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The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1976
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THE POLITICS OF HIGHER EDUCATION:
A STUDY OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS
IN OHIO

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
Raymond Dillard Smoot, Jr. B.A., M. Ed.

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The Ohio State University
1976

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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

Background of the Problem

Unlike many other countries, the United States has no national system of education. Debate over the vulnerability of a national system of education to political pressures from the government was resolved in favor of making no provision for education in the national constitution and leaving responsibility for education to the several states.

Since that time, education has emerged as a major function of state government, receiving the largest single share of the states' fiscal resources. On the national level, colleges and universities account for expenditures totaling about 2.5 percent of the national production of goods and services.¹ While education has frequently been viewed as being apart from politics, more recent studies of both K-12 and higher education at the state level conclude that "Education has always, in some sense, been the object of political action."²


Competition for scarce fiscal resources at the state level requires that educators function as actors in the political process through which state budgets are developed and enacted. Until recently, public colleges and universities have frequently pressed their needs individually and directly on state governments. Traditionally, the primary actors in the higher education appropriations process have been officials of the state-assisted colleges and universities, the governor and his staff, and the legislature.

During the twentieth century, however, there has emerged an increasing trend toward the imposition of an intermediate, state level coordinating or governing agency between the individual universities and the state government (see Table 1, p. 3). Currently, all but two states have developed such intermediary agencies, providing them with varying degrees of authority for state higher education policy development. These agencies represent the introduction of another actor into the higher education policy process at the state level.

A common feature of the coordinating or governing agency is some degree of involvement in the appropriations process whereby public funds are budgeted for the colleges and universities in the

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Classification</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1972</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No State Agency</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Association</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating Board</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(created by statute but does not supersede institutional governing boards)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Majority of institutional representatives having essentially advisory powers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. All or majority of public members having essentially advisory powers</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. All or majority of public members having regulatory powers in certain areas but not governing responsibility</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolidated Governing Board (charged with full responsibility for governing all institutions under its jurisdiction)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
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state. Lasswell's characterization of politics as "the study of who gets what, when, and how" underscores educational policy making as a political phenomenon and suggests that the appropriations process provides a focus for studying the role of the various actors at the state level in higher education policy development.

Higher education has been a recurring, and at times hotly debated, concern of the political system in Ohio. Prior to 1939, there was no organized group to champion the needs of higher education before the state government. Neither was there any arrangement in Ohio, either formal or informal, for promoting a coordinated effort to develop a state system of higher education. Each state-assisted college and university, usually through its president, dealt directly and singularly with the legislative and executive branches of state government. Appropriations for individual universities were largely dependent on the political influence each university could muster. Efforts to develop a unified voice for state-assisted higher education culminated in 1939 with the establishment of the Inter-University Council. Composed of the president, business manager, and one trustee from each state-assisted university, the Council developed and lobbied for coordinated appropriations for higher education in Ohio.5


5John J. Gargan and James G. Coke, Political Behavior and Public Issues in Ohio (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1972), pp. 234-44.
Largely because of the failure of the Inter-University Council by the 1960's to speak with a unified voice in matters relating to higher education appropriations and its failure to provide coordination and planning for the anticipated flood of students about to hit the university campuses, the Ohio Board of Regents was created by legislative action in 1963. As is the case in many other states, the Ohio Board of Regents was granted statutory responsibility to develop and present the budget request for higher education and hence emerged as a primary actor in the higher education appropriations process.

Recent developments in state government in Ohio have once again raised the issue of what the relationship between public higher education and state government should be and have focused attention on the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process. In the 1973 General Appropriations Act the Ohio General Assembly mandated the establishment of a Citizens' Task Force on Higher Education to study, among other concerns, "the role of the Board of Regents with respect to both the public and private sectors." Reporting in May, 1974, the Task Force, composed of legislators, university officials, and private citizens, recommended that

---

6 Ohio, Amended Substitute House Bill 86, 110th General Assembly (1975).
the Board of Regents should continue its role of providing coordination of the state's system of higher education with its powers unchanged but more fully utilized.7

The report of the Citizens' Task Force appeared to signal general agreement among the primary sets of actors in the higher education appropriations process about the role each would play. In January, 1975, however, newly elected Governor James Rhodes quickly served notice that he did not share this view of the Citizens' Task Force. Speaking from the west steps of the Statehouse, Governor Rhodes, in his inaugural address, charged that the Board of Regents had "completed the job it was created to do" and had "become an expensive and unnecessary overhead cost" which should not be allowed to continue.8 Amplifying these remarks at a press conference later that month, Rhodes suggested that the Inter-University Council had served an effective role in the appropriations process prior to the advent of the Board of Regents and should return to its pre-Regents role as the primary interface between the universities and state government in the higher education appropriations process. Under such an arrangement, the Ohio Board of Regents would be abolished, in the view of Governor Rhodes.9

---

8Citizen-Journal (Columbus, Ohio), 7 January 1975.
This attempt by the Rhodes administration to alter the role of the various actors in the higher education appropriations process is significant for two reasons. It was the Rhodes administration which, in 1963, established the Ohio Board of Regents, seeking to alter patterns of influence in the higher education appropriations process to which it is now proposing a return. More significantly, the proposal of Governor Rhodes that the state agency charged with higher education coordination be abolished and that university officials deal directly with the legislative and executive branches of state government in appropriation matters represented the first known challenge in the fifty states to a thirty year trend toward greater state level coordination of higher education and the lessening of direct involvement of university officials in the appropriations process.

Scholars of higher education/state government relations have identified a number of trends over the past thirty years which have impacted on the exercise of influence by actors in the higher education appropriations process; among these are the development and growth of state coordinating agencies, increased scrutiny of higher education budget requests by increasingly larger and more quantitatively sophisticated legislative and executive staffs, and the rise and decline of higher education as a priority of state policymakers. The impact of these developments - and others - on the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process varies across states. Few analyses have been undertaken of the influence process through which state funds are appropriated for higher education in individual states.
Statement of the Problem

This study sought to analyze the exercise of influence by the primary sets of actors in the state-level process through which funds are appropriated for higher education in Ohio. These sets of actors were hypothesized to be university officials, the Ohio Board of Regents, the Ohio General Assembly, and the executive branch of state government. The selection of these policy actors for study is discussed in Chapters II and IV.

Recognizing that the exercise of influence by each set of policy actors in the political system is determined by historical as well as environmental factors, this study first traces the evolution of the higher education appropriations process in Ohio from the establishment of the first state assisted university to the present. Following this historical account, the 1975-77 General Appropriations Act is utilized as a focus for determining and analyzing the manner in which each set of policy actors exercises influence in the political process through which higher education appropriations are made today.10

This study sought to provide answers to the following questions related to the politics of higher education in Ohio:

---

10 Influence is defined in this study as "the capacity of a policy actor to achieve desired outputs from the policy system." Though some scholars, e.g., Bachrach and Baratz, Power and Poverty, differentiate between "influence" and "power," this study will use these terms interchangeably, in agreement with Lindblom, The Policymaking Process, p. 29, that no generally accepted differentiation between the two terms exists in the literature.
1. Are university officials, Board of Regents staff, and members of the executive and legislative branches of state government the sets of primary actors in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio?

2. Examining authority, constituency support, and expertise as determinants of influence, what resources enhance and what constraints retard the ability of each of these sets of policy actors to exert influence on the appropriations process?

3. In what way do coalition and conflict occur between and within groups of policy actors as they seek to exert influence?

4. What changes appear to be occurring in the way influence is exercised by the sets of primary actors in the higher education appropriations process and what factors are contributing to this change?

Following an introduction to the research problem in Chapter I, Chapter II focuses on a review of the literature on higher education/state government relations. The methodology of the study is discussed in Chapter III. Chapter IV provides an historical view of the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio. Chapter V provides a case study of the process through which the higher education appropriation for the 1975-77 biennium was developed and enacted. The research data as they relate to the research questions are presented and analyzed in Chapter VI. Chapter VII presents conclusions drawn from this study and discusses their implications on the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process.
Policy development is viewed in this study from the framework of allocative theory. Allocative theory views policy as the result of an influence process in which various actors seek to maximize beneficial outputs from the political system under conditions of scarcity. The framework of this study assumes that the policy actors in the appropriations process have various resources (e.g., authority, constituency support, and expertise) at their disposal which they seek to utilize in influencing the political system to produce outputs favorable to their interests and that they attempt to apply these resources as political influence. Conversely, the policy actors also are influenced by certain constraints which lessen their efforts to secure outputs favorable to their interests. In the exercise of influence by the policy actors, conflict and coalition between and within groups of policy actors is likely to occur.

This study assessed the exercise of influence by the primary actors in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio. The authority possessed by each set of actors, the political constituency of each set of actors, and the expertise possessed by each set of actors were examined as determinants of influence. Also, the development of coalition and conflict between and within sets of policy actors was probed to determine strategies employed in the exercise of influence.

---

**Definition of Terms**

While most of the terms used in this study are in extensive use throughout the literature of educational administration, public administration, and political science, their meanings frequently vary among writers. The following definitions will apply throughout this study:

**Actor:** An individual or group of individuals performing with the policy system.

**Coalition:** The process of two or more actors exercising influence together in the policy system to achieve a common goal.

**Conflict:** The confrontation between two or more policy actors to secure differing outputs from the policy system.

**Influence:** The capacity of a policy actor to achieve desired outputs from the policy system.

**Policy:** The authoritative decisions of the policy system.

**Policy system:** The state level system which makes authoritative decisions for the state and allocates state resources. The primary sets of actors in the policy system with regard to higher education in Ohio are assumed to be the governor and his staff, legislature and staff, Board of Regents and staff, and university officials.

**Significance of the Study**

Studies of higher education policy development in the states have recently been sponsored by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, the Education Commission of the States, and the National Committee on the Financing of Postsecondary Education. Although each study offers recommendations on many aspects of higher education-state government relations, none of these studies are based on systematic, in-depth case studies of the higher education policy
process in particular states. Based largely on a hodgepodge of observations and impressions drawn from policy observers and actors across a variety of states, the applicability of the findings and recommendations of these studies to the higher education policy process in a particular state is likely to be doubted by policy actors and observers in that state. Likewise, such unsystematic studies, frequently based on anecdotal material, do little to assist the reader in making generalizations across states on the nature of higher education-state government relations.

This study may be of significance to scholars and policy actors concerned with the higher education policy process in several ways. First, it seeks to contribute to the small body of existing literature focusing on in-depth case studies of higher education policy development in a particular state. Second, it attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of higher education policy development in Ohio which may be used by scholars, state officials, and university officials seeking to understand the policy process. From such an understanding, strategies for maximizing policy outputs favorable to one's constituency may be developed. Such an analysis of the exercise of influence in the present policy process may offer assistance to those seeking to alter the present policy process to make it more responsive to their own or the public's interests by suggesting additional ways in which the exercise of influence may be undertaken. Third, this study can serve as a framework for similar studies in other states by suggesting possible areas of examination
and developing hypotheses on higher education policy development against which findings in other states may be compared and contrasted.

While the focus of this study is on the exercise of political influence by the primary actors in the higher education appropriations process, the recent challenge by the Governor of Ohio to the role of another policy actor in that process also presented the opportunity to chronicle and analyze the first known challenge to a thirty-year trend toward greater state level centralization in higher education policy development in the United States. This analysis suggested possible ways in which the state level coordinating agency in other states is vulnerable to challenge as a continuing actor in the higher education policy process, as well as suggested likely responses of other policy actors (the legislature and university officials) to a challenge to the role of the coordinating agency by the executive branch of state government.

Should a comprehensive, comparative national study of the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process be undertaken in the future, it is hoped that this work will be of assistance to those who may undertake such a study.
Higher Education and the Political System

Higher education has historically been an object of attention by the political system in the United States. Thomas Jefferson, likely influenced by his close association with French political and education thinkers, proposed that the United States establish a national system of higher education, incorporating a variety of institutions concerned with engineering, military training, agriculture, teacher preparation, and the liberal arts. This system was to be capped by a great national university, the faculty of which would contain the foremost scholars in the country.12

The manipulation of the French system of higher education in behalf of the political aspirations of leaders of the French Republic, and later by Napoleon, alerted many in the United States to the political vulnerability of a national system of higher education and Jefferson's plan for such a system in this country was not realized.13 The United States Constitution made no provision for education, thus leaving it as a concern of state government.

12 DuPont de Nemours, National Education in the United States, 2nd Ed. (Newark, Delaware: University of Delaware Press, 1923).

Higher education, at times a concern of colonial governments, soon became a concern of the new state governments. Histories of higher education institutions founded during the first half of the nineteenth century are filled with the efforts of these institutions to secure support from the state. Frequently, state support was no sooner acquired than conflict between the institution and the state developed. Along with state support came varying degrees of effort by the state government to exert control over the management and programs of educational institutions.

Well into the twentieth century, institutions of higher education existed as distinct and relatively autonomous units of state government. During this century, however, most states have established a state agency to serve as an intermediary between colleges and universities and the state government. The imposition of these coordinating or governing agencies has caused some scholars of state government and higher education, and many university professors and officials as well, to once again question the degree to which higher education is a legitimate concern of state government.

Perhaps not surprisingly, those who raise this issue hardly ever question whether state funds should be spent for higher education.


In fact, they frequently argue that the level of state funding is too low and should be increased. Their concern instead is with the legitimacy and degree of state supervision and control of the higher education enterprise.

This concern has frequently been expressed by viewing the executive and legislative branches of state government, as well as the coordinating agency, as a threat to university autonomy, "the power of a university or college to govern itself without outside controls."16 While recognizing that state government does represent a threat to university autonomy, Berdahl argues that discussions of university autonomy from the political system frequently ignore two important considerations:

1. Universities, at least those which receive state funds, have never been autonomous from the state.

2. Encroachments by the state on university autonomy are often equated with encroachments on academic freedom, which they usually are not.17

Leon Epstein, writing from the perspective of a political scientist, faculty member, and former university administrator, maintains that the critical issue is not whether state governments


17 Ibid., pp. 3-12.
lessen university autonomy, but, whether the actions of state governments represent encroachments on academic freedom or erode the ability of university administrators to manage their institutions:

Even the strongest proponent of university autonomy acknowledges the legitimacy of the authority of the legislature and the governor to decide the state's appropriations for higher education. The debatable question about this annual or biennial process is over the scope of policy decisions to be made by state officials when they are enacting the university budget.18

Because the higher education appropriations process brings together all actors in the higher education/state government relationship and provides a vehicle for critical examination of existing and proposed activities of the state's higher education system, it would appear that the appropriations act might be utilized by state governments to impose additional controls on the operation of the universities. The potential of the state to exert such controls over higher education emphasizes the degree to which higher education must become an actor in the state political system and provides evidence that higher education and state politics are closely intertwined.

Recent studies of higher education as a function of state government suggest that the priority given to higher education by state governments during the 1960's may be declining.19 In a 1969 report for the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Eulau and Quinley found that:


Legislators and other state officials thought higher education held its own in the competition for funds, either when competing with lower-level education systems or with other state programs. In general, our respondents certainly did not feel that higher education was disadvantaged vis-a-vis other state commitments, and they seemed to feel that higher education was at least as important as the other programs.20

This feeling of optimism regarding the ability of higher education to maintain or increase its share of state resources is absent from the 1973 Report of the National Committee on the Financing of Postsecondary Education:

Several factors - the campus disturbances of the late 1960's, the necessity for careful scrutiny of college and university budgets when money was tight, and the press of other public problems - have operated to give spending for postsecondary education a relatively low level of importance in the minds of state officials. Many of the states have been subject to growing pressures for reform in public school finance, local property tax relief, and increased spending for mental health, health insurance, rapid transit, environmental protection, and other competing demands for financing. And, while state appropriations for postsecondary education are increasing, they are not growing in proportion to state revenues.21

A 1974 report for the Education Commission of the States on state appropriations for higher education as a percentage of total state revenue reveals that the steady growth in the rate of higher education


appropriations during the 1960's peaked in 1971 and is now in decline (see Table 2, p. 20). 22

Among the reasons advanced by various study commissions for the decline in higher education appropriations as a percentage of state revenue, the following are common:

1. Declining student enrollments in baccalaureate and graduate institutions of higher education
2. Negative reaction to student activism and lifestyles
3. An increase in importance to state officials of other demands on the state budget
4. Failure of higher education to command an organized and powerful interest group.

While the percentage of state revenues allocated to higher education increased through the 1960's until 1971 and then declined, the percentage of state revenues allocated to elementary and secondary education has declined throughout the entire period (see Table 2, p. 20). A study by Usdan, Minar, and Hurwitz in 1969 on both higher education and K-12 education as actors in the state political system in part offers an explanation for the steady decline in the K-12 share of the state budget, while that of higher education increased. 23


23 Usdan, Minar, and Hurwitz, Education and State Politics.
TABLE 2

TOTAL STATE APPROPRIATIONS FOR ALL EDUCATION (HIGHER EDUCATION AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS OF ELEMENTARY/SECONDARY EDUCATION) AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL STATE GENERAL REVENUE: UNITED STATES (1963-1973)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'63</th>
<th>'68</th>
<th>'69</th>
<th>'70</th>
<th>'71</th>
<th>'72</th>
<th>'73</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELEMENTARY/SECONDARY</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHER EDUCATION</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to this study, the state power base of K-12 education was found to be declining somewhat in the late 1960's as the power base of higher education was growing and solidifying. This decline in the power of K-12 education interests was attributed to the breakdown of the coalition of school board, administrative, and teacher groups in the face of rising teacher unionization and militancy. Additionally, public disenchantment with some aspects of "progressive education" was viewed as a factor.

Conversely, higher education interests during this period were strengthened by the increasing percentage of the population electing to take advantage of higher education opportunities. Also, counter-productive rivalries among universities for state funds were lessening as coordinating agencies provided a unified front before the state government for higher education.

While higher education was increasing its share of state budgets during the 1960's and early 1970's as the K-12 share of state budgets declined, rapid increases in higher education enrollment during the period may indicate that higher education failed to make substantial inroads in gaining state support for its rapidly growing clientele (see Table 3, p. 22). Between 1963 and 1973, higher education enrollments increased nearly 100% as state appropriations increased 339%. During the same period, K-12 enrollments increased only 11% and state appropriations for K-12 education increased 187%.²⁴ It

### TABLE 3

**ELEMENTARY/SECONDARY AND HIGHER EDUCATION ENROLLMENTS, 1960-1973**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elementary/Secondary (in millions)</th>
<th>Higher Education (in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>48.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>49.6b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It appears that the changes in state support for both K-12 and higher education were largely incremental at a time when higher education enrollments were soaring.

Usdan, et. al., view K-12 and higher education as competing for the same share of state funds and predict increased conflict between the two levels of education:

Typically, the two sectors have drawn on somewhat different sources of support, the public schools having been heavily dependent on local real property taxes and the colleges and universities drawing their monies directly from the state.
from student fees, and from federal grants and contracts. As costs have risen, however, and particularly as the tax burden on real estate has come to seem unreasonable, the schools and colleges have increasingly turned for aid to the same source: general state revenues. They have come into competition, sometimes overt but more often unspoken, for larger shares out of a common but limited pot of money.25

This assertion that schools are increasingly turning to the state for additional support may be accurate but the success of school interests in mustering additional support is placed in question when the expense of K-12 education shared by the three levels of government (local, state, and federal) is analyzed (see Table 4, p. 24). According to Reischauer and Hartman, the percentage of total expenditures for K-12 education borne by the state government has remained nearly constant since 1960 at around 39%.26 During the same period, the percentage of total expenditures for higher education borne by the state governments increased from 54% to 59%. These figures indicate that the role of the state as a source of funds for the two levels of education has remained relatively stable since 1960 and that K-12 education interests have been unsuccessful in getting the state to assume a larger share of their costs. Similarly, the states' share in higher education funding has increased only marginally, although higher education funding as a percentage of the state budget has


TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF FUNDS ALLOCATED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS
AND HIGHER EDUCATION BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT
1959-1972\textsuperscript{a, b}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of funds allocated to public schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of funds allocated to higher education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>58.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a}Reischauer and Hartman, Reforming School Finance, p. 5.


increased while K-12 education funding as a percentage of the state budget has decreased. These trends, coupled with the increasing frequency with which local school referenda are being defeated and student opposition to increasing tuition in the universities, lend credence to the assertion of Usdan, et. al. that the competition between K-12 and higher education interests for a dwindling share of the state budget may intensify.
The findings of these studies on higher education/state government relations suggest several questions regarding higher education interests as actors in the state political system worthy of attention in the investigation of higher education politics in particular states:

1. In states with strong teacher unions, have higher education interests profited from alleged conflict between teacher unions, administrative, and school board groups?

2. Why have higher education interests been able to maintain or increase their share of the budget in some states, while losing ground in others?

3. Have coordinating agencies in fact effectively minimized competition between institutions of higher education for state funds and presented a unified front to the executive and legislative branches of state government?

4. Has higher education been able to build political support from the increased percentage of the population enrolling in colleges and universities?

The Budget as Policy

Policy is defined by Baldridge as those decisions of an organization which commit it to important courses of action.27 Because policy

27 J. Victor Baldridge, Power and Conflict in the University (New York: John Wiley and Sons), 1971.
is an expression of what the mission, goals, and activities of an organization will be, "People throughout the organization try to influence policy in order to see that their special values are implemented. In light of its importance, policy becomes the center of political analysis."

Policy decisions are made through the political process. Easton defines the study of politics as seeking to understand how authoritative decisions are made and carried out for a society. Policy is viewed as the authoritative allocation of scarce resources by the political system. Viewed in this manner, the analysis of state level policy development in higher education must give primary attention to the process through which state resources are allocated to the several universities within the state system of higher education.

A number of scholars of higher education policy development conclude that it is in the appropriations process that many issues of higher education policy are decided and that budget making authority "is intertwined with policy-making power." Lee and Bowen, in an analysis of relationships between individual state universities,

28 Ibid.


30 Epstein, Governing the University, p. 55.
multi-campus systems, and state government, conclude that it is through the appropriations process that higher education policy is authoritatively made, whether by design or through the failure of internal university constituencies and/or external state government agencies to come to grips with basic policy issues. On the campus, long range university plans are developed. The relative values of each of the university's functions take the concrete form of budget and expenditure estimates. At the state level, a broader set of policy questions are raised:

What should be the size and role of the public sector, to what extent should higher education be supported from taxes or tuition? And within higher education, should state policy emphasize a broad collegiate education of an elite meritocracy? How shall these contrasting values be accommodated?

Most budgets do not explicitly ask or answer these questions, whether at the campus and multi-campus levels or in the state capitol. The issues are often deliberately kept ambiguous by all participants, for few institutions - academic or political - are capable of attacking such fundamental questions head on. Nevertheless, the budget represents the only policy answer to these crucial and controversial questions, however vaguely they may be phrased. The answers of the budget are policy declarations, explicit in the figures regardless of the words.31

Berdahl also asserts that it is in the appropriations process that many questions of state higher education policy are debated and resolved:

The appropriations process involves an abrupt confrontation between long-cherished plans requiring public monies and political realities. On one side are the many hopeful aspirants seeking support for their real or imagined needs; on the other are the legislative brokers who must decide first how much money to require of the taxpayer by force of law and then how to spend it in the public interest?  

Berdahl's characterization of the legislature as a broker of competing claims to the state's fiscal resources emphasizes the need to identify the primary actors and their roles in the appropriations process if one is to understand how many higher education policy decisions are made and attempt to influence the policy system toward outputs favorable to his interests. Epstein suggests that the appropriations process defines state policy toward higher education in both general and specific ways. Not only may the appropriations process be concerned with how much money will be appropriated, it may also be used to mandate specific academic policies which the legislative and executive branches of state government feel are desirable. Though the primary concern of the appropriations process is determining how much will be spent for higher education, another concern is the "scope of policy decisions to be made by state officials when they are enacting the university budget."  

32 Berdahl, Statewide Coordination, p. 100.  
33 Epstein, Governing the University, p. 55.
Simply to appropriate generously or ungenerously over a period of years itself amounts to a policy of developing a certain kind of university, quantitatively or qualitatively. Salary increases, new staff positions, and new programs all require legislative and gubernatorial action. The need for this state authorization allows the possibility of attached conditions— for instance, that faculty members teach a certain number of hours per week in order to be paid from appropriated funds. Even without such conditions or the restrictions of a detailed line budget, state officials can use their power over appropriations to influence university policies.34

The realization that the state higher education budget is a policy document requires that studies of the appropriations process be concerned not only with the question of how much but also with the question of under what conditions. The degree to which specific academic policy questions find their way into the appropriations process may provide an indication of the ability of the primary sets of actors in state higher education policy development to reach accommodation outside the public political arena. The conditions accompanying appropriated funds also indicate the degree to which university officials and Board of Regents staff are allowed a free hand in exercising management of the state system of higher education.

The Policy Process

A model for viewing the role of the various actors in the policy process is the political systems model developed by Easton.35 In this

34Ibid., p. 55.

model, the policy system is viewed as receiving inputs in the form of demands and support from the environment in which it functions. These inputs influence the policy system as it seeks to allocate scarce resources among competing programs or groups. The decisions of the political system are then discharged into the environment as policy, from which they may reenter the system as feedback in future policy decisions.

In higher education policy development at the state level, university officials, coordinating board staff, legislators and staff, and the governor and his staff may all be viewed as primary sets of actors in the political system through which higher education policy is made. Each of these actors receives demands and support from the environment and seeks to maximize outputs from the political system which he perceives as desirable to the interests of his constituency. Each actor is viewed as competing for scarce resources with other actors who are seeking to maximize outputs from the system favorable to their interests. An important element in understanding the higher education policy process is the identification of the resources and constraints which each actor brings to the policy process.

Applying concepts of political systems theory to the process through which education policy is made at the state level, Mazzoni found that the exercise of influence by the several sets of policy actors is an important area of investigation for those seeking to understand the policy process. "Education policy making is a competitive process, the dynamic of which resides in the interplay of influence. Part of the explanation for policy decisions, from this
perspective, comes from revealing the patterns of accommodation among competing actors, actors who differ greatly in priorities, power, and political skill.  

