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THE EMERGENCE AND CHANGE OF ORGANIZATION-SETS: AN INTERORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF ECUMENICAL DISASTER RECOVERY ORGANIZATIONS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

George Alexander Ross, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1976

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is a basic tenet of the sociology of science that scientific research is a group phenomenon. The notion of the individual scientist alone in his laboratory single-handedly unlocking the mysteries of the universe was never very true—and is even less true now. This dissertation is certainly no exception, for several people have assisted me greatly throughout its creation. My first thanks must certainly go to Professors Russell R. Dynes and E. L. Quarantelli. Over the past three years they have unselfishly offered me many hours of their time and much good advice and have provided all of us at the Disaster Research Center with an environment as conducive to good research as any we shall see in the future. Their assistance to me throughout my graduate career has been inestimable.

The valuable and conscientious advice of Professor John Seidler contributed significantly to what was good in the study and, thankfully, eliminated much of what was poor. I thank him very much for his concern. Although not contributing directly to the dissertation, Professor Gisela Hinkle must also be mentioned in this context, for her constant insistence on the importance of examining one's basic methodological and theoretical assumptions has left an important imprint on my thinking.

But although the wisest advice often comes from those with more experience, it is inevitably to one's own cohort that one turns for most support. For his continuous challenging and questioning, but most of all for his friendship, I am deeply grateful to Joe Wright. He has been a friend and counselor who, although having his own concerns, has never been unwilling to help me deal with mine. It was Marty Smith who first introduced me to the substantive area with which this study deals. For this introduction as well as his companionship during the earliest stages of the research, I thank him. The many hours spent with Verta Taylor in research travel, analyzing what we had found or hoped to find, were some of the most rewarding and enjoyable times of the entire study. Her assistance as well as the support of the entire staff of DRC have made the seemingly awesome task of writing a dissertation far less imposing.

The actual production of a finished manuscript is a process for which we seem seldom to be adequately prepared. In this regard, I am especially grateful to Mim Morris as editor and Debby Kraus as typist for executing that process so admirably. I also appreciate the help of Ruth Chalfant, Marty Woodruff and Annette Haban, all of whom assisted
not only in the mechanics of the task but in the emotional support of
the author.

The dissertation is the culmination of many years of education. I
could not have asked for a stronger foundation throughout those years
than the one provided for me by my family. While they have given me
the freedom to make my own mistakes, they have, nevertheless, been
there to help me recover. But my greatest debt I owe to Beth, for she
has displayed the greatest patience and yet suffered the most as a
result. I dedicate this work to her.
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"Review of Rapport sur l'Analyse de Films, by C. Vigneron-Larosa and
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Delivery of Mental Health Services in Disasters: The Xenia Tornado
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Organizations represent one of the more imposing facets of contemporary life. Providing the necessities of food, clothing and shelter as well as the employment required to obtain these necessities, the almost limitless array of organizations in modern society also supplies the products and services we eagerly procure in our struggle for "the good life." Yet, just as the modern organization provides us with the necessities and luxuries of life, it also furnishes us with some of our greatest frustrations. Most of us, at one time or another, have cursed at the baffling amount of "red tape" which seems frequently to be collected merely to thwart our intentions. In the face of such frustration, not only the power but the rigidity of organizations seem much too real.

But in spite of the all too common examples of bureaucratic inflexibility, organizations do change. In fact, it is safe to say that all organizations are constantly in a process of change. Obviously, the type, as well as the extent, of that change will vary radically among organizations. Yet, certainly, no organization which exists in the empirical world can be static.

To say that something is always changing, however, does not mean that it is chaotic. Indeed, the only thing that makes social life possible is that change which occurs around us is not chaotic or random but patterned. Much change, in other words, repeats itself, allowing new factors to emerge within a process which is itself not new.

The objective of this study is to examine one type of change—change that occurs around newly formed organizations as they interact with other organizations in their environment. These emergent organizations, as they are called, seldom resemble their fully grown counterparts. Indeed, to believe that the emergent organization can actually develop into the type of established organization with which we are familiar may require as much faith as is required to believe that the tadpole actually develops into a frog or that a human fetus eventually changes into an adult Homo sapiens. Nevertheless, sociologically they are of the same species.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
It has frequently been emphasized that no organization can survive in a vacuum (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Lawrence and Lursch, 1969; Azumi and Huge, 1972: 26). There must be both a source for the raw materials used to produce its output and a receptacle for that output. And in contemporary post-industrial society, other organizations often represent the most salient element of this environment. Yet when an organization first emerges, it has little or no contact with the other organizations in this environment. It must, therefore, develop these contacts. This process is perhaps best conceptualized as an attempt to reduce the uncertainties facing its programs (Thompson, 1967), for the development of stable patterns of interaction with external organizations is mandatory if the organization is not to continually confront unforeseen circumstances which disrupt its operations. The actual process involved in the development of these contacts is the focus of this study.

A useful concept which has come to be widely employed in the literature on complex organizations is that of the "organization-set." Introduced by William Evan as an organizational counterpart of the role-set, the organization-set consists of all those organizations which interact in some fashion with a given focal organization, which is itself the analytical point of reference (1966). Like an individual, an organization will interact with a number of other social units in its daily routine. These other social units, i.e., organizations, comprise the organization-set of that given organization.

To clarify this concept further, let us briefly examine the organization-set of a small pharmaceutical supply house. The supply house is the focal organization or the point of reference for the analysis. During the course of business the supply house must occasionally be in contact with numerous other organizations. A salesman may attempt to persuade the owner of the supply house to carry a drug recently introduced by his company, or a nearby druggist may come by to pick up an additional supply of an antibiotic on which he has run low as a result of the current flu epidemic. Other organizations such as the state or federal government may regulate certain activities of the supply house, sending a notice of requirements for labeling procedures, etc. Or finally a plumber may arrive to repair the backed up drain in the basement.

Although the organizations represented above generally differ greatly among themselves, they all share a common membership in the organization-set of the supply house. Yet when our fictional supply house was originally organized there was no interaction with these other organizations. Indeed, some of the more important contacts, such as that with the neighborhood druggist, may have taken some time to develop. Nevertheless, such contacts had to be made if the new organization was to remain solvent (Downs, 1967: 5). The development
of these contacts, a course almost all organizations must negotiate, is what is called the emergence and change of the organization-set.

**Purpose**

In our examination of the emergence and change of the organization-set several more specific goals will be pursued. First of all, a previously fashioned model of the emergence of the organization-set will be examined and illustrated. Second, after exploring three empirical cases of emerging organization-sets, the applicability of the model will be demonstrated.

Following this, an extension of the model will be proposed, attempting to outline some of the recurrent patterns exhibited by the organization-sets examined in the research. And finally, practical and theoretical implications of the research will be specified with special reference to the inherent characteristics of emergence.

**Inception of the Study**

The present study grew out of an interest in two main sub-areas in sociology—the emergent organization and interorganizational relations. Though the latter has attracted a good deal of attention in the sociological literature over the past decade (cf. Brinkerhoff and Kunz, 1972; Heydebrand, 1973), the emergent organization has stimulated a relatively small amount of research. This lack of attention seems ironic in the face of the allegedly increased attention in organizations as dynamic systems (Azumi and Hage, 1972), for the most fluid, changing period of an organization's existence is during its emergence.

On the other hand, the neglect is quite understandable, since the sophisticated methodological techniques so highly favored in contemporary American sociology are of rather limited use in the analysis of these more volatile social phenomena. Or, on a simpler level, the neglect may be due to the difficulty in locating emergent organizations. If the researcher does not discover the organization before it becomes firmly established, all inquiry into its emergence must be done retrospectively, making valid investigation somewhat more difficult.

Not surprisingly, therefore, almost all systematic research into organizational emergence has been conducted in settings in which emergence of groups and organizations is most concentrated—collective stress situations. Natural disasters, civil
disturbances and other collective stress situations, largely as a result of the increased demands placed on the affected community, frequently give rise to new groups and organizations which attempt to fill the gap between services demanded and those supplied (Dynes, 1976, Palmer and Sells, 1965).

Although some interesting work on emergent organizations has appeared elsewhere (Thompson and Hawkes, 1962; Downs 1967; Perry, Gillespie and Perry, 1975), a significant position of the research in this area has been conducted at the Disaster Research Center (DRC). In both civil disturbances and disaster situations (Forrest, 1968, 1973, 1974; Parr, 1969, 1970; Quarantelli, 1970; Ponting, 1973; Teuber, 1973) the conditions leading to and the characteristics of emergent groups and organizations have been carefully examined. Forrest's research is particularly notable in this area, for he supplies us with both a useful tool for understanding the emergence process itself (1968) and an interesting analysis of the internal structural changes that follow (1974).

It was as a continuation of the DRC research into emergent organizations that the present author first became involved in this area. During the analysis of an ecumenical recovery organization which had emerged following a flood in the Eastern United States it was noted that, although the internal characteristics of the emergent organization had been examined, little if anything had been learned in regard to the initiation of the interorganizational contacts which obviously had to be made. The literature on interorganizational relations, although rapidly expanding, offered little help. Therefore, the flood recovery organization was examined in relation to the emergence of its organization-set and a model of the process was proposed (Ross and Smith, 1975). The present study is intended as a thorough reexamination and extension of this earlier work on the emergence of the organization-set.

Methodology

The research on which the present analysis is based consisted of the examination of three ecumenical disaster recovery organizations. Like the previously studied flood recovery organization, which will hereafter be labeled Interfaith A, these three organizations were staffed by clergy and lay persons from several denominations. Unlike Interfaith A, however, the three later organizations, Interfaiths B, C, and D, emerged within two weeks after their respective communities, all located in the Midwestern United States, had experienced extensive tornadoes.
It was judged imperative that the research maintain a longitudinal design. This was assured by a number of practices. First, follow-up trips were made to two of the three locations, permitting firsthand observation at different points in time. Second, periodic telephone contacts were made with the organizations to discover changes as they occurred. Third, some forms of documents were gathered specifically for their utility as longitudinal measures. Minutes of regular meetings, for instance, often contained information which could be compared over time. And finally, two waves of a mailed questionnaire were sent to personnel of two of the organizations in order to measure changes in the organization sets.

Data Collection

Data collected for the study consisted of primarily three sources. Approximately forty hours of semi-structured, tape recorded interviews with the key personnel of the three organizations (as well as with some of the members of their organization sets) comprised one data source. During these interviews the respondent was given a good deal of freedom to structure the answers himself. By so doing the researcher is less likely to impose his own categories and situational definition on the respondent. The interview guides used by the researcher in these situations are contained in Appendix A.

Documentary materials represented the second major source of data. Minutes of meetings, incorporation papers, organization charts, newsletters and financial reports were among the more important examples of the documents collected in the study. Written material was especially useful in this research since it often permitted rather precise estimates of when specific changes had occurred. Such information is rather quickly lost from the memories of respondents and, if not for the existence of these documents, would be lost from the researchers as well.

Finally, a questionnaire mailed to the personnel of two of the organizations comprised the third source of data. The questionnaire consisted of a list of approximately fifty organizations with which the focal organization might conceivably have some contact. The respondent was asked to place a check mark beside all those organizations with which he or she had had personal contact during the past seven days. The respondent was also requested to circle those five organizations which he or she believed were "currently the most important contacts" for their organization.
The organizations to be included in the list were chosen as follows: a telephone book was obtained for the two cities which contained Interfaiths C and D; each organization or general category of organization (e.g., department store, local bank, etc.) appearing in the yellow pages of the local telephone book was carefully examined and judged as to its possible relevance to the given ecumenical recovery organization. Organizations were selected for inclusion if, based on the research experience with the earlier Interfaith organizations A and B, there was any possibility that they might interact with the Interfaith in question. Because of the large number of churches and religious organizations in the communities, the more general categories of "National Church Bodies" and "Local Churches" were listed. However, in these two cases respondents were asked to specify their choices.

A number of organizations with special disaster relevance, such as Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) were also included, even if a local office did not appear in the telephone book. Finally, space was provided for the respondents to fill in the names of any organizations they had contacted which did not appear on the list. Only a few organizations ever appeared in this space, verifying, to some extent, the inclusiveness of the list. A copy of the mailed questionnaire is contained in Appendix A.

Two waves of the questionnaire were sent to Interfaiths C and D. The personnel of Interfaith C received the first mailing approximately five months after the emergence of the organization. This mailing might have been more suitably made two months earlier in order to gather data on the organization-set at that time. However, the first field trip to Interfaith C occurred about three months after the group's emergence and during that period supplied most of the information on the organization-set which the questionnaire was designed to tap. The second mailing to Interfaith C was completed approximately three months after the first.

The mailings to Interfaith D were more suitably timed. Within two to three months of its emergence, the organization received the first group of questionnaires. The second wave was sent approximately two months later. Because the organization was relatively short-lived, effectively lasting less than eight months, no further mailings were judged necessary. Data on the characteristics of the organization-set in the later stages of Interfaith D's existence were satisfactorily obtained from key informants.

Because of the small size of the organizations it was decided to send questionnaires to all personnel. However, this was prevented in the case of Interfaith C when it was requested that the questionnaires not be sent to board members until their approval was obtained. It is extremely unlikely that this action was in-
tended in any way to conceal information or to indicate an unwillingness to cooperate, for in all other ways the cooperation received from all personnel at Interfaith C was most notable. Rather it is likely that it was an example of an overzealous boundary person ("gatekeeper") who had become too accustomed to sifting through and discarding many of the requests to contact his superiors. If the request to send the questionnaires had been made two months earlier, it would quite probably have been accepted without question.

The primary purpose of the questionnaire was to afford an accurate representation of the organization-sets of the focal organizations. The size of the organization-set was measured by listing an organization as a member of the set if it had been checked at least once. A measure of the intensity of interaction with set members was provided by the frequency of check marks for any given organization, and an indication of the changes in these variables was supplied by comparing the results of the two mailings. In addition, several other significant variables, such as the formal position of the personnel making the contacts and the subjective importance of each link, could also be measured by the questionnaire.

Quality of the Data

Because the study had not been designed prior to the emergence of Interfaith B, the data on this organization was never as complete as the information relating to Interfaiths C and D. In spite of this, however, the quality of the data obtained in the research was generally quite good.

In-depth interviews require a great amount of the respondent's time, a fact which might seem to create a cooperation problem. However, without exception, all respondents contacted were extremely cooperative and appeared quite willing to supply any information requested. Of course, the information supplied by different respondents conflicted at times, and frequently the conflict was centered around a mere factual misunderstanding. But upon those occasions for which the discrepancy was based on differing perspectives, the researcher finds himself in a dilemma. He is expected to come up with a logically consistent account of a phenomenon, yet, the persons who have knowledge of that phenomenon see it in different ways. He may attempt to "weigh" the differing points of view to come up with a "true" account, but the analyst must not deceive himself—to do so is to merely substitute the perspective of the researcher for the perspectives of the participants, recognizing that even in this case the perspective of the researcher will play a role (Goldstein, 1963: 299).
Such concerns may seem all too complicated and irrelevant. Indeed, they may seem to represent a significant disadvantage to the use of a methodology which utilizes in-depth interviewing and other qualitative techniques. However, the fact is that persons often see their worlds differently, and a methodology which exposes these differences constitutes a significant advantage.

Apart from the earlier mentioned fact that the first group of questionnaires was sent somewhat later than advisable to Interfaith C, the quality of this data source was very good. The return rate on the questionnaire was excellent—remaining at about 90 percent for all four mailings. The respondents apparently read the instructions carefully, since most, whether or not they checked many organizations, circled five organizations and filled in names of churches with which they were in contact.

As a test of validity the results of the questionnaires were compared to information obtained during interviews. The organizations indicated as set members in the interviews were in all cases also indicated on the questionnaires. Furthermore, the questionnaires tended to be more inclusive, subsuming a greater number of organizations than had been designated by the interview data. Indeed, the possibility of a more inclusive measure of the organization-set was the primary rationale behind the check list format utilized. Had a more open-ended design been employed, several of the members of the organization-sets would certainly have been omitted.

However, it is also possible that the questionnaire might have been utilized to gather additional data. Information on the frequency of contact with set members or the nature of the interorganizational links might have been valuable additions to the research results (cf. Rogers, 1974; Whetten, 1974). Such additions would have contributed significantly to the complexity of the questionnaire format and were therefore rejected. Likewise, much of this data was supplied by interviews and documentary material. However, noting the rather high return rate, it might have been quite possible to make these additions and still receive an adequate return.

Significance of the Study

Over the last decade the interest in interorganizational relations has grown dramatically. According to Hirsch, however, the empirical inquiry into the interactive processes between organizations has not kept pace. As he says, "while we speak of organizations as interacting with their environment (in theory), most
empirical studies, by virtue of their design, continue to ignore the process by which this interaction occurs, from both the standpoint of the focal organization and that of agencies in its environment" (Hirsch, 1975:5). The empirical research conducted, in other words, tends to concentrate on the internal structural characteristics of organizations rather than the characteristics of the interactive patterns between focal organization and environment.

Yet organization-sets need not be examined only in relation to their effect on internal organizational characteristics. The organization-set itself has characteristics of relevance to the sociologist. The fact that the set does not have a collective identity (i.e., a name and location) as does an organization, does not imply that it is not sociologically real. On the contrary, an organization-set and its focal organization consist of stable patterns of interaction which are the meat of sociology. To examine the development of these patterns, therefore, represents a significant contribution to the discipline.

But the present study makes a contribution in another area as well. Every year scores of natural disasters strike the United States and Canada, resulting in death or injury to hundreds of persons and the destruction of residential and business property valued in the millions of dollars. And although both these countries possess relatively elaborate programs for the provision of aid to disaster victims, large numbers of persons receive no adequate assistance. It is under these circumstances that emergent groups and organizations play a valuable role by filling in some of the "gaps" in assistance missed by the more established agencies (cf., Taylor, Ross, and Quarantelli, 1976). A better understanding of the emergent organization and the strategic negotiations with its environment may help improve the effectiveness of the performance.

Outline of the Study

This chapter has presented a general introduction to the study as well as a discussion of the methodology employed. The six remaining chapters will be devoted to the more substantive issues of the research. Chapter II examines the theoretical foundation of the study by describing the general perspective on organizations followed in this context and exploring a previously constructed model of the emergence of the organization-set. The model is illustrated with data on the emergence of the flood recovery organization, Interfaith A.
A description of the emergence and change of the organization-sets of the three ecumenical recovery organizations which were the main subjects of this research follows in Chapters III-V. In Chapter VI, the model of the emergence and change of organization-sets is applied to the three organizations, and a substantial extension of the model is then suggested. Finally, in Chapter VII, a discussion of the practical and theoretical implications of the research and a summary of the results appear.
FOOTNOTES

1. See Forrest (1974: 7-12) for a discussion of the special problems associated with the study of emergent groups and organizations.

2. For a more detailed account of the qualitative methodology used in this research, see Appendix B.
CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE STUDY

This chapter explicates the theoretical foundation of the study. The theoretical foundation itself consists of two levels—a general perspective or approach to the study of organizations and a more specific model or analytical tool for understanding them.

The Nature of Organizations and Their Environments

Organizations are instruments of power; and like all instruments or tools they are useful only so far as they permit the more effective or efficient attainment of goals. It matters little whether the goals manifest expansive altruistic concern or mere personal greed, for organizations will go almost anywhere they are directed. As Max Weber stated, "one has to remember that bureaucracy as such is a precision instrument which can put itself at the disposal of quite varied...interests" (Weber, 1946:231; see Zald, 1970a, 1970b; and Perrow, 1972 for more recent but similar views).

Controlling an organization, however, is not as simple as controlling most other tools. Seldom directed by one individual, organizations are usually controlled by many persons—persons who often nourish rather divergent interests. And although one usually thinks of top management as the controlling factor in the modern organization even the lower level personnel can exercise extensive power (Mechanic, 1962). Thus, although organizations are tools, they are very complex tools, requiring the combined effort of numerous groups and individuals. It is hardly surprising then, that differences arise in regard to the use to which the organization is to be put. Such differences sometimes result in intense struggles for control, making the organization itself uncontrollable (Perrow, 1972: 14-20).

Although internal power problems can devastate an organization, its greatest threat is external; that is, in the environment of the organization. Questions like "will the shipment of materials
arrive?" "will they buy?" or "how will the government react?" all reflect the basic uncertainty regarding an organization's environment. It is a widely held, if not rather banal, assumption that organizations function best when such contingencies are minimized (March and Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967). If this assumption is true, it follows that organizations (or more accurately, the directors of organizations) will attempt to use their power to control one of their greatest sources of uncertainty, the environment.

Although the use of the term "environment" appears to connote some generally consistent set of phenomena situated outside of the organization, the organizational environment actually consists of a rather diverse array of elements, any of which may be chosen for detailed study. For instance, the general public is certainly one important aspect of the environment of many organizations. This element of the environment appears to be relevant to most organizations in primarily two ways. It supplies consumers who exchange financial assets for the real assets produced by the organization and it provides an important factor of production to the organization in the form of labor. While the strategies to control this environment will vary, pricing policies and the use of advertising are commonly employed techniques applied to consumers. Specific job requirements, on the other hand, are typical methods utilized to control the input of labor.¹

Another element of the environment of organizations which may be singled out is the general social and cultural milieu. Consisting of a widely varied set of phenomena, ranging from the historical characteristics of the surrounding area to the political system of the nation within which the organization is located, such factors are seldom influenced much by single organizations. But in many nations the stability of such factors removes the necessity for control. For what is stable can be predicted and is, therefore, no longer a source of uncertainty.

The aspect of the environment of primary importance to the present study is that portion which consists of other organizations. In so far as they are relevant to the given focal organization and interact in some fashion with it, other organizations may serve a variety of functions. They may act as consumers by purchasing the goods or services produced by the focal organization or they may provide some of the raw materials used by the focal organization to produce that output. Other organizations may regulate some of the activities of the focal organization or may serve as models after which the focal organization attempts to pattern itself (Evan, 1966).
The organizational element of the environment is in some ways the most uncertain and threatening of all, for at times the complexity of the interactive patterns among the surrounding organizations will produce emergent characteristics which are almost impossible to predict (Emery and Trist, 1965; Terreberry, 1968). In these "turbulent" situations the tactics normally used to understand the activities and control the influence of single organizations in one's environment are not suitable (Emery and Trist, 1965:26).

