations (such as the Urban League
or the Opportunities Industrialization Center) for manpower services. Each
of the contractees performed a varied range of manpower functions—from
intaking the client, to providing either training or work experience and
then attempting to place the individual in unsubsidized regular employment.
What differed about the individual organizations was the nature of the
employment or training opportunity, the comprehensiveness of the program,
and often the nature of their clients.

This fragmented system produced many problems: duplications of
service, lack of coordination between manpower operators, relatively
limited service to some clients, and inappropriate service to others.
Early attempts to deal with these recognized problems were the Concentrated
Employment Program, which centralized some manpower services under one
roof and program manager, and the CAMPS approach, which attempted to force
coordination among operators under the auspices of city hall. This section
will assess the results of CETA (where complete authority resides with
the prime sponsor) for the four cases in addressing new methods of delivery.

Akron: Akron Tri-County Manpower Area under CAMPS, in pre-CETA days, was a conglomeration of 19 categorical programs. According to most observers all the symptoms of the categorical system were present: duplication, fragmentation of effort, poor match between client need and service provided. Most of the programs were centered within the city.

In the transition between FY'74 and '75, very little change took place. Manpower staff concentrated on the task of "taking over" control of the programs from the categorical operators. Services were expanded into Portage and Medina counties, which received over twice as much in manpower funds as in 1974.

With the addition of nearly $1 million in mid-year of FY'75, the staff began efforts to create an improved method of delivery—what they called a manpower delivery system (MDS). With this money they established demonstration projects for a centralized intake center and follow up unit.

By the time the FY'76 plan was due they were ready to implement the new system. In addition to centralizing intake with the Vocational Development Center, they also added a central follow-up unit to trace clients, centralized OJT so that employers would not be besieged by competing manpower job developers, and satellite intake centers in sections of Summit County that had not received services before. They also added much more in supportive services for clients in the way of health care and transportation—thus increasing the likelihood of the client remaining with the program.
The new system is designed to cut down on some duplication and the inappropriate services for enrollees (in the past some people were trained at the Skills Center who were job ready); but job development and job placement remain decentralized to different operators, and the actual number of programs has increased to 33. A person entering the Akron manpower delivery system still runs the risk of being lost in the shuffle between programs, and service to the outlying counties--Portage and Medina--is still limited primarily to work experience, PSE, and some OJT.

**Canton:** By all accounts Canton (like Akron) in pre-CETA days was suffering from the categorical illnesses of fragmentation, duplication and inefficient uses of resources. Unlike Akron, "categorical hangover" lingered well into FY '75, and only in the FY '76 plan was there any evidence that the prime sponsorship would change its method of delivery. Each categorical operator remained autonomous and continued to perform the same functions they had been responsible for in pre-CETA days. This continued throughout FY '75.

The Canton staff was unable to produce a new plan for FY '76 until September of 1975, three months after the due date of July 1. During this period they attempted to restructure their method of delivering manpower services. The greatest change was the vast expansion of OBES as the central intake, assessment, placement, and development unit for the consortium, and the expansion of the prime sponsor manpower staff. These changes were designed to smooth the flow of clients through the system and to provide for central tracking of their progress. However, in terms of the manpower treatments (the employment or training opportunities) the system remained unchanged. Despite the elimination of some project operators, they
were replaced with others performing the same functions. Thus the play remained the same; only the cast of characters was different. Duplication of services remained; each unit within the consortium--Stark and Wayne Counties and the city of Canton--continued to run basically separate and overlapping programs.

Columbus: The first five months of FY'75 were designated a transition period for the Columbus Consortium, during which time they planned to "take over" operation of the categorical programs. In fact, there were no significant changes in the shape of manpower programs, but the city did assume overall administrative responsibility and supervision. In contrast to Canton, they at least had control over the operations of the program, despite the remaining structure of categorical programs and operators. Only the Skills Center was cut back in relation to FY'74 funding.

During 1975 the city centralized allowance payments, job development, indirect placement--i.e. placement for those who have received manpower services. These changes enabled the city to have more control over client flow than in the past. Duplication of programs for clients continued unabated. One manpower staffer described the FY'75 plan as "making a few pieces fit together, but overall no significant change. The year can be described in one word: frustrating."

Plans for FY'76 were no different. The programs would be continued as they existed under the 1975 system. The staff did suggest that city lay-offs would generate a large Title I PSE program in mid-year, which might have the effect of reducing the budgets of the current programs.
NOMC: To understand the development of NOMC one has to go back to the early 1970's. Under CAMPS, the city and then later the counties were eligible for organizational planning grants (OPGs). Most areas did not bother to use this money for the establishment of strong program staffs—NOMC was the exception. So by 1974 they had managed to displace most community manpower operators, including the local community organizations, with the exception of the Board of Education (Skills Center) and the Bureau of Employment services. As they moved into CETA, they already had direct control of most manpower programs. The major change for the year was the further development of the central components of the NOMC manpower system: the multi-service center.

The multi-service centers are the core of the NOMC system. Each political jurisdiction has its own manpower center where they have a manpower director, planner, and operations staff. In 1975 they ran all work experience, PSE, placement, and job development. (OBES continued to handle OJT contracts and some placement in the jurisdictions, and the Skills Center provided the training for enrollees). The concept embodied in the multi-service centers is one stop manpower services. The consortium staff continued to handle fiscal, evaluation, and administrative matters. For FY'76, NOMC solidified the multi-service center concept, by removing allowance payments from the Bureau of Employment Services and turning them over to the manpower staff. NOMC also made a number of administrative changes including the installation of a computerized management information system and a centralized fiscal unit.

Alterations in the NOMC method of service delivery have wrought both positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, they have
largely eliminated rigid categorical program guidelines and approaches, and the potential for client flow and accessibility to programs has been improved. Unfortunately, however, the price for this reorganization has been to duplicate services in each of the political jurisdictions of the consortium (with the exception of the Skills Training Center which serves the entire area). Each jurisdiction has retained considerable autonomy over its own programs. In fact the problems were judged to be so severe that the R/DOL withheld the so-called "consortium incentive allocation," (10% of the total Title I grant) in order to cause a restructuring of authority over the separate programs and a centralization of power in a central unit.

The Nature of Citizen Input: Manpower Planning Councils

As part of the overall development of manpower reform legislation, planning councils represented more of an afterthought than a central policy decision by Congress and the Administration. Yet their potential role as specified in Section 104 of the law to advise the prime sponsor "regarding program plans and basic goals, policies, and procedures, to monitor and provide for objective evaluation" was important in that manpower planning councils (MPCs) could be an independent source of influence within the local structure.

In the four research sites, the record of the role and influence of the manpower planning councils is mixed. The role of the planning council ranges from mere formal existence (NOMC) so that the grant may be received by the prime sponsor, to a planning council (Akron) that has had substantial involvement in minute policy details as well as major questions—such as evaluations of project operators and selection of priority service
groups. MPC influence has also been varied. Some councils serve in near
equality of influence with staff, while others are not even asked to
informally review staff decisions, but are informed of them after the
decisions are implemented.

One revealing indicator of the position of planning councils within
a prime sponsor is their creation data. Akron's Council was formed, out
of the old CAMPS council in January, 1974, as soon as CETA passed Congress.
Columbus started its council in April of the same year, followed shortly
by Canton in June. NOMC did not form a council and hold a meeting until
February of 1975--over a year after CETA took effect.

Another indicator of the council's role is the frequency of planning
council meetings and the turnout of members at them. Table 15 presents
that data for 1974 and 1975.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Sponsor</th>
<th>Total Members</th>
<th>Average Turnout</th>
<th>Number of Meetings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>1975 (Jan.-July)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akron:</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>7 &gt; 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton:</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8 &gt; 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10 &gt; 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14 &gt; 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1975 (Jan.-July)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12 &gt; 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus:</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMC</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0 &gt; 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Minutes of MPC meetings
In general, three of the four councils had a great number of meetings, while the fourth had very few. But only Akron sustained a very high turnout.

The councils also developed different subcommittee structures for considering manpower issues. They reveal the degree of sophistication that the council was able to bring to its consideration of manpower issues. Like most policy matters, manpower is very complicated and the ability of the council to make informed and detailed analysis of the manpower system within a prime sponsorship depends in large part on their degree of specialization in subcommittee.

By far the most structured council was the Akron MPC. It had an executive committee that met monthly with the manpower staff and developed the agenda for the full MPC meetings. In addition there is an evaluation system, which is subdivided still further into subcommittees on youth, training, employment, and counseling. They meet several times in a yearly cycle to evaluate all manpower programs. The Akron MPC has standing subcouncils in Portage and Medina counties that serve as mini-full councils and make most recommendations for manpower in their respective jurisdictions. Finally, the Akron MPC established Task Forces in 1974 as a one-time effort to review by function the entire manpower delivery system as a step toward redesigning the system for the FY'76 plan.

In Canton, three subcommittees dominated the MPC structure. The Stark County and Wayne County subcouncils dominated the planning process for the fiscal year 1975 plan. During this time the full council did not meet formally and played virtually no role. In 1975 the full council assumed a more important role and appointed a Review and Evaluation
Committee to consider all present programs and to pass judgment on new proposals.

There were no regular standing committees of the Columbus MPC during the period under investigation. However, several ad-hoc committees met to solve issues and then disbanded when they made their recommendations to the full council. These ad-hoc groups included committees to deal with community meetings, brochures, membership, by-laws, job placement, MPC budget, and FY'76 plan. There are no subcouncils to the MPC.

NOMC had no subcommittees during the period of the report, but they have announced plans to appoint subcommittees on monitoring, evaluation (of non-CETA funded programs) and labor market conditions. There are four geographically organized subcouncils, but of these only one met on a regular basis.

Having considered the structural aspects of the four MPC's, let us turn to an analysis of the tasks performed by the councils.

The Functions of Manpower Planning Councils: Section 104, of CETA says that the function of the council is "to submit recommendations regarding program plans and basic goals, policies and procedures, to monitor and provide for objective evaluations of employment and training programs conducted in the prime sponsorship area, and to provide for continuing analysis of needs for employment, training, and related services in such an area." The record of the four MPCs studied reveals very different emphases by the planning councils.

I will employ two methods to describe the activities of the planning councils. First, I will report the opinions of the members themselves in response to questionnaires given to the entire council. The other
involves the distillation of observations and notes made at meetings of the MPCs. In cases where I was not able to attend, I used the official minutes of the meeting. While the minutes are not always faithful to the nuances of the meetings, they generally accurately reflect the actions taken by the planning council and the matters that were brought before the council for consideration.

Manpower Planning Council members were asked to evaluate the role of their MPC in performing several functions commonly called for in the process of local manpower decision making. Their responses outlined in Table 16 demonstrate the substantial differences in the role of the planning councils in the four research sites.

Several general observations are noteworthy. It is obvious that Akron and Canton council members perceive their councils to be involved in manpower functions much more than their counterparts in Columbus. In Canton a majority of the council feels that it is at least important in everything from setting priorities to serving as a grievance committee. Akron members differ in that they do not feel that the council plays an important role in selecting operators for contracts, in assessing staff performance, or in hearing the complaints of people within the manpower system.

Manpower planning council members were asked to list other functions that their councils perform that may not have been included on the questionnaire. In Akron and Canton, a few members suggested that the planning council served as a public relations vehicle for making the community knowledgeable about manpower programs. In Canton, a few members felt that the planning council also served as an overseer of Department of Labor activities.
Table 17: MPC Member Opinions on the Role of their MPC in the Performance of Manpower Functions

(Percentage Reporting that the MPC was Very Important or Important)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manpower Functions</th>
<th>Akron (N=15)</th>
<th>Canton (N=23)</th>
<th>Columbus (N=16)</th>
<th>NOMC * (N=11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selecting general manpower priorities for the prime sponsor</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selecting specific project operators</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewing and evaluating the performance of project operators</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewing and evaluating the performance of the professional staff</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing a comprehensive manpower delivery system</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewing and approving the annual plan for Title I funds</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewing and approving the annual plan for Title II funds</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewing and approving Title VI plans</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving as a grievance committee to review complaints from individuals in the manpower system (operators, clients, and others)</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(* NOMC is included for comparison, but since the council had only met three times before they responded to these questions, their responses have to be taken in a different light from the other councils. It is more likely that the NOMC members were basing their responses in part on their feelings about what the council should be doing or their perceptions of what it would be doing. In fact, the latter analysis demonstrates that the NOMC council played absolutely no role in any of the functions listed in Table 16 during the course of this study.*)
Another way to assess the role of the planning councils and to determine what they actually did is to review the actual record of issues that were brought before them during the course of the first year. This was done by combining the official minutes of the meetings, usually produced by the staff of the consortium, with my observations and notes of meetings that I personally attended.

Akron: During the course of the year Akron MPC members considered a broad range of manpower issues, often in great detail, and made recommendations to the staff and elected officials on nearly all of them. A list of the activities includes review and approval of FY '75 and '76 Title I, II, III (Summer Youth), and VI manpower plans, with detailed attention to the new design for comprehensive services, the specific budgets and functions for each project operator, the allocation of manpower funds to partners within the prime sponsorship, the costs of the consortium staff, and the priority service groups. Throughout the course of the year, between planning for the new fiscal year, the council deliberated over the distribution of additional Title I, II, and VI monies as it became available to the PS, including incentive funds, discretionary funds from the DOL, and 5% Vocational Education money from the state. Much of the council activity involved evaluations of project operators either through the regular evaluation subcommittees, or through the major task forces that were established to review each functional program area, such as training, intake, and assessment. Finally, the Akron council was involved in a host of miscellaneous policy matters such as affirmative action guidelines, R/DOL assessments, policy toward students in PSE programs, and the threatened withdrawal of one consortium partner.
Canton: The Canton MPC did not participate in the development of the FY'75 plan, but they became more involved as the year progressed into the FY'76 planning process. The activities of the MPC included review and approval of Title I and II FY'75 plans, and in more detail, a review and recommendation regarding the FY'76 plan for Title I. Title VI was not brought before the council for approval. The council heard reports from project operators, OBES, and the state manpower office, but took no action. Much of the council activity in fact consisted of hearing reports on the activities of other groups. They spent a great deal of time listening to reports of the activities of the Stark and Wayne manpower subcouncils, but as the subcouncils declined in importance, the reports ceased. The Policy Committee (made up of elected officials and aides) also reported regularly to the MPC.

As the FY'76 planning process approached, the council commenced evaluations of programs and made recommendations regarding who should operate manpower programs. They were not, however, asked to participate in the allocational decisions--i.e. what size each jurisdiction's allocation should be, nor were they asked to participate in the allocation of additional incentive monies. Many policy matters of an administrative nature went to the Policy Committee first for approval and second to the MPC for information, as opposed to the Akron situation where policy matters went first to the MPC for approval and second to the elected officials for approval.

Columbus: The involvement of the MPC in Columbus also follows two distinct stages, but the trend in Columbus was reversed from Canton's. Columbus developed from a highly involved council, to one with only
minimal involvement in manpower activities. In the first stage (which runs from the appointment of the council to December of 1974) the council engaged in detailed discussions of manpower functions including the administrative structure to deliver manpower services, selection of priority groups and the question of governmental and non-governmental operation of manpower services. Another issue that occupied a great deal of their time in the early period and throughout the fiscal year was the role of the manpower planning council and its relationship to the prime sponsor, the community, the project operators, and city council.

After January, the MPC was much less involved in manpower decision-making. For example they were briefed on Title II and VI but were not asked to make recommendations; a new chairman assumed control and pledged a new low key approach; the MAC was told that its involvement in the FY'76 planning process would be limited to review and comment on the plan; they were not involved in evaluations.

NOMC: For over a year, NOMC did not have a manpower planning council. When it finally met in February of 1975, the members were informed that they would play a limited role in manpower and this promise was fulfilled. The MPC was told that it was responsible for monitoring CETA programs and for evaluation of all non-CETA funded programs, such as health and child care, and transportation to see what services they could provide to CETA clients. In its last meeting for the FY'75 year the staff presented decisions on the FY'76 plan. They were not asked for and did not make recommendations on the shape of the FY'76 plan.

MPC Recommendations and Influence: The last task is to evaluate the importance and influence of each of the manpower planning councils in the
FY'75 and '76 planning processes and in the operation of programs during the year. Once again evidence drawn both from interviews of manpower actors and from the record of meetings will be brought to bear on this question.

There seemed to be a general consensus among members of the manpower planning councils, elected officials, staff people, and project operators over the relative influence of the MPCs within their prime sponsorships. In general, manpower actors in NOMC agreed that the MPC had no influence in the making of manpower decisions; interviewees in Columbus expressed the belief that the MPC had played a limited role. Akron and Canton respondents expressed the opinion that their MPCs were somewhat influential, but that this was shared with other manpower actors--staff, and elected officials in particular.

When asked to describe their degree of influence in the prime sponsorships, the majority of planning council members in Akron and Canton reported that they had either a lot or some influence in decision-making. In contrast, most planning councilmen in Columbus and NOMC rated their council as relatively uninfluential (see Table 17).

