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CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Jessica Clay Cannon, B.A., M.A.

* * * *

The Ohio State University
1976

Reading Committee
Randall B. Ripley
John R. Chomplin
Aage R. Clausen
William E. Nelson, Jr.

Approved By

Randall B. Ripley
Advisor
Department of Political Science
To the memory of

my grandmother, Mrs. Jessie D. Vinegar,

who taught me the value of persistence
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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June 18, 1947. . . . Born - Lexington, Kentucky
1972 . . . . . . M.A., University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky
1972-1975 . . . . University Fellow, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1975 . . . . . . Independent Teaching Associate, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio
1975-1976 . . . . Graduate Research Fellow, U. S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: American Politics

Policy Analysis and Policy Processes. Professor Randall B. Ripley

Major Field: Political Theory

Explanation. Professor Theodore W. Meckstroth

Political Concepts. Professor John R. Champlin
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION ...............................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA ........................................................................</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter**

I. **THE PROCESS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION, AN INTRODUCTION** ........................................... 1

- Survey of the Literature ........................................ 4
- The Compliance Perspective ................................. 5
- The Collaborative Perspective ............................... 14
- Summary .................................................................. 23

II. **ANALYSIS OF A DISCRETIONARY PROGRAM, THE YOUTH SERVICE BUREAUX** ......................... 28

- The Central Thesis .................................................. 28
- A Discretionary Program ......................................... 30
- Administrative Discretion of the State Planning Agency .................................................. 31
- Local Administrative Discretion ................................ 37
- The YSB, a Decentralized Program ......................... 42
- Evaluation of YSBs .................................................... 48
- Youth Service Bureaus in California ....................... 49
- Evaluation of Youth Service Bureaus: A Study of Interorganizational Influence .................. 50
- Youth Service Bureaus: a Statewide Assessment .................. 53
- Summary .................................................................. 56

III. **COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FIVE YOUTH SERVICE BUREAUX** ........................................... 58

- Conceptualization ...................................................... 59
- Performance .......................................................... 60
- Intraorganizational Characteristics and Organizational Context ........................................... 62
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>65</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analysis</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Programs</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Methods</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Service</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Coordination</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Emphasis</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsiveness to the Target Area</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refining the Central Thesis</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications of Analysis</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing a Program Model for YSBs</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing the Ohio Standards for Youth Service Bureaus</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inferences to Other Community-Based Programs</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. CONCEPTUAL RELEVANCE OF THE COMPLIANCE AND COLLABORATIVE PERSPECTIVES

The Field Study and the Compliance Perspective | 110
Study of the Implementation Process | 116
Evaluation | 117
Characteristics of the Implementation Process | 118
Explanation of the Implementation Process | 121
Conceptualizing the Implementation Process | 129
Comparison of the Conceptual Framework to the Perspectives | 133
Implications of Perspectives for Conceptualization | 138
Conclusion | 142

APPENDIX

THE FIELD SURVEY | 145

BIBLIOGRAPHY | 149
LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1.</td>
<td>Implementing Federal Programs</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1.</td>
<td>Bureau Performance</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-2.</td>
<td>Bureau Performance in Relation to the Number of Intraorganizational and Contextual Characteristics</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3.</td>
<td>Innovative Programs by Intraorganizational Characteristics</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4.</td>
<td>Innovative Programs by Age, Turnover, Standardization, Controlled for Absence of Specialization</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5.</td>
<td>Relation of Innovative Programs and Bureaucratic Characteristics</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6.</td>
<td>Innovative Programs by Contextual Characteristics</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-7.</td>
<td>Innovative Methods by Age and Specialization</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-8.</td>
<td>Indirect Service, Case Coordination, and Program Emphasis by Community Involvement and Standardization</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-9.</td>
<td>Responsiveness of Bureaus to the Target Area by Contextual and Organizational Characteristics</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-10.</td>
<td>Change in Program Emphasis and Client Characteristics for Bureaus with the Same Monitoring Agency</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

THE PROCESS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION,

AN INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a basis for conceptualizing the process of public policy implementation. In surveying the case study literature concerning policy implementation, two general perspectives are formulated. These perspectives which describe how analysts have looked at the implementation process, differentiate the literature on the basis of characteristics of the implementation process, obstacles to implementation and recommendations for improvement. The field investigation of a public program permits an assessment of the applicability of one of the general perspectives for analyzing program implementation.

Why is conceptualization important? The case study approach that characterizes the policy implementation literature is both its strength and weakness. Although covering in detail a range of factors affecting the implementation process, the case study literature provides no systematic and cumulative base of knowledge. It is assumed here, that a collection of case studies, if surveyed systematically, will provide a cumulative base of information about the implementation process. In this chapter, the case study literature is surveyed and categorized.
The case study literature concerning the policy implementation process is not extensive. The programs surveyed here can be characterized as national programs, since they were created by federal statute and are often administered by federal agencies. It was assumed by the analyst that programs funded by the federal government but planned and implemented by the states and local communities may be implemented differently from these national programs. The original field investigation of a discretionary program is discussed in chapters two and three.

Conceptual models have been developed that direct attention to the importance of several factors in explaining variations in the implementation process. The utility of a conceptual framework depends on its applicability in an empirical setting. However, no model of the implementation process has been tested. By identifying areas of agreement and disagreement between different conceptualizations of the implementation process, it is believed that this study contributes to conceptualization. Chapter four addresses this topic.

Finally, the range of practical and theoretical reasons given for the study of policy implementation indicate the need to examine "what it is we are talking about, looking at or looking for (Merton, 1972:147)."

It has been assumed that the failure to achieve policy objectives can be attributed at least in part to inefficient administration (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Derthick, 1970; Levine, 1972). Williams discusses three perspectives which
can be explored. One can analyze whether the organization has the capabilities to accomplish specified objectives. "Does the organization have sufficiently developed lines of communication and administrative structure, and sufficient number of individuals with the requisite administrative and technical skills (1971:145)?" Analysis could focus on whether leaders possess the skill to motivate subordinates to act or on the development of approaches which are less sensitive to the difficulties of administration.

The study of implementation may also lead to the categorization of public policy by examining variations in the implementation of different programs. This would contribute to the development of a theory of public policy (Froman, 1968).

Studying features of the policy process related to implementation can be useful to the discipline of political science as well as to policymakers. Ripley (1975) identifies several of these features: patterns of influence over implementation decisions, patterns of cooperation and/or conflict in reaching implementation decisions, features inhibiting service delivery, patterns of change in processes and/or institutional arrangements.

Finally, because the implementation of federal policy involves other levels of government, study may contribute to the understanding of intergovernmental relations. In particular, the impact of different forms of federal grants-in-aid on the political and administrative capabilities of state and local governments may lead to the development of new forms of
technical assistance (PAR, 1975). Analysis of the political implications of using different grant structures may lead to changes in the process of decisionmaking (Pressman, 1974; Reagon, 1972).

SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE

Several questions have guided the survey of the literature. First, what is the problem? The formulation of the research question provides a key to the way in which the implementation process is looked at. Some analysts emphasize the problem of achieving compliance, others the politics of mutual adjustment. Secondly, what are the important characteristics of the implementation process? Some analysts tend to stress the importance of administrative or technical processes, others, political conflict. Third, what suggestions are made for improvement? Recommendations frequently reflect the perception of the federal system and its potential for change.

The survey is organized around two original concepts, compliance and collaboration, which seem to differentiate studies of the implementation process. Compliance implies a differentiation of function between the upper and lower levels of the bureaucracy on the basis of responsibility for making or executing decisions. Collaboration refers to the sharing of authority among participants at different levels of government in developing and implementing programs. These concepts are used to describe two perspectives of the implementation
process that differ in analyzing the characteristics of implementation, obstacles to implementation and suggestions for change.

Each perspective is first summarized and then, the studies categorized under the perspective are described according to the criteria stated above. All are studies of intergovernmental relations that focus on the problems of implementing national programs. Selection of studies for the survey was difficult because of limited bibliographic sources on the policy implementation process. Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) state there are few books dealing with implementation, while Van Meter and Van Horn (1974) rely on three bodies of literature as a basis for developing a theoretical framework. The former provided insufficient material, the latter too much to handle adequately.

THE COMPLIANCE PERSPECTIVE

The studies grouped under the heading of compliance assume that the pattern of implementation is determined by national standards. There is a division of function according to hierarchical structure which tends to coincide with the level of government. It is the function of federal officials to determine the standards of administration and service, while program execution is the responsibility of state and local officials.

A program is evaluated in terms of the achievement of national standards. The standards, which may be procedural or
substantive, are derived from the program. Success in achieving them depends on getting the lower level officials to conform to federal regulations and guidelines. Emphasis is placed on the formal mechanisms to achieve compliance, such as personnel standards, financial and technical assistance, reporting and accounting procedures, planning requirements and the withdrawal of funds.

The primary obstacle to implementation, analysts imply, is the federal system. The federal government does not have the authority to command the obedience of state and local governments. Successful implementation depends on the resources and administrative devices which a federal agency has at its disposal. Organizational structure and processes is a second obstacle to implementation. Studies identify the style of leadership, structure of authority, the communication network and competence of staff as some of the factors affecting the implementation process.

The separation of policy formulation and implementation seems to result in the de-emphasis of the political influences on policy implementation. Studies indicate that public and private interest groups and politicians at different levels of government are not as important as the formal attributes (structure and processes) of the bureaucracy. There is no conflict of interests over the basic goals of the program, rather there are differences over the details of administration. Resolution of these differences, analysts suggest, depends on intergovernmental interaction among administrators.
Characteristics of the Implementation Process

The type of standards used to assess implementation vary. Derthick (1970), in the *Influence of Federal Grants*, focuses on the success of federal efforts to achieve five administrative goals of the public assistance program in the state of Massachusetts. These standards focus on procedures or activities rather than the purpose of the Social Security Act, which is to support persons who cannot support themselves. Derthick notes that there are political constraints in the setting of substantive conditions: difficulty in arriving at a consensus on political issues, the necessity to induce the cooperation of state and local governments, the high priority attached to the attainment of administrative goals by administrators.

She concludes that "federal influence has had a profound effect on the Massachusetts public assistance program (1970: 194)." Although federal action is not shown to have caused the changes, it is stated that the changes took place faster than they would have in the absence of federal participation.

In contrast, Wildavsky and Pressman (1973) focus on the substantive standards of the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965. The substantive objective of the Act was to create jobs quickly for the black unemployed. There were procedural standards that could have been assessed, such as the employment plan which committed the employer receiving assistance to make an effort to recruit the hard core unemployed and the employment review board which ruled on each
application for assistance. If evaluated according to these procedural standards, the program may have been evaluated as successful but against the substantive standard, it failed.

According to the authors, adoption and initiation of the procedural conditions was part of policy formulation rather than implementation. Policy formulation includes the passing of legislation, the commitment of funds, the initiation of projects and the development of administrative procedures. Implementation refers to the "degree to which predicted consequence takes place after the initial conditions (policy) have been met (1973:XIV-XV)."

Murphy and Stoner both focus on Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act which was to provide financial assistance to local education agencies serving areas with concentration of youth from low income families. Stoner (1975) however distinguishes the stated and unstated goals of the policy. The unstated or symbolic goal was general aid. Whether local administrators complied with the stated goal depended on the administrators' perception of the policy and their situation (Stoner, 1975). The unstated goal of the program was achieved by administrators who had frequent contact with federal administrators. Accomplishment of the stated goal occurred only in small towns where administrators were unaware of the unstated goal. Murphy basing his analysis on the stated objective of categorical assistance concludes that instead of reform, "the local districts are fairly free to meet their own priorities (1971:60)."
Obstacles to Implementation

Although the standards vary, analysts assume that program failure or success is due to the administrative process rather than to the way the policy is formulated or its substantive content. Therefore in discussing obstacles to implementation, emphasis is placed on organizational problems.

Walter Williams states that an "inquiry about implementation capability seeks to determine whether an organization can bring together men and material in a cohesive organizational unit and motivate them in such a way as to carry out the organization's stated objectives (1971:144)." He implies that success depends on manpower, resources, communication and leadership. Williams is referring to implementation within an organization, not the federal system. The most important distinction is the absence of an hierarchical structure in the latter.

The studies grouped under the compliance perspective identify one or more deficiencies in the standards set by Williams. Problems which occur, arise from inadequacies in the 'organization'. The interaction of administrators at different levels of government is emphasized. Other participants are recognized only when they affect or influence the actions of the administering agency.

Derthick stated that localism and a decentralized administrative structure were inconsistent with the federal ideal of state administration. The test of federal influence she states is provided when major change is required and when federal
goals are incompatible with the prevailing features of state politics (1970:215). The goals of efficiency and professionalization provide the best test in Derthick's study. For in several instances, she admits that it is hard to state the federal role in the change. Because there was consensus on several of the standards there could be no test of federal influence.

The federal government was less than successful in achieving efficiency. The decentralized structure led to problems of communication between levels of government which distorted the federal intent to extend the merit system requirement to all public assistance employees. It hindered efforts to coordinate the activities of the national regional and state agencies to get a favorable bill through a recalcitrant state legislature. The federal government overcame a struggle to implement successfully the goal of professionalization. The state civil service system and many state legislators were opposed, but by cultivating a coalition of supporters including the governor's office and key legislators, compliance was achieved.

The separation of policy from implementation was perceived by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) as a major obstacle in implementing the public works program in Oakland. The Economic Development Administration (EDA) emphasized the importance of program design in the public works program. There was one federal agency and one local recipient. A special task force with direct access to the assistant secretary of commerce was created to get the program started quickly. All participants agreed on the importance of creating jobs for the unemployed.
The problem was that "what seemed to be a simple program turned out to be a very complex one (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973:94)." The transformation of a broad substantive agreement into effective program implementation was made difficult by the number of participants holding diverse priorities and the number of separate decisions concerning technical matters. Given these circumstances, the possibilities for disagreement and delay were numerous.

By establishing a special task force for administration, EDA was confronted with problems such as intraorganizational conflict over the goals and procedures concerning the Oakland project, ambiguity over the role of the regional office and the short run orientation of task force personnel which was inconsistent with a program designed to have a permanent effect. The purpose of the bureaucracy, the authors state, is to secure the predictability of participants which is essential for a reasonable prospect of program implementation. This was lacking in the EDA Oakland program.

Stoner states that the differences in the administrative behavior of fifteen small towns which complied with the stated goal of Title I and that of two cities was due to face to face interaction and the administrative structure which determine with whom interaction occurred. The small town administrators interacted with one another. In discussing their situation, they expressed fear of prosecution, incompetence to administer the program and no knowledge of the symbolic goal of general aid. In contrast, the urban administrators visited Washington
frequently. They were aware of the symbolic goal, felt superior to the state administrators and expressed no fear of the 'feds'. Their perception of the situation in terms of emotion, cognition and anxiety contrasted with that of the small town administrator.

Murphy provides a different explanation. The lack of political support was the fundamental problem in achieving federal reform. The threat of withholding funds was not believable since the funds were seen by the states as their rightful entitlement under the law. Grants were distributed according to a formula. The United States Office of Education (USOE) was accessible to pressure from local interests, primarily school officials who supported general aid for education. The poor whom the program was designed to help were unorganized and made no demands on the agency. Finally, USOE administrators felt that if they were too aggressive, Congress would replace the categorical programs with general aid, reducing the agency's influence.

Murphy notes that the old guard of the USOE responsible for implementation, and educational administrators and associations disagreed with the reformers who developed and passed the Title I program. But he assumes that conflicts of interest in policy formulation were less important than the absence of assertive leadership by the USOE. The problem of implementing federal educational reform, he states is a consequence of a weak central administration and the lack of political support.
Improving the Process

Can the implementation process be improved? The studies are positive but not without qualification. The structural features of the federal system are the major obstacle to implementation. Derthick states that although the grant structure is the system by which federal influence is primarily exercised, "its advantages and disadvantages are difficult to specify, for it is difficult to isolate its characteristics from the more general features of the American political system (1970:213)." Congress cannot formulate precise statements of goals or attach stringent conditions because of diverse interests and the necessity of state-local cooperation to achieve federal purposes. Although program objectives are inflated because of the separation of policy formulation from execution, inflation of goals is perhaps also a function of the President's need to express popular aspirations. Administrative control is made difficult by intergovernmental division of authority but lack of success is also a consequence of trying to control phenomena inherently uncontrollable (1970:243).

Derthick makes no suggestions for improving the public assistance program. However, she hypothesizes that there are fundamental obstacles in the way of federal efforts to promote the decentralization of decisionmaking. The strengthening of local and state administrative agencies increases the independence of these agencies from the legislative bodies and thus their accountability to the people. The goal of efficiency, of having something to show, conflicts with the requirement
of citizen participation in decisionmaking. Finally, the grant system entails a "decline in the accessibility of governmental processes to popular scrutiny and participation (1970:242)." Decisions concerning the allocation of funds, the specification of grant conditions and the response to federal requirements are arrived at through interaction between grant-giving and grant-receiving administrative agencies.

Pressman and Wildavsky note that bureaucratic problems can be diminished by designing programs with more direct means for accomplishing objectives and the creation of organizational processes for execution. Concerning the public works program in particular, to insure that the target group received the jobs, the authors state that it is necessary to attract employers to the core city and induce them to hire unskilled workers. A wage subsidy may provide this incentive.

Although Murphy suggests additional and better trained manpower and the creation of countervailing local forces to pressure administrative officials for reform, he notes that the "federal system with its dispersion of power and control not only permits but encourages evasion and dilution of federal reform, making it nearly impossible for the federal administrator to impose program priorities (1971:60)."

THE COLLABORATIVE PERSPECTIVE

From the emphasis on organizational processes, compliance studies suggest that nothing much can be done about the
problems presented by the federal system. In contrast are
studies which view the process of implementation from a col­
laborative perspective [1].

Analysts suggest that the implementation of federal pro­
grams involves not only administrative officials, but public
and private interest groups and politicians. All participants
share in the planning, policymaking and administration. There
is no division of responsibility according to structure, be­
cause there is no persistent or constant pattern of relations
between levels of government. Intergovernmental relations is
characterized by the mutual adjustment of participants' inter­
ests between and within levels of government.