Through the exercise of influence, each set of actors in the appropriations process seeks to mold the higher education appropriation in such a way that the priorities of the actor are realized. As the relative influence of policy actors changes over time, it would appear that policy outputs would also change. Scholars of the policy process have found that change in policy outputs is generally incremental:

Budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive. The beginning of wisdom about an agency budget is that it is almost never actively reviewed as a whole every year in the sense of reconsidering the value of all existing programs as compared to all possible alternatives. Instead, it is based on last year's budget with special attention given to a narrow range of increases or decreases. Thus the men who make the budget are concerned with relatively small increments to an existing base.

The incremental nature of the budget from biennium to biennium suggests that attempts by a policy actor to alter state priorities - and thereby increase his share of the state budget - are likely to be only marginally successful. Policy that is feasible is policy only


incrementally different from existing policy. Significant change in one program's share of the state budget in a brief period is likely to impact on other programs as they compete for the state's finite fiscal resources. Reordering of state priorities over a short period of time as reflected in dramatic changes in the percentage of the state budget particular programs command is likely to reflect change in established patterns of influence among the policy actors.

The literature of policy making in higher education supports the position that the policy process is best analyzed through the vehicle of the appropriations process. It also indicates that the sets of primary policy actors are several, that they possess differing resources and constraints, that they exercise influence in differing ways, and that conflict and coalition occur between and among the sets of policy actors. Changes in outputs of the policy process are likely to be incremental from one biennium to the next.

**The Policy Actors**

Four sets of primary actors in the higher education policy process are identified from the literature: the executive branch of state government, the legislative branch of state government, the state level coordinating or governing agency, and university officials. Faculty interest groups, frequently a primary actor in the K-12 education policy process, also play a significant role in higher education policy making.

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education appropriations process, generally are yet to exert significant influence in the higher education appropriations process. Increases in the number of faculty affiliating with unions or "professional organizations" suggest that these organizations may be beginning to exert political influence at the state level. This development merits close attention in studies of higher education/state government relations.

During this century, higher education/state government relations have become increasingly complex. Gone are the days when "a state-house clerk in green eyeshades delivered once each biennium (to the university) a sack of dollars and then turned away shyly for the next two years while the university, in full enjoyment of its autonomy, proceeded in its fashion to perform the work of the university."\(^{39}\)

In a landmark study of state level higher education policy development, Moos and Rourke found in 1959 that:

From an administrative standpoint, the agency at the pivot of relations between campus and capitol is the state budget office. Customarily this office receives the budget requests of the individual institution, analyzes all fiscal plans in terms of their inherent worth and over-all needs of the state, and finally welds these requests into a unified state budget to be submitted by the governor to the legislature.\(^{40}\)

\(^{39}\)Harold Enarson, "What's Left on Campus to Govern?" a paper presented at the 1974 meeting of the American Association for Higher Education, Chicago, 1974.

Looking ahead to the 1960's, Moos and Rourke predicted a much higher level of state control over higher education, resulting in greater scrutiny of higher education budget requests by a greatly enlarged and more quantitatively sophisticated state bureaucracy:

But however the winds of state politics may blow, the swing toward overhead control of state administration is deeply imbedded in current trends in state politics and government. In consequence, institutions like state colleges and universities which stand out against this development inevitably cast themselves in the role of the underdog. A few decades ago the burden of proof would have been placed upon budget and other fiscal officials to justify the utility of these new controls. Today, officials in higher education are faced with the necessity of explaining why they should not be subject to closer administrative supervision.41

The closer administrative scrutiny by state government forecast by Moos and Rourke is clearly seen in many states today. Coordinating or governing agencies for higher education have been given new and greatly expanded roles in the higher education appropriations process in many states. Many state legislatures have developed larger and more quantitatively sophisticated staffs to analyze budget requests of state agencies. University officials face an increasingly complex bureaucracy as they seek the states' fiscal resources for higher education.

The Coordinating Agency

Perhaps the most significant trend of the past twenty years in higher education policy development has been the granting of greater

41 Ibid., p. 55.
authority to existing state level coordinating or governing boards and the creation of such boards in states without them. As enrollments soared in the 1960's and competition for scarce state fiscal resources increased, public officials felt the need for a state agency which would bring coordination and planning to the largely disjointed higher education complex and provide quantitative standards against which to assess rapidly escalating budget requests. As a result, varying levels of involvement in the review of institutional budget requests prior to their submission to the executive and legislative branches of state government was given to these coordinating agencies in a number of states. This increased the influence of the coordinating agency as an actor in the appropriations process, at least to some degree at the expense of the university officials. Previously, these officials had frequently presented budget requests to state budget agencies which generally lacked the quantitative sophistication to evaluate these requests effectively.

Another reason voiced by some members of the executive and legislative branches of state government for giving coordinating agencies a role in the appropriations process was to lessen the sometimes intense competition between state colleges and universities for state funds. At least partially in response to this pressure from

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members of the executive and legislative branches, a number of coordinating agencies established budget formulas which tied appropriations to student enrollment at the several degree levels. As a result, the more politically influential universities received the same funding per student in comparable programs as those universities wielding less influence in the appropriations process.

Budget formulas developed by coordinating agencies vary among states. Some states use budget formulas only as evaluative tools in analyzing university budget requests, some utilize formulas for funding instructional activities only, and others utilize a multitude of formulas to fund instruction, student services, support personnel, operating expenses, and capital outlay. While the use of budget formulas in the appropriations process varies widely, a marked trend has developed toward greater use of increasingly complex formulas in higher education budgeting. The degree to which the increased use of formulas has had a leveling effect on the political influence of the several universities in a state system remains highly speculative.

Glenny and Dalglish assess the role of the coordinating agency in the appropriations process as follows:

(It is) usually responsible for the state master plan on higher education, reviews and approves new programs and degrees, reviews budgets, makes

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recommendations to governor and legislature ...
Often works on the budget in rather close
 collaboration with the budget bureau. Agency
has often been 'captured' by the institutions,
or, more recently, by the governor.45

This suggests that the coordinating agency is likely to enter into
both coalition and conflict with the other primary sets of actors in
the higher education appropriations process. While coordinating
agencies may serve to minimize competition between the universities
for state funds, it is possible that the coordinating agencies them­
selves have assumed a highly political role in the appropriations
process.

The Governor and Staff

Moos and Rourke, viewing the role of the governor and his staff
in higher education policy development, found in their 1959 study
that the governor was the single most prominent individual in the
universities' relation to state government:

Not only does the governor lead the way in shaping
the general fiscal policies that influence higher
education, but also his power to appoint college
governing board members, his role in many states
as an ex-officio board member, and the resources
of his personal staff all combine to place him in
a commanding position to affect the activities of
state colleges and universities.46

45Lyman Glenny and Thomas K. Daliglish, Public Universities, State
Agencies, and the Law (Berkeley: Center for Research and Development

46Moos and Rourke, The Campus and the State, p. 234.
With the trend toward greater state level coordination and control of higher education during the 1960's, there is little reason to believe the governor's prominent role has changed.

Perhaps the most important feature of the governorship in policy development is the role of the governor in appointing the personnel of and presiding over a host of state agencies which themselves become policy actors. Glenny and Dalglish identify a host of executive state agencies which are likely to impact on the higher education appropriations process. Among them are:

The Budget Bureau. This agency has primary responsibility for the form and detail of budget preparation, conducts initial review, establishes formulas, and prepares the governor's executive budget.

The Department of Administration. This department is frequently the governor's principal agency. It often contains sections for budget, audit, management analysis, and central purchasing.

The Higher Education Facilities Commission. This commission administers the federal Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963. It plans for long range capital outlay needs and inventories space utilization for colleges and universities in the state.47

Another important feature of the governor's influence in the higher education appropriations process is his role in setting the appropriation levels in the executive budget and his possession of the veto to enforce appropriation levels he feels are appropriate. These powers of the governor are likely to influence initial university requests, the actions of budget review officials, and the actions of legislators in the higher education appropriations process.

During the 1960's, higher education increasingly found favor with governors seeking to promote the educational status of their state as an increasingly larger proportion of the populace sought to take advantage of higher education. "Through political support, sponsorship of planning, expansion, and coordination studies and the like, they have put their mark on higher education." The degree to which the more adverse environment in which higher education operates in the 1970's has impacted on the governor's role in higher education is worthy of investigation in studies of higher education/state government relations.

The Legislature

While the governor is the dominant single figure in the higher education appropriations process, "political relationships with the legislature appear to be more pervasive and demanding of the time and attention of the multi-campus university than those with the governor." 49

48 Usdan, Minar, and Hurwitz, Education and State Politics, p. 177.

49 Lee and Bowen, The Multicampus University, p. 34.
Although it is the governor who recommends appropriation levels and has the power to veto legislative action, it is the legislature that enacts the appropriations bill. Legislative support is necessary if the goals of the other primary sets of policy actors are to be realized.

The development of support in the legislature is facilitated by the asymmetrical nature of legislative bodies. In his study of state legislatures, Francis found that in actuality it is a small number of legislators who are regarded by their peers as influential across policy issues. By identifying these legislators and building support with them, actors in the higher education appropriations process can influence final appropriations outcomes. The identification of the legislative leaders and the manner in which influence is brought to bear on them by the other policy actors is fundamental to understanding the higher education appropriations process.

Like the governor, the legislature may also have a number of agencies which are involved in the appropriations process. Glenny and Daliglish identify the following:

Legislative Analyst, Auditor, or Fiscal Bureau. Does in-depth studies, reviews budgets, provides analyses and recommendations to legislature or joint budget committee. Most powerful staff agency of the legislature.

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Joint Budget or Finance Committee and its Staff. Consists of members of both houses. Usually has a staff, sometimes quite large. Performs the functions of a legislative analyst for the legislature as a whole. Reviews budgets, briefs committees on salient questions and problems, often holds informal hearings without any legislators present.

Appropriations and Education Committees and their Staffs. Usually each house has both committees, with small or nonexistent staffs if there is a legislative analyst or a staff for the joint budget committee. If there is no such analyst or staff, the appropriations committee may have a good-sized staff; education committees rarely do. Staffs review budgets, prepare analyses, raise salient questions, do leg work for committee chairmen.

Interim Legislative Committees and/or Legislative Council. Does special studies, holds public hearings, and often prepares reports with accompanying bills for introduction.51

The importance of examining the policy role of legislators and their staff is supported by Eulau and Quinley in their study of legislators and higher education policy development. Legislators are seen as "strategic decision makers in politics affecting higher education. The resources mobilized for colleges and universities, the goals to which such resources are allocated, and how they are distributed depend to a great extent on the views and decisions of the nation's legislative bodies."52

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52Heinz Eulau and Harold Quinley, State Officials and Higher Education, p. vii.
The Universities

It is at the institutions of higher education that budget requests originate and to which the appropriations are returned to support the higher education enterprise. Once accustomed to pressing their needs and wants individually and directly on a governor and legislature lacking elaborate management information systems, a host of fiscal analysts, and a coordinating board to referee competing claims from the several universities on the public purse, university officials must now contend with all of these elements as they seek appropriations.

Faced with such a formidable array of state officials and agencies, university officials have attempted to develop strategies for success in the appropriations process. Realizing the political nature of their relationship to state government, they have sought to capitalize on the political clout of their university. Eulau and Quinley, in their analysis of university/state government relations, conclude that higher education generally has little political influence to exercise:

On the whole, however, higher education has no political saliency for state legislators because articulated demands from a broad section of the population are missing. As a result, policies and appropriations are less likely to be sacrificed in the kind of bargaining that occurs in policy areas where the stakes are seen as politically significant for survival.53

53ibid., p. 41.
However, in some states it appears that university officials play a direct role in the appropriations process. Such was found to be the case in an analysis of the role of university officials in the appropriations process in Pennsylvania:

Most of the schools, Penn State, Temple, University of Pennsylvania, Drexel, all have liaison men to the legislature. In effect, lobbyists. They're in daily communication with the legislative leaders as to their budget and their financial needs. When the situation becomes quite urgent, as it did in late 1967, when we were in an impasse in the state over a tax battle ... the presidents of these institutions themselves journeyed down to Harrisburg and met with the Democratic ... and Republican leaders. So there is no lack of communication between the schools and the legislative leaders.54

Unlike business and labor interest groups, universities do not have financial resources or a large voting block to use in support of politicians favorable to their interests. They do, however, have prestige and, skillfully used, it can pay considerable dividends:

In the hope of improving the institution's financial prospectus, everything from free football tickets to reduced prices at university hospitals are offered to legislators. To be sure, many colleges and universities enjoy excellent relations with the state government and with the public merely by virtue of their excellent programs and their service activities (extension, research, and the presentation of artistic and lecture events).55

54Ibid., p. 41.

University officials frequently have the opportunity to recommend individuals to the governor for appointment to boards of trustees. Skillful nomination of board members by university officials can result in developing relations with influential business and labor interest groups which from time to time can be called upon to support the needs of higher education before the state government.56

Some universities within a state have far greater political resources to mobilize in their behalf than do others. Long established state universities, particularly those with professional schools, are likely to have close ties with influential professional groups, such as the agricultural and medical lobbies, which they can use to exert political influence. Other universities, however, frequently those classified as "state colleges," have fewer politically influential alumni and lack ties with influential interest groups. A primary argument advanced by those in state government (and by some university officials of the less politically influential universities) who have favored the growth of coordinating agencies and closer state-level analysis of higher education budget requests has been that such procedures will minimize the political clout of individual universities and result in appropriations made on more objective criteria.57


57 Berdahl, Statewide Coordination of Higher Education, pp. 99-134.
Robert Salisbury identifies college and university presidents as traditionally the chief spokesmen for higher education interests before state government:

Whereas the public schoolmen work largely through associations, pressing their claims through a mass membership, the demands of higher education are more often expressed by prominent individuals occupying the highly political role of public university presidents.

The ability of a university, through its president, to command public funds often depended in the past on the specific services rendered by the university to the state and its legislative representatives... Representatives from the several regions could trade off in logrolling fashion, either by having the college representatives get together beforehand to develop a package to present to the governor and the legislature, or by negotiating in the legislature itself.58

Berdahl, summarizing the extremes to which some university officials have gone in attempting to exercise political influence, quotes one university president who stated he would "drink with the tipplers and pray with the pious" to promote the interests of his university.59

Several scholars of higher education/state government relations have speculated that as state coordinating agencies gain additional authority and expertise, it is possible that they will supersede

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university officials as the primary spokesmen for higher education before state government. Such a development would suggest an altering of traditional patterns of influence in the higher education appropriations process.

The trends in higher education/state government relations reviewed in this chapter had significant implications for this study. The use of appropriation acts in some states to lessen historical university autonomy in areas such as the setting of teaching loads and the internal allocation of university resources suggested that attention be directed to the extent to which actors in the appropriations process are concerned with policy issues beyond determining the amount of the higher education appropriation.

The alleged decline of higher education as a priority of state governments and the increasing competition with K-12 education interest groups for state resources suggested that attention be directed to determining what strategies, if any, university officials employed to exercise influence in a highly competitive and less supportive environment for higher education.

The identification of new actors in the higher education appropriations process in other states required that this study seek to identify new actors in the appropriations process in Ohio.

60 Berdahl, Statewide Coordination.

61 Epstein, Governing the University.
as well as determine which, if any, traditional actors were assuming a lesser role.

The interposition of coordinating agencies between state universities and state government has altered the process through which university budget requests are developed and considered and lessened the influence of university officials in some states. In other states, the coordinating agencies have served to minimize past competition between universities and enhanced the ability of university officials to work together in behalf of greater funding for higher education. These developments in other states suggested that the coordinating agency in Ohio may have impacted on existing practices and patterns of influence in the appropriations process. Similarly, the attempts of many state legislatures to reassert their authority over the state budget suggested that the legislative branch in Ohio might be seeking to exercise greater influence in the appropriations process. Clearly, traditional practices and patterns of influence in the higher education appropriations process are changing in a number of states. These national trends suggested particular aspects of the exercise on influence in the higher education appropriations process to which this study directed its attention.
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The Research Method

The primary thrust of this study was by necessity exploratory. Little prior research on the area of investigation (the politics of higher education as viewed through the appropriations process) has been undertaken in Ohio or other states.

A review of research methods suggested that the most appropriate research strategy to follow was that of the case study. In the case study, the attention of the researcher is focused on an intensive study of a limited number of cases, rather than on a few factors from a large number of social units.\(^62\) In this intensive investigation, the researcher gathers data about the "present status, past experiences, and environmental forces that contribute to the individuality and behavior of the unit. After analyzing the sequences and interrelationships of these factors, he constructs a comprehensive, integrated picture of the social unit as it functions in society."\(^63\)


\(^{63}\)ibid., p. 207.
The case study method sacrifices generalizability and finite prediction in its effort to view events and circumstances in their totality and to depict patterns of interaction rather than the operation of analytically segregated variables. Though generalizability is sacrificed to some degree in the case study, the case study serves to develop a data base from which comparative studies may be undertaken. In higher education policy development, where few in-depth studies of policy development in particular states have been undertaken, additional state case studies should be completed prior to undertaking comparative studies across states. Van Dalen views a primary function of the case study as "providing insights that will help an investigator formulate a fruitful hypothesis, for knowledge that a particular condition exists in a unique instance suggests a factor to look for in other cases." Sindell suggests that a primary function of the case study is to "present data and suggest generalizations and testable hypotheses that comparative research workers can use to establish more universal generalizations."

From the literature of educational administration, public administration, and political science, four groups of actors with

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primary involvement in the higher education appropriations process were identified:

1. The Governor and staff
2. The legislature and staff
3. Ohio Board of Regents staff
4. University officials

This study focused on the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process by each of these sets of actors and sought to determine what other actors, if any, were involved in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio. The work of Easton, Rourke, and Lindblom in analyzing the policy process suggests that influence is exercised by competing actors seeking to maximize policy outputs favorable to their interests. Several determinants of influence have been identified by these scholars as areas of investigation which afford insight into the roles of the various actors in the policy process:

1. Authority - An action by a policy actor is authoritative when the people to whom it is intended to apply or who


are affected by it consider that they must or ought to obey it." Each of the primary policy actors possesses certain statutory grants of authority to act in particular ways in the policy process. This study sought to identify the authority possessed by each set of policy actors and determine the manner in which it is utilized in the appropriations process.

2. Constituency support - "Agencies have power when they command the allegiance of fervent and substantial constituencies." Each of the primary actors in the higher education appropriations process possesses a constituency he seeks to mobilize to influence policy outputs or is influenced by his constituency to act in a particular way. Constituency support can be of assistance to a policy actor who lacks formal authority to compel a particular action or behave in a certain way. In his analysis of the exercise of authority in the policy process, Lindblom found that "Where A lacks authority over B, he will use his authority elsewhere to achieve an influence on B." This suggests that constituency support

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70Easton, The Political System, p. 132.
71Rourke, Bureaucracy, p. 1.
may be of assistance to a policy actor as a substitute for formal authority in the policy process. This study sought to determine the constituency commanded by each policy actor and the impact of constituency support in influencing the higher education appropriations process.

3. Expertise - Analyzing the role of bureaucracies in the development of public policy, Rourke found that "Of at least equal importance (to constituency support) as a source of bureaucratic power is the expertise of executive agencies." Each of the policy actors in the higher education appropriations process possesses varying degrees of expertise which he may seek to utilize as influence. This study sought to determine the kinds of expertise each policy actor possesses, his capacity to utilize expertise as influence, and strategies which may be employed in its utilization.

In this study, authority, constituency support, and expertise are each viewed as dimensions of influence which assist a policy actor in securing desired outputs from the political system. Different actors may possess varying amounts of each of these dimensions of influence. In cases where a particular policy actor is lacking in one or more of these dimensions of influence, he may

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utilize another dimension to overcome this deficiency. For example, university officials are unlikely to possess substantial authority to compel a large increase in appropriations from the legislature. By mobilizing the support of influential constituencies in the state, however, they may be successful in influencing the legislature toward the appropriations they desire.

From the exercise of influence by actors in the policy process, coalition and conflict between actors are likely to occur. Riker found that a frequent strategy employed by policy actors seeking to maximize policy outputs favorable to their interests is that of coalition, the combining of resources by two or more policy actors to influence the political system toward mutually desired outputs.\(^7^4\)

This study sought to identify where coalition occurs in the higher education appropriations process, the actors and their resources in coalition, and the extent to which the coalition is successful in influencing the policy system toward the desired output.

Conflict results from the confrontation between two or more policy actors seeking to secure differing outputs from the policy system. This study sought to identify those points in the higher education appropriations process where conflict arises, determine the actors in conflict, the resources they possess, the contrasts in

desired outputs which result in conflict, and determine the actors who achieve their desired outputs from the political system as a result of conflict.

The Research Questions

Research questions relating to each of the determinants of influence were formulated to guide the study and provide a meaningful way of organizing and presenting data. Each research question addresses an important aspect of the exercise of influence in the appropriations process. Data to provide answers to the research questions were gathered from interviews with policy actors, written sources, on-site observation, and the Higher Education Policymaker Inventory. The Higher Education Policymaker Inventory provided policy actors' perceptions of the validity of propositions advanced as descriptors of the exercise of influence. Each research question is listed under the heading of the determinant of the exercise of influence it is thought to describe:

The Policy Actors

1. What groups exercise influence in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio?
2. What groups not previously involved in the higher education appropriations process are emerging as actors?
3. What groups presently exercising influence in the appropriations process appear to be assuming a lesser role?
The Authority Determinant

1. What authority does each actor possess in the appropriations process?

2. How does the authority of each actor impact on the other actors in the appropriations process?

3. To what extent has the authority possessed by each actor changed in recent years?

4. At what points in the appropriations process is authority exercised by each actor?

The Constituency Support Determinant

1. What are the constituencies of each actor?

2. To what extent is the actor's constituency of assistance in the exercise of influence in the appropriations process?

3. What strategies do the actors employ to develop and utilize constituency support in the appropriations process?

The Expertise Determinant

1. What expertise is possessed by each actor that may be exercised as influence in the appropriations process?

2. To what extent has the expertise of each actor changed in recent years?

3. How is expertise utilized by each actor as influence in the appropriations process?
The Coalition Determinant

1. At what decision points in the appropriations process does coalition occur and between which actors?
2. What are the similarities in desired outputs of the policy system which result in coalition?
3. How have coalitions between actors in the appropriations process changed in recent years?

The Conflict Determinant

1. At what decision points in the appropriations process does conflict occur and between which actors?
2. What are the differences in desired outputs of the policy system which result in conflict?
3. How have conflicts between actors in the appropriations process changed in recent years?

The Research Propositions

From a review of the literature on the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process, as well as in an historical probe of the higher education appropriations process in Ohio, the following propositions were advanced as descriptors of the manner in which influence is exercised in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio. Each proposition addressed one or more research questions and provided the perceptions of policy actors on aspects of the exercise of influence raised by the research questions. Each proposition is listed under the heading of the determinant of the exercise of influence it is thought to describe:
The Policy Actors

1. The primary sets of policy actors who exercise influence in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio are university officials, Board of Regents staff, the legislature and staff, and the governor and staff.

2. Broad support exists among policy actors for the continuance of the Board of Regents as an actor in the higher education appropriations process.

3. University faculty, viewed as an interest group, exert little or no influence in the higher education appropriations process.

4. University officials are viewed as the most influential spokesmen for higher education before the executive and legislative branches of state government.

The Authority Determinant

1. The authority of the Governor to exercise a line-item vote over higher education appropriations influences legislators to go along with executive branch policy on higher education.

2. The authority of the Board of Regents to establish formula based appropriations has lessened the ability of university officials to influence the appropriation for their university.

The Constituency Support Determinant

1. Higher education does not possess an active and substantial constituency which exercises influence in the higher education appropriations process.
2. Higher education has declined as a priority interest of policymakers in Ohio during the past five years.

3. K-12 education possesses a more active and influential constituency than does higher education.

4. University officials work through other established interest groups (agricultural, medical, business, and labor lobbies) to influence the appropriations process.

The Expertise Determinant

1. The Board of Regents is viewed by policymakers as a more reliable source of information than are university officials on matters relating to the higher education appropriation.

2. Cost analysis data supplied by the Board of Regents staff to the executive and legislative branches of state government have led to more knowledgeable decision making with regard to the higher education appropriation.

The Coalition Determinant

1. Informal agreements on feasible appropriation levels are reached between university officials, Board of Regents staff, and key members of the executive and legislative branches of state government prior to the formulation of the higher education appropriation request.

2. During the appropriations process, university officials and Board of Regents staff form a coalition in support of the higher education appropriation.
3. Formula based appropriations have facilitated university officials working together in support of the entire higher education appropriation.

The Conflict Determinant

1. Efforts by individual universities to increase their funding through special subsidies result in conflict with the Board of Regents and other university officials.

2. The amount of the higher education appropriation is not viewed as a partisan issue.

3. Policymakers view higher education and K-12 education as being in competition for state appropriations.

4. The Board of Regents is viewed by policymakers as having failed to hold higher education appropriation requests down to reasonable levels.

Data Collection and Analysis

Data for this study of the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio were drawn from a number of sources. The author worked parttime in the Ohio House of Representatives in the year preceding the study and assisted a member of the Ohio Senate as a parttime legislative aide during most of the time the 1975-77 Biennial Budget was formulated and enacted.

The author's presence in the legislative environment provided an opportunity for direct observation of many legislative committee and floor sessions in which the higher education budget request was presented, analyzed, debated, and enacted. Perhaps more importantly, the author's involvement with the legislative staff provided access
to legislators and lobbyists on an informal basis. These contacts yielded valuable insight into the exercise of influence which occurred away from the public eye.

Written data utilized in this study include university budget requests and supporting documents; Ohio Board of Regents budget guidelines, policy statement, and budget recommendations; the Executive and Legislative budget proposals and supporting documents as presented to the 1975 session of the Ohio General Assembly; the Ohio House of Representatives and Senate daily journals; Legislative Budget Office, Office of Budget and Management, and Inter-University Council analyses of the budget bills; and newspaper reports and analyses of the appropriations process.

From this data, the process through which the higher education appropriation was developed by the policy actors, negotiated through the legislative process, and eventually enacted is traced. Written documents developed by the actors in the appropriations process provided insight primarily into the expertise determinant of the influence process. Newspaper accounts of the appropriations process contributed data of assistance in analyzing who the actors in the higher education appropriations process were, the identification of critical decision points in the appropriations process, and the exercise of the several dimensions of influence by these actors. Data generated through direct observation of the appropriations process supplement data from the other sources. Observations of the higher education appropriations process proved to be of assistance both by providing information not available from other sources and
by alerting the author to developments worthy of additional investigation as the appropriations process progressed.