Table 18: MPC Member Views on their Influence in the Prime Sponsorships
(How much influence does the MPC have in this prime sponsorship?)
(Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Sponsor</th>
<th>A lot</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Not Much</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akron (N=15)</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton (N=13)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus (N=16)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMC (N=11)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Asked to assess the relative influence of manpower actors in prime sponsorships, no interviewee in Columbus or NOMC mentioned the MPC as being influential. In contrast several actors in Akron and Canton suggested that the MPC was one of a few influential forces to be reckoned with in the making of manpower decisions.

It is clear from the evidence that MPCs have varying degrees of success in getting their recommendations adopted and utilized by the prime sponsors. Since NOMC and the Canton MPCs did not exist when the FY'75 planning process was underway, they had no influence. (The Canton Stark, and Wayne subcouncils in the Canton consortium filled the void by making recommendations regarding service mix, and project operators. The boards were made up almost entirely of project operators so the nature of the influence was directed at maintaining the status-quo balance in their favor. Their recommendations were accepted by the elected officials.)

The NOMC-MPC's minimal role continued into the operation of programs during the year and for the FY'76 planning process. In their three meetings they made a limited number of recommendations, but most of these were rejected. For example, their request to have the right to choose their own chairman--someone other than an elected official--was denied.

Canton's planning council stepped up its activity in late FY'75 and made recommendations on the shape of the FY'76 Title I plan, including the project operators and the size of their budgets and functions. Most of the recommendations--which represented a departure from the status-quo--were accepted by the elected officials. There were two important qualifiers, however. The Canton Board of Education program--which was thought to be the best manpower program by many council members was rejected, and as
noted above, the agencies denied funding under Title I, were granted PSE slots! Thus, most of the recommendations were accepted, but the intent was not closely followed.

Akron and Columbus present mixed cases for FY'75. Both had some influence to be sure and did in fact make substantial recommendations to the prime sponsor. Akron's were accepted by the prime sponsor. Columbus' MPC, however, lost in a struggle with the Mayor and his staff.

The major issue causing conflict in Columbus was the MPC recommendation that the city should not operate manpower programs. The MPC argued that the city must play the role of overseer and evaluator and that in this capacity it couldn't also run programs. The Mayor disagreed, and this led to the eventual resignation of the MPC chairman and the termination or reassignment of most of the staff who had supported the MPC position.

Throughout the rest of the year, the recommendations of the MPC (which were quite numerous) were generally ignored or turned down—often several months after they were initiated. At the end of the year, several of the more vocal dissidents on the MPC were replaced with more agreeable members. The staff adopted an attitude of contempt for the citizen council. As one of the principal staffers said of the MPC, "Forget about it, and everything connected with it." This pretty well summed up the position to which the MPC had sunk by the end of the year.

Akron's manpower planning council was generally regarded by local manpower actors as influential across the broad range of manpower decisions. It was not only involved in the discussions, but most of the recommendations made by the council were accepted by the elected officials. A closer inspection of the context of their decision making, however, reveals that the full planning council rarely made substantial modifications to staff
positions. In the few cases where the council and the staff took firm
stands they were rebuffed by the elected officials. Concern over the
acceptability of their recommendations lead them to act cautiously: they
refused to take positions on some controversial issues for fear of being
overturned. Unlike the Columbus MPC, they rarely tested the nature
of their influence. Instead they made modest recommendations in line with
carefully developed staff and executive committee positions. A few
examples will suffice.

When the Akron MPC reviewed the staff proposal for the FY'76 plan,
they made only modest changes in the recommendations brought forth by
the staff and the executive committee of the council. The full council
persuaded the staff to preserve a contract for two project operators whose
continued existence was threatened by staff dissatisfaction. But, when
the budgets and project operator contracts came before the council for
review, it was approved in less than ten minutes with almost no substantive
debate.

Twice the council and staff took similar positions on controversial
issues. Both times they were turned down by the elected officials. The
MPC and staff recommended that full time students should not be given
public service jobs, and that the economically disadvantaged should be
the sole target group for manpower programs. The elected officials re-
jected these policies on the ground that it was discriminatory against
certain groups who were legally eligible for service.

In general, Akron's MPC was an influential force within the prime
sponsorship, but it is easy to overrate their significance. While they
were more important in decision-making than the other councils considered,
they also acted mostly in the role of legitimizer of policies already well defined by the staff. Theirs was a shared power.

Conclusions

It is now possible to make some more concrete observations about the effects of CETA on the political process, client service patterns, programmatic decisions, and citizen involvement. Of the assumptions made at the beginning of the study, all were modestly confirmed, but there was clearly variation in the four cases and there was a need for revision in some of the assumptions. In general, elected officials were more involved in making manpower decisions than before, and greater political interest was focused on the allocation of manpower funds. However, elected official involvement varied across the cases, and was highly selective in most of them. General public interest in and concern over manpower issues remained low; manpower did not become a partisan political issue.

While the overall pattern of service to clients moved away from the economically disadvantaged and minorities (as predicted), it remained stable in some prime sponsorships. More important, the factors accounting for the observed shifts seemed to go beyond the simple direct relationship between local political control and client service alteration.

Programmatic change was not nearly as substantial as many observers assumed it would be. Few categorical project operators were eliminated, categorical methods of operation lingered throughout the study period in two of the four sites, and where change occurred it was modest. The achievements of CETA in programmatic terms were primarily administrative and managerial in nature—better fiscal accounting, and monitoring of program operations.
Citizen advisory councils also varied widely in involvement and influence. All but one, however, attained some importance within the prime sponsorship. And one became, at least, an important force to be reckoned with in the shaping of manpower programs and priorities.

Figure III presents a summary of the effects of CETA in the four Ohio prime sponsorships. The variations among the four cases, and the different patterns within each case are revealed. For example, Akron achieved a relatively high degree of change in method of service delivery, without reducing services to the disadvantaged and minority applicant. NOMC, on the other hand, achieved moderate changes in service design and substantially reduced resources for the disadvantaged and minority populations within the prime sponsor. Akron experienced low interest and involvement by elected officials, and high interest and involvement from its planning council. NOMC reversed the pattern. In the next chapter, I will elaborate further on these emerging patterns and put forward some explanations for the nature of program performance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Akron</th>
<th>Canton</th>
<th>Columbus</th>
<th>NOMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation of Elected Officials</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower Planning Council Activity (tasks performed)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence (recommendations accepted)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant Decision-Makers</td>
<td>MPC/Staff</td>
<td>MPC/Staff/ Elected Off.</td>
<td>MPC/Staff/ Elected Off.</td>
<td>Elected Off./ Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of Clients in CETA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title I (FY'75)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Economically Disadvantaged</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in Nature of Clients 2nd to 4th Quarter (Title I)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Black</td>
<td>+5%</td>
<td>+27%</td>
<td>-4%</td>
<td>-23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Economically Disadvantaged</td>
<td>+5%</td>
<td>-8%</td>
<td>+1%</td>
<td>-20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programmatic Changes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change in expenditures for Short Term programs (FY'75 to FY'76)</td>
<td>-6%</td>
<td>-23%</td>
<td>+18%</td>
<td>+4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Expenditures for Title I PSE (FY'75)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Service Deliverers defunded (FY'74 to FY'76)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Changes in Method of Delivery (FY'74 to FY'76)</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure III: Summary of the Effects of CETA in the Ohio Prime Sponsorships
Chapter 4: Explaining CETA Program Performance

The final task remaining is to provide some explanations for the program performance detailed in Chapter 3. What accounts for the various patterns of CETA implementation on the three major program performance measures: decentralization, decategorization, and citizen participation? In order to answer this broad question, the model outlined in Chapter 2 will be employed, but it must first be modified to meet the specific requirements of CETA.

Figure IV presents a revised version of the intergovernmental policy implementation model. It takes into account the fact that the nature of attitudes held by local decision-makers (the political officials, staff and manpower planning councils) are antecedent to programmatic decisions because they are made by the manpower actors. Secondly, client service patterns are influenced by the attitudes of local manpower actors as well as by programmatic choices. The program mix, choice of service deliverers, and significant segments affect the nature of client service outcomes, along with the other factors such as local economic conditions, and the characteristics of the implementing agencies.

Consequently, an explanation for program performance under CETA must follow a temporal sequence. First the involvement of elected officials and planning councils in CETA will be considered as dependent variables. Second, the issue of decategorization or program change will be discussed as the dependent variable. (Here the input of elected officials, and the planning council will be used as independent variables). Finally client usage will
Figure IV: Explaining CETA Program Performance
be treated as the ultimate dependent variable of the study. (Here local decision-making and programmatic choices will serve as independent variables in the analysis.)

The basic approach is to consider each of the major dependent variables separately. The variables from the model that are important in explaining the program performance will be discussed and the analysis will demonstrate how they contribute to a general understanding of variation in CETA outcomes.

The Role of Elected Officials in CETA

Generally, the involvement of mayors and county commissioners was greater under CETA programs than with previous manpower programs, but it was modest and limited to a few issues. Chief elected officials in NOMC were highly involved in CETA, much less so in Akron, with Canton and Columbus in-between. What accounts for the generally low level of elected official participation? What explains the differences among the four cases?

I. National Policy Standards and Regional Department of Labor Communications and Enforcement Activities

While the legislation and the regulations imply a central role for local elected leaders, little was in fact done in the early days of CETA to encourage their active participation in the management of manpower programs. During the first year of CETA, the R/DOL representatives met principally with the professional staffs of the prime sponsorships, ignoring, for the most part, mayors and county commissioners. One top level Regional/Department of Labor office staffer remarked: "The federal reps (representatives) thought at first that they only had to deal with the professional staff,
but this is not true. The staff must work with the political officials because if they are not involved and concerned the CETA system will not work."

National policy to change the situation was announced at the beginning of FY'76. The R/DOL staff were told to meet quarterly with elected officials and to send all communications to them and the staff. The general environment provided by national and regional statements and actions, however, was one in which the elected officials were not actively encouraged to participate in CETA business.

II. Characteristics of the Implementing Agencies: The Prime Sponsors

The minimal role of politicians in Akron and the relatively greater role of them in NOMC may be accounted for in part by the nature of the manpower staffs of the jurisdictions. In the Akron prime sponsorship, the mayor and county commissioners placed a great deal of support and resources with the staff of the prime sponsorship. All the members of the staff possessed broad experience in manpower programs, and all of them including the director held civil service status. Several of the key staff members had worked together for over five years when CETA became law.

In NOMC, the staff at the consortium level was quite small and the principal staff members in the political jurisdictions reported directly to their elected officials. These staff directors who operated all programs in their jurisdictions, were appointed and served at the pleasure of the mayor and county commissioners. The structure of NOMC also encouraged more involvement by elected officials because the prime sponsorship is incorporated under the regional commission statutes of the state of Ohio. Consequently the prime sponsor consortium is the legal administrative entity
for manpower, the staff reports directly to the mayor and county commissioners who serve on a consortium board, and the board must approve all decisions regarding the operation of CETA programs. The NOMC arrangement can be contrasted with those in the other prime sponsorships. The Canton staff reports to the City of Canton Services Director; in Columbus they report to the director of the Office of Community Development and in Akron to the Mayor's Finance Director.

To some degree the levels of elected officials' participation in Canton and Columbus are explained by the characteristics of the prime sponsor organization. The unit responsible for CETA programs in Canton was terribly understaffed and inexperienced. Consequently the Mayor, County Commissioners and their political appointees were more intimately involved in manpower policy deliberations. The staff did not and could not make policy independently. In Columbus the Mayor was more involved in CETA because he chose to place responsibility for the program with a member of his cabinet.

III. Local Political Conditions

The varying levels of elected official occupation with manpower matters may also be explained in part by the nature of local political conditions. Local community power interests are heavily represented in the CETA system in Akron both financially and decisionally. The mayor and county commissioners placed maximum value on avoiding conflict with these groups. As a result, they placed the responsibility for CETA in the hands of the staff and manpower planning council and usually accepted their recommendations. In essence they abdicated control over the program to the local interest group structure. One elected official reminded his
fellow political officials of the consequences of overruling the manpower planning council: "There are important people from labor, business and industry and your community groups on that council. If we ask them to be involved we had better expect to accept their recommendations. Otherwise they will either quit or complain publicly. Both ways we're in trouble." For the elected officials of Akron, non-involvement represented a comfortable accommodation of interests.

The levels of elected official concern with CETA in Canton and Columbus were also influenced by local political factors. When the mayors and county commissioners became involved in these two areas, it was usually as a result of pressure from local community organizations seeking CETA funding. In these instances the manpower decisions affected important segments of the community and a general election was forthcoming. For example, CETA decisions in Columbus regarding support for a black community action agency drew the attention of the Mayor prior to his re-election campaign against a black candidate: the mayor moved to insure that they were provided with a CETA contract.

Similarly, the mayor and county commissioners in the Canton prime sponsorship intervened to salvage some agencies whose total elimination from CETA was threatened by the staff. Once again they did so just prior to an election in order to at least minimize opposition from certain quarters of the black community. Pressure from groups in the NOMC communities was also severe in large part because the agencies were not simply seeking to retain manpower funds as in Canton and Columbus, but to obtain CETA support for new programs. In contrast to the strategy employed by politicians in Akron, NOMC elected leaders chose to intervene
in CETA decisions when they felt critical issues threatened their political environment. The Akron officials did not experience the critical issues because they had successfully managed to develop a staff and planning council which represented the key power interests in their community.

IV. Local Economic Conditions

The startling increase in unemployment in the prime sponsorships stimulated some political officials to become more involved in CETA decision-making. Officials, such as those in Akron, were quick to observe the dangers of promising too much in terms of local government amelioration of a depressed economy. Others, such as the NOMC politicians, felt that there were political benefits to be gained by such public action. Table 18 indicates that the unemployment rates reached high levels during the period of the study—the highest were in NOMC.

Table 19: Changing Unemployment Rates in the Prime Sponsorships (Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akron</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMC</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of Ohio</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ohio Bureau of Employment Services
V. The Attitudes of Elected Officials

The attitudes of elected officials and their perceptions of the local political environment help account for their role in CETA decisions. In general those elected officials who devoted considerable attention to CETA did so because they expected political benefits from association with a recession relief program, perceived political liabilities that would befall them if they left unattended a program that could "blow-up," and felt pressure from groups within the community seeking CETA funding or jobs.

Elected politicians in NOMC expressed concern over all three general perceptions. For example, one elected official said that "being involved in manpower is important to elected officials when times are bad. You have to do something, and public service employment is especially important." Another emphasized,

I am getting a lot of pressure from groups that want to be funded. CETA programs have expanded the scope of my responsibility...everyone wants to rip-off the program and there has been a lot of buck passing, but the elected officials have to make the decision anyway.

He went on to suggest that the need for his scrutiny was also related to fears of program failure or scandal:

if the program bombs, it is the elected official's fault. I will get nailed by the media and some no-name citizen will be on the air blasting me for insensitivity. But no one will say that it was this black-Puerto Rican-labor etc. group that pushed the program to begin with.

While the NOMC officials were concerned with maintaining control over their programs since they are ultimately responsible for the outcomes, the Akron officials instead emphasized the fact that they had delegated control of the program to others and were loath to involve themselves further. When asked about the importance of CETA as a political issue in the prime
sponsorship one Akron elected official responded,

manpower is low key. It doesn't get publicity, it is not controversial and it does not receive public approbation or displeasure. No interest groups have put pressure on me for action. I am only concerned that CETA remain non-controversial.

As in NOMC, where general public interest in CETA was described as "zilch, that's Z-I-L-C-H," by one elected official, Akron area officials did not perceive much public interest in manpower issues. But unlike NOMC, Akron leaders had not felt the heat of interest group conflict or controversy. They had acquiesced to these interest groups in the community and had allowed them to share power over program decisions. The NOMC officials worked to keep outside groups out of the CETA system. The requirements on the politician's time and attention varied accordingly.

Political officials in the Canton and Columbus areas echoed some of the sentiments expressed by their colleagues in NOMC. Canton and Columbus officials stressed the need for some involvement ("to make sure that nothing goes wrong"); the increased importance of CETA during a depressed economy ("when unemployment is low the manpower division is just another government agency, now it is important. The benefits are spread around and the programs are a political asset, not a liability"); and the direct pay-off in serving the unemployed individual ("when someone gets hired, the neighbor finds out, and he has friends, and the word gets around. It is the best PR (public relations) we can have.")

Nearly all the mayors and commissioners interviewed predicted that they would become more involved in CETA if someone squawked about defunding, or if there was the rumor of scandal in the program. Most felt that the public was not now and would not be interested in manpower
programs. Some scoffed at the notion of local accountability in the real decision-making sense. A mayor concluded his observations on accountability by saying,

how can you expect the public to have a clear understanding of these programs when the R/DOL doesn't, we don't, and they (the public) must read about it through the obscure mind of the news media? Real accountability means only that if you screw up too far you're going to get thrown out.

Summary of Elected Official Involvement in CETA

The dangers of mishaps in CETA, the few positive benefits from funding agencies and program recipients, and external group pressure led elected officials to devote more attention to CETA than before. However, the generally low levels of public interest in the community—particularly among those who are employed and vote in higher percentages—meant that intense political official interest in CETA remained low. The clear exception was NOMC where political infighting diverted the attention of elected officials to the program.

None of the cities and counties in the present study encountered severe financial difficulties or city work force lay-offs during the period of the investigation. Thus, in contrast to cities like New York, Cleveland, or Detroit where large segments of the city work force is employed by CETA funds, the case areas were relatively speaking fiscally sound, and elected officials were more free to devote their attention to the normal routines of local government management.