In most situations, however, there do appear to be strategies by which organizations can minimize the uncertainties created by an environment of other organizations. One strategy, suggested by Selznick, is cooptation of the threatening element. Defined as "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence," cooptation assumes two forms. Formal cooptation is overt and is the absorption of legitimized elements into the organizational structure in an attempt to raise the legitimacy or improve the performance of the focal organization itself. Informal cooptation is covert, consisting essentially in the offer of small "prizes" or, if you will, "bribes", in order to obtain the cooperation of specific centers of power in the community (Selznick, 1966:259-261).

Expanding on Selznick's analysis, Thompson and McEwen place the cooptation strategy between two other interaction patterns, bargaining and coalition. Bargaining entails the negotiation of an agreement regarding an exchange between two organizations (Thompson and McEwen, 1972:261). Coalition, on the other hand, is the creation of an alliance or the actual unification of two organizations for a common purpose (p. 263). Of the three strategies—bargaining, cooptation and coalition—coalition represents the tactic providing the greatest reduction in uncertainty. However, this increment in environmental predictability is purchased at the expense of a decrease in autonomy. That is, the fact that a coalition is formed between a focal organization and a member of its organization-set not only increases the control of the focal organization over that member, it likewise, and in equal measure, increases the control of the member of the set over the focal organization. Thus, what one gains in predictability, one loses in autonomy.

Bargaining represents the strategy which is least harmful to the focal organization's autonomy. However, of the three strategies it provides the least reduction in environmental uncertainty. Cooptation is the intermediate strategy, allowing greater autonomy and less predictability than coalition but less autonomy and greater predictability than bargaining (Thompson and McEwen, 1972:262).
In a more recent work Thompson suggests some proposition to predict the use of the above three strategies. Under conditions in which the supply of resources is concentrated in a few organizations and the demand is likewise concentrated, Thompson hypothesizes that the organizations in question are likely to assume a bargaining strategy. When the supply is concentrated but the demand is dispersed, the organization(s) desiring the resources will attempt to coopt the source of supply. And finally, when the supply and demand are both concentrated, "but the power achieved through contracting (bargaining) is inadequate, the organizations will attempt to coalesce" (Thompson, 1967:36). Although all three appear to be valid propositions, only the second has been systematically tested and supported by empirical research (Allen, 1974).

Another strategy similar to that of coalition is vertical integration. This strategy refers to the combination of successive stages of production in one organization (Thompson, 1967:40). American oil companies provide a good example of organizations which have employed this strategy. Formerly concentrating on the refining of oil products, these organizations have expanded in both directions. They have eliminated some of the uncertainty in the environment which receives their output by expanding into marketing through retail franchise. They have also assured greater predictability in the input environment by managing their own drilling operations (Thompson, 1967:40-41). Indeed, the fact that such strategies are so effective is well illustrated by the discontent expressed by oil company executives in regard to the U. S. Government's attempts at divestiture of the oil firms (Garvin, 1975; Cairns, 1975).

For some organizations vertical integration may be either impractical or legally prohibited. In such cases other strategies may be employed to reduce contingencies in the organizational element of the environment. In his analysis of managerial level organizations engaged in the production and distribution of "cultural" items (e.g., records, books and motion pictures), Hirsch describes another strategy. Because the failure to locate "creative raw material" (Hirsch, 1972:650) will lead to organizational collapse, the organizations employ "contact men" such as talent scouts and promoters to assure an adequate supply. These boundary-spanning personnel are specialists in environmental control, attempting to not only gather knowledge of the environment but also to influence its characteristics (Hirsch, 1972).

One final strategy for minimizing uncertain environmental effects is suggested by Lefton and Rosengren. Client organizations may orient themselves to their clients along two dimensions. The first dimension concerns the breadth of involvement and is labelled
"laterality". This dimension relates to the question of how much of the client's personality is relevant to the organization's activities (Rosengren, 1970:120). An auditor, for instance, is concerned only with facts relating to his client's financial situation. A psychoanalyst, on the other hand, must take into consideration a much broader set of the client's characteristics.

The second dimension is called "longitudinality" and relates to the length of involvement. In other words, is the organization's involvement with the client organized on a short-term or a long-term basis? An insurance agency is likely to exhibit a relatively long-term involvement with its clients, whereas an information center will probably relate to its clients only on a short-term basis.

Some organizations, such as suicide prevention centers, exhibit a broad lateral but short-term longitudinal orientation to their clients and are, according to Rosengren, particularly susceptible to uncertainties in the environment (1970:125). The number of inputs or sources of external support the organization must rely on are much greater when it deals with the "whole" client over a short period than when a more narrow, long-term focus is employed. This increase in external support effectively adds to the environmental contingencies with which the focal organization must deal. By shifting to a more narrow but long-term orientation, the organization minimizes this uncertainty by limiting the sources of external support upon which the organization depends (Rosengren, 1970:125).

Although there are other strategies which organizations may utilize to effectively control environmental uncertainties, the above examples will, perhaps, give a taste of the general process of interaction between an organization and its environment. One may recognize the significant compatibility between the approach to organizations outlined herein and the theoretical orientation commonly labelled "systems theory" (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Buckley, 1967). Both approaches equally emphasize the environmental constraint on the system in question and the permeability of its boundaries. However, where the systems approach tends to focus on morphogenesis, or internal structural changes resulting from environmental contingencies, the present orientation views the organization or system as a more active or aggressive phenomenon. Rather than merely adapting to the environment, the organization actively seeks to influence or control it.

This characteristic of active influence is especially apparent during the emergence of the organization-set. At the earliest stages of existence, an organization's particular vulnerability to environmental contingencies requires that a rather aggressive stance be taken in its attempts to establish a domain and control environmental contingencies. The development of a stable organization-set can be usefully conceptualized as one
manifestation of this attempt to reduce uncertainty in the organizational environment. Like the strategies described above, in other words, the attempt to develop a stable organization-set exemplifies the active or aggressive character of much of the interaction among organizations; for the emergence of a stable organization-set is itself an effective reducer of environmental influences which can seriously threaten the emerging organization.

However, the attempt to develop an organization-set appears to be on a different level of analysis than the earlier mentioned strategies. Nevertheless, the process of organization-set emergence as presented in the analytical model to follow does exhibit many of the characteristics of the aggressive stance which were illustrated above by the strategies of cooptation, vertical integration, etc. That is, just as established organizations reach out into the environment in an attempt to control the recurrence of threatening elements, the newly emerged organization endeavors to minimize contingencies by developing a stable organization-set. Indeed, the very strategies discussed above may periodically be used by the emergent organization just as their more established counterparts might use them. And, like these strategies, the emergence of an organization-set has important ramifications for environmental control. Yet, because this emergence process has not previously received systematic attention, it deserves examination in its own right. The following model of the emergence of the organization-set is an attempt at such an examination.

A Theoretical Model of the Emergence of the Organization-Set

No theoretical model actually reflects the reality it is intended to portray. Such an achievement is impossible. Yet even if it were possible, the exact duplication of a given reality would add little, in itself, to scientific understanding. For in science one attempts to systematically discover the recurrent patterns and relationships among phenomena in the empirical world. A duplication of that world may be a useful tool to discover those patterns, but it does not by itself explicate them.

The model outlined on the next page is, like every other model, a simplification; not a reflection of reality but a conceptualization employed in understanding it. Constructed inductively from a careful study of the emergence of the ecumenical recovery group, Interfaith A, which was formed after a massive flood occurring in the Eastern United States, the model is an outline of the several temporal phases in the emergence of an organization-set (Ross and Smith, 1975). Figure 1 represents a summary of these phases.
The first phase is the crystallization of the emergent organization. Borrowed originally from Lang and Lang (1961), the term **crystallization** refers, in this context, to the commitment to a course of action by the members of the newly forming organization. Perhaps more than any other characteristic, it is this commitment to a more or less specific set of goals which gives the emerging social unit its organizational character. Prior to this phase a group may attempt to grapple with the characteristics and meaning of the situation at hand (Forrest, 1968). But not until this more decisive action is taken does the group take on the characteristics of an organization. Indeed, it is this aspect of commitment or the "formal establishment for explicit purpose" which is Blau and Scott's primary definitional criterion for organizations (Blau and Scott, 1962:5; see also Parsons, 1956:63; and Etzioni, 1964:3). In the context of this research, the crystallization phase was said to have been reached when the group in question came to a general consensus on a set of activities which would be pursued. This consensus was exhibited in all cases by either an oral or written agreement to a general course of action by the attending individuals. Even after this point, of course, modifications on the proposed activities would be made, but the commitment on the part of the persons present was used as an indicator of crystallization in spite of the fact that some of the tasks might quickly be altered.

Following this first phase, there occurs a specification of responsibility for external contacts. This phase, called the **development of boundary personnel**, consists of the delineation of...
specific individuals to initiate external contacts. In effect, a division of labor is created at this point, restricting the persons who will actually make the initial contact with the environment and develop the organization-set.

Although all personnel are likely to have contact with the environment at this early stage and are therefore correctly termed "boundary personnel," it will most probably be the highest level organizational positions which are assigned the responsibility of initiating most of the external contacts. After the establishment of relationships, lower level staff personnel will tend to handle much of the interaction. In concrete cases, the existence of this second phase was indicated when persons overtly assumed or were assigned the task of making contact with other organizations.

Before proceeding to the third phase, a slight digression is necessary. During its emergence there appear to be two primary environment-related tasks facing an organization: a) establishing recognition and b) exchanging resources. The establishment of recognition consists essentially of the creation of visibility and the acquisition of legitimacy. Although problems may develop, the creation of visibility is relatively straightforward, requiring a variety of methods which familiarize the elements of the environment with the name and function of the new organization.

More problematic is the acquisition of legitimacy, for it requires more than just attempts to familiarize the environment with the new organization. Rather, a specific endeavor must be made to convince or cajole environmental elements to accept the new organization's domain, i.e., the goods and services produced and the population served (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). As may be apparent, the sociological meaning of the term legitimacy has little relation to its use in the field of law. For an organization may be legitimate in the sociological sense while engaging in activities which are far outside the bounds of law. Legitimacy, then, refers not to the legal status of an organization but rather to the acceptance by a given population (be they organizations, groups or individuals) of both the goods and services produced by the organization and its means of production (Perrow, 1970:98-99). Thus, the clients of an illegal gambling house accept the organization as a legitimate provider of a number of services even though these services happen to be unacceptable according to certain legal statutes.
Of course, it is not imperative that an organization be totally accepted by all elements of its environment. What is important, however, is that the elements with which the organization plans to interact accept it as at least minimally legitimate; thereby limiting the threat to the stability or existence of the focal organization.

The second primary task facing an organization at its emergence is the exchange of resources. Generally this task refers to the assurance of both an adequate source for the input of raw materials and a suitable consumer or other repository for the organization's output. Resources, therefore, is a term which is applied not only to that which is fed into the organization but also to that which is removed. The term possesses a rather broad meaning in this context, denoting informational as well as financial, material and human resources.

Returning, then, to the third phase of the emergence of the organization-set one notices that this phase receives the same label as the first of the two tasks discussed above. This recognition phase represents the very first attempts at contact with the organization's environment. During this period, which may be as short as a few hours or as long as several months, the establishment of recognition is given priority over the second fundamental environment-related task, obtaining and depositing resources. The indicator used to establish the progression to this third phase involved the search for the existence of activities on the part of boundary personnel to acquaint representatives of other organizations with the presence and tasks of the new organization. Often these activities might entail a simple introduction at a meeting, such as, "Hello, my name is _____, and I represent Interfaith Disaster Recovery. We're providing the following services to disaster victims..." Or the third phase might be indicated by the printing of leaflets designed to inform persons of the existence of the new organization. The important point, however, is that the actions in this third phase are focused primarily on the establishment of recognition with the organizational environment.

That the first task is given priority in this phase does not imply, however, that there are no attempts to exchange resources. On the contrary, attempts to obtain resources are often the first activities carried out by the leadership of the new organization. For after all, the establishment of recognition is only a means and not an end in itself. Organizations are conspicuously dissimilar to human beings in this regard.

The third phase shades off into the fourth, the resource-recognition phase. In this phase resource exchange gains in
relative importance and manifests an interesting interaction with the establishment of recognition. For instance, an attempt to obtain certain resources from another organization may, in itself, lead to an increment in the recognition of the focal organization. In a similar fashion, the establishment of recognition is likely to increase the likelihood of an exchange of resources between the emerging focal organization and the external element. Each task, therefore, reinforces the other, building both the size and stability of the organization-set. Although it may be difficult to clearly differentiate the third and fourth phases, a noticeable increment in requests or offers of resources in interorganizational interaction was the indicator used in this research to specify the fourth phase.

The final phase is the institutionalization of the emergent organization-set. This phase is characterized by a relatively stable pattern of interaction between the focal organization and its organization-set. For the purposes of this research, the institutionalization phase was able to be distinguished by a kind of "lack of newness" or "business as usual" character of the contacts between the focal organization and its organization-set. This character itself was exhibited by the abandonment of much of the preliminary introductions and explanations which had been necessary before interorganizational exchange could occur in earlier phases. In other words, rather than spending time legitimating any requests, the organizations in question could skip many of the preliminaries and more promptly perform the desired exchange.

Yet, a stable organization-set must not be confused with one which is static, for even after the organization-set has become institutionalized, changes in such factors as its components or the intensity and nature of interaction will occur. Most changes will likely be minor in nature, but major shifts are possible. For instance, in the case of a major reevaluation in the goals of the organization, much of the organization-set may no longer be relevant to the focal organization's activities. In such an instance, what is called a "renegotiation of the emergence process" may be required. Thus, in order to create an organization-set more relevant to the new goals of the focal organization, the organization may be forced to return to an earlier phase of the emergence process and proceed anew through the remaining phases.

Illustration of the Model: The Case of Interfaith A

Isolated as it is from any empirical referent, the model undoubtedly appears rather lifeless. It would be valuable, therefore, to illustrate the model by a description of the emergence
of an actual organization-set. The organization-set to be described is that of the ecumenical recovery organization, Interfaith A. It is important to note, however, that the following in no way represents a test of the model, for the model itself was derived from the research experience with Interfaith A.

Caused by a tropical storm which hit the Northeastern United States in early summer, the flood that inundated the community which was to be the site of Interfaith A was massive by any standard. Located in a mountain valley with a major river, the community had experienced floods before. Yet none of the earlier floods had caused such immense destruction. Throughout the valley some 80,000 people were left homeless. More than 25,000 homes were seriously damaged or destroyed, while approximately 2,700 businesses were closed. Estimates of the total damage exceeded two billion dollars (Musari, 1974).

Although the immediate disaster response was coordinated by county Civil Defense and most other recovery efforts were undertaken by the various levels of government, religious organizations also became involved. Besides such traditionally disaster-relevant organizations like the Mennonites and the Salvation Army, various denominations such as Lutheran, Methodist and Roman Catholic organized their own individual recovery efforts. Concentrating on the massive cleanup operation, the denominational recovery efforts made great use of the large numbers of volunteers, most of whom were college students on summer vacation.

There was almost no communication between the separate denominational groups. Indeed, the community had never exhibited much ecumenism. The Council of Churches, for instance, was an inactive body receiving little support from either the large or small denominations. And a significant dissonance existed between the Protestant churches and the larger Catholic population. Such a context would not appear to be conducive to the emergence of an ecumenical recovery organization.

Nevertheless, approximately two months after the flood two VISTA workers contacted the existing religious-based recovery organizations in regard to the establishment of a single coordinated effort. Charged with the responsibility of unifying the various voluntary recovery groups in the area, the VISTA workers found that the only local, non-governmental efforts were church-related. Therefore, they attempted to contact a large number of clergy and religious organizations for the purpose of arranging a meeting to discuss a more coordinated response.

Considering the community's history of inter-denominational conflict the response to the meeting was good. With the exception
of the Mennonites, the leadership of all the existing denomina­tional recovery organizations attended. Representatives of other denominations were also present including an official of the Jewish Community Center and a representative of the Council of Churches. Although little was accomplished at the first meeting, those present did, at least, decide to meet again.

In the following few meetings numerous ideas were discussed: the problems an ecumenical organization would face, the possible advantages, and the specific programs which might be undertaken. Although perhaps with some misgivings, all did agree that a coor­dinated effort was advisable. As one participant explained:

I know it was a question in their minds, you know, would denominations that weren't normally getting together anyhow really want to get together. So it was going to be a big step to take. But because of the flood we had seen a lot of cooperation and a lot of ethnic barriers being torn down. So we decided to go ahead.

As much as anything, however, the decision to set up Interfaith A was based on the desire by some of the denominations to get out of "the private flood business."

About two months after the flood we started to get a feeling from within our own denomination that there were people who thought that we'd never be able to handle this thing; that it was getting too big and that maybe we should let a government agency take over.

And from another respondent:

Many of us were getting very, very weary at that point. Many of us had been helping to operate volunteer centers and shelter centers and we were becoming pretty well exhausted, short of staff; and we simply needed to cooperate our efforts.

Thus, far from being a threat to the existing denominational recovery efforts, Interfaith A represented a welcome opportunity to discontinue some costly and time consuming activities.

With the decision to set up Interfaith as an "emergency clearinghouse" for the many resources still converging on the area, the emergent organization entered the first phase in the develop­ment of its organization-set, crystallization. As described earlier, this phase is characterized by the commitment to a more or less specific set of goals.
The crystallization phase, however, was extremely short-lived, giving way almost immediately to the second phase in the emergence of Interfaith A's organization-set. In the same meeting in which a commitment was made to initiate the organization, the first steps were taken in the development of Interfaith's boundary personnel. Strictly speaking, almost all participants were designated as boundary personnel since all were asked to contact their own denominations for financial support. But the primary responsibility for initiating external contacts was placed with one individual. This individual was asked to be the director of Interfaith "because he already had a good name" from his previous work in one of the denominational recovery organizations—a fact which facilitated the effectiveness of his initial contact with the organizational environment.

The emerging organization-set rapidly moved into its third or recognition phase. Primarily in the person of the director, the organization made contact with the local offices of HUD (Housing and Urban Development), the Red Cross, VISTA, EEA (Emergency Employment Act) and other disaster relevant organizations. The director's extensive previous contact with many of these organizations significantly simplified the establishment of recognition for the new organization; and its organization-set grew rapidly. As one respondent noted, "Once Interfaith was formed it seemed like all those doors that had been open only a crack before just flew open."

The organization itself grew rapidly, too. From a staff of only three persons shortly after its emergence, Interfaith A expanded within a few months to almost twenty paid personnel. Included among these personnel were the director, a small supervisory staff, several clerical employees and a number of skilled craftsmen such as electricians and carpenters. The board of the new organization consisted of approximately a dozen representatives of both local and regional religious organizations. This growth in size was anything but controlled, however, and problems naturally developed. One participant remembered the following:

There inevitably are problems in any organization that grows as fast as we did. We had to put together an office and field staff that was big enough to handle thousands of volunteers on each weekend. There were the inevitable mixups with this kind of thing—of groups either being assigned to help a homeowner who had already been assigned help and was already finished or being assigned to a neighborhood where none was—this kind of thing; a volunteer group coming in needing housing overnight and nobody had
gotten word they needed housing, so they were hung. All these things were certainly part of the confusion of handling so many people so quickly with a staff that had never done it before. Those early days were hectic, they were!

Moving into the fourth phase, the organization-set gradually gained in stability. Successful exchanges between Interfaith and its emerging organization-set increased the mutual trust of the organizations involved, thereby raising the tendency for further exchanges. Interfaith's relationship with HEW is especially illustrative of this resource-recognition phase. Approximately one month after its emergence, Interfaith was contacted by HEW and requested to distribute 60,000 blankets to flood victims. In what was "the key to our total relationship with the government," in the words of one participant, Interfaith A carried out the request to the complete satisfaction of HEW officials. More than any other single incident, this successful exchange established a firm recognition and a stable pattern of interaction with the government.

It was not until approximately two months after emergence that Interfaith A's organization-set entered the final, institutionalization phase. By this time Interfaith had set up stable relationships with several private business firms as well as the numerous government agencies involved in the recovery. For instance, IBM, Xerox and the U-Haul Company had all contributed equipment to be used by Interfaith. Thus, within two to three months of its emergence, Interfaith had successfully developed a stable organization-set; and with a stable organization-set many of the environmental threats to the existence of an emerging organization are minimized.

The entire process, from crystallized organization to institutionalized organization-set, was extremely rapid, occurring in less than a few months. Such a rate is unlikely in most non-disaster situations; but time, of course, is an especially important consideration after disasters which leave thousands of people homeless and without jobs. As one respondent so aptly stated, "Probably why it happened so quickly, there wasn't time to sit down and talk about the problems, the structure, the flow charts and all this crap that organizations frequently have to get into. It just happened."

Over the next year and a half both the goals and the organization-set of Interfaith remained relatively stable. There was a gradual shift from the provision of financial and material aid
to victims to the actual reconstruction of damaged housing, but no major changes in the characteristics of the organization-set resulted.

But there comes a time for any recovery organization when the disaster must be declared over—even though its effect may be felt by the community for decades. The Red Cross pulled out of the community in less than six months; HUD ceased most operations in about a year; and within a year and a half most of the disaster-related needs which Interfaith had fulfilled were satisfied. Yet the organization did not shut down, but rather undertook the task of repairing and reconstructing low income housing in the area. Under these circumstances the model outlined above would indicate that a renegotiation of the emergence process was probable. That is, because the organization must shift to a non-disaster domain, it must likewise substantially alter its organization-set by returning to an earlier phase.

However, little renegotiation of the process was evident in the case of Interfaith A. The new task of repairing low income housing was close enough to the former task of reconstructing flood damaged homes that few new organizational linkages were necessary. Indeed, the very difficulty that would be involved in forming a new organization-set may have precluded the choice of any other goal. Perhaps, in other words, the organization-set itself acted as a resistance to the possible changes which the organization could exhibit. This possibility of resistance to change will be explored further in Chapter VI.

Summary

The preceeding chapter has been devoted to an examination of the theoretical foundation of the study. Organizations are viewed in this context as tools or instruments of power which, if they are to meet the goals for which they are designed, must control or minimize environmental contingencies. When an organization emerges it is particularly vulnerable to these contingencies, and the development of a stable organization-set decreases this vulnerability. The model outlined and illustrated in this chapter is an attempt to examine the process by which a stable organization-set is formed.

