INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or “target” for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is “Missing Page(s)”. If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.

2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.

3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in “sectioning” the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.

4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from “photographs” if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of “photographs” may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.

5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
DONOHUE, William Anthony, 1949-
A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF NEGOTIATION:
TEST OF AN EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK.
The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1976
Speech

Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF NEGOTIATION:
TEST OF AN EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

William Anthony Donohue, B.S., M.A.

The Ohio State University
1976

Reading Committee:
Donald J. Cegala
Leonard C. Hawes
Robert E. Nofsinger

Approved by
Donald J. Cegala
Advisor
Department of Communication
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In an article written in the early fifties, Fritz Heider outlined three conditions to which an epistemological model must conform to maximize its ability to describe or explain physical or social phenomena. The model must be externally constrained consisting of a large number of elements acting independently of one another. This model suggests that knowing is best achieved by becoming sensitive to one's environment from a number of alternative perspectives whose philosophical assumptions are quite diverse.

Donald J. Cegala and Leonard C. Hawes have brought me to this dissertation by encouraging me to pursue these objectives of knowing. I have become sensitive to so many interesting dimensions of communicative phenomena, and my desire to pursue them from a diverse set of perspectives seems to expand daily. At times these explorations seemed confusing to my professional objectives and challenging to my self-concept. However, I may never fully realize the extent to which I have grown by taking advantage of Len's and Don's guidance.
In addition, I want to thank Len Hawes and Elaine Litton-Hawes for standing behind me when I most needed support. Their friendship is one of the most valuable products of my graduate education. Also, a special appreciation must be extended to Robert Nofsinger for becoming a most valuable and interesting colleague.
VITA

October 31, 1949

Born, Cleveland, Ohio

1972

B.S., Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio
Major: Speech

1974

M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
Major: Communication

1972 - 1976

Teaching Associate, Department of
Communication, The Ohio State
University, Columbus, Ohio

PUBLICATIONS

Black, White, White Gifted and Emotionally Disturbed
Children's Perceptions of the Reality in Television Pro-
gramming with Thomas R. Donohue. Human Relations. Manuscrip-
t accepted for publication, 1976.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Communication
Studies in Communication Theory. Professors Jack
Douglas, Leonard Hawes, and Donald Cegala.

Studies in Sociology. Professors Clyde Franklin,
Timothy Curry, and Gisela Hinkle.

Minor Field: Research Methods
Studies in Quantitative Research Techniques. Pro-
fessors Wallace Fotheringham, James Erickson,
Robert MacCallum, Robert Wherry, and Donald Cegala.

Studies in Qualitative Research Techniques. Professors
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter

### I. A MODEL OF NEGOTIATION

- An Empirical Framework for Examining Negotiation Processes and Outcomes: 5
- Situation: 5
- Social Power: 10
- Expectation: 15
- Personality Type: 19

### II. METHODOLOGY

- Procedures: 26
- Subjects: 26
- Negotiation Game: 27
- Judging: 32
- Operational Definitions
  - Personality: 33
  - Expectation: 35
  - Social Power: 36
  - Negotiation Outcome: 39
- Validity and Reliability
  - Social Orientation Scale: 40
  - Expectation: 41
  - Social Power: 43

### III. RESULTS

- Test of the Hypothesis: 46

### IV. DISCUSSION

- Limitations: 51
- The Process and Outcome of Negotiation: 53
- Research Implications: 56
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
A MODEL OF NEGOTIATION

A communicative situation largely ignored in instruction and research is negotiation. In a paper examining applications of research on bargaining and negotiation to communication instruction Smith (1972) rejects the old target model of persuasion (in which the listener's response is controlled by the speaker's message) as a viable paradigm for teaching communication fundamentals. Smith (1972) argues for substituting a negotiation model that "views both parties to any transaction as operating with intent and as making judgments as to how their relationship can best serve their individual and overlapping interests." (p. 4) A focus on negotiation provides more concrete answers to students concerning how they can better control their communication in common interpersonal settings. Smith exemplifies his argument by applying negotiation ideas to such communicative activities as relationship maintenance and trust development.

Research in communication has tended to ignore the specific characteristics of the negotiation situation. Researchers have examined negotiation processes as special forms of group discussion (Sereno and Mortensen, 1969), decision-making (Collins and Guetzhow, 1964), and conflict resolution (Schelling, 1960). This treatment of negotiation,

1
while providing a useful starting point for research, has tended to obscure a comprehensive view of the negotiation situation. Research needs to focus on the specific characteristics of the negotiation situation and construct more holistic models facilitating research and instruction in negotiation. Communicative scholars should be committed to this objective if they believe in the need to nourish negotiation skills and use them as alternatives to violent means of goal acquisition.

The purpose of this dissertation is to develop an empirical framework for examining the process and outcome of negotiation. Negotiation is defined as a "mixed-motive" situation (Rappoport, 1970) in which individuals must reach inconsistent goals (but not mutually exclusive ones) by cooperating with one another to agree on an outcome benefiting them both. Participants must employ a strategy of "reciprocal-argument and counterargument, proposal and counter-proposal in an attempt to agree upon actions and outcomes mutually perceived as beneficial" (Sawyer and Guetzkow, 1965, p. 479). The framework developed in this dissertation will attempt to define and operationalize key concepts within the negotiation process and how these concepts aid in predicting outcome.

A review of the literature (Collins and Guetzkow, 1964; Swingle, 1970) reveals a preoccupation with the structural factors affecting the outcome of a negotiation. For example,
communication scholars have examined the effects of reward
distribution on willingness to cooperate (Rapoport, 1970;
Swingle, 1970) and power distributions as affecting outcome
(Blau, 1964; Raven and Kruglanski, 1970; and Gruder, 1970).
Reiches and Harrel (1974) suggest that this emphasis on
structural variables affecting outcome overlooks the process
of communication as a viable dependent variable in understand­
ing negotiation processes. In quoting Patchen (1970), Reiches
and Harrel (1974) argue that "although these models purport
to account for the behaviors of each negotiation, most theories
of bargaining do not give direct and explicit attention to
the process of interaction between parties." (p. 36)

Research that has focused on interaction has provided
considerable insight into the role of communication in nego­
tiation. For example, Fisher (1970) examined decision-
proposal-making "to discover the nature of the interaction
process across time leading to group consensus on decision-
making tasks" (p. 200). He found that group decision-making
is a phased process moving from states of clarification-
orientation, to dispute, to ideational conflict, and finally,
to decision-awareness. Another model for examining the
interaction of negotiators is offered by Reiches and Harrel
(1974). They argue for examining the dimensions of power
(the control of resources), risk (the willingness to consider
alternative proposals), prediction (the ability to construct
accurate expectations of the other's position), and situation (the context in which the negotiation occurs).

A closer analysis of the Reiches and Harrel (1974) model reveals some limitations. First, their dimension of power focuses on the negotiator's control of resources. However, a substantial body of literature (Raven and Kruglanski, 1970; Thibaut and Kelley, 1959; Gruder, 1970; Collins and Guetzkow, 1964; and Berger, 1966) argues that the strategies negotiators use to gain power also must be examined as an integral dimension of the negotiation process. Thus, a reconceptualization of negotiation must address the question, what strategies do individuals use to increase their ability to control the negotiation settlement?

Second, their model overlooks considerable research supporting the argument that an individual's predispositions interact with and strongly influence the negotiation process and outcome (e.g., Kruglanski, 1970). For example, in a study by Goodstat and Hjelle (1973) individuals who perceived themselves as relatively powerless in the negotiation situation used significantly more aggressive strategies. Thus, the interaction of personality and negotiation can provide insight into how individuals use others' messages and construct their own messages to affect outcome.

Finally, the Reiches and Harrel (1974) model focuses on the processes of negotiation, almost to the exclusion of
outcome. Why can't a model offer a useful conceptual framework to analyze process and predict outcome? If the authors had been interested in increasing the utility of their model to predict outcome they might have made a more systematic attempt to integrate conceptually their dimensions of negotiation into an empirical framework, covering a more general scheme of dimensions, e.g., personality and power strategy.

An Empirical Framework for Examining Negotiation Processes and Outcomes

The framework offered in this dissertation attempts to pull together four key constructs, suggested by previous research, that seem to affect the negotiation process: situation, social power, expectation, and personality. This study will proceed to define these dimensions by synthesizing a diversity of works related to each construct. As the constructs are defined they will be integrated into a framework of negotiation through a series of four propositions. The final proposition will posit the interrelationships among all four constructs.

Situation

Research in bargaining and conflict resolution suggests that interactional context exerts significant influence over the process and outcome of the negotiation event. Collectively, this research seems to define situation in at least two ways.
First, several studies assume that the situation includes those external conditions imposed, or "fixed" upon the group from the beginning of the interpersonal encounter. For example, the number of messages participants are able to send and receive may affect group negotiation processes and outcomes. Schelling (1960) and Smith (1968a, 1968b) argue that as the number of messages that can be sent decreases, the participants dependency on the situation to resolve the conflict increases. Schelling suggests that participants seek as much information as they can obtain to coordinate their expectations and reach settlement. If information is not available directly from the other participant the individual is forced to draw inferences based on other dimensions of the situation to coordinate his expectations of what the other will accept.

Reiches and Harrel (1974) argue that tasks, or negotiations conducted under urgent conditions, is an external condition that tend to influence the minimum disposition of the group members. With less time to negotiate participants may have to lower their minimum disposition to off-set potential costs from taking too much time. Also, the urgency of the task may affect the kinds of bargaining strategies negotiators are willing to implement. Less time to negotiate may encourage more efficient strategies to encourage a settlement (e.g., coercion). Also, Collins and Guetzkow (1964)
propose that an individual's power, or direct control of rewards and punishments over the other, may affect the other's level of satisfaction with the outcome of the negotiation. Power used to punish or threaten will be perceived most likely as an incompatibility in group relations and serve to distract the group from constructing useful proposals. When power is used to reward participants the incompatibility is not likely to be perceived, and constructing useful proposals (useful to the one exercising the power) may be facilitated.

The quantity of resources available to the bargainers also appears to affect the negotiation outcome. Fischer (1969) found that as the quantity of resources available to subjects in a bargaining game decreases, conflict intensity increases. These results demonstrate that when the subjects' task was to divide only a few resources among themselves conflict intensity and the use of threats increased. Thus, the availability of communication, time constraints, and the availability of power resources constitute a set of situational variables imposed upon the group at the outset of the negotiation.

A second group of studies assumes that situation includes some set of internal conditions generated from the interaction, thereby becoming features of the interaction as it develops. For example, Collins and Guetzkow, (1964) suggest that the compatibility of participants personalities in the negotiation
setting may affect task performance and group outcome. More specifically, Collins and Guetzkow present evidence supporting the argument that, in general, "differences among members in styles of interpersonal behavior decreased the group's effectiveness" (p. 92). The effects of these differences seem to be contingent upon the nature of the task. When the task requires resources such as information personality heterogeneity generally facilitates creating a wider range of alternative solutions to the problem. Conversely, in negotiation settings characterized by high goal incompatibility participants might spend more time focusing upon the incompatibilities, and less time forwarding proposals to form an agreement.

