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NATIONAL GUARD, 1870-1954: THE STRUGGLE FOR
MILITARY RECOGNITION AND EQUALITY IN THE
STATE OF OHIO.

The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1976
History, United States

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DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Lowell Dwight Black, B.A., M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University

1976

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This dissertation discusses the service record of Ohio Negro volunteers, from their arrival in the Northwest Territory to their participation in the Korean Conflict. It also deals with the political status of the Negro citizen-soldier as well as his social relationships within his own community. After examining this subject one fact is firmly established: despite formidable political and social barriers, Ohio Negro Guardsmen achieved a high level of dignity and accomplishment through state and federal service.

The Negro officer observed a rigid caste system in his relationships with the enlisted ranks. Based almost entirely upon heredity, his lofty stature was received at birth and was generally immutable. Membership in this group governed all facets of his life. It determined his occupational status as well as his merit as a citizen. To maintain these social advantages, the Negro officer prevented upward mobility into the Guard's leadership positions by practicing endogamy and residential segregation.
The Negro volunteers did not fight their most savage battles against a foreign enemy but against the white political elites. These decision makers of society derived their power, authority, and prestige through economic affluence, precedent, social customs and the use of political hegemony, e.g., police, army, courts and legislative bodies. Ironically, a need for Negro votes in 1870 necessitated a political alliance between the white ruling elite and the Negro community. This coalition not only sparked the formation of Negro Guard units but it also perpetuated the existing caste system within Negro society. Unfortunately, the white elite's practices of individual and institutional racism often characterized Ohio Negro Guardsmen as second class soldiers.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to all those who assisted me in preparing this dissertation. I want to thank especially the staff members of the Ohio Historical Society Library for their untiring help in locating rare reference materials. I am also indebted to Professor Allan R. Millett for his patience and understanding these past three years. Professor Millett advised me and guided this project from the very beginning. I also wish to thank Linda Schoephoerster, who pushed aside her private life to type the manuscript. Finally, my wife Yolanda deserves more credit than I can express for her valuable support and encouragement.

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INTRODUCTION

The state of Ohio was created from the Northwest Territory. On July 13, 1787, the U.S. Congress decreed that each inhabitant of this region was "free and equal" under the law. Section Nine of the ordinance specified that a General Assembly would be elected by the first five thousand male residents of the territory. Although hailed as the cornerstone of the American territorial system, the Ordinance of 1787 politically discriminated against Negro inhabitants. For example, Negroes were denied representation in the General Assembly because they were not regarded as United States citizens.¹

From the beginning, the Negro in the Northwest

¹"Ordinance of the Northwest Territory of 1787," Constitution of State of Ohio (Columbus, 1937) 1. (Hereafter cited as "Ordinance of 1787.") Caleb Atwater, A History of the State of Ohio (Cincinnati, 1838) 365-376. (Hereafter cited as Atwater, History of Ohio.) Eugene H. Roseboom and Francis P. Weisenburger, A History of Ohio (Columbus, 1953) 47. (Hereafter cited as Roseboom and Weisenburger, History of Ohio.) The Ordinance of 1787 stated that only those male inhabitants who had been U.S. citizens for three years were eligible to be representatives to the territorial General Assembly. Since Negroes did not possess the rights of citizenship under the federal constitution, they were likewise denied this political status in the Northwest Territory. However, they were permitted to vote for white representatives. See "Ordinance of 1787," 1-2.
territory was considered a political liability. Many of them were fugitive slaves from neighboring Virginia and Kentucky, while others possessed legitimate "free papers" given to them by former owners. The remainder of the Negroes in the territory had purchased their freedom with money earned from lotteries, sweepstakes, and inventions. Prohibition of slavery in the new land provided the impetus for Negro emigration and served to unify the former bondsmen.²

Whatever reasons Negroes had for settling in the Northwest Territory, whites reluctantly granted them equal militia rights. The framers of the Ordinance of 1787 required that all male citizens participate in the defense of the new settlements. On July 25, 1788, the General Assembly of the territory established a more definitive framework of collective military responsibility. The first militia act provided that all physically-qualified males between the ages of sixteen and fifty years were required to perform military service. These men were to arm themselves with a musket, ammunition, priming wire and brush, and six flints. In addition, the act stipulated that militia troops had to be trained and inspected quarterly by commissioned officers appointed by the governor. The

²Charles H. Wesley, Ohio Negroes in the Civil War (Columbus, 1962), 3-4. (Hereafter cited as Wesley, Ohio Negroes.)
odious task of muster and drill was made more palatable when the legislature absorbed the costs of providing arms for the militia.\(^3\)

Because of the frequent Indian raids upon the white settlements, the territorial assembly legally enrolled Negroes in the militia. Whites' fear of the Shawnee, Ottawa, and Wyandott Indians overshadowed concern for armed Negroes. Consequently for eleven years, the colored soldier was a welcomed participant in the colonial defense. In September, 1799, the territorial legislature passed a militia law limiting military service to "able bodied, white male citizens" ranging in age from eighteen to forty-five years.\(^4\)

Enforcement of the new statute excluded the handful of Negroes previously enlisted in the militia. Unlike many white militiamen who had to be prodded, fined, and often imprisoned for failure to muster, Negro soldiers

\(^3\)James H. Rodabaugh, "History of the Ohio National Guard," Annual Report of the Adjutant General to the Governor of the State of Ohio for the Fiscal Year Ending November 15, 1946 (Columbus, 1946.) 25. (Hereafter cited as Rodabaugh, "Ohio National Guard.") Confronted by the rising costs of weapons, the General Assembly, on November 23, 1788, amended the provision of arms purchases by the legislature and required each militiaman to purchase his own musket. See Ibid., 26. See also Illinois Historical Society, The Laws of the Northwest Territory, 1788-1800 (Springfield, 1925) 419. (Hereafter cited as Illinois Historical Society, Laws of the Northwest Territory.)

\(^4\)Rodabaugh, "Ohio National Guard," 25-28; Charles
took great pride in militia drills, inspections, and parades. Military training was considered a rite of manhood in their community. Without the aid of the militia system, the Negroes' presence in the new territory was seriously threatened. Many of them now feared permanent banishment from the region and an escalation in racial hostility. In October, 1799, Arthur St. Clair, Ohio territorial governor, explained to angry Negroes that the General Assembly had no choice in abrogating their militia rights. He declared that the representatives were required to observe the United States Militia Act of 1792, which was passed seven years before the territorial militia law. The federal statute banned Negroes, felons, lunatics, imbeciles, and women from bearing arms.5

Desire to comply with federal militia regulations, however, was not the only reason Negroes were banned from the military exercises. The majority of the 337 colored pioneers in the Ohio territory had already experienced a dozen years of not being "free and equal" under the law.

J. Wilson, "The Negro in Early Ohio," Ohio Archaeological and Historical Society Publications, 39,733. (Hereafter cited as C. Wilson, "Negro in Early Ohio.")

5Rodabaugh, "Ohio National Guard," 27-28; John F. Callan, The Military Laws of the United States: From the Foundation of the Government to the Year 1858 (Baltimore, 1858) 64-69. (Hereafter cited as Callan, U.S. Military Laws.)
White settlers from the Southern portion of the territory were the most vehement persecutors of Negro families. Originally from Kentucky and Virginia, they brought their racial stereotypes to Ohio. They regarded the Negro race as innately inferior, servile, and morally abominable.\(^6\)

Despite attempts by white citizens' councils to bar Negro residency in the southern counties, the interests of businessmen deemed otherwise. Cities along the Ohio River were constantly in need of cheap, unskilled labor. Unable to enlist adequate white help, the southern Ohio businessman reluctantly turned to the Negro. Employed at loading docks and railway terminals, Negro labor was considered a necessary evil. Because they received a smaller wage than white longshoremen, Negroes in southern Ohio were chronic victims of economic exploitation.\(^7\)

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\(^7\)Cincinnati Gazette, October 3, 1835; Wesley, *Ohio Negroes*, 4; Hickok, "Negro in Ohio," 54-55, 111; Charles
Whites in the southern counties became increasingly alarmed as they viewed the by-products of their prosperity. The promise of steady longshoreman work signalled a rush of destitute blacks to Cincinnati and Chillicothe. (Maps 1 through 3 reveal that Ohio's most anti-Negro region now harbored the majority of the colored population.\textsuperscript{8}) The influx of Negroes northward caused white property owners to fear armed slave insurrections. Concerned southern Ohio residents decided that action should be taken immediately to neutralize the "Negro menace." In September, 1799, the southern delegates to the Ohio Territorial Assembly voted to expel the Negro from the enrolled militia. For the next sixty-four years this region would be successful in keeping the formation of Negro militia units only a dream.\textsuperscript{9}

\textsuperscript{8}Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 18,25,27,74; Cummings, Negro Population, 57; Hickok, "Negro in Ohio," 40; Samuel H. Stille, Ohio Builds a Nation (Ohio, 1939) 78,207; William T. Utter, The Frontier State, 1803-1825, II (Columbus, 1942) 397. (Hereafter cited as Utter, Frontier State.)

\textsuperscript{9}The delegates from Southern Ohio easily outnumbered the other representatives to the General Assembly. Living in the state's wealthiest region, they did not hesitate to flaunt their money and aristocratic background at their poorer brethren. See Rodabaugh, "Ohio National Guard," 26-28. Hickok, "Negro in Ohio," 40. Eugene H. Roseboom, The Civil War Era, 1850-1873, IV (Columbus, 1944) 7. (Hereafter cited as Roseboom, Civil War.)
MAP 1 - OHIO - 1800: THE BEGINNING
NEGRO POPULATION
TOTAL 337
SOURCE: Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 18.
MAP 2 - OHIO - 1830

TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF NEGRO MIGRATION IN THE SOUTHERN COUNTIES

NEGRO POPULATION TOTAL 9586

SOURCE: Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 27.
MAP 3 - OHIO - 1850

ONE HALF CENTURY OF NEGRO MIGRATION IN OHIO

TOTAL POPULATION: 25,279

SOURCE: Quilllin, Color Line in Ohio, 74.
In contrast to the racial climate of southern Ohio, whites in the eastern counties befriended the Negro and supported his right to citizenship. Largely inhabited by Pennsylvania settlers, this region viewed slavery and racial prejudice as morally evil. They accepted the idea that Negroes could be "uplifted and educated" to become productive citizen-soldiers. They proudly mentioned that the eastern and northern counties of Ohio contained many Negro businesses and farms.10

The northern counties were also friendly to the Negro. Settled by New Englanders, the "Western Reserve" became the center for the civil rights drive of Ohio Negroes during the pre-Civil War period. As in the eastern counties, the Western Reserve pioneers believed that the Negro could be trusted with a musket. But in 1799, at the General Assembly session, they were unsuccessful in forming Negro militia units. Three years later, however, the cry for "Negroes in arms" triumphed at the first Constitutional Convention.11

10Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 4; Hickok, "Negro in Ohio," 40,55; Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 17,20.

11The "Western Reserve" was originally part of Connecticut. In May of 1795, it was purchased by the Connecticut Land Company, an Ohio-based firm consisting of thirty-five land speculators, at a cost of $1,200,000. See Roseboom and Weisenburger, History of Ohio, 59.
PART ONE

THE NEGRO IN OHIO MILITIA POLITICS, 1802-1860
CHAPTER I

MILITARY DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND LAWS CONCERNING
THE LEGAL STATUS OF OHIO NEGROES

The town of Chillicothe served as the site of Ohio's first constitutional convention. Although records of this historic meeting are brief and incomplete, the topic of Negro rights received much attention. The delegates to the convention immediately took up the issues of Negro voting and militia rights. An initial debate over the value of Negro militiamen exposed an obvious fact: the delegates had made up their minds about Negroes long before they reached Chillicothe. The northern and eastern counties pooled their votes on every issue in an effort to checkmate the anti-Negro southern region. It was a fruitless gesture. Controlling twenty-four of the thirty-five votes at the Convention, the southern delegates were confident that no pro-Negro measures could succeed over their opposition.¹

¹Isaac Franklin Patterson, The Constitutions of Ohio, Amendments and Proposed Amendments (Cleveland, 1912) 27-30. (Hereafter cited as Patterson, Ohio Constitutions.) Daniel J. Ryan, The First Constitutional Convention and Its Effects Upon the History of Ohio (Columbus, 1902) 1-16. (Hereafter cited as Ryan, First Constitutional Convention.) Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 3-15,18-19; Charles B.
The final votes on the Negro-related issues revealed the size and power of the southern delegation. It defeated in succession the motions granting eligible Negroes the rights of suffrage, civil duty, and military muster. Midway through the convention, the Western Reserve counties initiated a change in strategy. They advised the southern Ohio delegates not to discriminate against the Negro. The Western Reserve delegates advised the convention to forsake their racial beliefs in the name of destiny. If something extraordinary could be accomplished at the gathering, each delegate would insure himself a permanent place in history. If Ohio could be a "model of virtue and fairness," it would surpass any other state in the practice of true democracy, so the northerners told the southern delegation. Finally, the entire convention was reminded that the Negro race would not simply disappear. Its future was in the hands of thirty-five "wise men."^2

^2 Despite the anti-Negro sentiment of the southern delegation, the votes on these measures were very close. Negroes were denied the right to vote by only five votes (19-14), and were defeated on the second proposal by four ballots (19-15) in a second motion. Similarly, they were denied the right to hold a civil office by only one vote (17-16). See Hickok, "Negro in Ohio," 33-36; Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 18; Jacob Burnett, Notes on the Early Settlement of the Northwestern Territory (New York, 1847) 306; Cummings, Negro Population, 45.

Galbreath, History of Ohio, II (New York, 1925) 39-44.
The Western Reserve then questioned the delegates' fears of armed slave revolts. It was deemed unlikely that the 337 Negroes (112 under the age of 10) would threaten the 45,028 whites living in Ohio. Embarrassed by their overreaction to the armed Negro threat, the delegates from southern Ohio counties reassessed their position. Arthur St. Clair, delegate from Cincinnati, remarked in caucus that it was the Ross County representatives who were really afraid of colored militiamen and were trying to "re-enslave Negroes" to minimize the threat of revolution. The gentlemen from Chillicothe did not appreciate St. Clair's sense of humor. Although Ross County did have more Negroes than any Ohio region except Wayne, delegates Edward Tiffin and Thomas Worthington did not harbor pro-slavery notions. In fact, before coming to the Northwest Territory from Virginia, both men voluntarily freed their plantation slaves.³

The Western Reserve tactics succeeded. The southern Ohio delegates agreed to table nearly all resolutions concerning Negroes. Convinced of their moral obligation to future Negro advancement, the southern representatives directed that the Constitution be written "making no direct

³Utter, Frontier State, 7-8; Alfred Byron Sears, Thomas Worthington: Father of Ohio Statehood (Columbus, 1958) 113.
reference to the black man's status." The framers preferred that the Negroes occupy the same relationship to the state as Indians and unnaturalized foreigners did. They could reside in the state, but could not participate in its government.

The Constitution of Ohio was unusual in that it did not deny Negro participation in the militia. Considering the diverse interests and racial attitudes of the delegates, it was remarkable that such a high level of accord was reached in only twenty-nine days. Ohio historian Charles Galbreath declared that the final draft of the Constitution precluded any stereotyping of the delegates. Their regard for the Negro was not governed entirely by geography. For example, Cincinnati delegate Charles W. Byrd, formerly of Virginia, supported Negro voting and militia rights. However, Samuel Huntington, of Trumbull County, rejected his

\[4\] The only proposal insisted upon by the southern delegates was the denial of Negro suffrage. After thirty-four delegates had cast their ballots, a tie resulted (17-17). Edward Tiffin, the President of the Convention, was now required to vote. Concerned that Ohio might become a slave sanctuary, he shuddered at the thought of enfranchised Negroes controlling state politics. Hence, he voted against Negro suffrage. See C. Wilson, "Negro in Early Ohio," 749-750; Ryan, First Constitutional Convention, 1-16; Ohio Constitutional Convention, The Constitution of the State of Ohio, 1802 (Chillicothe, 1802) 3-4, 17-18, 22. (Hereafter cited as Constitutional Convention, Ohio Constitution, 1802.) Galbreath, History of Ohio, II, 15; Hickok, "Negro in Ohio," 39; Patterson, Ohio Constitutions, 30.
New England heritage and voted against Negro suffrage and the formation of colored militia companies.  

The accord that marked the first Constitutional Convention was soon replaced by open hostility in southern Ohio. White residents in the counties of Ross, Clermont, Adams, Washington, and Hamilton bitterly opposed the militia section of the constitution that allowed Negroes the right to bear arms. They naturally blamed their representatives for failing to define legally the Negroes' status in Ohio. Indeed, many southern Ohioans suspected that their naive delegates were the victims of a ruse perpetrated by the pro-Negro Western Reserve. The constitution, as it was written, might prompt Negroes to believe that they were political equals of white citizens. Under the auspices of the General Assembly, southern Ohioans vowed to nullify any constitutional gains by the Negro race. 

Fears of armed Negroes legitimately enrolled in the Ohio militia created an hysteria among southern Ohio residents. They were certain that if fugitive slaves from Kentucky and Virginia bolstered the numbers of Negroes

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5Ibid., 29-30; C. Wilson, "Negro in Early Ohio," 752; Galbreath, History of Ohio, II, 18,25,34; Constitutional Convention, Ohio Constitution, 1802, 18; Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 13-15.

6Ibid., 17,19,22,25,70,73; Galbreath, History of Ohio II, 15-16.
presently living in the territory, the existing government could be threatened militarily. Fortunately, the white settlers' paranoia of musket-bearing Negroes did not interfere with public acceptance of the constitution. Had it been submitted for public referendum, the new constitution probably would have passed by a wide margin. However, the Constitution became law without popular approval. Charles Galbreath admitted that convention delegates intentionally by-passed this procedure on the grounds of expedience. Ohioans were more concerned with statehood than with democratic formality.\footnote{Ibid., II, 15-16.}

In 1803 the rapid influx of Negro emigrants to Ohio aggravated fears of a military coup d'etat. White citizens' councils, hastily organized by business associations in southern Ohio, petitioned the Ohio Legislature for help. The interest groups made good use of scare tactics to inform their fellow citizens about the horrors of slave uprisings. Their cause was aided by news of a slave revolt in Haiti in which militia-trained slaves and their Negro officers were rebelling against established white authority. Southern Ohioans tartly reminded the state that the same thing could happen in Ohio.\footnote{Ibid., II, 200; C. Wilson, "Negro in Early Ohio," 759; HickOK, "Negro in Ohio," 54-55; Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 25-26,73; Jack D. Foner, Blacks and the Military
The focal point of the move to disarm the Negro was Cincinnati. Settled by the former residents of slave states, the city feared slave rebellion as well as the loss of regional trade. A friendly attitude toward Negroes could cost the Queen City profitable business from Kentucky and Virginia. Thus, the fear of economic sanctions from these wealthy slave regions forced the city to adopt "the South's attitude toward the Negroes."  

The Ohio Legislature in 1803 addressed itself to the petitions barring Negro soldiers from militia duty. Fearing armed insurrection by Negroes against the infant state, the General Assembly took immediate action. On December 30, 1803, the legislature declared that the militia was open to whites only. Formally called "An Act for Organizing and Disciplining the Militia," the statute restricted military duty to physically qualified white males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five.  

The legislature had completed the task that the
convention delegates in 1802 had refused to do. In voting to ban Negro participation in the militia, several Ohio politicians insisted that it was not prejudical legislation. They contended that political pressure from Washington to conform with the federal militia law was responsible for the action.

For the seventy-five militia-eligible Negro men in Ohio, it was a familiar story. They had heard the same excuse from Governor St. Clair four years earlier. Many of their fathers were once informed by General George Washington that Negroes were not wanted as volunteers in the Revolutionary War. Despite this policy, Negroes had loyally served Washington's army as spies, teamsters, and as soldiers. The Ohio Militia Act was an unfortunate interruption in the Negro tradition of military service.\footnote{11William L. Katz, Eyewitness: The Negro in American History (New York, 1967) 44-45, 52. (Hereafter cited as Katz, Eyewitness.) George W. Williams, History of the Negro Race in America from 1619 to 1880: Negroes as Slaves, as Soldiers, and as Citizens, Pt.1 (New York, 1883) 325. (Hereafter cited as G. Williams, History of Negro Race in America.) Foner, Blacks and the Military, 9, 16.}

The rapid influx of Negroes into Ohio in 1804 prompted new fears among white property owners of Negro unrest. Although legally barred from militia duty, free Negroes could conceivably utilize escaped slaves in an underground resistance movement. To insure that Ohio's Negro population would remain miniscule, the Ohio legislature passed
the "Black Laws" of 1804. Prompted by southern Ohioans, the "Act to regulate black and mulatto persons" contained further restrictions upon Negro life in Ohio. For example, it was unlawful for any person of African descent to enter Ohio without proof of his freedom. These "free papers" must be signed and certified by a county clerk or notary public. In addition, Negro parents were required to register their children at the county clerk's office at a fee of twelve and one-half cents each. Stiff penalties were also reserved for whites violating the statute. A fine of ten to fifty dollars was levied against any white employing or harboring a Negro without free papers. Finally, a thousand dollar fine was imposed on any white citizen apprehended in a slave state encouraging Negro insurrection.12

White residents in southern Ohio were only temporarily satisfied with the Black Laws. They watched in

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anguish as the state's Negro population quadrupled in only five years. To make matters worse, ninety percent of the emigrating Negroes chose this region as their home. Once more the Ohio legislature was beseiged with requests for more stringent measures against colored inhabitants. In 1807, a supplementary "Black Law" was enacted. Blacks and mulattoes in Ohio were directed to post a five hundred dollar surety bond within sixty days with any two reputable white men. This money would be used to insure "good Negro behavior" while in Ohio. Any misconduct would result in forfeiting the money to the state. Negroes could also forfeit their bond if officials determined that they were chronically unemployed and likely to become a public burden. In addition, the second "Black Law" prohibited Negroes from testifying in court against whites "no matter what the circumstances." Inevitably, the supplementary statutes restated the exclusion of Negroes from the Ohio militia and a ban was placed upon their possession of firearms. Despite these harsh measures, the tide of Negro emigration into Ohio continued. In ten years the black population of the Buckeye State had increased five-fold. Sympathetic whites in Ohio continued to aid fugitive slaves despite the thousand dollar fine restricting such activity.13

13O.L., XVIII (Columbus, 1820) 120-123; Randall and
The "Black Laws" marked the high point of anti-Negro feeling in Ohio. They failed primarily because of lax enforcement. The white political elite in Ohio only threatened Negroes with the "Black Laws." Rarely was a Negro expelled from the state for violating their provisions. Had the "Black Laws" been vigorously enforced, there would have been few Negroes in Ohio. Certainly not many white Ohioans would have trusted a Negro for an unsecured loan in the amount of five hundred dollars. John Malvin, a respected black citizen of Cleveland, declared that in actual practice Negroes were not required to post surety bonds. In fact, Malvin stated that the "Black Laws" were used only against militant, outspoken Negroes, but the statutes remained in effect until their modification in 1849 and eventual repeal in 1887.  


Laws completely wrecked Negro hopes of participating in the militia. In the tide of racial hysteria, no legislator in the state dared to advocate arming the Negro. Designating the Negro as the primary enemy in Ohio, the "Black Laws" further alienated white support for Negro military duty.\textsuperscript{15}

The Ohio Militia Act of 1803 curtailed any hopes of Negro participation in the War of 1812. Fortunately, a manpower shortage compelled Commodore Oliver H. Perry to enlist the services of several Negro men from Ohio. These ex-militiamen eagerly volunteered for "Perry's Army" and later distinguished themselves in combat at the Battle of Lake Erie. Perry, who was reluctant to accept Negro volunteers, found them to be excellent soldiers.\textsuperscript{16}

Negro historian George Washington Williams attributed the salvation of Negroes' military hopes to their performance during the manpower crisis of 1812. Williams declared that the Negro tradition of soldiering in Ohio stayed alive despite prohibitive militia acts. Besides

\textsuperscript{15Ibid., 23-24.}

the usual reasons of patriotism, free Negroes were encouraged to enlist as volunteers for a bounty of "one hundred twenty-four dollars and one hundred sixty acres of land." Many Ohio Negroes claimed that the money was a secondary factor. They were more concerned with the Army's position on equality for black troops. Upon discovering that black and white volunteers were paid the same bounty, Negroes from Ohio rushed to join America's land and naval forces. Owing to the brevity of the war, most Ohio Negroes never saw combat action.17

If Negroes depended upon their patriotism to alter white racial attitudes, they were mistaken. The Ohio legislature again refused their petitions for entry into the state militia. While acknowledging their military contributions to the war effort, the General Assembly reminded Negro soldiers that nothing had changed. Reluctantly used by the army primarily as laborers, they ably filled the crucial manpower shortages. Upon their return to

17George W. Williams, History of Negro Troops in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865 (New York, 1888) 55-57. (Hereafter cited as G. Williams, History of Negro Troops.) The Ohio Adjutant General's Department did not include the twelve Negro volunteers killed in the War of 1812 in its roster of war dead. Excepting for the official Registers of Enlistments in the United States Army, 1798-1914, National Archives, microfilm edition, rolls four to fifteen, there existed no records of these Negro patriots. See Roster of Ohio Soldiers in the War of 1812 (Akron, 1938) 4-157. (Hereafter cited as Ohio Soldiers, War of 1812.) Clarence S. Patterson, Known Military Dead During War of 1812 (Baltimore, 1955) 1-74.
civilian life, they were treated as outcasts by Ohio's militia. 18

CHAPTER II

THE OHIO MILITIA BEFORE THE NEGRO:
WHAT WAS IT REALLY LIKE?

Ohio's white electorate of the early nineteenth century could ill afford to spurn Negro militia volunteers. Until 1870, militia duty in Ohio was popularly characterized as a "worthlessness of drill and muster."¹ The state's adjutant general in 1861 echoed the woes of his predecessors by complaining that the enrolled militiamen lacked spirit, dedication, or interest in soldiering. Militia officers encountered numerous instances of prospective enrollees giving false names and addresses, feigning illnesses, and hiding under beds to avoid muster. During the Civil War, the manpower shortage became so acute that Ohio had to depend upon hard-drinking "squirrel hunters" to guard the borders against Confederate raiders. These men were completely undisciplined and apt to shoot at a friend as well as the enemy. It was not surprising that Adjutant General Carthinius Buckingham referred to

¹Annual Report of the Adjutant General to Governor of the State of Ohio, 1869 (Columbus, 1869) II. (Hereafter cited as Ohio Adjutant General's Report with the appropriate date.)
the militia as a subject "fit for ridicule." 2

The concept of the enrolled or common militia was an outgrowth of an impractical political idea. Regardless of interest, eligible men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years were required by law to arm themselves and provide for local defense. Common militiamen were expected to enjoy soldiering and pass this esprit de corps down to the younger members of the settlement. It was all wishful thinking. Despite the law, many enrolled militiamen declined to bear the costs of their own arms and accouterments. They did not consider the exemptions from compulsory highway and jury duty as a quid pro quo for militia participation. 3

Nevertheless, the Ohio legislature expected the militiamen to aid civil officers in executing the law, suppressing domestic insurrection, and repelling foreign

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2Ibid., 1861, 6-9; Ohio Executive Documents, 1864 (Columbus, 1864) 11. (Unless otherwise noted, place of publication for all Executive Documents is Columbus.) Ibid., 1863, 361; Ibid., 1861, 53-55; Peter H. Clark, The Black Brigade of Cincinnati: Being a Report of its Labors and a Muster Roll of its Members; Together With Various Orders, Speeches, Etc., Relating to It (Cincinnati, 1864) 10. (Hereafter cited as Clark, Black Brigade of Cincinnati.) Edgar A. Toppin, "Humbly They Served: The Black Brigade in the Defense of Cincinnati," JNH, XLVIII (1963) 88-89, 91. (Hereafter cited as Toppin, "Black Brigade of Cincinnati.")

3Militiamen were also exempted from paying a turnpike toll coming to or from drill sessions. See O.L., VII (Columbus, 1808) 3-4,97; Ibid., LXVI (Columbus, 1869)
invasion. The General Assembly appropriated no money for purchasing provisions and supplies and declined to pay militiamen for drill and muster. Morale was so low in these units that campaigns against the Indians were usually unsuccessful.  

In contrast to the pathetic common militiamen, the volunteer provided the Ohio frontier with adequate protection. Unlike the common militia, volunteers organized themselves into independent companies, purchased their arms and equipment, and consciously trained at every opportunity. Frequently called uniformed volunteers, these independent companies did not disband after every campaign. A strong sense of esprit de corps developed among members of such units. The display of company pride gave rise to a "private club" atmosphere by the late nineteenth century. Entirely at their own expense, Ohio volunteer regiments constructed magnificent armories and held expensive 

51. Callan, U.S. Military Laws, 64-69; Frederick A. Todd, "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History," Military Affairs V (1941) 74-75. (Hereafter cited as Todd, "National Guard.") Ohio Adjutant General's Department, General Regulations for the Military Forces of Ohio, 1859 (Columbus, 1859), 4-5. (Hereafter cited as Ohio Military Regulations, 1859.) Ohio Adjutant General's Department, Regulations for the Ohio National Guard, 1897 (Columbus, 1897) 166-177. (Hereafter cited as Ohio Guard Regulations, 1897.)

4For a critique of Ohio's early militia, see Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1861, 6-9, 21-22; Ibid., 1869, 12.
banquets. Pomp and ceremony were emphasized by these units; field training was often shamefully neglected. Since the state provided no assistance or pay to volunteers, such organizations were entirely supported by the social elites of the white community. These volunteer militia were the forerunners of the modern Ohio National Guard.5

Volunteer militia units, such as those found in Ohio, were highly prized by the federal Congress. Under the Militia Act of 1792, they were allowed to retain their "accustomed privileges." Designated as the "flower of young men," volunteers were nominated by General George Washington to form the nucleus of a federal select militia. Realizing America's traditional hostility to standing armies in peacetime, Washington proposed that a "well organized and equipped militia" modeled after the Swiss

5 Charles A. Peckham, "The Ohio National Guard and Its Police Duties, 1894," Ohio History, LXXXIII, No.1, 53. (Hereafter cited as Peckham, "Ohio National Guard.") Historical Annual. The National Guard and Naval Militia of the State of Ohio (Baton Rouge, 1938) xxxi. (Hereafter cited as ONG Historical Annual.) Todd, "National Guard," 75-76,158; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1861, 21-22; O.L., LXVI (Columbus, 1869) 47. For a general account of the Ohio volunteer militia during the colonial era, see Utter, Frontier State II, 86-119. See also Ohio Roster, War of 1812, 4-157. For a history of the state's volunteer companies during the Mexican Conflict, see Francis P. Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 1825-1850, III (Columbus, 1941) 431-432,447-450,455-457,460,467. (Hereafter cited as Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier.)
Army substitute for regular units. Influenced by Washington's praise of the volunteer, Congress in 1792 decreed that no law impair the spirit and organization of the militia. Congress then grimly faced its enormous task of "organizing, arming and disciplining the militia" under the Second Amendment of the Constitution.

Despite charges from critics that it was sanctioning an ill organized militia, Congress attempted to standardize the equipment of the enrolled militia. In 1808 Congress provided the states with $200,000 annually to organize and maintain their state militia. This move was intended as both a gesture of friendship and a bribe for the common militiamen to organize into independent companies. Under the grant's provisions, the Ohio legislature could aid enrolled militia in purchasing arms and ammunition on a limited basis. In a later effort at uniformity, Congress enacted legislation declaring that

6 Todd, "National Guard," 79.

7 Callan, U.S. Military Laws, 38, 64-69. For a critique of the militia, see Emory Upton, Military Policy of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1904) 8-11, 38, 73.

8 Callan, U.S. Military Laws, 169-170; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1873, 7; Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man in Peace and War (Harrisburg, 1964) 10-11. (Hereafter cited as Hill, Minute Man.)
field and training maneuvers, as well as uniforms for the volunteer and enrolled militia, must be identical to the regular army.  

This latest federal militia provision, passed on May 12, 1820, produced cries of outrage from Ohio's volunteer companies. They had previously resented the government's financial assistance to the despised enrolled militiamen, but this statute now threatened the very heart of the independent companies. Crack units, such as the Cleveland Grays, the Guthrie Grays, and the Dayton Light Guards, insisted upon Congressional compliance with the "accustomed privileges" clause of the Militia Act of 1792. Later, these units admitted that the stigma of militia inefficiency was annoying even to the volunteers.

While he loathed the common militiaman, the Ohio volunteer was in turn scorned by the regular army soldier. Described by the regulars as "colorful but useless," volunteer militiamen were often regarded by the army as "play soldiers." Regardless of their image, the Ohio volunteers jealously guarded their individualism and stood firm against any changes affecting the "club tradition" of

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9 Adjutant General's Department, Ohio Militia Law, 1857 (Columbus, 1857) 18; Callan, U.S. Military Laws, 276.

10 Ibid., 68; ONG Historical Annual, xxxi.
their organization. Only in the post Civil War era was
the federal government strong enough to coerce volunteer
regiments into compliance with Congressional militia stat-
utes. 11

Ohio's enrolled militiamen did not protest the fed-
eral standardization orders, for they had no intentions
of training or purchasing uniforms and equipment anyway.
The Ohio volunteers, on the other hand, had a direct in-
terest in halting Congressional encroachment. Striving
to maintain complete local autonomy over their units, vol-
unteers declared the Army uniform to be "inappropriate."
Instead they wore bright fancy uniforms of their own
choosing. Many of these were Confederate gray with bright
red and lilac beads forming the outline of the regiment's
totem. Such were the distinctive symbols of Ohio's social
elite. 12

General Buckingham noted in 1860 that none of the
volunteer regiments had purchased the regulation Army

11 Ibid., xxxi; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1860,
16; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Official History of the Ohio
National Guard and Ohio Volunteers in the War with Spain,
1898-1899 (Cleveland, 1901) 12-13. (Hereafter cited as
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History.)

12 Not until 1885 did most of the state's volunteers
adopt the single breasted dark blue jacket and the "kersey
pants" worn by the regulars. See Ibid., 6-12; O.L.,
LXXIII (Columbus, 1876) 179.
uniform or seriously considered Army-style training. He later reprimanded the volunteers for conducting parties at the summer encampments instead of undergoing military training in the proper dress. The Adjutant General's Department issued a direct order in 1860 stating that all volunteer units must comply with U.S. Military Regulations by 1865. It was totally ignored. As long as Ohio assumed no expense for the formation and organization of the volunteer units, state control over them was nominal.\(^{13}\)

Ohio Governor Salmon P. Chase attempted to unify the militia during his administration. He requested the Ohio legislature to supervise the replacement of defective arms with new ones. In 1859 Governor Chase issued Special Order No. 18 which authorized the adjutant general to issue arms only to uniformed militiamen. The governor was aware that the common militiamen had no interest in soldiering and often lost or sold their muskets. Before leaving office in 1860, he directed that the General Assembly appropriate money to build a new state arsenal.

The governor's greatest personal triumph came in the fall of 1860 when he observed thirty well-organized militia

\(^{13}\)Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1860, 16; Adjutant General Department, Ohio Militia Law, 1857; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 6-13; Ohio Guard Regulations, 1897, 83.
companies pass in review. Governor David Tod in 1862 proposed that the Ohio militia could improve with the admission of Negro volunteer companies. Tod argued that the popular image of the "beer-drinking, carousing militiamen" did not speak well of Ohio. If well-drilled Negro units were allowed to join the militia, it would help give the state a more positive military image. The Tod Bill specified that "white" should be deleted from the state's militia law. Seeking only the highest caliber Negroes for the Guard units, the governor declared these men would serve as a model for the future advancement of the colored race in Ohio.

The Ohio legislature applauded the governor's efforts but refused to change the militia law. Unlike the governor, the lawmakers were convinced that respectable Negroes were capable of carousing and drinking beer much like white militiamen. Despite this setback, Governor Tod continued his efforts at reorganizing the militia. He succeeded in getting the legislature to appropriate $500,000 to pay militia expenses if it should be called into state service. Under the Militia Act of April 14,

14Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1859, 6; Ohio Historical Society, Governors of Ohio (Columbus, 1954) 73; ONG Historical Annual, xxxi.

15Ibid., xxxiii.
1863, all members of the Guard were each paid two dollars per twenty four hours of state duty. The act also levied a four dollar fine against enrolled militiamen refusing to join an independent company. The law's last provision was opposed by the majority of Ohio's military community. Adjutant General Benjamin Cowen argued that imposing a four dollar fine upon "militia slackers" would lead to the "eventual replacement of compulsory militia duty with money."16

The recruiting of Ohio Negroes for the Civil War eased the state's worsening manpower shortages. Aided by anti-slacker movements in Ohio in 1864, the legislature addressed itself to militia affairs. On March 31 of that year, the National Guard Act was born. Ohio's militia was now composed of the volunteer militia or National Guard and the reserve militia or common militia.17 The duties of the National Guard were the same as those contained in previous militia acts. Guardsmen were required to enlist for five years and promise to wear the U.S. Army uniform.

16Ohio Executive Documents, 1863, 12; O.L., LX (Columbus, 1863) 107; ONG Historical Annual, xxxiii.

17O.L., LXI (Columbus, 1864) 110-112; Ohio Executive Documents, 1864, 13,32; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 6; U.S. Congress, Senate, Executive Documents, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., 1859-1860, No.28, (Ser.1031).
Any volunteer purchasing the proper uniform was rewarded with a five dollar reimbursement from the state. In return for complying with federal militia law, the state promised Guard units assistance in the construction of armories and in the purchase of camp equipment. The fines collected from the common militiamen would provide Ohio with an adequate revenue source for these projects. Regretably, the Militia Act failed to provide compensation for drill and muster.\(^{18}\)

Despite legislation aimed at reorganizing the militia, little interest other than that shown by the volunteers emerged. The Adjutant General's Department reported that in 1864 that the state had 442,380 physically qualified white males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years. However, an increasing number of them were avoiding military duty by bribing physicians to declare them unfit for militia service. Of the whites in Ohio drafted for federal service, five per cent capitalized upon the commutation clause in the draft law by paying $300 for a substitute. (Appendix A shows the large number of Negroes paid to substitute for white draftees.) After a short training period, the substitutes were assigned to active colored units. One such group, the

\(^{18}\)O.L., LXI (Columbus, 1864) 120,122.
U.S. Heavy Colored Artillery Battalion, reported that 28 per cent of its enlisted ranks were hired Negroes. Responding to the problems of manpower and anti-war sentiment in Ohio, the General Assembly quietly agreed that Negroes in arms were preferable to white copperheads and traitors.

The decision to use Ohio Negroes as provisional militiamen liberated the white common militiamen from further military duty. Wanting no part of compulsory service, the common militia gladly paid the $4 fine rather than become soldiers. Leaving the fighting to loyal black and white troops, the enrolled militiamen quietly retreated into civilian life. As a final rebuff to the military system, many militiamen sold their state-provided weapons. By refusing to muster, the common militiamen eventually destroyed the archaic institution. By the 1840's the

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19 Ohio Adjutant General's Department, Official Roster of the Soldiers of the State of Ohio in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1866 (Akron, 1893) 661-680. (Hereafter cited as Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion.)

20 A copperhead was a northerner with southern sympathies. During the Civil War, Ohio was plagued with this type of soldier. A case in point involved Captain Wendell Mischler of the 40th Infantry Battalion, Ohio National Guard. In 1864 he was court-martialed for refusing to fight in the Union army. See Ohio Executive Documents, 1864, 32-33, 41-256.
majority of states were convinced that the militia system had no redeeming values. Massachusetts, for example, abolished the common militia in 1840 and reorganized on a strictly volunteer basis. The change proved so favorable that other states rapidly abolished their enrolled militia. However, it would be another thirty years before Ohio released her sullen grip upon the apathetic and frustrated common militia.21

21Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1859, 6; Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion; O.L., LXVII (Columbus, 1870) 107-110; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 6-7; Todd, "National Guard," 159.
In observing the bitter resistance of Ohio's whites to full Negro citizenship, Charles Hickok noted the following:

With all her boast of freedom, of her inheritance of the Ordinance of 1787, and her honorable descent from the Northwest Territory, it was said to her shame that the slave states treated their free colored population with scarcely more cruelty than did the free state of Ohio.¹

Strangled by both the Ohio Militia Act of 1803 and the "Black Laws," Negro enthusiasm for the militia rapidly declined. By 1830 Negroes had relinquished all hope of becoming uniformed volunteers. Economic survival was now the pressing issue. In 1829 the Ohio legislature enacted legislation prohibiting Negroes from receiving welfare assistance under the state's "Poor Laws." Barred from technical and vocational training, they were forced to either take menial jobs or receive charity. The white political elite's discriminatory use of the "Poor Laws"

¹Hickok, "Negro in Ohio," 46-47.
had a marked effect upon colored life in Ohio. The economic position of Negroes plunged to an even lower depth of poverty.\(^2\)

Ohio's restrictive "Poor Laws" were deliberate attempts by southern Ohioans to discourage Negro emigration from the slave states. By starving out colored families, the whites hoped to permanently rid themselves of the "Negro problem" in Ohio. With the aid of the "Black Laws," whites prevented any appeals by oppressed Negroes through Ohio's courts. Receiving no protection under the law, Negroes were subject to all types of abuse, including physical mistreatment. In many parts of the state, white mobs confiscated weapons from Negro tenements while beating and robbing the victims with impunity. Unable to command the ballot, Negroes in Ohio were little more than slaves.\(^3\)

In 1831 the state's growing mulatto population demanded the same constitutional rights as white citizens.

\(^2\)O.L., XXVII (Columbus, 1829) 35; Sheeler, "Negro Struggle," 211; Hickok, "Negro in Ohio," 46,55.

Stating that they were practically caucasians, Ohio mulattoes declared themselves exempt from voting and militia restrictions as well as from the "Black Laws." Many publicly announced that they had already "passed" for white several times and knew of others that were currently doing so. The move for immediate political recognition by the mulattoes could be attributed to their advantageous social position. Most mulattoes in Ohio were the offspring of wealthy Virginia planters. Since whites considered them more socially acceptable than darker-skinned Negroes (blacks), mulattoes refused to associate or identify with blacks.4 As early as 1830 the mulatto population

4For clarity, the U.S. Bureau of the Census used its 1870 analysis of the Negro population. Negroes with a "visible admixture of white blood" were known as "mulattoes." Negroes devoid of these physical traits were designated as "blacks." See Ohio State Reports. Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of Ohio, IX (Columbus, 1831, 1842, 1853, 1859) 412-413, 419. (Hereafter cited as Ohio State Reports.) John Mercer Langston, From the Virginia Plantation to the National Capitol (Hartford, 1894) 37-53. (Hereafter cited as Langston, From Virginia Plantation.) James H. Johnston, Race-Relations in Virginia and Miscegenation in the South 1776-1860 (Amherst, 1970) 191-193, 206, 258. (Hereafter cited as Johnston, Race-Relations in Virginia.) Cummings, Negro Population, 207-208; E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro in the United States (New York, 1949) 185-186. (Hereafter cited as Frazier, Negro in U.S.) Chapman Bros., (comp.) Portrait and Biographical Record of Stark County, Ohio (Chicago, 1892) 251. (Hereafter cited as Chapman Bros., Stark County History.)
was cognizant of its special status in Ohio. Often they attended the same churches and amusement parlors as whites and frequently intermarried with them. In an effort to convince the whites of their worthiness, they imitated Ohio's white society. For example, Charles Ferguson, a mulatto rancher in Warren, Ohio, followed the patterns of his former Virginia master by owning nine black slaves. His action, of course, violated the Ordinance of 1787.5

Ohio mulattoes copied white society rather than continuing to suffer the legal disabilities of blacks. Consequently, they quickly separated themselves from the rest of Negro population. Mulatto society insisted upon tracing its ancestry back to the ruling families of Europe and Hispanic America. In doing so it developed a social hierarchy founded entirely upon mixed blood. This "mulatto aristocracy" was complete with its inherent prejudices against full-blooded Negroes. Mulatto-owned restaurants and barbershops often refused to accommodate blacks. Such action prompted an Ohio Negro Convention in 1852 to condemn "any colored man who refuses to shave a man because he is darker or colored." But in a society based upon skin color, Ohio's mulattoes could ill afford to ally with the

5 Carter G. Woodson, Free Negro Owners of Slaves in the United States in 1830 (New York, 1924) vi, 26. (Hereafter cited as Woodson, Negro Slave Owners.)
The importance of "looking white" was so engraved into mulatto society that at the age of four, John Mercer Langston, Ohio's first mulatto attorney, pitied his darker brother Charles. Delighted that he resembled his white father, John Langston moved to Ohio in 1833 after his father's death. Living with the William Gooches, a white Chillicothe family, he believed he was also white.7

The mulatto's feelings of social superiority were reinforced by Ohio whites. For example, whites preferred to hire and train mixed bloods rather than blacks, thereby facilitating better economic and educational opportunities for them. White students and faculty members of Oberlin and Western Reserve College preferred associating with the mulattoes rather than the black pupils. John Mercer Langston, a graduate of Oberlin, capitalized upon his mulatto background and college training to convince the Ohio Bar Examining Board to grant him a license.


White society's concept that beauty and intelligence depended upon Caucasian features permeated the creed of even the Ohio Abolitionist Movement. White abolitionists preferred to work with mulatto anti-slavers, believing them to be more perceptive than black abolitionists. In 1858, John Mercer Langston was elected president of the Ohio Anti-Slavery Association. No full-blooded Negro could ever hope to achieve such an honor at that time. As Wendell Phillips Dabney, a black newspaperman in Cincinnati, observed:

The differentiation between light and dark Negroes from the standpoint of color was often marked by similar differences in the treatment accorded them by the white public. Mulattoes had more privileges and greater opportunities. They could go to school with the whites; they could go to the polls and vote. They often enjoyed the social advantages concomitant with inter-racial commingling.

The educated mulattoes became the elite of Negro society. By 1860 they formed the core of the Negro middle

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8Ibid., 29; Litwack, North of Slavery, 139,182; Frazier, Negro in U.S., 186; Reuter, Mulatto in the United States, 293-314,338-339,362.


10Dabney, Cincinnati's Colored Citizens, 145.
and upper classes while curtailing social mobility into these groups. Within the narrow world of Negro affluence, the upper and middle classes included "professionals, successful businessmen, large scale farmers, carpenters, skilled mechanics, barbers and high-placed waiters, servants and coachmen." The lower class consisted of day laborers and included the vast majority of Negroes in Ohio. Nearly every Negro officer of the Ohio National Guard would emerge from the mulatto bourgeoisie. The officer corps in turn adhered to the class distinctions between themselves and the lower class of enlisted men.\textsuperscript{11}

The mulattoes' lofty social stature caused other Negroes "to envy a light complexion, accept white standards of beauty, and do everything to alter their own appearances accordingly."\textsuperscript{12} Enterprising mulattoes made


\textsuperscript{12}Litwack, North of Slavery, 186.
large profits through the manufacture and sale of skin lighteners and hair straighteners. However, the aristocracy was not content in maintaining its superiority over other Negroes. It also wanted the full political advantages of being white. In many Ohio communities mulattoes were restricted from voting and militia participation. However, in 1831 they resolved to prove their white heritage and gain the rights of militiamen and electors.  

To obtain a legal opinion regarding their rights, prominent mulattoes persuaded the Ohio Supreme Court to hear a test case. The *Polly Grey vs Ohio* decision of 1831 was a landmark verdict in Ohio militia politics. Actually, the case itself had nothing to do with the military, for it involved the eligibility of a black man as a witness in a trial involving a quadroon charged with a felony. The plaintiff argued that having over three-fourths white blood entitled him to be treated as a Caucasian. Looking closely at the man, the high court agreed that Polly Grey's Negro blood was imperceptible. The court subsequently dismissed the testimony of the witness, charging that the "Black Laws" prevented him from testifying in court against whites.  

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13Ibid., 186; Ohio State Reports IX, 412-413,419; Reuter, *Mulatto in the United States*, 315-324.

14The *Polly Grey vs Ohio* verdict influenced similar decisions in North Carolina. In the case of the *State vs*
the complexities of such cases in the future, the Ohio Supreme Court quickly established guidelines for lower courts in Ohio. It ruled that a person having five-eighths white blood in his veins was white and entitled to the rights of citizenship. Presumably, the court established this ratio because it feared opposition from the white community if a smaller fraction was observed. At any rate, the five-eighths rule served its purpose. It hindered upward mobility of Negroes into white society because it required the Negro parent of a mulatto offspring to be a mulatto also. In clarifying its position, the court formally divided the Negro race into two groups— mulattoes and blacks. Children of the former were given the legal status of caucasian if they could prove the white ancestry of their Negro parent. "Blacks," on the other hand, were designated as any persons having less than the five-eighths white blood requirement.

Dempsey, 1849, Joseph Dempsey, a mulatto claiming three-fourths white blood, was allowed to vote and participate in the militia. Ten years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court, reflecting upon the Dempsey Case, refused to classify a mulatto as a Negro "merely because he derived from some remote ancestor a tinge of color that was not white." The plaintiff was permitted to own a firearm and enter the state militia. See Ohio State Reports IX, 412-413; Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 24; Johnston, Race-Relations in Virginia, 195-197.

Ohio State Reports IX, 419. The Polly Grey decision created deeper lines of division within the Negro race. Darker-skinned Negroes detested the arrogant, "half-gentried" mulattoes because they constructed a caste
The U.S. Bureau of the Census was the first agency to complain about the court-imposed racial classifications. Census takers refused to distinguish between blacks and mulattoes, declaring that it was impossible to pour out the blood and measure it. It was not until 1850 that federal census takers designated lighter skinned Negroes as mulattoes and darker colored Negroes as blacks. During the same year the bureau published its census report showing that Ohio had a higher percentage of mulattoes than any other free state in the Union, for the Buckeye State had nearly 130 mulattoes for every 100 blacks. (Appendix B confirms this finding.) The bureau's report was hailed by Ohio's mulattoes as its declaration of independence from the despised black population.  

The majority of Ohio's white citizens refused to accept mulattoes as their political equals, maintaining that two Caucasian parents were absolutely necessary for membership into the white race. Although socially

system more vicious than that imposed by whites. Mulattoes, on the other hand, considered blacks as hopelessly demented, "and incapable of assimilation into white society." See James McPherson, "The Negro: Innately Inferior or Equal?" Blacks in the Abolitionist Movement, 79. (Hereafter cited as McPherson, "Negro.") Litwack, North of Slavery, 178-186.