The following three chapters examine the emergence of the organization-sets of Interfaiths B, C and D, respectively. Each chapter explores the general characteristics of both the disaster and the affected community as well as the organizations themselves. The application of the model outlined above to the three
organizations will be deferred until Chapter VI, at which point each of the three organization-sets will be examined in light of this theoretical model, demonstrating its applicability. The model will not only be applied, however, but will be developed further in reference to the three empirical cases discussed in Chapters III-V. It will be shown that a mere application of the model tells us little about the specific behavioral patterns exhibited by organization-sets as they emerge. Thus, Chapter VI will also be devoted to the delineation of recurrent patterns displayed by the three cases examined in this study. The final chapter presents a summary and a discussion of the implications of the research.
FOOTNOTES

1. For a rather unusual example of an organization's control over the input of labor see Sigelman, 1973.

2. Much of the work in what is variously called ethnomethodology, cognitive sociology or the sociology of everyday life may appear to contradict this statement. Nevertheless, even though the ground rules in these emergent areas of study are significantly different from traditional sociology, the search for patterns (essences?) inherent in social activity represents their primary goal.

3. Of course, the organization-set may fail to materialize at all. For most emergent organizations such a failure would almost certainly prevent any more than a transient existence for the organization itself.

4. Data on which the following illustration is based consisted of approximately thirty hours of semi-structured, tape recorded interviews and a rather large collection of documentary materials.
CHAPTER III

THE EMERGENCE AND CHANGE OF AN ORGANIZATION-SET: INTERFAITH B

The following chapter consists of a description of the formation of Interfaith B and the development of its organization-set. To adequately depict these processes, however, an examination of the context in which both the organization and the organization-set emerged is first necessary.

The Context of Emergence

The county seat of a primarily rural county in a Midwestern state, the community in which Interfaith B was to be located had a population of approximately 27,000 at the time of the tornado. In many ways the city (hereafter called Community B) could be considered a "bedroom community." Possessing a relatively small amount of industry of its own, almost 25 per cent of its work force commuted to the large metropolitan area (population 242,000) 15 miles away. The work force itself was rather similar in profile to that of the United States as a whole, although the percentage of farm workers and managers was somewhat less than the national average and the proportion of craftsmen and operatives somewhat more (U. S. Census, 1973).

Prior to the tornado the median family income of Community B was slightly higher than the national average; however, the percentage of families with incomes above $15,000 was only 15 percent--actually lower than the nation as a whole. The racial composition of the city was more similar to the national figures, the community having only a slightly higher percentage of blacks than that of the nation as a whole. And finally, Community B had a higher percentage of younger persons than was characteristic of the entire nation while those over sixty-five years of age were slightly underrepresented in the city (U. S. Census 1973).
Like so many rural areas in the United States, Community B did not possess an abundance of social service agencies (Taylor, 1976). Perhaps as a result of this relative absence, as well as the smaller size of the community, linkages between the agencies that did exist were more common and more frequently utilized. Thus, the isolation that so often plagues bureaucratized social service agencies was significantly less prevalent in Community B.

Frequently in communities which lack abundant social service agencies, the existent mental health organizations tend to expand their traditional domain, branching out into areas more commonly relegated to the social service sector (Schulberg and Baker, 1970). This was indeed the case in Community B. The few years prior to the tornado had seen a dramatic expansion of mental health organizations in the community; and the year before the disaster a massive mental health tax levy had been accepted by the voters. Most of the new services reflected a much broader definition of mental health than had traditionally been applied (Taylor, 1976).

It had been more than forty years since a tornado had hit the community. And even then, the disaster was given little newspaper coverage; possibly because only one person was killed, or perhaps because the area hit hardest was inhabited primarily by blacks. Consistent with the practices of other cities with scant disaster experience, Community B possessed no over-all disaster plan. The single hospital in the city had drawn up a brief plan, as had the school system, but the latter had never conducted a tornado drill. When the tornado hit, the community was not prepared.

On an early April afternoon, with winds of more than 250 miles per hour, a double funnel cloud descended and entered the southwest section of Community B. After first destroying hundreds of single story brick homes in a subdivision, the tornado sliced through schools, churches and other buildings on its way to the central city. It derailed a train at a major crossing and devastated several blocks of the business district. Traveling northwest and scarcely sparing the community's hospital, the tornado destroyed more schools and extensively damaged the oldest section of the community. Then proceeding from the city, the storm cut a path through the center of a local university, leveling nearly eighty-five per cent of the campus structures (Taylor, Ross and Quarantelli, 1976).

Almost before the tornado had passed out of the city limits a response to the devastation commenced. Firefighters began searching through the debris, and even the personnel of a gasoline station in the impact area set up their own rescue effort. The hospital, which had amazingly escaped major damage, quickly began
treating casualties while city officials organized a command post from which to assess damage and direct a response.

The response would have had to be massive. Thirty-three persons were killed and approximately 1,200 persons were injured. The storm destroyed about 1,100 homes and close to 160 commercial and industrial businesses. Although estimates of the total damage vary, ninety million dollars appears to be a fairly accurate accounting of the loss (Taylor, Ross and Quarantelli, 1976).

But the tornado's devastation was manifest in more subtle ways than the death and injury of persons and the destruction of buildings. Almost the entire pattern of routine activities in the community was disrupted. Stores and businesses were closed and unable to provide the commonly available services to the populace. The school system was shut down, forcing a radical change on both the children of the community and their parents. Churches, although attempting to maintain regular Sunday services, cancelled many of their usual activities in order to respond to the disaster's destruction. Services usually provided to the community by the government, such as police protection, mail delivery and garbage collection, had to be either temporarily discontinued or radically altered.

Many organizations, both inside and outside the community took part in the response to the disaster. With the cooperation of those schools and churches which remained intact, the Red Cross was able to set up a number of emergency facilities which offered food and shelter. The local fire department carried out much of the search and rescue operations with the assistance of units from outside the city. In fact, because of the train derailment, a large portion of the community could not even be reached by local rescue personnel and had to be covered by rescue units from the larger neighboring city. The hospital treated almost 500 persons in the first 12 hours and approximately 250 more in the next 18 hours. The National Guard was called in to seal off the area in the hope of curtailing the expected influx of sightseers and looters. Even the mental health organizations in the area organized a response. The initial plan designed to funnel the more seriously disturbed to psychiatrists was discontinued when it became apparent that no one was utilizing the service. Hoping to more closely adapt to the needs of the disaster stricken community, an outreach program was initiated (Taylor, 1976).
The Emergence

Several of the community's ministers quickly became aware of a function for the churches in such a crisis. They reasoned that many of the outside groups which were entering the city to offer help would remain only for a short time. But the extensiveness of this disaster made it evident that a much longer commitment would be required. The churches seemed a logical provider of such long-range care and might be capable of maintaining some continuity in the disaster services that the community would need for a long time to come.

The first outward attempts at organization, however, came from the Metropolitan Churches United (MCU), the ministerial association of Community B's neighboring metropolitan area. Announcing plans over the radio, MCU proposed a meeting to be held outside of Community B to discuss the role of the churches in the disaster response. The meeting never came about, for the proposal was perceived by some of Community B's ministers as an imposition from the outside and a way of saying, as one respondent remembered, "you're not capable of dealing with your problems." So they arranged their own meeting, holding it one week after the tornado in one of Community B's churches.

Representatives of a number of organizations besides the local churches were present at the meeting. Officials of area mental health organizations and a few social service agencies as well as ministers from the MCU were in attendance, with perhaps fifty persons in all at the meeting. The meeting was chaired by some of the more active and prominent of Community B's ministers; however, because of the large attendance the group frequently broke up into subcommittees which met and then gave suggestions or recommendations to the others present.

Also at the meeting was the executive director of Interfaith A, the flood recovery organization that had emerged a year and a half earlier. As one respondent remembered, the director was a "low key, low profile consultant who tried to help in any way he could" by offering suggestions as to specific programs that his own Interfaith organization had found either successful or unsuccessful. Arriving uninvited a few days after the tornado, Interfaith A's director had attempted to locate a center of the churches' response so that he might offer his services. Referred to the president of Community B's ministerial association, he was pleased to find that an effort had already been initiated to organize the churches for a unified disaster response. He was asked to assist at the meeting.
Although the interdenominational conflict that Interfaith A had faced prior to its emergence was greater than that which was faced by Interfaith B, Community B had never exhibited extensive ecumenical cooperation. Nevertheless, the representatives of almost forty-five area churches were able to reach a consensus on the need for a cooperative effort, its general goals and a few preliminary programs.

The domain of the new organization was intriguingly broad—to provide needed services that were not provided elsewhere. This residual domain, as it could perhaps be labeled, was well described by one of the organizers of Interfaith B.

Our main purpose was to serve people that couldn't be served other ways; and maybe it's a tacky phrase or an overused phrase, but to fulfill their spiritual, mental and physical needs. And that covers quite a wide deal.

At the urging of the director of Interfaith A, the first specific program initiated by the group was a survey of the stricken areas of the community. The purpose of the survey was to assess the needs of the community by actually asking the tornado victims what their specific requirements were. Thus, instead of waiting for the community members to come to them, the ministers wished to actively place themselves out into the community where they might more accurately specify and fulfill the needs that existed.

The director of the local mental health coordinating agency offered the services of a newly appointed staff member to function as coordinator of the needs assessment survey. Trained in pastoral counseling and the spouse of a prominent minister in Community B, the new coordinator was well involved in the religious and social service activities of the area, and was an effective link between the two sectors.

The next several days were extremely active. The interested persons met frequently, attempting to come to a number of organizational and programatic decisions. It was suggested that the new group apply for non-profit corporate status to permit tax-deductible contributions from private corporations. The necessary papers were drawn up and submitted within a week. Officers and board members were selected, by-laws were proposed and the new organization was given a name.

Besides the needs assessment survey it was suggested that a mechanism be constructed whereby the skills necessary to meet those needs could be located. This "skills bank" was to consist of a collection of forms on which all volunteers were asked to indicate any special skills relevant to disaster recovery. Probably
as a result of the numerous reports to the press of Interfaith B's existence and intent, a colonel from a local air force base contacted Interfaith shortly thereafter and offered the use of the base computer for storage and retrieval of the skills bank. Interfaith gladly accepted the offer.

In less than a week after the initial meeting the needs assessment survey was begun. Located primarily through the churches, seminaries and universities in the area, the volunteers were first given a brief training session in order to prepare them for what to expect. Then, armed with numbers of small (3½ inches by 5½ inches) "need cards," the surveyors entered the damaged portions of the community. The cards, identical to ones used by Interfaith A, recorded information regarding the general needs of the victims, such as debris removal, minor carpentry work, transportation and employment. Although most items on the card related to physical needs, one item labeled "like to talk to someone" was used as an indicator of an emotional or mental health need. A reproduction of the need card appears in Appendix C.

Within two weeks the survey was almost complete. The volunteers had collected approximately 1200 completed need cards indicating the services requested by the community. Although most of the cards specified physical types of requirements, one tenth of those returned indicated that the victim wanted to talk to someone. This latter group of cards was turned over to Disaster Follow-Up, a mental health outreach team which had also emerged following the tornado.

During this early period, hundreds of personal contacts were made with other agencies in the area by the members of the new organization. Regular meetings of the local social service agencies were attended by representatives of Interfaith. A local department store was contacted in regard to the provision of furniture to tornado victims. Bank accounts were opened in two local banks. Office equipment was located. Organizations in the area were contacted in order to obtain the use of warehouse space. Church judicatories were asked to supply funds for the new organization. HUD was repeatedly visited in order to obtain its list of relocated families. And representatives of other organizations frequently attended the early board meetings of Interfaith B.

Unlike Interfaith A, however, no one person was charged with the responsibility of initiating contacts with the environment. On the contrary, almost every member of the emerging organization made occasional contact with other organizations. At times specific individuals would be designated by the board to communicate
with a given organization regarding some needed service. Most contacts were not nearly so formalized and consisted primarily of communications by members on their own initiative.

By early May, one month after the tornado, Interfaith had procured the relocation list from HUD. The list, similar to those compiled by HUD after other disasters, consisted of all those families who were relocated temporarily by HUD because of extensive damage to their homes. HUD would pay the rent for up to one year, and the family would purchase the utilities.

The list was particularly valuable to Interfaith, since it represented the only viable means of locating a large proportion of families which had left their destroyed homes. Most of the approximately 600 families on this first list (which was updated from time to time) had been relocated in Community B's neighboring metropolitan area. Interfaith therefore requested that Metropolitan Churches United set up a visitation program to assist the relocated families. The forty ministers who consequently took part in this program were able to visit several hundred of the families, recording their requests on need cards and informing the families of available services.

At about the same time, Interfaith B initiated its own visitation program. Although the need cards had been useful indicators of some types of requests, many of the more specific needs of the victims were not recorded. Thus, it was necessary to recontact many of the families and to locate new families not previously contacted in order to actually meet their needs.

Interfaith's visitation program had really begun on a small scale a couple of weeks earlier through the activities of the volunteers from the Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC) and the limited utilization of the skills bank. However, it was not until May that the program truly became substantial, when, after securing a paid staff member to coordinate the program, Interfaith began actively recruiting volunteers. Training sessions lasting three to four hours were employed to prepare the volunteers for contact with the tornado victims. By assisting them with listening skills and informing them of the services available to the victims, the Interfaith staff hoped that the volunteers would be adequately prepared to deal with the many, divergent needs of the community members.

Eventually reaching a total of 125, recruited primarily from universities, churches and women's groups, the volunteers participating in the program were given the name "advocates." One respondent explained the new name.
At first we talked in terms of caseworkers but that just sounded too social agency-like. It's an overused word that types people into a category. So we wanted our volunteers to be advocates of the families that they saw. We wanted to help them with their material needs but also were aware that they would be encountering other problems; and we also wanted to be there as a friend.

The advocacy program, as it came to be called, focused primarily on the attempt to assist victims in dealing with the uncountable problems created by the disaster. Frequently this involved merely advising tornado victims where they could locate assistance. In other cases, an advocate would contact relevant agencies personally and negotiate on behalf of the victim.

I had a creditor call me a couple of days ago because I told him to call me rather than the woman he was bugging. It was kind of preventive mental health, I'd say, because he upset me and I don't even owe him money. So I can imagine how unnerving he is to her. You know, strictly business.

Finally, if Interfaith could not supply sufficient support for the victim through established agencies, it attempted to provide the required resources itself.

In conjunction with the advocacy program, Interfaith B, in the first two months of its existence, disbursed $50,000 in direct grants or vouchers to tornado victims. The funding on which these disbursements were based originated in a special tornado fund which had been organized by a local radio station almost immediately following the disaster. Numerous groups and organizations throughout the country responded to the fund, $100,000 of which eventually went to Interfaith.

Within four and a half months of its emergence, Interfaith B had more than tripled these assets, having received $312,400 from various contributors. The largest funding source was churches, accounting for $160,700; and of the churches, the Roman Catholic, Methodist and Presbyterian provided the largest donations. Private corporations, groups and individuals contributed the remaining $51,700.

Disbursements had also significantly climbed by this time. By the end of August, Interfaith had paid out $193,719--less than $34,000 of which was in administrative expenses. Of the remaining $160,000 40 per cent or $64,000 was spent on furniture for victims while the next greatest amount, $25,000, was given in cash. The remainder of the disbursements consisted of outlays for such goods
and services as (in decreasing magnitude) home repair, housing, transportation, medical treatment, clothing and food for victim families.

During the summer months the organization-set of Interfaith B had become quite stable. Few new contacts were made and much of the interaction with members of the set was quite regular. As illustrated in figure 2, the organization-set of Interfaith B had come to consist of a number of rather divergent organizations. The welfare department, public health, HUD, mental health organizations, department stores, contractors, local churches and church administrative units, although representing only a portion of the members of the set, reflected the range of organizations which maintained interaction with Interfaith B during this more stable, institutionalized period.

![Figure 2. The Institutionalized Organization-Set of Interfaith B.](image)

Of particular significance to Interfaith during this period was its relationship to HUD. Ever since HUD released the first relocation list in May, it had continually updated its record of displaced families. Interfaith personnel had thus attempted to maintain constant interaction with the government agency in order to retain a knowledge of the location of victim families. In addition, HUD offered special programs such as that of providing furniture to persons who had no insurance. Thus, as an advocate for its clients, Interfaith had good reason to maintain contact with HUD.
The relationship with HUD was interesting for another reason as well. For interaction between the two organizations was not confined to the formalized exchanges one often associates with interorganizational communication. One of the staff members at Interfaith remembered the following about HUD:

Most of the staff was under twenty-five, very turned-on, highly energetic, idealistic; a sympathetic, empathetic kind of staff. I think the only other organization in town that had that kind of staff was Interfaith. It was a natural for them to get together. They started dating each other; we had parties together—not early on, but eventually—and it led to a really neat kind of cooperative effort.

The relationship with HUD was not entirely cooperative, however. In regard to its program which allegedly provided free furniture to families without insurance to cover their losses, HUD soon became aware of the fact that the number of families eligible for this program surpassed its expectations and its financial limits. As one attempted solution, HUD went to Interfaith. An Interfaith staff member recalled the following:

I think what happened was that HUD saw the vastness of this disaster and said, "My God, we can't afford to give furniture to all these people..." And HUD came to us wanting us to be in contract with HUD, you know, saying that we would pick up the balance of anything that tornado victims could not do. Which in effect means that as a private agency we're making checks off the U. S. Treasury, which is just absolutely ridiculous. We refused to do it.

Another significant element of Interfaith's organization-set during the summer months was Disaster Follow-Up. Emerging a few weeks following the tornado, Disaster Follow-Up was a mental health outreach organization designed to assist tornado victims in dealing with the emotional reactions that occurred following the disaster. Relying primarily on volunteers with little or no professional mental health training (e.g., housewives, students), the organization focused mainly on combating the depression and anxiety which were expected to surface in victims several months after the tornado. With participation by a total of 52 volunteers, Disaster Follow-Up was able to make 520 visits to 381 families in the first five months of its existence.

A large proportion of these families—perhaps as much as seventy per cent—was originally located by Disaster Follow-Up through the help of Interfaith. As mentioned earlier, almost ten per cent of the 1200 need cards collected in the first few
weeks of Interfaith's existence were transferred to Disaster Follow-Up; and many of the cards obtained by MCU and returned to Interfaith were likewise given to the outreach organization.

On the other hand, Interfaith was the most common recipient of referrals from Disaster Follow-Up; twenty-five per cent of them going to the ecumenical organization. The other mental health organizations in Community B also made good use of the services offered by Interfaith, for more tornado-related referrals from the mental health agencies were made to Interfaith than to any other organization (Taylor, 1976).

The Change

Toward the end of its first summer Interfaith hired a new director. The appointment may, perhaps, have reflected a growing maturity on the part of the organization since it soon began to exhibit a greater reflexivity and concern for the future. This change was mirrored subtly in the organization-set of Interfaith B. Attempts to expand financial support for the recovery organization stimulated proposals to denominations totaling $200,000. By September the proposals had been answered with denominational grants of $125,000. And by the end of the year arrangements were being made for a proposal to the State Public Health Department to fund a program that would bring Interfaith an additional $81,000 in revenue.

As documentary support for the latter proposal, Interfaith utilized the results of a comprehensive community survey that the ecumenical organization had undertaken with the assistance of the Disaster Research Center (DRC). The survey was administered to a randomly selected sample of nearly 600 Community B families. Approximately seventy volunteers underwent a two hour training session to familiarize themselves with the specifics of the questionnaire and general interviewing technique. Through personal interviews conducted over a three week time span in October and November, hundreds of sociological and psychological variables were measured. The primary role of DRC in the research was to design the questionnaire and analyze the data. Interfaith organized the actual data collection and procured the financial backing.

The results of the survey proved to be quite useful ammunition in Interfaith's future funding proposals. Emphasizing the persistent financial strains and the existing mental health problems which the survey disclosed, Interfaith utilized the results to obtain funding from the Public Health Department. Although administered by Public Health, the proposal was actually for the delivery of mental health services. Interfaith had always most
strongly emphasized the satisfaction of tornado victims' physical needs; nevertheless, because of the rather broad definition of mental health prevalent in Community B, Interfaith had developed a close link with the local mental health organizations. Therefore, when it was suggested by high-ranking state personnel that a proposal relating to the delivery of mental health services would be favorably considered, the local mental health coordinating agency asked that Interfaith associate itself with the project.

The acceptance of the proposal and the eventual receipt of funds did little, however, to alter either the structure and domain of Interfaith B or its organization-set. No major organizational positions were added, and the activities of the organization, although, perhaps, intensified somewhat, were little altered. Likewise, the elements of the organization-set remained relatively stable.

The contract with Public Health did have a latent consequence for Interfaith's organization-set, however. A few months after the institution of the contract, a major conflict arose between the coordinating agency and the organization assigned the task of evaluating the program. The conflict, eventually leading to the withdrawal of the evaluating agency from the project, centered around the degree of autonomy to be retained by this agency. Although it did not appreciably affect the reception of funds by Interfaith, it did alter its stance toward future funding by the government. One respondent made the following comment:

Probably church funding is absolutely essential to us; and our flexibility absolutely essential. Our advocacy role would be severely compromised, I think, by government funding, and therefore it's essential that we develop a support system that is independent.

But a more substantial change in the organization-set did not begin to materialize until about six months after the conflict—that is, almost a year and a half after Interfaith B's emergence. Although the advocacy program had continued to be a demanded service, there was explicit concern among board members that Interfaith could not long confine itself to its previously established domain. Disaster recovery in Community B could not continue forever.

A five-member strategy committee was formed. Among the suggestions for future direction was the establishment of a permanent advocate program administering to non-disaster as well as disaster-related needs. Another suggestion concerned the execution of research and evaluation of their own program, with the ultimate goals of sharing the results with others interested and using those results to animate their own future funding.
For the strategy committee the most promising new direction involved the establishment of a national ecumenical disaster recovery organization. Originally conceived of as a coordinating agency which would enter an impacted community shortly after a disaster to direct the entire church response, the conception was soon altered to include only a facilitating role, not a coordinating function. That is, Interfaith would enter a community and, if favorably received, assist through consultation the attempts of local organizers to effectively structure an emergent ecumenical recovery effort.

Indeed, in the previous six months Interfaith B had already served such a consulting function in four other communities which had experienced disasters. Two of the communities subsequently produced ecumenical recovery organizations. In each case two of the staff members of Interfaith B visited the stricken community, discussing some of the problems their own organization had faced and explaining their advocacy program. The establishment of a national recovery organization would thus be merely an expansion of a previously established role.