Federal programs are not evaluated in terms of achieving
national standards, rather the analyst most often supplies the
criteria for evaluation. This explicit linking of prescription
and description is the result of the blending of policy formu­
lation with policy implementation. Some suggestions made for
improving the process would require radical changes in the
execution of federal programs and would alter the distribution
of power and resources within the political system.

Obstacles to implementation, analysts imply, are political
rather than administrative. There are conflicts over the for­
mulation of program goals between politicians, bureaucrats and
the public. The consequence occasionally is major changes in
policy and program standards that are impossible to implement
without adaptation to the environmental setting, and to exist­
ing organizational and technological capabilities. Sometimes
the inability to reach a satisfactory agreement leads to delay or even failure to implement a program. In contrast to the internal bureaucratic disputes described under the compliance perspective, resolution of these conflicts seems to depend on bargaining which is not contained within the boundaries of the bureaucracy.

Characteristics of the Implementation Process

The studies can be roughly classified according to the type of decision discussed. Policy formulation encompasses inputs from the environment and the government, and the conversions process which transforms them into a statement of government intent to do something (Ripley 1973:9). Program initiation refers to the effort in getting a program established (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). Program management concerns the daily operation of agencies carrying out policy along functional lines (PAR, 1975:701). Studies most illustrative of the three types of decisions will be briefly summarized.

Policy Formulation. Charles Jones, in Clear Air: The Policies and Politics of Pollution Control (1975), focuses on the sharing of authority among levels of government in the development of air pollution policy. With the development of federal laws, he states that policy analysis cannot be limited to one level of government, it becomes necessary to study the intergovernmental impact of policy formulation on implementation.

The federal government became involved with the Clean Air Act of 1963 with the objective of increasing state and local
capabilities. Jones notes that as a consequence of legislation, almost every state government created an office to handle air quality control problems, expanded staff, and increased state and local expenditures. The Air Quality Control Act of 1967 created air quality control regions and processes for establishing and enforcing air quality standards. It changed the process of decisionmaking at the state and local levels which affected air pollution policy development. Public hearings required by the act raised the visibility of air pollution problems and resulted in more comprehensive and stringent regulations at the state and local level. The previous cooperative and self regulatory relations between government and industry became an adversary relationship.

At the national level, Jones states public opinion demanded that Congress act to curb industrial effects on the environment. Instead of a majority having to be established for a policy, policy had to be constructed for a majority. Because the mandate was nonspecific, the policymakers were unsure about what would be acceptable. The consequence, he states, was speculative augmentation. Neither the technical nor the administrative capabilities were adequate to meet the needs of the 1970 amendment.

Studies categorized under program initiation and management suggest that program objectives developed at the national level must adjust to the interests at the lower level if implementation is to be successful. Affecting the pattern of implementing management decisions are the style of leadership within
an administrative agency as well as the vertical and horizontal distribution of authority within the federal system. Program initiation focuses primarily on the interaction of participants at different levels of government.

**Program Initiation.** Derthick (1972) focuses on the surplus lands program which was to create model new communities on federally owned land in metropolitan areas. The program, she states, failed in each of seven projects that were initiated. In four communities, the program lacked sufficient local support to overcome local opposition. In Atlanta and Clinton Township, where there was adequate local support, technical problems involving coordination between levels of government were responsible for delays in implementation. Secondly, inflated objectives were difficult to accomplish. Because of the high visibility of the Fort Lincoln project in Washington, D.C., there was less willingness to compromise objectives for the sake of action.

Derthick states that the degree of federal dependence on the local government varies with the domestic function, "community development, being extremely vulnerable to the vicissitudes of local politics (1972:95)." Because the program was centrally conceived, local interests were not taken into account. "Federal programs often work at the local level... because there is adaptation by both levels of government, with the result that domestic programs are neither federal nor local, but a blend of the two (1972:97-98)."
Program Management. Berke and Kirst (1972) examine the patterns of allocating federal aid to education and the processes of decisionmaking that determine fiscal distribution. The bulk of the study focuses on the latter issue, relying on case studies in six states.

After examining the role of the governor, legislature, political parties and interest groups, the authors conclude that the state education agency exercised principle authority for allocation decisions. "The SEA operates in an environment that permits bureaucratic standard operating procedures and routine administrative programs to predominate (1972:64)."

The state superintendent often influenced extensively the agency's orientation and administrative policies. In Michigan, the state education department was oriented toward innovative educational leadership to achieve equalized educational opportunity. In Texas, the agency deferred to local autonomy.

Patterns of distributing state aid were often used to distribute federal aid. Only Title I of ESEA where funds were allocated according to a formula, reflected an equitable distribution. "Many other federal programs appeared neutral to such factors and a number of programs frequently worked to make rich districts richer." A reason cited was the "immense area for state discretion in the allocation of most federal programs (Berke and Kirst, 1972:400)."

A constraint on state administrative behavior was the political culture. Frequently the norm of localism allowed
the local education agencies to have a major voice in determining the policy and operation of the schools.

**Obstacles to Implementation and Suggestions for Improvement**

Why are federal programs distorted or resisted? The collaborative perspectives suggest that problems in implementation develop when federal standards do not respond to local conditions. When there is conflict over a program, federal incentives, positive and negative, are insufficient to induce compliance. It is frequently the case that federal money is used to satisfy state and local priorities. Even when there is consensus on program goals, program execution may result in changes because of conditions or interests which cannot be controlled (Berke and Kirst, 1972; Bollinger and Vezner, 1974).

Collaborative studies imply that the most important factor influencing implementation is the process of policymaking. The objectives formulated by the central government must be flexible enough to be implemented under a variety of conditions.

Connery and his associates (1968) indicate that the concept of community mental health centers had serious implications for the successful implementation of the Community Mental Health Act of 1963. They note that policy statements contained three contradictory conceptions of community: limited service population, coordination of community services and community involvement. None of these conceptions were consistent with established administrative and political patterns.
Similar to Derthick (1972), they recognize the effect of central decisionmaking on the inflation of objectives. "In situations of low pressure public policy (characteristic of mental health), government officials have greater freedom in the decisionmaking process than in the usual pattern of interest group-government relations. The consequence is that a program is likely to reflect professional interests without being subject to practical compromises (Connery et al., 1968: 566)."

The authors state that successful implementation will require administrative flexibility and political adaptability. Although Connery et al. feel that the federal government should play the dominant role in implementation, they believe it cannot rely solely on the provision of federal money as an incentive. The federal government should revise the grant program to commit more money and assure continuing support, encourage training programs, and use its discretionary power over awarding grants and approving plans to strengthen state mental health agencies.

A policy beyond capability was formulated by federal-state-local decisionmakers in 1969-70 in response to public concern about air pollution. Scientific, organizational and technological incapacibilities were ignored. The result, Jones (1975) states, in the short run is the probability of effective implementation is reduced while emphasis is placed on increasing these capabilities. Regulations will be revised or not stringently enforced because of a lack of knowledge to
support them, pressure from industry, decline in public support, and a public philosophy that stresses state and local responsibility. Jones suggests an incremental/cooperative approach to air pollution policy development and implementation, where a flexible policy would be based on existing knowledge and a formal process ensured representation of all major interests.

Citizen participation in decisionmaking led to an air pollution policy incongruent with the environment, but centrally conceived programs like New Towns in Town and Community Mental Health had the same consequence. There does not appear to be a single solution to the centralization-decentralization issue. If policy formulation is too centralized, there are likely to be obstacles to implementation. If a government's response to public pressure is given higher priority than existing capabilities, then effective implementation is beyond capability. Even at a later stage in the policy process, if a program is not responsive to public interests, implementation is not likely to be successful (Derthick, 1972).

What the collaborative studies imply is that policy formulation and policy implementation are interdependent processes. Changes in the process of decisionmaking affect implementation and obstacles to implementation often require changes in the program if it is to be effective.

In contrast to the compliance studies, the implementation process is perceived to be dynamic. Program standards must be adaptable to the pattern of implementation, rather than being
the determinant of that pattern. The greatest obstacle to implementation is rigidity in the federal administration of programs.

SUMMARY

The survey of the literature presents a general view of how analysts have described the implementation process. There was no attempt to discover a real definition of implementation, for that is the purpose of conceptual frameworks. The compliance and collaborative perspectives suggest that there are at least two different interpretations of policy implementation. Whether the differences outlined in earlier pages have an empirical basis is considered in chapter four.

In Table 1-1 the differences in the two perspectives are summarized. The compliance perspective perceives program implementation as independent of policy formulation. It is possible to evaluate the implementation process in terms of whether it achieved policy objectives. According to the collaborative perspective, policy formulation and implementation are interdependent, it is not possible to evaluate either separately. While compliance studies view organizational problems as a major obstacle to implementation, collaborative studies focus on conflict among participants concerning program goals, and the environmental setting. The two perspectives differ in recommendations for improvement with compliance studies most often suggesting changes with the bureaucracy and collaborative studies recommending changes in the process of decisionmaking.
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<th>Collaborative Perspective</th>
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<td>Division of Functions</td>
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<td>Program Goals</td>
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<td>Orientation of</td>
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<td>Participants'</td>
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The perception of the federal system may be the most important distinction between the two perspectives. Federalism as a legal concept stresses the "constitutional division of authority and functions between the national government and state governments (Reagan, 1972:3)." As a political concept, it refers to "the actual relationships between levels of government as they share in the performance of expanding governmental functions (Reagan, 1972:4)." Legally, the federal structure is altered only by constitutional amendment, in practice, it is changed by court decisions, statutes, custom and technology.

The legal definition of federalism seems applicable to the compliance perspective. Where there is a structural division of authority and functions, the problem of implementing federal programs is how to get state and local governments to comply with federal directives, since the federal government lacks the authority to command obedience. Given the political autonomy of the lower levels of government, successful implementation depends on administrative processes such as developing an alliance with agencies receiving grants, etc. Since program implementation is primarily an interbureaucratic process, then characteristics of the bureaucracy become very important in explaining the process of implementation.

The legal conception of federalism as reflected in the doctrine of dual federalism is inconsistent with the assumption of analysts using a compliance perspective. It is assumed that the federal government has the right to determine the objectives of all public programs. If there is a separation of responsibilities and functions between the federal and state governments,
then the federal government has the authority to direct only a limited number of activities.

The political definition of federalism seems applicable to the collaborative perspective, which emphasizes the interdependence of governments. Whose priorities prevail may vary with the service delivered. In some programs such as education and community development, the federal government may defer to the localities, in others, like public assistance, the federal government may dominate. There is no legal basis for determining the centralization or decentralization of policymaking or administration.

A policy proposing to change the existing relation between governments however is not likely to be successfully implemented without adjustments. Political officials and interest groups must be accommodated as well as administrators. Changes may be made in the administrative process, in program design or both. With no set pattern of interaction, the analogy to organizational processes is no longer useful. Political bargaining is the appropriate concept to explain conflicting relations between participants in a collaborative process.
NOTES

1. The concept was borrowed from Morton Grodzins (1966) who used it to describe the American federal system.
CHAPTER II
ANALYSIS OF A DISCRETIONARY PROGRAM,
THE YOUTH SERVICE BUREAU

The purposes of this chapter are to introduce the central thesis which guided the field study; to analyze the concept of discretion used in the central thesis; to summarize the origin of the Youth Service Bureau (YSB) and its development in the state of Ohio; and to justify the analysis of program performance by outlining the limitations of several evaluations of YSBs.

THE CENTRAL THESIS

The central thesis states that: the performance of a federally funded program permitting local discretion is associated with the intraorganizational characteristics of the program and the organizational context. The thesis is based on three hypotheses taken from the literature of public policy. Several analysts have stated that the problems of implementation vary with the policy type (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1974; Smith, 1973; Jones, 1975). Distinguishing characteristics have included the extent to which policy deviates from past policies, the degree of conflict or consensus over policy goals and objectives and the effect of public demands for action on policy formulations. It was assumed by this analyst
that a program granting discretion to the local community to develop program objectives and functions would vary greatly in program operation from community to community.

Community characteristics may facilitate or inhibit federal attempts to build local support or to coordinate activities at the local level (Derthick, 1972; Sundquist, 1969; Bradford, 1968; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973). By analyzing the intra-organizational characteristics and the organizational context, the field investigation provides a basis for hypotheses about which community characteristics affect the implementation process.

Derthick hypothesizes that the extent of federal influence on implementation may depend on the grant structure. She states that "it is reasonable to suppose that federal influence ultimately depends on the capacity of federal administrators to manipulate funds—to give or withhold them depending on how closely state or local governments conform to federal expectations (1970:217)." If so, then categorical grants offer greater opportunity for federal influence than bloc grants. Categorical grants are selectively distributed according to administrative discretion, while bloc grants are distributed according to statutory formula. There is also a distinction in terms of program substance. A categorical grant is for specifically defined purposes leaving little discretion to the recipient government as to the use of the grant. A bloc grant is broader in scope, although tied to clearly stated areas, it does not specify the exact objects of permitted expenditure (Reagon, 1972:59).
The Youth Service Bureau program was selected for study because of the possibility for local discretion. The program was not enacted by federal statute but by being included in the state's comprehensive plan, it is eligible for federal funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). This federal agency is responsible for the administration of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, a bloc grant program.

These hypotheses suggest that policy types, community characteristics and the federal grant structure affect the process of implementation. The hypotheses are not tested in the field study, since only one program is examined. In chapter four, however, compliance and collaborative studies which imply differences in the implementation process will be examined for variations in these factors.

A DISCRETIONARY PROGRAM

Discretion is defined as the "delegation of decisionmaking power to administrative agencies (Rourke, 1969:54)." This delegation of power, granted by Congress through statutes, may involve decisions on the means of administration and decisions on policy. Rourke states that the distinction between politics and administration is not valid since "all bureaucratic decisions are recognized as having at least some implications for policy (1969:51)." However in this study, decentralization of administration and policy are discussed separately.
First, the scope of administrative discretion permitted by statute and by LEAA guidelines, and the flexibility of the state planning agency's requirements are assessed. Then, the characteristics of the YSB program are described. The purpose is twofold: to provide background information on the YSB and to describe the decentralized nature of the YSB program.

The policy literature provides several guidelines for evaluating the extent of discretion. Concerning the statute, Derthick (1970) asks if federal requirements impose operative standards on conduct or if they focus on the process of achieving goals. Lowi states that the most important sources of standards are definitions, list of examples, exceptions, exclusions, and prerequisites (1969:234). Does the federal agency have discretion in the use of federal money, can it give or withhold funds (Derthick, 1970:217)? Do amendments to the statute increase or reduce administrative discretion (Reagan, 1972:101)? Concerning the exercise of discretion by the administrative agency, Derthick asks if directives define the activities of the state at length or do they go little beyond the language of the law (1970:228)?

Administrative Discretion of the State Planning Agency

Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended by PL 91-644 (1971), PL 98-83 (1973) and PL 93-413 (1974), established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration which has provided funding for four of the five bureaus analyzed in the following chapter. The purpose of
Title I is to "assist the states and local governments in strengthening and improving law enforcement at every level by national assistance (PL 90-315, 1968)." This is to be accomplished by encouraging states and units of local government to prepare and adopt comprehensive plans; authorizing grants to states and local governments to improve and strengthen law enforcement; and encouraging research and development directed towards improvement of law enforcement, development of new methods for the prevention and reduction of crime, and the detection and apprehension of criminals. The 1968 act did not indicate the institutions that were to achieve these objectives but in the amendments of 1971, the police, courts, corrections, probation or parole authorities and programs relating to the reduction of juvenile delinquency and narcotic additions were listed to carry out law enforcement activities.

Title I authorized three types of grants: planning, Part B; law enforcement assistance, Part C; and training, education and research, Part D. In 1971, grants for correctional institutions and facilities were added, Part E. The first two types will be briefly discussed. The YSB in Ohio is funded by Part C; Part E is limited to programs within the criminal justice system.

Part B provides federal funds for establishing and operating state planning agencies (SPA). Responsible to the governor, their functions are to develop a comprehensive plan, establish priorities for the improvement of law enforcement, and to define, develop and correlate programs. State planning agencies
are required to be representative of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, units of local government, and public agencies maintaining programs to reduce and control crime. Federal grants may provide 90% of the cost of operating the SPA, with funds distributed to states in bloc grants of $200,000 with the remainder allocated according to state population.

Part C funds are directed at achieving the second objective of Title I: the improvement and strengthening of law enforcement. In order to receive funds under Part C, the SPA must have an acceptable plan. Some of the requirements for the state plan which the statute specifies are: provides for the administration of grants, adequately takes into account the needs and requests of local government, incorporates innovations, contains a comprehensive outline of priorities for improvement of all aspects of law enforcement, includes provision for research and development, fiscal control, procedures for monitoring, auditing and application review and state technical assistance. It also must include a comprehensive program for the improvement of juvenile justice and procedures for submission of comprehensive plan by units of local government with a population over 250,000.

Given these requirements that the SPA must meet, in addition to the bloc grant approach for the distribution of funds, it appears that the intent of the Act was to give the state primary authority and responsibility for Title I. Eighty-five per cent of the funds of Part C are allocated in grants to the SPA in accordance with state population, fifteen per cent are
allocated for programs at the discretion of LEAA. In addition, the states were given priority over urban areas since no direct grants are provided local governments. This emphasis has continued in the amendments. The original statute provided that 40 per cent of the state planning funds had to be made available to units of local government for participation in the planning process. But in 1971, LEAA was allowed to waive the requirement if it was inappropriate in view of the "respective law enforcement and criminal justice planning responsibilities exercised by the state and local governments (section 203)." The SPA was required to assure that major cities and counties received planning funds to develop comprehensive plans. The original statute also provided that 75 per cent of federal funds be passed through to units of local government. Beginning in FY 1973, the proportion of federal funds required to be distributed to local units depended on the percentage of local law enforcement expenditures to the total state and local expenditures for law enforcement. However the law required that the comprehensive plan must provide for the allocation of adequate assistance for areas characterized by high crime incidence and high law enforcement activity. Federal funds for all activities under Part C could be made up to 90 per cent of the total cost of the program with the state required to fund one-half of the nonfederal funding.

The LEAA guideline manual for State Planning Agencies was consulted to determine the type of administrative regulations imposed on the SPA regarding administration, development of the
plan and evaluation of action programs. Here the statutes were least specific.