The U.S. Bureau of the Census eventually developed its own guidelines for analysis of the Negro population. In 1850 census-takers complied with the Polly Grey finding regarding the five-eighths white blood requirement for Caucasians. In 1890 they refined their classifications
preferring mulattoes to black, whites strongly opposed any political coalition recognizing mixed bloods as white citizens. This attitude held that militia duty, voting, and running for public office were the rights of "pure" white men only. 17

Ohio's mulatto society dismissed such notions as absurd and subsequently launched a massive legal campaign against the white reactionaries. In 1834 in Williams vs Directors of School District No. 6, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that mulatto children having five-eighths white blood could attend white schools. The court disagreed with outraged school officials, who charged that the color of skin, not blood, should determine racial classification. The court's opinion gratified the aristocracy and initiated a short honeymoon between mulattoes and sympathetic Ohio judges. 18

Heartened by the court decisions in the Polly Grey and Williams cases, mulattoes eagerly rushed to the

and designated a "black" as one having three-fourths or more African blood. The mulatto group (including octo­roons and quadroons) contained those Negroes exempted from the above category. See Cummings, Negro Population, 207-209; Frazier, Negro in U.S., 185-186; Reuter, Mulatto in the United States, 11-20.

17Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 24-34; Litwack, North of Slavery, 182.

18The high court's reaffirmation of the Polly Grey decision led to favorable court verdicts for mulattoes in other cases. In the Parker Jeffries vs John Ankeny,
nearest militia armories to enroll in white regiments. They were greeted by militia commanders who still refused their admission. As far as white militia commanders were concerned, mulattoes were simply "mongrelized Negroes." It soon became evident that mulattoes, however light in color, were just as unwelcome in the militia as were the darkest Negroes.19

The militia commanders were supported by the white Ohio electorate. White property owners did not consider armed mulattoes to be any safer than militia-trained blacks. The Polly Grey decision was totally ignored by both the legislative and executive branches. In fact, the failure of Governor Mordecai Bartley to enforce the ruling resulted in the denial of Ohio mulattoes to participate in the Mexican War, 1846-1848.20

Mulattoes filing discrimination suits in lower et.al; Case of 1842, Negroes showing proof of one white parent were given the right to vote. During the same year, in the Edwill Thacker vs John Hawk Case, a similar finding was reached. In 1843, in the Lane vs Baker Case, the court ruled upon an issue akin to the Williams suit. See Ohio State Reports IX, 412-413,419,422.

19Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 25.

20Ohio Historical Society, Governors of Ohio (Columbus, 1969) 53-55; Alphabetical Index to Ohio Official Roster of the Mexican War, 1846-1848 (Cleveland, 1938) I-64.
courts invited arrest under the "Black Laws" for impersonation of white men. The very nature of their complaints made it easy for hostile judges to declare them in violation of the Act of 1807. Similarly, appellate court judges rejected the Polly Grey ruling and accepted in its place the dissenting opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court Justice N.C. Read of Cincinnati concerning the legal definition of "white." Read in 1842 had become annoyed with his colleagues over the fractionalizing of white blood in the Edwill Thacker case and argued that the constitution intended for the word "white" to mean "unmixed." Unable to enroll in the militia, mulattoes were equally unsuccessful in seeking legal aid from sympathetic white organizations. Finally, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to hear any further cases involving discrimination against the aristocracy.  

21Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 9, 22, 25, 34, 58. The aristocracy was unsuccessful in obtaining the services of Cincinnati attorney Salmon P. Chase. Considered a friend of the Negro, he was admitted to the Ohio Bar Association in 1830, sufficient time to defend the Polly Grey ruling. However, no records existed of any organized attempt by a mulatto-white coalition demanding the enforcement of the 1831 precedent. The Ohio Anti-Slavery Society was evidently not concerned about mulattoes enrolling in the militia. Eugene Roseboom, retired Ohio State University history professor, put it succinctly when he declared that the badge of white liberalism did not necessarily imply Negro political equality. See Roseboom, Civil War, IV, 219-220, 223; Weisenburger, Passing of the Frontier, 363-386; Annual Report of the Ohio Anti-Slavery Society Presented to the American Anti-Slavery Society (New York, 1855) 7-120.
The failure of the mulattoes' drive for enrollment in the Ohio militia intensified the friction within the Negro race. The aristocracy maintained that whites would never consent to political equality with them as long as blacks were "shiftless, slovenly, childlike, savage, and incapable of assimilation as equals into white society."22 The mulatto leadership accused the blacks of downgrading them politically and vowed to separate completely from the Negro race. By 1850 the mulatto aristocracy began to organize politically for its own benefit. Special interests groups such as the Convention of the Colored People of Ohio, the Ohio State Convention of Colored Freemen, and the Equal Rights League enabled the aristocracy to effectively voice its political opinions.23

Calling for an end to voting and militia prohibitions, the aristocracy worked closely with white leadership to achieve these ends. Furthermore, it increased its chances of political success by limiting positions of leadership in its civic organizations to its most prominent and influential members. The clannish aristocracy had become so exclusive by mid nineteenth century that fellow


23 Litwack, North of Slavery, 182,184,186; R. Davis, Black Americans in Cleveland, 68-69,85; G. Williams, History of Negro Troops, 239; The Aliened American, April 9, 1853.
white abolitionists accused them of being a detriment to Negro unity in Ohio. The Pennsylvania Abolition Society, for example, declared that mulattoes were blindly following the white race to point of absurdity. The white abolitionists also pointed out that the mulatto's rejection by white society did not justify his hostility toward blacks.24

The aristocracy retorted that lower class Negroes could only injure its political efforts. Under no circumstances would they permit such an alliance. Exasperated over the whole business of mulatto prejudice, Sarah Grimke wrote to her abolitionist friend Theodore Tilton, asking:

How could prejudice be conquered when mulattoes and Negroes found it difficult to live together, or when Negroes insulted each other as 'Niggers', or when they excluded members of their own race from their business establishments? I mourn over the aristocracy that prevails among our colored brethren... They have as much caste among themselves as we have and despise the poor as much as I fear their pale brethren.25

24Requirements for leadership roles within mulatto society included the lightest of skin color, college training, militia orientation, and a professional or business occupation. See R. Davis, Black Americans in Cleveland, 68-70,85; Litwack, North of Slavery, 185; Dabney, Cincinnati's Colored Citizens, 345; Bracey, Meier, Rudwick, Blacks in Abolitionist Movement, 27,30,32,36.

25Litwack, North of Slavery, 186.
CHAPTER IV

THE RESPONSE OF THE WHITE POLITICAL ELITE
TO THE NEGRO MILITIA, 1849-1860

The mulatto's coalition with white Ohio liberals proved beneficial in 1849. The aristocracy had hoped for a rapprochement with white society upon the issue of Negro militia rights. Feeling the sting of recent betrayals, some mulattoes declared that white society could not be trusted. The Polly Grey decision had been ignored and Negro harrassment under the notorious "Black Laws" continued. Despite growing disenchantment with the white race, the aristocracy still preferred a policy of accommodation.¹

Mulattoes saw Ohio's "Black Laws" as the major obstacle to militia participation. White public officials used them to break up Negro political rallies, seize their firearms, and compel "undesirable Negroes" to leave

¹William Hayden, an Ohio mulatto claiming three-fourths white blood, led the movement for the aristocracy's separation from white society. Hayden advocated self-sufficiency for the mulattoes because the white race was degenerate and adverse to granting Negro militia and voting rights. See Johnston, Race Relations in Virginia, 213-214.
town. Through the political efforts of Salmon Chase and the Ohio Free Soil Party, Negroes gained some relief from the "Black Laws." They could now testify in court against whites, and the state authorized separate "colored" schools for manual training. However, Negroes were still banned from jury duty, voting, and participation in the militia. ^

Ironically, the modification of the "Black Laws" signalled a renewal of open racial hostility in Ohio. Awakened by the litigation that gained mulattoes political victories from 1831-1843, Ohio whites fought back. At the Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851, the delegates grappled with the issue of Negro enrollment in the Ohio militia. Norton S. Townsend, a delegate from Lorain, was a reputed friend of the mulatto aristocracy. Leading the fight to eliminate "white" from the Ohio Militia Act,

^The modification of the "Black Laws" was a political compromise engineered by Joshua R. Giddings, a Free Soil candidate for U.S. Senator in 1849. Giddings, a firebrand Ohio abolitionist, was unacceptable to the Conservative Ohio Democrats. Realizing his dilemma, he proposed to House Democrats that he would resign if their majority party would vote to "repeal" the "Black Laws." The Free-Soil Democratic coalition selected Salmon P. Chase, a Whig, as a compromise candidate. The bargain was completed with the initial changes in the "Black Laws" in 1849. See Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 37-40; Ohio Historical Society, Governors of Ohio, 72-75; Sheeler, "Negro Struggle," 221; Ohio State Journal, February 24, 1849; Peskin, North Into Freedom, 18; Galbreath, History of Ohio, II, 200; Johnston, Race Relations in Virginia, 196; O.L., LIV (Columbus, 1857) 51.
he proposed that the phrase "all male citizens" be inserted in its place. This idea encountered heated opposition from the southern Ohio delegates. William Sawyer of Auglaize County spoke for the majority of the convention delegates when he insisted that suffrage and militia rights be limited to whites only. Sawyer declared that if Negroes were allowed in the militia, he would support any equal rights amendment permitting women to bear arms. Urged on by the riotous laughter of convention delegates, Sawyer continued:

We have had a good many petitions coming in from the ladies of the state claiming equal privileges with ourselves... If ladies were allowed to muster, we should have different times. The ladies would parade, form hollow squares, charge bayonet, and go through all the revolutions with the utmost propriety. ³

Other proposals drawing support included allowing Negroes to join the militia but holding the drills in cold weather. The obvious implication that Negroes could soldier only in warm temperatures delighted the anti-Negro faction at the convention. ⁴

In a final, desperate effort to obtain militia rights for the Negro elite, Townsend declared the term "white" to


⁴Debates of Convention, 1851, I, 452.
be ambiguous and confusing. He remarked that some "persons regarded as Negroes by others are whiter than many persons absolutely known to be of pure Caucasian blood."
The convention members remained unconvinced. (Map 4 shows they overwhelmingly voted against Negro participation in the militia and smashed mulatto hopes of a political coalition.) Ohio Negroes, previously barred from the militia by legislative statute, were now constitutionally banned.5

The counter-attack of whites upon the aristocracy continued in 1853. During that year, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that the terms "white and colored" be used for classification purposes only. The court further stipulated that "anyone having five-eighths white blood and was not distinctly colored, was white."6 The Polly Grey and the Williams decision of 1842 were finally repealed. The color of one's skin, not white blood, determined a Caucasian. The court further ruled that community opinion was the final judge in this matter.7

5Ibid., II, 350, 551; Hickok, "Negro in Ohio," 58-63; George B. Okey and John H. Morton, Constitution of Ohio, 1851 (Columbus, 1851) 96; Ohio Constitution, 1803, II (Chillicothe, 1803) 5.

6Ohio State Reports IX, 413-419.

7Ibid., IX, 413-419; O.L., LI (Columbus, 1853) 441; Hickok, "Negro in Ohio," 98.
MAP 4 - REJECTION OF NEGRO VOLUNTEERS BY THE WHITE POWER STRUCTURE: THE OHIO CONSTITUTION CONVENTION OF 1850 - 1851

*Denotes vote to exclude Negro from Militia: Ayes 62, Nay 22

SOURCE: Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 75.
Mulattoes unable to pass the new legal test for whiteness were forced to leave all white schools and relinquish their applications for militia enrollment. In 1859 the Ohio Supreme Court complied with the wishes of the white electorate by reaffirming white community control over the mulatto aristocracy.\(^8\) During the same year the Ohio legislature enacted statutes nullifying the vote of any mulatto discovered passing for white.\(^9\)

The years 1850-1861 marked the complete dominance of the white political elite in Ohio. Even the haughty, exclusive mulatto aristocracy was temporarily humbled. Although socially preferred over blacks, the mulattoes realized that they would never be accepted as political equals of whites. Consequently, they retreated into the security of their own group. Finally recognizing the need of Negro unity, the mulattoes pledged to promote civil rights and brotherhood for all Negroes. However, leadership roles in the Negro movement were still limited to its mulatto members. This point was strongly emphasized by the militia faction. Although from the same background

\(^8\)Enos Van Camp vs State Board of Education. Ohio State Reports IX, 406-425.

\(^9\)An Ohio statute in 1868 called the "Act to Preserve the Purity of Elections," subjected mulattoes to a three to ten year prison term for impersonating white men for the purpose of voting. See O.L., LXI (Columbus, 1864) 441; Ibid., LXV (Columbus, 1868) 97.
as the majority of Ohio's mulattoes, the "militia aristocracy" formed an even smaller caste within the already minute Negro middle class. 10

The militia aristocracy received wide publicity in 1860 when the prospects of Civil War shrouded the country. These patriots (listed in Table I) were distinguishable from other mulattoes by their love for the military. In this respect, they fancied themselves to be a higher quality than ordinary mixed bloods. Without exception, members of this group proudly pointed to one white parent or at least two generations of white blood containing an exalted history of soldiering. The militia aristocracy exercised the requirements of a caste system by intermarrying with other mulatto families that supported Negro participation in the Ohio militia. Forming its own Negro military companies, this group provided the officer

10 The foundation of the aristocracy was shaken when the Ohio legislature passed an anti-miscegenation law on January 31, 1861. Violators were subject to ninety days in prison term and a $100 dollar fine. See Ibid., LXIII (Columbus, 1866) 6; Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 91-93; William H. Parham, An Official History of the Most Worshipful Grand Lodge, Free and Accepted Masons (Cleveland, 1906) 4-9,242-246. (Hereafter cited as Parham, History of Masons.) Dabney, Cincinnati's Colored Citizens, 47,155,274,345; Litwack, North of Slavery, 182-186; Cleveland Leader, July 28, August 3, 1858; Langston, From Virginia Plantation, 198-217; Levstik, "Slavery to Freedom," 10-15; Reuter, Mulatto in the United States, 293-314.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roster</th>
<th>Recruiters for United States Colored Troops (USCT) 1862-1865</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J.T. Alston</td>
<td>Solomon Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William E. Ambush</td>
<td>Sgt. Maj. Milton Holland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major William T. Anderson</td>
<td>Charles Langston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Regular Army)</td>
<td>John Langston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powhatan Beatty</td>
<td>Capt. O.S.B. Wall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William T. Boyd</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jeremiah Brown</td>
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<td>James Brunson</td>
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<td>Richard Cain</td>
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<td>James Monroe Carter</td>
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<td>John Cisco</td>
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<td>William Dupree</td>
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<td>John R. Gaines</td>
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<td>William H. Parham</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Pinn</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Travis (U.S. Navy)</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Monroe Trotter</td>
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<tr>
<td>O.S.B. Wall</td>
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TABLE I
THE MILITIA ARISTOCRACY IN THE CIVIL WAR:
ELITES WITHIN AN ELITE
TABLE I - Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services Refused by U.S. War Dept. 1861-1863</th>
<th>Ohio Negro Officers (Commissioned and Non-Commissioned) 1861-1865</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J.T. Alston</td>
<td>Sgt. Powhatan Beatty*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William E. Ambush</td>
<td>5th USCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William T. Boyd</td>
<td>Sgt. James Brunson*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John R. Gaines</td>
<td>5th USCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newell Goodale</td>
<td>Lt. James Monroe Garter**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Green</td>
<td>55th Mass Volunteer Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milton Holland</td>
<td>Corp. John Cisco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Parham</td>
<td>124th Ohio O.V.I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Pinn</td>
<td>Lt. William Dupree</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sgt. Maj. Milton Holland*</td>
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<td>5th USCT</td>
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<td>92nd O.V.I.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Capt. John Henry Davies Paine</td>
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<td>27th USCT</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sgt. Robert Pinn*</td>
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<td>19th O.V.I.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th USCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. James Monroe Trotter**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All Negro troops in the Civil War, including those originally part of state-designated militias from Ohio, were placed under the special category of United States Colored Troops (USCT) by the War Department in May 1863.

*Congressional Medal of Honor Recipients

Recruited from Ohio

corps for future Negro units of the Ohio National Guard.\(^{11}\)

Socially, Negro militiamen were members of either the Free and Accepted Masons (F.A.A.M.) or the Elks Fraternity. They were also staunch Republicans and supporters of the Lincoln Administration. Working from within the

\(^{11}\)Cleveland Leader, July 28, 1858; Johnston, Race Relations in Virginia, 196-200; Langston, From Virginia Plantation, 140,206-207; Clark, Black Brigade of Cincinnati, 1-30; Peckham, "Ohio National Guard," 52; Adjutant General Department, "Roster of Ninth Battalion, Ohio National Guard, 1896-1904," 1-41. (Hereafter cited as Adjutant General's Department, "Roster of Ninth Battalion.") Toppin, "Black Brigade of Cincinnati," 75-97; "Anonymous to Dr. A. Metz," November 24, 1863, Springfield, Ohio, Vertical File Material (VFM) 83, Ohio Historical Society (OHS) Columbus, Ohio. (Hereafter cited as "Dr. A. Metz, Correspondence," VFM, 83, OHS.) Reuter, Mulatto in the United States, 246-292.
party, the militia aristocracy succeeded in getting 5,092 Ohio Negroes officially mustered into federal service.  

PART TWO

OHIO NEGROES IN THE CIVIL WAR

1861 - 1865
CHAPTER V

THE WHITE POLITICAL ELITE AND THE NEGRO

SOLDIER 1861 - 1865

On April 12, 1861, an excited member of the Ohio state legislature informed his colleagues that the Secessionists were bombarding Fort Sumter. The attack upon the federal outpost compelled the mulatto aristocracy to quickly volunteer its services to the Union. The first of these offers came from a Cleveland militia company on April 19, 1861. Meeting in secret session, Negro militiamen adopted the following resolution:

...We, as colored citizens of Cleveland, desiring to prove our loyalty to the Government, feel that we should adopt the measures to put ourselves in a position to defend the government of which we claim protection. Resolved, that to-day as in the times of '76 and the days of 1812, we are ready to go forth and do battle in the common cause of the country.¹

Another Negro militia group quickly met the opportunity to express its patriotism. During the week of April, 1861, the "Attucks Guards" of Albany, Ohio, was...

¹Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Civil War (Boston, 1953) 22,25. (Hereafter cited as Quarles, Negro in Civil War.) McPherson, Negro's Civil War, 25; Foner, Blacks and the Military, 32.
hastily organized by the town's leading mulatto families. Captain Julius Hawkins, attaché of the U.S. District Court of Cincinnati, commanded the unit. Although untrained and ill-equipped, the men felt that they could contribute to the defeat of the Confederacy. On May 1, 1861, the Negro volunteers informed Governor William Dennison that every man was ready to fight the Union's cause.²

Individual members of the aristocracy also volunteered their help. Robert Pinn of Massillon, Ohio, informed the War Department that mulattoes stood ready to defend the nation. In November of 1861, William T. Boyd and J.T. Alston of Cleveland told Secretary of War Simon Cameron that Ohio Negroes were anxious to fight. Speaking on behalf of the Free Masons Society, the men affirmed that Negro militiamen "make as patriotic and as good soldiers as any others."³ William A. Jones of Oberlin refused to be outdone by his mulatto colleagues. On November 27, 1861, he wrote to Secretary Cameron requesting permission to "field an entire regiment of colored men immediately from Ohio."⁴ Of all the mulatto volunteers

²Dabney, Cincinnati's Colored Citizens, 200; Wesley, History of Prince Hall Lodge, 42; Quarles, Negro in Civil War, 28.

³Chapman Bros., Stark County History, 251; R. Davis, Black-Americans in Cleveland, 77; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 23.

⁴William A. Jones to Simon Cameron, November 27, 1861, The Negro in Military Service of the United States,
in 1861, Milton Holland of Athens County, Ohio, had the best chance of seeing federal duty. The white political elite knew well that young Milton was the son of one of Texas' most powerful politicians. In 1844, Bird Holland was elected as Texas' secretary of state. If Governor Dennison had to select one Negro to represent Ohio in the Civil War, the choice of Holland would have been assured.  

John Malvin of Cleveland was the state's only black to volunteer in 1861. Organizing a military company in April, he was confident of federal muster. Writing a letter to Governor Dennison, he declared that his men were well-drilled, trained, and waiting. Despite the existing tension between mulattoes and blacks, Malvin did not restrict enrollment for his company to blacks only. His efforts to heal the racial breach was one of the factors insuring the success of later Negro militia units. Malvin's patriotism was widely publicized around the nation in many Republican newspapers. The Cleveland Leader, 1639-1886, National Archives microfilm edition, roll 1, 833. (Hereafter cited as Negro in Military Service.)


6R. Davis, Black-Americans in Cleveland, 76; Peskin, North Into Freedom, 40-41; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 26-41; Langston, From Virginia Plantation, 198-217; Cleveland Leader, May 8, 1861.
on May 8, 1861, echoed his sentiments by declaring Negro militiamen to be "exceedingly eager to enlist and either form companies of their own or be attached to white companies."^7

Ohio's white political elite responded to the Negroes' offer of service. Governor Dennison declared that public opinion did not favor arming Negroes, but secretly, the governor had long questioned the combat prowess of Negroes. His views on this subject were probably influenced by Democratic newspapers, such as the Cleveland Plain Dealer. In 1856 the journal declared Negroes to be cowardly and worthless under fire. According to the Plain Dealer, this shortcoming was the reason that Ohio did not permit them to join the militia.8 Dennison also claimed that the War Department forbade him to recruit Negroes even if he desired to do so. As a final rebuff to the state's Negroes, he stated that Attorney General James Murray had counseled him about the

^Ibid., May 8, 1861.

8Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 31, 1856; Joseph T. Wilson, The Black Phalanx; A History of Negro Soldiers in the Wars of 1775-1812, 1861-65 (Hartford, 1891) 41. (Hereafter cited as J. Wilson, Black Phalanx.) Ohio Executive Documents, 1861, 169-172; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 15; Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen, Her Generals and Soldiers, I (Cincinnati, 1868) 176. (Hereafter cited as Reid, Ohio in the War.)
illegalities of Negroes bearing arms. Quickly throwing the hot political issue into the lap of Adjutant General Buckingham, the governor effectively sidestepped all Negro inquiries.\(^9\)

Buckingham was at least honest in his replies to Negro volunteers. He declared it unfortunate that such patriotic services were not accepted. He personally felt that the prejudices against Negro militiamen tragically wasted valuable manpower. At a time when white militiamen were shirking duty, organized and trained Negro Guardsmen were being refused. But until the Ohio Militia Law was amended, Buckingham announced that no Negroes could be mustered into state service. Under pressure from the Cleveland militia company, the Adjutant General's Department dispatched the following message: "your patriotic letter of the 20th April inst. is received, and in reply, would say, the Constitution will not permit me to issue the order."\(^10\) Likewise, the "Attucks Guards" were also refused.\(^11\)

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\(^9\) Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 16; Wesley, History of Prince Hall Lodge, 44; Official Roster of Federal, State and County Officers for the State of Ohio (Columbus, 1974) 108; McPherson, Negro's Civil War, 22.

\(^10\) Ibid., 22; See also Ohio Executive Documents, 1861, 169-172.

\(^11\) Ibid., 1861, 169-172; See also Quarles, Negro in Civil War, 22,25; Dudley T. Cornish, The Sable Arm: Negro Troops Union Army, 1861-1865 (New York, 1966) 15-16. (Hereafter cited as Cornish, Sable Arm.) Dabney, Cincinnati's
The War Department also handled inquiries from Ohio Negroes. Secretary Cameron had direct orders from President Abraham Lincoln to spurn all Negro offers of service, and closely watched by the moderates in the War Cabinet, he obediently refused every Ohio Negro volunteer. Known around Washington as a flaming Radical, Cameron was closely aligned politically with Senator Benjamin Wade of Ohio. Both men had advocated the early use of Negro soldiers in the conflict. Cameron felt that Lincoln's position on the issue in 1861 was hopelessly inconsistent with his own sentiments. Before the year drew to a close, his advocacy of Negro employment in the war helped terminate his cabinet career.12

Negroes in Ohio reacted angrily to the government's policy of exclusion. They accused General Buckingham of "playing politics" with the issue of Negro soldiers. One such letter claimed that the state Adjutant General's Department was "pawning off unwanted blacks to the U.S. War Department."

12P. Watson to William Jones, May 20, 1862, Negro in Military Service, roll 1, 857; Chapman Bros., Stark County History, 251; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 22-23; Cornish, Sable Arm, 18.

13Samuel Maltley to Carthinius Buckingham, June 2, 1862, Negro in Military Service, roll 1, 871; P. Watson to William Jones, May 20, 1862; Ibid., roll 1, 857.
Wilberforce University, bitterly described his feelings in 1861:

> When Fort Sumpter [sic] was fired upon...There were one hundred and fifteen of us students at that University, who, anxious to vindicate the stars and stripes, made up a company and offered our services to the Governor of Ohio, and sir, we were told that this is a white man's war and that the Negro had nothing to do with it.\(^{14}\)

John Malvin was also refused for service in 1861. His militiamen, however, voted not to disband. Instead, they journeyed to New England to enlist in Massachusetts' 54th and 55th Volunteer Infantry Regiments in 1863.\(^{15}\)

No persons were more disgusted with the government's policy of exclusion than Milton Holland and Robert Pinn. As charter members of the aristocracy, they decided to pass for white and became soldiers anyway. In September of 1861, Holland entered federal service as an aide to Colonel Nelson H. Van Vohres, commander of the 3rd, 18th, and 92nd Ohio Volunteer Infantry (O.V.I.) Although not seeing combat, his friendship and counsel was highly valued by the regimental commander. Joseph T. Wilson, a member of the Lousiana Native Guards, commented that: "Quite a few mulattoes served in white National Guard

\(^{14}\)U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 43rd Cong. 1st sess., pt 1, 1874 (Washington D.C., 1874) 566.

\(^{15}\)R. Davis, Black-Americans in Cleveland, 76; Peskin, North Into Freedom, 41.
regiments, some as officers; they were so light in complex­ion that their true race connection could not be told." Wilson acknowledged Holland's enlistment in Ohio's 92nd Regiment, though he did not mention him by name. In similar fashion, Robert Pinn enlisted as a Caucasian in the 19th Ohio Infantry and saw action at the Battle of Shiloh on April 6-7, 1862. Under a doctor's care, Pinn had been ordered to the regiment's infirmary to treat a serious wound. When the battle started, however, he quickly dressed, grabbed his rifle, and "jumped into the thickest of the fight." Commended for bravery under fire, Pinn was also one of the first Negroes to fire a musket in the Civil War. After Shiloh, the Massillon native participated in other engagements that earned him outstanding service medals. Surprisingly, Holland and Pinn were not the first Negro Ohioans in the Civil War. That honor went to John H. Cisco of Cleveland. Enrolled as a white soldier in the 124th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, he was promoted to a corporal in "Company F" in August of 1861.

The Lincoln Administration was hard pressed in 1861 to justify its opposition to Negro soldiers. Northern

16Wilson, Black Phalanx, 179-180; McPherson, Negro's Civil War, 35; ONG Historical Records.

17Chapman Bros., Stark County History, 251-252; R. Davis, Black-Americans in Cleveland, 82.
Radicals constantly pressured the president to field Negro regiments immediately, being apathetic to his concern for the Border States. The sensitive slave regions of Maryland, Kentucky, Missouri and portions of Virginia greatly feared that the Union Army was bearing "emancipation on its bayonets," and Lincoln feared that arming Negro soldiers would only intensify their alarm and force them to join the Confederacy.

Because of the delicate political situation, the president was especially grateful to have obedient field commanders. General George B. McClellan, commander of the Division of the Potomac, mirrored the president's laissez-faire policy regarding slavery. During a campaign to capture Grafton, Virginia, McClellan assured the Unionists that he would "abstain from all such interference [with slaves] but with an iron hand crush any attempt at an insurrection on their part." General Robert Patterson, commanding the Department of Pennsylvania, was another delight to Lincoln. Addressing his troops in June of 1861, Patterson reminded them that the war did not

18 Cornish, Sable Arm, 10-11.

19 U.S. War Department (comp.) War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, 1880-1901) Ser.1, II, 49. (Hereafter cited as O.R.) Unless otherwise noted, all references will be to Series 1.
extend to the destruction of slavery and declared that Union soldiers had an obligation to quell Negro revolts. 20

Lincoln's refusal to use colored soldiers in the conflict disappointed many Negro leaders. Frederick Douglass argued that since the Confederacy was employing Negroes, the North should also. Douglass told Lincoln that Negro troops would not only give added meaning to the cause of democracy, but would yield additional manpower as well. Douglass was certain that "let the black man get upon his person the brass letters U.S., let him get an eagle on his button, and a musket on his shoulder and bullets in his pocket, and there is no power on earth that could deny that he has earned the right of citizenship in the United States." 21

The president could not deny knowledge of reports confirming the South's employment of Negroes as soldiers and laborers. Although not officially enrolling Negro soldiers until March of 1865, the Confederacy did permit individual members to recruit free Negroes. On June 28, 20Cornish, Sable Arm, 11.
1861, the Tennessee General Assembly encouraged free Negroes between the ages of fifteen to fifty to join the Confederate army. All enlistees were promised eight dollars per month, one daily ration, and a yearly allowance for clothing.\textsuperscript{22}

Reliable sightings of Negro Confederates were prevalent in 1861. In August of 1861 sentries for the 1st Vermont Infantry Regiment reported that a Confederate artillery unit was manned by a large number of Negroes. Ben Butler, commander of Fort Monroe, Virginia, declared that he personally observed Negroes being employed in the South in labor battalions. On May 27, 1861, Butler informed the War Department that if this practice did not cease, he would employ "all able-bodied Negroes" also. Butler's stand on this issue redeemed him in the eyes of the Radicals, for in April of 1861, he had told the governor of Maryland that his own army would suppress slave revolts.\textsuperscript{23}

The Ohio Anti-Slavery Association persuaded John Mercer Langston to join hands with Douglass and Horace Greeley, editor of the New York Tribune, in seeking

\textsuperscript{22}Cleveland Leader, May 8, 1861; Cornish, \textit{Sable Arm}, 15; \textit{O.R.}, Ser.4, I, 409.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., Ser.4, I, 569, Benjamin Butler to Winfield Scott, May 27, 1861, \textit{Negro in Military Service}, roll 1, 408-409; Cornish, \textit{Sable Arm}, 5.
Congressional help for enlisting Negro soldiers. Fortunately, the Radicals had already initiated such action. Led by Thaddeus Stevens in the House and Benjamin Wade in the Senate, the Radicals unveiled their strategy for winning the war. It included immediate emancipation as well as the employment of Negro troops in the Union Army.\footnote{Langston, From Virginia Plantation, 198, 206, 217. For a discussion of Benjamin's Wade's true feeling regarding Negro soldiers, see Hans L. Trefousse, "Benjamin Wade and the Negro," Ohio Historical Quarterly, 68, No.2 (April, 1959) 161-176.}

Under constant pressure from Northern radicals, Lincoln half heartedly supported economic reprisals against the South. On August 6, 1861, the First Confiscation Act legalized the seizure of all rebel property, including slaves. The act did not affect slaves in the loyal Border States. During this time, the president's concern for General John C. Fremont's freedom proclamation of August 30, 1861 in Southwestern Missouri overshadowed his signing of the act. Rescinding the order on September 2, Lincoln reaffirmed his military authority although he faced strong criticism from Radical forces in Congress. General David Hunter replaced Fremont as commander of the Western Department at St. Louis.\footnote{O.R., III, 466-469, 477-478; Cornish, Sable Arm, 12-13.}
As the controversy over Fremont subsided, the president turned his attention to the refugee problem. Most Union commanders regarded the disposition of the fugitive Southern slaves as a political problem and refused to enlist their aid in the war. However, General Benjamin Butler, commanding Fortress Monroe, Virginia, in 1861 designated the slaves as "contraband" because they had been previously employed as laborers by the Confederacy. Realizing the potential value of Negro workers, he used them as his camp teamsters and cooks.26

The first step toward the fielding of a Negro army was taken by Secretary Cameron on October 14, 1861. Without Lincoln's knowledge, he authorized Thomas W. Sherman, commanding the Department of the South, to use fugitive slaves in any capacity necessary. Lincoln was greatly relieved when Sherman failed to organize the Negro units. The president promptly relieved Cameron of his duties and appointed Edwin M. Stanton as the new chief of the War Department.27

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26 Benjamin Butler to Winfield Scott, May 27, 1861, Negro in Military Service, roll 1, 468; Simon Cameron to Benjamin Butler, May 30, 1861, Ibid., roll 1, 410; Ben Butler, Butler's Book (Boston, 1892) 260.

27 Thomas Scott to Thomas Sherman, October 14, 1861, O.R., VI, 176-177; Shannon, "Negro Soldier," 568; Cornish, Sable Arm, 18-20, 24, 30.
In 1861 the Lincoln Administration completely rejected the concept of Negro soldiers. In 1862 Ohio Negroes vowed to renew their enlistment efforts. On August 13, William E. Ambush, a prominent Negro beautician from Cleveland, appealed to Governor David Tod to raise a Negro regiment from Ohio. Ambush declared that Negroes could guard Confederate prisoners at Camps Chase and Sandusky. In this manner, he argued that veteran white militiamen could be relieved for combat duty. Governor Tod thanked Ambush for his offer but declined it. Confident that white troops could keep rebel prisoners from escaping, he publicly stated that Negro soldiers were not needed. Moreover, he claimed no legal authority to uniform colored troops.  

Following Ambush's letter, Newell Goodale issued a call for Negro troops on August 14. Publishing his "Address to the Colored Population of Ohio," the Negro businessman urged all militiamen to safeguard their freedom. Goodale then converted his Cleveland office into a registration and recruiting center for Negro soldiers. He triumphantly wrote Secretary Stanton that a thousand Cuyahoga County Negroes had formed an infantry regiment. However, there was one stipulation: the unit would not

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28 Cleveland Leader, August 13, 1862; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 23; R. Davis, Black Americans in Cleveland, 77.
seek admission into the state's militia. Goodale declared this a useless gesture and requested direct muster into the federal army.29

Stanton's negative reply to Goodale did not discourage other Negro inquiries. Within the same month, William H. Parham of Cincinnati requested permission to organize a colored military company. He was promptly refused. Writing his friend Jacob White of Philadelphia, Parham reflected upon his militia failures:

When Sumpter [sic] fell, the North's heart was fired with indignation...Some of the colored men thinking they were a part of this Northern heart alluded to, immagined [sic] themselves very indignant; and as all the rest of this heart was forming Home Guards...These proceedings came to the ears of the Municipal Authorities, judge the surprise of patriotic individuals when waited upon by the Chief of Police,...and informed that it was the white men's fight with which niggers had nothing to do.30

Disturbed at the white political elite's refusal to enroll Negro soldiers, John Langston questioned Governor Tod directly upon the subject. The governor proved as obstinate on this occasion as all the rest. In no uncertain terms, he informed Langston that white men could protect and defend the country without the aid of Negroes. When asked by Langston why Negroes could not serve in the

29Newell Goodale to Edward Stanton, August 12, 1862; Negro in Military Service, roll 1, 944; R. Davis, Black Americans in Cleveland, 77.
30McPherson, Negro's Civil War, 34-35.
militia, Tod declared: "That to enlist a Negro soldier would be to drive every white man out of the service." However, the governor stated that should Negro troops be needed, he would call upon Langston for advice.\textsuperscript{31}

Despite the Union's increasing manpower needs in the summer of 1862, the War Department rejected all Ohio Negroes for military service. General Buckingham wrote on August 6, 1862, that Lincoln "under no circumstances" would consent to either Negro or Indian troops.\textsuperscript{32} Public opinion was cited as the chief obstacle to the arming of Negro soldiers. Most whites had perceived Negroes to be servile and cowardly under fire. Others believed that Negroes in arms would incite slave insurrections similar to Nat Turner's revolt of 1831. Many Northern congressmen also feared mass resignations by white officers if Negro aid were enlisted. General William Sherman had already warned the War Department that it was "unjust to the brave soldiers and volunteers to be put on an equal basis with blacks."\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31}Langston, \textit{From Virginia Plantation}, 206.

\textsuperscript{32}Carthinius Buckingham to E. Solomon, August 6, 1862, \textit{Negro in Military Service}, roll 1, 935.

The president was still hopeful that the conflict would quickly end and the issue of Negro troops would be avoided. At any rate, the War Department's call for three hundred thousand white volunteers in July of 1862 would forestall the issue. It was not the case. Less than one-fourth of the white soldiers needed answered the call. Confronted with manpower shortages worsened by battlefield reverses in 1862, the president turned to Negroes for help.34

Congressional leaders studied the Union's problems and voted to remove the prohibitions to Negroes in federal service. Two laws were quickly enacted on July 17, 1862. The first was a confiscation statute declaring all Negroes serving rebel masters to be "forever free." Care was taken to insure the Border States that slaves there would be undisturbed. The second act amended the U.S. Militia Law of 1795. Under its provisions the president could federalize state militias for nine months instead of ninety days. When the militia was in federal service, its legal composition was "all able-bodied male citizens" between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. The word "white" had finally been deleted. Section 12 of the statute also empowered the president to employ Negroes

34Negroes in Military Service, roll 1, 942; Butler, Butler's Book, 578; Foner, Blacks and the Military, 33.
for fortification duty or any other military purpose. According to section 15, all Negroes in federal service were entitled to ten dollars per month, of which three dollars monthly might be in clothing. Finally, they were allowed one daily ration.\(^35\)

Ohio Negroes applauded the change in the militia law. They gathered from Washington news sources that U.S. Senator John Sherman from Ohio had led the fight for the amendment's passage. This was surprising because Sherman was not considered a friend of the Negro. The story was only partially correct, for the senator did not champion the interests of the Negro militia class. When asked by Senator Willard Saulsbury of Delaware the reason that Negroes were barred from the Ohio Militia, Sherman answered that they were inferior. His only positive statement was in reference to the military use of Negroes. According to Sherman, they made excellent laborers. Unlike Senator Benjamin Wade, he did not advocate Negro combat units.\(^36\)

The chief backer of the amendment, Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, skillfully prevented all attempts


\(^36\)Congressional Record, 37th Cong. 2nd Sess. pt.4, 3198-3199.
to shelve the proposal. Echoing the words of Frederick Douglass, Wilson declared that "black soldiers had distinguished themselves in every war the U.S. has fought. Why not this one?" The proposal's chief opposition came from Senator John Carlisle of Virginia. Union representatives from other Border States also contended that Presidential interference with the composition of state forces was unconstitutional. The argument was disregarded and the amendment passed by a comfortable margin.37

One of the first Negroes in Ohio taking advantage of the new law was Joseph D. Green of Cleveland. Hastily organizing a military company in February of 1863, he decided to enlist in the service of Massachusetts. Disgusted by the previous attempts to join the Ohio militia, Green had given up on his home state. Each infantryman was given a rigorous physical examination before his acceptance into the unit. On March 30, twenty-five Negroes had passed the test and were reportedly headed for Boston. Green was assured by Charles Langston that "another company will leave for Boston in a day or two."38

Captain William Johnson, a white officer of the 7th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, also organized a Negro

37Ibid., 37th Cong. 2nd Sess. pt. 4, 3198,3202-3203.  
38Cleveland Leader, March 30, April 1, 1863.
infantry company known as "Butler's Cadets." The organization consisted of white officers and sixty Negro enlistees, for Johnson realized that the War Department would not accept companies officered by Negroes. It would, however, muster in Negro troops commanded by white officers. The Cleveland Leader in February of 1863 printed a letter confirming the acceptability of white officers to Negro recruits. Although Negroes preferred "their own officers," they were not adverse to "serving under those white men who have, for many years labored and suffered with us."39

Negro units such as those organized in Ohio during 1863 assured the War Department of additional manpower. Noting the change in public opinion regarding Negro soldiers, the president moved closer to arming them. On September 22, 1862, Lincoln issued a warning to the Confederacy. Those states that continued to make war against the Union after January 1, 1863, would suffer the loss of their slaves. The president sweetened his strong message by offering a program of Negro deportation. The preliminary proclamation was hailed by Northern radicals as a significant step in the crusade for Negro freedom.

39Ibid., March 30, 1863; R. Davis, Black-Americans in Cleveland, 78.
Regretably, it did not go much beyond the Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862.  

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Cornish, Sable Arm, 84; Quarles, Negro in Civil War, 163; U.S. War Department, "General Order No. 139, Preliminary Proclamation," August 24, 1862, Negro in Military Service, roll 1, 613.
CHAPTER VI
THE EMPLOYMENT OF COLORED TROOPS IN THE
WAR OF THE REBELLION: THE RESPONSE
OF OHIO'S NEGRO GUARDSMEN TO THE
CALL OF SERVICE

Despite the enthusiasm of Ohio Negroes for soldiering, the white political elite in 1862 refused their offers of military service. Militia-eligible Negroes watched from the sidelines as other states forged ahead in their recruiting drives.

The first attempt to arm Negroes was an ill fated one conducted by General David Hunter, now commanding the Department of the South. Using the Cameron Proclamation, he liberated the slaves in Georgia, South Carolina and Florida, and later organized them under the banner of the First South Carolina Volunteers. Hunter's well intentioned plans soon ran into trouble. After frightening many of the Negroes into Union dress, he requested the War Department to provide the unit with muskets. Lincoln quickly countermanded Hunter's actions and removed him from command.¹

¹O.R., IV, 264; Ibid., XIV, 333,341; Cornish, Sable Arm, 37-39; Robertson, "Negro Soldiers," 22-24; Cleveland Leader, May 6, 1862; William A. Jones to Simon Cameron, Negro in Military Service, roll 1, 833,874.
The Cleveland Leader criticized those Ohio Democrats applauding Hunter's failure. Although agreeing with the former commander in theory, the newspaper indicated that the time was not right for arming Negroes. Nevertheless, the ice had been broken and other Negro regiments would surely follow. Reflecting the sentiment of the Negro militia class, the Leader declared that, "General Hunter is acting with the wisdom of a statesman as well as the genius of a military chieftain."  

The next effort to arm Negroes occurred in August of 1862. General James Lane, commanding the Kansas Brigade, recruited fugitive slaves from Missouri as camp laborers. However, he was cautioned by the War Department against converting his workers into infantrymen. Suspecting the general of duplicity, Secretary Stanton denied official recognition to the First Kansas Colored Volunteer Regiment until January 4, 1863. In the meantime, the unit was engaged in several skirmishes against rebel forces in Kansas and Missouri. Significantly, the Regiment was the first colored troops in a free state.  

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2Cleveland Leader, April 21, May 6, 1862.
3O.R., Ser. 3, II, 43; James Lane to Edwin Stanton, August 6, 1862, Negro in Military Service, roll 1, 936; Ibid., roll 1, 939, 945, 954, 965, 967, 1002; Edward Stanton to James Lane, August 23, 1862; Ibid., roll 1, 957; Lane to Stanton, September 23, 1862; Ibid., roll 1, 409; G. Williams, History of Negro Troops, 101; McPherson, Negro's Civil War, 164.
While Ohio Negroes cheered Lane's efforts in Kansas, Ben Butler grabbed the spotlight in Louisiana. A late convert to Radical philosophy, he began arming fourteen hundred Negro militiamen who had previously served in the Confederate Militia in 1861. Thus, Butler avoided the heated issue of arming slaves. The Louisiana "Native Guards" were reborn and became the first Negro regiment in the Union army on September 27, 1862.4

The Cleveland Leader praised Butler's shrewdness. It remarked that the commander "has been the most practical experimenter of all officers upon the slavery question."5 The Radical experiment in Louisiana rekindled an effort by the aristocracy to form Ohio's militia. Factions within the bourgeoisie abruptly violated the pledge of Negro military unity. On August 30, 1862, a Cincinnati regiment of "bright mulattoes, a thousand strong," offered their services to Mayor George Hatch. They agreed to pay for their own arms and equipment and restrict their enrollment to mulattoes only. The men explained that they were so light in color that no political controversy


5Cleveland Leader, December 24, 1862.
would result from their bearing arms. Despite their generous offer, the Negroes were refused.6

The city then braced itself for the enemy's attack. Responding to the rebel raids of Confederate Generals John Morgan and Kirby Smith in 1862, Mayor Hatch constructed protective fortifications. Since Cincinnati was extremely vulnerable to invasion, the enemy's capture of the hills overlooking Newport and Covington, Kentucky, would leave the Queen City defenseless. Rumors persisted that Confederate militia, after seizing the town, planned to ransom it for fifteen million dollars. Hatch blamed Cincinnati's troubles upon the inefficiency of General Buell's Army. Retreating from Chattanooga to Nashville, the Union commander had given a carte blanche to all Confederate invaders.7


Faced with immediate danger, Cincinnati's white citizens declined the Negro's help. Instead the city council appealed to Governor Tod for militia forces. Adjutant General Charles Hill denied the request, saying that no militia companies could be spared at this time. Tod, who had known of the existence of the colored Cincinnati regiment, refused to sanction its use. It was still a white man's war. Forced to organize "home guards," the city found a use for the despised Negroes. On September 2, 1862, they were assigned to general fatigue duty. Many Negroes refused this job, saying that they wanted muskets and not shovels. The mayor then ordered a massive roundup of all Negroes not reporting for duty. Considering all Negroes as slackers, the Cincinnati police department brutally executed its task. Peter H. Clark, a Negro abolitionist, described the September 2 confrontation:

They [police] went from house to house followed by a gang of rude, foul-mouthed boys. Closets, cellars, and garrets were searched; bayonets were thrust into beds and bedding; old and young, sick and well were dragged out, and amidst shouts and jeers, marched like felons to the pen on Plum Street opposite the Cathedral...Had the city been captured by the Confederates, the colored people would have suffered no more than they did at the hands of these defenders.  

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8Ohio Executive Documents, 1863, 367.

9Clark, Black Brigade of Cincinnati, 7,15; Dabney, Cincinnati's Colored Citizens, 69.
Major General Horatio Wright, commander of the Department of the Ohio, immediately placed the city under martial law. Businesses were closed and residents were directed to form militia units. General Lewis Wallace, commander of the home guards, received reports of police brutality upon Negro inhabitants. He quickly asked abolitionist Colonel William M. Dickson to command the "Black Brigade." Dickson eagerly accepted the job. Known as a friend of the Negro, the attorney had represented numerous clients in fugitive slaves cases.10

The brigade trusted Dickson and voluntarily emerged from hiding. One thousand and six Negroes defended the Queen City from the threat of attack. Working from September 3-20, without arms, the brigade performed valuable labor services. For example, it constructed military roads, cleared hundreds of acres of forests, and built numerous foxholes. Its other feat included the construction of a pontoon bridge within twenty-four hours. Its quick deployment helped the Ohioans fortify their positions on Newport and Covington Hills.11

10 Not all Cincinnati whites condoned the police's methods in handling the Negroes. The Cincinnati Commercial reported that many prominent white citizens publicly condemned the action. See Cincinnati Commercial, September 8, 1862; Clark, Black Brigade of Cincinnati, ii, iii; O.R., XIV, pt.1, 476; Ibid., XIV, pt.2, 734-735.

Negroes working on the bridge were often the victims of white kidnappers. Regiments of the Ohio militia had employed brigade members as camp servants and teamsters. Several white militiamen conspired to sell their Negro help to slaveowners in Kentucky. Transporting their cargo across the bridge, the soldiers made a handsome profit until Colonel Dickson discovered the plot. Organizing a search party, he invaded Kentucky to retrieve his men. It was ironic that Negroes working for Cincinnati's freedom almost lost their own.\footnote{Ibid., 85-86.}

While performing its duty, the brigade reported only one casualty. On September 17, Joseph Johns was killed by a falling tree only twenty four hours before he would have been discharged. During the same month, the unit was nearly annihilated while working along the Licking River valley when Colonel Joseph Taylor of the 50th Ohio Volunteer Infantry thought that the brigade was black Confederate regulars and ordered his men to destroy the enemy. Fortunately, the artillery officer had better sense. Placing blank cartridges into the field pieces, he shouted to the brigade to quickly raise a white flag. Upon seeing the "surrender," Colonel Taylor was convinced that the Confederacy would soon topple.\footnote{Ibid., 85; Clark, Black Brigade of Cincinnati, 20, 27; Cincinnati Commercial, September 18, 1862.}
The brigade members were certainly not mercenaries. They received city compensation for only one week of service, each man receiving a dollar per day from September 8-13. The amount was raised to one dollar and a half per soldier by the third week. No money was appropriated for their initial work. Because they were unwilling recruits, the city council forfeited the unit's first week's pay. By September 20, the threat of invasion was over and the men were discharged.  

While the Cincinnati Gazette was praising the Negro's dedication and patriotism, it also reported that many white militiamen did not participate in the effort. Some were found dressed in women's clothes; others feigned sickness to avoid military service. General Wallace conceived an idea to bring the slackers from hiding. He organized a drum and bugle corps to play in a downtown parade. When curious militiamen came to enjoy the musical festivities, they were seized and transported to labor camps. Unwilling to defend the city, these men had been the loudest protestors to the arming of Negro militia.  

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14Clark, Black Brigade of Cincinnati, 20.  
15The Brigade did not receive the accolades given the squirrel hunters. The undisciplined frontiersmen played a minor part in Cincinnati's defense. Yet they were hailed as great military heroes. See Ibid., 10-15; Cincinnati Gazette, September 22, 1862; Toppin, "Black Brigade of Cincinnati," 89.
The black brigade of Cincinnati represented the first time Northern Negroes were organized militarily. Of the thousand-man regiment, all were Negroes except three company officers. Sanctioned by the adjutant general as emergency militia, the brigade completed its services before the first Negro regiment was officially mustered into federal service. The Cincinnati unit served a year before either the 5th or 27th United States Colored Troops (USCT) were organized. Getting their first taste of militia duty, brigade members later joined the Negro regiments of Massachusetts. For example, Thomas Bowman, a former member of the unit, was decorated for bravery at the Battle of Olustee in February of 1864 while serving with the 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment. Other brigade members also serving with the Massachusetts unit distinguished themselves in the Fort Wagner assault on July 18, 1863.  

When Ohio formed its Negro militia units, brigade members dominated the muster rolls. Their previous military service gave them a preferred status, and white officers enrolled as many of them as possible into their regiments. The brigade's history exemplified Negro patriotism in Ohio. More importantly, it provided the

\[16\text{Ibid., } 94-95; \text{Clark, Black Brigade of Cincinnati, } 10,15; \text{O.R., Ser.3, II, } 436-438.\]
spark for the acceptance of Negro soldiers in the Union army. 17

The first official recruitment of Negroes occurred on August 25, 1862. The War Department, disappointed with the autumn draft results, authorized General Rufus Saxton to reorganize elements of the First South Carolina Volunteers. Assisted by Colonel Thomas W. Higginson, a former captain of the 51st Massachusetts Infantry Regiment, Saxton quickly filled the Union ranks. Promises of equal pay for Negroes to that given white soldiers ($13 dollars monthly) produced huge crowds at the Union's enlistment centers. The War Department was pleased with this response, and regarded the mission as a huge success. 18

The South was incensed over the Union's enlistment of Negro soldiers and vowed to stop it. On May 1, 1863 the Confederate Congress adopted the policy of "no quarter" for Negro troops and their white officers in battle. Those captured as prisoners of war would be charged with "inciting slave insurrections." The maximum penalty for

17 Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 591-624, 627-658.