In order to gather the policy actors' perceptions of the manner in which influence is exercised in the higher education appropriations process, a questionnaire was devised and administered to the presidents of the state-assisted universities, Board of Regents staff, and members of the executive and legislative branches of state government (See Appendices A and B). These sets of actors were selected as those individuals most involved in the higher education appropriations process based on a review of the literature of higher education/state government relations and the author's observations of the higher education appropriations process in Ohio. The questionnaire was designed to determine the degree to which the policy actors perceived the research propositions as accurate descriptions of the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio.

Thirty-one interviews were arranged with critical policy actors and expert observers to probe beyond perceptions of influence revealed from the questionnaire. Critical actors were identified as individuals who, in the course of the appropriations process, were involved at one or more decision points leading to the determination of the higher education appropriation. Each interview focused on that part of the appropriations process in which the interviewee was a participant and probed the patterns and determinants of influence which were brought to bear on the appropriations process. Interviews were also held with several expert observers of the higher education appropriations process in Ohio. Expert observers were identified as individuals who,
because of positions they occupied or because of their own research in higher education/state government relations, were particularly knowledgeable about the subject of this study.

Because data were drawn from a number of sources and, as the study progressed, reached voluminous proportions, it was necessary to organize the data in such a way that they assisted in answering the research questions and could be presented in a manner which would give the reader insight into the several determinants of influence probed in the study. This was accomplished by assigning the data to one or more of the determinants of influence which the data explicate: the identification of the policy actors, the authority determinant, the constituency support determinant, the expertise determinant, the conflict determinant, and the coalition determinant. Data are presented in Chapter VI according to the determinants of influence which the data explicate.

Prior to including data in the study and utilizing them to draw conclusions, collaboration of the circumstances surrounding particular events was sought. Collaboration of data was facilitated by collecting data from a number of sources independent of one another and by employing several collection techniques.

In cases of conflicting data, data were evaluated on the criteria of objectivity, source, and consistency with related data. Particular events described in this study were collaborated from more than one source unless otherwise noted.
CHAPTER IV
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS IN OHIO

The Origins of State Support for Higher Education in Ohio

The systematic process through which state funds are presently appropriated for higher education in Ohio bears little resemblance to the manner in which the state first committed resources in behalf of education for its citizens. An historical overview of the manner in which the higher education appropriations process in Ohio today has evolved is instructive for several reasons: existing patterns of influence in the appropriations process are more clearly understood; alternative structures for appropriating state money for higher education may be evaluated; and the continued emergence and resolution of issues in higher education/state government relations offers insight into how influence has been exercised by the policy actors at the state level.

Higher education was recognized as a concern of government even before Ohio became a state. In the ordinance of Congress establishing the Northwest Territory, from which the state of Ohio was carved, specific provision for public support of education was made:

"Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools, and the means of education
shall forever be encouraged." The Ohio Company of Associates, formed by a group of New Englanders interested in developing the area that is now southeastern Ohio, was granted 750,000 acres by Congress, with the stipulation that two townships, comprising 46,080 acres, be reserved for a "seminary of learning."  

In 1804, only two years after Ohio became a state, the General Assembly of Ohio gave legislative sanction to the establishment of a university, to be built in the town of Athens. In 1806, Ohio University enrolled its first students. State support for the university came from rent generated through the leasing of land originally set aside in the Congressional land grant for the support of a university. No other state support, either in the form of operating or capital subsidies, was given.

A similar land grant soon led to the establishment of a second university in Ohio, this one in the town of Oxford. In 1792, John Symmes of New Jersey was awarded the Ohio territory north of the Ohio River and lying between the Little Miami and the Great Miami Rivers. Under the terms of this land grant, one township (a tract of land six miles square) was to be held in trust for the sole means of supporting schools of learning. By an act of the Ohio General Assembly in 1809, Miami University was created and awarded the income

from this tract of land. Again, no further state support for the university was given.\footnote{Walter Havighurst, The Miami Years: 1809-1969 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1969), pp. 1-15.} It was not until 1824 that sufficient money could be raised for Miami University to open its doors.

Ohio University and Miami University both suffered from inadequate support during their early years. The leasees of land whose rent subsidized Ohio University secured passage in 1843 of an act by the Ohio General Assembly which prevented increasing their rent as the value of the land increased. Rather than realizing the forty to fifty thousand dollars annual revenue projected from this source, only $4,500 annually was collected.\footnote{Hoover, History of Ohio University, pp. 76-79.}

Another factor contributing to lack of support of Ohio and Miami universities was the rapid growth of church-related colleges in the state. By the latter part of the nineteenth century, it was said that "there are two universities in England, four in France, two in Prussia, and thirty-seven in Ohio."\footnote{Hoover, History of Ohio University, p. 159.} In 1849, the President of Miami University resigned, citing the competition from church colleges as a hindrance to the development of that university. The emergence of numerous church-related colleges in Ohio continued to effect adversely support for the state universities well into the twentieth century.
The first recorded instance of state universities working together to influence additional state support occurred in 1859. Trustees of Ohio University and Miami University cooperated in an attempt to secure surplus funds which had been distributed to the state by the federal government. This attempt to increase state funding beyond the meager income generated from the original land grants was not successful.79

The passage of the Morrill Act by Congress in 1863 produced the second attempt by the two state universities to act in concert in behalf of greater state support. Trustee committees were appointed by Miami and Ohio universities to attempt to influence the Ohio General Assembly to accept donation of federal lands. Working together, these committees envisioned dividing the revenue from the land between the two universities. Though successful in 1864 in influencing the legislature to accept these lands, this cooperative venture yielded no benefit to Miami and Ohio universities. Instead, the General Assembly, in 1870, authorized establishment of Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical College, to be located in Columbus. As was the case with the establishment of Ohio and Miami universities, the legislature made no operating or capital outlay allocations to this new college.

The next effort to secure additional state funding occurred in 1876 when trustees of Ohio University and Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical College attempted to influence the legislature to sell some waste land owned by the state and divide the resulting income among the two schools. (Miami University was closed at this time, because of financial difficulties largely brought about by the Civil War.) Like previous efforts to secure a larger financial commitment from the state to higher education, this one also met with failure.80

It appears that a factor in these recurring failures was the inability of the state universities to generate interest in higher education among legislators who represented districts distant from the three state institutions of higher education.

Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical College made frequent pleas to state government for financial support during its early years. All were unsuccessful until $4,500 was allocated in 1877 to establish a department of mines, mine engineering, and metallurgy. This allocation represented the first appropriation of funds from the Ohio treasury for higher education and established the precedent of state support for university operations. Seventy-three years had elapsed between the establishment of the first state university and the first appropriation of state funds to support their operation.81

80Hoover, History of Ohio University, pp. 126-7, 145.

81Hames E. Pollard, History of The Ohio State University - The Story of Its First Seventy-Five Years: 1873-1948 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1952).
While the recitation of statistics on the level of support other states give to higher education has not proven particularly persuasive in influencing Ohio legislators to fund more generously, it was an 1879 trip to the Industrial University of Illinois by several members of the Finance Committees of the Ohio General Assembly which appears to have marked a turning point in state support for higher education. This trip, significantly, was undertaken at the urging of several trustees at The Ohio State University (until 1878, the Ohio Agricultural and Mechanical College). On this trip, it was learned that Illinois had appropriated approximately $350,000 in support of its university. Upon the return of these legislators to Ohio, the Ohio State University received an appropriation of $15,800 and, two years later, Ohio University received $20,000 for repair of buildings.\textsuperscript{82}

Along with this initial state support came greater legislative scrutiny of the operation of the universities and a desire for coordination of the state's expanding commitment to higher education. In 1880, a bill, supported by Ohio and The Ohio State Universities, was introduced in the General Assembly to consolidate the three universities in Ohio. President Scott of Ohio University, obviously influenced by the failure of any of the universities to garner

\textsuperscript{82}Driver, \textit{Study of Voluntary Coordination}, p. 15.
significant financial support from the state, viewed the consolidation venture as a means to ensure adequate funding for at least one university:

The cause of higher education in Ohio demands a concentration of means and effort. The attempt to sustain so many institutions of learning of this rank would fail in any state. It is more certain to fail in this state where there are so many colleges. It is possible to create here one strong institution, an honor and a blessing, not to Ohio only but to the whole country. But to create more than one is impossible.83

As had been the case with most other attempts to secure additional state funding, this one also ended in defeat.

Regular appropriations for the operation of the state universities began in 1885. In 1891, The Ohio State University secured passage by the General Assembly of a state-wide property tax of one-twentieth of one mil for the support of the university. In 1896, a similar tax was levied for the support of Ohio and Miami Universities.84

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, the universities created by the state in Ohio had at last established regular appropriations from the state. University trustees, sometimes assisted by the university presidents, had served as the spokesmen for higher education before state government. Most of the efforts of the universities

83 Hoover, History of Ohio University, pp. 156-7.

acting in concert to influence special appropriations had ended in failure. The attempt by The Ohio State University, acting alone, to create a continuing source of support through the property tax was successful and set the precedent for similar support to Ohio and Miami universities. The growth of the universities, both in enrollment and programs, was determined by individual boards of trustees and their ability to raise the necessary funds. Each university brought its needs directly before the legislature and its success in securing funds was largely dependent on the political influence it could muster. This haphazard process for appropriating state funds for higher education was to change dramatically during the next century.

As demands for higher education funding from the state intensified, efforts by the General Assembly to coordinate and differentiate the programs of the several universities mounted. In 1906 the General Assembly, through legislative act, laid out the foundation upon which the structure of state-assisted higher education in the state was to be built:

Inasmuch as it is deemed desirable for this state to determine its policy in regard to the support of institutions of higher learning, and further desirable that it adopt a distinct and fixed policy in regard to universities and colleges for all time to come so that the policy of the state with reference to the Ohio State University, the Miami University, and the Ohio University shall be determined and made definite and to the end that the state may build up one university worthy it, as now begun at the Ohio State University, and also to fix such a policy as will provide
support for the Miami and Ohio universities as colleges of liberal arts, but not to include technical or graduate instruction, aside from the usual graduate work for the degree of master of arts, and to determine definitely for all time that the Miami University and the Ohio University shall be no greater charge on the state so far as university purposes are concerned than herein provided for; therefore this subdivision of this chapter is passed to set forth the policy, to-wit: That in the future no representative of the Miami University or of the Ohio University or the Ohio State University shall violate or attempt to violate this policy herein enacted into law as a policy for the support of higher education and as a guide for future general assemblies of the state of Ohio.85

No sooner had the legislature defined the roles of the existing universities than pressures began to mount for the establishment of normal schools (teacher education colleges) in northeastern and northwestern Ohio. In 1910 a legislative act was passed authorizing the establishment of these colleges and it was decided that they would be located in the towns of Kent and Bowling Green.

As the number of institutions of higher education receiving funds from the state grew, so did competition between the colleges and universities for state support. An early effort to promote voluntary coordination and cooperation among the state assisted colleges and universities in behalf of operating appropriations occurred in 1914 when President William Oxley Thompson of Ohio State

85 General Code of Ohio, sec. 7923.
brought together the five presidents to discuss state appropriations and student fees. While informal dialogue on these and other matters continued between the state assisted colleges and universities, it was not until 1939 that a formal organization for developing and presenting a unified budget request for higher education was created.

The Inter-University Council

Efforts by some universities to increase their share of the state's appropriation for higher education, frequently at the expense of the other universities, contributed directly to the founding of the Inter-University Council (IUC) in 1939. Composed of the state-assisted universities, the IUC quickly assumed a role in the higher education appropriations process by compiling and presenting a single, unified budget request for all of higher education.

Prior to this time, each university had lobbied directly with the legislature for its funds. While instances of cooperative appeals by the universities for new revenue sources are recorded, competition between the universities in behalf of appropriations increased significantly during the first part of the twentieth century.

During the 1920's and 1930's, the legislature was controlled largely by legislators from rural areas of the state. Ohio State University, by legislative act in 1906 designated as the state university, received an increasing share of the state funds for higher

education. Ohio and Miami universities, largely because of their age and prestige, possessed an active constituency which was at times of assistance with the legislature. Bowling Green and Kent, largely because of their youth and their designation as "normal" colleges, found it difficult to compete at the state level for funds.87

When John Edward McGilvrey assumed the presidency of Kent State University, he began to lash out at the comparatively low level of support afforded that institution. In a series of public speeches and circulars, McGilvrey argued that Kent State, located in "the Ruhr of America" and a short distance from the state's largest city, was substantially underfunded, particularly when compared with the other universities:

The Kent State Normal College District pays 46% of the taxes in Ohio ... the taxpayers in the Kent District annually contribute for the instruction of a teacher in the Fourth Quarter at Ohio State $11.73; at Miami, $5.34; at Bowling Green, $4.40; AND AT KENT STATE TOWARD THE EDUCATION OF A TEACHER OF THEIR OWN CHILDREN, $1.88.88

It is clear that Dr. McGilvrey viewed the per student funding levels as some relative measure of each university's political influence with the legislature.

In a retrospective view of the higher education appropriations process in Ohio in the years prior to the establishment of the IUC,

87Driver, Study of Voluntary Coordination, pp. 24-5.

88Shriver, Kent State, pp. 87-88.
President Bevis of Ohio State summarized the deteriorating relations between the state universities and the growing spectre of state government imposing order on the appropriations process:

As the years went by and the state schools gained a larger and larger percentage of the student population the relations between the educational institutions in Ohio rapidly grew worse. Formal amenities were preserved for the most part, but representatives of the different state schools would not willingly be seen together in the committee rooms at the State House, and more energy was often devoted to tearing the others down than to building themselves up. The situation became intolerable. Not only were all the schools languishing for want of nourishment but the Legislature and the interested public were becoming discouraged and disgusted.

Increasingly there loomed upon the horizon a darkening shadow; the shadow of something which none of the state universities wanted; the shadow of One Big Board.\textsuperscript{89}

A number of interrelated factors contributed to the founding of the Inter-University Council and its emergence as an actor in the higher education appropriations process: the threat of legislative imposition of a single governing board; disenchantment on the part of the universities with the state's fiscal commitment to higher education; recognition by the universities of the counterproductive competition for funding in which they were engaged; a growing trend among the states toward some degree of coordination of higher education, either voluntary or by state edict; and concern by The

\textsuperscript{89}Howard L. Bevis, "How the Dual System of Higher Education Functions in Ohio," an address to The Annual Conference on Higher Education in Michigan (Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1955), p. 23.
Ohio State University that the other universities were about to expand their offerings into areas traditionally reserved to Ohio State by the legislative act of 1906.

During 1938, the Administrative Council at Ohio State, under the leadership of Vice President J.L. Morrill, worked out the agreement under which the IUC would be established. A critical feature of the agreement was the stipulation that Ohio State would work with the legislature in behalf of the appropriation for all the universities. In exchange, the other universities gave public recognition to Ohio State's premier position in graduate and professional education and curtailed some of their expansionary interests in these areas. That the other universities were willing to give up these plans in exchange for a pledge of Ohio State's support in the appropriations process indicates the great influence Ohio State possessed with the legislative and executive branches of state government and the concern of the other universities over their ability to compete for state support.

On January 17, 1939, a resolution establishing the Inter-University Council was unanimously adopted by representatives of the five universities, meeting at Ohio State. Prior to this, the concept of the IUC had been presented to the Governor and Lieutenant Governor, who gave their endorsement.

The entrance of the IUC into the operating appropriations process came about because of the initial success of the Council in presenting a coordinated capital outlay budget. Undoubtedly, the legislative and executive branches of state government were delighted to have the competing claims of the universities to capital outlay
reconciled among the universities and saw the potential for handling the operating appropriation in a similar manner:

A joint capital improvements budget was hammered out and presented to the State authorities. Its reception was favorable. Late in the period of the Legislative session I received one afternoon a call from the Governor. "Howard," he said, "you people from the universities did a fine job in presenting a joint budget for capital improvements. Why can't you do the same thing for your operating money?"

Here was the challenge, the challenge that could not be ignored. Unless we could meet it the Council was doomed to failure, and the One Big Board was the probable alternative.

With trepidation but, nevertheless, with dispatch, I called the Council members to Columbus. We went into an afternoon dinner session that lasted far into the night. In the wee hours of the morning we prepared a joint report, a joint asking for our operating funds. The next morning we took it to the Governor. He called in the Legislative leaders who received it with obvious relief. "It was acted upon promptly; we all got more than we had hoped to get by our own single efforts. A new precedent was set, a new system was established.  

The "new system" established through the IUC was to endure, with only slight modification, for the next twenty two years. An analysis of this system offers insight into how influence is exercised in the appropriations process under a voluntary coordination arrangement and reveals the establishment of influence patterns which continue to be found in the appropriations process in Ohio today.

Once the practice of a single higher education budget request, supported by each of the state universities, was established, a

procedure for formulating that request had to be developed. Representatives of the state universities (usually the president, the business officer, and one trustee) would meet and develop the coordinated budget request. The share for each university was based on two considerations: the appropriation received in the previous biennium and the enrollment growth of the university. A control figure for the total higher education budget request was usually communicated to the IUC by the Director of Finance or Governor prior to its formulation of the higher education request. Once the percentage of the total appropriation to be received by each university was agreed to by the presidents at a meeting of the IUC, the appropriation request for each university was determined simply by multiplying the control figure by whatever percentage of the total request was allotted to each university.91

In arriving at a control figure for the higher education appropriation, the Director of Finance would frequently consult IUC officers and university officials. A business officer of one university described these negotiations as follows:

I've been called down, interviewed by the director of finance. I'd say this is fine, but we can't agree to this without the Council. "Oh, no, we realize that." He'd call somebody from Miami. He wasn't trying to bypass the Council, but getting our reaction on what an additional cut

would do, what would we do. He'd feel them all out, then he'd come back and call a Council meeting, and we'd all go back in Council. "Did you say this?"
"Yes, we can take a cut here, we can take a cut there." "Well, why couldn't you take a cut there?"
"Well, we just can't do it." Hammer it out. Then we'd revise. If they'd give us a grand total of $20 million for all the universities, then we would go back and hammer it out -- all day and night and part of the next day. And things would get pretty strained at times -- especially between the presidents. The fiscal officers, well, we could call each other any names we wanted to. With some of the presidents it was not easy. Very bitter feelings developed. Those are things you will not find in the minutes.92

During the legislative sessions, officials of the IUC were in continuous contact with key members of the executive and legislative branches of state government, seeking to maximize the appropriations for higher education:

The funding process, then, was not simply a matter of the presidents getting a control figure from the Director of Finance and sitting down to divide it. The figures were often in a state of flux and the final recommendations depended at times on such uncertainties as legislative approval of a proposed tax increase.

The universities were also actively involved in attempting to influence the legislature. While the presidents met occasionally in private sessions with key legislative leaders and members of the finance committees as well as testifying at public hearings, most of the lobbying was done by other university personnel. Each university had one or two trustees who were also quite useful politically.93

92Driver, Study of Voluntary Coordination, p. 61.

The bitter feelings sometimes generated during the meetings of university presidents when each university's share of the budget request was divided can be traced to several factors. First, it was recognized that Ohio State University would receive a disproportionately large share of the appropriation because of the higher cost of graduate and professional education. Yet, the cost associated with particular academic programs was never identified and claims by any university that it should receive a larger appropriation because of the higher cost of particular programs were viewed with suspicion. Second, although lobbying in behalf of individual university budget requests was forbidden under agreement reached within the IUC, there were occasional examples of end runs by particular universities seeking to increase their funding for special projects. Third, the IUC was called upon to make difficult decisions. When the entire request of the IUC was not agreed to by the legislature, the member universities had agreed to share the reduction proportionately if it was within 5 percent of the requested amount. When it was not, the IUC would meet and, through a process of debate and bargaining, decide how much of the reduction each university would have to assume. The failure of the IUC to develop a sufficient data base from which to identify program cost and to utilize such a data base in deciding each university's share of the budget request contributed substantially to the curtailment of its role in the higher education appropriations process in the early 1960's.94

A number of concurrent developments in the late 1950's and early 1960's contributed to the demise of the IUC as a primary actor in the higher education appropriation process and the subsequent establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents, with responsibility for preparing and submitting a consolidated budget request for the state universities. In 1959, Ohio University announced that it would proceed with plans to award the Ph.D. This action, in violation of the 1939 agreement of the universities under which doctoral work was reserved for Ohio State, demonstrated the inability of the IUC to provide coordination of the state's higher education system. The tidal wave of new students about to sweep across college campuses in the early 1960's also speeded the demise of the IUC. Members of state government, receiving increasing pressure to provide additional educational facilities and expanded academic program, quickly came to realize there was no central agency or organization to which they could turn to provide a coordinated response to the growing demand for higher education.

More than any other factor, however, it was the failure of the IUC to present a unified front in the appropriations process that spelled its demise. In 1961, the Speaker of the House presented a capital outlay plan for higher education and sought IUC support for its enactment by the legislature. Reflecting post-Sputnik concern for the rapid development of American technology, the capital outlay plan would finance 15 million dollars of engineering and science buildings at Ohio State. In exchange for their support of this program, the Speaker of the House pledged that all capital outlay funds
for the next biennium would go to the other state universities. This proposal was accepted only by President Fawcett of Ohio State. Strong lobbying against it in the legislature by the other universities created an atmosphere of hostility toward the IUC and supported the notion that a state agency with statutory authority to present unified higher education budgets was needed. This notion was strengthened further by the failure of the state universities to agree, as they had in the past, on the relative percentage of the higher education operating request to be received by each university.95

As the state's fiscal commitment to higher education began to grow rapidly, the consensus among the universities which had allowed the IUC to serve as a broker between the state and the universities in the appropriations process began to decline. This development, coincident with growing legislative and executive branch desires for coordination and the growth of coordinating and governing boards in other states, created the climate in which a new and influential actor was introduced into the higher education appropriations process - the Ohio Board of Regents.

The Ohio Board of Regents

The 1963 legislative act which established the Ohio Board of Regents requires that the Regents play a central role in the appropriations process:

(J) Review the appropriation requests of the public community colleges and the state colleges and universities and submit to the department of finance and to the chairmen of the finance committees of the house of representatives and of the senate its recommendations in regard to the biennial higher education appropriation for the state, including appropriations for the individual state colleges and universities and public community colleges.96

The first Chancellor of the Ohio Board of Regents, John Millett (previously president of Miami University) interpreted the legislative act to designate the Board of Regents as the state budget agency for higher education. Dr. Millett, the only university president in 1963 to give enthusiastic support to the establishment of the Board of Regents, succeeded in having the higher education budget analysts in the Department of Finance transferred to the Board of Regents.97 Dr. Millett clearly recognized that if the Board of Regents was to fulfill the planning and coordinating role for which it was created, it must interpose itself between the universities and state government in the appropriations process:

I think it is imperative that a state board of higher education have a major role in the state appropriation process. Otherwise the state board has very little utility. The appropriation process is the primary influence that a state government has in the continuing relationship between state government and higher education. If the state board of higher education is removed from

96Ohio Revised Code, Section 333.04 J

The transfer of the higher education budget analysts from the Director of Finance staff to the Board of Regents, coupled with the Board's legislative authority to review university budget requests and recommend a single higher education budget, established the Board of Regents as a central actor in the appropriations process. In an effort to strengthen further the role of the Regents, Governor Rhodes let it be known that state university presidents were welcome in the State House only when specifically invited.

This action by Governor Rhodes, likely intended to minimize university lobbying activities and establish the Chancellor and his staff as the representatives of higher education before state government, was only partially successful. While it did make the university presidents less visible in the State House, it also resulted in the establishment of new and additional patterns of influence in the appropriations process which will be discussed in a later chapter.

Once the structure, operating procedures, and personnel of the Board of Regents were established, a procedure for formulating the

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higher education appropriations request and determining each university's share had to be developed. It was apparent from the demise of the process utilized by the IUC that the Regents had to develop a process which would address two fundamental and interrelated issues: equity in funding between universities and the minimizing of political influence in determining the university appropriations. Some effort at addressing these issues had been initiated by the IUC in 1959 when it began a study of costs per student credit hour at the state universities in various fields of study. By drawing on this IUC study of instructional costs and establishing a data system through which costs associated with instruction support activities such as student services, libraries, and physical plant operation could be determined, it was possible for the Board of Regents to derive formulas for determining the average cost per full-time student within the various levels of instruction across the state universities. Eventually, eight funding models, reflecting various levels of instruction, were established.

The funding model or formula concept, based on the number of full-time equivalent students each university enrolled at each of the instruction levels, addressed both issues of equity and political influence in the appropriations process. Equity was promoted by funding each university at the same amount for each student credit hour generated at each instructional level and relating this funding to the actual cost of instruction. Political influence was minimized by making most of each university's appropriation a function of the student credit hours generated, rather than a function of the
political influence possessed. While formula based budgeting neither guaranteed absolute equity nor eliminated all exercise of political influence by the universities, it did provide a new approach to higher education budgeting in Ohio which answered some of the criticisms of the former process and firmly established the Board of Regents as a primary actor in the appropriations process.