Level of conflict intensity arising from the interaction also appears to affect negotiation processes. For example, Parsons (1963) found that when conflict is intense it is much easier to believe that the other person will fulfill his threats rather than make good his promises. Additionally, Tedeschi (1972) reports a number of studies supporting the conclusion that when given a choice between influence modes subjects prefer the use of coercion at high levels of conflict intensity. Thus, situations developing at intense levels of conflict seem to affect the participants' choices of modes of influence.

Given the research findings concerning situational variables the following proposition is offered: As interpersonal
style and power incompatibilities increase in groups with urgent task demands and few available resources to divide among themselves, the group's reliance on communication, and the potential for intense, dysfunctional conflict increase.

The proposition suggests that when interpersonal style and power incompatibilities dominate the interaction conflicts may become more person-centered. As individuals attack each other or vent frustrations without attending to the common purpose of achieving a settlement, they decrease their chances of reaching a settlement. When the situation is urgent, and few resources are available to distribute, these incompatibilities may be perceived as even more frustrating, thereby intensifying the person-centered conflict. Under these conditions group members may be more willing to carry-out their threats or use coercion to manage this conflict.

Further, these incompatibilities encourage participants to rely heavily on the situation to provide information for use in maximizing outcomes. As a result, participants must be more aware of the cues they transmit. If a third party is called on to arbitrate the negotiation one of his objectives may be to clarify each participant's messages for the other because participants may tend to "read more into" the messages than is normally reasonable. The situation seems to exert significant influence over the process and outcome of the negotiation event.
The situation seems to affect the modes of influence subjects use to win the negotiation. In an article focusing upon the influence of situation on the use of power strategies Tedeschi et al. (1972) conclude that, "conflict intensity, availability of communication modes, and physical and social arrangements are among the more important situational determinants of how influence will be wielded" (p. 333). Thus, the kinds of power strategies individuals are willing to implement is dependent, in part, upon the manner in which the situation mediates the negotiation.

Social Power

French and Ravens' (1959) dimensions and strategies of social power seem particularly useful for the model presented in this study. They indicate that one may implement several strategies to influence outcomes, including, 1) increasing the amount of new information one brings to the situation; 2) demonstrating expertise; or 3) increasing one's ability to confer rewards on the other. In addition, a negotiator can influence his outcomes by 1) encouraging the other to identify with a reference group, or norm; 2) restricting the other's power; 3) forcing the other's compliance to a prescribed, legitimate power structure; or 4) coercing the other with threats.

These strategies can be categorized into two groups. The first group of power strategies discussed by French and Raven (1959) extends the ability of the user of such strategies to
deliver rewards to the other person. Over time the other might create a dependency on such rewards thereby increasing the individual's power to influence the other. These "reward-extending" strategies include increasing interpersonal attraction through ego gratification, or the presentation of physical rewards. For example, an individual may attempt to flatter or compliment the other person, show concern about the other's well being, give small concessions to the other, or demonstrate cooperative intentions to negotiate.

In addition, the individual can extend his ability to deliver rewards to the other by appearing more knowledgeable, or expert in the domain in which participants are focusing their communication. For example, he might attempt to use facts relevant to the negotiation but unknown to the other, state credentials or qualifications allowing the individual to make judgments about the other's information, or use statistics or jargon to sound intelligent.

The second group of power strategies discussed by French and Raven (1959) reduces the ability of the other to deliver rewards to the user of such strategies. This "reward-reducing" power decreases the individual's dependency upon the other's rewards, and consequently, reduces the other's power. The individual can use coercive strategies to block, sabotage, or discredit the other in some way. For example, the individual might attempt to interrupt the other person's
speech, call the other person's bluff, change the immediate topic of the discussion, talk more loudly than the other, or stick to his position and to his offers. Also the individual might attempt to reduce the other's power base by having him conform to some normative structure to restrict the other's freedom to manipulate the individual. For example, the individual may attempt to make the other follow the stated rules of the negotiation, obligate the other to negotiate fairly, or suggest that the other is not negotiating in good faith.

The set of power strategies the individual selects depends largely upon the amount of risk involved in implementing strategies (Tedeschi, et al., 1972; Reiches and Harrel, 1974). If risk is defined as the potential for increasing personcentered, dysfunctional conflict, then an individual might be taking a great risk using coercive strategies tending to decrease interpersonal attraction and intensify any personality and power incompatibilities perceived. Straight-forward intimidation offers few opportunities to increase attraction. Normative-cohesion also might constitute a high risk strategy by decreasing attraction and increasing perceived incompatibilities. However, the risk involved in encouraging compliance to a normative structure may be less intense than presenting coercive threats, as the other may have greater difficulty becoming hostile to hard an impersonal norm than toward the more visible individual.

Reward-extending strategies involve fewer risks in provoking dysfunctional conflict. Reward power would tend to
decrease person-centered conflict by focusing on interpersonal compatibility, and more emotionally gratifying dimensions of the negotiation. Power derived from demonstrating expertise may offer less emotional gratification than reward power but it still may remain a useful means of decreasing dysfunctional conflict when the other is particularly influenced by highly credible individuals.

The risk involved in using reward-reducing strategies may intensify in situations with urgent task demands. By increasing participant's attention to perceived incompatibilities enactment of reward-reducing strategies may result in less time to focus on the task, and more time to resolve the incompatibilities. Reward-extending strategies are less likely to provoke dysfunctional conflict in situations with urgent task demands because they are not threatening in general. However, reward-extending strategies take more time to implement. Attraction and credibility are difficult to implement when the participants are unfamiliar with one another. Thus, to achieve a favorable settlement for himself, a participant may be willing to take his chance using primarily reward-reducing strategies.

From these relationships the second proposition can be presented.

As the successful implementation of power strategies increases, perceived situational incompatibilities, and the potential for dysfunctional conflict (inhibiting settlement) decreases.
Proposition two maintains a distinction between successful and unsuccessful power strategies. Successful power strategies increase an individual's ability to control the other's outcomes. Such control over a broad range of negotiation situations depends upon power flexibility, or the ability to use both reward-extending and reward-reducing strategies when they are most appropriate. Thus, when the individual is maximally successful using his power strategies he will most likely reduce situational incompatibilities, including goal incompatibilities, and persuade the other to accept his proposals. With somewhat less success the individual may be forced to accept less than he desired initially, or under extreme circumstances individuals may not be able to reach a settlement because one person could not influence the other successfully to accept his proposals.

Understanding power processes can be facilitated by examining processes of expectation formation and change during the negotiation. As Blau (1964) argues, "The expectations of people govern the satisfactions they find in social life and hence their reactions to social experiences" (p. 165). That is, Blau's observation suggests that the kinds of power strategies an individual implements depends, in part, on the individual's expectations of what he and the other are willing to accept when they enter into and begin their negotiation.
Expectation

Schelling (1960) argues that a participant's expectations of the other's position play a central role in the bargaining process. More specifically, he maintains that "each party's strategy is guided mainly by what he expects the other to accept or insist on; yet he knows that the other is guided by reciprocal thoughts. The final outcome must be a point from which neither expects the other to retreat; yet the main ingredient of this expectation is what one thinks the other expects the first to expect, and so on" (p. 70). Schelling suggests that individuals coordinate their expectations by attempting to learn from each other what the other stands for and what the other is willing to accept. Bargaining involves a dynamic process of mutual accommodation in which individuals jockey for limits by reading and responding to each other's moves revealing information about a player's value system or about the choices of action available to him.

Blau's (1964) conceptualization of expectation focuses on three pre-task types of expectation: a generalized expectation of the potential rewards available from a situation based on previous participations in similar situations, a specific expectation of potential rewards based on their initial encounters, and a comparative expectation, based on both previous expectations, comparing the potential rewards to the potential costs for entering the situation. Blau's
approach focuses on the expectations likely to affect outcome. For example, if the individual perceives he is wasting his time in a situation, then he likely does not value the potential reward in the situation. Under such conditions the individual may not negotiate as vigorously as someone who places more value on the potential reward.

Both perspectives can be synthesized through the notion of "focal point". Schelling (1960) argues that individuals form focal points, or expected outcomes, as the negotiation continues. He states that "the focal point is more persuasive as an exact outcome than as an approximation" (p. 111).

If, in Blau's terms, the individual maintains low comparative expectations for the situation, i.e., the individual places little value on the potential reward, then the individual's focal point is likely to be more of an approximation than an exact point. The individual simply does not feel the need to defend an established point firmly, and his outcomes are likely to be affected by this attitude.

Further, Schelling (1960) contends that the ability to perceive accurately the other person's focal point, i.e., the accurate coordination of expectations, determines the kind of power strategy the individual is likely to pursue. When information about the other person's focal point is available, such that the individual makes moves clearly revealing his focal point, the individual has greater flexibility to employ
strategies relying more on accurate information. For example, to use higher risk power strategies, i.e., reward-reducing, the individual would need to know how the other was going to respond to the strategy to justify the risk involved in using it.

The coordination of expectations also tends to reduce dysfunctional conflict arising from situational incompatibilities. As the individual increases the accuracy of his perceptions concerning what the other is willing to accept, the individual can mold his style of negotiation more effectively to adapt to the other's needs, and consequently, maximize outcome. This adaptive process reduces the chances that dysfunctional conflict will arise from incompatible personality styles. In addition, the outcome of negotiations conducted under urgent task demands may be affected by the speed with which participants coordinate their expectations. An early coordination might facilitate negotiation by reducing the potential for conflict arising from situational incompatibilities. Individuals can begin to use strategies adapting more to the needs of the other, and the task issues in the negotiation.

The coordination of expectations emphasizes the role of communication in negotiation encounters. Schelling (1960) contends that individuals must rely on situational cues to coordinate expectations about each other's focal point.
Individuals would have to rely on other situational cues to reach an agreement. Thus, when explicit information is unavailable, the other's position becomes obscured and the probability of reaching an agreement is decreased.

Given these relationships a third proposition can be presented.

As the coordination of expectations increases, intense, dysfunctional conflict arising from situational incompatibilities, decreases.

Reading and responding to other's moves will tend to expose situational incompatibilities. If an individual reads accurately the other's position the individual is in a better position to adapt his strategies to the other's needs. If participants are highly motivated to gain the reward, and coordinate their expectations quickly, the negotiation likely will be focused on the issues, especially when conducted under urgent task demands. Individuals will attempt power strategies and counter strategies, regulate the level of risk in their strategies more accurately, and formulate and reformulate propositions to reach an agreement maximizing their outcome. They will depend heavily on the situation, especially on direct contact with one another, for information helping to coordinate their expectations. Thus, expectation occupies a central position in the negotiation process.