18 J. Wilson, Black Phalanx, 133; Negro in Military Service, roll 1, 942; Shannon, "Negro Soldier," 513; Thomas W. Higginson, Army Life in a Black Regiment (Boston, 1901) 1; Carter G. Woodson and Charles H. Wesley, The Negro in Our History (Washington, 1972) 375. (Hereafter cited as Woodson and Wesley, Negro in Our History.)
this offense was death.19

The threat of death did not dampen the spirit of Negro soldiers. On January 27, 1863, Governor John Andrew of Massachusetts received permission from the War Department to enroll Negro infantrymen for three year terms. The shortage of militia-eligible Negroes in his home state compelled Andrew to look elsewhere for recruits. Enlisting the aid of Frederick Douglass, Martin Delany, John M. Langston and Orindatus Wall of Oberlin, the governor began his task. 20

Ohio proved vital to Massachusetts' hope of fielding a Negro regiment. Possessing 7,161 Negroes of militia age, the Buckeye State ranked third behind Pennsylvania and New York in this category. Governor Tod fully assisted the recruiting efforts, but only because he saw an opportunity to rid the state of Negro malcontents. Writing to William Porter of Massillon, Tod revealed his good fortune: "I do not propose to raise any colored troops. Those now being recruited in this state are recruited by ________


20Edwin Stanton to John Andrew, January 27, 1863, Negro in Military Service, roll 2, 1076; Charles W. Foster to Edwin Stanton, May 5, 1863; Ibid., roll 2, 1221; Cum- mings, Negro Population, 57; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 25; Foner, Blacks and the Military, 37.
the authority of Governor Andrew of Massachusetts. 21

The 54th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment was quickly filled and mustered into federal service on May 13, 1863, at Readville, Massachusetts. The unit was the first Northern regiment composed of free Negroes. Three-fourths of the regiment was recruited from Ohio. The promise of equal pay, in addition to an enlistment bonus, produced overflowing crowds at many recruiting stations. The unit was filled so rapidly that Tod wondered if he made the right decision. In a letter to John Langston, the governor declared that he did not want another state taking credit for his Negroes. On May 16, 1863, Tod made certain demands upon Governor Andrew. He insisted that Ohio Negroes be kept in separate companies with complete records of their names and addresses. In this way, Tod declared that "Ohio will have the full benefits of all enlistments from the state, and the recruits themselves the benefit of the State associations to the same extent as if organized into a state regiment." 22

21 In 1860, Pennsylvania listed 10,844 Negro men of militia age. New York 10,208 Negro males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years. See J. Wilson, Black Phalanx, 142; Stanton to Andrew, January 27, 1863, Negro in Military Service, roll 2, 1076.

22 Ohio Executive Documents, 1863, pt.1, 271; Dyer, Compendium, III, 1266; Toppin, "Black Brigade of Cincinnati," 94; Reid, Ohio in the War, I, 176; David Tod to John M. Langston, May 16, 1863, Negro in Military Service, roll 2, 1242.
Governor Tod was a late convert to the idea of arming Negroes. Although favoring Negro participation in the militia in 1862, he conformed these beliefs to whims of a conservative electorate. The governor rejected the popular myths of Negro cowardice but was reluctant to publicize his stand. Using the Massachusetts regiment as a test case, he scrutinized the behavior of Negro soldiers in combat. If they should prove satisfactory, a major obstacle to their admission into the Guard would be eliminated.\textsuperscript{23}

From its inception, the 54th Massachusetts was plagued with organizational problems. First, Negroes clamored for command positions. The original legislation governing Negro volunteers stipulated that only whites could be officers. Governor Andrew listened to the regiment's protest and sided with his men. Telegraming Secretary Stanton on February 3, 1863, he verified the appointment of Negro line officers, surgeons, and chaplains.\textsuperscript{24}

The governor's announcement sent a shock wave through the War Department. Stanton quickly replied that Andrew's

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., roll 2, 1242; Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 31, 1856; Wesley, \textit{Ohio Negroes}, 29-34.

\textsuperscript{24}Line officers refer to those commanding (second lieutenant and above) combatant branches of the army -- infantry, artillery, and cavalry. \textit{Negro in Military Service}, roll 2, 1065; John Andrew to Edwin Stanton, February 3, 1863, \textit{Ibid.}, roll 2, 1086.
action was illegal and ill timed. Requesting that common sense prevail, he declared that only Congress could approve commissions for Negro soldiers. Despite official condemnation, Andrew commissioned Negroes in the 54th and its sister regiment, the 55th, and probably at least ten Negroes held commissions in the Massachusetts regiments. 25

Secondly, the controversy over wages threatened to dissolve the units. Governor Andrew had received assurances in January that Negroes would receive the same pay as white soldiers. When asked a month later, Stanton declared that the federal militia law allowed Negro troops only $10 a month, but Andrew retorted that his regiment should receive $13 a month because they were not bound by federal law. These were Massachusetts National Guard troops, not army volunteers. Bringing his case to Lincoln, the governor requested that Reverend Samuel Harrison, the regiment's clergyman, receive the same wages allotted a white chaplain. Lincoln was sympathetic but supported Stanton's position. The president did admit, however, that $10 a month was "grossly insufficient" to support a soldier's family. 26 This was an understatement. Already

25 Stanton to Andrew, February 13, 1863, Ibid., roll 2, 1102; G. Williams, History of Negro Troops, 141.

26 "Opinion of the Solicitor of the War Department as to the Pay and Emolument of Colored Troops," April 25, 1863, Negro in Military Service, roll 2, 1203-1204; "Message of the President of the United States," April 7,
the wage dispute had created several morale and financial problems within the Negro units. A case in point was Sergeant Stephen Swails of the 54th Massachusetts. While Swails fought for the Union, his family was placed in a Boston poorhouse. White commanders attributed the increasing desertion rate to the low wages paid to colored troops. In April of 1864, an entire Negro company mutinied in Texas over the pay issue. The disturbance was finally quelled by two regiments of white troops stationed nearby. 27

Unable to dodge the problem, the president conferred with Attorney General Edward Bates. He advised Lincoln to pay Harrison $100 a month. Bates explained that Harrison was not a private soldier mustered into federal service. He belonged to a state-designated unit. Governor Andrew had triumphed, but the president was not ready to concede defeat. Afraid of causing dissension among white soldiers, Lincoln left the final decision to Congress. 28

1864; Ibid., roll 3, 2532; William Birney to Charles W. Foster, April 14, 1864; Ibid., roll 3, 2480.

27 William Birney to Charles W. Foster, April 14, 1864, Ibid., roll 3, 2480; Luis Emilio, History of the Fifty-Fourth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry 1863-1865 (Boston, 1894) 179. (Hereafter cited as Emilio, History of Fifty-fourth Massachusetts.)

28 Cornish, Sable Arm, 192; Negro in Military Service, roll 3, 2532; Ibid., roll 3, 2301.
Disgusted with the president's attitude, Andrew called a special session of the Massachusetts Legislature. They overwhelmingly voted to pay its Negro regiments the difference between their actual and promised wages. Negro soldiers balked at this gesture because it confused the issue, which they saw as the concept of unequal treatment within the Union Army. More money had little to do with it. To dramatize its cause, the 54th refused its wages for eighteen months.  

Despite the unfair treatment accorded Negro soldiers, the government rapidly filled the enlisted ranks of subsequent colored units. Of the one thousand men composing the Massachusetts 55th Volunteer Infantry Regiment, nearly nine hundred of them were Ohio recruits. The white political elite noted these statistics and sharply criticized Andrew's greediness. It resented his extracting the bulk of Ohio's cheap Negro labor force. The Ohio State Journal on May 22, 1863 also objected to this depletion of the state's Negro population by Massachusetts. In his report to the governor in 1863, Adjutant General William Knapp echoed the sentiments of the Journal. Fearing a massive loss of Negro men, he campaigned  

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29 McPherson, Negro's Civil War, 197; G. Williams, History of Negro Race in America, pt.2, 311.
against making "Ohio a recruiting ground for filling Massachusetts quotas." 30

Governor Tod ignored General Knapp's advice because he still doubted the efficiency of Negro troops under fire. Since they were largely untried in combat, he refused to organize any Negro Guard units. 31 Fortunately, by mid-1863, the War Department was willing to take the risk. Adjutant General Thomas received permission to recruit Negro soldiers in the Mississippi Valley. Thomas' mission reflected the changing attitudes in the North toward Negro soldiers. Writing to Major General John M. Schofield, he noted that the white officers of these Negro units would determine their success or failure. Consequently, only those commanders "whose hearts were in the work" were needed. For Ohio Negroes, a new beginning in military service had arrived. 32

The white slacker problem in Ohio heightened Negro hopes of military employment. The Conscription Act passed by Congress on March 3, 1863, prompted many whites to

30 Ohio Executive Documents, 1863, pt.1, 270; Ohio State Journal, May 22, 1863; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 27.
31 Reid, Ohio in the War, I, 176.
leave the country, give false information, or hire Negroes in their places. A fee of $300 enabled a wealthy white draftee to employ a Negro substitute.\(^3^3\) (Appendix A shows that this practice encouraged many Negroes to by-pass the segregated Ohio militia and enroll directly into the Volunteer Army.)\(^3^4\) The commutation system, ignited several riots in Ohio as well as major cities such as New York and Philadelphia. Whites unable to pay the money feared loss of their jobs to Negro workers if they were drafted. Although they wished the rebellion to end, white Ohioans had no intentions of fighting for "Negro liberty." On June 12, 1863, mob violence erupted in northcentral Ohio counties of Morrow, Richland, Crawford, Holmes, and Knox. Negro residents were savagely beaten and driven off, and Union recruiting stations were smashed and burned. Units of the state militia were required to quell the

\(^3^3\)The Conscription Act did not specifically mention that Negroes were subject to the draft. The War Department later stipulated that nonwhites were included in the provision. The Enrollment Act of February 24, 1864, expressly called for the enlisting of all physically qualified Negroes. See G. Williams, History of Negro Troops, 136; Fred A. Shannon, The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865, II (Cleveland, 1928) 175-176, 228. (Hereafter cited as Shannon, Organization and Administration.) Ohio Executive Documents, 1863, 13, 32; Shannon, "Negro Soldier," 580.

\(^3^4\)Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 661-680; Dyer, Compendium, III, 1721-1734.
By the summer of 1863, the War Department realized that no national agency governed the raising of Negro troops. Needing more control over the employment of "blacks in blue," the Department established the Bureau of Colored Troops on May 22, 1863. All matters relating to Negro soldiers was handled by this agency, and no person was allowed to recruit Negroes without specific permission from the bureau. Its chief job, however, was the commissioning of white officers for Negro regiments. The thought of commanding Negro troops did not appeal to many white soldiers initially, but there were many advantages for those that volunteered. Along with an increase in pay and rank, these officers received "fringe benefits" from the War Department. Better food, larger sleeping quarters, and adequate medical care awaited each "captain of niggers." With the Bureau's help, the War Department

35G. Williams, History of Negro Troops, 173-179; McPherson, Negro's Civil War, 72; Shannon, Organization and Administration II, 228; Foner, Blacks and the Military, 39.

36Sometimes the Bureau took its job too literally. On March 9, 1863, it published a ridiculous pamphlet called the United States Infantry Tactics for the Use of Colored Troops. See Quarles, Negro in Civil War, 200; "War Department, Special Orders; No. 229," Negro in Military Service, roll 3, 1261; David Tod to John M. Langston, May 16, 1863, Ibid., roll 2, 1262.
could hold the line against radical white commanders. The likes of a David Hunter or James Lane could never embarrass the Lincoln Administration again, and the commissioning of Negro officers, as practiced by Ben Butler and John Andrew, would also be halted.\(^7\)

Governor Tod was the first to congratulate Stanton upon the Bureau's formation. By this time, the governor had given serious consideration to organizing a Negro Guard unit, but, he had to act rapidly for Massachusetts had already enlisted 1700 Negroes from the Buckeye State. The governor was further encouraged by reports of Negro bravery under fire. Contacting John M. Langston, Tod inquired about raising a regiment of a "thousand and one colored men at Camp Delaware." Within a few days the governor requested permission to organize a Negro regiment.\(^8\)

Langston enlisted the aid of his father-in-law, Orindatus Wall, in mapping recruiting strategy, and other members of the aristocracy soon joined the project. Veteran Milton Holland personally brought over five hundred

\(^7\)Foner, Blacks and the Military, 61; Cornish, Sable Arm, 205-221; Negro in Military Service, roll 4, 3767.

\(^8\)Langston, From Virginia Plantation, 205; David Tod to Edwin Stanton, May 27, 1863; Ibid., roll 2, 1270; Ohio State Journal, May 22, 1863; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 27.
men to Camp Delaware. Most of his recruits had been previously organized for enlistment in a Massachusetts regiment, but upon hearing of Governor's Tod intentions, the men voted overwhelmingly to remain in Ohio. Solomon Grimes, a Washington County businessman, followed Holland's example and recruited nearly three hundred troops. Telling Negroes that their day had come, the bourgeoisie succeeded in filling the enlisted ranks. On June 18, 1863, Governor Tod designated the unit as the 127th Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiment. Captain Lewis McCoy of the 115th Ohio Volunteer Infantry Regiment took command of the Regiment at Camp Delaware.39

Ohio Negroes eagerly responded to the call of military service. One reason was money. When asked if they would receive the same pay as white troops, Tod telegraphed the War Department: "My colored unit is progressing handsomely. They are expecting usual pay and bounty allowed white soldiers. Will they get it?" Secretary Stanton replied that Negro troops could only be paid "ten dollars and no bounty." To avoid a mutiny among Negro Guardsmen over wages, the governor personally raised funds for the support of soldiers' families. Unlike the

39 Langston, From Virginia Plantation, 208; Reid, Ohio in the War, II, 916; Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 591; David Tod to Lewis McCoy, June 18, 1863, Negro in Military Service, roll 4, 1336.
Massachusetts Legislature, the Ohio General Assembly did not approve state aid to Negro households.\(^\text{40}\)

Fortunately, the Negro middle class took up the issue. Under the leadership of Mrs. James Poindexter of Columbus, the Colored Auxiliary Soldiers Aid Society provided money to Negro Guardsmen and their families. Deploiring the government's parsimonious attitude toward Negro soldiers, Mrs. Poindexter issued a bi-racial appeal for funds. Enough money was collected from this drive to keep Negro families from being sent to Ohio's poorhouses. The Society also subsidized widows and orphans of deceased soldiers during the Reconstruction Era.\(^\text{41}\)

Despite the Society's efforts, Negro soldiers were convinced that equal justice, not pay, was the real issue. Taking their cue from the 54th Massachusetts, the men wanted to disband and return home. Governor Tod declared that each man was free to decide his own course of action. Secretly, the governor thought that the Negroes would

\(^\text{40}\)Tod to Stanton, June 26, 1863, Ibid., roll 2, 1352; Edwin Stanton to David Tod, June 26, 1863, Ibid., roll 2, 1351; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 34.

\(^\text{41}\)Cleveland Leader, November 25, 1863; Ibid., December 2, 1865; Richard C. Minor, "James Preston Poindexter, Elder Statesman of Columbus," Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly, LVI, 1947, 257-286. (Hereafter cited as Minor, "James Preston Poindexter.") S.A. Vesey (comp.) Franklin County (Ohio) At the Beginning of the Twentieth Century, 364.
"disgrace themselves and their race forever" by abandoning camp at this time.\textsuperscript{42} Several meetings were held by the soldiers. Under Holland's influence, the regiment voted to remain at Camp Delaware. The decision marked a cooperative spirit between the aristocracy and its black cohorts. John Mercer Langston described the verdict: "The leaders and every man asserted that he was ready to accept the situation just as it was, and show his patriotism and devotion to his country in efforts and struggles for its defense which might cost him even his life." The Ohio National Guard was finally integrated.\textsuperscript{43}

The Bureau of Colored Troops exercised great caution in selecting white officers for the regiment. Those having an abolitionist background were preferred, and Governor Tod personally inspected each candidate. All applications from "friends of the Negro race" were quickly approved and sent to the Bureau for further examination.

\textsuperscript{42}Langston, \textit{From Virginia Plantation}, 208; Tod to McCoy, \textit{Adjutant General's Papers}, July 18, 1863, \textit{Ohio Archives}, OHS.

\textsuperscript{43}In recognizing the 127th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Governor Tod completely ignored the Ohio Militia Law of 1803 and the state Constitution of 1851, which banned Negro participation in the militia. He based his authority to raise Negro Guardsmen upon the U.S. Militia Law of 1862, which deleted "white" from the regulations of all state militias. See Langston, \textit{From Virginia Plantation}, 208; O.L., II, 5; \textit{Debates of the Convention, 1851, I}, 452; \textit{Ohio Guard Regulations, 1897, 2}; \textit{U.S., Statutes at Large, XII}, 597.
Upon passing tests of military and general knowledge, the candidate was awarded a commission, provided he was physically qualified. As expected, most of the officers were graduates of Oberlin and the Western Reserve College, but others came from Dennison University and Ohio Wesleyan University. (Appendix C shows that all the men belonged to the professional and business classes.) Moreover, only two officers had less than fourteen months of previous military service. Their mean age was 28.3 years. Finally each man was an Ohio resident. The Bureau selected Giles W. Shurtleff, an Oberlin College student, as the regiment's temporary commander. When informed of the appointment, Shurtleff was ecstatic about this "special job," for he had long believed that military service provided the key to Negro acceptance into white society.

The Bureau's policy of "white officers only" was contested by many regimental members. In a letter to the governor, the Guardsmen requested the commissioning of several Negro line officers. The men were willing to

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44Langston, From Virginia Plantation, 209; Adjutant General Department, Governor's Telegraphic Dispatch Book, October 17, 1863 - December 9, 1863 (Columbus, 1863) 7,8, 10,33,38,54,64,73,81,84,94,121,135,149. (Hereafter cited as Telegraphic Dispatch Book.) Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 593-624; "Report of Candidates Examined"; Ulysses Marvin, "Giles Waldo Shurtleff," Oberlin Alumni Magazine, VII (1911) 312-313. (Hereafter cited as Marvin, "Giles Waldo Shurtleff.")

45Giles Waldo Shurtleff to Mary Shurtleff, May 19, 1864, Giles Waldo Shurtleff Papers, 665.
obey white officers, but they preferred Negro company commanders. Governor Tod did not act upon the request because it violated federal law. By offering Negro soldiers the positions of non-commissioned officers, he hoped to avoid further discord within the unit. 46

The unit's NCOs were all members of the militia aristocracy. Since Ohio contained few educated blacks, mulatto soldiers assumed the tasks of completing muster rolls and acting as clerical assistants to the white officers. Captain Elliot Grable of Company "H" praised Milton Holland's bookkeeping ability. Writing to Colonel Shurtleff, he said of Holland: "You see the Sergeant Major's a far better penman than I. Holland is almost white, and is a smart fellow and an excellent soldier." 47

46 Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 38; Telegraphic Dispatch Book, August 3, 1863; See also G. Williams, History of Negro Troops, 141-144.

47 Elliot F. Grable to Giles W. Shurtleff, October 11, 1864, Giles W. Shurtleff Papers. The complete roster of Ohio NCOs included Sergeant (Sgt) Major Milton Holland, "Company C," Fifth USCT, an insurance salesman and shoemaker from Athens County, led the roster of Ohio's mulattoes in the Civil War. Other distinguished NCOs were Sgt. Robert Pinn, Company I, an attorney from Stark County; Sgt. James Bronson, Company D, a Trumbull County beautician; and Sgt. Powhatan Beatty, "Company G," a businessman (shop-owner) from Hamilton County (Cincinnati.) See Chapman Bros., Stark County History, 251; Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 591-624; "James Bronson's Pension Application File and Military Service Record, October 27, 1886," Claim Number 343751, National Archives; ONG Historical Records; Athens Messenger, February 4, 1864; Levstik, "Slavery to Freedom," 10-15; Dabney, Cincinnati's Colored Citizens, 345.
The War Department was pleased that the regiment contained a surplus of trained Negroes. In granting the colored soldier a semblance of authority, Stanton discovered that most colored regiments were devoid of educated Negroes for NCO slots. Reluctantly, the Bureau replaced illiterate Negro sergeants with competent white personnel.  

The sight of Negroes at Camp Delaware prompted a protest from the conservative Cincinnati Enquirer, which declared that Negro soldiers "are a disgrace to the government that employs them, a reproach to our cause, calculated to bring upon us the shame of the whole world." Other reactions to Negro Guardsmen were less hysterical. John Brough, the Republican gubernatorial candidate in 1863, expressed the view of most whites when he stated: "I had rather do it [muster Negroes] then to send any more of our sons and brothers down there."  

Because Negro soldiers were in the public eye, their behavior had to be excellent. Whites living around the camp had opposed the stationing of Negro troops in


49 Cincinnati Daily Enquirer, July 8, 1863.
Delaware County. On several occasions, white militiamen training there had been guilty of petty theft and drunkenness. To the residents' surprise, the Negro committed no acts "unbecoming an American soldier." By October 13, the regiment had mustered in nine full companies. Thinking that a tenth company could not be filled in time, Governor Tod promised that the unit would quickly be enrolled in federal service. This was good news, for the men had become restless and weary with six months of continuous drilling.50

On November 1, 1863, the War Department informed the governor that Negro soldiers could not hold state designations. Although an Ohio Guard unit, the regiment's name was changed to the 5th Regiment, USCT. The unit was quickly ordered to Norfolk, Virginia, where it became attached to the Army of the James, commanded by General Butler. Colonel James Conine assumed permanent command of the regiment and immediately assigned his men to

50 On July 22, 1863, Governor Tod telegraphed Secretary Stanton that his colored regiment was "in fighting trim." This report was premature because the Guardsmen needed more instruction in infantry tactics. But the men (especially the brash eighteen year olds) were bored with camp life and wanted actual combat. See Langston, *From Virginia Plantation*, 210; Frank Levstik, "The Fifth Regiment, United States Colored Troops, 1863-1865," *Northwest Ohio Quarterly*, XLII, No. 4, 1970. (Hereafter cited as Levstik, "Fifth Regiment, USCT.")
fatigue duty. Fortunately, the unit would soon see combat action.51

The War Department in 1863 had relegated Negro soldiers to labor battalions. As a result of three important engagements against Confederate soldiers, Negroes succeeded in reversing this trend. Colored soldiers at Port Hudson, Louisiana, proved their mettle on May 27 when two regiments of Louisiana's d'Afrique (formerly "Native Guards") attacked a Confederate stronghold. Outnumbered six to one, the Negroes still fought heroically. Charging without support, they were eventually forced to retreat. Even in defeat, their bravery silenced the most vocal critics of colored troops. General Nathaniel P. Banks, a skeptic about Negro line troops, later wrote that, "the determined manner in which they encountered the enemy leaves upon my mind no doubt of their ultimate success."52

51 The two Negro regiments from Massachusetts kept their state's name because they were organized and sanctioned by the War Department before the establishment of the Bureau of the Colored Troops. Governor Tod's argument that John Andrew was receiving preferential treatment from the Bureau was disregarded by Secretary Stanton. See Dyer, Compendium III, 1261-1267; O.R., Ser.3, IV, 164; Ibid., Ser.3, III, 1111; Stanton to Andrew, January 27, 1863; Negro in Military Service, roll 2, 1076; Reid, Ohio in the War II, 916-917.

52 During this time General Banks was commander of the Department of the Gulf. See Cornish, Sable Arm, 142-143; U.S., Statutes at Large, XII, 592,599; Reddick, Army's Negro Policy," 11-13; O.R., XXVI, 145; Daniel Ullman to Edwin Stanton, June 6, 1863, Negro in Military Service, roll 2, 1298; Robertson, "Negro Soldiers," 29.
Other battles also proved that Negroes could do more than simple labor assignments. On June 7, at Milliken's Bend, Louisiana, eleven hundred Negro troops were attacked by a regiment of fifteen hundred Texans commanded by General H.E. McCulloch. After twenty minutes of fierce hand-to-hand combat, the Negroes retreated, but General Elias Dennis, commander of the Union forces, praised the Negro's valor. Considering the youthfulness of his troops, Dennis declared: "It is impossible for men to show greater gallantry than the Negro troops in this fight."53 Charles Dana, assistant secretary of war, stated that the "bravery of blacks in the Battle of Milliken's Bend completely revolutionized the sentiment of the army with regard to the employment of Negro troops."54

The assault upon Fort Wagner, South Carolina, by the 54th Massachusetts Regiment made a believer of Governor Tod. On July 18, the unit, assigned to the Department of the South, staged a morning raid upon the well-fortified Confederate position. The plan of attack was not indicative of sound military thinking. The darkness proved unfavorable to the regiment which charged into unfamiliar surroundings without any visibility. Moreover, the 54th

53Ibid., 29.
54Cornish, Sable Arm, 145.
was exhausted by several days of fatigue duty on Morris Island, South Carolina. Finally, the raid was hardly a surprise. Confederate sentries had observed the massing of troops long before the beginning of the attack. Despite all these obstacles, Negroes under the command of Colonel Robert Gould Shaw actually reached the top of the fort's parapet before Shaw was killed and his troops retreated in confusion. The dilemma of the Ohioans was described by Private James Hewitt of Xenia:

...The rebels remained silent at Fort Wagner till we got fifty yards of it, then let loose with the grape and canister, doing terrible execution. They were firing from all directions—from James Island, and from Sullivan's Island, and Cummings Point, Battery Gregg and so forth... Union casualties were heavy. The toll included three officers killed and eleven others wounded. The enlisted ranks reported thirty-one soldiers killed and two hundred thirty-five men wounded or missing. When the regiment sought the return of Colonel Shaw's body, the Confederates replied: "We have buried him with his niggers." Francis George Shaw, the colonel's father, answered the insult with this statement: "We hold that a soldier's most


56Xenia Torchlight, December 23, 1863.
appropriate burial is on the field where he has fallen."

From a purely military view, the Fort Wagner assault was a failure. However, it did provide the most severe test to date of Negro soldiership. The Nashville Daily Union praised Ohio Negroes for a superior performance, but recognized that many whites, still unconvinced of the Negro's military prowess, "would have called the 54th Massachusetts cowardly if they had stormed and carried the gates of hell...." Despite their repeated displays of courage, Negroes were still assigned monotonous field duty in 1863. Understandably, they readily volunteered for the tasks of storming enemy fortifications, for even these suicide missions were preferable to entrenching duties. It was not until 1864 that Negroes were allowed to do soldier's work.

On December 4, 1863, the 5th USCT was assigned to the 24th Army Corps' Third Division, commanded by Brigadier General Edward Wild. Called the "African Brigade," the troops were used primarily in raids and skirmishes against the enemy. Ohio's regiment received its first taste of combat on December 5. Accompanying an expedition

57 G. Williams, History of Negro Troops, 202-203; Cornish, Sable Arm, 135.

through Camden Court House, North Carolina, the unit was ambushed by Confederate guerrillas and lost twelve men.\(^{59}\)

In retaliation for the attack, the brigade burned two enemy camps, destroyed a number of houses and razed "several moonshine stills." The federals also captured fifty Enfield rifles and a snare drum. By December 18, Wild's unit had cleared the area of Sandy Swamp, North Carolina, of all enemy positions. Reporting to General Butler, Wild charged that the guerrillas were not actually soldiers but "crooks hired by the Governor of North Carolina." He later declared that the guerrillas' sole purpose was preventing fugitive Negroes from entering Union lines. Rumors of slave executions by the insurgents were also widespread.\(^{60}\)

Resolving to punish the outlaws for the slayings, Wild remained in North Carolina an extra week. On December 18, the brigade captured Private Daniel Bright of Company "L", 62nd Georgia Regiment. After a quick trial,

\(^{59}\)Other units in the Brigade included the 55th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment, the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Volunteer Regiments of North Carolina and the 10th USCT. See O.R., XXIX, pt.2, 619; Ibid., XXXIX, pt.1, 910; Battles and Leaders IV, 591-592.

\(^{60}\)After the Battle of Sandy Swamp, the Brigade reported a total of sixteen casualties--nine killed and seven wounded. Of these killed in action, four were Ohioans. See "Report of Edward A. Wild," O.R., XXIX, pt. 1, 910-915; Dyer, Compendium, II, 822.
the rebel was found guilty of murder and hanged within twenty-four hours. General Wild did not stop there. Conducting still another raid, he destroyed two more enemy camps and took six Confederate soldiers and four civilians as hostages. Three of the noncombatants seized by the brigade were white women.61

General Butler, fearing that Negro soldiers might sexually exploit the female hostages, quickly censured Wild's actions. He ordered the commander to "stick to the War and not deviate for entertainment." Finally, Butler declared that in the future, Negro troops could only capture males. The War Department was informed of Wild's deeds. The popular notions of Negroes raping white women sent a shudder through Secretary Stanton. These stories, even if unfounded, could kill the experiment of Negro soldiers in the Union Army. On June 14, 1864, the War Department stipulated that no women (white or otherwise) could be captured by black soldiers.62 Despite a severe censure, General Wild retained his command. Privately, he felt betrayed by Butler's overreaction to the


62Butler to Stanton, January 26, 1864, Ibid., roll 5, 4282; Benjamin Butler to Henry Halleck, January 26, 1864, Ibid., roll 5, 4284; Lorenzo Thomas to Edwin Stanton, June 4, 1864, Ibid., roll 3, 2618.
incident. Wild later wrote that during his expedition, his men were only punishing hostile whites it encountered. Reminding the War Department that North Carolina was a rebel state, the general stated that Negro soldiers were unwelcomed. In fact they were often shot by Confederate sympathizers. Finally, he declared that he was only protecting his men.63

On December 21, the brigade marched back to the Norfolk Area. Sergeant Major Holland noted that the Ohioans had no winter clothing. They had participated in the raids without "blankets or overcoats," but not a man in the ranks complained of this condition. The white cavalry unit accompanying the brigade marvelled at the regiment's ability to withstand such hardships.64

In January of 1864, the War Department ordered the transfer of the 5th USCT to Yorktown, Virginia. Officially the regiment was part of the Second Brigade, United States Forces at Yorktown. While encamped there, the unit received news of the hanging of one of its soldiers. The citizens of Pasquotank, North Carolina, informed General George Getty, commander at Yorktown, that the body of a Negro soldier was found on January 12. Stapled to his

64Athens Messenger, February 4, 1864.
back was the following note:


The residents stated that they had not taken part in the execution. However, they did remove the handcuffs from the body and bury the soldier.  

On January 17, an angry Ben Butler wrote General Henry Halleck that the Confederates' no quarter policy was now in effect. Private Jones had been a prisoner of war at Richmond and was released to General Pickett for hanging. After a thorough investigation, Butler discovered that Private Bright was a deserter from the 62nd Georgia Regiment. While plundering the countryside, the ex-rebel had, in fact, killed several slaves. Butler concluded that General Wild had justly treated him, not as a prisoner of war, but as a murderer. He then pressured Halleck for a definite government policy regarding the killing of Negro prisoners by rebel forces. Halleck responded that the execution was not a "deliberate Southern policy" and refused to bother Jefferson Davis.

The 5th USCT reacted sharply to the Union’s abandonment of Negro soldiers. Milton Holland, spokesman for the regiment, declared that the soldiers themselves must avenge the murder. Vowing to "pin their sentences to them with Uncle Sam's leaden pills," he threatened the enemy with massive retaliation in kind. The specter of death upon capture had long haunted the unit, and with their worst fears now realized, the men prepared for their next engagement.

On March 3, 1864, the regiment departed from Yorktown en route to New Kent Court House. Colonel Shurtleff discovered that a band of Confederates was following his men. Delighted to meet the enemy, he ordered his men to open fire. The skirmish lasted only a few minutes. The surprised rebels hastily retreated to their base camp. Shurtleff praised his unit's performance in the fight. He reminded the men that even small battles were noticed by the corps commanders. If they expected additional

66 Butler later reported an error in the dead soldier's name. He was Private Samuel Jordan, Company D, Fifth USCT. The mistake was attributed to the fact that the regiment was raised in Ohio and was popularly called the "Fifth Ohio." See O.R., Ser.2, VI, 858; Ibid., Ser. 2, VI, 845; Benjamin Butler to Henry Halleck, January 17, 1864, Negro in Military Service, roll 5, 4274; Ibid., roll 5, 4284; Levstik, "Fifth Regiment, USCT," 90.

67 Athens Messenger, February 4, 1864.
combat duty, the soldiers must consistently defeat the enemy, the criterion for veteran troops. The colonel's prophecy rang true nearly a month later when General Butler, planning a summer attack upon Petersburg, picked the "experienced" 5th USCT to lead the assault.68

On April 23, the regiment was transferred to the Second Brigade, Third Division, 18th Army Corps. For the next three weeks, the men were bored with fatigue duty and rudimentary drill. Finally, on May 12, the unit began four days of heavy fighting at City Point, Virginia. Storming the rebel works at Fort Darling, they captured an artillery battery and several signal officers, clearing the road to Petersburg. Regimental casualties for the May operations in Virginia were listed at eight men killed and nine wounded.69

While marching towards Petersburg, the 5th USCT received news that a sister regiment had been formed. On

68 The regiment reported no casualties in the encounter. See Dyer, Compendium, II, 912; O.R., XXXIII, 198; G. Williams, History of Negro Troops, 242; Reid, Ohio in the War, II, 916-917.

69 The Third Division, also known as "Hinks Colored Troops," contained two Negro brigades. The First Brigade, commanded by General Wild, included the 10th, 22nd, and 37th USCT. A colored artillery battery was also attached to these units. The Second Brigade enlisted the 4th, 5th and 6th USCT under the command of Colonel Samuel A. Duncan. See O.R., XXXIII, pt. 1, 198; Ibid., XXXVI, Pt. 3, 17; Dyer, Compendium, I, 392,936; Reid, Ohio in the War, II, 917.
January 11, 1864, Ohio was authorized to raise a second Negro Guard unit. Quickly ordering all enlistees to Camp Delaware, Governor Tod organized the 27th USCT, and the regiment's ten companies were filled within five days. The response of Ohio Negroes was so great that a waiting list of unassigned recruits was circulated on January 13. (Appendix D reveals that in the fall of 1864 Ohio was the eleventh state successfully raising at least two Negro regiments. However, it was the sixth state mustering a colored unit into federal service.)

Qualifying tests for the unit's white officers were identical to those given previously to the 5th Regiment. Some interesting comparisons can be made between the cadres of the two units. (Appendix E shows that the officers of the 27th Regiment were abolitionist-oriented, college trained, wealthy, and either professionals or businessmen.) Unlike the 5th USCT, all line officers of its sister regiment had at least fourteen months of previous military experience.

70 The Ohio governor again lost his bid to designate the regiment "Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Ohio National Guard." See U.S. War Department, "General Order No.7," Negro in Military Service, roll 3, 2327; Ibid., roll 3, 2320; Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 661-680.

71 Ohio was preceded in the completion of its roster by Massachusetts, South Carolina, North Carolina, Louisiana and Kansas--all of whom received authorization from the War Department before the Buckeye State. See O.R., Ser.3, III, 1113; Dyer, Compendium, III, 1186.
service. Another difference existed in the ages of the men. The officers of the 27th Regiment averaged 29.9 years of age, more than a year older than their predecessors. Whenever possible Negro NCOs were appointed. On March 24, 1864, Colonel Albert Blackman was chosen as the regiment's commander. 72

On March 8, the unit was mustered into federal service and assigned to the First Brigade, Fourth Division, of the Ninth Army Corps. Brigadier General Edward Ferrero, commander of the all-Negro Fourth Division, quickly designated the regiment as assault troops. Informing Major General Ambrose Burnside, the corps commander, of his intentions, Ferrero moved rapidly. From March 17-23, the regiment was dispatched to Knoxville, Tennessee, where it studied battlefield tactics and performed guard duty. Observing the progress of his entire division, Ferrero was certain that they could assist Lieutenant General Ulysses Grant in the battle for Petersburg. 73

During the Wilderness Campaign in Virginia (May 4 - June 12), the Division received the job of guarding the Union's supply trains. On May 9, at the Battle of Spotsylvania, the soldiers impressed their white officers

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72 Report of Candidates Examined; Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 627-658; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 38.

73 Battles and Leaders IV, 103,158,164,563.
MAP 5

ENGAGEMENTS OF THE 27TH USCT DURING THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN, MAY 4 - JUNE 12, 1864

by preventing the theft of a single wagon. The 27th Regiment was not satisfied with this job. The men complained of insufficient combat duty. Except for a skirmish at Orange Plank Road, Virginia, they had not engaged the enemy. Fortunately, the men realized the significance of their assignment. General Burnside pointed out that the Army of the Potomac had been plagued with Confederate bandits. If the Union's wagons were seized by the enemy, the federal army would perish. With this problem apparently solved, Burnside and Grant devoted their energies toward the Petersburg attack.74

The Wilderness comprised the region south of the Rapidan River. Here General Robert Lee constantly harassed Grant's forces with guerrilla attacks. The Confederate strategy involved drawing the Union army into Petersburg's interior and then attacking it from mountainous positions. Grant was unmoved by the rebels tactics. His only concern was capturing Petersburg, occupying Richmond and ending the rebellion. To this end, he was ready to sacrifice large numbers of men to Confederate snipers.

74 Two brigades totaling a mere 4,300 men composed the Fourth Division. The 1st Brigade, commanded by Colonel Joseph Siegfried contained the 27th, 30th, 39th, and 43rd USCT (2000 soldiers). The 2nd Brigade, under the direction of Colonel Henry Goddard Thomas, included the 19th, 23rd, 28th, 29th, and 31st USCT regiments (2300 men). See O.R., XL, pt.2, 550; Dyer, Compendium, III, 1728; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 38.
On June 1, the combined Armies of the James and the Potomac received Grant's plan for assaulting Petersburg. 75

Thirteen days later, the regiments participating in the attack were selected. To the chagrin of the 27th, the 5th USCT was given the job of leading the assault. This was a bitter disappointment because the unit perceived itself to be as experienced as its predecessors. The 27th's performance during the Wilderness Campaign had been outstanding. In fact, on May 20, the regiment captured many Confederate soldiers at Salem Church and Fredericksburg. While fighting at Germanna Road, the unit inflicted heavy losses upon the enemy, but suffered no casualties themselves. 76

The 27th Regiment grew increasingly weary of living in the shadows of "Ohio's first," and it seemed that the entire Fourth Division was simply a service unit for Butler's 18th Corps. Building fortifications at New Kent Court House and at Chapens Farm, Virginia, was not the Ohioans' idea of soldiering. Growing impatient with the Union's envelopment strategy, the regiment clamored for an increased combat role. Its wishes were not granted.

75 Southern Historical Association, Confederate Military History, III (Atlanta, 1899) 516.

76 Reid, Ohio in the War, II, 917; O.R., XXXVI, 986-988.
As the 5th USCT prepared to storm the rebel defenses at Petersburg, its sister unit was ordered to guard water wagons near the Chickahominy River. 77

Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, however, acted to change the duties of most Negro regiments and on June 14 issued General Order No. 21. It instructed all field commanders to divide the fatigue duties equally between colored and white troops. In addition, Union generals were required to assign combat missions to Negro units. Thomas explained that this action was necessary "to prepare them [Negroes] for the higher duties of conflict with the enemy." 78

While the 5th USCT welcomed its assignment, the unit was not really prepared to meet the enemy. One of the regiment's most glaring deficiencies was weapons. All of the Negro regiments were armed with flintlock muskets converted to percussion. Most of these were inoperable and had been condemned by white units since 1861. Although promised modern weapons in November 1863, the 5th USCT was still fighting with obsolete arms. General Buckingham's inventory of the Ohio Arsenal in 1859


78 Ibid., Ser. 3, IV, 431.
revealed that the state owned 62,093 muskets, only 6,995 of which had rifled bores. The rest were vintaged smooth-bore flintlocks. Ohio did possess 363 modern breechloaders, but refrained from issuing them to Negro troops.  

On April 27, 1864, Adjutant General Thomas informed Secretary Stanton of the acute weapon problem in Negro units. Soldiers using foreign rifles such as the English-made Brunswick, Whitworth, or Enfield muzzle loaders often suffered from lack of ammunition and spare parts. Commanders of Negro regiments deplored these conditions and demanded breechloaders for their men. Reputed to be more accurate than muzzleloaders, these firearms had a major drawback. The leaking of gases at the breech could produce an explosion powerful enough to decapitate the user. Barring this hazard, breechloading muskets possessed a greater rate of fire than the muzzleloaders and were easier to load. During the last year of the War, the Springfield Armory managed to produce enough "rifle-muskets" (.58 caliber) to equip the majority of the Negro regiments.  

79 Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1859, 30. See also A.L. Chétlain to Lorenzo Thomas, April 5, 1864, Negro in Military Service, roll 3, 2472; Quarles, Negro in Civil War, 204.  

80 At the outbreak of the War, both sides needed firearms so desperately that they purchased them abroad. Most of the early weapons came from Britain. These were
Petersburg, the key to the defense of Richmond, was crucial to Union hopes of winning the War. To achieve its objective, the North planned to use Negro soldiers as storm troopers and support them by heavy artillery barrages. After enveloping the rebel fortress in a "pincer's movement," the charging soldiers would capture all weapons and personnel and signal for reinforcements. 81

At 6 a.m. on June 15, the attack began as Duncan's Brigade, augmented by the 22nd USCT, advanced three hundred yards under the cover of darkness. Crawling through a ravine, the brigade's movement was impeded by thick underbrush and fallen timber. The anticipation of combat proved too much for some of the soldiers. Without orders, several companies of the 4th USCT rushed the Confederate batteries. A confused retreat followed as the unit was heavily shelled by enemy artillery. As a result, the regiment lost 120 of its men. At 2 p.m., the 5th USCT was given orders to charge. While the Confederates' left flank skirmished with the 4th and 22nd Regiments, the modified muskets using the cylindrical shaped "Minie Ball." 81


81 O.R., XXXVI, pt. 2, 266-267; Confederate Military History, III, 516; See also Levstik, "Fifth Regiment, USCT," 90-92.
Ohioans stormed the right side of the bastion and "drove the enemy form the works." Six artillery pieces and hundreds of rebel defenders were also captured by the regiment. The next day, Duncan's unit was held in reserve near Spring Hill and City Post Roads. The 1st Brigade under General Wild was assigned "mop up" duty.  

The Union was ecstatic over its victory. The praise of Negro soldiers was unceasing. General Edward Hinks was the first to offer his congratulations. However, he cautioned against overconfidence "lest we imperil the success of arming colored men as well as the success of our armies." Hinks pointed out that the Negro was not a natural soldier but one made by "intelligent drill and instruction."^{82}

Major General W.F. "Baldy" Smith, the commander of the 18th Army Corps also cheered the performance of Duncan's Brigade: "In the thickest of the fighting, they never flinched...With the veterans of the 18th Corps they have stormed the works of the enemy, taking guns and prisoners, and in the whole affair they have displayed the qualities of good soldiers." Smith noted that the

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^{82} The lines of attack for the colored troops were as follows: 5th, right, 22nd, right center; 4th, left center. See Levstik, "Fifth Regiment USCT-" 92; O.R., XXXVI, pt.2, 266-267; Ibid., XL, pt.1, 722; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 31-38.

^{83} Edward Hinks to W.F. Smith, June 27, 1864, O.R., XL, pt.2, 490.
MAP 6

THE 5th USCT AT THE BATTLE OF PETERSBURG

Army of the Potomac, so long prejudiced against using Negroes in combat, was deeply shocked by their success at Petersburg. The assault upon Petersburg marked the first major battle for the 5th USCT. With this performance, the experiment of arming Negro soldiers was successful.  

By June 17, the victory was tarnished by ineptness when General Wild's men failed to drive the enemy's scattered forces from the crest. The debacle so frustrated General Hinks that he wished that Duncan's unit had finished the assault. Nevertheless, a second attack upon Petersburg was not anticipated before the end of July. The Ohioans used this lull in the fighting to nurse their wounds and perform needed entrenching duties.  

The regiment learned quickly that Negro soldiers did not receive adequate medical attention. At Petersburg a shortage of ambulances resulted in the injured white troops receiving primary attention. Wounded members of the 5th USCT attempting to walk to the field hospitals often died on the way, and drivers and medics frequently refused to assist injured Negroes unless they

24G. Williams, History of Negro Troops, 241-242; Benjamin Butler to Ulysses Grant, June 15, 1864, Negro in Military Service, roll 3, 3165-3166.

85Edward Hinks to William Russell, June 17, 1864; O.R., XXXIX, pt.3, 460; Ibid., XXXVI, 268.
were bribed. Medical supplies apparently earmarked for Ohio Negroes were sold to other regiments bidding for them. To make matters worse, the War Department neglected the stationing of trained doctors near Negro units.86

From June 18 to July 29, the 5th USCT performed entrenchment duty near Petersburg. During this time the regiment's commander worried over the high mortality rates among Negro soldiers. The War Department statistics for 1864 revealed that Negroes were more susceptible to death by disease than were white troops. For example, in Negro regiments, 141.39 per thousand soldiers died of diseases. White units recorded only 59.22 per thousand men dying of illnesses. On the other hand, Negro battlefield casualties were considerably smaller than his white counterpart. (Appendix F offers a comparative analysis of casualties for the regulars, white volunteers, and

86 On June 15, during the first assault upon Petersburg, Colonel James Conine of the Fifth, USCT, was wounded, and of course, promptly treated. He was transferred to a comfortable hospital in Annapolis, Maryland for a short convalescence. He resigned in August. Negro Ohioans in the conflict however, received no such medical care. See Reid, Ohio in the War II, 917; U.S. Surgeon's General's Office, Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion (Washington, D.C. 1870) I, pt.1, 164, 176. (Hereafter cited as Medical and Surgical History.) Diary of Colonel Albert Rogall, Twenty Seventh USCT, 8. (Hereafter cited as Rogall, Diary.) Franklin, Slavery to Freedom, 293.
colored troops.)

The explanation for the Negro's disproportionate disease toll may be found in his employment. Performing the majority of fatigue duties, in addition to his combat details, Negro soldiers were too exhausted to resist infectious diseases. (Appendix G reveals that diarrhea, typhoid, and small pox were rampant in Negro regiments.) Aware of this problem Colonel Shurtleff constantly inspected the 5th USCT for proper hygiene and sanitation. However, this action was atypical of most Negro regiments. Rarely were they ever examined for cleanliness. An officer of the 27th USCT commented that "everything around our camp promoted disease--the sand just moving with lices and other vermin." It appeared that as long as the white officers had the "best of everything," the health and welfare of their Negro troops were largely neglected. (Despite Shurtleff's concern, Appendix H, which contains a complete record of casualties for the unit, show that the Ohioans lost 135 men to diseases. Comparatively,


88Rogall, Diary, 7; Medical and Surgical History, I, pt.1, 62, 176, 636-637, 710; Negro in Military Service, roll 5, 3766, 7.
Appendix I points out that only 111 soldiers of the 27th Infantry Regiment succumbed to illnesses.) These wretched conditions notwithstanding, neither unit reported a single desertion. Placing their problems behind them, the Ohioans prepared for the second assault upon Petersburg.\(^\text{89}\)

Although the 18th Corps failed to achieve a total victory at Petersburg, the Ninth Corps had managed to pull within one-hundred-thirty yards of the Confederates' main lines. Facing Elliot's Salient, the federals were constantly under attack from enemy artillery. (Figures I and II reveal that behind the Confederates' position lay a deep valley.) Colonel Henry Pleasants, a former mining engineer with the 48th Pennsylvania Volunteers, told his division commander, General Robert Potter, that the rebel's forts should be mined. If explosives were placed forward of the ravine, the enemy's guns could be silenced. The five hundred yards separating the Armies would then be easily covered by storming troops.\(^\text{90}\)

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\(^{89}\)These figures indicate that excessive fatigue duty was responsible for over 54% of the total deaths reported by the 5th USCT. The 27th USCT attributed 66% of its death toll to wretched intrenchment duty. See Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 591-628. The Union Army reported that 7% or 14,887 Negroes deserted from a total number of 200,000 Negro enlistees. See Ibid., 593-628; O.R., Ser.3, V, 1030.

\(^{90}\)Ibid., XL, 70; Battles and Leaders IV, 545; T. Williams, Lincoln and the Radicals, 361.
FIGURE 1

PROFILE VIEW OF THE CRATER AT PETERSBURG, JULY 30, 1864

FIGURE 2

AERIAL VIEW OF THE CRATER AT PETERSBURG, JULY 30, 1864

General Potter mentioned the idea to General Burnside. The corps commander approved it and selected the troops participating in the attack. General E.O.C. Ord, commander of the 18th Corps, indicated to Burnside that the 5th USCT was available for duty. Restricted to trench digging for nearly a month, the "heroes of Petersburg" were anxious for combat. Captain Ulysses Marvin declared that the regiment was excited over its new assignment. Proud of their combat record, the men prepared to add another streamer to their unit banners.91

The designation of assault troops led to jealousies between Negroes of the 9th and 18th Corps. The Fourth Division, Ninth Corps, strenuously objected to Duncan's Brigade monopolizing the combat assignments. Complaining to General Ferrero, the division stated that it was well drilled and ready for battle. Aware that his men had never been in a major conflict, the commander still wanted to give the soldiers their share of glory. He told the corps commander that the division was ready for a combat mission.92

91For its performance at Petersburg (June 15) the Fifth USCT inscribed "Petersburg" on its flag. See Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 39; Marvin, "Giles Waldo Shurtleff," 318.

92Battles and Leaders, IV, 549, 592; O.R., XL, pt. 1, 58.
Trusting General Ferrero's advice, Burnside selected the Negro Division to lead the assault. The latter had been quite annoyed that General "Baldy" Smith declared the Army of the Potomac to be "prejudiced" in the employment of Negro troops, and the Ninth Corps was anxious to prove him wrong. It was now clear that the jealousies and hostilities of the enlisted ranks had spread to the corps leaders as well. But the feuds among Union generals contributed little to the war effort. In this case, they proved a major detriment, for the 5th USCT was overlooked in favor of green troops. Burnside was reassured of his decision by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Loring, chief inspector of the Ninth Corps. He declared that the use of Negro troops was the only alternative to postponing the attack, for he believed that the corps' white soldiers were battle weary and did not have the same spirit as the Negro Division.93

93 The general use of the 5th USCT was further complicated by petty intra-corps feuds. Generals Smith, Ord, and Godfrey Weitzel were locked in fierce competition for command of the 18th corps. The Ohioans preferred General Smith. However, his failure at Petersburg compelled Lincoln to replace him. The new commander, General Ord, was not enthusiastic about leading colored troops. After the war, he declared that Negro soldiers were "immoral and dishonest." See Foner, Blacks and the Military, 62; G. Williams, History of Negro Troops, 242-244; O.R., XL, pt.1, 58; Marvin, "Giles Waldo Shurtleff," 318; James H. Wilson, Life and Services of William F. Smith (Wilmington, 1904) 109-111.
On July 26, General Burnside submitted his plan to Major General George Meade, the commander of the Army of the Potomac. After studying the proposal, he gave it little chance of success. First, Meade thought that the mine was improperly placed to affect the enemy's artillery batteries. Secondly, he believed that Negro troops were too inexperienced to handle such an important task. Privately, the general shuddered at the political consequences of using Negro assault troops. If they were massacred, he would be crucified by the Radical Northern press.