The organization-set, however, would require alteration. The four consulting trips had involved little more than temporary contracts with other organizations and had not required any budgetary expansion. To establish consultation on a full-time basis, however, would necessitate the location of new support structures and an extension of the organization-set.

Since the 1930's, Church World Service (CWS), the domestic missionary arm of the National Council of Churches, had been involved in disaster recovery work. Its response effectiveness was extremely limited, however, since its charter required that it actually be invited to the stricken area by an already existing ecumenical organization. In many disaster communities, of course, no ecumenical organization exists, and something as simple as an invitation to an extralocal group may require several days to convey in a disaster situation. Interfaith B did not exist under these constraints, yet it had the structure and experience uniquely suited to national church recovery work. Thus, the strategy committee believed that CWS might wish to cooperate and lend, at least, its financial support.

Two conferences were held over the next few months at which representatives of disaster communities, members of disaster field units (e.g., Mennonites, Brethren, etc.), numerous denominational representatives and CWS staff were present. Initiated primarily by Interfaith, the conferences consisted of the discussion of the national church structure's response to disasters and the presentation of proposals relating to that response. Although Interfaith
hoped to receive backing from CWS for its plans to organize on a national level, no response was immediately forthcoming. Interfaith B, therefore, made arrangements for funding from other sources (such as private foundations) in case the CWS support did not materialize.

Although at this writing Interfaith's funding issues have not been entirely resolved, it appears certain that the organization is committed to a long-term existence. Like Interfaith A it has found a domain which is marketable, even though the community in which it exists has little need for specifically disaster-related services. The alternative of a continued existence, of course, is the disbanding of the organization. The following two chapters deal with organizations which chose the latter course, although, as one will see, for different reasons.

Summary

The preceding chapter described the formation of Interfaith B and the emergence and change of its organization-set. Organized after a tornado severely damaged the community of 27,000 people, Interfaith B quickly grew into a recovery organization controlling more than $300,000. In less than two months the ecumenical organization had developed a stable organization-set consisting of numerous mental health and social service agencies, religious organizations and commercial enterprises. After becoming institutionalized, the organization-set remained quite stable until a year and a half after the tornado. At that point the organization-set was altered, reflecting a concomitant alteration in the goals of the organization.
FOOTNOTES

1. In point of fact, however, only a small amount of looting did occur—a finding consistent with most other natural disaster situations (Quarantelli and Dynes, 1969; Wright and Quarantelli, 1976).

2. Although actually Presbyterian in origin, the word "judicatory" is widely used within the ecumenical movement to refer to the highest relevant denominational office.
CHAPTER IV

THE EMERGENCE AND CHANGE OF AN ORGANIZATION-SET: INTERFAITH C

The second organization that will be examined in detail is Interfaith C. Although similar in many respects to its predecessor, Interfaith B, this more recently formed ecumenical organization exhibited a number of important differences. The context in which it and its organization-set emerged was one of the more salient of these differences.

The Context of Emergence

The largest city in its state, Community C had a population of 347,328 in 1970; representing an increase of more than 15 per cent since 1960 (U. S. Census, 1973). This Midwestern city is a major food processing center. Specializing in meat products, it contains the largest livestock market in the world. Other prominent commercial activities in the city include insurance, banking and transportation. It is the fourth largest railroad center in the world, and more than thirty insurance companies locate their main offices in Community C.

There is a greater percentage of middle to upper-middle income families in the city than is characteristic of the nation as a whole. Families with incomes of between $7,000 and $15,000 account for 53 per cent of the community's population, while 47 per cent of U. S. families are in a comparable income bracket. The age characteristics of the city, on the other hand, generally reflect the figures for the U. S. in its entirety. The 10 per cent 65 years and older in Community C virtually mirrors the 9.9 per cent of that age group in the United States. However, a somewhat higher percentage of persons under twenty-five live in the city than is characteristic of the nation as a whole (U. S. Census, 1973).

White collar workers are more heavily represented in Community C than they are in the entire United States. For instance,
clerical workers account for nearly twenty-two per cent of the labor force of the city, while the proportion of clerical personnel for the United States is less than eighteen per cent. Crafts­men and operatives, on the other hand, are less well represented in Community C. For the entire nation craftsmen and operatives comprise, respectively, 13.2 and 17.7 per cent of the labor force; in Community C these two occupations account for 11.5 and 14.1 per cent of the total employed (U. S. Census, 1973).

The community is relatively rich in both religious organizations and social service agencies. It is both a Catholic archdiocese and a See for the Episcopal church. The state headquarters of the Presbyterian and Baptist churches are located in the city, along with some 350 individual churches and synagogues.

One year prior to the tornado a regional umbrella agency was created to coordinate a number of the existing social services in the area. Attempting to develop a "system" of service agencies, the new coordinating organization began activities to increase the continuity of public social services offered. The agencies merged under the system included the Office on Aging, Youth Services, Mental Retardation and Mental Health. A number of private organizations, however, particularly in the area of mental health, remained outside the scope of the new coordinating organization.

Natural disasters are fairly common in Community C. A flash flood occurred in the area in 1964, taking seven lives, and another flood followed in 1968. Although a levee system has since been completed, the threat of floods remains salient.

Tornadoes, however, represent a more obvious danger to the city. In 1913 a tornado killed 94 persons and injured 322. Damage to the city was estimated at $3,500,000. Another severe storm caused $1,500,000 in damage in 1968; although, fortunately, no one was killed. And only five weeks prior to the tornado which led to the emergence of Interfaith C, a funnel cloud hit the outskirts of Community C, with an estimated cost of $200,000. The tornado which followed, however, surpassed even the 1913 storm in property damage.

On a Tuesday afternoon in early May a massive tornado with three appendages or "tails" descended onto the southwestern section of Community C. Traveling east, it first demolished an area with a large concentration of apartment buildings. The storm soon shifted to the north, where it totally destroyed an elementary school and inflicted heavy damage to a 455-bed hospital. Retaining that course, the tornado smashed through dozens of small businesses and hundreds of homes, while extensively damaging numerous churches and other schools. Not until it had cut nearly a ten-mile path through the city did the funnel finally reascend.
The devastation which remained was massive. Three persons were killed, and between two and three hundred were injured. More than one hundred businesses were destroyed or extensively damaged; numerous other buildings, such as schools, churches and a hospital, were also hit. A total of 287 homes were destroyed, while close to 650 dwellings received extensive damage. And fifty-three separate apartment buildings were damaged, many of them heavily. Original estimates of the total destruction reached $500 million "or even more," but $200 million appears to be a more accurate figure.

Although the extent of physical damage wrought by the storm was extraordinary, the effect on the city as a whole was less severe than might be expected. Totally missing the downtown section, the disaster was primarily residential in focus; a large number of small businesses were also badly impaired. Tremendous resources remained unaffected by the impact and were available for relief and recovery. Except for the immediate impact area, few of the normal services provided by the community for its citizens were discontinued. As one respondent noted:

The entire community was not crippled; in fact, it was very easy not to be aware. You see, the tornado area became, in fact, a sideshow—the thing you had to see that week. It hit a large area, it cost a lot of money, but it didn't cripple the city.

Nevertheless, the tornado had caused immense damage, and both immediate relief and long-term recovery would be enormous tasks.

Although one must, of course, be skeptical of the depictions of the immediate response as a "textbook disaster," the emergency activities did appear to be quite effectively handled. Radio and television stations were broadcasting the weather bureau's tornado watch nearly all afternoon. A tornado warning was issued nineteen minutes before the funnel touched down, and the warning sirens sounded between four and six minutes before the tornado descended.

Before the storm had reached the northern section of Community C, police had already begun search and rescue in the area first hit. One hundred and fifty-seven casualties were transported within a few hours to the area's hospitals, and less than two hours after the tornado touched down, crews were beginning to clear debris off the streets.
The Emergence

The first activities of the churches in response to the disaster involved the establishment of a crisis telephone line by the Lutheran Metropolitan Ministries (LMM) office. In operation by the morning after the tornado, the line was designed to provide a telephone number available twenty-four hours per day to which persons needing help or offering help could call. During its first day, the line was used primarily to contact the area churches in an effort to assess damage and inform them of the establishment of the crisis line. In addition, denominational headquarters was contacted, and $3000 was immediately pledged. The media were quickly advised of the line's existence, and by the first evening of its operation the local newspaper carried an announcement; television and radio spots regarding the line were broadcast the following day.

The LMM office was located in a building containing a number of other religious organizations. Among them, United Methodist Ministries and the Metropolitan Association of Churches had representatives who had cooperated with the Lutheran office on a number of earlier occasions. It was natural, then, that on the day after the tornado, "passing in the hall," the officials of these organizations quickly began discussion of an ecumenical response. As one of the organizers stated, "We'd worked on so many things in the past, it's just a foregone conclusion we're going to do things together." Contacting the mayor in order to gain his support, they arranged a meeting to be held in the mayor's conference room the following day. In the interim they began drawing up plans for an interfaith recovery effort.

We had an informal little policy making thing—kind of behind the scenes thing—because of our experience in the past and because we knew we could mobilize quickly. And we went to that meeting in the mayor's office with planted nominations because we felt if we could keep it within the circles of those who were organized and whose offices were set up for that thing we'd have a better chance of making it go rather than squabbling about it.

Nearly fifty persons were present at the meeting in the mayor's conference room the following day. Most were clergy from a variety of local churches and religious organizations, although half a dozen were church officials from outside the area. For instance, the Christian Reformed World Relief Committee had sent representatives, as had the Mennonite Disaster Service. Also represented at the meeting, however, were a number of secular organizations such as the Red Cross, the United Way, Disabled American Veterans, the Office on Aging, a local radio station and the city's newspaper.
Although the meeting was called in order to organize a church-related disaster response, the mayor had apparently invited other groups to attend as well.

The meeting was called at the behest of the religious groups. But there were others who showed up, primarily because others had been harassing the mayor wanting some information and he thought, "Hell, I'll just put them all together." And so he did.

Shortly after the meeting was called to order, a motion was made and seconded that an organization "be formed to coordinate the various human services available through churches and other human service agencies." Although some of those present appeared to be skeptical of the utility of establishing still another recovery organization, after some discussion the motion passed. The nominations for officers drawn up the previous day were all upheld, and the individuals selected were designated the steering committee of the organization.

Immediately upon the adjournment of the first meeting, the newly selected steering committee organized a second gathering in the city council chambers. Besides the representatives of Lutheran Metropolitan Ministries, United Methodist Ministries and the Metropolitan Association of Churches, the steering committee also included officials of Catholic Social Services, the Salvation Army, the Red Cross, the United Way, the mayor's office and the Evangelical Church. Representatives from a few other churches were also present.

In addition to designating an official name for the organization, those present at the second meeting also outlined a number of specific programs to be undertaken. The crisis line previously established by the Lutherans would be maintained on a twenty-four hour basis as the official telephone contact to Interfaith C. Also, the new organization would share the table assigned to the Salvation Army at the One Stop Centers which were soon to be formed. However, since sufficient volunteers were not yet available to Interfaith C, Salvation Army personnel would act as agents of the emergent organization. To aid these personnel Interfaith C would construct a directory specifying the resources that were available to tornado victims. And finally, a hot meal program would be established on a short-term basis to provide meals to both victims and volunteers in the impact area.

The crisis line proved at first to be a better method of attracting volunteers than of locating victims. In the first few weeks of its operation over 1300 phone calls were handled; the persons offering help outnumbered those requesting assistance by nearly twenty to one. Although all the volunteers could not
immediately be utilized, their names, phone numbers and basic
skills were recorded so that they could be recontacted when needed.
Between forty and fifty volunteers worked on four hour shifts for
twenty-four hours a day the first two weeks of the crisis line
program. At that point it was decided to reduce the maintenance
of the line to eighteen hours per day. Eventually the crisis line
was limited to a daily operation of eight hours.

The joint Salvation Army/Interfaith facility at the One Stop
Centers was less successful. The representatives of the Salvation
Army stationed at the One Stop Centers were understandably more
adept at providing their traditional services of short-run emergency
relief (Ross, 1969) then they were at referral and other tasks of
particular importance to Interfaith C. The organizers of Interfaith
soon became disenchanted with the arrangement, and interaction with
the Salvation Army, despite its representation on the steering
committee, decreased markedly shortly thereafter.

The first efforts at establishing a hot meal program faced
difficulties also. It was found that few people took advantage of
the program either because they were not aware of it, because
transportation to the meal sites was difficult or because they did
not want to leave their badly damaged homes unprotected. To solve the
first problem, efforts to inform the public of the existence of the
program were strengthened. Buses were chartered in order to
alleviate the transportation problem. Anxiety in regard to an
untended house was lessened by the employment of "house-sitters"--
persons who would remain near a dwelling until the owner returned.
As a result of these modifications, the utilization of the hot
meal program increased dramatically, and over 14,500 meals were
served during its two week existence.

Within a week of the emergence of Interfaith C a fourth
program was initiated--one that would shortly constitute the most
distinctive task of the new organization. A few days after the
meeting in the mayor's office representatives from Interfaith B
arrived in the city. Offering their services as consultants to
the new organization, they described the advocacy program which had
been developed through their own tornado experience. The steering
committee was quite receptive to the idea and immediately incor-
porated it into its own plans.

Similar to the program of Interfaith B, Interfaith C's
advocacy was to consist of a survey of the damaged neighborhoods
coupled with an attempt to assist people in locating needed
resources. Although Interfaith C had money which it could distri-
bute in the form of direct grants to victims, the strength of the
program lay in the ability of the advocates to locate already
existing sources of victim support from established agencies
of which the tornado victim might not be aware. Yet, the members saw their organization as independent of other agencies; as an "advocate for the people."

As an advocate, then, we said we're going to be for the people, for the victims. And this may mean going up against the federal government, the Red Cross, whoever; it meant being on the side of the victims, helping them walk through all the red tape, all the maze of, you know, what they had to do to get the kind of assistance that they were entitled to. It meant interpreting, it meant telling them where, it meant telling them what was available, what were their rights, etc. This is what we deemed an advocate.

Training sessions were begun almost immediately. Recruited by means of the crisis line, nearly 100 volunteers (many of them college age youths) attended the training sessions held the first few weeks of the advocacy program. The sessions were designed not only to acquaint the volunteers with effective means of ascertaining the losses and needs of a family but also to give them a brief exposure to techniques by which the volunteers might encourage the victims to talk about or "ventilate" their experiences.

After a lot of the initial shock was gone people were wanting to talk, needing to talk, needing someone to talk to. So the advocates were given some training in active listening to deal with those people, where they didn't feel the press of schedules or duties where they had to have this interview over in three minutes, that one in five. They'd spend an hour or two hours, or however long was necessary with the people just to be friendly with them; to sympathize with them, empathize with them, to accept them, draw out their feelings. It wasn't a matter of arguing with them or questioning them. It was just listening.

The first advocacy work was undertaken by volunteers from the Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC) who had arrived a few days after the tornado, but within a week and a half of the emergence of Interfaith C local volunteers had begun to take over. Using "need cards" identical to those employed by Interfaiths A and B, the advocates contacted more than 700 families in the first two weeks. The most common problem (indicated by over 200 families) was inadequate insurance, while nearly 80 families needed to have debris removed.

Meanwhile Interfaith C's organization-set was being formed. The initial contact with other organizations had been made at the meeting in the mayor's office. Although there were several organizations present at the meeting, there remained many more which Interfaith C had yet to contact. It was decided that the most
An effective way of making that contact was to attend the numerous meetings that were held throughout the city in the first few days after the tornado. The members of the organization would go to different meetings and, upon returning, report to the rest of the group. Through such activities Interfaith C gradually established legitimacy with organizations in its environment such as HUD, the Office on Aging, etc.

I think it's just a matter of time; being able to assure them that we are in fact able to deliver, that we do in fact have the best interests of the folk at heart. But in time, when it was evident that we showed up at all the right meetings and made our reports, and we were able to say this is what we've done, and this is how we've done it, and this is what needs to happen; then we began to be taken seriously. You have to be present where they're present, you have to make sure that they see you, that they know who you are.

In an attempt to broaden the support base of Interfaith, several other religious organizations in the area were contacted. Some of these organizations had sent representatives to the original meeting in the mayor's office but had since had little communication with Interfaith C. Approximately two weeks after its emergence, Interfaith recontacted these groups to request their attendance at a meeting. On the basis of this gathering, a governing board of sixteen religious organizations, representing Protestant, Catholic and Jewish faiths, was established. Secular organizations such as the Red Cross had quickly lost interest in the new organization, leaving Interfaith C to be directed entirely by the churches.

Churches, then, were the obvious choice for financial support. By the end of its first week, Interfaith C had acquired $6,350 to be placed in its special Disaster Fund. Five thousand dollars of that total had been contributed by the Lutheran church while most of the remainder was provided by Catholic Social Services. The Fund was deposited under the name of the Metropolitan Association of Churches in order to take advantage of its tax exempt status.

Within two weeks of its emergence, Interfaith C had "identified" over $100,000 in church monies. None of this money, however, was placed into the Disaster Fund but was retained by the individual denominations, which promised to make it available on request. Thus, if the advocacy program located a victim requiring a direct grant from Interfaith, any one of a number of denominations would be requested to make out a check for the appropriate amount. As such, the denominations retained more power over their contributions than would have been the case had they provided single donations. Interfaith, on the other hand, possessed less financial autonomy as a result of this practice.
These disbursement policies were altered when Interfaith was finally incorporated. Primarily as a result of resistance from the Metropolitan Association of Churches, the organization was not incorporated until two months after its emergence. At that time a large portion of the available money was placed in the Disaster Fund, and whereas formerly only administrative outlays were covered by the Fund, after incorporation all disbursements were made through the single account. By that time nearly $200,000 had been pledged by various churches. In most cases, however, the denomination retained a portion of its pledge until requested by Interfaith to supply more.

By early June, approximately one month after its emergence, Interfaith hired a full-time coordinator of volunteers. Responsible for directing the advocacy program, the coordinator had soon taken over much of the responsibility for contact with other organizations. The board members, although not actually losing interest in the new organization, participated progressively less in interorganizational communication. Much of the contact with members of Interfaith's organization-set was also made by the six VISTA workers hired at the end of June. Although volunteers did not become scarce until the end of the summer, it was believed advisable to employ full-time staff in order to retain more continuity and control over the advocacy program. A proposal for the employment of six VISTA workers was thus submitted to ACTION, and within three weeks was accepted.

Interfaith contacted significantly more families (approximately 900) during its first month than it did in later months. However, the actual provision of financial aid remained relatively stable throughout the first six months of its existence. By June the new organization had distributed approximately $5,000 to 29 families requiring assistance. This figure, by the end of June, had grown to $12,468 awarded to a total of 65 victim families. Increasing gradually, the total distribution (to 360 families) by the end of November had reached $63,497. More than one third of this sum, $28,516, helped provide clothing to victim families, while the next largest amount, $12,764, was used to purchase new and used furniture.

Referrals to Interfaith from other organizations provide a view of some of the interorganizational exchanges during the first few months of Interfaith's existence. Of the total number of families contacted during that first month, 62 (more than 40 per cent of all referrals) were referred to the Office on Aging for assistance. Thirty-two families were sent to CRWRC for aid and 24 were referred to the Mennonites. By the end of June, however, referrals to organizations had dropped more than 60 per cent. The Office on Aging received only ten referrals from Interfaith during
this summer month, while CRWRC and the Mennonites received only four and eight, respectively. This lower rate of referrals remained stable throughout the year.

Interfaith, of course, received a number of referrals itself. HUD had provided the new organization with continuous up-dates on its relocation list which, although not technically constituting referrals, provided Interfaith with more clients than it received from any other organization. The Tornado Center, a disaster-related mental health program established in July, also made a number of referrals to Interfaith C. And finally, the welfare department was repeatedly contacted as a source of clients for the ecumenical organization.

By the middle of the summer, interaction between the above mentioned organizations and Interfaith C had become much more standardized. Exhibiting a rather extensive familiarity, most inter-organizational contacts involving Interfaith C had acquired an almost habitual character. The resulting stable or institutionalized organization-set reflected a strong similarity to that which had previously emerged around Interfaith B. As shown in figure 3, both in terms of the actual components and the range of organizational types, the institutionalized organization-set of Interfaith C was quite similar to that of Interfaith B (for comparison, see figure 2, page 37). As in figure 2, the organizations illustrated in figure 3 are not intended to exhaust the members of Interfaith C's organization-set but rather to reflect the range of organizations represented.

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Figure 3. The Institutionalized Organization-Set of Interfaith C.
The Change

In January, eight months after the tornado, some important changes began to develop in the organization-set of Interfaith C. The most salient of these changes was the cessation of operations of two important members of Interfaith's organization-set. HUD closed down its local office and moved its personnel back to its regional headquarters, and the Tornado Center completed its six-month program of disaster-related mental health services.

A more subtle change was also manifest. Although the market for Interfaith's services had decreased only slightly and the staff of the organization generally maintained its previous activity level, the board began to consider the future of Interfaith. As in the case of Interfaith B, it assumed a more reflexive attitude toward itself. But unlike its predecessor, it did not search for additional funding or reevaluate its goals, but rather took actions which would eventually lead to its dismemberment.

A short bulletin summarizing the activities of Interfaith C was printed, and thousands of copies were distributed to the churches that had offered financial support to the ecumenical organization. But rather than being a request for additional assistance the bulletin served as an acknowledgment to the churches for their past aid. To serve a similar function, a thirty minute television documentary was planned to publicize the past actions of Interfaith C; this too did not appear to be oriented toward a request for additional financial assistance. Instead it was an attempt to proclaim this "unique" ecumenical effort and, at the same time, recognize those who had assisted in its activities.

In March, at a board meeting in which the future of Interfaith C was discussed at length, it was agreed that because it had generally fulfilled its goals, the organization would terminate. Although at this writing, the organization is still in existence, it does appear likely that it will shortly disband. Because of the frequency of ecumenical cooperation in the past, there appears to be little reason for continuation of the program simply because it represents a successful cooperative effort among churches. On the other hand, Interfaith C, because of the rather extensive resources it controls, has bestowed a good deal of power on its directors--power which some might wish to retain. Yet, because of the lack of any apparent search for future funding the continuation of Interfaith C seems unlikely.