To those functions of the SPA, as stated in the statutes, the guidelines add: provide information to prospective aid recipients on procedures for grant application, encourage grant proposals from local units of government and project proposals from state law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. The organization and structure of the SPA is left to state discretion, but it must be a definable agency in the executive branch of state government. A supervisory board is required to be responsible for review, approval and general oversight of the plan and its implementation, administration and staff. It must have a balanced representation which is specified but flexibility is permitted in the composition of the board.

In the establishment and operation of the SPA, discretion is encouraged, as indicated by the inclusive list of functions and the method of awarding planning funds. Planning grants by statute are based on a formula and advance funds of up to 50 per cent may be awarded on the basis of a single page application. To receive the full planning grant, there are administrative requirements which need be submitted only if there has been a change.

Most of the guidelines for formulation of the comprehensive plan paraphrase the statute. But there are definitions of concepts not provided in the law. LEAA also provides a method for meeting the requirements of the plan as stated in sections
303(a)5 and 303(c) which pertain to the comprehensive outline and statewide priorities for improvement and coordination of law enforcement and criminal justice. Neither statute or guidelines identify programs eligible for funding. It is the responsibility of the state planning agency to develop standards and programs to achieve them.

Concerning program accountability, the guidelines discuss in some detail monitoring and evaluation procedures which are referred to in section 303(a)12 of the statute (PL 93-83, 1973). Monitoring and evaluation are distinguished; the former involving description of the planned project results and comparison of these results with actual project achievement. Evaluation involves intensive analysis to verify causality or that changes or achievements are attributable to project activities. The SPA is required to monitor every project it supports, but only selected projects must be evaluated.

Although LEAA approval of the comprehensive state plan is required before action grants are distributed, the administrations' funds for management and operation since 1972 have not totaled more than three per cent of the total program budget. (This includes budget estimates for 1974 and 1975. The number of permanent positions has increased approximately 37 per cent in the same period and appropriations 27 per cent.)

However the requirements for the comprehensive plan have also increased. This perhaps reflects the concern of Congress about LEAA failure to exercise a leadership role. A report of the Congressional committee on Government Operations (1972)
emphasized problems of program management. It cited the absence of program standards, inadequate auditing procedures and recordkeeping and unethical political and financial dealings. In 1973, Congress rejected a special revenue sharing proposal for law enforcement.

Federal statute limits the discretion of LEAA by providing for the distribution of 85 per cent of the action funds according to formula. It gives the states primary authority and responsibility for administering Title I. LEAA guidelines allow the states flexibility in meeting federal requirements which have been formulated. In addition, LEAA's management capability does not seem to be adequate for its responsibilities. It has been criticized by Congress and by public interest groups (National Urban Coalition, 1972) for inefficient program management. In brief, these factors are consistent in suggesting that SPAs have discretion in administering the funds received from the Safe Streets Act.

LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION

In a report prepared by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under law (1972), it is stated that the Ohio SPA is the most democratic and most decentralized of all the state systems. The Administration of Justice Division (AJD), the Ohio state planning agency, is located in the Department of Economic and Community Development. Besides AJD, the Department is comprised of three operating divisions: Community Development, Economic Development, and Human Resources.
The local planning structure of AJD consists of six regional planning units (RPUs), which serve metropolitan areas, and four administrative planning districts (APDs), for non-metropolitan regions. The RPUs, a joint city-county unit, follow the basic structural position of the SPA having an administration staff and a supervisory body with policymaking authority. The RPUs receive planning grants to develop a comprehensive plan. State approval of the plan entitles the RPU to receive Part C funds to implement its action projects. Review and approval of individual project applications and all further grant administration are the responsibility of the RPU. Each RPU receives allocation of at least $1,000,000 in planning funds with additional amounts distributed on the basis of population.

Each APD is served by a three member team composed of AJD field staff who work with local officials to develop and implement projects. All project related functions are conducted at the state level. The distribution of Part C funds to RPUs and APDs is based on a crime-population formula, in which index crime is weighted twice as heavily as population (Dept. of Economic and Community Development, 1975).

The Ohio Directives for developing program applications, the SPA monitoring and evaluation plan and forms for application and program reports were reviewed as a means of determining if the SPA has developed standards for implementing programs. Standards may concern the process of program execution or goals which the program is to achieve. Standards of
the first type are labeled process standards, the second, program standards. The distinction between the two types is that process standards refer to program input; for example the number of personnel hired, qualifications of staff, the composition of policy boards, etc. Program standards refer to the purposes for which service is provided. Attention will focus first on process standards.

All potential applicants must submit a pre-application, the initial form used by eligible subgrantees to submit proposals to AJD for funds to implement a project. Eligible subgrantees are units of local government, RPUs, state agencies including state related universities and certain private organizations. The manual describing the pre-application process is written not as a set of rules to be followed but as suggestions on writing a successful proposal. For example in describing the content of the preapplication, it states: pre-applications are required to include, "a detailed statement of the problem to be addressed by the project with specific statistics to document need, a full description of the project, an explanation of how the proposed project will reduce crime and/or improve operational efficiency and a completed budget (Dept. of Economic and Community Development, 1975:4)." Descriptions of fundable programs emphasize objectives but do not provide explicit criteria for writing the proposal.

Pre-application forms, which may differ among RPUs primarily provide topical headings which must be discussed.
These include standards and goals, project description, i.e., planned accomplishments of the project, project objectives in terms of methods and target groups, activities, personnel, the evaluation process, the proposed budget and plans for the assumption of costs.

Instructions for preparing the formal application concern the organization of the information, identification of items which must be addressed and definitions. The budget application is most detailed with forms covering cost categories, and a budget summary. A budget narrative explaining each cost item is also required. Although there are also forms for the project narrative, the instructions are less detailed. The narrative must address the nature of the problem, present resources which bear upon the problem, nature of the proposed solutions, the proposed means of solution and evaluation. For continuation projects, applications must also describe changes in the project.

The proposed means of solution appears to require information concerning process standards. However, these standards are not determined by AJD but by the applicant. AJD requires that methods to achieve goals be described, it does not prescribe the content. Neither the procedures concerning the pre-application or the formal application provide process standards. Requirements pertaining to the program as distinct from the budget are stated in a form allowing applicant flexibility. Project controls listed in the Directives are mandated
by LEAA and most are not applicable to the YSB (Dept. of Economic and Community Development, 1975:118-121).

The evaluation requirement however is applicable to the YSB and therefore the monitoring and evaluation system developed by AJD was thought to provide standards. In 1973, AJD developed a project by project evaluation system which was in operation for approximately a year. Information requested compared program goals in terms of clients served to the actual number of participants served. Comparisons concerned the number of males and females served and the types of services provided. There were also questions to be addressed in the narrative reports concerning changes in the goals or services of the project, the community crime problem, the response of the community to the project and project effectiveness.

The type of data requested focused on program input. The goals set were established by the applicant not AJD. In response to the difficulties with the evaluation instrument system, a new evaluation/monitoring system has recently been developed.

The system which became operational in June, 1975, is characterized as more flexible and individualized while allowing for comparison of similar projects. For the Youth Service Bureau, required information includes client services provided by bureau and by referral sources; client training provided by the bureau and referral sources, client's involvement with the juvenile justice system and the age, sex, and race of client.
The data is recorded in terms of the number of participants. As before, the standards imposed are those developed by the applicant.

In summary, the organizational structure of AJD is decentralized, federal funds are distributed to local units of government according to a formula, and neither the application process or evaluation requirements provide process standards for the Youth Service Bureau program. Program standards which will be discussed shortly have only recently been developed.

THE YSB, A DECENTRALIZED PROGRAM

The Youth Service Bureau was proposed by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. It recommended that community agencies should deal with delinquents nonjudicially and close to where they live (1968: 223). The Commission stated that community agencies have several advantages: they avoid the stigma of processing youth by an official agency; are regarded by the public as an arm of crime control; are organizations better suited for redirecting conduct; heighten the community's awareness of the need for recreational, employment, tutoring and other youth development services; and engender a sense of public responsibility through involvement of local residents (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, 1968:223-24).

"The significant feature of the bureau's function would be its mandatory responsibility to develop and monitor a plan of service to a group now handled for the most part either
inappropriately or not at all, except in time of crisis (Task Force on Juvenile Justice, 1967:21)." Examples of bureau activities included group and individual counseling, placement in group and foster homes, work and recreational programs, employment counseling and special education. Services would be under the bureau's direct control, either through purchase or voluntary agreement with community organizations. The Commission felt that the key to the bureau's success would be voluntary participation by the juvenile and his family in working out and following a plan of service or rehabilitation.

In examining the Commission's proposal for the establishment of YSBs, J. A. Seymour (1971) identified several issues which must be considered by those concerned with implementation. First, for what types of juveniles should the bureau provide services? "The majority would fit Rosenheim's description of 'juvenile nuisances': those who commit minor offenses and those who come within the present jurisdiction of juvenile court because of noncriminal misbehavior (1971:5)." Seymour expected that most of the referrals to the bureau would come from police and juvenile court intake staff.

Should the bureau emphasize counseling or other services, and to what extent should it provide direct services? Rosenheim stated that the bureau should perform a 'brokerage service' in which the bureau arranges with existing programs for the provision of service (Seymour, 1971:10). However, Seymour stated that a bureau might appropriately provide short term counseling with intensive long term counseling provided by outside sources.
The emphasis placed on direct or indirect services, would vary with the area and depend on the nature of the service sought.

To what extent is a bureau a local community based agency? "Will bureaus be local only to the extent that they are situated in communities which they serve, will the policy be set by local indigenous body, will staff be obtained from the surrounding community? Seymour stated one way of achieving community involvement is to involve local people at the management level (1971:16).

Should the bureau emphasize coordination or innovation? "The Crime Commission's description of the YSB spells out a dual role: these agencies would act as central coordinators of all community services for young people and would also provide services lacking in the community (Seymour, 1971:18). Seymour emphasized the importance of maintaining a balance in these roles, overemphasis on coordination might obscure the fact that in many areas present services are inadequate.

Seymour's purpose in the examination was to "lay a foundation for a discussion of the nature and role of these bureaus (1971:1)." He did not provide any specific recommendations. But his comments suggest that in implementing a YSB, there must be flexibility, particularly concerning the nature of the services provided.

In 1972, Sherwood Norman's book The Youth Service Bureau, a Key to Delinquency Prevention, was published. It furnishes basic principles and guidelines for establishing and operating a YSB and has been a useful resource to many communities.
Since then, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (NAC) appointed by LEAA and the Juvenile Delinquency Task Force of the Ohio Criminal Justice Supervisory Commission (OCJSC) have developed program standards for the YSB.

None of these sources provide specific program goals. The NAC stated that priorities among goals and the selection of functions should be locally set and based on an assessment of youth problems and needs in the community (1973:70-71).

Norman who did not distinguish goals and functions, identified three functions of YSBs. The goal of service brokerage is to bridge the gap between available services and the youth in need of them through referral and follow up. Some of the activities include an inventory of community resources, establishing cooperation with the court, police, schools and the public, and getting youth to accept the YSB staff through an outreach program. To carry out the resource development function, the YSB works with community organizations seeking to develop new resources where they are lacking, by arranging for existing agencies to extend their services; instituting new services within an existing agency; or developing a new program (1972:95). The objective of systems modification is to change established social practices that affect children adversely. Methods include working cooperatively with youth serving agencies to identify problems, and using existing resources to solve them; seminars and workshops to examine
problems and discuss alternative methods of intervention; and short community demonstration projects (1972:108).

Norman did not outline how these functions are to be carried out nor did he provide standards for judging success. It is difficult to distinguish functions in terms of activities. For example, a community inventory is associated with all three functions, as is the establishment of working relations with community agencies.

The Ohio Criminal Justice Supervisory Commission stated that one goal of the YSB is to divert youth from the juvenile justice system. Diversion is defined in terms of the target group. It may take place any time up to the juvenile court hearing and may be considered for youth offenders under 18, offenders with little previous contact with the system, and those who have not committed violent acts or acts which for an adult would be a crime (1975:35). The goal is to be achieved preferably by utilizing existing services for youth in the community. OCJSC also stated that the YSB should meet the needs of the community. It is unclear whether the goal of diversion is required of all YSBs or if it is used as an example of one strategy to be used in preventing delinquency, an ultimate goal.

There were no examples of activities which would lead to the accomplishment of these goals. It is only stated that "the YSB should be considered as one of the means to divert youth from the juvenile justice system (1975:35)." To an
analyst searching for specific program criteria, these sources are not helpful.

The development of the YSB in Ohio has been characterized by a shifting of objectives. In the 1970 action plan when the YSB was first described, the objective was listed as counseling services and community treatment as an alternative to institutionalization. Although it was stated that the YSB should coordinate government and private agency efforts in the provision of services, YSBs funded also provided direct service.

In the 1972 action plan, the YSB was eligible for funding under two categories, juvenile delinquency prevention and community based treatment of delinquents. From 1973 to 1975, the objective of the YSB was defined as delinquency prevention with an emphasis on the early identification of juvenile youth problems before delinquent acts were committed. In the directives for FY 1976, again YSBs are eligible for funding under two categories, delinquency prevention and juvenile diversion.

There is no distinction by the SPA among YSBs with different objectives. In neither the state plan or directives are activities of YSBs specified. The YSB is both nationally and within the state of Ohio described in general terms. Goals are prescribed without stating methods of achieving them. This abstraction is believed to be characteristic of the YSB program rather than the fault of program planners. Because the YSB is a community agency, with the purpose of serving needs of the community, it is impossible to state in specific terms what a YSB should do, unless all community needs are the
same. Sherwood Norman stated "because communities differ widely in population density, ethnic composition, and youth mores, appropriate means of reaching youth in one neighborhood or part of the country may be quite inappropriate in another (1972:4)."

It is also possible that the lack of knowledge about delinquency prevention may result in the emphasis on experimentation. This would require program design to be flexible. Whatever the reason, the YSB is a decentralized program, i.e., the decisions about program content are made by program implementors rather than the state planning agency.

Given that the Ohio SPA allows the localities administrative discretion, there is no basis to expect uniformity in the implementation of YSBs. But since standards have been developed, it is assumed that program requirements will eventually follow which will limit the administrative discretion of local communities. Analysis of the relation between community characteristics and bureau performance will provide a basis for hypotheses about the implementation of state standards for YSBs.

EVALUATIONS OF YSBs

Evaluative studies generally do not attempt to explain why a program works or does not work. Those which do, Suchman categorizes as process evaluations. "Making sense of the evaluative findings is the basic reason for adding a concern with process to the evaluation study. Otherwise one is left with the descriptive results of the evaluation but without any
explanation (Suchman, 1969:66)." The brief summary of studies which have evaluated YSBs indicate the need for analysis of process.

**YOUTH SERVICE BUREAUS IN CALIFORNIA**

The Department of Youth Authority, the state of California, in compliance with the Youth Service Bureau Act passed by the legislature in 1968, has submitted annual reports on the progress of Youth Service Bureau pilot projects. The January, 1972, report covers the operation of nine bureaus during an eighteen month period from January, 1970, to June, 1971.

The objectives of the evaluation were "to determine if the YSB can divert significant numbers of youth from the juvenile justice system, if bureaus can utilize existing community resources in a more coordinated manner, and if delinquency is reduced in selected project areas (Dept, of Calif. Youth Authority, 1972b:8)." Attention centered on the first and last objective. Sources of information included monthly records on each youth at intake, with information on age, sex, grade in school, ethnic group, reason and source of referral. Follow up reports on the type of service provided to each youth during a six month period, the number of bureau contacts with youth, number of contacts with the criminal justice system, in addition to interviews and target area delinquency statistics were also used.

The number of juvenile arrests decreased in all target areas for which there was information in 1970. However this
did not always result in the reduction of juvenile delinquency as measured by the number of court reports on youth in the target area. In the first half of 1971, the data indicated that the number of juvenile arrests increased in four of the eight target areas where bureaus were located. Reasons suggested for particular cities included: an increase in target area youth population, lack of supervised volunteers to carry out the program, bureau goals not shared by community agencies, and planning by lay citizens without agency commitment of staff to the program. There was no attempt to generalize about program success or failure.

Another measure of diversion was reduced referral of juvenile arrests to probation after establishment of the bureau. Similar trends were found. Available data show that in 1970, referrals to probation declined in six bureaus, in 1971, there was a decrease in the number of probation referrals for two of the bureaus.

EVALUATION OF YOUTH SERVICE BUREAUS: A STUDY OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCE

Assuming that the function of the YSB is coordination of services, Elliott hypothesized that the YSB must be influential in the community in order to be effective (Fromkin and Elliott, 1974). Three YSBs in Indiana were selected for analysis by a panel of six judges who were asked to rate twenty-two YSBs as high, moderate or law in effectiveness. It was desired that bureaus be located in similar communities to
minimize the possibility that results would be confounded by community differences.

The two independent variables were YSB effectiveness in three similar communities and organizational subsystems, defined as legal-criminal, social, and educational. Dependent variables were YSB characteristics, defined as the perceptions or expectations of community agencies; integration, the degree to which differentiated segments of the system work together; the environment, the way various organizations perceive each other; and differentiation, variation in goals and structure between organizational subsystems and the YSB and among organizational subsystems. A questionnaire was administered to 246 persons representing the organizational subsystems, 10 YSB personnel and 23 influential individuals identified by the general sample.

Few significant differences between ratings for the high and moderately effective YSBs were found on measures of effectiveness, success in accomplishing objectives, helpfulness, reduction of conflict and influence, all characteristics of the YSB. Elliott hypothesized that the panel of judges may have utilized different criteria of effectiveness and objective accomplishment, since they had information concerning the operational and performance discrepancies between YSBs.

Regarding measures of integration, the degree of cross referral, personnel exchanged and contact between the YSB and community agencies, the high and moderately effective YSBs were rated higher than the low effective YSB. Because the
general sample perceived less interagency interaction in the community in which the moderately effective YSB was located, Elliott assumed that this bureau was more highly integrated with community agencies than the highly effective YSB. There were few differences in measures of environment and no differences among bureaus in differentiation.

The role of the YSB as an integrating organization in a delinquency prevention system is not well supported. Elliott assumed that a function of the YSB was to influence members of the interorganizational system, i.e., organizations with resources useful to the prevention of juvenile delinquency, to work together. However, there were few differences among organizational subsystems on the dependent variables in communities with bureaus differing in perceived effectiveness.