Meade later told General Grant that:

If we put the colored troops in front (we had only one division) and it should prove a failure, it would then be said, and very properly that we were showing these people ahead to get killed because we did not care anything about them. But that could not be said if we put the white troops in front.

To Meade's surprise, Grant liked the idea of Negro storming troops. Finding himself outvoted, Meade was "persuaded" to approve the plan also. However, he ordered that the mine's powder charge be reduced from 14,000 pounds to 8,000 pounds.\(^4\)

After a month of hard work, the mine was completed. Laboring under adverse conditions, Colonel Pleasants later told a Congressional Committee of his difficulties:

...I found it impossible to get assistance from anybody...I could get no boards or lumber supplied to me for my operation...I had no mining picks furnished me, but had to take common army picks and have them straightened..."95

On July 28, General Meade changed his mind and informed Burnside that Negro troops could not lead the assault. Instead white troops would have to be used. A day later General Burnside convened a meeting at corps headquarters, and his division commanders "pulled straws" to find the unlucky commander. General James Ledlie, who had been with the First Division only forty-two days, drew the shortest straw. It was then decided that Generals Willcox and Potter would follow in that order. General Ferrero's unit was held in reserve.96

On July 30, the mine was detonated at 4:40 a.m. The blast not only destroyed the enemy fort, but also produced a giant hole 150 feet long. Ordering his troops into the crater, General Ledlie discovered that the rebel fire to the flanks was too intense. Seeing the futility of the charge, he halted his men and ordered a general retreat. It came too late. Burnside had already directed the other divisions "to keep moving and, ignore Ledlie's troops." General Potter's men, trying to protect the left flank, soon became entangled with Ledlie's division.

95Battles and Leaders, IV, 545.

96Ibid., IV, 545, 549; O.R., pt.1, 60, 70-74.
Neither commander realized that the crater's thirty foot walls were too steep to climb. Confederate artillery enjoyed a field day shooting the helpless federals trapped in the crater. Many of the Ninth Corps troops were shot in the back as they tried digging their heels into the wall and climbing backwards. Others were trampled and suffocated beneath their comrades. General Willcox's Third Division had better luck. Charging the right side of the crater, it destroyed all nearby enemy entrenchments. 97

At 7:30 a.m. Burnside realized that the attack was a fiasco. As a last resort, he ordered the Fourth Division to charge the crater and "march over the white soldiers." Negro soldiers found themselves lodged between retreating whites and the crater's insurmountable walls. To make matters worse, most of their officers were deliberately killed by the enemy. Without leadership, Ohio's 27th USCT stormed nearby Confederate positions and engaged the rebels in savage hand to hand fighting. Coordinating its charge with the 43rd USCT, the unit temporarily captured the enemy's interior works.

but other regiments of the Fourth Division became frightened and began to retreat. Refusing to take orders from Negro NCOs, the men bolted and ran. George L. Kilmer, an officer of the First Division, reported that white Union troops were angered at the sight of retreating Negroes. Black soldiers falling back into the crater were killed by their white comrades.98

General Meade frantically requested help from the 18th Corps. Circling the crater, Ord's troops captured minor enemy positions, but could not stem the tide of defeat. By 9:30 a.m. Meade conceded defeat and ordered all remaining troops from the crater. The Union mission was an utter failure, and the federal troops suffered an astronomical 4,400 casualties. The 27th USCT alone listed one hundred-fifty-one casualties. Overall, Negro units reported the heaviest losses of any division.99

The disaster prompted two weeks of investigations by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Charges

98Confederate Military History, III, 521; Hardesty, Ohio Military History, 215; Battles and Leaders, IV, 556; O.R., XL, pt.1, 596-597; Cornish, Sable Arm, 275; George L. Kilmer, "The Dash into the Crater," Century Magazine, XII (September, 1887) 775-776.

99The Ohio Regiment listed one officer and eleven enlisted men killed; and three officers and thirty-six men captured and missing. The entire Fourth Division suffered 1,327 casualties; the Second Division lost 832 men. The First and Third Divisions listed 642 and 659 casualties respectively. See O.R., OX, pt.1, 70,246-248, 598; Hardesty, Ohio Military History, 215.
and countercharges were heatedly tossed about in the ses­
sions. General Meade constantly defended himself from the
Committee's charges of being a racist. He stated that he
did not use Negro soldiers in the initial assault because
of their inexperience, not because of his personal dislike
for them. Meade implied that Burnside had no regard for
Negro life because he was willing to sacrifice them to
the enemy's artillery. In his final testimony, he de­
clared that Burnside's entire strategy at Petersburg was
characteristically ill-conceived.100

In turn, General Burnside, the Committee's favorite,
accused his superior of sabotage. He declared that Meade
reduced the mine's powder charge, not for conservation but
to nullify the entire mission. Burnside stated that had
the Negro brigades led the assault, victory would have
been guaranteed. By placing the disaster on Generals
Ledlie and Meade, he exonerated himself from any wrong­
doing or negligence.101

Burnside's praise of the Fourth Division was corrob­
orated by two regimental commanders, Colonels Henry G.
Thomas and Joshua Siegfried. The former stated that his

100O.R., XL, pt.1, 44-45; "Battle of Petersburg,"
Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, 1865, I, 30-
41. (Hereafter cited as C.C.W.)

101Ibid., I, 13-30; O.R., XL, pt.1, 57-72,74.
his soldiers displayed gallant conduct at Petersburg. He argued that the First Division was responsible for the defeat because it refused to charge the enemy. Colonel Thomas also declared that Negro soldiers captured some Confederate positions, but could not hold them without support. Finally he criticized Burnside for allowing Ledlie to advance the assault. According to Thomas, the corps commander was a victim of idealism and unsound military thinking. The latter agreed with Colonel Thomas's testimony. He stated that the Division's First Brigade was well on its way to victory when Ledlie's retreating troops stopped them.

General Ledlie appeared to be the scapegoat of the whole affair. Every officer had testified that he "clogged the crater" by halting his troops. Ledlie further implicated himself when he admitted that he did not remain in the crater with his troops. Returning to a bomb proof shortly after the retreat, he was treated for minor wounds by Surgeon O.P. Chubb. However, Ledlie was not


103 The bomb proof was located about 115 yards from the crater. See "Testimony of Surgeon O.P. Chubb," O.R., LX, pt.1, 103-104; Hardesty, Military History of Ohio, 215.
alone in the bomb proof. General Ferrero joined him shortly after his troops charged the crater. Surgeon H.E. Smith of the 27th Michigan Volunteers testified that Ferrero had been in the shelter for hours and had come to him complaining of exhaustion. Smith declared that Ferrero constantly begged him for "stimulants" (rum and whiskey.) In the general's absence, Colonel Siegfried commanded the division.104

The findings of the congressional body were predictable. Both Generals Ledlie and Ferrero were censured for failing to remain with their troops. In addition, General Willcox was cited for neglect of duty, while General Burnside received a mild rebuke for improper coordination of the attack. General Meade was declared innocent of all charges of incompetence.105

The media's comments upon the Petersburg disaster were divided along party lines. The Republican Cleveland Leader blamed the defeat upon "white troops" assigned the glorious duty of carrying the enemy's position.106 The Putnam County Courier, a New York Democratic newspaper,


105 General Willcox was charged by a Court of Inquiry with failing to order his men to capture Cemetery Hill. See O.R., XL, pt.1, 128.

106 Cleveland Leader, August 5, 1864.
charged that Negro soldiers exhibited great cowardice under fire. Many Northern whites, influenced by the adverse publicity of the incident now wondered if Negro demands of equal pay treatment were justified. 107

The 27th USCT redeemed its failure at Petersburg during the Battle of Weldon Railroad (Yellow Brick House) on August 18-21. The 4th Division not only sealed the defeat of the enemy upon the battlefield, it also destroyed the valuable railway supplying Lee's Army (at Petersburg) from Richmond as well. The Ohioans, suffering no casualties in the contest, eagerly anticipated their next engagement. 108 They were disappointed at Hatcher's Run because Burnside ordered them to the rear. Aware of the Confederate policy of shooting Negro sentries, General Meade was extremely sensitive about an increase in Negro casualties. Nevertheless, the Fourth Division did participate in heavy fighting against the rebels. The October 27th engagement cost them eighty men. By contrast, the white division of the Ninth Corps suffered an aggregate

107 On July 15, 1864, Congress enacted legislation providing Negro Soldiers with the same pay, equipment, rations, and medical care accorded white troops. This law was retroactive to January 1, 1864. See E.D. Townsend to War Department, July 15, 1864, Negro in Military Service, roll 3, 2685; Quarles, Negro in Civil War, 200-202; Cornish, Sable Arm, 276.

108 Battles and Leaders, IV, 569-575; Cleveland Leader, December 19, 1864.
MAP 7

OHIO NEGRO VOLUNTEERS: CAMPAIGNS IN VIRGINIA 1864

SOURCE: Battles and Leaders, IV, 569.
of only seventy casualties.109

The recent combat action boasted the morale of the 27th USCT. But the 5th USCT was not as fortunate. Returning to Deep Bottom, Virginia, after the Petersburg engagement, the unit suffered the scourges of fatigue duty:

Confederate snipers, weariness and worsening camp conditions, took a heavy toll within the regiment. The sick and wounded soldiers mounted so rapidly that the unit required 375 new recruits to maintain its full strength.110

Near the end of August, the men anticipated a combat assignment. Under the command of Colonel Alonzo Draper, the regiment moved to New Market Heights, Virginia, where on September 29, 1864, the 5th, 36th, and 38th Regiments stormed Fort Harrison and captured the rebel's artillery. Fighting without support, the Second Brigade braved a deadly hail of musketry from surprised Confederate defenders. Using the same strategy adopted at the Battle of the Crater, the enemy's target was the white officers of the colored regiments. Leaderless Negro soldiers could then be easily defeated. The Confederates' policy resulted in five officers of the 5th USCT, including Colonel

109Dyer, Compendium, II, 956; O.R., XLVI, pt.3, 793; Cornish, Sable Arm, 281; Battles and Leaders, IV, 578.

110Reid, Ohio in the War, II, 917; Harper, Ohio Handbook, 41.
MAP 8

THE 5th USCT DURING THE STORMING OF FORT HARRISON, NEW MARKET HEIGHTS, VIRGINIA, SEPTEMBER 29, 1864, AND THE DUTCH GAP AFFAIR, OCTOBER 13, 1864

SOURCE: Battles and Leaders, IV, 198.
Shurtleff, being seriously wounded or killed, but their plan did not succeed. Negro NCOs immediately replaced the fallen officers and led the regiment to victory. For their gallant leadership and bravery, Sergeants Milton Holland, James Bronson, Robert Pinn, and Powhatan Beatty were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. 111

General Butler was especially pleased with Holland's performance: "Had it been within my power, I would have conferred upon him in view of it, a brigadier-generalship for gallantry on the field." 112 Writing to Secretary Stanton, Butler reaffirmed himself as the Negro's primary military supporter. "I told you they would do well in my Department. My colored troops under General Paine, 2,500 strong, carried intrenchments at the point of the bayonet...Their praises are in the mouth of every officer in the army." Butler was careful not to include the

111 In August the Regiment was transferred to the 18th Corps' Second Brigade (Draper) Third Division, commanded by Brigadier General Charles Paine. See O.R., XLII, pt.1, 136,168-169; Colonel Draper later reported that Lieutenant Samuel S. Simmons of the 36th USCT fled the battle scene and was later found in hiding at Deep Bottom. Nevertheless, Draper praised the overall performance of the white officer corps in the battle. See Ibid., XLII, pt.1, 820; Frank Levstik, "Robert A. Pinn, Courageous Black Soldier" (October 1) Negro History Bulletin, November, 1974 XXXVII, 305. (Hereafter cited as Levstik, "Robert A. Pinn.")

Union casualties in his report. The 5th USCT headed the list with 85 soldiers killed (including one officer) and 248 men captured and wounded. These figures represented 50 percent of the total casualties of the 18th Corps, which were estimated at 455.\textsuperscript{113}

Despite their setback at New Market Heights, the Confederates stopped the Union's advance just short of Richmond. They realized that new fortifications needed to be constructed in order to reinforce their capital's defenses. However, the South had exhausted its manpower reserve. To meet the crisis, President Davis authorized that captured Negro soldiers be employed for fatigue purposes. Twenty-three prisoners from the 5th USCT, seized at Fort Harrison, were among those taken from Libby Prison and compelled to work as laborers. The Confederacy reasoned that these men were initially slaves and were still the South's property. When Davis cited the urgency of the situation and used them anyway. He later commented that the soldiers regarded the work as a "welcomed change from confinement."\textsuperscript{114} Davis' statement was probably

\textsuperscript{113}General Ord was wounded in the battle. He was replaced by General Charles Heckman. See Benjamin Butler to Edwin Stanton, October 3, 1864, O.R., XLII, pt.3, 65, 136; Reid, Ohio in the War II, 917.

correct. The Ohioans had known of the Fort Pillow massacre of five months past. The Confederate's policy of no-quarter, in conjunction with its notorious prison camps, made labor duty seem preferable indeed, for Libby Prison ranked second only to Andersonville in the number of fatalities among Union troops. To make matters worse, Confederate wardens confiscated the prisoners' uniforms, leaving them to freeze to death in the winter. Rations for the captives were often severely limited as the starving rebel army consumed most of the available food supply. Although the South generally treated Negro prisoners humanely, the mortality rate among the USCT regiments exceeded that of the white prisoners. 115

General Butler, feeling a moral obligation to Negro soldiers, ordered the Confederates to stop using them as laborers. On October 12, he sent a note to Robert Ould, the Southern exchange agent, explaining that a number of Confederate prisoners would be likewise employed. Since Lincoln refused to enforce the Union's policy of retaliation, Butler was self-appointed for this task. General Grant became concerned about Butler's threat. Painfully

115Of every thousand prisoners confined at Andersonville, Georgia, 73.26 of them died (73.3%). Only 25% of all Northern prisoners (including the Ohioans) at Libby Prison, Virginia, died. See Negro in Military Service, roll 5, 4616-4626; Medical and Surgical History I, 38, 48; Quarles, Negro in Civil War, 207.
aware of the Radical commander's limitations as a battlefield leader, Grant was equally uncertain of Butler's ability as chief exchange officer. Grant was quite willing to suspend prisoner exchanges and allow the South to keep captured Negro soldiers. With its depleted manpower reserves, the rebels desperately needed to retrieve their prisoners. Since these men were better fed than the Union captives, Grant did not wish to trade healthy soldiers for sickly ones. He asked Butler to be certain that the South was using Negro soldiers for labor purposes. Butler quickly assured him that the stories were true, and on October 13, eighty-seven Confederate prisoners began digging the Dutch Gap Canal. To dramatize the event, Butler placed a Negro regiment (the 127th USCT) to serve as "overseers" of the project. Unaware that the men were fellow soldiers, rebel snipers quickly opened fire upon the crew. 116

The Confederate press deplored Butler's stunt and urged General Lee to negotiate a settlement. Writing

116 Butler's previous attempts to exchange white rebel prisoners for Negro soldiers were unsuccessful. On May 3, 1864, he suspended the entire prisoner exchange program because of the Southern refusal to recognize Negro troops as prisoners of war. But the present situation was a welcomed consolation for Butler. It afforded him an opportunity to personally humiliate the Confederacy. See Butler to Stanton, May 3, 1864, Negro in Military Service, roll 5, 4327; Sommers, "Dutch Gap Affair," 55, 57.
Secretary of War James Seddon, Lee stated that he was forbidden to deal with Butler because the latter was still an "outlaw." The Southern general hoped that Grant, a professional soldier, would spurn such political games and reverse Butler's actions. On October 20, the Confederacy promised to abolish its policy regarding Negro prisoners of war. Upon hearing this news, Grant ordered the removal of all rebels from the canal. Although Butler saw the compromise as a personal triumph, it had a more important meaning. The grim prospect of further escalation was averted.117

The Dutch Gap incident broke the monotony for the 5th USCT. Since its last engagement, the unit had performed guard duty near Chaffins Bluff. At Fair Oaks, Virginia, the 18th Corps won a bloody victory. Nine of its white regiments reported a total of 850 casualties. However, the Third Division, containing the Ohioans, suffered only 196 losses. As in the previous battle, the 5th USCT provided the muscle for the Second Brigade. Of the 14 casualties suffered by the brigade, 10 were Ohio Negroes.118

117 The Confederacy declared Butler an outlaw in September of 1862 because he enlisted and armed Louisiana Negroes in the Union Army. See Cornish, Sable Arm, 162; O.R., VII, 990-993, 1015; Sommers, "Dutch Gap Affair," 61, 64.

118 During the Battle of Fair Oaks, the regiment reported one officer and three enlisted men wounded. Six
On December 3, 1864, the War Department organized the 25th Corps, joining Negroes from the Departments of Virginia and North Carolina under Major General Godfrey Weitzel. The all-Negro Corps was the only one of its kind ever developed in American military history. The unit contained three divisions, each composed of three brigades. One unattached cavalry unit, the 2nd United States Colored Cavalry, was also included. Although serving in different brigades, Ohio's sister regiments were finally together. The Fifth USCT was part of the Third Brigade, First Division. The 27th was assigned to the division's First Brigade.  

The bulk of the corps was assigned fatigue duty. However, Paine's Division received a combat assignment in Wilmington, North Carolina. Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles informed the Army that an enemy installation there had to be captured because the rebels were using it as a supply depot. Welles directed General Weitzel to command the naval attack. Grant delivered these orders to enlistees were also reported captured or missing. See O.R., XLII, pt.1, 51; Ibid., XLII, pt.3, 56-57; Cornish, *Sable Arm*, 281.

119 The First Division was commanded by General Charles Paine; the Second Division was under the direction of General William Birney. General Edward Wild assumed command of the Third Division. See Ibid., 281; O.R., XLII, pt.3, 1126-1127.
to him, but the corps commander did not read them, for he thought they were intended for General Butler. Since the orders were issued by the Navy Department, Weitzel was unsure of his status. Butler, after reading the dispatch, did not tell the general of its contents. The orders called for the army to land troops after the navy had shelled the fortification. If the army failed in its mission, it would retreat and await new orders. 120

The Union objective was Fort Fisher. Situated between the Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, the installation proved a formidable target. The fort's capture would not only halt the blockade-running, but it would starve the Southern population as well. On December 25, the 5th USCT performed a reconnaissance of Fort Fisher and confirmed its sturdiness. It later informed General Weitzel that the enemy's walls must be completely destroyed before an infantry assault was successful. The Union forces moved quickly. With the help of Admiral Dixon Porter, the naval attack was finally underway. Ben Butler, regarded by Porter as an inept commander, exploded the powder charges, but they failed to destroy the fort. By this time a third of the men had landed and were preparing to charge the hill. Porter, elated over Butler's failure,

120Ibid., XLII, pt.3, 1126-1127.
MAP 9

THE 5th USCT AT THE SECOND BATTLE OF FORT FISHER

SOURCE: _Battles and Leaders_, IV, 645.
promptly sailed in to bomb the enemy. However, Butler pulled the rug from under him. Citing bad weather and the fort's impregnability, he ordered all the soldiers back to the ships. The attack was cancelled. Porter was hopping mad but it proved fruitless. Without the cooperation of the army, the naval bombardment was useless. 121

Although Radicals in Washington jumped to Butler's defense, the damage was irreparable. The error in judgement cost him his command, and on January 10, 1865, Grant relieved the Massachusetts radical from further duty. Free of Butler's influence, a second attack upon the fort was successful. On January 15, the 5th USCT participated in the noon raid upon the fort, while Blackman's 27th USCT provided cover for the regiment as it captured rebel guns and prisoners. Part of the 5th USCT served with white soldiers as sentries during the attack. Upon seeing the enemy, some of the white units retreated, but the Ohioans held their ground. Preventing the counterattack of Confederate General Robert Hoke, the regiment insured the success of the campaign. 122 Later, the 27th USCT joined its brothers inside the walls of the fort. The journey was not an easy one. General Joseph Abbott's Brigade which

121 Battles and Leaders, IV, 629, 642-643, 657; O.R. LXVI, 406.

122 Ibid., LXVI, pt. 1, 399.
was covering the regiment's advance, deserted. Without support, the unit stormed the fortification and engaged the enemy in savage hand to hand combat. For its gallant efforts at Fort Fisher, the entire 27th USCT was praised by Major General Alfred H. Terry. Casualties were light for both Buckeye units. The 5th USCT lost no men. The 27th reported five soldiers captured and wounded. The combined assault aided in reducing hostilities and petty jealousies between the units' enlisted ranks.  

The War Department reassigned the Ohio units to the North Carolina theaters as part of the Tenth Corps, commanded by General A.H. Terry. On February 11, 1865, the regiments simultaneously assaulted Confederate positions at Sugar Loaf. Pursuing the enemy to Wilmington, the Ohioans easily captured rebel fortifications and weapons. Casualties for the two campaigns were heavy. Ninety-two men, including three officers, were lost by the 5th USCT. Blackman's unit remarkably suffered no casualties.  

The Battle of Wilmington marked the final combat assignment for either regiment. After the surrender of the Confederate Armies, the units performed garrison duty

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124Dyer, Compendium II, 823; O.R., LXI, 925; Ibid., LXVII, 926.
at Goldsboro, Wilmington, and Raleigh, North Carolina. On April 14, both regiments passed in review before General William Sherman. During the latter part of September, the men were mustered out of federal service and returned to Columbus, Ohio, on October 5, 1865.125

Ohio Negroes proved their worth during the Civil War. Through their courage, loyalty and service, Negro Guardsmen effectively combatted the prejudices of the white political elite. As a soldier in the Union Army, the Negro proved his manhood to himself. With ratification of the 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution, it seemed as if the nation also recognized his merit. The Buckeye State saw Negro militiamen gain white support in the fight for political recognition, for five years after the war, Negro military companies became permanent fixtures of the Ohio National Guard.126

125 Ibid., LXVII, 926; Reid, Ohio in the War, II, 917; Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 591-624.

PART THREE

OHIO NEGRO SOLDIERS IN THE POST CIVIL WAR ERA, 1866-1898
CHAPTER VII
RESPONSES OF THE WHITE POLITICAL ELITE TO THE NEGRO SOLDIER'S DRIVE FOR POLITICAL RECOGNITION IN OHIO, 1866-1870

The excellent military record of Ohio Negro soldiers in the war prompted them to petition the Adjutant General's Department for formal admission into the organized militia. On July 11, 1866, Negro veterans from Cleveland requested permission to organize a volunteer militia company. Although Adjutant General Benjamin Cowen was anxious to admit them, he stated that he had no constitutional power to do so. After consulting with the attorney general William H. West, he informed the soldiers that "white" remained a qualification for Guard participation.¹

Ohio's rejection of the Negro veterans occurred at a most inopportune time because it had only eleven organized militia companies totaling a mere 327 men. Any major disturbance would have required the mobilization of regular army troops. General Cowen lamented that the militia a year before possessed 35,000 well organized and

¹Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1866, 32; O.L., 1803, II (Chillicothe, 1803) 5.
equipped soldiers. He blamed its shrinking numbers upon the wave of anti-militarism gripping the state's adult male population. He further declared that Governor Jacob Cox aggravated an already grave situation by discharging the entire Guard organization upon the termination of hostilities. Finally he noted that the militia's only salvation was the General Assembly's passage of an efficient military law in 1866.²

While the Buckeye State spurned the Negro volunteers, the army opened its door to them. Under the direction of Senators Henry Wilson and Benjamin Wade, six regular regiments of Negro cavalry and infantry units were proposed and authorized. Although the radicals declared that their action rewarded the Negro's patriotism during the war, their primary objective was establishing a Republican-Negro political alliance to punish the Confederacy.³ The enactment

²In 1866 the Ohio Independent Militia contained the First Battalion (Zouave) from Cincinnati (three companies,) and several understrength companies of Guardsmen from Toledo, Lebanon, and Columbus. See Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1869, 12-13; Ibid., 1866, 30-31; Cleveland Plain Dealer; Ohio Guard History, 6-7.

³The units included the 9th and 10th Cavalry, and the 38th, 40th, and 41st Infantry Regiments. In 1869, because of the shortage of funds, the four infantry regiments were reduced to two--the 24th and 25th Regiments of Infantry. See Negro in Military Service, roll 5, 4671-4672; Richard J. Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the United States Armed Forces (New York, 1968) 10-11. (Hereafter cited as Stillman, Integration of Negro in U.S. Armed Forces.) Marvin E. Fletcher, "The Negro Soldier and the United States Army, 1891-1917," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of
of the legislation caused a rush of Negroes to the army recruiting station in Columbus, Ohio. Spurred by their traditional love for soldiering, army pay, a military uniform and the promise of travel, Negroes quickly filled the ranks. It was not surprising that few vacancies ever existed in these regiments.4

Negro military service was rewarded by white Ohioans in the postwar era. The electorate, between the years 1866-1870, demonstrated wide support for Negro militia rights. White philanthropic organizations initiated this trend by assisting the Negro soldiers. For example, the Soldiers Aid Society of Northern Ohio, organized in 1866, provided refreshments to colored veterans being discharged from Camp Chase. The group also helped the soldiers collect their pensions and back pay. Other white agencies, such as the Ohio Chapter of the Freedman's Bureau and the Grand Army of the Republic (G.A.R.) instituted schools and orphanages for the children of deceased Negro soldiers.5

The proposed 14th and 15th amendments to the Constitution polarized the attitudes of the white political elite.

Wisconsin, 1968, 9,134,142,162-163. (Hereafter cited as Fletcher, "Negro Soldier and U.S. Army.")

4Ibid., 10,14-15; Foner, Blacks and the Military, 53.

5Cleveland Leader, June 13 and December 18, 1866; Ibid., July 21, 1870.
Although Republicans (Unionists) acknowledged their "debt of gratitude" to Negro veterans, the white electorate affirmed that its appreciation did not extend to politics. In October of 1867, it overwhelmingly rejected the Negro suffrage bill by 38,358 votes. In January of 1868, it rescinded approval of the fourteenth amendment also. The popular defeat had a sobering effect upon Republicans, who now joined with Ohio Democrats in denouncing voting rights for Negro citizens. The action also disillusioned the Negro servicemen, who had actively campaigned for universal manhood suffrage as a step toward the reintegration of the National Guard. Fortunately, the proposals received enough support to nullify Ohio's conservatism. On April 14, 1870, the 15th Amendment went into effect, and the last obstacle to Negro militia service was finally removed.

Ohio Republican Party rekindled its friendship with the Negro community in 1870. Aware that 10,000 Negro males were now armed with the ballot, the Unionists

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7Ohio Statesman, April 14, 1870; O.L., LXV (Columbus, 1868) 280.
desperately sought a political alliance with them. Since the political parties in Ohio were so evenly balanced the Negro vote became the margin of victory.\(^8\) Ohio Negroes quickly recognized their political importance and used it punitively. On August 22, 1873, the state's most affluent Negroes attended a Colored People's Convention in Chillicothe. The platform adopted by the committee declared that Negro voters would not align themselves with Republicans until they were granted certain political concessions. Although Negro participation in the Guard was not specifically mentioned, it was clear that the Negro bourgeoisie had given the issue importance.\(^9\)

Unable to take the Negro vote for granted, Republicans adopted a system of "clientage politics." In return for votes cast for Unionist candidates, the "mulatto aristocracy" received appointive positions in community and government offices. Admired by both blacks and whites as the "progress of the race," the Negro middle class firmly controlled the politics of the large, black, urbanized areas. (Appendix J pinpoints these Ohio cities and records their growth of Negro population from 1870-1920.) Although the Negro bourgeoisie declared this policy as

\(^8\)Bonadio, North of Reconstruction, 93-95; Cummings, Negro Population, 44-45, 56-57.

\(^9\)Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 107-108.
beneficial to the black masses, it aided only the Negro elites.¹⁰

A speech given by Governor Rutherford B. Hayes in April of 1870 marked the official beginning of the patron-client system. Attending a celebration in Columbus in honor of Negro suffrage, Hayes prepared the white electorate for things to come. He spoke not of the 15th Amendment but of Negro military prowess. Praising the courage and loyalty of Negro Ohioans in the war, the governor declared that such patriotism and service deserved a reward. The governor's speech was enthusiastically cheered by companies of Negro volunteer militia in attendance. Organized by former Negro servicemen, the Douglass Guards and the Grand Army of the Potomac Guards provided escort service for Negro elites attending the rally. Hearing

¹⁰During the 1870's changes were already noticeable in types of Negro occupations. In the 19th century, the Negro agriculturalist was challenged by his fellow industrialist for the dominant position. By 1930 the factory worker surpassed his rival. Between 1910-1920, Negroes from the south flocked into Ohio's industrial communities at a tremendous rate. Three Buckeye cities--Columbus, Cincinnati, and Cleveland--during these years accounted for 46 percent of the state's total Negro population. See Allan Spear, "Origins of the Urban Ghetto, 1870-1915," Key Issues in the Afro-American Experiences, II (New York, 1971) 159. (Hereafter cited as Spear, "Origins of the Urban Ghetto.") Martin Kilson, "Political Change in the Negro Ghetto, 1900-1949's," Ibid., II, 171,174-176. (Hereafter cited as Kilson, "Political Change in the Negro Ghetto.") Roseboom and Weisenburger, History of Ohio, 377.
LOCATION OF THE FIRST NEGRO GUARD UNITS IN OHIO, 1870 - 1878

*indicates first Negro Guard Units.

SOURCE: Ohio Adjutant Generals Report, 1874, 22-26; Ohio Executive Documents, 1875, II, 40; Ibid., 1892, I, 1499-1500; Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 101.
"racial brotherhood" speeches from Ohio Congressmen and clergy, the soldiers witnessed a new era in Negro-military relations.  

The Republican rapprochement with the Negro militia class in 1870 was a prime example of clientage politics. (Map Ten shows that the majority of 62,213 Ohio Negroes, still resided in Southern Ohio and in the Northern counties of Cuyahoga and Lorain.) Following orders from Governor Hayes, Adjutant General William Knapp authorized the formation of National Guard units in those districts most heavily populated by Negro voters. Map Ten clearly shows the relationship between Negro urbanization and the location of colored Guard organizations. The state then directed Negro citizens councils to organize volunteer companies and send lists of names to the Adjutant General's office. Although no limit was placed upon the number of recruits, time was an essential factor. Those cities filling their quotas at the earliest date received the allotted Guard units. By May 1870, the selection of officers and enlisted men for the Negro Guard units had been completed.

11 Ohio Statesman, April 14, 1870; Minor, "James Preston Poindexter," 277-278; Ohio Historical Society, Governors of Ohio, 93-96.

12 In 1870 the Ohio counties of Franklin, Ross, Hamilton, Green, Brown, Clark, Washington, Clermont, Pike, Meigs, Muskingham, Scioto, Cuyahoga and Lorain accounted for 96%
The response of Negroes to the call of service was overwhelming. The reasons for enlistment were varied. Love of soldiering was foremost. Those who enjoyed militia duties sought the trappings of military life. The prestige derived from wearing a uniform was undeniable. Even an unskilled laborer commanded respect from both races when he donned the colors of his unit. The right to own a firearm was also an important consideration to the volunteers. Since Ohio Negroes had been traditionally barred from the militia, they were also subject to local ordinances prohibiting them from owning weapons of any kind. Law enforcement agencies often conducted searches in Negro tenements for hidden arms. But as a member of a Guard unit, a Negro could legally keep a musket in his home. Although most units locked the weapons in the armory, volunteers were permitted to practice their shooting skills at will.13

of the Negro population in Ohio. See Roseboom, Civil War, IV, 7; Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 101. Sometimes clientage politics superseded the law. In permitting Negroes to organize Guard units, Governor Hayes ignored the Ohio Militia Law of 1803 and the Constitution of 1851. See Ibid., 76; Cincinnati Enquirer, May 13, 1870.

13Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 12; "Report of the Adjutant General to Governor Edward Noyes," October 14, 1872, The Edward F. Noyes Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Box 2, Folder 3; Clark, Black Brigade of Cincinnati, 21; Calvin W. Cheatham Jr., "The Black Units of the Ohio National Guard," unpublished paper, Ohio State University, 1973, 5-6. (Hereafter cited as Cheatham, "Black Units of the Ohio National Guard."
Life in the Guard also promised Negroes with families an opportunity to soldier. Unlike the army, the volunteer militia permitted their soldiers to marry. Wives of Negro officers frequently gathered together for tea, cookies and good conversation. The Guard's club-like atmosphere greatly appealed to Negroes. Since the armory was a center of community life, volunteers enjoyed picnics and barbecues sponsored by various church and civic organizations. On these occasions the Negro community cheered the Guardsmen as they conducted parade and drill ceremonies. Membership in a Guard unit was instrumental in combatting the boredom and frustration of Negro life in Ohio.14

Besides the Guard's social benefits, there were other advantages open to militia leaders. The Negro officer corps often used its military experience as a means of advancement into business and political ventures. Negro-owned corporations often requested the officers to endorse their products. In return, these commanders were allowed to purchase controlling shares of a company's stock. Political opportunities also attracted the officers. Since they were well-known, the Negro officers had a good

14Ohio State Journal, May 20, 1898; ONG and Historical Annual, xxxvii; Dabney, Cincinnati's Colored Citizens, 125-127.
chance of being elected to public office.15

During the time that Ohio was organizing its Negro Guard units, the Southern states began enrolling Negro volunteers. While both groups of soldiers had similar reasons for enlisting, several basic differences existed between the Guard units in the two regions. For example, Ohio Negro militiamen never labored under the handicap of protecting the state from armed groups of white racists, such as the Ku Klux Klan. The Negro Guard was used by the governor and other civil officials in strict accordance with the law. In addition, the Ohio units were homogeneous, well trained and disciplined. The situation was reversed in the states of the Old Confederacy.16


CHAPTER VIII

THE FIRST PERMANENT NEGRO MILITIA UNITS OF THE OHIO NATIONAL GUARD, 1870-1898

The first companies of Ohio Negro volunteers received quick approval from the Adjutant General's Department. Under the new militia act passed in 1870, the enrolled militia was formally abolished and replaced by independent militia companies. The General Assembly made it clear to Negro soldiers that the state would not subsidize them. "No expenses whatever" would be incurred by Ohio for the units' organizational costs. Legislators offered Negroes little incentive to enlist except the usual exemptions from compulsory highway and jury duty. As a means of raising money, the legislature allowed each company to enroll 150 "contributing members." For a yearly fee of five dollars, those supporting local Guard units received the same exemptions as the active members, but not the obligations. Despite the limited state support, the Guard's recruiting of Negroes flourished. Between the years 1870-1875, a Negro infantry battalion in addition to five infantry companies were organized.
in Ohio.\(^1\)

The units were officered exclusively by mulattoes. Elected by the rank and file, company commanders were required to be educated men, for the success of the unit depended upon their competency and skill at administration. Since the majority of mulattoes were college trained, the enlistees accorded them the leadership roles in the organization. (Appendix K provides an occupational study of these Negro Guard officers 1870-1898.) After their election to a five year term, the officers were commissioned by the governor.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Peckham, "Ohio National Guard," 52. The requirements for the volunteer militia were identical for both Negroes and whites. The men had to be physically identified and between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years. The names and locations of the first Negro Guard units were as follows: The Second Battalion Cincinnati (1870); the "Muskingham Blue Jackets" (1870); the "Portsmouth Light Guard" (1870); the "Duquesne Blues" (1874); the "Cleveland Barnett Guards" (1875) and the Cleveland "City Guards" (1875). See Ohio Executive Documents, 1875, II, 40; Ibid., 1892, I, 1499-1500; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1874, 22-26; O.L., LXVII (Columbus, 1870) 110; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 6-7.

\(^2\)Peckham, "Ohio National Guard," 52; Adjutant General's Department, Code of Regulations for the Ohio National Guard, 1887, 192-195; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1874, 22-26; Frazier, Negro Family, 423,427,443; Reuter, Mulatto in the United States, 246-374; Dabney, Cincinnati's Colored Citizens, 145; August Meier, Elliot Rudwick and Francis Broderick, eds., Black Protest Thought in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1965) xxix. (Hereafter cited as Meier, Rudwick, Broderick, Black Protest Thought.) Ginzberg, Middle Class Negro, 6-7.
Negro officers enjoyed the fruits of their social position. Their belief of superiority were accepted by the enlisted men in all but one case. The incident occurred in Cincinnati. On May 13, 1870, William Travis, a navy veteran, described to his battalion his qualifications for leadership. They included his middle class occupation (barber), his superior intelligence, the lightness of his skin color, and his experience during the war. The volunteers were unimpressed by the speech and voted to disband rather than elect him as their leader, for the men strongly objected to Travis' constant reference to the unit as "his colored battalion." One of the volunteers quipped that the good barber was suffering from an insatiable ego problem and began to leave the meeting. As other recruits also departed, they were physically attacked by the battalion's mulatto officers. Several fistfights erupted during the twenty minute fracas. Fortunately, no serious injuries were reported by either side. The incident prompted several of the darker skinned recruits to form their own splinter militia organization. Calling themselves the "West End Guard," the men conducted regular drill and practice sessions. However, they were not recognized by the Adjutant General's Department, who declared

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3 Cincinnati Enquirer, April 25 and May 13, 1870; Reuter, Mulatto in the United States, 246-374.
that Ohio's major cities were fiercely competing for militia companies. Consequently Cincinnati was allotted only one Negro militia unit--the Second Battalion. The state's decision left Negroes there with two alternatives: elect Travis as commander of the unit or forfeit their militia quota to another city.¹

On June 1, 1870 William Travis was elected as battalion commander over his troops' protests. The men had little choice in the matter since the battalion refused to oppose his candidacy. Rather than disband, the enlistees' love for soldiering compelled them to remain with the unit in spite of its "repulsive" leader. A.E. Baker, one of the spectators at the first meeting, wrote the editor of the Cincinnati Commercial about the incident. He charged that Travis bribed and cajoled the men into voting for him. Baker also attacked the mulatto "rights of leadership" based upon skin color. Finally he noted that Travis' daring exploits in the Civil War were highly exaggerated. Baker wrote that "His [Travis] military qualifications consisted in being a waiter on a gunboat, where it is said he fought bravely among the pots and kettles."²

¹Cincinnati Enquirer, April 25 and May 11,13,19, 1870.

²Cincinnati Commercial, April 23, 1870. Baker, a darker skinned Negro (black) nearly precipitated a split in the ranks of the mulatto officer corps. Captain William B. Scott of the Second Battalion advised Baker that if the
The officer corps exercised its hegemony over the enlisted men through the NCOs. Appointed by the battalion commander, they resembled the commissioned officers in many ways. Like their superiors, the majority of NCOs were married, members of the professional or business class, and former enrollees in the regular army. Thus, the cadre of the colored units mirrored the social structure of the Negro community. The major beneficiaries of clientage politics received commissions; the smaller fish were given NCO positions. (Appendix L surveys the socioeconomic status of NCOs in the Ohio Guard from 1874-1880.) This practice of elitism in the Guard denied the socially inferior black an opportunity for advancement.6

The Negro units suffered the problems common to the militia--apathy, rapid personnel changes, and lack of charges brought against Travis were true, court martial proceedings would be brought against him immediately. Scott's statement was a rarity. For the sake of discipline within the unit, the officers did not publicly attack one another. Nevertheless, no disciplinary action was ever taken against Major Travis. See also Cincinnati Enquirer, June 1, 1870; Reuter, Mulatto in the United States, 11-14, 183-274.

6The commissioned officers averaged thirty years of age. The NCOs were slightly older (thirty-one.) See Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1879-1880, 79,96,101,188,191; Springfield City Directory, 1879-1880 (Springfield, 1880) 264,334,373,399; Columbus City Directory, 1878 (Columbus, 1879) 264,334,373,399; Peckham, "Ohio National Guard," 52; Charles Fillmore to George A. Myers, July 5, 1897, The George A. Myers Papers, OHS, Box 3, Folder 5. (Hereafter cited as George A. Myers Papers.)
money. Enlisted men quickly realized their bleak chances for promotions within the unit and obtained quick discharges. However, the major conflict was money. Enlistees complained that their friends in the army were paid as much as twenty-two dollars a month while they received nothing except a mere dollar a day when in state service. The cadre also discovered that the purchases of sidearms and ceremonial swords pinched its budget considerably. Additionally, the costs of maintaining armories and sponsoring numerous dances and parties rapidly depleted the units' treasuries. Despite revenue from contributing members, the companies' expenditures far exceeded their incomes. The parsimonious Militia Law of 1870 offered no salvation, and by 1877, the Duquesne Blues from Springfield was the sole surviving Negro unit.\footnote{Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1877, 8: Ohio Executive Document, 1878, 999.}

The Ohio General Assembly became alarmed at the Negro's exodus from the Guard and pledged to assume a greater share of the financial responsibility for the militia. The amended Ohio Militia Act of 1876 was the first step in achieving that objective. Under its provisions, the state paid to each company of infantry and cavalry a sum of $100 for the maintenance of its equipment. Each unit having a two gun battery was additionally
compensated $50 annually. The act also provided for standardization of weapons, for various Guard units were currently using rifles manufactured in England, France, Prussia and Austria. Often these muskets were obsolete, and badly in need of repair. The new legislation stipulated that by 1877 all Guard organizations would receive reliable Springfield breechloaders. Additional help for the ravaged Negro units came from the law. The Militia Reorganization Act of 1877 required towns and cities having Guard units to bear the costs of construction and maintenance of the armories. In addition, the law established compensatory rates for Guardsmen while in the service of the state and during summer encampment periods.  

Governor Richard Bishop studied the Negro's military problems in 1878 and initiated a different course from that taken by the legislative branch. After consulting with Adjutant General Luther Meilly, he decided that Negro Guard units needed legitimacy in addition to state aid. Bishop urged the 63rd General Assembly to delete

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When performing state duty, officers of field grade rank received $2.50 per day. Line officers (second lieutenant to captain) were paid $2.00 per day. NCOs received $1.50 daily. Enlisted were paid $1.00 per day. Each Guardsmen was also compensated $1.00 for his annual summer encampment session. O.L. (Columbus, 1876) LXXIII, 173-181; Ibid., LXXIV (Columbus, 1877) 231-235; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 10; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1879, 375-377.
"white" from the state's seventy-five year old militia law. The Republican-dominated legislature, sympathetic to clientage politics, quickly opened debate upon the governor's proposal. Directed by Representative Joe Poe from Cuyahoga County, House Bill No. 8 was unanimously approved and forwarded to the Senate on January 8, 1878. By a vote of 27 - 0. The upper chamber also endorsed the measure. On January 24, 1878, the governor signed the bill into law. 9

Fortunately, Ohio did not need a constitutional convention to amend the militia act because the prohibition was originally enacted by the legislature. In this respect, Ohio's Constitution differed from the majority of those found in other northern states. Neighboring Indiana, for example, wanted to organize Negro volunteers in 1881, but its constitution specifically barred the participation of Negroes in the militia. Because of the expense and legal technicalities involved in the passage of an amendment to the constitution, it was not until 1936 that Negroes could legally enroll in the Indiana Guard. As in Ohio, the Hoosier State had long enrolled Negro militia

9Ohio General Assembly, House. Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Ohio, 63rd General Assembly, LXXIV (Columbus, 1877) 68,114,1274. (Hereafter cited as Ohio House Journal.) Ohio Executive Documents, 1879, 793; O.L., LXXV (Columbus, 1878) 3.
The legislature's action revitalized the Negro's interest in the Guard. On February 9, 1878, the Palmer Light Guards was organized in Columbus. The unit was so well disciplined and proficient in drilling that Adjutant General Meilly remarked: "This company is the special protege of this Department. We have planted the tree and are proud of the fruit. (The) Palmer Guards have made believers out of those doubting the Negro's ability to soldier." Meilly soon discovered that the Negro Guard units in Columbus and Springfield were armed with obsolete weapons and promised them Springfields by the next year.  

The Negro companies functioned as unattached infantry units until June 18, 1881, when they formed the Ninth Battalion of the Ohio National Guard. Since it was the oldest unit, the Duquesne Blues was designated as Company A. The Columbus Guard was appropriately named Company B. Captain Henry Harper, former commander of the Springfield unit, was elected major of the battalion. By 1884, the "Martin Light Guard" from Xenia joined the battalion as Company C. The Negro Guard units established a reputation for efficiency until July 8, 1896, when, citing insufficient

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state service, the enlisted men resigned en masse. The
battalion organization was then dissolved by the Adjutant
General's Department. Company B, which maintained its
adequate strength during this time, was not disbanded and
was redesignated as an unattached infantry unit. During
the months of January and April, 1897, Companies A and C
were reorganized, and the Ninth once again had three units.
In anticipation of the war with Spain, the battalion mustered in "Company D" from Cleveland on May 27, 1898. The
Ninth's aggregate strength prior to the beginning of the
conflict was only 181 officers and enlisted men.

The social structure of the Ninth Battalion in 1898
was identical to the rigid class distinctions observed
by the first units of 1870. The family-oriented, middle
class cadre was carefully segregated from the unmarried,
lower class enlisted men. The city of Columbus provided
an interesting study of the housing patterns of Negro
elites between 1880-1900. The majority of Negro officers
of Company B resided in the fashionable East Long Street

12Ibid., 1881, 33; Ibid., 1884,116; Ibid., 1896, 8.

13Prior to its muster into federal service, Company
A reported 64 NCOs and enlisted men. Companies B and C
listed their strength at 57 and 46 NCOs and enlistees
respectively. Company D from Cleveland joined the battal­
on in 1898 and initially listed its strength at 67 men.
The officer corps (battalion staff and line) reported 13
members. See Ibid., 1898, 12; Ibid., 1897, 157-306; Ibid.,
1896, 149-190.
District. This area stretched from Third Street on the West to Taylor Avenue on the East, and from Long Street on the South to Atcheson Street on the North. Doctors John H. Dickerson, William G. Wren, and Attorney Walter S. Thomas of the Ninth Battalion were the first Negro officers to buy homes in this area. Retired Lieutenant Colonel James A. Nichols, former commander of the 372nd Infantry Regiment (2nd Battalion) declared this section of town to be so exclusive that prospective recruits reluctantly visited the palatial armory located there. Consequently, the Columbus unit experienced many difficulties in enrolling a sufficient number of enlistees. Other families of Negro officers in Columbus lived at East Naughten, Third and Seventh Street, an area that housed the remnants of the mulatto aristocrats that had resided in Columbus since 1865. (Map 11 marks these neighborhoods containing Company B's Negro officer corps.)

Ironically, the mulatto's practice of social segregation was of some value militarily. Unlike the enlisted

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14 Mary Louise Mark, Negroes in Columbus (Columbus, 1928) 16-17; Columbus City Directory, 1898, 281,790,868; Private Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Nichols, former commander of the 2nd Battalion (1941) at his home in Columbus, Ohio, on January 22, 1975. (Hereafter cited as Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Nichols, Columbus, January 22, 1975.)

15 Mark, Negroes in Columbus, 15, 18.
MAP 11

DISTRICTS ONE AND THREE: NEIGHBORHOODS OF THE NEGRO ELITES, COMPANY B, OHIO NATIONAL GUARD

SOURCE: Mark, Negroes in Columbus, 15.
ranks, the Negro officer corps from 1881-1898 was stable. Hardly any vacancies were reported in the echelons of command during these years. There were several reasons for this. First, Negro soldiers in Ohio were legally and socially restricted to the Ninth Battalion. They were not allowed to transfer or receive a commission in a white unit. Nearly all of the white Guardsmen belonged to a fullsized regiment. Negroes on the other hand, were confined to a single unit one-fourth the size of a regiment. They simply had no other place to go.  

Secondly, since a battalion-sized organization limited the number of available command positions, it became extremely crowded at the top. Lieutenant Colonel Nichols, an enlistee in the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Battalion, in 1917, declared that promotions were so rare in Negro units that the officers would rejoice upon hearing that a superior had resigned, left town, or died. The absence of advancement in the commissioned ranks spawned a generation of frustrated Negro officers. Robert Rudd, for example, was elected as a captain of the

16Peckham, "Ohio National Guard," 52; Benson Hough to A. Mills, August 11, 1916, George A. Myers Papers, Box 17, Folder 2; George Myers to E.H. Baker, May 4, 1917, Ibid., Box 17, Folder 3.

17Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Nichols, Columbus, January 22, 1975.
Springfield unit in 1887. Seventeen years later, he was still a captain. Unable to rise to the position of battalion commander in 1898, Rudd began a personal campaign to unseat incumbent Major Charles Fillmore. Upon accomplishing this deed, he was still ignored for the promotion by Governor Asa Bushnell. Lieutenant Charles Young, a regular in the Ninth Cavalry, was given command of the unit. For Robert Rudd it was an inglorious end to 19 years of devoted military service. He resigned his commission in 1899 at the age of 39. The family's tradition of military service was continued by his brother William, who captained the unit in 1902.18

Harry H. Robinson, commander of the Xenia Guard in 1898, was another portrait of despair. Attaining a captaincy in July 8, 1886, he remained at that rank for the next 15 years. His reputation for efficiency and discipline did not secure him a promotion. Although the position of battalion commander changed hands five times in those 15 years, Robinson was overlooked in favor of younger, more popular officers. In 1901, at the age of 43, he quit his job. His cousin, Oliver Robinson, was

18Colored American, May 7, 1898; Ohio Roster, Spanish American War, 666; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1881, 33; Ibid., 1901, 311-315; Ibid., 1902, 186; Ralph Tyler to George A. Myers, September 12, 1898, George A. Myers Papers, Box 6, Folder 5.
immediately elected as captain of the unit on September 8, 1902.\textsuperscript{19}

The highly prized position of battalion commander was an ambivalent one. Although the height of success for a Negro soldier, the job also marked his ascendency in the Guard institution since he was denied regimental command. One's only hope for promotion lay in distinguished service during a war. Nevertheless, the battalion would still require an expansion into a peacetime regiment before a colonelcy was authorized by the Adjutant General's Department. The Ninth proved a graveyard for ambitious majors. Henry Harper, commander of the unit from 1881-1888, knew this well. John Fulton (1899-1918) did also.\textsuperscript{20}

Despite its internal problems, the battalion's commander and staff compiled an honorable record of federal and state service from 1881-1917. Jacob A. Meckstroth, one of Columbus Ohio's oldest residents, was a member of the Guard in 1907. When asked about the power struggle within the Negro unit, he reported that: "The accomplishments of the Negro Guard units were not indicative of men stabbing one another for power. Their jealousies

\textsuperscript{19}Ohio Roster, Spanish American War, 682; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1894, 67; Ibid., 1899, 107; Ibid., 1901, 312.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., 1884, 62-70, 265; Ibid., 1901, 73-74; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 27-32.
were professional in nature and did not impair the efficiency, enthusiasm or discipline in the unit.\textsuperscript{21}

Third, the Guard was a plaything of the Negro elite. Every eligible member of the Negro middle class was urged to volunteer for service. It was an unwritten requirement for manhood and social prestige. For example, Ralph W. Tyler, a prominent Negro journalist from Columbus, was overjoyed when his brother Maurice joined Company B. Writing to his friend George Myers of Cleveland, Ralph explained that the family's name commanded new respect because it was on the Guard's muster rolls.\textsuperscript{22} Families with exalted histories of military service obligated their sons to continue the martial tradition. A prime example was the Pinn family of Massillon, Ohio. Henry Pinn, a grandson of Medal of Honor winner Robert Pinn (5th USCT), enlisted in Company D, Ninth Battalion, for service in Cuba. Likewise John W. Beatty, nephew of Powhatan Beatty (Medal of Honor, 5th USCT), joined the battalion on July

\textsuperscript{21}Private interview with Jacob A. Meckstroth, former private Ohio National Guard, 1907, and retired private secretary to former Ohio Governor A. Victor Donahey, 1923-1929, at his home in Columbus, Ohio, on January 20, 1975. (Hereafter cited as Interview with Jacob A. Meckstroth, Columbus, January 20, 1975.)