Schelling (1960) and Blau (1964) suggest that the accuracy with which an individual reads situations to coordinate his
expectations is largely contingent upon his individual predispositions toward processing information. In addition, Collins and Guetzkow (1964) indicate that individual predispositions also affect the nature and intensity of the power strategies an individual may use, and his general response to situational demands. Thus, personality characteristics appear to play a central role in understanding the process and predicting the outcome of a negotiation.

**Personality Type**

Terhune (1970) posits a conceptualization of personality particularly useful for this proposal. He maintains "it is helpful to think of personality variables as the more or less enduring behavior potentials that the individual carries with him. They are his internal programs, or general predispositions" (p. 195). Terhune argues that this conceptualization of personality must be viewed relative to the situation in which individuals interact. The situation establishes a predispositional hierarchy within which the individual makes certain kinds of traits more relevant in certain situations than others. Personality cannot be assessed apart from the situation.

Terhune's (1970) view provides a framework to interrelate personality traits in the proposed negotiation model. One of the criticisms of personality research is that traits are
frequently interrelated without any substantive theoretical foundation, or conceptual framework (Lazarus, 1971; Terhune, 1970; Wiggins, 1973). Focusing on specific kinds of situations, e.g., negotiation, can provide such a framework and increase the utility of personality as a predictive tool.

Which personality traits seem to be most relevant in negotiation situations? In general, those traits which appear relevant to participants' ability to demonstrate: accurate perception of situational cues, enact effective power strategies, and the accurate perception and response to relevant role requirements. Clearly these behaviors do not represent the total range of skills necessary to maximize outcome in negotiation. However, they do begin to provide an indication of some of the skills related to personality types that might be relevant in the negotiation situation.

Rotter (1966) argues that an individual's locus of control affects his ability to perceive situational cues accurately. For example, his research suggests that people who feel that the control of outcomes is external to them (e.g., they are controlled by others) have a tendency to be more aware of situational cues since the information contained in the cues may reveal how, or to what extent, the individual can respond to those controlling his rewards. Christie and Geis (1970) also contend that personality affects an individual's ability to process information. For example, Machiavellians
(interpersonal manipulators) maintain a more intense need to pursue rewards from the environment despite moral, or other prescribed rule considerations. Machs need accurate information to use power strategies effectively to gain the potential rewards.

Also, Machs have a greater propensity to use power strategies in manipulating others. Since Machs remain unrestricted by moral or other normative prescriptions they are more willing to use any available source of leverage upon the other to gain the reward. Also, Machs have demonstrated a propensity to respond more accurately to role requirements when they are instrumental in gaining a reward. For example, Blumstein (1970) found that high Machs demonstrate greater ease and success at role assimilation than low Machs when they were before a live audience. The live audience provided Machs with relevant cues, and was instrumental in gaining rewards.

As the individual maintains predispositions enabling him to perceive situational cues accurately, to enact effective power strategies, and to respond to relevant role requirements, the individual increases his ability to reduce dysfunctional conflict arising from situational incompatibilities. For example, if the goals of the participants are widely incompatible, the individual maintaining relevant personality traits can perceive more readily the incompatibility
and construct strategies to confront it directly. In addition, individuals with greater abilities to select relevant situational cues from the environment can coordinate more accurately their expectations with the other's focal point and devise a strategy for effectively confronting the other person's focal point.

Perhaps the examination of personality in negotiation settings is most useful in determining the kinds of power strategies an individual might employ to maximize his outcome. Individuals feeling less inhibited to use power strategies may employ different kinds of strategies than individuals who feel more inhibited. For example, Machs may be more willing to risk confrontation with the other by using reward-reducing strategies such as aggression or coercion since they probably have had more experience using them, and can process situational information more quickly to determine the appropriateness of the strategy relative to the situational information more quickly to determine the appropriateness of the strategy relative to the situation.

These relationships suggest the following proposition:

As personality becomes more consistent with the situational requirements of the task social power, the coordination of expectations, and the ability to reduce dysfunctional conflict increase.
This proposition integrates the key conceptual dimensions of the empirical framework presented in this proposal. It posits the relationship between situational incompatibilities, social power, the coordination of expectations and personality. Thus, an analysis of the negotiation encounter can be facilitated by measuring these variables as processes, and as structural variables predicting outcome. A measurement strategy could be devised to content-analyze messages to define the type of power strategies individuals use during the negotiation process. Then, subjects' expectations could be compared to the type of power strategy the individual used to respond to the other. These analyses could reveal substantive information about how the process of negotiation is transacted between participants.

When personality and situation are added to the model it becomes a potentially powerful predictor of outcome. For example, a valid, reliable assessment of individual's predispositions can indicate the kinds of power strategies an individual might select, and his ability to perceive information to coordinate expectations. Manipulative, perceptive individuals would tend to construct more accurate expectations of the other and use them to implement more high-risk power strategies. In addition, these individuals would be more effective at reducing conflict and/or reaching an agreement with the other. Thus, the addition of personality and situation
increase the power of the model to predict the participant's performance.

The previous discussion argues that understanding negotiation processes and predicting negotiation outcome can be facilitated through an analysis of the following key components: **situation**, including the availability of communications, time constraints, personality compatibility, and conflict intensity, **social power** strategies, including reward-reducing and reward-extending tactics, **expectation** formation and coordination processes, and **personality** traits relevant to the negotiation situation including the ability to perceive accurately situational cues, enact effective power strategies, and perceive accurately and respond to relevant role requirements.

To test the utility of the model the constructs personality, expectation, and social power will be used to predict negotiation outcome. Situation will not enter the predictive model for two main reasons. First, situation may be the most conceptually complex construct proposed in the framework. To deal with the relationship between situation and negotiation outcome adequately may remain as a study in itself to be conducted at some future point. Second, situation may be viewed as a product of the other constructs examined in this study. Collins and Guetzkow (1964) argue that the interaction between subjects' power strategies, expectations, and personalities during the negotiation session has a great
deal to do with defining the situation for the negotiators. From this perspective situation enters the predictive model in a more indirect manner while the constructs social power, expectation, and personality enter as direct predictors of negotiation outcome.

The following hypothesis is designed to test the proposed model: pre-negotiation expectations, the use of power strategies, and individual personality traits will, in combination, predict significantly negotiation outcome. The criterion for significance on all analyses of results is established at p. < .05.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY

Procedures

Subjects

This study was conducted in three phases. First, subjects responded to the 50 item Social Orientation Scale (SOS) (Cegala, 1976). Second, 24 subjects were selected to participate in four fifteen-minute negotiation sessions. Twelve of the forty-eight sessions were video taped, with each subject appearing once on tape. Third, a sample of judges was selected to view the video tapes and assess subjects' use of power strategies.

One hundred students from an undergraduate course in the Department of Communication completed the SOS. Data from these one hundred subjects were added to the responses of 673 other subjects. This larger group of subjects exhibited more varied age and occupational characteristics than the student sample. Since the number of subjects in the combined sample was at least ten times greater than the number of items on the SOS, the resulting factor scores are assumed to be reliable estimates.

From the original sample of 100 undergraduate students, 24 were selected randomly to participate in the negotiation
experiment. To complete the judging phase of the experiment 40 judges were used (the rationale for using this number of judges is detailed in the "Operational Definitions" section under "Social Power"). The judges were selected from undergraduate courses in the Department of Communication.

**Negotiation Game**

In the negotiation game subjects role-played lawyers trying to reach a settlement in mock, civil-suit damage cases (Williams, 1970). As such, one subject represented the attorney for the defendant, while the other represented the attorney for the plaintiff. The details of the case were given in a case description presented to the subjects before the negotiation began.\(^1\) In addition, the case description stipulated the amount of money for which the plaintiff was suing the defendant. The task was to negotiate a settlement from this initial amount.

Accompanying the case description for the plaintiff and defendant was a settlement schedule specifying the subject's reward for settling at various dollar amounts (settlement schedules accompany the case descriptions in Appendix A). For the plaintiff, higher settlements meant greater rewards.

---

\(^1\) Four case descriptions were pilot tested. Transcripts from these descriptions indicated that the cases were able to generate lively discussions, while not giving any kind of advantage, a priori, to plaintiff or defendant. The cases appear in Appendix A.
For the defendant, higher settlements meant fewer rewards. When subjects failed to settle, they were given a very small reward. Thus, subjects were placed under some pressure to settle.

Three major criteria were used to select a game that would be useful for the purposes of this study. First, the game should encourage subjects to use power strategies to win. It should be sufficiently competitive to test the subject's ability to employ the appropriate strategy to win more than his partner. Second, but related to the first, the game should be able to elicit relevant personality predispositions. Subjects should be placed under some pressure to test their abilities to perceive the other's moves accurately and respond to them efficiently. Third, the game should be a mixed-motive interaction in which both cooperation and competition are relevant to be consistent with the definition of negotiation used in this study.

The negotiation game selected appears to be particularly well suited to meeting these criteria for several reasons. First, subjects were negotiating for money or extra credit points (depending on their preference at the end of the four rounds). They could win as much as $5.00, or 5 extra-credit class points. As Fisher (1969) points out, when the quantity of resources available for the negotiators to divide among themselves decreases, the situation becomes more competitive. In addition, this task was conducted under urgent conditions.
that tend to encourage the use of primarily coercive strategies to be more successful. Those subjects demonstrating flexibility in using coercive strategies when necessary would tend to be more successful in the game.

Second, the subjects were given complete freedom to use any message form they wished. In addition to the facts on the case description subjects were told from the beginning that they could introduce any other information they felt appropriate. This freedom should have been instrumental in eliciting relevant personality traits. That is, subjects predisposed to being 1) responsive to situational cues; 2) manipulative; 3) or assertive, should find this situation to be well suited to their personality. Also, the flexibility and the competitive nature of the task encouraged subjects to use as much information as they could possibly attain to be maximally successful. Besides, using the other's cues during the negotiation, participants should have come to rely on their expectations to guide their strategies. Based on experiences gained in prior trials these expectations should have become a valuable set of resources for participants.

Third, both competition and cooperation are necessary for a subject to be successful. Encouraging too much competition may result in personality clashes, and a consequent nonsettlement. Too much cooperation may result in giving everything away. Thus, the game-playing situation seems to
have provided an environment in which personality related skills, power strategies, and expectation formation processes can be observed.

The negotiation games were conducted in three sessions over three consecutive evenings. Each session consisted of four rounds of games. Each subject participated in four, fifteen-minute negotiation games (see Appendix A for the game descriptions) playing the defendant twice and the plaintiff twice. This format was arranged so that no subject faced the same opponent twice. Also, each round used a different case description so no subject argued the same case twice. One dyad in each round was randomly selected to be video-taped, so eventually, all participants were taped at least once during the four rounds. These video-tapes were used by the judges to assess subjects' use of power strategies.