Though formula based appropriations utilized by the Board of Regents promoted equity in funding and lessened the ability of each university to influence its total appropriation, the exercise of political influence by the universities in the appropriations process had by no means been eliminated. In each biennial budget since the Board of Regents was established, a number of "special subsidies" to the universities have been included. These special subsidies represent revenue to particular universities in addition to their funding generated through the application of the instructional formulas. While some of these special subsidies were supported by the Regents as funding for university activities to which the instructional subsidy formulas were not sensitive (such as funding for agricultural research and extension), others have represented an "end run" around the Regents by particular universities seeking to gain additional resources.100

A review of Table 5 reveals that the percentage of the total higher education appropriation going to instructional subsidies has

100Millett, Politics and Higher Education, pp. 89-115.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Instructional Subsidies</th>
<th>Special Subsidies</th>
<th>Total Appropriation</th>
<th>Special Subsidies as % of Total Appropriation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963-64</td>
<td>$52,511,390</td>
<td>$7,938,350</td>
<td>$60,449,740</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-65</td>
<td>59,681,450</td>
<td>7,988,350</td>
<td>67,669,800</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>73,886,150</td>
<td>10,977,150</td>
<td>84,863,300</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-67</td>
<td>81,767,785</td>
<td>16,332,545</td>
<td>93,100,330</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-68</td>
<td>130,866,305</td>
<td>17,730,694</td>
<td>148,596,999</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>158,393,100</td>
<td>18,328,531</td>
<td>176,721,631</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>189,792,744</td>
<td>52,926,782</td>
<td>242,719,526</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>202,473,147</td>
<td>58,784,343</td>
<td>261,257,490</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>234,498,750</td>
<td>59,190,500</td>
<td>293,689,250</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>252,067,650</td>
<td>73,000,000</td>
<td>325,067,650</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>278,994,105</td>
<td>84,828,409</td>
<td>363,822,514</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>311,084,660</td>
<td>108,594,475</td>
<td>419,678,185</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

been declining, while the percentage going to special subsidies has been increasing. This trend casts some doubt on the ability of the Board of Regents to maintain formula funding based on each university's enrollment and mix of academic programs. It also provides evidence that the universities themselves have continued to possess influence which they exercise directly in the appropriations process and that their ability to secure appropriations other than those recommended by the Board of Regents appears to be increasing.

Although the universities continued as influential actors in the appropriations process after the establishment of the Board of Regents, the Board of Regents did cause some significant altering of influence patterns existing under the IUC. In selecting Dr. John Millett, President of Miami University, as the first Chancellor, Governor Rhodes secured the leadership of a man already knowledgeable about higher education/state government relations in Ohio. Additionally, as a scholar of public administration, Dr. Millett brought with him definite ideas concerning the higher education/state government interface and gave strong direction to their establishment.

It is apparent that Dr. Millett felt the Regents should assume the policy development function for the executive and legislative branches of government on issues regarding higher education appropriations. Under the IUC, the university presidents had fulfilled this role. Dr. Millett moved on three fronts to transfer this role to the Regents. First, a data information system was designed and implemented by the Board of Regents staff. This information system,
receiving data from each of the state universities, established the Regents as a source of expertise on policy issues relating to appropriations. Second, the Governor's pointed reminder to the university presidents to stay away from the Statehouse firmly established the Chancellor as the ranking, on-site representative of higher education before the legislative and executive branches. Third, Dr. Millett worked closely with Governor Rhodes, developing the Governor's trust and support.101

Dr. Millett became somewhat of a political ally of Governor Rhodes, consenting to the Governor's request that he give a nominating speech in support of the Rhodes' favorite son candidacy at the 1968 Republican Convention. This act resulted in some members of state government and the academic community criticizing Dr. Millett.

In discussing the exercise of influence in the appropriations process after the establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents, Dr. Millett suggested that the higher education appropriation was decided by a relatively small group of politically influential individuals:

[The appropriation] depends in large measure upon the state's political leadership, reinforced by interested individuals among the political elite. It has been my experience that the key person in the development of higher education policy in a state is the governor.102

101 Millett, Politics and Higher Education.

This evaluation of the governor as the key person in higher education policy development was undoubtedly true in Ohio during the first two Rhodes administrations. The Governor held commanding majorities in both houses of the legislature and the legislature was content to enact the Executive Budget with only slight modification. With the Governor firmly in command of the appropriations process and looking to the Chancellor and his staff for policy advice, the university presidents' opportunity to exercise influence in the appropriations process was significantly reduced.

With the election of Democrat John Gilligan as Governor late in 1970, influence patterns established during the eight years of the Board of Regents existence began to change. The Chancellor, identified as a political ally of Republican Governor Rhodes, soon announced his intention to resign effective June 30, 1972. In the state legislature election in November, 1972, the Democrats gained control of the Ohio House of Representatives. Each of these developments served to alter the close relationship which had existed between the Chancellor and the executive and legislative branches of government and provided the university officials with an opportunity to re-assert themselves as actors in the appropriations process.

Recognizing that the Board of Regents was composed primarily of Rhodes appointees, Governor Gilligan elected to appoint an acting Chancellor upon Dr. Millett's resignation. It was not until July, 1973, that Dr. James A. Norton, Director of the Cleveland Foundation, was appointed Chancellor. The void left by the departure of Dr. Millett and the subsequent delay in appointing a new Chancellor
further presented the university officials with an opportunity to re-
assert themselves.

Another indication of a weakening of the Board of Regents' influence with the legislative and executive branches in higher education under the Gilligan administration was a provision in the 1973 appropriations act for the creation of the Citizens' Task Force on Higher Education. The Task Force, composed of prominent citizens, legislators, and representatives of both the public and private universities, was to report on the following topics:

- Relations between the public and the private sector, including development of a plan for contracting for the services of private colleges during 1975.

- Relations between the four-year and the two-year institutions, and needed future developments.

- Present and future enrollment in post-secondary education related to the state's and the nation's manpower needs.

- Role of the Board of Regents with respect to both the public and the private sectors.103

As preparation for the 1975 appropriations session of the legislature began, the higher education/state government environment in Ohio appeared unsettled. After remaining vacant for a year, the Chancellorship of the Board of Regents had recently been filled by someone with little previous experience in higher education. With

interim leadership at the Board of Regents, university officials were presented with the opportunity to become more active in seeking to influence the legislative and executive branches of state government. The Citizens' Task Force on Higher Education was probing all facets of higher education in Ohio and would report prior to the 1975 legislative session. Each of these developments was likely to impact on existing influence patterns in the higher education appropriations process.
CHAPTER V

FORMULATION AND ENACTMENT OF THE
1975 HIGHER EDUCATION APPROPRIATION IN OHIO

The exercise of influence by the primary actors in the higher education appropriations process can best be analyzed by following that process from the development of the budget request by the Board of Regents through the signing of the appropriations act by the Governor. In Ohio, this process is divided into six distinct steps: formulation of the Board of Regents budget request; drafting of the appropriations bills; consideration and enactment of the appropriations bill by the House of Representatives, consideration and enactment of the appropriations bill by the Senate; reconciliation of the House and Senate actions through a Conference Committee; and action of the Governor on the legislative appropriations act. Within each of these steps, one or more critical decision points are reached where the primary actors exercise influence to achieve desired outputs. Authority, expertise, and constituency support possessed by each actor are mobilized to influence the political system. Coalitions are formed and conflict develops between sets of actors at these critical decision points.

104 This study did not attempt to provide a quantifiable measure of the influence possessed by each set of policy actors. Rather, influence is evaluated by viewing the degree to which the policy actors were able to elicit the outputs they sought from the political system.
Formulation of Board of Regents Budget Proposal

An important factor with which the actors in the higher education appropriations process must contend is the state's historical level of support for higher education. Ohio has historically placed low in state rankings of two generally accepted measures of higher education support - per capita appropriation for higher education and percentage of state general revenues appropriated for higher education (see Tables 6 and 7, page 94).

The low ranking of Ohio's per capita appropriation for higher education can be largely attributed to a political culture in which the state has historically provided a low level of public services. During four of the past eight years, Ohio has ranked 50th among the states in state expenditures per citizen.105

Ohio's low level of support for public services in general would make its support for higher education appear low in comparative analyses, unless an usually high percentage of the state budget was set aside for higher education. Such is not the case. Because the percentage of general revenues going to higher education in Ohio is below the national average, Ohio's comparative position is further lowered. In the two rankings of support for higher education discussed above, the five poorest states rank ahead of Ohio.106


106Glenny and Kidder, State Tax Support.
### Table 6a

**Ohio Per-Capita Appropriations for Higher Education, 1968-74**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Ohio</th>
<th>U.S. Average</th>
<th>Ohio's Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>$22.38</td>
<td>$28.59</td>
<td>43rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>24.52</td>
<td>34.69</td>
<td>46th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>24.73</td>
<td>34.97</td>
<td>46th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>30.19</td>
<td>41.91</td>
<td>47th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>32.27</td>
<td>46.41</td>
<td>48th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Lawrence J. O'Brien, Comparing Ohio's Higher Education Fundings with Other States (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio Board of Regents Staff Paper, 1974).*

### Table 7b

**Percent of General Revenue Appropriation Allocated to Higher Education, 1968-74**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Ohio</th>
<th>U.S. Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968-69</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-70</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972-73</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-74</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*O'Brien, Comparing.*
A study of the higher education appropriations process in Ohio must begin with the realization that state support for higher education has historically been low and those seeking to secure state funds for higher education are starting from a disadvantaged position. Several reasons for this low level of support may be identified. First, in the first half of the nineteenth century, a large number of church-related and private colleges were founded in Ohio. Enrolling over half of all students in higher education in Ohio until the mid-twentieth century, these private and church-related colleges developed a public perception that Ohio's needs in higher education were largely being met by the private sector without aid from the state. Second, a political culture evolved in Ohio which funded state services at a low level. Not until 1972 was a state income tax enacted. A third factor in Ohio's low level of support for higher education is postulated by John Millett:

It appeared to me that the wealthy social, economic, and political leaders of the State sent their sons and daughters to the major private colleges and universities of the East. Everyone was well aware that the men in the Taft family were Yale men. The state universities existed to provide educational opportunity for the sons and daughters of school teachers, preachers, the artisans, and other middle class citizens, and there was no need to spend any undue amount upon their education.\(^{107}\)

During the 1973 legislative session, a number of concerns were voiced about the adequacy of higher education opportunities for the

\(^{107}\)Millett, Politics and Higher Education, pp. 15-16.
citizens of Ohio. Largely as a result of these concerns, the 1973-75 biennial appropriations act, HB 86, provided that a Citizens' Task Force on Higher Education, composed of legislators, citizens, and university officials, was to be convened. University officials were quick to recognize the potential value of the Task Force as a public forum and advocate for greater state support of higher education. In many ways, the work of the Task Force became the preliminary activity in an effort to improve significantly funding for higher education in the 1975 legislative session. A member of the Task Force staff stated: "There was a feeling that the Board of Regents had not done a particularly effective job of communicating the needs of higher education to the legislature and Governor. The Task Force was seen as a way to publicize the real needs of higher education."

Reporting in May, 1974, the Task Force was especially critical of the low level of funding for higher education in Ohio. Though not directly charged to study finances by the legislative mandate establishing the Task Force, nearly one-third of the report and its recommendations was devoted to the finance issue. Noting that improved access and quality in higher education would become "empty hopes and unfilled promises unless the State of Ohio is willing to increase substantially its dollar commitment to learning beyond the high school," the Task Force recommended:

Recommendation #22: State funding for all of higher education should be substantially increased.
Recommendation #23: The General Assembly should continue to use the enrollment-based formula for allocating biennial appropriations to public colleges and universities. Institutions must be given the necessary resources to permit excellence in the delivery of instructional, research and public service programs and services. This should be an important public policy objective for the State of Ohio.

Recommendation #24: The enrollment-based subsidy model should reflect actual cost data for personnel, instructional programs, general operations and costs due to inflation through the development of a cost-indexing system by the Board of Regents.108

While the Task Force Report, setting the stage for the drive for greater state support, was being finalized, the Board of Regents staff, in consultation with university officials, was engaged in one of the most critical activities of the appropriations process: the setting of instructional subsidy models and university enrollment projections. During the 1973-75 biennium, subsidy models were utilized based on eight levels of program classification: 1) General Studies, 2) Technical Education, 3) Baccalaureate General, 4) Baccalaureate Professional, 5) Master's Programs, 6) Graduate Professional, 7) Doctor's Programs, and 8) Medical Programs. Because several of these program classifications contained a wide variety of academic programs with considerable variance in cost, the Regents staff and some university officials felt additional classifications were needed. By developing additional classifications, each subsidy model would more accurately reflect the actual costs associated with the academic programs funded through that model.

It is important to remember that instructional subsidy models are based on the costs associated with the academic programs grouped within each model. Because the highest funding model (Medical II) is nearly 15 times greater than the lowest (General Studies I), each university's appropriation is determined by two factors: the mix of its academic programs and the number of student credit hours projected at each subsidy level. In consultation with university officials during 1974, Board of Regents staff set about identifying the cost of each academic program at each university during the 1973-75 biennium, grouping programs according to similar cost levels, averaging the costs of programs within each level among the universities, and projecting the increased cost of these programs during the 1975-77 biennium. From these analyses of instructional cost, it was decided that sixteen subsidy models would provide the necessary sensitivity to variations in costs between academic programs.

While the setting of instructional subsidy models may appear to be little more than a mathematical exercise, the way in which academic programs are grouped and the subsidy set for each model impact significantly on each university's appropriation. The universities are not required, and, in fact, do not, budget internally for academic programs according to the subsidy each program generates. Because of the variation among universities in the cost of each academic program, the assigning of a particular academic program to a Board of Regents subsidy model may generate considerably less funding for that program than the particular university spends for it.
In expanding from eight to sixteen subsidy models, the Board of Regents assigned some academic programs to higher funding levels than before and some to lower. Depending upon the mix of their academic programs, some universities would receive a net funding increase, while others would have fewer dollars to support existing programs.

The nature of the "consultation" between Board of Regents staff and university officials in developing the subsidy models created hostility from some university officials. A university lobbyist, echoing disenchantment encountered in interviews with a number of university officials, charged that "We really weren't consulted. The Regents staff presented the models as an accomplished fact. We could offer suggestions but they (the Regent's staff) developed those models." Another concern voiced by some university officials was that increasing the subsidy models from eight to sixteen was a move away from descriptive budgeting to prescriptive budgeting. Although continual expansion of the number of subsidy models would eventually eliminate university discretion in internal budgeting, the universities seemingly have little to worry about in this regard. "We increased the number of budget models to sixteen to make them more sensitive to the costs associated with particular academic programs and to overcome some glaring inequities," stated Dr. James Norton, Chancellor of the Regents. "Expanding the number of categories further would lead to undue interference in internal university budgeting. I don't feel we will propose further expansion of the models." A university president felt the conflict between university officials and the
Regents staff over the number and level of subsidy models was counterproductive and urged his colleagues to turn their attention to the common goal of greater funding:

Sure, the Regents' models were inequitable for some universities; models based on state averages always will be. But the point was that if we got involved in arguing among ourselves and with the Regents over the models, we would alienate our legislative friends and lose an opportunity to increase the funding of every university. The models are reevaluated every two years, so inequities could be corrected. I urged the presidents to close ranks, accept the models, and devote their attention to the larger issue of adequate funding.

This point of view prevailed among the presidents in their Inter-University Council discussions of the subsidy models and a potentially divisive and harmful conflict between university officials and the Regents staff was avoided.

Concurrent with the establishment of instructional subsidy models, the Board of Regents staff, again in consultation with each university, developed enrollment projections. Because each university's instructional appropriation is the product of each subsidy model multiplied by the number of full time equivalent students projected at that level, university officials are very sensitive that the Regents enrollment projections be as high as practical. University concern in this regard is well founded. If a university achieves ninety-six percent of its projected enrollment in any year, it is awarded one-hundred percent of its subsidy. However, if a university achieves more than one-hundred percent of its anticipated enrollment, it must go to the State Controlling Board to obtain the additional money it has earned. In the past, there have been times when the
Controlling Board had no additional funds to allocate to the universities and they received no subsidy for the additional students.

The plight of Ohio University, beset with steadily declining enrollments since 1970, provides insight into the manner in which enrollment projections can become laden with political significance. From an enrollment of 19,314 students in 1970, Ohio University had declined to nearly 12,000 students in 1974. Because of the sensitivity of the instructional subsidy models to enrollment, Ohio University found itself in a downward spiral of retrenchment as it approached the 1975-77 appropriations process. Board of Regents enrollment projections forecasted Ohio University enrollment stabilizing at around 10,000 students. Ohio University officials felt that those projections, if made public, would seriously hurt the university's image and become a self-fulfilling prophecy by causing potential students to go elsewhere. They attempted to get the Regents staff to project an enrollment of 13,500, based on renewed efforts to recruit students, a change of presidential leadership, and the establishment of a college of osteopathic medicine at Ohio University. Board of Regents staff, on the other hand, felt that in spite of these efforts, enrollment at Ohio University would decline to 10,000 and university officials should begin immediately to plan to stabilize the university at that size. "Ohio University just wasn't being realistic," stated a member of the Regents staff. "To plan for a university of 10,000 students would necessitate making agonizing decisions on what the university would look like at that size. We
could no longer continue to support OU in a year to year crisis environment which showed no indication of improvement."

In spite of the pleas from Ohio University that the Regents project a higher enrollment, Regents staff announced the projection of a declining enrollment. While not wanting to alienate the Ohio University Board of Trustees and university officials, the Regents' credibility before the executive and legislative branches of state government, as well as with the other universities, would likely have been diminished had they increased their projections for Ohio University, projections the Regents staff felt would never be realized.

The Ohio University enrollment projection issue emphasizes the highly political nature of decisions which are made throughout the appropriations process. The Speaker of the House and Chairman of the House Finance Committee, probably the two most influential actors in the appropriations process, both represented districts in the region where Ohio University is located. Reflecting the concerns of their constituents, these men were concerned that Ohio University receive adequate support and that its future health not be impaired by low enrollment projections made by the Regents staff. The Regents showed sensitivity to these concerns by supporting in the Ohio University appropriation two "special subsidies" - one to fund bond payments on unoccupied dormitories (3.6 million) and one to provide additional operating funds (beyond those generated through the instructional subsidy models).
For the 1975-77 biennium, the instructional subsidy models comprised 72% of the higher education budget request. The remainder of the request, with the exception of special subsidies, was line-item appropriations for a variety of essentially non-instructional activities: public service, agricultural research, student assistance, the expansion of medical education, and educational television. These monies would flow both to universities and to state agencies, such as the Ohio Instructional Grant Commission, for the support of specified activities.

Responding to and reflecting the recommendations of the Citizens' Task Force that "state funding for all of higher education should be substantially increased," the Board of Regents budget request totalled 1 billion, 300 million, a 555 million increase of 70% above the preceding biennium. Following endorsement of the 1.3 billion budget request by the Board of Regents during the summer of 1974, Chancellor Norton began an unprecedented campaign to build public support for increased funding of higher education. First, he held a series of meetings with state newspaper publishers and editors to acquaint them with the necessity for greater funding of higher education if the recommendations of the Citizens' Task Force were to be implemented. Second, he gave tacit approval to the efforts of acting Senate Democrat Leader Oliver Ocasek, a professor at the University of Akron, and former Senator Robert Stockdale, a vice president at Kent State University and a Republican, to organize a higher education/state legislator retreat at Atwood Lake State Park in September to lobby for
legislative support of the Regents' request. Third, he met with Governor Gilligan and won approval to announce publicly the Regents' budget request at their September meeting.

Such activities represented a significant, and later controversial, departure from the way state agencies have traditionally negotiated their budget requests with the executive and legislative branches. In this process, heads of state agencies would meet with the Governor's Director of Finance who would communicate to them a control figure which their budget request should approximate. Lobbying by the agency heads with the Office of Budget and Management would continue through the fall until the Executive Budget was established and made public. Individual agencies would not publicly announce their request and would give public support for the recommendation in the Executive Budget.

Dr. Norton's decision to make public the Regents' request four months earlier than the other state agencies may be attributed to two factors. First, it was public knowledge that the public school (K-12) lobbies had been organizing for a massive campaign in behalf of greater state funding for K-12 education in the 1975 legislative session. The Education Review Committee, a legislative study commission probing public school finance, was set to report in late 1974. By announcing the Regents' request in September, it was hoped to focus public attention on the needs of higher education prior to the assault by the public school forces and begin to organize for legislative action. At a September 10 meeting to discuss the Citizens' Task Force Report held at The Ohio State University, Dr. Joseph Tucker,
chairman of the Government Department at Ohio University and consultant to the Task Force, reminded the participants: "If you want more out of the system, you have to organize for political muscle." A member of the Board of Regents, Ms. Mary Ludlum, echoed Tucker's theme: "We should be fighting as hard for higher education as other state agencies fight for their areas."109

A second factor in Dr. Norton's decision to "go public" with the higher education budget request was his belief that "it doesn't do any good to talk about funding in the abstract. If you are going to lobby the legislature, you have to say what the price tag is." It would be impossible, in his view, to undertake a lobbying effort without talking about the specifics of the Regents' program.

Governor Gilligan's willingness to allow the Regents to make their budget request public stems from several considerations. The Board of Regents, unlike most state agencies, is an independent body appointed by the Governor with the consent of the Senate. With an independent agency, the Governor lacks the authority to direct its actions. While it may be a political mistake for independent agencies to act contrary to the Governor's wishes, he cannot prohibit such acts. Governor Gilligan undoubtedly recognized this and decided not to oppose the Regents. Perhaps more importantly, the Governor had begun his campaign for reelection and, in his public statements, was supporting increased support for higher education, though not endorsing any

109Citizen Journal, Columbus, September 11, 1974.
particular amount. Governor Gilligan had reminded the Chancellor that while he endorsed making the Regents' request public, he was not taking a position on support of that request. Once reelected, the Governor could make policy choices without having to weigh their impact on his campaign.

Governor Gilligan's opponent in his reelection bid was former Governor James Rhodes (1963-71). Primarily because it was Governor Rhodes who established the Board of Regents in 1963, a number of members of state government expressed surprise when Rhodes announced during the campaign that he was considering "abolishing, reorganizing, or redirecting" the Regents. This was desirable, Rhodes stated, for three reasons. First, since establishment of the Regents, higher education had been made available within thirty miles of every resident of Ohio, fulfilling a major goal of the Regents when created. Second, the Regents, in Rhodes' view, had moved to a political advocacy role, contrary to his original concept of the body. Third, the Regents had become too involved in the internal operation of the universities, an issue on which Rhodes claimed to receive support from the university presidents.

While Rhodes' aides insisted that his desire to lessen the influence of the Regents was largely attributed to the above concerns, some university officials and legislators later stated that they felt that Rhodes was angered by the Regents' public announcement of their

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110 Columbus (Ohio) Dispatch, 24 November, 1974.
budget request, a move he felt was designed to aid the Gilligan reelection campaign. Additionally, by attacking the political role of the Regents, Rhodes was putting Chancellor Norton on notice that he would not tolerate the Regents' violating the traditional budget process in an effort to increase their share of the state budget. As was the case in the previous Rhodes' administration, the Chancellor would be expected to follow executive policy with regard to higher education appropriations.

With most state newspapers and polls predicting the reelection of Governor Gilligan, Ohioans awoke on November 6 to find that former Governor Rhodes had been elected to a third term with a plurality of less than one percent of the vote. Not the least surprised was Governor Rhodes himself, who had appeared at a press conference in Columbus the night before to concede defeat. The Democrats, while losing the governorship, won control of the Ohio Senate with a 21-12 margin and upped their membership in the House of Representatives to a 59-40 majority. Leadership of the state Democrat Party was thus transferred to the Speaker of the House and Senate Majority Leader. With the Democrats holding comfortable margins in both houses of the legislature, conflict between the executive and legislative branches in the upcoming appropriations process appeared assured. University officials, most of whom had expected the reelection of Governor Gilligan,\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{111}Interview with Inter-University Council staff.
now had to build support with the new governor for increased funding of higher education. University officials, as well as the Regents staff, recognized that Governor Rhodes' election had made the exercise of influence in the appropriations process more complex because of anticipated conflicts in executive and legislative policy. It was the role of the Board of Regents, however, on which Governor Rhodes' election likely had the greatest impact. Uncertainty over what fate Rhodes would propose for the Regents, as well as his disinclination to communicate with the Chancellor, had appeared to lessen the influence of the Regents as the next phase of the appropriations process was approached. Rather than devote full attention to the higher education appropriation, Board of Regents staff were diverted to defending the Regents against the Governor's attack, and the inclination of some legislators to reduce substantially the Board of Regents budget request.

**Preparation of Budget Bills**

The outgoing governor is required by the Ohio Revised Code to submit to the legislature a proposed budget for the next biennium when it convenes in January. During the autumn of 1974, the Office of Budget and Management, the Governor's fiscal staff agency, had been working with other state agencies to develop an Executive Budget. This process involved reviewing the budget request of each agency, projecting the state's revenue for the next biennium, and then recommending the allocation of this revenue among the state agencies based on executive policy priorities.
Late in 1974, two factors combined to alter significantly the traditional process through which higher education funds have been appropriated. The defeat of Governor Gilligan, just as the Office of Management and Budget was finalizing the 1975-77 Executive Budget, greatly reduced the influence of this document. "After his defeat, Gilligan just went through the motions of presenting a budget. No one regarded it seriously," stated a former staff member of the Office of Management and Budget.

More significant, however, was a growing sentiment in the legislative branch that through the years it had gradually lost control of the budgetary process to the executive branch. Following the 1971 legislative session, a Legislative Budget Office was created to provide staff expertise in budget matters to the legislature, lessening legislative dependence on the executive branch for budget information. The Legislative Budget Office was not particularly active during consideration of the 1973-75 biennial budget because it was still getting organized and because of reluctance by House Democrats to challenge the first Gilligan budget. According to a member of the House leadership: "We didn't want to kick John Gilligan in the ass by going our own way on the previous budget. This time, though, even if Gilligan had won, we were determined to develop and enact our own budget." Legislative reliance on the executive branch for information was further lessened by actions stemming from a 1973 Legislative Study Commission which recommended that legislative staff be greatly increased. By the time the 1975-77 biennial budget was considered, nearly every Senator had a fulltime legislative aide and
each House member either had an aide or shared one through a pool arrangement. Not only did this increase in legislative staff enable legislators to challenge the budget information supplied by the executive branch, but information supplied by the Board of Regents and university officials was now subjected to greater scrutiny than had been the case in previous legislative sessions.

With additional budget proposals being prepared by the Legislative Budget Office and the Rhodes appointed Office of Management and Budget staff, Governor Gilligan presented his budget recommendations to a joint session of the legislature on January 7, 1975. Under the Gilligan budget, higher education would receive 1 billion 48 million dollars from the state general fund, 289 million dollars less than the Regents request but 36.99 percent more than during the 1973-75 biennium. Because the Gilligan proposal included a number of new programs, instructional subsidies to the universities would be increased only 9 percent for 1976 and 7.9% for 1977. University officials and Regents staff were quick to point out that such increases failed to match the rate of inflation and as such represented a decrease in funding for instructional programs during the next biennium.