What does appear probable, however, is the emergence of other ecumenical groups in Community C, formed largely through the utilization of Interfaith C as a model. Not only might the basic


structure of Interfaith C be employed in constructing new organizations, but, more importantly, its successful image might be utilized to assist in the development of emergent organization-sets. Thus, although Interfaith C may terminate, it will, perhaps, stimulate the emergence of a number of other similar organizations in the community.

Summary

Although considerably larger than Community B and suffering greater absolute damage, Community C was not impaired as seriously by its tornado as had been Community B. Nevertheless, an interfaith organization emerged rapidly from the destruction and raised close to $200,000 in the first few months of its existence. Institutionalized within a few months, the organization-set of Interfaith C remained stable until almost eight months after the tornado. At that time arrangements were initiated for terminating the organization.
CHAPTER V

THE EMERGENCE AND CHANGE OF AN ORGANIZATION-SET: INTERFAITH D

Interfaith D is the final organization to be examined in regard to the emergence and change of its organization-set. Never attaining the scale of operation of its predecessors, this last ecumenical organization emerged within a much smaller community—a fact which may partially account for its more limited dimensions.

The Context of Emergence

Situated in a prime industrial area in the Midwest, Community D is the smallest of the cities examined in this research. The community had a population in 1970 of 14,217, less than one percent of whom were black. The population of the city is generally older than the U. S. population; the median age in Community D was 34 in 1970, while the comparable figure for the United States was 28. The city houses almost five percent more persons over sixty-five years of age than is characteristic of the nation as a whole, and younger persons are considerably underrepresented in the community (U. S. Census, 1973).

The average family income is less than is typical of the United States. In 1970, twelve percent of the families in Community D received an annual income of less than $3,000 while the comparable figure for the entire U. S. was less than nine percent. The majority of families in the town are in the middle income bracket. A very small percentage (13.7 percent for Community D as compared to 22.3 percent for the U. S.) received a yearly income of more than $15,000 in 1970 (U. S. Census, 1973).

The primary economic base of Community D is manufacturing and strip mining. Approximately 2,000 persons are employed in the International Harvester Company plant located in the city, while nearly 1,000 jobs in the area are provided by the mining and processing of coal. As would be expected, blue collar workers are
especially abundant in the city—the category of operatives being particularly well represented (U. S. Census, 1973).

The social service sector of the community is relatively undeveloped. The Public Health Department operates an apparently effective, though low-key, community aid program for the aged, and the city possesses a single mental health center. The mental health center is an outpatient clinic serving primarily persons between the ages of twenty-five and forty years. No overall coordinating agency for either social or mental health services exists in the community.

There does exist a ministerial association to which most of Community D's twenty-two churches belong. The activities of the organization, however, are quite modest and have been limited chiefly to rather noncontroversial issues upon which the divergent denominations have agreed. None of the so-called "social issues" of race, poverty, etc., have been approached by the association.

Although ten tornadoes had struck the county in the previous twenty-five years, none had hit Community D since 1835. During that disaster five persons had been killed, including the founder of the city. Although not taking as many lives, the tornado that led to the emergence of Interfaith D was far more destructive of property than its nineteenth century predecessor.

It struck at about 6:00 on an evening in late July. Entering the western portion of the city, the tornado carved a way due east toward the center of town. Destroying a trailer court upon its entrance to the city, the storm sustained its course through the central business district, damaging more than 100 businesses. Tearing the roof off the city's main manufacturing plant, the tornado continued east through an area of low-income housing. Reaching the eastern limits of the community, it devastated another trailer court, sweeping most of the mobile homes into a neighboring field and killing two of their occupants.

The tornado left three persons dead and more than 60 persons injured—approximately one quarter of them seriously enough to require hospitalization. One hundred homes in the city were extensively damaged by the storm, while more than 300 received at least minor damage. Besides the destruction to the manufacturing plant, some 150 other businesses were damaged—more than 30 of them seriously. Estimates of the total destruction varied from between four and six million dollars.

Although the immediate response could have been better coordinated, the removal and treatment of casualties was accomplished with few complications. The single ambulance company in the city
provided much of the victim transport, although several of the less seriously injured were able to walk to the hospital. Because of the rather large vacancy in the city's hospital and the absence of many serious casualties, the admission of 16 victims created little strain on the hospital's operations.

With the exception of the hospital and a few other important services, the community was without power for some time. Telephone service was able to be resumed within a few days, but electricity was not completely restored until weeks after the disaster. In one of the few examples of overt conflict in the immediate aftermath of disaster (cf. Quarantelli and Dynes, 1976) local electrical workers continued their strike for "coffee breaks and insurance" even after the tornado struck the community. Although interrupting their pickets in order to restore power to the city's most important services, the workers quickly resumed their strike and refused to repair the remainder of the damaged power system.

Most other recovery activities proceeded quite smoothly. Cleanup operations were initiated a few hours after the storm and over the next few days tons of debris were hauled from the city. The downtown area was surveyed in regard to damage and buildings with structural damage were ordered razed. After the arrest of five persons for looting (the charges were dropped the following day) an evening curfew was imposed, and efforts were made to limit entrance to the city to the community's residents and recovery workers. The officials of the main manufacturing concern quickly denied rumors of the plant's closing and initiated the repairs necessary for the resumption of operations.

The Emergence

The first activity on the part of the religious sector of Community D consisted of the establishment of two programs which served free meals to emergency workers and residents in the damaged areas. Set up early on the morning following the tornado, the two programs, located in the Christian Church and the Congregational Church, had served more than 1100 meals by early afternoon. They were staffed primarily by members of the congregations and were able to serve nearly 30,000 meals in approximately two weeks of their existence.

The meal programs were generally individual denominational efforts. Besides some assistance from the Salvation Army and other churches in the community, the Christian and Congregational Churches directed the programs themselves. There appeared to be little thought of substantial ecumenical cooperation by the community's clergy, for most were busy ministering to their own
congregations—attempting to assess damage and provide any necessary emotional and spiritual support. When, five days after the tornado, the director of Interfaith B telephoned one of the local clergy to offer his assistance, he was received rather unenthusiastically.

The director called me on Monday morning and said they would like to come out and have lunch with me and some people I was to get together. I told him that we'd be glad to have him come in about three or four weeks but we were busy. And he insisted, so, I called the mayor and a few people and got a group together for lunch one day, and they came out and explained to us why we needed an organization based on the churches.

Between twelve and fifteen persons were assembled to hear the presentation of the consultants from Interfaith B. Besides the mayor, most of those present were clergy from local churches, although representatives from the Red Cross and HUD were also in attendance. After an initial word of support by the mayor, the consultants proceeded to describe their own advocacy program, emphasizing the advantages of ecumenical cooperation in disaster recovery. Although some individuals proved to be difficult to convince, most of the clergy immediately supported the idea of establishing their own recovery organization.

Because of its prominence in the presentation by the Interfaith B consultants, an advocacy program was designated as the primary focus of the activities of the new group. The ministers present at the meeting were requested to locate volunteers who would be trained to survey the damaged areas and specify the needs that existed. Some of the more interested clergy met informally with the consultants over the next few days in order to delineate the mechanics of the operation.

Approximately seventy persons, most of them members of the local congregations, volunteered for the advocacy program. However, unlike the earlier interfaith organizations, very few young persons were among the volunteers. Most of them were church women who frequently offered their services to church projects. This very fact proved a detriment to the new organization, for, as some of the clergy stated later, many of the volunteers were "too religious"—their inability to separate proselytism from the more secular aims of Interfaith D tended to make their clients uncomfortable.

Too much religion was interjected. I got feedback from the people who were contacted saying, "Are you trying to impose such and such religion on us?" Well how could we, because we're an interfaith? And I would say to the advocates, "Don't even mention religion, this can't be conducted in that manner." But then it would keep coming up.
The training sessions began a week and a half after the first meeting. Under the direction of one of the consultants from Interfaith B, the volunteers were given a brief introduction to advocacy. The mechanics of filling out the forms as well as useful techniques for approaching people were discussed. Within a few days of the first training sessions the first advocates were sent out into the field. The consultant remained in the city for nearly two weeks to assist in supervision of the advocates.

Meanwhile, the five or six clergy who had expressed an interest in the new organization began to contact their judicatories for financial support. Phone calls and letters were sent to other local pastors to inform them of Interfaith D and to elicit their support and participation, and weekly "breakfast meetings" were established to which all of the community's clergy were invited.

The financial position of the new organization remained rather poor for more than a month following its emergence. Three weeks after the first meeting only $2,500 had been obtained, even though $100,000 was thought to be a "minimum" allowance for the task ahead. One week later, however, at the end of August, Interfaith D's balance had grown to approximately $8,000. And in September the figure rose significantly higher. Contacting the mayor, Interfaith D was able to obtain $9,000 of the city's $60,000 emergency fund which had been established through donations from individuals and private businesses. The judicatories also provided a substantial sum. The largest donation, $7,000, originated from the United Church of Christ, although the American Baptist and the United Methodist Churches each contributed close to $5,000. By the end of September, with donations from numerous local churches, fraternal organizations and other miscellaneous sources, the total of all contributions to Interfaith D rose to over $33,000.

The weekly breakfast meetings proved to be only partially successful. The number of interested clergy rose to about ten, but still only six or seven of Community D's twenty-two churches were represented. Apparently the local churches' traditional avoidance of secular issues precluded their enthusiastic support of even such a seemingly non-controversial issue as disaster recovery.

Somehow their theology or their basic beliefs about social concerns don't really attract them to this kind of programming. I've discovered this in other places where I've pastored, too. They just don't seem overly aggressive. They're more concerned with saving the soul than the body, that sort of thing.

The meetings did, however, serve to provide some structure to the new organization. An executive committee, consisting of chairman,
vice-chairman and secretary-treasurer, was appointed while the remaining interested clergy were designated the board of directors. By-laws were discussed, and incorporation papers were drawn up and submitted. And a coordinator was hired to devote full time to directing the advocacy program.

Although catering to the emotional needs of victims, the advocacy of Interfaith D, like the programs of its predecessors, was directed primarily to the physical needs of its clients. Interfaith attempted to meet those physical needs in a number of ways: advocates assisted in debris removal and cleanup; clothing, food and other goods warehoused by Interfaith were distributed to victims; clients were referred to agencies like HUD and SBA for assistance; and Interfaith itself would provide financial aid when it was unavailable from other sources.

Although direct grants were made to victims, the most common form of financial assistance from Interfaith consisted of vouchers for specific goods. After reviewing a victim's situation, a voucher slip for a specific amount of money would be given to the client. Often the goods to be purchased as well as the store to be visited would be designated on the voucher. As payment for the desired goods the client would give the voucher to the merchant, who in turn would return it to Interfaith for reimbursement. A number of stores gave Interfaith discounts on such transactions.

However, the initial location of victims with needs proceeded more slowly than expected—a slowness due in large part to the lack of an adequate number of volunteers. Within the first week of the advocacy program the original seventy volunteers had dwindled to half that number. And by September only about ten remained. However, five or six of these advocates proved to be highly committed to their work, and in most cases quite capable. Nevertheless, prior to September less than 150 "need cards" (identical to those used by Interfaiths A, B and C) were collected and filed. And on the basis of the advocacy work up to that time, only $500 was disbursed by the new organization. The board was discouraged with what they felt was too slow a progress.

To accelerate the advocacy program and its location of waiting victims, the need cards were distributed to several churches and civic organizations in Community D. Each was asked to cover a pre-designated area of the community and return the completed cards to Interfaith. Unfortunately, these efforts were insufficiently coordinated and the cards that were eventually returned to the ecumenical organization were of little use.

As another attempt to improve the effectiveness of the program the board began searching for a new coordinator. The first coordinator had, apparently, never been comfortable in the position of
leadership, and the board was understandably careful in the selection of a replacement. Although not possessing a college degree, the person chosen had had experience in the area of public relations and appeared to the board to be quite capable of coordinating the advocacy program.

One of the first actions of the new coordinator was to reestablish contact with HUD. A list of relocated families had been obtained by Interfaith earlier but had served only a minor role in the advocacy work, and no efforts had been made to obtain updates of the list. A current list was acquired, and the coordinator began a reorganization of Interfaith's files based on the new information. Subsequent contact with HUD was more frequent, and a relationship of mutual trust developed between the two organizations. The coordinator of Interfaith soon found that information she supplied to HUD regarding her clients was employed confidentially. Likewise, HUD personnel supplied the coordinator with background information on their clients, secure in the knowledge that such information would not be used improperly.

Thus, exchanges between the two organizations were not unilateral. HUD, of course, supplied many clients to Interfaith through its conferral of the relocation lists, yet Interfaith referred several persons to HUD as well. No all referrals were limited to disaster related requests, however, for, through the assistance of Interfaith, several families were able to register for an experimental housing program which had been established by HUD long before the tornado hit.

Over the next month interaction with other organizations in the community became more established and the organization-set of Interfaith D increased in stability. Thus, within two and a half months of its emergence, in spite of its problems with an imperfect advocacy program, Interfaith D had developed relatively stable patterns of interaction with several of the community's organizations. Figure 4 is a diagrammatic representation of the organization-set of Interfaith D during this more stable period. Besides HUD, some of the more important members of Interfaith's organization-set included the Public Health Department, SBA, a local furniture store, church judicatories and the Red Cross. As mentioned earlier, the Health Department maintained a community aid for the aged program to which Interfaith was able to make a number of referrals. Interfaith also referred families to SBA, which offered low interest loans to under-insured homeowners. A large proportion of the vouchers granted by Interfaith were redeemed at one of the local furniture stores. The Red Cross, capable of assisting families financially as well as materially, received several referrals from the ecumenical organization.
Interfaiths B and C had exhibited rather close relationships with mental health organizations in their respective communities, but although Community D's mental health center did have contact with Interfaith D, interaction between the two was not extensive. The mental health center had undertaken no activities directed to specifically disaster related mental health needs; the personnel had perceived no demand for such services. However, there were a few persons located by Interfaith who, in the estimation of Interfaith's coordinator, might have profited from a visit to the mental health center. Since, on the suggestion that these people make such a visit, all refused, no actual referrals were made to the center.

By October the advocacy program had exhibited a significant improvement. Although approximately the same number of persons were visited in the second month as the first, the number of families receiving some sort of financial assistance increased by 600 per cent. And by the end of October, three months after the organization's emergence, the total amount awarded in direct grants and vouchers to victim families exceeded $11,000.

The Change

However, few additional contributions were being received by the organization, and the balance was exhibiting a rather steady decline. By December the funds at Interfaith's disposal had diminished to approximately $12,000; two months later half of that
sum was gone. Yet the needs of the community had also decreased. In February only three families were still being served by HUD, Interfaith was receiving much fewer requests, and plans for rebuilding the stricken downtown area were being drawn up. The disaster was almost over.

The diminished needs were also perceived by persons outside the community. When a major earthquake occurred in Guatemala in February, some of the judicatories which had supported Interfaith applied pressure to the recovery organization to divert their remaining funds to the Central American country. The board considered doing so but decided that more than their remaining bank balance was required to cover the residual disaster related problems in Community D.

Along with a decrease in demand and diminishing finances, Interfaith also reduced its contact with other organizations in its environment. At its most stable point the organization-set of Interfaith D consisted of approximately fifty organizations, excluding the local churches whose clergy were board members of the ecumenical group. By the middle of December that number had been reduced by half, and by February, when the coordinator's office was closed down, the dying organization had irregular contact with only a handful of organizations.

Although some of the board members envisioned a post-disaster function for Interfaith D, the absence of any substantial financial support precluded the continuation of an active organization. However, a dormant or latent structure of some type was retained. Two thousand dollars were designated to remain in Interfaith's account for any future contingency which might require the assistance of the organization. A conference to which all of the community's emergency organizations were invited was arranged in order to discuss planning for future disaster situations. The organization, with a domain that had become almost entirely obsolete in three-quarters of a year, was forced to discontinue the tasks which it had attempted to fulfill over that time.

Summary

The preceding chapter examined the emergence of Interfaith D and the development of its organization-set. Interfaith D was the smallest of the three ecumenical groups studied in this research and emerged within the smallest of the three communities. Consisting of religious organizations, social service agencies and commercial businesses, the organization-set of Interfaith D became institutionalized within approximately three months of an
extensive tornado. Within eight months of its emergence, the organization and its organization-set had for most practical concerns been discontinued.

Thus, Interfaith D was both the shortest lived and the smallest in scope of the disaster recovery organizations examined in this research. Yet, in spite of these differences, there were significant similarities among these organizations; and there were important parallels between their emerging and changing organization-sets. In the next chapter, as the reader is again returned to the more analytical phases of this research, the explication of these similarities will become a major point of focus.
1. The five young men arrested for looting were apprehended the evening of the tornado in a local tavern which had been damaged by the storm. However, after discovering that one of the men had permission to be in the tavern and had merely invited some friends to accompany him, the police dropped all charges.
CHAPTER VI

DATA ANALYSIS: APPLICATION AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL

In a very simplified fashion, the similarities between the previously described emergent organization-sets reflect the recurrent patterns of social behavior which the analyst strives to locate. In other words, if there are certain processes that all the organization-sets appear to exhibit, these very processes may represent inherent characteristics of the emergence of organization-sets and, therefore, warrant the researcher's closer attention. For instance, all the organization-sets previously described became stable (institutionalized) within two to three months of their emergence. Based on this observation, the analyst may wish to tentatively conclude that organization-sets which emerge in the context of natural disasters are likely to be fully institutionalized within two to three months. Of course, with only four organization-sets upon which to base this hypothesis, its tentative nature must be emphasized. Nevertheless, this illustration does serve as at least a simplified example of the analytical process itself (Lofland, 1971).

But not all similarities or recurrences indicate patterns of theoretical importance. Some may represent confounding factors which serve only to conceal patterns which are sought. One such example in this research concerns the mutual influence of the interfaith organizations. It will be recalled that, with the exception of Interfaith A, all the ecumenical disaster recovery organizations were influenced in some fashion by their predecessors. Interfaith B was assisted by Interfaith A; Interfaiths C and D were, in turn, influenced by Interfaith B. It would seem, therefore, that the successive influences of the ecumenical organizations upon each other might confound any analytical statements about emergent organization-sets in disaster situations. To return to the earlier hypothesis, the two to three month institutionalization time might be due to the influence of the preceding ecumenical organization rather than to some other theoretical variable.
However, this does not appear to have been the case. With the exception of Interfaith D, the extent of influence on the ecumenical organizations by their predecessors was actually quite limited. It will be recalled that the director of Interfaith A was a "low key, low profile consultant" who offered suggestions to Interfaith B rather than imposing directives, and Interfaith C had already emerged when representatives of Interfaith B arrived. Furthermore, the influence of the predecessors on the actual emergence of the organization-sets of Interfaiths B, C and D was more limited still. With the exception of a few of the initial contacts with some of the nationally based organizations, the preceding interfaith organizations had little or no effect on the emergence of the organization-sets. The presence of the consultants was limited to approximately two weeks, diminishing even further this confounding factor.

The influence of these earlier organizations was generally limited to programmatic concerns. Especially in the two instances of consulting by Interfaith B, the primary focus was on the presentation of the advocacy program. The fact that all four ecumenical organizations used identical "need cards" can certainly be attributed to this mutual influence. But the characteristics of the emerging organization-sets were little affected by this factor. Nevertheless, the organizations studied are not strictly independent, and although the cases allow tentative generalization, more rigorous testing would require a more adequate sample of organizations.

The following chapter is devoted to the actual analysis of the data presented in the preceding three chapters and is composed of two main portions. The first portion consists of the application of the theoretical model outlined in Chapter II to the three organization-sets examined in this research. Drawing examples from the previous three chapters, this application is intended as an explication of the primary characteristics of the phases in the emergence of the organization-sets. The second portion of the analysis presents a further development of the model and is based on recurrent patterns exhibited by the ecumenical organizations studied.

**Application of the Model**

The model delineated in Chapter II consisted of the following phases in the emergence of the organization-set: crystallization, development of boundary personnel, recognition, resource-recognition and institutionalization. The first phase, crystallization, refers to the commitment of the members of the emerging organization to a course of action. Next follows the development of boundary
personnel, an activity which comprises the second phase of the emergence of an organization-set. The third phase is the recognition phase in which the establishment of recognition (i.e., legitimacy and visibility) is given priority. The resource-recognition phase follows. In this fourth phase, the exchange of resources gains in importance; reinforcing and being reinforced by the task of establishing recognition. Finally, the institutionalization phase is entered; a phase in which the organization-set attains a degree of relative stability.

Although organization-sets in most contexts may be expected to reach the institutionalization phase and subsequently manifest stability for some time, sets which have emerged in disaster situations face a rather different likelihood. The domain claimed by recovery organizations is one which is almost certain to rapidly become obsolete. Disaster recovery is only relevant in disaster situations; and the primary goal of disaster recovery is to propel a community to a non-disaster, normalized situation. Obsolescence is thus built into the very goals of these organizations. As such, they must choose one of two alternatives: to remain in existence but alter the goals and the organization-set, or to disband the organization (Sills, 1951:149). Both these alternatives are examined in the analysis to follow. The former is called the renegotiation of the organization-set; the latter is labelled termination.

Crystallization

The first phase of the emergence of an organization-set, crystallization, refers to the commitment by the members of the emerging organization to a course of action. In the case of Interfaith B this phase was reached a week following the tornado. The actual crystallization of the organization was to some extent stimulated by the activities of the Metropolitan Churches United, an ecumenical organization located in Community B's neighboring metropolitan area. Hearing that the MCU planned to set up a response, some of the local ministers of Community B expressed the view that an externally initiated plan would be inferior to an organization which emerged from within the stricken community. The local clergy, therefore, held their own meeting.

The meeting that was called to discuss plans for a church response was organized and chaired by some of the community's more prominent ministers, all of whom knew each other rather well. In spite of the large number present (representatives from almost forty-five area churches were in attendance), a general consensus on the basic goals of the effort was reached.
Requiring only a few days, this first phase of the emergence of Interfaith C's organization-set was reached even more rapidly than had been the case for Interfaith B. By the day after the tornado, plans were already being made for the initiation of an ecumenical recovery organization. The clergy responsible for these plans had, it will be recalled, associated frequently in the past on other ecumenical endeavors. And, perhaps as a result of this past interdenominational cooperation, they were able to more quickly crystallize a disaster recovery organization.