At the beginning of each session directions were read to subjects explaining the task, their role responsibilities, the limits, and their reward structures indicated on the settlement schedules. Subjects were shown a sample case to illustrate the game. They were told that they could accept either money or extra-credit class points as payment for their bargaining efforts; the amount of which depended solely upon the success of their negotiation efforts in the four games. Subjects were permitted to ask questions, then they were lead to their soundproof negotiation rooms.
At the beginning of each round subjects were introduced to one another, and permitted to chat with one another for two to three minutes. At the end of their interaction subjects received a pre-game questionnaire. This questionnaire asked several questions related to subjects' expectations (see the "Expectation" section under "Operational Definitions" for a discussion of the specific expectation questions). After the questionnaires were completed, subjects were given their respective case descriptions (One plaintiff and one defendant) interaction, subjects were told when they had five, two, and one minute remaining. At the end of the negotiation subjects completed a "Settlement Sheet" to record their settlement. Finally, at the end of each session, rewards were distributed to subjects, and the subjects were debriefed.

As indicated previously, one dyad during each round was video-taped. Video tape was selected over audio tape so judges could examine subjects use of non-verbal behaviors to examine non-verbals, the taping procedures were constructed to capture as much of each subject's head and body movements as possible. Specifically, subjects sat in chairs facing one another, with nothing between them. The cameras were placed so it appears as if the subject is talking into the camera. The interaction was placed on tape, so the signal was "mixed" onto one screen. "Mixing" signals served to facilitate judging procedures since judges were
able to see both participants' responses to one another at the same time. Capturing the full fidelity of the interaction should have helped judges formulate more reliable impressions concerning a subject's use of power strategies.

Judging

Judges were divided into two groups, with each group viewing one-half of the subjects. This procedure was designed to avoid having judges evaluate two people in the same negotiation. In this way, judges' responses remained unaffected by prior judgments made in the same interaction since only one subject in each negotiation was evaluated by one group of judges.

Before each session judges were trained on the power categories, and judged a practice tape to become familiar with the categories. Then, judges began viewing the tapes. They analyzed the last seven minutes of the interaction. The entire tape was not being judged because pilot study-data indicated that judging the whole tape proved too tedious for judges. Also, the pilot study data revealed that participants became more involved (e.g., posing and refuting more arguments, offering more dollar settlements) during the last half of the negotiation. This intense interaction should constitute a more effective test of subjects use of power strategies because subjects predisposed to using power are more likely to rely on power
strategies when the negotiation intensifies as reaching a settlement becomes more urgent. Thus, only the last seven minutes of the negotiation were analyzed.

After viewing each seven-minute video-taped segment judges were asked to apply the power-strategy categories to the individual they were told to watch. Judges were not asked to count the number of instances a behavior occurred nor were they asked to "pin-point" specific utterances and categorize them. Judges were asked to give their opinion regarding the frequency with which behaviors occurred (The rationale for assessing power strategies using this methodology is detailed in the "Operational Definition" section under "Social Power."). Specifically, judges were asked to give their opinions concerning how often the individual directly or indirectly attempted to interrupt the other, change the topic, etc. The response scale is: Very Frequently, Often, Sometimes, Seldom, and Never. The two groups of judges continued this procedure until all twelve tapes were analyzed.

Operational Definitions

Personality

In an initial work Cegala (1976) has developed a "Generalized measure of assertiveness" (p. 1) named the Social

---

2 The power-category judging sheet is given in Appendix E.
Orientation Scale (SOS). Cegala argues that this instrument measures an individual's ability to meet the demands of the social situation. Preliminary data on the scale reveal that the SOS consists of five dimensions relating to interpersonal persuasion: aggressiveness, manipulativeness, awareness, assertiveness, and persuasability. Aggressiveness items relate to an individual's "argumentativeness, competitiveness, and a willingness to challenge others verbally" (p. 9). Manipulativeness items "suggest a general tendency to observe and assess other's behavior carefully for specific goal-oriented purposes" (p. 10). "The awareness items were designed to assess aspects of individuals' general role-taking ability, with particular emphasis on responsiveness to others' communication behavior" (p. 10). Assertiveness items are "Characterized by a general willingness to interact with others and a tendency to defend self when necessary" (p. 10). Persuasability items assess the extent to which an individual allows others to take advantage of him. The scale appears in Appendix B.

Clearly, the SOS seems to assess the personality skills relevant to negotiation situations outlined in the rationale including: a) the accurate perception of situational cues (Awareness), b) enactment of effective power strategies (Aggressiveness, Assertiveness), and c) the accurate perception and response to relevant role requirements (Manipulativeness). This conclusion is supported by recent papers by
Donohue (1975), and Cegala (1976), in which the Social Orientation Scale discriminated significantly winners and losers in the negotiation games used in this study. Thus, the subjects' scores on the SOS should be significant predictors of outcome in this study.

**Expectation**

Expectation was defined operationally as a set of twelve questions presented to subjects at the beginning of each negotiation round. Four questions asked subjects to evaluate their chances of success based on prior negotiations or similar situations. Four others asked subjects to assess the amount of resources they brought to the negotiation game, and the remaining four questions asked subjects to assess the value of the reward as their payment for participation in the negotiation.

This information should constitute a useful set of variables to help predict outcome. If the person does not care about the value of the reward, has not experienced much success in such situations, or does not bring many resources, such as experience or information to the bargaining situation, then the individual may not be as successful as the more reward-conscious, less easily manipulated individual (Tedeschi, et al., 1972).

Likert-type responses to these questions were averaged across each round and factor analyzed. Factor scores for
each individual across the expectation questions entered the regression equation. As these scores increase subjects' outcomes should increase since these expectations are likely to be based on a subject's performance in the prior negotiation round. This prenegotiation questionnaire appears in Appendix C.

Social Power

Social Power was defined operationally as judges' ratings of subjects' power strategies using the categories presented in Appendix E. These categories were derived from viewing video tapes, and reading transcripts of several pilot negotiation-game studies. Judges' ratings were averaged across judges, producing a matrix of 24 (rows of subjects) by 20 (columns of power strategies). This matrix was factor analyzed, producing a set of factor scores for each subject playing the game. These factor scores entered the regression equation.

An analysis of this procedure reveals that it is somewhat of a departure from more traditional procedures. More traditional procedures (cf. Hawes, 1972; Freedman, 1972) ask a small number of judges (perhaps three to five) to count instances of specific behaviors. The success of this procedure relies heavily upon the definition of the behaviors to be counted. The more specifically the behaviors
are defined for the judges the greater the likelihood that the judges can count the behaviors reliably. Through this procedure the researcher gathers primarily nominal data.

This procedure has several disadvantages for the purposes of this study. First, counting specific instances of behaviors, verbal and non-verbal, can be extremely time consuming and expensive since interaction must often be transcribed into scripts that judges can read. Reading through these transcripts can require a good deal of time thereby limiting the amount of interaction that can be analyzed. Second, the researcher may often be restricted to analyzing only those behaviors he can define very specifically for judges. Thus, analyzing more complex combinations of behaviors, e.g., power strategies, may be prohibitively problematic. Third, given that the product of traditional analyses is often nominal data, the researcher is somewhat limited in what he can do with the data. Since more sensitive, parametric statistics cannot be used on nominal data, gaining more information from the data becomes more difficult. Also, using nominal data makes it more difficult to use parametric procedures to assess the validity of the content categories.

The procedure outlined previously to analyze power strategies attempts to address these limitations. First,
viewing seven minutes of twelve interactions for a group of judges is not particularly time consuming. For each group of judges the procedure took only two and one-half hours. Second judges were able to use their own impressions concerning the meaning of complex combinations of behaviors. That is, the judging procedure assumes that judges were raised in the same socializing community (Bem, 1968) as the subjects they were viewing. Consequently, judges should be able to identify a behavior as an instance of e.g., stumbling around in presenting information, because the judge is able to assume that if he were performing the same behavior he could label it "stumbling around" also. The socializing community gives us these descriptors. However, using these descriptors reliably as content categories can be difficult with only a few number of judges. Across forty judges, these errors should begin to cancel out so that reliability can be established.

Third, the product of the analysis can be treated as interval-level data. As a result, these data were factor-analyzed without violating the assumptions of the model severely. Factor analyzing the data provides the advantages of being able to complete factor scores to be plugged into the regression model, and as a method of assessing directly the quality of each category in contributing to the analysis of social power. Even though this procedure requires more
judges than the more traditional procedure it seems far more consistent with the purposes of this study.

**Negotiation Outcome**

Negotiation outcome was defined operationally as the amount of the subjects' settlements across all four games in proportion to the amount for which the subject was negotiating originally. For example, if a subject settled for the maximum amount as a plaintiff, and kept the other from receiving any money when playing a defendant, then the plaintiff would be defined as maximally successful.

The formula for computing this settlement is:

1) For each game the subject receives a proportion score (actual dollar settlement/maximum settlement possible).

2) Average proportion scores are computed, one score for defendant games and one for plaintiff games.

3) Settlement Score is computed by subtracting the average defendant score from the average plaintiff score.

4) When no settlement is recorded the trial does not enter the formula.

To stabilize the reliability of this estimate of negotiation success subjects play four negotiation games. This estimate is determined more reliable, just as four questionnaire items generally are more reliable than one item, i.e., errors have a greater chance of becoming more normally distributed as the number of observations increases.
Validity and Reliability

Social Orientation Scale

To assess the internal validity of the Social Orientation Scale subjects responses on the scale were factor analyzed according to the procedures described by Cegala (1976). Specifically, a principal-axis factor analysis was performed on the data with a Binormamin rotation (Soupac, 1974). Items with factor loadings less than .30 were eliminated from the final analysis. Applying this criterion resulted in retaining 50 of the original 58 items. The twenty-four subjects in the experiment were combined with a much larger sample of 773 described by Cegala (1976), to achieve more stable factor scores for the twenty-four subjects. Factor scores were computed using Tucker's (1971) Method III since the scores were entered in a regression equation. The 50 items and their respective factor loadings are reported in Appendix B. Scores for each subject on the five dimensions of the SOS, (aggressiveness, manipulativeness, awareness, assertiveness, and persuasibility) entered the regression equation.

To assess reliability A Kuder-Richardson formula 8 was used. The resulting reliabilities were .83, .85, .86, .81, and .85 for the five factors of the SOS respectively.
Expectation

The expectation pregame scores were factor analyzed using a Binormamin rotation. Communality estimates were computed by the regression method, and the Scree Test (cf. Rummel, 1970) was used to determine the number of factors. Items with factor loadings less than .30 were eliminated from the final analyses. Thus, ten of the original twelve items were included in the final factor analysis.

The analysis revealed three factors accounting for 39.36 percent of the total variance and 79.85 percent of the total common variance. The intercorrelations among the factors were non-significant. The factor structure is reported in Appendix D.