\textsuperscript{22}Ralph Tyler to George A. Myers, September 12, 1898, George A. Myers Papers, Box 6, Folder 5; Ohio Roster, Spanish-American War, 681; "Roster of the Ninth Battalion" I-41.
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5, 1898, in search of another New Market Heights. (Appendix M shows the domination of the four Negro units by powerful mulatto families.)

Lower class Negroes emulated the military tradition of the middle class. Although living mostly in tenements and alley shacks, these blacks devised their own standards of elitism. Families of enlisted men thrived upon the Guard's social importance and attempted to halt the "influx of a lot of cheap, worthless niggers" into the organization. The prejudice exhibited by the Negro bourgeois was a divisive factor splitting the lower echelons of the Negro militia community. From 1881-1898 the enlisted ranks of the Negro Guard, once composed chiefly of unskilled day laborers, became a private club. The Adjutant General's Report for the year 1898 helped to demonstrate this point. Of the battalion's 205 enlisted personnel, nearly half of that number came from 44 families in Ohio. This figure (44) represented only 9.3 per cent of the total number of black, lower class households in the state containing militia-eligible males. (Appendix M provides a list of these families.) Thus, Negro militia

23Ohio Roster, Spanish-American War, 693-694; Dabney, Cincinnati's Colored Citizens, 125-127.

24Ralph Tyler to George A. Myers, August 13, 1908, George A. Myers Papers, Box 14, Folder 5.
society represented a closed system not only within the
echelons of command but among the enlisted corps as
well.25

25 The contributions to the Guard from these households
were as follows: Company A enlisted 16 Guardsmen from
seven lower class black families. Company B reported
that 35 Negro soldiers originated from 17 such families.
The Xenia Guard related that 37 of its volunteers were
contributed by only 15 impoverished black families. The
9.3 percent figure was obtained in this manner: In 1900,
Ohio had a population of 96,901 Negroes. Of that number,
10 percent constituted the Negro middle class. The U.S.
Bureau of the Census reported that 18,978 lower class
Negro families lived in the state during this time. In
addition there were 23,000 militia eligible Negro men in
Ohio in 1900. Finally, each household averaged 4.6 mem-
Bureau of the Census, Twelfth Census of the United States
I (Washington D.C., 1902) LXX-LXXIV; PNG Historical Re-
cords; Ohio Roster, Spanish-American War, 666-699; "Roster
CHAPTER IX

USE OF NEGRO TROOPS IN STATE SERVICE 1872-1898

The nature of Negro units limited their use by civil officials. Generally, disturbances requiring the deployment of troops were thoroughly checked by the legal authorities for strong racial overtones. If a high level of anti-Negro sentiment were discovered, the colored Guard was not mobilized. This policy regarding the use of Negro soldiers seriously affected the patron-client system. The Negro officer corps complained to the Adjutant General's Department that insufficient duty produced a morale problem within the unit. Anticipating mass resignations from the enlisted ranks, the officers demanded immediate corrective action. Otherwise, they threatened abandonment of the Guard and the Republican party simultaneously. In order to keep the Negro vote, Republican governors outlined a list of state services in which Negro units could be deployed. For example, parades and celebrations provided good opportunities to display Negro troops. Upon these occasions, well-dressed Negro Guardsmen moved with precision and dignity before an admiring crowd of Negro and white spectators. Governor Asa S. Bushnell quickly
recognized the positive attitude of the Negro community toward its uniformed militia. Consequently, he requested the Ninth Battalion to escort him to the gubernatorial inauguration on January 10, 1898. On May 19, 1898, the Ninth again performed parade duty as it accompanied dignitaries to Columbus in celebration of the upcoming war with Spain. In September of 1898, the battalion completed its ceremonial duties for the year. At Governor Bushnell's request, the volunteers escorted the Second Army Corps Commander to the Peace Jubilee held at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

State funerals also afforded the governor an opportunity to exhibit his Negroes. On September 19, 1901, the Ninth served as honor guards for the funeral train of assassinated President William McKinley. Major John Fulton, the battalion's commander, declared afterwards that the men were genuinely moved by the experience and behaved in a "creditable manner as befits them upon such an

1Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., "Ohio's Negro Battalion in the Spanish American War," Northwest Ohio Quarterly, XLV, No.2, 57-58. (Hereafter cited as Gatewood, "Ohio's Negro Battalion.") Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1894, 14; Ibid., 1897, 18-19; Ohio Executive Documents, 1897, III, 426-429; Peckham, "Ohio National Guard," 52; History of the 372nd Infantry, Army of the United States, 47. (Hereafter cited as History of 372nd Infantry); F.L. Barnett to George A. Myers, April 27, 1898, George A. Myers Papers; Cheatham, "Black Units of the Ohio National Guard," 4;

2History of 372nd Infantry, 47.
occasion." When the battalion finished its duties at Canton, it was reviewed by President Theodore Roosevelt. Meeting national dignitaries not only bolstered men's morale, but produced feelings of elitism within the unit as well. During these times, the volunteers cared little that they were not used to suppress race riots or other civil disturbances. They were now grabbing the public spotlight and performing "safe duty" at the same time. This special treatment given the unit soon led to inter-Guard jealousies. Jacob Meckstroth, related that the white volunteers constantly complained about the "governor's favorites" holding a monopoly on all ceremonial duties. Fortunately, the rivalry between Negro and white soldiers did not impair the efficiency of the Guard organization.

The white political elite found other noncombatant roles for Negro troops. On January 19, 1894, Company A of the Ninth was called upon to assist authorities at Springfield. A fire originating in the vintage Arcade Hotel threatened several nearby establishments. The mayor of the city thought the local police were unable to control the crowd that quickly gathered in the downtown

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3 Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1901, 73-74.

4 Interview with Jacob A. Meckstroth, Columbus, January 20, 1975.
area. Placing a call to Captain Robert Rudd, he was confident that order would be quickly restored. In concert with other militia units, Company A was able to push the crowd away from the hotel only minutes before parts of the building's walls fell upon the area where spectators had previously stood. The Guard's presence also deterred looters and other citizens "ever ready to take advantage of such calamities." On January 20, the Springfield Guard was relieved of duty. Its work was highly praised by Adjutant General J.C. Howe.\(^5\)

The Ninth performed other services besides escort duty and crowd control during fires. The outbreak of labor violence in Ohio in the 1870's forced the white political elite to employ Negro troops in a more dangerous capacity. Since the majority of enlisted men in white units were unskilled laborers and mechanics, the white political elite feared that the militia might identify and sympathize with strikers during a disturbance. This was a special hazard if "home troops" were used because a Guardsman-laborer might be ordered to fire upon friends and neighbors while performing state service.\(^6\)

\(^{5}\)Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 30; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1894, 14; Toledo Blade, January 4,5, 1894.
The white political elite found a partial solution to controlling labor unrest. First, the use of Negro Guardsmen eliminated the fear of an alliance between white volunteers and fellow strikers. Although Negro enlistees also belonged to laboring class, the prejudice arising from the competition of Negroes and whites for jobs precluded any such coalition between the races. Secondly, the white political elite avoided the use of home troops if possible. Calls for strike duty were placed to armories far removed from the scene of the disturbance. Fortunately, the Ohio Guard adopted a professional attitude toward the control of labor violence. Its unenviable reputation as a strike-breaking force did not interfere with its objectivity or efficiency. The white political elite had nothing to fear. Beginning in 1877, the entire volunteer militia proved its competency, loyalty, and obedience to law and order.

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The Great Railroad Strike of 1877 matched the Guard against strikers in Newark, Ohio. On July 14, in a dispute over higher wages, firemen and brakemen of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad halted the movement of all freight trains. By July 20, four volunteer units were dispatched to Licking County in an effort to halt the illegal strike. By this time, armed workers met the Guard at the depot and resolved to "clean out the troops." Upon seeing the massing of volunteers, however, the miners changed their minds and turned back. Rumors that the strike had spread to Zanesville resulted in the Guardsmen being sent there in case of trouble. As a precautionary measure, Adjutant General Charles Karr mobilized the Duquesne Blues of Springfield. Since a company-sized unit was usually inadequate to police a large mining town, Governor Thomas Young planned to attach the soldiers to a white regiment. However, the Negro volunteers were not needed for duty during the strike. By July 30, the public, which had previously sympathized with the strike, became anti-labor and supported the Guard's effort to break it. By August 6, the strike ended and the volunteers were relieved from further duty.  

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9Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1877, 110.

10Ibid., 1877, 111, 119-141; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 27-28.
The role given Negro Guardsmen in suppressing the labor unrest after 1877 changed dramatically. By the 1880's they were active participants instead of reservists. Although white volunteers had demonstrated their loyalty and efficiency in 1877, the white political elite was not taking any chances. Negro troops were included in all major expeditions involving labor strikes. For example, on August 31, 1884, Adjutant General Ebenezer Finley ordered Company B of the Ninth Battalion to move into the Hocking Valley area to halt a miners' walkout. Meanwhile, the Duquesne Blues were hastily mobilized to prevent the strike from spreading to nearby Perry and Athens County. A similar emergency occurred in Cleveland on July 21, 1899. Company D of the battalion brutally restored order during a railway strike in the Lakefront City.\(^{11}\)

The white political elite eagerly employed Negro troops to crush mining strikes. Such was not the case involving other forms of civil unrest in Ohio. Lynching, was a nemesis of Negroes in America, and according to the records of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 2,500 Negroes were the victims of lynch ---

\(^{11}\)Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 27-32; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1884, 73,76,270; Ibid., 1899, 130-131; Charles Creager, The Fourteenth Ohio National Guard, The Fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry (Columbus, 1899) 42-44. (Hereafter cited as Creager, Fourteenth ONG.)
mobs nationwide during a thirty year span. This figure constituted 78% of all persons illegally hanged during these years. Of the total number of lynch victims, at least two were Ohio Negroes.12

The employment of Negro Guardsmen for the prevention of lynchings was determined by the race of the alleged offender. If he were white, Negro troops would be quickly mobilized to protect him. In the case of a Negro suspect, however, the colored volunteers were never called. The rationale behind this philosophy was quite obvious. In the former case, Negro soldiers were regarded by the lynchers as allies in the fight for quick justice if they refrained from interfering with the mob. However, those Negro troops enforcing the law were jeered and spat upon by the pro lynching elements. During the Cincinnati Riot of 1884, for example, Companies A and B of the Ninth Battalion were ordered to protect the life of a white graverobber from a band of irate white citizens. In 1886

12The geographical breakdown of Negro lynch victims were as follows: the North had 219 cases; the South reported 2,834 victims. The Western region listed 156 lynchings. Alaska and unknown localities tallied 15 successful hangings. See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States, 1889-1918 (New York, 1918) 7. (Hereafter cited as NAACP, Thirty Years of Lynching.) Creager, Fourteenth ONG, 64; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1897, 18-20; Ibid., 1904, 424.
Company B of the Ninth was once again on duty in the Queen City as it prevented the lynching of a white felon. In the latter case, civil authorities detailed white troops to halt lynchings of Negroes. The white political elite feared that the sight of armed Negro soldiers protecting "one of their own" might exacerbate the hostilities of a white mob. A clash between the opposing forces could eventually "drift into a war of the races." (Appendices N, O, and P studies the responses of Negro Guardsmen to lynchings in Ohio from 1877-1906.)

If the action of a lynch mob or any similar disturbance precipitated a full scale race riot, the use of Negro troops followed the same pattern generally observed in the prevention of lynchings: the object of the mob's wrath had to be white before the Negro soldiers were mobilized. The only exception to this practice in the entire history of the Ohio Guard occurred in Cincinnati in 1872. On October 14, of the year, Governor Edward F. Noyes alerted the Second Battalion to halt a fight between roving bands of armed Negro and white citizens. The

13Ibid., 1884, 62-70,148,173,210-211,224-226,264-265; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 30.

fracas began when a group of white men interrupted a bake sale conducted by a local Negro church. The subsequent beating of a Negro youth by the men apparently initiated the pitched battle. The Negro Guard quickly responded to the governor's call. Using riot control techniques (close order drill) it quickly restored order.15

The prime causes for the lynchings of Negroes in Ohio were alleged rapes and murders of whites. A survey of mob action from 1856-1906 revealed that 80 percent of the lynch victims were charged with "rape." The other 20 percent were murder suspects. The charge of rape did not necessarily imply that a consummated sexual attack had taken place. For example, viewing a white woman's anatomy by a Negro was considered a rape. Other "Negro acts," such as speaking to a white female, making suggestive remarks to her, or brushing against her on a public conveyance, were also regarded as rapes.16

An alarmed Negro middle class resolved to halt the lynchings of its fellow citizens. Several alternatives were proposed. The extremist position recommended the


use of Negro Guardsmen to protect colored citizens accused of a felony. In July of 1892, a Negro convention was held at Cincinnati to discuss the merits of this proposal. A resolution requesting federal funds for the maintainance of an Afro-American Military Academy was seriously considered by the delegates. According to the plan, Negro troops would receive tactical training at the center and would then be dispatched to large urban areas in Ohio with sizable Negro population. The militant proposal was defeated by the moderates, who cautioned that the patron-client system would not tolerate such action. State Senator John P. Green, a black attorney from Cleveland, told convention delegates that a military solution to lynching was infeasible.17

A more practical solution was adopted by Representative Harry C. Smith, editor of the Cleveland Gazette, a Negro journal. His anti lynching bill attacked the lynchers' "pocket nerve." The proposal allowed the representatives of victims lynched to sue the county where the lynching occurred for $5000. A person who was seized by the lynch mob but not killed could sue for a maximum of a thousand dollars. On April 8, 1896, Governor William McKinley signed the bill into law.18

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17 Cleveland Gazette, July 9, 1892.
18 Ibid., October 6, 1906; See also Ibid., March 3, 1894; Gerber, "Lynchings," 45-49; Murat Halstead, Life
The new law did not immediately affect the lynch rate of Ohio's Negroes. Fourteen months after the statute was enacted, Charles "Click" Mitchell, a Negro porter, was lynched in Urbana for the alleged rape of a wealthy white widow. The participants in the mob were not prosecuted nor was compensation paid to the victim's family. Another miscarriage of justice occurred in Springfield. In 1904 a Negro laborer was hanged by a mob for the murder of a white policeman. Again, the county's prosecuting attorney returned no indictments against the lynchers. Despite its dismal beginning, the act ultimately deterred the lynching parties. From 1911-1931, no lynchings were recorded in Ohio. The increasing political consciousness of Negroes compelled law enforcement officials to obey the law.19

PART FOUR

WAR, POLITICS AND REFORM: OHIO'S NEGRO MILITIA, 1898-1917
CHAPTER X

THE NINTH BATTALION IN THE SPANISH AMERICAN WAR AND
THE FILIPINO INSURRECTION, 1898-1902

The American declaration of war against Spain in 1898 was enthusiastically cheered by Negro Guardsmen. Although they fully supported independence for their colored brethren in Cuba, Ohio's volunteers had ulterior motives for enlisting. First, the officer corps could demonstrate their command abilities while in federal service. Secondly, the entire battalion clamored for an opportunity to show the enemy its proficiency with weapons. Third, the Ninth's participation in the war would dramatize the patriotism of all Negro citizens. The soldiers firmly believed that their efforts in Cuba would enable Negroes at home to enjoy a better life.¹

The Ninth's esprit de corps was somewhat dampened by the controversy over American intervention into Cuban affairs. The Negro press expressed strong reservations

¹Congressional Record, Appendix, 56th Congress, 1st Sess., 440-442; Dabney, Cincinnati's Colored Citizens, 125-127; Paul A. Revere, Cleveland in the War with Spain (Cleveland, 1900) 222. (Hereafter cited as Revere, Cleveland in the War.)
concerning the use of Negro troops in an "imperialistic war." The majority of the 150 Negro newspapers in America believed that Cuban independence was a euphemism for white colonialism. Even the Cleveland Gazette, the voice of the Negro middle class, became so anti-McKinley that the War Department wondered if the recruitment of Negro volunteers was a wise policy. However, Republican-Negro clients, such as John P. Green and Judson Lyons, assured the president of the battalion's loyalty and support.  

The Ninth's endorsement of the war set the patron-client system into high gear. With the blessings of Governor Bushnell, the muster date for the battalion's three companies was tentatively scheduled for May 14, 1898, at Camp Bushnell in Columbus, Ohio. Caution was taken to insure the Negroes of federal duty under the first call for 125,000 volunteers. The unit was graciously acknowledged by President McKinley. As a former governor of

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2 John P. Green, a former Ohio state senator, received an appointment by President William McKinley to the U.S. Treasury Department. Judson Lyons, a prominent Negro attorney from Augusta, Georgia, was also appointed by McKinley as the Register of the Treasury. See Congressional Record, Appendix, 56 Congress, 1st sess., 439-443; Willard B. Gatewood Jr., "Smoked Yankees" and the Struggle for Empire: Letters from Negro Soldiers, 1898-1902 (Urbana, 1971) 4-5, 111. (Hereafter cited as Gatewood, "Smoked Yankees.") Cleveland Gazette, July 13, 1899; George P. Marks, "Opposition of Negro Newspapers to American Philippine Policy, 1899-1900," Midwest Journal, 4, (Winter, 1951-1952), 1-25. (Hereafter cited as Marks, "Opposition of Negro Newspapers.")
Ohio, he was familiar with clientage politics. McKinley praised the Negro Guard and pointed out that they were evidence that "substantial social progress" was being made in this country. He also lauded the officers of newly formed Company D from Cleveland as being the "most conservative elements in American society."³

The Ohio battalion was unusual because it contained a complete roster of Negro officers. With the exception of Guard units from Illinois, Kansas, and North Carolina, no other state boasted an all-Negro volunteer officer corps. The Ninth was further distinguished because it was the only volunteer organization commanded by a regular army officer.⁴ From March through May, the battalion conducted several parades through Columbus before an admiring public. Although Ohio was proud of all of her volunteers, the Negro soldiers received more attention than the rest of the other Guard units combined. Their esprit de corps and "fancy weapon tricks" caught the eye of every spectator. Jacob A. Meckstroth, who observed the Ninth in 1898, belabored the obvious by declaring that

³Halstead, William McKinley, 457-458; Sinkler, Racial Attitudes of American Presidents, 361; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1898, 22,29; ONG and Naval Militia, xxxvii.

The battalion was the "most impressively drilled unit in the Ohio National Guard." 5

The sight of the well dressed Negro cadre and enlisted men prompted other Negroes to volunteer their services. In April of 1898, a volunteer regiment of Cincinnati Negroes requested permission to enroll into federal service. Calling themselves the "Douglass League," the group was sponsored by a committee of the Negro elite. They were informed, however, by the War Department that their application was denied because the unit's officer corps was not white. The reply infuriated the Negroes. They deplored the army's policy of racism and vowed to fight it. The League's only alternative to the army was the National Guard, so a petition containing the

5 Besides Ohio, seven other states mustered in Negro volunteer units. The Eighth Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment, the 23rd Kansas Volunteer Infantry Regiment, the 3rd North Carolina Volunteer Infantry Regiment have already been acknowledged. Massachusetts had a completely Negro unit, "Company L," in an otherwise all white unit (Sixth Regiment.) The states of Virginia and Indiana presented a racially mixed officer corps. Alabama mustered in an all Negro unit commander by white officers. See Interview with Jacob A. Meckstroth; Ohio Roster, Spanish American War, 666-699; Miles V. Lynk, The Black Troopers, or the Daring Heroism of the Negro Soldiers in the Spanish-American War (New York, 1899)157. (Hereafter cited as Lynk, Black Troopers.) Gatewood, "Ohio's Negro Battalion," 64; Steward, Colored Regulars, 283; Fletcher, "Negro Soldier and U.S. Army," 233-235; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 44-46; Fletcher, "Negro Soldier and the U.S. Army," 233-235; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1898, 7-18.
names of its volunteers was quickly collected and dis­patched to Governor Bushnell. The group requested an ex­ansion of the militia so that it would become a member unit. In this manner, the regiment could be mustered into federal service and retain its Negro officers. Wend­dell P. Dabney, the regimental colonel, explained the situation to Governor Bushnell:

We have in this country quite a number of capable, young men anxious and ready to battle for the United States. Why not give them opportunities commensurate with their qualifications? Race prejudice stalks boldly abroad in all avenues of religion, industry, art, yes, even in the army! The Negro soldiers can only enlist in colored companies and the first regiment ordered to the front was colored...If the Negro private is not allowed to enlist, if the Negro officer is not permitted to serve in white regiments, what can be the objection to placing colored men to lead their own flesh and blood to death or glory...6

Bushnell spurned the passionate plea. Since the League had previously sought enlistment in the army, and not the Guard, he had no control over War Department's policy regarding its officers. At any rate, the request was a dead letter because Adjutant General Herbert B. Kingsley refused to authorize any expansion of the Guard. He also rejected the league's proposals to enlarge the Ninth Bat­talion to regimental size.7

6Dabney, Cincinnati's Colored Citizens, 126-127.

7Ibid., 126-127; Lynk, Black Troopers, 92; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1898, 15-33; Gatewood, "Ohio's Negro Battalion," 59.
The controversy in Cincinnati did not dampen the volunteering spirit of other Negro organizations. Between June 18 and July 16, the governor's office received twelve requests for federal duty from other new Negro militia groups. Unlike the Douglass League, most of these organizations were willing to compromise. They would accept white officers in their units if the president could assure them of a trip to Cuba. General Kingsley informed the militia committees that Ohio did not intend to organize additional volunteer units exclusively for them. He declared that the federal "Immune" Regiments were organized for that purpose. The Guard did not handle such matters.\(^8\)

The Negro bourgeois was outraged by Kingsley's position. Attorney Robert Pinn, the distinguished hero of the Civil War, wrote Governor Bushnell that if Negro volunteers were not allowed membership in the Guard, they would have no opportunity to serve their country. Pinn stated that the "Immune" Regiments were so overcrowded that no new applicants were being accepted. He

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\(^8\)The "Immune" Regiments were so named because of the War Department's belief that Negroes were invulnerable to tropical diseases. See Henry Ward to Asa Bushnell, June 18, 1898, Asa S. Bushnell Papers, Box 7, Folder 2. (Hereafter cited as Bushnell Papers.) Lynk, Black Troopers, 158; Stephen Bonsal, "The Negro Soldier in War and Peace," North American Review, 186 (June, 1907) 324. (Hereafter cited as Bonsal, "Negro Soldier.") Fletcher, "Negro Soldier in U.S. Army," 232.
also charged that the army's recruiting stations had adopted a "white only" policy for enlistments. Despite the many appeals for an Ohio regiment of Negro volunteers, none was ever formed.  

As the Ninth Battalion prepared for federal duty, its officers nervously watched the political developments upon Capitol Hill. In March of 1898, John A.T. Hull, Iowa Republican and Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, introduced a bill that would have banned all National Guard units from wartime service. Hull perceived the Guard as a useless institution for warfare. Concurring with the sentiments of War Department, his proposal increased the size of the regular army only in wartime. Based upon the "expansible army" concept, the plan called for a revamping of the United States infantry regiments. In 1898 each regiment was composed of ten companies. Eight of these had maximum manpower, and the remaining two were skeleton outfits containing Army instructors detailed to national Guard units. The Hull Bill chose to combine the eight fully manned companies into two battalions and convert the skeleton units into a

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9 Robert Pinn to Asa Bushnell, July 6, 1898, Bushnell Papers, Box 7, Folder 1; F. Ulseed to Asa Bushnell, July 11, 1898; Ibid., Box 7, Folder 1; Henry Ward to Asa Bushnell, July 18, 1898; Ibid., Box 7, Folder 1; "Governor's Memorandum," June 30, 1898; Ibid., Box 7, Folder 2.
third battalion, which could then be utilized in wartime. The regular army would be increased from 27,822 to 104,000 officers and enlisted personnel. The latter figure represented all the troops necessary to defeat the Spaniards.\(^{10}\) Ohio immediately saw the bill's threat to the militia system. She urged other states to organize voting blocks against the measure and pressure their congressmen into similar actions. On April 6, 1898, the Hull proposal was voted upon by the House and soundly defeated. The Guard was going to Cuba after all.\(^{11}\)

Ohio Negro volunteers cheered the Hull Bill's defeat and initiated steps to improve their status. Anticipating great dividends from their trip to Cuba, the younger officers in the battalion organized a purge of the unit's senior line officers. Major Charles Fillmore, the thirty-six year old battalion commander, agreed with the idea. He firmly believed that younger talent would insure the ultimate success of the unit in the war. The enlisted ranks, however, resisted the overtures of the junior officers and


\(^{11}\)Cosmas, Army for Empire, 95.
refused to unseat most of the veteran line officers. The only casualty of the youth movement was Captain Benjamin Payne of Company B. The forty year old officer, who had commanded the Columbus unit since 1881, was now regarded by his men as an expendible relic. Deaton J. Brooks, a twenty year old factory foreman, was elected as Payne's successor.12

Ironically, Fillmore's support of the purge came back to haunt him. Known as the "handsome major," he was a favorite of state republicans. Ralph Tyler, a Columbus journalist, was amazed at Fillmore's ability to "make many friends but no enemies." Governor Bushnell, who remembered young Charles as a boy in Springfield, persuaded him to accept a clerkship in the secretary of state's office in 1897. Fillmore returned the favor in 1898 and offered the services of the Ninth Battalion to escort the governor in the inaugural parade.13

Fillmore's meteoric rise in politics was abruptly halted in January, 1898. The lynching of an accused rapist in Urbana in October of 1897 produced cries of

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12Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1881, 33; Ibid., 1898, 184; Ohio Roster, Spanish American War, 675; Columbus City Directory, 1878, 314.

13Ralph Tyler to George A. Myers, August 13, 1898, George A. Myers Papers, Box 2, Folder 3; Gatewood, "Ohio's Negro Battalion," 55-57.
protest from Negro community, and Harry C. Smith, editor of the Gazette, informed the governor that an immediate investigation of the lynching was needed. Smith declared that he conducted a personal study of the incident and concluded that no rape had ever taken place. He wrote that

"it [the lynching] was just another case of an innocent black man first being victimized by a racist system of injustice, then being delivered into the hands of a mob."14

Bushnell agreed to look into the matter, but postponed the inquiry until after the election. His inaction prompted the Gazette to inform its readers that "Urbana Bushnell" had condoned the mob's action. Negroes were implored not to vote for the governor but continue to support the remainder of the Republican party candidates.15

The political situation grew increasingly difficult for both Bushnell and Fillmore. On January 7th the governor reluctantly appointed Cleveland industrialist Mark Hanna to the U.S. Senate seat vacated by John Sherman. This action was politically expedient since Hanna was one of the party's most influential men. Bushnell, however,

14 Ibid., 57.

15 Ibid., 57; Ralph Tyler to George A. Myers, August 6, 1897, George A. Myers Papers, Box 3, Folder 6; Jordan, Ohio Comes of Age, 308-313; Ohio Executive Documents, III, 1897, 426-429.
said that he preferred that Robert McKisson, the mayor of Cleveland, fill the position. Despite the opposition from the Bushnell-Foraker wing of the party, Hanna was later elected by the legislature to the Senate.\textsuperscript{16}

Editor Smith finally persuaded Fillmore that Hanna, not Bushnell, represented the Negro's true friend. Known as "Uncle Mark" to the Negro bourgeois, Hanna offered his political coattails to all anti-Bushnell clients. Receiving verbal support from both Smith and Hanna, Fillmore cut his ties with the Bushnell Administration. He withdrew the escort offer and declined to support the governor in the Urbana Affair. Despite massive Negro opposition, Bushnell was reelected. With a taste for revenge, he now called for the major's resignation, which he received. The vacancy precipitated a great deal of infighting among the officer corps. For example, Captain Robert Rudd attempted to better his chances for promotion through direct political means. In February he wrote to George Myers, the one Negro member of the Republican state executive committee, and asked the Cleveland barber to use his influence with Bushnell so that he might be appointed as battalion commander. However, the letter

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{16}Frank Levstik, Inventory to Governor Asa S. Bushnell Papers, OHS (Columbus, 1970) 132-135; Philip Jordan, Ohio Comes of Age 1873-1900 (Columbus, 1943) 310. (Hereafter cited as Jordan, Ohio Comes of Age.) Gatewood, "Ohio's Negro Battalion," 57.}
became lost in the mail and was not discovered until September.  

On May 13, 1898, the governor ended all speculation concerning the post. He commissioned Lieutenant Charles Young of the 9th U.S. Cavalry as major of volunteers. The choice of Young was not universally popular. Jacob Meckstroth declared that the incumbent officers in the battalion were upset with Bushnell's decision, for they felt that one of them should have been selected. They resented taking orders from an "outsider." Many white Ohioans were also bitter over the appointment of Young. Motivated by racial prejudice, they conducted a letter writing campaign to the War Department. The groups demanded Major Young's removal from command before he became the state's first Negro colonel. However, the war ended before any action was taken upon the request.

17John Green to George A. Myers, September 16, 1898, George A. Myers Papers; Gatewood, "Ohio's Negro Battalion," 57-58.

18Through Mark Hanna's influence, Fillmore received a lieutenancy in one of the Immune Regiments. He performed garrison duty with his unit in Cuba until the fall of 1898. He was subsequently discharged and returned to Springfield. It was an inglorious end for one with so much promise. See Mark Hanna to George A. Myers, June 9, 1898, Box 6, Folder 4, George A. Myers Papers; Fletcher, "Negro Soldier and U.S. Army," 180; Interview with Jacob A. Meckstroth, Columbus, January 20, 1975.
On May 19, 1898, the Ninth left Columbus for Camp Russell A. Alger at Falls Church, Virginia. Shortly after its arrival, the battalion was expanded to four companies with the addition of the Cleveland unit. The morale of the soldiers was excellent during their three months encampment in Virginia. Because they were confident of seeing action in Cuba, the men tolerated a few annoyances. One was the hostility of the townspeople to northern Negro soldiers. The residents were afraid that the Ninth would not observe the established Jim Crow practices while entrained in Virginia. The second vexation was Major Young. Known as a strict disciplinarian, he introduced the battalion to the rigors of professional military life. Long hours were spent upon drilling and physical exercises. In addition, no drinking or gambling were allowed in or near the camp. Finally, few liberty passes were issued to the men.\(^{19}\) The monotony and boredom of camp life were broken by the visits of distinguished personalities. Major General Oliver Otis Howard, the former chief of the Freedmen's Bureau, was greatly impressed by the Ninth's excellent behavior in Virginia, and Paul Laurence Dunbar,

\(^{19}\)Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1898, 12; Gatelywood, Smoked Yankees, 115-118; Charles Young to Adjutant General, November 30, 1898, Regimental Book Records of the Ninth Battalion, Ohio National Guard, Records of the Adjutant General's Department, Record Group 94, National Archives. (Hereafter cited as Regimental Records.)
the Negro poet from Dayton, kept the Guard's spirits high when reciting some of his brilliant compositions. Other notable guests included Charles Douglass, son of Frederick Douglass, and Judson Lyons of the U.S. Treasury Department.20

On August 16, 1898, the Ninth was transferred to Camp Meade, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The Guardsmen were noticeably hostile and restless during their first days of encampment. There were two reasons for their behavior. First, it appeared to the men that Major Young had forsaken two of his most popular officers. In July, Captain John H. Dickerson and Lieutenant William H. Brooks were accused of raping a "young white women who kept a stand on the grounds" near Camp Alger, Virginia.21 Fearful that publicity from the incident might ruin his military career, Young advised the two officers not to defend themselves against the allegations. Instead he urged their resignations in the "best interests of the service." On August 6, the major quietly accepted both resignations.22

Most of the battalion disagreed with Young's action. They declared that the officers should have been given an

20Ohio State Journal, June 9, 1898; Gatewood, "Ohio's Negro Battalion," 60.


22Charles Young to Adjutant General, August 6, 1898, Regimental Records.
opportunity to refute the charges. Reminding the major that "rape" was a familiar cry of the white race, the soldiers protested the sacrificing of their superiors to a "racist system of injustice." The men now believed Major Young to be an opportunist who would sacrifice the battalion's welfare to that of his ambition.23

With the noticeable exception of Columbus newspaperman Ralph Tyler, Ohio Negroes also believed the charges against the officers were contrived. They condemned Young's decision as selfish and labelled the entire affair as a disgrace that threatened the patron-client system. Tyler, on the other hand, remarked that the pair probably committed the rape. Taking the same position in this case as he had done in the Urbana lynching, he believed that any such allegation against a Negro was genuine. For punishment, Tyler recommended that Lieutenant Brooks be transported to Santiago "where the yellow fever is." Concerning Dr. Dickerson, he had nothing to say, except that "he [Dickerson] is one of those fellows with more animal than man."24

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23Gatewood, "Ohio's Negro Battalion," 57, 61; Interview with Jacob A. Meckstroth, Columbus, January 20, 1975; Cleveland Gazette, September 18, and October 16, 1897.

24Ralph Tyler to George A. Myers, August 15, 1898, George A. Myers Papers, Box 6, Folder 5.
Secondly, Guardsmen were certain that the four regular regiments had already squeezed the Negro's quota of glory from the war. The heroics of Negro regulars at the battles of El Caney, San Juan Hill, and Las Guasimas only made the Ninth increasingly envious. Morale in the unit had dropped considerably because the battalion's dream of fighting in Cuba was rapidly fading. J. Madison Pierce, a young Negro lawyer from Columbus, summed up the feelings of the Guard at Camp Meade:

Now that the hope of participating in battle is gone, our boys in common with all volunteers, are eager to don the habiliments of civilians. There is a good deal of apathy among us since the peace negotiations began. Previous to that there was no complaint or fault finding.25

The disillusioned battalion soon donned all the symptoms of a rebellious unit. Over 30 percent of the enlisted men were constantly receiving treatment for "illnesses." Frequently, brothers, especially twins, became "sick" simultaneously so that they could room together. There were hazards, however, involved in this practice. Most of the unit's prescribed medicine came from the same bottle, and it made no difference to the camp surgeon if one suffered from a sprained ankle or

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from acid indigestion. Everyone received the same treatment. Consequently, the prescription produced a number of cases of diarrhea in previously healthy soldiers.  

Besides the siege of the Ninth at the infirmary's doors, there were eleven reported desertions at Camp Meade. The problem became so acute by October 15 that one Guardsmen wrote the Cleveland Gazette:

> We have now nearly as many men away from camp without leave—possibly deserters—as you would find leaving the Ohio penitentiary if the walls were torn down suddenly. All say they would take any kind of chance to get away rather than continue to receive the kind of treatment they now receive. Yes, every man with a bit of pride and love for family is more than anxious to get out of this hell. The war is over now and [Theodore] Roosevelt, [Nelson A.] Miles and others (white of course) have all there is to be gotten out of it.  

One soldier, Private George Hallicks of Company A, revealed his hatred for army life by leaving camp, but he refused to go alone. On November 11 he escaped the clutches of Major Young accompanied by Alice Hawkins, a girlfriend from Harrisburg.  

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26 Gatewood, "Smoked Yankees," 120; Charles Young to Adjutant General, July 25, 1898, Regimental Records.  
28 Generally, desertions among military personnel in the war occurred for a number of reasons. The volunteer (such as Private Hallicks of the Ninth), deserted because of sheer boredom. Negro regulars, on the other hand, racially and ideologically sided with the enemy, and some of them subsequently deserted and adopted the enemy's cause. The white regular tired of military with its stringent rules, regulations and protocol. He deserted
By the end of September, those soldiers not deserting beseiged their company commanders with a rash of complaints. They pointed out that boredom and inactivity was not their main problem. It was Major Young. The enlistees charged their leader with advancing his own career at the expense of the battalion. For example, some of the men were bitter over their being detailed as servants for General W.M. Graham, the commandant at Camp Meade. One volunteer mentioned that he was going bankrupt because of his constant purchases of white gloves for the general's dinner parties. Whenever white companies offered to relieve the Ninth of this detail, Young steadfastly declined the invitations. His reason for doing so was quite obvious. For him, pleasing the right people spelled advancement in the regular army. But to the rest of the battalion, General Graham's whims meant absolutely nothing. The other major grievance against the battalion commander concerned his


29 Gatewood, "Ohio's Negro Battalion," 61; Fletcher, "Negro Soldier and United States Army," 249; Ralph Tyler to George A. Myers, September 12, 1895, George A. Myers Papers, Box 6, Folder 5; Gatewood, "Smoked Yankees," 118.
preferential treatment of white visitors to the camp. The Ninth had acquired such a sterling reputation for drill proficiency that large crowds waited for its arrival at Camp Meade. Whenever white spectators appeared, Major Young ordered maneuvers for its guests. Throngs of admiring whites were also treated to war games, bayonet exercises, and parades. Negro visitors to the camp, however, received no such matinee. In fact, they were generally ignored by Major Young, who often refused to leave his tent to greet them.  

By October 11 it was evident that Major Young had lost the trust of nearly everyone in the battalion. Over 60 percent of the officers and enlisted men had requested immediate discharges from military service. One Guardsman who had become literally sick of the whole affair was Maurice Tyler of Company B. He wrote his older brother in September begging for a discharge "or at least a furlough." Maurice charged that Young had denied all furlough requests so that the truth about him [the major] would not be disclosed. Young Tyler also claimed that men were not encouraged to write home because the battalion commander feared public exposure. He [Tyler] had been sick in quarters but was prohibited from contacting his family.

Ralph Tyler was furious after reading his brother's communique. He wrote George Myers that "if Maurice is not sent home in a few days, his remains will be sent for burial. Major Young will have to answer me personally, if I have to travel across the continent to seek him." With the help of Senator Hanna, Maurice received an immediate thirty day furlough and an eventual military discharge.31

It became evident that Major Young had developed a paranoia over criticism of his leadership. Determined to keep the battalion a "closed shop," he sent spies around the camp to discover the identity of "trouble-makers." In addition, he regularly inspected all outgoing mail in an effort to stifle discontent. Unknown to him, Tyler had managed to place his letter into a civilian mailbox.32

Another Guardsmen using political connections advantageously was Corporal Robert Allen of Company A. The Springfield businessman carried a letter addressed to the War Department in his pocket for several days. When no one was looking, he sneaked the dispatch into a civilian mailbox.

31Ralph Tyler to George A. Myers, September 12, 1898, George A. Myers Papers, Box 6, Folder 5.
32Charles Young to Adjutant General, October 22, November 2, 1898, Regimental Records; Ralph Tyler to George A. Myers, September 12, 1898, George A. Myers' Papers, Box 6, Folder 5; Ohio Roster, Spanish-American War, 681.
post office on October 22, 1898. Young soon discovered that the nature of Allen's letter concerned a discharge. He quickly wrote to U.S. Adjutant General Henry C. Corbin and asked that no outside interference impair the discipline of his men. He declared that Corporal Allen was an incorrigible and had been a major source of unrest within the battalion. Nevertheless, the War Department did not agree with Young's opinion of Allen and ordered the major to discharge him.33

Young blamed his problems with the men upon the company commanders. He accused them of sabotaging his leadership by causing "restlessness and discontent" within the camp. The major had apparently discovered a petition to the Ohio Adjutant General's Department requesting discharges for all married Guardsmen. Since that presumably included the entire officer corps, the petition amounted to a censure of his leadership. Regarding the circular as a threat to his military future, Young promised to court-martial anyone signing the petition. As a result, most of the officers erased their names.34

33Charles Young to Adjutant General, October 22, 1898, Regimental Records; Adjutant General to Charles Young, November 28, 1898; Ibid., Adjutant General Department, Special Order, 1898, for Ohio Volunteers from the War Department, November 21, 1898 (Columbus, 1898) OHS.

34Charles Young to Adjutant General, December 5, 1898, Regimental Records.
The major did compromise with his subordinates by allowing all NCOs and enlisted men who were married an opportunity to go home. He then imported some of his own loyal students from Wilberforce University to take their places. Young then resolved to punish the company commanders for their "unsoldierly behavior" during the war. He informed them that they were a group of unprofessionals preparing to receive training from an authentic professional soldier. For two consecutive days, he returned all the companies' morning reports and ordered them to be redone according to the army's standards. In addition, he vindictively denied all officer requests for furloughs or military discharges. The situation became so intolerable that one officer declared that the major had taken leave of his senses and had become a "regular tyrant."\(^8\)

On November 21, 1898, the battalion arrived at Camp Marion near Summerville, South Carolina. Described by the men as the "worst place we have struck yet," the encampment ground was actually located in a swamp. To make matters worse, the battalion's water supply contained

\(^8\)Ralph Tyler to George A. Myers, September 12, 1898, George A. Myers Papers, Box 6, Folder 5; Charles Young to Adjutant General, December 5, 6, 12, 1898, Regimental Records; Charles Young to Robert Rudd, December 12, 1898, Ibid.; Charles Young to John Fulton, December 14, 1898, Ibid.; Fletcher, "Negro Soldier and U.S. Army," 244.
mineral deposits, ruining its potability. Besides the environmental problems, the hostility of southerners toward northern Negro troops was immediately noticeable. Although most of the residents' abuses were verbal, some took on a more serious nature. For example, Private Albert Williams of Company D was seriously wounded after being felled by a sniper's bullet. Four other Guardsmen, fearing for their lives at Camp Marion, promptly deserted. Lieutenant Wilson Ballard of Columbus put it succinctly when he stated that the "reception was not cordial." Attempting to counteract the prejudice of the townspeople, Major Young counseled each soldier to treat the residents with respect. The plan succeeded. By the end of December, the battalion had won the admiration of the majority of the townsfolk. Young was highly praised by a local newspaper for doing a creditable job.

After pacifying the natives, the Ninth resumed its soldiering duties. On November 29, General S.B.M. Young, commander of the Second Army Corps, visited the camp and complimented the battalion upon its drill proficiency. He was so impressed with the Ninth's performance that he


excused the battalion from all afternoon obligations. Despite the fame enjoyed by the unit, most of the men were more concerned with going home. On January 28, 1899, the battalion was officially mustered out of federal service. It was redesignated as a state volunteer militia unit a year later.\textsuperscript{38}

The history of the Ninth Battalion in the war was similar to that of other volunteer organizations in federal service. The enemy was easily conquered by the regular troops. Guard units were simply luxuries, and the vast majority of them never saw action. For example, of the ten Ohio regiments (white) mustered into federal service, only three actually traveled abroad. The 4th Ohio engaged the enemy at Porto Rico on August 13, 1898. The 6th Ohio was dispatched to Santa Clara, Cuba, on August 28, but arrived there after the peace negotiations had begun. The 8th Ohio was sent to Santiago on June 11, but did not participate in the siege.\textsuperscript{39}

The Ninth's record did not compare favorably with those of most white Guard units, including the Ohio regiments. In 1902 the War Department published the conduct

\textsuperscript{38}Steward, Colored Regulars, 297; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1901, 73-74.

\textsuperscript{39}Ohio Roster, Spanish-American War, 226,396,576; ONG and Naval Militia, xxxvii.
records of all volunteer organizations mustered into the
war. Of the 148 white infantry regiments in federal ser­
vice, only 8 of them reported a higher percentage of courts­
martial and desertions than did Ohio's Negro battalion. Moreover, the Ninth recorded a higher ratio of these of­
fenses (summary courts-martial in particular), than all
of its sister units combined. With the exception of Ohio's
9th and 10th Regiments, the Negro volunteers led all
Buckeye units in number of desertions among enlisted men.
This was remarkable because all of the Ohio regiments con­
tained at least 1100 enlistees. The Ninth's enlisted
strength was a mere 429 men. (Appendices Q and R offer
a statistical comparison of the battalion's record of
courts-martial and desertions with Ohio's white Guard
units in the war.) Among the state's white volunteers,
those that performed garrison duty in Cuba generally

40 All of the forty-four states raising white Guard
units were included in the survey. Alabama reported
one white unit with a higher percentage of misbehavior
among its troops than the Ninth Battalion. New York
listed three such units. The other white regiments were
from Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Wyoming (one each.)
See United States War Department, Correspondence Relating
to the War with Spain and Conditions Growing Out of the
Same, Including the Insurrections in the Philippines
Islands and the China Relief Expedition, Between the
Adjutant General of the Army and Military Commanders in
the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, China, and the
Philippines from April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902, I, 583­
628. (Hereafter cited as U.S. War Department, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain.)
compiled the best morale and behavior records. 41

The Ninth Battalion did not compare favorable with the conduct records of other Negro Guard units either. Proportionally, Ohio's Negroes compiled one of the worst behavioral records among the eight states mustering a colored volunteer unit into federal service. Based upon the total number of Guardsmen, only the 8th Illinois and 3rd Alabama Volunteer Infantry Regiments reported a higher percentage of courts-martial than did the Ohioans. In addition, the Ninth placed second to the highly illiterate Alabama Guard in the number of desertions among enlistees. (Appendix R contains a qualitative analysis of the conduct performances of all Negro Guard units mustered into the war with Spain.) With the exception of

41 The seriousness of the offense determined the nature of the court. A general court-martial contained at least three judges (officers) and was convened for serious infractions of military laws. For example, cases of desertion, and death resulting from dueling, Articles of War (A.W.) 48-51, and 26-28 respectively, were heard by this body. A summary court-martial consisted of one commissioned officer (captain or above) that judged minor offenses. Most Negro Guardsmen brought before this court were cited for alleged disrespect toward white officers (A.W. 54). However, Major Young handed out six sentences of this nature to the Ninth's enlisted corps. Other actions resulting in summary courts-martial among all Guardsmen were leave violations (A.W. 32), drunkenness on duty (A.W. 38), and sleeping on duty (A.W. 39). See Ohio Guard Regulation, 1897, 98-121, 178-204; Ohio Roster, Spanish-American War, 18-960; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1898, 12; U.S. War Department, Correspondence Relating to the War with Spain, I, 610-612.
the Ninth Battalion, the Indiana Negro units, and Company L, 6th Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry Regiment, the Negro Guard organizations contained at least 800 soldiers. As in the white regiments of Ohio, those Negro units performing duty in Cuba had the best morale and the lowest number of desertions. The muster-out rolls of the 8th Illinois and the 23rd Kansas Guard units confirm this observation.42

The experience of the Ninth Battalion in the war was not a total disaster. The many hardships encountered by the unit brought the cadre and enlisted men closer together. Class differences were forgotten as company commanders protected their ranks from Major Young's martinet command. For example, the officers sought discharges and furlough for those soldiers who were extremely ill, homesick, or whose personalities clashed with that of the battalion commander. The tense situation within the unit worsened when the men unfairly blamed Major Young for their unhappiness and inactivity. Admittedly, had the Guardsmen ultimately participated in Cuba, most of their morale problems might have disappeared. Since

they did not, they sublimated their restlessness into an anti-Young movement. Sulking around Camp Meade, they openly criticized the major for their misfortunes. Many of them were actually engaged in embarrassing him politically and discrediting his leadership capabilities.  

Although not responsible for the Guard's political situation, Major Young must share the blame for the battalion's ignominy during the war. He failed to establish a working relationship with his subordinate officers. Moreover, he openly ridiculed the cadre and was generally contemptuous of all non-professional soldiers. Young considered the Guard as a second rate institution to the regular army. The major also regarded Ohio Negro volunteers as a group of clannish, status seeking amateurs who were pampered by Republican governors. This "professional" attitude insulated him from the needs of his men. Young's personal ambitions also contributed to the dissension and general disillusionment within the battalion. His obligation to advancing the Negro race was inseparably connected to his own quest for advancement in the regular army. Eventually he obtained a captaincy

43 Gatewood, "Smoked Yankees," 115-120; Ralph Tyler to George A. Myers, September 12, 1898, George A. Myers Papers, Box 6, Folder 5.

44 Charles Young to Adjutant General, October 22, December 5,6,12,14, 1898, Regimental Records.
through seniority. It was a Pyrrhic victory because it not only lost him the respect of his men, it also politically embarrassed the entire Negro population of Ohio.\(^4\)5

In April of 1898, Admiral George Dewey sailed into Manila Bay to destroy a Spanish Squadron and aid a native uprising against the Spaniards. Initially, the Filipino rebels welcomed the Americans as allies in the fight against tyranny. However, the natives gradually realized that the promise of independence was not American policy, and in December of 1898, the Filipinos' worst fears were confirmed when the treaty of Paris awarded the islands to the victor. The natives were simply exchanging one ruler for another. Emilio Aguinaldo, the leader of the Filipino freedom movement, quickly severed the alliance with the American forces. On January 9, 1899, he issued the Malalos Proclamation declaring war upon the United States.\(^4\)6

\(^{45}\) Ralph Tyler to George A. Myers, September 12, 1898, George A. Myers Papers, Box 6, Folder 5; Charles Young to Adjutant General, November 2, December 5, 6, 1898, Regimental Records.

\(^{46}\) Charles Danby, "Some Remarks on a Filipino Point of View," The Independent (January 4, 1900) 52; Fletcher, "Negro Soldier and the U.S. Army," 265; Gatewood, "Smoked Yankees," 239; W.F. Sylvester to William McKinley, August 22, 1899, The William McKinley Papers, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Ser.1, Reel 7.8-9. (Hereafter cited as William McKinley Papers.) (Unless otherwise noted all references will be to Series 1.) U.S. Congress. Congressional Record, 57th Cong., 1st Sess., XXXV, pt.1, 1902, 649-650; Hearings Before the Committee on the Philippine Islands,
Americans responded to the challenge of war, and from 1899-1902, nearly 70,000 United States soldiers took part in quelling the insurrection. The outbreak of new fighting proved a boon to the sagging morale of Ohio's Ninth Battalion. Anticipating a return to federal service, the unit observed the war with great interest. In September of 1899, the War Department shattered the battalion's dream of military service. It announced that Negro volunteers would probably not be used in the Philippines. Because of the anti-war sentiments of the Negro press, the army was hesitant to use Negro Guardsmen. In spurning the colored citizen-soldiers, the War Department also claimed that they were less disciplined and more apt to be indoctrinated by the enemy than Negro regulars.47

Speculation that the Ninth Battalion would not see action prompted attorney John P. Green to ask the president if he had forgotten Ohio Negroes. Green charged that the War Department deliberately discharged the Ninth from Camp Marion to avoid its use in the Philippines.48


48 John Green to William McKinley, June 29, 1899. Ibid., Reel 7, 4.
The president was receptive to criticism and promised that colored volunteer regiments commanded by Negro officers would be quickly organized and dispatched to Luzon. On August 17, 1899, Secretary Root gave his reaction to McKinley's plans:

> About the colored regiments, I am embarrassed by the fact that while the colored troops have always fought well, the colored officers in the volunteer regiments raised for the Spanish-American War were failures. I am told that they have not the faculty of commanding, or of enforcing the discipline and are not respected by their troops as are white officers.