Responding to questions about the Gilligan proposal and the anticipated Rhodes budget, the chairman of the House Finance

112 State of the State Address, Columbus, January 7, 1975.
Committee was quick to assert the legislature's budget making authority: "We aren't going to have a Gilligan budget or a Rhodes budget; we're going to have a legislative budget."  

On January 23, 1975, House Bill 155, the biennial appropriations bill, was introduced under the sponsorship of Finance Chairman Shoemaker. This bill was the result of deliberations among the Democratic leadership of the legislature, with staff assistance supplied by the Legislative Budget Office. A general fund appropriation of $1,023 million was recommended for higher education, 18 percent of the total state general fund appropriation. This amount was 25 million less than outgoing Governor Gilligan had recommended. With the introduction of HB 155, the general parameters of the higher education appropriation were established. Nearly six months before the enactment of the 1975-77 appropriations act, the basic policy decisions regarding the funding of higher education in Ohio for the next two years had been made.

The manner in which the appropriation in HB 155 was determined provides significant insight into the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriation process. Because of the determination of the legislature to exert greater influence over the budget, the

113 Columbus Dispatch, 8 January 1975.  
114 Legislative Budget Office, Expenditure Analysis No. 3. (Because of slight differences among various budgeting agencies in calculating appropriation levels, this study will utilize Legislative Budget Office data throughout.)
Legislative Budget Office, in the latter half of 1974, was furnishing revenue projections for the 1975-77 biennium to the legislature. These revenue projections provide an estimate of what the state's level of spending could be for the next biennium. The astuteness of the Legislative Budget Office in predicting a budget surplus toward the end of the 73-75 biennium several months before the executive branch expressed an awareness of the surplus gave the LBO revenue projections high credibility among legislators and state agency heads. While developing revenue projections, the Legislative Budget Office was also attending Board of Regents meetings and holding informal conversations with Regents staff regarding the higher education budget request. Additionally, the Legislative Budget Office staff was receiving data directly from the state universities regarding their budget needs for the upcoming biennium. Following the Board of Regents preparation of its instructional subsidy models, in the summer of 1974, a meeting of the Legislative Budget Commission, composed of members of the House and Senate Finance Committees, was convened and the models were presented. Although the Legislative Budget Office was aware of the 1.3 billion request the Regents would present, the Director of the LBO stated that the Regents' request was arrived at without consultation with his office. Therefore, the LBO felt no obligation to support the Regents' request as it prepared the Democrats' appropriation bill (HB 155).

How, then, was the level of funding proposed for higher education in HB 155 determined? During December, 1974 and January, 1975, a series of meetings were held with the Director of the Legislative
Budget Office and the House and Senate Democrat leadership, including the finance chairmen, in attendance. By this time, it was obvious that the Democrats had sufficient margins in each house of the legislature to enact their own budget bill, provided they could keep their members unified. According to those in attendance, discussion in these meetings centered around revenue projections for the next biennium, the priority to be assigned to the competing claims for state funds, and the strategy to be employed to maintain party solidarity behind the Democrat budget bill. One participant in these meetings described them in the following manner: "First, we determined how much new money we are going to have. Then, we talked about how much would go to education, how much to welfare, and so on. We looked back over the past several bienniums to see who was getting the increases and who had been waiting their turn." Another participant described the priorities: "Our first priority was greater state aid to the public schools. We were all under pressure from back home to ease the burden on our school districts. Our second priority was community health services. Higher education was our third priority, probably because higher education hadn't done too well in the past several budget sessions." An analysis of HB 155 reveals this ranking of priorities to be accurate. Eighteen percent of the general revenue fund would be allocated to higher education in the 1975-77 biennium under HB 155, compared to thirteen percent in the 1973-75 biennium.
The Exercise of Influence

Action in the House of Representatives

Following the introduction of HB 155 in the House, it was referred to the Finance Committee. For purposes of considering the biennial appropriations bill, the House Finance Committee is subdivided into three sections: General Section, Welfare Section and Education Section.

In preparation for Finance Committee consideration of the appropriations bill, the House and Senate Finance Committee chairmen on February 5 jointly sent to each state agency twelve questions to be answered, in writing, regarding their budget request. Most of these questions, actually drafted by the Legislative Budget Office, were concerned with defining the priorities of each agency and identifying its areas of growth. One question, however, was to become more important as the appropriations process progressed:

State in measurable terms the indicators against which you wish the people, through their representatives, to judge your agency's performance one year from now.

115 The House and Senate committees refused to cooperate in another aspect of the appropriations process, joint committee hearings. A legislative study committee had recommended that the House and Senate committees hold a single, joint hearing of testimony on the budget, rather than requiring each state agency to present its testimony separately before each chamber, a time consuming process. While there was support for this among the leadership of the Finance Committees, the chairman of the Education Section of the House Finance Committee failed to go along: "There are two houses of the legislature, each with its own concerns. Joint hearings are a step toward a unicameral legislature and I'm against that." Another legislator suggested that joint hearings would create a conflict between the House and Senate as the leadership of each committee sought to establish its power in a joint committee.

116 Memo from Senator Harry Meshel and Representative Myrl Shoemaker to state agency heads, February 5, 1975.
This question was in preparation for an effort by the legislative leadership to incorporate a new accountability feature into the appropriations act - an expression of Legislative intent of what each agency's appropriated funds were to accomplish. Again, the legislature's concern that it assume greater control over the spending of state revenues was evident.

With HB 155 pending before committee and testimony on the higher education section set to begin on February 19, university lobbying intensified. Each university in Ohio has a designated legislative liaison, or lobbyist, to represent it before state government. Though in close contact with members of the legislative and executive branches throughout the year, the university lobbyists are particularly active during consideration of the biennial budget. During the legislative session, the lobbyists meet as a group at least once a week to chart strategy and share information. According to a longtime member of this group: "We agree to work together in behalf of the total higher education appropriation, yet each member reserves the right to go his own way on special items affecting his university." This tendency toward working together, yet reserving the right to individual action, was clearly seen in two incidents, (to be discussed later) involving special subsidies in HB 155.

One of the few aspects of the appropriations process which is conducted in public is the committee hearing of testimony on the appropriations bill. During the 1973 hearing of the higher education section of the appropriations bill, each university president appeared
before the committee in a session lasting eight hours. This procedure created some degree of ill will among legislators, both with the content of some presentations and the attitude of some university presidents. "All the presidents sounded alike, pleading for more money. One prima donna must have felt he had something more important to do because he kept asking me to let him testify first. He said he had another meeting to attend. I told the Chancellor this time I felt a coordinated presentation would be better," stated the chairman of the Education Section of the House Finance Committee. On February 13, the Chancellor wrote to each university president stating that, after consultation with Dr. Hollis Moore, president of the Inter-University Council, it was decided that a coordinated presentation would be made. Dr. Enarson would speak for the comprehensive, research universities, Dr. Waetjen of Cleveland State would speak for the urban universities and Dr. Newsome would speak for the special needs of Central State, a predominantly black university. Dr. Moore would begin the testimony by describing the needs of the entire system and then focus on the residential universities. There was surprisingly little opposition to this plan from the university presidents, partially because some presidents knew they did poorly before the committee two years earlier and others felt that the hearing had little significance beyond providing a public show. In addition, arrangements had already been made to allow Dr. Bennis of the University of Cincinnati and Dr. Crewson, representing Ohio University, to address the committee in a separate session regarding the special subsidies requested by these universities.
The committee hearing of the higher education budget request was held on the afternoon of February 24. All university presidents were present but, as previously agreed, only Drs. Moore, Waetjen, Enarson, and Newsome spoke. The presidents, in their remarks, reviewed the written material previously submitted to the committee and emphasized the need for increased funding, especially for instructional subsidies, if quality education was to be provided. Questions and comments from committee members were generally supportive of the needs of higher education, although several exchanges between the presidents and legislators demonstrated how seemingly small issues can come to haunt a university official in his relations with state government. The following exchange between committee chairman Jaskulski and Dr. Moore of Bowling Green will illustrate this:

Rep. Jaskulski: Do general fee monies go for intercollegiate athletics?

Dr. Moore: Yes, some.

Rep. Jaskulski: How many hockey scholarships do you give?

Dr. Moore: Sixteen.

Rep. Jaskulski: Isn't it true that most of your hockey players come from Canada?

Dr. Moore: Yes, fourteen of sixteen.

Rep. Jaskulski: How can you come before this committee and say you need a general fee increase when you're using this money to support students on athletic scholarships who aren't even United States citizens?

Dr. Moore: (Silence)
Following the presentations by the university presidents, the committee chairmen asked if anyone else wished to speak. Significantly, not a single faculty member or student was present to testify. Legislators expressed pleasure with the coordinated presentation format and invited any president who did not testify to share any comments he might have with the committee in writing or to request a future time to testify. Outside the committee room following the hearing, one university president who participated in the presentation remarked to several colleagues: "I don't know what any of us are doing here." Subsequent interviews with university officials revealed an impression that the committee hearings do little to influence the legislators, with the possible exception of exerting negative influence if a president appears poorly prepared or fails to respond diplomatically to a particular legislator's pet peeve. After three hours of public discussion, the decision process on the higher education appropriation returned to more familiar surroundings - behind closed doors.

Two features of HB 155 - special subsidies for Ohio University and the University of Cincinnati - deserve special attention because they reveal how universities seek to utilize their constituencies to receive additional appropriations. The problem of declining enrollment and the corresponding reduction in instructional subsidies which had beset Ohio University has already been discussed. To help stabilize the situation at Ohio University, university officials proposed that two special subsidies be included in HB 155; a subsidy of 3.6 million dollars to make debt payments on unoccupied buildings
and a subsidy of 4.5 million dollars to cover instructional costs. The special instructional subsidy was needed primarily to prevent having to reduce the number of faculty members and curtail some academic programs. The Regents recognized the need for some additional funding for Ohio University and supported these subsidies, though at lower amounts than desired by Ohio University officials. HB 155 as introduced allocated no special subsidy to Ohio University for debt retirement or instruction. Recognizing the severe financial problem the university faced, Ohio University officials met with the Speaker of the House to present their case for special subsidies. At the same time, university trustees and prominent alumni began to lobby with key legislators. Ohio University was in a favorable position to exercise influence in behalf of the subsidies - both the Speaker of the House and the chairman of the Finance Committee came from that region of the state. "By mobilizing support back home where people expect legislators to look after local interests, the OU people were able to get the special subsidies put into the appropriations bill when it was rewritten," stated an aide to the Speaker of the House. In a confidential meeting with Ohio University trustees, however, the Speaker let it be known that he could not engage in such intervention on a regular basis. "The Speaker told the trustees that they had best get their house in order because he wouldn't support such a maneuver again," reported a member of the Regents staff. Ohio University officials also were successful in influencing Governor Rhodes, a native of southeastern Ohio, to include special operating and debt
service subsidies in the Executive Budget proposal, thus placing the influence of the Executive branch behind these subsidies.

The University of Cincinnati special subsidy was requested to allow that university to assume full state university status. Previously, the University of Cincinnati maintained dual status as both a municipal and state university. Because of dwindling support from the city, both university and city officials lobbied for full state status. Located in a large urban area, the university had a number of legislators sensitive to its plight. Among these were two of the most prominent black members of the House, Representative Mallory, Majority Floor Leader, and Representative Rankin, chairman of the Welfare Section of the Finance Committee. Interviews with legislators revealed that the House leadership was particularly sensitive to the concerns of the black caucus in an effort to maintain its support in upcoming floor votes on the appropriations bill. The support of the black caucus appeared to work to the advantage of the University of Cincinnati in its effort to win backing for its special subsidy.

On March 13, Governor Rhodes' appropriation bill was introduced in the House (HB 555). The executive budget requested a 1,053 million general revenue fund appropriation for higher education, 30 million more than the House Democrats' bill (HB 155). Significant differences between the House Democrats' and Rhodes' proposals were:
1. The Rhodes bill provided 3 million for an Ohio University Operating Subsidy and 3.6 million for Ohio University Debt Service. HB 155, as introduced, provided no special subsidies to Ohio University.

2. The Rhodes bill provided 1 million to install the Auditor's uniform accounting system among the universities.

3. A contract revision subsidy of 5 million was proposed for the University of Cincinnati, an increase of 2.4 million over the House Democrats' proposal.

4. The Executive Budget adjusted enrollment projections at Ohio University to lower levels, thus decreasing its instructional subsidy. Total instructional subsidy increases for the universities were 9.5 percent and 8 percent respectively for each year of the 1975-77 biennium under the Rhodes proposal, as compared with 9 percent and 7.9 percent under the Democrat proposal.

5. The Rhodes proposal removed the prohibition against the universities raising fees, thus providing them with a potential source of additional income.117

While the Rhodes proposal stood little chance of enactment because of Democrat majorities in both houses of the legislature, It

1171975-77 Expenditure Analysis, No. 3, Legislative Budget Office, Columbus, March 18, 1975.
did provide an expression of executive policy on higher education appropriations, an expression that could not be totally ignored because of the governor's authority in Ohio to exercise a line-item veto of legislative action. By the time HB 555 was introduced, House hearings on HB 155 were nearing completion. The House Democrat leadership refused to hold hearings on HB 555 and the Republicans were left with little to do but wait for the Democrats to bring HB 155 to the House floor.

Although the parameters of the higher education appropriation were determined by the Democrat legislative leadership during December and January, university officials and Board of Regents staff were able to influence some modification of HB 155 as introduced. Once budget hearings were completed, the Democrats retired behind closed doors to redraft HB 155. Significant changes had to be cleared with Speaker of the House Riffe and Finance Committee Chairman Shoemaker, who acted as brokers among the competing claims for state funds. Arriving at a budget which would command solid Democrat support on the House floor was paramount in their deliberations. Major changes made in the higher education appropriations section were:

1. Special subsidies for instruction and debt service at Ohio University were included, primarily because of the ability of Ohio University officials to mobilize local constituency influence on the Speaker of the House and Finance Committee Chairman.
2. The special subsidy to the University of Cincinnati was increased from 2.6 million to 20 million, primarily at the insistence of black members of the House, an element whose support would be critical in House votes on the bill.

3. The special subsidy to Central State University was increased by 1 million, again in response to university influence exercised through black members of the House.

4. A provision was inserted in the bill to allow the state to postpone subsidy payments to the universities during times when the state's cash flow was low. This provision was incorporated with the reluctant and confidential support of the university officials, who were given the choice of agreeing to subsidy payment postponements or a reduction in instructional subsidies.

5. Legislative intent language was inserted to specify the standards against which the universities' use of tax funds would be evaluated in the next appropriations session. The idea of incorporating legislative intent language into the appropriations bill originated in conversations between the House Democratic leadership and the Legislative Budget Office (there was no such language in HB 155 as introduced). The legislative intent language was taken largely from the universities' response to questions in the pre-hearing memorandum from the House and Senate Finance Committee chairmen (see page 114).
6. A prohibition against using state or student fee revenue for intercollegiate athletics was included, at the strong urging of Rep. Jaskulski, chairman of the Education Section of the House Finance Committee. "I believe in putting funds at the central mission of state agencies. With funds so limited, we need to order our priorities," argued Rep. Jaskulski. The House Democratic leadership, under intense university lobbying against such a prohibition, agreed to leave it in but warned that the leadership would not oppose anticipated attempts to remove it on the floor.

Following consideration of amendments to HB 155 by the Democratic caucus in late April, substitute HB 155 was reported on May 9 and floor action was scheduled for May 13. A general revenue fund appropriation of 1 billion 33.2 million was recommended for higher education, an increase of 33.1 percent over the previous biennium. Amid Republican charges that state revenue for the next biennium would be less than expenditures authorized under Substitute HB 155, the bill was passed with all Democrats voting "aye" and all but one Republican (who represented the district in which Ohio University is located) voting "nay." The only change of substance to the higher education section made during the floor session was the removal of the prohibition on using state and general fees for intercollegiate athletics. The sentiment expressed on the floor by one legislator that "athletics do more for Ohio than many of the masters and Ph.D. programs and the snobbery of debates over which departments are best" apparently had wide support; both Democrats and Republicans who had agreed on little
else joined in supporting the removal of the prohibition. University lobbyists seated in the House balcony beamed smiles of success.

An exchange between Republican and Democratic legislators during the floor debate on the appropriations bill underscores the nearly complete control of the Democrat House leadership over the appropriations:

Rep. Rose (Republican): The Education Section of the Finance Committee did not decide the basic policy questions of how the higher education appropriation would be spent. These decisions were made in the Speaker's Office by the senior Democrats on the committee.

Rep. Wilkowski (Democrat): If you want to write the budget, get yourself 50 seats. The majority party writes the budget. You know that.

The higher education general revenue fund appropriation approved by the House was 19.8 million less than provided in the Rhodes budget (HB 555) and nearly 14.8 million less than originally proposed by former Governor Gilligan in HB 155. This appropriation represented a 33.1 percent increase in general revenue funds for higher education over the previous biennium, considerably less than proposed by the Regents but a larger increase than higher education had received in the past several biennia. With action in the House complete, the attention of university officials and Regents staff now focused on the Senate.

The Exercise of Influence in the Senate

Because the Senate Democratic leadership had participated in the sessions during December and January when the general parameters of the appropriations bill were set, significant change in the higher education section of Substitute HB 155 in the Senate was unlikely.
The House Democratic leadership, successful in maintaining party solidarity during debate on the appropriations bill, sent to the Senate a bill which reflected the parameters agreed to by the Senate leadership.

University officials and Board of Regents staff viewed the consideration of Substitute HB 155 by the Senate as an opportunity to have objectionable features of the bill amended. In the weeks prior to consideration of the appropriations bill in the Senate, university lobbyists, usually with a Vice Chancellor of the Board of Regents present, met on a regular basis to identify those features of the House passed bill they would seek to modify or eliminate. Discussion in these sessions focused on those areas of Substitute HB 155 which the universities and Board of Regents found mutually objectionable. "The majority of our concerns were with language, trying to get restrictive language out of the bill," stated a university lobbyist. Among language changes receiving unanimous support from university officials and Board of Regents staff were: removal of language allowing the state to postpone subsidy payments during periods of low cash flow; removal of language requiring uniform faculty contracts at all universities; removal of language imposing uniform accounting procedures; removal of language mandating travel reimbursement procedures; and removal of Legislative Intent language charging the Regents with responsibility for evaluating certain management practices. Agreement was also reached among university officials and Board of Regents staff to press for funding of state mandated salary increases for classified
employees. While university officials and Board of Regents staff agreed the total funds appropriated for higher education needed to be higher, this matter was not given priority in the Senate. A university official reported: "We knew at this point we weren't going to get substantially more money. We decided to try to protect what we had, go after the mandated salary increases, and attempt to get the language cleaned up."

On some of the more significant changes desired in Substitute HB 155 in the Senate, there was not agreement between the Board of Regents staff and the university, nor was there agreement among the universities. The special subsidies to Ohio University, in the view of the Board of Regents staff and many university officials, did little more than prolong a bad situation, rather than correcting it. In conversations with the Senate leadership, Regents staff pressed for an amendment to Substitute HB 155 which would require Ohio University to plan for a stable enrollment of 10,000 students and eliminate the need for continuing subsidies to that university. Also, because of the special subsidies, Substitute HB 155 should be amended so that Ohio University would not receive full funding from the instructional subsidy formula if it attained 96 percent of its projected enrollment, as would the other universities. The Board of Regents staff lobbied the Senate leadership for adoption of these amendments, while the universities (other than Ohio University), quietly passed the word to the Senate leadership that they viewed these amendments as necessary to correct a worsening situation (the Ohio University special subsidies were viewed by the other universities as coming from funds which could
have gone to all universities through increased instructional subsidy formula). "We knew that Ohio University didn't have the friends in the Senate that it did in the House," stated a Regents Vice Chancellor. "The Senate leadership is from northern Ohio and Senator Collins (a Republican representing the Ohio University region) had alienated the Senate leadership, so they weren't likely to heed his pleas for OU. We decided to work in the Senate to tackle the problems with Ohio University."

Another area of disagreement among the universities was state subsidy for teaching hospitals at universities with medical colleges. Universities with medical colleges (led by Ohio State) pushed for a Senate amendment to provide subsidy for the operation of these hospitals. The other state universities, joined by the Board of Regents, argued that the cost of teaching hospitals should be borne by the patients who receive services there. The aid of the Ohio Medical Association lobby was enlisted by the universities seeking the teaching hospital subsidy. Additionally, influential physicians were contacted by the universities to speak with their senator about the matter.

On May 29, a luncheon meeting of the university presidents and the Senate leadership was held at the Athletic Club in Columbus. During this meeting, which lasted three hours, the university presidents presented their mutually desired changes in Substitute HB 155. The items presented by the university presidents had already been communicated to the Senate leadership by university lobbyists and the
meeting concluded, as anticipated, with the leadership promising to give consideration to the objections raised by the presidents.

In the Democratic caucus meetings held in early June, various legislators raised objections expressed by university officials within their districts. A number of amendments to Sub HB 155, requested by university officials or Board of Regents staff, were accepted by the caucus:

1. The special instructional subsidy to Ohio University was reduced from 4.5 to 2.5 million.
2. The special subsidy for revision of the University of Cincinnati's contract with the state was cut in half, from 21 million to 10.5 million.
3. The identification of higher education as the state agency to receive postponement of subsidy payments in periods of low cash flow was eliminated.
4. Authorization for the Auditor of the State to approve university contracts was eliminated.
5. All references and restrictions on intercollegiate athletics were removed.
6. Authorization for the Board of Regents to set minimum enrollments for academic programs was removed.

Not all of the amendments made in the higher education appropriation were to the liking of university officials or Board of Regents staff. Since House passage of Sub HB 155 on May 13, other interest groups had intensified lobbying for increased appropriations. The Senate leadership, concerned that revenue projections on which
Sub HB 155 was based might not be attained, sought to reduce the total expenditures to be authorized in the Senate bill. Caught in this crossfire, higher education lost a total of 23.4 million dollars through Senate amendments. While most of these deletions were for special subsidies at Ohio University and the University of Cincinnati, total instructional subsidies were reduced by over 3 million and equipment funds of 1.5 million were eliminated.

Amendments approved by the Democrat caucus were introduced when the bill was brought to the Senate floor on June 17. As was the case in the House, Republicans lacked sufficient votes to exert an impact on legislative action and all Democrat-sponsored amendments were adopted. With all Democrats voting "aye" and all Republicans "nay," Amended Sub HB 155 was passed by the Senate on June 17. A general revenue fund appropriation of 1 billion, 9.8 million was authorized for higher education, 31 percent over the previous biennium, but 23.4 million less than approved by the House.

Following amendment in one House of the legislature on a bill originating in the other house, the bill is returned to the house of origin to determine if that house concurs with the amendments. Usually, the house of origin will not concur and a conference committee of members of both houses is needed to reach agreement on the final bill. Because the House and Senate leadership was successful in allowing amendments only within the parameters originally agreed to with respect to the 1975-77 appropriations bill, the House, in a surprise move, voted to concur with all Senate amendments and the need for a conference
committee was avoided. The bypassing of the conference committee eliminated a key decision point in the appropriations process where policy actors normally seek to exercise influence and shifted attention to Governor Rhodes as the appropriation process reached its final stage. From this point forward, only action to delete provisions already in the bill could be taken. The opportunity for any increase in appropriations had passed.

The Exercise of Influence in the Executive Branch

Even before the legislature concluded action on the 1975-77 biennial budget, Governor Rhodes was issuing stern warnings that the budget was "seriously underfunded," and he would likely have to reduce authorized spending levels. University officials, taking the Governor's warnings seriously, communicated to the Governor their belief that existing academic programs would be seriously jeopardized if universities were to have their appropriations further reduced. Recognizing that this argument alone would not likely deter Governor Rhodes' fiscal restraint, university officials sought to protect their programs by urging the Governor to veto the legislative restriction against increasing student fees, thus allowing the Governor to reduce appropriations to the universities but allowing the universities to make up the loss by increasing fees. Governor Rhodes viewed this arrangement as an attractive alternative and indicated his willingness to take such action.

In seeking to exercise influence with the executive branch, university officials did not find it advantageous to work with the Board of Regents staff, as they did on some items with the legislature.
"Dolph Norton hasn't seen the Governor since John Gilligan left," stated a university official. "Governor Rhodes won't see him. Rhodes feels the university presidents support his efforts to downplay the Regents and he looks to them for advice on education matters. We have to avoid the Regents when dealing with the Governor." Other university officials expressed the opinion that there was little reason to work through the Regents in attempting to influence the executive branch. The Governor and his staff appeared receptive to working directly with university officials.

Another area in which Governor Rhodes and university officials found agreement was in their dislike of the Legislative Intent language in the appropriations bill. Governor Rhodes viewed the Legislative Intent as nothing more than an effort by the Democrats in the legislature to make state agencies accountable to the Democrats, rather than to the Republican executive branch. University officials viewed the Legislative Intents as a move toward greater state level control over the internal management of the universities, creating the need for even more detailed management information systems. In addition to agreeing to veto the Legislative Intents, Governor Rhodes also agreed to veto some additional authority given to the Republican-controlled Office of Budget and Management. A staff assistant to the Governor attributed these vetoes to "the Governor's belief in government at the local level. He feels the state bureaucracy is too big." Some university officials attributed the vetoes more to political considerations and the Governor's desire to court the support of university presidents. In any case, university officials were able to influence
the Governor to veto two key items in appropriations bill by understanding and taking advantage of political considerations which, to them, were extraneous to the issue at hand.

On another item growing out of the Governor's review of the appropriations bill, university officials did not fare so well. The Governor announced that he would enforce a 2 per cent reduction in spending from the levels authorized for all state agencies in the next biennium. This decision, anticipated by university officials, was minimized by getting Governor Rhodes to remove the prohibition on raising student fees. In the event that state revenues exceed projections, higher education, unlike other state agencies, will gain additional funding beyond anticipated levels, rather than only making up for funding lost in the Governor's cut.

Legislative Democrats, angered by Governor Rhodes' veto of the Legislative Intent language in the appropriations bill and his order to reduce state expenditures by two percent, vowed to attempt to override his vetoes. To do so, the support of sixty percent of the members of both legislative houses was needed. In the Senate, Democrats controlled more than enough seats to override. In the House, however, Democrats were one seat short of the votes required. Republican leaders in the House immediately began to attempt to solidify their members behind the Governor's veto. The outcome of this effort was doubtful because several Republicans represented university towns where increased fees would not be popular with student constituents. Additionally, one Republican represented the district which included
Ohio University, a university which owed much to the influence of the Democrat leadership. It was this lone Republican who had initially voted with the House Democrats to pass Sub HB 155.