The first factor, accounting for 39 percent of the common variance, relates to an individual's assessment of his own ability to predict his chances of success based on his previous negotiation experiences gained from both the immediate preceding game, and other "real" experiences. This factor can be labeled "Previous Experience" consistent with the discussion of Expectation in the Operational Definition section of this study. Items loading on this factor include: "I know I have what it takes to come out on top this round," and "I'm pretty good at predicting my negotiation partners' moves." An individual scoring highly on this factor would be fairly confident of his ability to
predict his partner's moves and to use this information to become a more successful negotiator. The second factor, accounting for 23% of the common variance, emerges as a "Reward Value" factor assessing the extent to which subjects valued the reward they were receiving. Items loading on this factor include: "I don't care about my compensation since I'm doing this for the fun of it," and "I would rather negotiate for some other reward if I had the chance." Individuals scoring highly on this factor would not seem to value the reward offered for negotiating.

The third factor, accounting for approximately 17% of the common variance consists of two items including "The amount of reward seems fair compensation for my efforts," and "I have trouble being sympathetic toward my opponents." An individual who thinks he is being rewarded fairly may be an individual who perceives he is not doing too well in the negotiation rounds. He may feel that since his performance is not too successful he is getting what he deserves. An individual who is doing well may be less likely to think he is being rewarded fairly since he may perceive that he is putting a good deal of effort into the negotiations and should be getting more out of them. Consequently, the individual who thinks he is being compensated fairly for his efforts may lose interest in the negotiation over time. This lack of interest may decrease his ability
to become sympathetic for his opponents and their clients. Given that this is a reasonable interpretation of the relationship between the items, this third factor may be termed "Resignation." An individual scoring highly on this factor may perceive that he is having difficulty sustaining his enthusiasm for participating in the negotiations.

A Kuder-Richardson formula 8 was used to assess reliability. For the four negotiation rounds the reliabilities were .61, .43, .40 and .57, respectively. The small number of items and subjects may have accounted for these rather weak reliabilities.

Social Power

The subjects-by-power categories matrix, collapsed across judges, was factor analyzed using the same procedures indicated in the previous section. Using those procedures all of the original 20 items were retained in the final factor analysis.

The analysis revealed three factors accounting for 48.29 percent of the total variance and 76.86 percent of the total common variance. The intercorrelations among the factors were nonsignificant. The factor matrix is reported in Appendix F.

The first factor, accounting for 48 percent of the common variance, can be interpreted clearly as "Reward-Reducing"
strategies of social power. All of the reward-reducing items loaded on this factor including the non-verbal item "stare at the other for long periods." However, two items intended originally to be reward-extending items loaded on this factor. They included "Make dollar offers to settle," and "Introduce facts not in the case description." These items could easily be interpreted as reward reducing since making dollar offers to settle and introducing new facts may be a means of controlling the direction of the interaction in much the same way asking the other to stick to the topic controls the interaction. Individuals scoring highly on this factor would be those whom the judges found to be using coercive strategies more frequently.

The second factor, accounting for 15 percent of the common variance, can be labeled "Argumentative Assertiveness." Items loading on this factor include: "Stumble around in presenting information," "Make hand or body movements unrelated to his/her speech," and "Look away from his/her partner under stress." Subjects with high positive scores on this dimension could be labeled as not very assertive or competent in presenting cogent arguments to their opponents. Given this interpretation the negative correlation between factors one and two seems to be conceptually reasonable. The third factor, accounting for 13 percent of the common variance, consisted of only two items: "Voice concern and/or
sympathy about the others client, and "Flatter, or compli-
ment the other in any way." This factor may be labeled
"Sensitiveness" in that an individual who scores highly
on this factor may demonstrate an ability to respond to
the emotional needs of the opponent or the opponent's client.
This third factor may demonstrate an ability to respond
to the emotional needs of the opponent or the opponent's
client. This third factor has the appearance of being a
"Reward-Extending" power strategy factor. However, the
small number of items on this factor suggests that the
label "Sensitiveness" may be more appropriate since more
reward-extending items loading on this factor would be
necessary to label the factor "Reward-Extending."

Reliability was assessed by computing a Kuder-Richard-
son formula 8 on the categories-by-judges matrix for each
subject. These reliabilities ranged from .61 to .88.
The estimates were then averaged across subjects to derive
the overall reliability of .76.

All analyses, except the reliability estimates were
computed using the Soupac (1974) statistical package. The
reliability estimates were calculated with the Wherry (1975)
package.
CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Test of the Hypothesis

The data from the complete regression analysis appear in Table 1. As Table 1 indicates the full model does not support the hypothesis that negotiation outcome can be predicted significantly from the dimensions of the SOS, judges' rating of subjects' power strategies, and subjects' expectations prior to each negotiation round.

As Table 1 indicates the overall $F$ was not significant. However, the independent variables in combination accounted for over 56 percent of the variance of negotiation outcome. This finding suggests that several variables were not contributing to the model. Thus, the number of independent variables needs to be reduced to the best set of predictors. Draper and Smith (1966) suggested the step-wise regression analysis procedure to accomplish this objective. The results of the step-wise procedure are presented in Table 2.

Table 2 indicates that the first four variables entering the regression equation constitute the optimum set of predictors, since, in step 5, the $F$ level to enter the equation becomes non-significant. Also, the $F$ level to remove from the equation decreases in significance, and
Table 1
Summary Table of Full Regression Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regression Model w/ coefficients</th>
<th>F*</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>R²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$Y_1 = 3.6913 - .2351x_1 - .1368x_2 + .0303x_3 + .0080x_4 + 1.37 \frac{11}{12} .56$</td>
<td>.1408x_5 - .5110x_6 - .1004x_7 - .4996x_8 + \ .6879x_9 - .0219x_{10} - .7179x_{11}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* F was non-significant

$x_1$ = Aggressiveness

$x_2$ = Manipulativeness

$x_3$ = Awareness

$x_4$ = Assertiveness

$x_5$ = Persuasibility

$x_6$ = Reward-Reducing Power Strategies

$x_7$ = Argumentative-Assertive Power Strategies

$x_8$ = Sensitivity Power Strategies

$x_9$ = Previous Experience Expectations

$x_{10}$ = Reward-Value Expectations

$x_{11}$ = Resignation Expectations

$x_{12}$ = Dependent Variable
### TABLE 2

Summary Table of Step-Wise Regression Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step Number</th>
<th>Variable Entered</th>
<th>Regression Model</th>
<th>F Level To Enter</th>
<th>F Level Remove</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>$R^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>$y_i = 2.9383 - .3782x_{11}$</td>
<td>3.672</td>
<td>3.672</td>
<td>1/22</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>$y_i = 2.9383 + .3721x_9 - .4075x_{11}$</td>
<td>4.019*</td>
<td>4.097*</td>
<td>2/21</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>$y_i = 2.9383 - .3612x_8 + .4242x_9 - .5776x_{11}$</td>
<td>3.238*</td>
<td>4.102*</td>
<td>3/20</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>$y_i = 2.9383 + .4279x_6 - .4355x_9 + .6429x_9 - .6962x_{11}$</td>
<td>5.108**</td>
<td>4.986**</td>
<td>4/19</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>$y_i = 2.9383 - .1678x_1 + .4110x_6 - .4724x_9 + .6654x_9 - .6962x_{11}$</td>
<td>1.005</td>
<td>4.190*</td>
<td>5/18</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* F significant (p < .05)

** F significant (p < .01)
the amount of variance contributed to the model by variable one is only three percent. Also, all the $t$-tests for the regression coefficients are significant ($p < .05$) for the four step model ($t_6 = 2.260$, $t_8 = 2.344$, $t_9 = 3.394$, and $t_{11} = -3.672$) whereas the $t$-test for variable 1 in the five step model is non-significant ($p > .05$) ($t_1 = -1.002$). Thus, variables 11, 9, 8, and 6 constitute the best set of variables to predict negotiation outcome. Variables 11 and 9 are the resignation and previous experience expectation predictors, respectively. Variables 8 and 6 are the sensitivity and reward reducing power strategy predictors, respectively. None of the personality variables entered the equation as significant predictors of negotiation outcome.

By looking at the direction of the regression coefficients among the four significant predictors in the step-wise model a profile of a successful negotiation player emerges that is consistent with the initial expectations of this study. Specifically, a highly negative relationship exists between negotiation outcome and the resignation factor (variable 11) of the expectation dimension indicating that successful negotiators seem to maintain their interest or enthusiasm for playing-out the negotiation game. This relationship is consistent with the highly positive score between the previous experience expectation factor
(variable 9) and the dependent variable. Those subjects confident of their ability to predict their partners' moves tend to be more successful negotiators. These individuals seem to rely more on past experiences due to their perceived successes in prior negotiation trials. In addition to maintaining their enthusiasm and their confidence in predicting their partners' moves, successful negotiators seem to be relying more on reward-reducing strategies than on reward-extending strategies. Specifically, the winners appear to be more verbally and non-verbally assertive in attacking their opponents more frequently than losers. Perhaps due to time restraints, winners seemed less willing to use such reward-extending strategies as flattery or sympathy for their opponents.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION

The results of this study indicate that negotiation outcome can be predicted significantly by assessing members' power strategies and members' pre-negotiation expectations. Specifically, successful negotiators seem to maintain their enthusiasm throughout the interaction rely more on information gained in prior negotiation rounds, use primarily reward reducing power strategies and remain less willing to use such reward-extending power strategies as flattery or sympathy.

Limitations

The results of this study must be assessed vis-a-vis several limitations. First, the results indicate that the Social Orientation Scale is not a significant predictor of negotiation outcome. This negative result may be more a function of sampling error than any inherent weakness of the SOS. Examining the subjects' factor scores on the SOS revealed that the great majority of factor scores were less than one standard deviation from the mean indicating that very few of the subjects held extreme scores on any of the SOS factors. Thus, not many subjects maintained the SOS traits relevant to
succeeding in the negotiation games. Selecting subjects on the basis of SOS scores or selecting subjects randomly from a larger population than the one used may have overcome this problem. Better sampling may have brought the results of this study more in line with Cegala's (1976) finding that SOS scores can predict significantly negotiation outcome.

Second, the results of this study might have indicated that reward-extending strategies were used more extensively if the entire 15 minutes of each tape were analyzed. That is, selecting only the last seven minutes of interaction for judges to assess power strategies may have biased the results in favor of reward-reducing strategies since reward-reducing strategies are encouraged under urgent time conditions. Analyzing the entire tape may have produced a more balanced use of power strategies by subjects since reward-extending strategies typically require more time to implement.

A third factor attenuating the results of this study is that the results were derived from one rather limited type of negotiation situation. Generalizing beyond the situation in which the variable time was restricted, and the cases were not "real" to the subjects, may be rather difficult. Perhaps the results of the study would be more useful if the situational parameters had been manipulated. For example, what differences in the use of power strategies might emerge under no time limit and restricted time limit conditions? Or, if
subjects were negotiating issues directly relevant to them, as opposed to the researcher-imposed issues, would the interaction become markedly different? Or, perhaps other situational parameters could have been manipulated, e.g., personality compatibility, further enhancing the generalizability of the results. Nevertheless, as they stand, the results of this study are restricted to generalizing across one rather limited type of situation. Subsequent research should begin to examine the effects of situation on the use of power strategies.