Recommendations for improving the effectiveness of the YSB focus on preventing the formation of negative attitudes toward the YSB. They emphasize communication with key agencies on the commonality of goals, motivation to reduce delinquency, accomplishment of objectives, provision of reliable information, communication to organizational subsystems about the standardized nature of bureau programs, and awareness that self perceptions of competence may influence the perceptions of others.

Although YSB effectiveness was related to community perceptions of YSB characteristics and integration, it is not explained how differences in perceptions developed. Why were the high and moderately effective YSBs rated similarly on
several factors? Elliott does not describe the criteria used by the panel of judges to rate bureaus. This information might have been useful in assessing the validity of different measures of YSB effectiveness, particularly psychological dispositions. Also, a further examination of community characteristics seems warranted since Elliott states that differences among the communities in interagency integration affect YSB effectiveness as an integrating organization (1974: 219-220). Finally, Elliott does not examine the linkage between the perception of influence and behavior. For example, is a YSB which is perceived as effective more successful in service brokerage or coordination of programs? The usefulness of Elliott's study seems to depend on the assumption that attitudes determine behavior.

YOUTH SERVICE BUREAUS: A STATEWIDE ASSESSMENT

The purpose of evaluating twelve YSBs in the state of Ohio was to determine whether there was a significant reduction in the number of contacts with the juvenile justice system for those youth who have been referred to the YSB (Dept. of Criminal Justice, 1975). A significant reduction in contacts with the system was taken as a measure of diversion.

Bureaus chosen for study were receiving funds from AJD. There were two sources of information: interviews with bureau directors and bureau records used solely to assess diversion. Only records of clients who received direct services from the bureau with only limited referral services were included.
On the basis of available data, nine YSBs were successful in diverting youth, 82 per cent of those referred had no further contact with the juvenile justice system. There was no follow up of clients nor was it indicated how long bureaus collected data on closed cases. It was concluded that neither structure nor operating policy of the YSB prevented it from diverting significant numbers of youth from the juvenile justice system.

Bureaus however differed in the extent of effectiveness. The proportion of youth who had no contact after referral to the YSB varied from 100 per cent at one bureau with 59 clients to 23 per cent at another with 13 clients. There is no explanation for variation in the success of diversion. But there were differences in organizational structure and operational policy.

Bureaus differed in size and composition of the policy board. Nine were characterized as being independent, two were under the auspices of an agency of the juvenile justice system. The functions of staffs varied, with three directors required to do counseling. Three of the bureaus had associated directors. The goals of the YSBs varied with eleven citing diversion, eight, the provision of services to youth, and five, service brokerage. The activities associated with service brokerage tended to conflict with Norman's conception. Eleven of the twelve bureaus identified direct service as the first function of service brokerage and youth advocacy as the second function (1975:29-30). The sources of referrals from law enforcement ranged from 0 per cent to 90 per cent; from
the court, 1 per cent to 50 per cent; from schools, 15 per cent to 66 per cent; and from family, 3 per cent to 25 per cent. There were few referrals from social agencies, although all of the YSBs indicated they had established good working relationships with them (1975:37).

Recommendations focused on how to improve effectiveness and manpower allocation. It was suggested that all visual aspects of the juvenile justice system be removed to present an image of an independent non-coercive agency. Standardized intake forms were recommended to provide more efficient record-keeping. It was suggested the YSB should not limit its caseload to status offenders, i.e., youth who have committed non-criminal acts. The data indicated that YSBs were most effective with delinquent youth with limited prior contacts. It was recommended that working relations with area residents and community agencies be cultivated since the survival of the bureau depends on the reputation made within the community as well as within the juvenile justice system. The YSB should evaluate existing services and provide direct services only where they are lacking or inadequate. Finally it was stated that the area of community planning and resource development was where the YSB provides a function not available elsewhere in the community.

The assumption that because YSBs for which data was available, were effective in diversion, there was no need to develop a model for the YSB, is not reflected in the recommendations.
Most YSBs studied emphasized direct counseling, limited services to status offenders, had not established relations with a large number of community agencies or engaged in resource development. The recommendations would alter the existing character of the bureaus.

Since there was no attempt to explain the conditions under which a YSB was most successful or the effect of program attributes on diversion, there is no basis for predicting the success of adopting the recommendations. Some of them may not be easily adopted, if certain community characteristics or program attributes inhibit the functioning of the YSB.

SUMMARY

This chapter provides the basis for the comparative analysis of five Youth Service Bureaus in the following chapter. The central thesis implies that the local community has discretion in designing and operating the YSB. Discretion was defined as the decentralization of administration and policy-making.

The federal statute, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, although limiting the influence of LEAA, gives primary responsibility to the SPA for designing and executing action programs, of which the YSB is one. LEAA guidelines allow the SPA flexibility in carrying out their comprehensive plans. The Ohio SPA is decentralized in structure and in program administration. There are no state administrative standards for YSBs and the monitoring/evaluation system is described
as individualized. Each project is responsible for determining program content and is required to report quarterly its accomplishments to the SPA.

Although the ultimate goal of the YSB is delinquency prevention, the literature is ambiguous about how to achieve it. The functions of service brokerage, systems modification and resource development, listed by Norman, are difficult to distinguish by activity. The Ohio standards define the YSB in terms of its target group not its activities.

It is generally agreed that program activities should be determined by the local community, since the purpose of the YSB is to serve community needs. Furthermore, since there is little knowledge about delinquency prevention, flexibility in program design may be one means of discovering what works.

Evalitative studies of YSBs are not helpful in understanding why a YSB works or does not work. Reasons, if cited, are unique to a bureau or a particular city.
CHAPTER III
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FIVE
YOUTH SERVICE BUREAUS

This chapter focuses on the implementation of a community program, the Youth Service Bureau. In the preceding chapter, it was stated that localities have discretion in designing and operating the program. The central thesis states that the exercise of this discretion is associated with intraorganizational characteristics of the program and the organizational context.

Analysis of the association of these internal and external factors to bureau performance will provide a basis for program recommendations. Second, it may further understanding of the policy implementation process. The YSB program, although eligible for federal funds in the state of Ohio, is not a federal program. It is characteristic of the trend in intergovernmental relations toward greater local control and responsibility for public programs. Analysis of the YSB program may identify factors which are applicable to other programs giving discretion to localities. However, without a standard for comparison, it is not possible to determine the appropriateness of the inferences made.
CONCEPTUALIZATION

Five performance criteria are standards for evaluating the implementation of YSBs. Performance is the process or method used in accomplishing program objectives. It is distinguished from the evaluation of program effectiveness, which refers to "the determination of results attained by some activity designed to accomplish some valued goal or objective (Suchman, 1967:32)." While evaluation of program effectiveness requires identification of program objectives, analysis of performance is not so constrained. The analyst may select standards, hopefully with adequate support from the literature and administrators.

Chapter two summarized the unsuccessful efforts of the analyst to identify program and process standards for the YSB program in Ohio. No process standards were discovered and program standards, just recently developed, are not aggressively enforced. The indicators used to measure performance were derived from the literature on YSBs (Seymour, 1971; Norman, 1972).

Ideally, analysis of performance and effect should be carried out simultaneously. Analysis should explain why a program succeeded or failed. A statewide evaluation of YSBs conducted in 1975 concluded that bureaus were effective in diverting youth from the juvenile justice system. There was no attempt, however, to explain why bureaus varied in the degree of success [1]. It is hoped that this analysis of bureau performance may contribute to explanation. However, the linkage between this analysis of performance and the prior evaluation of effect requires empirical investigation.
Evaluative research was believed inappropriate because YSBs in Ohio have already been evaluated by the state planning agency. It was felt that if the analyst was to gain bureau cooperation, the purpose of the research should be perceived as providing useful information \( \text{[2]} \). It was impossible to obtain the results of the statewide evaluation for individual bureaus.

**PERFORMANCE**

The six variables used in assessing performance are defined below.

**Indirect/direct Service**

The variables used to measure this criterion were the percentage of youth receiving direct service during a one year period, the average amount of time spent on a case estimated by bureau caseworkers, and the number of bureau activities classified as direct or indirect. Indirect services, which included interagency relations, planning and coordination, and family and community relations, refers to services not involving direct contact with youth. Bureaus’ services were categorized as indirect when at least one-fourth of the clients were provided referral services, clients received direct service for less than three months and more activities were classified as indirect.

**Case Coordination**

Case coordination refers to the exchange of referrals between the YSB and other agencies. Only one aspect is measured:
the sources of referrals to the bureau over a one year period. Bureaus receiving more referrals from agencies than individuals were assumed to be more involved in coordinating referrals.

**Innovation**

Innovation is defined as organizational change. Change in programs is measured by the number of reported changes in bureau objectives and services since the first full year of operation. Program reports and responses to the questions: "Have the objectives of this bureau been changed due to local circumstances, since it began operation?" "Have the services been altered since the program began?" were the sources of information.

Innovative methods is measured by staff reports of change in rules or techniques by which services are delivered to clients.

Judgments of innovativeness in programs and methods were made through comparison of bureaus.

**Program Emphasis**

A descriptive rather than an evaluative criterion, program emphasis is measured by the largest proportion of clients receiving a service over a period of one year. Services are classified according to the extensiveness of staff involvement with clients. An ordinal ranking is achieved on the basis of an assumption that psychological counseling requires a great deal of interaction with a client over a period of time, instruction requires moderate involvement and individual advocacy requires the least involvement with the client.\(^3\).
Bureau Responsiveness to the Target Area

Using the performance criteria outlined above, bureaus located in the same city but with different target areas were compared. If bureaus differed in performance criteria associated with the environment, bureaus were judged responsive.

INTRAORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT

It is assumed that if the local community is primarily responsible for program implementation, characteristics of the community, environment and organizational structure, will affect the implementation process. The focus on these particular variables was influenced by an analytic model of the implementation process, summarized in chapter four (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975). The indicators used to measure these variables were derived from the literature analyzing organizational structure (Pugh et al., 1963; Hage and Aiken, 1967; Ripley et al., 1973). The variables and their operational definitions are given below.

Intraorganizational Characteristics

Intraorganizational characteristics refer to the internal structure of the YSB. Properties assumed to define structure are the centralization of decisionmaking, specialization of function, age, turnover of personnel, and standardization of procedures. Interviews with the personnel of the YSBs provided information on these organizational properties.
Centralization of decisionmaking is measured by the number of levels of organizational structure involved in decisions concerning the bureau. Three types of decisions were identified: general policy, program planning, and program management. Only the first two were used in measuring participation in decisionmaking, since they affect the entire program. The more levels of structure involved in decisionmaking, the greater decentralization of decisionmaking.

Specialization of function refers to the distribution of professional duties among the number of job positions within a bureau. The higher the number of job positions, the greater specialization of functions.

Age is measured by the number of years a bureau has been in operation, as opposed to the time of the grant award.

Turnover of personnel is measured by two indicators, the rate at which staff have left the bureau since its inception, and the rate at which directors have been replaced. Bureau personnel were asked to estimate if turnover for staff had been large; names and the length of appointment of previous directors were requested of administrators.

Standardization of procedures refers to the specification of rules for intake, which is the initial interview with clients, and for rejection of youth for services. If rules are specified for both, the bureau is characterized as having standardized procedures.
Organizational Context

The organizational context refers to characteristics of the setting in which the YSB is located. Variables hypothesized to define the setting were autonomy, community involvement, the size of the city, occupational and industrial structure of the city, economy, racial composition, and government fragmentation. Data for measuring autonomy and community involvement was provided by interviews with bureau personnel. The 1970 U. S. census and the 1972 census of governments were the sources of information for the remaining variables. The variables and their operational definitions are stated below.

Autonomy refers to the relationship of the YSB to other organizations in its environment. Bureau control over two resources, hiring of staff and budget development, was one indicator of autonomy. Each measure was weighted equally. The second indicator was the frequency which the bureau was required to submit reports. It was assumed that bureau submitting weekly reports had less autonomy than bureaus submitting monthly reports. A bureau's autonomy was the sum of these indicators.

Community involvement refers to participation of citizens and agencies in the initiation and operation of the YSB program. The degree of community involvement was measured by the presence or absence of the following characteristics: existence of a policy board and method of selection, initiation of the program by organizations or individuals, support of influential citizens and organizations for the YSB program.
A policy board appointed by government was given more weight as was the initiation of the YSB program by a community organization.

The size of the community is measured by the population of the city. The literature on the YSB does not define the concept of a community, i.e., whether it refers to a geographical area, the perception of belonging, or the service areas from which the bureau receives most of its clients. The latter two would have been difficult to measure, therefore, it was decided to define community in terms of geographical area.

Occupational structure refers to the proportion of employed persons sixteen years and older having white collar occupations.

The economic status of the city is measured by the proportion of poor families with children under 18 of all families with children under 18, and the number of unemployed persons in the civilian labour force.

The racial composition is measured by the percentage of blacks living in the city. Government fragmentation is measured by the number of local governments in the county per 100,000 population.

METHOD

Selltiz' definition of an exploratory study is descriptive of this comparative analysis of YSBs. The purpose of an exploratory study is "to gain familiarity with a phenomenon or to achieve new insights into it, often in order to formulate a more precise research problem or to develop hypotheses"
A number of variables were examined because of uncertainty about what aspects would be important. The consequence is that there is no indepth study of any variables.

As mentioned earlier, a survey instrument was the primary source of information for many variables. It contained approximately one hundred fixed alternative and open-ended questions. It was the basis for interviews with bureau directors, assistant directors and at least two members of the program staff. Interviews with administrative personnel focused primarily on the overall operation of the bureau and were approximately one hour in length. Interviews with program staff stressed their activities and were approximately thirty minutes long. All interviews were conducted at the bureaus during a two month period, May and June, 1975. The criteria used in selecting bureaus for investigation were funding source, region, variation in organizational structure and the size of the city.

Bureau records were the second source of data. Because records kept on clients differed in each bureau i.e., the types of information kept and the frequency in which it was recorded, there was difficulty in comparing bureaus. Therefore there was greater reliance on the survey instrument, in addition to program reports than was desired.

It is possible to rank bureaus in terms of the organizational and contextual characteristics, but not in terms of most of the performance criteria, which are measured at the nominal
level for either presence or absence of the attribute. Initially, it was expected that bureau records would be used entirely as indicators of performance, however, the desired data was not available. The interview schedule primarily focused on organizational and contextual factors, therefore more information is available for analysis. The questions primarily addressed facts rather than perceptions. Through comparison of replies of several staff members of a bureau, it is felt that some degree of accuracy was attained. All responses were categorized by the analyst.

To identify associations between organizational, and contextual variables and performance criteria, the data was manually tabulated. When several variables were associated with performance criteria, cross tabulations of subcategories were done. This technique permitted control of a third factor in order to determine if each variable was independently associated with performance. The small number of cases however limited the number of cross tabulations possible. Finally, qualitative analysis of bureaus which were consistently evaluated as either having or not having a particular attribute was carried out. The purpose was to discover other factors which may be related to the other factors identified earlier. The analysis ends with the development of hypotheses for further more extensive investigation. Given the small number of cases studied, the associations from which hypotheses are inferred are extremely susceptible to error. However since one of the
purposes of analysis is to provide policy recommendations, it is felt that generalization was essential.

It may be logically argued that comparative analysis is not possible, since the YSB program is characterized by a great deal of local discretion. It may be that there are five different programs rather than one. Most of the bureaus, however, had several characteristics in common. Four were funded by the state planning agency under the same program category, all are labeled YSBs and located in the same geographical area. In a national survey of YSBs, it was stated that bureaus located in the same state tended to have similarities (Department of California Youth Authority, 1972a:146). Finally four of the bureaus have in common the recently developed state standards for YSBs.

ANALYSIS

Differences in the performance of the five bureaus is shown in Table 3-1. There was no attempt to rank the performance criteria, i.e., to decide if innovation is a more important activity than coordination. Two of the performance criteria are dynamic; innovative programs and methods. The remaining criteria characterized the programs as in the spring of 1975. Program emphasis unlike the other attributes is not evaluative. It describes the type of service delivered to clients, not the quality of service. One bureau, number (5), was perceived as having all of the evaluative attributes, while bureau (2) had none of them. Bureaus differed most in provision of indirect
service and case coordination. One bureau was not evaluated on these attributes because it is funded to provide a particular service. Bureaus differed least in the development of innovative programs, with only one bureau described as having program change.

Responsiveness of bureaus to the target area is measured only by comparison of bureaus located in the same city, and thus it was not possible to evaluate bureaus separately.

In discussing each criterion, similarities and differences in bureaus' performance are compared to intraorganizational characteristics and the organizational context.
INNOVATIVE PROGRAMS

Table 3-2 illustrates that more intraorganizational characteristics are associated with innovative programs than the other performance criteria. Comparing each of these characteristics with performance, it is seen that three of the bureaus lacking innovative programs had centralized decision-making, and standardized procedures, but lacked specialization of function and maturity. Two bureaus had high staff turnover (see Table 3-3). The bureau which was characterized as having innovative programs had specialized functions, and had been in operation longer than three years. All of the other characteristics, it lacked. There was one noninnovative bureau which also had specialized functions, and had been in operation more than three years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Organizational</th>
<th>Contextual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Programs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Methods</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Coordination</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Emphasis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 3-3
INNOVATIVE PROGRAMS BY INTRAORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Centralized</th>
<th>Standardized</th>
<th>New Bureau</th>
<th>High Staff Turnover</th>
<th>No Specialization</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With Innovative Programs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Non-innovative Programs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3(^a)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Data missing for one bureau.

When Table 3-3 is compared with Table 3-4, it is observed that the association between noninnovative programs, centralization of decisionmaking and standardization of procedures decreased when looking at bureaus described as not having specialized functions. There was no change in the relation of noninnovative programs, age of the bureau and staff turnover. Centralization and standardization were independently associated with noninnovative programs. It could not be determined if noninnovative programs were independently associated with high staff turnover or age of the bureau.