Root declared that Negroes would not favor a volunteer organization without colored officers. For this reason, he opposed raising a Negro volunteer regiment. Besides the political problems in a Negro unit, Root stated that the Filipino insurrection would end so quickly that Negro troops would be superfluous. To soothe the ruffled feelings of the Negro bourgeois, he suggested that a limited number of Negro be recruited and placed under white officers. "This would keep them [Negroes] from making trouble."^{49}

The president was noticeably irked at his secretary's burst of racial prejudice. He was surprised that Root accepted the belief that Negroes were unable to command.

^{49}Elihu Root to William McKinley, August 17, 1899, *Ibid.*, Reel 7, 1,2.
It became evident to McKinley that Root had lost all objectivity concerning the issue, and the president proceeded with his original plan. He telegraphed Governor Bushnell and requested a list of Negro officers for line positions. McKinley then empaneled a committee of Negro politicians to assist him in recruiting colored commanders --"the best officers possible." This action confirmed the president's sincerity toward the Negro militia class. The president then corresponded with his secretary of war and ordered him to immediately examine Bushnell's recommendations. Toning down his communique, he added:

I note what you say about forming the colored regiment. This subject is always one of difficulty, but I feel very much inclined to organize a colored regiment making the field officers (white) all regulars and line officers all colored.

McKinley further stated that the Negro soldier had fought bravely in Cuba and the Insurrection was quite similar to that conflict. Finally he asked Root to modify his notion concerning unintelligent Negro officers. The president declared that Negroes just needed an opportunity to "demonstrate their fitness to command."

50Sinkler, Racial Attitudes of American Presidents, 364; William McKinley to Elihu Root, August 19, 1899, William McKinley Papers, Reel 7, 1.

51McKinley to Root, August 19, 1899, Ibid., Reel 7, 1.
With great alacrity, the 48th and 49th Volunteer Infantry Regiments were organized early in 1900. The units were actually composed of Negro Guard units mustered into federal service for the Cuban conflict. As expected, the regiments were commanded by white field officers and Negro line officers. Ohio's Ninth Battalion was well represented in the officer corps of the units. Four of the battalion's veterans were nominated by Governor Bushnell and approved by Secretary Root. The name of Charles Fillmore was conspicuously missing from the governor's list. All of the Ohio officers were assigned to the 48th Volunteer Infantry Regiment.52

The Negro volunteers joined the colored regulars in the Philippines in September of 1900. For eighteen months they fought bravely against the enemy. Their most memorable engagements occurred in November, 1901. The soldiers from the 49th Regiment, distinguished themselves at Cagayan, Luzon, the island's most northerly province.

52 Robert Rudd, formerly of Company A, Ninth Battalion, O.V.I., was given a captaincy. Charles Caldwell and Wilson Ballard (Company B) also accepted lieutenancies. Emmanuel Bass, formerly of Company D, Ninth Battalion, was also selected as a lieutenant. President McKinley offered Charles Young (Ninth Cavalry) a captaincy in one of the volunteer regiments but the latter refused, hoping for field grade status (major and above.) He was already a captain. See Congressional Record, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 442; Fletcher, Negro Soldier and the U.S. Army," 287.
The unit captured a large number of ladrones (robbers), who were hailed as patriots by the peasant populous. The steady fire of the volunteers at Luzon ended their guerrilla raids upon American base camps. Rienzi Lemus, an enlisted man in the 25th Infantry Regiment, credited the volunteers with removing one band from the resistance to the American military pacification. Both regiments were also instrumental in subduing the stubborn Moros. Before their departure from the islands in 1902, the Negro officers of the two regiments were praised by the War Department for their good conduct, gentlemanly behavior, and meritorious service. Unfortunately none of the 75 Negro volunteer officers were reassigned to any special duty or given a civil appointment in the new territory's government. These jobs were reserved for white officers only.53

The Negro volunteers performed a creditable job in the Philippines. Their accomplishments were even more remarkable because they fought two enemies--the Filipino rebels and the transplanted racism of white America. For

example, Negro soldiers in Manila were prohibited from entering "white only" brothels, barbershops, and restaurants. In addition, Negro officers were subjected to racial slurs and profanity from white enlistees refusing to salute them. Negro troops returned to an unappreciative white society that was still unwilling to grant them first class citizenship. One southern senator remarked that since the islands contained colored citizens, it might be feasible to export American Negro citizens there, especially the "troublesome mulattoes." The ungrateful attitude of the white political elite was also reflected by the U.S. Senate Committee investigating the performance of the American military operations in the Philippines. The Committee sarcastically concluded that the venereal disease (VD) rate among American soldiers jumped from 8.97 percent in September of 1900 to 20.42 percent in April of 1901. The increase was concomitant with the introduction of Negro volunteers into the islands.\[54\] Although no racial analysis of those afflicted with VD was available, General Robert P. Hughes declared that his Negro regulars were so "eaten up with syphilis and gonorrhea, that they were unable to fight the enemy."

Hughes also implied that Negro troops were responsible for the booming prostitution trade in the Philippines. Neither the committee nor the white commanders testifying before it had any praise for the Negro volunteers. They seemed contented to dwell upon the common pitfalls of extended military occupation. The battles of Luzon and Bolotan were forgotten amidst their determination to discredit the Negro soldier's contributions, but within eighteen short years, the Negro volunteer would be asked once again to help preserve a racist nation.  

CHAPTER XI

REASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL GUARD INSTITUTION.

THE NINTH BATTALION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The collective performance of the National Guard in the Spanish-American War was poor. Of the 125,000 volunteers mustered into federal service, few had taken even rudimentary drill training and arms instructions. They were not prepared to defeat the weakest of enemies. Besides these deficiencies, most Guard units lacked tent equipment, modern weapons, and adequate financial support for the proper maintenance of armories and field training areas. It was indeed fortunate for America that the untrained and often ill-equipped citizen-soldier was not depended upon to carry the brunt of the fighting in Cuba.\(^1\)

In 1900 the War Department considered the Guard as an anachronism in relevant defense planning. Secretary Root declared that the regular army must be sufficiently strengthened and expanded if America were to become a world power. Following the tenets of Emory Upton, he

\(^1\)Cosmas, Army for Empire, 127-128,136; Cantor, "Dick Militia Act," 118-119-137; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1894, 112-120.
proclaimed that the Guard was useless in its present form. He also declared that the reliance upon volunteers to execute national policy was passe.  

The National Guard recognized the threat of extinction in 1900 and fought back by bitterly denouncing Uptonian dogma as a case of mistaken identity. The Guard agreed with the War Department concerning the worthlessness of the enrolled militia system, but argued that they resembled the regulars in training, spirit, and dedication. The Guard pinned its present difficulty upon Upton's failure to distinguish between the classes of "militia." Nevertheless, the citizen-soldiers realized that their only alternative lay in increased federal aid. In return for this assistance, the states would relinquish some of their autonomy over the Guard.  

Guided by U.S. Senator Charles Dick of Ohio, the National Guard Association (NGA) led the fight for additional federal money for the volunteers. Since its inception in 1879, the NGA had jealously protected the militia's independence from an encroaching federal government. The Association's past successes in this endeavor were impressive. For example, in 1887, federal aid to

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3 Upton, U.S. Military Policy, 8-11,35,434-435; Todd, "National Guard," 164.
the Guard doubled to $400,000 annually without any concessions from the militia. In 1898, the powerful NGA, using its less elegant name "militia lobby," defeated the Hull Bill. By 1902, however, the Association, fighting for the Guard's very existence, changed its philosophy and supported dual control over the militia. 4

The Dick Militia Bill of 1903 reflected this change in attitude. Unlike the federal militia law of 1887, the new proposal was a quid pro quo between the Guard and the War Department. The measure called for the recognition of the Guard as the official reserve component of the U.S. Army. In this manner the Guard's police function would decline in importance, and the citizen-soldier would not be relegated to performing strictly domestic duty. Other provisions promised federal pay and an abundant supply of ammunition during summer encampments to volunteer units participating in joint maneuvers with the regulars. Finally, the federal government pledged to increase its annual appropriations to all Guard organizations. In

4Cosmas, Army for Empire, 96-97; Cantor, "Dick Militia Act," 59, 81, 140, 195, 263; Colonel (Ret.) R. Ernest Dupuy, The National Guard: A Compact History, 92, (Hereafter cited as Dupuy, National Guard.) Hill, Minute Man, 134; Riker, Soldiers of the State, 60; U.S. Statutes at Large, XXIV, 401; Todd, "National Guard," 163; Charles Dick to A.G. Keck, October 22, 1906, The Charles Dick Papers, OHS, Box 32. (Hereafter cited as Charles Dick Papers.)
return for these concessions, the Guard relinquished its right to serve outside the continental United States as units separate from the Volunteer Army. The Guard also consented to federal regulations standardizing the equipment and training of National Guard units. At least twenty four times annually, the Guard agreed to conduct mandatory drills. Besides this requirement, the volunteers' summer encampment was set at five days. These training sessions were open to inspection by regular army instructors. The Dick Bill passed on January 21, 1903, and marked the final demise of the antiquated Militia Act of 1792.5

The provisions of the Dick Act proved satisfactory to Secretary Root. He realized that America's hostility to standing armies prevented an adequate expansion of the regular forces. Unlike other staunch Uptonians in the War Department, he recognized the Guard's potential as an effective fighting force. Army General Staff officers, on the other hand, discounted the value of the present Guard organization and pushed for a completely federal

5The Dick Act increased the annual federal grant to the volunteer militia from $400,000 to $2 million dollars yearly. See Todd, "National Guard," 163; Hill, Minute Man, 187-188; Cantor, "Dick Militia Act," 148,263-264,266; U.S., Statutes at Large, XXXII, 775; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1903, 6-7,143-145; Callan, U.S. Military Laws, 64-69; Riker, Soldiers of the State, 64,69-70; Dupuy, National Guard, 92-93.
force of volunteers. However, Root's collaboration with Major General Dick in improving the militia muted much of the army's criticism of the act. By 1908, the War Department distaste for the Guard was superseded by its concern for the militia's growing political power. The federal Militia Act of that year enabled the volunteer units to serve outside the boundaries of continental America as distinct Guard units. The citizen-soldier also demonstrated his influence two years later by lobbying for a federal subsidy for armory construction.

The War Department genuinely feared this surge of pro-Guard legislation. They did not wish to repeat the Hull Bill hearings of 1898, which questioned the importance of the regular army. The only alternative to countering the Guard's power lay in gaining greater control over it. The professionals achieved a rare victory in 1912. U.S. Attorney General George W. Wickersham was asked by Secretary of War Lindley Garrison to rule upon the constitutionality of the Militia Act of 1908. Specifically, the army sought to repeal the Guard's right to serve outside the continental United States as separate entities from the regular or Volunteer armies. The

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6Ibid., 176; Riker, Soldiers of the States, 64; Todd, "National Guard," 164; Dupuy, National Guard, 92-93; Cantor, "Dick Militia Act," 268-269; U.S., Statutes at Large, XXXIX, 400.
Wickersham decision proved favorable to the War Department. It declared that the Guard was bound by the Constitution to domestic duty only. The army continued its plan to neutralize the Guard's political power. During the same year, General Leonard Wood, Army Chief of Staff, conducted a study of America's military forces. He proclaimed that a reformed National Guard was infeasible and proposed a federal "Continental Army" of citizen-soldiers in its stead. Although the move to abolish the Guard entirely was defeated by the militia lobby, volunteer organizations learned a valuable lesson from the scare: "The Guard must always remain the Guard." It should also redirect its political influence so that it did not threaten the existence of the professionals. To this end, the Division of Militia Affairs, of the War Department created by the Dick Act of 1908, worked for genuine army-Guard cooperation.\(^7\)

The National Defense Act of 1916 was a compromise between the proponents of the Continental Army Plan and backers of the National Guard. The measure provided the volunteers with federal pay for armory drills. More importantly, however, the act permitted the drafting of

\(^7\)Hill, *Minute Man*, 207; Cantor, "Dick Militia Act," 153.

\(^8\)Ibid., 272; Todd, "National Guard," 164.
Guardsmen into the federal service under the "Army Clause" rather than the "Militia Clause." The Guard's concessions to the federal government in return for its increased support and recognition were numerous. Instead of the twenty-four annually required drills, the citizen-soldiers attended twice that number after 1916. In addition, the Guard extended its summer encampment to fifteen days. The act also stipulated that all Guardsmen must take an oath to the United States in addition to their own states. Finally, the legislation required all officers to pass physical fitness examinations conducted by the War Department. The Act of 1916 undoubtedly reduced competition

9Under the act's "National Guard" provisions, Congress prescribed the following annual pay scale for volunteer personnel: Captain, $500; 1st Lieutenant, $240; 2nd Lieutenant, $200. NCOs were allowed to earn as much as $150 yearly, while the private received $54 in annual wages. When mustered into federal service, commissioned Guard officers earned a minimum of $150 monthly. The NCOs received $50 for the same wage period. Pay for the enlisted corps was limited to $18 monthly. In addition, the federal government paid each Guard member $1 per drill. Attending just one monthly drill (including summer encampment) could earn Guardsmen as much as $27 annually. This was a substantial second income, especially for the Negro volunteers. See U.S., Statutes at Large, XXXIX, 175,186-187,206-210. Section Two of the NDA of 1916 specified that the Army of the United States consisted of the Regular Army, Volunteer Army, Officer's Reserve Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the National Guard when mustered into federal service. See Ibid., XXXIX, 166,201-202; Riker, Soldiers of the State, 84; John K. Mercer, Ohio Legislative History IV (Columbus, 1919-1926) 137.
between the army and the Guard. Unfortunately it was riddled with legal questions that could not be resolved until after the Mexican Border crisis. The Guard's inadequate preparation for the conflict prompted the army to resurrect Upton's critique of the militia.\(^\text{10}\)

While the War Department remodeled the National Guard, the Ninth Battalion was reorganized in 1900 following its reversion to a state militia unit. Captain John Fulton, the popular Cleveland businessman, was elected as the battalion's commander. Fellow Guardsman Jacob A. Meckstroth, a close friend of the major's, remembers him:

> When he [Fulton] was off duty, he was one of the most fun loving guys around. But when he was conducting Guard Affairs, he was all business and very serious. John was well liked and respected by all the white Guardsmen.\(^\text{11}\)

Fulton's "easy going" nature was likewise respected and appreciated by his subordinates within the battalion. However, one staff officer took advantage of it. During the unit's summer encampment at Chagrins Falls, Ohio, in 1901, Captain William Guy Wren, the battalion's assistant surgeon, operated an illegal liquor stand adjacent to the field hospital. Devoting most of his time to the

\(^\text{10}\) Todd, "National Guard," 166.

\(^\text{11}\) Interview with Jacob A. Meckstroth, Columbus, January 20, 1975; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1901, 73-74.
profitable whiskey trade, Wren delegated his medical duties to an untrained orderly. From August 23-28 his liquor sales boomed. On August 29, Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Ames, Assistant Inspector for the Guard, made a surprise visit to the Ninth's encampment site. Upon visiting the hospital there, he discovered that no medical officer was on duty. After inquiring as to the whereabouts of William Wren, Ames located the captain next door tending bar. He immediately began court-martial proceedings against both Captain Wren and Major Fulton. Wren was found guilty as charged and was suspended from duty without pay for twelve months. Although he was unaware of Wren's activities, Major Fulton was pronounced guilty of negligence. He was sentenced by the court to pay a fine of one hundred dollars. In addition he was also suspended from duty without pay for one year.12

After reviewing the courts-martial of the Ninth Battalion's officers, it might appear that a charge of discrimination could be levelled against the Inspector General's Department. It was not the case. Violations in the white units were treated with equal harshness. For example, the Adjutant General's Department reported in 1901 that three white line officers were cited for fraud

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12Ibid., 1901, 204-206; Interview with Jacob A. Meckstroth, Columbus, January 20, 1975.
during their summer encampment at Minerva Park, Ohio. Two of these men received dishonorable discharges from the Guard. A third officer, Colonel Charles Zimmerman, commander of the 5th Infantry Regiment, found himself in the same predicament as did Major Fulton. He was unaware that his company commanders were embezzling camp funds for their private uses. Nevertheless, the court found him guilty of negligence. As a result, he was reduced in rank and ordered to pay back all of the missing funds.13

From 1901-1909 Ohio experienced blissful tranquility, and during these years the Ninth was mobilized only once. In 1907 Company B was called out to restore order during a coal strike in Tuscarawas County.14 Unfortunately, an incident in November of 1906 involving one of the regular Negro regiments compelled the battalion's officers to whisper that another civil war was brewing. During the spring of that year, Companies B, C, and D of the 25th Infantry moved from Fort Niobrara, Nebraska, to Fort Brown near Brownsville, Texas. The arrival of the Negro soldiers aggravated the latent racism of the white townspeople. Accustomed to keeping the "Negro in his

14ONG and Naval Militia, 425-426.
whites resented the Negro servicemen because they were symbols of authority and success. The soldiers were not only barred from white-owned establishments, but were physically abused by Brownsville's white residents as well.  

On August 13 a rumor accusing a Negro infantryman with the attempted rape of a white woman prompted a group of armed white vigilantes to search for Negroes wearing military uniforms. The band of saviors roamed through the streets shooting recklessly into various buildings where Negro soldiers were reportedly staying. The next morning, town officials discovered that some of the shots had killed a bartender and wounded a policeman. A check of the regiment's equipment at Fort Brown indicated that none of its weapons had been fired. However, an ad hoc Brownsville Citizens Committee quickly blamed the casualties upon rioting Negro soldiers. A Court of Inquiry was convened on August 16. The panel concluded that the shots were fired by Negro soldiers protesting the town's Jim Crow practices. The jurors recommended that the Negro regiment be moved elsewhere and bound twelve Negro:

15Foner, Blacks and the Military, 95-98.

16Ibid., 97; See also Ann J. Lane, The Brownsville Affair: National Crisis and Black Reaction (New York, 1971) 5,17. (Hereafter cited as Lane, Brownsville.)
suspects over the state of Texas on charges of murder. After failing to indict any of the soldiers, the grand jury was dismissed. 17

The panel's decision did not please President Theodore Roosevelt. He sent word to the commander of the 25th and ordered him to obtain a confession from someone lest the entire regiment be dishonorably discharged. Despite this warning, none of the soldiers admitted the shooting. Greatly enraged by this "conspiracy of silence," Roosevelt on November 5 ordered the dismissal of all enlistees in the three companies. However, the order was not executed until after the Congressional elections on November 9. From November 16-26, 167 Negro veterans were discharged without honor; six of those dismissed were Medal of Honor recipients. Thirteen of them had received citations of bravery in the Spanish-American War. 18

U.S. Senator Joseph Foraker of Ohio was sympathetic to the cries of outrage from the Ninth Battalion's officers. He assured Major Fulton that everything possible would be done to correct the injustice. Since the Negro regiments contained large numbers of Ohioans, Roosevelt's

17 Foner, Blacks and the Military, 97; Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces, 12.

18 Roseboom and Weisenburger, History of Ohio, 321-322; Foner, Blacks and the Military, 98; Lane, Brownsville, 21-22, 25, 118, 138.
actions apparently affected some of the major's personal friends. At any rate, the Guard officers deplored the dismissals as "racist" and demanded a thorough inquiry into the matter. Negro businessman George Myers summed up their feelings in the following manner: "His [Roosevelt's] action is so palpably plain even to the illiterate Hamite." 19

With his eye upon the presidency in 1908, Foraker capitalized upon the chance to become a hero to the Negro voter. He quickly censured Roosevelt for his hasty action and launched his own investigation of the incident. After a month of tedious work he declared that the "Brownsville Incident" occurred primarily because of the inefficiency of the white officers in the Negro regiment. Constant thefts of ammunition from the unit's arsenal were never reported by the officers on duty, and according to Foraker, whites dressed as soldiers stole the regiment's weapons and conducted raids upon their private enemies. He further stated that prejudicial "eyewitnesses" immediately placed blame for the raid upon black soldiers. 20

stout defense of the Negro troops not only demonstrated
the weak case against them but politically embarrassed
the Roosevelt administration as well. 21

Unsettled by Foraker's action, Roosevelt forced the
senator to retire from political life. Although he was
proclaimed a hero by the Negro community, Foraker's presi-
dential ambitions were undermined by Roosevelt's in-
fluence. In 1907 the Republican party ignored him and
nominated William Howard Taft, former governor-general of
the Philippines, as its candidate. 22

Foraker's courageous behavior during the Brownsville
Affair was applauded by the Ninth Battalion. Confident
that justice would eventually prevail, the officer corps
turned its attention to state matters. Ordinary training
from 1910-1916 kept the battalion occupied until the eve
of World War I. On July 28, 1910, Company B was called
out to aid authorities during the Columbus street car
strike. In 1913, a flash flood in Portsmouth neces-
sitated the presence of the Columbus unit once again. Two

His Papers, 122. (Hereafter cited as Ely, Joseph B. For-
aker.) Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U.S.
Armed Forces, 12; Lane, Brownsville, 27,38-39.

21 Ibid., 98.

22 Facing the possibility of defeat in 1909, Foraker
agreed to Roosevelt's appointing of a Court of Inquiry com-
posed entirely of military officers. The Court judged the
soldiers guilty of misconduct. See Ibid., 6,38-39,69-87,
98-99,110; Roseboom and Weisenburger, History of Ohio,
322.
years later, the entire battalion was mobilized to battle an onion field fire in McGuffey City, Ohio.  

In June of 1916, the Ninth was again mobilized for duty during the Mexican War. Technically, the battalion was not included in the order federalizing the Guard for the border campaign. In his initial call for troops, President Woodrow Wilson had limited the number of Negro combat soldiers on duty in Mexico. Under these conditions, the Ninth was employed as fatigue troops. Its assignment consisted of preparing Camp Willis in Columbus for the incoming white Guardsmen. After completing this task, the battalion was scheduled for demobilization. The unfair treatment received by the Ninth precipitated a revolt from the Negro community. Harry Smith, editor of the Gazette, complained that Negro Guardsmen were used for manual labor while the white volunteers enjoyed the benefits of federal service. The controversy soon reached the statehouse. Governor Frank Willis feared that the bad publicity would ultimately affect the patron-client system. On July 4, he relieved the battalion of digging trenches and ordered a work crew from the state penitentiary to finish the job.  

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23 Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1910, 5; Ibid., 1913, 246-341; History of the 372nd Regiment, 47.

24 Cleveland Gazette, June 24, 1916.

The Ninth's officer corps was extremely bitter over President Wilson's decision, but most of the line officers blamed their problems upon the unit's size. They declared that an organization smaller than a regiment was seldom used in federal service. Supported by a committee from the Negro elite, the officers took their grievance to Governor Willis. They informed him that Ohio needed a Negro Guard regiment. Willis did not object to the idea but declared that he could not unilaterally grant the request. That authority belonged to the War Department. The excited officers quickly contacted George A. Myers and asked for his help in the matter. Myers was a personal friend of Newton D. Baker, the newly appointed Secretary of War, when the latter had served as mayor of Cleveland. From July to September of 1916, Myers corresponded with War Department officials about the proposal but was told that expanding the battalion involved a host of legal technicalities.26

Following the entry of America into World War I, Myers continued his effort to get a Negro regiment. He was again repudiated. The War Department's negative attitude greatly angered him. On May 4, 1917, he wrote Elbert H. Baker, the editor of the Cleveland Plain Dealer:

26 A. Mills to George A. Myers, August 1, 1916, George A. Myers Papers, Box 17, Folder 2.
The Negro is loyal and dependable as a soldier and second to none in bravery and discipline. He is now anxious to shed his blood for humanity and in defense of his country. Why should he be denied the chance or why any special legislation is necessary?27

Myers later accused Adjutant General Benson W. Hough of sabotaging the Ninth's expansion efforts. Hough had evidently informed General Anson Mills, chief of the Militia Bureau, that Ohio desired a new colored regiment. The request was carefully worded so that it would be automatically rejected.28

On June 29, 1917, newly elected Governor James Cox voiced support for the expansion of the Ninth Battalion. He stated that the War Department's policy in the matter amounted to a tragic waste of manpower. By July of 1917, the War Department and the state's Adjutant General's Department apparently consented to a regiment for Ohio Negroes. On July 10, the Ohio State Journal reported that the project was underway and that Lieutenant Colonel Charles Young was named as the regimental commander.29

While Young toyed with the idea of leading a Negro Guard regiment into France, his army career suddenly collapsed.

27George A. Myers to Elbert H. Baker, May 4, 1917; Ibid., Box 17, Folder 3.
28Benson W. Hough to A. Mills, August 11, 1916; Ibid., Box 17, Folder 2.
29Ohio State Journal, July 10, 1917.
In June of 1917, Secretary Baker had approved a plan to place Negro officers in command of colored enlistees at the platoon and company level. The decision was unpopular with most of the General Staff's southern officers, who feared that Negroes would eventually reach field grade status also. Specifically, they feared that Lieutenant Colonel Young, the senior Negro officer in the regular army, would ultimately command the proposed Negro division bound for France. The complaining officers threatened to refuse all commands given by a Negro. Finally, they wrote "nagging letters" to both Secretary Baker and President Wilson concerning Young's status. Wilson became alarmed and informed Baker that the situation was detrimental to the war effort and should be resolved immediately. 30 Upon receiving the president's communique, Secretary Baker became irate. He wrote Major General Tasker H. Bliss, the Assistant Chief of Staff, of his "indignation over the way the white officers were acting." He suggested that all complainants unable to follow his orders should resign. Nevertheless he realized that his original idea was doomed and reluctantly wrote the president that "the situation may not develop to which you

By presidential orders, the War Department was obligated to resolve the Young controversy. In June of 1917, the Negro officer was ordered to Letterman General Hospital at San Francisco for a physical examination. He was told that he was suffering from "high blood pressure" or "Bright's disease," and was subsequently relieved from command. The indignation of the Negro community over the incident was muted when Young was detailed to the Ohio National Guard. Concerning his new appointment, the Ohio State Journal reported:

In assigning Lieutenant Colonel Charles Young to duty with the Ohio National Guard, the War Department has broken the rule recently announced that the regular army officer, except those in the highest grades, will not be detailed in the National Guard. It was explained by the Adjutant General McCain [United States Army] today that the Ohio State authorities asked to have Lieutenant Colonel Young sent to them, and that the request was granted without any definite information as to whether he is attached to the Ohio Guard during the entire war or used only for a time.

Young arrived in Columbus in mid-July and immediately conferred with Governor Cox and the Adjutant General's Department. In addition to recruiting enlisted personnel

31Ibid., 225-226.


33Ohio State Journal, July 18, 1917.
for the proposed regiment, he was also given permission to recommend its officer corps. Since he would become a full colonel, a lieutenant colonel and two majors were needed to complete the regimental staff. For each position Young recommended officers from other states. The announcement that no Ninth Battalion officers were considered for the posts sparked a protest from the battalion's staff. It had been assumed that Major John Fulton of Cleveland would be tapped for the lieutenant colonelcy and that Captains Charles C. Caldwell of Columbus and William R. Green of Cleveland would receive the majorities.\textsuperscript{34}

The Ninth's officers bitterly complained to the Adjutant General's Department about Young's selections, for they felt that he deliberately excluded them because of his difficulties with the battalion during the Spanish-American War. Lieutenant Colonel Young refused to publicly comment upon the struggle for power within the Negro unit. He was preoccupied with enrolling the fifteen hundred soldiers needed for the new regiment.\textsuperscript{35}

By August 1, preparations for the Negro regiment were ordered stopped by Colonel George M. McIver, acting

\textsuperscript{34} The officers selected by Lt. Colonel Young were from Kentucky, Indiana, and Tennessee. See Ibid., August 2, 1917; Cleveland Gazette, July 28, 1917.

\textsuperscript{35} Ohio State Journal, August 2, 1917.
head of the Militia Bureau, who declared that the Ninth Battalion "will not be part of the Ohio National Guard division and will not be expanded into a regiment." The expansion of the battalion had not been officially approved by the War Department. McIver stated that a Negro Guard regiment from Ohio was unnecessary. Instead the battalion would be assigned to duty "along with Colored troops from other states." Those enlistees who were recruited for the regimental organization were allowed to return to civilian life subject to recall as reserves.36

McIver's announcement touched off an interfactional squabble within the Negro community. Many Negroes who had supported the creation of the regiment blamed its dissolution upon Lieutenant Colonel Young. They believed that his controversial selection of officers directly resulted in the disbandment of the unit. Others maintained that Young's action had little effect upon the ill-fated regiment. Determined to find the truth, Editor Harry Smith wrote the War Department. His reply came from Brigadier General William A. Mann, chief of the Militia Bureau, who said that Colonel McIver was following explicit orders from Secretary Baker.37

36Ibid., August 2, 3, 1917.

37Cleveland Gazette, August 14, 25, 1917.
While the controversy over the Ninth Battalion continued, the War Department announced that Lieutenant Colonel Young had been found "physically disqualified for the duties of Colonel by reasons of disability" and had been placed upon the list of retired officers. The retirement was effective on August 22, 1917. The news stunned Ohio's Negro community and silenced the quarreling within the Ninth Battalion. On August 11, 1917, the Gazette correctly gauged the opinions of the Negro majority in Ohio. It was widely believed that the regiment's disintegration resulted from a conspiracy between military officials in Columbus and Washington to force Young out of the service. Ultimately the status of the Ninth Battalion was forgotten amid the controversy over Young's retirement.

38 Ibid., August 11, 14, 1917.
39 Ibid., August 11, 1917; Dubois, Dusk of Dawn, 250; The Crisis, XIV, (October, 1917) 286.
PART FIVE

THE NINTH BATTALION IN THE WORLD WAR
CHAPTER XII

MOBILIZATION OF NEGRO GUARD UNITS FOR
THE GREAT INTERVENTION

In the fall of 1917, Ohio volunteers became part of America's military commitment to Europe. The Ohio National Guard, including the Ninth Battalion, was called into federal service on August 5, 1917, and assigned to Camp Sheridan in Montgomery, Alabama. Although brigaded with white volunteers, Ohio Negroes were not included in the newly formed Buckeye 37th Infantry Division. The Militia Bureau, in keeping with its of "separate but equal" policy, assigned the battalion to service with colored volunteers from other states.\(^1\) Despite the War Department's mobilization orders, the Ninth was burdened with

\(^1\)Emmett J. Scott, Scott's Official History of the American Negro in the World War (Chicago, 1919) 34. (Hereafter cited as Scott, Negro in the World War.) History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 47; Rodabaugh, "Ohio National Guard," 38-39; Ohio State Journal, August 2, 1917; ONG and Naval Militia, 167. The Thirty-Seventh Division Veterans Association, ed., The Thirty-Seventh Division in the World War, 1917-1918 (Columbus, 1926) 70-78,181-188. (Hereafter cited as Thirty Seventh Division in the War.) W. Allison Sweeney, History of the American Negro in the Great World War (Chicago, 1919) 75. (Hereafter cited as Sweeney, Negro in the Great World War.)
recruiting problems that prevented it from making the trip South. Company B, having long filled its manpower quota, was the lone Negro volunteer unit accompanying the Ohio Guard to Camp Sheridan in August. The duty of the Columbus soldiers consisted of preparing an encampment site for the rest of the battalion.²

The state of Alabama vigorously opposed the stationing of northern Negro soldiers within its borders. U.S. Representative Robert Dent of Alabama, chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs, declared that he would not prevent Ohio Negroes from entering Camp Sheridan. However, he cautioned the Ninth to observe all of the state and local segregation statutes, including the use of separate facilities from those enjoyed by white soldiers in the camp. If these Jim Crow practices were ignored by the battalion, he warned of an inevitable "racial clash."³ Dent's warning to the Ohio Negroes were not satisfactory to the majority of Montgomery's city officials. An anti-Negro delegation, led by Alabama governor R.I. Manning asked Secretary Baker to transfer the colored soldiers to

²The Ninth Battalion was first mustered into federal service on July 15, 1917. Since the proposed regimental organization was disbanded the battalion had been given a reserve status. See Ohio State Journal, August 3, 1917; Cleveland Advocate, September 1, 1917; History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 47.

³Cleveland Gazette, August 25, 1917.
a Northern camp. After studying the request, Baker denied it. Citing the mildness of the Southern climate, he declared that northern Negro troops would not be sent to a more "suitable" training area. 4

Popular opposition to Ohio Negro soldiers increased following the "Houston Riot," which involved the 24th Infantry Regiment. On August 23, 1917, a colored private intervened in the beating of a Negro woman by two white Houston policemen. The soldier was subsequently assaulted and arrested by the assailants. Later that day, Corporal Charles Baltimore, a member of the regiment's military police, requested a report of the incident from the arresting officers. They responded by beating and arresting him on a charge of disorderly conduct. Although Baltimore was not seriously injured, rumor quickly spread through the regiment that he had been murdered. To avenge the "death of their comrade," some of the soldiers stole guns and ammunition from a supply tent and headed for town. Although the regiment's white commanders were warned of the impending clash, no precautions were taken to safeguard the weapons or keep the men in camp. As the soldiers "fired off their guns" outside the city limits, they were met by police and a band of armed, white citizens.

4Ibid., August 25, 1917; Woodson and Wesley, Negro in Our History, 630.
Gunfire was exchanged, and two soldiers and seventeen whites were killed in the battle. The entire regiment was quickly disarmed and transferred to New Mexico. Those implicated in the massacre were arrested and tried before a general court-martial. As a result, thirteen soldiers were sentenced for execution, forty-one were committed to life imprisonment, four received shorter terms, and five infantrymen were acquitted.\(^5\)

Negroes throughout America were outraged by the army's double standard of justice whenever colored soldiers were on trial. Most Negro citizens believed that the hastily arranged executions were simply "military lynchings" to satisfy the Southern thirst for revenge.\(^6\) The Negro press also refused to condemn the convicted soldiers' actions and instead blamed white racism as the real culprit. On December 11, 1917, the executions were carried out in armed secrecy. As a final tribute to the martyrs, The Crisis, the official NAACP journal, fashioned this elegant eulogy: "They have gone to their death. Thirteen


\(^6\) Foner, Blacks and the Military, 114.
young, strong men; soldiers who fought for a country which
was never wholly theirs; men born to suffer ridicule, in-
justice, and last, death itself."^7

Company B quickly allayed the residents' fear of
"another Houston." To ease the racial tension, Captain
Charles C. Caldwell instructed his men to avoid any acts
that might upset the townspeople. His efforts at an
accommodation with the white community were aided con-
siderably by the location of the battalion's encampment
ground. Bivouacked in a swamp, the Ohioans' search for
dry sleeping quarters consumed much of their time. Con-
sequently, little thought was given to liberty passes into
town. The unit's twelve piece band also contributed to
good public relations by performing daily concerts in
front of its headquarters. Captain Caldwell praised his
men's efforts and reported that the Guard's behavior "has
dissipated apprehension among the Montgomery people that
trouble might follow their arrival. No one looks for it
or expects it now and there will be no repetition of the

^7President Wilson and the War Department had the
power to review the condemned soldiers' cases but declined.
They claimed that in time of war, the area commander had
full authority in such matters. On January 5, 1918, six
more soldiers were hanged, bringing the total executed to
nineteen. Working through the NAACP, Negro citizens in
1920 circulated petitions to president Warren G. Harding
requesting the release of all remaining imprisoned
soldiers. See Barbeau, "Black American Soldier," 122-
125; Cleveland Gazette, January 5, 1918.
Houston riot in Montgomery. 8

In the meantime, Companies A, C, and D of the Ninth Battalion remained in Ohio and were nearly forgotten by the War Department. This oversight was most pronounced in the battalion's inventory of its equipment and clothing. For example, some of Cleveland's Negro Guardsmen reported a lack of shoes, overcoats, and undergarments. However, the neglect of Company C (Dayton) received the most publicity. State Fire Marshall Bert B. Buckley, a long time proponent of Negro soldiering, quickly volunteering his aid to the Dayton Guard unit. In a letter addressed to Ohio Senator Warren G. Harding, he charged that the Negro volunteers "are now without underwear and are compelled to wear their coats next to their skin; a large number are without shoes and are compelled to drill six to eight hours per day...yet they entered the Federal army last June."

Buckley concluded his entreaty: "If they [colored troops] have no influential friends in Washington to get them simple justice, then the Senator from Ohio should step into the breach..." 9

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8Ibid., September 29, 1917.

9Between 1910-1920, the Ninth Battalion underwent a minor change. Company C, formerly the Xenia Guard unit, was supplanted by Dayton Negroes. The reason was, of course, political. In 1910 Dayton reported a Negro population of 4,842 persons. This figure included 1,781 Negro men of voting age. In contrast, Xenia's colored population totaled only 2,052 persons; a mere 637 of them were
Frank W. Howell, secretary of the Dayton Defense League, echoed Buckley's sentiments. He stated that Company C was anxious for duty in France but was ill-equipped for the task. Moreover, he revealed that the Guardsmen had not been paid since their entry into federal service. Through Howell's efforts, the League organized a fund to aid the soldiers, but he warned that federal assistance was necessary to ensure the success of the campaign. Deploiring the negligence of the War Department, he made the following observation:

The federal government seems to have forgotten these boys temporarily at least, but I believe that if they will investigate it as I have done, they will come to their assistance at once. The colored soldier is as good a fighter as any other class of soldiers in the army...They should receive the same treatment as any other volunteer soldiers, and this has not been done.10

While the federal government failed to cope with Negro privation, the citizens of Dayton ably filled the void. Within two weeks, a total of $211.50 had been collected for the purchases of underwear, socks, and handkerchiefs. Captain Robert Mallory lauded the biracial support for his unit and declared that "had it not been for their

eligible to vote. See Cummings, Negro Population, 772; Bert Buckley to Warren Harding, September 27, 1917, Cleveland Gazette, October 6, 1917.

10 Cleveland Gazette, October 6, 1917.
Ohio Guard officials reacted quickly to public concern for its Negro volunteers. On October 13, Adjutant General George H. Wood telegraphed Major General William H. Carter at the army's Central Supply Depot in Illinois. Wood stated that the Ninth Ohio had not been issued shoes or clothing since its mobilization on July 15. Besides requesting immediate aid for the unit, he informed the War Department that the citizens of Dayton should be commended for their support of Company C. Senator Harding also told the War Department of the Negro Guard's situation and recommended that they "get the attention that they deserve."

The battalion's next problems concerned recruiting. Before entering federal service, the Ninth's aggregate strength was 218 officers and enlisted men. On October 6, Company D was authorized to recruit one hundred additional men. However, a few days later, the order was rescinded, and the unit was ordered to Camp Sheridan on October 12. Nevertheless, the battalion nearly tripled its strength to 600 officers and enlistees. By the middle

11 Ibid., October 20, 1917.
12 George H. Wood to William H. Carter, October 13, 1917, Ibid.
13 Warren Harding to Bert Buckley, October 11 and 20, 1917, Ibid.
of October all of the battalion had been dispatched to Alabama.  

During the first days of encampment, Major John Fulton declared that the soldiers were still in need of clothing and other personal articles. His plea was quickly answered by several Ohio benevolent organizations. The Cleveland Women's Club, a colored soldier's auxiliary society directed by Inez Richardson, collected $500 to purchase tobacco for the battalion. Miss Richardson was a step sister of William Green, captain of Company D. The Cleveland Chapter of the Red Cross also aided the Negro soldiers by sending 150 sweaters and a supply of scarfs, wristlets and socks to Camp Sheridan. Finally, Editor Harry C. Smith organized a separate campaign to help the destitute Negro Guard units. On October 17, additional clothing and other articles were dispatched to the battalion. The presents were greatly appreciated by the soldiers. Captain Green personally thanked the people back home for not "making a color distinction in the dispensing of gifts to the Guardsmen." He made the

14Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1910, 84; Cleveland Gazette, October 13, 1917; Scott, Negro in the World War, 34.

15Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 11, 1917.

16Bert B. Buckley to Harry C. Smith, October 18, 1917, Cleveland Gazette, October 27, 1917.
statement in response to a query from Charles Waddell Chesnutt, the Negro poet from Cleveland, who had requested the captain to check the extent to which the colored soldiers were benefiting from the campaigns of the Red Cross, Young Men's Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.), and the Knights of Columbus. Having long suspected that these associations were guilty of discrimination against Negroes, he was delighted to hear that all troops were treated as equals.17

To reduce the possibility of a racial confrontation between the Ninth and the white townspeople, several groups of Montgomery's Negro citizens organized recreational activities to occupy the soldiers' time. Under the direction of Victor H. Tulane, a trustee of Tuskegee Institute, football games were scheduled between the battalion and the Negro college.18 Despite an atmosphere of racial misgivings, no violent clashes occurred between the soldiers and the white townsfolk. The Gazette reported that, "the boys are getting along nicely, merely sticking to Camp Sheridan and staying out of this prejudice


18 Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 27, 1917; Scott, Negro in the World War, 76; Barbeau, "Black American Soldier," 116.
The battalion did not completely escape the scourge of Southern racism. On November 8, a member of the Ninth was arrested on a traffic violation charge while on leave in Montgomery. However, a rumor circulated that a Negro soldier had been kidnapped by a white lynching party after brushing against a white woman upon a crowded public conveyance. The Ninth quickly organized a rescue party and drove to the spot of the alleged lynching. Military police soon arrived and promptly arrested 135 of the Guardsmen. The police's action infuriated Captain Caldwell of Company B. Insisting that the soldiers had every "right to be in town," he ordered their release from jail. The Ninth was then commanded by the provost marshal to remain in camp, pending an investigation of the disturbance. Fortunately, the official inquiry exonerated the soldiers from any wrong-doing.

The incident caused a feeling of unrest within the battalion. Major Fulton commented that the men were

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19 Apparently Tulane advised the Ohioans to observe the South's Jim Crow laws to avoid a racial encounter with hostile whites. Most of the battalion members cooperated with him in this effort. See Cleveland Gazette, November 10, 1917; See also Cleveland Advocate, September 8, 1917.


21 Cleveland Gazette, November 10, 17, 1917; Cleveland Advocate, November 24, 1917.
weary of being treated as second class soldiers. Although provided facilities equal to those of the white Ohio units, Negro soldiers were not really given a "square deal" at Camp Sheridan. First, the heightened racial tension curtailed all liberty passes into Montgomery. Second, the battalion believed that some of the white Guardsmen at the camp had "imbibed some of the prejudices of the South after their location here." Fulton later modified this accusation by declaring that the behavior of Montgomery's whites toward the Negro soldiers was really "inexplicable to the majority of the Ohio men down here." To improve the Ninth's morale, the battalion commander asked his friends in Ohio to send Christmas presents to Camp Sheridan. He stated that the men especially needed pajamas, woolen socks, and gloves. Cleveland Mayor Harry L. Davis promised the soldiers that they would not be forgotten during the yule season. 22

On December 15, the Ninth Battalion was transferred from Camp Sheridan to Camp Stuart, Newport News, Virginia. Here they formed part of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, United States Army. The other units comprising the regiment hailed from Maryland, Connecticut, Massachusetts (Company L), and the District of Columbia. Colonel

22Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 11, 1917; Scott, _Negro in the World War_, 452.
Glendie Young commanded the regiment during its training in Virginia. (Table 2 contains the strength of these units, including their dates of muster into federal service.)

The 372nd Regiment, in conjunction with two other National Guard regiments from Illinois and New York, constituted three-fourths of the 93rd Infantry Division. It was a curious organization for many reasons. First, the entire concept of the division represented an administrative afterthought. Originally assigned to the Guard units of their respective states, the Negro soldiers were later reshuffled by the War Department, who had discovered the displeasure of the white volunteers at having colored troops brigaded with them. At this point, military officials in Washington felt that race mixing in the army should be strictly avoided.

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23On January 1, 1918, the Ninth Battalion was redesignated as the Second Battalion, 372nd Infantry. See History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 47; See also Charles H. Williams, Sidelights on Negro Soldiers (Boston, 1923) 232. (Hereafter cited as Williams, Negro Soldiers.) Sweeney, Negro in the Great World War, 75; Scott, Negro in the World War, 239.

24The 15th New York Regiment and the 8th Illinois Volunteers (later the 369th and the 370th Infantry Regiments respectively) completed the National Guard contribution to the 93rd Division. See Scott, Negro in the World War, 34; Barbeau, "Black American Soldier," 187, 288.
TABLE 2

THE 372ND REGIMENT OF INFANTRY, 93RD DIVISION,
UNITED STATES ARMY, IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
<th>Date of entry in Federal Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>*9th Separate Ohio</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>July 15, 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Separate Company</td>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>July 25, 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Separate Company</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>July 31, 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Separate Company</td>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>August 5, 1917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Separate Battalion</td>
<td>District of Columbia, (Washington)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>929</td>
<td>March 25, 1917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: Scott, Negro in the World War, 34. C. Williams, Negro Soldiers, 229; Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 23, 1919.

*The Ohio Negro Guard units were reclassified as follows: Company E (Springfield); Company F (Columbus); Company G (Dayton), and Company H (Cleveland).
Second, the organization was not homogeneous. Unable to locate another Negro Guard unit, the War Department dumped an infantry regiment (the 371st) of southern Negro draftees commanded by white officers into the division. This action was vigorously protested by the Guardsmen. Lieutenant Colonel James Nichols, then a private in Company B, Ninth Battalion, explained that the volunteers perceived themselves as better soldiers than the drafted men and generally ignored them in camp. Nichols also stated that the white officers of the 371st felt "uneasy and out of place" among their Negro peers.25

Third, the War Department added insult to injury by failing to designate the division as a National Guard organization and instead placed the unit under a separate fourth category. Many Negro leaders protested this action and demanded that the men be clearly represented as Guardsmen. When Washington refused to change the units' designation, Negroes regarded the decision as just another facet of the institutional racism existing within the military structure.26

25 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.), James A. Nichols, Columbus, January 22, 1975. For an extended discussion of this subject, see Williams, Negro Soldiers, 219; Barbeau, "Black American Soldier," 187-189.

26 The army's classification system included numbers for Regular Army units, National Army groups, and National Guard volunteers. The placing of the 93rd Division into a special grouping was reminiscent of the USCT units of
Fourth, the 93rd was given none of the supporting units organic to a division, such as artillery regiments and machine gun battalions. In fact, the War Department never seriously considered assigning support groups to the Negro soldiers. It was simply more efficient to organize a skeleton division than to have "odd infantry units scattered around." This action prompted W.E.B. DuBois to comment that the division was an "aggregate nobody wanted." 27

Nearing the end of their three month training at Camp Stuart, the Ohioans received some unwelcome news. Two of the battalion's ranking officers had been relieved from duty for "physical reasons." Major John Fulton and Captain William Green of Cleveland were informed by the army of their bad health and were ordered to retire immediately. It was not surprising that the army issued the retirement notices only days before the 372nd Regiment was scheduled to sail for France. Although the officers protested the action, they had little recourse. (Table 3 notes the fine service record of the Guardsmen and shows the military's tragic waste of Negro officer manpower in the Civil War. See Barbeau, "Black American Soldier," 191.

27 Ibid., 188-190, 288-289.


Table 3

Removing Ohio Negro Guard Officers for the Great Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, Rank, and Date of Commission</th>
<th>Service Record</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major John C. Fulton, May 2, 1901</td>
<td>In ONG. Captain, Co. D., 9th Battalion (Inf.), May 28, 1898; mustered out with Co., April 14, 1899; recommissioned Captain on June 27, 1899; also served in &quot;L Ouverture Rifles,&quot; located at Cleveland, Major, Nov. 6, 1899; reduced in rank to May 2, 1901, per sentence of G.C.M. on G.O. No. 8s, 1901; recommissioned Nov. 14, 1904, War with Spain-Captain, Co. D, 9th Battalion, O.V.I., July 8, 1898; mustered out on Jan. 28, 1899.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1914, 432-435; See also Ibid., 1912, 385-386; Ibid., 1911, 458-459.
The army, apparently with the blessings of the War Department, continued its purge of colored Guard officers by "retiring" Colonel John Harlan, the veteran leader of the 8th Illinois, from command.

With the removal of Colonel Charles Young from command in June of 1917, the War Department also thinned its regular ranks of Negro field grade officers. Although refusing to name his enemies in Washington, Young made the following statement to Ohioans in January of 1918:

> Although I am retired because of ill health, I am in fighting trim and mean to do my duty for my country...I want the people of Ohio to see with their own eyes that I am in excellent physical condition and fit for the front.

To demonstrate his good health, Young rode horseback from Xenia to Washington in the summer of 1918. He was quickly greeted by Emmett J. Scott, the Negro assistant to Secretary Baker. Scott's efforts at having Young reactivated to military duty proved useless. The War Department waited until the completion of the war in Europe to reassign him to active service.

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30 Cleveland Gazette, January 26, 1918.

31 During the course of the war, Colonel Young was assigned to Camp Grant in Rockford, Illinois, with the Colored Development Battalions. See Scott, Negro in the World War, 64-65.
The Negro press was outraged at the War Department's policy regarding colored officers. It believed that the "retirements" were merely excuses to remove prominent Negro leaders from command. Aided by Joel Spingarn, a white NAACP official, Negroes resisted the army's "white only" policy regarding commissioned officers in the war. Convening numerous meetings with Secretary Baker, Spingarn was instrumental in persuading the War Department to institute a separate training camp for Negro officers. His cause was helped by the Negro community, which conducted a massive letter writing campaign to influential Congressmen endorsing the camp. Colored voters had threatened to withhold political support from all public officials not favoring the idea.

The Negro press opposed the concept of military segregation and declared that Spingarn should have insisted that the army integrate one of its fourteen white Reserve Officer Training Corps (R.O.T.C.) camps for Negro hopefuls. Spingarn silenced this opposition by stating that white army officers wanted the camp to fail and Negro discord was only aiding that crusade. Writing in the

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34 Ibid., 134-136.
Crisis in 1917, W.E.B. DuBois angrily explained the NAACP official position to all Negro malcontents:

Where in heaven's name do we Negroes stand? If we organize separately for anything--"Jim Crow!" scream all the Disconsolate; if we organize with white people--"Traitors!"...If unable to get the whole loaf, we seize half to ward off starvation...We cannot get them [Negro officers] admission to the regular camps because the law of the land prevents, or its official interpretation, wickedly prevents us. Therefore, give us a separate training camp for Negro officers.35

On June 15, 1917, the War Department reluctantly designated Fort Des Moines, Iowa, as the Negro officer training site. Nearly 1,250 prospects underwent a strenuous four month leadership program, and on October 14, 1917, 639 officers graduated from the camp. Despite the center's high rejection rate (51.2 percent) eighteen Ohioans were included in the commissioning exercises. However, only sixteen percent of these men were former members of the Ninth Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Nichols declared that two principal reasons existed for the Ohio Guard's minimal representation at Fort Des Moines. First, he related that the majority of volunteers were afraid of failing the course and becoming the object of jokes and ridicule from their comrades. Second, he stated that most volunteers preferred to enter France with their unit. If they had attended the camp, the army

might place them into another company. Consequently, the opportunities to advance were spurned. Unlike their cohorts, the three Guardsmen surviving the training preferred promotion to friendship and unit solidarity. It was understandable, for these men had been privates in the Guard since 1898.\(^{36}\) (Table 4 contains a complete roster of all the graduating officers including their ranks and assignments.)\(^{37}\)

On March 30, 1918, the 372nd left Camp Stuart en route for France. Arriving at St. Nazaire fourteen days later, the regiment was immediately "loaned to the French" because General John J. Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) opposed the idea of Negro troops in an all-black division.\(^{38}\) Nevertheless, the

\(^{36}\) Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Nichols, Columbus, January 22, 1975. See also Ohio Roster, Spanish-American War, 666-699.