The Process and Outcome of Negotiation

The results of this study provide some potentially useful information for understanding the process of negotiation. For example, this study revealed that subjects' expectations over time appear to influence the subjects success in the negotiation. Subjects maintaining an active interest in playing the game and subjects relying more on prior negotiation experiences seem more successful.

By examining these findings in greater detail, a deeper insight into negotiation processes is revealed. Manipulating the number of trials might reveal an expectation "curve" that could indicate the points at which successful negotiators rely more heavily on prior experiences to guide their strategies. The reliability estimates on the four trials indicated that subjects were able to articulate their expectations more
consistently on the first and fourth trials. Expectations expressed for trials two and three seemed more confused and ambiguous to subjects. If the number of trials were extended to 10 or more, subjects might reach a point at which expectations become less useful. One might hypothesize that winners reach that point more quickly than losers since prior expectations have proved more valuable to winners.

Examining power strategy implementation in greater detail also might provide some useful information for describing negotiation processes. The results of this study indicated that subjects relied more heavily on reward-reducing power strategies to win the negotiation. These results were derived from judges' estimates of the last seven minutes of interaction. In one pilot study judges assessed the first seven minutes of interaction. The factor structure derived from these assessments indicated that subjects made greater use of reward-extending strategies during the first few minutes of the interaction. These results suggest that power-strategy implementation may move through phases (in much the same way Fisher (1970) discusses phases of decision-making). Negotiations may begin with lower-risk reward-extending strategies and move toward reward reducing strategies. Between these two rather gross phases, other phases may be common to power strategy implementation. For instance, negotiations typically may begin with an "information-exchange" phase in which members
attempt to implement such reward-extending strategies as information power. A negotiator might attempt to bring new information to bear on the problem to extend his credibility, thereby boosting his control over informational resources. Once information has been exchanged the negotiation may enter a "trust-seeking" phase in which a negotiator might attempt to extend his ability to deliver rewards to the other by increasing the others personal attraction to him. The negotiator may rely on flattery, demonstrations of sympathy, or other strategies designed to increase the other's trust in the negotiator's intentions.

When time or other pressures to settle become salient the interaction may be characterized more by the use of reward-reducing strategies. Initially the negotiator may be less willing to use such confrontive strategies as coercion to reduce the other's ability to deliver rewards to him. Instead, he may try to implement primarily normative cohesion strategies by appealing to the other's sense of fairness to conform to the rules of the negotiation. Interaction in this phase may be characterized by appeals to do what is right or what is "best" for both parties. As time and other situational constraints increase the urgency of the negotiations members may be more willing to implement higher-risk reward-reducing strategies including attempts to coerce, threaten, or block the opponents moves. The "everything-to-win-nothing-to-lose"
logic may govern the negotiators' strategies when pressure is applied to settle. In the final phase of negotiation members may undergo an intense proposal making session in an attempt to settle. This phase may be characterized by some in depth maneuvering in which members may come to rely heavily on reward-reducing strategies to maximize their settlement.

These preliminary ideas concerning phases of power implementation in negotiations are intended to act as a springboard to explore further the role of communicative processes in negotiations. As such, these ideas pose some interesting implications for future research.

**Research Implications**

Exploring negotiation phases can best be achieved by using more sensitive measures of power-strategy implementation. While the method used in this study is useful for making inferences about the negotiators themselves other more sensitive methods would be required to make inferences about the negotiation process. For example, recordings gathered of "actual" negotiation could be coded utterance by utterance using a modified version of the categories judges used to assess subjects' power strategies. The utterances could be analyzed using Markov process analysis techniques (Hawes and Foley, 1973) given that the categories met the assumptions of the Markov
model (outlined in Hawes and Foley, 1976). This analysis could reveal the extent to which negotiations are characterized by phases of power strategy implementation by analyzing changes in transition probabilities during various times throughout the negotiation. One might hypothesize significantly higher transition probabilities among reward-extending strategies during the first half of the negotiation than during its last half. This may be one means of testing the phase hypothesis in negotiation.

In addition to exploring some interesting theoretical implications, this study may have a practical pay-off, as well. The methods used in this study to assess individual's use of power strategies may be useful for assertiveness training, or for training individuals to be successful in a variety of communicatively competitive situations. The categories could be used to diagnose an individuals' use of power strategies under different kinds of conditions. This diagnosis could be used to overcome any serious deficiencies in the individual's approach to competitive situations. While this implication may have minimal theoretical value, it does retain a pragmatic value for those interested in how well individuals perform under certain kinds of competitive communication conditions.
References


Cegala, D.J. The social orientation scale: an operational definition of role perception and role enactment tendencies in interpersonal persuasion. Unpublished manuscript, 1976.


Rotter, J. Generalized expectations for internal vs. external control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 1966, 80, 609.


Smith, D.H. Applications of behavioral research to speech fundamentals: applications from research on bargaining and negotiation. Paper presented to the Central States Speech Convention, April, 1972.


Tucker, L.R. Relations of factor score estimates to their use. Psychometrika, 1971, 36, 427-436.


Your success in negotiating a settlement to this case is important to you both in the figurative sense of your success as a lawyer and because it will determine how much actual money you will receive. The more successful you are the more money you will receive. Remember, the person who obtains the lowest dollar figure as an attorney for the defense will be awarded an additional $1.00 or 1 point; so it is to your advantage to be as successful as possible even within the settlement ranges given below. If your total settlement is:

- $400,100 and above, you will receive $0.00 or 0 points
- $300,100 to $400,000 you will receive $0.25 or 1/4 point
- $200,100 to $300,000 you will receive $0.50 or 1/2 point
- $100,100 to $200,000 you will receive $0.75 or 3/4 point
- $ 75,100 to $100,000 you will receive $1.00 or 1 point
- $75,000 or below, you will receive $1.25 or 1½ points
- IF YOU FAIL TO SETTLE YOU WILL RECEIVE $0.10 or 1/8 point

Your opponent will be paid as to how well he/she does and he/she will be working hard towards that end. Your payoff schedule is not symmetrically reversed so don't be concerned with how much money he/she makes. **WARNING!** At no time can you reveal how much money you will receive by settling at a certain point. If either one of you should violate this rule you will each receive nothing and the experiment will be over. Read the following case carefully. You may use the case when negotiating.
Allison vs. F & W Chemical Company

The F & W Chemical Company manufactures some very caustic chemicals for construction purposes. In order to clean out their manufacturing equipment they use water which is then pumped out to a settling pond where it evaporates. The water in the settling pond is extremely caustic and will burn the flesh of a human. The Company has erected a 12 foot cyclone fence around the pond and posted warning signs.

Six year old Bobbie Allison, while playing with some friends near the fence, scraped out an opening under the fence and accidently fell into the pond. He suffered severe burns over 80% of his body and, while he recovered from the burns he is left with some very unsightly scars on his face and arms.

A later examination of the pond area revealed that at least two of the warning signs were damaged or weather worn to the point where they were not legible. In addition, there were clear indications that other people, at different times had broken the cyclone fence and that it had been repaired hastily and incompletely.

The Allisons have sued the F & W Company for $500,000 for medical expenses and the pain and suffering involved. Their attorney is arguing that by having such a dangerous pond the Company accepts the liability for damage it inflicts on someone. Furthermore the Company was negligent in not providing a more fool-proof fence. The Company is arguing that they were not negligent in constructing the fence. Indeed, they had gone to a great deal of trouble and expense in constructing the fence. Furthermore, since Bobbie has completely recovered physically, the amount asked is excessive even if the Company had been negligent. The judge has ordered the attorneys to settle out of court. The two of you are the attorneys. Get the best possible settlement in your client's interests.
You are the attorney for the plaintiff

Your success in negotiating a settlement to this case is important to you both in the figurative sense of your success as a lawyer and because it will determine how much actual money you will receive. The more successful you are the more money you will receive. Remember, the person who obtains the highest dollar figure as an attorney for the plaintiff will be awarded an additional $1.00 or 1 point; so it is to your advantage to be as successful as possible even within the settlement ranges given below. If your total settlement is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Settlement Range</th>
<th>Payoff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$80,000 or below</td>
<td>$0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$80,100 to $175,000</td>
<td>$0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$175,100 to $300,000</td>
<td>$0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$300,100 to $424,900</td>
<td>$1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$425,000 and above</td>
<td>$1.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you fail to settle you will receive $0.10 or 1/8 point.

Your opponent will be paid as to how well he/she does and he/she will be working hard towards that end. Your payoff schedule is not symmetrically reversed so don't be concerned with how much money he/she makes. **WARNING!** At no time can you reveal how much money you will receive by settling at a certain point. If either one of you should violate this rule you will each receive nothing and the experiment will be over. Read the following case carefully. You may use the case when negotiating.
Jim Sanders was involved in an automobile accident with Arthur Gressel. The road was very slippery and it was impossible to determine whose fault it was. Mr. Sanders lost the use of both legs while Mr. Gressel had suffered only minor injuries. Mr. Sanders had been an All-American hockey player in college and had just recently signed a contract with a professional hockey team for a handsome bonus. As a result of the accident, obviously, Mr. Sanders will not be able to pursue his chosen career.

Mr. Sanders has brought suit against Mr. Gressel asking $500,000 damages. He contends that as a result of the accident he will not be able to pursue his chosen career, which would have been financially lucrative.

Mr. Sanders has reason to believe that Mr. Gressel may have been drinking prior to the accident. Although Mr. Sanders has a degree in English he has been told that there are not many jobs available for people with degrees in English.

The judge has instructed the attorneys representing both parties to settle out of court and both attorneys have agreed. The two of you are the two attorneys meeting to negotiate a settlement. Get the best possible settlement for your client's interests.
YOU ARE THE ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF

Your success in negotiating a settlement to this case is important to you both in the figurative sense of your success as a lawyer and because it will determine how much actual money you will receive. The more successful you are the more money you will receive. Remember, the person who obtains the highest dollar figure as an attorney for the plaintiff will be awarded an additional $1.00 or 1 point; so it is to your advantage to be as successful as possible even within the settlement ranges given below. If your total settlement is:

- $80,000 or below, you will receive $0.25 or ¼ point
- $80,100 to $175,000 you will receive $0.50 or ½ point
- $175,100 to $300,000 you will receive $0.75 or ¾ point
- $300,100 to $424,900 you will receive $1.00 or 1 point
- $425,000 and above, you will receive $1.25 or 1½ points

If you fail to settle you will receive $0.10 or ¼ point.