It seems as if bureaus which had more bureaucratic characteristics were less innovative. Centralization, standardization and specialization are all characteristics of bureaucracy (Pugh et al., 1963) but while specialization was positively
TABLE 3-4

INNOVATIVE PROGRAMS BY AGE, TURNOVER, STANDARDIZATION, AND CENTRALIZATION, CONTROLLED FOR ABSENCE OF SPECIALIZATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureaus</th>
<th>Centralized</th>
<th>Standardized</th>
<th>New Bureau</th>
<th>High Staff Turnover</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With Innovative Programs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Non-innovative Programs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2(^a)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Data missing for one bureau.

associated with innovation, the other two characteristics were not. Table 3-5 indicated that the least "bureaucratic" bureau was the one characterized as having innovative programs.

Two contextual variables were associated with innovative programs, autonomy and the size of the city (see Table 3-6). All of the noninnovative bureaus were located in large cities, over 250,000, while the innovative bureau was located in a small city, under 100,000 in population. Three of the bureaus lacking innovative programs also lacked autonomy, while the bureau with innovative programs was characterized as having autonomy.
### TABLE 3-5

**RELATION OF INNOVATIVE PROGRAMS AND BUREAUCRATIC CHARACTERISTICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureaus</th>
<th>Innovative Program</th>
<th>Centralization</th>
<th>Standardization</th>
<th>Specialization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>moderate</td>
<td>moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 3-6

**INNOVATIVE PROGRAMS BY CONTEXTUAL CHARACTERISTICS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureaus</th>
<th>No Autonomy</th>
<th>Large City</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With Innovative Programs</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Noninnovative Programs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because it was not possible to rank bureaus in terms of the degree of innovation, the importance of specialization, age, staff turnover, autonomy and the size of the city to innovation could not be determined. However if bureaus with non-innovative programs are compared in terms of the potential for
innovation as measured by the number of proposals for change, it appears that autonomy is more important. Two bureaus located in the same city differed in autonomy but were similar in having high staff turnover, lacking specialization and the number of years in operation. The autonomous bureau had the greatest potential for innovation. Two other bureaus located in another city were similar in lacking autonomy but did not differ in the potential for innovation. They differed in the number of years in operation and specialization.

Since there was no direct question concerning proposals for change, the information obtained depended on the openness of bureau personnel to the interviewer. Because bureaus varied in responsiveness to the interviewer, knowledge of proposals probably came from more open bureaus.

Several hypotheses were formulated on the basis of the associations.

H1: The more bureaucratic the organizational structure of a bureau, the less innovative are its programs.

H2: A bureau characterized by specialization of function and decentralized decisionmaking, requires a stable staff for the development of innovative ideas.

H3: The more autonomous a bureau, the greater number of program changes.

H4: In a smaller city, because the need for services is greater, there is more community support for the bureau.

H5: With community support, the probability of successful program implementation is higher.
INNOVATIVE METHODS

There were two characteristics associated with innovative methods, specialization and age (see Table 3-7). Both of the bureaus which had been in operation more than three years were characterized as having innovative methods, while newer bureaus were not. Age and specialization appear to be highly related. Given the small number of cases, it was not possible to hypothesize about the independent association of these characteristics to innovative methods.

There were no contextual variables associated with innovative methods (see Table 3-2). It was the only performance criterion not associated with contextual characteristics. In contrast to innovative programs, the development of new methods of delivering service is entirely depended on the expertise of bureau staff, which seems to be a consequence of specialization of function and time.

Two hypotheses are formulated on the basis of associations.

H:6. The longer a bureau continues to operate, the more likely are changes in the environment to occur, which require a response.

H:7. As the staff becomes more specialized, new methods of delivering services are likely to be developed.

INDIRECT SERVICE

Only one variable was associated with the provision of indirect services, community involvement, a contextual characteristic. Only four bureaus were classified because one is a specialized project. Of these four bureaus, the two bureaus
### TABLE 3-7

**INNOVATIVE METHODS BY AGE AND SPECIALIZATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureaus</th>
<th>3 years or over</th>
<th>Specialized</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With Innovative Methods</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With Noninnovative Methods</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Described as providing indirect service had high community involvement, the two which emphasized direct services had low community involvement (see Table 3-8).

### TABLE 3-8

**INDIRECT SERVICE, CASE COORDINATION, AND PROGRAM EMPHASIS BY COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT AND STANDARDIZATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureau Performance</th>
<th>Low Community Involvement</th>
<th>High Community Involvement</th>
<th>Standardized</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case Coordination</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Service</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Service</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Client Involvement</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Client Involvement</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Looking at the proportion of clients referred by each of the bureaus categorized as providing indirect service, the bureau with the highest community involvement, referred more clients. The difference in community involvement was the existence of a policy board. Having a policy board was given more weight primarily because interviews with the staffs indicated that it was important.

Reasons given for the importance of the policy board were: increases community support, gives the YSB more flexibility in program development, and insures responsiveness to the community. The only negative perceptions of policy boards were given by two persons working in bureaus without a policy board. Both of the bureaus providing indirect services were initiated by influential community organizations while bureaus providing direct services were initiated by individuals.

Neither autonomy or size was associated with the provision of indirect services. It may be that a neighborhood YSB is not affected by the size of the city. The provision of indirect services may tend to limit the autonomy of the bureau, since effectiveness depends on the bureau's relation with other organizations. However a longitudinal study would be needed to discover a relationship.

H:8. The more a community is involved in the YSB program, the more likely the bureau is to stress indirect services.

H:9. Involvement of community agencies in the planning of the bureau program facilitates the provision of indirect services.
CASE COORDINATION

Community involvement was the only variable associated with this performance criterion. Here only three bureaus were considered because of the lack of data for the fourth bureau on coordinating activities. The remaining bureau had the specialized program.

The two bureaus which were perceived as emphasizing case coordination had community involvement in YSB programs, while the bureau not stressing case coordination did not (see Table 3-8). Similar to the provision of indirect services, the bureau which was most involved in coordinating activities as measured by the sources of referral to the bureau, also had the highest community involvement.

It was assumed that referrals from agencies reflected more coordinating effort than referrals from individuals. Differences in organizational structure seem to present problems in achieving coordination. An Indiana study observed that there were differences between the YSB and the legal-criminal, social, and educational systems in the number of hierarchical levels and in the use of standardized procedures. It was hypothesized that the feeling of status incongruity may be created for persons "unable to concretely identify the status due a YSB representative (Fromkin and Elliott, 1974:197-198)."

The authors hypothesized that structural differentiation affected the YSB interaction with community agencies.
In the statewide assessment of YSBs in Ohio, most of the bureaus reported good working relationships with social service agencies, educational resources, religious groups and independent professional resources. Neither the police or courts, which Fromkin and Elliott stated have the highest number of hierarchical levels, were mentioned (Dept. of Criminal Justice, 1975:37).

Another factor which may affect interagency relations is differentiation of goals. The YSB goal is to divert youth from coming in contact with the juvenile justice system. The role of the police is to prevent crime and arrest offenders. Given the potential conflict of values, it may be more difficult for the YSB to establish good relationships with the police.

Records on referral sources for the two bureaus categorized as providing case coordination for a one year period were compared with county records on the sources of referrals for unruly offenses in 1973 (Department of Mental Health and Retardation, 1973). Large discrepancies in the records were considered to indicate a lack of bureau effort or limited success in achieving coordination.

One bureau received few referrals from law enforcement, while the juvenile court received most of its referrals from police. When this data was compared with staff perception of relations with the law, courts and schools, there was consistency in the staff perceptions that relations with courts were excellent, while with schools and the police they were good.
The staff of the other bureau perceived the YSB’s relations with the court and the police as excellent and with the schools as good. However, less than 10 per cent of its referrals came from courts and police.

It may be that positive perception of interagency relations may lead to more efforts to coordinate casework. Given the crudeness of the indicators, there was no attempt to measure the relationship between perceived relationship and source of referrals to the bureau.

H:10. The ease of establishing interagency relations depends on structural differences between the YSB and other community agencies.

PROGRAM EMPHASIS

One contextual and one organizational variable were associated with program emphasis. The two bureaus described as having high involvement with clients had low community involvement. The two bureaus which were ranked low on involvement with clients had high community involvement. The bureaus with high client involvement had standardized procedures, while one of the bureaus with low involvement did not (see Table 3-8).

The direct services provided by the two bureaus with high client involvement were highly differentiated. The services which the client received depended very much on the intake interview. Given the importance of this initial interview, specification of rules for carrying it out is understandable. In contrast the bureau with no standardized procedures did not highly differentiate direct services provided to clients.
When the two bureaus with high client involvement were compared with the bureaus with low client involvement, community involvement appeared more important than standardization. None of the bureaus with high community involvement had high client involvement but one of these bureaus did have some standardized procedures.

Program emphasis was associated with the method of providing services to clients. Bureaus categorized as providing direct services had programs stressing high involvement with clients while bureaus providing indirect service, did not emphasize high client involvement.

It is reasoned that by emphasizing extensive involvement with clients, there is less time or need for interaction with other agencies, which is essential to a bureau emphasizing indirect services. Greater community involvement may require a bureau to serve many varying needs which may result in 1) services to all clients being limited; and 2) provision of indirect services.

In one of the bureaus described as having high client involvement, the method of service delivery was changing. With increased caseloads, there has been a greater reliance on volunteers and group counseling. In 1975, there were plans to implement a procedure reducing the time which the staff spends on a case to one month, with a focus on a particular problem. This supports the assumption that as a community requires more of bureaus there is less involvement with clients.
H:11. Community involvement affects program emphasis more than the structure of the organization.

H:12. Greater involvement with clients leads to a need for standardized procedures.

H:13. The more a community seeks the services of the YSB the less emphasis placed on extensive involvement with clients.

RESPONSIVENESS TO THE TARGET AREA

Responsiveness to the target area is assessed by comparing the performance of bureaus located in the same city but with different target areas. Table 3-9 shows that bureaus described as not responsive differed only in the presence of innovative methods. This criterion was associated only with organization characteristics (see Table 3-7). The nonresponsive bureaus were similar in administrative autonomy and community involvement, and differed only in two organizational characteristics, specialization and age.

No data was collected on the target areas, however program descriptions provided some information. One bureau serves a rapidly changing neighborhood with a high rate of unemployment, overcrowded housing, limited social services and recreational facilities and a high rate of delinquency. The other nonresponsive bureau which serves the rest of the city, is located in a neighborhood with similar characteristics. The city however has a low unemployment rate and the county a lower rate of delinquent cases per 1,000 youths than corresponding data for other communities in which bureaus in the field study
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bureaus not Responsive</th>
<th>Interbureau Differences</th>
<th>Intercity Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>specialization</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaus Responsive</td>
<td>centralization, autonomy</td>
<td>program emphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>turnover of directors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
were located. Although bureaus differ in target areas, it was not reflected by the performance criteria.

In contrast, the responsive bureaus differed in a performance criterion, program emphasis, associated with a contextual variable (see Table 3-8). Program applications did not provide information on the target areas. However, the analyst in visiting the areas observed differences in the quality of housing and in the YSB offices. Racial composition of bureau staff probably reflected differences in racial characteristics of the target area.

The responsive bureaus differed in centralization and turnover of directors. In contextual variables, they were similar in community involvement but differed in autonomy (see Table 3-9).

Although these bureaus did not differ in innovative programs hypothesized to be affected by autonomy, there were indications that constraints in autonomy lead to greater similarity in bureaus, particularly in program emphasis. When bureau records for 1974 and 1975 were compared, the trend was toward greater similarity in program emphasis and client characteristics (see Table 3-10). The percentage difference in clients provided educational services by the bureaus was 69 per cent in December, 1974, at the end of July, 1975, it had declined to 20 per cent. The number of male clients served by the bureaus differed by 32 per cent in December, 1974, in July, 1975, the percentage difference was 10 per cent.
### Table 3-10

**Change in Program Emphasis and Client Characteristics for Bureaus with the Same Monitoring Agency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>12/74</th>
<th>4-7/75</th>
<th>12/74</th>
<th>1-7/75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Per Cent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clients</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provided</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Educational Services</strong></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male Clients</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Served</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Community Youth Service Bureau, The Citizens' Committee on Youth.

The director of one of these bureaus mentioned that the first year proposal for funds was developed by the bureau, while the second year proposal was prepared through consultation with the monitoring agency. In addition, the bureaus have filled out the same report forms. It is assumed that the longer bureaus are subjected to the same reporting system, the more similar will bureau programs become.

This assumption receives some support from the unresponsive bureaus, which were similar in program emphasis. The reports to the implementing agency were similar, although
no standard form was used. The staff of these bureaus also regularly interacted and some of the services were jointly provided. This may also account for similarity in programs.

Although both responsive bureaus had experienced high turnover of staff, one has had several administrators, thus increasing its instability. It is hypothesized that this bureau is less likely to be innovative because of this organizational characteristic as well as the lack of autonomy.

What did responsive bureaus have in common which non-responsive bureaus did not? It was community involvement and high turnover of staff (see Table 3-9). Responsive bureaus had community involvement and high turnover of staff while the unresponsive bureaus did not.

How are these characteristics related to responsiveness? Without input from the community, a bureau may not be aware of community needs. Community involvement may give the bureau the base needed to carry out programs which are dependent on relations with other organizations and groups. By publicly stating its support of the bureau, citizen involvement adds credibility to the program. All of the bureaus were able to list some influential agencies supportive of the bureau, but a policy board was perceived as providing the most influence.

Intercity differences in turnover in staff probably is related to salaries. Information on one bureau in each city indicated that salaries in the bureau with a high rate of turnover were approximately 30 per cent lower than in the bureau with low turnover. If staff is continually being
recruited and trained, awareness of community needs is likely to be limited, unless the staff is indigenous to the area.

H:14. Bureaus held accountable to the same agency tend to develop similar programs.

H:15. The more interaction between bureaus, the greater similarity in the programs.

H:16. Bureaus having the same implementing agency tend to be similar in performance.

H:17. The more unstable a bureau, the less likely it is to develop new programs.

H:18. Community involvement, low turnover of staff and administrative autonomy increase a bureau's responsiveness to its environment.

REFINING THE CENTRAL THESIS

The following statements summarize briefly the analysis of five YSBs.

(1) Contextual variables are more often associated with variation in bureau performance than are organizational variables.

(2) When both contextual and organizational variables are associated with performance, contextual variables appear to be more important.

(3) Activities which can be accomplished by the bureau alone are primarily associated with organizational characteristics.

(4) Activities which depend greatly on the cooperation of other agencies, are primarily affected by contextual characteristics.
Some activities seem to facilitate the implementation of others.

Given the association of two contextual variables, community involvement and administrative autonomy with five of the performance attributes, a more qualitative examination of the field interviews seemed in order. The objective was to identify factors or conditions that may affect these variables or bureau performance. Especially important was the bureau which was positively evaluated on all applicable criteria and the two bureaus which were negatively evaluated on three of these.

Community Involvement

It is assumed that the extent of community involvement in the YSB program depends on environmental conditions. In order to determine if environmental characteristics were related to differences in the performance of bureaus located in the same city, data for target areas is needed. This was not collected. But one of the bureaus studied had a branch office located in a city very similar in environmental characteristics to the city in which the main office was situated. Bureau staff however had no difficulty in differentiating these cities. Differences in history, culture, the number and interdependence of youth serving agencies and the power structure were noted. From interviews with staff members, the following summary was constructed.

Competition between the two cities is seen to derive in part from the location of the county seat in one of the cities.
This city receives all of the benefits resulting from being the county seat, such as receiving more public services, but provides less of the county's revenue than the other city, which also receives less state aid per capita.

The cities differ in the openness of the power structure which was perceived to affect the implementation of the YSB program. While the power structure in which the main YSB is located was accessible to YSB influence and strongly supported the program, the other city was initially hostile to the YSB staff and some citizens openly opposed a YSB program. One explanation was that the city was hostile to all agencies that have main offices located in the county seat. Another was that the community is less sensitive to the problems of youth. The county seat with more agencies providing services to youth and better interagency relations facilitated the provision of indirect services. The YSB branch office provides more direct services because there were fewer agencies to refer clients to and because interagency relations were more difficult to establish. Clients served by the YSB and its branch office also differed in age and social class. Although the class distinction was probably a consequence of city economy, the age difference was perceived to be a function of different criteria used to refer youth to the bureau.

Most of the differences identified by the YSB staff are not reflected in the environmental characteristics operationalized in terms of census data. However, discussions with the staff of another bureau indicated that socioeconomic status
of the target area did affect the degree of citizen participation in bureau's programs. After unsuccessful efforts to get citizens involved in a YSB program, a small stipend was used as an incentive.

Another factor which may affect community involvement and bureau performance is whether the YSB is acceptable to the dominant community. If the race of YSB personnel differs from that of the dominant community, it may have a negative effect on community involvement, and persons needing services may be hesitant to seek it. Earlier it was mentioned that differences in organizational structure and goals may make interagency relations difficult. Any factor which differentiates the YSB from dominant community is hypothesized to negatively affect community involvement in bureau programs.

It would be difficult to find comparable data for the number and types of agencies providing services to youth, although this seems to be an important factor in the provision of indirect services. Other factors such as the community power structure, culture and interagency relations which seem to affect the degree of community involvement, a bureau's coordination effort and the success of program implementation generally would require intensive analysis.

**Administrative Autonomy**

One factor which appears to affect autonomy is bureau auspices. Bureaus with implementing agencies were described as lacking autonomy. The implementing agencies were responsible for hiring staff and developing the YSB budget.
Bureau personnel were asked if they thought public administration would limit the effectiveness of the YSB. The bureaus without implementing agencies and privately operated expressed negative feelings toward public administration while the staff of bureaus that were publicly administered had mixed feelings.

In one of these bureaus, a staff member mentioned that public administration limited the flexibility of the bureau. There were a number of regulations which affected structure, i.e., establishment of a policy board, the recruitment of staff, programming, the expenditure of funds and the development of a budget. These regulations were seen as limiting the bureau's responsiveness to the community and the development of new programs. In contrast, another staff member felt that public administration had little effect on program operation.

When asked what was unique about the YSB program, staff members of both of the publicly administered bureaus responded that the YSB eliminated the frustrations of the bureaucracy by being small, located in the community and capable of developing close relations with you.

This discrepancy in responses about public administration may be explained when a distinction is made between whether a bureau has the autonomy to make agency wide decisions, and the autonomy to determine methods of delivering services. While all bureaus seemed to possess the latter, only bureaus without
implementing agencies made agency wide decisions. Furthermore, in comparison to other agencies serving youth, such as schools and the welfare department, even the publicly administered bureaus would be perceived as less bureaucratic.