\(^{37}\) Scott, Negro in the World War, 471-481; Sweeney, Negro in the Great World War, 79; Adjutant General's Department, Official Roster of the Ohio Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines in the World War, 1917-1918, II, 2051; Ibid., VI, 6071; Ibid., VII, 7490.

\(^{38}\) Besides his preference for leading homogenous (white) soldiers into battle, General Pershing also opposed the stationing of Negro troops in a white foreign country, as well as deploiring the commissioning of Negro officers. He believed that colored troops performed their best "under capable white officers." See John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, II (New York, 1931) 117. (Hereafter cited as Pershing, Experiences.) Barbeau,"Black American Soldier," 190-191,293.
TABLE 4

OHIO OFFICERS COMMISSIONED AT FORT DES MOINES
IOWA, OCTOBER 14, 1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deton J. Brooks</strong></td>
<td>1st Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel C. Brown</td>
<td>2nd Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Arthur A. Brown</td>
<td>1st Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonard J. Faulkner</td>
<td>1st Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dillard J. Firse</td>
<td>1st Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellsworth Gamblee</td>
<td>1st Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Howard C. Gilbert</td>
<td>1st Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leroy H. Godman</td>
<td>2nd Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ted Harper</td>
<td>1st Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesse S. Heslip</td>
<td>1st Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne Hopkins</td>
<td>2nd Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Hough</td>
<td>2nd Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Huffman</td>
<td>1st Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James O. Jones</td>
<td>2nd Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Lee</td>
<td>1st Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Phillips</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Charles W. Robinson</td>
<td>2nd Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pitman E. Smith</td>
<td>1st Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archibald Tuck</td>
<td>1st Lieut.</td>
<td>Camp Sherman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Nineteen officer - 11 - first lieutenants
6 - second lieutenants
1 - captain

SOURCES: Scott, Negro in the World War, 472-481; Ohio Roster, Spanish-American War, 675.

*former members of Ninth Battalion, ONG. **former company commander (Company B, Ninth Battalion, ONG, 1898) moved from Columbus to Chicago.
French Army graciously received the regiment and attached it to its 63rd Infantry Division. Billeted at Conde-en Barrios (Argonne Sector), the unit began intensive instruction in the art of early twentieth century warfare: machine gun practice, grenade throwing, bayonet charges, and trench construction. On May 27, the Guardsmen were transferred from the Argonne to the Vauquois Sector of the Meuse department. During this time they performed mainly patrol, entrenchment, and stevedore duties. On July 2, the volunteers were attached to the 157th "Red Hand" Division and ordered to the Courcelles Subsector for combat duty.39

On July 4, Colonel Herschel Tupes assumed command of the regiment and immediately initiated personnel changes within the officer corps. Writing to General Pershing, he requested that white officers replace the existing Negro leaders, and that no more "colored officers be forwarded to the regiment." He declared that "racial

39 The 372nd Regiment was integrated into the French Army using the latter's system of conversion. The American infantry regiment contained three separate battalions, one machine gun company, and a special signal communications detachment. The French infantry regiment, however, was composed of three infantry battalions, each having a machine gun company. Hence, two American infantry companies were converted into machine gun units. See Ibid., 291; Scott, Negro in the World War, 239-241; C. Williams, Negro Soldiers, 231-233; Sweeney, Negro in the Great World War, 181.
distinctions which are recognized in civilian life continue to be recognized in the military life and present a formidable barrier to that feeling of comradeship which is essential to mutual confidence and esprit de corps."

Although discounting any personal hostility against Negro officers, he told Pershing that besides their inferiority, colored officers were undependable, apathetic toward their men's welfare, lacking in self motivation, and required constant supervision from white officers. With no hesitation, Pershing granted the request.

The Ohio unit greatly resented Tupes' policy but realized that any protests during wartime were useless. The men now understood that Major Fulton's forced retirement at Camp Stuart was merely a prelude to the wholesale removal of Negroes from command positions. (Appendix S lists the Ohio officers that were affected by the new order.) The army's waste of Negro military leadership was growing. Despite this demoralizing blow, the Second Battalion (Ohio) rededicated itself to accomplishing


41 John J. Pershing to Herschel Tupes, August 28, 1918, Ibid., 431-432.

its missions, defeating the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Nichols admitted that sometimes the unit did not know who the "enemy was--the Germans or the AEF." But he summed up the attitude of the Guardsmen in the following words:

The enlisted men were angry at the removal of their Negro superiors but we did not let our personal feelings deter us from our mission. We were proud that the 372nd did not suffer the fate of most of the other Negro units in France. We did not come overseas to unload supplies or clean barracks. We were trained infantrymen--nothing else--and we conducted ourselves like soldiers.43

The 93rd Division represented one of the two Negro combat groups dispatched to France. Except for its racial composition and assigned mission, little similarity existed between the 93rd and its counterpart, the 92nd Division. While the former included trained National Guardsmen, the latter was composed of inexperienced draftees that satisfied the Negro demands for a combat division in 1917. Unlike the 93rd, the 92nd had never trained together as a division, hence, little comradeship and esprit de corps existed between the men.44

43 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Nichols, Columbus, January 22, 1975.

44 The War Department feared the massing of so many Negro troops in one area. Hence, the 92nd was trained at seven centers across the country later assembled in France. See C. Williams, Negro Soldiers, 156; J. Davis, Negro Reference Book, 617-618; Barbeau, "Black American Soldier," 192-202, 229-284; Sweeney, Negro in the Great World War, 181-182; Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops (Washington, D.C., 1966) 12-13. (Hereafter cited as Lee, Employment of Negro Troops.)
Another difference between the two groups lay in the attitudes of the respective officer corps. The French commanding officers of the 93rd treated the Negro soldiers with respect and admiration. However, the white American commanders were contemptuous of the colored enlistees and officers of the 92nd Division, and spent much of their time trying to discredit and degrade their Negro subordinates. For example, they portrayed the colored soldiers as an unmotivated, illiterate coward whose only merit lay in his ability to rape white women. Likewise, they regarded the Negro officer as an ingrate that displayed no initiative or concern for his men. Major General Robert Lee Bullard, commander of the 2nd Army to which the 92nd was attached, said that "the Negro officers have an inadequate idea of what is expected of soldiers, and the white officers are too few to leaven the lump."^45 Yet those Negro leaders displaying zeal for their jobs were labelled as meddlers and "troublemakers."^46

General Charles C. Ballou, commander of the 92nd Division, initiated the libel of the Negro soldier by issuing "Bulletin No. 35" at Camp Funston, Kansas. This

^45Robert Lee Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences of the War (New York, 1925) 295. (Hereafter cited as Bullard, Personalities and Reminiscences.)

295
notice reminded Negroes of their inferior place in society
as well as in the military.

White military police (MPs)

received the job of scrutinizing the Negro soldier’s
behavior in France.

"Negro c r i m e s s u c h as talking to

a white woman or entering a French home, were vigorously
punished by the MPs.

Relations between the Negro soldiers

and the white policemen deteriorated so badly in 1918
that the colored troops were certain that the "worst
racists were automatically given MP armbands."

Other

common punishments for Negroes included restrictions to
camp and the withholding of pay.

Once pay was withheld

for the entire 92nd Division while serving

o v e r s e a s .

47

The American military command disliked the French’s
judicious treatment of the 93rd.

To combat this frater­

nization, the AEF headquarters on August 7, 1918 dispatched
a pamphlet entitled "Secret Information Concerning Black
American Troops to the French Army."

Although the com­

munique was secret, it was exposed by The Crisis a year
later.

The document implored the French to treat the

Negro soldier as an inferior and not praise him excessively
in front of white men.

The report also pictured Negroes

as persons "laden with repressed desires to rape white
47%bid., 229,284,471-473; See also J. Davis, Negro
Reference Book, 618; Scott, Negro in the World War, 97,
44'(T,'5zrz:-------------------------


women." For this reason, the French were asked to keep its women from "spoiling" the colored soldiers. Finally, America requested its ally to keep the Negro segregated and ignore him "outside of the requirements of military service."48

The French Army ignored the document. It explained to General Pershing that it was impossible to separate the Negro soldiers from the native population because they were quartered in barns and private houses. In response to the American policy of racial segregation, Marshal Ferdinand Foch, commander of the Allied forces, called the practice illogical and declared that his country "had no color prejudices and persecutes no man on account of color or creed."49

The American high command quickly saw the ramifications of the French social creed. It observed that French women (especially prostitutes) treated Negro and white soldiers as equal suitors and clients. The army quickly moved to halt this practice. First, the 92nd Division issued Order No. 40 prohibiting Negro association with any white women in France. The white commanders of the


49Barbeau, "Black American Soldier," 293; See also Sweeney, Negro in the Great World War, 188.
division cited the spiralling venereal disease rate among Negro soldiers as sufficient cause for enforcing the rule. To the army's displeasure the French commanders observed no communicable health problems within the 93rd and declined to issue any sexually restraining orders. Second, the army contrived to frighten the French population with tales of "Negro rapes." The 92nd Division reported that thirty rapes had been committed by Negro soldiers while in France. However these stories were largely fabricated and must be viewed as a deliberate attempt to discredit Negro soldiers. Of the two Negro divisions in France, only one soldier from the 92nd was convicted of rape.  

50 In 1918 the VD rate among Negro soldiers of the 92nd Division was 62.5 percent (625 cases per thousand soldiers.) Compare this figure to the VD rate among all the white combatants in France, which was 24 percent (240 cases per thousand soldiers.) Thanks to the U.S. efforts in making the French whorehouses off limits to American fighting men, a substantial reduction in these figures was observed within twelve months. Only 10 percent of the 92nd Division still had the disease by January of 1919. Among white troops examined during this same time span, only 2.6 percent were still infected. The VD rate among Negro soldiers of the 93rd rose from a mere 2½ percent to 6 percent within the twelve month period (1918-1919). The increase was attributed to "the ease with which the colored soldier could associate with the lower type of French women." There were no reported cases among Ohio Negro Guardsmen. See Barbeau, "Black American Soldier," 94-97; See also Cleveland Gazette, January 26, 1918.

The issue of rape was also hotly debated in the 93rd Division. Since the charge could be easily made, the units were advised to take all precautions against it. Lieutenant Colonel Nichols recalled that the Second Battalion expressed no concern over the accusation because, "although some of the enlisted men dated French women, most of the fellows generally avoided them." Nichols accounted for the creditable behavior of the men in the following manner:

In our regiment the men emphasized the importance of racial pride and dignity to each other. We had a responsibility to millions of colored Americans back home who were bragging on our performance over here. This is why the great majority of the 372nd Regiment refrained from any activity that Americans disliked. The fact that no Negro women lived in France was not used by the soldiers as an excuse to "misbehave."

He also explained that the battalion used a "buddy system" to check the social behavior of the men. For example, if one soldier went into town, he would be accompanied by another battalion member. If one of the Guardsmen started to drink excessively, became loud, or began to hail prostitutes, his comrade would stop him and carry him back to camp. Aware of the dangers that both men could become intoxicated, he declared that the teams always contained one teetotaler.  

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52 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Nichols, Columbus, January 20, 1975. For another view of the social life of Negroes in the war, see the confession of an Ohio Negro soldier in France, Cleveland Gazette, February 22, 1919.
The 372nd Regiment got its first taste of combat action on July 26. Brigaded with the 371st, the unit relieved the beleagured 333rd French Regiment upon Hill 304 in the Verdun Sector. Remaining here throughout the month of August, the regiment successfully blunted several German attempts to recapture the area. Despite constant bombardment from the enemy's artillery, subsector 304 was "organized and consolidated for the first time by this regiment." (Map 13 shows the strategic importance of the area to the allied army.) To honor the regiment's fine performance, the French high command renamed the fortification as "Hill 372." The French government's faith in the fighting ability of the Negro soldier was well justified in this battle. The exhibition of bravery under fire merited the unit additional combat assignments.53

On August 16 at the Battle of Monzeville, the regiment repelled an attack by an Austrian unit. Three casualties were suffered by the 372nd in the skirmish. The weapons used by the regiment hampered its effectiveness in the engagement. Since the French intended to employ them as "shock troops," the Guardsmen were issued the ponderous Lebel rifle in exchange for their Springfields. Although better suited for bayonet charges, the French

53 Ibid., March 1, 1919; See also C. Williams, Negro Soldiers, 234; Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 23, 1919.
MAP 13

SECOND BATTALION 372nd INFANTRY REGIMENT: CAMPAIGNS IN FRANCE, INCLUDING THE BATTLE OF "HILL 304"
JULY 26, 1918 AND THE CHAMPAGNE OFFENSIVE,
SEPTEMBER 26 - OCTOBER 7, 1918

MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE PROGRESS TO OCT. 31

STATUTE MILES

CORPS ZONE BOUNDARY

TO CHAMPAGNE
weapons lacked the accuracy and firepower of the American arm. Despite this handicap, the unit kept the casualty toll remarkably low. On September 18, 1918, the unit left "Hill 304" after being relieved by the 129th U.S. Infantry Regiment, 33rd Division.\(^\text{54}\)

The regiment's severest challenge came in the Argonne Sector. During the Champagne offensive from September 26 to October 7, the unit's mission consisted of attacking the enemy's position upon the Crete des Observatoires. At 3 p.m. on September 26, the 372nd began advancing upon its objective. After twelve hours of savage fighting, the position was taken. Besides capturing sixty prisoners, the regiment also seized one 105 mm. field gun, two 77 mm. field pieces, two anti-tank rifles, and a large cache of small arms and ammunition. (Map 13 marks the path of the unit's assault upon the enemy.)\(^\text{55}\)

Columbus journalist Ralph Tyler, an employee of the Committee on Public Information, highly praised the Ohioans in the fight. In his report to the War Department he noted the following incident:


A company of the old Ninth Battalion, under command of its captain from Dayton, O., lay in an open field all night awaiting order to go into action, while all the time the Germans were dumping 210 shells and 88 machine gun fire at them. But even in the face of a murderous fire, the line stood firm. Anderson Lee and William Chenault of Dayton were killed there.56

The Ohioans suffered nearly one hundred casualties in the battle. The Cleveland Guard unit (Company H) reported the most substantial losses as its entire officer corps were either killed or wounded. Those soldiers escaping serious injury were violently ill after being gassed.57

On September 30, the Second Battalion conducted a combat patrol mission 250 meters south of Bussy Farm. Relieving a battered patrol from the 371st, the Ohioans marched three kilometers north on the Sechault-Monthois road and captured the villages of Ardeuil, Bussy, and Cotte. On October 3, the battalion assisted soldiers from the 120th French Division in repelling a German counterattack in the area. The battle, which ultimately developed into hand to hand combat, was completely dominated by the Ohioans and two battalions from the French 333rd Regiment. The enemy's hasty retreat netted the Second Battalion a total of fifty-four prisoners and six machine guns. The Ohioans finished their campaign by performing sentry

56Cleveland Gazette, November 23, 1918.
57Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 23, 1919.
duties in the Department of Vosges (Corceiux) until the signing of the armistice. 58

The Ohio Guardsmen were elated over their triumphs in the Champagne. Private Elmer Palmer of Cleveland declared that the Second Battalion had the important task of throwing grenades at the enemy. "If one of us did not get him, another generally did. And if we bomb throwers failed, he was struck with a bayonet." Another Cleveland Guardsman, Private William House, told of his company's frenzied charge against the enemy's position. Although it reported heavy losses, the unit forced the enemy to retreat and abandon its artillery batteries. 59

During the Argonne offensive, several Ohioans were seized by the enemy as prisoners of war. Private Henry E. Talbott of Cleveland maintained that he and two other soldiers were captured while on patrol in November. Mistaking them for Algerians, the German soldiers began beating the trio with their rifles. When informed of their American citizenship, the enemy became very cordial and inquired if they were American Indians. Talbott answered negatively, but the Germans refused to distinguish between Negroes and Indians and insisted that the Guardsmen

58 Ibid., February 23, 1919; C. Williams, Negro Soldiers, 236-237; Scott, Negro in the World War, 242.
59 Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 23, 1919.
scalp some of the English prisoners at their camp. While incarcerated, the Guardsmen's diet consisted of acorn coffee, a small loaf of bread (daily), and a small helping of barley soup.60

The French Army was ecstatic over the performance of the 372nd. On October 8, General Mariano Goybet, commander of 157th Division, issued General Order No. 234 thanking the regiment for a superb effort against the Germans. Two months later General Goybet further congratulated the regiment:

For seven months we have lived as brothers at arms, partaking in the same activities sharing the same hardships and the same dangers. Side by side we took part in the great Champagne Battle which was to be crowned by a tremendous victory. Never will the 157th Division forget the indomitable dash, the heroic rush of the American Regiment up the Observatory Ridge and into the plain of Monthois...Our brotherhood has been cemented in the blood of the brave and such bonds will never be destroyed.61

The French 157th Division of Infantry was ordered dissolved on December 20, 1918. However, the 372nd remained in France to receive honors from a grateful nation. On January 24, 1919, in the mud-soaked city of Brest, the regiment was decorated with 80 Croix de Guerre (the highest

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60Ibid., February 23, 1919.

61See "General Order No. 234," October 8, 1918; Scott, Negro in the World War, 244-245; "General Order No. 245," December 12, 1918; Ibid., 250; History of the 372nd 47; Cleveland Gazette, February 8, 1919.
French military medal), 21 Distinguished Service Crosses, and 1 Cross of Legion of Honor Medal. In addition, the French people began construction upon a monument located at Monthois commemorating the fallen soldiers of the 372nd. On February 3, 1919, the regiment headed for home aboard the Leviathan. Landing at Hoboken, New Jersey, eleven days later, the unit began the process of demobilization.

The return of the "heroes of Verdun, the Argonne, and the Champagne" ignited massive celebrations in several Ohio towns. The grandest ceremony was held in the Lakefront City. On February 23, Company H paraded in Cleveland amid bands and cheering crowds. It was warmly greeted by Mayor Davis and a multitude of dignitaries. The Negro Guardsmen, marching triumphantly down Main Street, were the toast of the town. It was a well deserved homecoming.

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62 Private Lewis Jackson of Cleveland described the mud at Brest as "hip deep." See Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 23, 1919; See also New York Herald, January 24, 1919. While the French praised the military exploits of the 372nd the units of the 92nd Division were being labelled as traitors. Colonel Allen J. Greer, the Division's Chief of Staff, in a letter to Senator Kenneth McClellar of Tennessee, noted that the 368th Infantry Regiment "failed in all their missions, laid down and sneaked to the rear." See Barbeau, "Black American Soldier," 406.

63 C. Williams, Negro Soldiers, 240; Scott, Negro in the World War, 254-255.

64 Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 23, 1919.
The performance of the 372nd Regiment in France ranked it among America's elite fighting units. A major portion of that glory must be attributed to the Second Battalion. Ohio Negro soldiers in 1918 faced a double task. First, they had to avenge their disastrous military record in the Spanish-American Conflict. Second, they had to maintain a soldierly attitude during the removal of their beloved officers from command. The men accomplished both objectives magnificently. Distinguishing themselves in every battle, they brought honor to the Negro community as well as to the entire state. By demonstrating the qualities of vintaged soldiers, the Ohioans mitigated the general indictments against Negro troops for cowardice in the war. Their battalion was truly "one of the noblest, in all of the history of American arms."65

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65 C. Williams, Negro Soldiers, 194.
CHAPTER XIII

BETWEEN THE WARS: OHIO NEGRO GUARDSMEN

IN PEACE, 1919 - 1940

Ohio's Negro Guard units remained inactive for five years following completion of their demobilization in 1919. There were two principal reasons for this organizational vacuum. First, the combat-weary volunteers wanted to return to their families. Having seen enough of war-ravaged Europe, they obtained quick discharges from military service. Second, the wave of antimilitarism accompanying the end of each war contributed to the scarcity of Negro volunteers in Ohio. In July of 1919, the aggregate strength of officers and enlistees in the entire Ohio Guard was a scant 598 soldiers, a far cry from the 26,138 Ohioans mustered into federal service in 1917.\(^1\) Adjutant General Roy E. Layton declared it an "act of Providence" that no disturbances requiring the use of

\(^1\)Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1919, 6-7,17; Ibid., 1920, 69-75; ONG and Naval Militia, 423; History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 1941, 47; Mercer, Ohio Legislative History, IV, 137; Robert Lee Daugherty, "Citizen Soldiers in Peace. The Ohio National Guard, 1919-1940," Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1974, 15. (Hereafter cited as Daugherty, "Citizen Soldiers in Peace.")
troops were reported during 1919.2

Ohio Guard officials quickly recognized the dangers of an understrength militia and initiated steps to increase its enrollment. Launching a massive advertising campaign that featured paid drill sessions and summer encampments, the Guard reported a 441 percent increase in its numbers between 1919-1920. At the beginning of 1921, the Guard's aggregate strength was listed at 6,000 officers and enlisted men, an increase of 227 percent over the previous year's enrollment.3 Billboards emphasizing money and the allure of adventure were largely responsible for the Guard's rapid resurgence:

"It [enrollment in the Ohio National Guard] makes your muscles hard--fills out your chest and gives you a steady eye--makes you proud of yourself to hold your own with a bunch of buddies who went to France and back and won the old outfit a place in World History."4

The statewide recruiting effort greatly benefitted the Negro companies. Reporting an aggregate strength


3In 1920 the Guard reported an aggregate enrollment of 2640 officers and enlisted men. See Ibid., 1920, 69-74; See also Daugherty, "Citizen Soldiers in Peace," 29, 35; Mercer, Ohio Legislative History, IV, 137.

4Daugherty, "Citizen Soldiers in Peace," 24-25. The Guard's recruiting drive was helped immensely by General Pershing's favorable comments upon the volunteers' performances in the war. U.S. Congress, Reorganization of the Army: Joint Hearings Before the Committee on Military Affairs, 66th Cong., 1st sess., 1919, Washington, D.C.
of nearly 300 officers and enlistees by September 22, 1924, the units were reorganized by the Adjutant General's Department and designated as the First Separate Battalion, ONG. During the reorganization period, Negroes from Cincinnati and Toledo had requested permission to organize a Guard unit. The Adjutant General's Department carefully studied the petitions and discovered that these cities contained more registered Negro voters than did Springfield and Dayton. The U.S. Bureau of the Census report for 1920 proved the undoing of the Guard units in the latter cities and paved the way for the new applicants.

Declaring that it "already belonged to an existing regiment," the Adjutant General's Department conveniently shelved all Negro proposals for the expansion of the battalion into a six company regiment. Thus, Ohio avoided the bitter struggle that the Ninth Battalion underwent for regimental status in 1917.

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5 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States, 1920, 56; Mark, Negroes in Columbus, 26; Cummings, Negro Population, 101-102; Roseboom and Weisenburger, History of Ohio, 377; ONG and Naval Militia, 423; Mercer, Ohio Legislative History, V, 183-184; History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 1945, 55-68.

6 The Second Battalion contained the following units: Company E, Cleveland; Company F, Columbus; Company G, Cincinnati; Company H, Toledo. See Cleveland Gazette, August 18, 1917; Ibid., March 1, 1919; Ohio State Journal, August 2, 1917; History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 1941, 47; Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 23, 1919; Mercer, Ohio Legislative History V, 183-184; E.H. Baker to James
Howard C. Gilbert of Columbus as the battalion commander, Governor Victor Donahey promptly redesignated the unit as the Second Battalion, 372nd Infantry Regiment on April 1, 1925.  

The interwar years witnessed a rapid rise of professionalism within the Negro officer corps. There were three reasons for this occurrence. First, the black citizen-soldier returning from France was a changed man. Before 1917 he had rarely travelled more than twenty-five miles from home. Two years later, he had not only seen a great part of the world, but had aided the defeat of the German army as well. Embarking for America, he felt inferior to no one, especially the mulattoes. The new militancy of the black Guardsmen was clearly manifested in the attitudes of those who had participated in the Camp Des Moines experience of 1917. These soldiers demanded that Guard commissions be issued upon the basis of ability and prior military experience, not upon social position in the community.

Cox, June 29, 1917, George A. Myers Papers, Box 17, Folder 3.

7ONG and Naval Militia, 423; History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 1945, 55-68; Ibid., 1941, 47.

8The use of the word black in this instance refers to the darker skinned Guard enlistees. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Nichols, Columbus, January 22, 1975. See also Scott, Negro in the World War, 463-470.
Second, the mass influx of Southern blacks to Ohio's industrial regions had altered the Negroes economic status. Taking the places of the draftees and volunteers in the factories, these blacks had attained an unprecedented level of personal wealth. Their affluence not only expanded the Negro middle class, but it also increased their political voices as well. For example, Jacob Meckstroth declared that the non-mulatto community began to heartily endorse black candidates running for elected office in Ohio. No longer would the aristocracy automatically receive the clientage vote. The "new Negro" in Ohio also exercised his power within the military sector and demanded that non-aristocrats be given an opportunity to command the Guard units.  

Third, the entire Ohio National Guard actively recruited former servicemen during the postwar era. The Adjutant General's Department credited the war with accelerating the maturation level of its volunteers. As a result it encouraged Guard units to nominate their most distinguished veterans for command positions. Lieutenant Colonel Nichols claimed that the official directive

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9Interview with Jacob A. Meckstroth, Columbus, January 20, 1975; See also R. Davis, Black Americans in Cleveland, 221-270; Speer, "Origins of the Urban Ghetto," 153-166; Kilson, "Political Change in the Negro Ghetto," 167-192.
reminded the Negro companies in 1924 that army-trained blacks deserved an equal opportunity for advancement.\textsuperscript{10} Anticipating an experienced, well-trained militia of returning soldiers in 1919, General Layton confidently met the challenge of labor unrest. Ohio's "professional Guardsmen" had arrived.\textsuperscript{11}

The tenets of professionalism were clearly manifested in the revised training and selection of the prospective Negro officers. During the interwar years, five alternatives existed for those soldiers desiring a Guard commission. Besides working one's way through the enlisted ranks, an aspirant could enroll into ROTC class as a part of his college curriculum. However, some institutions, such as Ohio State University, allowed Negroes to complete only the first two years of their reserve military training. Barred from the advanced courses, Negro trainees often used the third method of becoming an officer. Known as the "Ten Series," these examinations were administered by the War Department for home correspondence study. Upon receiving the programmed exercises, the trainee completed the course work and returned it for grading. After

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{10}Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Nichols, Columbus, January 22, 1975.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{11}Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1919, 6-7, 43-64; Daugherty, "Citizen Soldiers in Peace," 34.}
successfully finishing his requirements, he was authorized a second lieutenant's commission. The "Ten Series" helped Negroes who were unable to attend college to become officers. Retired Lieutenant Colonel Herbert A. Quinchett, who joined the Second Battalion in 1926, was one of the officers benefitting from the home study courses. Because of economic and personal reasons, Quinchett decided against enrolling at Ohio State University.

The fourth method of becoming an officer consisted of enrolling in Ohio's Officer Candidate School (OCS). Open to all Negroes regardless of education, the training entailed ninety days of rigorous instruction at an army branch school. Upon successful completion of the course, the applicant was awarded a second lieutenant's commission in the army. Direct battlefield commissions from the president of the United States represented the fifth method of becoming an officer. For the Negro Guardsmen, these

12 Other tests included the "Twenty Series" for a first lieutenancy and a "Thirty Series" for a captaincy. See ONG Historical Records; See also Cheatham "Black Units of the Ohio National Guard," 10. The Ohio State University changed its policy in 1946 and permitted Negroes to participate in the junior and senior classes of ROTC training. See Ibid., 10.

13 Personal interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Herbert A. Quinchett, May 5, 1975, at his home in Columbus, Ohio. (Hereafter cited as Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Herbert A. Quinchett, Columbus, May 5, 1975.)
were virtually non-existent.  

A study of Negro leadership between the years 1924-1940 reveals that 75 percent of the officers had completed at least two years of ROTC training. The majority of those students finishing the entire four year course had attended predominantly Negro institutions such as Howard and Wilberforce Universities. Retired Major Arthur H. Terry, an enlistee in Company F, Second Battalion in 1941, explained the Negroes' preference for ROTC instruction: "The majority of Negro officers were college graduates. Since reserve army training was offered at this level, officers found it economically convenient to pursue a military career as well as a civilian occupation."  

In 1941 the trend toward ROTC training suddenly stopped. The outbreak of war with Japan increased the competition among Guardsmen for line positions. As expected, the applicants selected the quickest method of becoming officers--the OCS. Although not as prestigious as ROTC, it did offer the volunteers the same military

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14ONG Historical Records; History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 1941, 47; Ibid., 1945, 55-68.

15Ibid., 1941, 51-70; ONG Historical Records.

16Personal Interview with Major (Ret.) Arthur H. Terry, March 24, 1975, at the General Robert S. Beightler Army, Linworth, Ohio. (Hereafter cited as Interview with Major (Ret.) Arthur H. Terry, Linworth, Ohio, March 24, 1975.)
rank in a fraction of the time. Major Terry substantiated this finding by declaring that since World War II, the majority of Negro Guard officers in Ohio had received OCS training. Despite the militia consciousness of the black community, the middle class still firmly controlled the politics of command. A survey of the officer corps of the Negro Guard from 1924-1941 revealed that only one-seventh of its commissioned officers were considered non-mulattoes.

17 ROTC did have one distinct advantage over OCS training. The former was supplemented with a college degree. The participant of OCS did not necessarily enjoy this prestige. From the Guardsmen viewpoint, the latter harbored one distinct shortcoming: It's commission was in the U.S. Army, not in the Guard. All of the privileges and advantages of the citizen-soldier was lost. See History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 1941, 51-70; Ibid., 1945, 55-68; ONG Historical Records.

18 Interview with Major (Ret.) Arthur H. Terry, Lindworth, Ohio, March 24, 1975.

19 In computing the mulatto population of the officer's corps at least two generations of white blood (from a total of four) were the determining factors. From 1924-1941, a total of fifty-six Negroes held commissions in the Ohio National Guard. Only eight of them could not qualify as mulattoes. The list of non-aristocrats included the following officers:

Company E--Lieutenant Colonel Herbert A. Quinchett; 1st Lieutenants Frank Toomer, John Burrell, Rufus Houston; 2nd Lieutenants Sydney T. Smith.

Company F--1st Lieutenants Harold A. Butler, Samuel Mason, Rufus Johnson.

Company G and Company H--None

See Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Ninchols, Columbus, January 22, 1975; See also Johnston, Race Relations in Virginia, 196-200,213-214; Dabney, Cincinnati's Colored Citizens, 274; Reuter, Mulatto in the United States, 11-20,127-246; History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 1941, 51-70; Ibid., 1945, 55-68; Captain Leroy A. Clay, ed., On Guard! 372nd Infantry in 1944, 25-31. (Hereafter cited as Clay, On Guard!)
The Second Battalion performed limited state duty in the post war era. On April 21, 1930, the unit was dispatched to the Ohio State Penitentiary in Columbus to aid in crushing a rebellion there. The trouble at the institution began when inmates started a fire that heavily damaged many of the buildings. While being transferred to temporary housing on April 29, the prisoners rushed the Guardsmen and engaged them in hand to hand combat. Fortunately, no one was killed. The next morning the battalion, armed with machine guns, prevented any further violence. By May 7, the trouble subsided and the men were relieved of further duty. The death toll at the penitentiary was determined at 320 prisoners. The Ohio Guard listed no casualties among its troops.\textsuperscript{20} Lieutenant Colonel Quinchett, supervisor of one of the Guard units at the institution, accounted for the high death rate:

Most of the men \{prisoners\} were helplessly trapped by the wall of flames. Since the prison contained few fire extinguishers, there was little hope of saving them. The prisoners also refused to cooperate with police and fire officials. Had this not been the case, a lot of lives could have been saved. We \{Company B\} tried to maintain order after the fire but our presence was greatly resented by the inmates.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{20}Daugherty, "Citizen Soldiers in Peace," 227-270; Ohio State Journal, April 20, 26, 1930; History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 1941, 47.

\textsuperscript{21}Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Herbert A. Quinchett, Columbus, May 5, 1975.
The battalion was again called upon in 1937 to aid flood victims in Cincinnati and Columbus. Lieutenant Colonel Quinchett recalled that the high flood waters were the Guard's secondary problem. As in most civil emergencies, looters and other opportunists had to be discouraged at bayonet point. Nevertheless, the men successfully completed their duties and withdrew in good order. Surprisingly, the Negro Guardsmen were not mobilized against labor dissidents during this period. Apparently the civil officials felt that the level of violence did not warrant their assistance.

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22 History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 1941, 47; Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Herbert A. Quinchett, Columbus, May 5, 1975.

23 For a good account of labor disturbances in Ohio during this time, see Daugherty, "Citizen Soldiers in Peace," 240-321; See also Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1935-1936, 7. Conceivably, the Second Battalion was available for duty during the trouble at Niles on October 30, 1924. However, Governor Donahey declined to use Negro troops to battle the forces of the Ku Klux Klan. Jacob A. Meckstroth, serving as Donahey's private secretary in 1924, explained that "sending Negro Guard units in Niles would have only made the situation worse. The Klanmen would have deliberately shot them hoping to precipitate another Civil War." See Interview with Jacob A. Meckstroth, Columbus, January 20, 1975. See also Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 2, 1924; Youngstown Vindicator, November 3 and December 9, 1924; New York Times, November 2, 4, 6, 1924; Columbus Evening Dispatch, November 2, 1924; Mercer, Ohio Legislative History, V, 157-158.
PART SIX

OHIO NEGRO SOLDIERS IN FEDERAL SERVICE, 1941-1945,
IN THE POSTWAR ERA, AND IN THE KOREAN
CONFLICT, 1946-1954
CHAPTER XIV

THE SECOND BATTALION IN WORLD WAR II

During the interwar years, the War Department's General Staff evaluated the Negro's military performance in France. After hearing testimony from the white commanders of the 92nd Division, it made several observations. First, most of the white officers believed that the Negro combat unit was an utter failure. Portraying the colored soldier as a mental and moral degenerate, the white commanders recommended his restriction to labor battalions in the future. Second, the Negro officer was slandered as one lacking "responsibility and initiative." Colonel Allen J. Greer agreed with this description and further declared that they were unable to complete simple morning reports and possessed no knowledge of military planning. These anti-Negro sentiments, persuaded the General Staff to avoid the future employment of Negro soldiers in combatant roles. The War Department Plans of 1922 and 1937 reflected this attitude.¹ On the eve of World War II, the

War Department indicated that Negroes "would probably be used as primarily laborers."\(^2\)

Major Arthur Terry insisted that the Second Battalion was unperturbed by the controversy over Negro soldiering. He added that "because the unit compiled a fine war record in France, it was not on trial. The men felt that the failure of the 92nd Division in the war had nothing to do with them."\(^3\) In August of 1940, the battalion prepared for its second world war. Participating in the Second Army's field training exercises at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, the unit reviewed tactics, map reading, and marksmanship training. On March 10, 1941, the battalion was mustered into federal service and ordered to entrain for Fort Dix, New Jersey. Under the command of Colonel Howard C. Gilbert, the unit left Columbus on March 16, arriving in the Garden State the following day. On March 18, the Ohioans were again redesignated as the Second Battalion of the fully organized 372nd Infantry Regiment. Composed of 60 officers and 3000 enlisted men, the regiment relived its campaigns of 1918 while awaiting

\(^2\)Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 48; See also Dalfiume, Desegregation of U.S. Armed Forces, 38-50.

\(^3\)Interview with Major (Ret.) Arthur H. Terry, Linworth, Ohio, March 24, 1975.
embarkation orders to Europe.\(^4\)

The Ohioans had scarcely begun their training exercises at Fort Dix when they were mobilized to battle forest fires in New Jersey. On the morning of April 19, the soldiers answered the emergency alarm that was located near the camp's rifle ranges. Upon sighting the blaze, they quickly grabbed shovels to halt the fire's advance. Working until dark, the regiment constructed numerous trenches to save the towns of Browns Mills and New Egypt from disaster. After 48 hours of continuous duty, the troops succeeded in bringing the fires under control. A few days later the Post Commander's Department congratulated the men for their fine efforts.\(^5\) Lieutenant Colonel

\(^4\)Howard Gilbert of Columbus was promoted to full colonel on December 23, 1940, and named as regimental commander on March 10, 1941. The Second Battalion mustered into federal service with an aggregate strength of 15 officers and 500 enlisted men. The units composing the 372nd Infantry Regiment were simplified in 1941. The First Battalion was made up of Negro Guardsmen from the New Jersey State Militia; the Second Battalion was, of course, the Ohio Negro Volunteers. The Third Battalion consisted of a full battalion of Negro Guardsmen from Massachusetts. In 1917 this state had mustered in only one company (Company L) into World War I. See Regimental Commanders Reports, A Factual History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, National Guard of the United States (Columbus, n.d.) 3-6. (Hereafter cited as Reports, Factual History of 372nd Infantry Regiment.) History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 1945, 7-9; Clay, On Guard!, 6-7; Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 42-44,192.

\(^5\)Reports, Factual History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 6-7.
Nichols also praised the work of the Second Battalion in New Jersey. However, he stated that the men regarded the expedition as a "waste of time" because the fires were deliberately set.\textsuperscript{6}

In June of 1941, the Second Battalion received its share of uninspired soldiers, as many illiterate and incorrigible southern Negroes, obtained under the Selective Service of 1940, were assigned to the unit. Nearly 75 percent of these men were unable to write their names, and, of course, knew nothing of military life. Their intelligence scores on the Adjutant General's Classification Tests (AGCT) were among the lowest ever recorded by the military. For convenience's sake, the army placed these soldiers in Class V and regarded them as hopeless. Although the War Department declared that the draftees would serve as temporary "fillers" for the undermanned National Guard units, the consequences of this action were unfortunate. Crack Negro infantry regiments, such as the 372nd had become so diluted with Class V soldiers that it was rendered unfit for combat service.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{6}Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Nichols, Columbus, January 22, 1975.

\textsuperscript{7}Reports, Factual History of 372nd Infantry Regiment, 8; Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 137; J. Davis, Negro Reference Book, 637.
After completing its training at Fort Dix, the Second Battalion embarked for New England. From August 26 to September 12, it was attached to the VI Corps, United States Army. Colonel Gilbert personally drilled the Ohio unit during these maneuvers and discovered several weaknesses in its performance. First, the squads consistently failed to maintain contact with each other during the simulated battles. Second, the unit's outpost security during "enemy attacks" was non-existant. Third, the Ohioans bivouacked in a marsh when better terrain was nearby. Retired Captain Harvey Alston of Company F stated that Gilbert did not directly blame the draftees for the unit's shortcomings. However, Alston noted that an Ohio Guard unit had never performed so poorly in the past. In reflecting upon the battalion's poor showing in New England, Lieutenant Colonel Nichols declared:

The Southern Negroes fouled everything up. They were constantly becoming lost in the field, and none of them could read a map or a compass to find their way back to camp. Our training exercises were soon transformed into a kindergarten for these soldiers.

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8Captain Alston joined Company F, of the Second Battalion, in 1930. During the New Jersey experience, he was a commissioned second lieutenant. See Personal Interview with Captain (Ret.) Harvey Alston, at Mini City Hall, Columbus, Ohio, January 22, 1975. (Hereafter cited as Interview with Captain (Ret.) Harvey Alston, Columbus, January 22, 1975.) See also Reports, Factual History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 7-8,10-11,13.
These men sabotaged out spirit and hurt our chances to go to Europe. The army had played a bad joke on us.\(^9\)

Following the declaration of war against Japan, the General Staff implemented Phase Two of its utilization plans for Negro soldiers. Instead of assigning the Second Battalion a specific combat mission, the War Department relegated it to "home guard" details. In an almost apologetic tone, Brigadier general Dwight D. Eisenhower, chief of the War Plans Division, explained the government's reasons for employing Negro soldiers in a stateside capacity. The memorandum, dated March 17, 1942, noted that no foreign country had yet been found "where Negro troops would be welcome."\(^{10}\) The Ohioans immediately began their

\(^9\) Lieutenant Colonel Nichols held a captaincy in the Guard during this time. See Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Nichols, Columbus, January 22, 1975. See also History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 1945, 56-68.

\(^{10}\) J. Davis, Negro Reference Book, 636-637; Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 473. The Ohioans were not alone in their protests over War Department policy. The Negro press vigorously opposed the conversion of the four regular regiments to training units. Arthur Adams, Dean of the College of Humanities at Ohio State University, served as a captain in the 24th Infantry Regiment during the war. Describing the government's attitude toward Negro manpower as "wasteful," he supported his allegations with the following evidence: First, the elite 24th Infantry did not join the 93rd Division in the Philippines until April 9, 1945--near the war's end. Second, the War Department believed that Negro soldier's were not intelligent enough to master modern weapons. Hence, the regulars were restricted to labor duties in Okinawa. See Personal Interview with Dr. Arthur Adams, University Hall, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, January 23, 1976. For a
noncombatant duties. On December 8, 1941, the battalion was ordered to protect the Philadelphia Navy Yard from enemy saboteurs. Nine days later it was shipped to New York City to guard the harbor, subway, and other key installations from "fifth column" movements. The unit was relieved of this duty on April 21, 1943.11

While entraining for New York, the Second Battalion was informed of a change in command. On December 14, 1941, Lieutenant General L.F. Fredendall, commander of the II Army Corps, announced that Colonel Howard Gilbert had been relieved of duty. Lieutenant Colonel Edward O. Gourdin, commander of the Third Battalion, was named as his successor. Although General Fredendall gave no specific reason for Gilbert's "retirement," it was assumed that the commander's advanced age had been discovered. Despite his insistence that he was younger, Colonel Gilbert was actually 62 years old, two years over the army's age limit. The War Department, however, announced another reason for his dismissal from military service. In a published report in 1942, it declared the 372nd Infantry Regiment to be "making little progress in training."

11Reports, Factual History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 14.
Blaming Colonel Gilbert for the unit's inadequacies, the War Department portrayed him as a soldier who "is deficient in basic education, has displayed a decided lack of administrative ability, and appears to be ignorant of modern methods of training." Following this action, Washington appointed a white colonel from one of the Negro regular regiments but reversed this decision when Guardsmen and Negro politicians opposed the selection. To soothe the ruffled feelings of the Guard, the War Department promoted Gourdin, a Negro, to the position of regimental commander.

Colonel Gilbert's controversial retirement temporarily reduced the morale within the regiment. The soldiers greatly resented the War Department's attitude upon this matter as well as its prejudicial ban upon Negro soldiers in combat. However, the Second Battalion pushed aside its personal feelings upon these issues and executed its duties in a soldierly manner. Lieutenant Colonel Quinchett recalls that the officers knew the importance of domestic duty in wartime, but the enlistees did not accept it quite so readily. Nevertheless, he explained to Company

12Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 200; See also Reports, Factual History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 11.

13Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 200-201.
F that guarding New York City was vital to national security. He told Guardsmen that:

If the subway were bombed by the enemy, millions of residents would become panic-stricken. It is your job to guard the city's transportation system and prevent any commotion or delay. This is one of the most important assignments in the war.14

Major Terry simplified Quinchett's message and told the volunteers that "they were getting something easy for a change." The strategy succeeded. From December of 1941, until the end of the war, no complaints were heard from Guardsmen concerning their boredom and mistreatment.15

In fact, the entire regiment performed its mission so well in New York City that Mayor Fiorello H. La Guardia pleaded with the War Department to leave the soldiers on duty there until the end of the war.16 La Guardia had become indebted to the volunteers for their suppression of the "Harlem Riot" in April of 1943. The trouble began after two soldiers (not from the 372nd) were involved in

14 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Herbert A. Quinchett, Columbus, May 5, 1975. See also Reports, Factual History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 15-23.

15 Interview with Major (Ret.) Arthur H. Terry, Linworth, Ohio, March 24, 1975; See also Reports, Factual History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 5-26.

16 President Franklin Roosevelt replied affirmatively to La Guardia's request, noting that the 372nd might as well remain in New York City since it was not going overseas anyway. See Lee, Employment of Negro Troops, 473.
a fistfight. Aided by boredom and a hot summer day, the disorder quickly spread among the ghetto inhabitants. Although the local police appeared capable of handling the matter, Mayor La Guardia requested the mobilization of federal troops as a safety precaution. Upon Colonel Gourdin's orders, elements of the Second Battalion left the encampment site at Aquaduct Park en route to Harlem. The mere presence of the troops quickly dissipated the rioters, and the trouble ended. After completing their duties in Harlem, the Ohioans journeyed to Fort Dix to participate in the Advanced Infantry Training (AIT) Courses.17

In April of 1944 the Ohio unit was transferred to Camp Breckinridge, Kentucky, to fulfill its primary mission: preparing for combat duty in the European and Asian theaters. However, it was converted into a training detail for elements of the 92nd Division. Within the next two months, the battalion trained 600 infantrymen for overseas deployment. The Guardsmen finished this assignment on November 8, 1944, and was subsequently ordered to Fort Huachuca, Arizona, where the battalion again served as a training unit.18

17Reports, Factual History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 16-17.

18Some of the Ohio soldiers (officers and men) were randomly chosen to serve as replacements in the 92nd
On April 15, 1945, the Ohio unit received joyous news from the War Department. It had finally been assigned an overseas combat mission. Using Fort Lawton, Washington, as a last minute assembly and preparation area, the battalion loaded its last ship on April 30 and sailed toward Hawaii. Three weeks later, it underwent jungle training near Honolulu and was assigned to defensive positions on the islands.\(^{19}\) By September 2, 1945, the battalion had ended its mission and was inactivated along with the regimental organization on January 21, 1946.\(^{20}\)

Ohio Negro volunteers experienced four frustrating years of federal service in World War II. Barred from combat duty because of racism, they were assigned to home guard and later redesignated as a training detail. Such duty was not only inappropriate for an elite fighting unit, but it also demonstrated the army's waste of trained infantrymen. Desperately searching for combat personnel

\(^{19}\)The Ohio Guard Companies were assigned to the following sectors in Hawaii: Company E patrolled the "Big Island," Hawaii; Company F was assigned the island of Kauai; Company G was responsible for Maui, and Company H was assigned Molokai. See Reports, Factual History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 22.

\(^{20}\)"General Orders, No.2," June 21, 1946, ONG Historical Records; Reports, Factual History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment, 23.
in 1944, the War Department removed the 372nd from any such consideration. Ohio Negroes deserved much better treatment. Their record in 1917-1918 should have dispelled any doubts concerning their ability to soldier. Yet they were implicated in the failure of the disorganized 92nd Division and subsequently regarded by the General Staff as unsuitable for combat purposes. Although they performed their domestic duties well, it was only a partial triumph for the Guardsmen. They wanted to meet the enemy.
CHAPTER XV

THE WAR DEPARTMENT CHANGES ITS EMPHASIS: THE DEMISE OF THE NEGRO INFANTRY BATTALION IN OHIO

The devastating use of airpower during World War II prompted a change in the army's Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE). Instead of maintaining its usual number of infantry regiments, the army phased out these units in favor of Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) groups. Ohio quickly implemented the policy change in 1947. Adjutant General Chester W. Goble's annual report to Governor Thomas J. Herbert indicated that many infantry units had already been consolidated. The remaining regiments, awaiting inactivation because of personnel deficiencies, were prohibited by the army from recruiting to their pre-war manpower levels. During the same year, the Department of the Army circulated a register of Guard units scheduled for disbandment, and the name of the 372nd Infantry Regiment appeared upon the list.\(^1\)

The Second Battalion found that its postwar problems were only beginning. Besides facing extinction, the unit

\(^1\)Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1947, 5-17; Ibid., 1948, 5-15; ONG Historical Records.
realized that it must eventually integrate its ranks as well. Anticipating the recommendations of the Fahy Committee, President Harry Truman issued Executive Order No. 9981 on July 26, 1948. The mandate barred racial segregation in the armed forces of the United States, but did not affect National Guard organizations that were not in federal service.  

2 the War Department seriously studied the problem of racial segregation in the military in October of 1944. Secretary of War Robert Patterson appointed three officers to investigate the army's "Negro policy" and submit a new plan for efficiently using Negro manpower. Headed by Lieutenant General Alvin C. Gillem Jr., the "Gillem Board" published its report on April 1, 1946. Its findings were vague and inconclusive. While advocating greater opportunities for Negroes within the military structure, the committee still adhered to the army's doctrine of racial segregation. The Board thought that the problems of integration could be solved by a "distant war." The council also upheld the army's quota system (10 percent) for Negro troops in proportion with the colored population. The army was infuriated with the Gillem recommendations in 1947 because they were so blatantly contradictory. In September of 1948, the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces was officially recognized by Truman, although he had received counsel from some of its members long before its formal designation. Popularly known as the Fahy Committee (after its chairman, Charles Fahy) it advocated the complete integration of America's military institutions. Submitting its report to the president on October 29, 1948, the group consistently deplored segregation as a waste of human resources. These findings, although formulated after the issuance of Truman's executive order, paralleled the president's own philosophy upon the subject. See Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, 155-160, 177-188, 196-200; Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces, 17-20; Reddick, "Army's Negro Policy," 9-29.
Negro veterans saw the inevitability of Guard integration, but they were still unwilling to accept white soldiers into their private club. Lieutenant Colonel James Nichols refers to the irony of the situation when describing the battalion's feeling upon the subject:

No member of the Fahy Committee had realized that integration was a two-edged sword. To most people, Negroes entering into an all white unit was integration, and that was supposed to mean progress. But integration worked to our disadvantage. We did not care to have whites join our unit.\(^3\)

The first official protest against integration of the Guard occurred in 1948. Retired Lieutenant Colonel Jason Palmer, then commander of the Second Battalion, explained to Assistant Adjutant General Kenneth Cooper the disadvantages of an integrated unit. First, he noted that the cultural and social differences between Negro and white soldiers was a potential source of racial friction and discord within the unit. Second, he stated that promotions for Negroes serving within an integrated structure would be non-existant since white officers received priorities for the available positions. When Colonel Cooper denied the latter allegation, Lieutenant Colonel Palmer clarified his position in the following manner.

\(^3\)Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Nichols, Columbus, January 22, 1975.
It is no secret that a Negro officer has a better chance for advancement against another Negro officer than against a white officer. This is the one advantage of an all black unit. Although promotions are limited because of the few available slots, at least the opportunity to advance is there. A Negro has no such chance in an integrated unit.

Third, he feared that the white political elite would transfer efficient and experienced Negro officers from the positions of command to staff jobs. He then predicted that the Negro's responsibility would consist of "only seeing that the orders from the white commanders were carried out. You [Negroes] were prevented from giving any orders."  