Your opponent will be paid as to how well he/she does and he/she will be working hard towards that end. Your payoff schedule is not symmetrically reversed so don't be concerned with how much money he/she makes. WARNING! At no time can you reveal how much money you will receive by settling at a certain point. If either one of you should violate this rule you will each receive nothing and the experiment will be over. Read the following case carefully. You may use the case when negotiating.
Jim Sanders was involved in an automobile accident with Arthur Gressel. The road was very slippery and it was impossible to determine whose fault it was. Mr. Sanders lost the use of both legs while Mr. Gressel had suffered only minor injuries. Mr. Sanders had been an All-American hockey player in college and had just recently signed a contract with a professional hockey team for a handsome bonus. As a result of the accident, obviously, Mr. Sanders will not be able to pursue his chosen career.

Mr. Sanders has brought suit against Mr. Gressel asking $500,000 damages. He contends that as a result of the accident he will not be able to pursue his chosen career, which would have been financially lucrative.

Mr. Gressel contends that Mr. Sanders was not permanently disabled and because he has a college degree in English he can expect to make a comfortable living for the rest of his life. Mr. Gressel had also discovered that Mr. Sanders had a questionable driving record.

The judge has instructed the attorneys representing both parties to settle out of court and both attorneys have agreed. The two of you are the two attorneys meeting to negotiate a settlement. Get the best possible settlement for your client's interests.
YOU ARE THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT

Your success in negotiating a settlement to this case is important to you both in the figurative sense of your success as a lawyer and because it will determine how much actual money you will receive. The more successful you are the more money you will receive. Remember, the person who obtains the lowest dollar figure as an attorney for the defense will be awarded an additional $1.00 or 1 point; so it is to your advantage to be as successful as possible even within the settlement ranges given below. If your total settlement is:

- $400,100 and above, you will receive $0.00 or 0 points
- $300,100 to $400,000 you will receive $0.25 or 1/4 point
- $200,100 to $300,000 you will receive $0.50 or 1/2 point
- $100,100 to $200,000 you will receive $0.75 or 3/4 point
- $75,100 to $100,000 you will receive $1.00 or 1 point
- $75,000 or below, you will receive $1.25 or 1 1/4 points

IF YOU FAIL TO SETTLE YOU WILL RECEIVE $0.10 or 1/8 point

Your opponent will be paid as to how well he/she does and he/she will be working hard towards that end. Your payoff schedule is not symmetrically reversed so don't be concerned with how much money he/she makes. WARNING! At no time can you reveal how much money you will receive by settling at a certain point. If either one of you should violate this rule you will each receive nothing and the experiment will be over. Read the following case carefully. You may use the case when negotiating.
While waiting for a job interview with a prospective employer, Herbert Smith asked the receptionist whether there was a pop machine in the building. The receptionist told Mr. Smith that there was one down the hall but that no one had been around to service it in several months. Mr. Smith noticed that there was one Pepsi-Cola left and decided to have it even though a sign on the machine said "out of order." After finishing his drink Mr. Smith discovered that the bottom of the bottle was covered with a green fungus and about twenty minutes later he became violently ill. Mr. Smith was rushed to the hospital where it was discovered that he had a form of food poisoning and he had his stomach pumped. As a result of this incident Mr. Smith was unable to keep a promising job interview and the job was given to someone else.

Mr. Smith has brought suit against the Pepsi-Cola Company asking $2,000 damages. He contends that his medical bills should be paid for and that he should be paid the equivalent of one month's wages for the job for which he was interviewing. The $2,000 includes punitive remuneration as well.

The firm with which Mr. Smith was scheduled to interview rents pop machines from the Pepsi-Cola Company. Consequently, the Pepsi-Cola Company is responsible for the maintenance of the machine even though they had not serviced it for months.

The Pepsi-Cola Company contends that since Mr. Smith was warned against using the machine by both the secretary and the note on the machine that they should not be held liable. They also contend that since Mr. Smith was not working at the time of the incident they should not be expected to pay loss of wages.

The judge has encouraged the attorneys representing both parties to settle out of court to negotiate a settlement. Get the best possible settlement for your client.
Smith vs. Pepsi-Cola Company

YOU ARE THE ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINIF

Your success in negotiating a settlement to this case is important to you both in the figurative sense of your success as a lawyer and because it will determine how much actual money you will receive. The more successful you are the more money you will receive. Remember, the person who obtains the highest dollar figure as an attorney for the plaintiff will be awarded an additional $1.00 or 1 point; so it is to your advantage to be as successful as possible even within the settlement ranges given below. If your total settlement is:

- $400 or below, you will receive $0.00 or 0 points
- $410 to $600 you will receive $0.25 or 1/4 point
- $610 to $790 you will receive $0.50 or 1/2 point
- $800 to $1,000 you will receive $0.75 or 3/4 point
- $1,100 to $1,600 you will receive $1.00 or 1 point
- $1,610 and above, you will receive $1.25 or 1 1/2 points

IF YOU FAIL TO SETTLE YOU WILL RECEIVE $0.10 or 1/8 point.

Your opponent will be paid as to how well he/she does and he/she will be working hard towards that end. Your payoff schedule is not symmetrically reversed so don't be concerned with how much money he/she makes. WARNING! At no time can you reveal how much money you will receive by settling at a certain point. If either one of you should violate this rule you will each receive nothing and the experiment will be over. Read the following case carefully. You may use the case when negotiating.
While waiting for a job interview with a prospective employer, Herbert Smith asked the receptionist whether there was a pop machine in the building. The receptionist told Mr. Smith that there was one down the hall but that no one had been around to service it in several months. Mr. Smith noticed that there was one Pepsi-Cola left and decided to have it even though a sign on the machine said "out of order." After finishing his drink, Mr. Smith discovered that the bottom of the bottle was covered with a green fungus and about twenty minutes later he became violently ill. Mr. Smith was rushed to the hospital where it was discovered that he had a form of food poisoning and he had his stomach pumped. As a result of this incident Mr. Smith was unable to keep a promising job interview and the job was given to someone else.

Mr. Smith has brought suit against the Pepsi-Cola Company asking $2,000 damages. He contends that his medical bills should be paid for and that he should be paid the equivalent of one month’s wages for the job for which he was interviewing. The $2,000 includes punitive remuneration as well.

The Pepsi-Cola Company contends that the firm with which Mr. Smith was scheduled to interview rents the pop machines from them. But the firm had not rented the machine for several months prior to the incident. Consequently, the Pepsi-Cola Company had not been servicing the machine. They had not yet removed the machine due to a shortage of man power. They contend that since Mr. Smith was warned against using the machine by both the secretary and the note on the machine that they should not be held liable. They also contend that since Mr. Smith was not working at the time of the incident they should not be expected to pay loss of wages.

The judge has encouraged the attorneys representing both parties to settle out of court and the attorneys have agreed. The two of you are the attorneys meeting out of court to negotiate a settlement. Get the best possible settlement for your client.
Your success in negotiating a settlement to this case is important to you both in the figurative sense of your success as a lawyer and because it will determine how much actual money you will receive. The more successful you are the more money you will receive. Remember, the person who obtains the lowest dollar figure as an attorney for the defense will be awarded an additional $1.00 or 1 point; so it is to your advantage to be as successful as possible even within the settlement ranges given below. If your total settlement is:

$1,800 and above, you will receive $0.00 or 0 points
$1,500 to $1,790 you will receive $0.25 or 1/4 point
$1,000 to $1,490 you will receive $0.50 or 1/2 point
$700 to $990 you will receive $0.75 or 3/4 point
$510 to $690 you will receive $1.00 or 1 point
$500 or below, you will receive $1.25 or 1 1/4 points

IF YOU FAIL TO SETTLE YOU WILL RECEIVE $0.10 or 1/8 point.

Your opponent will be paid as to how well he/she does and he/she will be working hard towards that end. Your payoff schedule is not symmetrically reversed so don't be concerned with how much money he/she makes. WARNING! At no time can you reveal how much money you will receive by settling at a certain point. If either one of you should violate this rule you will each receive nothing and the experiment will be over. Read the following case carefully. You may use the case when negotiating.
Mrs. Thomas' husband John, while driving home one night from a local tavern, was struck and killed by a freight train. The night was clear and the road dry. John Thomas had had several drinks at the local bar, but there was no way to tell whether he was drunk. The train engineer, when approaching the crossing, sounded his whistle several times. But, the warning lights at the crossing malfunctioned and did not operate. The car was traveling at about 30 miles per hour and struck the second engine of the train. The brakes were applied immediately before impact.

Mrs. Thomas claims that her husband telephoned her just before leaving the tavern and that he definitely was not drunk. Moreover, she claims that her husband frequently went to that local tavern and was always very cautious at that particular railroad crossing because he knew that the warning lights often did not function.

Mrs. Thomas, who is now left with three children in grade school to support, has sued for $1,000,000, claiming negligence on the part of the railroad. The railroad is willing to pay $10,000, but argues that there was no way they could prevent the malfunction and that if John Thomas had used normal caution at a railroad crossing the accident would not have occurred.

The judge has instructed the attorneys to settle out of court. You two are the attorneys. Get the best possible settlement for your client's interest.
Thomas vs. Penn Railroad

YOU ARE THE ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF

Your success in negotiating a settlement to this case is important to you both in the figurative sense of your success as a lawyer and because it will determine how much actual money you will receive. The more successful you are the more money you will receive. Remember, the person who obtains the highest dollar figure as an attorney for the plaintiff will be awarded an additional $1.00 or 1 point; so it is to your advantage to be as successful as possible even within the settlement ranges given below. If your total settlement is:

- $75,000 or below, you will receive $0.00 or 0 point
- $75,100 to $200,000 you will receive $0.25 or 1/4 point
- $200,100 to $375,000 you will receive $0.50 or 1/2 point
- $375,100 to $500,000 you will receive $0.75 or 3/4 point
- $500,100 to $890,900 you will receive $1.00 or 1 point
- $900,000 and above, you will receive $1.25 or 1 1/4 points

IF YOU FAIL TO SETTLE YOU WILL RECEIVE $0.10 or 1/8 point.

Your opponent will be paid as to how well he/she does and he/she will be working hard towards that end. Your payoff schedule is not symmetrically reversed so don't be concerned with how much money he/she makes. WARNING! At no time can you reveal how much money you will receive by settling at a certain point. If either one of you should violate this rule you will each receive nothing and the experiment will be over. Read the following case carefully. You may use the case when negotiating.
Mrs. Thomas' husband John, while driving home one night from a local tavern, was struck and killed by a freight train. The night was clear and the road dry. John Thomas had had several drinks at the local bar, but there was no way to tell whether he was drunk. The train engineer, when approaching the crossing, sounded his whistle several times. But, the warning lights at the crossing malfunctioned and did not operate. The car was traveling at about 30 miles per hour and struck the second engine of the train. The brakes were applied immediately before impact.

Penn Railroad claims that they continuously monitor their railroad crossing signs to make sure that they function. Even so, it is impossible to know when a warning sign will malfunction. Often Penn Railroad relies on reports from drivers and pedestrians to determine where malfunctioning warning signs occur.