Some fifty persons were present in the organizing meeting of Interfaith C held in the mayor's office. Yet, in spite of the large number of persons present, a general consensus was reached and a sketch of the initial programs was constructed. The nominations which had been "planted" by some of the clergy assured that the leadership of the new organization would remain in the hands of the ministers who had previously worked together ecumenically.

Community D had little previous experience with ecumenicism. However, the clergy who were called together a week after the disaster for the organizing meeting of Interfaith D did know each other prior to the tornado--and certainly a previous acquaintance among clergymen would be likely in a town the size of Community D. Nevertheless, until the involvement of Interfaith B, there were few signs of the development of an interdenominational disaster recovery effort.

The course of action chosen by the members of the new organization was strongly influenced by the presentation of the representatives from Interfaith B. And although some members proved to be dubious of the utility of another recovery organization, a general consensus was reached by the end of the first meeting. All three organizations, therefore, did exhibit behavior which was characteristic of crystallization, the first phase in the emergence of the organization-set.

Development of Boundary Personnel

In all three cases, the development of boundary personnel rapidly followed the first phase in the emergence of the organization-sets. A large number of the clergy who were later designated the board members of Interfaith B were called on to make contact with other organizations in the environment. Thus, unlike Interfaith A, no one person was charged with the responsibility for initiating external contacts.
Likewise, for both Interfaiths C and D, the persons, primarily clergymen, most interested in the new organization took on the responsibility of initiating contact with other organizations. In neither case was there any specific designation of a boundary-spanning position or responsibility; rather all of those who were especially interested in the development of their organization simply assumed a portion of the responsibility for initiating external contact. Thus, for all three interfaith organizations, the second phase in emergence followed in the temporal order indicated by the model.

Recognition Phase

The third, or recognition, phase refers to the period in the development of an organization-set in which the establishment of recognition is given priority. Within days of the first meeting, Interfaith B had entered this phase by initiating contact with numerous other organizations. Several of the pastors telephoned their judicatories to inform them of their recovery efforts and the condition of Community B. Interfaith B began interacting with the government disaster relevant organizations such as SBA and HUD; and contact was established with several social service and mental health agencies which had offices in town or had sent representatives to the impacted city.

Little time was devoted to attempts merely to inform other organizations of the existence and rationale of the new entity. In fact, many of the first contacts made by Interfaith B immediately resulted in the supply of some needed resource. Thus, even at this early point in time the characteristics of the fourth phase in the emergence of the organization-set had begun to surface. With some organizations, however, the establishment of recognition was more difficult. More than two weeks passed after the initial contact with HUD before Interfaith B was promised the government organization's valuable relocation list; the list was not actually furnished until one more week had passed.

Although a number of contacts with other organizations were initiated at the meeting in which Interfaith C was organized, the new organization required several more linkages before it could successfully pursue its new tasks. To establish these contacts the members of the emergent recovery organization attended the various disaster meetings held during the first week after the tornado. Often, because of the frequency of these meetings, the members would each attend different gatherings, returning to give a report of the proceedings. As was the case for Interfaith B, many of the initial contacts made by Interfaith C personnel immediately resulted in an exchange of some resource. There was little time
for the careful explanation and documentation of the utility of the new organization; and the recognition phase of the emergence of this organization-set was extremely short lived.

Somewhat longer was the recognition phase of Interfaith D. The letters sent out to local pastors to inform them of the program were not followed by any exchange of resources until almost two weeks after the emergence of the organization. And although several of the judicatures were quickly acquainted with the existence and goals of the organization, formal requests for funds were not made for more than two weeks. Likewise, contacts with HUD long remained primarily at the level of this third phase rather than proceeding to the fourth. It will be recalled that not until the new coordinator assumed her position in September (one month after the organization's crystallization) was there a noticeable exchange of resources between the two organizations.

In spite of the differences in time required, the acquisition of legitimacy was relatively simple for all three organizations and the establishment of recognition followed relatively easily. Although the administration of specific programs for disaster recovery may create controversy (Taylor, Ross and Quarantelli, 1976), the general attempts to relieve suffering caused by disasters seldom face resistance. Only a small effort was required, therefore, to demonstrate the convergence between the goals of the interfaith organizations and the prevailing values of the communities—a demonstration necessary for the acquisition of legitimacy (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975:127).

Resource-Recognition Phase

The fourth phase is perhaps the most dynamic of the phases in the emergence of an organization-set. In it the focal organization attempts to secure (or deposit) needed resources while, at the same time, endeavoring to establish recognition with the organizational environment. The two tasks of exchanging resources and establishing recognition interact with each other. Although the directors of the focal organization obviously hope that each task will positively reinforce the other, an unsatisfactory resource exchange may lead to a decrease in recognition, or vice versa.

Because of the temporal constraints imposed by the disaster, the ecumenical organizations quickly entered the fourth phase of the emergence of their organization-sets. Interfaith B's early attempts to obtain volunteers, warehouse space, furniture, clothing and clients all involved repeated contact with other organizations. Gradually, over the first few months of its existence, the emergent recovery organization established a reputation for successfully fulfilling its tasks and providing an important service. Through the satisfactory exchange of resources, the organization and its
domain were soon acknowledged by the surrounding organizations—an occurrence which the literature on complex organizations labels "domain consensus" (Levine and White, 1961).\(^1\)

Entering the resource-recognition phase as quickly as Interfaith B, Interfaith C was also able to develop recognition through successful exchanges. A statement by one of the organizers of Interfaith C captures well the character of this phase.

I think it's just a matter of time; being able to assure them that we are in fact able to deliver, that we do in fact have the best interests of the folk at heart. But in time, when it was evident that we showed up at all the right meetings and made our reports, and we were able to say this is what we've done, and this is how we've done it, and this is what needs to happen; then we began to be taken seriously.

Although also rapidly moving into the fourth phase of the emergence of its organization-set, Interfaith D was, nevertheless, somewhat more sluggish in its course than its predecessors. More than two weeks passed before many substantial exchanges were made with members of its emerging organization-set. Even three weeks after its crystallization, Interfaith had secured only $2,500, and up to that time had sent only a few clients with vouchers to local merchants.

The difficulties within the advocacy program of Interfaith D appeared to exhibit a significant relationship with the sluggishness in which the organization-set emerged. That is, the inability to locate and adequately deal with clients in the first two weeks of the program tended to inhibit the establishment of recognition and the development of a stable organization-set. On the other hand, the relationship was not asymmetrical; for the absence of effective links with other organizations precluded a well operated advocacy program. With the employment of a new coordinator, a more effective effort at establishing stable patterns of interaction with other organizations ensued, and the advocacy program was improved. Therefore, the interaction between the tasks of recognition establishment and resource exchange, which is characteristic of the fourth phase of emergence, was exhibited by all three interfaith organizations. All three, thereby, progressed toward the establishment of an institutionalized organization-set.
Institutionalization

Institutionalization refers to that period in which more or less stable patterns of interaction have evolved between the focal organization and its organizational environment. The organization-set, in other words, is generally fully developed. Such a situation may take years to attain by organizations which emerge in non-disaster settings. Yet Interfaiths B, C and D had all developed institutionalized organization-sets within only a few months of their formation.

In fact, although the present model has not been systematically applied to the emergence of organization-sets in non-disaster situations, it appears likely that all the phases would be much more quickly negotiated in collective stress circumstances than in less disrupted settings. To a large extent this rapidity is due to the necessity of immediate action. As one of the organizers of Interfaith A was quoted earlier as saying, there wasn't time for "all this crap that organizations frequently have to get into."

But equally important is the expansive gap in needed services created by the disruption of the disaster. Within hours, even minutes, entirely new services and extensive new demands become relevant to the population of the impacted community. Many of the services are able to be provided by existing organizations; but many are not. Organizations and groups which emerge to provide those services face very little competition, and their formative months exhibit few of the problems which would have troubled them had they emerged in a less disrupted setting.

Between two and three months after its emergence, Interfaith B had developed stable patterns of interaction with its organization-set. Although the set contained fewer members during the institutionalization phase than at earlier times, interaction between those members and Interfaith B was now somewhat more regularized, if not more frequent. HUD was perhaps the most important element of the organization-set, although some of the mental health organizations, social service agencies and certainly the church judicatories were also regular contacts of the ecumenical organization.

The constituency of Interfaith C's institutionalized organization-set was quite similar to that of Interfaith B. Again, HUD represented an extremely important element of the organization-set, and mental health organizations, while not as prominent as they had been in Community B, also accounted for much of Interfaith C's external contact. In addition, suppliers of material goods were a key element of Interfaith C's organization-set--as they were
for all the ecumenical disaster recovery groups. Yet several of
the organizations with which Interfaith C had interacted in its
earlier stages were no longer members of its set. Organizations
such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, although originally
represented on the steering committee of Interfaith, no longer
maintained meaningful contact with the ecumenical organization.

Although Interfaith D was somewhat slower than the other
organizations in reaching the resource-recognition phase, its
organization-set had nevertheless become institutionalized within
three months. Only a portion of those organizations contacted
during the first month of its existence could be considered
members of its institutionalized organization-set; among the most
frequently contacted of this latter group were HUD, Public
Health, a local department store and the Red Cross. Thus, mental
health organizations did not represent as important an element of
the organization-set of Interfaith D as they had in the earlier
recovery organizations.

The institutionalization of the organization-sets of the
interfaith organizations represented an important increment in their
control over environmental uncertainty. With this fifth phase in
the emergence of the organization-set, the focal organizations
acquired a predictability over the sources of input and the
repositories of output not previously held. Of course, the
organizations' attempts to control their respective environments
did not cease at the institutionalization of their organization-
sets. Interfaith B, for instance, was able to use the knowledge
 gained through the Interfaith-DRC population survey to assure the
 provision of future funding. Interfaith C altered its disbursement
policies to permit it to control all outlays of the organization
rather than relinquishing the power to the individual denominations. But although additional actions to control external
contingencies were necessary, the institutionalization of the
organization-sets did much to stabilize the environment of the
ecumenical organizations.

Renegotiation of the Organization-Set

As the communities finally recovered from the tornadoes, the
interfaith organizations found themselves confronting radically
changed environments. Most of the services which they had pro-
vided had been directly relevant only to disaster victims. Yet,
as the disaster receded further into the past, the victims, or at
least the appropriateness of the label, "victim", decreased
markedly. Thus, the organizations were faced with a dilemma—
whether to continue in operation and alter their previous domain
or to disband the organization.
The former alternative was chosen by Interfaith B. A strategy committee, formed to consider new directions for the organization, arrived at a number of suggestions. The creation of a national disaster recovery organization was the one most highly favored. Interfaith B had previously involved itself in such a task by providing consultants to the religious organizations in four other communities which had been stricken with tornadoes. Thus, a good deal of expertise in the suggested task area had already been developed by the organization, and its operational efficiency was higher than would have been the case had the organization entered the area inexperienced.

Under these new circumstances a higher degree of efficiency would be necessary since the organization would find itself in competition with other established organizations (Gillespie and Perry, 1975:38)—competition largely absent in the immediate post-disaster setting of Community B. The Red Cross, the Salvation Army, the Mennonite Disaster Service and Church World Service all had national disaster recovery programs which would represent competition for Interfaith B. Inefficient organizations are able to emerge and survive in collective stress situations because the plethora of demands decreases interorganizational competition and resistance to emergence. But when the scarcity of clients and other resources rises, competition also increases (Levine and White, 1961; Evan, 1966). To compete effectively, the organization ought to have developed an efficient structural arrangement. Fortunately for Interfaith B, by the time it was ready to alter its goals it could boast of a rather efficient structure—considering the size and age of the organization.

Interfaith B's change in goals was a classic example of what is referred to in the sociological literature as goal succession (Sills, 1961:146-159; Blau, 1963:243). Defined as the selection of new goals after the former ones have been either achieved or made irrelevant by the changing social context, the succession of goals has been exhibited by numerous organizations. For example, in 1844 the YMCA was established in London "to improve the spiritual condition of young men engaged in the drapery and other trades." Today, however, its prime emphasis is on recreational activities (Sills, 1961:150; Zald, 1970a:25). Dartmouth College was founded for the purpose of Christianizing American Indians but was later transformed to a general liberal arts institution (Sills, 1961:149). And the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis (March of Dimes), after assisting in the development of an effective polio vaccine, shifted its energies to other medical problems (Etzioni, 1964:13).

The concept of renegotiation provides one with a totally new way of examining phenomena previously well explored in the sociological literature on goal succession. Rather than focusing on the
internal processes involved in the alteration of goals as did the goal succession literature, renegotiation deals with the external processes of environmental interaction which take place simultaneously with that change in goals. Consisting of the significant alteration of the focal organization's organization-set, the renegotiation of Interfaith B's organization-set was foreshadowed in the organization's first attempts, six months after crystallization, at broadening its support base. The renegotiation efforts became more salient as the organization began considering new goals a year and a half after the tornado. Through interaction with Church World Service, national denominational representatives and certain private foundations, the organization-set of Interfaith B began to take on a significantly extra-local character. As one might readily imagine, this extra-local character of the organization-set would facilitate, if not actually be mandatory for, the successful establishment of a national recovery organization.

The renegotiation of the organization-set is best viewed as a return to an earlier phase in the emergence of the organization-set rather than a phase in itself. That is, in its attempts to alter its set, the focal organization actually may return to the very first phase in the emergence process, crystallization. Although not technically "starting from scratch," the strategy committee formed a year and a half after the emergence of Interfaith B resulted in a commitment to a new course of action. This recrystallization was followed by the specification of boundary personnel to initiate contact with possible members of the altered organization-set. One person, the director of Interfaith B, was given primary responsibility for this area.

The third or recognition phase was much slower during renegotiation than had been the case when Interfaith originally emerged. Organizations such as Church World Service were resistant to accepting Interfaith's new domain, whereas Interfaith's original emergence had been opposed by almost no one. Of course, the recovery organization no longer existed in an environment of excessive demands which provided a ready market for its services. Now it entered an area with competitors who, although not providing exactly the same services which Interfaith intended to supply, overlapped sufficiently with the newcomer to constitute a significant resistance.

At present, Interfaith B appears to have reentered the resource-recognition phase in the renegotiation of its organization-set. Presumably, if all goes well for the organization, its new organization-set should shortly be institutionalized.
Termination

Of course, organizations whose goals have been either achieved or rendered obsolete have an alternative to goal succession and the renegotiation of their organization-sets; the dissolution or termination of the organization. Such an outcome is hardly uncommon. In 1970 alone, almost 11,000 commercial and industrial failures occurred in the United States (U. S. Census, 1975:490). But even when the functions of an organization are no longer relevant or are unable to be performed efficiently, the organization need not dissolve, for frequently there are vested interests present which tend to sustain the organization long after its usefulness has past (Downs, 1967:22-23).

Thus, termination is often not an intentional outcome, but rather a failure of attempts to prolong existence. Such was apparently the case for Interfaith D, for some of the more active members of the board had hoped for the continuation of the organization in some form even after the disaster needs were met. However, organizations as small as Interfaith D are unable to adapt as readily to fluctuations in support as larger organizations often can (Downs, 1967:23). Thus, the withdrawal of support by the judicatories and the failure to locate sufficient additional revenue precluded any option but the termination of the organization.

Within five months of its emergence, Interfaith D had already curtailed its operations significantly. Interaction with other organizations reflected this reduction in activity. The organization-set decreased in size to almost half as many members as there had been during Interfaith's most active period. Inter-organizational interaction continued to decrease until, when the office was closed in February, only a few representatives of Interfaith D had any contact whatever with other organizations. The organization-set, as well as the organization, had been dissolved.

In contrast, there was almost no expression of an interest in the continuation of Interfaith C by any of its directors. On the contrary, a rather orderly "phasing-out" operation was outlined by which the personnel would gradually be laid off and the office closed. However, plans were discussed in regard to the formation of another ecumenical organization directed to emergency assistance for individual crises. Although constituting a different organization from Interfaith C, a good deal of the experience gained during the operation of the recovery organization would probably carry over to its successor. And though most of the personnel of the two organizations would be different, there would be overlap among the board members. Indeed, the very fact that some of the board members of Interfaith C would, in spite of the
termination of their organization, shortly assume positions of leadership in what they hoped would be another successful ecumenical organization, may have minimized their desire to prolong the existence of Interfaith C.

Further Development of the Model

The theoretical model of the phases in the emergence of the organization-set does appear to be applicable to the three ecumenical organizations studied in this research. The phases appear to follow one another in the order outlined above, and although some are rather brief in existence, each is empirically distinguishable from the rest. By itself, the model provides one with a mechanism for examining organization-set emergence. It takes the profuse aspects of the process by which organization-sets emerge and transposes them to a more readily workable form. Yet there is an important function which the model does not serve. Apart from the fact that each phase is distinguished by an organizational task (e.g., crystallization is distinguished by an action commitment, the recognition phase by the primacy of recognition establishment), the delineation of specific behavior patterns characteristic of each phase is weak. In other words, a valuable task which ought to be approached is the specification of any recurrent interactive patterns which may emerge between a focal organization and its organization-set as the latter develops.

Such patterns are likely to be much more contextually related than the model itself. That is, although the phases themselves may be applicable to organization-sets which emerge in widely divergent contexts, the interactive patterns characteristic of each phase will not. Thus, it is especially important to emphasize that the characteristic patterns relate only to specifically disaster related emergent organizations which develop within the religious sector of the community. The patterns may be displayed by non-religious disaster related emergent organizations, but it is unlikely that they will be exhibited in normalized settings. In either case, however, additional research is required before adequate generalization is possible.

For an increased clarity in presentation, a slightly modified temporal sequence will be employed in the delineation of patterns to follow. Rather than the five emergence phases plus renegotiation and termination, a four period temporal format will be followed. The first period, Time 1, will correspond exactly to the first two emergence phases, crystallization and development of boundary personnel. Time 2 consists of both the recognition phase and the resource-recognition phase, respectively the third
and fourth phases in the emergence of the organization-set. Time 3 corresponds to the institutionalization of the emergent organization-set. And the final period, Time 4, is devoted to either the renegotiation or the termination of the organization-set. The modification is indeed slight, since it consists simply of the collapse of the five (plus two) phases into four separate time periods. Such a modification is warranted because 1) it simplifies the explanation and understanding of the exhibited interactive patterns without appreciably affecting the information supplied and 2) in light of the patterns which emerged from the data, a four period temporal sequence more appropriately captured the process.

Time 1--Crystalization and Development of Boundary Personnel

Time 1 corresponds to the first two phases in the emergence of the organization-set, crystallization and development of boundary personnel. Since neither of these phases involve actual interaction with the organizational environment, Time 1 refers to the period prior to the initiation of interorganizational contact. A number of patterns common to the three organization-sets during Time 1 emerge upon careful examination. First, this initial period was extremely short-lived in all three cases. Within a week and a half of their respective disasters, the organizations had all crystallized and developed boundary personnel for the purpose of initiating contact with other organizations.

A second commonality was the lack of conflict among the divergent denominational representatives who formed the organizations. In the case of Interfaith B, as many as forty-five different churches cooperated in the ecumenical effort--certainly an exceptional case of ecumenism. Such an absence of conflict does appear to be characteristic of the early stages following a natural disaster. Largely because of the immediacy of the problem and the necessity of the response, communities tend to exhibit an uncommon amount of cohesiveness immediately after the impact of a disaster (Fritz, 1961; Quarantelli and Dynes, 1976). 3

A third and theoretically more interesting pattern relates to the original constitution of the organization. In all three instances the organizations were formed by individuals who had known each other prior to the emergence. Forrest labels this prior acquaintance "previous interaction patterns" and claims it as one of the more important regularities exhibited by emergent groups and organizations (1968). According to Forrest, emergent groups tend to develop around previous interaction patterns, utilizing those patterns as a basis for further structural differentiation and organizational development (1968; 1974).
Although the experiences of all three organizations readily support Forrest's hypothesis, the emergence of Interfaith C is especially corroborative. The clergy most responsible for creating Interfaith C had not only been acquainted prior to the emergence of the organization, but had actually cooperated on other ecumenical endeavors in the past. As one of the organizers was quoted earlier as saying, "We'd worked on so many things in the past, it's just a foregone conclusion we're going to do things together." Although not as well developed, the previous interaction patterns among the creators of Interfaiths B and D were also substantial.

The strength of these previous interaction networks appears to be an important condition affecting the rate and likelihood of emergence. Interfaith C, with the best developed pre-disaster network, began to emerge the day after the tornado. Interfaiths B and D, on the other hand, did not show signs of life until approximately one week following their disasters. Indeed, without the catalytic influence of Interfaith B, perhaps no ecumenical organization would ever have emerged within Community D.

A final regularity apparent in Time 1 relates to the boundary personnel of the emerging organizations. It was noted in the brief description of Interfaith A appearing in Chapter II that the primary responsibility for initiating external contacts in the name of that organization was placed with the newly appointed director. Largely this placement was due to the fact that the director "already had a good name" as a result of his work with an earlier flood recovery effort. Several of the organizations with which Interfaith A would need to interact were already familiar with this individual, and thus, the establishment of recognition by Interfaith A was made that much easier.

Interfaiths B, C and D, on the other hand, had no such advantage—interorganizational contact had to be established anew. In order to do so the individuals most interested in the ecumenical organizations assumed the task of contacting other organizations both inside and outside the community. Thus, rather than a single individual, the boundary personnel of Interfaiths B, C and D more closely corresponded to a "small band of warriors"—as Downs labels the more active of an organization's creators (Downs, 1967). Later designated as board members or upper level staff of the new organization, these individuals were responsible for the establishment of most of the initial contacts with the emerging organization-set.
Time 2--Recognition and Resource-Recognition

The two phases in the emergence of the organization-set which correspond to Time 2 are the recognition and resource-recognition phases. Both represent the period in which the focal organization initiates interorganizational communication and attempts to develop stable relationships with its organization-set. The most characteristic pattern associated with this phase for the interfaith tornado recovery organizations is what one may refer to as the "shotgun" approach to the establishment of contact. In all three cases, large numbers of organizations were contacted in some fashion in the first weeks after emergence. Several of these organizations, however, were of limited relevance to the ecumenical groups and were not contacted further. The label "shotgun" is an attempt to capture the rather diffuse projection of external linkages characteristic of this early phase as opposed to the more specific focus of contacts during the organization-set's institutionalization.