The Role of Manpower Planning Councils in CETA

The general participation of manpower planning councils (MPCs) in CETA was quite varied in the four cases examined. The activity and influence
of the Akron council was high; high activity and moderate influence characterized the Canton MPC; and the Columbus group experienced periods of intense involvement in most cases with little substantial impact.

In NOMC, both the activity and the influence of the MPC were inconsequential. What accounts for the role of planning councils under CETA? And what explains the differences in program performance for the four research sites?

I. National DOL Standards and Resources

It is necessary to consider the legislative framework within which all the planning councils operated--the national legislation (PL 93-203) and the federal regulations. CETA provides a vague mandate for the planning councils. They are covered in one short paragraph (Section 104) which states that they shall, submit recommendations regarding program plans and basic goals, policies and procedures, monitor and provide for objective evaluations of employment and training programs conducted in the prime sponsor area, and provide for continuing analysis of needs for employment and training related services in such an area. Any final decision regarding such recommendations shall be made by the prime sponsor (read: elected officials).

Otherwise the law only stipulates that the composition of the MPC should be representative of local community groups and that a professional, clerical, and technical staff should be appointed to assist them.

The tasks assigned to the manpower planning councils by the law are considerable. Nevertheless the authority with which they are vested is quite limited. Specifically the law does not insist that the citizen advisory council approve the plans submitted by the prime sponsor to the Department of Labor. The regulations go only a small step further. They state (Section 95.13) that the prime sponsor shall "utilize the advisory councils" to make recommendations which it shall consider "in the context
of its overall decision-making responsibility." It also elaborates on the nature of people who should be appointed.

In summary, the national legislation and policy standards did little to guide local prime sponsor staffs and elected officials in the utilization of the manpower planning councils. In NOMC and Columbus, the legislation and the regulations were often cited by elected leaders and staff in explaining to the councils their limited role. The NOMC staff interpreted the provision in the regulations that reads,

planning councils should monitor all manpower programs funded under the act and provide for objective evaluations of other manpower and related programs operating in the prime sponsor's area,

to mean that the planning council could not evaluate the programs running in the prime sponsorship funded by CETA--only those programs not funded by CETA.

The Mayor of Columbus appeared before the planning council at the height of early planning council aggressiveness in October of 1974 and repeatedly reminded the members that under the act, "the council's advisory authority does not free the prime sponsor from its decision-making responsibilities." He maintained that he could not follow their recommendations because they conflicted with other assurances made in the grant agreement.

II. R/DOL Communications and Enforcement

In general, the Regional/Department of Labor did little to improve the status of the manpower planning councils within the prime sponsorships. The R/DOL representatives' positions ranged from total neutrality in Akron and Canton to overlooking serious problems in Columbus (to some extent) and NOMC (to a large extent.)
Regional field representatives and supervisory personnel all extolled the virtues of planning council advice, but admitted that in the press of time their importance in the R/DOL agenda had taken a back seat to other priorities. At the end of the fiscal year 1975, the R/DOL conducted an assessment of the performance of the prime sponsorships. The portion of that assessment devoted to planning councils covered only the bare essentials about them, such as "Is there a planning council? Does it meet? How often?" A review of the forms completed by the R/DOL staff revealed that some of the staff were either ignorant of the facts about the local planning councils when they filled out this portion of the assessment, or they were dishonest. The R/DOL representative to NOMC responded affirmatively to the question, "Has the council had an impact?" (which was also part of the assessment schedule of questions) even though the planning council had only met once in over 15 months. In fact, the only R/DOL response to the lack of a viable planning council in NOMC was a suggestion in the year-end assessment letter to the prime sponsors that they establish regular meetings of the MPC. Nonetheless, the R/DOL rated the prime sponsor as satisfactory and eligible for funding without requiring concrete steps to improve the role of the council.

In Columbus, where, by the time of the R/DOL assessment, the importance of the MPC had all but vanished, the field representative stated on the assessment form that the council was involved in evaluation and was having an impact on prime sponsor actions. In fact, the Columbus staff itself completed the R/DOL assessment form. They then turned it over to the R/DOL field representative. This subversion of the DOL oversight policy was a direct violation of Department policy.
During the course of the study, many prime sponsor plans were accepted by the Department of Labor without MPC review and comment. This was especially true of Title II and Title VI public service employment plans. The DOL did not inform the prime sponsors that they were expected to have planning council reviews of Title II plans until October of 1974—well after the initial Title II plans had been submitted. At no time did the DOL directly inform the prime sponsors that the planning councils should review the major modifications to their plans, although this item was included on the DOL assessment checklist.

The attitudes of the field representatives correlated with the varying statuses of the MPCs in each of the jurisdictions and perhaps contributed to their degree of strength and weakness. For example, in NOMC where the council was weakest by far, the first R/DOL representative said he "wasn't real concerned about the fact the NOMC never got their council together... The staff had enough trouble in the limited time last year." And the second field representative considered planning councils "irrelevant."

III. Characteristics of the Implementing Agencies

In a broad sense, the characteristics of the prime sponsor's organization affected the nature and scope of planning council influence. To take the two extremes, Akron and NOMC, remember that Akron is a prime sponsor with a great number of manpower program operators whose interests were accommodated in part by participation on the planning council. NOMC on the other hand had a program which was almost totally operated by the staff of the political jurisdictions. The desire in NOMC was to keep alternative program operators out of decision-making roles. In this sense, the existing structure of manpower programs (or the development of manpower
programs over several years) had an effect on the nature of planning
council activity and influence.

IV. Local Political Conditions and the Attitudes of Elected Officials

Referring back to the discussion of the role of elected officials,
it will be recalled that those in NOMC were highly involved and that those in Akron
were least involved. The Akron MPC, however, is influential while the
NOMC MPC is not. The Columbus and Canton MPCs are somewhat active and
influential as are the elected political leaders. Without strong
political leadership from the elected officials the Akron MPC was able to
move into the power vacuum and to create a significant role for itself.
The chairman of the council made presentations at each meeting of the
elected officials.

In NOMC the political power relationships were reversed. The elected
officials invested a larger proportion of their time in CETA programs and
they were responsible for the results, since the manpower program was run
by their staff. In this case the council would have represented a threat
to the NOMC officials in that they would have been exercising oversight
of the prime sponsor's performance.

The attitudes of the elected officials reflect different perceptions
of the nature and importance of planning council input and again correspond
to the actual role played by the MPCs in each area. One NOMC elected
politician characterized the planning council as a "pain in the ass."
He continued:

The problem with citizen participation is that all the groups that
show up represent vested interests. They are all after a piece of
the action: blacks, Puerto-Ricans, welfare types, unions. The
average citizen is not represented. When I go into those meetings,
I feel like I am walking into a whore house: I know I am going to
get screwed but I don't know by whom. These vested interests are
self-appointed representatives of this or that group, when in fact
they just represent their own selfish interests. And to whom are
they accountable. I am accountable. Oh, we listen to these
groups, but 90% of them just want money. The planning council is a consortium of vested interests.

Other elected officials in NOMC echoed the same themes, noting that advisory councils often "overstep their bounds and get upset when their recommendations are not accepted."

In contrast the Akron Mayor and County Commissioners were willing to accept the sizeable role of the planning council even though they shared some of the NOMC officials' skepticism about citizen advisory councils.

One official elaborated:

The MPC is playing the role it should be--one of giving advice. Of course they do represent vested interests but then--they are the ones involved in the program. I can only think of one situation where we disagreed with the council and overruled them, but I can't remember why or what the issue was.

Canton officials also gave support to the planning council, although they suggested that the planning council was not, in the words of one official, "in the thick of things all the time." Also some admitted that "deadlines have prohibited us from involving the planning council in some things." But basically the position was one of general acceptance of the MPC. As one politician recalled,

the members were selected for their interest and qualifications. We wanted a group that could function--not too many people, no silent backward types. For Chairman, I wanted someone from big industry who had respect in the community and who had not been associated with political squabbles or power plays. Now that things have settled down the council will be more involved.

Other Canton officials noted that on most occasions the Policy Committee (the board of elected officials) had agreed with the planning council. Several warned that the planning council should remember that it is only an advisory body.
During the early months of CETA, problems between elected officials and the Columbus MPC flared. The Mayor appeared before the council to remind them in the strongest terms that they were not going to run the programs. Privately, some elected officials noted that the original membership of the MPC was too heavily laden with those out to protect personal empires.

Relations between the city administration and the Chairman of the council deteriorated and he resigned in January of 1975. In his resignation letter (dated January 17, 1975) the chairman suggested that the city had been unresponsive to planning council input.

Although there has been the appearance of significant involvement on the part of the MAC, our actual participation has been superficial. I believe the MAC will have little or no impact on the critical issues in developing the program... It is now clear that there are profound conflicts of political philosophy which can only render the MAC insignificant... I have no desire to be involved in activities which are both contrary to my own beliefs and insignificant in nature.

The city responded by accusing the Chairman of submitting $1,000 worth of unauthorized expenditures for personal monetary gain and of holding secret meetings with the planning council. The former chairman responded by denying the allegations and charging that the city "held no commitment to the principle of government by the people." Subsequent to the chairman's resignation a local businessman who was thought to be more in accord with the Mayor replaced him. Later in the year the membership of the council was also reconstituted and some (though not all) of the outspoken opponents of the city administration were removed.

V. The Attitudes of the Prime Sponsor Staffs

The attitudes of the staff towards the role of manpower planning councils parallel (for the most part) the positions taken by their
superiors—the elected officials. Most of the NOMC staff openly opposed a strong planning council. The Columbus staff, which was initially assigned to CETA, encouraged council participation. However, for other reasons noted below, it was either fired or shifted to a place in the city administration that had no relationship to manpower. The new staff desired a more limited role for MPCs. The Canton staff supported the planning council because they lacked clear visions about the shape of manpower in their area and welcomed MPC input. In Akron, the staff was highly favorable to the planning council in all respects. Support for these general observations will be provided below.

Open hostility to neglect characterizes the attitudes of NOMC staffers towards their planning council. From the very beginning of CETA the staff contemplated a minimal role for the MPC. "The concept of a planning council is good on paper, but it expects too much—if we are actually supposed to sit down with them and go through the whole process of planning with them... This can't be." The person responsible for overall area planning observed, "the council members have no expertise, so the staff has to write the plan." There was the general feeling that planning councils would "impede reorganization and change in the manpower system." The staff of NOMC even referred to Akron's more active planning council in a derisive manner and claimed that their superior ability to effect change was due to the absence of "a meddling planning council." They were sure that the Akron staff lacked this coveted flexibility.

Fear of activating planning council interests and the extra problems in seeking MPC approval caused the staff to totally ignore planning
council development for over a year. When the planning council finally met, most of the meeting was spent informing the council that they would have a strictly proscribed and limited role. Having been informed that they were not important, one of the members asked what they could do, whereupon the council was again told to read the regulations governing their involvement. The council requested the right to select their own chairman: this was denied; an elected official would chair all meetings.

Given these attitudes held by the staff and elected officials it is not surprising that council attendance dropped rapidly and dramatically. By the end of the year, the council was again not meeting, after only three fitful attempts to organize itself. One staffer remarked, "The council has fallen so low that they have not met for months. And two of those listed as active members are deceased!"

The MPC in Columbus passed through two distinct phases of participation. The first one (which lasted less than six months) was a period of major activity and some limited influence on the direction of CETA programs in the prime sponsorship. Corresponding to this period of high MPC activity there was a supportive staff who had been involved in the previous CAMPS programs and with the previous Democratic Mayor of Columbus. Additional problems were created when the staff encouraged MPC participation in the development of the first plan, only to later discover that their recommendations were almost totally ignored by the Mayor and his chief assistants.

The hostility between the planning council and the elected officials grew gradually. At first the MPC tried negotiating with the city; failing this, they tried involving the city council in the fray; failing that, the MPC chairman quit. The end of meaningful council participation was
nearly instantaneous. For example, in early January, 1975, the city appointed a staff liaison to the planning council. His appointment was described by one individual as "ludicrous" because the city had just tried to terminate him. He was only reinstated at the instruction of the civil service commission which found against the city on his appeal.

The Mayor's assistants were so intent on cultivating the proper atmosphere of support from the MPC that they began rehearsing activities for upcoming meetings with the new Chairman. The intent, one staff person opined, was to keep the advisory council "barefoot and pregnant in the kitchen." At the year's end, the MPC continued to meet, but it too had been plunged into insignificance. According to one staffer the council was totally ineffectual: "It is like a pogo stick--a lot of fun, but it never gets anywhere." Much of the ineffectiveness of the MPC can be laid at the doorstep of the unsupportive top staff.

Staff perceptions about the role of the planning council in Canton also went through two stages corresponding to the changing expertise and aggressiveness of the MPC. Initially the staff stood behind the planning council's attempts to gain more knowledge of CETA programs and more decision making power. A major breakthrough occurred when the MPC was asked to evaluate and make recommendations about service deliverers for FY'76. A few of their recommendations were rejected by the elected officials--much to the dismay of the council and the staff. Later in the year, however, as the council gained more experience with CETA, it began to question harshly the advice of the prime sponsor staff. The MPC also made increasingly difficult demands for analyses of local program performance. The staff, unable to respond to the questions or fulfill the requests for
information, lashed out at the MPC and moved to constrain its participation.

Building on the positive experiences of the staff and planning council under CAMPS, the Akron MPC continued to function strongly under CETA. Staff's attitude was one of support and even deference to the wishes of the council. The staff talked in terms of "seeking the approval" of the planning council and "requesting" this or that from them.

In fact, the council and its executive committee formed the locus of policy making in the prime sponsorships. Most decisions were forged in the executive committee of the council and later ratified by the full council and the elected officials—usually without much debate or comment. The MPC was supported as an equal partner by the staff because they constituted the key manpower actors in the area.

VI. Attitudes of the Planning Council Members

Additional confirmation of the observations already made is found in the MPC member responses to the council questionnaire. They were asked to describe the information available to them in their deliberations. Table 20 displays results which indicate that the members perceived different levels of information quality. These patterns correspond to the degree of staff and elected official support for planning council activity in the four cases.

Similar information on staff and elected officials' attitudes is tapped in another question asked of manpower planning council members. They were asked to rate the level of cooperation that they received from the professional staff and elected officials. Once again the results reveal that the perceptions of planning council members correlate with
Table 20: Perceived Quality of Information Available to Planning Council Members

(Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Sponsor</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Very Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton (N=13)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus (N=16)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOMC (N=11)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

the varying degree of staff and political support for the council's activity. Akron MPC members perceived a very cooperative environment, while those in Columbus and NOMC felt that they faced a relatively uncooperative staff and elected official group. Table 21 presents more details.

Table 21: Perceived Levels of Cooperation from Prime Sponsor staffs and Elected Officials

(Figures in Percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Sponsor</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Fair</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Very Poor</th>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elected Officials</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton (N=13)</td>
<td></td>
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Summary of Manpower Planning Council Participation

In general, the varying activity and influence of the MPCs may be explained by the nature of the legislation, the attitudes of the staff and elected officials, and the posture of the R/DOL towards council participation. CETA provided wide discretion to local officials about the shape of planning council input. With this loose foundation, the attitudes of support or opposition to MPC participation made a direct and substantial impact on the role of the councils. Additionally the R/DOL chose a non-interventionist posture regarding planning council usage.

The attitudes of the staff and elected officials toward MPCs were shaped by the roles that they decided to create for themselves in CETA decision making. The larger the role assumed by the political official the smaller the part afforded the MPC. Some manpower actors viewed the planning councils as potential dangers that promoted vested interests. And it was felt that they slowed the progress towards change in some jurisdictions. In other jurisdictions the vested interests represented on the council were accepted and they were incorporated into the decision process. In these instances the politicians regarded the MPCs as political buffers—willing and able to take the pressure for negative outcomes, or at minimum to help diffuse criticism.

Programmatic Change in CETA

A major anticipated result of CETA was change in the nature of manpower delivery systems. It was hoped that this would come about as a consequence of decategorizing manpower programs and placing them under the authority of a single administrative agency within a local jurisdiction.
The changes produced by the four case studies ranged from moderate to minimal. Akron generated the most substantial change in its method of service delivery, followed by NOMC, Canton and Columbus. In the following section an explanation for the nature and amount of manpower reform will be offered.

I. National Policy Standards, Resources, and R/DOL Communications and Enforcement Activities

The evidence suggests that the Department of Labor and its regional office representatives did not facilitate the development of improved methods of manpower service delivery or changes in the shape of manpower programs at the prime sponsor level. None of the R/DOL representatives in the four prime sponsorships articulated a vision of program comprehensiveness and decategorization to the prime sponsors. Except for what most staff viewed as a useless "Program Activities Guide," there was no widely available DOL policy statement about what a comprehensive manpower system should look like. At the national level, and in terms of specific advice communicated to the prime sponsors, there were no elaborations of what the local areas would have to do to bring about the "comprehensive manpower services" called for in the Act.

There were no CETA letters (the major means for re-specifying national level policy or further elaborating upon it) that directly or indirectly suggested any DOL concern with the issues of programmatic change, program comprehensiveness or decategorization. Indeed, the major DOL assessment of prime sponsor performance in April of 1975 did not even address questions of overall program design, despite the fact that manpower reform and the assumed problems of the categorical system were
among the central reasons espoused by those who favored the CETA approach of decategorization.