In one privately administered bureau, it was felt that public administration would limit flexibility of staff and the YSB's responsiveness to the community. In addition, the YSB could become involved in partisan issues and government might be pressured to constrain the YSB program when it was not acceptable to community influencers.

The question of public funding was distinguished from public administration. Public funding was perceived as beneficial by the staff of all bureaus. Reasons given were that it provided stability for the program and increased local commitment to the YSB. None of the respondents felt that public funding would limit autonomy, while some felt that public administration would.

There were two bureaus implemented by a public agency which received most of their funds from outside the local community. These bureaus were evaluated as not having innovative programs. The locally funded and publicly administered bureau was also categorized as having no innovative programs. It seems that public administration affected both organization and performance, contrary to the perceptions of some respondents.

Another contextual factor which has the potential to limit the autonomy of some YSBs is the regional planning unit.
The RPU determines which applications within its jurisdiction are to be funded and is responsible for grant administration. This authority could be used to regulate a bureau's activities. There is no evidence however that RPUs have exercised their influence in this way. The YSBs submit reports quarterly to RPUs. Without independent sources of information such as frequent visits and evaluations, there is no way to check on the accuracy of the feedback from the bureaus.

Summary

Many of the contextual factors identified as having an impact on bureau performance are not susceptible to manipulation. There is little that a YSB can do about culture, perceptions, the community power structure or the number of youth serving agencies. The YSB therefore must adjust to these circumstances. This can be facilitated by program standards which are flexible enough to allow for variation in community characteristics.

Administrative autonomy is a variable which can be manipulated. Although there may be overbearing reasons why a YSB should be publicly administered, the YSB should be allowed discretion in programming. Community involvement, particularly a policy board, would seem to give the bureau an independent base of support. Attention should also focus on inflexible regulations which were not formulated for YSBs but which the YSB must follow as a public agency. Many of these such as the reporting system may constrain bureau responsiveness to its environment.
DEVELOPING A PROGRAM MODEL FOR YSBs

Before the field investigation was conducted, it was assumed that the organizational context and the structure of decisionmaking were adequate bases for formulating a typology of YSBs. Although the structure of decisionmaking was associated with innovative programs, it was initially hypothesized to affect the other performance criteria. The importance of the organizational context depends on the type of services which a bureau provides. If a bureau provides direct service, the organizational context may not be very important in classifying its program.

Establishing indicators of bureau performance was the most difficult task of the field study. There were no criteria presently used to describe the functions of YSBs which were 1) easily operationalized; and could 2) discriminate bureau programs.

In a national study of YSBs, there was an attempt to group programs by emphasis on direct or indirect service (Department of California Youth Authority, 1972a). Five categories were formulated with an ordinal ranking of activities as more or less direct. Approximately 70 per cent of the programs (n=58) were categorized as providing both direct and indirect services with over 70 per cent of these (n=41) emphasizing direct services. Differentiating bureau performance according to this
classification system was not very useful. Until a suitable method of categorizing program content is formulated, a program model for YSBs will not be developed.

IMPLEMENTING THE OHIO STANDARDS FOR YOUTH SERVICE BUREAUS

Using the standards for the YSB developed by the Ohio Criminal Justice Supervisory Commission (1975) and the recommendations from the statewide evaluation of YSBs (Department of Criminal Justice, 1975) as goals for the YSB, recommendations and comments are made. The recommendations are stated as hypotheses to stress the exploratory rather than the explanatory nature of the field study. Recommendations supported by hypotheses are underlined.

YSB - Functions and Goals

1. "YSBs should avoid providing direct services except short term demonstration projects whenever possible (OCJSC, 1975:33)."

"YSBs should make use of whatever resources are available and only provide direct services for those resources not existing within the community,...the YSB was developed...to institute a coordinating effort to refer clients to available services (Dept. of Criminal Justice, 1975:56)."

a. If indirect service is the approach used, public operation should be considered, particularly in a large city.
b. If there are several branches of a YSB in a city, service brokerage should be coordinated by a central bureau.

c. If there is an integrating organization in the community, such as a council of social service agencies, participation of the YSB may assist in the performance of the service brokerage function.

It is not clear whether the Supervisory Commission intended indirect service as a goal or a method. Diversion and prevention are two goals specifically mentioned. Each is defined in terms of the target group: diversion refers to youth who have had formal contact with police or juvenile court; prevention to youth who have not had such contact. The Youngstown evaluation concluded that all of the bureaus studied were effective in diversion, most of them emphasized direct services.

All of the bureaus studied in the comparative analysis provide direct services, only two were classified as providing indirect service. This was hypothesized to be a function of the extent of community involvement in the planning and operation of the YSB program. Factors which may affect community involvement are socioeconomic status of the target area, the size of the community, differentiation in goals and structure between the YSB and the dominant community, community norms and power structure.

Because the size of the community may affect the development of community support, it is suggested that bureaus in large cities be publicly operated. Association with government
will not only lend visibility to the YSB but may facilitate the cooperation of public institutions such as the police and schools. The field study indicated that it was particularly difficult for the YSB to establish good relations with these institutions.

Although government fragmentation may hinder interorganizational relations, it was observed that a bureau located in a city with the greatest governmental fragmentation had been able to develop strong interagency relations. Two contributing factors may have been the smallness of the city and the existence of an integrating organization.

Evaluation

2. "Unless these goals (of the bureau) are behaviorally stated, proper measurement toward them cannot be accomplished (Dept. of Criminal Justice, 1975:65)."

a. If a bureau has goals other than diversion, it may be difficult to provide objective measures of effectiveness.

b. If a bureau is to be perceived as effective, it is essential that it carry out public relations programs to increase community awareness.

Although Youngstown recognized that there may be other goals of the YSB, its recommendations assume that diversion is the principle goal of the YSB. In terms of recordkeeping, Youngstown recommended that bureaus develop a standardized intake form, including the referral source, reason for referral, and contacts prior to referral. These records provide
information useful in assessing diversion but not systems modification. Evaluation of effectiveness would depend on whether the system had become more responsive to the needs of youth. While diversion focuses on changes in the client's behavior, systems modification emphasizes change in the institutions dealing with youth. This goal is not easily subject to objective evaluation; neither is the goal of prevention. Without knowledge of the causes of delinquency or the characteristics of predelinquent youth, it would be difficult to develop indicators of success. Even Youngstown stating that community planning and resource development were areas "that YSBs have made their great impact in diversion and prevention" mentioned the difficulty of measurement and relied on qualitative data for their judgment (Dept. of Criminal Justice, 1975:65).

The bureau which was perceived by AJD staff as most effective, before the evaluation, was involved in activities which increased awareness of the program. The bureau has participated in community organizations, received recognition from the government and conducted training programs and workshops. An Indiana study of YSBs suggested that community agencies's perception of YSB effectiveness depended on interagency communication, innovative youth services and the level of contact that the agencies had with the YSB, particularly the Director (Fromkin and Elliott, 1974:223-24).

It may be that perception of effectiveness is more important than objective measures of effectiveness, especially
for building community support. Perception may influence program operation, particularly the function of coordination. In addition, Youngstown stated that community feedback is a valid form of evaluation.

Decision Structure

3. "The YSB should be organized as an independent, locally operated agency that involves the widest number of people of the community in the solution of youth problems (OCJSC, 1975:37)."

a. If the YSB is to perform the service brokerage function, then it should have a policy board.
b. If the YSB is to be independent in terms of procedures and programs, then it is important that the bureau have the administrative autonomy to hire staff and approve programs and budget.
c. If a bureau is publicly administered, a policy board would promote community involvement which facilitates the performance of the service brokerage function and would increase the bureau's responsiveness to its environment.
d. If a bureau is located in a low socioeconomic area, it may be necessary to provide incentives for participation in programs by the community.
e. In a large city, the independence of the neighborhood bureau may be best achieved by having two boards, a central board responsible for interagency relations and a neighborhood board to insure responsiveness to community needs.
The Community Prevention Report of the National Advisory Commission states that "a bureau with high priority on coordination requiring some control over resources, may more appropriately be publicly operated...a bureau with high priority on systems modification may more appropriately be privately operated (NAC, 1973:72-73)." Public operation in the field study referred to the existence and status of the implementing agency. Three bureaus were categorized as publicly operated, one provided indirect service. This bureau, with an advisory board representative of the neighborhood, interacted primarily with neighborhood agencies. The other two bureaus did not have a policy or advisory board. It was hypothesized that the more a community is involved in the YSB program, the more likely the YSB is to stress indirect services. A policy board was perceived by the staff of bureaus as important, both because it insures responsiveness to the community and provides a base of support needed for the development of a wider range of programs.

If community wide coordination is desired, perhaps a central board with agency representatives in the majority is needed. A California report indicated that lay composition increased community participation, but might produce a different type of bureau. It was hypothesized that a board built around an indigenous community might focus on "generalized delinquency prevention among self referrals rather than diversion among referrals from the established juvenile justice system (Dept. of California Youth Authority, 1972b:21)."
If the YSB is to be responsive to its environment, then neighborhood branches of the YSB should have a separate board composed of persons residing in the target area.

Although bureau effectiveness was not analyzed, it may be that the composition of the decision structure determines the source of referrals to the bureau which may influence the achievement of the diversion function. The composition of one bureau's board changed from having a majority of professionals to lay citizens. In the first year of operation, more than 90 per cent of the referrals were from agencies, however in the past year, one-third of the referrals came from individuals.

The Supervisory Commission was not clear on the meaning of the terms "independent" and "locally operated." It stated that a bureau should not be under the control of the juvenile justice system, but stressed that "it must have recognized authority to handle youth problems (1975:37)." This seems to require public operation of the bureau or the delegation of authority by government to a privately operated bureau. Public operation limits a bureau's discretion, necessary for responsiveness to the community and innovative programs. However a bureau having a policy board with authority for program development may provide autonomy, even though the bureau is publicly operated.

Of the bureaus with noninnovative programs, the YSB with the greatest potential for innovation had a policy board. However constraints on autonomy seemed to be a factor preventing the implementation of innovative ideas that were developed.
The socioeconomic characteristics of the community should be considered in mobilizing community support for the bureau. One bureau located in a poor neighborhood had to alter a program because of difficulty in getting citizens involved. Staff of another bureau noted that there were problems in getting the poor to participate, however persons of middle class status were active in the program. Approaching organized groups may be one way of getting greater representation of the poor on the YSB board. In a community action program, this approach achieved greater representation than either holding of elections or appointment by government (Greenstone and Peterson, 1973:179).

Staffing

4. "Staff who will work directly with youth should be hired on the basis of ability to relate to youth in a helping role. The focus of staffing should not be to hire only via traditional educational and experience requirements (OCJSC, 1975:40)."

a. If a bureau is publicly operated, then there will be less flexibility in selection of staff who will probably have to meet the standards of the administering agency.

b. If staff is recruited and hired by the administering agency, the discretion of the bureau in developing programs is limited.

A characteristic of publicly administered bureaus is the hiring of staff by the implementing agency. This occurred in
three bureaus. They all lacked administrative autonomy, because they did not control hiring or program and budget development. They differed in the stability of staff, only one had high turnover, a function of difference in salaries. All were categorized as lacking innovative programs. It is assumed that the bureau director is very important in determining program operation, especially in bureaus with centralized decision-making, which was also a characteristic of these YSBs. However, if the director does not have the authority to control the staff, his objectives may not get implemented.

In all of the bureaus, staff tended to differ from administrators in the perception of bureau objectives, with staff emphasizing objectives most directly related to youth. They had a less systemic view of the program, probably due in part to their involvement in providing counseling services. Where the director exercises control over staff, there may be greater consistency in staff behavior and thus in the provision of services.

There was greater consistency in staff descriptions of responsibilities in bureaus which had a program supervisor who directed staff activities. While a director may be occupied with administration, a program supervisor can greatly affect staff behavior. One of these bureaus was publicly administered. It is assumed that although the YSB may be limited in selecting staff when publicly operated, it may gain some control over staff through a program supervisor.
Funding

5. "Public funds should be appropriated on an ongoing basis to support youth services bureaus because the total community has a concern for youth and their problems (OCJSC, 1975:41)."

a. Local government administration of the program may tend to discourage innovation.

b. If the reporting system is inflexible, it may constrain program operation.

Associated with public funding is the requirements of public accountability: that the money be spent efficiently and effectively. The reporting system for demonstrating accountability can become a form of control over the bureau's programs. If all bureaus are required to fill out the same reports, goals may be distorted in order to satisfy monitoring requirements (Derthick, 1970:156). Bureaus studied did not provide an example of this. The reporting systems have been changed frequently. Secondly, it was impossible to separate the reporting system from the other effects of administrative dependence.

It was hypothesized that bureaus held accountable to the same agency tend to develop similar programs. Over a period of one year, records for two bureaus accountable to the same agency showed a trend toward greater similarity in the clients served and the extensiveness of staff involvement with clients. This may be a function of the reporting system, and the same source of funding. It may reflect changes in the target
population or a deliberate effort of staff to serve a certain type of client.

The influence of public funding on program operation may not be limited to overt acts, but may also be reflected in the bureau's anticipation of what its sponsors will approve (Reagan, 1972:104). It was observed in the field study that where it was necessary to get the approval of the implementing agency for program expenditures, innovative programs were not developed. Dependency on public funding may lead to the preservation of the status quo rather than the innovative role for the YSB as envisioned by the President's Commission.

Public administration even when separated from the sources of funding seems to affect bureau performance. All of the YSBs implemented by a public agency regardless of the source of funding lacked innovative programs.

INFERENCES TO OTHER COMMUNITY-BASED PROGRAMS

The trend in intergovernmental relations seems to be toward greater decentralization of planning and implementation of public programs. Since this also characterizes the YSB program, it is felt that the comparative analysis may be relevant to the study of similar programs. Three factors seem to distinguish these programs from those implemented directly by the federal government: the difficulty of specifying program objectives, the importance of relations between government and the service deliverers and the impact of citizen participation on program operation.
When program goals are to be established by the local community, the analyst is confronted with the problem of identifying goals and determining their comparability from community to community. Most administrative agencies however are more likely to specify program activities than was the case with the YSB.

The data provided on the forms submitted to the administering agency may be taken as reflecting program goals. However as mentioned earlier, the type of information provided focuses on program inputs rather than the accomplishment of objectives. State monitoring forms for YSBs emphasize the setting of targets for the number of clients trained and served. This may have nothing to do with the achievement of diversion or prevention. The meaningfulness of performance targets depends on evaluating the linkage between performance and effect. Presently, the SPA is measuring the amount of work not the effectiveness of that work.

In studying community-based programs, the analyst will often have to rely on less objective data until the information collected by the government is appropriate for the measurement of effectiveness.

The field study indicates that the relationship between the government and the service delivery agencies may have an important effect on program operation. Although government delivery of services may be most efficient by eliminating the problem of coordination, it may be ineffective as a means of providing
discretionary nonroutine services, such as counseling, outreach, referral and advocacy.

YSBs ran by government were perceived as less responsive and innovative than bureaus which were privately operated or which had a contractual relationship with the public agency. Other programs which stress the importance of individualized service may have greater success in program implementation if services are provided by private agencies through a contractual arrangement.

Finally, citizen participation is frequently required by the newer federal programs. However the extent to which citizens actually have influence over the program depends on the composition of the decisionmaking body, the method of selecting representatives and the authority which it possesses vis a vis the implementing agency.

In two YSBs, the implementing agency was seen as increasingly infringing the authority of the decisionmaking body with the result that services were becoming less individualized. Effective citizen participation may insure public responsiveness, but when ineffective, citizen participation may lead to more public apathy.

**SUMMARY**

The question which focused the analysis of the YSB program was what effect does local discretion have on program operation. The central thesis which guided analysis stated that
the performance of a federally funded program permitting local discretion is associated with the intraorganizational characteristics of the program and the organizational context.

A standardized interview schedule containing both fixed alternative and open-ended questions was used to interview personnel of five Youth Service Bureaus in the state of Ohio. Bureau directors, assistant directors, and at least two caseworkers were interviewed at each bureau. The criteria used in selecting bureaus for study were the major funding source, region, size, and variation in organizational structure.

In the comparative analysis of the YSB, it was observed that contextual variables were more often associated with variations in bureau performance than organizational variables. Of the contextual variables, it was hypothesized that community involvement and administrative autonomy were the most important. The performance attributes studied could be classified according to the degree which implementation depended on the cooperation of other agencies. The more activities required interagency relations, the more contextual factors, many which were not manipulable, affected performance.

The central thesis was not refuted but refined through formulation of several hypotheses. The field study was the basis for recommendations on implementing the Ohio standards for YSBs, comments on developing a program model for the YSB and suggestions about studying other community-based programs.
NOTES

1. In chapter two of this study, several evaluations of Youth Service Bureaus are summarized.

2. In the appendix to this study, problems in implementing the field survey are discussed.

3. Individual advocacy Norman (1972) states requires the identification of problems, establishing a rapport with the youth, developing a plan of action, referral to another agency and follow-up to see that the client receives adequate services.

4. An implementing agency is defined as "any person or body recognized and authorized by the subgrantee to perform a service within a select crime area (Dept. of Economic and Community Development, 1974:2)."
CHAPTER IV
CONCEPTUAL RELEVANCE OF THE COMPLIANCE
AND COLLABORATIVE PERSPECTIVES

In this final chapter, the objective is to link description to conceptualization. First, the utility of the compliance perspective for analyzing the YSB program is assessed. Second, several issues are considered in formulating hypotheses concerning differences in the compliance and collaborative perspectives. Finally, by means of analogy, the two general perspectives are used to assess the applicability of a conceptual framework of the implementation process in an empirical setting.

THE FIELD STUDY AND THE COMPLIANCE PERSPECTIVE

It was initially assumed that because the YSB program is discretionary, it could not be analyzed using a compliance perspective. The field study supported that assumption. It is inferred that programs similar to the YSB cannot be analyzed using this perspective. However, since the field investigation covered only one program, there is no data to confirm or disconfirm the appropriateness of the inference.