Although university officials favored the Governor's vetoes in the higher education section of the appropriations bill, they were careful not to interpose themselves into what was essentially a partisan political conflict. With reminders of the benefits to legislators from the leadership of both parties regarding the benefits of party loyalty when close votes are faced, the House, voting along strictly party lines on July 17, upheld the Governor's veto by a margin of one vote. With this vote, the political process leading to the 1975-77 biennial appropriation for higher education came to a close.
CHAPTER VI

THE EXERCISE OF INFLUENCE IN THE HIGHER EDUCATION
APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS IN OHIO

In Chapter III, six determinants of the exercise of influence were identified for investigation: the identity of the policy actors, the authority determinant, the constituency support determinant, the expertise determinant, the coalition determinant, and the conflict determinant. Research questions (relating to each of these determinants, pp. 54-56) were formulated to guide the study and provide a meaningful way of organizing and presenting the data.

Propositions thought to describe selected aspects of the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriation process in Ohio were developed for each of the six determinants to be studied. During the study, key policy actors were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with these propositions by completing the higher education policymaker inventory (see Appendix A). Responses garnered on the higher education policymaker inventory provided perceptions from a broad base of policy actors on these selected aspects of the exercise of influence. Of the 44 key policy actors who received the inventory, 38 returned it suitable for use in the study, a return of 83 percent.

This chapter first presents the key policy actors' perceptions of the validity of the research propositions as revealed through the
inventory and then utilizes this data, as well as data obtained through interviews, observation, and written sources to posit answers to the research questions.

**Policy Actor Perceptions**

**Regarding the Research Propositions**

The Policy Actor Propositions:

Proposition 1: The primary sets of policy actors who exercise influence in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio are university officials, Board of Regents staff, the legislature and staff, and the governor and staff.

Policy actors' perceptions of the primary sets of policy actors were probed by Item 23 on the Higher Education Policymaker Inventory. University officials and Board of Regents staff were asked to identify those groups with which they initiated contact regarding the higher education appropriation and the frequency of those contacts. Legislative and executive branch members were asked to identify those groups from which they received contacts regarding the higher education appropriation.

Responses of university officials to Item 23 on the Higher Education Policymaker Inventory support the validity of the proposition. University officials report a high frequency of contacts with legislators from their district and with the legislative leadership with regard to the higher education appropriation. Less frequent contact with the executive branch was indicated.
Few contacts with professional interest groups in behalf of the higher education appropriation were initiated by university officials, suggesting that these groups are not perceived by university officials as primary actors in the higher education appropriations process.

**TABLE 8**

**CONTACTS INITIATED BY UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS**

**WITH OTHER GROUPS REGARDING**

**THE HIGHER EDUCATION APPROPRIATION**

(N=12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Contacted</th>
<th>Frequency of Contacts</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governor or staff</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative leadership</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Appropriation/Finance Committees</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators from their district</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural lobbies</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical lobbies</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business lobbies</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor lobbies</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td>(None reported)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Board of Regents staff were asked to identify those groups with which they initiated contacts regarding the higher education appropriation and the frequency of those contacts. Responses of Regents staff on the Higher Education Policymaker Inventory indicate a high frequency
of contact was initiated with members of the executive and legislative branches regarding the higher education appropriation, while few contacts were initiated with professional interest groups. These responses indicate that Board of Regents staff view the executive and legislative branches as primary actors in the higher education appropriations process and maintain frequent contact with executive and legislative branch members as they seek to influence the higher education appropriation. Board of Regents staff, like university officials, initiate few contacts with professional interest groups, suggesting that these groups are not viewed as primary policy actors in the process through which the higher education appropriation is determined.

TABLE 9
CONTACTS INITIATED BY BOARD OF REGENTS STAFF
WITH OTHER GROUPS REGARDING
THE HIGHER EDUCATION APPROPRIATION
(N=6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Contacted</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative leadership</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Appropriation/Finance Committees</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators from their district</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural lobbies</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical lobbies</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business lobbies</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor lobbies</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: (None reported)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Members of the executive branch were asked to identify those groups from which they received contacts regarding the higher education appropriation and the frequency of those contacts. Board of Regents staff were identified as the group most frequently in contact with the executive branch with regard to the higher education appropriation. All executive branch members also indicated receiving contact from university officials, although less frequently than from Board of Regents staff. Contacts from professional interest groups were minimal, as were contacts from university faculty and students.

**TABLE 10**

**CONTACTS RECEIVED BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH MEMBERS REGARDING THE HIGHER EDUCATION APPROPRIATION (N=5)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Initiating Contact</th>
<th>Frequency of Contacts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative leadership</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University officials</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents staff</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business lobbies</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor lobbies</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural lobbies</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical lobbies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University faculty</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University students</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituents in district</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td>(None reported)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Members of the legislative branch with key roles in the appropriations process were asked to identify those groups from which they received contacts regarding the higher education appropriation and the frequency of those contacts. University officials, Board of Regents staff, and the legislative leadership were identified as those groups most frequently contacting legislators with regard to the higher education appropriation, legislators also reported frequent contact from constituents regarding the higher education appropriation. Legislators reported a low frequency of contacts from professional interest groups and university faculty and students. Contact of legislators by the executive branch regarding the higher education appropriation was also limited, likely because the executive branch made little effort to influence legislators of the other political party.
### TABLE 11

**CONTACTS RECEIVED BY LEGISLATORS REGARDING THE HIGHER EDUCATION APPROPRIATION**  
*(N=15)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Initiating Contact</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor or staff</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative leadership</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University officials</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents staff</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business lobbies</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor lobbies</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural lobbies</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical lobbies</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University faculty</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University students</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituents in district</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati Alumni</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party (in Cincinnati)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Proposition 2: Board support exists among policy actors for the continuance of the Board of Regents as an actor in the higher education appropriations process.

Each policy actor was asked to indicate his degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: "The Board of Regents should continue to review university budget requests and present a unified budget request for higher education." Responses to this statement by policy actors completing the Higher Education Policymaker Inventory support the validity of the proposition; at least 80 percent of the policy actors in each group indicated general agreement with the statement. The high level of agreement within and among groups of policy actors demonstrates broad support for the continued role of the Board of Regents in the higher education appropriations process.118

Proposition 3: University faculty, viewed as an interest group, exert little or no influence in the higher education appropriations process.

Responses of all groups of policy actors indicate general agreement (86%) with this statement (Item 6) and support the validity of the proposition. Although the literature indicates a rising level of faculty interest group activity in some states, university faculty

118Responses of policy actors to each item on the Higher Education Policymaker Inventory are presented in Appendix D.
are perceived as exercising little influence at the state level in the appropriations process in Ohio.

Proposition 4: University officials are viewed as the most influential spokesmen for higher education before the executive and legislative branches of state government.

Each policy actor was asked to respond to the following question: "Which of the following do you regard as the most influential spokesmen for higher education before state government: University officials or Board of Regents staff?" (Item 22) Responses from policy actors indicate that 68 percent perceive university officials as the most influential, while 27 percent perceive Board of Regents staff as most influential, and 5 percent rank them equally influential. University officials were perceived as most influential by a majority of each group of policy actors surveyed, including Board of Regents staff. These data support the proposition that university officials are viewed as the most influential spokesmen for higher education before state government.

The Authority Propositions:

Proposition 5: The authority of the Governor to exercise a line-item veto over higher education appropriations influences legislators to go along with executive branch policy on higher education.

Of the policy actors surveyed, university officials were the only group in which a majority (67%) agreed with this statement (Item 7). Only 13 percent of the legislators felt that the threat of a line-item veto influenced the legislature to go along with executive branch
policy. Among all policy actors, only 39 percent were in general agreement with the statement, questioning its validity as a descriptor of the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio.

Proposition 6: The authority of the Board of Regents to establish formula based appropriations has lessened the ability of university officials to influence the appropriation for their university.

A substantial majority of the policy actors in each of the groups surveyed were in general agreement with this statement (Item 8). Of all policy actors responding, 78 percent perceived that formula based appropriations have lessened the ability of university officials to influence the appropriation for their university, supporting the validity of the proposition as an accurate descriptor of the exercise of influence.

The Constituency Support Propositions:

Proposition 7: Higher education does not possess an active and substantial constituency which exercises influence in the higher education appropriations process.

A majority of the actors within each group surveyed were in general agreement with this statement (Item 9). Among legislators, however, perceptions were closely divided, with only 53 percent expressing general agreement. This indicates that legislators perceive higher education as having a more active and substantial constituency than do the other policy actors. University officials, 83 percent of whom perceive higher education as not possessing an
active or substantial constituency, may be underestimating the influence of their constituency at the state level. These differing perceptions among groups of policy actors of the influence of the higher education constituency place in question the validity of this proposition as a descriptor of the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process.

Proposition 8: Higher education has declined as a priority interest of policymakers in Ohio in the past five years.

Responses from university officials, executive branch members, and Board of Regents staff to this statement (Item 15) indicate their perception that higher education has declined as a priority interest of policymakers in Ohio in the past five years. Among legislators, however, only 40 percent perceive such a decline. Of all respondents, 72 percent expressed general agreement with the proposition. These differences in perceptions among policy actors indicate that higher education remains a priority interest of a significant number of legislators and places in question this proposition as a descriptor of the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process.

Proposition 9: K-12 education possesses a more active and influential constituency than does higher education.

Policy actors expressed near unanimous agreement (97%) with this statement (Item 11), supporting its validity as a descriptor of the exercise of influence. K-12 education is perceived by all groups of policy actors as possessing a more active and influential constituency than does higher education. This finding supports Proposition 3 which
characterizes university faculty as possessing little or no influence in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio.

Proposition 10: University officials work through other established interest groups (agricultural, medical, business, and labor lobbies) to influence the appropriations process.

A majority in all groups interviewed expressed general disagreement with this statement (Item 12), with the exception of executive branch members, 60 percent of whom expressed agreement. Only 30 percent of all policy actors expressed general agreement with the statement, indicating that the proposition probably is not valid as a descriptor of the exercise of influence. This finding further supports Proposition 1 which identifies university officials, Board of Regents staff, the legislature and staff, and the governor and staff as the primary groups of actors in the higher education appropriations process.

The Expertise Propositions:

Proposition 11: The Board of Regents is viewed by policy makers as a more reliable source of information than are university officials on matters relating to the higher education appropriation.

All Board of Regents staff surveyed expressed general agreement with this statement (Item 13), while 91 percent of university officials generally disagreed with it. Executive branch members generally perceived the Board of Regents to be a less reliable source of information than university officials, while legislative branch
respondents were nearly evenly divided in their perceptions of which source provided the more reliable information. The executive branch responses may likely be attributed to the concerns Governor Rhodes raised regarding the Regents and his stated intention to lessen its role. Legislative branch responses likely indicate that the Regents have been more effective in developing trust with some legislators, while university officials have been more effective with others. The variance in responses among groups of policy actors places this proposition in question as a descriptor of the exercise of influence.

Proposition 12: Cost analysis data supplied by the Board of Regents staff to the executive and legislative branches of state government have led to more knowledgeable decision making with regard to the higher education appropriation.

All groups of policy actors indicated a high level of agreement with this statement (Item 14), suggesting that the data base developed by the Board of Regents is looked to and utilized as a source of expertise by the policy actors in the higher education appropriations process. General agreement with this statement indicated by 79 percent of the policy actors supports the validity of this proposition as a descriptor of the exercise of influence.

The Coalition Propositions:

Proposition 13: Informal agreements on feasible appropriation levels are reached between university officials, Board of Regents staff, and key members of the executive and
legislative branches of state government prior to the formulation of the higher education appropriation request.

A majority of members of the legislative and executive branches agreed with this statement (Item 15), as did a slight majority (55%) of university officials. All Board of Regents staff surveyed disagreed with the statement. The perceptions of Board of Regents staff may likely be attributed to the refusal of Governor Gilligan to agree to their original budget request while, at the same time, endorsing the Regents' tactic of attempting to build public support and hence influence the legislature. Because of the legislature's control over the 1975-77 budget, informal agreements on appropriation matters were reached among the legislative leadership and then communicated to the other groups of policy actors. The percentage of policy actors agreeing with the proposition (55%) questions its validity as a descriptor of the exercise of influence.

Proposition 14: During the appropriations process, university officials and Board of Regents staff form a coalition in support of the higher education appropriation.

A majority of the legislative branch and Board of Regents staff indicated general agreement with this statement, (Item 10), while a majority of the executive branch and university officials expressed disagreement with it. Because of Governor Rhodes' concerns with the Board of Regents, it is likely that university officials recognized that coalition with the Regents would be harmful in attempting to influence the executive branch. In attempting to influence the
legislative branch where there was support for the Regents, university officials were perceived in coalition with Regents staff and a high percentage of legislative respondents (79%) expressed agreement with the statement. The variance in response among groups of policy actors places this proposition in question as a descriptor of the exercise of influence. The forming of coalitions between university officials and Board of Regents staff appears to be dependent on who is to be influenced and the ability of university officials and Regents staff to agree on the issue at hand.

Proposition 15: Formula based appropriations have facilitated university officials working together in support of the entire higher education appropriation.

A high level of agreement with this statement (Item 17) was found among each group of policy actors. All university officials surveyed perceived that formula based appropriations had facilitated forming a coalition among the universities in behalf of the entire higher education appropriation. The high percentage of agreement (95%) with this proposition by policy actors supports its validity as a descriptor of the exercise of influence.

The Conflict Propositions:

Proposition 16: Efforts by individual universities to increase their funding through special subsidies result in conflict with the Board of Regents and other university officials.
A large majority of the policy actors in each group surveyed perceived that special subsidies sought by individual universities resulted in conflict with the Board of Regents and other university officials. As the percentage of the higher education budget going to special subsidies has increased (see Table 5), the ability of university officials and Board of Regents staff to avoid conflict among themselves and work together has come under increasing strain. The high percentage of policy actors indicating agreement with this proposition (95%) supports its validity as a descriptor of the exercise of influence.

Proposition 17: The amount of the higher education appropriation is not viewed as a partisan issue.

A majority of policy actors in each group surveyed indicated general agreement with this statement (Item 19). These perceptions reflect the historically low levels of support given to higher education in Ohio (see Tables 6 and 7) in both Democratic and Republican administrations. Executive and legislative budget proposals for higher education in the 1975 legislative session differed by less than two percent. The percentage of policy actors agreeing with this proposition (74%) supports its validity as a descriptor of the exercise of influence.

Proposition 18: Policymakers view higher education and K-12 education as being in competition for state appropriations.
A high percentage (92%) of policy actors indicated general agreement with this statement (Item 20). The defeat of local school levies in Ohio has prompted increasing effort to get the state to assume a greater share of the cost of K-12 education. Increased funding of K-12 education is viewed as likely coming at the expense of higher education. Policy actors' perceptions support the validity of this proposition as a descriptor of the exercise of influence.

Proposition 19: The Board of Regents is viewed by policy-makers as having failed to hold higher education appropriation requests down to reasonable levels.

A majority of the policy actors in each group surveyed indicated general disagreement with this statement (Item 21), with the exception of executive branch members, 60 percent of whom expressed general agreement. Executive branch response to this statement may likely be attributed to the displeasure the Board of Regents incurred from Governor Rhodes when it made public its budget request representing a 65 percent increase above the previous biennium. Disagreement with this statement by 76 percent of the policy actors denies its validity as a descriptor of the exercise of influence.

The Research Questions

Research questions (pp. 54-56) were developed early in the study to focus on significant components of the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio. Data to provide answers to the research questions were sought by gathering perceptions of key policy actors through use of the Higher Education Policymaker Inventory, interviews with key policy actors and knowledgeable
observers, written sources, and on-site observation of the appropriations process. These sources provided a wealth of data which is summarized in the discussion of the research questions which follows.

The Policy Actors

The study sought to identify the primary sets of actors which exercise influence in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio, new groups which may be emerging as actors in that process, and groups presently exercising influence which appear to be assuming a lesser role.

Based on the literature of higher education/state government relations, the study assumed the primary sets of policy actors to be university officials, Board of Regents staff, and the executive and legislative branches of state government. The accuracy of this assumption is supported by data collected during the study. Executive and legislative branch policy actors reported much more frequent contact from university officials and Regents staff regarding the higher education appropriation than from other groups. Similarly, contacts initiated by university officials and Regents staff were directed primarily to members of the executive and legislative branches.

University faculty do not appear to be making inroads as actors in the higher education appropriation process in Ohio. A former faculty member now staffing the Inter-University Council stated: "Faculty members have no notion of what state finance is like. Faculty are oriented to the national scene; they know what's happening in Washington but know little about what's happening in the Statehouse."
The potential of university faculty to become an influential actor in the appropriations process as is the case with K-12 faculty is difficult to gauge. The Senate Majority Leader, himself a university faculty member, and former member of the Ohio Education Association Executive Committee, felt unionization of faculty would be necessary to exercising influence at the state level: "There are 22,000 faculty in Ohio. If they were unionized, they would have great political influence." Most policy actors interviewed took a less optimistic view, pointing out that K-12 faculty number six times university faculty and can exert influence through local political committees in every community in the state. Many policy actors also felt that K-12 education was viewed by the public as a more vital service than higher education and that view contributed to the influence of K-12 faculty interest groups. It does not appear that university faculty will emerge as an influential actor in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio in the foreseeable future.

The degree to which professional interest groups such as the medical, agricultural, labor, and business lobbies have emerged as actors in the higher education appropriations process was also investigated. Interview and questionnaire data indicate that these groups seldom become involved except on occasions when an item in the appropriation is of direct interest to their membership. In most cases, these groups lend their influence only in behalf of capital outlay requests, in which cases there is direct relation between the budget request and a particular professional interest group. On these occasions, the professional interest groups will intercede with
legislators or executive branch members sensitive to the needs of that interest group.

The role of the executive branch of government in the appropriations process is coming under increasing challenge from the legislative branch. The Office of Budget and Management, which traditionally has developed the biennial budget proposal and been the legislature's primary source of fiscal data, appears to have recently been eclipsed by the Legislative Budget Office and a growing legislative staff. While this may be partially attributed to the control of the present legislature by the opposite political party of the executive branch, interviews with legislators of both parties revealed a growing determination to assert the authority of that branch in fiscal matters.

University officials, historically the primary spokesmen for higher education before state government, retain an influential and active role in the appropriations process in Ohio. Although their role has been modified somewhat by the establishment of the Board of Regents, members of the legislative and executive branches expressed broad support for the continued involvement of university officials in the appropriations process. "Universities have to be able to present their case directly to the legislature," stated a member of the Senate leadership. "They provide us with information we don't get from the Regents. After we hear from the universities and the Regents, then we make the decision. We would lose a valuable source of information if we looked only to the Regents."
The Board of Regents' role in the appropriations process appeared to be lessened somewhat in the 1975 legislative session for several reasons. In attempting to assume a greater advocacy role for higher education, the Regents alienated the newly elected governor who questioned the necessity of the Regents continued involvement in the appropriations process. Not wishing to alienate further the governor, the Regents assumed a low profile. The ability of Ohio University and, to a lesser extent, the University of Cincinnati, to deal directly with the legislative leadership further weakened the Regents' role. University officials, cognizant of the Regents position, determined to become even more active in the appropriations process. The Inter-University Council employed a fulltime staff person to assist in coordinating the exercise of influence by university officials at the state level. The ability of the Regents to maintain or increase its role in the appropriations process appears dependent on its ability to reestablish its influence with key policy actors in the executive and legislative branches of state government. To do this, lines of communication with the executive branch must be reopened and the Regents must provide the legislature with expertise on matters relating to the higher education appropriation beyond what is available from other staff sources.

The Authority Determinant

The study sought to identify the authority possessed by each actor in the appropriations process, the way each actor's authority impacts on other actors, the extent to which the authority possessed
by each actor has changed in recent years, and the points in the appropriations process where authority is exercised by each actor.

By provision of the Ohio Revised Code and the Ohio Constitution, the governor is given authority to review the budget requests of all state agencies, to compel data and testimony from the agencies related to these requests, to present a unified executive budget request to the legislature, and to exercise line-item veto of the legislative appropriations act.

While the governor's authority is spread over the entire appropriations process, the legislature's authority is concentrated primarily in the period during which an appropriation bill is under legislative consideration. The legislature possesses authority to establish appropriation levels, subject to executive veto; to compel data and testimony from state agencies, and to establish legislative commissions (like the Citizens' Task Force on Higher Education) to study particular concerns relating to appropriations.

Board of Regents staff possess authority to act for the Board at several important points in the initial stages of the appropriations process. Regents staff may compel the universities to supply fiscal data related to the higher education appropriation, consolidate university budget requests into a unified higher education budget request, and recommend appropriation levels for each of the universities. Because the Board of Regents is an independent agency governed by its own board, it possesses the authority to act independent of executive and legislative direction, except as provided by law.
University officials, acting as agents of university boards of trustees, possess little specific authority to act in the appropriations process, other than to recommend university budget requests and to confer with Board of Regents staff during the preparation of the unified higher education appropriations request. University boards of trustees do not enjoy constitutional status in Ohio and are therefore dependent on legislative acts for specific grants of authority. The boards of trustees are, however, independent from the executive branch and possess the authority to govern the universities free of executive control.

The establishment of the Board of Regents in 1963 with authority to compile and present a unified budget request for higher education impacted significantly on the historical role of the universities in that process. The authority to determine the share of the appropriation each university would receive was transferred from university officials to the Board of Regents. While the Board of Regents developed data based formula for deciding each university's allotment, officials at the universities turned their attention to influencing the Regents staff to make the formulas as sensitive as possible to the needs of their university. Additionally, this development paradoxically guaranteed that university officials would continue to be actors in the appropriations process by directing their attention to securing special subsidies as a means of increasing their share of the appropriation.
The impact of the Governor's authority to exercise a line-item veto over the legislature's appropriation varies with each appropriations session of the legislature. If the governor's political party has sufficient seats in at least one house of the legislature to sustain a veto, this authority of the Governor may be used to influence legislative action. Policy actors generally expressed the view that the veto threat has little influence on legislative action because of the legislature's inclination to exert its own will and then allow the governor to take the credit or blame for items he may veto.

The authority possessed by each group of policy actors in the higher education appropriations process has not changed since the revision of the Ohio Revised Code in 1963 which defined the role of the Board of Regents. What has changed has been the manner in which policy actors, most notably the legislature, have elected to exercise their authority. During the 1970's the legislature has sought to reassert its authority over the state budget. In the 1975 legislative session, the governor's (executive) budget did not even receive a committee hearing. This development has given renewed emphasis to the need for university officials to give primary attention to developing influence with the legislature branch of state government, particularly with the legislative leadership.

An analysis of the process through which the higher education appropriation is developed and enacted reveals eight distinct decision points at which authority is exercised by one or more policy actors as a dimension of influence:
1. Formulation of university budget proposals.
2. Formulation of unified higher education budget proposal by the Board of Regents.
3. Determination by the legislative leadership and governor of the amount to be allotted to higher education in their respective budget bills.
4. House of Representative action on legislative and executive budget proposals.
5. Senate action on the House-passed appropriations bill.
6. Conference Committee reconciliation of differences between House and Senate appropriations bills, if any.
7. Governor's action on legislative appropriations act.
8. Legislative action on governor's vetoes, if any.

University officials, acting for boards of trustees, possess sole statutory authority for determining their budget request made to the Board of Regents. Board of Regents staff possess statutory authority for determining the amount of the unified higher education budget request, with the provision that the Regent's staff confer with university officials. At the next decision point, the Governor possesses statutory authority for recommending an amount in the executive budget proposal to be allocated to higher education. The legislative leadership possesses no such grant of statutory authority for determining the amount to be recommended for higher education in legislative appropriations bills. This authority of the legislative leadership is based on precedent and general acceptance among
legislators who confer authority on the leadership to act in this manner. The House of Representatives possesses constitutional authority to pass a biennial appropriations act and the Senate possesses constitutional authority to review and amend House action. Authority for a Conference Committee to reconcile differences between House and Senate action is conferred by the legislative houses under their rules. The Governor possesses constitutional authority to review and line-item veto legislative action with regard to appropriations. The legislature possesses constitutional authority to review the governor's vetoes and override them if a sufficient majority can be mustered.

The Constituency Support Determinant

The identification of the constituencies of the primary groups of actors in the higher education appropriations process reveals that the actors share many of the same constituencies. As members of institutions in the public domain, university officials, Board of Regents staff, and members of the legislative and executive branches of state government all have the citizens of Ohio as their constituency. While board based public support is important to any public institution, political influence is usually exercised through organized interest groups which seek to make public institutions responsive to the demands of segments of the populace.

The most obvious constituencies of universities are those groups which purvey and receive its services: faculty, students, and alumni. None of these groups, however, are organized to exercise political influence. Although this study gave particular attention to
identifying the role of university faculty in the appropriations process, no significant involvement could be found. Similarly, students also were found to exercise little influence with regard to the higher education appropriation. Alumni, as a group, were found to have little political value to a university. Individual alumni, however, particularly those in prominent political or professional positions in the state, were found to be of assistance to universities in the exercise of political influence. These alumni, usually members of politically influential groups such as medical, agricultural, business, labor, or partisan political organizations, provide access and political clout for universities that policy actors, mindful of their need to maintain good relations with influential constituents, often find difficult to deny.

Policy actors themselves - members of the executive and legislative branches - are themselves constituents of the universities. Universities can provide a public forum, recognition, and services for policymakers which generate political support. At the conclusion of an interview with a Senate leader, he remarked: "I never finished my Ph.D. but I have three doctor's degrees from schools in this state. That's not bad, is it?" A member of the House Finance Committee gave another perspective on what universities may offer legislators: "Universities give me something I don't get from other lobbyists. They give me respectability. Most lobbyists can offer money or votes. The universities give me stature in the eyes of the public." An incident viewed in the Statehouse rotunda gave another view of how universities can build political support. While talking with a university lobbyist,
a legislator approached and reported that his son needed to have a complex operation. The lobbyist gave the legislator the name and phone number of the Dean of the College of Medicine at his university, assured the legislator that he would receive good service, and called the Dean himself to have it arranged.