In two senses, the financial resources provided by CETA were inadequate to foster program change. The prime sponsors generally faced reduced budgets in that the same or less money had to be allocated across a wider geographical area. Initially, there were limited funds with which to innovate. The resources were also lacking in that the DOL failed to provide any concentrated training and technical assistance for local manpower staffs. This might have enabled them to obtain the expertise needed to develop better service delivery systems.

Another factor related to national level CETA resources should be highlighted—the changing size of public service employment funds and its effect on Title I program goals. The original CETA appropriations made Title I the largest manpower program, with Title II a distant second. Eighteen months later public service employment appropriations had grown by 400%: Title II had greatly expanded and the new public employment Title VI had been grafted onto CETA. The addition of massive amounts of public service employment funds diverted national and regional DOL and local energies toward PSE and away from Title I comprehensive planning. As a senior DOL official recalled, "PSE became synonymous with CETA and we forgot about Title I, which is the guts of the program."

Unfortunately, the Department of Labor also lacked a clear picture of what a comprehensive manpower system looks like—or at least they had not designed alternatives that could be replicated nationally. And those within the DOL who possessed knowledge about manpower reform techniques
and outcomes did not effectively communicate these to their personnel in the field. The R/DOL representatives were not trained in managing manpower programs at the local level, and were therefore in a disadvantageous position for rendering useful technical assistance to prime sponsors.

Prime sponsor staff, when questioned about the quality of DOL technical assistance, generally asked in return, "What technical assistance?" One respondent expressed the view of many when he said, "in order to be able to give technical assistance you have to know more than the fellow you are giving it to. Unfortunately, in the case of the R/DOL, they don't know any more than we do."

At the national level the Department was cross-pressured by various interested parties. This may help account for the failure to produce federal direction on manpower reform at the local level. DOL may desire change (and it may even have visions of ways to facilitate change) but many prime sponsors jealously guard their autonomy and discourage federal intervention. Additionally, vested interests at the local level who delivered programs under the categorical manpower system pressure the federal government to support the status-quo. Many of these groups (the OICs, Urban Leagues, and community action agencies) have powerful lobbies and support in Congress. Quite a number of DOL personnel sympathize with these traditional providers of manpower and support their local activities.

The Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, in particular, enjoyed an inordinate amount of bolstering from federal level implementors. A federally financed and state operated agency, it is part of the DOL organizational structure and was in pre-CETA days a presumptive deliverer of manpower programs. The Labor Department offered substantial assistance for the OBES in its effort to continue in local manpower schemes.
Overall, the DOL and R/DOL were forces acting to preserve the present manpower configurations at the local level. And where they did not contribute to the maintenance of the current approach (however good or bad), they were ineffective in helping local staff and elected officials to develop alternatives. The ineffectual federal role in promoting change stemmed from vagueness in the legislation, limited federal authority to intervene in prime sponsor policies, and the relative power of local elected officials versus federal bureaucrats.

II. Characteristics of the Implementing Agencies

While the R/DOL staff may have lacked sufficient training in the development of improved methods of manpower delivery, most of local staffs (with the exception of Akron) were totally without it. Staff weaknesses were acute in Canton and Columbus (for different reasons), thus hindering movement towards revising prime sponsor manpower programs.

The task of administering a $3.0 million program overwhelmed the small Canton staff. When CETA was initially implemented, there were only three professionals in the manpower branch of city hall: two different staff directors assumed their roles without previous experience in manpower programs or related fields. After struggling for nearly two years with inadequate staff resources, the staff was finally enlarged threefold.

Agency weaknesses in Columbus stemmed from organizational confusion and staff turnover, rather than size. These shortcomings unquestionably contributed to Columbus' poor performance in this area. But unlike Canton, where staff commitment to reform was high, the top level staff in Columbus was less enamoured of change, so staffing and agency problems
should not be overrated. More will be said of this later; however the central issue is that the Columbus staff functioned for the first six months of CETA in constant fear of lay-offs or terminations. The majority of the Democratically connected staff was indeed purged from the program by January, 1975.

Thereafter, the difficulties inherent in new staff organizations hindered programmatic innovation and change. The staff director retained responsibility for other important city programs, as well as a seat in the Mayor's cabinet. Her multiple and unique responsibilities both limited the amount of attention she gave to CETA matters and slanted the nature of that attention towards a more careful political calculus. One insider complained: "Every move we make is political. If only the director and the Mayor would sit down with us and outline their priorities. Since they haven't, we have been operating on the basis of our perceptions about what they want politically. When we make a mistake, we get our knuckles rapped."

The staff of NOMC was also closely linked to the political officials in the prime sponsorship. Each director for programs was personally selected by the local elected officials; the consortium staff director was hand-picked by the Mayor; and the assistant director was the son of the leader of the local Democratic party. None of these individuals had any experience or training in human resource programs prior to CAMPS.

Some marginal revisions in the nature of programs occurred, however, and much of this was due to the drive of one individual who articulated a coherent agenda for change and successfully convinced the rest of the staff and the elected officials to adopt it. The impact of those alterations was mitigated in large part because of the local options that were permitted.
Each jurisdiction could adopt the new plan without actually altering the structure of its programs.

The staff and implementing agency in Akron were relatively insulated from elected officials and were large and experienced in human resource programs. The chief professional staffer, a veteran of five years in manpower, recruited a staff with similar backgrounds. All the positions were civil service appointments. The CETA staff director held the only civil service appointment in Ohio for a person of equivalent rank. The agency structure was highly differentiated: its main components included Title I and PSE units, and planning, operations, fiscal and management information branches. Job responsibilities were clearly defined. In contrast to other prime sponsors, where staff assignments shifted daily, an individual in Akron's CETA unit could concentrate on a major task for a long period of time—long enough to achieve results and to gain expertise. For example, one constant problem faced by most planners involved the requirement to produce an analysis of needs in their prime sponsor area. Most staff dealt with this task in a routine fashion: they merely massaged the language from previous manpower plans and placed it into the new proposals. In Akron, the planning staff concentrated for six months on developing the information to help them respond analytically. They unearthed information from central data sources that other staffers had never heard of before and produced a much more comprehensive analysis. Consequently, the staff of Akron developed a more solid working knowledge of their job responsibilities, rather than getting bogged down in crisis management.
Akron was not without its problems in agency structure and operation. An inordinate amount of time and energy went to handle intramural fights with the staff in neighboring Portage County (one of the counties in the consortium). Some staffers felt that their failure to produce more sweeping changes in local manpower programs was due in part to the diversions of the "Portage problem." Eventually, Portage County withdrew from the Akron consortium.

III. Local Political Conditions

Political conditions in the prime sponsorships affected the amount of change achieved in the shape of manpower programs under CETA. Both the degree of support for the staff and the involvement of elected officials, as well as the structure of organized interests, impinged on the nature of Title I programmatic decisions.

The Akron staff experienced the most backing and independence from the Mayor and county commissioners. Columbus and NOMC lacked both items from their elected officials: the former CETA unit was directed by a Mayoral Cabinet appointee, the latter was dominated by appointees of the elected representatives of each political jurisdiction. The Canton staff was also controlled largely by political officials and their appointees, but suffered less oversight by them than either Columbus or NOMC. The general level of staff professionalism corresponded to the relative personal involvement by mayors and county commissioners in each area.

The general inability of local prime sponsors to effect substantial modifications in manpower programs is also related to the role of organized groups in the communities. In Columbus, Canton, and to a lesser extent Akron, local community organizations came into conflict with the
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The general inability of local prime sponsors to effect substantial modifications in manpower programs is also related to the role of organized groups in the communities. In Columbus, Canton, and to a lesser extent Akron, local community organizations came into conflict with the
prime sponsor staff when alterations in the organizations' roles were proposed. Some agencies were eliminated in Canton, but the groups were given PSE slots instead of Title I contracts and the defunded groups were replaced by other agencies, so that duplication of service remained high. The Columbus administration abandoned early attempts to break with a local community action agency when it enlisted the support of Democratic city council members. The Akron staff proposal to cut three service deliverers was stopped short when the affected agencies made successful appeals to the planning council which intervened and recommended strongly against the changes. As noted above the organized interests remained on the fringes of the CETA system in NOMC, so they were not parties to the status-quo, but potential agents of change. The fact that the political jurisdictions controlled most of the programs, however, limited the prospects for substantial variations from present practices, because this would have required defunding one of the political jurisdictions' agencies and handing the contract over to an outside organization.

While the overall nature of local political conditions worked to limit the degree of change, the particular structure of Akron did permit modest shifts. Because most powerful community groups were included in the manpower planning council executive committee deliberations, the staff and these individuals reached acceptable compromises about the shape of manpower programs. No agencies lost out totally, but new ones were added and the roles of older deliverers were in some cases redefined.

IV. Local and National Economic Conditions

The depressed economic conditions experienced in the nation during the early stages of CETA implementation influenced the prospects of
change. In general, the economic factors limited the degree of reform and innovation by the prime sponsors, encouraged higher allocations of resources for short term programs, and lessened the importance of Title I in the priorities of national and local implementors.

Rising unemployment rates in the prime sponsorships and perceptions about the importance of those rates created the trends of less expenditures for on-the-job training and classroom training and the corresponding increase in work experience and Title I public service employment programs. Indirectly, this shift affected the likelihood of manpower reform in that fewer resources remained for program innovation because the funds were siphoned off into enrollee wages.

The impact of unemployment rates varied across the cases, and the areas experiencing the worst unemployment rates were most affected. For example, the Columbus prime sponsorship had the lowest overall unemployment rate (See Table 19, above) and had the lowest expenditures for short term programs. In NOMC, the unemployment rate was highest among the four cases, and it had the greatest commitment to short term programs and by far the largest Title I PSE program (see Table 14, Chapter 3).

National and local economic trends also impacted on the relative importance of Title I, II and VI CETA programs. The Department of Labor concentrated on PSE and the rapid expenditure of funds in all Titles. This policy affected local implementors who tended to focus additional amounts of time and resources on Titles II and VI and on programs, such as work experience, that would expend CETA funds most rapidly.

The growth of public service employment created the worst dislocations in prime sponsorships whose staffs were not carefully delineated (NOMC,
Canton, Columbus). In Akron, pressure for action on public service employment issues was relieved by the staff assigned to those tasks, thus leaving the rest of the staff free to work on Title I matters.

V. The Attitudes of Prime Sponsor Staffs Towards Programmatic Change

The attitudes of prime sponsor staffs affected the degree and nature of manpower reform in the four cases. However, these attitudes were strongly shaped by the characteristics of the implementing agencies, the political conditions of the jurisdiction, and the degree of political official participation in CETA.

Relatively slight manpower change occurred in Canton. The inexperienced staff held no well formed positions about how to reshape their manpower delivery system, what programs to offer, or who should run them. Fearing intrusions by elected officials, the staff waited for direction or approval before making independent decisions. Because no systematic leadership was forthcoming from the mayor or county commissioners (or from the R/DOL), the staff made few changes. Overall the staff merely supervised the inherited categorical manpower system, and seemed content in that role. The minor modifications that were made were stimulated by planning council members who successfully urged the demise of a few program operators.

Similar factors affected Columbus staff attitudes, most notably the anticipation of elected official intervention. According to one Columbus manpower planner, "political agendas--hidden agendas--held by elected officials and appointees dominate decision-making. If you make a move, you have to take the heat. So we usually play it safe." Coupled with this general apprehension, there was limited political support for the agency.
staff and an awkward organizational structure. The staff had little incentive or inclination to engage in long range planning directed at altering the manpower approach in Columbus. For example, the PSE expansion in mid-FY'75 had a devastating impact on the staff, because it was not organized to cope with the additional burdens of the new and increased programs. A very small inner circle handled all crisis decisions. In the words of one senior manpower professional,

we knew that we could not do everything at once and there wasn't time for any major planning effort. We had a new internal organizational structure to deal with CETA and it just wasn't flexible enough to meet the new demands placed on it.

NOMC managed modest changes in the operation of its manpower programs. An energetic staffer gathered a consensus for a new approach and got the plan accepted in principle. In practice most things remained the same. For example, despite central staff opposition to Title I public service employment programs, the manpower directors in the member jurisdictions increased funding for it over the course of FY'75 and FY'76.

Political officials also cautioned the staff against major revisions in manpower. Following two public discussions regarding the possible termination of the NOMC consortium director, the individual in question assumed a very low profile and refused to exercise any leadership function. NOMC's manpower system was only marginally different at the end of two years because, one top staff professional observed,

I miscalculated the extent to which attitudes developed during the pre-CETA days were ingrained in various manpower actors. They were not able to respond to the change I was seeking because their prior experience with categorical programs limited their perspective.

In NOMC, the general orientation of the staff went against change, and the political environment reinforced this tendency.
Akron staff members advocated programmatic reform, and they functioned in an environment that encouraged those attitudes. While the staff accepted the previous categorical structure, it also altered it by placing maximum stress on utilizing existing services—with modified roles for some agencies. One central figure on the Akron staff admitted some of the drawbacks to the Akron approach, but defended the final manpower delivery system:

As far as drawing charts is concerned, our system probably makes about as much sense as two tits on a hog's head, but we think it makes a better system. The DOL has gotten carried away with the notion of comprehensive services. Everything does not have to be centralized.

Rather than make major adjustments in the set of program operators, the Akron staff started with the present structure as a given and worked to get the most out of it.

In contrast to NOMC, Columbus, and Canton where political backing for the manpower agencies was low, the Akron staff enjoyed significant support. One top assistant to a county commissioner noted, "the Commissioners and the Mayor know what is going on in CETA, but they are too busy to get involved. Besides they have a great deal of confidence in the manpower staff and there have been no disagreements between them."

The staff was also able to include (or coopt) potential opponents onto the manpower planning council. Council approval was employed to legitimize changes in the nature of CETA programs and to diffuse blame, which allowed the staff to effect more sweeping changes in the delivery system than their counterparts in Columbus and Canton who faced hostile interest group environments.
Summary of Programmatic Change in CETA

In terms of manpower reform, the evidence of prime sponsor performance is disappointing: changes aimed at eliminating the recognized flaws of the categorical manpower system were limited. Two of the four cases resembled the pre-CETA categorical structure at the end of the first 18 months of CETA. The others made moderate administrative modifications in the nature and shape of CETA programs.

Several elements make up the account of prime sponsor program performance, and explain the variation among the four cases. The law, regulations, policy guidelines and enforcement activities of the Department of Labor offered inadequate advice or guidance to local actors on how to improve their manpower programs. And the resources provided by CETA in the first year were not sufficient for program innovation.

National and local economic trends plunged the Department of Labor and the prime sponsors into drastic action to provide immediate relief. The consequences included a vastly increased emphasis on public service employment, insistence on rapid grant expenditures, and concentrations of larger proportions of program funds on work experience. All of this tended to make Title I manpower reform the orphan of CETA.

Some of the CETA administrating agencies were incapable of running Title I, let alone the expanded CETA effort for emergency employment. These initial weaknesses were compounded by inadequate backing and autonomy from elected officials in some prime sponsorships.

Other elements of the local political environment impinged on the prime sponsor staff and its progress towards manpower reform. Strong vested interests, often represented on manpower advisory councils,
thwarted attempts at change in the shape of CETA—particularly the arrangements for service deliverers. Prime sponsors who operated CETA programs themselves also supported the status-quo. They evaluated their performance positively and generally tended to arrogate more control over programs to themselves. Elected officials sustained no concern over manpower reform.

Finally, the attitudes of the prime sponsor staffs were influenced by all the aforementioned factors. This resulted in either a failure to grasp the path that would lead to change or a conclusion that such attempts were politically unwise. While the majority of manpower professionals sought program improvements in principle, the limitations imposed by economic, political, and agency conditions usually inhibited effective implementation.

Client Service Patterns in CETA

National and state trends in services to clients in CETA programs were described in detail above. Overall participants became older, better educated, more male, more white, and less economically disadvantaged. These patterns continued across all programs (Titles I, II and VI) and throughout the program years. For Title I, Akron reversed national and statewide directions and slightly increased service to blacks and economically disadvantaged during the first year of CETA; Canton substantially increased service to the economically disadvantaged; Columbus patterns were stable; and NOMC substantially decreased service to blacks and economically disadvantaged persons.

Public service employee participants are relatively the most male, oldest, best educated, whitest, and least economically disadvantaged
group of enrollees. In Ohio, statewide, for example, 52% of the Title I clients are black as compared with only 27% of the public service employees. Likewise 82% of the Title I clients are considered economically disadvantaged while only 37% of the public service employees are so classified. The import of these findings is that the program with the highest per-enrollee cost--one that directly provides employment and is therefore the most desirable program--is allocated to the least economically disadvantaged and minority individuals. Generally the case studies follow this trend also, with the notable exception of Canton. The Title II or original public service employee program more closely resembles the Title I enrollee than the Title VI participant in demographic characteristics. And the decline in service to minorities and the disadvantaged from Title I to Title VI is not as sharp as the state and national trends in most cases.

In summary, expectations about decreases in resources for the relatively more disadvantaged individual (the person with low income, limited education, the young, the black, and the female) were confirmed. However, the explanation for these changes must go beyond the simple direct relationship between local political control and shifts in service patterns. The task of this section is to account for the shifts in service to the economically disadvantaged and blacks in some of the cases and the countervailing stability or increases in others.