A compliance perspective requires standards for evaluation, either procedural or substantive. If they are not developed by program administrators or by statute, then they must be
created by the analyst. The YSB program was not created by statute, therefore program descriptions, administrative regulations and report forms were examined as possible sources of YSB standards. There were no administrative requirements that could be used as process standards for the bureaus. A decentralized program, there were no standardized criteria for evaluating success or failure.

The primary purpose of the YSB is that it should serve the needs of the community (NAC, 1973:70). In describing the bureau, the literature emphasizes the different forms it may take, rather than similarities. In addition, functions of the YSB, as defined by Norman in chapter two, are not associated with discrete activities. For example, activities associated with the function of service brokerage include: direct services, community inventory, coordination, referral, youth advocacy and follow-up. Some of the same services may be associated with other functions, such as resource development or systems modification. Most important would be the reason why a particular activity is carried out. This could vary with bureaus and thus cannot be considered a basis for comparative analysis.

The compliance perspective assumes a hierarchical differentiation of authority for policy formulation and implementation. Policy formulators establish the standards which determine the desired pattern of implementation. These functions were not separated hierarchically by level of government in
the YSB program. Each YSB project is responsible for determining its program goals and executing them.

Because there was no reason to expect that the pattern of implementing YSBs in the state of Ohio would be uniform, the analyst had the problem of determining standards for comparative analysis.

Howard Fromkin has developed a hierarchical model of objectives for evaluating YSBs. A major assumption underlying the model is that "the degree of achievement of lower order objectives is an important determinant of the degree of achievement of higher order objectives (Fromkin and Elliott, 1974:4)." Secondly, it is hypothesized that certain activities lead to the accomplishment of YSB objectives. A bureau which has been in operation for a short period of time would be expected to be involved in activities directed at a lower level than a bureau in operation for a longer period of time.

Without assuming that a hierarchical model was a priori useful, some of the objectives associated with immediate, intermediate and ultimate objectives of YSBs were selected. Bureau staff were asked to state those which were applicable to their program and rank them according to importance. It is felt that bureau staffs were unable or did not rank YSB goals because of the complexity of the program. The analyst therefore did not believe it was possible to accurately develop meaningful standards for the YSB when practitioners did not.

In order to evaluate the implementation process, the compliance perspective implies that performance must be measurable.
It suggests that indicators are provided by the program, even if ambiguity makes this task difficult. Concerning the YSB program because there were no procedural standards, the record-keeping system varied with the bureau. However, the attempt was made to collect and compare available information on the characteristics of the clients served and the type of service provided.

The utility of the information was low, not only because the bureaus didn't keep all the information wanted, but also the "independent" variables could not "explain" variation. Most of the bureaus practice outreach, i.e., meeting youth in their own setting, developing rapport with them and encouraging those in need of services to seek it (Norman, 1972: 222). This probably affected the type of client served, but it is also affected by the characteristics of the target area. Environmental variables observed, the size of the population, ethnicity and socioeconomic status, were not amenable to identification of the behavior of youth. A factor affecting the type of clients served is the sources of referrals. This depends on the bureau's relation with the juvenile justice system and with the community as a whole.

The compliance perspective stresses the importance of organizational structure and processes in explaining the implementation process. The interview schedule, which was the primary source of data on bureaus, contained questions focusing on the hierarchical structure of the YSB and its effect on the pattern of decisionmaking and the structuring of staff.
activities. However the contextual variables which received less emphasis in the interview schedule were more often associated with variation in bureau performance than organizational variables. When both contextual and organizational variables were associated with performance, contextual variables seemed to be more important.

The concept of compliance implies conflict between levels of the hierarchy which requires mechanisms of control to insure implementation of program objectives. The state planning agency requires quarterly reports of the YSB projects. However there is one person on the evaluation staff who must monitor all of the LEAA funded projects in the state.

The size of the evaluation staff implies that the SPA is not aggressively seeking to control its programs. Second, as stated in chapter two, the standards for YSBs in Ohio are not being enforced. Rather it appears that the technique of persuasion is being used, since projects which "demonstrate they are working to implement the Ohio Standard" are given priority in funding (Dept. of Economic and Community Development, 1975: 10).

There is the potential for conflict between the local implementing agency and the YSB project, but this is at the same level of government. Some of the personnel of bureaus with implementing agencies indicated they were less than satisfied with the implementing agencies' administrative and program requirements. In addition, bureaus more closely monitored by implementing agencies, having less autonomy, were described
as less responsive to their target areas. This may result in the inability of the YSB to serve the needs of the community and thus conflict with a basic objective of the YSB program.

The YSB program was not amenable to a compliance perspective. Organization of the program, especially the lack of administrative standards, as well as characteristics of the program, such as individualized service to clients, and program content designed and implemented by the local community, did not permit analysis of program implementation using a compliance perspective.

A compliance perspective was attempted because of greater familiarity with studies categorized under this heading. For example, the Pressman and Wildavsky book, entitled Implementation (1973) was described as using a compliance perspective. Second, the organization literature provides operational measures of characteristics of organizational structure, some which have been tested. The main problem is to select a classification system appropriate to the study of social agencies.

The collaborative perspective has no theoretical base. There is no identified body of empirical research on political bargaining which characterizes interorganizational or intergovernmental conflict. There are no guidelines about what to investigate, i.e., how to determine who are participants in the implementation process, since the bureaucracy does not bound implementing activities. A collaborative study would require an historical perspective; a focus on the development
of the program through time is necessary if the process of mutual adjustment is to be identified. Finally, most of the data collected would be qualitative because of the importance of values to understanding conflict and cooperation.

The collaborative perspective, however, seems prima facie more amenable to analysis of the YSB program. Standards for evaluation are supplied by the analyst. There is no hierarchical differentiation of function, nor is it assumed that the pattern of implementation is determined by policy formulators. Rather than trying to answer the question "did it work," the analyst is concerned with "what happened."

**STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS**

In chapter one, the compliance and collaborative perspectives were introduced as a means of categorizing the case study literature concerning the process of implementation. Delineation of differences in the two perspectives was based on studies of federal programs. In this section, the literature is reviewed abstractly. The purpose is to hypothesize about empirical differences in the perspectives.

Dale Marshall (1974) in a review of federal poverty and welfare policy identified three central issues in the study of implementation. These are evaluation of the impacts of public policy, characteristics of the implementation process, and explanation of variations in implementation. In discussing each of Marshall's issues, attention will focus on whether the two perspectives are distinguished, and if these differences have empirical relevance.
Marshall observed that "studies often disagree less about what the results (of implementing a policy) are, than about the appropriate standard to use in evaluating the results." Analysts using strict standards, involving major change, judge implementation a failure, while those with loose standards, conclude it is a success (1974:153).

The literature survey identified two distinctions in program evaluation. Analysts using a compliance perspective tended to derive standards from the program, those using a collaborative perspective supplied their own, if the program was evaluated. Wildavsky (1973) and Murphy (1971) utilizing substantive standards judged the program a failure, while Derthick (1970) using procedural standards stated that federal influence was successfully exercised in the public assistance program.

Jones in evaluating air pollution policy relied on "theoretical concepts about how policy should be made in a good society (1975:295)." Berke and Kirst, although stressing how allocation decisions were made, used the standard of fiscal equity to rank states in the expenditure of federal funds for education.

Although it was shown that the perspectives differed in the source of standards, it is not believed that they differ in program evaluation. Compliance studies imply that evaluation by a policy analyst is a scientific endeavour, i.e.,
standards are supplied by the program, the analyst is not concerned with ultimate judgments of value.

An ultimate judgment of value asserts that a certain state of affairs (or a policy objective) is good in itself (Ranney, 1968:16). Ranney states that the empirical political scientist is not professionally equipped to deal with ultimate judgments of value, but the methods and standards of empirical political science (1968:17) are appropriate to deal with instrumental judgments of value, which state that a particular action is good for the attainment of a specified goal.

It has been stated that policy objectives may be "very murky, diffuse and implicit (Ripley, 1975:3), that the evaluator may have to tease the objectives out of a variety of documents and statements of policymakers." In some cases, "the policy's standards and objectives will have to be deduced by the individual researcher (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1974:17)." In deciding the appropriateness of the standard for a program, whether the policy is ambiguous or clear, the analyst is making an evaluative judgment. On what basis does the analyst justify that program regulations, statute or any other document contain program objectives? Only with an ultimate judgment of value can it be asserted that these sources contain standards for evaluation.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

In describing characteristics of the implementation process, Marshall noted that some social scientists view it as a
technical process. It has been characterized by the number of decisions to be made, central administration of rules, and structural constraints on coordination. Others view it as a political process involving "basic differences in preferences about outcomes and in beliefs about how to achieve desired outcomes (1974:154)."

The compliance and collaborative studies differ in emphasis given to technical and political factors. Compliance studies focus on structure and administrative processes. Derthick (1970) emphasized the effect of structure on achieving coordination between the state agency and the federal administration; Murphy (1971) on the lack of assertive leadership by the federal administrative agency, and Stoner (1975) on face to face interaction among administrators.

Collaborative studies emphasize interaction among participants in implementation. Jones (1975) described how relations among industry, government and the public changed from a cooperative to an adversary relationship. Derthick (1972) stressed the difficulties of local officials in gaining public support for the program and Berke and Kirst (1972) the dominance of the state educational agency in the allocation of federal aid.

Although the perspectives differ in the emphasis placed on political and technical aspects of implementation, a more useful distinction may be in terms of the pattern of decision-making and the degree of authority exercised by the federal administration. Schultz (1968) compared two approaches
characterizing decisionmaking, the problem solving or analytic approach, and the political bargaining or muddling through approach.

The problem solving approach requires that program objectives be identified and ranked. Alternatives to achieve the goals and their probable consequences are surveyed and the alternative which is most effective and efficient selected. Methods used in analysis and evaluation are scientific such as PPB. Its aims are "evaluation of program output as it relates to objectives, measurement of total system costs, multiyear program planning and integration of program with the budgetary process (Schultze, 1968:19-20)."

The political bargaining approach assumes that in the context of conflicting values, it is best not to focus on specification of goals. Process rather than substance is stressed. Recognizing man's limited intellectual capacity, incrementalism is recommended. Analysis is restricted to a small number of alternatives not drastically different from current programs, while policy is considered serially, rather than holistically. As defined by Schultze, the problem solving approach emphasizes technique or method in policy analysis, while the political bargaining approach focuses on achieving cooperation among partisans.

In the literature survey, it was noted that compliance studies distinguish policymakers from implementors, thus implying a hierarchical structure; collaborative studies do not.
The federal structure cannot be described legally as an hierarchical structure, but the executive branch of the federal government can be perceived as dominating in policymaking and administration.

With this assumption, it is possible that concern shifts to technical problems, getting the state and local governments to comply with federal standards. In contrast, when the federal system is perceived as noncentralized, i.e., "constitutional coexistence of a general government and governments with more particularized authority, which share governmental power (Elazar et al., 1969:19)," problems of implementation involve bargaining and negotiation. Most of the mechanisms of control available to organizations are absent in a noncentralized federal system. It is hypothesized that the character of the implementation process is related to the pattern of decision-making and the degree of authority exercised by federal administrators.

EXPLANATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

The third issue which Marshall discussed is how differences in the pattern of implementation are explained. Factors which have been hypothesized to explain variation in the way different cities respond to federal policy include socioeconomic characteristics, group demands, city government structure, and attitudes of decisionmakers (1975:154).

In chapter two, it was stated that the central thesis was based on three hypotheses taken from the literature of public
policy. These hypotheses suggest that policy types, community characteristics and the federal grant structure affect the process of implementation. Below, discussion will focus on whether these factors differentiate the compliance and collaborative perspectives of the implementation process.

**Policy Types**

Policies analyzed by the collaborative and compliance perspectives differed in several respects: the specificity of objectives, the number of programmatic strings tied to the grant and the ease of standardizing activities. The objectives of programs categorized under the collaborative perspective were general. For example, a Community Health Center was defined as "a facility offering comprehensive mental health services for persons residing in a particular community (Connery et al., 1968:491). Neither the concept of mental health nor the community was defined. Because there was no target group specified in the statute, it was impossible to evaluate if services were being delivered. In contrast, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act identified by formula those schools which were eligible for financial assistance and thus provided a standard for evaluation: comparability of funds received by Title I and non-Title I schools.

It may be that program objectives aren't clear because there isn't sufficient knowledge of what can be done or how. When this is the case, often authority to develop standards is delegated to administrators. Jones (1975) noted that this
characterized air pollution policy in 1963. It was not until 1970 that standards were formulated and written into law, and then the program exceeded technological capabilities to implement.

The lack of standards allows for greater variation in program implementation. Derthick (1968) stated that centralization of rulemaking in the Massachusetts public assistance program limited intercity differences in administration. Only in a program that was locally controlled, general relief, were administrative differences among cities noted. Similarly, Connery et al. predicted that the implementation of the Community Mental Health program might vary substantially given the ambiguity of program concepts.

Certain activities however may be difficult to standardize. In the public assistance program, service giving was a discretionary function which varied with the social worker in each case. Activities associated with YSB functions varied with the bureau and sometimes among a bureau's staff.

Differences in the formulation of policy may influence both program characteristics and the implementation process. Where public policy lacks public visibility, government officials have greater freedom in decisionmaking. The program adopted is likely to reflect professional values without being subjected to practical compromise (Connery et al., 1968:566). Derthick observed that "the typical proposal is submitted to Congress where local interests have the opportunity to make their positions known...and the formulation of administrative
guidelines is likely to follow consultation with local officials (1972:96)." By allowing for adjustment to local interest, the program's success is enhanced.

Both the field study and the survey of the literature indicate the importance of policy type on the implementation process. It is hypothesized that the extent of information and knowledge about a problem will determine the type of policy formulated. Concrete policies are developed when there is information about what to do and of how to do it. In implementing the program, the achievement of compliance is likely to be a major concern. General policies are likely to change as the program is implemented; standards, if created, are not enforced or perhaps are unenforceable.

Community Characteristics

Collaborative studies gave more weight to environmental conditions than compliance studies. Environment refers to socioeconomic characteristics, culture, and precedents. Compliance studies implied that structural characteristics were more important than the setting. Wildavsky and Pressman noted that government fragmentation and the lack of political interest groups was a difficult problem for implementation but the core of the book focused on the problems of achieving coordination and cooperation among a variety of participants. Although recognizing that the ethos of localism influenced relations between that state agency and the local units, Derthick emphasized conflict between the decentralized state
administration and the federal goal of full state administration of public assistance.

Subjective environmental conditions were identified as more important by collaborative studies than objective factors such as SEA. Berke and Kirst concluded that the state political culture and the SEA environment, which referred to the activities and strength of interest groups and government, and the partisan image of the SEA were the most significant influences on the state administrative process. In the study of YSBs, several factors were examined: the size of the population, racial composition, degree of urbanism, occupational structure, employment and juvenile crime rates. Only size and racial composition differentiated communities. Other variables such as community culture, availability of youth services and interagency relations were felt to affect bureau performance as much as the size of the community.

When collaborative and compliance studies are compared in terms of the level of government primarily responsible for program administration, the local level is indicated for all of the collaborative studies, although Jones characterized the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act as reflecting centrally directed sharing. Two of the three programs, EDA and Public Assistance categorized under the compliance perspective, emphasized the role of the federal government in administration. This may explain the greater recognition of environmental factors by collaborative studies. If the federal system defines the setting, then there can be no analysis of environmental conditions.
The environment is hypothesized to affect the implementation process when the program is characterized by local responsibility for program planning and implementation. In the case of Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, analyzed using a compliance perspective, local education agencies were described as having the greatest say in the allocation of funds. One of the factors hypothesized to favor local interests over state and federal was the "historical commitment in Massachusetts to local control of schools and the resultant concentration of power at the local level (Murphy, 1971:591)."

Another factor was the size of the community. Stoner noted that administrators in small towns complied with the stated goal of Title I, while urban administrators did not. Secondly, it is assumed that the definition of the environment should encompass variables such as culture, precedents, community interest in politics, as well as socioeconomic status. All of the studies which discussed environment recognized these variables as affecting the process of implementation.

**Grant Structure**

Both compliance and collaborative categories contained programs that allocated funds by categorical and formula grants. Therefore it is assumed that the grant structure does not significantly affect the process of implementation. Although a formula grant limits federal influence, it is important to examine the distribution of influence at the substate level. For example, the organization of the state planning agency
responsible for distributing LEAA funds in Ohio may affect the amount of discretion which the local project has in the development and implementation of the program. It may be that because the criminal justice plan for metropolitan areas is developed by the regional planning unit, the autonomy of local projects is limited.

Although the literature did not provide a basis for differentiating the perspectives, it is felt that the perception of intergovernmental relations expressed in a public philosophy may affect the implementation process. Lowi defines a public philosophy as a "set of principles and criteria above and beyond the reach of government and statesmen by which decisions of government are guided and justified (1967:5)."

Intergovernmental relations has been characterized by a history of public ideologies (Reagan, 1972). For example, President Johnson's Great Society Programs such as community action, and federal aid to education, were justified by the doctrine of Creative Federalism. It emphasized federal initiative in deciding national social goals, yet assumed that an increase in federal government power would not diminish the power of any other group (Elazar et al., 1969:620). Because the consequence of Creative Federalism was perceived to be overly centralized administration, the New Federalism was proposed to redirect program initiative to the state and local governments.

An approach labeled national localism was created in which the federal government is responsible for setting national
goals, but the state and local governments determine how to achieve them, taking account of local needs. The responsibility for implementation shifts to the local government, although federal financial and technical assistance is provided to increase state and local capabilities to deliver services (Publius, 1972). The concept of the New Federalism has been applied to a wide range of government actions including the replacement of federal categorical programs with general and special revenue sharing (Grosenick, 1973).

Although new programs developed when a public philosophy is dominant are the best example of the doctrine's effect on a government program, two studies in the survey of the literature indicate that a federal doctrine may also affect programs already in existence.

Creative Federalism, Derthick stated, "stressed the rationalization of the grant system through consolidation and coordination of programs and administration, and the importance of enhancing the scope and capacity for action of the recipients of federal grants (1970:221-222)." Reform of the Public Assistance program, which was regarded as the model of what ought to be avoided, resulted in a more permissive, decentralized program.