Negro Guardsmen made a concerted effort to keep their battalion segregated. In January of 1949 at an NAACP meeting in Xenia, Captain Harvey Alston of Columbus announced that he was collecting money to "continue the fight for the tradition of the unit." He explained that the funds would be used to print handbills and petitions telling the history of the 372nd Infantry Regiment. He was certain that "when people realize that the Second Battalion was one of the oldest infantry outfits in Ohio militia history, they would request the legislature to preserve it." The NAACP passed the resolution but informed

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4 Personal Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Jason Palmer, at Cleveland, Ohio, February 2, 1975. (Hereafter cited as Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Jason Palmer, Cleveland, February 2, 1975.)
Alston that it dissapproved of the concept of segregation.5

The campaign to "save the 372nd" ended almost as quickly as it began. Amid the controversy over integration, the battalion apparently forgot that it was scheduled for disbandment. In the spring of 1948, Colonel Kenneth Cooper told Alston that his efforts were futile. Having just left Washington with dissolution orders for the entire regiment, Cooper explained that the Ohio legislature was powerless to aid the battalion. Captain Alston then argued the contrary, but in vain. Later, he was told by Colonel Cooper "black soldiers wouldn't like it [integration] nor would whites like it."6

Encouraged by Negro opposition to integration, the Adjutant General's Department forestalled any immediate desegregation efforts. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E.P. McCann, administrative assistant (personnel) to Guard

5Interview with Captain (Ret.) Harvey Alston, Columbus, January 22, 1975.

6Ibid., Columbus, January 22, 1975; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1947, 15-17. After losing the fight to keep the Second Battalion as an all Negro unit, Captain Alston retired in 1949 after 19½ years of military service. For a general account of Captain Alston's military life see William M. Dulaney, "Black and Blue in America; The Black Policeman of Columbus, Ohio, 1875-1974," unpublished M.A. thesis, Ohio State University, 1975, 43,51. See also "Retiring Inspector to Run for Council," Columbus Citizen Journal, IV, No.64 (January 22, 1963.)
headquarters in Columbus, recalls why the Department adopted this attitude:

Integration should not be looked up as a cure-all for every social ill. In fact, it had the opposite effect in Ohio. It created an atmosphere of suspicion and of misunderstanding when none previously existed. The blacks had a great deal of pride in their unit and the introduction of white soldiers into it would have destroyed that esprit de corps. The adjutant general had no desire to see Palmer's Club broken up.

McCann further declared that 50 percent of the Second Battalion's officer corps and enlisted men either resigned or stayed upon active duty with the army to avoid an embarrassing situation.  

Major Richard C. Alexander, the Equal Opportunity Officer for the Ohio National Guard in 1976, substantiates McCann's findings but added that "the relocation of Guard armories away from the centers of Negro population increased the dropout rate." Major Alexander explained that the Guard built its armories where cheap land could be found. He repudiated the idea that the new constructions were deliberate attempts to "rid the Guard of its Negro representation. These were economic considerations not racial ones." Nevertheless, he added that a "black

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7 Personal Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E.P. McCann at the General Robert S. Beightler Armory, Linworth, Ohio, March 3, 1975. (Hereafter cited as Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Joseph McCann, Linworth, Ohio, March 3, 1975.)
living in Cleveland could not be expected to drive to Portsmouth for a weekend meeting." Finally, he attributed the high retirement rate among Negro infantry officers to their "inability or unwillingness to retrain for commissions in the artillery branch." Officer personnel records of the Second Battalion confirmed Alexander's observations. They indicate that only 25 percent of the officers became branch-qualified in the artillery field. From 1949-1950 the unit suffered such manpower deficiencies that it was not mobilized for the Korean Conflict.

While the Second Battalion was plagued with political problems, another Negro unit was formed in Ohio. On September 26, 1947, the 183rd AAA (Automatic Weapons) Battalion established its headquarters in Columbus as part of the army's new air defense force. Within a year, the 115 man unit had organized branches in Cincinnati and Cleveland, beating its sister unit, the all white 182nd AAA, in the recruiting race. The two artillery sections composed of the 371st Anti-Aircraft Group, which was formally organized on November 17, 1947. The event

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8Personal Interview with Major Richard C. Alexander, at the General Robert S. Beightler Armory, Linworth, Ohio, January 16, 1975. (Hereafter cited as Interview with Major Richard C. Alexander, Linworth, Ohio, January 16, 1975.)

9ONG Historical Records.
marked the first occasion that a Negro Guard unit was included in Ohio's 37th Infantry Division. The 183rd was commanded by Captain Lovell B. Tipton, now a retired lieutenant colonel. Serving with the regular army in Australia in 1946, he had intended to remain in that capacity until receiving a letter from General Kenneth B. Cooper, the 37th Division's artillery commander. The message requested that Tipton attend a Guard staff meeting in Columbus "because there was a need for a black artillery officer." Obtaining a quick army discharge, he joined the Ohio Guard and activated its Negro artillery section.

The 183rd had an authorized manpower capacity of 6 officers and 109 enlisted men. The Battalion and Battalion Headquarters, as well as Battery A, were located in Columbus. Batteries B and C were instituted in Cincinnati and Cleveland respectively. The 182nd AAA, with an authorized strength of 38 officers and 529 enlistees, located its Battalion, Battalion Headquarters, and Battery A in Dayton. Battery B was recruited in Middletown. The unit completed its recruiting drive in November of 1947. Presumably, the white artillery group was larger than the Negro organization because of the latter's unfamiliarity with the new branch as well as the Negro's comparatively small population. See Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1947, 10; Ibid., 1948, 14; Pictorial History of the Thirty-Seventh Infantry Division (Columbus, 1952) 381-396. (Hereafter cited as History of the Thirty-Seventh Infantry Division.)

First Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lovell B. Tipton, at Gahanna, Ohio, January 15, 1975. (Hereafter cited as First Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lovell B. Tipton, Gahanna, Ohio, January 15, 1975.)
The unit conducted its first summer encampment in August, 1948 at Camp Pendleton, Virginia, near Virginia Beach. Tipton was pleased that the men worked hard to become good soldiers. Within two weeks they had grasped the rudiments of electronic warfare: radar, missile guidance, computer programming, and data processing. Despite their good conduct and enthusiasm, Tipton maintained that he was always wary because "with so many beautiful young [white] ladies and our black fellows so close together, trouble could erupt." In February of 1949, the army's TOE recognized the need for increased mobility and changed the unit's designation to the 137th AAA Battalion (Self Propelled.) Lieutenant Colonel Tipton declared that with the revamping of the semi-mobile 183rd, the Buckeye State had the first black motorized and mechanized Guard unit in the United States.  

During the Korean War, the battalion was mustered into federal service on January 15, 1952, and dispatched to Fort Bliss, Texas, as part of the IV Army Corps. While training there, it was converted by the War Department into a "dumping ground for black incorrigibles and other mentally disturbed soldiers." At the same time, the army

12Ibid., January 15, 1975; See also History of the Thirty-Seventh Division, 381; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1949, 10.
transferred the best NCOs from the unit and placed them into other companies. This left Tipton with a makeshift, inexperienced cadre to train the new arrivals. As a result, the 137th AAA consistently failed all written and practical field tests and was subsequently declared by the army as unfit for overseas duty. Tipton angrily charged that the army "deliberately sabotaged my efforts as an excuse to keep Negroes from entering the combat zone." He further maintained that the 182nd AAA suffered none of the disabilities experienced by the Negro artillerymen. 13

In September of 1952, the Ohioans were transferred to Camp Polk, Louisiana, along with the 37th Infantry Division. Instead of preparing for overseas duty, the unit was ordered by Colonel Frank Leary, the IV Army Artillery Group commander, to serve as a labor organization. Assigned to painting and policing the entire battalion area, the 137th was allowed only two drill periods before the designated inspection. Hampered by the cast-offs from the army, the unit's miserable performance at Fort Bliss was again repeated. Failing all phases of its

13Second Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lovell B. Tipton, at Gahanna, Ohio, March 24, 1975. (Hereafter cited as Second Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lovell B. Tipton, Gahanna, Ohio, March 24, 1975.) See also History of the Thirty-Seventh Division, 381-396.
examinations, the 137th was declared a disgrace by the War Department. As a result, Lieutenant Colonel Tipton was relieved of duty and replaced by Major Frank Nairn of Columbus. His failure as a commander was especially embarrassing because the 137th AAA was the only Negro artillery battalion in the IV Army Corps. The experience was not only a personal defeat, but it also betrayed the trust that General Cooper had placed in him. After his pride had been shattered, Lieutenant Colonel Tipton nearly suffered a nervous breakdown. He credited Dr. James B. Kingsland of the 357th Medical Battalion with successfully "treating his condition." Prescribing massive doses of stimulants for the former commander, Kingsland's actions were reminiscent of the treatments given General Edward Ferrero during the disaster at Petersburg crater on July 30, 1864.14

After regaining his composure, Tipton wrote to the Department of the Army and charged that its Negro units were systematically discriminated against during wartime. First, he alleged that the army's imported band of "cut-throats and dope fiends" had caused his failure as a military leader. Second, he charged that Negro companies

14Second Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lovell B. Tipton, Gahanna, Ohio, March 24, 1975; See also History of the Thirty-Seventh Division, 381.
were automatically labelled by the army as depots for inferior, shoddy equipment. Since he could not requisition the proper weapons needed by the battalion, the Ohioans were insufficiently trained for combat duty. Third, he blamed Colonel Leary for "giving the battalion paint brushes instead of guns." Again he observed that the 182nd AAA did not suffer a similar fate. In 1954 the luckless 137th reverted to a state militia unit.

The end of the Korean Conflict marked the return of the integration issue in Ohio. In March of 1954, Lieutenant Colonel James B. Kingsland, the Negro commander of the 357th Medical Battalion, returned to Ohio and requested an appointment in the Guard. He was informed by the Adjutant General's Department that since the Negro battalion had already been assigned a medical officer, "there was no place in the Guard for him." Kingsland subsequently launched a public campaign advocating the complete integration of the Guard. His actions

15Lieutenant Colonel Lovell B. Tipton, "The American Negro and the National Guard of the United States," 1-9; Second Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lovell B. Tipton, Gahanna, Ohio, March 24, 1975; History of the Thirty-Seventh Division, 381-396; See also Raymond Watkins, "Race Discrimination in the National Guard Violates Federal Law." 1-4.


17Dr. Kingsland was later offered a rank of major in an Ohio medical battalion, but he refused because it involved a reduction in rank. He later journeyed to New
displeased many members of the Second Battalion who had worked closely with the Department in obstructing the process. Warrant Officer Donald E. Lee, a former enlisted man in the Second Battalion and currently assigned to the Headquarters Battalion of the 137th AAA, confirmed this observation. He declared that Dr. Kingsland's efforts "went over like a lead balloon among the black Guard members of the 372nd."18

Adjutant General Leo Kreber was greatly embarrassed by the Kingsland Affair and moved to settle the state's integration problem. On March 17, 1954, at Fort Hayes, he convened a meeting with the commanding officers of both Negro Guard units. Talking first with Lieutenant Colonel Palmer, General Kreber agreed that the Second Battalion should remain all-Negro. Lieutenant Colonel McCann, who was present at the meeting, recalls that the agreement carried a stipulation:

The 372nd was required to maintain a maximum man­power enrollment. Otherwise it would have to accept a role as filler troops. General Kreber also proposed the formation of a Negro infantry battalion

York and accepted a lieutenant colonelcy in a New York National Guard regiment. See Second Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lovell B. Tipton, Gahanna, Ohio, March 24, 1975.

18Personal Interview with Sgt. Donald E. Lee, at the Howey Road Armory, Columbus, Ohio, March 10, 1975.
in Ohio "to provide additional positions for an expanding Negro militia class."19

Lieutenant Colonel Tipton opposed Kreber's plan of voluntary segregation. First, he said that Negroes could not fill an entire regiment because they had difficulty in maintaining sufficient enrollments in the 372nd and the 137th. Second, he believed integration to be a "positive good" and chided the efforts to pacify Lieutenant Colonel Palmer.20 His position was supported by Major James Purdue, commander of Company H of the Second Battalion. The major asserted that integration provided an "opportunity to show that blacks could function efficiently and effectively with white troops, thereby breaking down unjustified prejudices." Purdue also contended that integration meant that Negroes "could attain the higher commissioned grades within the Guard's command hierarchy."21

The controversy over integration soon reached the statehouse. In April 1954, Governor Frank Lausche ordered General Kreber to integrate the Guard and complete

19Second Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lovell B. Tipton, Gahanna, Ohio, March 24, 1975; Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Joseph E.P. McCann, Linworth, Ohio March 3, 1975.

20Second Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lovell B. Tipton, Gahanna, Ohio, March 24, 1975.

21Personal Interview with Major (Ret.) James Purdue, Cleveland, Ohio, February 2, 1975.
the process before the start of the annual summer encampments. The governor explained his actions:

It [integration] was a simple solution for me. Each member of the National Guard was assigned to protect life and property in Ohio. This responsibility had no division; it was equally applicable to both black and white members of the Guard. If blacks were to participate in the National Guard, they had to share this collective responsibility.

Lausche admitted that he initially harbored doubts concerning the feasibility of integration, but after observing a review of integrated Guard companies at Indian-town Gap, Pennsylvania, in June 1953, he decided to end segregation in the Ohio Guard. Finally, he emphasized that his decision was based upon personal convictions and vehemently denied any pressure from the War Department "or any other organization" to integrate the state's forces.22 The governor's story is substantiated by Robert Wade, deputy director of the Columbus chapter of the Urban League. He remembers that "neither his group nor the NAACP had anything to do with integration of the Guard in Ohio." According to Wade, "in the military, an order is an order. The Truman Proclamation initiated the action. Outside pressure upon Governor Lausche was not needed."23

22 Telephone interview with ex-Ohio Governor Frank Lausche, at Bethesda, Maryland, June 25, 1975.

23 Personal Interview with Robert Wade, Urban League Deputy Director, a 22 year veteran of the Air Force and current advisor to the Ohio National Guard on minority recruitment, Columbus, January 7, 1975.
Mindful of his previous meeting with Negro Guard leaders in March, General Kreber delayed the governor's executive order. It was a fruitless move. During the Guard's military review at Camp Perry, Ohio, in June of 1954, John Combs, a writer for the Columbus Call and Post, was seated next to Governor Lausche. Upon observing the Second Battalion passing in review, he whispered to the governor that the Guard was not integrated at all. It (Second Battalion) contained no white soldiers. Lausche immediately turned to General Kreber and inquired: "What happened to the integration?" Kreber was unresponsive.24 By this time the governor had become infuriated and approached Lieutenant Colonel Jason Palmer with the same question. Palmer replied: "I never got any orders on it, sir." Again, Lausche confronted General Kreber and asked if he had executed his orders. The adjutant general answered negatively. On July 1, 1954, Governor Lausche issued Executive Order No. 39, reemphasizing his previous mandate to integrate the Guard.25

The desegregation of the Guard was a smooth operation. Sergeant Major Wilbur Jones of the 137th AAA

24 Personal Interview with John Combs, columnist for the Columbus Call and Post, Columbus, January 16, 1975.

25 Second Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Lovell B. Tipton, Gahanna, Ohio, March 24, 1975. See also ONG Historical Records, July 1, 1954.
remembers that white soldiers initially resisted the move to place them in a Negro unit. Once they became accustomed to working with Negro soldiers, however, racial differences were no longer an obstacle. One of the first white soldiers assigned to the 137th was Captain Robert W. Souder, currently a member of a ONG Communication unit from Cincinnati. Having originally enlisted in the Air Guard, he requested an immediate transfer to the Negro battalion on August 6, 1955. Describing his relationship with the Negroes as "a personal learning experience," he asserted that the pride and esprit de corps of the unit was second to none in Ohio.

The first white officer assigned to the 137th AAA was Lieutenant Colonel Huffman King. Taking the job because it offered command and promotion opportunities, he soon realized that the task was not an easy one. First, he found his central problem was communicating with his subordinates because Negroes "spoke a different language from whites." Second, he admitted that he was uncertain of his acceptance by the men. Nevertheless, the problems


soon dissipated.  

Integration was working. An Ohio Sentinel reporter acknowledged that fact while he observed the Guard during a two week summer encampment in 1954. Prior to Governor Lausche's order, the 37th Field Artillery Battalion, for example, had been closed to Negroes. Now it contained several colored volunteers, who were readily accepted by their white counterparts.

The Second Battalion continued to resist the integration order and was apparently determined to hold General Kreber to his original promise. However, since the unit failed to maintain its proper strength, it was converted into support units on September 1, 1959.

With its redesignation, Ohio Negro soldiers lost the last vestige of their private club status. The unit's proud lineage soon became buried and was nearly forgotten by everyone, save its old officer corps, who had retired in defeat. Although integration produced a long term

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28 Personal Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Huffman King, at the General Robert S. Beightler Armory, Linworth, Ohio, March 24, 1975.

29 John Combs, "Integration Working in the Ohio Guard," The Ohio Sentinel, July 31, 1954.

30 Companies A, B, and D of the Second Battalion Infantry Regiment were converted into the 493rd, 494th, 372nd and 366 D Ordinance Companies of Cleveland. Company C was redesignated as the 3582 Transportation Company of Dayton. See Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1959, 18, 20.
social benefit, the Second Battalion remained unconvinced. Its men perceived integration as a disruptive force that stripped them of their unit pride and dignity. Between 1950-1965 the Negro enrollment in the Guard declined 90 percent in the enlisted ranks, while 95 percent of the officers left state service. The loss of the infantry battalion accounted for some of the drop in enrollment but more importantly, Negro apathy toward Guard participation was the actual cause. The Negro volunteer no longer had anything to call his own.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{31}ONG Historical Records; Cheatham "Black Units of the Ohio National Guard," 14.
CONCLUSION - SUMMARY

From 1864 until 1954 Ohio Negro Guardsmen compiled an illustrious state and federal service record. Although often victimized by internal fighting, the units never abandoned their professional attitude and dedication whenever mobilized for duty. They took their job seriously and performed creditably upon most occasions. Unlike the white Guardsmen, most Negro soldiers constantly fought poverty and an unfriendly white society in addition to executing their normal militia duties. Their struggle with these forces caused them to develop a sense of unit cohesiveness, spirit, and dignity that was unsurpassed by any white military organization. The white political elite and the Negro soldier developed a symbiotic relationship. The former, dependent upon Negro votes, provided the mulatto middle class with Guard companies, which were used by the latter to increase their socio-economic status within their own community. Negro soldiers graciously accepted this client status and all of the disadvantages that it entailed. The limitations upon personnel, promotions, and deployment of the unit proved frustrating to the officer corps, but it failed to significantly affect the overall morale and patriotism.
of the Negro volunteers.

After adjusting to these systemic deficiencies, Negro Guardsmen were threatened with the integration and subsequent dissolution of their unit. When they resisted, Negro and white "progressives" severely criticized their actions and labelled them as reactionaries. These groups disregarded the reservations that the Negro soldier held concerning integration. First, they underestimated his fear of losing promotions or commands to white officers. Second, they denied that the Negro officer would be treated as a mere subordinate by his white counterpart. At any rate, integration produced a negative effect upon Negro interest and participation in the Guard and hastened his defection from it as well. The loss to the Ohio Guard is immeasurable.
APPENDICES
## APPENDIX A

### OHIO SUBSTITUTES IN NEGRO REGIMENTS 1863-1865

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Troop Nomenclature</th>
<th>Number of Negro Substitutes (Ohio)</th>
<th>Total Number of Soldiers in Unit (Est.)</th>
<th>Ratio of Ohioans to Total No. of recruits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th Regt.</td>
<td>USCT</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Regt.</td>
<td>USCT</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72nd Regt.</td>
<td>USCT</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Regt.</td>
<td>*NG</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th Regt.</td>
<td>*NG</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Regt.</td>
<td>USCT</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery</td>
<td>USCT</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 2,025 Negro substitutes

**Sources:** Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 661-680; Dyer, Compendium III, 1721, 1726, 1734; Reid, Ohio in the War I, 176-177; Wesley, Ohio Negroes, 31-38.

In addition to these units, Ohio Negroes were credited with 1000 unassigned recruits. Then soldiers were recruited from the state, trained at Camp Delaware, and dispatched by Provost Marshalls to various congressional districts. Unfortunately, records of these soldiers cannot be found. Many drifted into other colored units to become part of Ohio's "lost volunteers." Journalist Whitelaw Reid estimated that the Buckeye State received credit for only one-third of her colored patriots.

*NG = National Guard
### APPENDIX B

#### TABLE OF MULATTOES FOR THE YEAR 1850

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State and Territory</th>
<th>Mulattoes to 100 Blacks in the Negro Population: 1850.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>12.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STATES</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>7.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>16.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>9.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>30.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>9.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
<td>42.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>10.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>6.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>85.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>89.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa</td>
<td>87.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>17.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>14.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>51.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>14.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>34.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>76.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>7.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>18.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>54.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>18.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>19.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>12.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHIO</td>
<td>129.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>40.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>24.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>4.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>10.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>15.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>40.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>17.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin</td>
<td>87.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX C

**ROSTER OF WHITE LINE OFFICERS FOR THE 5TH REGIMENT, USCT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Where Born</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Military Aptitude</th>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James P. Conline</td>
<td>Nov. 3, 1863</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Conn.</td>
<td>Carriage maker</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>2 yrs. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Oren</td>
<td>July 27, 1863</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Priv. citizen</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td></td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orlando Brockway</td>
<td>July 20, 1863</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1st Sgt.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Student Oberlin College</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>20 mos. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gustavus Fahrlon</td>
<td>July 24, 1863</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Bookkeeper</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>16 mos. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvin Spear</td>
<td>July 18, 1863</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>14 mos. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alex Poundstone</td>
<td>July 11, 1863</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>19 mos. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carl Von Heinze</td>
<td>July 22, 1863</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Machinist</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>18 mos. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX C -continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Where Born</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Military Aptitude</th>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elliot F. Grable</td>
<td>Nov. 6, 1863</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1st Lt</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>24 yrs. prev. serv.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 591-624; Adjutant General's Department, Report of Candidates Examined for Commissions in Colored Troops, July 18, 1863 - February 13, 1864 (Columbus, 1864.) (Hereafter cited as Report of Candidates Examined.)

P = Passing  * = assumed command of Regiment at Yorktown
## APPENDIX D

### NEGRO TROOPS IN THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: THE FIRST UNITS STATES AUTHORIZED BY BUREAU OF COLORED TROOPS TO RAISE NEGRO REGIMENTS (OCT. 31, 1863)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>two regiments of infantry</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>one regiment of infantry (incomplete)</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>three regiments of infantry (incomplete)</td>
<td>2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>two regiments of infantry (one incomplete)</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>two regiments</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>three regiments (two of infantry and one of artillery, all incomplete)</td>
<td>1,295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>five regiments (four infantry, one of artillery, all incomplete)</td>
<td>12,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>one regiment, (complete)</td>
<td>1,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>three regiments infantry (incomplete)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>five regiments</td>
<td>3,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas</td>
<td>two regiments infantry (complete)</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHIO</td>
<td>(as of Oct. 31, 1863) one regiment of infantry (complete) 5th USCT</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Jan. 16, 1864) one regiment of infantry (complete) 27th USCT</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** O.R., Ser.3, III, 1111-1115; Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 593,624.
# APPENDIX E

## ROSTER OF WHITE LINE OFFICERS FOR THE 27TH REGIMENT, USCT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Where Born</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Military Aptitude</th>
<th>Finding</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albert M. Blackman</td>
<td>March 24, 1864</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Lt. Col.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Col.</td>
<td>3 yrs. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin C. Lattimer</td>
<td>Feb. 8, 1863</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>13 mos. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward F. McNulty</td>
<td>Jan. 16, 1864</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2nd Lt.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>2 yrs. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Eberhardt</td>
<td>July 20, 1863</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Bookkeeper</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>2 yrs. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Rogall</td>
<td>March 14, 1863</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>2 yrs. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Gillespie</td>
<td>July 15, 1863</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Serg.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
<td>Mechanic</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>2 yrs. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanders Huyek</td>
<td>July 28, 1863</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Prof. Soldier</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>3 yrs. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph J. Wakefield</td>
<td>July 28, 1863</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Bookkeeper</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>2 yrs. prev.serv.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Report of Candidates Examined; Ohio Roster, War of the Rebellion, 627-658.

P = Passing
## APPENDIX F

### ANALYSIS OF CASUALTIES FOR THE UNION ARMY 1861-1865*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Armies</th>
<th>Killed in Action or Died of Wounds</th>
<th>Died of Disease</th>
<th>Deserted</th>
<th>Honorably Discharged</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regulars</td>
<td>30.55</td>
<td>42.27</td>
<td>244.25</td>
<td>17.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Volunteers (Loyal States)</td>
<td>35.10</td>
<td>59.22</td>
<td>62.51</td>
<td>67.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colored Troops</td>
<td>16.11</td>
<td>141.39</td>
<td>67.00</td>
<td>15.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** *Negro in Military Service*, roll 4, 3766,3771.

*Based on service per 1000 men.*
### Diseases Causing Most Deaths Among Negro Troops*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chronic Diarrhea</td>
<td>12,098</td>
<td>3,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smallpox</td>
<td>6,716</td>
<td>2,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typhoid Fever</td>
<td>4,094</td>
<td>2,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,899</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage of deaths caused by major diseases = 36.7%

Note: Total deaths among Negro troops attributed to disease = 29,004

### Diseases Causing Most Deaths Among White Troops*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disease</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chronic Diarrhea</td>
<td>107,448</td>
<td>27,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typhoid</td>
<td>75,368</td>
<td>27,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>54,614</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage of deaths caused by major diseases = 34.7%

Note: Number of deaths attributed to disease
153,995 Volunteers
3,009 Regulars
157,004 Total

SOURCES: Medical and Surgical History, I, pt.1, 636,710; Dyer, Compendium, 18.
APPENDIX H

RECORD OF CASUALTIES FOR THE FIFTH REGIMENT, USCT
1863 - 1865

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Wounds Received in Action</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Disease</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidental Deaths</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executed by Enemy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured and Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


EM = Enlisted Men
APPENDIX I

RECORD OF CAUSUALTIES FOR TWENTY-SEVENTH
REGIMENT, USCT 1863 - 1865

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed in Action</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Wounds Received in Action</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died of Disease</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murdered in Camp</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captured and Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**EM = Enlisted Men**

*Private Randolph Burr was murdered at Camp Delaware November 12, 1864, by Private Alfred Chapman. The latter was held for murder and escaped on December 3, 1865.*
APPENDIX J

THE PATRON-CLIENT CONNECTION: CENSUS FIGURES FOR OHIO NEGROES 1870-1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Negro</th>
<th>Percentage of total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>2,601,946</td>
<td>62,213</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>3,117,920</td>
<td>79,900</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>3,584,805</td>
<td>87,113</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>4,060,204</td>
<td>96,901</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>4,767,121</td>
<td>111,452</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>5,957,984</td>
<td>186,187</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

INCREASES IN NEGRO URBANIZATION IN OHIO 1910-1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>% of Increase Negro</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>8,448</td>
<td>34,451</td>
<td>307.8</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati</td>
<td>19,639</td>
<td>30,079</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus</td>
<td>12,739</td>
<td>22,310</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: Cummings, Negro Population, 44-52, 92-93; Roseboom and Weisenburger, History of Ohio, 377; Kilson, "Political Change in the Negro Ghetto," 175.
### APPENDIX K

**OCCUPATIONAL STUDY OF THE NEGRO OFFICER:**

**CORPS--OHIO NATIONAL GUARD, 1870-1898**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William Travis</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Barber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.F. Buckner</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Oculist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Knox</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Physician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson B. Scott</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Barber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John H.B. Wilson</td>
<td>Captain (Adjutant)</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Robinson</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Second Battalion Cincinnati (1870)**

(Staff)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard P. Griffin</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Chef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James H. Wilson</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Apartment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Shaw</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Painter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Company A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henry Scott</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Printer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Ellis</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Printer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin W. Tillman</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Coachman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Company B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frank Hawkins</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Painter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Mulligan</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel Black</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Company C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henry Porter</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Bricklayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Freeman</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Barber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Clements</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Muskinghum &quot;Blue Jackets&quot; 1871</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Quincy Adams</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Miner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Patterson</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Grocer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Tupper</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Servant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Portsmouth &quot;Light Guard&quot; 1871</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lloyd Henson</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Barber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Biggs</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Barber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank White</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Barber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cleveland &quot;City Guards&quot; 1875</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James A. Hardin</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Janitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Graham</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Ironworker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Green</td>
<td>Second Rank</td>
<td>Machinist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cleveland &quot;Barnett Guards&quot; 1875</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Brock</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Watchman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Johnson</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Baker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry B. Williams</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Waiter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Duquesne Blues&quot; (Springfield) 1877</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Harper</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Coachman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Jones</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrew Jackson</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Palmer &quot;Light Guards&quot; (Columbus) 1879</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Payne</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Shipping Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Moten</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>No record</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Ball</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Hostler</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ninth Battalion, Infantry, ONG, 1881</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Henry Harper</td>
<td>Battalion Commander</td>
<td>Coachman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX K - continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Company A (Springfield)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Rudd</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Salesman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel Rudd</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodore Dolby</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Painter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Company B (Columbus)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See Palmer &quot;Light Guards&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Company C (Xenia) 1884 &quot;Martin Light Guard&quot;</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubbard P. George</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Howard</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeffrey Foster</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Company D (Cleveland) 1898 &quot;L'Ouverture Rifles&quot;</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John C. Fulton</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William H. Brooks</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred A. Moore</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Painter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NINTH BATTALION, INFANTRY, IN THE WAR WITH SPAIN, 1898

(Staff)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charles Young</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Career Soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ninth Cavalry,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Regular Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter S. Thomas</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Attorney</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John H. Dickerson</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Physician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Guy Wren</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Physician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilson Ballard</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Dentist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Company A (Springfield)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Robert Rudd</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Salesman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Rudd</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William F. Ellicott</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaton J. Brooks</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles C. Caldwell</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Grocer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodson P. Welch</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Company C (Xenia)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harry H. Robinson</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James W. Smith</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Watchman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James B. Raselton</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Teamster</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Company D (Cleveland)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John C. Fulton</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emmanuel Bass</td>
<td>First Lieutenant</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred A. Moore</td>
<td>Second Lieutenant</td>
<td>Painter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES**: Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1872, 15; Ibid., 1874, 22-26; Ibid., 1877, 53; Ibid., 1879, 230, 232; Ibid., 1881, 33; Ibid., 1882, 49; Ibid., 1884, 116, 1895, 185; Ohio Roster, Spanish-American War, 666-698; Ohio Executive Documents, 1875, II, 40; Ibid., 1876, I, 459; ONG Historical Records; Cincinnati City Directory 1872, 133,173,210,250,334,375,405,638,691,726,789,799, 851,856,1002; Zanesville City Directory 1885-1886, 36,288, 359; Portsmouth City Directory 1881-1882, 60,106,199; Cleveland City Directory, 1877, 90,316,656; Ibid., 1907, 193,1093; Ibid., 1920, 613; Columbus City Directory, 1878, 54,314; Springfield City Directory, 1879-1880, 92,102, 118,121; Xenia City Directory and Greene County Ohio Directory, 53,66; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 44-46; Cincinnati Enquirer, May 13, 1870.
APPENDIX L

OCCUPATIONAL SURVEY OF NEGRO NCO'S, OHIO
NATIONAL GUARD, 1874-1880

"Duquesne Blues" (Springfield)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R.R. Rudd</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Essex</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Schlinder</td>
<td>Bookstore owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Green</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.A.C. Jones</td>
<td>Machinist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Palmer "Light Guards" (Columbus)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.F. Smith</td>
<td>Construction foreman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.T. Moton</td>
<td>No civilian record</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.A. Townsend</td>
<td>Construction foreman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.S. Richardson</td>
<td>Barber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.M. Meredith</td>
<td>Waiter</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX M

### THE NEGRO GUARD UNITS: A FAMILY AFFAIR, 1898-1904

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William Bailey</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Butcher</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Bailey</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jesse Brown</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Brown</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Fillmore*</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elmer Fillmore*</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Ironworker</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theodore Fillmore*</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Frye*</td>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Student</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Frye*</td>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Florist</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuil Frye*</td>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Coachman</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John W. Greene*</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Coachman</td>
<td>Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Greene*</td>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>Dentist</td>
<td>Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarence Greene</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Jackson*</td>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Jackson*</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Jackson</td>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Powell</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Powell</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenny Robinson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Robinson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Rudd*</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Winslow</td>
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<td>Plasterer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Priv.</td>
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</table>

Total enrollment: 3 comm. officers
98 EM and NCOs

COMPANY B (Columbus)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Herman Allen*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(twins)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Priv.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Grant Fields*</td>
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<td>Laborer</td>
<td>(twins)</td>
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<td>Porter</td>
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<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
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<td>Simon Jackson</td>
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<td>Brothers</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Jackson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousin</td>
</tr>
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<td>Name</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Relationship</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elijah Jones</td>
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<td>Brothers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foster Lewis</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Lewis*</td>
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<td>1st cousins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph McFarland*</td>
<td>2.m.Sgt. Merchant</td>
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<td>Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William McFarland*</td>
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<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Son</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Cecil Pierce</td>
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<tr>
<td>Willis Redman</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver Redman</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarence Redman</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertie Scott*</td>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lester Scott*</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnest Scott*</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Arthur Smith</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
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<td>Brothers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mike Smith</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
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<td>A.W. Stewart</td>
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<td>Porter</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eddie F. Stewart</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brentwood Stewart</td>
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<td>Laborer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edward Taylor*</td>
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<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benjamin Taylor</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Taylor</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
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<td>Brothers</td>
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<td>John W. Thomas*</td>
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<td>Businessman</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter S. Thomas*</td>
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<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Washington</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fred Washington</td>
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## APPENDIX M - continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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Total enrollment: 3 Comm. Officers
106 EM and NCOs

### COMPANY C (Xenia)

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<td>Richard Alexander</td>
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<td>Brothers</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Anderson</td>
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<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lee Anderson</td>
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<td>Brothers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wesley Anderson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Bowen</td>
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<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Bowen</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William S. Brown</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willie Brown</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Brown</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Brown</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry Bush</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles Bush</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
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<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Byrd</td>
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<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Brothers</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>John Jackson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eddie Jackson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
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<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Jenkins</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
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</table>
### APPENDIX M - continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jantis McFarland</td>
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<tr>
<td>Louis McFarland</td>
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<td>Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joshue Newsome</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Newsome</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry H. Robinson*</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Robinson*</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Bricklayer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver Robinson*</td>
<td>Sgt.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Robinson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Robinson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Robinson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Robinson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>2nd cousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James W. Smith*</td>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
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<td>2nd cousins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Louis Smith*</td>
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<td>William Smith*</td>
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<td>Thomas Stewart</td>
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<td>1st cousins</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walter Stewart</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
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<td>Frank Washington</td>
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<td>Laborer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Garfield Washington</td>
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Total enrollment: 3 Comm. Officers
94 EM and NCOs

### COMPANY D (Cleveland)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Relationship</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Brooks*</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousins</td>
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<tr>
<td>William H. Brooks*</td>
<td>1st Lt.</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Brooks*</td>
<td>Corp.</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John C. Fulton*</td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidell Fulton*</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harry Hall</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Laborer</td>
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### APPENDIX M - continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Relationship</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clifford Jackson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Moore*</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred Moore*</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Moore*</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Robinson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
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<td>Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Robinson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Son</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank Robinson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1st cousin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John White</td>
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<td>Laborer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daniel White</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel White</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Wilson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>Brothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Wilson</td>
<td>Priv.</td>
<td>Laborer</td>
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**Total enrollment:** 3 Comm. Officers
111 EM and NCOs

**SOURCES:** Ohio Roster, Spanish-American War, 666-699; Roster of Ninth Battalion, 1896-1904, 1-41; "ONG Historical Records," Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) James A. Nichols, Columbus, January 22, 1975.

*Mulattoes
## APPENDIX N
THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEGRO GUARDSMEN DURING TWENTY-NINE YEARS OF SUCCESSFUL LYNCHINGS OF NEGROES IN OHIO BY WHITE MOBS, 1877-1906

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Militia Called Out</th>
<th>Negro Guard Mobilized or Used</th>
<th>Nature of Alleged Crime</th>
<th>Name and Race of Accused</th>
<th>Name and Race of Victim</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oxford, Ohio</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Negro Male</td>
<td>White</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sandusky, Ohio</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Negro Male</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galion, Ohio</td>
<td>May 1, 1882</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Negro Male</td>
<td>Frank Fisher</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamestown, Ohio</td>
<td>1887</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Negro Male</td>
<td>12 yr old white female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oxford, Ohio</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Negro Male</td>
<td>White</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adams Co., Ohio</td>
<td>Jan. 10, 1894</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>Negro Male</td>
<td>Mr. and Mrs. Rhine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rushylvania, Ohio</td>
<td>April 15, 1894</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Negro Male</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Richmond, Ohio</td>
<td>July 27, 1895</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>Negro Male</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbana, Ohio</td>
<td>June 4, 1897</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Negro Male</td>
<td>Mrs. Eliza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbana, Ohio</td>
<td>June 4, 1897</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>Negro Male</td>
<td>White policeman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** Gerber, "Lynchings," 37; Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 115-117, 141-142; Cleveland Leader, May 2, 1882; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1894, 14, 19-20, 212; Ibid., 1895; Ibid., 1897, 13-20; Ibid., 1904, 424; National Association of Advancement of Colored People, Thirty Years of Lynching, 9-10, 36; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 27-30.

*Unidentified **Name not given
APPENDIX O
RESPONSE OF NEGRO GUARDSMEN TO UNSUCCESSFUL LYNCHINGS OF OHIO NEGROES BY WHITE MOBS, 1900-1906

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Militia Called Out</th>
<th>Negro Guard Mobilized or Used</th>
<th>Nature of Alleged Crime</th>
<th>Name and Race of Accused</th>
<th>Name and Race of Victim</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akron, Ohio</td>
<td>August 1900</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Lewis Peck</td>
<td>Unidentified White Female</td>
<td>20 yrs. Ohio Pen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Court House, Ohio</td>
<td>Oct. 17, 1894</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>William Dolby</td>
<td>Unidentified White Female</td>
<td>20 yrs. Ohio Pen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorain Co. Ohio</td>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>Unidentified Black Male</td>
<td>Unidentified White Female</td>
<td>20 yrs. Ohio Pen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springfield, Ohio</td>
<td>Feb. 27, 1906</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>Unidentified Black Male</td>
<td>Unidentified White Female</td>
<td>Life Ohio Pen.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1894, 14,18-21; Quillin, Color Line in Ohio, 141-143; Gerber, "Lynchings," 37; Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 30-32.
### APPENDIX P

RESPONSE OF NEGRO GUARDSMEN TO ATTEMPTED LYNCHINGS OF WHITE OHIOANS BY WHITE MOBS, 1884-1906

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Militia Called Out</th>
<th>Negro Guard Mobilized or Used</th>
<th>Nature of Alleged Crime</th>
<th>Name and Race of Accused</th>
<th>Name and Race of Victim</th>
<th>Sentence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Lexington, Ohio</td>
<td>July 27, 1894</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(mobilized)</td>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>Unidentified White Male</td>
<td>Unidentified White Male</td>
<td>Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiffin, Ohio</td>
<td>Oct. 27, 1895</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(mobilized)</td>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>Miller-White</td>
<td>Unidentified White Male</td>
<td>Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talmadge, Ohio</td>
<td>March, 1896</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(mobilized)</td>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>Unidentified White Male</td>
<td>Stone Family White</td>
<td>Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoyt's Corner, Wood County</td>
<td>March 25, 1899</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(mobilized)</td>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>Attorney Westenhaven-White</td>
<td>Zeltner Brothers</td>
<td>Life</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: Cleveland Plain Dealer, Ohio Guard History, 30-32; Ohio Adjutant General's Report, 1884, 62-70; Ibid., 1896, 14.
APPENDIX Q

COMPARISON OF RECORDS OF COURTS-MARTIAL AND DESERTIONS AMONG (WHITE) OHIO VOLUNTEER INFANTRY REGIMENTS AND THE NINTH BATTALION MUSTERED INTO THE WAR WITH SPAIN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Strength of unit (officers and enlisted men)</th>
<th>Courts-martial Summary</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Deser tions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Regiment</td>
<td>1307</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd &quot;</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd &quot;</td>
<td>1296</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*4th &quot;</td>
<td>1259</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th &quot;</td>
<td>1270</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*6th &quot;</td>
<td>1101</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th &quot;</td>
<td>1166</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*8th &quot;</td>
<td>1230</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th &quot;</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th &quot;</td>
<td>1175</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Regiment</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion</td>
<td>691</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9TH BATTALION</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX Q - continued

SOURCES: U.S. War Dept., Correspondence Relating to the War With Spain, I, 610-612; Ohio Roster, Spanish-American War, 18-718.

*Regiments going to Cuba
## APPENDIX R

**COMPARISON OF RECORDS OF COURTS-MARTIAL AND DESERTIONS AMONG THE NEGRO GUARD UNITS MUSTERED INTO THE WAR WITH SPAIN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Strength of Unit (officers and enlisted men)</th>
<th>Courts-martial</th>
<th>Summary General</th>
<th>Desertions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Ninth Battalion, Infantry</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Eighth Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>1269</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*23rd Kansas Volunteer Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third North Carolina Volunteer Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Virginia Volunteer Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Companies A &amp; B Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Strength of Unit Courts-martial (officers and enlisted men)</td>
<td>Summary General Desertions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Alabama Colored Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company &quot;L&quot; Sixth Mass. Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>No Statistics Available</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX S

**OHIO NEGRO LINE OFFICERS REMOVED FROM COMMAND**

**BY ORDER OF COLONEL HERSCHEL TUPES**

**2nd BATTALION, 372nd INFANTRY REGIMENT**

**AUGUST 1918**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, Rank and Date of Commission</th>
<th>Service Record.</th>
<th>Born</th>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Major.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John C. Fulton May 2, 1901</td>
<td>In O.N.G.-Captain, Co. D, 9th Battalion (Inf.), May 28, 1898; mustered out with Co., April 14, 1899; re-commissioned Captain, June 27, 1899; also served in &quot;L'Ouverture Rifles,&quot; located at Cleveland; Major, Nov. 6, 1899; reduced in rank to May 2, 1901, per sentence of G.C.M., on G.C.No.8.1901; re-commissioned Nov. 14, 1904. War with Spain-Captain, Co. D, 9th Battalion, O.V.I., July 8, 1898; mustered out Jan. 28, 1899.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Captains.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William R. Green, July 2, 1906</td>
<td>In O.N.G.-Captain, Co. D, 9th Inf., July 2, 1906</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James Edward Deaton, Aug. 26, 1908</td>
<td>In O.N.G.-Private, Hospital Corps, 9th Inf., July 17, 1903; appointed Sergeant, Aug. 6, 1904; discharged Oct. 6, 1908; change of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name, Rank and Date of Commission</td>
<td>Service Record</td>
<td>Born</td>
<td>Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John R. Rudd, Feb. 6, 1914</td>
<td>In O.N.O.-Private,&quot;Duquesne Blues,&quot; Jan., 1879; Corporal, Sergeant, Bushnell Guard, 1884; Commissary Sergeant, 9th Batt., Inf., 1884; Private, Co. A, unattached Inf.; Oct. 15, 1896; Second Lieutenant; Nov. 21, 1896; First Lieutenant, April 24, 1897; Quartermaster, Sept. 2, 1899; grade changed to First Lieutenant, April 29, 1902; grade changed to Second Lieutenant, per par. 3, S.O. 191, A.G.D., Sept. 26, 1913, and assigned to duty as Battalion Quartermaster Commissary, per par. 3, S.O. 191, A.G.D., to rank from Sept. 2, 1899; elected and commissioned Captain of Infantry, and assigned to duty</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name and Rank</td>
<td>Service Record</td>
<td>Born.</td>
<td>Address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Hendrick Mallory, Jan. 6, 1909</td>
<td>In O.N.G.-Served five years in Hospital Corps; commissioned First Lieutenant, Jan. 6, 1909; assigned to Co. C, 9th Inf., O.N.G., S.O. 6, par. 1, A.G.D., Jan. 11, 1909</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Dayton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry E. Davis, Jan. 28, 1909</td>
<td>In O.N.G.-Enlisted Co. D, 9th Inf., Aug. 16, 1899; Corporal, March 23, 1900; Sergeant, April 1, 1903; discharged Aug. 16, 1904, expiration term of service; re-enlisted Aug. 16, 1904; Discharged March 28,</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Dayton</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX S - continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, Rank and Date of Commission.</th>
<th>Service Record.</th>
<th>Born.</th>
<th>Address.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James E. Dunhill, Aug. 17, 1911</td>
<td>1908. S.O. 59, removal from Company station; enlisted June 14, 1906; commissioned Second Lieutenant, July 2, 1906; First Lieutenant, Jan. 28, 1909; assigned to duty with Co. and Batt., S.O. 39, par. 3, A.G.D., March 5, 1909</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Cleveland</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In O.N.C.-First Sergeant, 9th Inf., Hospital Corps, Jan. 13, 1908; discharged March 7, 1910, to accept commission as Second Lieutenant, Co. B, 9th Inf., S.O. 89, par. 2, A.G.D.; elected and commissioned First Lieutenant of Infantry, and assigned to duty as First Lieutenant of Co. B, 9th (Sep.) Batt. of Inf., per par. 17, S.O. 93, A.G.D., April 23, 1914, to rank from Feb. 9, 1914. | Ohio | Columbus |
### Second Lieutenants.

**Clarence E. Brown,**
*Aug. 25, 1911*


**Born.**
Ohio

**Address.**
Cleveland.

**Thomas D. Walker,**
*Feb. 21, 1913*

- **In O.N.G.**-Enlisted as a Private in Co.A, First Battalion, 9th Inf., June 28, 1910; appointed Corporal July 21, 1910; appointed Sergeant Aug. 24, 1913; discharged Feb. 21, 1913, to accept a commission as Second Lieutenant of Inf., per S.O.118, par.2, A.C.D., June 16, 1913; assigned to duty as Second Lieutenant, Co. A, 9th Inf., per S.O.118,par.3, A.G.D., June 16, 1913, to rank from Feb. 21, 1913.

**Born.**
Ohio

**Address.**
Springfield.

**Albra Jackson,**
*March 24, 1913*

- **In O.N.G.**-Enlisted as a Private, Hospital Corps, 9th Battalion of Inf., June 17, 1904, for three years; discharged June 16, 1907, expiration
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, Rank and Date of Commission</th>
<th>Service Record</th>
<th>Born</th>
<th>Address</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>William Nichols, April 5, 1914</td>
<td>In O.N.G.-Enlisted as a Private in Co.B. 9th (Sep.) Batt., Ohio Inf., July 10, 1899, for five years; discharged July 9, 1904, expiration term of service; re-enlisted July 10, 1904, for three years; appointed Corporal, per C.O. 9, Aug. 13, 1904; Appointed Sergeant, per C.O. 3, Feb. 16, 1905; discharged July 9, 1907, expiration term of service; Re-enlisted July 10, 1907, for one year, and warrant as Sergeant continued; discharged July 9, 1908, expiration term of service; re-enlisted July 9, 1908, for three years, and warrant as Sergeant continued; detailed First Sergeant, per C.O. 3, Jan. 10, 1910;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ohio Dayton</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX S - continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, Rank and Date of Commission.</th>
<th>Service Record.</th>
<th>Born.</th>
<th>Address.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas W. Howard, April 5, 1914</td>
<td>discharged July 9, 1911, expiration term of service; re-enlisted July 9, 1911, for three years, and warrant as Sergeant and detail as First Sergeant continued; discharged April 5, 1914, to accept a commission as Second Lieutenant, Co. B, 9th (Sep.) Batt. of Ohio Inf., per par. 13 S.O. 93, A.G.D., April 23, 1914; commissioned Second Lieutenant of Infantry, and assigned to duty as Second Lieutenant of Co. B, 9th (Sep.) Batt. of Ohio Inf., per par. 14, S.O. 93, A.G.D., April 23, 1914, to rank from April 5, 1914</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In O.N.G.-Enlisted as a Private in Band, 9th (Sep.) Batt. of Inf., Jan. 14, 1906; appointed Sergeant Feb. 12, 1906; and detailed as First Sergeant and Drum Major, per Battalion Order 6, Headquarters 9th (Sep.) Batt. of Inf., Feb. 12, 1906; discharged Jan. 13, 1909, expiration term of service; re-enlisted Jan. 14, 1909, for three years, and warrant as Sergeant and detail as First Sergeant and Drum Major continued; discharged Jan. 13, 1912, expiration term of service; re-enlisted Jan. 17, 1912, for three years, and warrant as Sergeant and detail as First Sergeant and Drum Major continued; discharged April 5, 1914, to accept a commission as Second Lieutenant of Infantry, per par. 2, S.O. 163, A.G.D., July 23, 1914; assigned to duty as Second Lieutenant, Battal...
APPENDIX S - continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name, Rank and Date of Commission</th>
<th>Service Record.</th>
<th>Born</th>
<th>Address.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lion Quartermaster Commissary, 9th (Sep.) Batt. of Inf.</td>
<td>per par. 3, S.O. 163, A.G.D., July 23, 1914, to rank from April 5, 1914; detailed as Battalion Treasurer, per par. 1, S.O.18, Headquarters 9th (Sep.) Batt. of Inf., Sept. 3, 1914</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>Columbus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*proclaimed by the U.S. War Department Officer Efficiency Board to be the only Ohio Negro Guard officer competent to command a unit.
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Lee, Donald. Former enlisted man in 2nd Battalion, 372nd Infantry Regiment, Ohio National Guard, During World War II, and staff sergeant in the 137th Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Automatic Weapons Battalion, Ohio National Guard, during the Korean Conflict; currently serving as Warrant Officer and Recruiting Counselor for the 16th Engineer Brigade, Army Reserve Command, Howey Road, Columbus, Ohio, Interview, March 10, 1975.

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Meekstroth, Jacob A. Former private, Ohio National Guard, 1907, and retired private secretary to former Ohio Governor Victor A. Donahey, 1923-1929; editor (Ret.) The Ohio State Journal, 1930-1959, Columbus, Ohio, Interview, January 22, 1975.

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Palmer, Jason. Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) former Battalion Commander, 2nd Battalion, 372nd Infantry Regiment, Ohio National Guard, and retired United States Postal Clerk, United States Civil Service Commission, Columbus, Ohio, Interview, February 2, 1975.

Quinchett, Herbert A. Lieutenant Colonel, (Ret.), 1946-1952, former logistics officer for the 2nd Battalion, 372nd Infantry, Ohio National Guard, and former Executive Officer (X-0), 137th Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Automatic Weapons Battalion, Ohio National Guard, currently employed as supply clerk at the Defense Construction and Supply Center (DCSC), 3400 East Broad Street, Columbus, Ohio; Interview, May 5, 1975.


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