I. National Policy Standards and R/DOL Communications and Enforcement Activities

The nature of national policy, action and inaction helps account for decreases in disadvantaged and minority participation rates under CETA, as well as the differences among the types of people served by Titles I,
II, and VI. The law itself alters eligibility standards towards a much wider population than under the categorical programs. MDTA and EOA mandated that the bulk of participants be economically disadvantaged. The CETA target populations are not restricted to the poor, but also include the unemployed (for seven days or more in Title I) and the underemployed. At the same time, CETA extends manpower programs into primarily suburban areas, whereas before they were concentrated in central cities where the minority population is concentrated.

Among the public service programs, the law places more emphasis on the transitional (or temporary) and targeted nature of Title II, than on Title VI which is more explicitly aimed at reaching the recently unemployed. For example, Title II calls for assurances from the prime sponsor that "special consideration will be given to unemployed persons who are most severely disadvantaged in terms of the length of time they have been unemployed and their prospects for finding employment without the assistance under this Title..." (section 205, paragraph 7). Title VI also suggests that prime sponsors give consideration to those who have exhausted unemployment insurance but states that persons are eligible who have been unemployed for as little as fifteen days (section 602d).

Title I legislation requires that prime sponsors make assurances that, "to the maximum extent feasible manpower services, including the development of job opportunities will be provided to those most in need of them, including low-income persons and persons of limited English speaking ability." (Section 105). In communications to the prime sponsors and reviews of their local plans, the R/DOL failed to emphasize these qualifiers to the general eligibility standards. Nevertheless the perceptions
of the staffs in the prime sponsors accorded primarily with these varying
guidelines among the three Titles. Title I was viewed as reserved for
the disadvantaged, Title II much less so, and Title VI not very much at all.

R/DOL enforcement policy also reinforced the trend towards less
service for the poor by taking only minimal steps to monitor eligibility
of enrollees in the prime sponsorships. Audits of previous manpower
programs, such as the Emergency Employment Act of 1971, have demonstrated
substantial inaccuracies in reports from prime sponsors, yet there was
little R/DOL attention to this problem (see Levitan and Taggart, 1974,
for information on EEA).

National DOL policy was not followed up by the Regional office
personnel. For example, the DOL issued a national policy standard that
directed prime sponsors to carefully analyze and respond to the problems
of veterans, inner city youths, women, and persons with limited English
speaking ability. In the R/DOL nothing was done to enforce this policy
or to ensure that local plans were in conformance with local need.

This last point was perhaps the most serious one. The R/DOL did not
attempt to determine if the existing (or reported) patterns of client
usage in the prime sponsors, corresponded to the actual nature and
incidence of need.

The process of establishing priority service groups represents another
instance of the R/DOL failure in oversight of prime sponsor implementation.
The process of choosing so-called "significant segments" or priority
groups is important because it represents decisions about how to allocate
scarce resources most effectively in the prime sponsors. Local planners divulged the distortion of this process. Rather than making their choices with objective analyses of the types of people most in need, the planners simply use data about the characteristics of people served in the last quarter as the basis for describing actual need in the jurisdiction—they reify experience. The planners argue that they must do this in order to guarantee that they will come close to meeting the goals set forth in the plan. "If you don't meet the goals in the plan, the feds will raise hell, and they never check to see if our goals make sense," recounted one staffer.

In a more direct way, DOL enforcement policy encouraged a reduction in CETA opportunities for the low-income populations. In the Spring of 1975, the DOL, following national policy calculated to increase rates of expenditures of federal funds, evaluated prime sponsor performance in large part on their ability to dispose of their grant allocation. This criterion of success stimulated prime sponsors to commit greater proportions of funds to programs that could be implemented quickly with high per enrollee costs. Public service employment was the most commonly chosen alternative, with adult work experience programs (which approximated PSE in cost per slot) next. The consequence of this shift in program resources was to curtail the availability of funds for programs that serve the less job-ready applicant—the economically disadvantaged client.

In summary, while the Department of Labor cannot be blamed for the decline in commitment to the economically disadvantaged and minority applicant, it must share a portion of that blame. Strong national and local economic trends shaped the population of eligibles into a relatively
more advantaged group; yet some prime sponsors were willing and able to reverse the trends and retain or even increase services for those most in need. In these cases, as we shall see below, the work of local officials (particularly professional staff) was the key to holding the line. DOL policy and enforcement activities not only failed to direct prime sponsors in their client usage patterns, but often encouraged a decline in funds for the poor.

II. Local Economic Conditions

Economic and social conditions in the prime sponsorships had direct and indirect effects on client service patterns under CETA. Indirectly staff and elected officials perceived compelling reasons for serving the adult, white, head of household who was recently unemployed and probably not economically disadvantaged. Local economic conditions directly influenced program performance by altering the pool of people eligible for CETA programs. The rise in unemployment, documented in Table 19, swelled the ranks of those applying for programs with the recently unemployed, better educated worker, who fared well in competition with the chronically unemployed and poor applicant. This section will describe in more detail the nature of local economic and social conditions in the four research sites, and concentrate on measuring their direct impact on participant outcomes.

Conceivably economic and social conditions could affect the nature of CETA enrollees in several ways. First, the basic demographic make-up of each prime sponsor might tend to influence the types of program participants and lead to levels of service reflective of those characteristics. Using one measure of demographic characteristics (the 1970 Census Report),
the actual prime sponsor service patterns do not closely follow patterns of need (see Table 22, Columns A and B).

Several observations regarding the first two columns in Table 22 are warranted. While the 1970 Census data are certainly out of date as estimates of the magnitude of unemployment among blacks and the magnitude of those who are economically disadvantaged, the data at least reveal the substantial similarities in incidence of need among the four prime sponsors. Nevertheless there were very great differences among the amounts of service given to various groups, and among the overall unemployment rates in 1975 (see Table 19). It will also be apparent from reviewing Table 22 that the actual service to blacks and poor far exceeds (in most cases) their general incidence in the population, according to the 1970 figures.

All the prime sponsorships have nearly the same overall rate of poor individuals; yet in Title I Canton reports having served 100% economically disadvantaged and NOMC reports serving 61% of the same category. Akron and NOMC had the same rate of unemployed who are black (in 1970), but Akron serves 55% black in Title I and NOMC delivers to 25%. While Columbus had a larger black percentage unemployed in 1970 than NOMC by 35%, its CETA programs serve 3 times as many blacks as those in NOMC.

In summary, Column A and B produce the conclusion that it is wise to peer beyond differences in demographic characteristics in order to explain variation in actual services to clients under all CETA titles. NOMC shares similar characteristics with the other prime sponsors but exhibits very different program outcomes.

Thus far we have considered data from the 1970 Census Report when the national unemployment rate, and the rates in the four cases were well below
Table 22: Selected Comparisons of 4th Quarter Title I, II, and VI Clients with 1970 Census Data and to an Estimated Incidence of Need as of June, 1975 (Figures in Percent)

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<td>4th Quarter Client Service Patterns</td>
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<td>Economically Disadvantaged</td>
<td>Unemployed who are Black</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Title II (N=5,975)</td>
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<td>Title VI (N=4,557)</td>
<td>28</td>
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(1) Quarterly Summaries of Client Characteristics from Prime Sponsors, June 30, 1975; (2) U.S. Census Report, Commerce Department, 1970; (3) Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, Selected Employment Service Activities by Applicant Type and Local Office, June, 1975.
4%. It would be desirable to employ more detailed and current information in the analysis in order to more accurately determine the degree to which prime sponsors are responding to the actual nature of local needs. Unfortunately, a completely satisfactory analysis of this kind is impossible, but an approximation can be developed using data collected by the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services.

The OBES data, reported in Column C of Table 22, allows an estimation of the current (1975) incidence of need in the prime sponsorships for selected characteristics. Several problems inherent in employing these data must be prominently noted. First, the data are derived from the OBES "active file." The active file includes CETA eligibles, such as the unemployed (who are not job attached), the underemployed, and the economically disadvantaged. But it also includes a small percentage of those who are employed. They are included in the active file because they are seeking new employment while holding down another job. The best estimates of the proportion of people in this group is around 10% or less. And the general feeling among experts at OBES was that this figure would be considerably lower during the recession of 1975, since most people do not engage in idle job searches when the economy is poor. Consequently, the OBES figures will overrepresent need to a certain extent.

Secondly, because the data are limited to those people on active file at the bureau, it does not contain information on an important class of CETA eligibles--those who decide to give up the search for employment. Research at the national level indicates that the so-called discouraged worker is a sizeable proportion of the population and that these people often tend to be almost completely in the low-income group. In this sense the data tend to underrepresent the real need for CETA services.
Finally, the matching of prime sponsorships and OBES area offices is also an approximation. The data are reported by place of registration, rather than by place of residence. A person does not have to register in his or her county OBES office, and they may register more than once.

Despite this bundle of caveats, there is merit in using a more current data source. Again the comparison of Columns A (actual prime sponsor service pattern) and C (estimated incidence of need) reveals that the prime sponsors in almost all cases exceed the need in their service to the groups of clients included in the analysis.

More important, the estimated incidence of need in the jurisdictions does not correlate with service patterns under Title I, II and VI. This reinforces the observation made above: local economic conditions do not alone (or powerfully) influence CETA client service outcomes. Using the OBES data for June, 1975, 25% of the unemployed in Akron and NOMC were black. But Akron and NOMC served 55% and 25% black respectively in their Title I programs. Canton had the lowest estimated incidence of economically disadvantaged among the OBES active file registrants and reported enrolling the highest proportion of poor people in its CETA program. NOMC was among the highest Ohio areas in percentage of OBES registrants who were classified as economically disadvantaged and nevertheless enrolled the lowest number of economically disadvantaged across all titles.

One final point should be made about the OBES data. A calculation of the black and economically disadvantaged registrants was made for July, 1974, and January, 1975, and compared with the data reported in Column C for June, 1975. The black rates of registration with OBES remained stable, even though the overall rate of unemployment in the prime sponsorships rose
dramatically. Of course, their absolute numbers increased and blacks continued to endure an unemployment rate roughly twice their percentage in the general population, but the ratio of black to white unemployment remained even.

The percentage of OBES registrants who are economically disadvantaged grew sharply in conjunction with the unemployment rate. Therefore the drop in participation by this group in NOMC and statewide from December, 1974, to June, 1975, ran counter to patterns of need: economically disadvantaged registrants increased by 12% in NOMC and by 10% in the state as a whole; actual service to this group fell in NOMC by 23% and in the state by 8%.

Despite all that has proceeded in this analysis of local economic conditions that might have supported the conclusion that they did not influence client usage outcomes, there remain two sets of arguments for the importance of them. First, it should be noted that higher overall rates of unemployment in the four cases are associated with less service to blacks and economically disadvantaged. NOMC with the highest unemployment rate of 10.6% served the fewest blacks and economically disadvantaged. Columbus with the lowest unemployment rate, at 7.2% served the most blacks in all Titles and was high in commitment to the economically disadvantaged. Statewide, using data from 13 prime sponsors (Balance of Ohio is omitted), the Pearson's r correlations support the case trends. Higher rates of unemployment in December and March are associated with lower percentages of service to blacks (r=.21, -.36) and poor (r=.25, -.27) in March and June respectively. The results of the Title II and VI analysis provide more striking results. For Title II the Pearson's r
reaches -.82 for the relationship between unemployment rates and black enrollment, and -.36 for the correlation between unemployment and percentage poor in CETA programs statewide. Relationships of -.70 for black service patterns and -.25 for economically disadvantaged levels are obtained for Title VI.

The second argument relates to the first in that the earlier data did not reflect the patterns of individuals who enter CETA registration offices and seek CETA services from the prime sponsors. The unemployment rates give surrogate measures for the changes that may be occurring and thus correlate with changing service patterns. For example, if one uses the rough numbers reported in the statewide OBES registrant total as a measure of the number of people eligible for CETA in Ohio (and this undoubtedly understates the real numbers), it is obvious that the 62,000 plus people served under Titles I, II, and VI in Ohio reach less than 20% of the eligible group. The key questions then are who seeks out CETA programs and what is the relationship between the economic conditions and the changing types of people enrolled in the programs.

Unfortunately there is not even rough data to estimate the changes in the nature of applicants through the course of the year, but the observations of staff and program operators provide evidence to confirm the hypothesized relationships. Overwhelmingly, these individuals reported changes in the nature of the CETA Title I applicant during the course of the program year, due in large part to changes in local economic conditions. Most agreed that the CETA intake units faced an applicant who was on the whole more likely to be white, better educated, male, recently unemployed, non-economically disadvantaged, and an adult than before the
recession. Thus, local economic conditions were by no means determinative of actual service percentages, but they clearly exerted a strong direct influence on emerging patterns because the deepening economic crisis produced an expanded group of people who were indeed eligible for service, though not as disadvantaged as those who had queued for service in the first days of CETA.  

III. Attitudes of Elected Officials and Staff towards Client Service Patterns

The attitudes of political officials and manpower professionals about the proper balance of participants in CETA programs had a direct effect on the nature of people served, and helps account for the differences among the three Titles of CETA. The local actors' attitudes seem to be related to three factors: general beliefs about the types of groups that should be enrolled by CETA programs; perceptions of the desirability of serving some groups during the recessionary times; and expectations of electoral or political benefits and liabilities associated with serving or not serving particular clients. In the discussion, I will elide the consideration of staff and elected official attitudes in order to show the relationships between them.

The staffs of Akron, Canton, and Columbus expressed strong preferences for enrolling the economically disadvantaged and minority individual. The main emphasis, however, was upon the poor client, since the staffs felt that this would probably insure high service to blacks anyway. For example, one professional staff member in Akron said, in reference to a decision by elected officials to include full-time students in public service employment programs,

We think the intent of CETA was to serve the disadvantaged and that is what we try to do... The recent position on college students in PSE was a traumatic thing for our staff because the policy has
the effect of pushing service away from the hard-core disadvantaged. With PSE we have probably already moved away from the disadvantaged... But we try hard to keep this from happening. In fact, the reason that we funded (a community organization) was to do outreach in the inner city to get at the hard core.

In fact, the Akron staff also attempted to develop a policy restricting Title I programs to the poor, even though this technically violates the law because the unemployed and underemployed are legally eligible also. The elected officials in Akron rejected this proposal as "exclusionary and discriminatory against the job ready applicant."

Although the elected officials did not state this publically, several staff members felt there was a racial issue underlying their decision. One member of the staff observed:

The elected officials on the consortium board look with a jaundiced eye and say that blacks get too many breaks. They are more concerned with the problems of the white poor and they claim that there are more white poor than black poor. Our staff has been able to show them that the actual breakdown is probably 60% black and 40% white in the area. But the elected officials are satisfied because the PSE program is more white and the Title I program is more black.

In Akron, there seemed to be a tradeoff between high rates of black and poor participation in Title I, in return for much lower (by between 20% and 35% less) enrollments in Titles II and VI.

The Canton staff viewed CETA as a remedial, redistributive program for the poor. In fact, in FY'75 the staff planned to serve all economically disadvantaged participants in Title I, and if their reports are accurate this is what happened. The elected officials saw no problem with this approach, arguing, "it makes it easier to make decisions about who gets in and who doesn't." In fact, one of the chief elected officials of the area said, "CETA funds should be used to help the economically disadvantaged people even if this means city or county lay-offs." Neither the Canton staff, nor the elected officials felt that major distinctions should be
drawn between the Titles in terms of the types of people enrolled. The similar actual service outcomes seem to reflect that basic decision.

Similar staff commitments to high proportions of minorities and poor existed in Columbus. Columbus led the four cases on all three Titles in percentage black enrolled and was high (62%, Title VI, and 82%, Title II) in the amount for economically disadvantaged people. Also, service to these groups did not decrease significantly across the program year, although it did erode somewhat in Title II.

The basis for such high service was related to supportive staff attitudes, but one staff member added another perspective:

The client mix is just the product of what we inherited from before. It may change, but that all depends on the data that we can develop. I feel personally that the white poor is not getting a fair share, but I would like to prove that scientifically. I would like to set goals and quotas with good hard evidence. In the absence of it, we will continue with the status-quo. The status-quo is what existed prior to CETA and it was arrived at by chance.

The same individual rejected the notion that conscious decisions produced more or less service to the blacks and economically disadvantaged under CETA. In fact he asserted,

PSE serves less disadvantaged because of the nature of the job more than any decision in our part or pressure to do this. The only order we have received from the top is to get more women in PSE jobs that would ordinarily go to men.

In general then, it is important to consider the influence of pre-existing manpower arrangements and other programmatic factors before concluding the discussion of variables influencing client service patterns. This will be accomplished below.

The elected officials in Columbus, who were moderately involved in CETA, paid little attention to the nature of enrollees in their programs. While one official expressed skepticism about the people served by CETA
programs because, "it is usually people who are too lazy to get off their butts to do anything for themselves," he nevertheless noted that such service was necessary, "because if we don't serve them they will be on welfare anyway. One way or another, it will cost taxpayer dollars."