Jones stated that "the Nixon philosophy, the New Federalism, set the context for implementing the 1970 federal air pollution law (1975:253)." Although the 1970 amendments allocated a great deal of authority to the federal government for air pollution regulation, the New Federalism determined the use of
that authority. Jones stated that the state implementation-plan regulations incorporated much of the new doctrine (1975: 253).

CONCEPTUALIZING THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

In the previous section, several hypotheses about the process of implementation were developed, based on studies of the implementation process. These hypotheses suggest that the process varies with the pattern of decisionmaking, the extent of information and knowledge on which the policy is based, the perception of intergovernmental relations and environmental conditions. The hypotheses are restated below.

(1) The character of the implementation process is related to the pattern of decisionmaking and the degree of authority exercised by the federal administrators.

(2) The extent of information and knowledge about a problem determines the type of policy formulated and implemented.

(3) Environmental conditions affect the implementation process when the local government is primarily responsible for program administration.

(4) The perception of intergovernmental relations as expressed in the dominant public philosophy affects policy formulation and implementation.

Although the compliance and collaborative perspectives were not completely differentiated on these factors, compliance programs tended to be centrally administered, concrete, and
less affected by environmental conditions. In contrast, state and local governments shared in the development and administration of collaborative programs. Goals changed as the program was implemented and adjustments were made to environmental conditions.

Although the compliance and collaborative perspectives described how the implementation process has been looked at, rather than the implementation process, these perspectives have suggested several hypotheses. Empirical import of these hypotheses depends on operationalization of the concepts. This is a task for future research. Through the field investigation, however, it was possible to evaluate the utility of the compliance perspective for analyzing program implementation. It was concluded that this perspective was not appropriate for analysis of the YSB program.

A conceptual framework of the policy implementation process has been developed by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975). By comparing areas of agreement and disagreement between this conceptual model and the two perspectives, it is possible to assess the scope of the framework.

Van Meter and Van Horn stated that three bodies of literature guided the development of their theoretical framework: "work in the area of organizational change and control; the impact of public policy and selected studies of intergovernmental relations (1975)." Primary attention was given to organizational literature, specifically, the forces conducive
to organizational change and the processes through which organizational control is exercised by superiors and subordinates in a complex organization. The conceptual model they stated "can be used to analyze policy implementation, both where it involves actors within a single organization and across organizational boundaries (197)."

Six independent components were hypothesized to determine the performance of policy, "the degree to which anticipated services are actually delivered (197)." These were policy standards, policy resources, interorganizational communication and enforcement activities, characteristics of implementing agencies, economic, social, and political conditions and the disposition of implementors.

The authors state that the evaluation of performance requires that policy goals and objectives be identified and measured. Implementation is judged to be successful when standards and objectives are realized. Implementation may fail because "implementors refuse to do what they are supposed to do (197)." The term implementors may refer to subordinates in an organization or to state and local officials. Factors hypothesized to affect the disposition of implementors were their perception and interpretation of policy objectives, their response to policy (acceptance, neutrality, rejection), and the intensity of the response. The five remaining components directly and indirectly influence the disposition of implementors.
Van Meter and Van Horn hypothesized that the probability of effective implementation will "depend—in part—on the type of policy being considered and that specific factors contributing to the realization or nonrealization of program objectives will vary from one policy type to another (1975)."

The two dimensions of policy assumed to affect the implementation process were the amount of change involved and the goal consensus among participants in the implementation process. If only marginal change is required and goal consensus among implementors is high, the authors hypothesized that implementation will be most successful. Goal consensus is perceived to have the greater effect on the implementation process.

The conceptual model emphasizes the importance of administrative processes to program performance. The authors' reliance on organizational literature, particularly "studies of the process by which compliance is obtained or avoided (1975);" the analogy of the relationship between superiors and subordinates within an organization to intergovernmental relations and the discussion of the relevance of the communication process and an organization's capability to effective implementation indicate this.

Policy formulation is distinguished from policy implementation. In a model of the policy delivery system, the implementation process is not identified. It is defined as the link between two components: policy, "the formal goals, intentions
or statements of government officials, (1975)" and performance. The implementation phase of the policy delivery system "does not commence until goals and objectives have been established (1974:3)." All of the hypothesized linkages between components of the model indicate that the flow of action is from the top, policymakers (superiors), to implementors (subordinates). The implementors are not perceived to have a role in deciding policy standards and objectives. Implementation is successful when policymakers have the influence and resources and the organizational capability to get implementors to "do what they are supposed to do (1975)."

COMPARISON OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK TO THE PERSPECTIVES

It was stated in chapter one that no conceptual model of the implementation process has been tested. However, by analogy, it can be stated that the Van Meter and Van Horn model of the policy implementation process, which is most consistent with the compliance perspective, is not comprehensive enough to analyze all public programs. Although there is no data for support, it is hypothesized that programs consistent with the philosophy of the New Federalism may not be analyzed using a compliance perspective. Programs such as special revenue sharing have fewer federal strings and provide greater opportunity for the recipient to exercise policy and administrative discretion (Steinberg and Walker, 1976). These characteristics are similar to the YSB program.
Areas of agreement between the compliance perspective and the framework are noted below.

(1) Influence exercised by Federal officials.

The framework assumed that successful implementation often requires "enforcement activities" by federal officials. Methods include technical advice and assistance, grants, the development of an alliance with state and local officials, plans, program evaluations and reviews. The compliance perspective assumes it is the function of the federal government to direct the activities of state and local officials.

(2) Policy standards decided by the Federal government.

Because federal officials were described as using methods of enforcement to enhance the success of implementation, it was implied that the federal government also establishes the objectives which this method is used to achieve. Implementors did not participate in the decisionmaking process. The compliance perspective assumes it is the function of the federal government to formulate policy.

(3) Policy Analyst evaluates government performance.

In order to evaluate performance, it is necessary that policy objectives and standards be identified and measured. This implies that it is possible to "deduce" objective standards from some source. It would be easier for the analyst to deduce standards from concrete programs associated with the compliance perspective than from the more general programs of the collaborative perspective. In addition, the compliance
perspective does not describe goals as changing during the implementation process, which would present problems for evaluative research.

(4) The Implementation Process is an Organizational Process.

In the survey of relevant literature, in the conceptualization of the implementation process and in their discussion of explanation for unsuccessful implementation, Van Meter and Van Horn relied extensively on organization literature. The compliance perspective assumes that the primary obstacle to implementation is organizational processes. Important functions include communication, coordination and management capability.

(5) Environmental conditions are less important than Organizational activities.

Although environmental conditions were a component of the conceptual model, these were not given as much attention as most of the other five components. The environment was described as directly influencing the delivery of public services, the disposition of implementors and the capacity of a jurisdiction to support a well developed bureaucratic structure (1974:27). Although the environmental setting was recognized as a factor affecting implementation, the compliance perspective emphasizes organizational structure and processes.

(6) Intergovernmental Relations is similar to Intra-organizational relations.
The authors assumed by analogy and in the conceptual model that the implementation process within the federal system is similar to the implementation process within an organization. The compliance perspective assumes there is a hierarchical differentiation of authority for policy formulation and policy implementation, within the federal system.

There are no points of agreement between the conceptual model and the collaborative perspective, although the authors cite two studies categorized under that heading, Derthick (1972) and Berke and Kirst (1972). In summarizing the literature of intergovernmental relations, Van Meter and Van Horn stated that it "points to the interdependence of public officials at all levels of government, and...gives emphasis to the autonomy of subordinates both in intra- and inter-organizational affairs (1974:17)." Yet, the conceptual model has an organizational or compliance perspective. The authors in developing their theoretical framework felt that "the literature on organizational change and control" had "the greatest theoretical contribution to make (1974:8)."

It is concluded that the scope of the conceptual framework of the policy implementation process is too limited. It does not allow for the possibility of decentralized administration, changing of program goals as the implementation process continues, participation of state and local officials in the development of policy, or the mutual adjustment of participants' interests. The model does recognize that conflict may affect the process of implementation but it is conflict between
federal officials and implementors. The collaborative perspective describes conflict as occurring not among administrators but between professionals, bureaucrats and interest groups, between different branches of government and between public organizations at the same level of government.

The conceptual model however does have several strengths. It focuses on factors which can be manipulated to improve the delivery of public services. Although environmental conditions may have a significant effect on program implementation, there may be little that a public official can do to alter the environmental setting. Van Meter and Van Horn assumed that the purpose of studying implementation is to provide relevant advice to policymakers about "variables that can be manipulated to improve the delivery of public services (1975)."

Public officials are probably most capable of changing organizational processes.

Secondly the authors have contributed to understanding of the policy process. Specifically, they suggested that the implementation process, the link between policy and the delivery of services, was a meaningful and relevant topic for empirical research. The conceptual model is the best attempt at providing a theoretical perspective for the study of implementation. It is the only model that is sufficiently conceptualized to permit criticism (Bunker, 1972; Smith, 1973). It suggests several hypotheses for further investigation and may serve as a guide for analyzing some types of programs,
i.e., those having characteristics consistent with the compliance perspective.

Finally, the authors demonstrated that several bodies of literature contribute to understanding of the implementation process. Although they overestimated the importance of organizational theory for explaining implementation within the federal system, they suggested that theorists in several disciplines, sociology, public administration, social psychology as well as political science have a base of knowledge for doing implementation research.

IMPLICATIONS OF PERSPECTIVES FOR CONCEPTUALIZATION

Reconceptualization is beyond the scope of this study. However one alternative is to consider the factors which were hypothesized to differentiate the compliance and collaborative perspectives. These were the pattern of decisionmaking, the extent of information and knowledge on which the policy is based, and environmental conditions.

Another alternative is to operationalize the collaborative perspective. The compliance perspective assumes a monocratic structure, with the organization becoming the unit of analysis. The collaborative perspective implies a pluralistic structure, where participants are not limited to the occupants of formal positions.

The survey of the literature provides some support for considering a policy typology and the perception of intergovernmental relations in reconceptualization.
Policy Typology

There has been little progress in developing an empirical policy typology. Froman states that policy categories that hold the greatest theoretical promise also present methodological problems (1968). Van Meter and Van Horn assumed that the extent to which there is consensus among participants in the implementation process was the primary characteristic of a policy affecting implementation.

Case studies of federalism indicate that the relation between administrators at different levels of government are more likely to be cooperative rather than conflicting. Edward Weidner concluded on the basis of survey data from a Minnesota study of federalism that the "main clash of values occurs within a unit of government, rather than between units (1969: 277)." He observed that professional interest groups tended to behave similarly, regardless of the formal organization of the interest group or the level of government. This he stated was a consequence of sharing the same values.

Carroll in a survey of administrators at each level of government observed that level by level differences within a given type of program were smaller than program by program differences within a government level (1969:293). Working in a given type of program, he found was more important in establishing attitudes than working at one level of government. In comparing ratings of types of formal intergovernmental interaction, respondents rated nondirective interaction as
important. "Practically no official of any level thinks
government orders the most important type of contact (1969:
308)." This fact, Carroll stated, suggests that intergovern­
mental relations are generally friendly. If they were char­
acterized "by conflict and tension, recourse would doubtless
be had to orders (1969:308)."

These case studies conflict with a major thesis of the
Van Meter and Van Horn conceptual model, which is, that im­
plementation fails because of the negative disposition of
implementors. Secondly, Van Meter and Van Horn's stress on
enforcement activities may be unnecessary and possibly aggra­
vate existing intergovernmental relations.

Substantive studies of the implementation process suggest
other characteristics of policy which affect policy. These
are: specificity of objectives (Connery et al., 1968); the
adequacy of information on which the policy is based (Jones,
1975); the flexibility of administrative conditions and the
process of policy formulation (Connery et al., 1968; Derthick,
1970, 1972; and Jones, 1975); and the ease of standardizing
activities (Derthick, 1970).

Perception of Intergovernmental Relations

In chapter one, it was noted that the perception of the
federal system may be the most important distinction between
the compliance and collaborative perspectives. In separating
policymaking and implementation, analysts using the compliance
perspective had no difficulty in characterizing the bureaucracy
as a hierarchical structure of authority. It was assumed that
the scope of power decreased as one descended the federal
structure, federal administrators having more authority than
their counterparts at the state and local levels.

Elazar has stated that hierarchical thinking may affect
the existing system of government. Hierarchical thinking
"sees the federal system as a pyramid with the federal govern­
ment on top, states in the middle and the localities below
them, all connected by a neat chain of command in which the
right to make policy rests with the top of the pyramid, leaving
program execution to the 'lower levels' (1972:223)." Elazar
is referring to the policymaking process but his comments seem
appropriate in a study of implementation since it is not accep­
ted that policy formulation and implementation are always
separate functions.

He predicted a change in the existing noncentralized govern­
ment. Decisionmaking within the present system Eliazar stated
is a time-consuming process requiring bargaining and negotia­
tion, but it has barriers to check those who would tyrannize
over the interests of others. Jacobin democracy, which he
apparently saw as a likely replacement, was defined as rule
by a simple majority. It allows for immediate action on domes­
tic issues but it also removes the barriers designed to pro­
tect minorities (1972:225-226). Elazar stressed the importance
of the structure of the federal system which he saw as appli­
cable to the bureaucracy as well as to intergovernmental rela­
tions.
However federalism is perceived, it seems to affect the implementation process and thus should be addressed in a theoretical framework.

CONCLUSION

Pressman and Wildavsky stated that the process of implementation should not be divorced from policy. "Means and ends can be brought into somewhat closer correspondence only by making each dependent on the other (1973:143)." According to these authors, policy should not be designed without considering the methods which are used to execute it.

The field study indicated that in some programs, policy formulation and implementation are not separate functions. It was hypothesized that if the YSB program was characterized by autonomy, bureau services were responsive to the target community. In these instances, flexibility of means allowed for the achievement of a major objective of the YSB, as a community agency.

It is suggested that in integrating policy and implementation in other programs, goals should be more important than technique. If public programs are to be responsive to the public, then the local government must be involved in determining those goals.
NOTES

1. Performance indicators used in the comparative analysis were discussed in chapter three.
APPENDIX

THE FIELD SURVEY

Although the literature on survey research was helpful, some of the information was inappropriate for a small comparative case study. Cases were selected not by means of a sampling plan, but on the basis of variation in the organization of YSBs, location, and the willingness of the bureaus to cooperate. Second, because of the exploratory nature of the study, there was greater use of open-ended questions than is generally recommended in survey research.

Reviewing the field experience, there were some things which should have been done differently, yet there were others, where the investigator just happened to do the "right" thing. Describing the most important of these might be useful to other novices in field research.

The investigator had no problems in gaining cooperation of YSBs. The Ohio Youth Service Bureau Association was very receptive especially since about the same time, YSBs were being evaluated by the state planning agency. The association was promised a copy of the study and YSBs analyzed were promised anonymity.

The original research problem which was formulated was both too complex and too imprecise to be very useful in designing the questionnaire. There were too many variables,
requiring different forms of the questionnaire to be administered to too many people. It was not realized until after the pretest that all of the hypotheses originally formulated could not be examined, by just interviewing bureau staff. The more precise the problem, the easier it is to develop the questionnaire and to analyze data.

More time should have been spent on hypothesizing about relationships between variables and deciding what type of information would be needed. This is probably the most difficult task, but it is well worth the effort. Not all the data needed can be obtained through a survey, nor should it be when there are other sources of information. Because there is usually a time constraint on the availability of respondents, interviews must be well focused. The large number of variables covered limited investigation of them. The interview schedule only tapped the surface in most areas where a smaller number of variables would have permitted more probing.

An area which was appropriately emphasized was the survey of the literature, other questionnaires on the same subject, program descriptions and reports and discussions with persons familiar with the program. This, it is felt, was very important since some of the respondents indicated that the quickest turnoff was irrelevant questions. Most felt that the interview schedule was interesting and appropriate to analysis of the program.

Respondents were most receptive to open-ended questions about program activities. Most of the YSB personnel were
genuinely interested in their work and enjoyed talking about it. It is believed that if more fixed alternative questions had been asked, the reception would not have been as positive. Some of the respondents indicated they felt the program was unique, highly structured questions and responses would have implied that the interviewer thought differently. Open-ended questions are another reason to limit the number of variables. Establishing criteria for categorization of responses is a complex and time-consuming task.

The content of the questionnaire should be addressed to the audience. For example, some of the questions asked of administrators were not asked of field staff, since it was felt they did not have the experience to answer them. The pretest was useful in determining the appropriateness of questions for respondents. It was also useful in detecting problems in the administration of the questionnaire. It is essential that the interviewer be completely familiar with questions since reading the questions and long lapses in time break rapport with the respondent. Responses to open-ended questions are difficult to record by hand. It may be useful to try a tape recorder in the pretest to see if it makes any difference in responses. It would definitely be an aid to the interviewer.

The use of response cards should be limited. They are useful when there are several alternative responses to a question. But too many tend to annoy the respondent and are difficult to keep track of. If a number of response cards are needed, the questions are probably too complex.
Probably the most important factor affecting the success of a field survey is flexibility. The interviewer must adapt to different personalities and settings. Again the investigator was fortunate in that the YSBs were very receptive. However there were a couple of instances, mostly with older persons, when a different approach might have resulted in a better interview. In one instance, a respondent was quite hostile to the questionnaire, making it a very tense situation for both persons. However, the respondent was quite willing to talk to the interviewer after the formal questioning. It might have been better if the questions had been asked informally and the responses remembered for recording later. In general, however, it is best to stick to the interview schedule, since any questions omitted result in "missing data."

The interviewer should be open about the purposes of the research and willing to answer any questions. Each respondent should be informed of the purposes of the research, since the director may not have informed them. It is believed that because the investigator was a graduate student, interested in learning about the program, the YSBs were more receptive. This was reflected not only in the investigator's attitude but in the type of questions asked. Every opportunity to learn about the program should be used. Often informal conversations provide insights into the program which the questionnaire doesn't address.
Finally, the investigator should remember that the respondents are helping by cooperating. Therefore the investigator should not ask more of them than their time. For example, this investigator sought to obtain data which the YSBs did not have or in some cases not in the desired form. This was not an issue in the interview situation, since the two were kept separate.

In formulating the research problem, the investigator should be aware of the availability of data. Often what appears to exist, doesn't. This is probably especially true of less structured programs. The investigator can expect to receive only what is readily available and must make the possible use of it.
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