Unlike the universities, the Board of Regents possesses no clearly delineated constituencies. Created for the purpose of serving as an intermediary between the universities and the executive and legislative branches of state government, all of these may be considered as constituencies of the Regents. Because the policy outputs desired by universities and the executive and legislative branches are often in conflict, the Regents are caught between conflicting desires and must offend one constituency to please another. When asked what he regarded as the Board of Regents' constituency, a Vice Chancellor replied: "We're still looking for a constituency. We haven't found one. When we say no to the legislature or the universities, we make them unhappy. I suppose the Board of Regents survives because it's usually right. We make decisions the legislative and executive branches don't want to make." In this sense, the Board of Regents at times serves its legislative and executive constituencies as a scapegoat which they can criticize for many unpopular decisions the legislature or governor would have to have made.

Because citizens appointed to the Board of Regents frequently hold a prominent position in a political party or professional organization, the Regents themselves possess political influence they can use in behalf of the Board. When the Board of Regents was attacked by
Governor Rhodes in January, 1975, individual Regents quietly conducted a letter and visit campaign with legislators whom they knew personally to solicit support for the Board.

Legislators' constituencies with regard to higher education include the residents of their districts (some of whom are faculty, students, and alumni), their political party, and other interest groups. Responses on the Higher Education Policymaker Inventory and to interview questions reveal that legislators receive little communication from their district constituents regarding the higher education appropriation. Exceptions to this do occur, however, when some part of the higher education appropriation is of particular interest to residents of the district. For example, legislators from districts where farming is a principal industry will at times receive considerable communication about funding for agricultural research programs.

When a university that is important to the economy of a district appears in difficulty, legislators are looked to by the university and district residents alike to provide relief. Such was the case with the Ohio University special subsidies. The legislative leadership, to protect itself in its home district, was forced to exercise the influence of its position in behalf of a local problem.

Political parties on occasion influence legislators on some aspect of the higher education appropriation. In the 1975 legislative session, the Republican Party in Cincinnati, traditionally a Republican stronghold, pressed for the special subsidy to provide greater state funding to the University of Cincinnati. Such funding
would in part relieve city government of its fiscal commitment to the university and put off the necessity of a tax increase.

Interest groups also may look to legislators to use their influence in behalf of some part of the higher education appropriation of interest to their members. Capital outlay funds for professional schools appear to be a particularly fruitful area for this kind of lobbying. Special subsidies for professional schools also receive the attention of interest groups.

The executive branch is subject to the same constituencies as the legislative, with the exception that its focus is more on state-wide than local constituencies. The degree to which constituents seek to exercise influence through the governor appears partially dependent on his degree of control over the legislature. "When Governor Gilligan was in office, we worked through his staff to build support for the higher education appropriation. Now with the Democrats controlling the House and Senate, Governor Rhodes can't be of much help there," explained a university lobbyist.

While Governor Rhodes could do little to influence the higher education appropriation in the legislature, university officials urged the governor to exercise his line-item veto in their behalf. Objecting to some of the legislative intent language in the appropriations bill, university officials urged the governor to veto this language. Governor Rhodes obliged for several reasons. Legislative intent language was viewed by the executive branch as extending legislative control over the operation of executive agencies. Also, the governor viewed the legislative intent language as extending the
authority of the Board of Regents, a trend he had pledged to reverse. University officials were also successful in getting the governor to veto the freeze on university fees, pointing out that the universities needed this additional revenue and Increases in the Ohio Instructional Grant Program would ease the burden of a fee increase on students from the lower to middle economic groups. Constituencies likely to oppose the increase in student fees, primarily university students, lacked any political organization at the state level and had to be content with venting their opposition in student newspapers.

Strategies employed by policy actors to develop and utilize constituency support vary according to the issue at hand. Some generalizations, however, can be made. University officials continually seek to develop broad based support for higher education with influential individuals and groups within the state. University lobbyists visit legislators in their home districts when the legislature is not in session to discuss university needs and maintain continuing dialogue. Universities seek to recognize influential leaders of professional and political organizations by hosting them at public events. In some cases, university alumni mailing lists are made available to political candidates and university services (hospitals, recreation facilities) are opened to state officeholders. Alumni of professional schools who hold leadership positions in medical, business, or agricultural organizations are communicated with regularly by university officials to utilize their influence with political leaders. Legislators in the university's district are
courted heavily by university officials who recognize that a number of these legislators' constituents (students, parents, faculty, staff) are concerned with the university's welfare.

Board of Regents staff, lacking a substantial constituency, attempt to develop support through individual university officials and members of the executive and legislative branches who are dependent on the Regents for assistance in the appropriations process. University officials at the newer universities in the state system which must compete with the older, established universities for state support are likely to view the Regents as protecting their financial well being. These university officials, some of whom have developed close ties with influential legislators, are called upon to solicit legislative support for the Regents. Another constituency through which the Regents can exercise influence is those legislators who are skeptical of the increasing costs of higher education, dubious of the managerial competence of university officials, unwilling to make unpopular decisions about the competing claims of the universities, or who remember the sometimes cutthroat competition which existed between universities prior to the creation of the Board of Regents. These legislators perceive the need for a state-level agency to oversee the higher education system and can be counted upon to resist attempts to weaken the Regents' role in the appropriations process.

Members of the legislative and executive branches of state government, always faced with competing claims which exceed state funding capabilities, must develop priorities for funding public programs. Those who consider higher education to be among the higher priorities
work with university officials and their constituents to influence other policy actors to support the needs of higher education. Those who perceive greater need or political viability from other public services work with the constituents of those services to obtain greater state support. Recognizing that public services are in continual competition for public funds, the effective mobilization of constituency support is crucial to success in the appropriations process.

The Expertise Determinant

This study sought to identify the expertise exercised by each of the primary groups of policy actors, the extent to which the expertise of each actor has changed in recent years, and the manner in which expertise is exercised in the appropriations process as influence.

The wealth of expertise on higher education finance which is present today in the form of national studies, national and state data systems, and the budget and spending reports of state fiscal analysts is a relatively new development. University officials, primarily the university presidents and later the business managers, were the only policy actors to possess expertise with regard to higher education finance in the early days of state funding of higher education. The first recorded attempt to exercise this expertise as influence in Ohio occurred in 1879 when university presidents pointed to the much higher state expenditures for higher education in Illinois, while seeking to increase funding in Ohio. These bits of data describing
comparative spending levels were apparently an important factor in securing the increased funding.

After regular appropriations for higher education were established during the late 1800's, the governor began to look to his staff for expertise in analyzing the university budget requests and arriving at an appropriation recommendation. Prior to 1963, expertise with regard to the higher education appropriation came from two sources: university officials and the governor's fiscal staff. Legislators were largely dependent on these sources for all data with regard to the performance and needs of the universities.

Since the early 1960's, sources and amounts of expertise with regard to the higher education appropriation have grown rapidly. The Board of Regents quickly established a data system through which comparative expenditure data among the universities were generated. Additionally, the Regents assembled a staff with expertise in higher education cost analysis and funding models. This provided both the executive and legislative branches a new source of expertise with regard to the higher education appropriation, a source recognized as likely to provide more objective data than the universities.

University expertise in internal budgeting and expenditure analysis also grew rapidly during the 1960's. The direction of this growth was dictated largely by the requirements of the Regents data system. These data allowed the universities to challenge the validity of some of the information supplied to state government by the Regents. It was largely the Regents, however, who supplied the kinds of
comparative data that allowed the legislative and executive branches to challenge certain aspects of the appropriation request of the universities.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the rise of the Board of Regents as a source of expertise is that university officials can no longer present fiscal data to state government the validity of which is unchecked. The Regents now possess expertise with regard to the appropriation request which allows them to challenge or support data presented by the universities. The legislative and executive branches are thus provided a broader data base from which to make appropriations decisions.

In the early 1970's, the legislature felt the need for expertise independent from the branches of state government on matters related to state finance and established the Legislative Budget Office. Paralleling in many ways the function of the Office of Budget and Management in the executive branch, the Legislative Budget Office provides legislators with in-house expertise and, in some respects, guides legislators' consideration of budget requests. This office provides a challenge to the validity of both university and Board of Regents supplied data and, by lessening legislative dependence on the Regents for expertise, may have lessened its influence with the legislature in the appropriations process.

Expertise with regard to the higher education appropriation is utilized in differing ways by the various actors in the appropriations process. University officials develop information and fiscal data to support the needs of their university and higher education in general.
Because the majority of state funds received by individual universities is based on formula appropriations, university officials develop data to support their contention that the formula underfunds programs at their university and thus should be modified. The Board of Regents staff utilizes its expertise to develop funding formulas it considers equitable across universities and then uses this expertise to answer university criticism. Though it is unlikely either party to the university/Regents debate over funding is likely to acknowledge the expertise of the other party, the important consideration is that both university officials and Regents staff be able to defend their data before the executive and legislative branches, where it may be challenged by another host of fiscal analysts.

Despite the wealth of expertise now available with respect to higher education finance, little progress has been made in developing cost benefit data. This lessens the influence of university officials and Board of Regents staff in the competition for funds with other state agencies, whose outputs are more suited to cost benefit analysis: "We need to be able to demonstrate that if the state spent 100 million more dollars on higher education unemployment would decrease or the citizens would be happier, but we can't," lamented the Chancellor of the Board of Regents.

Expertise of the executive and legislative branches is utilized to challenge the fiscal needs expressed by university officials and Board of Regents staff, as well as to suggest ways in which economies could be realized in the operation of the higher education system. The expertise of the Office of Budget and Management and the Legislative
Budget Office in estimating state revenues for the upcoming biennium is an important element in the exercise of influence. Because state expenditures must be within revenue projections, these projections set the parameters of the biennial budget. A lowering of revenue estimates during a legislative budget session, as occurred in 1975, results in appropriation cuts to some or all components of the state budget. Regardless of how convincing data supplied by university officials and Board of Regents staff may be, the amount of the higher education appropriation is in part determined by the expertise of the executive and legislative branches in projecting state revenue.

The Coalition Determinant

This study sought to identify the decision points in the appropriations process at which coalition occurs between policy actors, the similarities in desired policy system output which result in coalition, and the manner in which coalitions between policy actors have changed in recent years.

Few coalitions among policy actors in the higher education appropriations process were identified during the study. The Citizens' Task Force on Higher Education, composed of university officials, legislators, and private citizens, reached agreement on the need for a substantial increase in state support for higher education but, despite the efforts of the Chancellor of the Regents and the Senate Majority Leader to expand the Task Force into a coalition of influential citizens in support of the Task Force recommendations, little was heard from the Task Force during the legislative session.
The desire of both university officials and Board of Regents staff for larger appropriations for higher education results in these groups forming a coalition to lobby for this result. This coalition, however, is tenuous because of conflicting views within and between these groups over how the appropriation should be divided between the competing needs of the universities. The governor's Director of Finance noted this in his analysis of the relationship between the universities and the Regents: "They both work for and against one another; it depends on the issue. They all seek higher funding but their conflict over how the funds should be spent lessens the influence of their coalition."

Under the coalition that existed within the Inter-University Council prior to the 1960's, each university's share of the higher education appropriation was determined prior to the legislative session. When this coalition of the universities broke down in the early 1960's because of the failure of the universities to agree on their proportionate shares, the Board of Regents was created to recommend to the legislature the distribution of the appropriation among the universities. The arrangement has facilitated the universities once again focusing their attention on maximizing the total appropriation, although data from the inventory and interviews indicate that the growing percentage of the budget going to special subsidies threatens the continuance of this coalition.

The participation of the Board of Regents staff in a coalition with the universities opens it to the allegation that it has been "captured" by the organizations over which it was created to exercise
regulatory powers. Interviews with university officials indicated that they felt the Regents staff should assume an advocacy role for the needs of higher education in coalition with the universities, while some legislators and members of the executive branch expressed the belief that the Regents staff should exercise greater fiscal restraint over the budget requests and future plans of the universities.

The most fruitful ground for coalition among universities in the appropriations process appears to be on those issues which affect all universities in a uniformly positive or negative manner. These issues most frequently are not the fiscal provisions of the appropriation bills but rather concern the bills' language. In the 1975 legislative session, such items as the withholding of subsidy payments to universities by the state during periods of low cash flow, the standardization of faculty contracts, and the prohibition against fee increases were offensive to all the universities and university officials formed a coalition to defeat or modify these provisions. At weekly strategy meetings of the university lobbyists, each lobbyist would assume responsibility for contacting legislators with whom he was on friendly terms to lobby against these provisions. University presidents, meeting monthly, also worked together to eliminate these provisions.

The competition among universities for limited state resources, the differing expectations among policy actors over the proper role of the Board of Regents in the appropriations process, and need for legislators and the governor to respond to numerous and competing constituencies results in few lasting coalitions among actors in the appropriations process.
The Conflict Determinant

The competition for the scarce fiscal resources of the state which characterizes the appropriations process provides an environment in which conflict among policy actors is inevitable.

It was an attempt to eliminate conflict among the universities in the appropriations process which led to the founding of the Inter-University Council in 1939. In the early 1960's, conflict developed within the IUC when the universities could no longer agree on their respective portions of the higher education appropriation and this conflict resulted in the Council losing its position as a primary actor in the appropriations process. The establishment of the Board of Regents in 1963 was an attempt by the legislative and executive branches of Ohio government to reduce conflict on appropriation matters among the universities and between the universities and state government. This would be accomplished by interposing an agency between the universities and state government which would recommend appropriations based on objective criteria rather than historic spending patterns and political influence.

The degree to which conflict in the appropriations process has been eliminated since the establishment of the Board of Regents may be evaluated by viewing the exercise of influence at several critical decision points in the appropriations process. At the first critical decision point, the setting of instructional subsidy formulas and university enrollment projections by the Board of Regents staff, conflict was found among the universities and between the universities and Board of Regents staff. Each time the number of instructional
subsidy formula has increased and academic programs have been reclassified to different formula levels, some universities have experienced a decrease in funding from levels anticipated under the previously existing formulas. Each university, seeking to maximize its appropriation, attempts to influence formula funding levels and the assignment of academic programs to particular formula which will yield to that university the largest possible appropriation. The Board of Regents staff relies on historical expenditure levels and the nature of the instruction (class size, facilities required) to determine instructional subsidy models. Universities tend to argue that instructional subsidy models tend to ignore the "uniqueness" of certain academic programs and consideration of quality between universities. After consulting with the universities, the Board of Regents staff must finally set instructional subsidies and group academic programs in a manner it can support from the data it has collected. Similarly, universities seek to have their enrollment projection established at as high a level as they can support because the line-item instructional subsidy appropriation for each university is the product of the formula amount allocated to each instructional level times the number of fulltime equivalent students projected at that level.

When a particular university feels it is being underfunded by instructional formula levels or enrollment projections set by the Board of Regents staff, it may ask a friendly legislator (usually representing the district in which it is located) to intercede with the Board of Regents staff in its behalf. A member of the House of
Representatives recounted his experience with seeking to modify the Regents' formulas as follows: "The people at Bowling Green explained to me how they were being penalized by the new formulas. When compared to Toledo, Bowling Green was substantially underfunded. I talked to the Board of Regents about this but didn't have much success. I'm just one poor Republican trying to protect my university while Toledo has a host of Democrats working for it." A Vice Chancellor of the Board of Regents discounted this political view of the funding models: "Each university tries to influence us to write the formulas in a way that it finds beneficial. For us to yield to political pressure on this would be suicide. We have to take the data we have, make objective decisions, and stick with them." Significantly, once the Board of Regents budget request has been finalized and sent to the legislature, no effort has ever been made to amend the instructional subsidy models set in the bill. A university official long involved in the biennial appropriation battles attributed this to fear among the universities that such an effort would be counterproductive: "If we once start arguing with the legislature over the various funding levels, we would cause a bloodbath. Legislators would see that as nothing more than an effort to make each university's appropriation a measure of its political clout and would play one university against another. Besides, most legislators don't understand the subsidy models anyway and we would all end up with less money." While university officials have been hesitant to challenge the instructional subsidy models in the legislature in the past, this appears to be an area for potential conflict in the future as one or
more universities, faced with rising costs and a static or declining enrollment, comes to view a legislative revision of the instructional subsidy as its only recourse to financial solvency.

Another decision point at which conflict is present is at the setting of special subsidies in the appropriations bills. Most policy actors (95%) indicated on the higher education policy maker inventory that they perceived efforts by a university to increase its funding through special subsidies resulted in conflict with other universities and the Board of Regents staff. As the percentage of the higher education appropriation going to special subsidies has increased in recent years (see Table 5), the potential for conflict at this point has grown. During the 1975 legislative session, special subsidies for Ohio University and The University of Cincinnati generated conflict across each of the four sets of primary policy actors. Ohio University, feeling that the Board of Regents budget request failed to show sensitivity to its problem of a declining enrollment, worked through influential legislators to secure two special subsidies. The Board of Regents staff, feeling that these special subsidies represented a unique expenditure of public funds and a challenge to its authority to review university budgets and allocate the higher education appropriation to the universities, opposed them. Officials of the other universities, perceiving that such special subsidies would come at the expense of instruction subsidy appropriations to the other universities, joined in opposition. Both the Board of Regents staff and university officials, recognizing that the House leadership was necessarily committed to these special subsidies because of constituent
political considerations, directed their efforts to defeating them to the Senate. The opposition to the Ohio University special subsidies maintained a low profile for several reasons. Neither the Board of Regents staff nor university officials wanted to cause the House leadership public embarrassment on this issue, largely for fear of reprisal against their appropriations. Also, there was recognition of the precarious position Ohio University was in and both university officials and Regents staff were cognizant that negative publicity for Ohio University would only compound its problems. Additionally, there was concern that public awareness of the Ohio University situation would reflect negatively on support for all the universities.

In confidential meetings with the Senate leadership, university officials and Board of Regents staff urged an amendment to the House-passed appropriations bill either to reduce the special subsidies to Ohio University or to require Ohio University to develop a plan for the university at an enrollment level of approximately 10,000 students. Ohio University officials, seeking to protect their House-passed special subsidies, presented a conflicting point of view, i.e., that the instructional subsidy formulas failed to be sensitive to the problems of a university with declining enrollment and that any requirement that Ohio University submit a plan for 10,000 students would become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Senate leadership, representing districts in the state distant from Ohio University, viewed the special subsidy as a source of revenue for projects of more interest to their own constituents, and were agreeable to suggestions from university officials and Board
of Regents staff that the Ohio University special subsidy be reduced. "By cutting the Ohio University subsidy, we told the Ohio University people that we wouldn't reward failure to deal with their problems; yet, we allowed the House leadership to save face back home." Of the 4.5 million special operating subsidy voted by the House, university officials and Board of Regents staff were successful in having it reduced by two million dollars.

The special subsidy to provide for the University of Cincinnati to attain full state status also generated conflict among the policy actors. In an effort to generate public support for its special subsidy, University of Cincinnati officials issued a public brochure which alleged that per student funding at Cincinnati was below that at Ohio State. Officials at Ohio State, challenging this statement because it failed to explain that per student funding within comparable academic programs was identical at the two universities, quietly demanded that the brochure be retracted. University of Cincinnati officials agreed to do so, but only after 50,000 brochures had already been distributed. Legislators were besieged with letters generated by a letter writing campaign organized by University of Cincinnati officials, each letter demanding "full funding for the University of Cincinnati." Because of the commitment to the House leadership to this special subsidy, officials of the other universities again decided to work in the Senate to have it deleted or substantially reduced. Again, the special subsidy was perceived by officials of the other universities as taking money away from their instructional subsidy appropriation.
The Senate leadership was receptive to the efforts of Board of Regents staff and university officials to reduce the University of Cincinnati special subsidy for four reasons. First, no member of the Senate Democrat leadership was from the Cincinnati area. The Senate leadership was more attuned to the needs of northeastern Ohio. Second, some state agencies whose appropriation requests did not fare well in the House had intensified their lobbying with the Senate leadership for greater funding. Cutting the University of Cincinnati subsidy would provide funds to divert to these state agencies. Third, there was concern among the Senate leadership that the House passed budget was based on overly optimistic revenue projections. Any reduction of the budget would lessen the likelihood of the state being unable to fund its authorized expenditures. Fourth, unlike Ohio University, the University of Cincinnati was not located in the region of the state which the House leadership represented. The House leadership did not oppose efforts to reduce the University of Cincinnati special subsidy in the Senate. Interviews with the Senate leadership revealed that all of these factors contributed to the Senate's action to eliminate the University of Cincinnati's special subsidy and postpone its assuming full status as a state-assisted university.

A mechanism frequently employed to resolve conflicts between House and Senate action on bills is the conference committee, a committee of several members from each legislative house which attempts to compromise differences between the houses on legislation. Conference committees are most frequently necessary when the House and Senate are controlled by different parties, although on major legislation
differences frequently exist between the houses even when they are controlled by the same party. Because of the intense coalition between the House and Senate leadership which held together throughout the appropriations process, probable conflict at this decision point was avoided by the House concurring in all the Senate amendments.

The Governor's possession of a line-item veto of appropriations legislation in Ohio establishes another decision point in the appropriations process likely to generate conflict. Governor Rhodes utilized his veto authority in an attempt to prevail over the legislature on several policy issues related to the higher education appropriation. By vetoing the legislative intent language in the bill, Governor Rhodes sought to weaken the authority granted to the Board of Regents by the legislature to exercise greater control over the higher education system, and further his own intent to deemphasize the Regents. The Governor's veto of the freeze on university fees, an action sought by university officials, provided the universities with an option to make up revenue lost in the two percent expenditure reduction. Because only one vote more than the Democrat majority in the House was needed to override the Governor's veto, Democratic leaders were hopeful they could prevail. Just as the House Democratic leadership had maintained party solidarity in the face of the Republican attempts to amend the original appropriations bill, however, House Republicans unanimously supported the Governor and his vetoes were sustained by one vote.

Recognizing that conflict between the executive and legislative branches is likely whenever one party controls the executive and
another the legislative branch, university officials and Board of Regents staff may view the governor as their last resort in attempting to influence the appropriations act. Influence at this decision point is limited, however, to efforts to delete items already in the appropriations bill; the governor has no authority to increase appropriations or add additional language. Efforts to increase appropriations must be directed at the legislature. Policy actors seeking to remove restrictive language should direct their efforts at both the legislature and the governor when policy conflicts between the two branches are identified.

One other aspect of the conflict dimension should be noted - conflict between higher education and other state services for public funds. Although the percentage of the state's general revenue fund appropriation allocated to higher education increased slightly for the 1975-77 biennium, higher education has received approximately 15 percent of the general revenue fund appropriation for the past decade. Policy actors were in general agreement that higher education is decreasing in priority as a concern of state government and this places in doubt whether higher education can maintain its share of the state budget as the priorities of other state services increase.

Policy actors viewed higher education as being in competition with K-12 education for state funds. This competition appears likely to increase as localities in Ohio turn to the state to fund a greater portion of K-12 education costs. While open conflict between the two levels of education has been avoided in the past, the increasing activity of the Ohio Education Association lobby, as well as growing
awareness among higher education interests of the need for coordinated and public action, raises the probability of conflict between these levels of education in the future.

As the percentage of the higher education appropriation going to special subsidies has increased and the trend toward greater state-level control of the management of higher education has intensified, the potential for conflict between actors in the higher education appropriations process has grown. University officials and Board of Regents staff, seeking to maximize the amount of higher education appropriation, encounter conflict with the executive and legislative branches which must allocate the state's scarce resources between a host of competing claims. Although in agreement in seeking higher funding, conflict develops between and among the universities and Board of Regents staff over how the funds should be distributed. The legislature's recent attempts to reassert its control over state finance has intensified conflict with the executive branch over the conditions and distribution of appropriations. Policy actors in the higher education appropriations process face a future where the ability to exercise influence in a highly competitive environment charged with conflict will be necessary if desired funding levels are to be obtained from the political system.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS

Summary

This study sought to assess the exercise of influence by the primary actors in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio. The identification of the primary actors, the authority possessed by each set of actors, the political constituency of each set of actors, and the expertise possessed by each set of actors were examined as determinants of influence. Additionally, the development of coalition and conflict between and within sets of policy actors was probed to determine strategies employed in the exercise of influence.

A review of research methods suggested that the most appropriate research strategy to follow in this study was that of the case study. The process through which the 1975-77 biennial appropriation act was developed and enacted was selected as the vehicle for analyzing the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio today. The development of higher education/state government relations with regard to appropriations was researched to provide an historical perspective to present trends and events. Data were drawn from a number of sources, including written documents, interviews with key policy actors, a questionnaire, and on-site observation of the appropriations process.
Prior to interviewing policy actors and administering the higher education policymaker inventory, research questions relating to specific determinants of the exercise of influence were formulated to guide the study. From the literature of higher education/state government relations, research propositions thought to describe specific determinants of the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process were developed. Policy actors' perceptions of the validity of these propositions as descriptors of the exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio were gathered through their completion of the higher education policymaker inventory. Data gained from interviews, written documents, on-site observation, and the perceptions of key policy actors were then used to posit answers to the research questions.

The four primary sets of actors in the higher education appropriations process in Ohio were found to be university officials, Board of Regents staff, and the legislative and executive branches of state government. Unlike the trend in K-12 education where faculty unions are emerging as influential actors in the appropriations process, university faculty in Ohio exercise little influence in the higher education appropriations process and no movement toward their entry as an actor in the appropriations process was found.

University officials, who in some states appear to be losing their position as primary actors in the higher education appropriations process in the face of greater centralization of authority in the state coordinating agency, continue to be primary actors in Ohio. The presence in the Statehouse of a lobbyist representing each state
university provides continuous dialogue between the universities and state government. University presidents, preferring to work behind the scenes, assume a lower profile, appearing in the Statehouse only for occasional testimony and consultations with the legislative and executive leadership.

Professional interest groups such as medical, business, labor, and agricultural lobbies were not found to be active in behalf of the higher education appropriation. In most cases, these groups were found to lend their influence only in behalf of special subsidies and capital outlay appropriations of direct interest to their membership.