A basic division characterized the NOMC staff attitudes about CETA enrollees. Those in the central office of the consortium favored the disadvantaged client; those in the counties and the city, who actually managed day to day operations tended to favor the more advantaged individual. For example, one county manpower director suggested that there, "was already too much service for the poor in overlapping programs." Another staffer suggested that, "too much service for the disadvantaged would lower your placement rates terribly."

The highly involved mayor and county commissioners of NOMC were more in agreement with the staff of their respective jurisdictions than with the central office staff on the issue of who gets into the programs. Most of the elected officials expressed a preference for serving the recently unemployed and less economically disadvantaged person. One put it bluntly, "these people need the service because of the economy, and they vote. The others don't."

In general the attitudes of the professional staffs favored high commitments of program resources to the economically disadvantaged and minority applicant. In Canton, the commitment to these groups was high, as it was in Columbus and Akron. Overall, the desire to enroll the disadvantaged and black was lowest in NOMC.

Most of the elected officials, who were willing to express a preference cast their support with the recently unemployed individual who was dislocated
by the economic recession. Although they were few in number, some officials were even willing to openly express attitudes negative toward the black and disadvantaged enrollee. The impact of their attitudes was usually marginal however, since most had no involvement whatsoever with the actual selection of clients, and only a few even had knowledge of the characteristics of those served by the CETA agencies in the prime sponsorships.

IV. Characteristics of the Implementing Agencies

Two factors about the prime sponsor implementing agencies are associated with the attitudes of the staffs and the ability of them to exercise control over program outcomes. The first of these deals indirectly with the degree of support given to the staff by the mayor and county commissioners. The relative amount of support helps explain in part the varying commitments to the poor in CETA. Canton and Akron enjoyed relative freedom and higher support from elected officials than staff located in NOMC. Akron elected officials decided to write-off Title I programs. They were not greatly concerned that the percentage service to economically disadvantaged and blacks reached such high levels. In Canton, again the elected officials gave relatively higher support to the staff or ignored much of what went on in the programs. As noted above, this was generally true of all elected officials regarding client service patterns, but was more pronounced in Akron and Canton.

The second factor relates to the composition of the staff and its experience with manpower programs. Basically, the more experienced the staff was with categorical programs, the more it retained a focus on those served by the old system--the economically disadvantaged. The more
experienced staffs in Akron and Columbus included large proportions of these groups in CETA programs, and the Canton staff, while less experienced nevertheless expressed explicitly categorical preferences derived from the pre-CETA experience.

The staff make-up also influenced the attitudes towards client usage. Where service to blacks and disadvantaged is lowest, in NOMC, there is only one black staff member out of over 17 professionals. In Columbus, where the commitment to the blacks is greatest in all Titles, the staff director, operations manager, planner, evaluation specialists, and planning council staff persons are all black. Akron also had three blacks in key staff positions. The relative anomaly in Canton, where Title II and VI programs serve more blacks than the area's Title I program (reversing state and national patterns) may be accounted for in part by the fact that the Mayor's chief assistant for manpower and de facto director of public service employment programs is black—-the only black PSE director in the four cases.

V. Additional Factors: The Impact of Manpower Planning Councils and Programmatic Decisions

In addition to the variables discussed above, manpower planning councils and programmatic decisions influenced the outcomes of the client service patterns. Manpower advisory councils were often significant elements in the forces pushing for high service to the black and disadvantaged population, especially when they were involved in setting or recommending priority groups for the manpower plans. Columbus' council is nearly 40% black and recommended, in the early stages when it had some impact, that the proportion of blacks in Title I programs should be at the 75% level (in fact it reached 72% for FY'75). In addition to the heavy overall
membership, the key influentials on the council, including the chairman, were also black.

Akron's council also contributed to the generally high level of participation by blacks and the disadvantaged. Here again the overall membership of the council was 35% black, and several key members of the powerful executive committee of the council are black, including the chairman, who also represents organized labor on the council. They were a powerful influence in the direction of more service for the black, inner-city, poor client in Akron programs.

NOMC did not have a functioning council during most of the period under study so its influence on service outcomes was nil. The Canton council had only a 14% black membership, and next to NOMC served the fewest number of blacks in Title I programs.

Programmatic decisions, including the choice of service deliverers and the types of manpower programs (work experience, PSE, classroom training, and on-the-job training) also influence client results. Agencies influenced client outcomes because of their locations in the community, and their history of service to this or that group. In fact, many staffers argued that client levels were determined by the choice of agencies to operate CETA programs. Often the decision to preserve or cut these agencies was based on decisions about preferred client outcomes. For example, one manpower staff member in Akron observed that a decision to cut an agency had obvious racial implications:

I called together a meeting of several blacks. _____ of my staff, _____, and _____ of the advisory council, and I asked them to find out what was being said in the black community about our decision to cut (two local community organizations). They came back within a week and told me that there were suspicions
that we were not committed to the disadvantaged anymore. They said OBES is viewed as white man's territory, that the Urban League is viewed by many as Uncle Tom, and that only (the two agencies) could serve the hard-core blacks in the inner-city. So we decided that we would have to preserve a role for both of them.

Another factor related to agency operation is the bias of the people who function at the intake level. These are the people who actually interview potential participants and decide whether or not to admit them to the program. One of the professional manpower planners in NOMC did an analysis of the correlation between the race of the intake interviewers and the people who were accepted into the program and found a very high relationship. In this area, the staff of the CETA unit usually has little or no control over the eventual outcomes unless it establishes rigid quota systems, or carefully monitors the performance of the intake people.

Before leaving the agency selection issue, it should be noted that the Akron and Columbus planning councils did play a role in preserving the roles of major black service delivery agencies in their prime sponsorships. In NOMC, there were no community agencies running manpower programs. This undoubtedly also had an effect on the types of people who signed up for CETA service.

Word of mouth rumours about programs and their receptiveness to people of different backgrounds often influences the applicant pool. The location of a program often telegraphs a message to individuals about whether they should bother to try to get into a program. Whether these perceptions are accurate or not, they influenced the eventual client service patterns also.
Finally, the role of program mix in determining client service patterns should be given prominent mention. According to some observers the choice of manpower programs, in addition to who delivers them, will substantially influence the balance of participants. It has already been observed that Title II and VI clients are less disadvantaged than the Title I enrollee. This is due to the nature of the manpower programs, because a public service job usually requires higher qualifications for participants. Therefore, prime sponsors with greater commitments of Title I PSE are more likely to serve a less disadvantaged population than those with low amounts of Title I PSE. On the other hand, work experience programs require the least of the enrollee in terms of preparation and therefore tend to include the highest percentage of disadvantaged participants.

The evidence from the four cases tends to confirm these general observations. In FY'75 Canton had the highest expenditures for work experience, while NOMC committed the greatest proportion of Title I PSE funds. Canton and NOMC were also the highest and lowest respectively in terms of percentage service to the poor. Evidence from 13 prime sponsors in the state also accords with the above observations. In terms of both expenditures and number of slots allocated, manpower programs are correlated with varying rates of service to blacks and disadvantaged. In general, higher expenditures ($r = .60$) and slots ($r = .40$) for work experience are associated with higher rates of low-income enrollment. And greater expenditures ($r = -.59$) and slots ($r = -.46$) for Title I PSE are associated with lower percentages of poor clients.
It may beg the question, but it seems that attitudes toward serving various groups are also determinative of the types of manpower programs that the staff chooses to run and the agencies they select to operate programs. When asked to cite the most important manpower decisions among client, program, and agency choices, most professionals selected client decisions. It is doubtful that the staffs make choices about programs and agencies without understanding that this influences the nature of program participants also. At any rate, these choices about agency and program mix do affect the patterns that emerge. This is due to the demands of various types of manpower programs and to the types of client groups that are associated with particular agencies in the prime sponsorship, as well as the personal biases of the people employed by those agencies.

Summary of Client Service Patterns in CETA

In terms of the possible explanations for the nature and variations in client service patterns in the four jurisdictions, a persuasive case can be made by combining several forces.

1. The attitudes of the actors in the jurisdictions are certainly important. Both the policy makers who set planning levels and quotas and those who actually admit people to the programs play critical roles in determining actual service levels, but the attitudes of manpower actors do not wholly account for the observed outcomes.

2. Another element, which may be indirectly related to the attitudes of the manpower actors, is the nature of programs selected and the types of agencies who receive contracts for CETA programs. These choices set limits on the types of people who can qualify for enrollment and help
account for the nature of people who seek CETA services. Programmatic choices inevitably will favor one group of clients over another.

3. Another crucial factor seems to be simply the types of programs that have operated in the past and the nature of areas that received service under the pre-CETA system. In Title I, except for NOMC, there were no large changes in the nature of CETA clients for the entire 18 month period. The argument that the final outcome is determined in part by chance is persuasive, but manpower professionals have the tools to alter the mix of participants if they so desire. The fact that limited change occurred in the face of changing economic conditions attests to this fact.

4. The direct impact of local economic conditions was not overwhelming. The need for service to blacks remained stable, and the need for enrollment of low-income individuals increased during the period of the study, according to the ODES data. Nevertheless the changing economic situation did alter substantially the characteristics of those who sought out CETA intake offices. The pool of applicants changed in composition and by the end of the program the overall nature of that pool had shifted towards the relatively more advantaged individual.

5. Economic conditions also had an indirect influence. Worsening economic conditions caused staff and elected officials to put more stress on the recently unemployed worker, particularly in NOMC. Whether this will continue as economic conditions improve is left for further analysis.

6. Finally, national standards and R/DOL communications and enforcement activities, rather than tending to hold the line against changes in client service patterns away from the disadvantaged, tended if anything to encourage such trends. This was due to the failure to take positive steps
to encourage prime sponsor behavior towards serving the poor individual, and because of DOL policies regarding manpower programs which unwittingly had the effect of reducing program resources for low-income people.
CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It is now time to ask, what has been established by this analysis of the implementation of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act? What does the experience with CETA have to tell us about approaches to organizing social policy delivery in a federal system? (More specific policy recommendations suggested by the findings may be found in Appendix B.)

What are some of the strengths and weaknesses of the model employed in the dissertation, and what avenues of future exploration should be pursued?

The first question implicitly raises another one: How well did CETA work? The analysis suggests that the answer may depend on what aspect of CETA one is referring to. While it is true that only limited manpower reform was brought about in the four research sites, that service to the disadvantaged declined in the nation and the state of Ohio, and that citizen participation was modest at best, there were clearly individual cases that in whole or in part reversed all these general trends. More important, the framework utilized in the analysis of program performance demonstrates the value of implementation research and policy evaluation because it provides insights into general outcomes and the individual variations. It is from this foundation that broader generalizations about intergovernmental relations, social policy delivery, and policy implementation can be drawn.

Let us begin with the question of elected official involvement. Supporters and detractors of the CETA concept of specialized revenue
sharing (turning block grants over to the authority of local officials) alternatively described the benefits and drawbacks of elected official participation in manpower decision-making. Chapter 3 provides considerable evidence that indicates the selective and limited involvement of most elected officials. But Chapter 4 implies that where they were more heavily involved, other CETA goals were sacrificed.

Opportunities for the public at large to exercise oversight of their elected officials' manpower decisions were at best limited to the indirect representation of manpower planning councils. In some areas the planning councils played no role whatsoever. The relative accountability for program operations seemed no different under CETA, with local control, than under the categorical system with federal government supervision.

Overall the rhetoric of decentralization did not match the reality in the prime sponsorships. What accounts for the gap between the expectations and the results?

The most powerful factor that explains the nature of elected official participation was the attitude of the elected officials, as influenced by the general orientations of the local citizenry. CETA's general thrust, even in very difficult times, implies a redistributive policy (Lowi, 1964). Its purpose is to transfer resources from the "haves" (those who pay federal income taxes and are therefore employed) to the "have-nots" (those who are unemployed, poor, societally disadvantaged for one reason or another.) Ripley and Franklin (1976) point out that CETA, much like other redistributive domestic policies, passed through the Congress without extensive discussion of its redistributive components.
In fact the redistributive elements of the legislation were "fuzzed over by the use of a formula to allocate funds and by the stress on local control" (p.135).

Locally CETA was implemented as a distributive policy. Attention was focused on the struggle between local agencies competing for funding, and the issue of what classes of citizens would be served was muted. Consequently the visibility of CETA to the public (and the media), and the time, energy, and attention of elected officials was probably lower than the interest and attention given to the early War on Poverty programs (Levitan, 1969). The limited interest demonstrated by elected officials in CETA was, as in War on Poverty Programs, directed at reducing or eliminating the redistributive and controversial elements of the program. For example, although the elected officials of the Akron prime sponsorship were only minimally involved in most CETA decisions and tended to accept manpower planning council recommendations, the two instances where they stepped in and disagreed openly with the council were issues that had a redistributive cast to them. The two major planning council policies overturned by the elected officials would have had the effect of more dramatically restricting CETA programs to the poor and minority individual.

The early patterns of implementation activity and program performance support this observation, and one would anticipate that the general results will continue to move in the same direction. Elected officials will gradually become more involved in CETA programs, in order to minimize the poverty aspects of the program and to enhance the general relief aspects for the less disadvantaged enrollees. The eventual weakening of the redistributive policy inherent in CETA will continue unabated if the
Department of Labor does not step in to halt the slide. So far it has not shown any strong inclination to fight the local officials on this issue.

The implementation results for public service employment programs also follow the CETA Title I pattern. While most of the elected officials in the present study did not use massive amounts of CETA funds for local government relief, elected officials in such cities as Cleveland, Detroit, and New York showed an early preference for this policy. Designers of intergovernmental policy must bear in mind the findings of Porter (1973) regarding the behavior of local officials in allocating federal resources. Two central theoretical notions outlined in Porter's analysis were again confirmed in the CETA experience.

The first concept, "multi-pocket budgeting," refers to the general tendency of local officials to,

promote their own priorities by using revenues with the greatest restrictions first, saving those revenues with the fewest restrictions until last. This procedure allows the administrator to adapt the restrictions placed on the revenues to his or her own priorities, rather than allowing the resource suppliers to impose their priorities (p.9).

Elected officials in the four research sites effectively employed CETA funds (which are, in the broad context, relatively unrestricted) for their own priorities. But in the four cases the overall reliance on CETA funds for general government support was minimal. This was due to the related concept in the theory of resource allocation—"marginal mobilizing."

According to Porter,

organizations design their mobilizing efforts to concentrate on sources which will be most productive...i.e. they marginally mobilize by devoting most of their time to those income sources which will yield the highest return for their current efforts (p.9).
The CETA funds were not as important in terms of the local government strategies as local revenue sources for most of the period and most of the cases. The Columbus Mayor, however, shifted his attention to CETA money following an election campaign during which he promised no new taxes. He had politically locked the door on the city's resource base. CETA became more urgent in his local marginal mobilizing strategy. For elected officials in other cities, such as Cleveland, where the resource base has for many years been considered already exhausted, the mayors immediately and substantially tapped whatever CETA resources they could garner. For them the pay-off in outside federal resources was higher.

Combining these two general observations about the behavior of elected officials leads to policy delivery approaches that will be dealt with in more detail below. But for now, it should be said that the ideas of local political accountability over federal funds aimed at poor clientele, and the notion that elected officials will utilize federal monies for redistributive purposes were dealt serious blows by the implementation results of CETA. The actual patterns of program performance ran in the opposite direction.

A second major program performance goal measured in the investigation was the role of local citizen advisory councils in the making of CETA decisions. The original idea for creating manpower planning councils in the CETA legislative package stemmed from the ideology associated with War on Poverty programs on the 1960s (see Sundquist, 1968). But the experience of Congressmen and local political actors with unfettered citizen participation also contributed to designing a more limited role for MPCs: the councils would be advisory only (see Levitan, 1969, Brechler,
The outcomes produced by the implementation process accorded with these expectations—planning councils, in most cases, did not effectively interfere with political officials when they asserted their authority.

The nature of citizen involvement in CETA invited individuals with vested interests rather than those wishing for dispassionate analysis. Most active councils and active council members worked to preserve the status-quo. While this meant that the categorical target groups would sometimes also be protected, it also had the effect of limiting local manpower reform and programmatic innovation.

Moreover, the planning councils were much more effective at promoting the continued operation of agencies funded by CETA, than for continued commitments to the disadvantaged and minority applicant. In short many planning councils became the locus of self-serving log-rolls. Few manpower councils attracted the altruistic participators referred to by Verba and Nie (1972). To paraphrase Schattschneider (1960) the MPCs in Akron, Canton, and Columbus (which had substantial to moderate impact on some manpower decisions) were able to expand the scope of conflict within the prime sponsorships. However, the expansion of conflict led only to the maintenance of previously preferred ways of doing things.

The well organized groups that had been galvanized by the War on Poverty programs and the early manpower programs worked to protect the interests of their agencies and in only a limited way the interests of the blacks and poor citizens that they claim to represent. In this sense the development of organized interest groups representing poverty agencies led to altered CETA outcomes: the pluralist model of influence worked effectively.
Truman, 1951; Dahl, 1961). But the nature of those group expressions tended to be directed towards group goals that were quite selfish, rather than to the interests of the clients. Few planning councils even pretended to have genuine client representatives. The poor or low-income groups found little direct or indirect expression for their concerns and manpower planning councils did not serve to mobilize potential beneficiaries in support of programs for the disadvantaged (see Walker, 1966).