For example, several of the organizations such as universities, seminaries and churches contacted in the search for volunteers did not long remain members of Interfaith B's organization-set. Likewise, as interest declined in the weekly social service agency meetings, Interfaith B had less contact with many of the former attendants. In a similar fashion, many of the organizations sending representatives to the numerous post-tornado meetings in Community C had only superficial, short-term contact with Interfaith C. And Interfaith C's attempts to create a resource booklet describing the community services available to tornado victims brought the ecumenical organization into contact with some organizations it seldom communicated with again. Finally, Interfaith D attempted to interact with most of the community's churches in an effort to involve them in the ecumenical recovery. However, two months later only half a dozen of these churches could be considered members of Interfaith D's institutionalized organization-set.

Another regularity which emerges from the data on the organization-sets in this second period concerns the level of personnel initiating interorganizational contacts. Very often when the first external contacts were made, formal positions within the organization had not been designated. Nevertheless, most of the initial interaction with other organizations was made by persons who would shortly be appointed to these higher level organizational positions. In the very earliest stages, this restriction of the boundary-spanning task to higher level personnel was simply a function of the lack of trained subordinates. However, it also appears to be due to the fact that the "small band of warriors" are, at least in the initial periods, highly committed and
willing to perform tasks which will establish recognition and obtain resources from other organizations. It is only at later stages that the unpaid board members begin to lose interest in the organization, preferring to return to their former duties.

Time 3--Institutionalization

Time 3 consists of the institutionalization of the organization-set. During this period the relationships between the focal organization and the members of its set achieve a stability not previously attained. A general consensus or acceptance of one another's domain exists, and exchanges are made in an habitual fashion. Yet this period is by no means static. Organizations with which there has been no interaction sometime become important contacts, while those which were once members of the organization-set discontinue interaction with the focal organization. Nevertheless, the organization-set at Time 3 is more stable than at any earlier time, both in terms of components and patterns of interaction.

The regularities exhibited by the ecumenical organizations in this advanced stage of the emergence of their organization-sets offer an interesting contrast to the characteristics of the preceding, Time 2 period. For instance, rather than a large number of diffuse, broad-scope contacts with the environment (the "shotgun" approach), the institutionalized organization-set in Time 3 is more likely to consist of a limited number of relatively specific linkages. Even in the case of Interfaith B's interaction with HUD, which, as mentioned earlier, was colored by the mutual attraction of the staff, contact between the two organizations was conducted in a generally standardized, habitual fashion.

Likewise, contrary to the earliest contacts with members of the organization-set, in Time 3 the focal organization communicated with other organizations primarily through the actions of its middle level personnel. Within a few months of its emergence, most of Interfaith B's interorganizational contacts were being made by the supervisors of the advocacy program rather than the organization's board members. By the time Interfaith C's organization-set had become institutionalized, almost all external interaction was being instituted by the coordinator of volunteers and the VISTA workers. And even Interfaith D, which employed only one staff member, exhibited this pattern. In Time 3 a misproportionately large share of interorganizational contacts were executed by the coordinator of this last ecumenical organization.

A final regularity which was apparent in Time 3 concerns what may be called the departmentalization of interorganizational
contact. Lawrence and Lorsch note that different departments within complex organizations interact with different elements of the environment. The marketing department, for instance, with its concern for the sale of the company's product, will maintain contact with a rather different set of organizations than the research and development department, oriented to product innovation. This differential environmental contact has, the authors suggest, an important influence on the characteristics of the individual departments and is the basis for much of the intra-organizational conflict that occurs (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1969; see also Udy, 1970).

Although the ecumenical organizations studied in the present context do not attain nearly the level of complexity characteristic of the plastics and canning manufacturers studied by Lawrence and Lorsch, the simpler organizations do exhibit a similar departmentalization of contact. Measured as the extent to which contact with each member of the organization-set is assigned to a specific representative of the focal organization, the departmentalization of contact increases during Time 3 for both Interfaith C and Interfaith D. Viewed another way, during this advanced stage in the emergence of the organization-set, fewer of the organizations contacted by each ecumenical organization communicated with more than one of that organization's representatives. For example, interaction with HUD is, in time, likely to be handled by one individual; the primary responsibility for contact with the mental health center is placed with another; and a third individual is asked to handle exchanges with the various stores in the surrounding area.

Although data was not collected which would have enabled the search for this pattern in Interfaith B, the mailed questionnaire administered to Interfaiths C and D did display this factor. As illustrated by Table 1, in the earliest portion of Time 3, 56 per cent of the members of Interfaith C's organization-set were contacted by more than one of its representatives. Two months later, the percentage had decreased to 31 per cent, representing a significant increase in contact departmentalization. An even stronger change was exhibited by Interfaith D. Forty-eight per cent of Interfaith D's organization-set were contacted by more than one representative in the earlier portion of Time 3. In approximately three months the figure had decreased to 14 per cent. Thus both organizations had displayed an increase in contact departmentalization during Time 3.
Table 1. Interorganizational Contact Departmentalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization-Set</th>
<th>1st Wave</th>
<th>2nd Wave</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interfaith C</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interfaith D</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This increasing departmentalization, which is as much a characteristic of the organization-set as of the organization, is consistent with the other patterns exhibited in Time 3. That is, the decrement in size of the set, the increased activity of lower level boundary personnel and the growing departmentalization of contact all connote an increasing specificity and standardization of interaction between the focal organization and its organization-set. And according to the literature cited in Chapter II (e.g., Thompson, 1967; Rosengren, 1970) such a consequence should generally decrease the environmental uncertainty faced by the focal organization, permitting it to more readily pursue the tasks for which it was designed.

Time 4—Renegotiation or Termination

The final time period is devoted to changes in the organization-set following institutionalization. These changes can be of two general kinds. Either the organization-set terminates with the dissolution of the focal organization or renegotiation occurs in which a significant alteration is made in the components of the organization-set.

The specification of patterns is much more difficult in this last time period than it was in preceding periods since our rather limited number of cases necessarily shrinks even further at this point. Little more can be said of termination than that it signifies the end of the organization-set as well as the organization; for at present Interfaith C has not dissolved, leaving only Interfaith D upon which to base conclusions. The renegotiation of the organization-set, however, can be examined with relevance to suggested patterns since, counting Interfaith A, there are at least two instances of its occurrence. Although it need not be reiterated, it is probably worthwhile to emphasize that none of the recurrent patterns explicated in this section of the
study are intended as generalizable hypotheses. Rather they are meant as sensitizers to the possible characteristics likely to be associated with the emergence and change of organization-sets. The extremely small number of cases in the analysis precludes any more elaborate a goal.

What appears to be the most significant pattern in the two instances of renegotiation is the rather limited nature of the process itself. That is, although renegotiation did introduce a number of organizations with which the focal organization had not previously interacted, an even larger number of former members of the organization-set sustained contact with the focal organization. By no means, therefore, can either instance of renegotiation be viewed as the creation of a totally new organization-set. Instead, the process is more appropriately seen as a modification of the original set.

The limited extent of the renegotiation process displayed by the two organizations may perhaps be due to the rather limited nature of the shifts in goals. It could be argued, for instance, that since Interfaith A chose to pursue a goal closely similar to that which it sought after the flood, there was little need for a massive alteration in the organization-set. And Interfaith B's new task had already been carried out a number of times. There would appear to be little necessity for the establishment of new contacts to support tasks fulfilled successfully in the past.

As sound as this reasoning appears, however, an important consideration is absent. While it is clear that the goals to be sought by an organization will influence which organizations are to be contacted, is it not apparent on the other hand that already existing interorganizational linkages will tend to restrict the goals which can be chosen? Simon quite insightfully sees that goals are merely one of the many constraints placed upon an organization (Simon, 1964). Other constraints such as the cost of labor or materials and the desire of the stockholders for higher dividends must be considered along with the so-called goals of the organization in any decisions which are made. Yet although Simon's emphasis is on constraints internal to the organization, external factors such as relationships with other organizations are an equally important resistance.

It is not a simple matter to build a stable relationship with another organization. Even in the facilitating context of a disaster, months are sometimes required. It is unlikely, therefore, that relationships which have been carefully constructed will be discarded lightly. They are, to the contrary, likely to serve as a substantial impediment or resistance to changes which would imply their destruction. Thus, rather than mere reflections of the goals
of an organization, the relationships or linkages with its organization-set are also an important constraint which may influence several aspects of the organization. That these relationships may themselves be resistant to change need not be explained by reference to any organizational goals.

Summary of the Patterns

Before proceeding to the final chapter it would be useful to offer a brief summary of the patterns which were characteristic of the four time periods in the emergence and change of the organization-sets of the ecumenical recovery organizations. These patterns are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2. Summary of the Patterns Exhibited by the Emerging Organization-Sets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHASES</th>
<th>PATTERNS EXHIBITED</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIME 1</td>
<td>Crystallization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Development of Boundary Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) Presence of Previous Interaction Patterns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Multiple Boundary Personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME 2</td>
<td>Recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resource-recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) &quot;Shotgun&quot; Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Higher Level Personnel Perform Boundary-Spanning Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME 3</td>
<td>Institutionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) Decrease in Size of Organization-Set</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b) Lower Level Personnel Perform Boundary-Spanning Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c) Increasing Departmentalization of Interorganizational Contact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIME 4</td>
<td>Renegotiation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Termination)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) Absence of Massive Alteration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Besides its rapidity and the absence of significant conflict, the most important regularities exhibited in Time 1 were the presence of previous interaction patterns upon which the organizations were built and the designation of a number of boundary personnel rather than a single individual. Time 2, representing the initial contact between the focal organization and its organizational environment, manifests two recurrent patterns: (1) these earliest contacts approximated what could be called a "shotgun" approach to environmental interaction and (2) the representatives making these contacts were likely to hold the higher level positions in the focal organization.

Time 3 corresponds to the institutionalization of the organization-set. The patterns exhibited in this period generally tended to reflect an increasing standardization and specificity of interorganizational linkages. The most salient of these patterns were a decrease in absolute size of the organization-set, increased boundary-spanning activity of the focal organization's lower level personnel and a growing departmentalization of interorganizational contact. The final time period, Time 4, is comprised of either the termination of the organization-set or its renegotiation. Because of the absence of at least a second case for comparison, no regularities inherent in termination could be explicated. However, renegotiation appeared to be particularly characterized by the lack of any massive alteration of the organization-set. In other words, although a number of organizations were newly introduced to the set, several more organizations sustained contact with the focal organization throughout the process.

A diagrammatic summary of the changing character of the organization-set appears in Figure 5. Although it was not possible to capture all of the recurrent patterns schematically, the diagram does offer a useful visual representation of the emergence and change of the organization-sets of the interfaith organizations. The image in Time 1 illustrates a newly crystallized organization prior to the establishment of interorganizational contact. The "shotgun" approach to contact establishment is captured by the image in Time 2 showing a large number of relatively unstable linkages (represented by dotted lines). The smaller size and greater stability of the organization-set during the institutionalization phase is illustrated by a smaller number of linkages in Time 3 (the solid lines depict stable relationships). The image at the bottom left of the page represents one of the possible alternatives in Time 4, renegotiation of the organization-set. It is useful to note that a number of the previous members of the organization-set have sustained contact with the focal organization. One should also note that two of the organizations, labelled A and E, have themselves terminated. The image on the lower right illustrates the termination option for the focal organization itself.
Figure 5. A Diagrammatic Representation of the Emergence and Change of Organization-Sets
Summary

The preceding chapter has been devoted to the analysis of the data on the ecumenical disaster recovery organizations studied in this research. Beginning the analysis with the application of the theoretical model to three cases, the adequacy of the model as an analytical device was demonstrated. However, although the model did appear applicable to the three cases, its treatment of specific behavior patterns was weak. An extension of the model was suggested and the recurrent patterns exhibited in four time periods were explicated.

The next and final chapter consists of an examination of some of the practical and theoretical implications of the research. Based on the findings presented in this study, topics such as the role of churches in disaster recovery and the possibilities of planning for emergence will receive special attention. In addition, a general summary of the research will be presented.
FOOTNOTES

1. There does appear to be a distinction which can be drawn between the conceptualizations of recognition establishment outlined herein and Levine and White's domain consensus. According to Levine and White, before an exchange can occur between two organizations, a domain consensus must already have been established (1961). However, although there does appear to be a minimum amount of mutual recognition required between the parties of an exchange, according to the ideas presented in this context resources may be transferred while recognition is still being established. Indeed, such an occurrence is the essence of the resource-recognition phase.

2. Renegotiation is conceived of as significant alteration because even during the institutionalization phase--the most stable period in the existence of the organization-set--minor changes in the characteristics of the set would certainly occur.

3. However, conflict often resumes rather quickly. For instance, approximately one month after its emergence, Interfaith C was plagued by a disagreement over the desirability of incorporation. The basis of the conflict appeared to be the retention of power over the emergent organization by some of the established church bodies in the area. With incorporation these established organizations would lose much of their power over and relinquish much of the benefit from the recovery effort.

4. It is legitimate to use Interfaith A as one of the cases here because at the time the model was originally formulated the flood recovery organization had not yet displayed any renegotiation process. Thus, the formulation of the model was temporally prior to the behavior examined.
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY

This study has provided a theoretical model for analyzing the emergence and change of organization-sets. Consisting of five sequential phases in the emergence of the organization-set, the model was applied to three empirical cases, all involving the establishment of ecumenical organizations designed to assist in tornado recovery. A natural disaster context was believed to be an appropriate testing ground for the model since, in such situations, emergent groups and organizations are frequently present.

The model assumes that organizations are instruments of power or tools which are designed to perform given tasks. However, these tools seldom go about their performance unimpeded but are almost constantly subjected to forces of uncertainty from both inside and outside the organization. In order to function efficiently, the organization attempts to minimize such contingencies. The major focus of this study has been the external sources of uncertainty--specifically the organizational environment. When an organization first emerges it is especially vulnerable to this environment. It is to its advantage, therefore, that it develop stable patterns of interaction with the organizational environment. That is, it is important that it construct an institutionalized organization-set.

The five phases comprising the model are (1) crystallization, (2) development of boundary personnel, (3) recognition, (4) resource-recognition, and (5) institutionalization. According to the model, each phase will follow in the order indicated above, although the duration of each may vary widely. In the empirical cases studied, the first few phases were extremely short-lived while the later ones were of longer duration. After the organization-set has reached the final phase, the organization may, as the disaster recovery groups did, face goal obsolescence. In such a situation the organization has two main alternatives: (a) to alter the tasks and goals of the organization or (b) to terminate. The first alternative calls for a renegotiation of the organization-set in which an earlier phase is returned to in an effort to alter the organization-set. The second alternative implies the dissolution of both the organization and the organization-set.
The empirical cases studied consisted of three ecumenical disaster recovery organizations. The contexts in which they emerged were similar in that all three organizations were responses to massive tornadoes and were located in the Midwestern United States. However, there were important differences as well. The cities in which the organizations developed were of different sizes. Interfaith B emerged in a medium sized city near a metropolitan area, Interfaith C formed in a much larger city, and Interfaith D developed in a small community. Likewise the extent of the damage wrought by the tornadoes was dissimilar. Interfaith B emerged in the city which had experienced the most destructive of the three tornadoes while Interfaith C and D confronted much less devastated communities. Although the destruction of the latter two cities differed dramatically in actual dollar estimate, the two communities were roughly equal in the extent of their social disruption.

These differing contexts appear to have influenced the scope of operation of the three recovery efforts. Interfaith B, partially as a result of the high devastation of its community, was able to attract the greatest amount of resources, particularly in the form of financial contributions and volunteers. Interfaith C, although emerging in a less disrupted context, had the advantage of a large city and the connections to rather significant sums of church money which that entailed. Yet, perhaps as a result of the less dramatic consequences of its tornado, it was unable to acquire resources equal to Interfaith B. Interfaith D, with neither financial connections nor a wellpublicized, devastating disaster, was unable to even approximate the scale of operation of its predecessors. This smaller scale, however, should not be taken as an indication of ineffectiveness, for all three organizations appeared to successfully meet their goals.

In spite of these differences all three empirical case studies did demonstrate the applicability of the theoretical model of the emergence and change of organization-sets. Yet the model appeared to be weak in an important area—the delineation of specific behavior patterns throughout the different phases. An extension of the model was thus provided. For the ecumenical organizations studied, the first two phases (Time 1) were characterized by two main patterns: the employment of previous interaction patterns and the development of a "small band" of boundary personnel rather than a single individual. The third and fourth phases (Time 2), representing the initial contact with the organizational environment, were characterized by a "shotgun" approach and a general restriction of boundary-spanning functions to higher level personnel. The fifth phase (Time 3) was the institutionalization of the emergent organization-set and exhibited an increasing specificity and standardization in interorganizational
linkages. Finally, renegotiation (Time 4) was particularly noteworthy for the limited nature of the alteration which it entailed.

But theoretical formulations such as those summarized above often appear rather abstract and removed from any pragmatic considerations. It is useful, therefore, to make clear the more practical implications of the study. Although developing organizations in widely divergent contexts will face the problem of the emergence of an organization-set, the present study has been directed solely to emergent ecumenical disaster recovery organizations. Thus, it is to this specific type of organization which one must turn for an examination of the practical implications of the study. Empirical analyses of emergent organization-sets in non-disaster situations would be a valuable test of the applicability of the model. But any extended explication of the implications for non-disaster organizations would be premature until such empirical analyses have been performed.

There are two general topics of relevance to the study which will be discussed in the remainder of this study. First, what are the implications of the findings to the future role of churches in disaster recovery? And second, what does the study suggest about the possibility and desirability of planning for emergence?

The Role of the Church in Disaster Response

Historically the church has been one of the primary sources of relief and recovery following major disasters. Ministering to their congregations through the provision of spiritual and sometimes material aid, churches have frequently in the past represented the only organized entity with both resources and a system of knowledge relevant to the construction of a meaningful response. Although meaningful, such responses were often anything but effective by today's standards. With no knowledge of a cure or even a cause of the disease, the churches of London could do little to halt the bubonic plague which engulfed the city in 1665. Many of the established clergy had fled London to avoid the plague, leaving the dissenting ministers to "exceed themselves in lively, fervent preaching" (Leasor, 1961:66). Ironically, even these sincere but limited efforts merely facilitated the spread of the disease by exposing the large numbers congregated to persons already infected (Leasor, 1961:66).

With increasing secularization, the religious sector has been stripped of many of its functions by other elements of society (O'Dea, 1966:80-81). Once maintaining control over vast economic, political and cultural spheres, the church has long since witnessed
the eclipse of its power over the western world. Even the response to community crises has been claimed by other societal sectors—namely, the political and scientific.

To a large extent, this secularization or "desacralization" of society must certainly be attributed to industrialization (Kerr, et al., 1964:71-74; Berger, 1967:109). The increased contact with "inner-worldly" concerns concomitant with the rise of industrial organization tends to radically decrease the relevance of the sacred. In turn, this decrease in relevance leads to a contraction of the domain of the church, limiting its power and influence over societal affairs. As such, it is not surprising that the church has maintained a long, if not ambivalent, struggle against economic activity (Weber, 1946:331; Tawney, 1947).

Although most aspects of immediate disaster response in the United States and Canada are currently provided by government organizations, various church organizations are still intimately involved in the area. Organizations like the Salvation Army, the Mennonites, the Brethren and the Christian Reformed Church all provide extensive aid following many of the disasters which occur in North America. Individual congregations in the impact area also frequently become involved, although their response is usually rather limited (Smith, 1976).

However, the major denominations have tended to avoid the establishment of disaster response programs, preferring to provide financial assistance to existing efforts instead. Such programs can be extremely expensive and yet, as sometimes illustrated by the American Red Cross, may provide the organization with little in return save a tarnished image (Wright, 1976). Furthermore, disaster response, even when performed out of some deeply religious commitment, is an extremely secular or worldly affair. To participate in this arena brings the religious organization into direct competition with secular agencies.

Generally, the church has not fared well in this competition. Gradually the influence over political, economic and, more recently, educational activities has been lost to its secular opponents. And membership figures, although calculated differently for separate denominations, have dropped for almost all religious groups over the past fifty years (Till, 1972:25-26).

Some observers have interpreted the ecumenical movement as a response to this loss in power (Currie, 1968; Wilson, 1969). As the delegates to a 1925 ecumenical convention in Stockholm noted, the world is too strong for a divided church (Dirks, 1969:5). Thus, as any other organization might do when faced with a threatening environment, the churches have attempted to control or minimize
the external influence by coalescing, thereby exhibiting a more united and stronger front. However, a coalition among organizations which in some cases have a history of nearly fifteen hundred years of conflict is not easily devised. Yet the progress in the past fifty years has been so extensive that reunification of the church does appear inevitable (Till, 1972:321-323). A coalition of this sort would most certainly increase the power of religious organizations.

In the more limited area of disaster response the strategy of ecumenical coalition is also likely to be advantageous. Because of their direct links to several denominations, the ecumenical organizations studied in this research were able to attract much greater resources than would have been possible relying on only a single support denomination. And the very fact of their ecumenicity tended to remove any taint of favoritism toward a specific religious group which might have retarded necessary interorganizational exchanges.

The rather striking success of the first few ecumenical disaster recovery organizations is evidence not only of the effectiveness of this coalition strategy but of its probable continuation. If Interfaith B is able to sustain its operation it will serve as a rather effective diffusion mechanism, dispersing both the rationale and the mechanics of ecumenical disaster recovery. Such a development is likely to alter dramatically the role of the church in disaster response, effectively increasing the saliency of the religious sector in future emergency operations. Indeed, it even appears possible that some sort of ecumenical organization may eventually replace the American Red Cross in disaster recovery. Yet, like the more global ecumenical movement, there still remain many theological and organizational barriers to interdenominational cooperation; and many of them may prove strongly resistant even to some of the mollifying effects of disaster contexts.

Planning for Emergence

To some extent the phrase "planning for emergence" is a contradiction in terms. Disaster planning, "the attempt, prior to the actual occurrence of a crisis, to facilitate recognition of emergency demands and to make more effective the community response" (Dynes, Quarantelli and Kreps, 1972:70) seems hardly compatible with the rather hurried fabrication of an emergent group after a disaster has occurred. The former activity tends to connote powerful words like "rationality" and "objectivity" while the latter process brings to mind rather embarrassing terms like "emotionalism" and "hysteria." If anything, however, the
connotations are reversed. For the actual behavior after a disaster is often more rational than that which occurred in any previous planning session.

Yet one must not belittle disaster planning, for it is an extremely important and valuable element in a community's response to crises. Certainly such plans can never encompass all situations nor can they be expected to always be followed even where appropriate; but they do provide a useful guideline which may prevent a harmful waste of time and resources.