The challenge of the governor to the continued role of the Ohio Board of Regents in the appropriations process, an event which received national publicity as the first known attempt of a state chief executive to reverse the trend toward greater state level control over higher education, was only partially successful. The Regents' budget received only an 11.6 percent increase for the next biennium and the rapid growth of the Regents staff (from 32 to 52 in the last biennium alone) was halted. Support for the role of the Regents in compiling and analyzing the higher education budget request was voiced by the legislative leadership and some university officials. The most significant result of the governor's challenge was to halt the trend of an expanded role for the Regents in each biennial budget session of the legislature.

Analysis of the authority possessed by each group of actors in the higher education appropriations process revealed little change in
the authority granted to each policy actor since the establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents in 1963. The manner in which the legislature has elected to exercise its authority, however, is changing as the legislature seeks to exercise greater control over the budgetary process. The creation of a Legislative Budget Office, the assignment of legislative aides to members of the House and Senate, and the decision to consider and act upon a legislative, rather than executive, budget proposal are all manifestations of the legislature's inclination to exercise greater authority in the appropriations process.

The primary constituents of the universities - students, faculty, and alumni - were found to be of little assistance to the universities in their efforts to exercise influence in the higher education appropriations process. These groups are not organized for political action and seldom communicate with policy actors regarding the higher education appropriation. Prominent alumni, political, and professional leaders were found to be of assistance in the exercise of influence in behalf of special subsidies and capital outlays, particularly when one or more of these individuals was willing to collect a political debt in behalf of a university owed by the legislative leadership or governor. The special subsidies to Ohio University in the 1975-77 appropriations act provide an excellent study in how these political constituencies can be of assistance in the exercise of influence.

Expertise on matters relating to the higher education appropriation was found to have grown rapidly among the policy actors during the past ten years. Elaborate data and cost analysis systems have been
implemented by the Board of Regents staff. Information gathered through these systems is now disseminated to a growing number of fiscal analysts in the Office of Budget and Management and Legislative Budget Office, as well as to a growing legislative staff. University officials now face much closer scrutiny of their budget requests by the executive and legislative branches than was the case ten years ago, when there was little expertise at the state level to challenge budget requests or spending patterns. This increase in expertise at the state level is coincident with the attempt by the legislative branch to assert its position as the preeminent branch of state government with respect to fiscal policy.

While the volume of data describing the higher education enterprise to policymakers has multiplied, little evidence was found of legislators utilizing this data in making policy decisions. During the legislative session, legislators receive volumes of fiscal data from the Board of Regents, Legislative Budget Office, and Office of Budget and Management. Interviews with policy actors revealed that little of this data is employed in the decision-making process. Data which are utilized frequently offers little assistance in making policy decisions because of the near impossibility of undertaking cost/benefit analyses of social services.

Few coalitions among policy actors in the higher education appropriations process were identified from this study. University officials and Board of Regents staff formed a coalition in behalf of their mutual goal of higher appropriations but this coalition became tenuous because of conflict within and between these groups over how
the appropriation should be spent. This coalition was further weakened by the governor's attack on the Board of Regents which made it politically inadvisable for university officials to work with the Regents staff in efforts to influence the executive branch.

University officials were found to form a coalition in behalf of maximizing the appropriation for higher education and in opposing language in the appropriations bills to restrict university autonomy. The adoption of formula based appropriations by the Board of Regents was found to have facilitated the forming of coalitions among university officials, since the greater share of each university's instructional appropriation is now predetermined by its enrollment and mix of academic programs. The strength of the coalition of university officials appears dependent on an awareness among all university presidents and lobbyists that any university reserves the right of independent action on matters relating directly to its own appropriation.

Conflict between policy actors in the higher education appropriation process was found to occur primarily during the setting of instructional subsidy levels and enrollment projections by the Board of Regents and during legislative consideration of special subsidies to particular universities. The inability of the universities to agree on what constituted an equitable division of the higher education appropriation contributed directly to the establishment of the Ohio Board of Regents in 1963. While this conflict still exists, the Board of Regents has largely removed the arbitration of this conflict from the legislature by establishing formula-based appropriations.
Conflict over instructional subsidy formula levels and enrollment projections now occurs prior to the legislative session and university officials have been unwilling to attempt to alter these formulas once the Board of Regents presents them to the executive and legislative branches in its budget recommendations. Conflict over special subsidies among universities and between universities and the Board of Regents still is arbitrated by the legislature and a trend toward a larger percentage of the higher education appropriation going to special subsidies in each biennial appropriation was found.

**Conclusions**

A reason frequently advanced for the interposition of coordinating agencies between state universities and state government is that such a body will substantially remove the allocation of state resources to higher education from the realm of politics. This study of the higher education appropriations process in Ohio suggests that quite the opposite is true. As the Board of Regents has received greater authority to coordinate and oversee the system of higher education, political action on the part of the other policy actors has intensified. University officials have been successful in increasing the percentage of the higher education appropriation going to the universities through special subsidies; the executive branch has sought to lessen the Regents' authority and transfer it to executive agencies, primarily the Office of Budget and Management; and the legislative branch, seeking to reassert its role in the appropriations process, has created its own budget staff which in part duplicates the appropriations function of the Board of Regents and Office of Budget and Management.
This proliferation of actors attempting to exercise influence in the appropriations process increases the potential for conflict and coalition among the host of competing actors. University officials now must attempt to maintain influential relationships with each of these components of the political system. Although a particular component may dominate a particular appropriations session, as the legislative leadership did the 1975 session, the relative influence of each actor may change as personalities and party alignments in the executive and legislative branches change. University officials now are faced with the need to develop and exercise influence with additional groups within state government on a continuing basis and they must be cognizant of political considerations in dealing with each group.

The exercise of influence in the higher education appropriations process was found to be highly dependent on personal relationships. Legislators in key leadership positions are usually longtime members of that body. The events of one appropriations session - the political "deals," the reordering of priorities for funding - become inputs into the policy system during the next appropriations session. Universities and the Board of Regents were found to attempt to maintain continuity in the person representing them before state government. Over the years, these individuals develop an identity with their institution which transcends changes in internal administrative leadership. Similarly, prominent alumni and professional leaders, willing to work in behalf of their alma mater, were found to be a vital link between the universities and the state's political system.
The dependence of the exercise of influence by university officials on personal relationships - the utilization of individuals in what has traditionally been the professional, social, and political "elite" of the state and the courting of members of the executive and legislative branch through extending personal favors and recognition - is characteristic of what has been described as the 'old politics.' As interest group activity intensifies at the state level and legislators' sensitivity to new constituencies grows, the continued success of this style of influence is in question.

The increasing competition for the state's fiscal resources will likely require some reordering of priorities by policymakers. It appears unlikely that higher education can develop a constituency as active and influential as those possessed by some other groups competing for state funds, such as K-12 education and welfare. If policymakers reorder priorities on the basis of interest group activity and input from their constituency, higher education may find it difficult to maintain its present share of the state budget. The difficulty of higher education developing an organized and politically active constituency is seen when contrasted with K-12 education. K-12 education has a physical presence in each community in the state, higher education does not; K-12 education is represented by a number of influential organizations at the state level, higher education is not; faculty members in K-12 education are organized for political action, those in higher education are not. Additionally, the level of state support to K-12 education impacts directly on local property
taxes and citizens generally have expressed an unwillingness to approve increases in local tax levies, looking instead to the state treasury for greater support.

As this study reveals, higher education in Ohio today is by no means lacking in ways to exercise influence in the appropriations process. Looking to the future, however, the ability of higher education to continue to command its present share of state resources is in question. New groups with organized constituencies (racial minorities, senior citizens, welfare rights groups) are becoming more active in the appropriations process. Recognizing that, unlike higher education, these groups represent constituencies which become active in the electoral process, higher education may find itself less able to gain state resources through strategies for exercising influence which have served well in the past.

The continuing increase in the percentage of the higher education appropriation going to special subsidies forecasts greater conflict and less objectivity in the higher education appropriations process in the future. The increase in special subsidies can partially be attributed to leveling or declining enrollments at some universities. Present instructional subsidy appropriations, based on enrollment driven formulas, are largely insensitive to problems of staffing and operation resulting from atable or declining enrollments. The present practice of responding to these problems through special subsidies - determined largely by a university's political clout rather than need - threatens to destroy the principle of equity in funding among the state
universities and places in question the ability of the Board of Regents to oversee and guide the orderly development of the state's system of higher education.

Although the literature on higher education/state government relations reveals that during the past ten years university officials have become less influential and active in the appropriations process in a number of states, university officials continue to be primary actors in the appropriations process in Ohio. This may be attributed in large part to the preservation of a board of trustees at each university following the creation of the Board of Regents in 1963. In states where individual university boards of trustees were abolished in favor of a single state level "super board," the identification of each university as a distinct entity was lost and officials of the single state-level board assumed responsibility for higher education/state government relations. Lacking their own boards of trustees, the chief executive officers of each university become little more than lieutenants of the state level Chancellor and his staff and lose their authority for individual action in behalf of state support for the universities. Recognizing that the influence higher education exercises in the appropriations process is highly dependent on the ability of individual universities to mobilize politically influential

119Epstein, Governing the University.
individuals in their behalf, the decision in Ohio to maintain individual boards of trustees has enhanced the ability of higher education to compete for resources at the state level.

**Implications**

**Implications for Research**

1. This study suggests the need for research on the development of budget formulas sensitive to problems now facing many universities resulting from steady and declining enrollments. Existing budgeting practices were developed during a time of unparalleled growth for higher education. The development of formulas with such sensitivity would minimize the need for special subsidies, thereby contributing to more rational public policy development.

2. Studies similar to this study should be conducted in states with varying levels of authority given to the state level coordinating agency. Such studies would allow an assessment of the impact of various kinds of coordinating agencies on the exercise of influence by policy actors in the higher education appropriations process.

3. Studies should be undertaken to determine if the use of formula based appropriations is having a leveling effect on universities within state systems of higher education where formula-based appropriations are utilized. While formula budgeting has been characterized as ensuring equity in funding among institutions,
concerns exist that such equity is arrived at by lowering the quality of universities of recognized distinction.

4. The apparent difficulties of employing cost/benefit analysis in higher education should be studied and assessed. If cost/benefit analysis in higher education is found feasible, a recognized national organization (such as the Education Commission of the States) should establish a task force to develop agreed upon accounting and reporting procedures for adoption across states and within all agencies of state governments. Such standardized procedures would significantly increase the utility of fiscal data and curtail the duplication of effort which now exists among state agencies with regard to data collection.

5. The degree to which the recent proliferation of legislative and executive branch staffs and agencies has resulted in duplication and removed decision making from elected representatives of the people should be assessed, along with an analysis of accompanying beneficial and harmful consequences on public policy development.

Implications for Practice

1. Higher education officials must be actors in the political system if higher education is to gain a substantial share of the state's resources. Nurturing of relations with state government should receive high priority by university officials. Education cannot be apart from politics and continue to receive substantial public fiscal support.
2. Policy actors should be aware that patterns of influence within the political system remain in a state of flux. Strategies to develop and exercise political influence must relate to all components of the political system, not only those which possess substantial influence at a particular moment. Policy actors should keep one eye focused on the future, anticipating alterations in existing patterns of influence.

3. The exercise of influence must be a continuous process if desired policy outputs are to be obtained. Because the parameters of the appropriations act may be set prior to the convening of the legislative appropriations session, lobbying with key policy actors while the legislature is not in session is as important, if not more so, as lobbying during the legislative session. Lobbying in the form of periodic displays of public sentiment is unlikely to impact significantly on policy system output.

4. Policy actors need to shift their attention from incremental budgeting techniques to a fuller evaluation of total social programs and services. The continuance of incremental budgeting eliminates periodic review of the majority of public expenditures and increases the difficulty of identifying priorities for public support.

5. University officials should be cognizant of their lack of active and influential interest groups to assist in the exercise of influence in the appropriations process. Attention should be
directed to developing new constituencies and organizing more effectively for political action.

6. University officials, as well as others concerned with the ability of higher education to command state resources, should oppose attempts to replace institutional boards of trustees with a single, state-level superboard. Such state-level centralization is likely to reduce the ability of higher education to maintain relations with and mobilize institutional constituencies, and is likely to undermine the influence and legitimacy of university officials as actors in the appropriations process.
HIGHER EDUCATION POLICYMAKER INVENTORY

1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Your current position in state government or higher education:
   ___ Executive branch
   ___ Legislative branch
   ___ Board of Regents staff
   ___ University official

QUESTIONS 2, 3, and 4 FOR LEGISLATORS ONLY; OTHERS GO TO QUESTION 5

2. Political party affiliation:
   ___ Democrat
   ___ Republican
   ___ Independent

3. Please indicate if you hold either of the following positions:
   ___ Committee Chairperson
   ___ Partisan leadership position

4. Do MOST people in your district live in a
   ___ Rural town, village, or farm
   ___ Small city outside the metropolitan areas
   ___ Suburb in a metropolitan area
   ___ Large city in a metropolitan area
II. VIEWPOINTS ON THE HIGHER EDUCATION APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS

Following you will find statements dealing with the higher education appropriations process in Ohio. To indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each statement, please circle ONE of the numbers to the left of each statement as follows:

Circle the "1" if you AGREE with the statement.
Circle the "2" if you TEND TO AGREE with the statement.
Circle the "3" if you TEND TO DISAGREE with the statement.
Circle the "4" if you DISAGREE with the statement.

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5. The Board of Regents should continue to review university budget requests and present a unified budget request for higher education.

6. University faculty, viewed as an interest group, exert little or no influence in the higher education appropriations process.

7. The authority of the Governor to exercise a line-item veto over higher education appropriations influences legislators to go along with executive policy on the higher education appropriation.

8. The authority of the Board of Regents to establish formula based appropriations has lessened the ability of university officials to influence the appropriation for their university.

9. Higher education does not possess an active and substantial constituency which exercises influence in the higher education appropriations process.

10. Higher education has declined as a priority interest of policymakers in Ohio during the past five years.

11. K-12 education possesses a more active and influential constituency than does higher education.
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University officials work through other interest groups (agricultural, medical, business, and labor lobbies) to influence the higher education appropriation.

The Board of Regents is a more reliable source of information than university officials on matters relating to the higher education appropriation.

Cost analysis data supplied by the Board of Regents staff to the executive and legislative branches of state government has led to more knowledgeable decision making with regard to the higher education appropriation.

Informal agreements on feasible appropriation levels are reached between university officials, Board of Regents staff, and key members of the executive and legislative branches of state government prior to the formulation of the higher education appropriation request.

During the appropriations process, university officials and Board of Regents staff work together closely in support of the higher education appropriation.

Formula based appropriations have facilitated university officials working together in support of the entire higher education appropriation.

Efforts by individual universities to increase their funding through special subsidies result in conflict with Board of Regents staff and officials of other universities.

The amount of the higher education appropriation is not viewed as a partisan issue.

Higher education is in competition with K-12 education for state appropriations.

The Board of Regents has failed to hold higher education appropriation requests down to a reasonable level.
22. Which of the following do you regard as the MOST influential spokesmen for higher education before state government:

_____ University officials
_____ Board of Regents staff

QUESTIONS 23, 24, and 25 FOR LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH RESPONDENTS ONLY.

23. Please indicate the number of times the following groups have contacted you regarding the higher education appropriation during this session of the legislature:

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>University faculty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constituents in district</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (SPECIFY)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. Which one of the above groups do you regard as most influential in the higher education appropriations process?
25. Your vote on the higher education appropriation is influenced most by: (check only one)

_____ Your party leadership
_____ Your constituency
_____ University officials
_____ Board of Regents staff
_____ Other (SPECIFY)

QUESTION 23 FOR UNIVERSITY OFFICIALS AND BOARD OF REGENTS STAFF ONLY.

23. Please indicate the number of times you have contacted the following groups regarding the higher education appropriation during this session of the legislature:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-7</th>
<th>8-15</th>
<th>Over 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governor or staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative leadership</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of Appropriations/Finance Committees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislators from your district</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural lobbies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical lobbies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business lobbies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor lobbies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RESPONDENTS TO HIGHER EDUCATION POLICYMAKER

INVENTORY

University Officials
Marion C. Anderson; President, Medical College of Ohio
Warren G. Bennis; President, University of Cincinnati
John J. Coffelt; President, Youngstown State University
Harry B. Crewson; Acting President, Ohio University
Glen R. Driscoll; President, University of Toledo
Harold L. Enarson; President, The Ohio State University
Robert J. Kegerreis; President, Wright State University
Hollis A. Moore; President, Bowling Green State University
Lionel H. Newsome; President, Central State University
Glenn A. Olds; President, Kent State University
Phillip R. Shriver; President, Miami University
Walter B. Waetjen; President, Cleveland State University

Board of Regents Staff
William B. Coulter; Vice Chancellor for Administration
James A. Norton; Chancellor
Larry J. O'Brien; Budget Analyst
Harold Oyster; Vice Chancellor for Public Relations
Richard Rupert; Vice Chancellor for Medical Affairs
Gerald L. Shawhan; Budget Analyst
Legislative Branch

Ohio Senate

Douglas Applegate; Member, Finance Committee
Stanley J. Aronoff; Member, Finance Committee
William F. Bowen; Member, Finance Committee
Paul E. Gillmor; Member, Finance Committee
Harry Heshel; Chairman, Finance Committee
Oliver R. Ocasek; Majority Leader
Donald J. Pease; Vice Chairman, Education and Health Committee

Ohio House of Representatives

Larry H. Christman; Member, Education Section, House Appropriations Committee
Robert J. Jaskulski; Chairman, Education Section, House Appropriations Committee
Charles F. Kurfess; Minority Leader
Allan E. Norris; Minority Whip
Vernal G. Riffe; Speaker of the House
W. Bennett Rose; Member, Education Section, House Appropriations Committee
Myrl H. Shoemaker; Chairman, House Appropriations Committee
Frederick N. Young; Member, House Appropriations Committee
Executive Branch

Howard Collier; Director of Finance

Dwayne Keeran; Higher Education Examiner, Office of Management and Budget

Thomas Moyer; Chief of Staff, Office of the Governor

James A. Rhodes; Governor of Ohio

William Wilkins; Assistant Director of Finance, Office of Management and Budget
APPENDIX C
INTERVIEWEES

University Officials

Richard A. Edwards; Executive Assistant to the President, Bowling Green State University. Formerly, Director, Citizens' Task Force on Higher Education

Harold L. Enarson; President, The Ohio State University; Member, Inter-University Council. Formerly, President, Cleveland State University

Novice G. Fawcett; President Emeritus, The Ohio State University. Formerly, Chairman, Inter-University Council; Superintendent, Bexley City Schools

Martin Hecht; Vice President for Development, Ohio University

Donald J. Roberts; Assistant to the Vice President for Legislative Relations, The Ohio State University

Allison Taft; Assistant to the President for Legislative Relations, The University of Cincinnati

Board of Regents Staff

William B. Coulter; Vice Chancellor for Administration. Formerly, Executive Secretary, Inter-University Council; Acting Chancellor, Ohio Board of Regents

James A. Norton; Chancellor

Harold Oyster; Vice Chancellor for Public Relations. Formerly, Chairman, Education Committee, Ohio House of Representatives; Chairman, Ohio Board of Regents
Legislative Branch

Sharon Brown; Higher Education Budget Analyst, Legislative Budget Office

Carol Drewes; Staff Member, Legislative Service Commission

Paul E. Gillmor; Member, Finance Committee, Ohio Senate

M. Morris Jackson; Chairman, Senate Education and Health Committee. Formerly, Member, Citizens' Task Force on Higher Education

Robert W. Jaskulski; Chairman, Education Section, House Appropriations Committee

Charles F. Kurfess; Minority Leader, Ohio House of Representatives. Formerly, Speaker of the House

Joseph Marshall; Staff Assistant to Education Section, House Appropriations Committee, Legislative Budget Office. Formerly, Staff Member, Legislative Service Commission

Harry Meshel; Chairman, Senate Finance Committee

Oliver R. Ocasek; Majority Leader, Ohio Senate; Associate Professor, University of Akron. Formerly, Member, Ohio Education Association Board of Directors; Member, Citizens' Task Force on Higher Education

Donald J. Pease; Vice Chairman, Senate Education and Health Committee; Chairman, Education Review Committee. Formerly, Chairman, House Education Committee; Member, Ohio Board of Regents; Member, Citizens' Task Force on Higher Education

Rick Pfeiffer; Legislative Assistant and Counsel to the Speaker of the House
W. Bennett Rose; Member, Education Section, House Appropriations Committee

Richard G. Sheridan; Director, Legislative Budget Office

Peggy Siegel; Legislative Assistant to the Senate Majority Leader

Frederick N. Young; Member, House Appropriations Committee

W. Craig Zimpher; Legislative Assistant to House Minority Leader.

Formerly, Staff Member, Legislative Service Commission

Executive Branch

Howard Collier; Director of Finance; Vice President (on leave), Medical College of Ohio. Formerly, Director of Finance

Dwayne Keeran; Higher Education Budget Examiner, Office of Budget and Management

Thomas Moyer; Chief of Staff, Office of the Governor

William Wilkins; Assistant Director of Finance, Office of Budget and Management

Knowledgeable Observers

Renee Petersen; Executive Director, Inter-University Council.

Formerly, Higher Education Examiner, Office of Budget and Management

Joseph B. Tucker; Chairman, Department of Government, Ohio University.

Formerly, Consultant, Ohio Board of Regents; Member, Citizens' Task Force on Higher Education
### POLICY ACTORS' RESPONSES TO STATEMENTS ON THE HIGHER EDUCATION POLICYMAKER INVENTORY

**Item 5:** The Board of Regents should continue to review university budget requests and present a unified budget request for higher education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>(\frac{8}{23})</td>
<td>(\frac{4}{11})</td>
<td>(\frac{3}{16})</td>
<td>(\frac{1}{16})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(89%) (11%) (14%)

**Item 6:** University faculty, viewed as an interest group, exert little or no influence in the higher education appropriations process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>(\frac{5}{16})</td>
<td>(\frac{5}{16})</td>
<td>(\frac{5}{16})</td>
<td>(\frac{1}{16})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(86%) (14%)
Item 7: The authority of the Governor to exercise a line-item veto over the higher education appropriation influences legislators to go along with executive policy on the higher education appropriation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>(\frac{2}{3})</td>
<td>(\frac{6}{12})</td>
<td>(\frac{3}{10})</td>
<td>(\frac{1}{13})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(39%)</td>
<td>(100%)</td>
<td>(61%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Item 8: The authority of the Board of Regents to establish formula based appropriations has lessened the ability of university officials to influence the appropriation for their university.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>(\frac{8}{15})</td>
<td>(\frac{2}{14})</td>
<td>(\frac{2}{5})</td>
<td>(\frac{2}{3})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(78%)</td>
<td>(22%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Item 9: Higher education does not possess an active and substantial constituency which exercises influence in the higher education appropriations process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>$\frac{7}{13}$</td>
<td>$\frac{3}{14}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{6}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{5}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Item 10: Higher education has declined as a priority interest of policymakers in Ohio during the past five years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>$\frac{9}{12}$</td>
<td>$\frac{3}{15}$</td>
<td>$\frac{6}{6}$</td>
<td>$\frac{5}{5}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Item 11: K-2 education possesses a more active and influential constituency than does higher education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>$\frac{9}{33}$</td>
<td>$\frac{3}{4}$</td>
<td>$\frac{0}{24}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{2}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(97%) (3%)

Item 12: University officials work through other interest groups (agricultural, medical, business, and labor lobbies) to influence the higher education appropriation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constituency</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{9}$</td>
<td>$\frac{9}{24}$</td>
<td>$\frac{2}{2}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(30%) (70%)
Item 13: The Board of Regents is a more reliable source of information than university officials on matters relating to the higher education appropriation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>6 (8)</td>
<td>1 (8)</td>
<td>5 (10)</td>
<td>5 (11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(40%) (60%)

Item 14: Cost analysis data supplied by the Board of Regents Staff to the executive and legislative branches of state government has led to more knowledgeable decision making with regard to the higher education appropriation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>2/7 (29%)</td>
<td>8/23 (100%)</td>
<td>2/7 (100%)</td>
<td>1 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(79%) (21%)
Item 15: Informal agreements on feasible appropriation levels are reached between university officials, Board of Regents Staff, and key members of state government prior to the formulation of the higher education appropriation request.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>$\frac{6}{18}$</td>
<td>$\frac{4}{11}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{6}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(54%) (46%)

Item 16: During the appropriations process, university officials and Board of Regents staff work together closely in support of the higher education appropriation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>$\frac{4}{19}$</td>
<td>$\frac{5}{11}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{2}$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(64%) (36%)
Item 17: Formula based appropriations have facilitated university officials working together in support of the entire higher education appropriation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>6/12</td>
<td>6/24</td>
<td>2/12</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(95%)</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Item 18: Efforts by individual universities to increase their funding through special subsidies result in conflict with Board of Regents staff and officials of other universities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>8/24</td>
<td>3/12</td>
<td>1/12</td>
<td>0/0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(95%)</td>
<td>(5%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Item 19: The amount of the higher education appropriation is not viewed as a partisan issue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>$\frac{3}{8}$</td>
<td>$\frac{4}{20}$</td>
<td>$\frac{2}{2}$</td>
<td>$\frac{5}{8}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(74%) (26%)

Item 20: Higher education is in competition with K-12 education for state appropriations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>$\frac{8}{25}$</td>
<td>$\frac{3}{10}$</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{1}$</td>
<td>$\frac{2}{2}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(92%) (8%)
Item 21: The Board of Regents has failed to hold higher education appropriation requests down to a reasonable level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Agree</th>
<th>Tend to Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(24%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(76%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Item 22: Which of the following do you regard as the MOST influential spokesman for higher education before state government:

University Officials

Board of Regents Staff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>University Officials</th>
<th>Board of Regents Staff</th>
<th>Equal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Branch</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Branch</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board of Regents Staff</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University Officials</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25 (68%)</td>
<td>10 (27%)</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Citizen-Journal*. Columbus, Ohio.


Meshel, Harry (Ohio State Senator) and Representative Myrl Shoemaker. Memo to state agency heads. February 5, 1975.


Ohio. General Code. Section 7923.

Ohio. Legislative Budget Office. Expenditure Analysis No. 3.

Ohio. Revised Code. Section 333.04 J.