The patterns of political official and manpower planning council participation contributed in large part to the relatively low levels of programmatic change and revision achieved in the prime sponsorships. The political context of manpower programs discouraged reformist policies because the elected officials were uninterested or apprehensive about alienating powerful agencies, and the agencies were territorially concerned.

Similarly the general difficulty of initiating new organizational relationships led to confusion and slowed the pace of planning (see Downs, 1967; Blau and Scott, 1962). In Kaufman's terms, many problems encountered during CETA implementation were due to the limited capabilities of the implementing agencies: they knew (for the most part) what they were supposed to do, but could not carry it out. The prime sponsors enjoyed neither the political nor financial resources required to move manpower reform much beyond renaming local programs. And a major interloper, unanticipated at the time of CETA's passage, was a dramatic downturn in the economy. This placed heavy demands on the time and resources of local agencies, and altered program choices sharply.
Despite the fact that major change might not have been realized under CETA, other positive revisions in the delivery of manpower programs took place. Chapter 3 noted that substantial organizational changes were about to occur, or had occurred in manpower planning and operation. These alterations were not immediately noticeable to the casual observer: particularly ones who believed that the federal government did in fact exercise strong management control over categorical programs in pre-CETA days.

The point is that the federal government never really closely managed local manpower efforts, but merely acted as a financial go-between in most cases. The Department of Labor supervised the disbursement of contracts to over 10,000 separate agencies to run manpower programs. Consequently, local supervision of manpower agencies was very limited in the categorical era. During the implementation of CETA, the control and supervision of local manpower contractors and programs improved. Local problems were identified more rapidly and could be dealt with more effectively. While little has changed in the outer shell of the manpower delivery system, important and useful changes have been brought about underneath it. While it may come as no surprise to the student of political organizations, CETA has proved that it takes more people to manage good intergovernmental programs rather than less. The Department of Labor has not reduced its number of employees, but the prime sponsors have increased the number of people working on manpower programs.

The gradual pace of change in CETA programs ties in with the literature on incrementalism and organizational change. In Simon's words (1955), local manpower planners often had to "satisfice"; that is, facing inadequate
information on which to base local choices they accepted interim solutions that were obviously not the most desirable or "rational ones." The professional staff discovered that, "what is feasible politically is policy only incrementally or marginally different from existing policies" (Lindblom, 1968).

Likewise, the accumulation of organizational problems noted above prohibited most of the prime sponsors from modifying their manpower systems (see Kaufman, 1971, and Downs, 1967 for a list of maladies common to organizations attempting change and revisited on CETA prime sponsorships). Most of the observed changes were brought about involuntarily, either through the prodding of the federal government, or simply because of recognized and immediate crises, such as a flood of new applicants or funds.

The implications to be drawn from this rather disappointing record of manpower reform are threefold. First, it is important to recognize the burdens which most prime sponsors suffered during the first two years of CETA. When CETA is reassessed, judgments should not be too harsh because prime sponsors were asked to perform the near impossible: change the manner of operating something that had been in place for over 10 years. This observation also leads to the recommendation that flexibility and discretion must be retained by program implementors. Social program legislation must begin to build in assessments of implementation problems. The anticipated shortcomings should be addressed by the legislation and resources should be included to help overcome them. For example, CETA left to chance the process of developing staff expertise in the prime
sponsorships. The legislation should have insisted on training for local manpower professionals and built in the funds to do this.

Second, the Congress should not always insist on rapid implementation of policies, particularly when the reshaping of organizational relationships is involved. CETA passed in December of 1973, and the DOL was told to implement the new system by July of 1974. Even the best intentioned of professionals could not have been expected satisfactorily to achieve the required results so quickly. A series of program failures, which have all cited rapid implementation as one problem, point to the need for a new Congressional policy of restraint in calling for immediate results, particularly when intergovernmental policies are at stake. The flow of benefits could have continued uninterrupted while the local areas gradually assumed control of the system, and the DOL and local professionals would have had time to develop long range strategies.

Third, these problems suggest that legislative oversight of policy implementation should be both more immediate, and restrained at the same time. The need for immediacy simply reflects the fact that federal and local implementors will tend to alter or distort legislative goals during implementation, especially if the tasks are difficult ones. Some of the changes will be required by modifications in the conditions to which the original legislation was addressed. These shifts should be legitimized by the Congressional oversight committees. On the other hand, the desire to revise immediately, in any major way, the new program should be resisted. A self-destruct clause, as suggested by Lowi (1973) is quite appropriate, but in intergovernmental legislation that calls for considerable organizational change, the time for reassessment may come only after 5 to
7 years of experience. CETA was enacted for only three years. This short fuse creates undesirable anxiety on the part of national office staff and lessens the likelihood of long term commitments to a professional staff and well developed organizations by state and local officials.

Over the last two years in CETA implementation, the disadvantaged individual has tended to come up as the loser: service to the low-income individual has been reduced. Not only are the poor individuals less competitive in the labor market as a whole, due to lack of education, experience, and training, and perhaps because of their race; but they are also less competitive in getting accepted into CETA programs. A new layer of needy, but less impoverished individuals was interposed between the disadvantaged client and CETA programs. This new layer was swollen by the general economic problems encountered by most prime sponsors in the United States. However, some areas reversed these trends in the face of strong pressures. The major reason was the attitudes of the local implementors who made decisions to maintain high commitments to this group--either by setting quotas, or by maintaining the same agency structure and hoping that the same client service patterns would emerge.

Unfortunately, any policy outcome that rests solely on the attitudes of the local implementors will be on a weak foundation. In considering some of the factors that led this to be the case, one must begin to look at the interrelationships among CETA goals. Not only were some of the Congressional goals for CETA broad and unclear (to wit: "serve the disadvantaged" and "serve the recession impacted employee" were both messages that could be derived from CETA policy statements), but the goals were contradictory. For example, the twin goals of change in manpower
programs at the local level and manpower planning council participation by previous categorical operators did not mesh. And if the national intention was to serve those most in need, then the permissive legislative definition of eligibility and the transfer of authority over client goals to local elected officials was misguided, for these policies tended to push in opposite directions.

In short, national goals for CETA clients, manpower program reform, citizen participation, and elected official involvement were in opposition to each other from the outset, and the implementation process was infused with competing priorities. This was particularly true when CETA was enlisted as a weapon in the general anti-recession arsenal. The familiar story of goal incongruity and ambiguity in federal policy was again repeated in CETA. (see Lowi, 1969; Ripley, 1972; Murphy, 1974).

During the implementation of CETA, broad national policy goals went through at least three distinct phases. The first phase leaned towards a modestly redistributive policy with, in Ripley's language (1972), "manipulative ends." Phase two produced the crisis dominated drive for immediate and substantial monetary bail-outs for individuals (and units of government). Public service employment ascended in size and significance, manpower reform was abandoned, and positive outcomes at the local level were measured in terms of the speed of fund transfer from the Federal treasury to the hands of the enrollees in the programs. As of this writing, national goals for CETA seem to be swinging back to point one—with an important addendum. The federal government is beginning to tighten the reins so that they can demonstrate accountability and positive performance in time to display the CETA success story before the Congressional oversight
committees. As Reagan (1972) notes, this evolution of program goals from general flexibility to restrictiveness is quite common in federal grant programs. The difference with CETA was the rapidity of the changes brought on by drastically changed national economic conditions. Local prime sponsor staff were unable to sidestep these broad national shifts in policy focus. Most feel as though they have administered several different programs over the past two years.

What does the CETA implementation experience suggest in the way of general paths for revision in social policy design? The answer to this question must come in several parts. One increasingly popular remedy proposed by political reformers (see, for example, Lowi, 1969) is for more congressional goal specificity and clarity. It is argued that this would perhaps help in resolving direct conflicts that are built into the legislation. Even if this change could be effected, the evidence suggests that in the absence of Congressional oversight the goals will be changed as the policy is implemented, both by the federal implementors and certainly by local actors. Some of the changes will occur for politically and professionally sound reasons. Other changes will be brought about for less admirable reasons such as differing political perspectives. Yet, the prescription for care in legislative crafting is still persuasive (even if the actual results may be limited), but it is in need of an important modification. The implication of the reform is that only federal level actors possess the correct residue of knowledge about the policy problem. This is not totally correct. In addition, the Congress must, as suggested above, begin to put itself into the position of more meaningful oversight of legislative programs if it hopes to steer the development of program goals in the
implementation process. Writing clear and unambiguous laws will not end the problem of the federal or local implementor who decides to alter the policy to his or her preferred position.

The central point is that the policy of decentralizing authority to the local level still has the potential for being the best approach to manpower program delivery. Where positive results were observed in this study, the prime sponsor's above average performance was almost always due to the superior competence of the local government personnel. Failures to produce positive program performance stemmed from combinations of incompetence and attitudinal, organizational, economic, and political restraints. The costs incurred by decentralizing social programs to local elected officials seem to be on balance worth it, if the programs can be marginally improved. The advocates of decentralization must still prove that local program success has been widespread enough to justify the costs of bad programs and less service to the disadvantaged.

All this leads to a carefully tailored approach to intergovernmental policy delivery systems. In revising CETA, and in designing other federal block grant programs, Congress must develop a formula which permits absolutely no discretion at the local level over who will receive aid, yet preserves local program flexibility. In my judgment it is the poorest citizen who can benefit most from the programs of remedial manpower. The person who is already competitive in the labor market by virtue of superior experience and education does not need the federal subsidy provided in CETA programs as much as the individual without either. Scarce resources—the situation that obtains in nearly all federal programs—should dictate harsh priorities. And the federal government is the only level at which such standards can be established.
As E.E. Schattschneider observed, "Debates about federalism, local self-government, centralization, and decentralization are actually controversies about the scale of conflict." (1960:p.11). Restricting the scope of conflict to the local level will tend to control outcomes for the more powerful local groups. The broader scope of conflict at the national level will tend to "break up local power monopolies and old sectional power complexes" (p.11). The disadvantaged will fair better when the goals are set nationally. Not the least of the reasons for this is the fact that the social costs of ill-trained and unemployed individuals are borne disproportionately by the federal government. And these problems have greater "spill-over effects" to use the language of the public finance economists (Oates, 1972).

Local implementors should not be permitted any flexibility regarding the characteristics of those who are enrolled in the programs, because they are more likely to shape the program for distributive ends. General Revenue Sharing (see Nathan, 1975) and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (see Berke and Kirst, 1972) are but two examples of this general trend. Mayors and other local officials can live with restrictive federal mandates about target groups, but when faced with ambiguous ones, they will opt for the more powerful groups within the community who on balance are not likely to be the low-income individuals or their representatives.

Simultaneously, federal legislation should be structured to stimulate local responsibility and initiative over the design and content of programs. Despite the inability of local manpower professionals to achieve much in the way of reform, on balance the program is probably run better today than under the categorical system; and in the first two years of CETA, the local
staffs encountered many externally imposed difficulties. There is now more local monitoring of program activities, less likelihood that completely useless duplication will occur, and more immediate redress for the individual who is abused by the system. The extended observations of James Sundquist (1969) merit quotation:

> Decisions on community problems made at the community level are potentially better than those made at the national level, because only at the community level can the community be seen as a whole, only there can community problems be interrelated, only there can the systems of comprehensive planning and program coordination be established and operated, and only there can widespread citizen participation be organized and the contributions of citizens be blended with those of the professionals in the decision-making process.

He concludes,

> the object of the federal government must therefore be to realize the superior potential of the community level process. The overriding aim must be to perfect the planning and coordinating machinery in the thousands of communities... Then, as the machinery begins to measure up to its promise and gains in competence, the conscious policy of the federal government as a whole should be to defer increasingly to local judgments. (emphasis in original) (p.250).

Many of the deficiencies inherent in CETA stemmed from overpermissiveness on the part of the federal government, in two senses. First, the federal government did not provide the necessary strong direction to local officials on some policy matters—such as who should be admitted to the program. And then, the Department of Labor provided almost no tools to the local staffs to help them in their task of restructuring manpower. If the federal government wants to help state and local governments realize their potential it must help them develop local capability to carry out the programs (see, for example, the reforms suggested by Martin, (1965)).

Equally important, however, is the need for federal level flexibility or a differentiated response on the part of the federal government towards state and local implementing agencies (Sundquist, 1969). The Department
of Labor should not treat all prime sponsors in the same manner in terms of their degree of administrative freedom. Only the very best prime sponsors are capable of operating under the present CETA system of wide discretion, tempered with federal oversight. Most of them need a combination of federal prodding, experience, and staff development before they will be able to exercise independent authority. To reiterate, certain national goals should not be relinquished under any circumstances, because the federal government remains the only level where such goals can be consistently maintained. The price of federal support in the form of a block grant is and should be federal level direction.

In summary, local/federal relationships should be characterized by both strong federal enforcement activities and broad flexibility to deal with variations in local prime sponsor performance. The first criterion recognizes the legitimacy of national goals (and the tendency of some local governments to disagree with them). The second criterion asserts the long range value of locally developed and administered programs and the concomitant requirement for differentiated responses by the federal government.

Finally, I would offer a few brief observations about the model of intergovernmental policy implementation and suggest directions for future research. Overall, the advantages of the approach employed in the dissertation outweighed some of the disadvantages. The extensive investigation of a limited number of case studies over a long period of time, with a large number of dependent and independent variables seems warranted in exploratory research such as this. Establishing relationships between various components of the intergovernmental policy
implementation model and the dependent variable will also permit a reduction in the number of variables, and perhaps an increase in the number of cases in future research.

The ability to make policy relevant recommendations is to a considerable degree fostered by the nature of the model. It tends to concentrate on not only those relationships that might be theoretically interesting, but also on those factors which could be manipulated by local or national level officials to effect change. For example, the detailed concentration on the process of policy implementation and the changing federal level policy guidelines would help the policy analyst devise different methods of federal enforcement and communications in future policy. However, the federal policy role did not independently or powerfully contribute to prime sponsor program performance. On balance it should be left in the study, if one has as a goal understanding the context of policy implementation, as well as developing more precise explanations.

Unfortunately, because much of the information gathered for the research is qualitative and sometimes speculative, the ability to make precise mathematical statements regarding explanations for program performance is reduced. And perhaps more important, it is very difficult to assess accurately the relative influence of a given variable cluster versus another. For example, it is impossible to say for sure whether economic conditions more directly or indirectly influenced client service patterns. The present analysis does provide some data based judgments on this issue, and in the future, methods of combining qualitative and quantitative data should be more fully explored. In the dissertation both kinds of information were employed, but they were not always merged to complete satisfaction.
What is required in future amendments to the model is a more thorough refinement of the model to its central elements. For example, the nature of inter-organizational relationships could be set more explicitly in the organizational theory of Etzioni (1961), or perhaps more use should be made of the theoretical concepts developed in bargaining theory. This further development would perhaps yield more parsimonious explanations of program performance. But in order to retain the policy relevance of the research product the pursuit of the policy-specific variables will have to be undertaken.

In addition to revising somewhat the nature of the model and research approach in future implementation research, the investigation should also be extended beyond the boundaries of the United States. This would be particularly useful for examining varying relationships among levels of government in other political systems as compared to the American federal system. One strong candidate for such cross-national implementation research is the United Kingdom where power over social programs is highly decentralized. In theory, the British government is a unitary one, but local government units have considerable autonomy. And that autonomy coupled with the more highly partisan nature of local elections in Britain would make for useful comparisons. Another valuable source for research on implementation techniques would be an analysis of communist countries, such as the Soviet Union or China where one would expect more effective central control over the implementation of social policy.

In summary, it seems that the value of undertaking implementation policy research has been affirmed by the dissertation. The policy
implementation process is an important element in the American political process because it affects the nature of governmental outcomes. It is also central to the study of politics in that the allocation of values does not cease when a policy passes the Congress. In fact, in CETA, one can see that many if not most of the important outcomes occurred during the period after the law was enacted. Increasingly, the value of policy implementation research should be recognized by those within and without the government. The period of expansive federal social programs has slowed if not ended and the effort of social scientists and policy makers has turned to the design and conduct of more effective governmental programs. Our knowledge of the process of implementing social policy, which is at root a political process, can improve the quality of those policies and contribute to our understanding of American politics.
APPENDIX A: OPERATIONAL INDICATORS FOR CETA PROGRAM PERFORMANCE AND THE MODEL OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

I: The Dependent Variables

Decentralization

a. Effects on the Political Process

- How does CETA affect manpower decision-making in the prime sponsorship?
- What is the degree of participation by elected officials?
- What is the nature of participation by elected officials?
- What other groups are involved in the decision-making process (interest groups, city councils?),
- Is greater public interest focused on the planning and operation of manpower programs?
- Does CETA become a political issue in the prime sponsorship?

(Sources: Interviews with prime sponsor staff, elected officials, service deliverers, members of manpower planning councils. Analysis of newspaper coverage.)

b. Client Service Patterns

- Analysis of the characteristics of CETA clients across the FY'75 program year for Titles I, II, and VI.
- Comparison of CETA clients with those served by categorical programs.

(Sources: Quarterly Summaries of Client Characteristics reported by the prime sponsors and by categorical service deliverers for FY'74 and FY'75.)

c. Decategorization and Programmatic Change

- Analysis of prime sponsor priority groups for service, FY'74 to FY'76.
- Analysis of proportions of expenditures and number of clients allocated to different types of manpower programs: classroom training, on-the-job training, work experience, and Title I public service employment, FY'74 to FY'76.
- Analysis of agencies funded to provide manpower services for FY'74 to FY'76.
- Analysis of changes in methods of manpower service delivery, FY'74 to FY'76.