But if it is possible to plan for disasters, why should some groups and organizations emerge only after disaster strikes? The most obvious answer is that no event, especially a natural disaster, can ever be predicted with complete accuracy. No plan, therefore, can be expected to confront all contingencies. Emergence serves as a backup or safety mechanism. When the main components fail or prove inadequate, new ones emerge to meet the demand (Parr, 1970).

Another answer, which is actually normative in orientation, relates to the advantages of emergence following disasters. There appear to be three such advantages. First, emergent organizations are generally much more flexible and adaptable to the changed context following disasters than are their established counterparts. The newly created structure, although often based on previously existing networks (Forrest, 1974:50), can readily be adjusted to the radically altered environment following a major disaster. Since one cannot predict accurately the type or extent of needs which will arise as a result of a disaster, this flexibility stands as a marked advantage for the emergent group. Efficiency is likely to suffer as a result of this adaptability, but effectiveness may increase.

Second, there may be little or no knowledge of the appropriate means to meet the changed needs in the disaster situation. For instance, regarding the delivery of mental health services following disasters, there still remains a good deal of controversy over the most appropriate techniques (Taylor, 1976; Taylor, Ross and Quaranteilli, 1976). Thus, rather than pre-plan an elaborate structure to supply a possibly needless service, it may be better to permit, and even stimulate, the emergence of a number of groups which may all follow different ideologies and employ different techniques. If some of these groups prove their superiority, perhaps then they may be deliberately constructed in later situations.

The final advantage of emergent groups and organizations over their pre-established counterparts is the former's lack of a history. Established organizations inevitably build an image in their community which may not be harmful in normal situations but
may become dysfunctional in disaster settings. Local councils of churches are notorious in this regard. Often labelled as harmless, "do-nothing" organizations, these councils are often capable of pursuing rather low-key ecumenical activities in normal settings. But because such organizations appear seldom to be taken seriously by the clergy or secular organizations, any attempt by them to establish a disaster recovery effort may prove extremely difficult. Whether organizations are real entities or not, people treat them as such, and they tend to typify organizations much as they do their fellow human beings. Any attempt to change these typifications is likely to be resisted by the relevant environment. Newly emergent organizations are not as constrained by such factors. Thus, their new activities may more readily be accepted.

The church surfaces as an almost ideal source of emergent organizations following disasters. Churches can frequently make available vast financial and material resources in the event of a disaster. In addition, they are a valuable source of indigenous, legitimate leadership. Trained to lead people, a community's clergy represents a frequently overlooked asset which might be better utilized during periods of crisis. And since outsiders are sometimes rejected by the impacted community (Turner, 1967), the utilization of indigenous personnel like the clergy is likely to be more successful than the importation of experts.

What steps can be taken, then, to plan for the creation of a church based recovery organization without sacrificing the advantages of emergence? First of all, it appears possible that the clergy and other religious leaders in the community can, prior to the occurrence of a disaster, discuss and come to an understanding about the desirability of an organized disaster response by the religious sector. Such an understanding may involve merely an informal commitment to the idea. Nevertheless, even this simple measure would make the possibility more salient in their minds so that it might more readily be considered when disaster strikes. The rate of crystallization of the emergent organization might thereby be increased.

There would appear to be no necessity in drawing up elaborate plans of the structure and goals of the organization-to-be. In fact, activities of this sort, by overelaborating the organization, would sacrifice the advantages of emergence. Furthermore, it is unlikely that interest could be sustained long enough to draw up such plans (Dynes, Quarantelli and Kreps, 1972:3). Disaster planning can be insufferably boring when the threat of disasters is not perceived. Any plans that are made, however, should maintain strict independence from any established organization, ecumenical or not. To do otherwise would also negate the advantages of emergence mentioned above.
Another step which can be taken is the establishment of certain interorganizational contacts prior to the disaster. A pre-disaster assessment or inventory of resources available from other community organizations would prove invaluable in the case of a disaster. An inventory of this sort might also eliminate some of the less necessary contacts which are made during the recognition phase of the emerging organization-set. In addition, facilitating the establishment of recognition, certain disaster relevant organizations, such as Civil Defense, can be contacted prior to the disaster in order to acquaint these organizations with the intentional emergence of a religious disaster recovery group. Although it would be valuable if such contact could lead to the explicit mention of the religious sector in these organizations' disaster plans, any increase in the salience of the churches as recovery agencies should facilitate the eventual emergence.

When setting up an ecumenical recovery organization there may be a tendency to merely model it after the interfaith organizations described herein. Advocacy appeared to be a successful program for Interfaiths B, C and D, but it need not be the central concern in other settings. A warehousing service, a food distribution program or a public information center may better warrant the intensive concern of churches in other impacted communities. The important point, however, is that emergent organizations manifest unique advantages over established structures. The flexibility in both the services offered and the technology used and the absence of any possibly debilitating history permits the emergent organization to pursue goals much less possible for established organizations. And although other organizations may be useful as models, every disaster will create some unique demands which may, perhaps, only be met by some unique organization. Planning for and stimulating emergence can lead to the creation of such organizations.

Theoretical Implications

Apart from the more practical concerns, this study exhibits certain theoretical implications as well. Conceptualized as an attempt to reduce environmental uncertainty, the model of the emergence of organization-set is totally compatible with earlier work which views the organization as a rational tool in a hostile, or at least uncooperative, environment (Thompson, 1967; Zald, 1970a; Perrow, 1972). In addition, however, the conceptualization expands the boundaries of that work to include the most fluid characteristics of organizations. That is, rather than limit the analysis to well established, large organizations, the examinations of the emergent organization-set focuses attention on the most changeable, dynamic period of an organization's existence--its emergence.
Thus, although strategies like cooptation and coalition may usefully be viewed as attempts to reduce environmental uncertainty (Thompson, 1967), the earliest activities of an organization attempting to develop an organization-set are just as obviously motivated by this desire for predictability.

The compatibility between the model presented here and the earlier work on strategies in environmental control is exhibited not only in the fact that the explanatory schemes represented grapple with attempts at reducing environmental uncertainty. There is also a degree of overlap in the actual processes examined. For instance, all three interactive processes explicated by Thompson and McEwen (1972) were exhibited during the emergence of the organization-sets studied in this research. Bargaining was the process most commonly utilized and was characteristic of most relationships between the interfaith organizations and their organization-sets. Cooptation is exemplified by the relationship between Interfaith C and the mayor's office of Community C. And the third strategy, coalition, is illustrated by both the early agreement between Interfaith C and the Salvation Army on sharing a desk at the One Stop Center and the survey conducted jointly by Interfaith B and DRC.

In a similar sense, the change from a broad lateral focus to a longterm longitudinal focus specified by Rosengren (1970) is reflected in some of the patterns exhibited by the emerging organization-sets of the interfaith organizations. A broad lateral focus, it may be remembered, implies a larger number of inputs or sources of external support for the focal organization, i.e., a larger organization-set. According to Rosengren (1970:125), organizations will attempt to shift to a more narrow but long-term longitudinal orientation to their clients and thereby decrease the number of inputs and the size of the organization-set. Such an hypothesis is consistent with the findings in this study. During the recognition and resource-recognition phase the organization-sets of the interfaith organizations were particularly large and unstable. By the time the sets had become institutionalized, however, their size had decreased and they had gained markedly in stability.

Hirsch's discussion of the employment of "contact men" at the organizational boundaries also emphasized the compatibility between the model outlined herein and the earlier work viewing the organization as a rational tool in a hostile environment. According to Hirsch, an organization may utilize boundary personnel ("contact men") to gather environmental information relevant to the functioning of the focal organization (Hirsch, 1972). This is exactly what occurs in the third and fourth phases (recognition
and resource-recognition phases) of the emergence of the organization-set. For during these phases boundary personnel are sent out to make contact with other organizations and bring back information relevant to the effective functioning of the new organization.

The model of the emergence of the organization-set appears quite compatible, therefore, with earlier work which views the organization as a rational tool in a hostile environment. That is, although applied to newly emerged organizations rather than the established entities more commonly examined in the earlier work, the model of the emergence of the organization-set presents an orientation to organizations consistent with that earlier work. Yet the model expands the previous boundaries of this research to include the period in which the new organization first confronts that environment. Rather than limiting itself to interaction among established organizations, the model branches out into an area seldom explored by organizational analysts. Such an expansion can broaden this specialized field of sociology considerably.

The study exhibits a theoretical implication for more than just the special area of organizational analysis, however. In sociology, the study of organizations and the study of collective behavior have long remained quite distinct and separate areas of inquiry. The former has claimed primarily the most stable, institutionalized, rational examples of social behavior as its special domain, while the latter appears to have limited itself to the more fluid, transitional and non-rational aspects of behavior (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1968; Weller and Quarantelli, 1973). Yet the two areas need not remain separate. In fact, a merger of the perspectives is advantageous to both. One substantive area in which this merger is exhibited is in research on social movement organizations (Zald and Ash, 1966; Curtis and Zurcher, 1974; Stallings, 1974) in which both orientations serve as analytical guides. The preceding study, by exploring one of the most fluid elements of interorganizational relations, will, hopefully, provide another substantive area in which the two perspectives may fruitfully be merged.

Conclusion

The preceding study has provided an exploratory analysis of one of the more dynamic processes exhibited by contemporary organizations, the emergence and change of organization-sets. By combining two of the currently more popular concerns within the field of organizational sociology, interorganizational relations and organizational change, the study has offered a valuable addition to each. Interorganizational analysis is too often limited to
cross-sectional studies, and the study of organizational change too frequently locates its dependent variable within the organization rather than outside.

The specific organizations studied were chosen largely because of their similarity. Organizations can vary in such diverse ways that if several types of organizations are examined together, meaningful patterns are frequently overlooked. Of course, because of the specific nature of the groups analyzed, generalization beyond the immediate cases is not warranted. Thus, although the study has demonstrated the applicability of the theoretical model to the organization-sets of ecumenical disaster recovery organizations, further research is necessary to establish the model's relevance to other organizational types.

The analysis of emergent organization-sets in non-disaster settings would offer an especially interesting contrast to the preceding study. Small businesses, government agencies and other organizations are almost constantly being formed in modern industrial societies. The questions addressed in this research regarding the process through which interorganizational interaction is established by the focal organization are certainly as relevant in more normalized settings as they are in disaster situations. There would likely be a number of significant differences exhibited by the two settings, not the least of which might be the rate of emergence. Yet in spite of these differences, the theoretical model outlined herein should provide a common foundation for the study of emergent organization-sets in both disaster and non-disaster settings.
APPENDIX A

GENERAL INTERFAITH INTERVIEW GUIDE

1. Perhaps it would be best to begin with a brief description of your experience with the tornado. For instance, where were you when it hit?

2. Specifically, what is your connection with Interfaith?

3. How did Interfaith get off the ground? How was it formed?
   Probe: 1st meetings--where, when, names and numbers of persons present. Did you know the others there? In what regard? What suggestions were made as to possible courses of action? What factors were most important in your consideration of a course of action? Did the activities of other organizations influence you?

4. Nearly every organization that comes into being finds that it must interact in some fashion with other organizations.
   a. What was your first contact with another organization?

   Why this organization?   Probe: Who initiated?
   Nature of contact
   Nature of response
   Frequency and Duration (do you still have as much contact)
b. What other organizations did you contact? (Maintain temporal order)

Why this organization? Probe: Who initiated?
Nature of contact
Nature of response
Frequency
Duration (do you still have as much contact?)

5. What do you see as the basic goals of Interfaith?
Have they changed since its inception?

6. Could you give me a description of the authority structure?
Possibly a sketch of the organization chart?

7. How would you characterize the clientele of Interfaith?
Number, age, sex, income, race...
Has this changed?

8. Could you give me an idea of the range of services that you offer your clients?
Have these services changed in any way? e.g., offering some services now more than previously...

9. What are your sources of funding? Probe: Changes in funding
Expectations regarding future funding

10. I have really only one more question to ask.
What do you see as the future of Interfaith?
Probes: Specific plans being made
Possible disagreements among personnel
Contact with other organizations regarding any future plans.
11. I am interested in whether you might have kept records on such things as:

Number of volunteers
Number of clientele served
Number of staff BY MONTH
Income or contributions
Administrative expenditures
Property owned or leased

Is there anything else that you might add to give me a better understanding of Interfaith?

Thank you very much.

-- GET DOCUMENTS --

minutes of meetings
papers of incorporation
by-laws
inter-office communication
newsletters
financial reports
advocate forms
survey cards
ORGANIZATION-SET QUESTIONNAIRE

Below are listed several organizations with which you may have had contact as a representative of the Interfaith Council. Place a check (✓) beside all those organizations with which you, as a member of Interfaith, have had contact in person, by telephone or by written correspondence during the past seven days. If there are any organizations which you have contacted over the past week which are not listed here, please write their names in the space provided at the bottom of the page.

After you have completed that, circle those FIVE organizations which you believe are currently the most important contacts for your organization.

___ Governor ___'s Office
___ State Legislator's Office
___ Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
___ Small Business Administration (SBA)
___ Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA)

___ Police Department
___ Fire Department
___ Civil Defense
___ Public Works (Street, Sanitation and Engineering Departments)
___ City Clerk
___ County Court
___ Attorney or Legal Aid Organization
___ Mayor ___'s Office
___ Chamber of Commerce
___ Hospital
___ Local Medical Clinic
___ Mental Health Center
___ Hotline
___ County Health Department
___ Ambulance Service
___ Nursing Home

___ Board of Education
___ Local School
___ Local Bank
___ Labor Union
___ Club or Fraternal Organization

___ Welfare Department
___ Red Cross
___ Salvation Army
___ United Way
___ YMCA
___ Youth Center
___ Senior Citizen's Center
___ Day Care Center

___ Building Contractor or Material Supplier
___ Furniture Company
___ Building Inspector
___ Mobile Home Dealer
___ Moving Company
___ Real Estate Office
___ Insurance Company
___ Automobile Leasing Agency
___ Office Equipment Supplier
___ Department Store
___ Grocery Store
___ Radio or Television Station
___ Newspaper Office
___ Electric Company
___ Gas Company
___ Telephone Company
National Church Bodies (Be specific)


Local Churches (Be specific)


Use the space below to record those organizations contacted over the past 7 days which are not listed above.


DON'T FORGET TO CIRCLE THE FIVE ORGANIZATIONS which you believe are currently the most important contacts for your organization.

After you have finished, put this sheet in the self-addressed, stamped envelope provided and place it in a mail box. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION. By filling out and returning this questionnaire you will have helped us gain important information which can be used in setting up effective responses to future disasters.
COVER LETTER FOR ORGANIZATION-SET QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear

Reverend _____ may have mentioned that you would shortly receive a questionnaire from the Disaster Research Center at the Ohio State University. The Disaster Research Center is the oldest existing organization devoted to the full-time study of the social implications of natural disasters. It is currently involved in a study of newly-formed disaster recovery organizations and we are vitally interested in the experiences of your own Interfaith Council. The questionnaire that I have enclosed is intended to record some of those experiences.

The purpose of the questionnaire is to determine with which organizations the Interfaith Council has contact. You have been selected to receive the questionnaire because in your position you are likely to contact other groups and organizations. You are asked simply to indicate by a check mark which organizations you, as a representative of Interfaith, communicated with over the past seven days. Although several other individuals at Interfaith will receive the questionnaire it is important that you answer the questions yourself and indicate only those organizations with which you yourself have had contact in person, by telephone or by written correspondence. The questionnaire will take less than five minutes to complete but will nonetheless provide a great deal of important information.

From your own experience you have probably noted that the groups and organizations you contact may change over time. To get an idea of this change I will periodically forward identical forms to you and ask that you fill them out and return them to me. The first of these follow-up questionnaires will be sent in approximately one month. It is, therefore, important that you fill out and return the enclosed form as quickly as possible.

As has consistently been the case at the Disaster Research Center, all information you provide is entirely confidential. No one's name will ever be used and no person will ever be identified. At the conclusion of the research I will personally provide you with results of the study.

The questionnaire is printed on the back of this sheet of paper. Please fill it out and send it back to me in the stamped, self-addressed envelope provided. Thank you very much for your help. I appreciate your cooperation and hope that our findings
will be of practical help to your own organization as well as persons who attempt to respond to future disasters.

Sincerely,

G. Alexander Ross
Research Associate
REMINDER LETTER FOR ORGANIZATION-SET QUESTIONNAIRE

Dear

Last month I sent you a questionnaire which requested that you indicate the organizations with which you have had contact as a representative of the Interfaith Council. Unfortunately, I have not yet received your completed questionnaire. Because of the specific nature of the research your quick response is especially important and I would greatly appreciate it if you would return the completed questionnaire to me. If you have already done so please accept my apology and thanks.

Sincerely,

G. Alexander Ross
Research Associate
APPENDIX B

METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED

The methodology employed in this study depended most heavily on various qualitative techniques of data collection and analysis. Of primary importance as data sources were the approximately thirty semi-structured, intensive interviews used in the research. The interviews, most of which were conducted by the author, were commonly one to two hour contacts with organizational representatives. The respondents were asked detailed questions about their own personal experiences with the given organization as well as specific characteristics of that organization. Because of the exploratory nature of the research, the respondents were permitted to structure the answers themselves as much as possible.

No attempt was made to select a random sample of respondents, for in organizational research not all personnel are equally capable of providing relevant information. The principle followed in sample selection was, rather, to contact those persons who had at some time been significantly involved in decision making in the organization. The persons were located through the so-called "snow ball" technique, in which respondents are located by asking persons already contacted who else might have relevant information. Thus, each person provides other potential respondents, who, in turn, provide still more, until a point is reached in which most, if not all, persons capable of providing the information are identified and contacted.

At least two field trips were made to each of the three locations of the interfaith organizations, and telephone contact was maintained throughout the study with key informants in each group. During the field trips, which usually lasted from one to two days, the director, a few of the staff members and some of the members of the board were contacted with regard to information relating to the given interfaith organization and its organization-set. In no case did the establishment of entree with the respondents present any difficulty, for a brief explanation of the purpose of the study always elicited good cooperation. Likewise, for the latter two organizations, the statement that the researcher was
acquainted with the staff of Interfaith B did much to gain the assistance of the personnel of Interfaiths C and D.

In addition to the intensive interviews, an important source of data for the study was the documentary material collected. Minutes of meetings, organization charts, internal memoranda, newsletters, by-laws and incorporation papers, as well as local newspaper accounts, all proved to be invaluable in the research process. The documents were most useful as a means of filling in the details which were frequently absent from the interview material. Even within a few weeks of the occurrence of an event, a respondent's memory will lose much of the specifics of that event. The documents, therefore, by providing a more accurate recording of the situation, allowed the analyst to more closely reconstruct the emergence of each of the organization-sets.

Research which extends over a number of months, as the present study did, occasionally creates problems of interaction between the researcher and that which is studied. The study of the interfaith organizations offered a number of examples of the potential danger in such a situation. For instance, as mentioned earlier, the author was involved, through his work with Disaster Research Center, with the evaluation study of Community B's mental health system. The study, unfortunately, ended in conflict between the administrative arm of the evaluation program and DRC and threatened seriously the good rapport which had been developed between Interfaith B and DRC. Although the conflict was effectively compartmentalized and led to no severe consequences for the relationship between DRC and Interfaith, the situation does serve to point out some of the dangers inherent in any prolonged and intensive research posture.

Rather than follow a traditional hypothesis-testing design in which an hypothesis is generated and then a measurement is made, propositions were generated throughout the research, tested and regenerated on the basis of information gathered at several points in time. The resulting interplay between data collection and data analysis represents one of the more important advantages of qualitative research (Lofland, 1971).

To adequately capitalize on this interplay, however, it is helpful if the same individual(s) who collects the data also analyzes it. This practice facilitates the development of a familiarity with the data which is necessary for good qualitative research, but it creates a problem of bias. That is, if the same person who generates hypotheses also tests them, how is the analyst able to maintain adequate objectivity in the research process? Will it not, in other words, be all to simple to falsify the findings in order to support the analyst's own preconceptions?
Such a problem of bias is not endemic to qualitative analysis alone, for even highly quantified data involve an implicit choice of perspectives in such things as the selection of questions, their phrasing, etc. All the analyst can do is to strive to explicate those biases and to compensate for them. In the research contained herein the author attempted to lessen this bias by two general practices. The first entailed the attempt to remain flexible to other perspectives. By allowing the interviewees to structure the answers themselves, the interviewer was more likely to come into contact with perspectives that differed from his own and to transcend, to some extent, the limitations of his viewpoint. Second, an attempt was made to actively pursue any cases or instances which were inconsistent with any preliminary analytical scheme. For instance, the renegotiation process was found, on careful examination, to be quite different (i.e., less pronounced) than originally supposed. The active pursuit of this specific case eventually led to a modification of the model. Thus, by investigating negative instances, the analyst is able either to account for their existence or to modify the model.

The analysis itself, utilizing the interviews and documentary materials, consisted of subsequent periods of approximately two weeks time in which the author emersed himself in the data for each of the three interfaith organizations. By listening to and keeping careful notes of the recorded interviews, comparing the accounts with each other and with the available documentary material, an accurate picture of each of the organizations was drawn. The intention here was to develop a "feel" or close familiarity with each of the organizations, facilitating the discovery of any general patterns which might be inherent in the process of organization-set emergence.
APPENDIX C

REPRODUCTION OF THE NEED CARD UTILIZED BY INTERFAITHS A, B, C AND D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTERFAITH TORNADO RECOVERY</th>
<th>NEED CARD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAME________________________</td>
<td>AGE______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOME ADDRESS__________________</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEMPORARY ADDRESS______________</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phone where you can be reached</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When will you be at home?________</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( ) Debris removal</td>
<td>( ) Glass replacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( ) Cleaning</td>
<td>( ) Need household items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( ) Walls, ceilings, and/or</td>
<td>( ) Like to talk to someone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>floor removed</td>
<td>( ) Transportation ( ) Medical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( ) Minor carpentry work</td>
<td>( ) Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( ) Minor electrical work</td>
<td>Were you insured ( ) yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( ) Painting (must be home</td>
<td>( ) no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for this work)</td>
<td>Was insurance adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( ) Roof repair</td>
<td>( ) yes ( ) no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signature:___________________</td>
<td>Date______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(If you have specifics, please write on back!)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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