Mrs. Thomas, who is now left with three children in grade school to support, has sued for $1,000,000, claiming negligence on the part of the railroad. The railroad is willing to pay $10,000, but argues that there was no way they could prevent the malfunction and that if John Thomas had used normal caution at the railroad crossing the accident would not have occurred.

The judge has instructed the attorneys to settle out of court. You two are the attorneys. Get the best possible settlement for your client's interest.
Thomas vs. Penn Railroad

YOU ARE THE ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT

Your success in negotiating a settlement to this case is important to you both in the figurative sense of your success as a lawyer and because it will determine how much actual money you will receive. The more successful you are the more money you will receive. Remember, the person who obtains the lowest dollar figure as an attorney for the defense will be awarded an additional $1.00 or 1 point; so it is to your advantage to be as successful as possible even within the settlement ranges given below. If your total settlement is:

- \$700,100 and above, you will receive \$0.00 or 0 points
- \$500,000 to \$700,000 you will receive \$0.25 or 1/4 point
- \$300,100 to \$499,900 you will receive \$0.50 or 1/2 point
- \$100,100 to \$299,900 you will receive \$0.75 or 3/4 point
- \$25,100 to \$100,000 you will receive \$1.00 or 1 point
- \$25,000 or below, you will receive \$1.25 or 1 1/4 points

IF YOU FAIL TO SETTLE YOU WILL RECEIVE \$0.10 or 1/8 point.

Your opponent will be paid as to how well he/she does and he/she will be working hard towards that end. Your payoff schedule is not symmetrically reversed so don't be concerned with how much money he/she makes. WARNING! At no time can you reveal how much money you will receive by settling at a certain point. If either one of you should violate this rule you will each receive nothing and the experiment will be over. Read the following case carefully. You may use the case when negotiating.
### Appendix B

#### Rotated Factor Pattern Loadings' for SOS (N = 773)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Factor I Aggressiveness</th>
<th>Factor II Manipulativeness</th>
<th>Factor III Awareness</th>
<th>Factor IV Assertiveness</th>
<th>Factor V Persuasibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I am often inclined to go out of my way to win a point with someone who has opposed me.</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I will usually persist in an argument until my point is made.</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I really enjoy the challenge of a good argument.</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I enjoy competitive situations where I am pitted against another person.</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I have no qualms about arguing with someone that I have just met.</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I feel uncomfortable challenging statements that others make, even when I know that they are inaccurate.</td>
<td>-.45</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I generally will easily give up when in an argument with another person.</td>
<td>-.43</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.22</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Sometimes I will start an argument with someone, just because I feel like it.</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. If given the opportunity, I will take advantage of an upper hand that I have on someone else.</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. If someone is rude or otherwise nasty to me, I tend to let the comment pass rather than answer the person back.</td>
<td>-.39</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items</td>
<td>Factor I</td>
<td>Factor II</td>
<td>Factor III</td>
<td>Factor IV</td>
<td>Factor V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel uncomfortable about (and try to avoid giving) negative evaluations of others.</td>
<td>-.38</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If someone makes inconsistent statements, I will generally point out the inconsistencies to the person.</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I generally don't take &quot;baloney&quot; from anyone; I will challenge almost any person who tries to put one over on me.</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am often reluctant to challenge someone, even when I feel that they are doing me a moderate injustice.</td>
<td>-.34</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I like socially touchy situations (e.g., ones where the slightest word or mannerism might reveal true feelings and thoughts).</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When talking with others I usually observe them carefully to determine what they are thinking.</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I often try to predict what other people will do or how they will respond to certain things on the basis of information that I have about them.</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When attempting to anticipate another's behavior, I can often successfully view the situation as they might view it.</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix B
Page 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
<th>Factor III</th>
<th>Factor IV</th>
<th>Factor V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19. While I can and will assert myself, I also know when not to be assertive.</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>-.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. I am a reasonably good actor; that is, I can play the appropriate part to meet most social situations that I have encountered.</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. I will evaluate other people in a social situation before attempting to assume a dominant or assertive role.</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22. I often feel people out by getting them to talk while I listen.</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23. I usually pay very close attention to what people say and how they say it.</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24. I am careful to spot inconsistencies in a person's behavior or expressed ideas.</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25. I think it's fun to &quot;play psychologist&quot; and try to determine what makes people tick.</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26. In a conversation, I observe others closely to determine how they are responding to what I am saying.</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27. I am sensitive to others' subtle meanings and gestures when talking with them.</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items</td>
<td>Factor I Aggressiveness</td>
<td>Factor II Manipulativeness</td>
<td>Factor III Awareness</td>
<td>Factor IV Assertiveness</td>
<td>Factor V Persuasibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28. I am generally responsive to others' reaction to what I am saying (e.g., if someone looks confused about what I'm saying I will ask if he/she understands me).</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29. I can look someone square in the eye and lie.</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30. I find it difficult to concentrate on the other person when communicating (e.g., my mind wanders and often I miss parts of what is said).</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.72</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31. Often I have difficulty being a good listener (e.g., my mind wanders, I am often preoccupied with what I want to say next, sometimes I'm not sure what the other is &quot;really&quot; saying, etc.).</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.68</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32. In a conversation, my mind often wanders and I feel sort of &quot;unplugged&quot; from the social situation of which I am part.</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.67</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33. In a conversation, often I am not sure what others' needs are (e.g., a compliment, a reassuring comment, etc.) until it is too late to respond appropriately.</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.50</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34. Often I am unsure of my role in a conversation with others (e.g., I'm not sure how I am expected to respond).</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Often I find that I do not fully understand the implications of comments that people make to me until I have had time to think about them.</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.44</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items</td>
<td>Factor I</td>
<td>Factor II</td>
<td>Factor III</td>
<td>Factor IV</td>
<td>Factor V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Often I find myself in situations for which I am completely unprepared.</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. I often try to anticipate what others are going to say, but many times my predictions are inaccurate.</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. I really enjoy interacting with people.</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. I generally make an effort to understand and interact with others.</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40. I am usually direct with people; that is, I usually say what's on my mind.</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.59</td>
<td>-.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. I have little or no trouble talking with strangers or people that I have just met.</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. I generally don't make a practice of starting arguments, but if challenged I will defend my position in an assertive manner.</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. While I don't like confrontations, I would rather confront someone directly when I'm bothered than simply avoid them or say nothing.</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>-.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. I don't think that I'm overly aggressive or dominant, but I can &quot;hold my own&quot; in most social situations.</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>-.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45. Often I feel little or no motivation to communicate with others.</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.29</td>
<td>-.36</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46. I am easily influenced by other people.</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Factor I Aggressiveness</th>
<th>Factor II Manipulativeness</th>
<th>Factor III Awareness</th>
<th>Factor IV Assertiveness</th>
<th>Factor V Persuasibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47. I am generally easily persuaded by others.</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48. I often feel intimidated by others.</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. I often let people take advantage of me (e.g., it is difficult for me to say no).</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50. After an encounter with someone I usually think of what I should have said.</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*a Items are arranged by factor; that is, they are not in the order in which they appeared on the SOS.

*b This item was taken from Hurt and Wheeless (1974).

*c It is not clear why persuasive individuals tend to agree with this item.

*d To maintain ease in using and interpreting the factor labels, the loadings on this factor were reversed in order to use the label "awareness." The non-reversed, original dimension is "unawareness."
Appendix C

PRENEGOTIATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Directions: Before you begin your negotiation please respond to the following statements. Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with these statements by circling the appropriate response.

1. Based on my performance in prior negotiation or competitive situations, I'll probably win this negotiation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

2. If this is a tough partner I probably won't do well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

3. I know I have what it takes to come out on top this round.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

4. Going on prior experiences, I know if I stick with it I'll do fairly well.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

5. I have some knowledge about law that I may be able to use in this session.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6. I have trouble being sympathetic toward my opponents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

7. I can usually think fairly clearly and quickly under pressure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

8. I'm pretty good at predicting my negotiation partners' moves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

9. I really need this money or extra credit points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
10. I would rather negotiate for some other reward if I had the chance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

11. The amount of reward seems fair compensation for my efforts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

12. I really don't care about my compensation since I'm doing this for the fun of it.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Slightly Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Slightly Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
APPENDIX D

Primary Factor Pattern of Subjects' Prenegotiation Expectations (n=24)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Number#</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>.751</td>
<td>-.157</td>
<td>-.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>.931</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>-.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>.766</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>-.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>-.048</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>.583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>.678</td>
<td>-.120</td>
<td>.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>.431</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>-.759</td>
<td>-.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.508</td>
<td>-.434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.880</td>
<td>-.026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Items 2 and 5 on the original scale were removed after a preliminary Factor Analysis since they did not meet the criteria for remaining in the primary factor pattern.
APPENDIX E
Social Power Evaluation

Name _______________________

Directions: After viewing the interaction indicate how often the individual attempted to enact directly or indirectly the following behaviors. If the individual enacted the behavior very frequently, mark a 5; often, mark a 4; sometimes, mark a 3; seldom, mark a 2; or never, mark a 1.

Once again, respond with one of the following alternatives: very frequently, 5; often, 4; sometimes, 3; seldom, 2; never, 1.

How often did the individual directly or indirectly attempt to:

1. Interrupt the other person's speech.
2. Make dollar offers to settle.
3. Voice concern and/or sympathy about the other's client.
4. Make the other follow the stated rules of the game.
5. Introduce facts not in the case description.
6. Attack the other's offers as somehow inadequate.
7. Suggest that the other focus on the task.
8. Stumble around in presenting information.
9. Ask the other to hurry up.
10. Show he/she knew something about the law.
11. Raise his/her voice.
12. Challenge the other's evidence.
13. Make hand or body movements unrelated to his/her speech.

14. Change the topic.

15. Look away from his/her partner under stress.

16. Stare at the other for long periods.

17. Tell the other to stick to the topic.

18. Wait for his/her turn to speak.

19. Flatter, or compliment the other in any way.

20. Attack the other's points immediately, without hesitation.
## APPENDIX F

**Primary Factor Pattern of Post-Negotiation Social Power Evaluation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Number</th>
<th>Factor Number</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.908</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>-.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.791</td>
<td>-.202</td>
<td>-.089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.719</td>
<td>-.401</td>
<td>.075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.672</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>.251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.684</td>
<td>.163</td>
<td>-.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.759</td>
<td>-.253</td>
<td>.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.868</td>
<td>-.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.706</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>.354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.164</td>
<td>-.707</td>
<td>.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.903</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>-.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.867</td>
<td>.189</td>
<td>-.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.386</td>
<td>.865</td>
<td>.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.696</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>-.871</td>
<td>-.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.508</td>
<td>-.483</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.595</td>
<td>-.358</td>
<td>-.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td>.772</td>
<td>.317</td>
<td>.208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.877</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>-.176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*n = 24*