(Sources: Interviews with staff, elected officials, service deliverers, MPC members, analysis of PS plans, and QPRs)
d. The Nature of Citizen Input on Manpower Planning Councils (MPCs)

- Number of Meetings and average turnout, FY'75.
- Structure of MPC: committee and sub-committee system.
- Tasks performed by the MPC (e.g. selection of service deliverers, role in evaluation and monitoring, selection of priority groups, involvement in policy decisions for Titles I, II and VI).
- Analysis of recommendations made by the MPC and the responses of the staff and elected officials to them.

(Sources: Interviews with staff, elected officials, service deliverers, MPC members. Observations of MPC meetings. Analysis of minutes of MPC and elected official meetings.)

II: The Independent Variables

a. Policy Resources

- Allocations to the prime sponsors for Titles I, II, and VI for FY'74 to FY'76.
- Proportion of Title I to Titles II and VI for FY'75 to FY'76.
- Timing of the release of funding information.
- Staff and funding for implementing agency, R/DOL.

(Sources: Prime sponsor plans, interviews with R/DOL officials.)

b. Policy Standards

- Analysis of CETA (PL-93-203).
- CETA regulations.
- National/DOL policy statements and directives.

(Sources: Federal Register, Interviews with N/DOL officials).

c. R/DOL Communications

- R/DOL, CETA letters sent to the prime sponsors, FY'75.
- Prime sponsor specific communications sent to them by the R/DOL.
- Policy directives issued by the R/DOL field representatives to the PS. Interpretations of the Regulations and the Act by the field representatives.

(Sources: R/DOL CETA letters file, PS files, interviews with prime sponsor staff, elected officials, and R/DOL personnel.)

d. R/DOL Enforcement Activities

- Nature and amount of technical assistance provided to the prime sponsors.
- Nature and amount of R/DOL interventions in the prime sponsorships.
- Nature and follow-up to national policy and R/DOL communications.
- Nature of oversight and monitoring activities performed.
-R/DOL evaluation and assessment actions.
-Sanctions or penalties imposed by the R/DOL.

(Sources: Interviews with prime sponsor staff, and R/DOL field representatives and supervisory personnel. Analysis of R/DOL monitoring and evaluation activities.)

e. Characteristics of the Prime Sponsor Implementing Agency

-Personnel: Size and experience of the staff in manpower and in their specific assignment.
-General and specific training of the staff in manpower related fields.
-Nature of staff position: appointive or civil service.
-Responsibilities of each staff member.
-Agency History and Responsibilities: Number of years as manpower agency, degree of continuity between CAMPS organization and CETA unit, tasks performed by the agency in addition to CETA. History of cooperation and conflict between agency and service deliverers.
-Resources of the Agency: Administrative budget; degree of support from political officials, degree of autonomy from political officials.
-Position in government and reporting relationships to superiors.

(Sources: Interviews with PS staff, and political officials.)

f. Attitudes of the Implementors

-Understanding of CETA legislative requirements and major policy issues.
-Attitudes of support or opposition towards performance measures of participation by political officials, participation by manpower planning councils, programmatic change, and client service patterns.

(Source: Interviews with prime sponsor staff, political officials, service deliverers, and manpower planning council members.)

g. Political Conditions

-Party composition of prime sponsor elected officials and consortium board.
-Party composition of central city council.
-Support for CETA and implementing agency.
-Structure and nature of organized interest group activity in relation to CETA.
-Fiscal condition of prime sponsor governments.

(Sources: Interviews with prime sponsor staff, political officials, service deliverers. Analysis of prime sponsor expenditure reports.)
h. Economic and Social Conditions

- Unemployment rate from 1974 to 1975.
- Number of unemployed who are black and economically disadvantaged for 1970 Census and for 1974 and 1975.
- Demographic characteristics of the prime sponsorship according to the 1970 Census.

(Sources: 1970 Census data, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, prime sponsor plans. Interviews with prime sponsor staffs.)
APPENDIX B: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CETA

The following selective compilation of policy recommendations regarding the operation and design of CETA are organized around the major performance indicators investigated in the body of the dissertation. I have also added a category for specific changes in the role of the Department of Labor, although this subject is also included in the general policy recommendations.

Most of the recommendations are directly or indirectly suggested by the research findings, but the observations and comments of the hundreds of manpower professionals who were interviewed during the course of the study have also been incorporated. Many of the suggested changes could be effected without amendment or revision to the legislation. This reflects the wide discretion that CETA administrators retain due to the wide open mandate contained in CETA. Some of the changes could only be made if the law is altered.

Finally, the majority of the recommendations are directed at federal level policy and implementation activities. The discussion is couched in these terms because only the Department of Labor has the sufficient perspective and resources to bring about the needed revisions. And the local prime sponsor staffs would need the external support of the DOL in order to make the more serious modifications in CETA operations. However, it should be noted that some of the recommendations, such as those dealing with the nature of Manpower Planning Council participation, could be employed by individual prime sponsors without awaiting Department of Labor action.

I. Client Service Patterns

The Department of Labor should take steps to more specifically target the aid of CETA to the economically disadvantaged, and to stem the erosion in commitment to this group that has been revealed by the analysis. In order to do this they should:

a. Clarify the intent of the legislation via the regulations by putting more emphasis on the sections of the legislation which call for service to those most in need.

b. Monitor more closely the correspondence between a Prime Sponsor's client service patterns and the actual incidence of need in the area by requiring more thorough documentation of how the local plan will address that need (when reviewing the plans for approval); refusing approval of those plans that do not accurately address the local need or at least provide
very strong rationale for departure from it; evaluating the results of QSPC's to see to what extent the goals set out for client service in the plan have been met by the prime sponsors; requiring corrective action for those that depart; and requiring the prime sponsors to keep detailed and accurate records of their client service outcomes.

c. Investigate the accuracy of reporting records at the local level. They should do a performance audit of both the accuracy of client information given to the prime sponsor staff by the applicant and the accuracy of the reporting by the prime sponsor to the R/DOL.

d. Work to improve the quality of data and other information that is available to the prime sponsors at the national level by requiring amendments in State Employment Security Agency record keeping and reporting, and by permitting the use of locally developed analysis of need when conducted by reputable organizations in the jurisdiction. In order to stimulate this kind of activity, the DOL should make available discretionary funds which can be parcelled out to those willing to undertake such local Census updates. It should be emphasized, however, that these updates could not be used for the purpose of CETA fund allocation. The 1970 Census results, though out of date, provide the only equitable data source for fund allocation. The local analysis will be for the purpose of improving local planning efforts only. Some coordination with other agencies in the federal government who are interested in local need analysis such as HEW and HUD might be brought about also, and the surveys could be combined to effect economies.

II. Programmatic Change

Several aspects of program design and operation should be revised, including the nature of Title I PSE and program mix and the degree of program innovation and comprehensiveness.

1. Title I PSE and program mix: CETA does not allow the Department of Labor to refuse a prime sponsor's plan because of the relative amounts of funds or clients committed to any type of manpower program—classroom training, on-the-job training, work experience, or Title I Public Service Employment. In general, this is an unwise policy, particularly because of the changing nature of the Public Service Employment programs in the United States.

The DOL should (via Congressional amendment) be permitted to restrict the use of Title I PSE to a maximum of 20% of the local effort (and a low of 5%) depending on the economic conditions. Trigger mechanisms should be built into the law so that as unemployment goes above such and such a level, for example 6.5% in a PS, that local area would be allowed to use more than 5% of Title I PSE. At all times the local area would be allowed to use at least 5% of its Title I funds for PSE, but the absolute maximum level of Title I PSE would be 20% in any prime sponsor. This policy regarding Public Service Employment simply reflects several facts from the findings:
a. Prime sponsors who have high commitments to Title I PSE serve fewer economically disadvantaged and more with higher education and experience. If manpower programs are to remain remedial—to help improve the employability of people in the labor market—then the programs must be targeted to this group of individuals, not those people who are more able to find work in the private or public sector. Relief for these people must be provided by the other public service employment programs such as Emergency Unemployment Title VI.

b. Prime sponsors with shrinking Title II and VI resources will tend to raid Title I for large amounts of Public Service Employment. Because of the growth of PSE in FY'75, they have built-in "cliff" effects with the PSE programs. They need increasing resources just to maintain the current PSE rolls. Unless Title I is protected it will be the obvious candidate to fill that gap.

c. Prime sponsors facing genuine or imagined financial crises will turn to PSE and Title I for help in maintaining government payrolls rather than enacting other measures such as budget cutbacks, service cutbacks, or tax increases. Title I should not be the vehicle for local government bail-outs.

The other program types (classroom training, OJT, work experience) should also be restricted in overall size to no more than 50% of the local effort to any one activity. As noted in Chapter 3, some prime sponsors spend nearly 90% of their resources on work experience programs. While work experience is (for a limited number of cases) a valuable manpower tool it should not consume the entire Title I effort, because it has only short term effects that will not continue once the program is ended. It should be transitional and limited. Work experience should be viewed as a holding step for people between other manpower programs or prior to placement, not as a year-round subsidy program as it is now administered in many places. The Department should require that some steps be taken to move an enrollee into either training (classroom or on-the-job), or employment within 6 months of the applicant's entrance into the work experience programs. This might reduce the number of enrollees who can be served, but it seems that the shotgun approach works less well than one concentrated on improving the chances of a more limited number of people.

2. Program comprehensiveness and innovation were national goals established by CETA in order to bring about major reform in manpower delivery at the local level. Several steps could be taken to improve the likelihood of such reform. The Department of Labor should:

a. Take more positive steps to define the meanings of program comprehensiveness. In our research into the legislation and the regulations, we found that at least several concepts seem to be central to the meanings of program comprehensiveness: areawide programs—those that serve the entire consortium or prime sponsors rather than segmented programs, unrestricted client participation—allowing clients from each member
political jurisdiction to participate in the programs, balanced program mix (discussed above), geographical program balance, decategorization—removing rigid distinctions between the manpower programs and the merging strategies of serving clients with the total programs available rather than assuming that one program will solve all the problems of the client, consolidation of program functions—such as follow-up, placement, and intake assessment in order to improve the flow of clients through the system, and lack of redundant duplication of programs.

The DOL should provide the means for prime sponsors to achieve some of the desired results. It should fund demonstration projects and do a more effective job of disseminating the findings of these projects in other prime sponsors. It should stimulate the development of various model systems that other prime sponsors may be able to adapt to their specific circumstances.

b. Selectively parcel out its discretionary funds to those prime sponsors who demonstrate the willingness and ability to effect program innovations at the local level. There are several mechanisms for doing this. First, the DOL could use its consortium incentive money in a more discretionary manner. Presently it is given to all units of government who combine to serve a valid labor market. This 10% allocation should not be given to those areas that exist as consortia only on paper. Secondly the 4% state money should be given priority to be used in prime sponsors that are moving more rapidly towards program comprehensiveness. The DOL must use its plan approval function in a much more directed fashion by requiring locals to move more rapidly towards some of the goals in the legislation. Finally, the year-end assessments must include criteria related to program comprehensiveness.

c. Work to train local staff in long term programs to improve the capabilities of local manpower professionals. It should work to stimulate more long term training programs. One day, one-shot seminars will not have long-range impact. The DOL should organize its regional office staff into teams of specialists who can trouble shoot in prime sponsorships that needs assistance in program design.

III. Manpower Planning Councils

The DOL should remove several policy constraints to useful planning council participation. In general, the problems are twofold: planning councils seem to be either ignored or insignificant in some areas, and in other areas they seem to be too heavily loaded with vested interests. Each problem must be addressed.

In order to insure more effective citizen advisory groups, CETA should be revised to make planning council approval of prime sponsor plans mandatory for Title I, II, and VI plans. The prime sponsor council would have to approve the major elements of the plan. It would not have a line item veto, but negotiations between the council and the elected officials
might actually cause this anyway. The prime sponsor elected official would be free to go ahead with the plan without council approval and in effect appeal to the Department of Labor for approval without MPC sanction. The DOL administrative review process would serve as the referee in such disputes, rather than the line R/DOL personnel who are more subject to political pressures.

Short of revising the legislation, the DOL should take steps to enhance the role of the council and to make it more useful by providing technical assistance directly to the councils who request it, and by insisting that the prime sponsors provide local assistance to the council on a regular basis. Local plans should not be accepted unless the council has at least had the opportunity to review the plan before it was submitted. And a list of the council's recommendations, the prime sponsor's action with respect to them, and reasons for disagreement should be given with the plans. This would also cause the local staff to take the role of the council more seriously.

If the councils are to be more important, changes must be effected in their memberships. CETA should have a dual local advisory structure. The first council, called a manpower planning council, would be composed of broad representative groups in the community, but it would not contain either funded CETA operators, or their representatives.

The MPCs would have a parallel advisory body (known as the Manpower Coordinating Council), made up of CETA program operators, from the prime sponsor staff and from community based organizations, school boards, etc. It would also include representatives of other programs and agencies within the community that should help coordinate human resource programs: for example, the United Community Councils, the non-CETA board of education people, other key federal programs such as Housing and Community Development.

The distinction between the two groups would be one of policy-making and advice versus a working group of operators interested in coordinative efforts. The Coordinating Council would be advisory to the staff and the planning council and a forum for discussion of major issues of policy in the area, but would not be involved in recommending funding levels for programs or for agencies. They could be brought together to help resolve the day to day problems in running programs.

The Chairman of the MPC would be elected by the members of the council and would not be a member of the prime sponsor staff or an elected official. (Elected officials would be invited to attend all meetings of both groups.) This council should also specifically include a representative of the elected officials—other than PS staff. This person would represent the position of the elected officials rather than the prime sponsor staff who cannot fulfill the dual role of professional staff and political official representative. The coordinating group would be operations and management oriented. Its chairman would be the designee of the elected officials—most likely the chief professional of the manpower staff.
IV. The Role of R/DOL Communications and Enforcement

A number of specific tasks are implied by the aforementioned recommendations; however there are also some general recommendations that should be followed by the R/DOL.

a. The role of the field representative should be defined more clearly and in terms of specific features of prime sponsor performance to be monitored and specific areas for useful technical advice to be delivered. Presently the individual field representative is expected to be several things at once. He must be a generalist in CETA programs and monitor the performance of prime sponsor activities; he has to be a specialist in all areas of CETA (management information systems, contract monitoring, political and legal ramifications of local actions, manpower program design, and on and on). These multiple roles could not be performed by any one individual competently.

Each prime sponsor should have an individual (at R/DOL) who is generally responsible for monitoring the prime sponsor's performance and for providing centrally cleared policy interpretations and assistance. Beyond this, these same individuals would serve on teams of specialists who would serve all prime sponsors in the region in their specific and more narrow area of expertise. When the prime sponsor needed assistance, or when the general R/DOL monitor decided that a PS needed assistance, these groups would be scheduled to come in with the general monitor from the R/DOL and provide it.

b. The scope of R/DOL oversight and monitoring should be more limited and intense rather than general and weak as it is now. It should concentrate on key features of prime sponsor performance. Program comprehensiveness, client service patterns, and citizen participation should be the top priority items in DOL monitoring and enforcement activities. In conjunction with this, the general role of the DOL should be to establish the foundation of professionalism in manpower programs at the local level.

c. A scaled down amount of information and policy advice should be communicated to each prime sponsor. All the prime sponsor staffs and indeed all those in the manpower system suffer from information overload. The information packages should go especially to R/DOL field representatives, MPC members, PS staff, elected officials and program operators. The information given out should go first to the people running programs, rather than to national interest groups which now are the source of the information.

These information packages should be comprehensive and accurate, but short and in language that laymen can understand—with references to the full accounts contained in the regulations. Many ignorant decisions are made at the local level simply because they are not aware of national or regional DOL policy.
NOTES

1. Portions of an earlier version of this Chapter have appeared in Van Horn and Van Meter (1976).


3. Other students of judicial politics have utilized the literature on organization theory to construct partial theories of judicial implementation or impact. See, for example, Krislov (1965), Wasby (1970), Johnson (1967), Petrick (1968), Brown and Stover (1974), and Dolbeare and Hammond (1971).

4. See, for example, the differing interpretations of "implementation" implied by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Smith (1973), Lavin (1973), Bunker (1972), Derthick (1972), Gross and associates (1971), and Dolbeare and Hammond (1971). See also the following studies in which a variety of concepts are employed to explore the implementation process: Jones (1970), Gergen (1968), and Gross (1966).

5. For a more detailed discussion of the utility of incentives, see Porter (1973), Levine (1972), Derthick (1970), and Schultze (1969).
6. Economists generally agree that the discouraged worker effect dominates the added worker effect during economic downturns. The added worker hypothesis holds that when the usual breadwinner loses her/his job, additional family members enter the workforce, and the labor force participation rate increases as the unemployment rate increases. To the extent that the discouraged worker dominates, the OBES active file understates the incidence of need within a prime sponsor.

7. Despite improved economic conditions in most prime sponsors in FY'76, service to blacks and the economically disadvantaged has continued to decline. This would suggest that prime sponsors were not only responding to economic forces in FY'75.
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